Update for 76880HEADmain

1 files changed, 30345 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/76880-0.txt b/76880-0.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aded7f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/76880-0.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,30345 @@
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76880 ***
+
+
+
+
+
+                                THE MONIST
+
+                                     A
+                            QUARTERLY MAGAZINE
+
+                                  VOL. II
+
+                                 CHICAGO:
+                       THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
+                                 1891-1892
+
+                               COPYRIGHT BY
+                       THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.
+                                1891-1892.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.
+
+
+                                                                     PAGE.
+
+                                ARTICLES.
+
+  American Politics. By Thomas B. Preston                               41
+
+  Anschauung, What Does —— Mean? Editor                                527
+
+  Artificial Selection and the Marriage Problem. By Hiram M. Stanley    51
+
+  Clifford on the Soul in Nature, Professor. By F. C. Conybeare        209
+
+  Conservation of Spirit and the Origin of Consciousness, The. By
+    Francis C. Russell                                                 357
+
+  Criminal Suggestion, On. By J. Delbœuf                               363
+
+  Ethnological Jurisprudence. By Albert H. Post                         31
+
+  Evolution, The Continuity of. The Science of Language versus The
+    Science of Life, as represented by Prof. F. Max Müller and Prof.
+    G. J. Romanes. Editor                                               70
+
+  Facts and Mental Symbols. By Ernst Mach                              198
+
+  Littré, Émile. A Sonnet. By Louis Belrose Jr.                        110
+
+  Logical Theory, The Present Position of. By John Dewey                 1
+
+  Magic Square, The. By Hermann Schubert                               487
+
+  Mechanical Invention, The New Civilisation Depends on. By W. T.
+    Harris                                                             178
+
+  Mental Evolution. An Old Speculation in a New Light. By C. Lloyd
+    Morgan                                                             161
+
+  Mind, The Law of. By Charles S. Peirce                               533
+
+  Monism, Our. The Principles of a Consistent, Unitary World-View.
+    By Ernst Haeckel                                                   481
+
+  Necessity, Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s Onslaught on the Doctrine of.
+    Editor                                                             560
+
+  Necessity, The Doctrine of —— Examined. By Charles S. Peirce         321
+
+  Psychical Monism. By Edmund Montgomery                               338
+
+  Religion and Progress. Interpreted by the Life and Last work of
+    Wathen Mark Wilks Call. By Moncure D. Conway                       183
+
+  Spencer, Mr., on the Ethics of Kant. Editor                          512
+
+  Things in themselves, Are There ——? Editor                           225
+
+  Thought and Language. By George John Romanes                          56
+
+  Will and Reason. By B. Bosanquet                                      18
+
+                         LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.
+
+  France. By Lucien Arréat                                   266, 386, 583
+
+  France. The Intellectual Awakening of the Langue D’Oc.
+    By Theodore Stanton                                                 95
+
+  Germany. Christian Ufer                               103, 272, 396, 593
+
+               DIVERSE TOPICS. CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.
+
+  Clergy’s Duty of Allegiance to Dogma and the Struggle between
+    World-Conceptions. Editor                                          278
+
+  Comte and Turgot. Prof. Schaarschmidt                                611
+
+  Evolution and Language, Comment on the Discussion on. By F.
+    Max Müller                                                         286
+
+  Haeckel’s Monism, Professor. Editor                                  598
+
+  James’s Psychology, Observations on Some Points in. By W. L.
+    Worcester                                                          417
+
+  Littré, A Defense of. By Louis Belrose Jr.                           403
+
+  Littré’s, Émile, Positivism. A Reply. Editor                         410
+
+  Logical Theory, The Future Position of. Edward T. Dixon              606
+
+  Mind, The Nature of —— and the Meaning of Reality. Editor            434
+
+  Monism and Mechanicalism: Comments upon Prof. Ernst Haeckel’s
+    Position. Editor                                                   438
+
+  Peirce, Mr. Charles S., on Necessity. Editor                         442
+
+  Religion of Science, The. Editor                                     600
+
+  Thought and Language. A letter by G. J. Romanes                      402
+
+  Thought-forms, The Origin of. Editor                                 111
+
+                              BOOK REVIEWS.
+
+  Avenarius, Richard. _Der menschliche Weltbegriff_                    451
+
+  Baldwin, James Mark. _Handbook of Psychology_                        467
+
+  Bernheim. _Hypnotisme, Suggestion, Psychotherapie_                   465
+
+  Cornill, C. H. _Einleitung in das alte Testament_                    443
+
+  Curtis, Mattoon Monroe. _An Outline of Locke’s Ethical Philosophy_   300
+
+  Delabarre, Edmund Burke. _Ueber Bewegungsempfindungen_               297
+
+  Delbœuf, J. _Les Fêtes de Montpellier_                               131
+
+  Dillmann, Edmund. _Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen
+    Monadenlehre auf Grund der Quellen_                                460
+
+  Dixon, Edward T. _The Foundations of Geometry_                       126
+
+  Erhardt, Franz. _Der Satz vom Grunde als Prinzip des Schliessens_    631
+
+  Gruber, Hermann. _Der Positivismus vom Tode August Comte’s bis
+    auf unsere Tage (1857-1891)_                                       133
+
+  Holzmann, H. J. _Synoptiker. Apostelgeschichte_                      287
+
+  Hübbe-Schleiden. _Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe_               468
+
+  Husserl, E. G. _Philosophie der Arithmetik_                          627
+
+  Koenig, Edmund. _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems in der
+    Philosophie seit Kant_                                             457
+
+  Lasswitz, Kurd. _Seifenblasen_                                       471
+
+  Loeb, Jacques. _Untersuchungen zur physiologischen Morphologie
+    der Thiere_                                                        468
+
+  Lombroso, C. L. _Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et
+    D’Anthropologie Criminelle_                                        618
+
+  Lyons, Daniel. _Christianity and Infallibility_                      629
+
+  Mach, E. _Grundriss der Naturlehre für die oberen Classen
+    der Mittelschulen_                                                 617
+
+  Münsterberg, Hugo. _Schriften der Gesellschaft für psychologische
+    Forschung_                                                         289
+
+  Paszkowski, Wilhelm. _Die Bedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen
+    für die Ethik_                                                     453
+
+  Pearson, Karl. _The Grammar of Science_                              623
+
+  Pellegrini, Pietro. _Diritto Sociale Tentativo in Bozza_             298
+
+  Roberty, E. de. _Agnosticisme_                                       631
+
+  Roberty, E. de. _La Philosophie du Siècle_                           293
+
+  Romanes, George John. _Darwin and After Darwin_                      612
+
+  Schmidkunz, Hans. _Psychologie der Suggestion_                       464
+
+  Schröder, Ernst. _Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik_            618
+
+  Schurmann, Jacob Gould. _Belief in God_                              121
+
+  Schwarz, Hermann. _Das Wahrnehmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des
+    Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen_                    455
+
+  Scripture, E. W. _Ueber den associativen Verlauf der Vorstellungen_  137
+
+  Seth, Andrew. _The Present Position of the Philosophical Sciences_   450
+
+  Toy, Crawford Howell. _Judaism and Christianity_                     123
+
+  Van Bemmelen, P. _Le Nihilisme Scientifique_                         298
+
+  Whitney, William Dwight. _Max Müller and the Science of Language_    469
+
+  Wise, Isaac M. _Pronaos to Holy Writ_                                124
+
+  Ziehen, Th. _Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie in 14
+    Vorlesungen_                                                       461
+
+  PERIODICALS                           140-160; 303-320; 472-480; 634-640
+
+                                APPENDIX.
+
+  Kant and Spencer. Reprinted articles relative to Mr. Spencer’s estimate
+    of Kant. (In No. 4 of this volume.)
+
+
+
+
+                 VOL. II.      OCTOBER, 1891.      NO. 1.
+
+                               THE MONIST.
+
+
+
+
+THE PRESENT POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY.
+
+
+The remarkable fact in the intellectual life of to-day is the
+contradiction in which it is entangled. On one hand we have an enormous
+development of science, both in specialisation of method and accumulation
+of material; its extension and thorough-going application to all ranges
+of experience. What we should expect from such a movement, would seem to
+be confidence of intelligence in itself; and a corresponding organisation
+of knowledge, giving some guide and support to life. The strange thing
+is that instead of this we have, probably, the greatest apparent
+disorganisation of authority as to intellectual matters that the world
+has ever seen; while the prevalent attitude and creed of scientific men
+is philosophic agnosticism, or disbelief in their own method when it
+comes to fundamental matters. Such a typical representative of modern
+science as Mr. Huxley virtually laughs to scorn the suggestion of Mr.
+Frederic Harrison that science should or could become so organised as to
+give any support, any authoritative stay, to life.
+
+Now I do not intend to discuss this apparent contradiction. It seems
+to me obvious enough that the contradiction is due to the fact that
+science has got far enough along so that its negative attitude towards
+previous codes of life is evident, while its own positive principle of
+reconstruction is not yet evident. But without urging this view upon the
+reader, I wish to ask how and where in the prevailing confusion logical
+theory, as a synopsis of the methods and typical forms of intelligence,
+stands. Logical theory at once reflects and transforms the existing
+status of matters intellectual at any period. It reflects it, for
+logical theory is only the express, the overt consciousness on the part
+of intelligence of its own attitude, prevailing spirit. It transforms
+it, because this express consciousness makes intelligence know where
+it stands, makes it aware of its strength and of its weakness, and by
+defining it to itself forces it to take up a new and more adequate place.
+
+It is obvious, then, that as the prevailing influence in the intellectual
+world to-day is science, so the prevailing influence in logical theory
+must be the endeavor to account for, to justify, or at least to reckon
+with this scientific spirit. And yet if there is such confusion as we
+have indicated, then there is also manifested some chaos in logical
+theory, as to the true nature and method of science. Were it otherwise,
+were there at present a logical theory adequate to the specific and
+detailed practical results of science, science and scientific men would
+be conscious of themselves, and would be confident in their work and
+attitude.
+
+The especial problem of logic, as the theory of scientific method, is the
+relation of fact and thought to each other, of reality and thought. It
+is, however, differentiated from the metaphysical theory of knowledge.
+Logic does not inquire into the ultimate _meaning_ of fact and thought,
+nor into their _ultimate_ relations to one another. It simply takes
+them from the attitude of science itself, its business being, not the
+justification nor refutation of this attitude, but its development into
+explicit doctrine. Fact means to logic no more, but certainly no less,
+than it means to the special sciences: it is the subject-matter under
+investigation, under consideration; it is that which we are trying to
+make out. Thought too means to logic what it means to science: method.
+It is the attitude and form which intelligence takes in reference to
+fact—to its subject-matter, whether in inquiry, experiment, calculation,
+or statement.
+
+Logic, then, would have for its essential problem the consideration of
+the various typical methods and guiding principles which thought assumes
+in its effort to detect, master, and report fact. It is presupposed here
+that there is some sort of fruitful and intrinsic connection of fact and
+thought; that thinking, in short, is nothing but the fact in its process
+of translation from brute impression to lucent meaning.
+
+But the moment such a presupposition is stated, ninety-nine persons out
+of a hundred think that we have plunged, _ex abrupto_, from the certainty
+of science into the cloudland of metaphysic. And yet just this conception
+of the relation of thought (method) to fact (subject-matter) is taken
+for granted in every scientific investigation and conclusion. Here,
+then, we have in outline the present position of logic. It is that any
+attempt to state, in general, or to work out, in detail, the principle of
+the intrinsic and fruitful relation of fact and thought which science,
+without conscious reflection, constantly employs in practice, seems
+“metaphysical” or even absurd. Why is this? The answer to this question
+will give the filling-up of the outline just presented.
+
+The chief cause is that superstition which still holds enthralled
+so much of modern thought—I mean formal logic. And if this seems
+like applying a hard name to what, at best and at worst, is only an
+intellectual gymnastic, I can only say that formal logic seems to me
+to be, at present, _fons et origo malorum_ in philosophy. It is true
+enough that nobody now takes the technical subject of formal logic very
+seriously—unless here and there some belated “professor.” It is true that
+it is generally relegated to the position of a subject which, for some
+unclear reason, is regarded as “disciplinary” in a young man’s education;
+just as certain other branches are regarded as elegant accomplishments
+in a young woman’s finishing. But while the subject itself as a doctrine
+or science hardly ranks very high, the conception of thought which is at
+the bottom of formal logic still dominates the _Zeitgeist_, and regulates
+the doctrine and the method of all those who draw their inspiration
+from the _Zeitgeist_. Any book of formal logic will tell us what this
+conception of thought is: that thought is a faculty or an entity existing
+in the mind, apart from facts, and that it has its own fixed forms, with
+which facts have nothing to do—except in so far as they pass under the
+yoke. Jevons puts it this way: “Just as we thus familiarly recognise
+the difference of form and substance in common tangible things, so we
+may observe in logic, that the form of an argument is one thing, quite
+distinct from the various subjects or matter which may be treated in that
+form.”[1]
+
+Professor Stock varies the good old tune in this way: “In every act of
+thought we may distinguish two things—(1) the object thought about, (2)
+the way in which the mind thinks of it. The first is called the Matter;
+the second the Form of Thought. Now formal ... logic is concerned only
+with the way in which the mind thinks, and has nothing to do with the
+particular objects thought about.”[2]
+
+It is assumed, in fine, that thought has a nature of its own independent
+of facts or subject-matter; that this thought, _per se_, has certain
+forms, and that these forms are not forms which the facts themselves
+take, varying with the facts, but are rigid frames, into which the facts
+are to be set.
+
+Now all of this conception—the notion that the mind has a faculty of
+thought apart from things, the notion that this faculty is constructed,
+in and of itself, with a fixed framework, the notion that thinking is
+the imposing of this fixed framework on some unyielding matter called
+particular objects, or facts—all of this conception appears to me as
+highly scholastic, as the last struggle of mediævalism to hold thought in
+subjection to authority. Nothing is more surprising than the fact that
+while it is fashionable to reject, with great scorn, all the results
+and special methods of scholasticism, its foundation-stone should still
+be accepted as the corner-stone of the edifice of modern doctrine. It
+is still more surprising when we reflect that the foundation-stone is
+coherent only with the mediæval superstructure. The scholastics when they
+held that the method of thought was a faculty pursuing its own method
+apart from the course of things, were at least consistent. They did not
+conceive that thought was free, that intelligence had rights, nor that
+there was possible science independent of data authoritatively laid down.
+Really believing what they professed,—that thought was something _in
+se_,—they held that it must be supplied with a fixed body of dogmatic
+fact, from tradition, from revelation—from external authority. They
+held that thought in its workings is confined to extracting from this
+dogmatic body of fact what is already contained in it, and to rearranging
+the material and its implications. To examine the _material_, to test
+its truth; to suppose that intelligence could cut loose from this body
+of authority and go straight to nature, to history itself, to find
+the truth; to build up a free and independent science—to this point
+of incoherency mediæval scholasticism never attained. To proclaim the
+freedom of thought, the rejection of all external authority, the right
+and the power of thought to get at truth for itself, and yet continue
+to define thought as a faculty apart from fact, was reserved for modern
+enlightenment! And were it not somewhat out of my present scope, I should
+like to show that modern culture is thus a prepared victim for the
+skilful dialectician of the reactionary army. If the modern _Zeitgeist_
+does not fall a prey to the cohorts of the army of external authority, it
+is not because it has any recognised methods or any recognised criterion
+by which it can justify its raising the “banner of the free spirit.” It
+is simply the obstinate bulwark of outer fact, built up piecemeal by
+science, that protects it.
+
+The two main forces, which have been at work against the formulæ of
+formal logic, are “inductive” or empirical logic on one side, and the
+so-called “transcendental” logic, on the other. Of these two, the
+influence of inductive logic in sapping in practical fashion and popular
+results the authority of syllogistic logic has undoubtedly been much
+the greater. I propose, briefly, to give certain reasons for holding,
+however, that the inductive logic does not furnish us with the needed
+theory of the relation of thought and fact. To show this adequately would
+demand the criticism of inductive logic in the detail of its methods, in
+order to show where it comes short. As this is impossible, I shall now
+confine myself to a couple of general considerations.
+
+To begin with, then, the empirical logic virtually continues the
+conception of thought as in itself empty and formal which characterizes
+scholastic logic. It thus has really no theory which differentiates it,
+as regards the nature of thought itself, from formal logic. I cannot see,
+for example, what quarrel the most stringent upholder of formal logic
+can have with Mill as to the latter’s theory of the syllogism. Mill’s
+theory is virtually simply a theory regarding the formation of the major
+premiss—regarding the process by which we formulate the statement that
+All _S_ is _P_. Now, if we once accept the syllogistic position, this
+process lies outside the scope and problem of formal logic. It is not an
+affair of what Jevons calls the form of argument at all, but simply of
+the matter, the particular facts which make the filling of the argument.
+I do not see that it is any part of the business of formal logic to tell
+where the major premiss comes from, nor how it is got. And, on the other
+hand, when it comes to the manipulation of the data contained in the
+premiss, Mill must fall back upon the syllogistic logic. Mill’s theory,
+so far as the thought-element is concerned, presupposes the syllogistic
+theory. And if this theory, on its side, does not presuppose something
+like Mill’s inductive theory, it is simply because the logician, as a
+_philosopher_, may prefer “intuitionalism” to “empiricism.” He may hold,
+that is, that the content of some major premisses is given by direct
+“intuition” rather than gathered from experience. But in either case,
+this consideration of the source of the content of the premiss belongs
+not to formal logic, but to metaphysics.
+
+If, then, the theory of the syllogism is incorrect in its assumptions
+as to the relation of fact and thought, the inductive logic must be
+similarly in error. Its great advantage over the old scholastic logic
+lies not in its logic as such, but in something back of the logic—in
+its account of the derivation of the material of judgment. Whatever the
+defects of Locke’s or Mill’s account of experience, any theory which
+somehow presupposes a first-hand contact of mind and fact (though it be
+only in isolated, atomic sensations) is surely preferable to a theory
+which falls back on tradition, or on the delivery of dogma irresponsible
+to any intellectual criticism. But in its account of the derivation
+of the material of judgment, inductive logic is still hampered by the
+scholastic conception of thought. Thought, being confined to the rigid
+framework in which the material is manipulated after being obtained, is
+excluded from all share in the gathering of material. The result is that
+this material, having no intrinsic thought-side, shrinks into a more
+or less accidental association of more or less shifting and transitory
+mental states.
+
+I shall not stop to argue that, on this ground, the “inductive” logic
+deprives science of its most distinctive scientific features—the
+permanence and objectivity of its truths. I think no one can deny that
+there is at least an _apparent_ gap between the actual results of
+concrete science and these results as they stand after the touch of
+the inductive logic—that the necessity and generality of science seem
+rather to have been explained away, than explained. I think most of the
+inductive logicians themselves (while endeavoring to account for this
+apparent necessity as generated through association) would admit that
+something of science _seems_, at least, to have been lost, and that the
+great reason for putting-up with this loss is that the inductive logic
+is the sole alternative to a dogmatic intuitionalism and to arbitrary
+spinning-out of _a priori_ concepts.
+
+Certainly as long as thought is conceived after the fashion of
+syllogistic logic, as a scheme furnished and fixed in itself, apart from
+reality, so long scientific men must protest against allowing thought any
+part or lot in scientific procedure. So long some such _modus operandi_
+as that given by Mill must be resorted to in order to explain scientific
+methods and results. But, on the other hand, if the scholastic idea
+of thought as this something having its character apart from fact is
+once given up, the cause which at present cramps the logic of science
+into the logic of sensationalism and empiricism is also given up. And
+this brings us to the other point in general regarding the inductive or
+empirical logic. It is not strictly a logic at all but a metaphysic. It
+does not begin with the fact of science, the fact of the fruitful inquiry
+into fact by intelligence, at all. It does not, starting from this fact
+analyse the various methods and types which thought must take upon itself
+in order to maintain this fruitful inquiry. On the contrary, it begins
+with sensations, and endeavors by a theory of knowledge on the basis
+of sensationalism to build up the structure of cognition, ordinary and
+scientific. I am not concerned here with the truth of sensationalism as
+a metaphysical theory of knowledge, nor with the adequacy of the notion
+of sensation advanced by Mill. It is enough from the logical point of
+view to point out that such a theory is not logic—that logic does not
+deal with something _back_ of the fact of science, but with the analysis
+of scientific method as such. And is it forcing matters to indicate that
+this retreat from logic to metaphysic is also caused by the syllogistic
+notion of thought? Formal thought, with its formulæ for simply unfolding
+a given material, is of no use in science. There is, therefore, the
+need of some machinery to take the place of thought. And this is found
+in sensation and in “experience” according to the peculiar notion of
+experience current in the inductive logic.
+
+In a word, then (without attempting to show the insufficiency of
+inductive logic as the theory of science by reference to its treatment
+of specific points) inductive logic does not meet our needs because it
+is not a free, unprejudiced inquiry into the special forms and methods
+of science, starting from the actual sciences themselves. It is founded
+and built up with constant reference to the scholastic notion of thought.
+Where it is not affected positively by it, it is still affected by its
+reaction from it. Instead of denying once for all validity or even sense
+to the notion of thinking as a special, apart process, and then beginning
+a free, unhampered examination with an eye single to the fact of science
+itself, it retains this conception of thought as valid in a certain
+department, and then sets out to find something to supply the gap in
+another department. And thus we have the usual division of inductive and
+deductive logic, inductive being interpreted as empirical and particular,
+deductive as syllogistic and formal. They are counterpart and correlative
+theories, the two sides of the notion of the separateness of fact and
+thought; they stand and fall together.
+
+“Transcendental” logic, while usually conceived as utterly opposed in
+spirit and in results to inductive logic, has yet been one with it
+in endeavoring to abolish formal logic as the sufficient method and
+criterion of scientific truth. I say this although well aware that
+inductive logic is usually conceived as specifically “scientific,” while
+the transcendental movement is regarded as the especial foe of science—as
+a belated attempt to restore an _a priori_ scholasticism, and to find
+a scheme for evolving truth out of pure thought. This is because when
+the “transcendental” school talks of thought, of the synthetic and
+objective character of thought, of the possibility of attaining absolute
+truth through thought, and of the ontological value of thought, it is
+understood as meaning thought in the old, scholastic sense, a process
+apart and fixed in itself, and yet somehow evolving truth out of its own
+inner being, out of its own enclosed ruminations. But on the contrary,
+the very meaning of “transcendentalism” is not only that it is impossible
+to get valid truth from the evolution of thought in the scholastic sense,
+but that there is no such thought at all. Processes of intelligence which
+have their nature fixed in themselves, apart from fact and having to
+be externally applied to fact, are pure myths to his school. Types of
+thought are simply the various forms which reality progressively takes
+as it is progressively mastered as to its meaning,—that is, understood.
+Methods of thought are simply the various active attitudes into which
+intelligence puts itself in order to detect and grasp the fact. Instead
+of rigid moulds, they are flexible adaptations. Methods of thought fit
+fact more closely and responsively than a worn glove fits the hand. They
+are only the ideal evolution _of_ the fact,—and by “ideal” is here meant
+simply the evolution of fact into meaning.
+
+If this is a fair description of what the “transcendental” school means
+by thought, it is evident that it is a co-worker with the spirit and
+intent of “inductive” logic. Its sole attempt is to get hold of and
+report the presupposition and rationale of science; its practical aim
+is to lay bare and exhibit the method of science so that the true seat
+of authority—that is, the authority, the _backing_, of truth—shall be
+forever manifest. It has simply gone a step further than “inductive”
+logic, and thrown overboard once for all the scholastic idea of thought.
+This has enabled it to start anew, and to form its theory of thought
+simply by following the principles of the actual processes by which man
+has, thus far in history, discovered and possessed fact.
+
+I shall not attempt here any defence of the “transcendental” logic; I
+shall not even attempt to show that the interpretation of it which I
+have given above is correct. It must go, for the present, simply as
+my individual understanding of the matter. Simply taking this view of
+“transcendental” logic for granted, I wish, in order to complete our
+notion of the present position of logic, to consider the reasons which
+have thus far prevented, say, the Hegelian logic from getting any popular
+hold—from getting recognition from scientific men as, at least in
+principle, a fair statement of their own basic presupposition and method.
+
+The first of these reasons is that the popular comprehension of the
+“transcendental” movement is arrested at Kant and has never gone on to
+Hegel. Hegel, it is true, overshadowed Kant entirely for a considerable
+period. But the Hegelian régime was partly pyrotechnical rather than
+scientific in character; and, partly, so far as it was scientific, it
+exhausted itself in stimulating various detailed scientific movements—as
+in the history of politics, religion, art, etc. In these lines, if
+we trust even to those who have no faith in the Hegelian method or
+principles, the movement found some practical excuse for being. But
+the result of the case was—and its present status is—that because
+the principle of Hegel was, for the time, lost either in display of
+dialectical fireworks, or in application to specific subjects, the
+principle itself has never met with any _general_ investigation. The
+immense amount of labor spent on Kant during the past twenty years has
+made method and principle familiar, if not acceptable, to the body of
+men calling themselves educated. And thus, so far as its outcome is
+concerned, the transcendental movement still halts with Kant.
+
+Now, at the expense of seeming to plunge myself deeper in absurdity than
+I have already gone, I must say that the Kantian principle is by far
+more “transcendental” in the usual interpretation of that term—more _a
+priori_, more given to emphasising some special function of some special
+thought-power—than the Hegelian. As against the usual opinion that while
+some compromise between science and Kant is possible, the scientific
+spirit and Hegel are at antipodes, it appears to me that it is Kant who
+does violence to science, while Hegel (I speak of his essential method
+and not of any particular result) is the quintessence of the scientific
+spirit. Let me endeavor to give some reasons for this belief. Kant
+starts from the accepted scholastic conception of thought. Kant never
+dreams, for a moment, of questioning the existence of a special faculty
+of thought with its own peculiar and fixed forms. He states and restates
+that thought in itself exists apart from fact and occupies itself with
+fact given to it from without. Kant, it is true, gives the death-blow
+to scholasticism by pointing out that such a faculty of thought is
+purely analytic—that it simply unfolds the material given, whether that
+material be true or false, having no method of arriving at truth, and no
+test for determining truth. This fact once clearly recognised, dogmatic
+rationalism, or the attempt to get truth from the “logical” analysis of
+concepts was forever destroyed. The way was opened for an independent
+examination of the actual method of science.
+
+But while Kant revealed once for all the impossibility of getting truth,
+of laying hold of reality, by the scholastic method, he still retained
+that conception of thought. He denied, not its existence, but its worth
+as relates to truth. What was the result? Just this: when he came to his
+examination (criticism) of knowledge, it fell apart at once into two
+separate factors, an _a priori_ and _a posteriori_. For if Kant finds,
+as against the dogmatic rationalist, that formal thought cannot give
+knowledge, he also finds, as against the sceptical empiricist, that
+unrelated sensation cannot give knowledge. Here too, instead of denying,
+_in toto_, the existence of unrelated sensation, he contented himself
+with denying its functional value for knowledge. Unrelated sensation and
+formal thought are simply the complementary halves of each other. Admit
+the one, and the other is its necessary counterpart.
+
+Kant must now piece together his two separated factors. Sensation,
+unrelated manifold of sensation, is _there_, thought, isolated, analytic
+thought, is _here_. Neither is knowledge in itself. What more natural
+than to put them together, and hold that knowledge is the union of a
+matter or stuff, of sensations, atomic in themselves, on one hand, and a
+form, or regulating principle of thought, empty in itself, on the other?
+We have two elements, both existing in isolation, and yet both useless
+for all purposes of knowledge. Combine them, and presto, there is science.
+
+Such a “transcendentalism” as this may well stick in the crop of
+scientific men. For consider what is involved in it: an _a priori_
+factor, on one side, and an _a posteriori_, on the other. Kant, from
+one point of view, seems thus to have simply combined the weaknesses of
+empiricism and rationalism. He still continues to talk of experience
+itself as particular and contingent, and denies that it gives a basis
+for any universal laws. Aside from his effort in the “Kritik der
+Urtheilskraft” to overcome his original separation, special scientific
+laws are to him only more or less extensive generalisations from
+experience—as much so to him as to Locke, or Mill. Scientific men indeed,
+have accustomed themselves to this derogation of their own methods and
+results, and, as “inductive” logicians, indulge in it quite freely
+themselves. But an _a priori_ element, supplied by a thought fixed and
+separate, scientific men cannot do away with. Nor do I know any reason
+why they should.
+
+It is coming short, in my opinion, of the full stature of science to
+treat it as a quantitative and varying generalisation of contingent
+particulars, but this, at least, leaves what science there is free and
+unhindered. But _a priori_ elements supplied from outside the fact
+itself, _a priori_ elements somehow entering into the fact from without
+and controlling it—this is to give up the very spirit of science. For
+if science means anything, it is that our ideas, our judgments may in
+some degree reflect and report the fact itself. Science means, on one
+hand, that thought is free to attack and get hold of its subject-matter,
+and, on the other, that fact is free to break through into thought; free
+to impress itself—or rather to express itself—in intelligence without
+vitiation or deflection. Scientific men are true to the instinct of
+the scientific spirit in fighting shy of a distinct _a priori_ factor
+supplied to fact from the mind. Apriorism of this sort must seem like an
+effort to cramp the freedom of intelligence and of fact, to bring them
+under the yoke of fixed, external forms.
+
+Now in Hegel there is no such conception of thought and of _a priori_, as
+is found in Kant. Kant formulated the conception of thought as objective,
+but he interpreted this as meaning that thought subjective in itself
+_becomes_ objective when synthetic of a given sense-manifold. When Hegel
+calls thought objective he means just what he says: that there is no
+special, apart faculty of thought belonging to and operated by a mind
+existing separate from the outer world. What Hegel means by objective
+thought is the meaning, the significance of the fact itself; and by
+methods of thought he understands simply the processes in which this
+meaning of fact is evolved.
+
+There has been, of late, considerable discussion of the place and
+function of “relations” in knowledge. This discussion in English
+speculation, at least, tends to turn largely about Thomas Hill Green’s
+reconstruction of Kantianism. I consider it unfortunate that this
+discussion has taken the form of a debate between empiricism and
+Kantianism. The question of knowledge has thus come to be whether or
+not certain relations are supplied by thought to sensations in order to
+make an orderly whole out of the latter, chaotic in themselves. Now when
+Hegel talks of relations of thought (not that he makes much use of just
+this term) he means no such separate forms. Relations of thought are, to
+Hegel, the typical forms of meaning which the subject-matter takes in
+its various progressive stages of being understood. And this is what _a
+priori_ means from a Hegelian standpoint. It is not some element _in_
+knowledge; some addition of thought to experience. It is experience
+itself in its skeleton, in the main features of its framework.
+
+“Refutations” of Hegel, then, which attempt to show that “thought” in
+itself is empty, that it waits for content from experience, that it
+cannot by any manipulation evolve truth out of itself are, if taken as
+having relevance to Hegel, simply meaningless. Hegel begins where these
+arguers leave off. Accepting all that they can say, he goes one step
+further, and denies that there is any such “thought” at all anywhere in
+existence. The question of the relations or “categories of thought” is
+just the question of the broad and main aspects of fact as that fact
+comes to be understood.
+
+For example, Kant would prove the _a priori_ character and validity
+of the principle of causation by showing that without it science is
+impossible, that it helps “make experience.” Now, in terms, Hegel’s
+justification of this relation would be the same; he too would show
+that the fabric of experience implies and demands the causal relation.
+But in Kant’s case, the justification of the principle of causality
+by reference to the possibility of experience means that thought must
+continually inject this principle _into_ experience to keep it from
+disappearing: that experience must be constantly braced and reinforced
+by the synthetic action of thought or it will collapse. In short, the
+need of experience for this principle of causation means its need for
+a certain support outside itself. But Hegel’s demonstration of the
+validity of the causal principle is simply pointing out that the whole
+supports the part, while the part helps make the whole. That is to say,
+Hegel’s reference is not to some outside action of thought in maintaining
+fact as an object of knowledge; it is to the entire structure of fact
+itself. His contention is simply that the structure of fact itself,
+of the subject-matter of knowledge, is such that in one of its phases
+it presents necessarily the aspect of causality. And if this word
+“necessarily” gives pause, it must be remembered what the source of this
+necessity is. It does _not_ lie in the principle of causation _per se_;
+it lies in the whole fact, the whole subject-matter of knowledge. It is
+the same sort of necessity as when we say that a complete man _must_ have
+an eye; i. e., it is the nature of the human organism to develop and
+sustain this organ, while the organ, in turn, contributes to and thus
+helps constitute the organism.
+
+It is then evident that the question upon which the “refutation” of
+Hegel turns is not in showing that formal “thought” cannot give birth to
+truth except through the fructifying touch of experience. The question
+is simply whether fact—the subject-matter of knowledge—is such as Hegel
+presents it. Is it, in general, a connected system as he holds it to
+be? And, if a system, does it, in particular, present such phases
+(such relations, categories) as Hegel shows forth? These are objective
+questions pure and simple; questions identical, in kind, with the
+question whether the constitution of glucose is what some chemist claims
+to have found it.
+
+This, then, is why I conceive Hegel—entirely apart from the value of any
+special results—to represent the quintessence of the scientific spirit.
+He denies not only the possibility of getting truth out of a formal,
+apart thought, but he denies the existence of any faculty of thought
+which is other than the expression of fact itself. His contention is
+not that “thought,” in the scholastic sense, has ontological validity,
+but that fact, reality is significant. Even, then, if it were shown
+that Hegel is pretty much all wrong as to the special meanings which he
+finds to make up the significance of reality, his main principle would
+be unimpeached until it were shown that fact has not a systematic, or
+interconnected, meaning, but is a mere hodgepodge of fragments. Whether
+the scientific spirit would have any interest in such a hodgepodge may,
+at least, be questioned.
+
+Having dealt at such length with the first reason why as yet the
+“transcendental” movement has found no overt coalescence with the
+scientific, we may deal briefly with the remaining reason.[3] In the
+second place, then, the rationality of fact had not been sufficiently
+realised in detail in the early decades of the century to admit of
+the principle of the “transcendental” movement being otherwise than
+misunderstood. That is to say, the development and, more particularly,
+the application of science to the specific facts of the world was
+then comparatively rudimentary. On account of this lack of scientific
+discovery and application, the world presented itself to man’s
+consciousness as a blank, or at least as only stuff _for_ meaning, and
+not as itself significant. The result was that Hegel must be interpreted
+subjectively. The difficulties in the way of conceiving a world, upon
+which science had not yet expended its energies in detail, as an organism
+of significant relations and bearings were so great, that Hegel’s attempt
+to point out these significant types and functions as immanent in reality
+was inevitably misconstrued as an attempt, on Hegel’s part, to prove that
+a system of purely “subjective” thoughts could somehow be so manipulated
+as to give objectively valid results.
+
+Hegel, in other words, anticipated somewhat the actual outcome of the
+scientific movement. However significant fact may be, however true it
+may be that an apart faculty of thought is an absurdity, however certain
+it may be that there are no real types or methods of thought at all
+excepting those of the object-matter itself as it comes to be understood,
+yet to man this objective significance cannot be real till he has made
+it _out_ in the details of scientific processes, and _made_ it applied
+science in invention. Hegel’s standpoint was, therefore, of necessity
+obscure. When the significant character of fact was not yet opened up
+in detail, a method which worked upon the basis that the only possible
+thought is the reflection of the significance of fact, had no chance of
+fair interpretation.. And thus it was (and largely is) that when Hegel
+speaks of objective thought and its relations, he is understood as having
+the ordinary conception of thought (that is, of thought as a purely
+separate and subjective faculty), and yet as trying to prove that this
+apart faculty has some mysterious power of evolving truth.
+
+The question which now confronts us, therefore, as to the present place
+of logic is just this: Has the application of scientific thought to the
+world of fact gone far enough so that we can speak, without seeming
+strained, of the rationality of fact? When we speak of the rationality,
+of the intrinsic meaning of fact, can these terms be understood in their
+direct and obvious sense, and not in any remote, or _merely_ metaphysical
+sense? Has the theoretical consideration of nature in its detailed
+study, has practical invention, as the manifestation of the rationality
+of fact, gone far enough so that this significance has become, or could
+become with some effort, as real and objective a material of study as are
+molecules and vibrations?
+
+It seems to me that we are already at this stage, or are at the point of
+getting to it. Without arguing this question, however, (which, indeed,
+can be proved only by acting upon it, only _ambulando_,) I would point
+out that the constant detailed work of science upon the world in theory
+and in invention, must in time give that world an evident meaning in
+human consciousness. What prevents scientific men from now realising this
+fact, is that they are still afraid of certain “transcendent” entities
+and forces; afraid that if they relax their hostility to metaphysic,
+some one will spring upon them the old scholastic scheme of external,
+supernatural unrealities. To those who take the prevailing agnosticism
+not as a thing, but as a symptom, this agnosticism means just this: The
+whole set of external, or non-immanent entities, is now on the point of
+falling away, of dissolving. We got just so far, popularly, as holding
+that they are unknowable. In other words, they are crowded to the extreme
+verge. One push more, and off they go. The popular consciousness will
+hold not only that they are unknowable, but that they are not.
+
+What then? Science freed from its fear of an external and dogmatic
+metaphysic, will lose its fear of metaphysic. Having unquestioned and
+free possession of its own domain, that of knowledge and of fact, it
+will also be free to build up the intrinsic metaphysic of this domain.
+It will be free to ask after the structure of meanings which makes
+up the skeleton of this world of knowledge. The moment this point is
+reached, the speculative critical logic worked out in the development of
+Kantian ideas, and the positive, specific work of the scientific spirit
+will be at one. It will be seen that this logic is no revived, redecked
+scholasticism, but a complete abandonment of scholasticism; that it deals
+simply with the inner anatomy of the realm of scientific reality, and has
+simply endeavored, with however much of anticipation, to dissect and lay
+bare, at large and in general, the features of the same subject-matter,
+which the positive sciences have been occupying themselves with in
+particular and in detail.
+
+That we are almost at the point of such conflux, a point where the
+general, and therefore somewhat abstract lines of critical logic will run
+in to the particular, and therefore somewhat isolated, lines of positive
+science, is, in my opinion, the present position of logical theory.
+
+                                                               JOHN DEWEY.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Jevons, _Elementary Lessons in Logic_, p. 5.
+
+[2] Stock, _Deductive Logic_, p. 3.
+
+[3] It should be understood that in the previous discussion so far as it
+relates to Kant, I have taken him at his lowest terms—those of logical
+self-consistency. So far as Kant does not succeed in freeing himself
+from his original position—the existence of a formal, or apart, faculty
+of thought—so far his emphasis of the _a priori_ in the sense already
+attributed to him is inevitable. But that the _tendency_ of Kant is to
+make the thought-relations _a priori_ simply in the sense of being fact’s
+own anatomy and physiognomy I should not deny.
+
+
+
+
+WILL AND REASON.
+
+
+It has always been, I think, the practice in civilised society to speak
+of reason or good sense as in some way influencing action. And of course
+it must do so, if, as we suppose, it forms the radical distinction
+between man and the lower animals. “Be reasonable,” we say, in reference
+to action no less than to speculation. “Wisdom and blood,” says
+Shakespeare, “combating in so tender a body, we have ten proofs to one
+that blood hath the victory.” Blood here means passion. How does wisdom
+or knowledge combat passion? I do not say that wisdom and knowledge mean
+the same thing, but if they do not, we should like to know the difference
+between them.
+
+In this prevalent notion of the conflict between reason and desire, it
+may be observed that reason is, as a rule, supposed to be negative or
+prohibitive. “Be reasonable” generally means “give up something you want
+very much.” According to one account, the inward monitor of Socrates
+was always negative, and throughout moral philosophy, and especially
+throughout moralising philosophy, which is not quite the same thing, you
+find the point of view that reason conflicts with desire, and has in fact
+for its function very much to prevent you doing or caring about whatever
+you very particularly want to do or incline to care about. This is what
+gives rise to the state of things satirised in the old saying “Any
+young man would rather face an imputation on his moral character than
+an imputation on his horsemanship.” If moral character means a sort of
+detachment from everything, this feeling is both natural and justifiable.
+The popular interpretation of Aristotle leans in the direction of this
+idea about reason, in so far as the conception of the reason seems to be
+connected with commonplace notions about the evils of excess, strongly
+represented in Greek proverbial philosophy. It was easy to add to these
+ideas the conception of the evils of defect, which is little more than a
+verbal refinement on the other. These quantitative expressions have not
+much meaning in morality. Unquestionably, I think, the popular aspect of
+the Aristotelian doctrine is an idea that you ought not to throw yourself
+very deeply into anything. Reason is, in short, according to these
+moralistic conceptions, though not according to Aristotle’s fundamental
+view, a sort of check upon desire and little more.
+
+This negative character of reason will, I hope, explain itself away as we
+proceed. The primary point on which I want to insist is not why reason is
+thus treated as negative, but how it comes that reason can be supposed
+to conflict with or control desire at all. I speak for the present of
+Desire, not of Will, because the meaning of desire is clearer; whereas
+it is a doubt, until we have explained the nature of active reason, what
+Will is, and whether it is distinguishable from desire.
+
+Now, on the other hand, there is a sentence of Aristotle “Intelligence
+as such moves nothing,” and this seems to come home to us quite as
+naturally as the idea that reason controls action. All plain or
+unambiguous instances of reason or reasoning or intelligence, seem to
+deal with discovery of fact, couched in a form which is capable of truth
+and falsehood. For our purpose we may treat it as elaborate perception,
+whether direct or assisted through inference, such as calculation.
+Calculation is the old meaning of reasoning, both in Greek and Latin.
+
+How do we get across from perception or calculation to anything that can
+interfere with desire?
+
+Of course there is a meeting-point in the idea that attends desire.
+Human desire, at least, is not blind. It is desire of something, which
+is before the mind as an idea; and in the case of desire which issues
+in action this something must be mentally specified in respect of the
+particular means needed to bring it about. And also, the end or purpose
+which is desired for its own sake, is, in the connection of cause and
+effect, itself _de facto_ a means to other results _ad infinitum_, more
+or less of which are foreseen by the person who acts. Thus the act,
+as fully presented to the mind in idea, is a complication of external
+circumstances, which are ideally distinguished, supposing the act to
+be reflected on, as means, realisation of the purpose, and foreseen
+consequences both of the means and of the realisation of the purpose.
+
+It is, I think, all-important to remember, that these distinctions are
+distinctions of relation to the acting subject, drawn very lightly by the
+acting subject on the shifting surface of a complicated set of results
+presented in idea, and are not at all complete distinctions, and lend
+themselves very readily to self-deception. We shall see the importance of
+this remark directly.
+
+In the meantime, here we have one way in which reasonings about fact do
+help to modify our actions. If we know distinctly what we desire, say,
+a week’s holiday, then it is reasoning about matters of fact that will
+tell us what we must do to get it, and, in part, what the results will be
+both of our getting it and of what we do to get it. Now for philosophical
+purposes we need not consider the foreseen consequences separately. They
+must rank, morally, as means. That is to say, they are something which
+you have to take into the bargain in order to get what you want. They
+come in with all the other circumstances in determining whether you like
+the action or not.
+
+Now is _this_ connection between action and reason what we have in mind
+when we say that a person ought to act reasonably, or that reason combats
+desire? Do we understand by acting reasonably, that assuming some one
+part of the imagined circumstances to represent the purpose, the agent
+has got all the means to it, and the foreseen consequences of it, and
+the interdependence of the parts of the purpose itself, set out in a
+connection which is truly perceived or scientifically inferred?
+
+We do sometimes appear to mean this. We say: it is unreasonable to ask me
+to be at the station at nine when the train does not start till ten. It
+is unreasonable, you may say, on the ground that the means demanded of
+me are not, scientifically speaking, necessary to the end agreed upon.
+Still more we should pronounce it unreasonable to adopt any means which
+actually defeats your purpose; which could only happen, one would think,
+either from moral self-deception, or in complicated matters where the
+means are disputable. This second case does not matter to us; the first
+carries us a little further, because it suggests that what you call the
+means may really contain your purpose, or one of your purposes, perhaps
+inconsistent with another. The hackneyed example of selfish charity is
+as good a case of this unreasonableness as can be found. The gift, which
+is professed to be merely a means to the good of another, is, under all
+the conditions, a means contrary to that good, and is given because it
+gratifies an impulse of the donor. It might seem, in this case again, a
+fair explanation to pronounce such conduct unreasonable merely because
+the means adopted are scientifically speaking inconsistent with the end
+proposed. We might bear in mind, however, that we seem to have detected
+here a probable conflict of ends, not merely of means to an end.
+
+Admitting, then, for the moment, that we hold conduct to be unreasonable
+if the perception, implied in it, of the relation between means,
+ends, and consequences is flagrantly false, do we admit conduct to be
+reasonable _simply_ because the intellectual perception in question is
+clear and true? Taking truth in its ordinary sense, as truth of simple
+fact, we must deny this. I may know perfectly well that so much wine
+will make me drunk, and may drink it with that object and with that
+result, and yet no one will pronounce this a reasonable action, though my
+judgment of facts and results was as true and reasonable as could be. It
+may be, however, that in a larger sense true judgment involves reasonable
+action.
+
+Thus it does not seem that truth of perception or correctness of
+calculation as to the connection of the circumstances which are presented
+in the idea of an act are sufficient to make the act reasonable, although
+serious blunders in the perception or calculation seem to make the act
+which implies them unreasonable. I even doubt whether the last clause
+was rightly stated. I was obliged to say _flagrant_ errors, _serious_
+blunders. For it seems doubtful whether a purely intellectual error, or
+blunder of perception, does make an act “unreasonable,” which owing to
+such a blunder misses its mark. I incline to think that the reason why
+we are forced, in such cases as I have instanced, to lay stress on the
+_flagrancy_ of the blunder, is that it makes us suspect self-deception
+or moral neglect on the part of the agent, makes us suspect, in other
+words, that the inconsistency between means and ends was not owing to
+mere intellectual misjudgment, but was adopted with open or partially
+open eyes. I do not think that I _should_ call my friend unreasonable
+for wanting to meet at the station an hour before the departure of the
+train, if he could show me _bona fide_ grounds which made him imagine
+that it was necessary to arrive so early. I might in that case think him
+mistaken, but should not venture to call him unreasonable, unless his
+mistake seemed so obvious that I thought it was committed on purpose,
+that is, was not an intellectual mistake at all. When I call him
+unreasonable, perhaps I really suspect he is making a claim on my time
+to meet some private convenience of his own—to avoid a crowd or to make
+sure of some particular carriage, which I do not care about—and therefore
+perhaps it may after all be his _purpose_ that I think unreasonable.
+
+But there is one great doctrine of reasonableness which does reduce it to
+a question of means and ends, and that is, the doctrine that everything
+else is a means to pleasure, whether that of the agent or that of all
+sentient beings. I do not want to discuss Hedonism psychologically
+just now, I only want to use it as an illustration of one way in which
+intelligence may be alleged to control action. The ultimate theory would
+then be that this uniform purpose, pleasure, is a natural or obvious, or,
+so to speak, a _given_ purpose, and that all definite action is or has
+been prescribed by the intelligence dealing with matter of fact, as a
+means to the realisation of this given purpose.
+
+Then reasonable action would mean what our reasoning and perceptive
+powers, dealing with matters of fact, pronounce to make for pleasure,
+and unreasonable action would be all that does not. Here, though I
+wish to avoid hackneyed criticism, I must note that there is a certain
+difficulty in getting across from the idea of one’s own pleasure to that
+of other people’s pleasure as a natural purpose, and sometimes we find
+the contention that any person’s pleasure is a _reasonable purpose_ to
+any person, which, like several indications before, takes us out of the
+connection between reason and the mere calculation of means to an end.
+
+Apart from this, I have, for our object, only to refer back to the
+suspicion with which we regarded these distinctions between means, ends,
+and consequences, in the presented idea of an action. The burden of
+proof lies on those who limit the aspects in and for which activities or
+results can be or ought to be desired. If we say that the whole complex
+of our moral life is a means to a partial though necessary incident in
+it, it seems to me that we are putting the cart before the horse. If you
+could really say “moral life is the means, and pleasure is the end” then
+it would follow that, should calculation tell you that moral life was not
+the most effectual means, you would not prefer it. Now this old argument
+may be pronounced unfair on the ground that it puts an impossible case;
+just like the counter-question which is asked by the opposite side, “If
+morality led only to increased pain, would you prefer it then?” Still,
+if these two questions together bring out the fact that pleasure is an
+incident of a whole complex of functions and activities which we cannot
+suppose to be separated from it, we do get this much result, that there
+is no firm ground for distinguishing part of the complex as the end from
+the rest as the means. And it seems clear, also, that we differentiate
+pleasures _in kind_ according to the activities which they accompany,
+just as we have constantly found that the so-called means differentiates
+and qualifies the so-called purpose.
+
+Thus I do not think that it is possible to represent the reasonableness
+of action as consisting in its guidance by right calculation of the means
+to an end, not even to the alleged simple and universal end of pleasure.
+At the same time, this view has one essential element of truth, that is
+the recognition that a positive impulse or claim can only be combated or
+defeated by a positive impulse or claim. The view goes so far indeed as
+to say that one form of a general impulse can only be combated by another
+form of that same impulse through the discrepancy of the alternative
+means to its attainment. However this may be, so much does seem clear,
+viz. that reasonableness cannot be, as popular language tends to make
+it, something purely negative and prohibitive. Its negative aspect must
+be secondary, and according to the suggestions furnished by the notions
+we have been examining, must arise out of a discrepancy between two
+sets of means to the same acknowledged or accepted end. This I think is
+solid ground, so far that we are bound to deduce the negative side of
+reasonableness from a positive nature, whether a general relation to one
+and the same purpose, or relations to different purposes. We have learnt,
+on the other hand, to distrust the absolute distinction between means and
+end.
+
+2. Now I turn for a moment to what I may describe as _maxims_ of
+reasonableness. I will not call them “A priori principles,” because such
+an expression raises a question about the nature of experience which does
+not concern the point before us. But I do treat them as characteristic of
+a view which explains reasonableness rather by rules than by purposes;
+and it seems to follow from this that the rule must be alleged to be
+self-evident, because if they were derivative, they would most naturally
+be derivative from purposes. But in the history of speculation of course
+the same principle may be recommended at one time as analogous to an
+axiom of the reasoning power, and at another time as involved in the
+purposes which are recognised as good. Even the same writer may combine
+both views.
+
+Now if such principles are supported as constituting the reasonableness
+of action, either because connected with the predominance of the
+speculative intelligence, or because of an analogy between such
+principles and any axioms acceptable to the speculative intelligence, I
+believe that this support of them is due to a sheer confusion.
+
+I take two only, as illustrations, one of each type I have mentioned.
+
+Plato, it seems to me, constantly fails to distinguish between the
+reasonableness of conduct, and the reasonableness of abstract reasoning,
+that is, of the scientific intellect. To the moral philosopher,
+scientific or theoretical interest and activity are one interest and
+activity among others; and the reasonableness of activity is not
+insured by pursuing an activity of reasonableness. It _may_ be quite
+unreasonable, in the moral sense, to pursue abstract reasoning as a
+vocation in life. When we say that in every man the reason should be
+uppermost, we do not mean that every man should devote himself to
+intellectual pursuits. Plato knows this, as, in a sense, he knows
+everything; but he uses all arguments for his purpose, and among others
+I think he allows it to be supposed that occupation with intellectual
+matter is in a moral sense a predominance of the reason. I may instance
+his attempt to prove that intellectual pleasures are the pleasantest,
+more especially with reference to his aim in making the attempt, which
+is, I suppose, to recommend intellectual occupation as pre-eminently
+reasonable in the moral sense. To this I say No; if and in as far as the
+inference is meant to rest upon an identification of scientific with
+moral reasonableness, I think it a sheer confusion. It is like saying
+that because a doctor has to do with the promotion of health, therefore
+it is a healthy profession to be a doctor. But Plato’s argument shows
+how strongly this idea appealed to him, because he even recommends
+intellectual pleasures on the score of their sheer pleasantness, implying
+not only that intellectual occupation is reasonableness in the moral
+sense, but that intellectual occupation, even when chosen by way of
+self-indulgence, is still reasonableness in the moral sense. Of course
+the matter is complicated by a substantive connection, the degree of
+which is matter of opinion, between the two things, like that between
+being a physician and leading a healthy life. Intellectual exercise and
+ambition have a definite influence on certain capacities concerned in the
+reasonable will. But it cannot be made out, that a tendency to the more
+intellectual occupations is in itself a tendency to moral reasonableness.
+Moral reasonableness must be a general characteristic of moral action,
+not guaranteed by the special content of any form of activity.
+
+Next I have to discuss a principle which is advocated as an expression
+of the morally reasonable, on the ground of having a sort of analogy
+to several maxims or axioms of the intellectual world. It used to be
+said that justice is like a square; or that the rightness of an action
+consists in its conformity to certain eternal proportions impressed upon
+the world by God. I take one more modern form of these principles as a
+type of them all. Bentham said, “One is only to count for one,” and it is
+a mere amplification of this when Mr. Sidgwick maintains, if I understand
+him, that it is objectively reasonable not to prefer my own interest or
+pleasure simply because it is my own, to that of some one else. This
+principle seems to me a commendable expression of moral judgment, and I
+do not think that it is needless or empty. There is a famous passage in
+Middlemarch where the heroine, in a matter which acutely touches her own
+feelings, thinks to herself, “Now how should I act if I could compel my
+own pain to be silent, and merely consider what is best for the lives of
+all the persons concerned in the situation?” That I suppose is a concrete
+rendering of what this principle means.
+
+But if we look closer, we see its weak side. It is negative, and
+consequently abstract. You are not to heed your own feelings unless they
+are such that you would heed them if they were some one’s else in the
+same circumstances. This amounts to no more than saying, “We believe
+there is always, under all circumstances, a right course.” It is strictly
+parallel to the theoretical principles of Uniformity or Causation. “We
+believe that there is an explanation for everything; that nothing changes
+without some reason.” These are useful maxims if they make us look for
+the explanation, and so the other is a useful maxim, if it makes us look
+for the right course. But it really falls between two stools. It is
+not capable, as intellectual theorems are, of accurate development and
+application by measurement and analysis. Yet on the other hand it makes
+no special appeal to any special content, or tendency of reasonableness
+embodied in definite ends. It is neither theoretically fertile, nor is it
+a description of a practical influence.
+
+It is a well-known phenomenon that those who suggest maxims or moral
+axioms of this kind as defining moral reasonableness are apt to be
+reduced to assuming a particular impulse, told off to assist or obey
+the reason. Such are Plato’s “Spirited” element in the soul, Kant’s
+reverence, Mr. Sidgwick’s general desire to do what is reasonable. This
+seems to me to be creating a rule which has no positive content, and
+therefore has not the character of a human purpose, and then imagining an
+impulse to obey it the nature of which is not accounted for in reference
+to any plan of life, but must simply be propounded as an isolated fact.
+
+It kept suggesting itself to us above that reasonableness could not be
+thoroughly explained on the basis of a distinction between means and
+end, because actual ends are not simple and uniform, but are obviously
+qualified by the so-called means, or context of circumstance. We agreed,
+however, that what is reasonable must be so in virtue of a positive
+content, whether as means or perhaps as end, and that its negative or
+prohibitive aspect must arise from the conflict of two such positive
+contents.
+
+We have in this section looked at two interpretations of moral
+reasonableness apparently suggested by analogies with intellectual
+reasonings or principles, and we could not deny that each of them had a
+certain appearance of truth, but one seemed to confuse the content with
+the form, the other to consist of a form without any content.
+
+3. It suggests itself therefore that moral reasonableness must be a
+characteristic which we ascribe to purposes of action. Then we get a
+variety of positive content, without relying on the distinction between
+means and end; while the abstract principles which we feel to be
+reasonable fall into their right place as very general descriptions of a
+purpose or scheme of life which can be called reasonable.
+
+But the idea of a reasonable purpose requires explanation.
+
+First, it is irreconcilable with abstract Hedonism. You cannot have any
+relations within a single and uniform purpose, and reason always involves
+relations.
+
+Secondly, it is not the most intellectual purpose, the purpose that has
+most to do with reasoning. I have tried to explain this above.
+
+Thirdly, it _is_ such a life or purpose as possesses a self-consistent
+relation of the parts to the whole. This is the general characteristic of
+any reasonable totality _qua_ reasonable, and it is this which forms the
+general characteristic of reasonable purpose _qua_ reasonable.
+
+Then what is the meaning of the self-consistent relation of parts to the
+whole in the case of a human scheme of life?
+
+We cannot demand that our specific purposes should be related consciously
+to the purpose of the universe; because the universe as a whole is the
+object of theoretical knowledge only, and this does not furnish us with
+the idea of a concrete purpose at all. It seems then that the whole, by
+consistency with which human purpose is or is not reasonable, must be the
+whole of existing human purpose, taken of course as moving in a certain
+direction, owing to the modification continually introduced through the
+progressive realisation of purposes. I do not see that more than this can
+be said without entering upon the analysis of the actual structure of the
+moral world, of society and of history. What is important seems to me
+to be that we cannot construct the reasonable world of morality from a
+theoretical view of men in general and of nature. We have to take it as
+it is, and are then perhaps able to show that it is an organised movement
+in the direction of self-consistency of purpose.
+
+Is there not more than one kind or type of self-consistency possible, as
+when self-indulgence is restricted simply within the bounds of health and
+decency? This is the question whether consistency demands completeness,
+i. e. whether mere omission destroys consistency. It has often been
+discussed, and I suppose the general answer is that _assuming the unity
+of the total moral movement_, any elements omitted in any portion of the
+movement must ultimately have their revenge by producing disturbance.
+
+Then if we ask what after all is the relation of the theoretical reason
+to the reasonable will or moral reason, the only answer seems to be
+that the moral reason, in the individual or in the race, is the body of
+intellectual ideas which are in fact predominant as purposes in either,
+having become predominant by the power they have shown of crushing out
+or adjusting to themselves the active associations of all other ideas.
+And the power is what might be described as logical power; that is to say
+it depends on the range and depth which enables one idea to include in
+itself as in a system a great variety of minor purposes.
+
+The intellect as such is for morality in the first instance simply the
+medium in which the moral world or content of the moral world exists;
+and which therefore conveys to that content its own peculiar character
+of system and totality. Then, further, in theoretical reflection on the
+moral world, I imagine that we notice this predominance of ideas which
+have organising power, and we frame to express this predominance such
+predicates as important, right, good. And the whole of these judgments
+we must call wisdom as opposed to knowledge. But I cannot myself see how
+these or any judgments can be judgments of the moral reason. They seem
+to me to be, as judgments, necessarily judgments of the theoretic reason
+dealing with the facts of the moral world. But then there is the further
+complication that these judgments themselves, forming the content of
+intellectual ideas, may, if they have organising power, become actively
+predominant, and then again they will form a portion of the actual moral
+world as general ideas or clues, inciting to the active search for
+concrete ideas which are concordant with them. In this case they are not
+acting _as_ judgments, which are true and false, but only as dominant
+contents. It is one thing to judge that there is a right in the moral
+world, and another thing to be mastered by the right in one’s own mind.
+
+If I am asked, what I mean by the predominance of dominant ideas, which
+I allege to form the content of the reasonable will, I start from the
+position that every idea would produce action if unchecked, simply by
+suggestions which through associative reproductions call up the necessary
+movement. Desire may, I believe, or may not intervene, as a state of
+tension between a pain of want and a pleasure produced by an idea. All
+that is essential, it appears to me, is this idea which can suggest an
+action.
+
+In the formed life of a civilised man the organising ideas have long
+asserted their predominant power, and in every moment crush out countless
+intruders each of which has in itself suggestions quite capable of
+leading to action. In childhood or insanity the yielding to every
+suggestion is a mark of what is called absence or loss of will; that
+is, not the loss of a _general_ power to check minor suggestions, but of
+perfectly _definite_ habitual purposes which check them as a matter of
+course.
+
+This view sounds no doubt like an iron Determinism, and I am not much
+concerned to defend it from that imputation. After all, if we are
+determined by the content of our own minds, why then I suppose we
+determine ourselves. And trivial examples of indifferent alternatives
+such as “I can blow out this candle or not as I please” seem to me very
+poor representatives of the moral will, compared with the necessary
+pressure of an over-mastering idea which drives the man up to the point
+of saying, “This is what must be decisive with one like me, and I have no
+alternative.” We feel, as we say, that “we shall have to do it.” Almost
+all really serious action, it seems to me, is of this type. And if I have
+read at all correctly this lesson of the new psychology which owes its
+origin largely to Herbart, it is an instructive meeting of extremes, that
+the most analytic of psychologies should more than ever represent the
+individual as the incarnation of a progressive order in ideas.
+
+                                                             B. BOSANQUET.
+
+
+
+
+ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.[4]
+
+
+There is in the history of jurisprudence no more significant event than
+the foundation of the historical school by Gustav Hugo and Carl von
+Savigny. Jurisprudence, up to that time, was not a science, at least
+not a science in the modern acceptation of the term. It was an art,
+which the practical lawyer learned and employed in strict conformity
+with practical traditions, without reflecting on the reasons in virtue
+of which a legal norm or a social institution existed. The only part
+of jurisprudence of a scientific tendency was the philosophy of law.
+This latter branch had, since Hugo Grotius, emancipated itself from the
+church, but it had advanced no farther than to substitute for the will
+of God, to which formerly right and wrong had been traced, the principle
+of human nature, and to found upon the social instincts of man a system
+of natural law,—an ideal jurisprudential state by reference to which
+positive laws were tested in respect of their conformity with the ideally
+right and the ideally wrong. This fundamental conception of the essential
+character of law was only slightly modified by the substitution of the
+human reason for human nature. The rational systems of jurisprudence also
+derived the state and the law from the individuality of man, especially
+from the social traits of this individuality, and definite notions and
+principles were thus enunciated from which state and law were deductively
+constructed.
+
+The historical school first introduced a change in all this. It afforded
+the legal practitioner the possibility of seeing that the law which he
+applied was the slowly ripened product of a course of development that
+extended over many centuries, and it afforded the philosophical juristic
+inquirer the possibility of understanding, that the law was not founded
+on immutable ideas and principles, but that it was a product of the
+creative mind of a nation, that this product was subjected to processes
+of transformation and development, and did not admit of regulation by
+the individual reason of a single philosophical inquirer. But while the
+history of law has become a universally recognised discipline in the
+science of jurisprudence, the application of its underlying principles
+to the philosophy of law has as yet by no means been universally carried
+out. On the contrary, the reason still plays an extensive rôle as
+foundation and evolutionary principle; and to a great extent the history
+of law and the philosophy of law still pursue their solitary ways as
+independent branches of knowledge.
+
+In recent times, through the influence of ethnology, jurisprudence has
+entered on a new epoch. A new branch of the science of law has arisen in
+Europe, the so-called ethnological jurisprudence, and has already found
+in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland, enthusiastic
+supporters. Ethnology, as it is known, is the science that has for the
+subject of its investigations the totality of phenomena of social life of
+all the peoples of the earth, and which makes use, in this investigation,
+of the methods of inductive inquiry exclusively employed by physical
+and natural science. After the science of ethnology had advanced to a
+certain point, the extension of ethnological inquiry to the domain of
+jurisprudence followed as of course.
+
+To a certain extent the investigations of the history of law had prepared
+the way for ethnological jurisprudence. The inductive method was common
+to both. The idea of a history of the development of law was no longer
+strange to jurisprudence. Only the courage was wanting to allow the eye
+to range over the legal systems of all the peoples of the globe, instead
+of, as before, restricting it to very narrow limits. The historical
+investigation of law began in Europe with the history of the Roman law.
+Thereupon it was immediately extended to the Germanic laws of Europe, so
+that now all West-European peoples possess a highly developed history of
+law of their own. Recently, also, the history of Slavonic law has been
+assiduously treated.
+
+Whereas in every case here it was a question of the sources of the
+laws that stood in immediate historical connection with the prevailing
+systems of Europe, jurisprudential investigation was slowly extended to
+more remote ethnical fields. The first impulse in this direction came
+from comparative philology. This science had succeeded in tracing the
+languages of extended groups of peoples back to common primitive tongues.
+Among these primitive tongues the Aryan, the common original language
+of the Indo-Germanic group of nations, first occupied the attention of
+inquirers, and the law of this group of nations thus became the first
+object of investigation of a comparative jurisprudence extending beyond
+the more restricted provinces of the history of law. The provinces of
+Græco-Italic, Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, Iranic, and Indian law were
+investigated with respect to a common origin, and various agreements and
+various deviations were discovered. In very recent times the laws of the
+Armenians and the Ossetes in the Caucasus have been added to the laws of
+the Aryans, and the laws of the Afghans will probably soon follow these.
+
+A number of more remote provinces of law have also been entered upon, in
+connection with theological, philological, and connate inquiries. Thus,
+particularly, in connection with biblical investigation the Israelitic
+law, in connection with the study of Arabic the Islamitic, in connection
+with the decipherment of the hieroglyphic writings the Old-Egyptian,
+in connection with the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions the
+Soumerian and the Assyrian-Babylonian, and in connection with sinology
+the law of China. In very recent times the Japanese law has also been
+treated.
+
+In the laws of all these peoples, by the side of many peculiarities, were
+also found many phenomena of frequent and universal recurrence.
+
+After the science of law had so far extended its activity in this
+direction, it was a final step only that ethnological jurisprudence
+took when it declared that the subject of juristic science was the
+investigation of the laws of _all_ the peoples of the earth. And yet
+this step was perhaps a more important one than all that had hitherto
+been taken. For a considerable group of peoples had up to then been
+entirely neglected by the science of law, namely the uncivilised
+peoples, the so-called primitive peoples or _Naturvölker_. And just the
+laws of these savages furnished the most remarkable disclosures. They
+exhibited everywhere the most singular parallel phenomena, and made it
+possible to open up a complete early history of the law, and to bring
+to light periods of jural development of which the history of civilised
+peoples has preserved but a few unintelligible remains. Ethnological
+jurisprudence is thus able to supply complementary information at a point
+where the threads of the history of law are lost in the obscurity of
+early times.
+
+The condition of jural life in these primitive periods is very singular.
+No juristic philosopher has ever lighted on the idea that primitive man
+could exist with such jural conceptions as he actually does. That which
+ethnological jurisprudence has brought to light in this connection is
+something absolutely new and astonishing, something that no brooding
+brain could have ever developed out of any idea or principle. Indeed, it
+is so strange that it could not be conceived at all if we did not have it
+before our eyes to-day among savage tribes.
+
+The collecting of the laws of uncivilised peoples constitutes an
+independent task of ethnological jurisprudence. In this way the latter
+science will fill up the gaps which historical jurisprudential inquiry
+left open in our knowledge of the jural life of man. But more important
+than all, perhaps, will ethnological jurisprudence become for the future
+development of the philosophy of law. In this connection it goes hand in
+hand with the sociological tendency which dominates our time and has its
+surest foundation in ethnology.
+
+The prime significance of ethnological jurisprudence lies in the fact
+that it is an ethnological science.
+
+At first ethnology was a purely empirical science. It gathered together
+all the attainable phenomena of ethnic existence, and separately, at
+first, among single peoples and tribes. After an extensive store of
+material had accumulated in this manner, the discovery was made that
+in many provinces of ethno-social life, especially in the provinces of
+religion, law, and morals, especially also in all provinces of social
+custom, phenomena of essentially similar character presented themselves
+among a great number of peoples in the case of whom neither any original
+tribal relationship nor any infusion from one nation into the other could
+be assumed; and, curious to say, these were frequently the most singular
+phenomena, of which one would have thought at first that they had sprung
+from the individuality of a determinate people. This discovery of
+universal ethnographic parallels was all the more surprising in view of
+the fact that historical special inquiry, whose province up to then had
+been essentially national life, had placed especial emphasis on outwardly
+prominent events occurring in a different form in every nation, whereas
+phenomena that appeared uniformly among the different nations were little
+noticed. People had therefore grown accustomed to regard every nation as
+something existing by itself and peculiar to itself, and, particularly,
+had also declared it as inadmissible to employ phenomena of the life of
+one nation to explain corresponding phenomena of the life of another
+nation.
+
+The discovery of ethnographical parallels led to wholly different ideas.
+It became clear that a great portion of human ethnical existence was
+not founded in the peculiar character of particular peoples, but in the
+character of the human race, in the universal nature of man. And it
+became in addition clear that that which repeated itself everywhere on
+the earth, which was therefore an expression of the universal human, was
+something entirely different from that which previous philosophy had
+declared to be the actual human. It also became clear, at the same time,
+that the nations thought quite differently from what the individual man
+did. With this, however, the foundation of the entire previous philosophy
+was shaken. If the axiom of modern ethnology is correct, namely that it
+is not _we_ that think, but _it_ that _thinks in us_,[5] we shall no
+longer be able to explain our nature from our consciousness, from our
+ego, from our reason, but we shall have to pursue this momentous “It”
+that thinks in us, and since we cannot find it _in_ us we shall have to
+search for it _outside of_ us in the expressions of the human soul in the
+life of the race.
+
+This is the fundamental idea of modern ethnology. It seeks to collect all
+the expressions of the human soul in the life of the species, and from
+them to derive its inferences as to the nature of man. It regards ethnic
+existence as the precipitate of human psychical existence, and not merely
+of that part of it which is conscious, but also of that part of it which
+is unconscious, that which is inaccessible to introspective observation,
+that which is not thought, but is merely lived. It enlarges accordingly
+the domain of psychology, which was restricted hitherto to the analysis
+of the human consciousness, by the incorporation of an additional domain
+unmeasured in extent.
+
+These general conceptions of ethnology are also determinative for
+the science of ethnological jurisprudence, and from this results its
+peculiarity as contrasted with the other branches of juristic knowledge.
+
+Ethnological jurisprudence places the centre of gravity of the science
+of law not like the previous juristic philosophy in the individual jural
+consciousness, but in the law viewed as a province of ethnic existence.
+It regards the laws of the nations as the precipitates of that which
+is now active and has been active as jural instinct in the entire
+human race. It assumes that when all the phenomena of law in the life
+of the nations have been fixed, an infinitely more valuable material
+will be drawn therefrom adapted to the disclosure of the nature of law
+than could have ever in the world been acquired by an analysis of the
+individual jural consciousness. It does not regard the individual jural
+consciousness as something innate in man and exempt from the altering
+effects of time, but as a product of the social conditions in which the
+individual has grown up. It assumes, therefore, that the individual jural
+consciousness changes with a change of the social conditions, so that a
+man who grows up under different social conditions possesses a different
+jural perception. This assumption, if we compare the expressions of the
+jural consciousness of races low in the scale of culture with those of
+civilised peoples, is one that cannot be escaped. We have only to recall
+to mind the irresistible force with which the jural sense of peoples
+that live under clan-constitutions demand vengeance of blood, whereas
+this species of retaliation no longer exists in our jural consciousness
+of to-day. Thus there are hundreds and thousands of jural instincts and
+conceptions which are present at certain stages of civilisation and
+disappear entirely at others.
+
+Ethnological jurisprudence therefore assumes, that the juristic
+philosopher who lays at the foundation of his system essentially his own
+jural consciousness, simply enunciates therewith a system of law that
+answers perhaps to the current conceptions of his time and his people,
+but which can in no sense lay claim to a value beyond that.
+
+Quite different, on the other hand, are matters conditioned when the
+inquirer has before him the laws of all the peoples of the earth from the
+lowest to the highest. Here he has in his possession a picture of the
+jural consciousness of the mind of humanity, which is no longer subject
+to alteration, but which, to the extent that the development of human
+jural life has advanced, is complete.
+
+For the execution of its task ethnological jurisprudence first requires
+a collection of the laws of all the peoples of the earth. Each one of
+these laws is of equal value to ethnological jurisprudence in so far
+as the jural consciousness of humanity has found expression in it in
+any form. Especially deserving of consideration are the laws of the
+so-called savage peoples that have been so much neglected and contemned
+hitherto; since they bring to light the jural consciousness of humanity
+in its germinal stages, and since higher formations are invariably best
+understood when we know their first beginnings.
+
+The solidest basis for ethnological jurisprudence would be furnished by
+a monographic treatment of the law of every single tribe and people of
+the earth. By such monographic treatments the entire social organisation
+of a given tribe or people would be exhibited in all its complicated
+reciprocal relations, and we should be able to follow the law in all the
+thousands of minute ramifications that connect it with the remaining
+provinces of national life. But such a monographic treatment of the law
+of all the nations of the earth is accompanied with great difficulties,
+and this part of the task of the science of law has as yet been
+undertaken only to a limited extent.
+
+The condition of affairs is best in this respect where the nations
+themselves have collected and compiled their legal customs in books of
+laws. But such collections are found only among peoples that deserve
+to some extent the appellation of civilised peoples. Among the great
+majority of peoples the law is simply practised and handed down by oral
+tradition, so that here the legal customs must be collected by members
+of foreign civilised nations,—a very difficult labor and one that can be
+accomplished only by persons who take up their abode permanently among
+the races in question and become thoroughly familiar with their language
+and habits of life.
+
+Collections of this character we possess unfortunately only to a very
+limited extent, and our knowledge accordingly of the law of uncivilised
+peoples is still very meagre. Even the books of law possessed by the
+various peoples have not all been made available to juristic science.
+In part they have not yet been printed, and in part they have not yet
+been translated into a generally understood language. Considerable time
+will yet be required before the existing material has been made wholly
+accessible.
+
+Not before the legal customs of all the peoples of the earth have been
+collected will ethnological jurisprudence be in a position to furnish a
+successful solution of the task it has set itself,—the task namely of a
+causal analysis of all the phenomena of the jural life of the human race.
+Yet to a certain extent this task may be undertaken at present, even with
+a relatively limited store of material.
+
+The starting-point for the ethno-juristic investigation of the phenomena
+of jural life is furnished by the ethno-juristic parallels, legal customs
+that are found uniformly appearing among the nations, without there being
+any reason to assume that one nation has received them from another.
+Legal customs of this character are in part so universally diffused
+over the earth that they may be characterised as a common possession of
+mankind; in part they appear sporadically among unrelated peoples; in
+part they are restricted to more limited domains. The most important
+legal customs are those that have universal dissemination; for here it
+may be assumed that they are a necessary emanation of the social side
+of human life. Legal customs that occur only sporadically, but appear
+uniformly among unrelated peoples, must likewise be regarded as the
+products of the universal nature of man, yet only as such that _can_
+arise under definite conditions of existence. Legal customs that occur
+only in limited ethnological domains will have to be referred to the
+peculiar character of definite peoples and tribes. Legal institutions of
+universal character are, for example, the forms of marriage by capture
+and purchase of the bride, blood-vengeance, the right of refuge, the
+systems of composition, ordeals, oaths, and so forth. Almost universal
+are the levirate, and the betrothal of children. Sporadically among
+unrelated peoples appear: the seizure of the corpse of the debtor for
+debt; execution by fasting, whereby the creditor brings pressure to bear
+upon his debtor by having him fast a definite period of time before his
+dwelling; the custom of the chief doing combat with his grown up son,
+to whom the command of the tribe passes if he conquers his father; and
+so forth.[6] Frequently it is the most curious customs that thus recur,
+among peoples that are completely separated from each other by oceans
+and inaccessible mountain ranges and have unquestionably never been in
+communication with each other.
+
+The explanation of these ethno-juristic parallel phenomena is in part
+not very difficult, inasmuch as many of them can be traced back to
+fixed forms of social organisation. Thus, for example, a whole group
+of universally recurring legal customs is associated with the peculiar
+formation of the clan-constitutions and clan-law which regularly appears
+among uncivilised peoples and characteristically differs from the form of
+political organisation familiar to the present age. Many legal customs
+are also based on religious conceptions and social customs, and their
+explication in such cases is frequently very difficult.
+
+A complete explanation of all the legal customs of all the peoples of
+the earth with respect to their social causes would exhaust the work of
+ethnological jurisprudence as an ethnological discipline. But in the
+same way that the acquisitions of ethnology are in their turn utilisable
+towards the constitution of a universal philosophy, to which they will
+impart perhaps an entirely different character, so will the results
+of ethnological jurisprudence be in their turn utilisable towards the
+constitution of a universal science of law and for the philosophy of
+law, in which probably, through its means also, a powerful change will
+be inaugurated. These are the ideas, traced in their most general
+characters, that may be regarded as the fundamental ones in “ethnological
+jurisprudence.”
+
+                                                      ALBERT HERMANN POST.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[4] Translated from the manuscript of Dr. Albert Hermann Post by Thomas
+J. McCormack.
+
+[5] Bastian.
+
+[6] The reader will find a brief survey of the ethno-juristic parallels
+appearing among the various peoples of the earth, in a treatise of mine
+entitled _Ueber die Aufgaben einer allgemeinen Rechtswissenschaft_
+(1891), pp. 27 to 72.
+
+
+
+
+AMERICAN POLITICS.
+
+
+Nothing in this country appears to the stranger more intricate and
+inexplicable than our politics. The different parties, two big ones and
+several little ones, the various machines, county, state, and national,
+the “bosses,” “heelers,” and “workers” present such a confusion of ideas
+and a terminology so varied, that it is only after many years that
+the foreigner begins to comprehend our system of government and the
+principles underlying our political movements. Indeed, the majority of
+Americans themselves are no better off and have no clear perception of
+the part they are playing in the administration of affairs or the ethical
+effects of the ballot which they cast. Ask the ordinary voter why he
+supports the candidates of a certain party and you will find that his
+reasons are reducible to a few concrete facts, and are rarely governed by
+any general principles.
+
+In the Southern states the vast majority of the whites are democrats
+through opposition to the republican party which fought the war and
+deprived them of their slaves. The negroes on the other hand are
+republicans because it is to that party they owe their freedom, and
+from it they expect protection for themselves in the exercise of their
+political rights and the blessings of opportunity for education. The
+political question there becomes a race question, utterly regardless
+of the principles which the two great parties represent. Let there be
+a complete change of platforms and the result would be precisely the
+same as it has been for the past generation—the South would still remain
+democratic, and the votes of their presidential electors would still be
+cast for the candidates of that party.
+
+There is a minor race question in the feeling against foreigners, more
+especially Irish, Italians, and Germans, influenced to some extent by
+the fact that a large number of these foreigners are Roman Catholics and
+that there is an uneasy suspicion on the part of some Americans that the
+Catholic church is hostile to the spirit of democracy, a suspicion not
+entirely unfounded if one should judge solely by the sayings and doings
+of some of the prelates of that church for the past forty years. This
+“Know-nothing” sentiment at one time threatened to create a solid foreign
+vote in opposition. Germans and Irish united under the protecting wings
+of Tammany Hall and, aided by clergymen who hoped to obtain part of the
+state educational fund for their private parochial schools, formed a
+strong ally to the national democratic party. Happily prejudices of race
+and religion are dying out and neither party can now claim a monopoly
+of the foreign vote. Strange as it may seem, however, the Irish and
+German elements, so recently the objects of proscription themselves,
+have in late years become embittered against the Chinese. To the patient
+industry of the Mongolian immigrants is due the building of the Pacific
+railroads, when it would have been impossible to obtain white labor, and
+the cultivation and development of the Pacific coast states. Congress was
+terrorised into passing the law excluding all Chinese laborers. It was
+more than race prejudice which contributed to this hatred of the Chinese.
+The chief reason for Chinese exclusion was an economic one. Great masses
+of laborers feared that the Chinese by immigrating in vast numbers would
+deprive them of work by taking their places at lower wages, and, having
+the ballot, they dictated to Congress the terms of the Anti-Chinese Act.
+
+The alien contract labor law is a measure conceived in the same
+spirit and directed against the hiring of laborers abroad by American
+contractors, who could thus displace their employés at lower wages by
+Hungarians, or Poles, or Russians, ignorant of the language of this
+country and whose compensation could be the more easily reduced to a
+bare maintenance, and who in sickness or old age could be turned out on
+the roads to die without costing the contractor any contraction of his
+bank account. There was some excuse for this law, or at least for the
+feeling which prompted it, when the miners of a whole section could be
+evicted and they and their families made to suffer the pangs of slow
+starvation because the owners of the coal lands found they could obtain
+human machines at a less cost from abroad. It was natural that the
+laborers should demand a law which offered some immediate relief even
+at the risk of meeting wrong with wrong, rather than that they should
+attempt to regulate affairs on abstract principles of justice while their
+stomachs were empty and their wives and children were dying for want of
+sufficient nourishment. That feeling, however, is also vanishing and
+American workingmen are beginning to see that the increase in population,
+native-born as well as that imported by contract, is steadily adding to
+the number of competitors and lowering the rate of wages. Their attention
+is becoming more and more directed to the opening of new opportunities
+for work rather than to the restricting of the number of workers.
+
+Another class of men, if they vote at all, do so on no general principle
+of public welfare, but solely for their own advantage at the expense of
+their fellow men. These are to be found among the rich manufacturers, the
+coal, and iron, and railway kings, and the manipulators of the crops of
+the nation. Rarely casting a ballot in person, they give notice to their
+thousands of employés that if the latter do not support the candidates
+or the party which they happen to favor, the employés’ places will be
+given to more pliant servants. These men are as non-partisan as the most
+ardent reformer could wish. One of them, a few years ago when questioned
+by an investigating committee of the New York state legislature, said:
+“In a republican district I was a strong republican; in a democratic
+district I was democratic; and in doubtful districts I was doubtful, but
+in politics I was an Erie railroad man every time.” Another famous man
+of the same type said he had no politics; that he found it cheaper to
+buy up one set of legislators after they were elected than to purchase
+two sets of candidates before election. These corrupt men, counting
+their wealth by tens of millions, influencing state legislatures and the
+national Congress, and throwing their weight into Presidential campaigns,
+constitute the chief “dangerous class” in the United States to-day,
+far more threatening to the permanency of free institutions than the
+anarchists who were hanged at Chicago.
+
+Then there are the illy-paid employés of these men who do their bidding
+at the polls, voting for the candidates of their masters. Promise of
+office or patronage lures others into the support of one party or the
+other. Lastly come the poorest of the poor who live in the most miserable
+tenement houses, or when single hive in the big lodging-houses which
+are found chiefly in New York and Chicago. A ton of coal or a barrel of
+flour is the bribe to the former, frequently effected through the medium
+of the poor wretch’s wife who does not care for politics but sees a very
+material advantage in the food or fuel offered by the ward worker. The
+lodging-house voters, paid by drinks of whiskey or dollar bills, until
+recently in New York were marshalled in squads of twenty or thirty early
+on the morning of election day, given their ballots and compelled to hold
+them aloft between the thumb and forefinger of the right hand so that
+the heeler or paid servant of some political faction might watch them
+from the moment they took their place in the line of voters until their
+ballots were handed to the election inspectors and dropped in the box.
+Both parties wink at such frauds and their henchmen directly countenance
+and assist in them but the party that happens to be in the majority in
+any locality is usually the one most guilty. The result is that the
+minority affects great virtue and loudly denounces the corruption of its
+opponents.
+
+Among those who do vote on principle are the prohibitionists, the
+greenbackers, the adherents of ephemeral labor parties and the
+socialists. The anarchists generally refrain from voting because they
+do not believe in any government by force and say that an enlightened
+public opinion will lead the people to dispense with such things as the
+army and navy and police and law courts. The socialists occasionally
+vote for the men of other parties whom they think represent the worst
+measures, in order the sooner, as they frankly avow, to produce
+revolutionary conditions, which they expect would assist them greatly
+in their propaganda. The prohibitionists, greenbackers, and labor men
+each take a partial view of political economy. The first see the evils
+and degradation arising from intemperance and think that everything
+else must yield to the one consideration of the abolition of the liquor
+traffic. The panacea of the greenbackers consists in the destruction of
+the monopoly of the currency now enjoyed by the national banks. The labor
+men have different shibboleths at different times such as the prevention
+of child labor in factories, an eight-hour work-day and the like—measures
+which might effect some relief but are minor matters compared with the
+great social problem of the increase of poverty in the midst of the
+greatest productive energies which the world has ever seen, a problem
+which is rapidly coming to the front and overshadowing all others.
+
+But these minor movements hardly produce a ripple on the surface of our
+political waters. There are only two parties worthy of the name in the
+United States to-day, as there have been but two ever since the days of
+Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. These parties go on forming
+platforms chiefly on the theory of offending the least number of voters
+and phrasing their declarations in vague terms which may be explained one
+way in one part of the country and another way in another part. Such is a
+cursory view of the field of American politics to-day.
+
+It may seem that I have made out a pretty bad indictment of corruption
+against our politics and that the view of the cynic is correct that
+American politics are desperately wicked and there is no health in them.
+But the moral forces which are operating in the world are fortunately
+not dependent upon the changeable methods or the selfish objects of
+men. It is here in America, perhaps more than anywhere else, that the
+natural laws of social development have fullest play. It is here that
+the evolution of politics is working itself out freely, untrammelled by
+tradition or custom. It is here that the ultimate ideal of politics will
+first be reached. When the framers of the Declaration of Independence
+formulated their proposition that governments derive their just powers
+from the consent of the governed, a step in the right direction was
+taken—a step that was in accordance with our old Saxon traditions, yet
+for the first time in the world’s history made on an extended scale, to
+base human government on the principles of natural law. And through all
+the vicissitudes of our country, its struggle for independence, its
+war for the liberation of its commerce, its civil conflict which would
+have dismembered any other nation, or would have left one section the
+subjugated serfs of the other, through a disputed presidential election
+which strained the written constitution to its utmost, the great moral
+force of natural law has been working, now through one party, now through
+another, gathering impetus as it goes and giving promise always of better
+times to come.
+
+It is in this broad view that all the petty thieveries and striving for
+place and power sink into utter insignificance. The people do still rule.
+They may sleep for a time but are sure, sooner or later, to assert their
+rights in accordance with the instincts of the human mind, which are
+good and not bad. As long as the suffrage shall exist it is reasonably
+certain that this American government, “of the people, by the people, for
+the people,” shall not perish from the earth. If the wealthy monopolists
+could control the suffrage, the prospects might be different. The freedom
+of the voter has been impaired to a certain extent but the American
+people with quick instincts have awakened to the danger. The Australian
+system of voting, which secures secrecy and freedom from intimidation and
+almost extinguishes bribery is now becoming very popular. Fifteen of the
+states have adopted it and the other twenty-nine will, no doubt, follow
+their example in a few years. But the introduction of measures for its
+establishment presented the curious anomaly of being opposed by democrats
+in some localities and by republicans in others, both for partisan
+reasons, constitutional and high moral pretexts being of course advanced.
+When it becomes the general law, it will do more than anything else to
+purify electoral methods.
+
+Entirely above the question of methods, however, there are certain
+principles involved in American politics which it becomes of the highest
+importance to comprehend and which furnish the key to the apparently
+inexplicable confusion. These principles, it seems to me, are reducible
+to two, which may be likened to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in
+nature. As both are needed for the stability of the physical universe,
+so both the centralising and decentralising tendencies in politics are
+necessary for the co-ordination of the state. It is in the free play
+of these forces, each in its proper sphere, that lies the assurance of
+the perpetuity of American institutions. But as the ideal has not yet
+been reached, the practical result is that one tendency begins to act,
+at first legitimately, then from the aggrandisement of power and the
+“cohesive force of public plunder” the administrators of government
+attempt to stretch it unduly, the opposition comes to power and the
+same story is repeated. In each case the liberal party succeeds the
+conservative, acts at first wisely, then corrupted by the subtle
+temptations of place and power, and wishing to retain both, it becomes
+opposed to change and begets a new conservatism, while new liberals arise
+on a higher plane of evolution to continue the never-ending struggle. And
+it must be recollected that the conservative party of each generation is
+far more liberal than the one which it displaced, thus giving assurance
+of perpetual progress.
+
+This has been the epitome of all American history; each party
+government, by whatever name it may have been known, has been liberal in
+comparison with its predecessor and conservative as to its successor.
+When Washington organised his administration it was no doubt regarded
+in Europe as highly revolutionary and anarchistic. But such a class
+government, with laws of entail and slavery, and cruel punishments for
+petty offences, as existed then, would not be tolerated for a single year
+at the present time. Thomas Jefferson who founded the democratic party,
+then called the republican, was a consistent opponent of aristocracy
+and personally was a man far in advance of his time, but most of his
+followers would be horrified if they should now come back to earth and
+see the powers possessed by the general government to-day, necessary,
+legitimate powers, without which the affairs of the nation could not be
+administered for a single week. The United States soon got rid of laws
+of entail and the established churches. The democracy came to power and
+held it nearly sixty years. Long continuance in office endeared its
+possession to that party while the very growth of the nation, from five
+millions to thirty-one millions, demanded changes in internal policy
+which were not forthcoming. There were not lacking signs of popular
+discontent. In 1840 the democrats met their first defeat, and for three
+or four presidential terms the votes vibrated between the democrats and
+the whigs. But the latter were not united on a consistent policy. They
+needed a principle. The principle was shaping itself. Slavery, which had
+been abolished in the Northern states, was gradually strengthening in
+the South. The democrats forgot, or rather most of them never learned,
+that true democracy knows no distinction of color. The abolitionists
+were denounced by press and pulpit as socialists, as the disturbers of
+public order, as blasphemers against the very law of God contained in
+Holy Writ. The people, however, returned to power these same socialists
+and the institution of chattel slavery was doomed. That would have been
+the case in any event, but the civil war precipitated it, just as many
+other unjust wars in history have resulted in disestablishing the very
+institutions to perpetuate which the wars were made.
+
+The republican party grandly and patriotically fulfilled its mission. By
+degrees, however, the enormous destruction of wealth during the war and
+the heavy debt entailed by it, created a burdensome system of taxation
+which substituted self-interest for patriotism. Duties were laid upon
+imports from abroad heavier than those which formed one of the chief
+causes for the revolt of the colonies against Great Britain. These duties
+enabled American manufacturers to make on American soil the same class
+of goods that were imported and charge the same price as the imported
+goods enhanced by the duty, of course pocketing for themselves the extra
+profit which the tariff aided them to obtain from consumers. The quickest
+way to wealth was to start some manufacture, get the government to put a
+tax on similar articles imported and pocket the difference, or to get an
+internal revenue measure passed taxing a certain line of domestic goods,
+pay the tax in the first instance and then charge it to the consumers
+with of course a good commission added for patriotic services. As long as
+the government had work for every man who could shoulder a musket, the
+pernicious effect of the system was not clearly seen. But when the war
+was over and one million men returned to productive avocations, wages
+began to fall. Then the question of taxation inevitably came to the
+front and has now become the living issue of the hour. The needle of the
+suffrage is again vibrating, the republican party has been deprived of
+power for four years and the democratic President emphasised the issue by
+pushing the question of tariff reform to the foreground. His re-election
+was defeated, but the question is debated with more vigor than ever, and
+all signs point to absolute free trade as one of the certainties of the
+future. Judging from the last Congressional elections, the people have at
+last turned their faces in the right direction.
+
+It will be noticed that two elements, which I have called the centripetal
+and the centrifugal, have been predominant in shaping American politics.
+They may be termed the socialistic and the anarchistic forces. Socialism
+claims the direction of everything by a strong centralised government.
+Anarchists say with the democrats, “That government is best which governs
+least,” and logically argue for the abolition of all government. Now,
+the right or wrong of these principles depends upon their application.
+Only the most rabid anarchist would object to the Post Office, for
+instance, and few socialists would claim that the state has a right to
+regulate a man’s clothing or his religion. It is on the question as to
+what subjects these principles should be applied that all our American
+parties arise. The early federalists were socialistic in that they
+believed in a strong central government and in relegating as few things
+as possible to the states. President Jefferson introduced the anarchistic
+or centrifugal principle of decentralisation and individualism. But as
+the nation grew, it was seen that this wrought injustice, especially in
+the matter of slavery which was a violation of human rights, however the
+different states might regard it. Then the socialistic or centripetal
+principle began to act and slavery disappeared. Now it seems likely
+that the individualistic principle will again become dominant in an
+attempt to abolish all fiscal restrictions upon trade. After this may
+follow the socialistic principle of state ownership of railways and
+telegraphs. Perhaps this will be the work of the new political forces
+evidently gathering, as foreshadowed by the Farmers’ Alliance, after the
+breaking-up of parties and after the democrats, having given us free
+trade, will have resumed their natural position of conservatives. Then,
+in the remoter future, may come the anarchistic principle of the removal
+of the restrictions against female suffrage. And so it will go on, first
+one principle acting and fulfilling its mission, then the other, each
+bringing the nation to a higher plane of progress and uniting it more and
+more closely with the grand upward march of the human race.
+
+What is this, after all? It is not socialism. It is not anarchy. It is
+neither democracy nor republicanism. It is EVOLUTION. It does not depend
+on the temporary success of party governments for its action. It does not
+even solely result from our unique position or our independence wrested
+from Great Britain. Back of it lie the broad principles of British
+liberty, of common law, of Magna Charta won from King John on the plains
+of Runnymede. Back of it is the great wave of democracy arising out of
+the darkness of the Middle Ages. Back of it are the injunctions of Him
+of Galilee who taught the natural law as no man ever taught before. Back
+of it is Roman jurisprudence and Greek art and culture and the early
+efforts of the days when Cadmus brought the alphabet to Europe with his
+Phœnician colony. Indeed, back of it lies the primeval impulse of the
+first man, God-endowed, ape-descended, who stood upon his feet and began
+to think. We may carry our thoughts still further to the times when the
+red sunlight first filtered through the thick clouds upon an uninhabited
+world, and still further may we go in thought into the ages of eternity,
+and assert with fullest confidence that the principles of progress to-day
+working themselves out in politics are but the reflection of the divine
+ideals founded in the laws of nature.
+
+Can the course of such progress be turned back? Can we despair of the
+future in the light of all the past? Is not the general movement onward
+and upward? Will not the sneers at ephemeral phases of our American
+politics pass away with the incidents which they justly condemn, while
+the principles of progress remain forever?
+
+                                                        THOMAS B. PRESTON.
+
+
+
+
+ARTIFICIAL SELECTION AND THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM.[7]
+
+
+By artificial selection I mean all conscious and purposive arrangements
+between men and women which have in view character of offspring. This is
+opposed to natural selection which is merely instinctive unteleological
+union with one of the opposite sex as impelled by animal passion or
+romantic love. All sexual union among the lower animals is by natural
+selection; they do not forecast consequences, and by conforming to
+known laws determine consequences. Among the lower races of men natural
+selection is the sole or at least dominant factor in marital matters,
+but as civilisation advances artificial selection becomes a more and
+more powerful element. A truly thoughtful and intelligent man in our
+day in view of marriage will most carefully consider his own life
+history and that of his parents and ancestors, and also that of his
+intended partner and her ancestors, as to physical or mental disease,
+which might be handed down to the issue of the proposed union. He
+would not, for instance, marry into a family which has a tendency to
+consumption or insanity, for this would be a crime against his possible
+descendants. Further, this growth of artificial selection with the
+progress of society is manifest not only as regards individual action but
+by state regulation. Even in barbarous states it soon becomes evident
+to the leaders that if strong healthy men are to be had to defend and
+maintain the nation, strict attention must be paid to the character of
+those who marry. In Sparta and other ancient states this principle was
+recognised, and modern governments seek in many more or less indirect
+ways to encourage marriage between the most fit, so that good citizens
+and warriors may be raised up to serve the state. All this regulation
+of marriage by either individual or state action which looks to the
+character of offspring I term artificial selection.
+
+In the evolution of man as a rational animal artificial selection will
+more and more prevail, and human breeding will become a well defined
+art. Man is always artificial,[8] and it is his goal to become in all
+his life unnatural and thoroughly artful. There can ultimately be no
+_laissez-faire_ policy as to marriage or any other institution. The
+history of marriage is the history of the gradual retirement of natural
+selection; but art has come in here more slowly than in other relations
+of life owing to tremendous conservatism and the power of human passion.
+But the time has now come when man must more than ever before attend by
+artificial selection—that is, purposed care—to the perpetuation of the
+species in the line of its true advancement, spiritual achievement. I do
+not now see how the necessity of artificial selection can be gainsaid by
+any one who takes a broad view of the evolution of the race.
+
+The methods of artificial selection are either negative, which restrain
+the unfit from propagating, or positive, which encourage the fit to
+propagate. The most radical negative method is mutilation, and is
+employed by man with the lower animals and with slaves, but this
+plan could hardly be used by civilised society for human breeding.
+Imprisonment temporarily restrains some classes of society from
+perpetuating themselves. Prevention of conception is at present mostly
+a voluntary means, but accomplishes the elimination of both fit and
+unfit. Celibacy of monk and nun, of bachelor and maid, works also in both
+directions. In many indirect ways society discourages from marriage those
+whom it supposes to be unfit as tested by wealth, rank, or birth.
+
+It is not, however, so much by the extension of any negative methods, but
+rather by positive means that artificial selection may be best employed.
+I will mention three forms by which human breeding might be materially
+advanced.
+
+By common law and custom the wife surrenders herself physically to submit
+and morally to obey the husband. This is not for the most part harshly
+and literally carried out in civilised countries; still there is a vast
+deal of oppression which is hidden from all eyes, and which is often
+passively received by women as her rightful lot. This again is a subject
+upon which delicacy—perhaps unwise—forbids free discussion, but its
+bearing is manifest. If women have the choice to bear or not to bear, and
+she with educated conscience choose by fitness of offspring, a large and
+powerful element of artificial selection may be introduced. Again all
+governments have laws concerning marriage which act in general toward
+encouraging the fit. Certain conditions as to age, etc., being fulfilled,
+the state grants a marriage licence, and public opinion might easily be
+led to make the requirements more stringent. As a physician has suggested
+to me a certificate of health from an approved medical examiner might
+be required of all applicants for legal marriage. This would certainly
+be a strong measure of artificial selection, and would save much misery
+springing from ignorance and vice. It surely seems scarcely fitting that
+those who cannot pass an examination for life insurance freely contract
+marriage with view to issue.
+
+But the plan of artificial selection which seems to me most feasible at
+the present time would be voluntary associations of men and women who
+bind themselves to learn and apply the laws of heredity in their marriage
+relations, to seek for expert guidance, and in all their life to live not
+merely purely, but according to reason and science. Heredity societies
+of this stamp which should favor marriages only between members would
+ultimately become a rational aristocracy, and true and good blood would
+be perpetuated in the best manner. There is much, indeed, to be done in
+the science of heredity, especially as regards laws of transmission of
+mental and moral qualities,[9] but still we have even now a sufficient
+basis of knowledge to make the experiment well worth trying.
+
+Many objections can be raised to such schemes. For instance, it will
+be said that they might assure us of obtaining men of talent, but we
+should forever lose men of genius. If such societies were in, vogue in
+the Elizabethan period, we might never have had a Shakespeare. What
+likelihood that a scientific expert would advise the marriage of John
+Shakespeare and Mary Arden! I answer that we should have had a dozen
+Shakespeares instead of one. The law of the production of geniuses is
+not beyond human ken. Maud S. is truly a genius in horseflesh, but
+she came into the world in no fortuitous or instinctive way, but by
+scientific breeding. The applicability of similar foresight in breeding
+men would produce geniuses in abundance. It may not be accomplished in an
+exactly analogous manner, an expert leading around eminent men to “make
+the season,” but the analogous practical results will nevertheless be
+obtained.
+
+Another objection which might be urged is that any such scheme would
+seriously diminish population. True; but what thoughtful man applies
+the numerical test to the progress of the race! It is not quantity of
+citizens but quality, which constitutes the true greatness of states. The
+counting of heads instead of what is in heads, is a mistake into which
+democracies are peculiarly apt to fall. Were all men exactly equal a
+census would be a true test, but considering the tremendous inequalities
+in humanity it is sheer folly for a country to glory in the number of its
+adherents, or a sect in the number of its adherents, or a city in the
+number of its citizens. Civilisations are weighed down and ultimately
+crushed by the dead weight of the masses. The barbarian is not without
+but within the civilisation. By recent inquiries in New York and Chicago
+the slums appear to be five times as prolific as the most aristocratic
+portions; and while good may come from the lowest born, and bad from the
+highest born, still the chances are decidedly in favor of the high born.
+A few rise above the level of their birth, a few sink below it, but the
+great majority of men remain for their lives on the general level of
+society in which they were born. The United States would be a greater
+nation with 10,000,000 choice inhabitants than with ten times 10,000,000
+of the ill bred and low bred. Athens by the vulgar test of numbers was
+but a small and mean city, but in true greatness as revealed in far
+reaching spiritual power, she stands in the very forefront.
+
+Again it will be objected that scientific schemes for human breeding
+would inevitably destroy that beautiful flower of Christian civilisation,
+the poetry and romance of love. Sentiment and chivalry would wither, and
+brutality and cold calculation would supplant all tender and refined
+emotion. I should answer that the true refinement which refuses to
+obtrude the things of sense, and true purity which refuses to dwell on
+them salaciously, are perfectly compatible with the fullest knowledge
+and the consequent action. Lubricity breeds best upon a half knowledge
+acquired in dubious ways. A serious practical scientific treatment of
+this subject will not glorify the flesh with the fierce gusto of Walt
+Whitman, nor, with the Zola school, dwell upon animalism with the morbid
+detail of a heated imagination; but it will bring into the clearest light
+the laws of sex and the rules for the development of the human race into
+the perfect man. These laws of nature, which science reveals, are laws of
+duty and laws of God, and when once appropriated as such by Ethics and
+Religion, they will become the basis for all that is high in emotion and
+chivalrous in action.
+
+In that most vital of matters, human breeding, man is far behind his
+progress in all other spheres of action; but here as elsewhere Science
+must enter, not to destroy but to fulfil, to build up manhood and
+womanhood into the perfected relations which can only come from rational
+action, illuminated by complete knowledge, and sanctioned by noblest
+sentiment.
+
+                                                         HIRAM M. STANLEY.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[7] In an article in _The Arena_ for June, 1890, I endeavored to plainly
+set forth the renewal of society from its lowest elements as the
+greatest disease in our social life, and to show that the remedy lies
+in a thorough application of science to human breeding. Just how this
+application was to be made I did not state, for I did not include this
+in the scope of my discussion. Mr. Stead in his _Review of Reviews_ for
+July, 1890, and Mr. Wallace in the September _Fortnightly Review_ and
+October _Popular Science Monthly_, 1890, have drawn inferences on this
+point which I am not prepared to allow. Mr. Stead speaks in headlines and
+in text of “murder, mutilation, or imprisonment” as the methods which I
+hint at, and Mr. Wallace remarks upon my views “that such interference
+with personal freedom in matters so deeply affecting individual happiness
+will never be adopted by the majority of any nation, or if adopted would
+never be submitted to by the minority without a life-and-death struggle.”
+It seems incumbent then on me to state more clearly what I understand
+by artificial selection, and what forms of it are most expedient at the
+present time.
+
+[8] By artificial I understand not what is unnatural or against nature
+but that which is after conscious deliberation more in accord with the
+laws of nature. It is a higher degree of the natural.
+
+[9] See my remarks on this point in _Nature_, Oct. 31, 1889.
+
+
+
+
+THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.
+
+
+I have read with interest Prof. Max Müller’s paper on the above subject
+in the current issue of _The Monist_, not only because it is in large
+part devoted to a consideration of my own work on “Mental Evolution,”
+but still more because the explanations which it supplies touching
+certain points of disagreement between us appear to show that I have
+not misrepresented his statements, even if, as he alleges, I have
+misapprehended his meanings.
+
+The work to which allusion has just been made was published in 1888, and,
+as far as I am aware, it is only now that Prof. Max Müller has sought to
+meet my views as there expressed. Hence we may take it that his answer
+is, at all events, well matured. Furthermore, we may take it, from the
+tone in which his answer is conveyed, that he credits me with having had
+at least an honest desire to understand, and accurately to represent,
+his meaning in all the places where I have ventured to criticise it. It
+appears, however, that at all events in one important respect I have
+betrayed “a complete misapprehension” of his meaning—viz. with reference
+to his “theory of the origin of roots” (_The Monist_, p. 582); and it is
+for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension that he has published
+the latter half of his present paper. My reply, therefore, must take
+the form of excusing myself for the complete misapprehensions which are
+alleged.
+
+It is desirable at the outset to emphasise a distinction which I was
+careful to draw in my work on “Mental Evolution in Man”—that, namely,
+between philology and philosophy. A man may be an excellent authority on
+the “Science of Language,” and yet but a very indifferent writer on the
+“Science of Thought.” On the other hand, a man may know nothing at first
+hand touching the special province of a philologist, and nevertheless
+be fully capable of criticising what a philologist has published in the
+way of theoretical deductions from his facts—especially where these
+deductions quit the sphere of philology, and soar into that of Darwinian,
+or anti-Darwinian, speculation. This distinction, indeed, between the
+particular science of philology and the general scope of philosophy,
+Prof. Max Müller himself recognises where he says: “While the student
+of language seems to me to have a perfect right to treat the roots of
+language as ultimate facts, it is difficult for the philosopher not to
+look beyond.” (_The Monist_, p. 579.) Nevertheless he complains of me
+because, while accepting all his philological facts upon his authority
+as a philologist (save in so far as they are not accepted by other
+philologists), I have been obliged to express dissent from not a few
+of his theoretical deductions—especially, as I have already indicated,
+where these have reference to the general doctrine of evolution as
+applied to the mind of man. But how, I may ask, could a treatise be
+written on “Mental Evolution in Man,” or “The Origin of Human Faculty,”
+without considering the results which have been gained by the science
+of comparative philology? Or how can it be maintained that, in order to
+deal with these results in relation to the general theory of descent, a
+writer must first of all himself become an authority in that particular
+science? At any rate, I deemed it enough for the only purposes which I
+had in view, to read attentively all the leading authorities in this
+science, and, after extracting from them the information upon matters of
+fact which their researches had established, to show what I regarded as
+the bearing of these facts upon the theory of mental evolution. Nor can I
+plead guilty to the charge of arrogant presumption, which the following
+words appear to convey:
+
+    “We see in his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim
+    to speak with authority on his own special subject, to venture
+    to speak with authority on subjects not his own. Professor
+    Romanes has, no doubt, read several books on philology and
+    philosophy, but he is not sufficiently master of his subject to
+    have the slightest right to speak of men like Noiré, Huxley,
+    Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of Hobbes, with an air of
+    superiority. That is entirely out of place.” (_The Monist_, p.
+    383.)
+
+Now that any such “air of superiority” occurs in my book, I must deny—and
+this is a matter of fact. Noiré is alluded to only with reference to
+his theory of the origin of language, which I go further in accepting
+than does any “philosopher” or “philologist,” with the single exception
+of Prof. Max Müller himself. Huxley is mentioned in several places as a
+leading authority on anatomical matters, where my argument requires an
+authoritative statement upon them. Herbert Spencer, curiously enough,
+is never mentioned at all; while Hobbes is named only once, and then as
+sustaining, by a “shrewd analysis,” an opinion which I am advocating by
+quotations from recognised authorities in philosophy. Truly, therefore,
+it would be well for my critic “to say nothing of Hobbes”; and better
+still if he had looked at my index before condemning my supposed
+treatment of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Noiré. As it is, his allusion
+to these names “is entirely out of place.”
+
+But even apart from this particularly unfortunate allusion, his more
+general charge as to my “venturing to speak authoritatively on subjects
+not his [my] own,” is equally out of place. The following is my
+introduction to the chapter on Comparative Philology, and I cannot see
+that it betokens any “air of superiority”:
+
+    “In now turning to this important branch of my subject, I may
+    remark, _in limine_, that, like all the sciences, philology can
+    be cultivated only by those who devote themselves specially
+    to the purpose. My function, therefore, will here be that
+    of merely putting together the main results of philological
+    research, so far as this has hitherto proceeded, and so far
+    as these results appear to me to have any bearing upon the
+    ‘origin of human faculty.’ Being thus myself obliged to rely
+    upon authority, where I find that authorities are in conflict,
+    I will either avoid the points of disagreement, or else state
+    what has to be said on both sides of the question. But where
+    I find that all competent authorities are in substantial
+    agreement, I will not burden my exposition by tautological
+    quotations.”
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Having thus disposed of a merely personal matter, I may pass on to my
+justification of the “complete misapprehension” into which I have fallen
+with respect to Prof. Max Müller’s work on the “Science of Thought.”
+
+In the first place he tells us:
+
+    “On page 267 Mr. Romanes says that I profess, as a result of
+    more recent researches, to have reduced the number of Sanskrit
+    roots to 121. I wish I had. But the number of roots in Sanskrit
+    stands as yet at about 800: the number 121 of which he speaks
+    is the number of concepts expressed by these roots, many of
+    them conveying the same, or nearly the same, idea.” (_The
+    Monist_, p. 583.)
+
+Now it is quite true that on page 267 I made the statement which is here
+challenged; but as I immediately go on to speak repeatedly of the “number
+121” as being “the number of concepts expressed by the roots,”—and
+actually quote at length the whole 121 concepts with Prof. Max Müller’s
+own heading,—I am not sure that the point is worth the stress which is
+now laid upon it. Nevertheless, I may explain why in this one passage
+I used the word “roots,” instead of the word “concepts.” Briefly, the
+only reason was because, according to Prof. Max Müller’s theory of
+the origin of roots, it seemed to me virtually the same thing, from
+a psychological point of view, whether we speak of the reduction in
+question as pertaining to roots or to concepts. For, according to the
+theory, “every root embodies a concept,” or is the obverse side of a
+concept. Consequently, if the Sanskrit language presents some 800 roots,
+while it is expressive of only 121 concepts, the balance of the 800 roots
+must be concerned in conveying the same, or nearly the same, ideas—as
+Prof. Max Müller himself expressly asserts in the above quotation from
+_The Monist_. Indeed, the whole object of his psychological analysis of
+linguistic roots was to prove that such is the case; and, therefore, that
+the 121 roots which serve to convey the 121 concepts are the only roots
+required for the purposes of communication in Sanskrit speech. No doubt
+it would have been better if I had stated all this in my book; but even
+if its omission led to obscurity, I can scarcely see that on this account
+there could have been a “misrepresentation” where there was certainly
+no “misapprehension.” For, as already stated, I spoke of “121 roots”
+only once, while I alluded to “121 concepts” many times—and usually,
+moreover, in inverted commas. Lastly, it may be observed that, following
+his theory concerning the “origin of roots,” Prof. Max Müller himself
+so far identifies roots with concepts as to head one of his lists, in
+large capitals—ROOTS OR CONCEPTS. Therefore in saying that he professed
+to have reduced the psychologically efficient elements of Sanskrit speech
+to 121 constituents, it did not appear to me that I was departing from
+his own terminology when in one passage I spoke of these 121 constituents
+as roots, while everywhere else I spoke of them as concepts. “Give us,”
+he says, “about 800 roots, and we can explain the largest dictionary;
+give us about 121 concepts, and we can account for the 800 roots.”
+(“Science of Thought,” p. 551.) Well, if this is so, the 800 roots (i. e.
+phonetically separable elements) have been reduced to the 121 “concepts
+or roots” (i. e. psychologically separable elements). My critic cannot
+both have his cake and eat it. Either he must abide by the philological
+meaning of a root, as the ultimate result of philological analysis; or
+else he must abide by his own philosophical meaning of a root, as the
+embodiment of a concept. Under the former definition there will be about
+800 roots of Sanskrit; under the latter definition, and according to his
+analysis, there will be only 121.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The next point with regard to which “complete misapprehension” is alleged
+may best be presented by my critic’s own words, thus:
+
+    “Professor Romanes thinks it necessary to remark that ‘these
+    concepts do not represent the ideation of primitive man’! I
+    never said they did. I never pretended to be acquainted with
+    the ideation of primitive man. All I maintained was that,
+    making allowance for obscure words, every thought, that of the
+    lowest savage as well as of the most minute philosopher, can be
+    expressed with these 800 roots, and traced back to these 121
+    concepts.” (_The Monist_, p. 584.)
+
+Now, it is perhaps needless to say, I am extremely glad to learn that
+such was the meaning intended; but I trust that the following quotations
+will furnish a sufficient excuse for my misunderstanding of it:
+
+    “I hope that those who will carefully examine the results
+    at which I have arrived, will admit that they prove by
+    overwhelming evidence that the meanings of roots are really
+    what we expected them to be, and that they express the
+    primitive social acts of primitive social man, and the states
+    more or less closely associated with such acts.” (“Science of
+    Thought,” p. 403.)
+
+From this it appears that if Prof. Max Müller never professed to be
+acquainted with the ideation of _primitive_ man, he did profess to have
+proved, by overwhelming evidence, a very large acquaintance, not only
+with the ideation, but also with primitive acts of primitive _social_
+man. Possibly his acquaintance with both these matters is very much
+more intimate than mine; but as I have always taken it to be virtually
+certain that “primitive man” was “social” in his habits, I should like
+to learn the reasons which have induced my critic to believe in a still
+more “primitive man,” who was addicted to a solitary mode of life. For,
+otherwise, the only distinction on which his criticism appears to rest is
+a distinction without a difference.
+
+Again he says:
+
+    “The Science of Thought assures us that every thought that ever
+    crossed the mind of man can be traced back to about 121 simple
+    concepts.” (Ibid., p. 418.)
+
+And that the word “man” here is not intended tacitly to exclude
+“primitive man” (whether “social” or solitary), I gathered from the fact
+of the 121 concepts in question being tabulated under the heading, in
+large capitals, THE 121 ORIGINAL CONCEPTS. For, if the word “original”
+here was intended to mean original only with reference to the Sanskrit
+language, why did the writer follow it up with his statement about the
+Science of Thought, assuring us that _every_ thought which had _ever_
+crossed the mind of _man_ could be _traced back_ to these 121 original
+concepts?
+
+Lastly, not only by such particular passages was I led to suppose that
+the writer was referring to “primitive man” when he was writing about
+“primitive social man,” etc.; but still more was I led to suppose this
+by the whole drift and tenor of his work. For what would be the sense
+of all his disquisitions upon the importance of linguistic science in
+its relation to the theory of evolution, if he intended to restrict his
+inferences to the _semi-civilised_ condition of man, which (as he allows)
+must have been the condition of the speakers of Sanskrit? Clearly, if
+this were his intention, there would have been _no_ sense in all these
+disquisitions; and therefore, here again, my critic cannot both preserve
+his cake and consume it. Either let him adopt the position which he
+takes up in _The Monist_, as a philologist pure and simple, who “never
+pretended to be acquainted with the ideation of primitive man,” who
+refuses to go beyond the “facts” of the “Science of Language,” or to
+speculate upon their theoretical relations to the “Science of Thought”:
+or else let him do as he does in his published works—superimpose upon his
+functions as a “Student of Language” the functions of a “Philosopher,”
+freely speculate upon “the origin of roots,” elaborately argue the whole
+psychology of “concepts,” and strenuously endeavor to show that “language
+is the Rubicon of mind,” which not only now, but at all times, has
+separated man from the lower animals, as a being mysterious in origin, if
+not unique in kind.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Next we are told:
+
+    “Professor Romanes dwells on what he calls the interesting
+    feature of all roots being verbs. This is simply a
+    contradiction in terms. In giving the meaning of roots scholars
+    generally employ the infinitive or the participle, “to go,”
+    or “going”; but they have stated again and again that a root
+    ceases to be a root as soon as it is used in a sentence.” (_The
+    Monist_, p. 584.)
+
+Now, by a “verb” I understand a word that signifies either an action or a
+state; and by a “root” I understand—here agreeing with Prof. Max Müller
+himself—“an element of human speech,” so far as this has been hitherto
+reduced by philological analysis. Again, I hold—in this also agreeing
+with him—that “as soon as a root is used for predication it becomes a
+word, whether outwardly it is changed or not.” (“Science of Thought,” p.
+440.) Well, if we are agreed upon these points, I do not see how there
+can be any “contradiction in terms” when I stated the fact “of all roots
+being verbs.”
+
+In the first place, if one were to agree with Prof. Max Müller himself
+in holding that originally every root was “something real, something
+that was actually used in conversation” (Ibid. p. 420), there can be no
+contradiction in terms if we translate this into saying that originally
+every root was a word—for the mere quibble that not until it was spoken
+did the root become a word does not affect the matter, any more than if
+we were to say the same of any word now in use, which has given birth to
+a progeny of other words. But even if we disagree with Prof. Max Müller,
+and suppose that roots are merely “phonetic elements,” or the residual
+extract of a group of originally allied words, we should still be correct
+in saying that the “concepts” which they “embody” are all concepts which
+now admit of being expressed in equivalent words.
+
+So much for the “contradiction in terms,” which is alleged to arise if we
+speak of roots as _words_. Touching the second point, or the accuracy of
+saying that the words which roots express are always _verbs_, my defence
+is sufficiently easy. For to say, as my critic says, that “in giving
+the meaning of roots scholars generally employ the infinitive or the
+participle,” appears to me a most unphilosophical observation, since it
+appears to indicate that in the opinion of its writer the significance
+of a verb is but conventionally given to a root by the verbal form into
+which it is thrown by scholars. But the fact is that, even if they tried,
+scholars could rarely deprive a root of its significance as a verb, no
+matter into what verbal form they might choose to throw it. Take any root
+at random, such as HA _to go_. However much we may ring the changes, as
+“to go,” “going,” “goer,” it is impossible to get rid of the fundamental
+significance of the root as a verb. And although it is, of course,
+possible to select a root which presents a more equivocal interpretation,
+the cases in which this can be done are, comparatively speaking, not
+numerous, and apparently never such as to exclude the probability of its
+having primarily conveyed the force of a verb. For instance, HUR _to
+fall_, may be regarded either as a verb or a noun-substantive; but we
+cannot say that there is anything to render more probable the view of
+the root having been originally expressive of a fall than of the act of
+falling; and inasmuch as there do not appear to be any roots which _can_
+only have originally had the force of nouns or adjectives, while there
+are so many which _can_ only have originally had the force of verbs,
+we may fairly conclude that in the accidentally more equivocal cases
+the roots were likewise originally expressive of actions or of states.
+For, if not, why are there not as many roots which convey such meanings
+as _sky_, or _blue_ (which never can have had equivalents in the forms
+of verbs), as there are roots like HA, where we cannot doubt that the
+meaning from the first must have been the meaning of a verb?
+
+I am the more surprised at this head of Prof. Max Müller’s criticism,
+because it belongs to the very essence of his own theory touching “the
+origin of roots,” that they _must_ all originally have conveyed the
+meaning of verbs. Therefore from end to end of his own book he constantly
+alludes to roots as expressive of “actions”; never as expressive of
+objects or qualities. For instance:
+
+    “All, or nearly all, the roots of Sanskrit, or rather of the
+    Aryan family in general, express, as we shall see, acts, and
+    more particularly the commonest acts performed by members of a
+    primitive society.” (“Science of Thought,” p. 272.)
+
+And even in _The Monist_ article itself the same thing is stated thus:
+
+    “Let us remember that a most careful psychological analysis
+    had led Noiré to the conclusion that the germs of all
+    conceptional thought were to be found in the consciousness of
+    our own repeated acts. And let us place by the side of this,
+    the well-ascertained fact that the germs of all conceptional
+    language, what we call roots, express with few exceptions the
+    repeated acts of men.” (_The Monist_, p. 580.)
+
+Again:
+
+    “We begin with the fact that the great bulk of a language
+    consists of words, derived, according to the strictest rules,
+    not from cries, but from articulate roots. No one denies this.
+    We follow this up with a second fact, that nearly all the roots
+    express acts of men. No one denies that.” (p. 588.)
+
+Very well then, I submit that the only real distinction between Prof. Max
+Müller’s rendering of this “fact,” and my own rendering of it, consists
+in my having added “states” to “acts,” and observing that then the
+comparatively few outstanding roots may be included with the “nearly all”
+under the one category of “verbs.”
+
+For the distinction which he draws in _The Monist_ is not a real
+distinction: it is merely a verbal distinction.
+
+Here it is:
+
+    “If Professor Romanes approves of my saying that roots stood
+    for any part of speech, just as the monosyllabic expressions
+    of children do, I can only say that, if I ever said so, I
+    expressed myself incorrectly. A root never stands for any part
+    of speech, because as soon as it is a part of speech it is no
+    longer a root.” (_The Monist_, p. 585.)
+
+This, as I have previously observed, is merely a quibble. If originally
+every root was “something real, something used in conversation,”
+originally all roots were _words_, in just the same sense as “the
+monosyllabic expressions of children” are words. And if “nearly all these
+roots express the acts of man,” while most (if not all) the outstanding
+residuum were apparently expressive of states, it follows that the
+roots in question were not only words, but _verbs_. And in stating this
+“fact” I supposed that I was but following Prof. Max Müller’s statement
+of it, where he constitutes it the philological basis of his theory on
+the “origin of roots”—viz. that all roots sprang from sounds made by
+“primitive social man” when engaged in their “social _acts_.” But, while
+accepting this fact, I objected to the theory raised upon it, because
+the latter did not consider that roots which originally had the force of
+verbs must have been more likely to have survived, and so to have come
+down to us, than those which may originally have had the significance
+of any other parts of speech. And it was only in order to supply this
+further consideration that I alluded to the “fact” at all.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+We come next to some disparaging remarks upon “babies,” “parrots,”
+and the lower animals generally (_The Monist_, pp. 586-7). Prof. Max
+Müller “refuses to argue” with me, “or any other philosopher, either in
+the nursery or the menagerie.” So be it. As a philologist, of course,
+he is assuredly right; no one would expect him so to argue. But as a
+philosopher, who has written a large book on the “Science of Thought,” he
+is no less assuredly wrong. And one may be pardoned for wondering at this
+intentionally ostrich-like attitude on the part of a philosopher—who is
+“going beyond the origin of roots”—with respect to the fundamental germs
+of the sign-making faculty.
+
+Again, my critic appears to imagine that I am a supporter of the
+onomatopoetic theory—to the extent of regarding _all_ human language as
+having originated in imitations of natural sounds. (_The Monist_, pp.
+586-7.) But over and over again I have stated that this is not my view.
+I believe, indeed, that there is a very large amount of truth in this
+theory; but I deem it on all grounds most improbable that the principle
+of imitation has been the _only_ principle concerned in the origin of
+speech. I have argued that probably many other principles must have been
+concerned, including the “synergastic” principle suggested by Noiré, and
+enthusiastically adopted by my critic as alone sufficient to explain the
+whole problem of the origin of speech—and this although it is clearly but
+a particular branch of the general onomatopoetic theory. Hence, so far
+as I am concerned, it does not signify one iota whether any given root
+owed its origin to the principle of imitation, or to some other of the
+general principles which I believe to have been concerned in the birth
+of articulate language. And, if possible, still less does it signify
+whether or not in the development of any given word, such as “thunder,”
+the original root-sound has been afterwards imitatively modified, “from a
+feeling that it should be so.” These matters are no doubt of importance
+within the four corners of philology; but in relation to the “biological
+theory” of descent they present no importance at all.
+
+Yet I am told:
+
+    “Those who cannot see the difference between a man, or for all
+    that, between a mocking-bird, saying _Cuckoo_, and a whole
+    community fixing on the sound of TAN, as differentiated by
+    various suffixes and prefixes, and expressing the concept
+    of stretching in such words as _tonos_, _tone_, _tonitru_,
+    _thunder_, _tanu_, _tenuis_, _thin_, should not meddle with the
+    Science of Language.” (_The Monist_, pp. 588-9.)
+
+Doubtless. But as no word of this applies to me, I may be permitted to
+observe that if any one who has read my book can possibly suppose that it
+does, he should not meddle with the Science of Thought.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In conclusion, if it be the case that I have completely misapprehended
+Prof. Max Müller with regard to the points which he has mentioned,—and
+all of which I have now considered,—have I not furnished sufficient
+justification? Even now I cannot see in what respects it is possible
+to amend any subsequent edition of my book, so as to correct the
+misapprehensions which are alleged. But although my “mistakes” are thus
+far from “clear,” I am glad to have had this opportunity of publicly
+discussing them with Prof. Max Müller, if only for the sake of adding the
+following remarks.
+
+Be it observed, in the first place, that whatever may be thought of the
+foregoing “justification,”—whether it be held that the misapprehensions
+are due to ambiguity on the one side or to obtuseness on the other,—at
+least it is certain that the misapprehensions complained of all have
+reference to points of no importance whatsoever as regards the general
+theory of descent, even although some of them are not altogether
+without importance as regards the particular science of philology. Thus
+it is quite immaterial, so far as the doctrine of _Mental Evolution_
+is concerned, whether we say that the roots of Sanskrit are 800,
+philologically speaking, or 121, psychologically speaking. Again, as
+soon as it is explained by Prof. Max Müller that by his “121 original
+concepts” he means the number of concepts “original” only as regards
+the Sanskrit language; that by “primitive social man” he means only the
+semi-civilised progenitors of the Indo-European race; that by “every
+thought that ever crossed the mind of man” admitting of being “traced
+back to about 121 simple concepts,” he means no more than that such is
+the case as regards the recent and highly evolved Aryan branch of the
+human species;—when once all this is explained, it becomes evident that
+thus far there _can_ be no difference of opinion between us. For in that
+case he is not dealing with “the Origin of Human Faculty,” either in
+regard to language or to thought: he is considering merely the higher
+inflorescence of both. Once more, whether all, or nearly all, the roots
+of Sanskrit can properly be called _words_, and, if so, whether we must
+not go still further and call them _verbs_,—these are questions of
+mere terminology. If the roots were originally “used in conversation,”
+and if, as thus used, they were, with but few doubtful exceptions, all
+expressive of “acts” or “states,” it becomes mere verbal hair-splitting
+to challenge the propriety of saying that the roots were originally
+verbs. At all events, the matter has nothing to do with the general
+question of man’s derivative origin. Lastly, the same has to be said of
+the purely philological question as to how far the principle of imitation
+has obtained in the first formation of these archaic “words,” or “roots.”
+For, archaic though they be in a philological sense, in a phylological
+sense they are things of yesterday, and so can scarcely be said to have
+any direct relation at all to “the origin of speech,” or the rise of
+articulate sign-making. This has to be inferred from observations in
+the “menagerie,” as distinguished from research in the library; and the
+fact that Prof. Max Müller expressly refuses to give me the pleasure of
+his company where the best materials for studying the really “primitive”
+condition of the sign-making faculty are to be met with, merely renders
+more impossible than ever any real collision between his linguistic
+studies on the one side, and my “biological theory” on the other.
+
+But although it thus appears sufficiently evident that my
+“misapprehensions” of his linguistic conclusions are as unimportant
+in relation to the theory of descent as they are few—and, I think,
+also excusable—in themselves, it is impossible to doubt that far below
+the level of Sanskrit roots, and far beyond the range of philological
+science, there is a wide difference of opinion between us. For when he
+passes from the “Science of Language” to the “Science of Thought,”—when
+he quits his sphere as a philologist to enter that of the philosopher,—he
+persistently and consistently affirms that what he calls “the old barrier
+between man and beast” remains, and that he is as yet unable to perceive
+how it can ever be removed. This barrier of course is predicative
+language—the obverse side of conceptional thought; and the firm opinion
+thus expressed by so eminent a philologist is not only of weight _per
+se_, but is rendered more so on account of the manifest freedom from
+prejudice with which it is associated. It is on this account that I
+devoted so much space in my book on “Mental Evolution” to a consideration
+of his views; and therefore I am sorry that his present reply has not
+been directed to meeting my criticisms on this really important matter
+of philosophical doctrine, rather than to indicating “misapprehensions”
+with regard to such merely trivial matters of a purely philological kind
+as those which I have here been dealing with. But perhaps at some future
+time he may give me the benefit of his criticism upon my work as a whole,
+or not merely on the fringes of such details as really have no bearing on
+the objects of that work.
+
+And, if he should ever see his way to doing this, I am quite sure that
+the discussion would be one of a friendly character. For the points
+at issue would all have reference to that large and vague domain of
+speculative theory touching “the origin of human faculty,” where it is
+inevitable—and, in my judgment, even desirable—that wide differences of
+opinion should obtain. We are but at the commencement of a great and
+obscure problem, which only in our own generation has been presented by
+the science of biology to the contemplation of philosophy. Therefore it
+would be folly indeed if any man were to regard his own opinions upon it
+as other than provisional—and even more foolish if he were to introduce
+any “_meum_ and _tuum_ into these discussions.”
+
+Thus I invite Prof. Max Müller to state the grounds of his assertion in
+_The Monist_, that “all the facts of real language are against” me as
+an advocate of what he calls the biological theory of the developmental
+origin of man. This theory, he says, “derives no support whatever from
+the Science of Language.” I believe, on the other hand, that these are
+wholly unwarranted statements; and that the Science of Language does
+support the theory in question to as high a degree as is possible from
+the nature of the case. On account of this great difference of opinion, I
+felt, when writing my book, that I should be doing but scant justice to
+the matured judgment of so eminent a philologist if I did not carefully
+consider all that he had written upon the subject. And so, as I have
+said, I devoted more of my book to a consideration of his views than to
+those of any other philologist; and while accepting his scientific facts
+on his authority as a philologist, I nevertheless felt it incumbent on me
+to show why his philosophical deductions, where they had reference to the
+theory of descent, appeared to me by no means of equivalent value. This
+distinction, as I observed at the commencement of the present article, is
+surely a legitimate distinction; and I should be sorry indeed if anything
+that I have ever said can appear inconsistent with the genuine admiration
+which is due to Prof. Max Müller as “a student of language,” or with the
+no less genuine esteem which I have the best reason for knowing is due to
+him as a friend.
+
+                                                        GEORGE J. ROMANES.
+
+
+
+
+THE CONTINUITY OF EVOLUTION.
+
+THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE VERSUS THE SCIENCE OF LIFE, AS REPRESENTED BY
+PROF. F. MAX MÜLLER AND PROF. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES.
+
+
+All the sciences form, or at least ought to form, one great system,
+culminating in the science of sciences. Therefore it is more than
+doubtful how any science could exist without being somehow in contact
+with other sciences; and all of them must stand in some relation to
+philosophy. It is necessary that each science should develop in relative
+independence of the other sciences. We cannot expect to decide, for
+instance, chemical problems by physical or purely mechanical laws
+before we have carefully searched the nature and conditions of chemical
+processes. But as soon as this has been done we can expect that a
+comparison between the results of two or more sciences will throw new
+light upon the subject-matter on both sides. Solomon says: “To everything
+there is a season and a time to every purpose under the heaven.” Thus the
+sciences have to grow, each one on its own grounds, and when they have
+reached a certain state of maturity, they will coalesce with each other.
+And two sciences will by their coalescence fertilise the one the other so
+as to produce a new department which may by and by develop into a special
+science.
+
+Now it appears to the uninitiated as if the spiritual world of science
+were in every respect different from the world of objective realities
+around us. While in the world of bodily realities the struggle for
+existence is fought eternal peace is supposed to reign in the sacred
+halls of intellectual aspirations. Says the German poet:
+
+    “_Härt in dem Raume stossen sich die Körper,_
+    _Leicht bei einander wohnen die Gedanken._”
+
+This is true only in a very limited sense. Ideas are the most intolerant
+beings imaginable. The struggle for existence is raging as fiercely in
+the intellectual realm as in the world of realities, and there also the
+law that the fittest will survive holds good.
+
+Far be it from us to denounce this state of general warfare, for although
+it is hard on those who succumb, it is the means by which evolution
+becomes possible; and evolution in the domain of science means a nearer
+approach to truth. If in the evolution of thought two neighboring
+sciences have developed so far as to meet, a struggle will ensue. The
+ideas on the two sides will have to fight before they coalesce. It
+is natural that different scientists look at things from different
+standpoints. They have developed a terminology which exactly suits their
+purpose and thus the representatives of the different sciences are often
+like people of a different nationality. They do not understand each
+other because they speak different languages. Moreover they have not
+unfrequently a different religion; that means, their ideas about truth
+and the test of truth appear to be different and sometimes they regard
+one another as no better than heathens. The battle is unavoidable,
+and considering all in all, the battle is desirable, it should not be
+avoided. The fittest to survive being the truest, the whole progress of
+science through the struggle for existence among ideas consists in the
+approach to truth.
+
+It may be objected that there are peacemakers who will reconcile the
+contending parties. True. And it is further true that the aim of every
+war is peace. But a peacemaker can be successful only if his mind is
+broad enough to let the whole battle be fought out within himself.
+The battle itself is and will remain unavoidable. Idea stands against
+idea, and the mental process of reflection is nothing but a struggle of
+conflicting ideas which takes place in one and the same mind. The aim of
+all reflection is the settlement of the conflict, so that all ideas will
+agree. The two parties disappear in one; errors are given up, and that
+which is consistent only will remain. In other words Dualism makes room
+for Monism.
+
+It is a good sign of the times that a battle has begun to rage between
+the so-called natural sciences and the science of language. The old
+Hegelian distinction between the _Geisteswissenschaften_ and the
+_Naturwissenschaften_ has been surrendered; and Prof. F. Max Müller was
+among the foremost to inculcate the truth that philology is a natural
+science. If philology is a natural science it cannot be but that its
+subject of investigation is a part of nature and as such it stands in
+close relation to other parts of nature. One and the same thing may
+be the subject of investigation of different sciences. One and the
+same plant may be an object of observation to the physiologist, to the
+botanist, to the druggist, to the physician, and to the chemist. Their
+standpoints and their purposes being different, they will bring to light
+very different results, and if these results are contradictory among each
+other the conflict is at hand. It cannot be shirked but must be decided
+by an honest and square fight. We have witnessed of late a conflict
+between philology and anthropology concerning the origin of the Aryas
+and it looks as if this conflict will contribute much to promote our
+knowledge of the oldest history of mankind, although the last word has
+not as yet been spoken: _adhuc sub judice lis est_.
+
+We are now confronted with a conflict between Philology and Biology. The
+first skirmishes have been fought by two men who are entitled to speak,
+each one in behalf of his science. Prof. F. Max Müller stands up for
+philology and Prof. George John Romanes for biology.
+
+Professor Romanes takes it for granted that the rational mind of man has
+developed gradually from the lower stage of the brute. He says in his
+book “Mental Evolution in Man,” p. 276:
+
+    “The whole object of these chapters has been to show, that on
+    psychological grounds it is abundantly intelligible how the
+    conceptual stage of ideation may have been gradually evolved
+    from the receptual—the power of forming general, or truly
+    conceptual ideas, from the power of forming particular and
+    generic ideas. But if it could be shown—or even rendered in any
+    degree presumable—that this distinctly human power of forming
+    truly general ideas arose _de novo_ with the first birth of
+    articulate speech, assuredly my whole analysis would be
+    destroyed: the human mind would be shown to present a quality
+    different in origin—and, therefore, in kind—from all the
+    lower orders of intelligence: the law of continuity would be
+    interrupted at the terminal phase: an impassable gulf would be
+    fixed between the brute and the man.”
+
+And Prof. Max Müller criticises the position of Professor Romanes in an
+article on Thought and Language (_The Monist_, Vol. I. No. 4, p. 582); he
+says:
+
+    “My learned friend, Professor Romanes, labors to show that
+    there is an unbroken mental evolution from the lowest animal
+    to the highest man. But he sees very clearly and confesses
+    very honestly that the chief difficulty in this evolution is
+    language and all that language implies. He tries very hard to
+    remove that barrier between beast and man.... Professor Romanes
+    is, I believe, a most eminent biologist, and the mantle of
+    Darwin is said to have fallen on his shoulders. Far be it from
+    me to venture to criticise his biological facts. But we see in
+    his case how dangerous it is for a man who can claim to speak
+    with authority on his own special subject, to venture to speak
+    authoritatively on subjects not his own.”
+
+It is not at all my intention to appear on the battle-field as a
+peacemaker between these two generals, or to settle the problems that
+arise from the conflict between philology and biology. That will
+be better done by the parties concerned, and I am rather inclined
+to speak with Schiller when he thought of the struggle between the
+transcendentalist philosopher and the empirical naturalist:
+
+    “Enmity be between you! Your alliance would not be in time yet.
+      Though you may separate now, Truth will be found by your search.”
+
+I look forward with great interest to further discussions which will
+bring out with more clearness the positions of both parties, and it is
+not impossible that both parties as soon as they have better understood
+each other, will agree much better than either of them expected. But
+it may be permitted me to make a few comments upon a proposition that
+is involved in this conflict, which, however, properly considered, is
+neither of a philological nor a biological nature. This is the idea of
+the continuity of evolution. Prof. Max Müller says somewhere that, if
+a Darwinian means an evolutionist, he had been a Darwinian long before
+Darwin. “How a student of the science of language,” he says, “can be
+anything but an evolutionist is to me utterly unintelligible.” So there
+is no doubt about his being an evolutionist as much as Professor Romanes.
+But the question is, What means evolutionist? Is he an evolutionist who
+believes in a piecemeal evolution interrupted here and there by acts of
+special creation? In my conception of the term, an evolutionist believes
+in evolution wherever there is life and this involves the wholesale
+rejection of special-creation acts as well as of the idea that any being
+or organism (the organism of language included) could ever have made its
+appearance in full growth and maturity or that any phenomenon of life
+could present a break in the continuity of evolution.
+
+The Greek myth tells us that the Goddess of Reason, the blue-eyed Pallas
+Athene, was not born like other gods and mortals in the natural way of a
+slow development. She jumped out of the head of Zeus full-armed in all
+her beauty and gifted with the powers of her unusual accomplishments.
+Is this myth true after all? Does the Logos of rational thought
+present us with an instance in which the development process has been
+interrupted? If so, we shall have to abandon the evolution theory as a
+theory and return to the old-fashioned view of special-creation acts.
+The difference between these two views is not of degree, but of kind.
+He who accepts the principle of evolution as the law of life abandons
+forever the idea of special and unconnected beginnings as much as that of
+special-creation acts. He cannot with consistency believe in an evolution
+with interruptions, for the theory of evolution is serviceable only if
+evolution is conceived as continuous. Prof. Max Müller of course has a
+right to define and use the word evolutionist as he sees fit, but if he
+excludes continuity from the idea of evolution, we declare that he has
+taken out the quintessence of its meaning and the core of its truth.
+
+Why this is so, we shall now briefly discuss.
+
+The evolution theory has been gradually developed by empirical
+investigations and it owes its all but universal acceptance to the great
+mass of _a posteriori_ evidence furnished by the natural sciences. It
+rests nevertheless upon a better and safer foundation than isolated
+instances of hap-hazard experience. Its foundation is quarried out of
+another and more reliable material. The evolution theory rests upon the
+ground of _a priori_ arguments.
+
+By _a priori_ we do not understand anything mysterious, but simply such
+cognition as possesses universality and necessity. That cognition which
+is in possession of universality and necessity is also called formal
+cognition. The formal sciences (for instance arithmetic, mathematics,
+pure logic, and pure mechanics) give us information about such truths as
+are applicable, because they are purely formal, to the formal conditions
+of anything and everything possible. Because we know _beforehand_ that
+the purely formal laws will hold good under all conditions Kant called
+their formulated theorems “a priori.” All the objections to the idea of
+apriority made by John Stuart Mill and other empiricists are due to their
+misinterpretation of the term.[10]
+
+Mr. Mill was mistaken when he thought Kant meant _a priori_ cognitions
+were innate ideas which came to man from spheres unknown. The very first
+sentence of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” proves that Kant knew of no
+other knowledge than that which begins with experience. Kant says, “That
+all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.” But our
+knowledge consists of two elements, viz. the empirical and the formal.
+The former bears always the character of the special and incidental,
+the latter of the universal and necessary. The former is sensory, being
+furnished by the senses, the latter is properly mental originating in and
+with the action of the mind in dealing with sense-materials, in arranging
+them and bringing them into certain relations.
+
+Formal knowledge is different in kind from empirical knowledge. The
+rule “twice two is four” will hold good for all possible cases, but the
+statement “A swan is white” does not hold good for all possible cases.
+European swans as a rule are white, but Australian swans are black, and
+for all we know, we might find swans that are blue, or red, or yellow.
+Empirical knowledge is full of exceptions, formal knowledge is rigid,
+there is no exception to any rule of formal knowledge.
+
+All formal knowledge has developed by degrees. The history of the
+sciences, of mathematics, logic, arithmetic, and also of the natural
+sciences furnishes sufficient evidence. The formal part of the natural
+sciences, by Kant called _reine Naturwissenschaft_, consists of such
+cognitions as the law of cause and effect and the law of the conservation
+of matter and energy. The formulation of these laws has been accomplished
+after much and careful empirical investigation. And it could not be
+otherwise. The latter law was elaborated in its full clearness long after
+Kant. The law of causality and the law of the conservation of matter
+and energy are purely formal, they are not sense-impressions and do
+not contain any sensory elements. They are general rules of universal
+applicability which being rigidly universal and without exceptions are
+necessary under all conditions. Before we make any experiment we can know
+that they will hold good in the experiment. Indeed all our experimenting
+is based upon the supposition that the law of causation holds good and
+that there can be neither an increase nor a decrease of matter and energy.
+
+The mistake made by the so-called transcendentalists is this, that
+they consider formal thought as having an independent existence, being
+ready at hand before cognition is possible, while in fact it is a part
+of cognition which at least in its germ is present in every actual
+experience.
+
+The theory of evolution is not more and not less a formal principle
+than the law of causation and the law of the conservation of matter and
+energy. Indeed it is nothing but the same thing applied to a special
+case. The theory of evolution is the principle of the conservation
+of matter and energy applied to the province of life. The theory
+of evolution denies the possibility of special acts of creation.
+There cannot come something out of nothing. And the new creations
+that actually originate daily before our eyes are not creations from
+nothing, they are simply transformations. There was a time on earth in
+which no living being existed, neither plant nor animal. How did life
+originate? Our answer is, It did not originate out of nothing, but it
+evolved. Non-organised matter organised. That non-organised matter must
+contain the elementary conditions of organised life is a conclusion
+which we cannot escape from our point of view; and which is fully and
+satisfactorily corroborated by our daily experience that water, earth,
+and air under the sun’s influence are changed into wheat; and wheat is
+manufactured into the bread which nourishes man and sustains his life.
+Non-organised particles of matter are constantly being organised in
+living organisms and displace the worn-out materials in their tissues—not
+one atom of the latter remaining for good in a healthy living body.
+
+The theory of evolution may be called an hypothesis, an assumption, a
+presumption. But in that case we must say with Mill that the rule twice
+two is four is also a mere assumption. The evidence for the latter is not
+stronger than that for the former. Mill declares that after all twice two
+might somewhere be five. Exactly so and not otherwise evolution might be
+somewhere interrupted, so that something would originate out of nothing
+instead of evolving from other things through transformation.
+
+Prof. Max Müller speaks very sarcastically about the speechless man, the
+_homo alalus_ who is supposed to be the ancestor of the present man. He
+says (l. c., p. 585):
+
+    “Of the _Homo alalus_, the speechless progenitor of _Homo
+    sapiens_, with whom Professor Romanes seems so intimately
+    acquainted, students of human speech naturally know nothing.”
+
+Prof. Max Müller also condemns all efforts of approaching the problem
+of the origin of language through observation of children and animals.
+The former he calls “nursery philology” the latter “menagerie
+psychology.” And it is certainly true that the problem of the origin
+of language cannot be solved from observations of children or animals,
+because the problem lies in another field. The problem is not how a
+ready made language is transferred upon the growing mind of a baby
+but how speechless beings developed into speaking beings. And all the
+intelligence of clever animals is still very different from the rational
+thought of man. This is true, but it is also true that good observations
+of animal psychology and also of nursery philology will throw some light
+upon the evolution of rational thought.
+
+Prof. Max Müller says:
+
+    “How can we attempt to realise what passes within the mind of
+    an animal?... We can imagine anything we like about what passes
+    in the mind of an animal,—we can know absolutely nothing.”
+
+We are fully aware of the fact that the problem of the origin of language
+is quite different from the problems of animal psychology. A solution of
+the latter, which are extremely complex and difficult, would not help
+us to solve the former. This being conceded we can nevertheless see
+no reason why animal psychology should be condemned and given up as a
+hopeless task.
+
+It is not true that “we can know absolutely nothing about what passes in
+the mind of an animal.” It is true we cannot see the animals’ feelings
+and thoughts, but we can see their actions which reveal their feelings
+as much as and sometimes even plainer than the speech of our brother man
+reveals his thoughts. Might we not say with the same reason, “We see only
+the printed book of a scientist (which is an expression of his views as
+much as the behavior of an animal is of its feelings) but we can know
+absolutely nothing about what passes in the mind of that scientist. All
+we can do is to judge from analogy”? And should we on that account give
+up all reading and studying and also all arguing with others?
+
+Animal psychology is not only justified as a science, but we can even
+hope that correct observations of animal intelligence will assist us
+in correctly understanding the higher intelligence of human thought.
+And “that some useful hints may be taken from watching children is not
+denied” by Prof. Max Müller either, although this little concession
+appears only in the shape of a short foot-note. The _homo alalus_ is by
+no means a merely mythical figure, for according to the law of evolution
+man must have developed out of a being lower than the present man. His
+first ancestor must have been simple life-substance something like that
+of the amœba. He must have passed through a long period in which he was
+not capable of articulate speech. That we know nothing particular about
+the _homo alalus_ is no proof against his existence. Moreover every
+infant is an actual real _homo alalus_, a speechless man, or should we
+according to Prof. Max Müller class our babies among the brutes?
+
+Prof. Max Müller says (_The Monist_, p. 585):
+
+    “If, like Professor Romanes, we begin with the ‘immense
+    presumption that there has been no interruption in the
+    developmental process in the course of psychological history,’
+    the protest of language counts for nothing; the very fact that
+    no animal has ever formed a language, is put aside simply as an
+    unfortunate accident.”
+
+The theory of evolution rightly understood is no presumption in the
+usual sense of the word. It is no more a presumption than to say that
+something cannot come from nothing. And what is “the protest of language”
+which would disprove the continuity of evolution? That rational or human
+thought is something _sui generis_, that it is different in kind and
+not in degree from brute intelligence; that language is an impassable
+barrier between man and brute, being the Rubicon which no other animal
+has crossed. Very well. We agree entirely with all these propositions.
+Human reason is different in kind from brute intelligence and human
+reason has developed such as it is through language only. Nay reason is
+language. Noiré is right when he says, Man thinks because he speaks.
+But the Rubicon of language was not an absolutely impassable barrier.
+The speechless ancestor of man, whether we call him _homo alalus_ or
+anthropoid, or even man-ape, _has_ crossed it, and having crossed it he
+became the Cæsar of the animal creation.
+
+Prof. Max Müller’s theory of the identity of language and thought[11] is
+so valuable because it bridges the gap between the rational sphere of
+man and the not-yet rational sphere of the brute creation. It explains
+the origin of reason. The origin of reason in the world of living beings
+is explained as soon as the origin of language is understood, for reason
+develops with language and rational thought is nothing but rational
+speech. If the origin of language were an unfathomable mystery, Prof.
+Max Müller’s view of the identity of language and thought would lose all
+practical importance.
+
+The proposition of the identity of language and thought is a very radical
+idea; it is the fundamental idea of monism. In a more general form it
+was first pronounced by Giordano Bruno, who says somewhere that, if we
+could put the soul of a man into the organism of an animal, say of a
+snake, it would cease to be a human soul and become the soul of a snake.
+Speech would be changed into a hissing, in accordance with the snake’s
+organs for uttering sounds. And in the same way all the feelings, all the
+concepts, all the desires and inclinations—in short the whole psychical
+life would be that of a snake.
+
+Thought is the soul of language. As there are no ghost-souls, so there
+are no ghost-thoughts. And the soul is not something distinct from the
+organism, it is the form of the organism. It happens in fairy-tales that
+the Prince is transformed into a frog, but if a fairy could transform
+a man into a frog, his soul would certainly also become a frog-soul.
+Language is the visible organism of the invisible thought, and as is
+language, exactly so is thought.
+
+The problem how language has developed was first answered by the
+onomatopoetic theory, “the bow-wow theory” as Max Müller calls it.
+Language was conceived as an echo of nature, as a reflex action that
+takes place in a living and feeling being. Yet this theory had to be
+abandoned, because an historical investigation of language proved that
+words with very few exceptions were not imitations of external sounds.
+Yet the spirit of investigation was not daunted by this defeat, and
+the bow-wow theory reappeared in a modified form. Language was still
+considered as a reflex action; however, it was conceived to be a reflex
+which re-echoed the impressions of natural phenomena as they had affected
+man. This was the exclamation theory which seeks the origin of language
+in the “ohs and ahs,” the sighs and shouts of a feeling mind. Prof. Max
+Müller calls this theory “the pooh-pooh theory.” This theory had also
+to be discarded because it was in conflict with the actual facts of
+the evolution of language. Next Noiré and Prof. Max Müller came with
+their theory, called by Noiré “the synergastic theory,” which conceives
+language as the expression of common work, also called by Noiré the Logos
+theory, the sympathetic theory, and the causality theory. Prof. Max
+Müller in order to forestall any deriders of this theory suggests calling
+it “the yo-he-ho theory,” yo-he-ho being the sailors’ song when engaged
+in some common work as hoisting or hauling.
+
+This yo-he-ho theory actually explains the origin of language, and it is,
+so far as we can see, not in conflict with any historical or philological
+facts. But in honor of the inventors of the onomatopoetic theory it must
+be recognised that the main idea of the yo-he-ho theory is the same as
+that of the bow-wow theory. The main idea is this: Language did not
+originate in man’s mind out of itself in some mysterious way representing
+a break in the continuity of evolution, but it is a certain reflex-action
+of living and feeling beings taking place in consequence of external
+stimuli. This reflex-action however is not direct, but indirect. It is
+not that of a single being, it is the reflex-action of a whole society,
+engaged in common work. It developed in consequence of their common
+activity and through their want of intercommunication.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Prof. Max Müller charges against the evolutionist, that “the very fact
+that no animal has ever formed a language is put aside simply as an
+unfortunate accident.” Is this a fair reprehension? Is not the fact that
+no animal, except man, crossed the Rubicon of language quite a distinct
+problem? And accepting Professor Noiré’s theory of the origin of language
+which considers speech as the product of a common activity accompanied
+by what may be called _clamor concomitans_, I see very good reasons why
+other animals did not develop language. First, there is no animal, with
+the sole exception perhaps of ants and bees, that lives in societies.
+Some of them live in herds, but there is a great difference between a
+herd and a society. This difference is first a difference of degree, but
+gradually it becomes a difference of kind. Secondly, animals have no
+organs to work with, while man has his hands, and we may add, thirdly,
+that no animal, not even the parrot, has the same power of articulation.
+
+Prof. Ludwig Noiré accepts without equivocation the idea that the
+speechless ancestor of man became a rational being by developing language
+and I was always under the impression that Prof. Max Müller agreed with
+his late friend not only concerning the identity of language and reason,
+but also concerning the origin of reason. But if Prof. Max Müller agrees
+with Noiré, why does he object to the continuity of evolution which as
+he states in a private letter to us is “only a beautiful postulate”?
+
+Now there are indeed facts which prove that the Rubicon of reason is not
+so impassable to animals as Prof. Max Müller makes us believe. Let us
+hear Noiré on the subject. He explains most logically that man performs
+his many labors and has become a civilised being only with the help of
+language, by naming things and handling them in his mind. Noiré says:
+
+    “It can be graphically shown, how ideas may represent for
+    man the rôle of things real; how man has acquired the power
+    of combining in his representative faculty the most remote
+    objects, and thereby has been able to accomplish the great
+    miracles of human industry and commerce. But all this would
+    be utterly inconceivable without concepts, which impart to
+    percepts their unity and self-dependence, bring about and
+    multiply their rational connection. Hence also, no animal
+    can ever advance a single step beyond _present_ perceptive
+    representation, can never escape from the constraint with
+    which Nature circumscribes the narrow sphere of its wants.
+    Unfortunately, however, in apparent contravention of this rule,
+    ants to the present day carry on a regular and methodical
+    species of agriculture, keep livestock and domestics like
+    we! Nay, they have been caught in conversations and social
+    entertainments of a quarter of an hour’s duration—God save the
+    mark!”[12]
+
+This passage is full of humor, and the humor is slightly mingled with a
+comical anger and self-irony. There is a fine theory excellent in every
+respect worked out in all its details by the Professor and now he finds a
+few trifles of facts which possess the impudence not to adapt themselves
+to the theory. “_Gott besser’s_,” sighs Noiré, for it is not his fault
+that the ants accomplish things which they ought not to, and the good
+Lord is called upon to adapt nature with more rigidity to the Professor’s
+theories.
+
+Is there not an obvious reason why ants stand so high in their
+performances? Are not ants social beings, more so than any other animal?
+We are ignorant still of all their means of communication. But that they
+have some means of communication seems to be an established fact. When
+ants from different hills but of the same kind give each other battle,
+it happens not unfrequently that a warrior attacks another warrior of the
+same people most fiercely, but both let go as soon as they touch each
+other with their feelers.[13] I refrain from telling stories about the
+life of these wonderful creatures partly because one well-authenticated
+report is sufficient for our purpose and partly because I must suppose
+that most of my readers are familiar with the facts as presented by
+Darwin, Lubbock, Forel, Huber, and many others. I will add only one
+observation which is so far as I know undisputed. If ants of a special
+kind rob the larvæ of another kind and educate them as their slaves, the
+slaves will in case of war or danger stand by their masters even against
+their own folks. They evidently speak the language of the hill in which
+they have been raised.
+
+Professor Forel successfully made the experiment, with the assistance of
+ant-nurses, of raising together several kinds of ants from the larvæ of
+hostile species. The ferocious Amazons and the Sanguineæ did not show
+any enmity toward their comrades of the Pratensis and Rufa. When set
+at liberty and transferred to a new residence they remained together
+and behaved exactly as if they naturally belonged together. And this
+experiment may be quoted to corroborate the proposition of Prof. Max.
+Müller that “thought is thicker than blood.”[14]
+
+Now it would be a desperate case for Professor Noiré to maintain his
+theory in the face of these facts, if by language we have to understand
+vocal signs only. Yet the idea of his and also of Prof. Max Müller’s
+theory consists in the truth that thoughts cannot walk about like ghosts
+in bodiless nudity: they are a system of notation. As such they are
+symbolised in signs and are inseparable from their signs. These signs are
+sounds with men, and by words we understand usually sound-symbols. But
+there are other systems of notation besides vocal signs and they are
+for that reason not less language than speech. We have reason to believe
+that ants are in possession of symbolical signs and that most of them are
+communicated through their feelers.
+
+Professor Romanes describes the origin of ideas (in the second chapter of
+“Mental Evolution in Man,” p. 23) in the following way:
+
+    “Just as Mr. Galton’s method of superimposing on the same
+    sensitive plate a number of individual images gives rise
+    to a blended photograph, wherein each of the individual
+    constituents is partially and proportionally represented; so
+    in the sensitive tablet of memory, numerous images of previous
+    perceptions are fused together into a single conception, which
+    then stands as a composite picture, or class-representation,
+    of these its constituent images. Moreover, in the case of
+    a sensitive plate it is only those particular images which
+    present more or less numerous points of resemblance that admit
+    of being thus blended into a distinct photograph; and so in the
+    case of the mind, it is only those particular ideas which admit
+    of being run together in a class that can go to constitute a
+    clear concept.”
+
+Professor Romanes calls such a composite picture of sense-impressions
+as must be supposed to exist in the animal brain “a recept” and he
+distinguishes it from “the concept” of man. He says: “Reception means a
+_taking again_.... The word ‘recept’ is seen to be appropriate to the
+class of ideas in question, because in receiving such ideas the mind is
+passive.” By “concept” however he understands “that kind of composite
+idea which is rendered possible only by the aid of language or by the
+process of naming abstractions as abstractions.”[15]
+
+We agree with Professor Romanes in the main point, viz. that the process
+of evolution must be considered as uninterrupted, but we cannot agree
+with him on several minor points.[16]
+
+We must express our doubt concerning the propriety of calling the mind
+passive when receiving impressions. Every single sensation is an active
+process, just as much as a reflex motion, and it may be considered as a
+reaction that takes place in response to the stimulus of the impression.
+Conception of course is also an active process, and concepts, the
+products of conception, establish a new department in the mind. “Noiré,
+quoted by Prof. Max Müller, says: ‘All trees hitherto seen by me leave
+in my imagination a mixed image, a kind of ideal presentation of a tree.
+Quite different from this is my concept, which is never an image.’”[17]
+
+And this is true.
+
+We have on another occasion explained that sensations are
+sense-impressions which have acquired meaning.[18] Rays of light are
+reflected from an object and fall upon the retina of an eye. Here they
+produce a disturbance of nervous substance which is transmitted to the
+brain where it is felt as the image say of a tree. Now the ether-waves
+are not sight, but a certain form of ether-waves corresponds to a
+certain form of sight, and the latter comes to stand for the former. The
+mental picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside
+of us and it is projected to the place where experience has taught
+us to expect that object. In naming objects we repeat the process of
+expressing by symbols. Sensations are symbols, and names are symbols of
+symbols. The name and concept tree is not the composite picture of all
+the trees I have seen, but it is the symbol of this composite picture
+of sense-impressions. Sensations are like the chords of a piano and the
+concepts are like the keys. The key is different in kind from the chord
+which belongs to it. When I touch the key the chord will sound: when I
+pronounce a name the composite sensation of all its analogous memories
+will be awakened.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Can there be any question that difference in kind can originate by
+degrees? Professor Romanes uses the phrase “different in kind” as
+synonymous with “different in origin” and therefore declares that human
+reason and animal intelligence are “different in degree” only. The
+word “kind,” it is true, is at least as vague as the word species and a
+naturalist may often be doubtful where to draw the line. Man and monkey
+are different in kind, and they are also more different in origin than
+Carl Vogt assumed, for man is not the descendant of any of the monkey
+families now existent. But this does not disprove that they are of a
+still remoter common origin or at least that they originated in the same
+way in some amœboid form as simple life-substance.
+
+New formations which originate through combining are as much new
+creations, i. e. things new in kind, as if they were produced through
+special-creation acts of God which are said to be creations out of
+nothing and not mere transformations.
+
+Man builds houses out of bricks and timbers. Is not the house something
+different in kind from the trees and the clay from which the materials
+have been taken? Is not the boiler of a steam-engine different in purpose
+and accordingly also different in kind from a tea-kettle? Is not every
+invention something different in kind? And is not the same true of the
+products of thought? Is not a triangle something different in kind from
+a line? And the origin of the former is not more miraculous than that of
+the latter. A triangle is more complex than a line, but its existence
+in the mind is not more of a mystery than the existence of the line.
+Difference in kind need not include difference of origin. Harmony is
+different in kind from melody. Notes in succession produce melody, while
+simultaneous notes produce harmony. In either case it is simply a matter
+of combination.
+
+Professor Romanes when speaking of the passivity of sense-impressions
+seems to think of the unconsciousness of the process. We are not
+conscious of the transformation of impressions into sensations while
+we can become aware of our efforts to change the sense-material into
+concepts. Yet the nature of mind is throughout activity. And no one has
+perhaps insisted more strongly on the activity of mind than Prof. Max
+Müller. But Prof. Max Müller distinguishes between the activity of the
+mind and the ego which as he supposes performs that activity. He says
+(“Science of Thought,” p. 63):
+
+    “We think of a mind dwelling in a body, and we soon find
+    ourselves in the midst of psychological mythology. Let it be
+    clearly understood, therefore, that by Mind I mean nothing but
+    that working which is going on within, embracing sensation,
+    perception, conception, and naming, as well as the various
+    modes of combining and separating the results of these
+    processes for the purpose of new discovery.
+
+    “But if Mind is to be the name of the work, what is to be the
+    name of the worker? It is not yet the Self, for the Self, in
+    the highest sense, is a spectator only, not a worker; but it is
+    what we may call the Ego, as personating the Self; it is what
+    other philosophers mean by the Monon, of which, as we shall
+    see, there are many. Let us call therefore the worker who does
+    the work of the mind in its various aspects, the Monon or the
+    Ego.”
+
+And in another passage (l. c., p. 552) he speaks of the simplicity of the
+monon:
+
+    “If then the process of thought is so simple as we saw, not
+    less simple, at least, than that of speech, it follows, that
+    the complicated apparatus which had been postulated by most
+    philosophers for the performance of thought in its various
+    spheres of manifestation, must make room for much plainer
+    machinery. Instead of intuition, intellect, understanding,
+    mind, reason, genius, judgment, and all the rest, we want
+    really nothing but a self-conscious Monon, capable of changing
+    all that is supplied by the senses into percepts, concepts,
+    and names. These changes may be represented as something
+    very marvellous, and we may imagine any number of powers and
+    faculties for the performance of them.”
+
+    “Grant a Monon conscious of itself, and conscious therefore of
+    the impacts made upon it or the changes produced in it by other
+    Mona which it resists, and we require little more to explain
+    all that we are accustomed to call Thought.”
+
+The continuity of evolution naturally holds good according to Max Müller
+for the natural man, but not for the Self.
+
+How is this? Is the monon perhaps conceived as not-natural or outside of
+nature. Hardly. For Prof. Max Müller speaks of the object also as being a
+monon.[19] If the objects are as much mona as the subjects the same laws
+must hold good for both, and the subject-monon must be supposed to be an
+object-monon if considered in its relation to other object-mona.
+
+If Prof. Max Müller’s protest against the continuity of evolution is not
+based upon the dualism of natural and extra-natural mona, what can it
+mean when he says that evolution does not hold good for the Self?
+
+If the Self is conceived as a monon, i. e. something “alone” like an
+atomic unit, it can have no evolution. Evolution is change of form
+through the production of new configurations. A monon or an isolated unit
+considered by itself cannot evolve. It is as it ever has been and will
+be—a monon.
+
+If this is Prof. Max Müller’s meaning, we must ask, How does he know
+that the self is a monon and that objects are mona? Do they not, if so
+conceived, become highly mysterious entities? New mona are constantly
+born into this World. Whence do they come? Is every birth of a child
+the new creation of another monon by the creator, who so distributes
+the babes in the world that like babes are given to like parents thus
+producing the wrong impression of heredity as well as of a continuity of
+evolution? The idea of explaining all the activities of the mind by the
+postulate of a conscious monon is very simple indeed, but the problems
+which would arise from this postulate are extremely complex, and it seems
+to us that after all the proposition of evolution is by far the simplest
+solution of all the difficulties.[20]
+
+Mind as we conceive it is the product of evolution. Mind has been
+evolved in a world which (judging from its product) must be conceived as
+being freighted not only with energy but also with the potentiality of
+feeling. Mind, as we know it in experience, is no monon, no indivisible
+unit, but a unitary system of feelings and thoughts produced through
+external impressions upon one part of the world by the rest of the world
+which surrounds it. Mind is an abstract term; it does not denote a part
+of the world, but a certain quality of a part of the world, viz. the
+feelings and thoughts of special kinds of organisms. Mind is produced
+through external impressions, but it does not consist merely of external
+impressions. Mind, as we have stated before, is not passive; it is
+active. It consists of the reactions which take place in response to
+impressions and also of the accumulated products of these reactions.
+Thus every mind is the concentrated effect of the whole cosmos upon one
+special part of the cosmos, not as it takes place in one moment, but as
+it has taken place in a definite and continuous period up to date. The
+accumulation of these effects makes the mind grow and expand and the
+system of the growth constitutes its specific character. We can as little
+think of the mind as appearing suddenly by an act of special creation
+as we can think that an oak tree can be created out of nothing or that
+it can exist without previous growth. The law of continuity holds good
+as much in the realm of the human mind as in the domain of animal and
+plant-life.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+So far we have borne in mind the philosophical and scientific aspect
+only of the continuity of evolution. There is another aspect however
+of no less importance, that is the religious view of the subject. We
+do not believe that science and religion are two different spheres of
+thought and that something may be true in science which is not true in
+religion. Since the theory of evolution has revolutionised almost all our
+sciences, we ask, what influence must this change of thought exercise
+upon religion? Is not the religious idea of God destroyed and the whole
+system of religion overturned?
+
+We think not. An old and very powerful system of theology which has been
+considered as orthodox for centuries will become untenable as soon as
+the idea of evolution and the continuity of evolution are recognised in
+their sweeping importance; but religion itself will enter into a new
+phase of evolution and the idea of God will not be cast aside as a
+mere superstition of the Dark Ages, it will be purified and appear in a
+greater and sublimer, in a nobler, higher, and in a truer conception than
+ever before.
+
+The idea of God is an historical heirloom of past ages. The religious
+man and the philosopher of all times have tried to put into it their
+highest, their best, their grandest, and their purest emotions as well
+as thoughts. And these thoughts were not meaningless, they were not mere
+fancies. They contained the quintessence of their conception concerning
+that feature of reality which has produced us as living, thinking, and
+aspiring beings, and which still prompts us to aspire to higher aims. The
+world which has produced other beings and ourselves, cannot be and is not
+a meaningless congeries of material particles in motion. It is a living
+cosmos. It is a grand harmonious universe pregnant with mind, and nothing
+in it is suffered to exist for any length of time but that which conforms
+to its laws; and that which conforms to its laws we call moral.
+
+The idea of God, however, as it is commonly taught in our schools is
+full of pagan notions, and the very paganism of the present God-idea is
+often supposed to be its deepest and holiest meaning. No wonder that
+atheism increases with the progress of science! And why should not
+atheism increase, if it is truer than a superstitious theism? Atheism
+I believe will increase more and more until theism is cleansed of its
+pagan notions. But atheism will not come to stay, for atheism is a mere
+negative view and negations have no strength to live. They have power to
+criticise and they will serve as a leaven in the dough. Their purpose is
+the purification of the positive views. Negations will pass away as soon
+as their purpose is fulfilled.
+
+The old pagan conception (now considered as orthodox) places God in the
+dark nooks and crevices of our knowledge. Wherever science fails and
+wherever our inquiring mind is entangled in problems which we cannot hope
+to solve, wherever the continuity of nature and of the order of nature
+is hidden from our intellectual sight, the so-called orthodox believer
+comes forth and declares: “This is a holy place. Here is the finger of
+God’s special interference!” Consider what a degrading view of God this
+is! The place of darkness is conceived as an actual break in the order
+of the world and this break is supposed to be a special revelation of
+God! If we trust in truth, we need not shun the light of science and the
+God of science—in contradistinction to the pagan notion of God—reveals
+himself in the discoveries of science. God lives not in darkness but
+in light, and his existence is proved not through the breaks in nature
+(which we can be sure do not exist, and wherever they appear are due to
+our ignorance) but through the order of nature, for God _is_ the order of
+nature. God is that power through which we exist as living, thinking, and
+aspiring beings, and to which we have to conform in order to live.
+
+When Darwin speaks of “life as having been originally breathed into a few
+forms or into one _by the Creator_,” he either uses allegorical language
+or he means that the beginning of life was an act of special creation.
+He apparently means the latter and is in this respect not a consistent
+evolutionist. Darwin was great as a reformer of natural science, but
+in theology he still stood upon the old standpoint. He calls God to
+rescue where science fails. The Creator did not originally breathe life
+into the organism, but his breath is constantly ensouling all living
+beings. Now suppose there were or there could be exceptions to the law of
+causation, to the conservation of matter and energy, or to the continuity
+of evolution, would that not rather be a drawback in nature? Are the
+patches on a coat better proof that it was made by a tailor than the
+whole coat? Any kind of theology which still recognises special-creation
+acts, or miracles, or breaks in evolution, we do not hesitate to say,
+is not yet free from paganism, for it still sticks to the religious
+conception of the medicine-man that God is a great magician. The God of
+the medicine-man lives in the realm of the unknown and he appears in
+man’s imagination where the light of science fails. The God of science
+however is the God of truth, and evidence of his existence is not found
+in the darkness of ignorance but in the light of knowledge. God’s being
+is not recognised in the seeming exceptions to natural laws, but in the
+natural laws themselves. God’s existence is not proved by our inability
+to trace here or there the order of cause and effect, as if a disorder
+in the world made it divine; on the contrary the only rational ground
+of a faith in God is the irrefragable cosmic order of the universe. It
+is true that we have to give up the idea of a personal God, but is not a
+superpersonal God greater than the idol which we have made unto our own
+likeness?
+
+The God of science is perhaps more in agreement with the biblical God
+than the God of dogmatic theology. The interpretations of biblical
+passages which are at present generally considered as orthodox are
+(merely from the standpoint of impartial exegetics) untenable. The first
+chapter of Genesis has not one word about special-creation acts. Neither
+the Elohim nor the Jahveh-Adonai account declares that in the beginning
+there had been Nothing. Both accounts (Gen. Chap. I. 1 to II. 3, and
+II. 3 et seqq.) agree that God “shaped” the world. The word _barah_ (to
+shape, to form, to make) is nowhere used in the sense of creating out of
+nothing. The Psalmist says, “By the word of the Lord were the heavens
+made,” which was so interpreted in the New Testament that it meant “by
+the logos,” and the gospel of St. John adds καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, i.
+e. and the word was God. Logos means rational speech or reason, and
+the world-reason through which the heavens were made can mean only the
+cosmic order of the universe. This idea of St. John’s thought out to its
+ultimate conclusions means monism.
+
+There is a common error that scientific progress is dangerous to
+religion. Scientific progress is dangerous to superstition only. Religion
+(i. e. true religion) is not based upon our ignorance, but upon our
+knowledge; it is not a child of the darkness but of the light, and faith
+far from being a mere belief, i. e. the imperfect knowledge of an opinion
+for which no proof is forthcoming, is applied knowledge, it is knowledge
+plus the confidence that this knowledge can be made the basis of ethics
+and the supreme rule for regulating our conduct in life. The history of
+religion has been and is still a constant purification of our religious
+ideas, and the crucible in which the religious ideas are purified is
+science. We are slowly but constantly progressing toward a high religious
+ideal and this ideal is a cosmical religion free from the pagan notions
+so severely criticised by Christ and yet so carefully preserved by
+the Christian churches. This cosmical religion will be the religion
+of science. It will not consist of religious indifference nor of a
+toleration of any and every opinion as is so often erroneously proclaimed
+as the ideal of liberalism. On the contrary it will be in a certain sense
+the most orthodox religion, for its maxim will be to stand on the truth
+and nothing but the truth. And the truth is not at all indifferent or
+tolerant. The truth is extremely intolerant and suffers no error beside
+it, although, as a matter of course, the truth is very tolerant in so
+far as it sanctions no violence but employs only the spiritual sword of
+conviction by argument and logical proof.
+
+We have given up the idea of special acts of creation as the calling
+forth disconnectedly of something out of nothing. We conceive the whole
+world as an orderly cosmos, well regulated by laws and evolving the
+forms of life in agreement with its laws. Is there less divinity in a
+cosmos than in a half chaotic world in which God makes exceptions and
+counteracts his own ordinances? Is the idea of creation less religious
+if it ceases to mean an origination of something out of nothing? Is not
+man at least just as wonderful if evolved step by step out of the dust
+of the earth through innumerable stages in the long process of evolution
+as if he were made directly out of clay? And is there less divinity in
+his soul, is he any less shaped unto the image of God because his growth
+took place according to natural laws? Natural laws, in the conception
+of purified religion, of the religion of science, are nothing but the
+ideas of God, eternal and immutable, and formulated by scientists not on
+the ground of special revelations but on the ground of the universal and
+unchangeable, and throughout consistent revelation of God in his works.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The science of language and the science of life are two important
+highroads to the cognition of truth. That both sciences will be
+consistent with each other, that their results will finally be seen to
+harmonise perfectly is beyond all doubt and also that their bearing upon
+religious ideas will contribute much to their purification. Prof. F.
+Max Müller and Prof. George John Romanes are two great scholars, each
+one is a leader in his own branch of knowledge, and where they come in
+conflict, it appears to us, that they rather complement than refute each
+other. Both are strong Monists, although emphasising different sides of
+Monistic truth and we feel convinced that their very differences will
+help us to elaborate more fully and clearly and more comprehensively
+the great truth of Monism—of that Monism which will more and more be
+recognised as the corner-stone of science and also of the religion of
+science.
+
+                                                                   EDITOR.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[10] Compare the article _The Origin of Thought-Forms_ in the present
+number, under the caption “Diverse Topics.”
+
+[11] I should prefer to speak of the oneness or inseparableness of
+thought and language, but since Prof. Max Müller has sufficiently
+explained himself, I use here his term “identity” in the sense of
+inseparableness as it is used by Prof. Max Müller.
+
+[12] _The Logos Theory_, by Ludwig Noiré. Translated from the German.
+_The Open Court_, iii. p. 2196. English translations of Noiré’s most
+important articles concerning the origin of language, have appeared in
+Nos. 33, 137, 139, 141, 142 of _The Open Court_.
+
+[13] That ants communicate with each other through their antennæ is an
+undeniable fact. But Landois believes that they communicate also through
+sounds. Some ants possess in their stridulation-organ a kind of a rattle
+the sound of which, however, is perceptible to the human ear only in the
+Ponera ants.
+
+[14] See _Three Lectures on the Science of Language_, p. 47. The Open
+Court Publishing Co., Chicago.
+
+[15] Prof. Lloyd Morgan introduces several new terms, which seem well
+coined. The mental product which is called the object of sense he calls
+“construct”; the most prominent feature in a composite sense-image, he
+calls the “predominant”; and if the predominant is named and isolated by
+abstraction he calls it an “isolate.”
+
+[16] An impartial criticism of Professor Romanes’s position has been made
+by Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his recent work _Animal Life and Intelligence_.
+
+[17] This quotation is requoted from Prof. Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and
+Intelligence_, p. 325.
+
+[18] _The origin of Mind_, in _The Monist_, Vol. I. No. I.
+
+[19] L. c., p. 281. “So much about the subject or the monon. What now
+about the objects or the mona?”
+
+[20] Prof. Max Müller is a great admirer of Kant and so am I. But it
+appears to me that we differ greatly in what we accept as the essential
+teachings of the master; and I grant willingly that Prof. Max Müller has
+preserved the doctrines of Kant more faithfully than I. I have attempted
+to modernise Kant. If I am called a Kantian (and I do not object to the
+name, on the contrary I am proud of it) it is because I proceed from
+Kant and I attempt to preserve the spirit of Kant’s philosophy rather
+than his doctrines. For the sake of the spirit of Kantian philosophy I
+have seen myself urged to surrender the idea of the thing-in-itself as
+something unknowable. Prof. Max Müller has preserved in his philosophy
+(for such is the _Science of Thought_) the Ding-an-sich theory. Believing
+in things-in-themselves he must consistently believe in a self or monon,
+for this monon is nothing but the thing-in-itself of the soul.
+
+I have limited myself in the present article to the principle of
+continuity in evolution as a point of divergence between Prof. Max Müller
+and the views defended by _The Monist_. If I attempted at present to
+enter into the philosophical problem of things-in-themselves, I should be
+obliged to tax too much the patience of my readers. But as I am convinced
+that the reason of our difference with Prof. Max Müller concerning the
+continuity of evolution lies deeper still, I intend to treat the subject
+of things-in-themselves in a future number.
+
+
+
+
+LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+FRANCE.—THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING OF THE LANGUE D’OC.
+
+
+I have never seen mentioned in your periodical publications the _Revue
+des Pyrénées_; and perhaps I should never have heard of the periodical
+myself if I had not been in this interesting old city, and if my eye
+had not chanced on the title of one of the articles of a recent number
+advertised in a local journal. “Un Ariégeois sénateur des Etats-Unis
+d’Amérique: Pierre Soulé” was the title that attracted my attention and
+caused me to procure a copy, which I have found interesting in more ways
+than one.
+
+The publication is a well-printed quarterly of 150 pages, and has
+completed some time since the second year of its existence. Its full
+title is as follows: _Revue des Pyrénées et de la France meridionale,
+Organe de l’Association Pyrénéenne et de l’union des Sociétés Savantes
+du Midi_. The founders of the periodical are the late JULIEN SACAZE, a
+savant much venerated in these parts, and DR. F. GARRIGOU, its present
+editor.
+
+The Association Pyrénéenne, of which, as we have just seen, the _Revue_
+is the organ, is an active and significant organisation. Here are some
+of its aims. While it recognises the greatness of the Capital, Paris,
+it advocates decentralisation, by “showing that workers living in the
+provinces are as capable as others, though enjoying less support and
+funds, to aid in the building up of the great scientific edifice of
+France.” The importance and boldness of this declaration can scarcely be
+appreciated by those who have not breathed for some time the excessively
+monopolistic atmosphere of the French capital, which has been so baneful
+to so many national interests. The Association would also act as a
+means of union between the various learned societies of the South, the
+Midi, and thus render it possible to organise an annual Congress “for
+the discussion and defense of the grand scientific, industrial, and
+commercial questions which concern Southern France.”
+
+Here we see brought out still more precisely that rivalry between the
+South and North, characteristic of most nations, and which presents such
+curious aspects in the past and present history of France.
+
+I never weary of quietly noting, while in the South, the delightful
+contempt which the _méridionaux_ show for their Parisian fellow
+countrymen. The other day at dinner, for instance, I heard a learned
+professor of one of the Southern Universities defending the Southern
+accent and preferring it to “the Parisian accent,” as he put it. But I
+would need pages of your space to develop this line of thought. Suffice
+it to say here that the Association Pyrénéenne and its organ the _Revue
+des Pyrénées_ intend to prove, and have succeeded in proving, if we may
+judge by this number of the _Revue_ and by the account of the proceedings
+of the first Congress of the Association, placed at the head of the
+number, that there are creditable savants and sound learning outside of
+the walls of Victor Hugo’s “Ville Lumière.”
+
+Another object of the Association would be dear to Castelar’s heart.
+I give it in full: “To remove morally the grand Pyreneean curtain and
+to offer the hand of friendship to a nation justly proud of its past,
+whose interests touch our own, and which has the right, because of
+the illustrious sons of Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre, to take part
+in an intellectual and Pyreneean association based on science.” This
+is a paraphrase of Louis XIV’s famous remark concerning the Pyrenees,
+when he placed his grandson on the throne of Spain. Nor can one be
+surprised at the strong affection which binds Southern France to the
+Iberian peninsula. The grand mountains, the “Pyreneean curtain,” which
+separate the two countries, are always in sight, their snow-capped peaks
+glittering in the sun; the various _patois_, especially the dialect
+of Pau, resemble the Spanish more than they do the French tongue;
+Spanish money is foisted on you at the shops, and picturesque Spanish
+mountaineers lend a peculiar charm to the country fairs, while the nation
+is ever on the eve of a pronunciamento, destined to give to Spain the
+republican institutions of France.
+
+But to return to PIERRE SOULÉ who is the cause and starting point of this
+letter. Commandant Trespaillé’s eulogistic biographical sketch is of
+slight interest to American readers, who can find elsewhere a fuller and
+more exact account of the brilliant but rather disappointing career of
+the once famous Franco-Louisiana statesman. M. Trespaillé’s reference to
+“Old Hickory” as “the immortal Jackson,” his statement that the American
+people is full of prejudices against the French race, his metamorphosing
+New Hampshire’s only President into Pierre Francklin, and some other
+similar slips can be overlooked, for this essay offers a striking example
+of the dominant idea of the _Revue_, the Association and patriotic
+Southerners generally,—the glorification of the great men and great
+actions of the sunny South, the “Midi ensoleillé.”
+
+And I must admit, foreigner though I am, that I share much of this
+enthusiasm for persons and things meridional, and especially for the
+latter. What a land this is for historical and archæological study!
+Take this number of the _Revue des Pyrénées_, for instance; it is full
+of it. Here, for example, are the titles of three of the papers read
+at the first Congress of the Association Pyrénéenne, to which Congress
+I referred above: “The Domitian Road from Narbonne to Perpignan,” “The
+Third Century School of Sculpture in Southern Gaul,” and “The Roman Road
+from Narbonne to Carcassonne.” There are several articles in the _Revue_
+about the University of Toulouse, which is stated to be the oldest in
+France after that of Paris, having been founded in 1229, more than two
+hundred and fifty years before the discovery of America. The law school
+even antedates 1229 and its foundation is lost in the obscurity of
+the early centuries of the Christian era. Another article begins the
+publication of a list of the professors at the law school. The first
+recorded name dates from 1251. When one finds such themes as these on
+every hand, Rome, Gaul, the Middle Ages, and feudalism become almost
+living realities. And how inexhaustibly rich Languedoc is in these
+reminders of the distant past.
+
+And the patois or dialects of this part of France are not the least
+ancient and interesting subjects for study. Wonder is often expressed
+that the English of America differs so slightly from the English of
+England, with three thousand miles of ocean separating the two countries.
+The wonder increases when you find that here in Languedoc the same patois
+differs in some particulars from town to town. Let me first mention some
+big differences and then touch upon some minor ones. If you take the
+train which leaves Toulouse at about half past eleven in the morning,
+you will arrive at Pau at half past four. During these five hours on a
+pretty slow train you have passed from one patois to another. The lower
+classes of Toulouse cannot understand the lower classes of Pau. And
+if you continue in the same train, at about half past eight you reach
+Mauléon, in the French Basque Provinces, where the populace of neither
+Toulouse nor Pau could carry on a conversation with the populace of
+Mauléon. Thus a nine hours’ ride of about 175 miles on an accommodation
+train carries you through a region where French is the vernacular of the
+educated classes and is the official language, but where the great mass
+of the population is divided into three groups, each speaking a different
+dialect.
+
+The modifications which the same patois undergoes in neighboring
+localities is not less curious though of course not so radical. Roughly
+speaking it may be said that the same patois is spoken from Montpellier
+to Bordeaux and from Toulouse well up into the centre of France, which
+embraces the region where prevailed the Langue d’oc from which the
+present patois is derived. But, while a peasant could make himself
+understood throughout this wide territory, his ear would often be
+perplexed by more than one strange word and phrase. I was once told on
+the Riviera that the patois of Menton differed considerably from that of
+Nice and that this was particularly the case before the construction of
+the Corniche road and the railway, when a denizen of the former place
+could reach the latter city only by doubling Cape Martin under sail. I
+do not know how true this statement is, but I believe it to be correct,
+after a superficial study on these same lines which I have just made in
+the Department of the Tarn, one of the most isolated portions of Upper
+Languedoc. I find that the patois of towns as near together, as are New
+York, Newark, Patterson, Nyack and Tarrytown, for example, differs, not,
+perhaps, in its construction but in its vocabulary. Let me give some
+examples. Thus, potato, which is _truffet_ at Cordes, becomes _truffo_
+at Castres. _Patano_, the word employed in the South East end of the
+Department is also heard at Castres, but never at Cordes, which is in the
+North West end of the Department, Castres being about in the centre. Dog
+is _cagnot_ and _cô_ at Cordes, and _gous_ at Castres. (At Montpellier,
+in a contiguous Department it is _tschi_, while at Pau they say _can_,
+which approaches very near the Latin.) Pig is _pourcel_ at Castres and
+_tessou_ at Cordes. Broom _engranicro_ at Castres and _balatso_ at
+Cordes. I have also noted the following difference between the Tarn
+patois and that of Pau. The _f_ of the former always becomes an aspirated
+_h_ in the latter. Thus, _femo_, woman (Castres) is _henno_ at Pau;
+_fourco_, pitchfork (Castres) _hourco_ (Pau); _foun_ fountain (Castres)
+_houn_ (Pau).
+
+A comparison of this patois with the French as regards the spelling of
+geographical names reveals a fact that would somewhat dampen the ardor
+of our friend Colonel Shephard, of New York, in his effort to force the
+gazeteers to give geographical names as they are written in the countries
+where they are found. One might have thought that such near neighbors as
+the Langue d’oil and the Langue d’oc would have come to some rational
+understanding on this point and that the Ile-de-France would have
+accepted the spelling of Languedoc. But not so. The towns and rivers of
+this part of France look as different in French and patois printed pages
+and sound as differently when pronounced by educated and peasant mouths,
+as do the towns and rivers of Italy when seen in Italian and English
+books or when spoken by Americans and Italians. Thus Toulouso became
+Toulouse; Castros, Castres; Dourgnos, Dourgne; Carcassouno, Carcassonne;
+Narbouno, Narbonne; Billofranco, Villefranche; Labaou, Lavaur; Bibiers,
+Viviers; Boou, Vour; Abrayrou, Aveyron; Cordos, Cordes, etc.
+
+These patois, these dialects of the old Langue d’oc, are awakening just
+now increasing interest in the literary circles of the Midi, for it is
+only within recent years that the French has appeared to threaten their
+extinction. The spread of the railroad system and especially the wide
+development of the primary school since the advent of the Third Republic,
+are dealing deadly blows at these popular dialects. But they are still
+far from moribund. I have frequently been told that even to-day one
+stumbles now and then on old peasants living up in the isolated Black
+Mountain, a spur of the Cévennes, and which divides Upper from Lower
+Languedoc, who cling to _oc_, although _obe_ or _ope_, or the French
+_oui_ and _si_, are the common affirmative particles of the patois.
+
+It has often happened to me when taking a constitutional to ask my way
+and discover that I am addressing a person who neither understands
+nor speaks French, though, as a rule, all peasants understand French
+and the vast majority can speak the language too, but after a rather
+sorry fashion. A foreigner finds at least one comfort in all this: in
+Languedoc he uses the national tongue more correctly than thousands of
+native born Frenchmen! Nor is the knowledge of patois confined to the
+peasantry or the working classes of the towns. The _bourgeoisie_, with
+exceedingly rare exceptions, are quite at home in it, and the children
+of the nobility often prattle with their peasant nurse more easily in
+patois than in the polished speech of their parents. During a political
+campaign, it is a very common thing for a would-be deputy to address
+country voters in their familiar dialect, thereby gaining the favor not
+alone of the _félibres_; while, during this same period of electoral
+excitement, the local papers publish almost daily editorials written in
+patois. In hundreds of rural churches the short sermon after early mass
+is preached in patois, and many a time I have found myself turning with
+surprise when I heard French spoken in the streets of Languedocian towns
+of considerable size.
+
+There was a time when the government and the ruling classes of Languedoc
+itself strove to eradicate these dialects and to substitute French
+for them. The aim was a patriotic one; greater national unity, it was
+believed, would thus be secured. But that period has gone by, and at
+present there is a strong tendency to preserve from destruction these
+linguistic souvenirs of a rapidly fading past. What the enthusiastic
+_félibres_ would do for Provençal, they and their disciples and imitators
+in Languedoc would do for the dialects of South Western France. At the
+Congrès d’Etudes Languedociennes, held recently at Montpellier, one of
+the members proposed that the French language should be taught in the
+primary schools through the medium of the langue d’oc. The suggestion
+is not so chimerical as it appears to be at first blush, for one of the
+greatest and never-ending difficulties of the country schoolmaster in
+this part of France is to teach his scholars the three R’s by means of
+the French, which is a foreign tongue to ninety-nine out of a hundred
+of them. One is not surprised, therefore, to find that one of the
+resolutions passed by this same Congress takes up the plan proposed in
+the paper just referred to, and declares in favor of “the utilisation of
+the langue d’oc for teaching French in the primary schools.”
+
+At a recent sitting of the General Council of the Bordeaux University a
+resolution was passed calling for the creation of a chair of “Southern
+languages.” In explanation of this term, the _Gironde_, the leading
+Bordeaux newspaper, says: “Besides giving instruction in Spanish, one of
+the labors of the professor would be to teach our South Western dialects
+in which the most important historical documents of this part of the
+country were drawn up during several centuries.” The editor then goes on
+to say: “If the State does not feel able to found this chair, will not
+some private individual come forward and imitate the example of James E.
+Clark, who recently established at Worcester, Mass., a university endowed
+with a capital of $12,500,000?”
+
+Speaking of primary schools reminds me of a curious fact which has
+frequently attracted my attention in Languedoc this winter. In no other
+part of France perhaps was it so common for a town to grow up around a
+castle; for this region was terribly harried by the Wars of Religion,
+and the poor peasants were forced to seek the protection of some lord.
+In order to render them more impregnable, these castles were generally
+built on some high hill. So now one sees on every hand decaying hamlets
+surrounding ruined castles left almost deserted on the very crown of some
+pyramidal mount, while the busy town of to-day has descended to the more
+accessible base of the hill. But since the advent of the Third Republic
+and the grand impetus given to primary instruction, these abandoned
+castles have taken a new lease of life, and been converted into school
+buildings. The other day during an hour’s drive in Upper Languedoc I saw
+two of these old useless feudal piles consecrated to popular nineteenth
+century education. What a train of reflections is thus suggested! Within
+the very same walls where some proud ignorant seignior once lorded it
+over his humble vassals, the descendants of these serfs, still speaking
+the tongue of their oppressed ancestors, but enjoying all the liberties
+then usurped by their masters, are now being instructed in branches of
+knowledge of which the feudal knight had scarcely an inkling. What a
+revolution was that of ’89!
+
+                                                         THEODORE STANTON.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+GERMANY.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN THE DOMAIN OF PATHOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.
+
+
+The science of anthropology claims, as we know, to have discovered, that
+the various epochs of history are marked not only by characteristic
+religious, political, social, and literary conditions, but not
+unfrequently also by particular forms of disease; and it is the opinion
+of eminent medical authorities that nervous and mental diseases
+constitute the “pathological feature” of modern civilisation. This,
+of course, is not to be understood as meaning that diseases of this
+character have not appeared in previous epochs, but simply that they
+occur with unusual frequency at the present day and in unusually grave
+forms.
+
+A book treating of the affliction of the age ought to count on a large
+circle of readers, and it will be all the more deserving of such if it
+thoroughly and skilfully fulfils its purpose of holding up the mirror to
+the time and of imparting the light and advice required in this matter.
+This has been done in an excellent manner by the work of the Bremen
+alienist Dr. SCHOLZ, entitled _Die Diätetik des Geistes—Ein Führer zu
+praktischer Lebensweisheit_, which has just appeared in its second and
+enlarged edition, Leipsic, E. H. Mayer. This book is distinguished from
+the majority of similar recent publications intended for a greater public
+by its relative thoroughness. It must be characterised as thorough and
+comprehensive, also, in comparison with the older and more celebrated
+work, which its title at once suggests, FEUCHTERLEBEN’S _Diätetik
+der Seele_. The character of the book is not “purely psychological,”
+overlooking the high importance of the influence of the body, as was
+the case with Beneke; nor does it lean towards the moralising of a
+Heinroth and Ideler; nor does the author treat his subject from an
+exclusively medical point of view: the work, in fact, is anthropological
+in character. Its contents possess chiefly in two respects great
+interest: (1) from a universal human point of view, in that it affords
+us a glance into the awful abysses of life, in the company of an expert
+guide who tells us how these depths are to be avoided, or at least gives
+consolation to those whose way leads necessarily through them; and (2)
+from a pedagogical point of view, in that it directs attention to the
+heredity of the morbid constitutions and abnormalities that oppose
+obstacles to education or may become such if improperly treated.
+
+It is obvious that morbid mental dispositions must be taken into account
+in all work of education and instruction, if we wish to avoid an
+egregious violation of the universally recognised requirement to regard
+individuality. And from this point of view the book of Dr. Scholz will
+awaken in readers who have anything to do at all with education, the
+desire to learn more about the nature of morbid mental life in the young
+than is presented in this treatise destined for a large public.
+
+Such a wish would have had to remain unsatisfied six years ago, when the
+_Diätetik des Geistes_ first appeared. It is true, English physicians
+particularly, like West, Conolly, Maudsley, and others, had a long time
+previously directed attention to the morbid phenomena of infant psychic
+life, but their work, like that of their French and German professional
+associates, lies buried in medical magazines and volumes not easily
+accessible. The first to apply himself to the work needed in this
+condition of affairs was Professor EMMINGHAUS, who digested and collected
+all the material, thus supplied, in a compendious work bearing the title
+_Die psychischen Störungen des Kindesalters_, Tübingen, Laupp, 1887. The
+fact indeed is not to be left unrecognised that the book, in so far as it
+may be used by those who have not had a medical training, possesses two
+defects,—defects, however, for which the author cannot be censured. In
+the first place, it is intended for physicians only, and is therefore,
+on account of the many technical terms it uses, at times not uniformly
+intelligible. To the serious student, however, who possesses the previous
+psychological and physiological knowledge most indispensable, it presents
+no difficulties of too great magnitude. The second defect likewise
+springs from the purpose of the work. It consists in the fact that,
+excepting a few occasional references and hints, the pedagogical aspect
+of the question is not considered. Pedagogists, here, are confronted with
+a problem which must be solved, and of which the solution will certainly
+not be a thankless task. The writer of these lines has approached one
+aspect of this question in a treatise of his entitled _Nervosität and
+Mädchenerziehung_, Wiesbaden, 1890, in the course of which study he has
+arrived at the conviction that an important factor is lacking in modern
+pedagogics and the training of teachers. This conviction he has put into
+words in another treatise, _Geistesstörungen in der Schule_, Wiesbaden,
+1891, with what success it remains for the future to say.
+
+Two years after the appearance of Emminghaus’s work a translation was
+published in Germany of a French book of a similar character. _Der Irrsin
+im Kindesalter_, by Dr. PAUL MOREAU, authorised edition by Dr. Demetrio
+Galatti, Stuttgart, 1889, Ferdinand Enke, publisher. Unfortunately,
+Moreau, as his own preface reveals, did not know, when he wrote his
+book, of the existence of the German work,—a circumstance that has not
+been without regrettable consequences. Taken in conjunction with the
+work of Emminghaus, however, Moreau’s book possesses, on account of the
+numerous morbid cases it gives, a high value; although it cannot bear
+comparison with the former work in richness of material and familiarity
+with the literature of the subject, and much less so in the psychological
+treatment of the subject, where Emminghaus is incomparably subtler and
+more profound.
+
+A treatise that is closely related, in point of subject-matter, on
+the one hand to the works of Emminghaus and Moreau, and on the other
+to the books of Preyer (_Die Seele des Kindes_) and Pérez (_Les trois
+premières années de l’enfant_ and _L’enfant de trois à sept ans_) on
+the development of children, has just been published by a Leipsic
+teacher under the title of _Die Periodicität in der Entwickelung
+der Kindesnatur_, _Neue Gesichtspunkte für Kinderforschung und
+Jugenderziehung_, by GUSTAV SIEGERT, Leipsic, 1891, R. Voigtländer.
+The author endeavors, in a very interesting manner we must admit, to
+show that, in the development of the child, lasting states in regular
+alternate succession occur of mental and physical buoyancy on the one
+hand and depression on the other, of moral exaltation, likewise, and
+moral subsidence. The fundamental cause of this periodical alternation,
+of the general existence of which numerous proofs are adduced, is
+supposed to lie in the alternate strengthening and relaxation of the
+individual’s forces of action, brought on by the expenditure and
+reproduction of energy; additional determinative causes, accelerative as
+well as retardatory, are found in intercourse with the world and with
+other human beings. We may call the former the individual and the latter
+the social cause of the phenomena of periodicity. In the application of
+his results to juvenile education the author arrives at some far-reaching
+propositions of reform, the consideration of which, however, we shall
+have to leave to the pedagogical press.
+
+We shall have to preserve the same attitude with regard to a new work
+of the well-known Leipsic professor Dr. STRUMPELL—_Die pädogogische
+Pathologie oder die Lehre von den Fehlern der Kinder_, Leipsic, 1890,
+Verlag von Georg Böhme Nachfolger. We must refer here to this otherwise
+highly deserving book only in one respect, where we have occasion for
+censure. The author does not in his expositions sufficiently take account
+of the intimate connection between physical and mental phenomena, and the
+consequence of this is among other things that he excludes pathological
+mental conditions (the physical causes of which he is forced to admit)
+as a matter of principle from the pedagogic system and consigns them
+entirely into the charge of the physician. In our treatise mentioned we
+have explained why this is not allowable, as well as, in addition, what
+portion of duty devolves on the teacher in the consideration of these
+pathological mental conditions. Strumpell’s mistake springs from the
+fact that he conceives with Herbart the essential object of education
+to be intellectual culture. Allowing that Herbart cannot be taken to
+task for entertaining this conception, we may yet demand of Strumpell
+the recognition of the results of recent physiological psychology to the
+extent at least of perceiving that psychical and physical phenomena are
+_one_ if not the _same_. Even the opponents of Monism dare not overlook
+this truth,—a truth moreover that admits very well of reconciliation with
+the Herbartian pluralism to which Strumpell is devoted.
+
+We might cite here numerous pathological conditions of mind that very
+plainly spring from physical causes and to which the instructor has to
+give attention just as much as the physician. Instead, however, of citing
+particular cases, we will refer to three little treatises that are in
+the highest degree instructive on this point, not only for teachers
+exclusively but also for all who have to do with children. Dr. MAXIMILIAN
+BRESGEN, specialist in diseases of the nose and throat at Frankfort on
+the Main, has published at the house of Leopold Voss in Hamburg (1890)
+a brochure entitled _Ueber die Bedeutung behinderter Nasenathmung nebst
+besonderer Berücksichtigung der daraus hervorgehenden Gedächtniss- und
+Geistesschwäche_. A treatise of like character is that of Dr. med.
+LENZMANN of Duisburg, entitled _Ueber den schädlichen Einfluss der
+behinderten Nasenathmung auf die körperliche und geistige Entwickelung
+des Kindes_, Bielefeld, 1890, Anders Verlag. Both treatises contain,
+among other things not to be considered here, instructive examples of
+the rise and disappearance of that morbid mental condition to which Hack
+first directed notice in Germany but which elsewhere became known through
+the researches of the Dutch physician Guye by the name of _Aprosesia
+nasalis_. The third treatise is by Dr. med. RALF WIECHMANN, specialist
+for nervous diseases at Brunswick, and bears the title _Eine sogenannte
+Veitstanzepidemie in Wildbad_, Leipsic, 1890, Verlag von Georg Thieme.
+By St. Vitus’s dance (Ger. _Veitstanz_) we understand the disease of
+which the well-known symptoms are involuntary muscular twitchings usually
+accompanied by severe or light psychical disturbances, known in medicine
+by the name of _chorea minor_ and _chorea rhythmica_, and sometimes
+occurring in epidemics. At the school in Wildbad the number of the
+afflicted children rose in the course of time to twenty-six. Wiechmann
+expatiates at length in his book on the character of the contagion, and
+arrives through an exhaustive use of the existing literature on the
+subject at the result, that there was present in the individual children
+attacked substantially a physical predisposition, an unstable nervous
+system. As the first children attacked were not removed, the convulsive
+motions were seen and perceptually taken up by the other children, who
+were just approaching the period of puberty and labored under hereditary
+predispositions. “Once these images had entered perceptually into the
+unstable brain, they became competent to operate as stimuli and to be
+translated into involuntary muscular motions.”
+
+The conclusion of my letter may be taken up with the discussion of a
+treatise that deserves a somewhat more detailed consideration. The
+director of the Royal Würtembergian State Insane Asylum at Zwiefalten,
+Dr. F. L. A. Koch, who already possesses eminent repute in the domain
+of psychiatry, has just published the first part of a new work called
+_Die psychopathischen Minderwertigkeiten—Erste; Abteilung: Einleitung,
+Die angeborenen andauernden psychopathischen Minderwertigkeiten_,
+Ravensburg, 1891, Verlag von Otto Maier. In this work the author extends
+the development of the ideas he some time previously outlined in his
+_Rudiments of Psychiatry_, second edition, 1889. In the expression
+“psychopathische Minderwertigkeiten” (psychopathical secondary factors)
+Koch embraces all those psychical irregularities, be they natural or
+acquired, affecting the life of the human personality, which though in
+the severest cases even not amounting to actual mental disorders, yet in
+the most favorable instances so affect the persons afflicted with them
+that they appear as lacking the full possession of mental normality and
+capacity. Primarily, of course, the treatise is intended for physicians,
+and the author counts on the gratitude of this profession in so far as
+he has undertaken to put in independent form the separate facts formerly
+scattered over the whole domain of psychiatry, to free them from other
+neuro- and psycho-pathological subjects, and to unite them into one
+special group of pathological states. But the author also counts on his
+book being used by the representatives of other professions, by pastors,
+tutors, teachers, jurists, sociologists, historians, and the like, and
+indeed with perfect justice.
+
+The savers of souls, if they had mastered to a slight degree even
+the comprehension of the psychopathical secondary factors, would be
+astonished to see how many people there are in the case of whom medicine
+is more effective against “spiritual” vexations than pastoral advice,
+and that often such advice, being one-sided and starting from false
+assumptions, does harm only. They would see in the peculiarity of the
+religious needs and tribulations of many a man a psycho-pathological
+abnormality; they would come to understand how the otherwise
+unintelligible badness of many another has its source in a pathological
+basis: they would not regard and hail as absolutely good, moreover, many
+“good impulses”;—all this they would find out if they had learned to
+note and comprehend what the import is of such persons being descended
+from neurotic ancestors, of their exhibiting palpable indications of
+degeneration, and having also perhaps insane, idiotic, whimsical, and
+epileptical brothers and sisters. They would furthermore perfectly
+comprehend, that in the case of people who are descended from healthy
+parents, but who from being in times past happy and joyful Christians
+are now struggling with distractions of soul, it were often better
+first to inquire after the state of their organs of digestion. And they
+would be able to deal quite differently from formerly with many a soul
+entrusted to their care, perhaps also more easily to conquer, or at least
+to endure, some secret burden of their own lives. The import of the
+book for the educator is easily inferrible from the remarks made. For
+the jurist, who has to deal with the problems of accountability and the
+administering of punishment, its importance is manifest. Sociology, too,
+the deeper it enters into its problems, will not be able to dispense with
+psychopathology, and in this field it is precisely the psychopathical
+secondary factors that eminently demand attention. In that which concerns
+its connection with history we need only mention the names of Lombroso,
+Emminghaus (_Allgemeine Psychopathologie_) and Möbius (_Rousseaus
+Krankheitsgeschichte_), to point out the importance of a work like that
+before us. We recommend it without reserve to all whom it touches.
+
+                                                                CHR. UFER.
+
+Altenburg, July, 1891.
+
+
+
+
+ÉMILE LITTRÉ.
+
+
+    Some debts there are that make the debtor proud;
+        So ours to him, who could philosophise
+        With common-sense, and sweep from starry skies
+    The brain-spun webs that darken like a cloud.
+
+    We loved him, for his highest thoughts avowed
+        Our own akin and less than ours allies;
+        Born of the common soil but born to rise
+    And light the labor of the laurel-browed.
+
+    Justice he traced to truth; morality,
+        Back to the brutish primal needs of man;
+    And stood himself for all the best might be.
+
+        He wrought in words, a faithful artisan;
+    And lived to shame their loutish mockery
+        Whose virtue ended where his own began.
+
+                                                        LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
+
+
+
+
+DIVERSE TOPICS.
+
+
+
+
+THE ORIGIN OF THOUGHT-FORMS.
+
+
+Dr. H. Potonié, the editor of the _Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift_,
+Berlin, advances in one of its recent numbers (Vol. vi. 15) the following
+proposition concerning the origin of the forms of thought: “All the
+forms of thought have originated in the struggle for life not otherwise
+than the forms of organisms.” This is further explained in the following
+sentence: “Those conceptions which are called _a priori_, are inherited;
+they have been necessarily used by the primitive thinking organisms and
+are now in their disposition immediately present. Yet they have been
+gained by experience. Without any knowledge, for instance, of space and
+time, no action is possible; accordingly their conception is perhaps the
+oldest and therefore it appears aprioristic.”
+
+
+I. THOUGHT-FORMS AND THE FORMS OF EXISTENCE.
+
+We agree with Dr. Potonié that thought-forms grow naturally and that they
+grow such as they are, of necessity. In our opinion formal thought, with
+its so-called _a priori_ theorems, is derived from the thought-forms by
+abstraction. (See “Fundamental Problems” pp. 26-60, the chapter Form and
+Formal Thought.) If it had been possible for other thought-forms to have
+originated together with those which we possess at present, and it may be
+parenthetically remarked that we do not consider it as possible; but _if_
+it had been possible, we do not deny that all the other thought-forms
+would have gone to the wall, they would have perished in the struggle for
+existence and our present thought-forms alone would have survived. In
+this we agree with Dr. Potonié, and a naturalist may be satisfied with
+this statement, because it suffices for his purposes. The recognition
+of the objective validity of the laws of formal thought is all that
+the specialist wants for this or that branch of science. But this
+recognition is not sufficient for the philosopher. He has to understand
+the problem why the subjective laws of purely formal thought possess an
+absolute and an objective validity for the world of real existences. He
+must understand not only how thought-forms originated, but also why and
+on what ground the laws of formal thought are considered as necessary
+and universal truths. The question of their origin and growth is of
+secondary importance compared with the question of their rigidity and
+apriority.
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer has made the same proposition as Dr. Potonié and
+his view briefly expressed is this: “The laws of formal thought are _a
+priori_ to the individual, but _a posteriori_ to the race.” In other
+words apriority must be explained by heredity. A dog cannot count,
+because none of his ancestors have ever counted, but a child has the
+faculty to learn counting because innumerable ancestors of his have
+counted and his brain possesses a predisposition to learn counting
+easily. Concerning our apprehension of space-relations which expressed as
+mathematical theorems appear to us necessary and are called _a priori_,
+Mr. Spencer says:
+
+    “We cannot think otherwise because during that adjustment
+    between the organism and the environment which evolution has
+    established, the inner relations have been so moulded upon
+    the outer relations that they cannot by any effort be made
+    not to fit them. Just in the same way that an infant’s hand,
+    constructed so as to grasp by bending the fingers inwards,
+    implies ancestral hands which have thus grasped, and implies
+    objects in the environment to be thus grasped by this infantine
+    hand when it is developed, so the various structures fitting
+    the infant for apprehension of space-relations, imply such
+    apprehensions in the past by its ancestors and in the future by
+    itself.”
+
+Man’s ability to learn counting is inherited, and there may be more or
+less of it in different people. Mathematical talent is inherited just as
+much as musical talent or other faculties. But the philosophical question
+concerning the apriority of mathematical theorems has nothing whatever to
+do with the origin of mathematical talent. When Mr. Spencer declares that
+apriority is but an inherited aposteriority, this is equivalent and is
+intended to be equivalent to an actual denial of all apriority. His very
+explanation proves that he does not see the real problem, and in the same
+way Dr. Potonié overlooks it entirely. The philosophical problem of the
+apriority is not an historical problem, it cannot be solved by tracing
+the evolution of thought-forms. The philosopher does not ask how did
+thought-forms originate, but why do we attribute to the laws of formal
+thought necessity and universality and on what ground can we justify our
+assumption?
+
+Mr. Spencer compares our apprehension of space-relations to our inherited
+habit to grasp with our hands and to walk with our feet. This comparison
+is misleading and inappropriate. That we grasp with our hands and walk
+with our feet is incidental. There are animals who have developed other
+limbs for the same purposes. There are monkeys who grasp with their
+tails and the elephant grasps with his nose. There is no necessity and
+no universality in our predisposition of grasping with our hands. Yet
+there resides necessity and universality in the laws of formal thought
+so that wherever animals develop rational thought we are sure that to
+them twice two will always equal four just as much as it does to us.
+However they may be different in other respects: they may be winged
+creatures or may be somewhat like our ants, they may have developed other
+bodily structures than we can dream of, nevertheless their arithmetic,
+their logic, and their mathematics will in all essentials be exactly the
+same as ours. There are animals whose thought-forms are not as highly
+developed as in man, but there are no animals in whom they are developed
+differently. We must consider it as impossible even that on other stars
+rational creatures can be found whose reason differs from ours. To them
+also twice two will be four.
+
+
+II. THE PROBLEM OF APRIORITY.
+
+Kant did not call the formal laws _a priori_ in order to characterise
+them as innate ideas, but simply to denote that their validity is
+necessary and universal. If I have to walk twice a distance of two miles,
+I know “beforehand” (i. e. _a priori_) that I shall have to walk four
+miles—even before I have made the actual experience. And this wonderful
+quality of giving information beforehand is characteristic of all the
+laws of formal thought. It is certain that our ability of applying the
+laws of formal thought has been acquired by experience in the race as
+well as in the individual. But their necessity has to do with experience
+in so far only as its recognition is the indispensable condition of all
+methodical experience—i. e. of science. The laws of formal thought and
+our recognition of their necessity and universality (alias, “apriority”)
+are the organ of any and all scientific cognition. The methods of the
+sciences are exact measuring and counting based upon the faith that the
+laws of measuring and counting are unalterable and unfailingly reliable.
+We know beforehand that they will hold good for all possible cases.
+
+Our experience of millenniums suffices to prove that the laws of formal
+thought agree with the laws of actual existence, and Kant’s view to
+consider them as merely subjective and not objective appears to me
+untenable. We may fairly consider Kant’s subjectivism as a thing of the
+past. And the agreement of the forms of objectivity with the forms of
+subjectivity is easily explained when we bear in mind that the thinking
+subject is a part of the objective world. It is but natural that the
+forms of existence are impressed upon the thinking subject as forms of
+thought.
+
+Yet the question of the necessity and universality of the laws of form
+remains. Can we comprehend why the form of objective reality as well as
+of subjective thought must be such as they are, and might they not just
+as well be different? Is this question legitimate and can it be answered?
+We say Yes, the question is legitimate and can be answered.
+
+All the laws of formal thought are products of thought-operations which
+are based on no other principle than that of identity (_A_ = _A_). As
+soon as thinking beings have developed to that degree of thought-ability
+in which they are able to deal with the abstract idea of pure form, they
+can make constructions of pure forms. So long as these constructions
+of pure forms are made consistently and correctly (i. e. in strict
+agreement with the principle of identity), they will be found to hold
+good in reality and we can _a priori_—before we have made the actual
+experience—rely on their applicability.
+
+The laws of pure forms (forms of thought as well as forms of existence)
+can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who acknowledges the principle
+of identity. The principle of identity is not an assumption but it is
+the generalised statement of the simplest thought-operation, which, if
+employed with consistency, can serve as a rule for other and more complex
+thought-operations. Consistency is the condition of thought. Consistency
+produces order, and order is the most characteristic feature of thought.
+We create some pure form in some definite way, for instance in counting
+we posit a unit (we call it “one”). Now we create in the same definite
+way again a pure form, we again posit a unit (we again call it “one”).
+In so far as these two “ones” are the product of the same operation they
+will be the same and we express this truth in the sentence 1 = 1 or _A_ =
+_A_.
+
+When, for the sake of assistance in the process of abstract thought, we
+use real objects to represent our pure forms, similarly as an abacus is
+employed for assisting the young mind of a child in learning arithmetic,
+the dissimilarity of the objects is of no account. The proposition of
+their identity has no reference to the material objects, but to the
+operation. Two operations being according to some special and definite
+method exactly the same, their products are also exactly the same,
+and the rest is not to be minded, because we have in our abstraction
+purposely excluded everything else.
+
+Here is not the place to show the palpable advantages of the methods
+of abstract thought and especially of the abstract thought-operations
+with pure forms. It is sufficient to characterise its main principle of
+procedure. We may also parenthetically remark that from our position
+we are no longer in need of axioms either in mathematics or in any
+other formal science. The data of formal sciences are certain mental
+operations, viz. positing pure forms, and combining, separating, and
+recombining them. The subject matter of formal sciences consists in the
+products of these operations. To formulate some of the simplest products
+in axioms is a mistake which has been pointed out by Hermann Grassmann in
+his _Ausdehnungslehre_.
+
+We are struck and overawed with the cosmic order of all natural phenomena
+which, as science teaches, is produced through the rigidity of the formal
+laws of existence. The planetary system with its regularity of motion
+which in spite of its many complications has been formulated by Kepler in
+most simple laws is an object of wonder to us. This order of nature is
+the same order as the grand harmony that prevails in mathematics and all
+the other formal sciences. The most complicated laws of both, forms of
+nature and forms of thought, are nothing but generalisations of special
+applications of the principle of identity in some kind of action that
+takes place. While the order of the objective world excites our wonder
+we can understand the order of the subjective world of thought-forms
+and know that, being the product of certain mental operations according
+to the principle of identity, it must be a matter of course. Thus the
+intrinsic necessity of the laws of our thought-forms gives us a clue to
+the intrinsic necessity of the laws of nature.
+
+
+III. CONSERVATION OF MATTER AND ENERGY, AND CAUSATION.
+
+The law of the conservation of matter and energy is nothing but an
+application of the principle of identity to nature as a whole. And the
+law of cause and effect is again a corollary only of the law of the
+conservation of matter and energy. The law of causation is a formula
+which maintains that there is identity in difference. Some motion
+produces a change of form. There is accordingly a different state after
+the motion than before. Yet the total amount of matter and energy
+remains the same. This is the identity in the change. David Hume and
+with him John Stuart Mill and the empiricists misunderstood the problem
+of causation. Instead of considering cause and effect as one continuous
+process that should be analysed, they considered cause and effect
+separately and attempted a synthesis. In addition to this mistake, causes
+as well as effects were defined to be objects. Hume says cause and
+effect are objects following one another. Cause however is a process;
+it is a motion, a change that takes place, an event that happens; it
+is not a thing. And effect is the product of such a process. Effect is
+a special form, a special state of things, a special configuration,
+but not the material of which this configuration consists. A certain
+poison introduced into the stomach of a living being produces certain
+motions in the bowels, called cramps, which may finally prove fatal.
+One change produces other changes and their product is a new state of
+things which is accompanied with pain and ends in death. It is wrong to
+call strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect. But if we call
+strychnine the cause and a dead mouse the effect, we must forever despair
+of solving the problem of causation by a reduction to the principle of
+identity, for strychnine is not at all identical with a dead mouse. No
+cause is the same thing as its effect, and we can by no means identify
+cause and effect. And yet the principle of identity holds good. The
+identity in causation is the conservation of matter and energy in a
+change of form.
+
+It has been maintained that the law of cause and effect could never be
+proved; it is either an innate idea prior to experience (Schopenhauer and
+Schopenhauer’s interpretation of Kant) or it is an assumption derived
+from experience of which (since experience is not as yet exhausted)
+we cannot know whether it will hold good forever (J. S. Mill). In
+contradistinction to these views we maintain, that the law of cause and
+effect can satisfactorily be proved to anyone who accepts the principle
+of identity. So far as the principle of identity is recognised, all
+the formal laws are unequivocally determined, or popularly expressed
+they are as they are, they will remain so and cannot be otherwise, they
+are necessary. All the determining factors and also the procedure of
+an operation are set forth, no unforeseen events are possible, for the
+non-formal elements are excluded, and therefore the result will be in one
+case just as it is in any other. Thus it can _a priori_ be stated that
+formal laws will always hold good.
+
+The question has been raised: Whether or not our knowledge of the
+apriority of formal laws is independent of experience. We answer: In
+a certain sense it is dependent upon experience, in another it is
+not. Historically and evolutionarily it is dependent upon experience.
+A store of innumerable experiences has to be gained before a rational
+creature will be able to make the abstraction of pure forms. As soon as
+this stage is attained, man possesses a world in himself. He can now
+experiment within himself with mental images, for instance with numbers:
+he can calculate. His mental operations with pure form are called “pure
+thought” and “pure thought” is now opposed to “experience through the
+senses.” The word “experience” accordingly is used in two ways; it has a
+broad and a narrow meaning. In its broad sense it means any acquisition
+of knowledge generally, in its narrow sense it means knowledge acquired
+through the sense-activity alone. Our knowledge of the apriority of
+formal laws rests upon experience in its broad sense, but not upon
+experience in its narrow sense. We can never derive the idea of necessity
+from sense-impressions. John Stuart Mill in rejecting innate ideas saw
+no other way than to derive the formal laws from experience (taking
+here experience in the broad sense). Yet he did not make a distinction
+between formal thought and sense-experience. He considered the nature of
+sense-experience as typical for all experience. And thus, again, taking
+experience in the narrow sense of the term, he was from his premises
+perfectly justified in rejecting the idea of necessity. If the process
+of cause and effect is really a synthesis of two things represented in
+two different sense-impressions following each other, then indeed we have
+no guarantee that the same sequences will always be observed; and there
+may be worlds in which the law of causality does not operate. Mill saw
+all the consequences of his mistake, he conceded freely that we are not
+justified in assuming that twice two will always be four: many thousands
+of experiences are in its favor, but we cannot be at all sure that no
+case will ever happen in which twice two makes five.
+
+The ideas of causality and of the conservation of matter and energy are
+not derived from experience in the narrow sense of the word, not from
+sense-experience, but from experience in the wider sense of the word, i.
+e. from sense-experience arranged with the assistance of formal laws. We
+should not forget that mere sense-experience exists only in our abstract
+thought. In reality all sense-experience is relational, it is inseparable
+from its form. Form and the laws of form are not something purely mental
+which is transferred to the world of reality, form is something real, it
+is objective, it is a quality of the facts and the thought-forms of mind
+are a part and a product of the formal structure of the universe.
+
+The ideas of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy are
+not prior to experience, they are a part of experience, i. e. experience
+in the wider sense. They are not part of the sense-experience, but the
+results of our experiments with purely formal thought-operations, and
+being the vital instrument or organ of cognition they are the condition
+of all methodical experience.
+
+
+IV. WHY IS MR. MILL’S PROPOSITION UNTENABLE?
+
+In practical life we all expect that 2 × 2 will under all circumstances
+make 4, and not 5. We reject Mr. Mill’s idea that there may be even a
+possibility of the latter. Is our expectancy really due to _a posteriori_
+experience which having been repeated so often in the lives of our
+ancestors is now so firmly rooted in our minds that we imagine it to
+be necessary and _a priori_? No! certainly not. The experiences of our
+race in the struggle for life has produced our ability of thought,
+but it has nothing to do with the apriority of the products of formal
+thought-operations. A statement of formal thought such as “twice two
+makes four,” cannot be compared to statements of sense-experience such
+as that sugar has a sweet taste. There may be a moment in which the
+taste of sugar will be bitter to our tongue. This is quite possible.
+But to say that twice two might in the future or in any other world, as
+Mr. Mill maintains, make five is nonsensical, and the possibility of
+this assumption cannot be placed in one line with the possibilities of
+extraordinary and exceptional sense-experiences.
+
+What does “twice two makes four” mean? Two means 1 + 1, and twice two
+means 1 + 1 plus 1 + 1. This sum is called “four”; and what we call
+five is 4 + 1. To maintain that the operation 2 × 2 might produce the
+result 5, is to admit conditions which have been excluded. Pure forms
+are not like animals which multiply; they are and remain such as they
+have been posited. When we put two amœbas into a glass and then add two
+other amœbas, it is quite possible that in the mean time one of the first
+set has divided into two. In that case we would have five amœbas. But
+the operation 2 × 2 cannot breed any additional units, so as to produce
+a greater number than the sum of 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. Nor can we let any of
+these units disappear into naught, so as to produce the result 3, without
+committing some inconsistency in our thought-operations, for the products
+of our thought-operations are rigid and must remain such as they have
+been posited. They are not animals blessed with fertility but pure forms
+and nothing but pure forms.
+
+How could Mr. John Stuart Mill overlook so palpable a contrast as
+that between formal knowledge and sense-experience? He was apparently
+prejudiced against the term “a priori,” which as we freely confess is a
+very poor and inadequate expression. Mr. Mill himself states the cause of
+his prejudice in his autobiography. He says:
+
+    “There is not any idea, feeling, or power, in the human mind,
+    which, in order to account for it, requires that its origin
+    should be referred to any other source than experience.”
+
+Mr. Mill was justly exasperated against anything _a priori_, for in his
+time, it had become customary among certain philosophers to classify all
+pet superstitions which could not be proved by experience as _a priori_.
+Mr. Mill continues:
+
+    “Whatever may be the practical value of a true philosophy
+    of these matters, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the
+    mischiefs of a false one. The notion that truths external
+    to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness,
+    independently of observation and experience, is, I am
+    persuaded, in these times the great intellectual support of
+    false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory
+    every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which
+    the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the
+    obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into
+    its own all-sufficient voucher and justification. There never
+    was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated
+    prejudices.”
+
+We appreciate the cause of Mr. Mill’s prejudice, but we cannot agree
+with him. And Mr. Mill is mistaken when he imagines that a rejection
+of apriority will abolish false doctrines and superstitions. On
+the contrary. The recognition of absolute necessity based upon the
+universality of formal thought will alone be a safe basis of science
+through which we can reject _prima facie_ the wrong pretensions of
+superstitions and pseudo-science. If we assume with Mr. Mill that all
+formal knowledge partakes of the nature of sense-experience, that there
+is no difference between the two, no general judgment would be allowable
+and the idea of necessity would be inadmissible. These consequences
+are accepted by Mill. In that case science would lose its value and
+philosophy would be without foundation. The most absurd superstition
+could not be rejected off-hand on the ground of being contrary to that
+which through logic and other formal sciences has been found to be
+necessary and a condemnation of any superstition on the part of science
+would be mere arrogance. Pseudo-science would have the same right with
+true science.
+
+It is obvious that without being obliged to consider the apriority of
+formal laws as innate, we need not accept the consequence of Mr. Mill’s
+philosophy. We can and we do retain the idea of necessity and we consider
+it as the corner-stone of all science.
+
+
+V. THE MEANING OF “NECESSARY.”
+
+We have to be on our guard lest we introduce some mystical element
+into the idea of necessity. There is nothing mystical about necessity.
+Necessary means that a certain operation, if it is exactly the same
+operation as another one, will produce exactly the same result. When we
+posit two units twice, we shall have the same result as when we posit
+one unit four times; and we call this result four. We shall reach the
+same product whenever we repeat the same operation. Knowing that we
+shall always reach the same result, we can, _a priori_ (or beforehand)
+and with certainty, determine the result of certain operations after we
+have mentally gone through the same operations for all possible cases
+and under any imaginable conditions. That a perfect apriority with an
+unfailing certainty is possible only in the domain of formal thought
+is natural. The reason is that we know our thought-forms exhaustively.
+They contain nothing but that which has been predicated about them. Our
+sense-experience however is always piecemeal and never exhaustive.
+
+Comprehension is actually a tracing of form relations and a formulating
+them in concise statements. The scientist’s work is based upon the
+methods of measuring and counting (i. e. the methods of formal sciences)
+and he undertakes to show that certain phenomena, different in some
+respects, are the same in other respects, that their sameness can be
+stated in a comprehensive and exact formula. In this way he marks out
+their determining factors in terms of formal thought (for instance in
+numbers), so that we can compute them and predict them according to their
+determining factors, so that we can know, according to their conditions,
+that they will be always as they are.
+
+The importance of formal thought is paramount in science and the problem
+about the necessity which attaches to the laws of formal thought is the
+fundamental problem of philosophy.
+
+There are many philosophers, still, troubling themselves to solve the
+problem in the fashion of Schopenhauer or of Mill or looking upon the
+problem as insolvable. We do not doubt that the solution here presented
+is the only possible solution which as soon as it is understood will find
+a general acceptance.
+
+Must it be added that the solution of this fundamental problem does
+not involve the ready solutions of all other minor problems? Oh no! We
+all know that the solution of one problem is only a stepping-stone for
+attacking other problems. The possibilities of progress are as unlimited
+as the scope of cognition. Light on this general subject gives us hope
+that we shall succeed in throwing light also upon other subjects which
+are still shrouded to the philosophical inquirer in impenetrable darkness.
+
+
+VI. MODERN LOGIC.
+
+The problem of modern logic is at bottom no other problem than that of
+formal thought and of the origin of thought-forms. Professor Dewey in
+the excellent essay which appears as the leading article of this number
+says: “Any book of logic will tell us what this conception of thought
+is: that thought is a faculty or an entity existing in the mind apart
+from facts and that it has its own fixed forms with which facts have
+nothing to do—except in so far as they pass under the yoke.” This is
+the old conception of thought, rightly criticised by Professor Dewey,
+for, closely considered, it turns out to be dualistic. However, as soon
+as a proposition is recognised to contain or to rest upon dualism, it
+becomes a problem. The problem of modern logic is, How can we arrive at a
+monistic conception of logic, how can we rid ourselves of the dualism on
+the one side of facts not yet rationalised by the method of thought-forms
+and on the other side of mind with its empty thought-forms assimilating
+facts to its own nature.
+
+Our solution of the difficulty has been proposed, in the sense outlined
+by Professor Dewey, in “Fundamental Problems.” Professor Dewey, according
+to our opinion, is right when he says there is no such a thing as
+transcendental thought, or pure thought, thought by itself. And there is
+no such a thing either as fact, crude irrational chaotic fact. The world
+of fact, indeed, is a cosmos and no chaos; there never was a chaos and
+never will be a chaos, for the laws of form are an essential and the most
+characteristic feature of the world.
+
+Can there be any question how the order found in thought-forms originates
+in a world in which the inorganic and unfeeling mineral crystallises in
+a regular shape according to strict mathematical laws, i. e. the laws
+of form? A world in which the plant grows not otherwise than according
+to strict mathematical laws building up roots and stem and leaves and
+petals and stamens and all other organs obedient to a certain plan which
+will vary according to circumstances, but throughout consistent with
+the principles of formal laws? Can there be any question that in this
+world of cosmic harmony thought-forms will develop in feeling beings as
+a microcosm exhibiting the same regularity and conformity to law as do
+in this world all other things animate and inanimate? Our pure, i. e.
+merely formal, thought is an abstraction which serves the purpose of
+comprehension. And so is the concept “matter,” being that which produces
+sense-impressions. There are no such ghosts as pure matter or pure
+thoughts in reality.
+
+Modern logic, so far as we conceive it to be right, is by no means an
+overthrow of the old formal Logic, generally called Aristotelian. It is
+simply an amendment made in order to exclude an erroneous interpretation.
+And so is modern mathematics not so much a revolution as an extension
+of the old Euclidian system. It is a revolution only against a certain
+unclear conception of mathematics according to which this science is said
+to rest upon axioms, these axioms representing absolute truth—unprovable,
+incomprehensible, and mysterious.[21]
+
+The main truth of monism is that reality forms one indivisible whole
+and all our concepts are mere abstractions representing certain parts
+or certain features of the whole. As soon as we try to think of any
+of them as things in themselves we become involved in inextricable
+contradictions. It appears as if the formal sciences contained some
+truths which were absolute and independent of actual reality. But let any
+one think of any number, of 2 or 3, and he will soon find that conceived
+as absolute beings they are meaningless and unthinkable.
+
+This is not to say that numbers are phantoms, but that conceived as
+absolute beings they are phantoms. Numbers and all formal concepts
+represent something real, they represent pure forms. And form is as much
+a part and feature of reality as is matter and energy.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[21] Hermann Grassmann, one of the founders of modern mathematics, has
+called attention to the fact that Euclid had a clearer conception of the
+fundamental concepts of mathematics than his ill-informed translators
+and interpreters. Grassmann says in his _Ausdehnungslehre_: “From the
+imputation of confounding axioms with assumed concepts Euclid himself,
+however, is free, Euclid incorporated the former among his postulates
+(αἰτήματα) while he separated the latter as common concepts (κοιναὶ
+ἐννοιαι)—a proceeding which even on the part of his commentators was no
+longer understood, and likewise with modern mathematicians, unfortunately
+for science, has met with little imitation. As a matter of fact, the
+abstract methods of mathematical science know no axioms at all.”—Quoted
+from _The Open Court_, Vol. II. No. 77, _A Flaw in the Foundation of
+Geometry_, by Hermann Grassmann, translated from his _Ausdehnungslehre_
+by μκρκ.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK REVIEWS.
+
+
+BELIEF IN GOD. Its Origin, Nature, and Basis. Being the Winkley Lectures
+of the Andover Theological Seminary for the Year 1890. By _Jacob Gould
+Schurmann_. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1890.
+
+The learned Sage Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University, after
+tracing the historical origin and development of the belief in God,
+expresses his conviction that the problem of the modern theist consists
+in the union of the Aryan and Semitic modes of interpreting existence. We
+shall then have “a synthesis of the Father of all spirits with the ground
+of all nature.” This is the hypothesis developed in the course of the
+lectures delivered by Professor Schurmann last year before the Andover
+Theological Seminary on the Winkley foundation, that form the contents of
+the present volume. The theism embodied in that hypothesis is called by
+the author _anthropocosmic_, because, while it is based on the facts of
+the universe and those of human nature, the universe must be interpreted
+in the terms of man, and not man in the terms of the universe. The key
+to the universe is the self-conscious spirituality which makes us selves
+and persons. Hence anthropocosmic theism is the doctrine of a Supreme
+Being “who is ground both of nature and of man, but whose essence is not
+natural but spiritual.”
+
+Before considering the evidence for this hypothesis, let us see what
+the author has to say with reference to the logical character of the
+belief in God. He shows that _agnosticism_—of which he treats under
+its three significations as referring to the method of knowledge, the
+object of knowledge, and the subject of knowledge—is not consistent
+with the insight into nature and the constitution of knowledge gained
+by the Newtonian method of hypotheses and verifications. Science, as
+opposed to pure phenomenalism, assumes that what has not originated
+in the percipient subject is objectively real, and it postulates the
+universality of law in nature, a postulate which is the expression of a
+conviction of “the unity and universal inner connection of all reality.”
+The objective world cannot be understood without reference to our own
+conscious experience, and as the only reality we know from the inside
+is a spiritual _ego_, self-conscious spirit must be ascribed to the one
+ultimate reality whose existence science assumes, as that which will
+alone satisfy the requirement of unity in the midst of change.
+
+It might be objected here, that the existence in man of a spiritual
+_ego_ requires proof before that of a universal spirit or world-soul can
+be inferred from it. The author takes the existence of the _ego_ for
+granted, a course which is quite allowable from the theistic standpoint,
+although, in the face of what is now known as to the dissolution of the
+ego under abnormal conditions of the organism, not scientific. Having
+made that assumption and inferred the existence of God from that of the
+human spirit, the author explains the nature of the one by reference to
+that of the other. He tells us, that the finite spirit is identical,
+within the limits of its range, with the infinite spirit, because it is
+an _ego_, and that in the _ego_ we have, not merely a mode of the divine
+activity, but a part of the divine essence. Such being the case, the
+author has no difficulty in inferring the attributes of God from the
+phenomena exhibited by man. Thus God is a God of righteousness because
+the moral capacity in the human spirit must have its ground in the
+infinite Spirit. Again universal benevolence or love is the ideal of
+which human morality is the realisation; hence we must conceive of the
+Spirit of the universe as a God of love.
+
+We do not think the author’s final conclusion, that “the phenomena
+both of the universe and of human life require the thinking mind to
+postulate a Supreme Ground of things which we are entitled to describe as
+self-conscious Spirit and loving Father,” is warranted by his premises.
+But we can accept the statement that our knowledge of God must continue
+to grow with our knowledge of man and nature. Through these alone can we
+know Him, but the difficulty is to interpret the revelation. Let it be
+admitted also that the end of nature is the production of man, and that
+what is referred to by the author as the human spirit is “the organ of
+that communication of God which is the end of the universe.” This does
+not in reality throw any light on the nature of God. The utmost that can
+be said is that, as man is an organism possessing certain functions, the
+universe, viewed as God, must have an organic existence with functions
+_corresponding_ to those exhibited by the human organism.
+
+The author’s reasoning in support of the belief in God as cause or ground
+of the world, and as realising purpose in the world is very ingenious.
+He affirms that the creational form of the argument from causality is
+insufficient. It satisfies the devotional needs of a certain class
+of worshipers, but what the religious, as well as the scientific,
+consciousness demands is a God “here in the world, not there outside of
+it or making it.” It has not yet been shown that the universe has had a
+beginning in time, and the argument in favor of the eternity of matter
+ends with an assurance of the eternity of spirit alone. Spirit is the
+eternal reality, and nature its eternal manifestation, the latter being
+no more separable from the former “than the spoken word from the thought
+it symbolises.” The causal relation is, however, absolutely necessary
+for our apprehension of the facts of the universe, and as it cannot
+be interpreted without contradiction as an action between independent
+beings, it must be explained as the eternal dependence of the world upon
+God. This implies that God must be volitional as well as self-conscious;
+“for without will there could be no activity, no efficient causation,
+no material universe.” The universe is thus the eternal expression of
+the divine will. But what is the purpose realised in creation? The
+activity of the divine will precludes the notion of a blindly working
+nature. As creation is the eternal self-revelation of God, the supreme
+and preconceived end of all things must be the glory of God. But man is
+indispensable for the attainment of God’s glory, and therefore the end
+of nature as a realised scheme of divine ideas is the production of man.
+The volitional and teleological arguments as thus stated by the author
+are consistent with the theory of evolution developed by Darwin, but
+they may be combatted on other grounds connected with the conditions of
+the existence of God as one with Nature. With this observation, we must
+leave Professor Schurmann’s very thoughtful book which, although for the
+reasons we have stated, not conclusive, presents the theistic argument
+with great clearness and in its strongest form.
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. A Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old
+Testament to New Testament. By _Crawford Howell Toy_. Boston: Little,
+Brown & Co. 1890.
+
+This work is another contribution to that genuine history which is alone
+competent to impart any true instruction. In it the author undertakes to
+give an account of the genesis of Christianity as a child of Judaism.
+
+It seems to be the thesis of the author that those conceptions and
+beliefs that characterise any form of religion are rather determined by
+the social evolution than that the social progress and its features are
+determined by the evolution of ideas among which the religious ideas
+are specially influential. In his introduction the author sketches out
+his view of the general laws of social progress as the same are related
+to religious thought. He notices in history the tendency of ethnic
+religions to give way to or to develop into universal religions, and
+argues that Christianity is destined to overcome all its rivals and
+prevail universally. This kind of a conclusion is a natural one to follow
+from the theory that the character of thought is determined by social
+circumstances and progress. But if it be true that the special course
+of the evolution of thought and its characteristic form at any epoch is
+determined by causes that are uncontrolled by social conditions, that as
+between thought and society thought is the masterful factor, then quite
+another conclusion may ensue. But the dubitable nature of the main thesis
+of the work does not much detract from the great excellence of the work
+in general. As a history of the evolution of Jewish religious conceptions
+and beliefs from the very first until the establishment of Christianity,
+it is in the highest degree interesting and instructive.
+
+After a discussion of the literature of the Jews and the formation of the
+canon, the author proceeds to describe in full detail the nature genesis
+and mutations of the cardinal religious doctrines as they revealed
+themselves to the Israelite, Jewish, and early Christian insight. The
+entire body of the data are interpreted in consonance with the modern
+scientific idea of the organic nature of society. Jesus is regarded as
+the master spirit that created the Christian Church, and Paul whom many
+would install as the real author of the same is accordingly given only a
+second place. Altogether it may be said that Professor Toy has given us
+a most valuable contribution to religious history and to the scientific
+interpretation of the same.
+
+                                                                      ρσλ.
+
+
+PRONAOS TO HOLY WRIT. Establishing, on Documentary Evidence, the
+Authorship, Date, Form, and Contents of each of its Books, and the
+Authenticity of the Pentateuch. By _Isaac M. Wise_. Cincinnati: Robert
+Clarke & Co. 1891.
+
+Rabbi Isaac Wise, the president of the Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati
+and the Nestor of Orthodox Judaism in America, presents in the “Pronaos
+to Holy Writ” a review of the Biblical books with comments as to their
+authenticity and the times in which they were written. Having read these
+“books and every word thereof in the original for a term of sixty-six
+years, i. e. from boyhood up to his seventy-second birthday,” and having
+“acquainted himself with all the ancient versions and commentaries
+and a large portion of the modern translations and commentaries of
+the Bible,” the author is entitled to be heard. Rabbi Wise is a stern
+monotheist and he declares: “God only did create light out of darkness;
+man cannot produce truth out of fiction, unless in his self-delusion
+problematic truth satisfies him. All so-called gems of truth buried under
+the quicksand of fiction and deception are problematic at best, if not
+supported by authoritative corroborants.” This is true. All truth depends
+upon verification. We cannot make truth, but must find it, we must be
+able to corroborate it, and the corroborants of truth are its authority.
+Dr. Wise’s idea of a corroborant is different from ours, he says: “No
+one can speak conscientiously of Bible truth before he knows that the
+Bible is true, and especially in its historical data.” This seems to
+indicate that we must have a belief in the truth of the Bible before
+we investigate it and that moral truths, the ethics, the philosophy of
+the Bible depend upon its historical data. We cannot go so far with the
+author of the Pronaos. Dr. Wise says: “The science commonly called Modern
+Biblical Criticism, actually Negative Criticism which maintains on the
+strength of unscientific methods that the Pentateuch is not composed of
+original Mosaic material, no Psalms are Davidian, no Proverbs Solomonic,
+the historical books are unhistorical, the prophecies were written
+post festum, there was no revelation, inspiration, or prophecy, must
+also maintain that the Bible is a compendium of pious or even impious
+frauds, wilful deceptions, unscrupulous misrepresentations.” Dr. Wise
+thought it necessary to meet Negative Criticism with the documentary
+evidence and for this purpose he wrote his Pronaos, which is to be an
+entrance-hall to the Temple of Biblical Truth. We do not side with the
+negativism of certain biblical critics, for we believe that historical
+investigations have proved large portions of the Pentateuch to be Mosaic,
+several psalms to be Davidian, and the historical books to contain as
+much history as many old historical books contain. We believe that they
+have to be judged and searched and commented just as much and in the
+same spirit of scientific inquiry as our philologists treat Herodotus
+or Livy. But the value of the Bible, in our opinion, does not depend
+upon the acceptance or rejection of these or those historical data; nor
+is it necessary to consider the Hebrew prophets as special revelations
+of God, in contradistinction to the divine revelation in nature and the
+history of mankind in general. It may be true enough that the orthodox
+God-idea of Monotheism depends upon the belief in special revelation
+and prophecies, and it is also true that most of the Biblical criticism
+has been destructive and negative. But there is a way possible between
+both standpoints which may be called positive criticism. This positive
+criticism attempts to understand the very life and meaning of the old
+religion, it attempts to comprehend the belief of the orthodox and
+construe it in the terms of science—i. e. of rational and clear thought.
+Religion is certainly not a mere fraud or a vain illusion, it is an
+ideal which developed naturally out of certain needs of man and the
+conditions of society. That religious ideas, especially the idea of God
+as the cosmic power which represents the moral authority, are no mere
+fictions, is proved by their survival, and those who believe in evolution
+should not be blind to the fact that there is something good, something
+true, something well adapted to surroundings in religion. To find these
+elements of truth and goodness which constitute the life of religion
+is not mere negative criticism, but positive criticism, and it is not
+at all necessary for those who aspire in this direction, to believe in
+any historical data, or in special revelations, or in prophecies, or in
+the personality of God, but simply to trust in truth. Truth is the only
+way of salvation even though it may shatter the most sacred idols of a
+venerable orthodoxy.
+
+The contents of the book show that the standpoint of the author does not
+blind him to the finer traits of the natural development of his religion.
+So, for instance, Solomon’s rationalism is excellently contrasted with
+the spirit which manifested itself in the Judges as well as the Prophets.
+The author of the Judges was an outspoken theocratic democrat. “He
+literally pours out his abhorrence of the monarchical anti-theocratic
+institution in narrating the story of the first usurper Abimelech, the
+son of Gideon.... Entirely different are the language and tendency of
+the two appendices, evidently written by another author, who evinces his
+animosity to the democratic form of government by saying four times:
+‘In those days there was no king in Israel,’ to which he adds twice
+‘every man did what seemed right in his sight’” (p. 46). “The Solomonic
+ethics is a commentary on the Mosaic ethics, as by reason understood....
+Man’s knowledge of ethical doctrine is identical with his knowledge
+of God’s moral attributes, and all moral obligation has its root in
+the Mosaic God-idea....” According to Solomon “wisdom based upon and
+rooted in the fear of Jehovah with the revealed material before them was
+all-sufficient, without any further special oracles of any prophets. This
+peculiar rationalism brought upon him the ire of prophets and rabbis” (p.
+111).
+
+Some reviewers of Dr. Wise’s book will probably find fault with him that
+he has taken little if any account of the results of modern biblical
+investigations. And this is a grievous fault in our times where it seems
+to be essential for a scholar and author to have read the very latest
+things published on a subject while an acquaintance with the views of
+the classical old authorities is considered unnecessary. It appears that
+Dr. Wise did not intend to present his views or criticisms of and his
+answers to the latest biblical investigations. It may even be that he is
+not familiar with many of them. Granting this to be a fault of his book
+it is, nevertheless, refreshing to us to find an author who has actually
+read and is excellently familiar with all the old sources of the subject
+he is writing upon.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+THE FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY. By _Edward T. Dixon_. Cambridge (Eng.):
+Deighton, Bell & Co. 1891.
+
+This work is divided into three parts, the first containing such
+doctrines of psychology and logic as the author deems sound and useful
+for his purposes, the second exhibiting the author’s “subjective theory
+of geometry deduced from the two fundamental concepts _position_ and
+_direction_,” and the third “on the applicability of the foregoing
+subjective geometry to the geometry of material space.”
+
+In his preface the author expresses his desire that those who criticise
+his work shall “consider categorically” certain questions relating to his
+theory of definition, to the definitions and axioms prescribed by him,
+to his proofs of propositions and to the “objective applications” of his
+three axioms.
+
+Geometry may be studied for two distinct purposes, neither of which
+necessarily involves the other. Unless the aim is mainly the discipline
+of the logical faculty, it is plainly a poor method of study to pore
+over the definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems, problems, and
+demonstrations of Euclid or any similar text-book. Practical resources
+and geometrical information can be acquired much better and more rapidly
+by a course of mechanical drawing with here and there a more or less
+loose explanation of the grounds and reasons that warrant the geometrical
+doctrines, than by means of the Euclidian course. Under such a method of
+instruction the student would rarely feel any real doubt as to the truth
+of his geometrical knowledge.
+
+But where the paramount aim is the training of the reason the Euclidian
+rigor is all important. Hence the perfection of that method by the
+discovery and certification of the ultimate grounds on which, and the
+principles by which, it may be unfolded systematically and in necessary
+and sufficient sequence without presumption or fallacy, is an object of
+the most momentous concern to science, to philosophy, and to culture in
+general. For it is well known that however good an account elementary
+geometry may give of its superstructure the reports given of its
+foundations are all very far from satisfactory.
+
+Repeated and strenuous efforts have been made, and by the most competent
+of our race, to discover and certify the true state of the case in
+respect to the geometrical foundations, in order that the whole edifice
+of that science shall display throughout the same thorough-going
+necessity and sufficiency that distinguishes it in general.
+
+The author of the work under review is persuaded that he is now able to
+perform this so desirable service. He avers his belief that the system
+of geometry he “has set forth in this book is _logically sound_ and that
+consequently the more it is discussed and criticised, the more firmly
+will it become established.” He takes his stand upon two fundamental
+concepts, _position_ and _direction_, which he defines not explicitly but
+“implicitly.” This leads us to consider his first question and his theory
+of definition.
+
+The embarrassments that involve the foundations of elementary geometry
+are mainly, if not wholly, those which involve the general problems of
+definition. Now a definition is the certification of the purport of a
+name by means of a statement or a conspiracy of statements necessary and
+sufficient to that end. But names are constituents absolutely necessary
+for the formation of any statement, so that the above definition of a
+definition may be restated thus: A definition is the certification of the
+purport of one name by means of other names, necessary and sufficient
+to certify the purport of the one defined. Evidently then, definition
+can only lead us from name to name in unending process, or to some
+undefinable name, or to some name that we choose to leave undefined; and
+the question arises, on what sort of names shall we take our stand as
+ultimate grounds?
+
+Our author answers this question as follows: “The propounder of a
+scientific theory is not of course expected to teach his readers to
+speak, it is only necessary for him to define the terms peculiar to his
+science, or those to which he wishes to attach peculiar meanings. He may
+therefore assume that the meanings of all other words are known to his
+readers.”
+
+He then propounds that “all that is logically required for a definition
+is one or more assertions with regard to the word to be defined or, its
+attributes,” provided “they are not demonstrably incompatible with each
+other.”
+
+Although our author conceives that logical competence requires no more
+than this for a good definition, he yet goes on to remark, that “if the
+definition is to form the basis of a deductive science it is further
+advisable that the assertions should be independent,” and that “where
+it is required to define a term whose denotation is already known, it
+is further necessary not only that the assertions should be commonly
+accepted as true with respect to it, but that they should restrict the
+meaning of the term exactly to its accepted denotation, neither more nor
+less, and should do so in the simplest manner that can be devised.”
+
+It is upon this theory of definition that our author requests of his
+critics a “categorical” answer to his first question, “Do you accept the
+requirements I have laid down for a logical definition? (If not please
+state which of them you object to, why you object to it, and what you
+would propose to substitute for it.)”
+
+Since it is a “categorical” answer that is requested and since also it is
+the matter of definition that is put in issue, we wish that our author
+had been more definite and had made his propositions better issuable, for
+we must protest that we regard ourselves obliged to answer to what we
+can best conceive to be the author’s true meanings rather than to what he
+has explicitly said.
+
+We do not conceive that he regards it as _necessary_ to a definition that
+the defining assertions should be expressed “in the simplest manner that
+can be devised.” We have also to take his use of the word “restrict”
+as importing completion as well as limitation, and his use of the word
+“requirements” as intending conditions that together are sufficient as
+well as necessary.
+
+If we are right in our understanding of the meanings of our author he
+contemplates four cases, first, the definition of a name that has no
+denotation already known and that is not to form the basis of a deductive
+science, second, the definition of a name that has no denotation already
+known but which is to form the basis of a deductive science, third, the
+definition of a name that has a denotation already known but which is not
+to form the basis of a deductive science, and fourth the definition of a
+name that has a denotation already known and is to form the basis of a
+deductive science.
+
+In this fourth case our author deems it requisite for a logical
+definition that there shall be made one or more assertions about the
+subject of definition that are not demonstrably incompatible with one
+another, that are independent of one another, that are commonly accepted
+as true in respect to the subject defined and that “restrict” the meaning
+of the name under definition exactly to its accepted denotation.
+
+It seems to us that this last requirement dispenses with the necessity
+of all the rest. If we have provided an assertion or a set of assertions
+that do in fact complete and limit the meaning of the subject of
+definition exactly to its proper denotation that is a definition in full.
+It implies that the defining assertions are all consistent with one
+another, and in case any assertion is dependent upon one or more of the
+rest that is a circumstance wholly immaterial. _Utile per inutile non
+nocetur._
+
+Again, what is it to be commonly accepted as true? Does logical
+competence depend on the altering states of our knowledge or on the
+fluctuations of opinion? Was a whale logically defined as a fish before
+we learned that it was a mammal?
+
+The third case allows of the application of the same comment as that
+made upon the fourth. But in the first and second cases the doctrines
+of the author as well as his suppositions are very notable. He supposes
+the anomaly of names without any known denotation, by which he may mean
+those which have no application whatever. In respect to such he propounds
+that they may be given a logical definition by making one or various
+consistent assertions as applicable to them or to their attributes.
+
+“The proof of the pudding will be found in the eating,” as our author
+says. So let us say that a troft may be perceived whenever our attention
+is excited, and that trofts are of multitudinous variety. Do these
+assertions constitute a logical definition? It is a prime requisite for
+a definition that the defining assertion or assertions shall have a
+meaning, which is the same as to say that names must be employed that
+are already significant. These significant names must be so used that the
+intellectual sensibility shall be excited to perceive in a determinate
+way that which is intended to be defined. In other words, sense and not
+nonsense must be produced in the mind that considers the definition.
+Perhaps, however, our author intends such words as electricity, or
+spirit, or energy.
+
+Because of the considerations above indicated and others we cannot accept
+the author’s requirements for a logical definition as a whole. Some of
+them are in some of his cases unnecessary, while taken together they
+supply no new means whereby to solve the several problems of definition.
+
+The author’s subjective theory of geometry is plainly the outgrowth of
+his confidence in the solvent power of the concept of direction as a
+prime datum of geometry.
+
+Everything of consequence in his essay depends upon the worth of this
+concept as a geometrical foundation. Considering the disparagement
+that has been visited upon that concept by numerous writers of good
+geometrical rank we naturally look for considerations tending to remove
+the discredit that has befallen that notion. Instead however of this we
+find the most palpable set of circular definitions. Direction is defined
+by direction in the most distracting way, thus:
+
+“(_a_) A direction may be conceived to be indicated by naming two points
+as the direction from one to the other.”
+
+The inaptitude of the term direction for use in geometry is rooted in
+its ambiguous purport. As commonly used it means at least three distinct
+but closely associated notions which become confused in thought and
+expression unless the most solicitous care is taken to distinguish
+them. When we speak of the direction of one point from another or of
+the direction from one point to another we mean the straight off-ness
+or from-ness or to-ness which one bears to the other; in other words
+a relation of separation and straight mediation. When again we speak
+of the direction of a motion we intend the indefinite straight sense
+of its procession, which is not a relation but an attribute of the
+motion. When still again we speak of the direction of a line we mean its
+straight _lay_ as compared or as comparable with other actual or possible
+correlates which is again a relation but not necessarily the same
+relation as that that obtains between two points.
+
+In all these meanings the notion of straightness is involved, and could
+we say in lieu of straightness first directness and then direction and
+holding fast in thought this sense of the word, make a noun of it, so
+that a direction would intend the same as a straightness and no more, it
+might obtain a useful geometric term and notion.
+
+To define it we might first define a line thus: A line is a space
+boundary that is indefinitely long but not otherwise of any extent.
+Then, a direction is a line such that between the points that bound any
+assigned parcel of it no copy of said parcel is possible.
+
+But direction purports to our author the second of the meanings above
+set forth, namely, the indefinite straight sense of the procession of a
+motion. Definite parcels of a direction thus understood are identical
+with vectors.
+
+Now the notion of straightness is after the notions of point and line
+the most fundamental one of geometry and the one which is altogether the
+most prominent and useful. It is the necessary means for any definition
+of a vector or of the notion which our author deems so important. As
+straightness is attributable only to lines and long things which a line
+may represent it makes no difference whether we define straightness
+or a straight line, but a masterful performance of this definition is
+absolutely necessary before the foundations of geometry can be abidingly
+certified.
+
+Our author defines a straight line thus: “A straight line is a continuous
+series of points extending from each of them in the same two directions.”
+What kind of a thing a continuous series of points may be we are not told
+but as a point is defined to be “a portion of matter so small that for
+the purpose in hand variations of positions within it may be neglected”
+we take it that a straight line is a continuous series of particles of
+matter. The “purpose in hand” in this case must of course be the purpose
+of geometry.
+
+In defining an angle our author first lays down that “The difference
+between two directions is called their _inclination_ to one another” and
+then “The measure of an inclination is called an _angle_.”
+
+Considering that it is the doctrine of the author that every straight
+line has two contrary directions the measure of whose inclination is an
+angle of one hundred and eighty degrees, we imagine a northeast southwest
+line cutting an east west line and wonder if the right hand upper angle
+is really two angles according to whether or not the directions both pass
+to the left or both pass to the right or pass one to the left and the
+other to the right.
+
+Were this an ordinary work we might regard it as due to the author to
+notice the many excellencies which characterise it, in spite of the
+defects which we notice. But as our author evidently realises, the
+eminent dignity of the topic challenges and its singular importance
+demands unsparing criticism. He who offers to instruct the world on the
+foundations of geometry draws his sword and throws away the scabbard, and
+like a doughty champion he will scorn to accept any favor, prizing only
+such success as he shall take at the point of an efficacy of treatment
+that conquers all competent and candid criticism.
+
+Stringent as are such terms of contest an author who is a worthy
+competitor in the field of geometric research can be well content with
+them in the perception that the very same conditions apply in full force
+to the comments of his critics.
+
+The author is undoubtedly an able man and a close thinker. He has
+concentrated his mind upon a work that is worth the energy of a lifetime.
+But we must confess our judgment to be that in spite of his capacity and
+evident devotion he has come short of the high result to which he has
+aspired.
+
+                                                                      ρσλ.
+
+
+LES FÊTES DE MONTPELLIER. PROMENADE A TRAVERS LES CHOSES, LES HOMMES ET
+LES IDEES. By _J. Delbœuf_. Paris: Félix Alcan.
+
+We have here a charming narrative by the well-known Professor at the
+University of Liège of his visit to the fêtes of Montpellier, undertaken
+in great measure to make the personal acquaintance of M. Dauriac, the
+critic in the _Revue Philosophique_ of the author’s work “La matière
+brute et la matière vivante.” The description given of the fêtes,
+which marked the sixth centenary of the University of Montpellier, is
+very entertaining, as is the account of the journey through the South
+of France; but as M. Delbœuf says that he was more curious to become
+acquainted with men than with places, what he tells us about the former
+will be the more interesting.
+
+The author, with the companions of his tour, could not pass Nancy
+without stopping to see “the masters in the science of hypnotism” there.
+An account of what he saw and heard gives the author the opportunity
+of repeating “That he does not regard forgetfulness on awaking as
+characteristic of profound hypnosis, and that experience is against
+the efficacity of criminal suggestion unless the subject is criminally
+inclined.” The fêtes at Montpellier commenced with a religious service
+in the Cathedral, during which the Bishop, M. de Cabrières, preached a
+sermon so liberal in tone, that M. Delbœuf thinks the time is arriving
+when the church will demonstrate that Moses was the precursor of Darwin.
+At the University reception which followed, M. Delbœuf sought out among
+the professors for his friend M. Dauriac, whom he had figured when first
+he heard from him as small, thin and dark, but now found, in accordance
+with the usual rule in such cases, that he was tall, robust and fair.
+In the course of their subsequent conversations the two Professors
+made mutual confidences, M. Dauriac confessing that his true vocation
+was music, and that he was preparing a work on the psychology of the
+musician; while M. Delbœuf informed his friend that he was about to reply
+to his criticism of “La matière brute et la matière vivante,” and that he
+would throw the greatest light on the origin, which was still obscure, of
+life and death. If the genial Liège Professor can do this, he may be the
+first to reap the benefit referred to in his own words: “The discovery of
+the cause of death could not fail to assure the immortality of its author
+and its inspirer, and sooner or later that of humanity at large.” For,
+according to a medical adage, if the cause of a disease is known it is
+already conquered.
+
+Montpellier was honored during the fêtes with the presence of Helmholtz,
+to whom but for national jealousy would have been confided the part of
+speaking in the name of the foreign universities. Nevertheless he was
+the true hero of the occasion, and when at the official reception, on
+the President of the Republic shaking his hand and saying a few gracious
+words someone feebly hissed, Helmholtz received in response a perfect
+ovation of applause. M. Delbœuf met with a congenial spirit in the
+Professor of Zoology, M. Sabatier, who has a laboratory at Cette. Their
+views on free-will were in sympathy. They agreed in allowing freedom not
+only to the superior animals, and to inferior animals and plants, but
+even to so called inorganic matter. M. Sabatier is a Christian and at
+the same time a convinced transformist; having arrived at his views from
+religious considerations. He cited M. Dauriac as saying, “The reign of
+determinism is not in the objective world; its empire extends itself over
+nature only after having been exercised over thought. There is no other
+necessity than that of logic or mathematics.” M. Delbœuf is evidently
+an “indeterminist” by nature. He heartily sympathised with the students
+in all their demonstrations of freedom, although one of them assumed
+a somewhat serious character. Dining in the open air with M. Milhaud
+the author of an article in the _Revue Philosophique_ on non-Euclidian
+geometry, he was prepared to talk mathematics. The surroundings were
+too much for him, however, and in recalling the scene he cries, “To the
+devil with philosophy and mathematics! I cannot recall what we said; in
+my remembrances, I see only blooming faces, I hear only the indistinct
+bursts of gaity.” M. Delbœuf’s sympathetic nature is shown in the fact,
+which he records, that wild animals in confinement soon become familiar
+with him.
+
+One of the principal objects of the author’s journey was to see M.
+Gabriel Tarde, “one of the most prolific and original publicists in
+France, if not in Europe,” who resides at Sarlat. After quoting passages
+from an article of M. Tarde on Social Darwinism, which appeared in the
+_Revue Philosophique_, M. Delbœuf remarks that nothing is more attractive
+and at the same time more fatiguing than the reading of his works. M.
+Tarde is “the locomotive that carries you to the end of your journey
+across countries by turns wild, agricultural, industrial, picturesque;
+but without giving you time to regard and admire.” Referring to M.
+Tarde’s acute criticisms of Lombroso and his theories, the author says,
+“It is not that he strikes the pseudo-thinker with formidable blows, but
+he makes him drop gently to the ground.” The French publicist sees in
+_imitation_ the source of social life, and he has been long engaged in
+developing the idea, to the great importance of which M. Delbœuf bears
+witness; although he objects to the use which M. Tarde makes of terms
+taken from mathematics, physics, and biology, to express his sociological
+views. On the question of free-will there was no agreement. Although the
+latter is a determinist, he believes in penal responsibility, on the
+ground of personal identity; the diseased person or the madman is no
+longer himself, in which they differ from the criminal.
+
+We can say nothing of M. Delbœuf’s visit to the canons of the Tarn. Here
+was captured a lizard which displayed, when compared with a Spanish
+lizard in captivity with it, as much difference in character as could be
+found between two men chosen at hazard. The author concludes an amusing
+description of the habits of the two captives by recommending their
+history to the politicians and the historians of France and Spain, as
+likely to throw light on that of the peoples themselves. We leave M.
+Delbœuf, whose book of seventy-five pages may be said to be as full of
+interesting matter as an egg is of meat, with quoting his postscript:
+“On the day that these lines appear (March 1891) the Spanish lizard has
+finally cast off his savage character and follows in the footsteps of the
+French. Effect of imitation.”
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+DER POSITIVISMUS VOM TODE AUGUST COMTE’S BIS AUF UNSERE TAGE (1857-1891).
+By _Hermann Gruber_, S. J. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder’sche
+Verlagshandlung. 1891.
+
+This pamphlet of 194 pages is the continuation of another pamphlet on
+August Comte, the founder of Positivism, which was reviewed in _The Open
+Court_, No. 134. The author is a Jesuit and it is a matter of course that
+all the facts he relates, all the doctrines he explains are represented
+from the standpoint of Roman Catholicism. The booklet is of great
+importance in so far as we learn through it what an erudite Catholic mind
+thinks of that recent movement of philosophy which has been called by
+the collective name Positivism. The method pursued by Hermann Gruber is
+most recommendable. He states facts and quotes abundantly so as to let
+the various philosophers speak for themselves. He is economical with the
+salt of his own opinion, yet he uses it with such a discretion that Roman
+Catholics can become thoroughly acquainted with infidel views without
+suffering in their faith.
+
+The book consists of two parts: (I) The Positivism of the schools in
+connection with Comte and of the Positivistic movement outside of these
+schools. The first part begins with a discussion of Littré. Littré, “the
+voice, the spirit and the soul of Positivism,” as Bourdon calls him,
+is characterised as a philological genius. Although he had chosen the
+medical profession, which however he abandoned early, and although he
+regarded the propaganda of the positive philosophy as his life-work,
+all his talents lay in the direction of special investigation in the
+literary, historical, and linguistic fields, and the editing of the
+French dictionary remains his main achievement.
+
+Comte had not nominated a successor who should in his place be the
+_Directeur du positivisme_. Littré had forfeited this honor on account
+of his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with Madame Comte
+against her husband. After Comte’s death P. Lafitte was elected as a
+temporary director and he has kept this office ever since, which he
+conducts with remarkable devotion and unselfishness. Although without
+property himself he proposed not to use the positivistic funds until he
+had shown himself through his work worthy of using them. He ekes out a
+scanty living for himself by giving lessons in mathematics, and devotes
+all the rest of his time to the management of and the propaganda for
+the Positive Church. His co-workers are Audiffrent, Antoine, Robinet,
+and others—all of them as the reviewer thinks strange people, visionary
+enthusiasts, and, to use an expressive Americanism, regular cranks.
+Lack of space prevents us from recapitulating their ceremonies, their
+sacraments, festivals, pilgrimages, memorials, and other forms of
+service. Their whole behavior proves that they are and will remain
+infidel Roman Catholics and it would have been wiser if they had not
+left the church at all. The positivistic orthodoxy culminates in the
+positivistic mystery of Comte’s idea of a “Virgin-Mother” (_Vierge-Mère_)
+which according to Lafitte is destined to elevate the intercourse
+between the sexes, while Audiffrent, Lagarrigue, and the Brasilian Lemos
+stick closely to Comte’s view “to represent positivism as directly
+conceived under the Utopia of a virgin-mother.”[22] General Lemos goes
+so far as to say “We prefer to be looked upon with St. Paul for the
+sake of our faithfulness toward Comte as fools than to be praised by
+the contemporary frivolity as sages.” And Audiffrent defends against
+Lafitte the diplomatic action of Comte’s with the General of the Jesuits
+concerning an alliance between Positivism and Catholicism. Positivism,
+he says, invites all who have ceased to believe in God to become
+positivists, but it induces all those who still believe in God to turn
+Catholics, thus making an alliance possible of the disciplined against
+the non-disciplined.
+
+If the Jesuit General ever has seriously considered the offer, he would
+perhaps have accepted it, for there is no doubt that he would have made
+the better bargain as all the discipline we should say is on his side.
+
+The English group of Comtean Positivists consists mainly of Fr. Harrison,
+Richard Congreve, George Eliot and James Cotter Morison. The second part
+of the book which treats of the positivistic movement outside of the
+positivistic schools in England, France, Germany and other countries will
+be less interesting to English and American readers partly because the
+subject is better known to them partly because our author is apparently
+more familiar with his French than with his English sources. The second
+part begins with John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. It mentions Bain,
+Lewes, Clifford, Maudsley, Darwin, Sully, Romanes, Huxley, Tyndall.
+Clifford’s view is sketched in sixteen lines but in such a way that
+it appears grotesque. As French positivists outside the schools are
+mentioned Taine, Ribot, Fouillée, Guyau, Charles Richet, J. Luys, Cl.
+Bernard, and Roberty. It is correctly said of Ribot that his doctrine
+of personality is most characteristic of his views. The unity of a
+personality in the ego does not grow from above downwards but from below
+upwards, but Gruber is mistaken in saying of Charles Richet, the editor
+of the _Revue Scientifique_, that he represents about the same views as
+Th. Ribot. Richet’s publication on telepathic experiments in which he
+confidently believes, would never be countenanced by Ribot.
+
+As the first German positivist is mentioned Eugen Dühring. Riehl, Laas,
+Lange, Vaihinger and Avenarius are disposed of together in the next
+following chapter. Several pages are devoted to Wundt.
+
+The little chapter headed _Nord-America_ (p. 171) consisting of two and
+a half pages begins with the words: “According to the testimony of G.
+Stanley Hall philosophy in the new world is in its swaddling-clothes
+still (_in den Kinderschuhen_). Philosophers over there are as rare
+as snakes in Ireland (_Schlangen in Norwegen_).[23] For scientific
+instruction in the United States are used as guiding stars Spencer,
+Lewes, Darwin, Huxley, and Haeckel.” As a representative Atheist is
+named Ludeking, a man unknown to fame, while Colonel Ingersoll is not
+mentioned at all. It is maintained that J. D. Bell, a professor in
+New York had proclaimed the same confession of faith as Comte in _The
+Modern Thinker_—a journal which we have never seen nor ever heard of.
+The societies for ethical culture are characterised as avowing “a purely
+natural religion” while in fact natural religion, the religion of science
+and philosophy, as a basis of ethics is as rigorously rejected by
+Professor Adler as any dogmatic religion, and more than half of the two
+and a half pages is filled with a masonic proclamation of the Sovereign
+Grand Commander, Albert Pike, of Washington, which preaches the belief in
+an unknowable God and denounces Atheism.
+
+The booklet closes with the following sentences: “The full and true
+positivism is embodied in the Catholic Church. The divine revelation
+which she represents is that which is truly real ... truly sure ... truly
+precise ... truly organic ... truly useful. The deepest root, however,
+and the most essential nature of all true positivism (this is vouched for
+by reason as well as by revelation) is not the relative but the absolute.”
+
+Here we conclude our review of the book. We have however to add a few
+words which concern _The Monist_ as well as all the publications of The
+Open Court Publishing Co. Hermann Gruber mentions in his book _The Open
+Court_ and its editor together with the societies for ethical culture.
+We have, ourselves, characterised our views as positivism and as monism,
+but we stated at the same time that our positivism had nothing to do
+with Comte or with any one of Comte’s disciples.[24] They have (with the
+sole exception of Ribot and I should hesitate to call him a Comtean)
+contributed little if anything to the formation of our views. The name
+Positivism is a good and expressive word and we have adopted it because
+taken in its proper meaning it represents the true principle of modern
+philosophy. However we cannot agree with any of the fundamental tenets
+either of Comte or of his most positivistic and most scientific disciple
+Littré.[25] Comte as well as Littré are radical agnostics they repeat
+again and again that “We can know nothing about first and final causes.
+Positive philosophy denies nothing and maintains nothing.” According
+to our view of the subject this attitude is rather negativism than
+positivism. But it is not even negativism; it is worse, it is mere
+scepticism leading to indifferentism. It sounds very philosophical to
+speak of the inscrutability of first and final causes but the very
+terms “first causes” and “final causes” are most nonsensical and
+self-contradictory concepts. (See “Fundamental Problems,” pp. 88-90, and
+101.) Comte and Littré imagine to have conquered metaphysics, but in fact
+they are the worst kind of metaphysicians. They believe in the ghosts of
+metaphysics as strongly as some mediæval minds believe in devils but are
+afraid to wrestle with them, because, as they maintain these metaphysical
+ghosts cannot be conquered.
+
+Comtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by Littré, consists
+mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to “let metaphysics alone”
+(which latter includes the object of religious worship) and limits
+science to positive issues. Thus the oneness of the sciences, a unitary
+world-conception is lost, for the hierarchy of the sciences which are
+to serve as a substitute for philosophy is rather a summing up of the
+stock of knowledge than a system of the sciences exhibiting their organic
+growth. It is an inventory rather than a plan to guide science in its
+further evolution. It is an anatomy rather than a physiology, for the
+very life and spirit of the sciences is missing. And outside the pale of
+the hierarchy of the sciences there is looming around an awful something
+quite different in its nature, like an infinite ocean surrounding a
+forlorn island, the unknowable first and final causes! That which is
+called by former philosophers “metaphysics,” which is at the same time
+the essence of religion, is by no means either unknowable or indifferent.
+It is not something beyond, something extramundane, it is the very life
+of the world and our religious and philosophical opinions are not only
+of a theoretical interest. They are the main factors of our lives which
+in the long run will determine the direction of our development. That
+this is so, has not been sufficiently recognised, and we would suggest in
+this connection that a history of the United States should be written to
+point out that the political liberty of the country and its republicanism
+are nothing but the application of its religious principles and of the
+Puritan conviction of religious independence. The historic growth of the
+colonies remained faithful to this maxim. The religion of a man and of
+a nation is the most important thing. In the same way the structure of
+a seed predetermines the whole plant, and the angle of crystallisation
+together with the shape of the crystal-nucleus from which the process of
+crystallisation starts, will determine the formation of the whole crystal.
+
+His sceptical attitude led Littré to what he and his friends call
+“tolerance.” Littré’s wife was a devout Catholic and his daughter was
+educated in her mother’s faith. He had intended to explain to her his
+views of the subject when she had reached maturity, and leave the choice
+to her. But when the moment came, he declared that “the experiment was
+not worth the tears which it would cause.” Our view of “tolerance” is
+radically different. Whatever the truth may be it should be struggled
+for, cost it ever so many tears or pains.
+
+We cannot sympathise with Littré’s method of constructing ethics upon the
+nutritive and sexual instincts, the former producing egotism, the latter
+altruism. Emotions are, says Littré, as much as ideas, the result of
+brain-processes in consequence of external impressions and “the struggle
+between both kinds of emotion make up the moral life.” Littré rejects
+the evolution theory and its attempts to explain ethics. (See Gruber’s
+book p. 20.) Having explained our views of ethics on other occasions,
+it is sufficient here to state that we consider Littré’s attempt as a
+failure. We cannot even adopt the so-called “positive method,” of which
+Littré says: “Whoever adopts this method is a positivist and whether
+he acknowledges the fact or not, also a disciple of Comte. Whoever
+employs another method is a metaphysician. It is the surest mark by
+which a careful mind will discriminate what belongs to the positive
+philosophy and what is foreign to it.” What is this method? Says Littré:
+“It is an acknowledged principle of positive science that nothing real
+can be stated through reasoning (_raisonnement_). The world cannot be
+guessed.” Littré is opposed to so-called _a priori_ arguments. Hermann
+Gruber says in the preface: “This positive method is embraced by all
+the representatives of the lines of thought here discussed. All of them
+intend to build up their systems with the exclusion of scholastic,
+respectively of Kantian, Hegelian, or any _a priori_ speculations
+after purely ‘scientific’ methods upon the foundation of the facts of
+experience.” We certainly intend to build our world conception “upon the
+facts of experience” but the most important facts among them are their
+formal relations and these formal relations when represented in thought
+are exactly that element which Kant called _a priori_. The sense-element
+affords us the building stones, but the _a priori_ element represents
+the mortar without which we could not build. So much do we oppose
+this one-sided philosophy which takes its stand upon what is wrongly
+called the purely scientific method, that our views have been called
+the Philosophy of Form, and justly, for Form is that feature of the
+world which makes of it a cosmos and formal thought is the organ of our
+comprehension.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+UEBER DEN ASSOCIATIVEN VERLAUF DER VORSTELLUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation.
+By _E. W. Scripture_, M. A., Fellow of Clark University. Leipzig: Wilhelm
+Engelmann. 1891.
+
+This essay of 102 pages characterises most excellently some of the
+proceedings and methods of Professor Wundt’s psychological laboratory.
+The author, a disciple of Wundt, is a native American who studied in
+Berlin, Zürich, and Leipzig, and took his degree of Doctor on the ground
+of this dissertation. The object of the treatise is not so much to solve
+as to formulate the problem of the associative course of concepts, and
+the author hopes that in a future treatise he will be able to propound
+his theory based upon the facts here related.
+
+The experiments were made with the assistance of seven friends, among
+them German students, a doctor of philosophy, a doctor of medicine,
+and a teacher. They were of different nationality, three Germans, one
+Belgian, one Japanese, one Englishman from the Cape, and two Americans,
+the author included. The apparatus used was so arranged that the person
+operated upon sat in the dark, before him was a plate of ground glass
+intercepting from a camera an image which was exposed for four seconds.
+Pictures of all kinds, colors, and plainly printed words were used. For
+other sense-impressions the observer was also seated in the dark. Several
+instruments for producing sounds were ready on a table. Tastes were
+effected by liquids which the person operated upon had to drink, and the
+sense of touch was investigated through handing him cards to which some
+small objects had been attached. The author was partly operator, partly
+observer, i. e. the person operated upon. The ideas evoked through the
+sense-impressions produced in this way, are enumerated in tabular form in
+the order in which they arose.
+
+Among the experiments made in this way we find one kind which is of
+special interest. Sir William Hamilton made the remark in his Lectures
+on Metaphysics that unconscious ideas may serve as connecting links
+between two ideas otherwise unassociated. He represented his view in the
+following way: Let _A_, _B_, _C_, be three ideas, _A_ does not suggest
+_C_, but both are associated with _B_. It happens that _A_ is directly
+followed by _C_ in consciousness. In such a case _A_ may recall _B_
+and _B_ may recall _C_, but _B_ being a _minimum visibile_ or _minimum
+audibile_ does not enter consciousness. Thus the idea of the mount Ben
+Lomond called into Hamilton’s mind the system of Prussian education.
+Subsequent reflection taught him that he had met on Ben Lomond a German.
+The recollection of the place was associated with the ideas—a German,
+Germany, Prussia. These ideas were too weak to enter consciousness yet
+they reawakened another idea which did enter consciousness, the system of
+Prussian education.
+
+This is a mere suggestion of Hamilton’s but Dr. Scripture proved its
+truth by actual experiment. He took cards containing some simple
+words, such as MENSCH, GEHEN, KOMMEN, BLUME, etc., and also Japanese
+words in Roman characters HANA, HITO, IUKU, KURU. To every word was
+attached another Japanese word in Japanese characters so that the same
+character appeared on HANA and BLUME; HITO and MENSCH; JUKU and GEHEN;
+KURU and KOMMEN. The words were shown twice so as to give a stronger
+impression. The Japanese gentleman was excluded from these experiments,
+and indeed, the unknown Japanese characters which were only dimly or
+not at all remembered, evoked the corresponding words: HITO—MENSCH;
+KURU—KOMMEN; BLUME—HANA, etc. Dr. Scripture adds: “These associations
+were involuntary, the observer imagined them to be wrong, and could find
+no reason for the involuntary appearance of the words. He had not thought
+at all of the connecting links.”
+
+It appears that the links in a chain of concepts need not be all
+conscious and the result of his experiments in this line is formulated by
+Dr. Scripture as follows: A concept apperceived can bring another concept
+into the focus of consciousness although it was never associated with it,
+if there are other psychic elements of lower degrees or even outside of
+consciousness which are connected with both—provided that there are no
+other elements stronger than these. The effect of the unconscious link
+however is much weaker than that which was conscious.
+
+Pages 71-101 are devoted to the investigations of the after-effect of
+concepts. The phenomena of ideation being extremely complex, we cannot
+assume that the process of a so-called reproduced concept is analogous
+to the original idea. A sensation changes during its presence with
+reference to the degree of consciousness of its parts and even the
+concepts as a whole may be altered. The process is different according
+to circumstances. The renewed concepts differ from their originals,
+(1) in the degree of the consciousness of the whole idea, (2) in the
+degree of the consciousness of its parts among themselves, (3) in
+form, color, relations, etc., (4) in duration. In order to avoid the
+metaphysical influence of hypothetical theories we ought to avoid all
+kinds of terms suggestive of a theory and stick closely to a simple
+description of facts. Therefore Dr. Scripture proposes to discard such
+words as “retention, reproduction, revival,” etc., and suggests the term
+“after-effect.” Yet he adds, quoting from Wundt, “these after-effects
+themselves are as little ideas as the effects produced upon nerves and
+muscles by exercise can be called actions of will.”
+
+Dr. Scripture avoids explaining what he conceives these after-effects to
+be. We see no reason for disagreement and should say that the result of
+the after-effects is what generally goes by the name of “disposition.”
+And a certain disposition is produced according to the law of the
+conservation of form in living structures. (See “The Soul of Man,” pp.
+418-424.)
+
+Dr. Scripture is led by a consideration of his observations to the
+following statement: “Each concept is conditioned through the effects of
+the elements of the present state of consciousness and the after-effects
+of many (if not of all) previous elements of consciousness.”
+
+This result is not compatible with the theory of reproduction now almost
+universally accepted by the association-psychology. Wundt says: “If only
+certain single concepts were renewed, we might perhaps explain why in the
+memory-picture certain elements of a former reproduction are missing:
+but we could not explain why the elements of a concept change so often
+qualitatively as is indeed the case. This, it appears, is possible only
+because a memory-picture and others of a kindred nature affect each other
+mutually.”
+
+This will find explanation in the following experiment. The observer
+sees a dog, and thinks of a circus, which he saw a year ago. There is
+no direct association between the picture of the dog and the special
+reminiscence of that circus visited a year ago. The association was
+formed at the moment. Former sensations of dogs had their after-effects
+and this special reminiscence was localised.
+
+Dr. Scripture maintains that Höffding’s association theory contains too
+many hypothetical elements; it presupposes faculties of the soul to join
+like with like and to combine simultaneous or consecutive events.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[22] ... “A represénter le positivisme comme directement résummé par
+l’utopie de la Vierge-Mère”—Comte to Audiffrent, the 8th of St. Paul 69
+(May 28, 1857.)
+
+[23] Good philosophers, it is true, are rare in America, perhaps rarer
+than in Europe. Nevertheless the interest in philosophy is exceedingly
+strong here. There are metaphysical and philosophical clubs all over the
+country, and the crop of philosophical dilettanti is at least as great on
+this side of the Atlantic as in Paris.
+
+[24] It is a matter of course that we are in strong sympathy with many
+philosophers and scientists whom Hermann Gruber classes among the
+positivists outside of the positivistic schools, not only Th. Ribot, but
+also Guyau, Fouillée, Roberty, and others. How much they were influenced
+by the Comte-Littré or the Comte-Lafitte Positivism is difficult to say.
+It is certain that many of them would have accomplished the same work in
+the same way with or without Comte. Roberty was first a fervid disciple
+of Comte, but he soon combated not only Comte’s law of the three stages
+(which latter by the bye was according to Schaarschmidt first pronounced
+by Turgot) but also his agnosticism, declaring that Comte was still
+entangled in metaphysicism, and that the last bulwark, the idea of the
+unknowable, had to be conquered also.
+
+[25] We publish in this number a sonnet by Louis Belrose, Jr. to Émile
+Littré. Mr. Belrose is a positivist who attended together with Mr. Fred.
+Harrison positivistic lectures in France. We publish Mr. Belrose’s poem
+as an expression of his gratitude and admiration toward a master mind but
+not as an expression of our view of Littré.
+
+
+
+
+PERIODICALS.
+
+
+MIND. July, 1891. No. LXIII.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY. By _E. W. Scripture_.
+
+    THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. I. By _H. R. Marshall_.
+
+    SCHOPENHAUER’S CRITICISM OF KANT. By _W. Caldwell_.
+
+    DISCUSSION: On the Origin of Music. (1) By _R. Wallaschek_;
+    (2) By Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_; The Coefficient of External
+    Reality. By Prof. _J. Mark Baldwin_.
+
+    CRITICAL NOTICES: James’s “The Principles of Psychology”;
+    Pfleiderer’s “Development of Theology in Germany”; Keynes’s
+    “Scope and Method of Political Economy”; Lehmann’s “Die Hypnose
+    und die damit verwandten normalen Zustände.”
+
+As all sciences treat, to a great extent, of the same objects, they
+can be separated only according to _how_ they treat things. On this
+principle, Mr. Scripture divides sciences into Special Sciences,
+General or Philosophical Sciences, and Didactic Sciences. The Special
+sciences are, I, the Mathematical Sciences, treating the _forms_ of all
+experience; II, the Phenomenal Sciences, treating of the _contents_
+of all experience; the second class is divided into the Physical
+Sciences, which treat experience from its objective side, and Mental
+Sciences, which treat experience from its subjective side. The group
+of Mental Sciences is best divided, according to Wundt’s scheme, into
+the sciences of mental processes, Psychological Sciences; the sciences
+of mental products, Philological Sciences; and the Sciences of mental
+development, Historical Sciences. Psychology as a science of mental
+phenomena has a two-fold relation to the physical sciences: it is
+complementary to them, a necessary auxiliary; they are complementary
+to it, accessories in psychological investigation. States of mind
+always remain states of mind; they cannot be resolved into motions of
+particles of matter, and it is a fundamental axiom that _mental phenomena
+cannot influence or be influenced by material phenomena_. But we are
+justified in talking about a nervous stimulation becoming a percept, a
+muscular contraction following an act of will, as long as we remember
+that these are only substitutes for unknown quantities. Physiology
+investigates nervous changes; Psychology, mental changes; Physiological
+Psychology, the relations between the two. Mental phenomena are of two
+kinds, mental processes and mental products. Psychology is the science
+of mental processes; it seeks the exact description and explanation
+of the operations of our inner experience. The relation of Psychology
+to Philosophy is a burning question. Metaphysics, or Philosophy in
+the narrower sense, seeks from the agreement of the results of all
+other sciences to establish a system of the principles that underlie
+all existence, i. e. a theory of the universe, material and mental.
+After the general principles have been determined by metaphysics,
+philosophy has the duty of correcting the special sciences when they
+set up one-sided hypotheses, and of helping where they are unable to
+proceed alone. Psychology is considered a part of philosophy, but as
+a special science, treating mental processes from its own standpoint,
+it is distinct from psychology as a general science treating mind,
+relations of mind and matter, etc., from the standpoint of philosophy.
+The latter should be termed Philosophical Psychology. The relation of
+Psychology to Logic depends on what the latter is. Logic is a science of
+thought, but thought is also a subject of psychology. Psychology treats
+thoughts as we think them; Logic, as we ought to think them. Each of the
+sciences, Epistemology, the doctrine of knowledge, and Methodology, the
+doctrine of methods, treats of thought for its own distinct purpose.
+The former determines what the truth is; the latter determines how we
+ought to think. The didactic sciences are of two kinds: the sciences of
+the general principles or ends to be obtained, and the sciences of the
+means to attain these ends. Among the former is General Pedagogy, which
+determines the ends to be sought for in education. Psychology furnishes
+the foundation of fact; the science of general pedagogy judges which of
+these facts are desirable, in much the same way as epistemology judges
+which are true.
+
+In a former article (_Mind_ No. 56) Mr. Marshall showed that Pleasure
+and Pain are primitive qualities which, under proper conditions, _may_
+appear with any psychosis, whatever be its content. He now finds that
+all the most notable pleasure-pain theories may in the first instance
+be placed in four groups, determined by the emphasis of certain kinds
+of pleasure or pain. An examination of pleasure-pain theories shows,
+_first_ that there is a general agreement, with but few dissenting
+voices, that all pleasure is at bottom the same thing, and that all pain
+in its essence is a single psychological phenomenon, and further that
+pleasures and pains are unifiable; _second_, that there are certain facts
+so marked in experience as to have become the basis of the majority of
+pleasure-pain theories. Mr. Marshall proceeds to consider the theory that
+“the activity of the organ of any content if efficient is pleasurable,
+if inefficient is painful.” He concludes that pleasures and pains are
+involved with the nutritive conditions of the active organ, and lays
+down the principle that “all pleasure-pain phenomena are determined by
+the action in the organs concomitant of the conscious state, as related
+to the nutritive conditions of the organs at the time of the action.”
+The difference between the hypernormality of pain and of pleasure,
+turns upon the fact that pleasure is obtained where the organ has been
+_rested_. Rest in an organ which is sometimes active means storage of
+energy derived from blood supply; and action after rest means the use
+of stored energy. But as action of an organ after rest gives a psychic
+content which is pleasurable, we have the working hypothesis: “Pleasure
+is experienced wherever the physical action which determines the content
+involves the use of stored force—the resolution of potential into actual
+energy; or, in other words, whenever the energy involved in the reaction
+to a stimulus is greater in amount than the energy of the stimulus.”
+By a similar process of reasoning we obtain the hypothesis: “Pain is
+experienced whenever the physical action which determines the content
+is so related to the supply of nutriment that the energy involved in
+the reaction to the stimulus is less in amount than the energy of the
+stimulus.” We may also say in general, “Pleasure and pain are primitive
+qualities of psychic states which are determined by the relation
+between activity and capacity in the organs, the activities of which
+are concomitants of the psychosis.” Mr. Marshall then supplies the
+psychological interpretation of the physiological phenomena attendant on
+the pleasures of Rest and of Relief, and of the pain of Obstruction or
+hindered activity. He concludes the present article with the statement
+that the physical concomitants of pleasure-pain phenomena are to be found
+in general qualities common to all processes which are at the basis
+of our conscious life; and that this is corroborated by introspective
+analysis of pleasures and pains. Mr. Marshall’s idea does not appear to
+us as a happy solution of the problem.
+
+The object of Mr. Caldwell’s paper is to explain Kantism through
+Schopenhauer, who claimed to be Kant’s only true successor in philosophy.
+Schopenhauer came to the conclusion that Kant’s only real discovery,
+given in the “Æsthetic,” was that Space and Time were known by us _a
+priori_. The principle of Causality is the only element of value he
+finds in the “Analytic,” and a much simpler account could have been
+given of it. The “Dialectic” represents the Negative side of the
+Critical Philosophy, which although conclusive, might have been stated
+more simply. In Ethics Kant rendered the immortal service of showing,
+by his attribution of a noumenal freedom to man, compensating for his
+phenomenal necessary determination, “that the kingdom of virtue is not
+of this world”; although the _K. d. prakt. V._ is only an application
+to ethics of the principles already reached in the sphere of the Pure
+Reason. Schopenhauer finds the _K. d. Urtheilskraft_ to contain the
+characteristic defect of Kant’s whole Philosophy—the starting from
+indirect instead of direct knowledge. Lastly, the criticism of the
+Teleological Judgment only shows what the _K. d. r. V._ already showed,
+the subjectivity of what we may call the ontological categories.
+According to Schopenhauer, the chief tendency of the Kantian philosophy
+is to establish “the total diversity of the real and the ideal.” The
+Ideal he explains as “the visible, spatial appearance with the qualities
+that are perceived on it,” and the Real as the “thing-in-and-for-itself,”
+which is the reality underlying and determining the world of experience,
+and, as such, a real and not a hypothetical entity. Schopenhauer never
+speaks of it in the plural, as Kant does, and so keeps consistently to
+a monistic point of view. He says, “The way in which Kant introduced
+such a thing-in-itself and sought to reconcile it with his philosophy
+was faulty.” This concerns Kant’s method, against which Schopenhauer
+directs the full force of his criticism. The fundamental principle
+of Kant’s method Schopenhauer takes to be the starting from indirect
+reflective knowledge: Philosophy is for Kant a science of conceptions,
+while for himself it is a science _in_ conceptions; philosophy being a
+conceptualised or _generalised_ statement of our knowledge. Schopenhauer
+sees all Kant’s errors contained in the following sentence from the _K.
+d. r. V._: “If I take away all thought” (through the categories), “from
+empirical knowledge, there remains absolutely no knowledge of an object,
+for through mere perceptions nothing at all is thought.” In endeavoring
+to construct a philosophy out of pure conceptions Kant failed to solve
+the problem, in having the thing-in-itself left on his hands. This proved
+to Schopenhauer that the path of abstract reflection was closed as the
+path of philosophy. Mr. Caldwell demurs to Schopenhauer’s statement
+that the “Æsthetic” is Kant’s only discovery, yet as the “Æsthetic”
+shows the tendency to conceptual abstraction, his view of Space and Time
+is of extreme importance. It is of the “Logic” of the _K. d. r. V._
+that Schopenhauer’s criticism is materially and formally most radical.
+He gives a different account of the functions of the Soul, rejecting
+altogether the faculty-distinctions of Kant: he associates Kant’s faculty
+of Understanding more with Sense and the category of Cause with the
+spatio-temporal or perceptual construction of the world, and holds the
+other eleven categories to be mere blind windows put into a scheme
+through Kant’s love of symmetry; and, secondly, he holds Kant’s account
+of Reason to be utterly false, and substitutes his own doctrine of the
+thing-in-itself for Kant’s three Ideas of Reason. By Reason Schopenhauer
+means the power the mind has of forming general conceptions and of
+knowing by way of conception or idea, the matter for conceptions and
+ideas being of course derived from Perception. Reasoned knowledge is an
+abstraction from perceived knowledge, and all knowledge, as Schopenhauer
+says, is originally and in itself perceptive. The confusion in Kant’s
+account of the elements entering into knowledge, is Schopenhauer’s
+reason for holding that Kant can only have had the fundamental principle
+of his method imperfectly present to his mind. His whole difficulty
+in relating the elements of knowledge to each other arose from the
+fact that he in his thought likened the categories to conceptions
+through want of an explicit and persistent recognition of the nature of
+conception. Schopenhauer himself classifies the categories according to
+the planes or stages of experience they characterise: the perceptual,
+the mathematical, the logical, and the ethical in order. The categories
+are all abstractions, but not conceptions or notions. Conceptions are a
+particular kind of abstractions, and so are categories: to conceptions
+_material_ entities correspond, but to categories only relations or
+forms. Knowledge consists in the detection of relations existing between
+the different planes or sections of the perceptual continuum, the
+difference in perceived things being that some are immediately and others
+only mediately perceived. The true reason of Schopenhauer’s revolt from
+the method of conceptions is to be found in the difficulties in which he
+felt himself involved by the theory of Subjective Idealism. Philosophy,
+he says, is a search for the Thing-in-itself, but he tells Kant that from
+the idea nothing but the idea follows, and that the path of Reflexion
+or Knowledge is closed as the path of philosophy. Had Schopenhauer kept
+more true to his ruling that knowledge is originally and in itself
+perception, he would not have maintained that the world is my idea. The
+Thing-in-itself is the shadow cast by the Reflective or Abstracting
+Understanding. With both Kant and Schopenhauer it is primarily invented
+to get rid of the difficulty bred of a belief in an abstraction or
+unreality, and as it is a pure mental fiction, we may safely deny that
+there is any such thing in reality.
+
+Mr. Wallaschek finds the origin of music in a rhythmical impulse in man.
+The sense of rhythm arises from the general appetite for exercise, which
+recurs in rhythmical form owing to sociological as well as psychological
+conditions. On the one hand, there is the social character of primitive
+music, compelling a number of performers to act in concert. On the
+other hand, our perception of time-relations involves a process of
+intellection, by means of which the mind is able to comprehend them as
+a whole. Since music is produced not merely as an auditory impression
+and expression, but also in order to evoke reflexion, it must contain
+the qualities of time-order and rhythm. Mr. Herbert Spencer’s theory of
+the origin of the general appetite for exercise is said to afford the
+most valid explanation. It is the surplus vigor in more highly evolved
+organisms, exceeding what is required for immediate needs, in which play
+of all kinds takes its rise. We owe our musical faculty to the time-sense
+rather than to our sense of hearing. The perception of particular
+tones and tunes plays a very low part, if any, in primitive music. In
+almost all the examples furnished by ethnology, we see that music is
+the expression of emotion, which is also one of the sources of human
+language. Mr. Spencer is said to be wrong, however, in thinking that
+musical modulation originates in the modulations of speech Music and
+speech have a reciprocal influence, and primitive human utterance, using
+sound-metaphors and onomatopœia, may resemble primitive musical tones.
+Nevertheless, an early separation of distinct tones and indistinct sounds
+seems to have taken place, not as a transition from the one as prior to
+the other as succeeding, but as a divergence from a primitive state which
+is, strictly speaking, neither of the two.
+
+Professor Cattell objects that the theories of Darwin and Spencer on the
+origin of music, describe what probably took place, rather than explain
+why it was necessary that it should have taken place. As to Spencer’s
+explanation of harmony, he affirms that it amounts to saying that harmony
+gives pleasure because it is pleasant. After referring to the connection
+of harmony with the existence of overtones, Prof. Cattell states that
+music is not, as commonly supposed, a creation of the imagination, freer
+than the other arts from a physical basis, but is rather a discovery and
+a development. All the combinations of music are latent in the sounds Of
+nature, and the history of music bears witness to the gradual adoption of
+such as are more remote. The difference in voices rests on the overtones
+present, and the immense emotional effects of music are due to the fact
+that music expresses the emotion of the human voice, using and developing
+those combinations of tones which the voice uses when moved by sorrow and
+joy, despair and exultation.
+
+By the _Coefficient_ of External Reality, Professor Baldwin means the
+something which attaches to some presentations in virtue of which we
+attribute reality to them; while others, not having the coefficient,
+are discredited. Diametrically opposed solutions of this question
+are held. To one class of writers, the coefficient of the reality
+of an image is its independence of the will; to another class, the
+coefficient is subjection to the will. If we make a distinction between a
+memory-coefficient of reality—that is, the something about a memory which
+leads us to believe it represents a real experience—and a sensational
+coefficient, that is, the criterion of present sensational reality, we
+see that those two kinds of reality differ in their relation to the
+will. A present sensible reality is not under the control of any will,
+but a memory coefficient is subjected to will, in the sense that we
+are able to get the image again as a sensation by repeating the series
+of voluntary muscular sensations which were associated with it in its
+first experience. This memory-coefficient of external reality must be
+distinguished from the coefficient of memory itself; the latter being
+the feeling that an image has been in consciousness before, i. e.
+recognition, or sense of familiarity. A true memory is an image which I
+can get at will by a train of memory-associates, and which, when got, is
+further subject to my will. (London: Williams & Norgate.)
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. July, 1891. Vol. I. NO. 4.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. By Prof.
+    _Edward Caird_.
+
+    THE FUNCTIONS OF ETHICAL THEORY. By Prof. _James H. Hyslop_.
+
+    THE MORALITY OF NATIONS. By Prof. _W. R. Sorley_.
+
+    J. S. MILL’S SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY. By _James Ward_.
+
+    VICE AND IMMORALITY. By _R. W. Black_.
+
+    THE PROGRESS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE ADAM SMITH. By _Francis
+    W. Newman_.
+
+    PROGRAMME OF SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS: The Moral Aspect of “Tips” and “Gratuities.” By
+    _Christine Ladd Franklin_.
+
+Ideas and facts, says Professor Caird, are continually being woven
+together as warp and woof, into the web of man’s intellectual life.
+The idea of the unity of mankind has within the last century become
+an almost instinctive presupposition of all civilised men. It has
+special application to the history of religion. In a man’s religion we
+have expressed his ultimate attitude to the universe. Even atheism or
+agnosticism involves a definite attitude towards the ultimate problem
+of human life. The modern ideas of the organic unity and the organic
+evolution of man inevitably compel us to seek for the one principle of
+life which is striving towards the full realisation of itself.
+
+Professor Hyslop remarks, that two questions may be asked: (1) Why is
+it that any disturbance in ethical speculation at once brings men up
+in arms about the consequences? (2) Why is there such a tendency even
+in speculative ethics to bring its theories into harmony and sympathy
+with “practical” problems? The preliminary answer is the distinction
+between science and art. The aim of science is to find causes; the aim
+of art to produce ends by means of these causes. But art may be divided
+into productive and practical art. Every consideration of the scope and
+aim of ethics shows it to be both a science and an art. As a science it
+endeavors to explain something; as an art, to realise something. Its
+complications are thus two-fold. Ethics may be a science in two distinct
+relations. First, it aims to show the general conception which will
+reduce the various motives actually governing human conduct to unity.
+Secondly, it aims to show the end that ought ideally to govern conduct,
+and this is the supreme object of ethics as a science.
+
+In relation to the Morality of Nations, Professor Sorley says that the
+relations of the state, diplomatic or military, with other states may be
+compared with the relations of one individual to another, but the two
+sets of relations are not the same. A crime is an act punishable by law,
+and it is absurd therefore to speak as if the state, acting legally,
+could commit a crime. But if theft ceased to be a crime it would be as
+much an offense against morality as before. Taxation to which the taxed
+have not consented and unfair taxation cannot be regarded as theft, as
+some suppose. Individual morality becomes mixed with national morality
+when those through whom the state acts act for themselves and for their
+own interests, instead of for the common good. Within a nation the state
+is above all individuals, but there is no corresponding superior power
+over nations. What remains is a general obligation upon states to observe
+justice in their dealings with one another. National morality differs
+from individual morality in that a nation’s first duty may be said to
+be to itself. There is no selfishness, there is only patriotism, in its
+recognising the fact and acting upon it. The intercourse of nations can
+only reach a full measure of development under a common moral law, which
+recognises the rights of one nation as of equal value with the rights of
+any other.
+
+Mr. Ward points out, that Mill, in his exposition of what he called
+Ethology, or the Exact Science of Human Nature, repeated in all the
+issues of his “Logic,” remarks that Ethology must first proceed
+deductively. The laws of the formation of character “are derivative
+laws, resulting from the general laws of mind, and are to be obtained by
+deducing them from those general laws.” There was a want of clearness
+in Mill’s conception of an individual. The notion of a Self proved,
+on his own admission, “the real stumbling block” to his psychological
+theory. In discussing the influence of remarkable men, Mill allows that
+“whatever depends on the peculiarities of individuals, combined with the
+accidents of the positions they hold, is necessarily incapable of being
+foreseen.” When we attempt to estimate the influence of circumstances
+on individuals, we must often know how the circumstances appear to
+_them_,—this personal equation so to say is frequently incalculable.
+
+In the main, says Mr. Black, sin exists intimately in, or as an
+inseparable affection or potentiality of, the person as a whole, and to
+discourage it is to discourage the person, and tantamount, therefore,
+to discouraging his goodness as well. At this point the division of
+sin into vice and immorality becomes essential to a rational solution.
+Immorality is crime against living moral agents. Vice may be defined as
+the spending of the forces of one’s own life to the detriment of its
+moral capabilities.
+
+Mr. Francis W. Newman, who began the study of Political Economy seventy
+years ago, when he was sixteen, gives in this article his views on the
+evils of land tenure in England.
+
+Mrs. Franklin thinks “the subjective feeling of worth and dignity” which
+distinguishes the people of this country will be injured by “giving
+fees to our inferiors when they perform some service for which they are
+(or ought to be) otherwise well paid.” That the matter is not “absolute
+ethics” is apparent from the fact that in Japan a totally different
+sentiment prevails. The editor, Prof. Josiah Royce (under the signature
+of J. R.) in commenting on Mrs. Franklin’s communication after referring
+to the evils of the German custom of Trinkgeld as detailed by v. Ihering,
+says that if it harms the manhood of our writers to “tip” them the
+mischief should be met by organised devices such as v. Ihering proposes,
+and not by individual action. (Philadelphia: _International Journal of
+Ethics_, 1602 Chestnut Street.)
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
+
+CONTENTS: June, 1891. No. 186.
+
+    LES RESULTATS DES THEORIES CONTEMPORAINES SUR L’ASSOCIATION DES
+    IDEES. By _B. Bourdon_.
+
+    COMMENT LA SENSATION DEVIENT IDEE. By _J. Payot_.
+
+    NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS. QU’EST-CE QUE LA PHYSIOLOGIE GENERALE? By
+    _Durand_ (_de Gros_).
+
+CONTENTS: July, 1891. No. 187.
+
+    LA NOTION DE LIMITE EN MATHEMATIQUES. By _G. Milhaud_.
+
+    COUP D’OEIL SUR L’HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE EN RUSSIE (I). By
+    _F. Lannes_.
+
+    LES SOURCES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DE L’INDE. By _P. Regnaud_.
+
+M. Bourdon reviews the modes of association proposed by various
+psychologists, and the factors which intervene to give force to
+associations. Wundt alone; among psychologists has the great merit of not
+placing ideas and sensations in actual opposition. The laws of ideology
+are almost the same as those of physics; and the law of association ought
+to be true not only for ideas, but for sensations and for objects. M.
+Bourdon’s conclusion is that the theory of the association of ideas has
+hitherto been treated from a too subjective and idealistic point of view.
+He would substitute for the theory of _association_ of idea a theory of
+a _society_ of phenomena, which conception he thinks better explains the
+process.
+
+In a preceding contribution to the _Revue Philosophique_ (May, 1890)
+M. Payot showed that sensation is the translation into terms of
+consciousness of that which, considered from the objective point
+of view, is a reaction of the organism, as a whole, to an external
+impression. Sensations are the irreducible element of the psychic life.
+They contribute the materials which the mind modifies, combines, and
+classes according to their relations, variable or invariable. This
+is chronologically posterior to sensation, which has an affective
+origin. The reactions corresponding to the most frequent sensations
+become more and more rapid until consciousness, “which translates only
+physiological states of a sufficient duration,” has not time to appear.
+Here we have a reflex-act. In an intermediate zone where reactions take
+a time sufficient for them to be conscious, the intellectual states,
+to which the abstract name of the intellectual faculty has been given,
+have birth. Differentiation operates between sensible and intellectual
+facts, until they seem to belong to two irreducible faculties; but the
+intellectual states are grafted on the sensible states, and although
+the graft develops so greatly that the sensibility appears like a
+parasite, the latter is the primitive trunk and through it the graft
+exists by a kind of continued creation. Sensations are convenient
+abstractions but nothing more. A sensation never presents itself in
+the adult consciousness without a crowd of instantaneously evoked
+relations. There is never absolute exclusion between perception and
+sensation: these are two states which dissolve into each other, which
+have no difference in nature, and which are separable only in gross.
+Properly speaking there are no sensations, only perceptions more or less
+complex. In sensation the state of mind is considered in itself without
+reference to its relations; in perception attention is paid chiefly to
+the relations. But sensation exists only for consciousness, as it can
+never enter directly into intellectual constructions, but only through
+the state of remembrance. Every sensation so far as we are sensible of
+it is purely felt, and we effectuate our mental constructions not with
+sensations, but with our remembrances of sensations. But the rôle of
+sensation is still more restricted. However rapid its flight across
+consciousness it instantaneously provokes the remembrance of numerous
+sensations of differences and resemblances with anterior sensations. It
+is an occasion for this, and nothing more. To be perceived, a sensation
+must be followed by sensations different from itself. The mind seizes
+relations of resemblance between sensations and resemblances between
+relations: it classes them, the chaos unravels and organises itself.
+The organisation has been progressive, but at all stages the procedure
+is alike; it consists in disengaging remembrances more or less masked
+by dissimilarities: this is the universal procedure of the mind and the
+condition _sine qua non_ of thought.
+
+In his article on _General Physiology_, M. Durand (de Gros) in criticism
+of M. Ch. Richet’s article on this subject which appeared in the
+April number of the _Revue Philosophique_, points out that Richet in
+applying the term “general anatomy” to the anatomy of the tissues, and
+“special anatomy” to the anatomy of the organs, overlooked the fact that
+_generality_ and _speciality_ when used to express the two opposite sides
+of a science express relations of abstract, nominal extension and not
+real extension. Thus, by general chemistry is intended the consideration
+of the higher laws governing the molecular actions of bodies, the
+one on the other, whatever that may be, and the modes of composition
+which result therefrom for each of them. General physiology should be,
+therefore, the philosophy of the science of the functions of life,
+that is to say, the higher laws embracing all these various particular
+functions; special physiology having for its object these particular
+functions in what is proper to each of them and distinguishes it from
+the others. Physiology has reference, however, to the other animals as
+well as man, and also to plants, and hence the term general physiology
+has been applied to the physiology common to all living beings, and
+special physiology to that which concerns the various animal and vegetal
+species taken separately. But this is in reality comparative physiology,
+and thus positive physiologists have made a false use of the term general
+physiology, and have left the true general physiology unrecognised and
+unnamed. In conclusion, M. Durand presents his conception of “organology.”
+
+In the form of a dialogue M. Milhaud meets the objections made to the
+notion of limit in Mathematics. The question whether to have a limit,
+for anything variable, is not synonymous with attaining a limit, is
+considered in connection with Zeno’s problem of Achilles and the
+tortoise, the strict solution of which is, not that Achilles will
+never overtake the tortoise, but that he will not overtake it on this
+side of a spot situated at a distance of 10/9 of a metre from the
+starting-point, within a period equal to 10/9 of a second commencing
+at the instant of starting. To the objection that by its very nature
+the limit cannot be attained, as where the limit and the variable
+element which indefinitely approaches it are essentially different,
+it is replied that when a variable element has a limit, this element
+is a _quantity_ and the limit is a quantity of the same kind, quality
+being neglected. In the proposition: the length of the circumference is
+the limit of the perimeters of the inscribed polygons, the limit is a
+quantity of the same kind, that of length. It is not necessary to know
+whether the definition accords with reality. M. Milhaud then shows by
+reference to the properties of an unlimited series of inscribed polygons
+and the corresponding circumscribed polygons, that two such series of
+geometrical lengths satisfying the required conditions can always be
+considered as defining a new length, superior to all the first and
+inferior to all the others. As to its existence, it can be said only
+that a length exists only as determined, as limited; and a state of
+length, or a particular length has a right to exist, provided that the
+properties of quantity which condition it are not contradictory. The
+essence of mathematical space, breadth, length is only the content of
+their definitions. Mathematics owes its existence to the condition of
+creating for itself a world of fictions. There is a divergence of opinion
+as to whether incommensurables should be represented by lengths or by
+numerical symbols, but the divergence is a last echo of the endless
+discussions which the notions of infinity and continuity have raised
+among mathematicians.
+
+Philosophic thought, says M. Lannes, presents, in Russia, in its past
+history, a very poor condition. Philosophy does not exist, unless that
+name be given to such moral precepts, or domestic recommendations as we
+find in “the instruction” of a Vladimir Monomaque or in the “Domostroï.”
+The Russian mind was easily guarded against the liberties of thought,
+regarding science and philosophy with contempt and holy dread. There, as
+during the Middle Ages in the rest of Europe, the end to attain, to which
+all others were subordinated, was the safety of the soul. It was only
+with Peter the Great that thought took a freer flight, notwithstanding
+the restrictions that it had still to support. The Little Russians were
+the first to turn towards western instruction. In order to meet the
+Jesuits, who appeared in Russia about the middle of the 16th century,
+with the arms they used, scholastic philosophy was introduced into the
+college of Pierre Mohila, at Kief. Aristotle was taken as guide and the
+teaching was in Latin. Under Alexis Mikhaïlovitch, rational, natural, and
+moral philosophy began to be taught in a formal manner at the Academy
+of Moscow. Peter the Great ordered an important place to be given to
+rhetoric and dialectics, and the mention of logic, psychology, and
+metaphysics in the programme of the Academy. In 1755 logic, metaphysics,
+and morality entered into the teaching of philosophy at the University.
+In the 18th century two currents of ideas manifested themselves, of
+which some are connected with mysticism, others with the influence of
+French philosophy. The former became associated, through Novikof and
+Schwartz, with free-masonry, which was regarded as a means of acquiring a
+knowledge of God, of nature, and of man, of becoming a better Christian,
+a better citizen, and a better family head. Novikof and Schwartz founded
+the “Society of the Friends of Instruction,” and through their zeal
+a mass of moral and religious books were published for distribution
+in places of instruction. The influence of the French “philosophers”
+of the 18th century was preponderant in Russia in the second half of
+the 18th century. Voltaire enjoyed the greatest favor, and his renown
+was universal. Freethought penetrated the middle classes, and even
+conservative and religious men denied miracles in the course of history,
+considered religion as a political instrument, and attacked the ignorance
+and cupidity of the clergy. On the happening of the French revolution
+Catherine was frightened and took rigorous measures against those who
+wished to use freedom of thought.
+
+Questions of pedagogy held a great place in the thoughts of Catherine.
+She confided the care of pedagogic reforms to Betski, who showed that
+true education is that which unites the development of the body, of the
+mind, and of the heart; but the moral element ought to have the first
+place. Alexander I. re-established philosophic liberalism and sought
+to excite interest in social, economic, and political questions. The
+university of Moscow was reorganised, and one of the faculties included
+dogmatic and moral theology, theoretical and practical philosophy,
+natural, political and popular rights. Philosophy also established itself
+in the new universities of Kharkof, Kazan, and Petersburg. But minds
+were possessed with more living ideas and various tendencies, political,
+moral, religious, sceptical, led to the establishment of numerous secret
+societies whose starting point was the masonic alliance. About 1816,
+Schröder had introduced into the foreign lodges a spirit of cosmopolitan
+humanity. Fessler saw in the lodges a means of moral education, the basis
+of civic education. In order to be received as a mason, it was necessary
+to pass through certain “consecrations,” to obtain certain “degrees of
+knowledge.” Among those “consecrated” by Fessler was Spéranski who,
+notwithstanding his mysticism, was imbued with the principles of the
+Revolution. On the reaction under Prince Galitzyn, the minister of
+public instruction, science was given a mystical end, and religion was
+declared to be the supreme science. The sciences which could do injury
+to religion, as geology, were either discarded, or directed to be taught
+according to the spirit of Holy Scripture. As to philosophy, the teaching
+of moral philosophy, which does not separate morality from the faith,
+was alone allowed. The treatises of the Kantian Jacob were forbidden, as
+containing scandalous theories. In general, in the universities, during
+the first year of the nineteenth century the objects of philosophic
+study were somewhat vague. The utility of the sciences, of education,
+of the individual characters of peoples, enthusiastic discourses on
+free will, on the rights of reason, on the spirit and forces of nature.
+Fessler and Vellanski introduced the German philosophy and principally
+that of Schelling, which became in some sort the lever which put in
+movement ideas on the independence and the nationality of civilisation.
+The most ardent champion of Schelling’s doctrine was Odoievski, whose
+external personality marks curiously the idea entertained of philosophy
+and philosophers between 1820 and 1845. A philosopher was represented as
+a sort of romantic Faust, leading a kind of life different from common
+mortals. If he occupied himself with physical sciences, the philosopher
+was regarded as the equal of a sorcerer with terrible powers. M. Lannes
+concludes his present article with a sketch of the life and philosophy
+of Galitch, who on his return to St. Petersburg from a three years
+tour through Europe wrote a dissertation on philosophy, in which he
+explained the development of beings by the double action of _activity_
+and _passivity_, the one being cause, the other product. In 1819 Galitch
+taught in the University logic, psychology, and metaphysics, and later
+he received authority to teach the history of philosophy, to which he
+gave an _eclectic_ character, in accordance with the instructions of
+his hierarchical superiors. In his _esoteric_ teaching he initiated his
+friends into the philosophy of Schelling. In that year he published a
+“History of Philosophic Systems,” the appearance of which was a rare
+novelty in the Russian Scientific World. He subsequently published
+several other works, but the manuscript of one on the “Philosophy of
+the History of Humanity,” which cost him much labor was destroyed by
+fire. The merit of Galitch is to have wished to establish in Russia
+philosophy _as science_. He assigned to the study of philosophy the
+whole encyclopedia of the sciences, but true philosophic knowledge
+is the knowledge of the unity from which external phenomena flow. M.
+Lannes gives an analysis of Galitch’s “Picture of Man,” where, before M.
+Renouvier, he says of freedom, “it can itself begin an entire series of
+phenomena, which are then linked together in the relations of dependence,
+that is to say are the necessary acts of a voluntary principle.” Galitch
+deserves to occupy a small place in the general history of the philosophy
+of humanity. If there existed before him a science of the relations of
+the soul and the body, he was at least one of the first to elaborate a
+programme of what is called to-day _comparative psychology_.
+
+M. Regnaud finds the sources of the philosophy of India in India itself,
+as they appear in all their simplicity and primitive character in
+the Rig-Veda, the very ancient collection of liturgical hymns of the
+Brahmans. The whole doctrine implied by both the Vedic cult and the
+text of the hymns is resumed in a verse of the Rig Veda. “Each day the
+same liquid rises and descends; the rains vivify the earth, the fires
+of the sacrifice vivify the sky.” The libations destined to feed the
+fire of sacrifice and which consisted of inflammable liquids, such as
+the _ghrita_ or clarified butter, were poured out each time that the
+sacrifice was celebrated into the atmosphere (or the sky) whose life
+they maintained, in like manner as liquid and solid foods sustain the
+life of man. The whole religious conception of the Vedic epoch consists
+then in the idea of an endless _circulus_, of a perpetual exchange
+of the elements of life, in an immense body which is the universe,
+whose arterial centre is the sacrifice, and the fire the motor, the
+distributer, and so to say the brain. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+REVUE DE L’HYPNOTISME. April, 1891. No. 10. 5th YEAR.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    (1) ACCOUCHEMENT DANS L’HYPNOTISME. By _Dr. Fraipont_ and _M.
+    J. Delbœuf_. (2) ACCOUCHEMENT PENDANT LE SOMMEIL HYPNOTIQUE.
+    By _Dr. M. G. Kingsbury_. (3) MEMOIRE RELATIF A CERTAINES
+    RADIATIONS PERQUES PAR LESSENSITIFS. By _Baron de Reichembach_.
+    (4) DISCUSSIONS ET POLEMIQUE: La Nutrition dans l’hypnotisme.
+    By _Gilles de la Tourette_ and _H. Cathelineau_. (5) RECUEIL
+    DE FAITS: Contribution à l’application de la thérapeutique
+    suggestive. By _Dr. P. Van Velsen_. Huit observations
+    d’accouchement sans douleur sous l’influence de l’hypnotisme.
+    By _Dr. Marie Dobrovosky_. REVUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE.
+
+Dr. Fraipont terminates his interesting memoir with the remark that
+save under very exceptional circumstances, as when the subject is very
+sensitive or has before suffered a sort of trance, hypnotism can
+scarcely have any practical importance in accouchment. M. Delbœuf refers
+in a postscript to the case of a patient described in his writings by the
+initial J..., and states that her accouchment confirms him in his view of
+the rôle of the brain, which he regards as a moderating and inhibiting
+organ, and consequently in the opinion expressed by him in the _Revue
+Philosophique_ as to the essence of freedom, which he regards as having
+an arresting and not an inciting effect.
+
+MM. de la Fourette and Cathelineau confirm the conclusion drawn from
+researches made by them for Professor Charcot, that nutrition is affected
+during the hypnotic sleep, and therefore that hypnotism is a pathological
+condition. (Paris: 170 Rue Saint-Antoine.)
+
+
+PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 9 and 10.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    GOETHES VERHAELTNISS ZU SPINOZA UND SEINE PHILOSOPHISCHE
+    WELTANSCHAUUNG. By _G. Schneege_. I.
+
+    WILHELM WUNDT’S “SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE.” By _Johannes
+    Volkelt_. I.
+
+    RECENSIONEN: (1) A. Fouillée, L’Avenir de la métaphysique
+    fondée sur l’expérience. By _C. Schaarschmidt_. (2) Th. von
+    Varnbüler, Widerlegung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. By
+    _E. König_. (3) Bericht über neuere Erscheinungen aus dem
+    Gebiete der Geschichte der Æsthetik. By _E. Kühnemann_. (4)
+    C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen
+    Philosophie. By _P. Natorp_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+Johannes Volkelt continues his review of Wilhelm Wundt’s “System of
+Philosophy.” Prof. C. Schaarschmidt criticises Fouillée’s view of a
+future metaphysics as based upon experience, from the Kantian standpoint.
+Dr. E. König explains with sufficient strength the futility of Varnbüler
+in his bold attempt of refuting Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” and Dr.
+Paul Natorp, the editor, devotes an article to Prof. Clemens Baeumker’s
+book “Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie,” in
+which the author sets forth that the problem of matter is not a limited
+problem, but the sum total of all those questions which have reference to
+the existence of some cause of sensory phenomena which in its nature is
+different from consciousness. The problems of psycho-physics and of the
+theory of cognition are modern and were unknown to the ancients. Their
+standpoint remained throughout that of realism. A résumé of the views of
+Greek philosophers from Thales down to the New Platonists follows.
+
+The leading article is devoted to Goethe’s relation to Spinoza and his
+philosophical world-conception.
+
+Goethe’s philosophical and religious opinions are naturally of the
+greatest interest, because Goethe, the child of nature in the highest
+sense of the word, represents a genius not such as our great contemporary
+Cesare Lombroso conceives him to be, i. e. a species of the abnormal
+man and a kind of insane person, but such as genius is conceived by the
+layman, i. e. an abnormally normal man, a man whose excellencies lie in
+a rare harmony of highly developed perfections—not in eccentricities.
+Goethe’s eccentricities were not worse or more extended than those of
+average people, but he had more sense, more humor, more depth, and more
+spirit. Well, Goethe as a son of man and as a type of an unusually
+perfect man was a poet, a philosopher, a scientist, an historian, an
+artist, a man of the world, and a man of practical life, all in one, and
+the opinions of this man in the religio-philosophical field show at least
+that they accord with man as a child of nature.
+
+Goethe’s philosophical views were strongly influenced by Spinoza yet not
+so as if Spinoza had impressed his view upon Goethe. Goethe happened to
+read Spinoza’s “Ethics” while still immature in mind and felt himself
+powerfully attracted by the spirit of the book. “What I may have read out
+of or into that work,” he writes, “I could give no account. Yet I found
+a pacification of my passions. A great and free vista upon the sensual
+and moral world seemed to open before my eyes. That strange sentence ‘_He
+who loves God must not demand of God to love him in return_,’ with all
+its premises and conclusions filled all my thoughts. To be unselfish in
+everything and most so in love and friendship was my highest delight, my
+maxim, my practice, so that the bold expression of later years ‘If I love
+thee, it is none of thy business’ came right from my heart. In addition
+to this, it must be recognised that the most intimate combinations result
+from contraries. The all-pervading calmness of Spinoza contrasted with
+my excited aspirations, his mathematical method was a counterpart of
+my poetical thoughts and habits.” In Spinoza’s doctrine of necessity
+Goethe found comfort concerning man’s dependence upon the outer world
+which caused him so much pain. It is probable that the famous sentence
+of the liberation from passions through a clear comprehension of them
+was very sympathetic to Goethe, for it is a characteristic feature of
+his poetry that they were confessions as well as liberations of all that
+moved and disturbed him. As soon as Goethe was able to give to himself
+a clear account concerning that which had affected his soul and as soon
+as he could give a poetical form to it so that it became something
+independent and outside of him, he gained, in the sense of Spinoza’s
+doctrine of liberation from passions, the peace and liberty of his soul.
+Yet Spinoza’s doctrine of necessity was a metaphysical conception.
+Goethe transferred it into the domains of practical ethics, thus giving
+rise to his idea of resignation. Goethe writes in the beginning of the
+sixteenth book of “Wahrheit und Dichtung”: “Our physical as well as our
+social life, customs, habits, worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, even
+many incidental events, everything demands of us that we should resign
+ourselves. So many things which most intrinsically belong to us we are
+not allowed to develop. That of the outer world which we want as a
+complement of our nature is taken away and many things which are foreign
+to us and disagreeable are thrown upon us. We are deprived of everything
+that we have with difficulty acquired, of everything that is friendly and
+before we fully comprehend it we find ourselves obliged _to surrender
+our very personality_, first piecemeal and finally in its entirety.”
+Professor Schneege says that Goethe’s practice of resignation gave him
+solace when he felt low-spirited concerning the limits of human willing
+and wishing and hoping, and his resignation was as a matter of principle
+a total resignation. A partial resignation leads to the pessimistic
+outcry “All is vanity,” yet the total resignation affords an inner peace
+and produces that “air of peace,” _die Friedensluft_ as Goethe calls it,
+which surrounds us when reading Spinoza.
+
+One of Goethe’s maxims is quite Spinozistic. Goethe says (_Max. und Refl.
+Abth._ v.): “He who declares himself to be free will feel himself at once
+dependent but he who dares to declare himself dependent, feels himself
+free.”
+
+Goethe rejected the idea of a personal and transcendent Deity which was
+urged so strongly upon him by Lavater. Rejecting Lavater’s view, he says
+(_Wahrh. und Dicht._ xiv.): “I assured him in accord with my Realism
+which is inborn as well as acquired that since it had pleased God and
+Nature to make me as I am, I must remain so.” The expression “God and
+Nature” savors strongly of Spinoza’s “Deus sive natura.”
+
+According to Eckermann (_Gesp. m. G._ ii, p. 169) Holbach’s _Systéme de
+la nature_ had also made a strong impression upon Goethe. Nevertheless
+he was dissatisfied with the spirit of French materialism. He says: “How
+empty and hollow is this sad atheistic twilight, in which the earth with
+all its forms and the heaven with all its stars disappear. Matter only is
+said to exist, being in motion from eternity to eternity, thus producing
+to the right and to the left without further ado all the innumerable
+phenomena of being.” Goethe’s view of “God and nature,” did not deny the
+Deity as such, but identified both in the sense of Spinoza. In this sense
+Goethe interpreted the sentence: _Qui deum amat conari not potest, ut
+Deus ipsum contra amet—si homo id conaretur, cuperet ergo ut Deus quem
+amat, non esset Deus_. The latter idea, “if a man wished that God should
+love him in return, he would wish that God be not God” is a corollary
+only to the impersonal conception of Spinoza’s non-anthropomorphised
+Deity. We cannot and we must not think of God as a human being who like
+a monarch makes favorites of those who are faithful not so much to the
+divine laws of ethics but to God personally.
+
+Goethe agreed in his views of Spinoza with Herder, who in a letter
+to Jacobi writes: “The πρὼτον ψεῦδος, my dear Jacobi, in all
+anti-spinozistic systems is that God is supposed to be the great _ens
+entium_, the cause of all phenomena, a cypher, an abstract idea which we
+have formulated. However, that is not so according to Spinoza; God is to
+him the most real and active unity which says to itself ‘I am that I am,
+and shall be in all the changes of my phenomena that which I shall be.’
+What you mean, my dear fellows, by an existence outside of the world,
+I do not understand. If God does not exist in the world, and indeed,
+everywhere unlimited in his totality and entirety, he does not exist at
+all. The limitation of personality does not belong to the infinite being,
+since a person originates with us by limitation as a kind of _modus_ or
+as an aggregate of beings whose activity is endowed with the illusion of
+unity.” A modification of Spinoza’s view consists in the recognition of
+the creative activity which Herder attributes to God. In another letter
+to Jacobi, Herder writes: “You wish God in the shape of man like a friend
+who thinks of you. Consider that in that case he must think humanly of
+you. If he is partial to you he will be partial against others. Explain
+to me why you need him to be human. He speaks to you, he affects you
+through all noble men who are his organs and most so through his organ
+of organs, the core of his spiritual creation, his only begotten. I must
+confess that this philosophy makes me exceedingly happy. Goethe has read
+Spinoza since your departure and it is a test case to me that he has
+conceived him exactly as I do.”
+
+Herder was a clergyman and he held the highest position of his church,
+being Superintendent General. Would the protestant state churches of
+to-day either in England or in Germany have room for a man like Herder?
+
+Goethe concurred with Herder, that the idea of an extramundane Deity has
+no sense, an outside God is powerless and an immanent God alone is a
+reality. He puts in the mouth of Faust the following lines:
+
+    “The God that in my breast is owned
+      Can deeply stir the inner sources.
+    The God above my powers enthroned
+      He cannot change external forces.”
+
+                                    _Faust I, Scene 4, Tr. Bayard Taylor._
+
+Spinoza makes a difference between _natura naturans_ and _natura
+naturata_. A similar contrast is made by Goethe in the following lines
+which are found among the _Zahme Xenien_, Part vii.
+
+    “Life dwells in each celestial body
+      And on its self-selected roads
+    It likes to travel with the others.
+      There are in our earth’s deep abodes
+    The forces, shrouded now in night
+    And rising up again to light
+      If with eternal repetition
+    Some circles infinitely roam,
+      If thousand stones in strong construction
+    Together build life’s glorious dome,
+      Then through all things is pleasure thrilling,
+    The great, the little, both are blessed,
+      _Yet all this yearning, all this striving_
+    _In God the Lord, is eternal rest_.”[26]
+
+According to Schneege, Goethe was an agnostic. Faust says:
+
+    “Mysterious even in open day
+      Nature retains her veil, despite our clamors.
+    That which she doth not willingly display,
+      Cannot be wrenched from her with levers, screws and hammers.”
+
+                                                _I, 1. Tr. Bayard Taylor._
+
+This quotation however expresses Faust’s despair and not Goethe’s
+philosophical view. It is true that Goethe has made a few utterances
+which savor of agnosticism, but most of them are expressive of the idea
+that we can never be through with our wisdom; every new solution proposes
+new problems.
+
+    “_Will mich jedoch des Worts nicht schämen:_
+    _Wir tasten ewig an Problemen._”
+
+                                                      _Zahme Xenien_, vii.
+
+    [Will not be ashamed of the confession:
+    We are dealing with problems without intercession.]
+
+How little Goethe was in accord with the view of modern agnosticism
+or phenomenalism, that we know the outside of nature only and not her
+inside, can be learned from his opposition to Haller’s famous lines:
+
+    “Nature’s Within from mortal mind
+      Must ever lie concealed.
+    Thrice blessed e’en he, to whom she has
+      Her outer shell revealed.”
+
+In answer to the agnostic sentiment of the famous naturalist, Goethe
+answered with the following verses (quoted in the translation given in
+“Fundamental Problems,” p. 142):
+
+    “_Nature’s ‘within’ from mortal mind_”
+    Philistine, sayest thou,
+    “_Must ever lie concealed?_”
+    To me, my friend, and to my kind
+    Repeat this not. We trow
+    Where’er we are that we
+    Within must always be.
+
+    “_Thrice blessed e’en he to whom she has_
+    _Her outer shell revealed?_”
+    This saying sixty years I heard
+    Repeated o’er and o’er,
+    And in my soul I cursed the word,
+    Yet secretly I swore.
+    Some thousand thousand times or more
+    Unto myself I witness bore:
+    Gladly gives Nature all her store,
+    She knows not kernel, knows not shell,
+    For she is all in one.
+                                But thou,
+    Examine thou thine own self well
+    whether thou art kernel or art shell.
+
+We ought to bear in mind that Goethe was no philosopher in the strict
+sense of the word and did not attempt to have a system that should
+be free from contradictions. So we read in one place: “Man is not
+born to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the limit
+of the incomprehensible and then to remain within the limits of the
+comprehensible,” and in another place “Man must hold fast to the belief
+that what seems incomprehensible is comprehensible, for otherwise he
+would cease to investigate.”
+
+The idea of evolution was the basis of Goethe’s idea of immortality. Here
+also he remains in accord with Herder who had proposed in his “Ideas for
+a Philosophy of the History of Mankind” his views of the development
+of beings by degrees. Goethe wrote from Rome (See “Herder’s Nachlass,”
+ed. Düntzer, Frankfort, 1756, i, p. 17.): “How much I enjoy Herder’s
+‘Ideas,’ I can scarcely express. Since I expect no Messiah, this [viz.
+the prospect of further evolution] is to me the dearest Gospel.”
+
+Goethe’s idea of the soul is not clearly worked out in its philosophical
+aspect. He speaks of souls as of monads and believes in a migration
+of the soul. “I am sure,” Goethe said to Falk, “I have been here some
+thousand times and expect to come again some thousand times.”
+
+Goethe was very decided in practical and ethical respects. Goethe
+deviated from Spinoza by introducing a strong trait of individualism into
+Spinoza’s cosmism.
+
+    “_Zweck sein selbst ist jegliches Thier._”[27]
+
+    [Every creature has its purpose in itself.]
+
+And man is the last product of constantly higher evolving Nature—_das
+letzte Product der sich immer steigernden Natur_. Nature’s intention
+according to Goethe’s view is to produce constantly more perfect
+creatures. He says: “Imagine Nature standing as a gamester before the
+roulette table constantly shouting _au double_. With all she has won
+through all the phases of her activity she continues to play on into
+infinity. Stone, plant, animal, everything is risked in such hazarding
+ventures again and again, and who can tell whether man himself is not but
+a venture for a higher aim.” Death was to Goethe no destruction but a
+dissolution. A destruction or annihilation appeared as an impossibility
+to him. And his idea of immortality was not one of existence after
+death but of a continued activity. In the year 1825 Goethe declared to
+Chancellor von Müller (“Gespräche m.d. Kanzler von Müller,” p. 99), that
+he should not know what to do with an immortality in which he would not
+find new tasks to do and new difficulties to conquer. (Heidelberg: Georg
+Weiss.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.
+No. 4.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER KOMPLEXIONEN UND RELATIONEN. By _E.
+    Meinong_.
+
+    WUNDT’S ANTIKRITIK. By _C. Stumpf_.
+
+    UEBER DIE UNTERSCHIEDSEMPFINDLICHKEIT FUER KLEINE ZEITGROESSEN.
+    Eine vorläufige Mitteilung. By _F. Schumann_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+Professor A. Meinong discusses Ch. v. Ehrenfels’s article “Ueber
+Gestaltqualitäten”[28] adding the results of his own investigations
+suggested to him by this essay. Ehrenfels starts from Professor Mach’s
+consideration of figure and melody (see Mach’s _Beiträge zur Analyse der
+Empfindungen_) and proposes the question, What are figure and melody
+in themselves? Are they merely a combination of elements or are they
+something in contradistinction to their elements, something entirely
+new? Melodies and figures, says Ehrenfels, can be so transposed that
+not any one of their original elements will remain. Thus the similarity
+of figures in space as well as of tones is something different from the
+similarity of their elements; they must be something different than
+their mere sum. This is “the figure-quality” or _Gestaltsqualität_, and
+Ehrenfels distinguishes between two kinds, (1) those of time (2) those
+of space, which he calls (1) _Tongestalten_ and (2) _Raumgestalten_. In
+addition to these are discussed the figure-qualities of sensations and
+of inner apperception. Ehrenfels proposes the psychological question
+whether these figure-qualities are immediately given together with
+their foundations or whether they must be considered as the product of
+a special activity, and he decides in favor of the former possibility.
+Professor Meinong whose work has been in similar lines, refers to his
+article “Phantasievorstellung und Phantasie”[29] and criticises the term
+“figure-quality,” proposing in its stead the words _fundierend_ and
+_fundiert_, using the German term _Fundament_ as a correlative expression
+of “relation.” There is no relation without complexity and psychological
+experience has actually to deal with complex facts only. Melody and
+figure are names for the totality of the foundations including their
+“founded” contents.
+
+It may be that we are unduly prejudiced in favor of our own terminology,
+but it seems to us that the expression “form” will prove to be the most
+appropriate word. Form is neither quality nor quantity, but form can
+produce qualities. Let the same qualities, say of chemical elements,
+combine in different forms, and we shall obtain substances with different
+qualities. Figure and melody are special kinds of form. Forms consist
+in and originate through combination, and the unity produced through a
+special form-combination is actually something new, as much so as if
+it were a special-creation act. This wonderful power of form makes the
+study of form all-important in all branches of science. A neglect of the
+study of form will lead either to materialism when matter and motion are
+conceived as the only quality-producing factors, or to agnosticism as
+soon as a deeper inquiry proves that matter and motion are not sufficient
+to explain the most essential properties of the objects of investigation.
+We cannot judge from the present article how much Ehrenfels and Meinong
+are in sympathy with our standpoint, but we can see that their efforts
+are in the same direction.
+
+The second article is a rejoinder by Prof. C. Stumpf of Munich to Prof.
+W. Wundt’s reply to his critic. Professor Stumpf complains of Wundt that
+he ignored the points raised in his criticism and that his “Antikritik”
+consisted only of “a chain of distortions and insinuations.”
+
+F. Schumann publishes his results regarding sensibility for the
+difference between smallest quantities of time. He employed a chronograph
+modified in two respects from Wundt’s chronograph. First he replaced
+the expensive chronometer by a treading-wheel and introduced Pfeil’s
+time-marker, which, as he thinks, is handier as well as more precise
+than Wundt’s time-marker. Schumann’s results agree with the results of
+Professor Mach showing a maximum of 0.3-0.4 seconds, the relation of the
+perceptible difference to the normal time being in different persons only
+0.022. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L. Voss.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Vol. IV. No. 3.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    ENTHAELT DIE CHEMISCH-PHYSIKALISCHE ATOMTHEORIE WIDERSPRUECHE?
+    By _S. J. Linsmeier_.
+
+    NOCH EINMAL ZU PLATON’S TIMAEUS p. 51 E-p. 52 B. By _Clemens
+    Baeumker_.
+
+    DAS GESETZ VON DER ERHALTUNG DES LEBENS. (Zusatz der
+    Redaction.) By _W. Frye_.
+
+    DIE LOGISCHEN GAENGE DES DENKENS. By _Dr. G. Grupp_.
+
+    W. WUNDT’S SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIE. By _C. Gutberlet_.
+
+    RECENSIONEN UND REFERATE.
+
+The publishers and editors of _The Monist_ are not Roman Catholics and
+we suppose that the majority of our readers are not either. But all the
+more it appears to us necessary to state as a matter of justice that the
+Roman Catholic publications (i. e. those which avowedly and confessedly
+represent Roman Catholic thought) are far superior to their analogous
+Protestant contemporaries. The latter are debating their particular
+sectarianisms and do not seem to be interested in the progress of their
+times. They do not heed the discoveries of science or the views of
+philosophers, they live in a world of their own. It is different with
+Roman Catholics. The present magazine proves that they have thinkers
+among them who keep abreast of the time. It is true that there is more
+discipline in the camp of Roman Catholics which shuts their champions
+out from free enquiry in a certain direction concerning some fundamental
+tenets, but with all this discipline goes along a broad-mindedness in
+attacking the different problems of modern science and philosophy and
+bringing them into harmony with the Roman Catholic faith.
+
+The _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_ is published by the _Görres-Gesellschaft_
+and edited by Dr. Const. Gutberlet. Jacob Joseph Görres is the well-known
+champion of the Catholic Church (1776-1848)—a restless spirit who began
+his public career as an enthusiastic defender of the French Revolution
+for the propagation of which he published a fanatical journal _Das rothe
+Blatt_. With the rise of Napoleon he despaired of the cause of liberty,
+but he took courage again in the war of independence (1813-1815). In his
+journal _Der Rheinische Merkur_ he denounced bitterly those Germans who
+still held to the French; he recommended his countrymen to have more love
+for their language, customs, and traditions and exhorted the princes to
+stand united against the common foe and re-institute the empire. The
+war over he was persecuted by the Prussian government on account of his
+renewed interests in revolutionary affairs (he had published in 1820 a
+pamphlet “Germany and the Revolution”) and showing a decided inclination
+to mysticism (“Emanuel Schwedenborg, his Visions and his Relation to
+the Church,” 1827) he joined the Ultramontane party in the conviction
+that his ideals could be realised in the Roman Catholic Church. The rest
+of his life he remained faithful to Rome and was the most active, the
+most vigorous, and also the ablest defender of Roman Catholic views and
+interests. The present magazine is a Quarterly conducted with scholarship
+and tact, although as a matter of course not without that prejudice
+which necessarily results from the principle of giving all thoughts into
+captivity under a special and foredetermined faith. The last volume (vol.
+iii) is rich in interesting articles. Prof. Dr. Hayd, strange enough,
+defends the liberty of investigating the authority of faith, which the
+editor, however, without rejecting the idea off-hand considers as bold
+(_gewagt_). There are articles on the freedom of will, on the infinite
+number of possibilities, mongolian cosmology, Pascal’s position toward
+scepticism, analogies between cognition of God and cognition of nature
+with special reference to Kant’s criticism of the evidences of the
+existence of God. The present number of vol. iv contains an article on
+the chemico-physical theory of atoms. The question is proposed whether or
+not this theory contains contradictions. The author starts from Dalton’s
+Definition, whom he regards together with Wallaston as the founder of
+modern atomism. The four weightiest objections are considered, but
+the author arrives at the conclusion that all of them are based upon
+misconceptions. He sums up: “Chemists and Physicists do not repudiate
+eyes and senses when proposing and defending the atomistic theory. On
+the contrary they use for their view and build it upon an exceedingly
+richer material of observation than is employed by their antagonists....
+This denial of the validity of the most important objections, however,
+does not imply that the atomistic theory is without difficulties, gaps,
+unexplained details, etc. It is not as yet so certain a fact as for
+instance the heliocentric world-conception. It is an hypothesis still and
+will have to remain such for quite a long time. Yet we can confidently
+assert that the difficulties are by far less than those offered to
+the acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis at the time of the first
+condemnation of Galileo (1616) which were solved afterward by Galileo in
+the year 1632. We have further to state that the atomistic theory has
+been developed more and more since Dalton, the number and the importance
+of the explanations offered in it have constantly increased.”
+
+Dr. Frye of Jena discusses Preyer’s latest view of “The Self-Gubernation
+of Life—_Die Selbststeuerung des Lebens_” which appeared in a recent
+number of the _Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift_ (Berlin). Preyer
+considers his newly discovered law as a corollary to the conservation
+of matter and energy and maintains that the total amount of life in the
+world is as much constant as are matter and energy. Living mass (_Mz_)
+plus inanimate mass (_Mn_) are constant (_C_); _Mz_ + _Mn_ = _C_. So
+far scientists will agree, but Preyer adds that each separate item is
+constant for itself. He declares that “the total amount of protoplasm
+in the world remains unchanged in quantity.” It is hardly probable that
+Preyer’s view will be adopted by science.
+
+Dr. Grupp discusses the logical paths of thought, and the editor,
+Professor Dr. Gutberlet explains and criticises Wundt’s System of
+Philosophy.
+
+One of the most valuable features for Catholic readers must be considered
+the book reviews. Here the thoughts of the most advanced thinkers are as
+it were digested for the Catholic world. The material is carefully sifted
+but the exposition of heretic opinions is not evaded. The criticisms
+from the pen of Dr. Gutberlet are often trenchant and should not be left
+unheeded by the adversaries of the Church. (Fulda: Verlag der Fuldaer
+Aktien-Druckerei.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. July and August, 1891.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    LA SCIENZA DELL’EDUCAZIONE NELLE SCUOLE E NELLE RIVISTE
+    ITALIANE. By _F. Cicchitti-Suriani_.
+
+    LA FILOSOFIA DI EMPEDOCLE. By _S. Ferrari_.
+
+    SCIENZE FILOSOFICHE E SOCIALI: RELAZIONE SUL CONCORSO AI PREMII
+    MINISTERIALI. By _A. Chiappelli_.
+
+    ALCUNE CONSIDERAZIONI SULL’ECLETTISMO. By _L. Ferri_.
+
+    BIBLIOGRAFIA, ETC.
+
+_The Science of Education in Italian Schools and in Italian Reviews._
+Every nation is said to possess a peculiar physiognomy of its own,
+through which it is distinguished from every other nation; and
+consequently any nation will adopt a system of education that is best
+suited to its own national genius, to its racial, religious, and
+historical traditions. This may be true in a purely practical sense; but
+on the other hand, education, theoretically, as science or pedagogics,
+passes the narrow limits of any state or form of government, and ought
+to be ruled by principles and general laws common to the entire human
+family. Historically, ever since the 16th century, the educational
+movements in Italy have been directly called forth by the Catholic
+revival and reaction during and immediately following the period of the
+renaissance. Such was the origin of the _Filippini_, _Ignorantelli_,
+_Barnabiti_, _Ignaziani_, _Calasanziadi_, _Somaschi_, and of many other
+religious teaching-bodies that have made Italy until recently a bustling
+arena of ecclesiastical educational systems.
+
+_The Philosophy of Empedocles._ This first instalment of Signor Ferrari’s
+studies deals with the cosmological ideas of the great Agrigentine
+poet-philosophers. From the formation of the first elements to the
+highest functions of the human soul throughout, we perceive that
+everything is governed by the same laws, and that which is best, all
+happiness in fact, is only found in unity and harmony, evil and pain in
+disagreement and in separation. The law of evolution, in the modern sense
+of the word, prevails everywhere in the physical system of Empedocles.
+Yet his philosophy did not exclusively consist in mechanical evolution.
+To his cosmological doctrines were added moral and religious tenets,
+which, however, are not evolved continuously with the former. (Rome.
+Tipografia delle Terme Diocleziane di G. Balbi—160 Via Cavour, 162.)
+
+                                                                     γνλν.
+
+
+VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII. Vol. II. No. 4. May, 1891.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL. By _K. Ventzel_. (In
+    this article the writer explains and criticises the well-known
+    ethical theories of the late French thinker M. Guyau.)
+
+    THE PESSIMIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: CRITICISM, POSITIVISM. By
+    _E. de Roberti_.
+
+    RELIGIOUS METAPHYSICS OF THE MOSLEM ORIENT. (Conclusion.) By
+    _S. Umanetz_.
+
+    LETTERS ON COUNT TOLSTOÏ’S BOOK. “On Life.” (Conclusion.) By
+    _A. Kozloff_.
+
+    (The writer concludes his letters to Mr. N. N. with remarks
+    to the effect that count Tolstoï’s philosophy in all its
+    aspects and phases is manifestly characterized by a principle
+    of _dualism_. In the development of this general principle
+    through the different phases of his system and in his theory of
+    knowledge this dualism might assume the name of rationalism,
+    in metaphysics, that of idealism, and in ethics the name of
+    ascetical, quietistic eudemonism.
+
+    ON DETERMINISM IN CONNECTION WITH MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY.
+    By _N. Shishkin_. Lecture delivered before the Moscow
+    Psychological Society. February, 1891.
+
+    THE DOMAIN AND LIMITS OF SUGGESTION. By _N. Bajenoff_. Lecture
+    delivered at the annual session of the Moscow Psychological
+    Society. January, 1891.
+
+    ANENT THE FICTIONS OF PROFESSED CHRISTIANITY. By _Vladimir
+    Solovieff_.
+
+    (This article has appeared in an English translation in _The
+    Open Court_, Nos. 206 and 208, under the title “Christianity:
+    Its Spirit and its Errors.” It is a remarkable contribution
+    to the literature of to-day. Professor Nicolas von Grote of
+    Moscow writes about its author: “Vladimir Solovieff is at
+    present, besides the Count Tolstoï, our most eminent thinker;
+    he is a distinguished philosopher as well as theologian....
+    You Americans should be familiar with his works on religious
+    and ecclesiastical ‘questions’.” Vladimir Solovieff is the
+    author of the following works: “The Religious Foundations of
+    Life,” “The Dogmatic Development of the Church,” “Judaism and
+    the Christian Question.” (These titles are translated from the
+    Russian.) Other writings of his are “L’idée russe,” “La Russie
+    et l’église universelle,” “Geschichte der Theokratie.”)
+
+    SPECIAL DEPARTMENT. (1) Hegel’s Ontology. A Posthumous
+    Dissertation. By _N. P. H. Platonoff_. (2) The Influence of
+    fatigue upon the intuition of special relations. By _Nik.
+    Marün_. (3) Fundamental moments in the evolution of the new
+    philosophy. Main tendencies of the new philosophy. Empiricism
+    and Naturalism. Bacon and Hobbes. By _N. Grote_. (Moscow.)
+
+                                                                     γνλν.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[26] Specially translated for _The Monist_.
+
+[27] _Metamorphose der Thiere._
+
+[28] _Vierteljahrsschr. f. wissensch. Phil._ 1890. 3, p. 249-292.
+
+[29] _Zeitschrift für Phil. n. philos. Kritik._ Vol. 95, p. 173. 1889.
+
+
+
+
+                 VOL. II.      JANUARY, 1892.      NO. 2.
+
+                                THE MONIST.
+
+
+
+
+MENTAL EVOLUTION.
+
+AN OLD SPECULATION IN A NEW LIGHT.
+
+
+The theory of organic evolution, now generally accepted, needs to
+be supplemented by a theory of mental evolution. On a superficial
+examination of the matter the necessity for such a supplementary theory
+does not perhaps strike one as obvious, the mental seeming naturally to
+arise out of the organic and to be part of one continuous development.
+But closer investigation and a more rigid and exact treatment bring to
+light certain important and peculiar features, and disclose the necessity
+of some such hypothesis as it is my purpose to set forth briefly in the
+following pages.
+
+By organic evolution I mean the natural development, whether by
+“selection” alone or by this in co-operation with other natural
+processes, of the organisms which live upon the surface of this earth;
+and by mental evolution I mean the natural development of the mental
+faculties in at least the higher animals among these organisms. Now with
+regard to organic evolution there is no common and general agreement
+in respect of the first origin of primitive life on the earth. Some
+evolutionists believe that the living was somewhen, somehow, and
+somewhere evolved from the not-living. Others do not feel justified in
+holding this view, and deem it wiser to restrict their speculations as
+to natural genesis within the limits of the organic. So too at the other
+end of the developmental curve; there is no common and general agreement
+as to the evolution of the mental faculties or spiritual being of man.
+Some evolutionists believe that both in body and in mind, man is the
+product of natural development; others do not feel justified in holding
+this view, and retain unshaken the conviction that man in his spiritual
+essence is no part nor product of the common elements of nature. Seeing
+then that on either side there is want of agreement, on the one hand as
+to the origin of life, on the other as to the origin of man, I shall deal
+for the most part with that large area concerning which there is a more
+unanimous consensus of opinion, and in the main confine my speculations
+within the field of mental evolution in animals, ranging, say, from the
+amœba to the dog.
+
+Few will be found to deny or even to question the fact that our dumb
+companions and four-footed friends have mental faculties which enable
+them accurately to adjust their actions to the varied circumstances
+in the midst of which their lives are passed. Even if we see cause
+to hesitate, as I myself hesitate, before we ascribe to them
+self-consciousness and reason, in the narrower sense in which this word
+is used; still we must acknowledge that their instincts are powerful,
+their intelligence wonderfully keen and active; and that they are capable
+of strong emotional feeling both of affection and of antipathy. Should
+we so welcome them as our companions and friends if we regarded them as
+unconscious, insentient automata? But when we turn to the other end of
+the scale of life, to the amœba and all the myriad minutiae that swarm
+in ponds and stagnant pools, we are wont to speak with less confidence.
+Their consciousness, if so we can call it, is of so simple an order,
+their sentience of so low a grade, that we can hardly with any accuracy
+use the phrase “mental faculties” with reference to organisms so lowly.
+We feel uncertain whether in their case unconscious automatism does not
+after all pretty accurately express the facts. At any rate it would
+trouble us little or not at all if some one proved their automatism
+to-morrow. And yet, on the theory of evolution, out of such lowly
+beginnings have sprung the sagacity and affectionate devotion of the
+dog. But if the amœba and his tribe are insentient automata, at what
+stage of the development did consciousness creep in? And whence came
+it? Or put what is fundamentally the same question in another way. In
+the common course of generation the dog is developed from a minute
+egg-cell, one hundredth of an inch or less in diameter, with which a yet
+more minute sperm has entered into fertile union. Supplied with shelter,
+warmth, and nutriment by that maternal self-sacrifice which is a deeply
+significant fact of organic progress, this little speck of living stuff
+passes, by a process strictly continuous, though profoundly modified by
+the catastrophe of birth, into the dog with its wealth of intelligence
+and affection. It is surely impossible without extravagance to speak of
+the fertilised ovum as conscious. Where then in the continuous process
+of development does consciousness come in? How, and whence? We are not
+nowadays to be put off with the ambiguous assertion that consciousness
+and intelligence are “potentially” present in the germ. We ask: What is
+_actually_ present therein as the basis of this potentiality? Or are we
+told that consciousness dawns at or shortly after the catastrophe of
+birth? Then again we ask: Whence comes this dawning consciousness, and
+by what means does it become associated with the puppy’s brain? In yet
+another form does a question of like general implication suggest itself.
+Granted that in the ovum there is present something which we may call the
+germ of consciousness somehow associated with the protoplasmic material
+of which that ovum is constituted. How comes it that, in the adult dog,
+consciousness is associated with the brain? Why is the association of
+consciousness concentrated, so to speak, in this one tissue of the
+many which arise during the differentiation of development? That the
+association is so concentrated or specialised is now generally admitted
+to be the fact. We speak indeed of the skin, the palate, the nose, the
+eye, the ear, as each in its kind sensitive. But none the less we believe
+that the seat of consciousness is the brain or some part of it. Only
+when the nerves running inwards from skin, palate, nose, eye, or ear,
+have conveyed their appropriate stimuli to the brain, does that organ
+tingle with the accompaniment of consciousness. There and there only
+does consciousness “emerge”; not in peripheral sense-organ or ingoing
+nerve. But why? How comes it that there is this peculiar association of
+consciousness with the functioning of a particular organ?
+
+Perhaps we are told that consciousness is the special product of
+brain-tissue. But let us note that the word “product” is here used in
+an unwonted sense. We are not likely, it is to be hoped, to fall into
+the crude and demonstrably false materialism expressed in the formula,
+“as the liver secretes bile, so does the brain secrete consciousness.”
+Consciousness being immaterial, the second and fourth terms are
+incommensurable, and the formula is sheer nonsense. Nor are we likely
+(though here there is greater danger) to fall into the more subtle error
+of regarding consciousness as a mode of energy. “Granted,” says Professor
+Tyndall, “that a definite thought and a definite molecular action of the
+brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor
+apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass by
+a process of reasoning from the one to the other: the chasm between the
+two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable.”
+Consciousness is something _sui generis_. It is neither matter nor
+energy. It may accompany the transformations of energy in the dog’s
+brain; but to the category of these transformations of energy it does
+not, and, for any clear thinker, can not belong. And if we are told that
+the word “product” is used in the sense implied by Professor Huxley when
+he speaks of phenomena of consciousness being “called into existence” by
+physical processes; then we must again ask whence they are called into
+existence. We do not now speak of matter or energy being called into
+existence from a shadowy nowhere. When a cloud is called into existence
+on a mountain peak we know that the material particles have only assumed
+a new form. When the electrical current is called into existence or
+generated as we phrase it, we know that we are dealing with one of the
+many transformations of energy. And when phenomena of consciousness
+are said to be called into existence, we have a right to ask: Do you
+mean, by this phrase, creation _ex nihilo_? Or do you mean, origin by
+transformation? And if the latter, transformation of what?
+
+Having thus opened up these several questions, all of like implication,
+let us now endeavor to set forth the answer which seems most
+philosophical and most closely in accordance with scientific analogies.
+And to this end let us consider the living dog. His frame is pulsating
+with life and restless activity, and somehow associated with the
+transformations of energy in that brain of his there is consciousness—or
+what in the dog is the analogue of that consciousness with which
+alone I can claim any acquaintance at first hand, my own. Were his
+skin and the walls of his skull as transparent as glass; did the
+molecular vibrations of his brain lie open to the keenest scrutiny of
+the physical investigator; could we trace in detail all the varied and
+orderly transformations of energy of which that brain is the theatre;
+the accompanying consciousness would still be beyond our reach. _We_
+might follow the changes of energy; he alone would feel the states of
+consciousness. But suppose that the dog dies. His body lies before us
+stiff with the _rigor mortis_. If we had weighed it previous to death,
+and if we were to weigh it again after death, the scales would give
+us no information of the departure of anything material. All signs of
+consciousness, however, are gone. And could we see through skin and skull
+into the brain, which during life was the theatre of so complex and
+orderly a sequence of transformations of energy, we should find that it
+was still and motionless. It is true that we cannot actually do this. But
+we know that, whereas, during life, the functional action of the brain
+gives rise to certain material products, at death the production of these
+substances ceases. We are therefore justified in saying that, omitting
+minor qualifications, the orderly transformations of energy in the brain
+and the concomitant consciousness cease together at death. Closely
+associated during life, varying together in health and sickness, ceasing
+together at death, what is the nature of their connection?
+
+On the hypothesis of scientific monism it is believed that they are
+different aspects of the same phenomena: that what objectively to the
+physical investigator are transformations of energy in the brain, are
+subjectively to the dog states of consciousness? Let us look into this
+hypothesis. Let us see whither it will lead us; and if it will in any way
+help us over some of our difficulties. But first let us pay a moment’s
+attention to the impatient exclamation which some may feel inclined to
+interpose, that this assumption of the ultimate identity of brain-energy
+and consciousness, the two being respectively the objective and
+subjective aspects of the same occurrences, does not in the least do away
+with the mystery of the matter. That the same two occurrences should have
+different aspects, objective and subjective, is, it will be said, just
+as mysterious as that two separate existences energy and consciousness
+should be associated together. Of course it is. I should be shallow and
+pretentious indeed if my object were by any _hocus pocus_ to attempt to
+hide the so-called mystery. _All_ ultimate facts are mysterious. The
+fall of a stone to the ground is to-day as mysterious as it was in the
+days before Newton; the phenomena of life, as mysterious as in the days
+before Darwin. Our advances in science and in thought may do away with
+minor mysteries, but they leave the great ultimate facts of nature as
+mysterious as before. The end of our explanations is always to bring us
+face to face with the inexplicable. Not, therefore, in any hope of doing
+away with an ultimate mystery do I suggest that we look into and follow
+out some implications of this so called identity hypothesis.
+
+Let us regard the matter from the objective aspect first, from the side
+to which the occurrences present themselves as transformations of energy.
+The state of consciousness being _ex hypothesi_ accompanied or “called
+into existence” by certain complex and orderly molecular vibrations in
+the brain or some part thereof, we have to note that from the physical
+point of view these molecular vibrations constitute an exceeding complex
+and orderly mode of energy. It is upon this energy that we must fix our
+attention; the material structure of the brain being what we may call
+the vehicle of its manifestation. I am anxious that the reader should
+carefully follow me here. We are too apt to regard the _structure_ as
+the essential thing on which to concentrate our mental gaze, partly no
+doubt because, through the invaluable labors of microscopists, we know
+so much that is definite about this structure. But a more penetrating
+insight enables us to see that the structure is merely the necessary
+basis of what is the really important thing—the manifestation of
+energy. The material structure of a steam-engine is of importance. But
+why? Because it is the vehicle for the performance of work. That is the
+really essential part of the business. In like manner nerve-structure
+is of importance. But why? Because it is the vehicle for what Professor
+Huxley happily termed the neurosis, the complex and orderly manifestation
+of energy. The essential importance of looking at the _going_ machine,
+at the performance of work, at the energy of the matter in motion, not
+merely the material structure that is moved—the essential importance, I
+say, of fixing our attention on this, being fairly grasped, we may now
+proceed to enquire from what the complex and orderly vibrations of the
+dog’s brain have been evolved. In the fertilised ovum from which the dog
+was developed, (and the same is true of the amœboid ancestor from which,
+hypothetically, the race of dogs has been evolved,) there is certainly
+nothing approaching the orderly complexity of these molecular vibrations.
+But there are simpler organic modes of motion from which these complex
+molecular vibrations have arisen by a continuous process of development.
+It is from these simpler modes of energy in the simpler organic substance
+of the ovum that the more complex modes of energy which characterise
+the workings of the dog’s brain have been evolved. In the development
+of the ovum into the embryo, and thence into the puppy and the dog, we
+may trace step by step all the stages of the evolution of those material
+structures which are the vehicles of these special manifestations of
+organic energy. We may watch the further and further differentiation of
+the nervous tissue, and the fashioning of the brain and its parts. It is
+true that we cannot indicate the exact moment when, in the increasing
+complexity of the tissues, the simpler forms of organic energy pass
+into the higher form of brain energy accompanied by consciousness. But
+that is just because it is a continuous development, an evolution. That
+the passage from the one into the other does actually take place we are
+bound, by all the canons of logical reasoning, to admit. It is only
+during life, however, that neurosis occurs or is possible. A great number
+of modes of organic energy proceed side by side in the pulsating tissues
+of the living dog, their orderly continuance being what we term _life_.
+And only in and through their orderly continuance is the maintenance of
+the structure of the tissues rendered possible. The organic structure is
+like a spinning top. Only so long as it spins and manifests its proper
+energy is its stability maintained. All around it are forces which tend
+to make it totter to its fall. But so long as it spins freely it can
+resist all minor attempts to upset its stability. And when the dog dies;
+what happens then? The molecular vibrations of the brain in common with
+all other forms of organic energy cease. The top no longer spins; and the
+structure totters to its fall. Decomposition sets in. The orderly organic
+changes which characterise life, give place to the destructive changes
+which characterise decay. But according to the law of the conservation
+of energy, although there is decomposition of the tissues of which the
+body was composed there is no destruction or annihilation of energy. The
+particular modes of energy through which the body was instinct with life
+pass away; but only to give rise to their equivalents in other modes
+of energy. Just as the puddle in the road disappears, but only to give
+origin to an equivalent mass of invisible water-vapor; just as the candle
+disappears, but only to give rise to its equivalent mass in the products
+of combustion; so throughout life and in death the energy which throbs
+in the tissues neither appears nor disappears except at the expense of,
+or to the gain of, other modes of energy. Life is like a vortex in a
+rapid stream; on surrounding energy it is dependent for its continued
+existence; into surrounding energy it melts away. And this is true not
+only of individual life but of life in its entirety. Some believe that
+the vortex had a natural origin, the organic being evolved from the
+inorganic. Others hold that it was through the direct interposition
+of the finger of God that the tiny vortex of primitive life was set
+a twirling. Be this as it may, once initiated the vortex of life is
+dependent on surrounding stores of energy.
+
+Turning now from the objective aspect to the subjective aspect we pass
+from neural processes to states of consciousness. In the language of
+the identity hypothesis, here provisionally adopted, the states of
+consciousness in the dog’s mind, are the subjective aspect of what, from
+the objective aspect, are the molecular vibrations of his brain-tissues.
+And as in considering the matter objectively, so now in regarding the
+mental aspect, we must ask from what the complex and orderly states of
+consciousness of the dog’s mind have been evolved. In the fertilised
+ovum from which the dog is developed, (and the same is true of the
+amœboid ancestor from which, hypothetically, the race of dogs has been
+evolved,) nothing so complex as a state of consciousness is to be found.
+From what then have the states of consciousness been evolved? Do we not
+seem forced by parity of reasoning to answer: From something more simple
+than consciousness but of the same order of existence, which answers
+subjectively to the simpler organic energy of the fertilised ovum? Such,
+at any rate, is the hypothesis which appears to me the most philosophical
+and the most logically consistent. It requires, however, no little effort
+of thought to conceive the existence of those elementary states from
+which consciousness may have had its origin. We may be aided in doing so,
+perhaps, if we fix our attention on the close association of brain-energy
+and states of consciousness, regarding them as _distinguishable_ but
+not _separable_. Now the nervous energy of the brain is extraordinarily
+complex; and yet we believe that it arises by a process of continuous
+development from the much less complex energy of the fertilised ovum. In
+the ovum there is no brain-energy; there is only the far simpler germinal
+energy from which it is evolved. So too, the consciousness in the dog’s
+mind is wonderfully complex; but if it has arisen by a process of
+development, it must have been evolved from something of like nature only
+indefinitely simpler. May we not fairly suppose, therefore, that in the
+fertilised ovum, though there is no consciousness, there are the germinal
+states from which consciousness may be evolved? Or to put the matter
+tersely, may we not say: As the complex molecular vibrations of the brain
+are to the simpler molecular vibrations of the ovum; so are the complex
+states of consciousness associated with the former to the simpler states
+of infra-consciousness, if we may so call them, associated with the
+latter? It is the association of consciousness and infra-consciousness
+with energy—its objective manifestation—that is the distinguishing
+feature of the view which I am endeavoring to set forth. Concomitant
+with the evolution of higher modes of organic energy from those lowly
+modes which alone obtain in the ovum or the amœba, is the evolution of
+consciousness from lowly modes of infra-consciousness.
+
+It is true that it is only through the exercise of the conceptual
+faculty of reason, never through the senses or by direct perception,
+that we can reach this suggested infra-consciousness. But this will
+hardly be regarded as a valid objection by those who believe in the
+existence of the ether, or by those who adopt the atomic theory, neither
+of which could be reached by the senses or by perception alone. Still
+less will it be regarded as an objection by those who have grasped
+the distinction between energy as manifested in the objective world,
+and consciousness as inevitably subjective. Of no consciousness other
+than our own have we direct and first-hand experience. And yet certain
+manifestations of energy as exhibited by other living beings force upon
+us the conviction that we are not alone in possessing the subjective
+attribute of consciousness. That not only the dog and the elephant, but
+the bee also and the spider are endowed with this attribute and are
+conscious, though not self-conscious, few of us doubt for a moment. But
+their consciousness is presumably far simpler than ours. Carrying this
+simplification yet farther down the scale of animal life, we reach in
+the jelly-fish, the sea-anemone, and the sponge, forms of life which can
+hardly be said to be conscious at all with a consciousness comparable to
+our own. Yet they would seem to be endowed with the dim foreshadowings
+of such consciousness. Finally in the amœba and the monad we have these
+dim foreshadowings reduced to the lowest terms that are suggested by
+the study of organic life. If, then, in the series of organic forms,
+down even to the lowest, we admit consciousness or its foreshadowing,
+though it lies and must ever lie beyond the reach of our senses, why
+should we hesitate to generalise our belief in logical and scientific
+form, and hold that all organic modes of energy are associated with
+conscious or infra-conscious states?[30] It may perhaps, be objected
+that such a view, carried to its logical conclusion involves the
+supposition that all the tissues of the body are conscious or at
+least infra-conscious, whereas it is a well-established scientific
+conclusion that consciousness is specially associated with the nervous
+tissue of the brain. I see no reason, however, why this conclusion
+should not be accepted. If the organic transformations of energy in
+the ovum are associated with what for lack of a better term I have
+here called infra-consciousness, then there are two possibilities.
+Either the accompanying consciousness is _entirely_ concentrated in
+association with the molecular vibrations of the brain; or it merely
+becomes _dominant_ in the functioning of that tissue and continues in
+the dim infra-conscious condition in the other tissues of the body.
+Now to judge from our own experience it is only the dominant molecular
+vibrations in the brain that are accompanied by the clear light of
+consciousness. The sub-dominant neural changes are indeed accompanied by
+a dim sub-consciousness. But there are many molecular changes (even in
+the cerebral hemispheres themselves where consciousness is “called into
+existence”) which do not rise to the level of consciousness at all or
+are quite lost in the glare of that consciousness. Why this should be
+so I am not prepared to say. It seems to be a law of our mental being.
+Certainly it is convenient that it is so; and it may have been fostered
+or established by natural selection. We all know the sense of confusion
+that arises when, in certain states of intense nervous excitement, a
+host of ideas are crowding up into dominance and jostling each other
+for supremacy. An organism so constituted that such a state of things
+was normal, would, we may suppose, stand but a poor chance of survival.
+Hence perhaps there has arisen that due subordination of conscious,
+sub-conscious, and infra-conscious states which characterises the
+normal life of conscious beings. Having regard, then, to the cerebral
+hemispheres where consciousness emerges, not all the molecular changes
+there transpiring rise to the level of full consciousness. There is not
+a little of what Dr. Carpenter used to call unconscious cerebration. We
+seem forced to admit the existence of submerged states of consciousness;
+states which are infra-conscious, but which may become conscious at any
+moment by rising into dominance. And if in the cerebral hemispheres
+there are infra-conscious states, why should there not be associated
+with every molecular thrill of the living body yet lower states of
+infra-consciousness too deeply submerged ever in man to become dominant?
+
+It is, however, one thing to show that there is no insuperable objection
+to accepting the existence of such infra-conscious states, if such
+existence be otherwise probable, and another thing to establish this
+probability. And this leads us back again to the grounds on which their
+existence may fairly be regarded as probable. We are told that the mental
+faculties of the dog in common with his physical or organic frame, have
+arisen in the course of ages by a process of development. It is clear
+that such a statement is intended to apply to the living dog with active
+faculties; to a _going_ mechanism, or rather organism which is also
+conscious. Well and good. The material structure has been evolved from
+lower forms of matter: the organic modes of energy (in virtue of which he
+lives), from lower forms of energy, the mental states (in virtue of which
+he is conscious), from—what? I suggest in continuation and conclusion of
+this sentence—from lower forms of infra-consciousness; that is to say,
+of what is of the same order of existence as consciousness, but has not
+yet risen to the level of consciousness. Many people will no doubt see
+no necessity for such a conclusion. It is making an unnecessary bother,
+they will say, about a very simple matter. At some undefined stage of
+organic evolution—perhaps when nervous tissue had its genesis, perhaps
+earlier—consciousness began to dawn and has since developed in clearness
+and brightness during the evolution of higher and higher organisms.
+According to this view, the ascending curve of evolution is divisible at
+some undefined point into two portions: of which one represents organic
+evolution previous to the dawn of consciousness; the other organic
+evolution subsequent to the dawn of consciousness. But the question at
+once suggests itself: From what did consciousness dawn at this undefined
+point? In answer to which there are some who do not hesitate to reply
+that the consciousness arose out of the physical conditions; that when
+the rhythmic dance of organic molecules reached a certain intensity and
+intricacy consciousness was developed. There is, indeed, a certain class
+of nerve-physiologists, or of medical men who write on nerve-physiology,
+who, if they do not hold that states of consciousness are generated
+from the energy which accompanies the working of the brain-tissues, at
+any rate write as if this was their belief. But such a view is quite
+untenable. If there is one thing clearly established, both by those who
+have approached the matter from the scientific side, and by those who
+have approached the matter from the metaphysical side, it is that the
+distinction between energy and consciousness is radical and absolute.
+No conceivable increase in the orderly complexity of the molecular
+vibrations of brain-tissue could give rise to that consciousness which
+differs _toto cœlo_ from any manifestation of energy.
+
+And yet though stated in a form that is philosophically false, and
+therefore misleading, the conclusions of these earnest students of
+nerve-physiology are practically sound. Grant, for the moment, that the
+states of consciousness in the dog’s mind are the subjective aspect of
+the molecular energy of his brain. Then the following diagram (Fig.
+1.) will represent the ascending curve of development which, from the
+objective aspect, is a development of modes of energy, and from the
+subjective aspect is a development of modes of consciousness.
+
+[Illustration: FIG. 1.]
+
+Now what the nerve-physiologists are sometimes apt to do is, at some
+moment of development say _a_, to change their point of view, from
+the subjective aspect which deals with consciousness to the objective
+aspect which deals with energy. Their conclusions are practically sound
+because they are still dealing with the same developmental curve. They
+state these conclusions in language which is philosophically misleading
+because they suddenly jump from the subjective aspect to the objective
+aspect and ignore the great distinction between the two. When they say
+that consciousness emerges from the physical conditions at _a_, they
+presumably mean that at this point we are first justified in speaking of
+consciousness or the subjective aspect in anything like a human sense.
+But is it not more logical to hold that, just as from the objective
+standpoint the complex energy of the dog’s brain has been developed
+from the simpler energy of the ovum, so from the subjective standpoint,
+the complex consciousness of the dog’s mind has been developed from
+the simpler infra-consciousness of the ovum? And if we do not accept
+this view, do we not seem committed to the unevolutionary doctrine
+that the conscious aspect suddenly makes its appearance, without those
+lowly germinal beginnings which it is of the essence of any theory of
+development to postulate?
+
+It will perhaps be said that all this assumes an identity hypothesis,
+with its supposed double aspect, which is not accepted by the majority
+of men of science. Let us look at the matter, therefore, from what would
+seem the only other point of view open to one who accepts the theory of
+development as applicable alike to the dog’s mind and to the dog’s body.
+If states of consciousness and the molecular transactions in the brain
+are not different aspects of the same occurrences, they are parallel,
+concomitant, or associated phenomena. Our diagram will thus become that
+given below.
+
+[Illustration: FIG. 2.]
+
+Here the parallel or associated phenomena occur together at the higher
+end of the developmental curve, and, at _a_, the consciousness is
+supposed to emerge. On this view there is less justification for the
+nerve-physiologists’ assertion that it arises out of physical processes;
+for it is not simply another aspect of these processes, but something
+wholly different arbitrarily associated with them. Even on this view
+it would seem more logical to suppose that since the association of
+mental states with the dominant neural energy is of normal occurrence
+from _a_ onwards, the consciousness there emerging has been evolved from
+infra-consciousness parallel and concomitant with the physical processes
+in the ovum. If this be not so, we may once more ask: From what has
+the parallel line to the right of the diagram been evolved? We cannot
+say from the neural conditions without changing our point of view and
+ignoring the great distinction between matter and energy on the one hand
+and consciousness on the other. From what then has the consciousness been
+evolved, if not from something of like nature only indefinitely simpler
+which has here been spoken of as infra consciousness?
+
+We must now take a further step, one however in which all evolutionists
+will not be prepared to follow us. Attention has already been drawn to
+the fact that those who accept the theory of evolution are not agreed
+in their faith—for it is on either side a matter rather of belief than
+of demonstration—with respect to the origin of life. Some believe that
+the primitive organic germs were not produced by natural development
+nor through any process of evolution. For such, the hypothesis I am
+advocating must be submitted in the following form—when first the
+life-energy was started by the direct interposition of the finger of God
+it was endowed with some dim form of infra-consciousness which in the
+course of evolution developed into consciousness. And presumably those
+who see in the amœba and the fertilised ovum some dim foreshadowings of
+consciousness may follow me thus far. But for those who believe that
+the organic has arisen on this earth by process of natural development
+from the inorganic, the hypothesis must be more sweeping in its range.
+We must say that all modes of energy of whatever kind whether organic or
+inorganic have their conscious or infra-conscious aspect.[31] Startling
+as this may sound there is, I believe, no other logical conclusion
+possible for the evolutionist _pur sang_. For where are we to draw
+the line? The states of consciousness of the higher animals have been
+evolved from lower forms of infra-consciousness in the amœba-like or
+yet more simple protoplasmic germs in the dawn of life. But if those
+low forms of organic infra-consciousness were themselves evolved, from
+what could they arise if they were not developed from yet more lowly
+forms of infra-consciousness similar in kind but inferior in degree
+associated with inorganic transformations of energy? In any case it is
+here submitted that this doctrine that infra-consciousness is associated
+with _all_ forms of energy is necessarily implied in the phrase mental
+evolution for all thinkers who have grasped the distinction between
+consciousness and energy. And if this be admitted there is disclosed,
+by implication, an answer behind and beyond that ordinarily given to a
+question which has again and again been asked—the question:—Is there a
+conservation of consciousness analogous to the conservation of energy?
+The negative answer generally given to this question results from the
+fact that the question itself has always been put in a form which does
+not admit of a satisfactory solution. There is not a conservation of
+consciousness any more than there is a conservation of neural energy
+or a conservation of electricity. There is no conservation of neural
+energy because this is only one mode of energy which may be transformed
+into other modes. Not until we have generalised energy so as to include
+_all_ its modes can we speak of conservation in reference to it. So
+too not until we have generalised that universal form of existence, of
+which consciousness is only the highest and most developed mode, so as
+to include all modes, can we speak of conservation in reference to it.
+But so generalised I submit that there is a conservation of that form
+of existence which includes both consciousness and infra-consciousness,
+co-ordinate and coextensive with the conservation of energy.[32] Just as
+the dominant neural transformations in the dog’s brain are like a special
+vortex in the onward-flowing stream of the world’s energy, so are the
+states of consciousness in his mind like a special vortex in the onward
+flowing stream of that mode of existence which, whether it have risen to
+the level of consciousness or not, is still of the conscious order. For
+the believer in scientific monism there is but one vortex, objectively
+presented as energy, subjectively felt in consciousness. For the dualist
+there are two vortices, (1) an objective vortex and (2) a subjective
+vortex associated with the other and “called into existence” by it.
+In either case the vortex is dependent for its continual existence on
+surrounding stores of that out of which it has arisen; and in either case
+the modern tendencies of scientific thought suggest conservation which is
+but the antithesis of creation _ex nihilo_.[33]
+
+In conclusion it should be noted that this hypothesis is but a new
+presentation of an old speculation. It differs as it here stands from
+any theory of “mind-stuff” in that it regards the question rather from
+the dynamical than from the statical point of view. Not “mind-stuff”
+answering to matter but a universal conscious order or aspect of
+existence answering to universal energy is the leading idea I have sought
+to develop. In its newer form, again, this hypothesis differs from the
+view that “all force is will-power,” or the view that “all matter is
+conscious,” or the theory of “intelligent monads,” in endeavoring, not to
+carry anything like _our_ consciousness down into association with the
+simpler manifestations of energy, but rather to seek in association with
+these lower manifestations the germinal states indefinitely simpler than
+consciousness, from which nevertheless consciousness has been developed.
+Finally the keynote of this newer presentation is that which is the
+keynote of all modern theories of life and of thought—the doctrine of
+evolution.
+
+                                                          C. LLOYD MORGAN.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[30] I have elsewhere (_Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 467) suggested
+the term _kinesis_ for the manifestation of energy, and the term
+_metakinesis_ for its conscious or infra-conscious aspect.
+
+[31] In the phraseology I have elsewhere suggested, there is no kinesis
+unaccompanied by its metakinetic aspect.
+
+[32] That is to say, a conservation of metakinesis co-ordinate and
+coextensive with the kinetic conservation of energy.
+
+[33] The bearing of this conservation of consciousness and
+infra-consciousness (metakinesis) on Eastern conceptions of immortality
+and on transmigration would be an interesting theme to follow out but is
+beyond the scope of the present paper.
+
+
+
+
+THE NEW CIVILISATION DEPENDS ON MECHANICAL INVENTION.
+
+
+By reason of his physical nature man is hampered by three wants—he
+needs food, clothing, and shelter. In his first and lowest stage of
+civilisation man lives in a state of enthrallment to nature. He dreads
+and worships the cruel forces of matter. But by the aid of science, and
+invention which flows from science, man attains domination or control
+over things and forces and directs them into the service of humanity for
+use or for beauty. The soul conquers nature by science and machinery and
+then it next desires to see this conquest over nature reflected in works
+of art. Hence it creates architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and
+poetry, all of these fine arts portraying man’s victory over wants and
+necessities.
+
+If the spectacle of pauperism and crime, the savagery that still lingers
+in the slums of our cities, sternly reminds us of the yet feeble hold
+which our civilisation has obtained even in cities—if the census of
+mankind proves that three-fourths are yet counted as below the line
+that separates the half-civilised from the civilised—yet we are wont to
+console ourselves by the promise and potency which we can all discern
+in productive industry aided by the might of science and invention.
+This view is always hopeful. We see that there is a sort of geometric
+progress in the conquest over things and forces. The ability of man to
+create wealth continually accelerates. The more he obtains the more
+he can obtain. The more each one gets the more his neighbor also can
+get. Even the weakling of society, the pauper or beggar, the insane,
+and the criminal all fare better in the centres of wealth than they do
+at a distance from them where there is no wealth to beg or steal and
+no asylums created and sustained by wealth to shelter and heal their
+diseased bodies.
+
+Wealth in the modern sense of the word, far more than in its ancient
+sense, is self-productive. It is capital, and capital is wealth
+that generates wealth. Capital represents conquered forces and
+things—conquered for the supply of human wants. Capital consists of
+natural forces yoked and set to work for food, clothing, shelter, and the
+facilities of human culture. The three physical wants (food, clothing,
+and shelter) are produced by nature—they are the chains and fetters
+whereby nature asserts her right to enslave humanity—to keep man in a
+state of thralldom.
+
+But the Promethean cunning of man, realised first in science and next
+in useful machines, has succeeded in subduing the powers of nature and
+imposing on them the task of supplying and gratifying the very needs
+which nature creates in us. Nature had chained man to the task of daily
+toil for food, clothing, and shelter. But man turns back upon nature and
+compels her to take the place of human drudgery and produce an abundance
+of these needed supplies and bring them wherever they are needed for
+consumption. This is accomplished by mechanical combinations that secure
+the service of steam, electricity, and various devices of earth, air,
+fire, and water.
+
+This self-generating wealth that exists in the shape of capital is so
+much on the increase that it fills all classes of our population with
+hopes or if not with hopes at least with discontents—and discontent is
+certainly the product of hope struggling up from the depths of the soul.
+Without the vivid perception of a higher ideal and without the feeling
+that it is attainable, there would not be any such thing as discontent.
+The average production of man, woman, and child in the United States
+increased in the thirty years between 1850 and 1880 from about 25 cents
+per day to 40 cents per day—an increase of over 60 per cent. This means
+the production of far more substantial improvements for human comfort.
+Much more wealth is created that possesses an enduring character and may
+be handed down to the next generation. Finer dwellings, better roads and
+streets, fences for lands, drainings and levelings, and the processes
+necessary to bring wild land under cultivation, artificial supplies
+of water and gas, the warehouses and elevators, and the appliances of
+commerce—and finally the buildings and furnishings of culture, including
+churches, schools, libraries, museums, asylums, and all manner of
+public buildings. Great Britain, the leading nation in commerce and
+manufactures, according to the returns for 1888 (see Mulhall’s “Dict.
+Statistics,” new edition) distributed comfortable incomes of $1000 and
+upwards to each family of 30 per cent. of the entire population, and the
+remaining 70 per cent. averaged $485 per annum (for each family). France
+provided incomes of $1300 per annum for 24 per cent. of its families.
+This shows what great capitalists are doing for the creation and
+distribution of wealth. Italy showed by its income returns that less than
+2 per cent. received incomes of $1000 and upwards, while 98 per cent. of
+the families averaged less than $300 income. Italy makes little use of
+steam power and labor saving machines.
+
+If science progresses and its concomitant, useful invention, progresses
+as fast for the next hundred years as it has done for the past forty
+years, the vision of Edward Bellamy of comfort for all will be realised
+without the necessity of any form of socialism. There will be comfort and
+even luxury for all who will labor a moderate amount of time.
+
+Science inventories nature and discovers properties and possible
+combinations. Invention uses these combinations to meet mechanical
+problems. Can any one doubt who looks into the state of science and its
+continually improving methods that the conquest of nature will be more
+rapid in the coming century than it has been in the past century?
+
+But we are challenged by the question: What is the good of annihilating
+the necessity for bodily toil? Will not man degenerate spiritually as
+he comes to possess luxury at cheaper and cheaper rates? These material
+advantages gained by useful invention which create a steady and permanent
+supply of food, clothing, and shelter, are they not mere sumptuary
+provisions and do they imply progress in civilisation? To this challenge
+we reply by pointing out the relation of invention to the communication
+of intelligence and the diffusion of knowledge by newspaper and book.
+
+In the first place it is obvious that the three classes of employments
+devoted chiefly to the supply of the physical wants—namely agriculture,
+manufactures, and commerce—are undergoing change by aid of mechanic
+invention in such a manner as to bring the laborer everywhere more and
+more into relation with his fellow men. In other words commerce increases
+more and more, and becomes a part of all employments. In exchanging goods
+each gets something that he needed more than what he parted with. But the
+best result of the exchange is the acquaintance formed between producer
+and consumer. Each has learned something of the other’s ideas, modes of
+looking at the world and habits of action. Each one’s life is enriched by
+the addition of the knowledge of the life of the other.
+
+Man as a spiritual being has for his problem the exploration of the two
+worlds—the worlds of nature and man. The problem is too great for the
+individual and he must avail himself of the work of others. Each man may
+inventory a small portion of nature different from all others. Each one
+may live a life different from another’s. But the individual gets a very
+small glimpse of nature by the aid of his own senses. He gets a very
+small arc of the total of human life in his survey of his own biography.
+
+But by intercommunication each one may extend and supplement his own
+observations of nature and of the experience of life,—he may avail
+himself of the aid of the sense-perceptions of others and still more of
+the aid of the thoughts and reflections of others.
+
+We see at once that man is man because he possesses and uses this means
+of re-enforcing his individual observations and reflections by those of
+the race. Man is an individual endowed with the power of absorbing the
+results of the race. We have with this a definition of civilisation and a
+standard of measurement by which we may determine the rate of progress.
+Advancement means that there are improved means realised by which each
+individual can give to the rest of mankind the results of his living and
+doing and thinking and at the same time share in the lives, thoughts, and
+deeds of others.
+
+Looked at in the light of this definition we shall be enabled to claim
+progress in civilisation on substantial grounds. We shall be able to
+see something more hopeful in the material progress promised us in
+the coming century than the cheap supply of bodily comforts. We see
+a progressive increase of intercommunication which will enable each
+individual to command the results of the rational intelligence of all
+mankind.
+
+Man is first a speaking animal and next a writing animal. Each
+word that he uses expresses a general meaning. Each word therefore
+stores up an indefinite amount of experience. All men may pour into
+it their experience and by it recognise the experience of others.
+The art of writing at once increases infinitely the possibility of
+intercommunication because it preserves the experience recorded for
+persons widely separated in space and far removed in time. It renders
+every _where_ in some sense a _here_ and every _when_ a _now_. But
+mechanic invention comes to the aid of speech and the elementary arts of
+writing by printing with movable types. Printing and gunpowder are two
+great elementary arts both attributed to the Germanic race—the two wheels
+of modern civilisation so to speak. But the Anglo-Saxon has added the
+steam engine and the telegraph. The one makes locomotion possible to an
+increasing degree and the other makes instantaneous intercommunication
+with all places possible.
+
+Armed with these instrumentalities our modern civilisation lives in a
+sort of spiritual border land. It looks across the frontier and is in
+a constant process of interaction with all other nations. The great
+instrument of this process is the daily newspaper. Our people are
+becoming from year to year a travelled people—in a short time the per
+cent. of the population that has crossed the ocean has doubled. The
+per cent. that has visited the western border land has quadrupled. But
+the number of people who live in constant daily interrelation with all
+mankind by aid of the daily newspaper has increased a hundred fold within
+a single generation.
+
+The test of a civilisation is its efficiency in re-enforcing the
+endeavors of each individual so as to give him access to the labors of
+the world. We are approaching a spiritual civilisation as well as an era
+of the general distribution of wealth.
+
+                                                             W. T. HARRIS.
+
+
+
+
+RELIGION AND PROGRESS.
+
+INTERPRETED BY THE LIFE AND LAST WORK OF WATHEN MARK WILKS CALL.
+
+
+On August 20, 1890, died Wathen Mark Wilks Call, M. A.,—a spirit finely
+touched to fine issues. The posthumous work before me revives the sense
+of personal bereavement, but soothes it with the satisfaction of holding
+another interview with the beloved scholar on themes that through many
+years engaged our conversation. Here is a casket of golden thoughts cast
+up from the deep where went down the white-winged ship freighted with
+such treasures. The general world is unconscious that it is poorer;
+its ports and marts had little welcome for the dainty wares of this
+unfamiliar bark. Many an American thinker will through this specimen of
+the sunken treasures realise the world’s loss when it is irreparable;
+and some who used to hover around the silver sail now vanished, and come
+ashore laden with its gifts, have wondered that this writer, valued by
+Mill, George Eliot, and the scholarly English circle, should have courted
+obscurity rather than fame. He was not indolent, though his published
+volumes were few: “Lyra Hellenica” (1842), “Reverberations” (1849,
+second edition 1876), “Golden Histories” (1871). Besides his poems, his
+contributions in the reviews,—some, like “The Nero Saga” (_Theological
+Review_, July, 1871), equal to volumes,—would make a substantial and
+important collection. There is enough thought and learning in his poems
+and anonymous articles, to have earned fame for an ambitious and pushing
+author. Why then did the world get so much less than it ought to have
+got from this fine and active brain, and why is he so little known?
+
+Many years ago I heard from his own lips the story of his life, which
+is partly told in the fifty pages that introduce this book, under the
+title “A Chapter from my Autobiography.” It will there be seen that
+even so late as thirty-six years ago the finest minds and hearts that
+could not accept creed-dogmas might be almost mortally wounded. From
+that time he lived and wrote as from a retreat. The actual case, as he
+told it me, was that his sister, a widow, left him executor of her last
+will and testament, and the guardian of her children. He was tenderly
+attached to this sister and to her children. She knew his opinions and
+his doubts. When he went into the court for confirmation of his trust he
+was confronted by the postscript of a letter he had written to a supposed
+friend intimating his “dissent from the creeds of the churches.” For this
+mild and vague heresy he was prevented from acting as the guardian of his
+sister’s children, and fulfilling a sacred trust.
+
+At this time he was a clergyman in the Church of England, which to-day
+contains many ministers more unorthodox than Mr. Call was when he
+received this crushing legal blow. This public disgrace of a sensitive
+scholar, the loss of position, the alienation of friends, added to the
+grief of seeing his sister’s children carried to strangers, parted him
+from the world. He seemed to have no place in it. Stunned, lacerated, he
+had no heart to enter on any new profession. But from his retreat came
+the poems, pathetic but hopeful, entitled “Reverberations,” some of which
+are sung in the liberal chapels of England. Deified egotism and vengeance
+had brought home to him all their heartlessness: all nature was overcast
+with this chilling cloud.
+
+Silently bearing his grief, he gave himself to the search for truth
+in those matters which had been predetermined for him by a thousand
+subtle influences and associations. Born in 1817, he had graduated
+at Cambridge,—the chief poet of its Magazine,—had passed through his
+Shelleyan phase of scepticism, and entered the church (1845) through one
+of the many casuistical blind-ways provided in that old minster for those
+who hesitate at the main portal. Eleven years were occupied in passing
+from one to another theoretical cloister or tower of the venerated church
+before he finally discovered that it had no place for him. Nor was there
+any church which he could honestly enter. He must be the hermit of his
+truth. But in that retreat, where the lonely scholar must eat his own
+heart, the healing hand of a true divinity found him.
+
+Love found him. He married (1857) a lady whose beauty was the expression
+of her genius. Her father was Dr. Brabant, the friend of Strauss, and
+founder of the _Westminster Review_. In early life she married C. C.
+Hennell, author of “An Inquiry into the Origin of Christianity,”—a
+work which made a deep impression on Theodore Parker, who made it the
+subject of an article in the old _Dial_. Miss Brabant, versed in ancient
+and modern languages, did excellent work on the _Westminster Review_,
+assisted by her friend Marian Evans, afterwards known as “George Eliot.”
+These two ladies, as I have heard, undertook together the translation
+of Strauss’s “Leben Jesu,” and were more than half through it when Miss
+Brabant married. By a contrivance of Mrs. Hennell the name of Marian
+Evans alone, and to her regret, appeared on the title-page. “George
+Eliot” thereby gained a reputation helpful to her, though somewhat
+embarrassing, implying as it did a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek which
+she did not possess.
+
+Mr. Call’s marriage was most happy. The Calls were regarded by their
+circle of kindred spirits as representing the true ideal union. They had
+together shared the friendship of the finest intellects, and had moved
+abreast in intellectual progress, for more than the life of a generation
+when parted by death.
+
+About seven years ago trouble for the first time entered this almost
+sacred household. A formidable consumption of one lung set in,
+threatening Mr. Call’s life. I have always believed that this was the
+long latent bequest of pious cruelties suffered in earlier life. Six
+years ago the case became hopeless, in its normal course, and the
+physicians said that the only possibility of recovery lay in a rare
+and difficult operation, imperilling the few months of life that might
+remain. The patient and his devoted wife resolved to incur this risk.
+A tube was inserted through the back; through it the pus was drained
+from the ulcerated lung; and little by little the tube was withdrawn, by
+infinitesimal degrees, as the healing process went on behind it. It was
+a painful anxious process of many weeks. At this time, when he was kept
+motionless, I marvelled at his cheerful spirit; though the slightest
+miscarriage in the wearisome operation might prove fatal, the patient was
+always serene. One of his physicians, by no means sure of the result,
+approached him on the subject of religion, and the condition of his soul.
+Soon after Mr. Call gave me an account of the conversation. In religious
+matters the doctor had dabbled where Call had dived; it ended in the
+physician’s being compelled to consider the condition of his own soul,
+and why he should be holding the religion of primitive man along with a
+science almost able to raise the dead.
+
+The wonderful operation was perfectly successful. Love had healed the
+young man’s broken heart; science had healed the mature man’s dying
+frame. The real miracles that supplant fictitious ones, and fulfil
+their fables, had been brought home to him. Five happy years were added
+to his life, during which he wrote the important work to be hereafter
+considered. On a summer evening last year he passed a pleasant evening
+at home, ended with a game of cribbage with his wife. During the night
+he died painlessly of heart disease; a _post mortem_ examination proved
+the lungs quite sound. My friend’s body and mind and affections were so
+combined in organic unity that his very ailments had for me symbolical
+significance. The unsuspected failure of the heart, for instance, seems a
+last sequel of the spiritual lesion given him by Dogma as a parting blow:
+its counterpart is to me visible in the fact that after writing this work
+he hardly had heart to publish it. The substance of it was completed in
+1887; it was entirely finished in 1889; it lay in his library one year.
+His wife wished him to publish it—so she told me—but he thought the world
+would not be interested in his views. So deep had bigotry been able to
+send this man into the vale of Humiliation; and what an intellect was
+thus discouraged may be partly estimated by those who shall read this
+book on “Final Causes” published by his widow.
+
+In the last generation many young men, awakened by the song of Byron
+and Shelley, started out on a new spiritual pilgrimage. Their path was
+at first fringed with poetic flowers, and in the distance shone the city
+called Beautiful. But the path at length became flinty, the city became
+more dim with progress towards it, and many a pilgrim turned back. Those
+who pressed on were unique men, so that they came to parting ways, and
+each had to advance on his individual and lonely path, albeit they were
+travelling in the same direction. The records of these pilgrimages,
+wherever found, are chapters in the scriptures of their generation. There
+is one thing common to them all,—the tenacity with which they have clung
+to their old faith, and after it to their old church, until beaten off by
+bigotry or by conscience. “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” It
+was no mere cry, but a question reaching far into the ages, and stirring
+innumerable crucified hearts that have found no voice. Men do not forsake
+their God; their God forsakes them. They have invested some ancient name
+with all the pearls of their heart; they have idealised him as wisdom,
+justice, love, compassion; but no sooner do they think an honest thought,
+or maintain justice and love against unjust and heartless dogmas, than
+their Good Shepherd beats such tender lambs with his crook and sets the
+wolves on them. Yet even then, so long as they can, they keep in the
+fold, and lift their lacerated hands in prayer. They will even practice
+some self-deception that they may continue the old formulas after the
+truth has forsaken these.
+
+Mr. Call’s youthful scepticism,—a spell wrought by Byron and
+Shelley,—being chiefly the expression of others’ experiences, and with
+but little root in his own, carried him no further than the study of
+philosophy and theology. It was not deep enough to prevent his entering
+on residence in the University of Cambridge with a view of becoming
+a clergyman. The struggle being not yet in the arena of his own life
+and heart, but a combat for his soul between the Humes and the Jeremy
+Taylors, poetic sentiment easily carried the day. His nature clamored
+for a realised ideal, and the Church captivated him. “The church, as the
+embodiment of celestial truth, as the aggregate of noble and beautiful
+spirits, dead or living, appeared a sublime conception.” When a youth
+falls in love does he consider whether his beautiful lady’s bloom may
+not be hectic, or hereditary cancer be hovering near the fair breast?
+Our young scholar weds our Lady of the Litany amid the light of stained
+windows, and the white-robed choristers. He presently finds that the
+lovely creature insists on his preaching the doctrine that all who
+do not yield to her charms are to be burnt at the stake eternally.
+“Human philosophy had failed to explain to me the mystery of existence;
+Christian philosophy explained it to be the perpetuation of sin and
+misery, intensified by omnipotent intervention.” Recoiling from this the
+young clergyman went through years of critical investigation; he mastered
+the exegesis of the Germans and the French; and at length found himself
+a simple believer in the religion of Humanity. He, a clergyman of the
+Church of England!
+
+In the fifty preliminary pages of this posthumous book, comprising “A
+Chapter from my Autobiography,” we have a succinct and useful summary of
+the crucial criticisms under which biblical authority and supernaturalism
+have been relegated to professional casuistry. This we will not study
+here—profoundly interesting as it is—but dwell for a little on the
+situation in which the scholar found himself.
+
+“While I had thus been working my way through darkness into light—the
+sober light of sad reality—life had been bringing to all who belonged
+to me, as well as to myself, varied experiences of pain and sorrow. For
+their sake I had already done violence to my better nature. Was I now
+to render the previous sacrifice nugatory? Was the black shadow of my
+unbelief to enfold those who had already more than their share of the
+burden of life to sustain? Sympathising friends had early encouraged me
+to retain my position in the church. A beneficed clergyman, advanced
+in years, whose studies had ended, like my own, in the abandonment of
+dogmatic Christianity, had drawn up a statement of the motives which,
+as he argued, justified him in the retention of his preferment. This
+statement was forwarded to me. A celebrated and venerable German
+professor had sent me a message deprecating the abandonment of a post
+which, he thought, I might continue to occupy without dishonor to myself
+and with profit to others. I had hitherto deferred to the judgment of
+persons whom I regarded as superior to myself in knowledge of life and
+in ability to determine questions of moral obligation; but the progress
+of unbelief and enlarged experience decided me, at last, on the adoption
+of an independent course of thought and action. Taking counsel of my own
+heart, I resolved to terminate a conflict which had become intolerable.
+Painful and singular complications preceded, accompanied, and followed my
+retirement from the English Church.”
+
+Here is the “Robert Elsmere” of real life. Since Mr. Call left the Church
+of England, thirty-five years ago, it has become a largely rationalistic
+institution. Legal prosecutions of clergymen for heresy have resulted
+in proving that the evangelical and orthodox have no more right to the
+Church, in Law, than the liberals. They were usurpers of authority not
+guaranteed by the constitution, in which there is nothing requiring
+a clergyman to believe in hell, or the devil, or miracles, or the
+infallibility of the Bible. Many clergymen are now honestly preaching a
+simple theistic and humanitarian religion, and when told they ought to
+leave the Church need only reply, “If you think so you have a right to
+prosecute me.”
+
+The English charlatan who calls himself “Father Ignatius,” who could only
+make himself ridiculous as a heresy-hunter abroad, seems to have found
+the Episcopal Church in New York provincial enough to take him seriously.
+He would never venture to suggest the prosecution of a Broad Churchman
+at home. His ignorant tribe have too keen a recollection of their severe
+falls in grappling with Bishop Colenso, and the authors of “Essays and
+Reviews.” We have, however, to deal with America, where the sects, by
+departure of some of their best brains, seem falling more and more under
+control of their illiberal constituents, though the consecration of
+Bishop Phillips Brooks show that reactionists will not have it all their
+own way. The passage I have quoted above bears upon a moral problem
+which has already become urgent among us, and in the progress of inquiry
+must inevitably become of very serious importance to large numbers
+of ministers and their families. I therefore introduce here a little
+digression on this subject.
+
+What is the moral duty of a young minister who finds himself occupying
+the pulpit of a denomination in whose generally accepted doctrines he has
+ceased to believe? The New York _Evening Post_ recently declared this
+to be a plain moral question. If—thus it argues—a man has voluntarily
+entered the ministry of a church, and afterwards forms opinions which,
+if known, would have prevented his admission, he is morally bound to
+resign. But the question is much more complex than that. In a majority
+of cases the minister has not entered “voluntarily,”—within the genuine
+moral scope of that term. His orthodox parents, abetted by their
+preacher, have kept light from him, repressed his reason, imprisoned
+him in Sunday schools and prayer-meetings; he has been accorded no free
+choice; he has been led as a captive, before his intellect was capable
+of judgment, artificially terrified about his soul, and the world’s
+danger of damnation, and at length found himself in the pulpit. When
+the victim finds himself disabused of these fictions, what is his duty?
+In my belief it would be immoral for him to resign without having first
+secured a public decision of his church on the issue. His paramount
+obligations are to the community in which he lives. He is morally bound
+to preach the truth as he sees it, openly, honestly, plainly. He cannot
+utter the discredited creeds, prayers, or dogmas. But he has a right,—nay
+he is bound,—to throw upon the church which has entrapped him the
+responsibility of repudiating his principles and doctrines. He should say
+to his church: “You are responsible for the unhappy situation in which I
+find myself. By your zealous propaganda you frightened or persuaded my
+parents, my friends, myself, into acceptance of dogmas I now find false.
+The logical result of taking you seriously was to turn from all worldly
+occupations, and devote my life to the work of saving mankind from a
+terrible doom. Now, awakened from the nightmare superinduced by you, I
+find myself past the opportunities of youth, the time for preparations
+in other professions irrecoverably lost, and a family dependent on me.
+The situation concerns not only you and me, but others we have involved.
+For years I have been laboring with you to try and persuade other youths
+into the same situation as my own. Something is due to them. I have
+deceived them and must undeceive them. You say I must be true, but you
+must be true also. I have innocently reached a position which enables
+me to compel you to publish to the world exactly where you stand. I will
+clearly define my convictions: if you cannot tolerate them in your pulpit
+the youth will know the precise limits to their freedom they agree to
+in entering your ministry. If you can tolerate them they will know your
+liberalism. Therefore I remain here proclaiming my truth, and will not
+help you to cover the truth up by a resignation relieving you of the duty
+of proclaiming your position with equal clearness. You have got me here,
+and if I go now you must turn me out. So shall the cause of truth be
+advanced.”
+
+While this may be affirmed, I think, as a general ethical principle,
+it is equally true that each case must be judged by itself. The above
+principle depends on the condition that the ministry has been honestly
+entered from religious motives, there being no mental reservations
+at that time. It will be observed that in the case of Mr. Call the
+consideration entered that he had passed through a phase of Shelleyan
+scepticism in early youth. This had to be weighed, and perhaps may
+have had much to do with his determination to retire voluntarily from
+the ministry. He never concealed his views, however, and it is well
+known that great efforts are made by older preachers to beat down the
+scepticism that often arises in the minds of young candidates for the
+ministry. In such case these unwise advisers assume a large share of
+responsibility for the event, whether enough to justify the subsequent
+heretic in compelling a conflict must depend on the minister’s
+conscience. Although, therefore, Mr. Call decided rightly, in accordance
+with his moral consciousness, it were by no means fair to maintain, with
+the author of “Robert Elsmere,” that ministers who find themselves more
+liberal than the majority of preachers in their church should surrender
+to such mere superiority of physical force without testing its legality
+and laying on it responsibility for its exercise of power. Robert Elsmere
+should, on moral principles, have remained in the church. By so remaining
+Colenso, Dean Stanley, Charles Kingsley, Max Müller, Professor Jowett,
+Matthew Arnold, and others, have revealed the fact that, in their church,
+thought is not delivered up by law to the despotism of a majority.
+
+The case, however, is somewhat different again where the new opinions
+adopted by a minister amount to an abandonment of the fundamental
+doctrines of his church. That may not exonerate him from demanding a
+formal and public declaration of the church, but this being secured, it
+must affect his relation to the general world. Should it be proved that
+he may be legally tolerated, he must then consider whether it is his
+legitimate means of influence, or whether he would be substituting for
+his own expression the mask of an extinct faith. The ethical principle
+above affirmed relates to the first practical step of the minister whose
+beliefs have changed. The progressive and inquiring mind that continues
+in a church where it is barely tolerated does so at great peril. Where
+the swift foot agrees to march with the halt the pace must be that of the
+halt. Sceptical minds occupying pulpits even of liberal denominations
+are likely to discover, should such engagements end, that they have been
+unconsciously arresting their own development in finding a conciliatory
+_modus vivendi_ with the reactionary brethren. There is, indeed, a class
+of fine intellects, like the great English Broad Churchmen already
+named, whose comparatively advanced views are the result of larger
+learning; they have discovered that two and two are four, and gathered
+courage to deny that the amount is five. These constitute the right
+leaven by which great organisations are raised to higher standards of
+knowledge and veracity. But there are original and philosophic inquirers
+whose particular power were only buried in such organisations, without
+elevating them. These are due to the corps of pioneers in the direction
+whither the organisations are advancing. Their task is original research.
+These cannot wisely wear the uniform of any religious or political party.
+
+Mr. Call was such an original mind, and after he had left the English
+church his course was to the maturity represented in this ripe book on
+“Final Causes.” But had he not passed eleven of his best years in the
+church, out of his true habitat, we should have more fruit of this fine
+flavor. It is therefore a voice from his experience that here reaches us,
+as from his grave:
+
+    “Scepticism has been vigorously advancing in the nation—I
+    might say, in Europe. And not only has it extended its sphere,
+    but it includes within that sphere some of the loftiest and
+    profoundest intellects of the age—men renowned for vast and
+    exact erudition, for scientific research or critical acumen.
+    Philosophers, poets, historians, novelists, openly or silently
+    disavow Christianity. In palaces, in lordly mansions, in
+    college halls, in secluded homesteads, and here and there in
+    rectory or vicarage, scepticism, if it has not a bold and
+    fearless utterance, at least expresses itself in a guarded
+    whisper. It becomes doubly a duty, then, when notwithstanding
+    the general diffusion of avowed or latent unbelief, we trace
+    everywhere the presence of a conservatism that conceals and
+    hesitates and trembles at the doubts which it cannot suppress,
+    that individual dissentients should candidly disclose their
+    theological divergences. Christianity, indeed, which has had
+    its triumphs in the past, will long conserve a portion of
+    its power, and continue to furnish guidance not only for the
+    unreasoning multitude, but for thousands of excellent men and
+    women who cannot abandon the old religious ideal. But there is
+    no final arrest for the intellectual progress of mankind.”
+
+We now turn to Mr. Call’s work on “Final Causes.” In an introductory
+chapter of eight pages he compresses the history of the doctrine of
+Design in nature from Anaxagoras, B. C. 500, to our own time, stating
+its modifications, criticisms, denials. In the second chapter a brief
+account is given of “Natural Theology,” whose modern form is found to
+rest fundamentally on Newton’s generalisation, that a body at rest
+continues at rest unless acted upon by some external force; and on the
+geometrical order of planetary revolutions. Starting anew from this point
+the human mind has discovered in the varied realms of nature apparent
+evidences of a supersensuous Intelligence. Kant, however, is brought
+to criticise Newton. “Kant notes with delight that the ‘harmonical
+relations which excite the feelings in a more sublime manner than even
+the contingent beauties of nature originate in the properties of space’;
+and this inevitable congruity he refers ultimately, indeed, to Divine
+Wisdom, but directly to a common dependence on a single sovereign
+ground, to a unity of possibilities which it is no more difficult to
+conceive as self-existent than it is to conceive an Intelligent Cause as
+self-existent.” Matter is not, then, naturally inert, but an aggregate
+of forms and forces, and nature a self-adjusting, self-evolving power.
+In a chapter on “Order and General Adaptation” it is shown that nature
+contains vast realms of Disorder; and alleged “special adaptations”
+are shown too as often as otherwise for cruelty and agony. “With what
+feelings,” asks G. H. Lewes, “can we contemplate the destruction of
+such an organism as that of man for the sake of some microscopic animal
+made to live upon it? With what feelings can we think of a human being
+sacrificed to the growth of cancer-cells? What is the contrivance
+and benevolence here?” Particular illustrations of design on which
+teleologists have depended,—the eye, the bee’s cell, the bird’s wing—are
+examined with critical and scientific care, and imperfections, gratuitous
+and cruel if ascribed to omnipotent wisdom, found everywhere. “To assert
+that the Creator of the world is infinitely powerful and infinitely wise
+were to deny that he is infinitely good.”
+
+To escape the dilemma just stated, some theists postulate a “limited
+or constitutional deity.” Dr. Martineau’s idea of a “material datum
+objective to God” is an effort to relieve the deity of responsibility
+for the evils of nature, but Mr. Call declares the selection of “power”
+as the limited attribute is arbitrary. We have, he thinks, no more
+logical right to limit the deity’s power than his intelligence, or his
+benevolence. (This is doubtful, however, and requires more consideration
+than is here given it.) “The Evolutionary God” is next considered, and
+disproved by the uselessness and unfitness of some structures in various
+organisations, the often injurious character of others, (e.g. the
+intestinal canal called the vermiform process,) while the moral sense is
+still offended by the general predatory method of natural selection.
+
+The validity of the Design argument disposed of, Mr. Call leaves to the
+theist whatever evidences of a deity he may find in his ideals, emotions,
+aspirations, intuitions. He points out that the Designer thus disproved
+has never been able to satisfy the intellect or heart, the like being
+true of the “Unknowable.” The sole sacred ideal left us is that of
+humanity; not of the whole race but of the purer, nobler constituents of
+it.
+
+    “As Humanity will be the sole Ideal Object to which dutiful
+    obligation and exalted sentiment will be referred, so the
+    world of Humanity will be the world revealed, not by divine
+    inspiration or metaphysical intuition, but by Positive Science
+    The shadowy abstractions of the speculative rationalist, the
+    fanciful conceptions of the theologian, will gradually pass
+    away. To the Semitic explanation of the world and of man will
+    succeed that of Laplace and Darwin. The great and majestic
+    truths of the stellar universe, the mysteries of life, of
+    light, of heat, of sound; the wonders of natural history,
+    the magic of geologic lore, the epic of man’s progression in
+    time; the exaltation, the solace, the delight which flow from
+    poetry, music, painting, sculpture; the interest in the arts,
+    industrial no less than æsthetic; in the fellowship of work
+    which ameliorates the common lot; in friendships of man and
+    woman, short of passionate love, and in the happier profounder
+    affection of wife and husband; in all home charities and
+    patriotic activities, and in the identification of personal
+    ‘feelings with the entire life of the human race’;—all these
+    incidents of thought and varieties of emotion and action will
+    possess the intellect and fill the heart of future generations,
+    in a mode and degree which we can now only imperfectly realise,
+    and which, in the end, will leave men but little reason to
+    regret that the raptures of saint or prophet, or the splendours
+    of ancient theocracy, or the power and glory of the Mediæval
+    Church, or the imposing premise of Hellenic or of Teutonic
+    speculation, are as the dreams of a night that has passed
+    forever away.”
+
+Have we, in this prophetic conclusion, the afterglow of a faith sunk
+beneath the horizon? Why should we suppose that such beautiful things
+will come to pass in the future? Such prophecies have hitherto been
+inspired by belief in an overruling and omnipotent Love. But we are now
+brought by science and philosophy to the misgiving of Solomon, “We are
+born at all adventure.” Things, the sceptic may say, will grow better if
+man compels them so, otherwise they can as easily grow worse.
+
+It appears to me that in the old dogma of Jehovah’s curse on the world
+and its redemption by Jesus there is buried, as in a sarcophagus, a
+skeleton of human nature, and of moral history, resembling the man of
+to-day, and the history we are making. There was an appeal of the human
+heart from Jehovah to Jesus,—from the cursing to the saving deity. The
+terrible arraignments of nature written by some of the greatest men since
+Darwin’s discovery have not found any one to answer them. The severest
+indictment of the world, perhaps, is that by the late Cardinal Newman,
+who declares, “Either there is no Creator, or this living society of
+men is in a true sense discarded from his presence.... _Since_ there
+is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal
+calamity.” From a deity who having created his own materials, built up
+a creation liable to such calamity, mankind are once more appealing.
+The ancient case was Jesus _vs._ Jehovah; the present case is Humanity
+_vs._ the Creator of Nature. This rebellion of the moral sentiment and
+of compassionateness is not intellectually conscious; it goes on, and
+for a long time must go on, with ceremonial respect to the Final Cause
+of all the evils humanity tries to heal; but it appears to me certain
+that the heart and enthusiasm which once went out to a personal God
+are again turning to a crucified humanity. The humanitarian movements
+of our time have arisen simultaneously with the overwhelming evidences
+of nature’s cruelty and imperfections revealed by Science. The earlier
+deists appealed from biblical superstitions and ecclesiastical cruelties
+to the God visible in the order and beauty of the universe. With the
+existence of evil in external nature they never grappled. Bishop Butler’s
+“Analogy” first stated the problem. He answered deistic objections to the
+inhumanities of the Bible by pointing out the like in nature. Instead of
+answering the deists he set them on a new departure which has ended in
+results summed up in Mr. Call’s book. The omnipotent creator of nature
+is following the biblical Jehovah into extinction. But the instincts and
+aspirations of the human heart and mind remain the same; the religious
+sentiment remains. The stream that is dammed up in one direction or
+another does not lose any force thereby; it streams into other channels
+if it can find such, or floods field and village if it finds none. It
+will beat earthward as strongly as it once beat heavenward; it will, if
+channels be not provided, carry away institutions as it has carried away
+gods and goddesses.
+
+It has become therefore of great importance to recognise if possible
+the lines of least resistance along the mighty stream of religious
+enthusiasm, and provide that its energies shall not be destructive but
+conservative of human welfare. At present the most conservative force
+in the earth is ignorance: were the suffering masses of the world to
+discover, suddenly and universally, that the old creeds are fictions,
+their evils not providential, their heavenly hopes vain, every nation
+would be filled with convulsions. Fortunately the sun is not shot up into
+the heavens. But enlightenment progresses rapidly, and we have begun
+none too soon turning the rising flood of light and fire into the human
+channels long obstructed by sanctified inhumanities.
+
+Mr. Call’s little book, which I hope will find publication and wide
+circulation in America, sums up succinctly and cogently the present
+religious situation, and the steps by which it has been reached. It
+remains for us all to sweep the new horizon with eye and telescope,
+to compare our observations and to catch the first ray of the star
+that shall point wise men to the new incarnation. To my own mind this
+book is one of the many signs and promises that the divine will be
+steadily merged into and identified with the human. Not with humanity
+as an objective and historical entity, as Comte believed, but with the
+distinctive characteristics of humanity, the supreme qualities of reason
+and love: this will become the ideal of the reasoners and the lovers; it
+will then become the creating Word, instructing all; it will finally be
+made flesh and dwell among us, and all shall behold in it the glory of
+the kingdom of Man.
+
+                                                        MONCURE D. CONWAY.
+
+
+
+
+FACTS AND MENTAL SYMBOLS.
+
+
+I perceive from Dr. Carus’s answer to my letter in No. 3 Vol. I of _The
+Monist_, that amid all the agreement of our mutual endeavors a material
+difference of opinion exists between us on an important question of
+special character. As I was not successful in rendering my thought clear
+on this point, I shall endeavor on the present occasion to explain _what_
+it was that forced me to abandon my old position (1863), which is very
+near to that of Dr. Carus, and to assume a new one. The supposition
+that our difference of opinion is merely apparent and can be adjusted
+by a precise agreement as to the terms employed is a very natural one
+in philosophical discussions. It is hardly tenable, though, when the
+divergent views in question arise _subsequently_ to one another in the
+_same_ person.
+
+I must state, in starting, that I pursued in my youth physical _and_
+philosophical studies, particularly psychology, with equal ardor. There
+was hardly the question at that time of an experimental psychology, of
+a relation of psychological to physiological research. No more so did
+physics at that day think of a psychological analysis of the notions it
+was constantly employing. How the notions of “body,” “matter,” “atom,”
+etc., were come by, was not investigated. Objects were given of which
+physicists never questioned the inviolability and with which they
+unconcernedly pursued their labors.
+
+The fields of physical and psychological research thus stood
+_unconciliated_ the one by the side of the other, each having its own
+particular concepts, methods, and theories. No one questioned, indeed,
+that the two departments were connected in some way. _The way_, however,
+appeared an insoluble riddle; as it yet appears to Dubois-Reymond.
+
+Now although this condition of things was not such as to satisfy my mind,
+it was nevertheless natural that as a student I should seek to acquire
+tentatively the prevailing views of both provinces and put them into
+consistent connection with one another.
+
+I thus formed provisorily the view that Nature has two _sides_—a physical
+and a psychological side. If psychical life is to be harmonised at all
+with the theories of physics we are obliged, I thought, to conceive of
+the atoms as _feeling_ (ensouled). The various dynamic phenomena of the
+atoms would then represent the physical processes, while the internal
+states _connected therewith_ would be the phenomena of psychic life. If
+we accept in faith and seriousness the atomistic speculations of the
+physicists and of the early psychologists (on the unity of the soul), I
+still see hardly any other course to arrive at a half-way supportable
+monistic conception.
+
+It is unnecessary to set forth at length here what a prominent place the
+artificial scaffolding we employ in the construction of our knowledge
+assumes in these monadic theories as contradistinguished from the facts
+that deserve knowledge, and how poorly such theories satisfy in the long
+run a vigorous mind. As a fact, employment with this cumbrous artifice
+was in my case the means that effected very soon the appearance of my
+better conviction, already latently present.[34]
+
+In the further progress of my physical work I soon discovered that it was
+very necessary _sharply to distinguish_ between what we _see_ and what
+we mentally _supply_. When, for example, I imagine heat as a substance
+(a fluid) that passes from one body into another, I follow with ease
+the phenomena of conduction and compensation. This idea led Black,
+who established it, to the discovery of specific heat, of the latent
+heat of fusion and vaporisation, and so forth. _This same_ idea of a
+constant quantity of heat-substance _prevented_ on the other hand Black’s
+successors from using their eyes. They no longer mark the fact which
+every savage knows, that heat is _produced_ by friction. By the help of
+his undulatory theory Huygens follows with ease the phenomena of the
+reflexion and refraction of light. The same theory _prevents_ him, for he
+thinks solely of the longitudinal waves with which he was familiar, from
+marking the fact of polarisation which he himself discovered, but which
+Newton on the other hand, undisturbed by theories, perceives at once.
+The conception of fluids acting at a distance on conductors charged with
+electricity facilitates our view of the behavior of the objects charged,
+but it _stood in the way of_ the discovery of the specific inductive
+capacity, which was reserved for the eye of Faraday undimmed by any
+traditional theories.
+
+Valuable therefore as the conceptions may be which we mentally
+(theoretically) supply in our pursuit of facts, bringing to bear, as
+they do, older, richer, more general, and more familiar experiences
+on facts that stand alone, thus affording us a broader field of view,
+nevertheless, the same conceptions may, as classical examples and our
+own experience demonstrate, lead us astray. For a theory, indeed, always
+puts in the place of a fact something _different_, something more
+simple, which is qualified to represent it in some _certain_ aspect,
+but for the very reason that it is different does _not_ represent it
+in other aspects. When in the place of _light_ Huygens mentally put
+the familiar phenomenon of _sound_, light itself appeared to him as a
+thing that he knew, but with respect to polarisation, which sound-waves
+lack, as a thing with which he was doubly unacquainted. Our theories are
+abstractions, which, while they place in relief that which is important
+for _certain fixed_ cases, neglect almost necessarily, or even disguise,
+what is important for other cases. The law of refraction looks upon
+rays of light as homogeneous straight lines, and that is sufficient
+for the comprehension of the geometrical aspect of the matter. But the
+propositions that relate to refraction will never lead us to the fact
+that the rays of light are periodical, that they interfere. Just the
+contrary, the favorite and familiar conception of a ray as a smooth
+straight line will rather render this discovery difficult.
+
+Only in rare cases will the resemblance between a fact and its
+theoretical conception extend _further_ than we ourselves postulate. Then
+the theoretical conception may lead to the discovery of _new_ facts, of
+which conical refraction, circular polarisation, and Hertz’s electric
+waves furnish examples that stand in opposition to those given above. But
+as a general rule we have every reason to distinguish sharply between
+our theoretical conceptions of phenomena and that which we observe. The
+former must be regarded merely as auxiliary instruments that have been
+created for a _definite_ purpose and which possess permanent value only
+with respect to that purpose. No one will seriously imagine for a moment
+that a real circle with angles and sines actually performs functions in
+the refraction of light. Every one, on the contrary, regards the formula
+sinα/sinβ = _n_ as a kind of geometrical model that _imitates in form_
+the refraction of light and _takes its place_ in our mind. In this
+sense, I take it, all the theoretical conceptions of physics—caloric,
+electricity, light-waves, molecules, atoms, and energy—must be regarded
+as mere helps or expedients to facilitate our viewing things. Even
+within the domain of physics itself the greatest care must be exercised
+in transferring theories from one department to another, and above all
+more instruction is not to be expected from a theory than from the facts
+themselves.
+
+But instances were not lacking that demonstrated to me, how much greater
+the confusion was which was produced by the direct transference of
+theories, methods, and inquiries that were legitimate in physics, into
+the field of psychology.
+
+Allow me to illustrate this by a few examples.
+
+A physicist observes an image on the retina of an excised eye, notices
+that it is turned upside down with respect to the objects imaged, and
+puts to himself very naturally the question, How does a luminous point
+situated _at the top_ come to be reflected on the retina _at the bottom_?
+He answers this question by the aid of dioptrical studies. If, now, this
+question, which is perfectly legitimate in the province of physics, be
+transferred to the domain of psychology, only obscurity will be produced.
+The question why we see the _inverted_ retina-image _upright_, has no
+meaning as a psychological problem. The light-sensations of the separate
+spots of the retina are connected with sensations of locality from the
+very beginning, and we _name_ the places that correspond to the parts
+down, _up_. Such a question cannot present itself to the perceiving
+subject.
+
+It is the same with the well-known theory of projection. The problem of
+the _physicist_ is, to seek the luminous object-point of a point imaged
+on the retina of the eye in the backward prolonged ray passing through
+the point of intersection of the eye. For the perceiving subject this
+_problem_ does not exist, as the light-sensations of the retinal spots
+are connected from the beginning with determinate space-sensations. The
+entire theory of the psychological origin of the “external” world by the
+projection of sensations outwards is founded in my opinion on a mistaken
+transference of a _physically_ formulated inquiry into the province
+of _psychology_. Our sensations of sight and touch are bound up with,
+are connected with, various _different_ sensations of space, that is to
+say these sensations have an existence _by the side of_ one another or
+_outside of_ one another, exist in other words in a _spatial_ field,
+in which our body fills but a part. That table is thus self-evidently
+_outside of_ my body. A projection-problem does not present itself, is
+neither consciously nor unconsciously solved.
+
+A physicist (Mariotte) makes the discovery that a certain spot on the
+retina is blind. He is accustomed to associating with every spatial
+point an imaged point, and with every imaged point a sensation. Hence
+the question arises, what do we see at the points that correspond to the
+blind spots, and how is the gap in the image filled out? If the unfounded
+influence of the physicist’s method of procedure on the discussion of
+psychological questions be excluded, it will be found that no problem
+exists at all here. We see _nothing_ at the blind spots, the gap in the
+image is _not_ filled out. The gap, moreover, is not felt, for the reason
+that a defect of light-sensation at a spot blind from the beginning can
+no more be perceived as a gap in the image than the blindness say of the
+skin of the back can be so perceived.
+
+I have chosen intentionally simple and obvious examples, such as
+render it clear what unnecessary confusion is caused by the careless
+transference of a conception or mode of thought which is valid and
+serviceable in one domain, into another.
+
+In the work of a celebrated German ethnographer I read recently the
+following sentence: “This tribe of people deeply degraded itself by the
+practise of cannibalism.” By its side lay the book of an English inquirer
+who deals with the same subject. The latter simply puts the _question
+why_ certain South-Sea islanders eat human beings, finds out in the
+course of his inquiries that our own ancestors also were once cannibals,
+and comes to understand the position the Hindus take in the matter—a
+point of view that occurred once to my five-year-old boy who while
+eating a piece of meat stopped suddenly shocked and cried out, “_We_ are
+cannibals to the animals!” “Thou shalt not eat human beings” is a very
+beautiful maxim; but in the mouth of the ethnographer it sullies the
+calm and noble lustre of unprepossession by which we so gladly discover
+the true inquirer. But a step further and we will say, “Man _must_ not
+be descended from monkeys,” “The earth _shall_ not rotate,” “Matter
+_ought_ not everywhere to fill space,” “Energy _must_ be constant,” and
+so on. I believe that our procedure differs from that just characterised
+only in degree and not in kind, when we transfer views reached in the
+province of physics with the dictum of sovereign validity into the domain
+of psychology, where they should be tested anew with respect to their
+serviceability. In such cases we are subject to dogma, if not to that
+which is forced upon us by a power from without like our scholastic
+forefathers, yet to that which we have made ourselves. And what result
+of research is there that could not become a dogma by long habit of use,
+since the very skill which we have acquired in familiar intellectual
+situations, deprives us of the freshness and unprepossession which are so
+requisite in a new situation.
+
+Now that I have set forth in general outlines the position I take, I may
+be able perhaps to establish my opposition to the _dualism of feeling
+and motion_. This dualism is to my mind an artificial and an unnecessary
+one. The way it has arisen is analogous to that in which the imaginary
+solutions of certain mathematical problems have arisen—by the improper
+formulation of the questions involved.
+
+In the investigation of purely physical processes we generally employ
+notions so abstract that as a rule we only think cursorily or not at
+all of the sensations that lie at and constitute their foundation.
+For example, when I establish the fact that an electric current of 1
+Ampère develops 10½ cubic centimetres oxyhydrogen gas at 0° C. and 760
+mm mercury pressure in a minute, I am easily disposed to attribute to
+the objects defined a reality wholly independent of my sensations. But
+I am obliged in order to arrive at what I have determined to conduct
+the current through a circular wire having a definite measured radius,
+so that the current, the intensity of terrestrial magnetism being
+given, shall turn the magnetic needle at its centre a certain angular
+distance out of the meridian. The intensity of terrestrial magnetism
+must have been disclosed by a definite observed period of vibration
+of a magnetic needle of measured dimensions, known weight, and so
+forth. The determination of the oxyhydrogen gas is no less intricate.
+The whole statement, so simple in its appearance, is based upon an
+almost unending series of simple sensory observations (sensations),
+particularly so when the observations are added that guarantee the
+adjustment of the apparatus, which may have been performed in part long
+before the actual experiment. Now it may easily happen to the physicist
+who does not study the psychology of his operations, that he does not
+(to reverse a well-known saying) see the trees for the woods, and that
+he slurs over the sensory elements at the foundation of his work. Now
+I maintain, that every physical notion is nothing more than a definite
+connection of the sensory _elements_ which I denote by _A_ _B_ _C_ ...,
+and that every physical fact rests therefore on such a connection. These
+_elements_—elements in the sense that no further resolution has for the
+present been effected of them—are the most ultimate building stones of
+the physical world that we have as yet been able to seize.
+
+Physiological research also may have a purely physical character. I can
+follow the course of a physical process as it propagates itself through a
+sensitive nerve to the spinal column and brain of an animal and returns
+by various paths to the muscles of the animal, whose contraction produces
+further events in the environment of the animal. I need not think, in so
+doing, of any feeling on the part of the animal; what I investigate is a
+purely physical object. Very much is lacking, it is true, to our complete
+comprehension of the details of this process, and the assurance that it
+is all motion can neither console me nor deceive me with respect to my
+ignorance.
+
+Long before there was any scientific physiology people perceived that the
+behavior of an animal confronted by physical influences is much better
+viewed, that is understood, by attributing to the animal _sensations_
+like our own. To that which I see, to _my_ sensations, I have to _supply
+mentally_ the sensations of the _animal_, which are not to be found in
+the province of my own sensation. This contrariety appears still more
+abrupt to the scientific inquirer who is investigating a nervous process
+by the aid of colorless abstract notions, and is required for example
+to add mentally to that process the sensation green. This last can
+actually appear as something entirely novel, and we can ask ourselves how
+it is that this miraculous thing is produced from chemical processes,
+electrical currents, and the like.[35]
+
+Psychological analysis has taught us that this surprise is unjustified,
+since the physicist deals with sensations in everything on which he
+employs himself. This analysis is also able to render it clear to us that
+the mental addition by analogy of sensations and complexes of sensations
+which at the time being are not present in the field of sense or cannot
+even come into it, is also daily practised by the physicist, as when
+for example he imagines the moon an inert heavy mass although he cannot
+touch the moon but only see it. The totally strange character of the
+intellectual situation above described is therefore an illusion.
+
+The illusion disappears when I make observations (psychologically) on my
+own person which are limited to the sensory sphere. Before me lies the
+leaf of a plant. The green (_A_) of the leaf is united with a certain
+optical sensation of space (_B_) and sensation of touch (_C_), with the
+visibility of the sun or the lamp (_D_). If the yellow (_E_) of a sodium
+flame takes the place of the sun, the green (_A_) will pass into brown
+(_F_). If the chlorophyl granules be removed,—an operation representable
+like the preceding one by elements,—the green (_A_) will pass into white
+(_G_). All these observations are _physical_ observations. But the
+green (_A_) is also united with a certain process on my retina. There
+is nothing to prevent me in principle from physically investigating
+this process on my own eye in exactly the same manner as in the cases
+previously set forth, and from reducing it to its elements _X_ _Y_
+_Z_.... If this were not possible in the case of my own eye, it might
+be accomplished with that of another, and the gap filled out by analogy
+exactly as in physical investigations. Now in its dependence upon _B_ _C_
+_D_ ..., _A_ is a _physical element_, in its dependence on _X_ _Y_ _Z_
+... it is a _sensation_. The green (_A_) however is not altered at all
+_in itself_, whether we direct our attention to the one or to the other
+form of dependence. _I see, therefore, no oppositions of physical and
+psychical, no duality, but simply identity._ In the sensory sphere of my
+consciousness everything is at once physical and psychical.
+
+The obscurity of this intellectual situation has arisen according to
+my conviction solely from the transference of a physical prepossession
+into the domain of psychology. The physicist says: I find everywhere
+bodies and the motions of bodies only, no sensations; sensation therefore
+must be something _entirely different_ from the physical objects I deal
+with. The psychologist accepts the second portion of this declaration:
+To him, it is true, sensation is _given_, but there corresponds to it a
+mysterious physical something which conformably to physical prepossession
+must be _different_ from sensation. But what is it that is the really
+mysterious thing? Is it the Physis or the Psyche? or is it perhaps
+_both_? It would almost appear so, as it is now the one and now the
+other that is intangible. Or does the whole reasoning involved rest on a
+fallacious circle?
+
+I believe that the latter is the case. For me the elements designated by
+_A_ _B_ _C_ ... are immediately and indubitably given, and for me they
+can never afterwards be volatilised away by any considerations which are
+after all based in every case on their existence.[36]
+
+To the department of special research having for its subject the sensory,
+physical, and psychical province which is not made superfluous by this
+general orientation and Which cannot be forestalled, the relations of
+_A_ _B_ _C_ ... only remain to be ascertained. This may be expressed
+symbolically by saying that it is the purpose and end of special research
+to find equations of the form _f(A, B, C_, ...) = 0.
+
+I hope with this to have designated the point in which I am in opposition
+to Dr. Carus, with whom I agree so much in other respects. I am obliged,
+notwithstanding the latter fact, to regard this point as essential,
+inasmuch as my whole mode of thinking and direction of inquiry have
+been changed by the view it involves, and because, moreover, I do not
+believe that the difference in question can be dissipated by any verbal
+explanations however exact.
+
+This whole train of reasoning has for me simply the significance
+of negative orientation for the avoidance of pseudo-problems. I
+restrict myself, moreover intentionally here, to the question of
+sense-perceptions, for the reason that at the start exact special
+research will find here alone a safe basis of operations.
+
+                                                               ERNST MACH.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[34] A Greek philosopher to whom change of spatial configuration,
+pressure, and percussion were probably the only natural processes of
+which he had any intimate knowledge, thought out the atomistic theory.
+This theory we retain to-day, though it be in a modified form. And in
+fact natural phenomena really do exist that act _as if_ the pressure
+and impact of very small particles were involved in their production
+(the dynamical theory of gases), phenomena that admit therefore by this
+conception of being more clearly viewed. However, this conception, like
+that of caloric, possesses value only in certain fields. We know to-day
+that pressure and impact are by no means simpler phenomena than are for
+example the phenomena of gravitation. The contention that in physics
+everything can be reduced to the motion of smallest particles is, taken
+at its best, a more than improper draft on the future. Utterances of this
+kind afford no assistance to the solution of burning special questions,
+but only confound, and have about the same explanatory value as the
+utterances of the late physical philosophy of Oken which prescribe for
+example with the greatest ease the course of the creation of the world by
+a division of zero-quantities into _+a_ and _-a_ (0 = _+a_ _-a_).
+
+The motion of a _single_ body as a totality does indeed appear simpler
+at first glance than any other process, and this is the justification
+of attempts at a _physical_ monadic theory. The thoughts of a _single_
+man are connected together; the thoughts of two different men are not.
+How can the processes of the different parts of the brain of one man be
+connected? In order to make the connection very intimate, we collect
+everything which requires to be psychically connected in _a single_
+point, although the connection is not explained by this procedure. Thus
+the psychological monadic theory is created on the basis of a motive and
+of an illusion similar to that on which the physical rests.
+
+Let us assume for a moment the proposition in the text; viz., that the
+atoms are endowed with feeling. By the space coördinates _x_, _y_, _z_,
+_x′_, _y′_, _z′_ ... of the atoms are determined _in the atoms_ internal
+conditions α, β, γ, α′, β′, γ′ ... and _vice versa_. For we feel by
+our senses our physical environment, and our physical invasions of our
+environment are conditioned by our sensations. The idea is then at hand,
+α, β, γ ... alone being directly given, to set up by the elimination of
+_x_, _y_, _z_ ... equations directly between α, β, γ, α′, β′, γ′.... This
+latter point of view would be very near to my present one, aside from the
+fact that the latter wholly rejects metaphysical considerations.
+
+[35] The following is a legitimate question: To what kind of nervous
+processes is the sensation green to be mentally added. Such questions
+can be solved only by special inquiry, and not by a reference in a
+general way to motion and electric currents. How disadvantageous our
+remaining satisfied with such general conceptions is, can be seen from
+the fact that inquirers have been repeatedly on the brink of abandoning
+the _specific energies_, one of the greatest acquisitions we have made,
+simply because they were unable to discover any difference in the
+currents of different sensory nerves. I was impelled as early as 1863
+in my lectures on psycho-physics to call attention to the fact that the
+_most diverse kinds_ of nervous processes can conceal themselves in a
+current. Current is an abstraction and places in relief but one feature
+of the process—the passage of energy though a transverse section. A
+current in diluted sulphuric acid is something entirely different from a
+current in copper. We must therefore also expect that a current in the
+acoustic nerve is something entirely different from a current in the
+optic nerve.
+
+[36] It is the transitoriness of sense-perceptions that so easily leads
+us to regard them as mere appearances as contrasted with permanent
+bodies. I have repeatedly pointed out that unconditioned permanent states
+do not exist in nature, that permanences of connection only exist. A
+body is for me the same complex of sight-and-touch-sensations every time
+that it is placed in the same circumstances of illumination, position in
+space, temperature, and so forth. The supposed constancy of the body is
+the constancy of the union of _A_, _B_, _C_ ... or the constancy of the
+_equation f_(_A_, _B_, _C_ ...) = 0.
+
+
+
+
+PROFESSOR CLIFFORD ON THE SOUL IN NATURE.
+
+
+No one can read Clifford’s Lectures and Essays, without feeling that,
+if their author is less known and valued as an original thinker than as
+a master of mathematical analysis, it is only because having turned the
+force of his genius onto mathematics first he had time to complete some
+work in that direction, whereas his premature death in 1879 only allowed
+him to give us an earnest of the philosophical work which he had it in
+him to perform.
+
+The short biography which Prof. F. Pollock contributed to the first
+edition of his lectures and essays gives an interesting sketch of
+the phases of opinion through which Clifford passed. It appears that
+before he took his degree in 1867 and for a little time after he was
+a high churchman; but, says Pollock, “there was an intellectual and
+speculative activity about his belief which made it impossible that he
+should remain permanently at that stage.” “He never slackened in the
+pursuit of scientific knowledge and ideas,” and conscious of a hiatus
+between orthodox views and some of the results of science he yet held
+that religious beliefs are outside the region of scientific proof and
+that there is a special theological faculty or insight, analogous to the
+scientific, poetic, and artistic faculties, the persons in whom this
+genius is exceptionally developed being the founders of new religions and
+religious orders. This is not unlike the solution of religious doubts
+which Hume playfully suggested and which John Henry Newman has seriously
+adopted, namely that “divinity, or theology, has a foundation in _reason_
+so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid
+foundation is _faith_ and divine revelation.” “When or how,” continues
+his biographer, “Clifford first came to a clear perception that this
+position of quasi-scientific Catholicism was untenable I do not exactly
+know; but I know that the discovery cost him an intellectual and moral
+struggle, of which traces may be found here and there in his essays. Most
+readers of these essays would consider that Clifford is very unfair to
+the Christian beliefs which he had abandoned and beyond doubt he felt
+a certain grudge against them for having so long duped him.”[37] The
+theories of Mr. Darwin and Herbert Spencer took the place in Clifford’s
+mind of the old fashioned creed; Natural selection was to unriddle the
+universe, to yield a new system of ethics and education. We read that
+Clifford had an extraordinary power of taking up a theory provisionally,
+of throwing himself into it, accepting it, applying it, and of rejecting
+it in case it was not satisfactory; and this may account perhaps for his
+somewhat dogmatic assertion in many cases of crude views. There is one
+characteristic of Clifford however which all may emulate, and that is the
+candor and fearlessness of his thinking and speaking. Let me quote a few
+words from one of the best and most stirring of these essays:
+
+    “If I let myself believe anything on insufficient evidence,
+    there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be
+    true after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in
+    outward acts. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards
+    man, that I make myself credulous. The danger to society is
+    not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is
+    great enough; but that it should become credulous, and lose
+    the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then
+    it must sink back into savagery.... If a man, holding a belief
+    which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards,
+    keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in
+    his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company
+    of men that call in question or discuss it, and regards as
+    impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without
+    disturbing it—the life of that man is one long sin against
+    mankind.”
+
+The essay on the nature of things in themselves marks the furthest
+limit at which Clifford’s speculation arrived. In it Clifford begins by
+discarding the ordinary distinction between reality and ideas, eternal
+object and eternal subject, of feeling and thing. The distinction
+is really between two orders of feeling; there is the subjective or
+inner order, in which sorrow succeeds the hearing of bad news, and the
+objective or outward in which the feeling of letting go is followed
+by sight of falling object. It is with the latter order that physical
+science concerns itself, and all the inferences of natural science are
+inferences of my real or possible feeling. Since an object is a set
+of changes _in_ my consciousness and not anything out of it, is just
+my feeling real or possible and therefore part of me, it might seem
+as if we were shut up in ourselves and excluded from participation in
+any other reality. So we should be, says Clifford, if we made no other
+inferences beside those of physical science; but when I come to the
+conclusion that _you_ are conscious and that you have objects in your
+consciousness similar to those in mine, I am not inferring any actual or
+possible feelings of my own, but _your_ feelings, which are not and can
+never be objects in my consciousness. To feelings and consciousness thus
+inferred to exist in another, Clifford gives the name of _eject_, because
+in the very act of inference they are _thrown out_ of my consciousness,
+recognised as outside of it, as _not_ being a part of me. “The existence
+of my conception of you in my consciousness carries with it a belief in
+the existence of you outside of my consciousness.... How this inference
+is justified, how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything
+outside of itself I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which
+the world has cut for me long ago.” (Vol. II, p. 73.)
+
+Thus, _objects_ in the sense of things presented in _my_ consciousness,
+my phenomena, are not the sole or chief reality; ejects are equally real
+and my conviction of your existence as a conscious being like myself is
+coeval and of equal weight with my belief in my own conscious existence.
+You and your feelings are strictly speaking the only things which are
+real outside of myself and my consciousness. For though my objects or
+phenomena are external to my body they are not outside my consciousness,
+but part and parcel thereof. Nay, more than this an individual object,
+i. e. an object which is mine and mine only, never exists at all,
+according to Clifford, in the mind of man; for with each object as it
+exists in my mind is bound up the thought of similar objects existing in
+other men’s minds. All the objects in fact of which we are ever conscious
+are objects of consciousness in general, are in Clifford’s phrase social
+objects. “A fixed habit causes an object as it is found in my mind to
+be formed as a social object and insensibly embodies in it a reference
+to the minds of other men.” This belief in ejects is moreover the root
+of all language and all morals:—of language, because any sound which,
+becoming a sign to my neighbor, becomes thereby a mark to myself, must
+by the nature of the case be a mark of the social object and not of the
+individual object: of morals, because the “first great commandment,
+evolved in the light of day by healthy processes wherever men have lived
+together, is, ‘Put yourself in his place.’”
+
+So far there is nothing to distinguish Clifford’s theory from ordinary
+Idealism, which denies that the universe is real except as a phenomenon
+or appearance before a Self conscious thereof. The future course of
+Clifford’s argument turns upon two assumptions. One of these, borrowed
+from the current physiology of the brain, is this: that the changes in my
+consciousness—ejective facts he calls them—run parallel with the changes
+in my brain, which are objective facts. The parallelism between them is
+one of complexity, an analogy of structure. The complex ejective facts
+are the same sort of complication of simple ejects as the complex motions
+of the brain are of simple molecular movements. Clifford illustrates the
+points from the relation of speech to writing, the sentence spoken is the
+same function of the elementary sounds as the same sentence written is of
+the corresponding letters. In like manner the complex human mind is the
+same function of simple feelings as the brain is of primary atoms.
+
+The other assumption is based upon the current doctrine of evolution. Our
+bodies have been evolved step by step out of inorganic matter, and we
+have before our eyes a line of organisms connecting man with the simplest
+atom of matter. In this series there is no hiatus between one form and
+another, no breach of morphological continuity, but one species arises
+by insensible gradation out of its predecessors. Now in the case of
+organisms of a certain complexity we cannot help inferring consciousness,
+and as we go back along the line we not only see the complexity of the
+organism and of its nervous system insensibly diminishing, but for the
+first part of our course we have reason to think that the complexity
+of consciousness insensibly diminishes also.[38] The conclusion is
+forced upon us that nature is animate from top to bottom and that the
+humblest atom has an elementary feeling or eject of its own as simple in
+comparison with the complex intelligence of man as the atom is itself
+simple in comparison with his very complex brain. Unless we admit this we
+are in a dilemma. The ejective facts which we cannot help inferring in
+the case of all animals must extend further down through vegetables to
+inorganic phenomena, or else there must be a point at which we could say:
+here the object begins to have an inner or ejective fact corresponding
+to it as my mind corresponds to my body. But the series of objective
+forms presents no sudden break anywhere, not even between animals and
+vegetables, such as to warrant our supposing that ejective facts extend
+thus far down in the series and no further.
+
+Clifford is not quite as explicit about the nature of the elementary
+ejects, which answer to moving molecules, as we should like him to be.
+Of one thing however he is quite certain; they are elementary feelings
+which yet are neither modifications of a consciousness nor yet imply
+a consciousness in which alone they can exist. Every feeling may be
+part of a consciousness, but it need not be so. Consciousness is only a
+derivative and secondary result, following on the arrangement of feeling
+in a particular way and it is evolved at a very late period in the
+history of the world. In itself a feeling is an absolute _Ding-an-sich_,
+whose existence is not relative to anything else. _Sentitur_ is all that
+can be said of it.
+
+Thus strictly speaking it is not _consciousness_ which extends throughout
+the series of objective forms from man down to the molecule. It is
+only feeling. Consciousness proper only belongs to the later and higher
+members of the series. “If we make a jump from man say to the tunicate
+mollusks, we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness
+at all.” Therefore the doctrine of evolution itself forbids us to regard
+all ejects as being of the _same_ substant as mind. They are only of like
+substance ὁμοιούσιον not ὁμοούσιον, only quasi-mental[39] and not in
+themselves either rational, intelligent, or conscious.[40]
+
+Besides the evolutionist’s reason that it is absurd to attribute
+consciousness and personality to tunicate mollusks there is another
+reason drawn from human introspection for asserting elementary feelings
+to be absolute and unrelated existence. “A feeling, at the instance when
+it _exists_, exists _an und für sich_ and not as _my_ feeling.”[41] The
+self-perception of the ego, the sense that in all my various feelings it
+is _I_ who am conscious, this “unity of apperception” does not exist in
+the instantaneous consciousness which it unites, but only in subsequent
+reflection upon it. It consists further in the power of establishing a
+certain connexion between the memories of any two feelings which we had
+at the same instant.
+
+There is one other point of extreme importance to be noticed in
+Clifford’s account of the elementary feelings or ejects. They are
+connected together in their sequence and coexistence by counterparts
+of the physical laws of matter. Were it not so their correspondence
+with motions of matter could not be kept up. That they should be
+thus connected with one another militates at first sight with the
+characteristic of absoluteness above ascribed to them by Clifford. We
+must suppose therefore that when Clifford says that their existence is
+not relative to anything else, he means no more than that they are not
+ultimately related to a personal consciousness. We must suppose that it
+is these laws of the sequence and coexistence of elementary feelings
+which, “when molecules are so combined together as to form the film on
+the under side of a jelly-fish, so combine the elements of mind-stuff
+which go along with them as to form the faint beginnings of sentience.
+The same laws combine feelings so as to form some kind of consciousness,
+when the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous
+system of a vertebrate” (p. 85).
+
+We are now after these preliminary explanations in a position to
+appreciate what is the gist and core of Clifford’s speculations. It is
+this, that the reality external to our minds which is represented in
+our minds as matter is in itself mind-stuff or elementary feelings. The
+universe consists entirely of mind-stuff. Some of this is woven into the
+complex form of human minds containing imperfect representations of the
+mind-stuff outside them and of themselves also, as a mirror reflects
+its own image in another mirror, _ad infinitum_. Such an imperfect
+representation is called a material universe. The two chief points
+therefore of the doctrine as summed up by Clifford himself are:
+
+1) Matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing
+represented.
+
+2) Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which
+is made up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not
+conscious.
+
+We shall do Clifford an injustice if we interpret the foregoing theory as
+a dualistic and not as a monistic view, i. e. as a view which postulates
+two ultimate principles of reality rather than one. Clifford however
+often speaks as if feeling and matter were two coördinate aspects of
+reality, irreducible to one another. For example he allows himself to
+speak of mind-stuff as going along with the material object, of laws
+connecting the elements of mind-stuff which are only _counterparts_ of
+the physical laws of matter and not those laws themselves. Again he
+writes (p. 78) as follows: “The distinction between eject and object,
+forbids us to regard the eject, another man’s mind, as coming into the
+world of objects in any way, or as standing in the relation of cause
+or effect to any changes in that world.” Such language reminds us of
+Spinoza’s doctrine that body alone can determine body to move and only
+thought determine thought to think, but we must not therefore suppose
+that for Clifford as for Spinoza the two rival kingdoms of thought
+and extended matter are irreconcilably severed or nominally united by
+the figment of a single substance of which they are attributes: What
+Clifford means is that the thing _is_ a feeling so far as it is anything
+at all and that, if things coexist or succeed each other according to
+laws, they only coexist and follow _as_ feelings and conformably to
+laws of feeling. Not only is the elementary feeling a thing itself, but
+things-in-themselves are elementary feelings.
+
+It is incumbent therefore on us to ask if an elementary feeling is
+equal to the double burden put upon it by this theory of being the real
+universe of things and of creating the human intelligence. In answering
+this question we must be careful to divest feelings beforehand of any
+characteristics which they only possess as gathered up into the unity
+of a self, for at the stage in which we are considering reality selves
+have not yet arisen. It is hard to conceive what is left of feeling after
+these characteristics have been removed, nor does introspection help us
+here, for, as Clifford very truly says, the fundamental deliverance of
+consciousness affirms its own complexity and it seems impossible, as I
+am at present constituted, to have only one absolutely simple feeling at
+a time. Elementary feelings however could hardly constitute the cosmos
+without they follow one another, coexist, and connect themselves together
+in their groupings according to certain laws, i. e. by some inherent
+necessity always take up the same attitudes toward each other, and this
+much Clifford assumes that they do. Yet these assumptions will not bear
+examination. Let us examine first the postulate that feelings follow in
+a fixed order; call them _a_ _b_ _c_ _d_, _b_ succeeds _a_ and precedes
+_c_ and it makes a difference, which comes after or before the other. Now
+being absolute feelings, not only is _a_ past and non-existent before _b_
+begins to be, so _b_ before _c_, but each is in turn the entire reality
+and there is no consciousness before which they pass in procession. The
+real would thus fall into disconnected and mutually indifferent moments
+_a_ _b_ _c_ _d_; and as each of these in turn exhausts reality and is
+also unconscious of what goes before and after, there would be no real
+succession at all. In a real succession it makes a difference whether _b_
+comes before _or_ after _a_, but in the case we suppose it could make no
+difference. In truth there can be no relation of before and after between
+two terms except for a self, which takes note of the one disappearing and
+of the other appearing; and whenever we speak of things following one
+another we tacitly presuppose a self before whom the procession passes.
+
+It is even more difficult to understand how elementary feelings can be
+grouped and complicated in a fixed order of coexistence. Mind has not
+yet emerged, so we must suppose that the grouping takes place in space.
+In that case one feeling must be right or left, above or below another.
+The futility of such speculation will come home to anyone who will try to
+realise how a feeling of smell can be above or below one of taste.
+
+We have next to consider Clifford’s account of the genesis out of
+elementary feelings of personal consciousness. The hypothesis of
+mind-stuff, we must remember, was framed in order to preserve the same
+continuity of ejective facts as we see to exist in the case of objective
+facts, to provide, that is, a gradual development of the human mind out
+of the simpler feelings of amœbæ and even of atoms. It must be denied
+however that the hypothesis is a success if we retain the usual meanings
+of the words continuity and development. Properly speaking a thing can
+only be said to grow or develop when it remains the same with itself all
+through the process and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow
+latent in it to start with. Thus a tadpole develops into a frog, a grub
+into a butterfly, and the child grows into the man. But in the series
+of ejects which begins from atoms and after running through amœba and
+ape finally culminates in the human intelligence there is no point of
+identity, no community between the first and last terms. The eject which
+is the molecule is denied by Clifford to be either conscious or rational,
+nor has it even will, like the philosophical factotum of Schopenhauer or
+Von Hartmann. It is a purely negative conception, the abstract opposite
+of that mind into which it is to ultimately develop. The hiatus between
+our intelligence and a thing in itself, which call it feeling, or
+mind-stuff, or what we will, is merely all that our intelligence is not,
+is none the less of a hiatus, because it is, with the help of apes and
+amœbæ, spread out thin, so to speak. It would be better frankly to avow
+the chasm that exists than to gloss over it with words like evolution and
+development.
+
+“When a material organism,” writes Clifford, “has reached a certain
+complexity of nervous structure, the complex of ejective facts which goes
+along with its action reaches that mode of complication which is called
+consciousness. When a stream of feelings is so compacted together that
+at each instant it consists of (1) new feelings, (2) fainter repetitions
+of previous ones, and (3) links connecting these repetitions, the stream
+is called a consciousness. Consciousness is thus a relative thing, a
+mode of complication of certain elements, and a property of the complex
+so produced.” If we look into this statement we see that it only amounts
+to this: that feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the
+feelings of a conscious self and not before, for except as gathered up in
+the unity of a self which has memory and remains the same throughout its
+differences feelings can be neither new nor repeated nor joined by links.
+
+1) That a feeling is new means that I attend to it, contrast it with
+former ones, and decide that I have not felt it before.
+
+2) That a feeling is a previous feeling now repeated means that I
+recognise it as having already occurred.
+
+3) If feelings are joined by links of what nature are these links?
+Clifford does not say that they also are feelings, so presumably they are
+not; in that case no link is left save a connecting self. But even if the
+link is a feeling it cannot be less than a feeling of the togetherness
+of two other feelings, but such a feeling would involve memory of those
+feelings and memory involves self-hood. It is really, however, an abuse
+of words to apply the term feeling in such a case. We might with Hume ask
+of this feeling which links other feelings “Is it a taste, a smell, a
+sound, an impression of sight or touch?”
+
+Clifford makes a reference to Haeckel’s treatise upon “Zellseelen und
+Seelenzellen.”[42] Haeckel’s view is that every protoplasmic cell has
+a soul of its own and that when a number of these are combined under
+certain conditions, as in the human brain, they generate as their
+resultant the human soul. He helps out his theory by pointing to such
+phrases as national spirit, a nation’s conscience, a people’s will.
+Nothing, he contends, could be more real than these entities, which
+are yet only resultants of the wills, spirits, and consciences of the
+separate individuals who compose the nation.
+
+This is an interesting speculation, which it would be a pity to dismiss
+abruptly merely because it is groundless. No doubt our bodies and brains
+may be regarded as colonies of protoplasmic units of which each has an
+independent life of its own, of which each is born, nourishes itself,
+reproduces itself, and at last breaks up and dies. The colorless cells
+especially in our blood are such units and have as good a claim to be
+called individuals as the amœba which we find swimming about by itself
+in any pond. These units are certainly alike and must be allowed to
+have inner states of their own. It may also be freely conceded that the
+existence of certain inward states in these cells of which my brain and
+nerves are composed is the condition of certain states of feeling and
+emotion arising in me. But all these admissions fail to advance us a step
+toward Haeckel’s conclusion. That any number of atoms of protoplasm have
+souls and soul-states is not enough _per se_ to produce an extra soul
+which is none of them, yet _like_ their souls and possessed of a life of
+its own. Even if the molecules of my brain were each in possession of a
+self-consciousness as ample as my own, their mere juxtaposition could not
+give rise to my self-consciousness. From first to last their soul-states
+remain theirs, mine remain mine. The reasoning employed by Haeckel
+involves a fallacy of composition:—because each of a colony of cells _a_,
+_b_, _c_, _d_, has a soul of its own, therefore the colony as a whole has
+a soul of its own, which is not the soul of any one of them. Nor do the
+analogies Haeckel invokes help him at all, for the life of a nation does
+not exist at all except as the lives of the individuals composing that
+nation, nor do we expect to find any traits in our so-called national
+spirit which are not ultimately contributed by individuals; Haeckel
+however would have us believe that the mere composition of the primitive
+and simple souls of separate amœbæ results in a _human_ soul with its
+wealth of intuitions and interests. The utmost we are entitled to say is
+that given a certain collocation of cells in the brain there may by an
+entirely new act of the infinite be generated a human soul. It is only by
+playing fast and loose with words that we can deduce this new soul from
+an aggregate of other souls either like or unlike itself.
+
+It is surprising that Clifford should have recognised that the reality
+underlying so-called matter is akin to mind and yet have identified
+it rather with the quasi-mental facts of an amœba or of an atom than
+with the intelligence of man. The argument by which he arrives at
+this conclusion is as follows: You as a face, a voice, a touch, as an
+object to my senses in short, are a mere phantasm or appearance in my
+consciousness, part and parcel of myself and not distinct from me in
+any way. But I cannot help inferring an eject, to wit feelings and a
+consciousness like my own, behind the sensible show of your person; and
+this consciousness of yours which I address as _you_, is the truth of
+the object or appearance, which I have. _You_ are the reality which I
+really perceive, so far as I perceive anything more than my own feelings.
+Similarly when I watch an amœba, what I perceive as a somewhat formless
+mass of protoplasm is really in itself the struggling life within. Lastly
+what I handle and perceive as a crystal or metal is really the eject. If
+here we read force or unconscious will instead of eject or mind-stuff,
+Clifford’s view would practically coincide with Schopenhauer’s; for force
+is truly an eject in Clifford’s sense, not an object or appearance to me.
+
+Now the human intelligence arises late in the history of things and is
+altogether a secondary and derivative thing. Consequently the world
+is not really what it is for my consciousness. My _Weltanschauung_ is
+false in proportion as my mind is complex and derivative. Conversely,
+the _Weltanschauung_ of each being approximates to truth and becomes
+less and less illusive in proportion as the eject which it in reality is
+approaches the primitive simplicity of mind-stuff. I am _really_ very
+little of what I am _consciously_. If you want a truer exponent of the
+truth of things you must go to the amœba or lower still. It, as compared
+with me, is _consciously_ most of what it is _really_. The absolutely
+simple atom is probably the only being who is quite free from delusions.
+The conclusion then to which Clifford conducts us is this: that the
+universe is not really such as it appears to our intelligence, still
+less, I presume, such as it would appear to a higher intelligence than
+ours. It is really such and such only as it would appear to the being
+whose eject is the lowest rung in the ladder of mind-stuff. Our universe
+spread out in space and time, with all its splendours and harmonies,
+is a delusion; nay, more, the human soul with its æsthetic and moral
+sensibilities, its fears and aspirations, is the parent delusion which
+breeds the delusion of a cosmos. “We are such stuff as dreams are made
+of.”
+
+The loose way in which Clifford used the word feeling, as equivalent
+to any form of consciousness, blinded him to the fact that a qualified
+thing as such is not given in feeling at all and led him to suppose
+that the universe as we know it would continue to stand in the absence
+of all complex ejects whatever. Mr. Green has shown that all theories
+of the object which ignore the workmanship of thought manifest therein
+and identify the _esse_ of things with their _percipi_ lead straight to
+nihilism. To such nihilism Clifford’s doctrine, like Hume’s which it
+resembles, immediately bring us. But Hume did not take seriously the
+demolition of reality involved in his theory that things are only real
+as they are felt and that feelings are “entirely loose and separate”
+(Treatise I, 559) while the solid framework of reality is an illusion
+bred of a propensity of our minds to feign connections and relations
+where there are none. Hume tells us that he regarded his own speculations
+as “philosophical melancholy and delirium,” as “clouds to be dispelled”
+(Treatise I, 501). He writes “I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I
+converse and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four
+hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so
+cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to
+enter into them any further.” But Clifford, like Huxley, took Hume _au
+grand serieux_, forgetting that feeling as such does not reveal an object
+at all. There is a passage in a letter of Clifford’s written to Professor
+Pollock in September, 1874, à propos of Green’s introduction to Hume,
+which evinces pretty clearly that Clifford did not discern the true drift
+of Hume’s speculations in the way Hume did himself. “I hope,” he writes,
+“you have seen Sidgwick’s remarks on the introduction; he points out
+that to prove Hume insufficient is not to do much at the present day....
+Green, for instance, points out that Hume has no complete theory of the
+object;—to find fault with Hume for the omission is like blaming Newton
+for not including Maxwell’s electricity in the Principia.” Here Clifford
+hardly writes as if he saw that his own theory of the object as e. g. an
+unrelated feeling is open to exactly the same criticisms as Hume’s, as
+if he understood, what Hume had an inkling of, that, in proving the ego
+to be a relative thing instead of the heart and centre of reality, you
+dissipate the universe into nothing. There are several other features in
+Clifford’s doctrine that call for criticism. It should for example be
+pointed out that the entire view that ejects are the truth of objects
+is in the first instance a deliverance of consciousness itself. I only
+transcend my individual feelings, says Clifford, so far as I infer
+a consciousness more or less like my own to underlie them; and this
+underlying eject is the sole reality. “How this inference is justified,
+how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of
+itself, I do not pretend to say; I need not untie a knot which the world
+has cut for me long ago.” (Vol. II, p. 73.) But if consciousness is but
+the property of a temporary conjunction of unconscious feelings, what
+value shall we attach to its assurances? They are certainly not valid
+except for itself; they do not hold good for the atomic feelings of which
+the world ultimately consists. But my belief that the real is in the
+last resort an atom of feeling is simply an extension of my conviction
+that ejects are the truth of my feelings. Prove this conviction an
+illusion—and Clifford does prove it to be such, when he declares
+consciousness to be a relative thing—and you prove the entire theory an
+illusion. Thus the tail of Clifford’s theory is bitten off by the head.
+
+The hypothesis that feelings can be felt, without being felt as my
+feelings, is a very noteworthy one. “A feeling at the instant when it
+_exists_, exists _an und für sich_, and not as my feeling.” This is
+why a Greek said δέδορκα in the sense of I see, because the act of
+perception is necessarily over, when we become conscious of it. “When,”
+continues Clifford, “I remember the feeling as _my_ feeling, there
+comes up not merely a faint repetition of the feeling, but inextricably
+connected with it a whole set of connections with the general stream of
+my consciousness.” This is very truly and acutely observed but it is an
+admission that the unrelated feeling is no element in our experience,
+that in our cosmos at least there is no ὕλη whatever, but that every
+corner of it is illumined by the presence of a relating self. _My_
+consciousness never directly testifies at all to the existence of an
+absolute feeling. To be _my_ feeling a feeling must already be brought by
+connections of content into the web of my experience, but what do I know
+of feelings which are not mine. Are not “absolute feelings” an inference
+based on observation of low organisms like the amœba, which we are
+convinced have no self and yet feel? It should be also noticed that this
+supposition that we are not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious
+of our feelings ἔξεισιν εις ἄπειρον. Thus Clifford writes: “This memory
+(of a feeling which existed _an und für sich_ as _my_ feeling) is, _qua_
+memory, relative to the past feeling, which it partially recalls; but
+in so far as it is itself a feeling, _it_ is absolute, _Ding an sich_.”
+That is to say, I am not directly but only _ex post facto_ conscious even
+of what I remember. To be conscious of the content of a memory I must
+_remember_ that I remember it. Surely this new memory in turn cannot be
+known _ex post facto_ and so I must _remember_ that I remember that I
+remember _et sic ad infinitum_, before I become really _conscious_ of
+anything at all.
+
+One other point might be raised. What is the nature and origin of the
+laws which govern the sequence and coexistence of feelings. We have
+already seen that feelings as such neither follow nor coexist apart from
+a self.
+
+“These laws are counterparts of the laws which govern physical
+phenomena.” Clifford in writing thus conducts his speculation Without
+prejudice to his common-sense belief in a world of necessarily and
+rationally related things. He does not see that with the reduction of
+the real to a feeling physical facts disappear and with these facts the
+laws to which laws of feeling shall correspond. He is evidently confusing
+the laws of feeling with the psychological laws of association which
+depend upon the environment of the individual’s senses by a world already
+real. He does not see that the problem he really imposes on himself is
+this: starting from no world at all to arrive at one, or starting from
+the world as it may be supposed to picture itself in the feelings of an
+amœba to arrive at it as it exists for the human intelligence. We must
+not concede to Clifford any more than to Hume this postulate of a real
+cosmical order which shall give the cue to feelings when and how to
+follow and coexist. Huxley only allows it to Hume, because not having
+passed the threshold of Idealistic philosophy he cannot divest himself
+of it. If, however, this postulate be denied, then the doctrine that the
+_esse_ of things lies in their _percipi_ will recommend itself to no one.
+
+                                                          F. C. CONYBEARE.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[37] On the whole, however, it is probable that in dealing such hard
+blows as he did at priests and dogmas he was actuated by sheer love of
+truth, and those who knew him best assure us that he was entirely free
+from bitterness and from the vanity which sets some people upon beating
+their grandmother in public by way of showing that they are grown up in
+their opinions.
+
+[38] _Clifford’s Essays_, Vol. ii, p. 83.
+
+[39] Vol. ii, p. 61.
+
+[40] Vol. ii, p. 87.
+
+[41] P. 80.
+
+[42] _Deutsche Rundschau_, July, 1878.
+
+
+
+
+ARE THERE THINGS IN THEMSELVES?
+
+
+The proposition that things in themselves cannot be known, has often, and
+perhaps justly, been proclaimed as the central idea of Kant’s philosophy.
+Kant concludes the first section of his “Transcendentale Elementarlehre”
+with this “critical admonition”:
+
+    “That in general nothing which is intuited in space is a thing
+    in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a
+    property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us
+    in themselves, and what we call outward objects are nothing
+    else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form
+    is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is
+    not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be.”
+    (“Kritik d. r. V.” § 4.)
+
+The term “thing in itself” means originally the object as it is,
+independent of the thinking subject’s cognition. For instance: A rainbow
+appears in the clouds; the rainbow is not a thing in itself, but the
+appearance of a thing in itself. The rainbow exists in man’s sensibility
+only. The colors of the spectrum, indeed all colors, the colors of the
+sky, of the clouds, of trees, of living beings, are sensations only;
+they are subjective phenomena, they are certain kinds of feelings
+representing objective realities, but they are not these objective
+realities themselves. They are perceived in the brain and are projected
+to a place outside the organism. The rainbow, as it is seen, is not a
+thing, but it is something seen, it is an appearance only. And this is
+true of all things seen and heard and perceived by any one of the senses.
+The sense-pictures are localised in space, they are projected outside to
+a spot where the combined experience of the senses has taught a sentient
+being to expect them. But all the objects of the objective world as they
+are perceived are and remain subjective sense-perceptions. The world of
+our senses around us is woven of our sensations. It is mere appearance.
+This is not a question concerning which there is any doubt, this is
+simply a matter of fact. But the question arises, “Can we know things as
+they are independent of sensation? Can we know things in themselves?”
+
+The physicist and every scientist is engaged with the problem, What are
+natural phenomena independent of sensation? Light is a sensation of
+vision, but what is the objective process that takes place when a human
+eye perceives light? The physicist answers this problem by eliminating
+in his mind the sense-element and by describing the facts of the process
+in terms of matter and motion. His answer is that light, objectively
+considered, is a certain vibration of the ether. If we can rely upon
+physical science, the thing in itself of a rainbow would be a certain
+refraction of ether-waves. These vibrations of the ether-waves are
+transmitted from the sun, and being broken in the falling raindrops
+actually take place independent of cognition, they are real whether we
+look at them or not.
+
+The ultimate aim of science is a description of the natural phenomena
+not in terms of sense-elements, but in terms of form. That feature of a
+thing which we call its matter, constitutes its reality, but the form
+of a thing, of a motion, or of a process makes the thing that which it
+is; every act of causation is a change of form, and the forms of things
+are determined with the assistance of the operations of purely formal
+thought, i. e. through measuring or counting. Such is science, not only
+as it ought to be, but also as it actually is. All our scientists, each
+one in his field, are consciously or unconsciously working out a solution
+of this problem. And a solution of this problem means, in our conception,
+the objective cognition of the world—i. e., a description of the natural
+processes as they are independent of sensibility.
+
+Kant knew very well that a description of things and of natural processes
+in terms of form was possible. He clung, nevertheless, to the proposition
+that things in themselves are unknowable. And why? A description of
+things and of natural processes in terms of form was in his opinion
+not as yet a description of things in themselves, for—and here we are
+confronted with the original idea and the fundamental error of Kantian
+thought—Kant did not consider the forms of things as an objective quality
+of theirs, he maintained that the formal element is purely mental and
+merely subjective. The thinking mind, he declared, attributes them to the
+object. Space and time, the pure forms of existence, together with all
+other forms, such as causation, are, according to Kant, not qualities
+of the objective world, but of the thinking subject. The thinking
+subject cannot help viewing the world in the form of its own cognition,
+it transfers these forms to the objects. Therefore the thing in itself
+according to Kant would not be represented in a description of the thing
+purely in terms of form, the thing in itself would mean the thing as it
+would be, independent of time and space.
+
+Let us here point out a distinction between the thing in itself and
+noumenon. Noumenon means “a thing of thought.” The noumenal world is the
+world of thoughts in a thinking being’s mind. The noumenon must not be
+identified with the thing in itself. The two terms are often confounded,
+but they have to be distinguished. The idea of reflected ether-vibrations
+is a “noumenon,” but the reflected ether-vibrations themselves, the
+objective process are a thing, i. e. an objective reality, and in so far
+as they are a reality, considered as being independent of sensation, we
+may call them “a thing in itself.” Now when Kant denies the objectivity
+of time and space, he must, implicitly, also deny the objective
+validity of a description made in terms of measuring and counting. The
+pictorial world of our sense-perception is subjective, it is built up of
+sensations, it is not objective; and the world of thought is the attempt
+to reduce the subjective world of sense-imagery to terms of objective
+validity, i. e. to terms of form. But this world of thought is according
+to Kant purely mental, it is purely noumenal, or, in other words, noumena
+do not represent things independent of cognition, they represent things
+as our mind thinks them. The sensory world is mere appearance, it is a
+subjective phenomenon, but the world of thought, says Kant, is no less
+subjective, it is a world of thought which describes things in terms of
+purely mental properties and not in properties of the things themselves.
+This is tantamount to the proposition, that things in themselves cannot
+be known.
+
+The term “thing in itself,” in the sense of a thing as it is independent
+of sensibility, would better be called “the objective thing,” and we
+shall so call it when we wish to distinguish it from Kant’s thing in
+itself. The objective thing is the thing, not expressed in terms of
+subjective elements, such as feelings or sensibility, but in terms of
+objective elements, i. e. in terms of form. That a description of things
+in terms of forms is possible has never been denied either by Kant or by
+any Kantian; but they deny that these descriptions are anything more than
+mere noumena; Kant and the orthodox Kantians deny that they represent the
+things as they are in themselves. Thus the term thing in itself in the
+Kantian sense comes to mean the thing as it is independent of space and
+time.
+
+That every noumenon is a mental sign is a matter of course; the noumenal
+world is ideal. But we maintain that these mental signs represent real
+qualities of the objective world; they have a meaning; the things
+represented by them are actual features of reality. Kant denies this.
+To him the noumenal world is purely noumenal. To Kant there is no space
+outside the space-conception, and so he declares that space is ideal;
+it is not an objective quality of things. However, we maintain, that
+our space-conception describes, i. e. depicts, or represents space, our
+space-conception is ideal, yet space is not ideal but real; it is an
+objective quality of the world.
+
+Kant’s view is dualistic, or at least necessarily leads to dualism, and
+it appears to rest on an unpronounced dualistic assumption. Kant treats
+“the subject” as something quite distinct and separate from “the object.”
+If he had borne in mind that the subject is always at the same time an
+object, he would have treated both subject as well as object as mere
+abstractions of one and the same reality. Resting upon this erroneous
+presupposition, Kant’s most consequential mistake, in our opinion, was
+his conception of what he called “the ideality of time and space.” If
+time and space were purely ideal, purely mental, purely subjective, then
+indeed, the things as they are would forever remain unknown to us, then
+indeed the thinking mind would be as if shut up within a hollow globe out
+of which it could never escape, then indeed the world would be divided
+into two parts, the objective world, and the subjective world; and the
+gap between both could never be bridged over. The thinking mind would
+have within itself a noumenal world built upon the subjective elements
+of sense-impressions. This subjective world would possess no objective
+value, it would not describe realities, and the objective world would
+thus be unknowable, inscrutable, and mystical.
+
+The idea of a thing in itself found another support in a mistaken
+conception of the unity of certain things, especially of organisms. The
+unity of a combination of parts is not merely the sum of the parts,
+it consists in their peculiar combination which makes an harmonious
+co-operation possible. This unity is an additional element; it is an
+entirely new creation which exhibits features not contained in any
+of its parts. There is no latent watch contained in a heap of little
+wheels and cogs, the watch is created through the combination of these
+wheels and cogs. The unity of a thing is its form, consisting in a
+special arrangement of its parts; and this form although not material is
+nevertheless real.
+
+The materialistic conception overlooks the importance of form; but the
+spiritualist and also the transcendentalist materialise it as some
+spiritual substance, as entities or independent existences. They are in
+this way as much materialistic as the materialist.
+
+The question has seriously been asked, What is a melody in itself. The
+question has sense when we understand by it, What are those new qualities
+which appear through a certain combination of sounds? Those qualities
+are not nothing, they are something quite peculiar. We call one of them
+rhythm, another one is the fixed succession of notes of a different
+pitch. The qualities of a melody as a whole are not qualities of its
+separate parts; yet therefore the melody is not a thing in itself. We
+might just as well speak of a watch in itself, meaning thereby that
+peculiar unity of the combination of its parts which makes of them a
+watch. But if we thus speak of “the watch in itself,” we must be aware
+that this idea has not somewhere in a transcendental fairy-land an
+independent existence above space and time, and outside of its parts.
+The unity of a certain interacting group of parts is, on the one hand,
+no mere addition of the thinking subject, it is not purely noumenal, it
+is real and objective; on the other hand it is not a thing in itself,
+independent of its parts, it is the product of the relations in which its
+parts affect one another.
+
+Is not perhaps the basis of these vagaries a mistaken conception of
+language? We call a certain sensory picture a tree and we say, the tree
+has roots, a stem, branches, leaves, and fruits. Autumn sets in and the
+wind shakes the leaves off the branches. Now we speak of a leafless
+tree. We cut the tree down and we speak of a rootless tree. We burn the
+trunk and the branches, and the tree as a phenomenon is gone, all its
+properties are taken away. What remains? The tree in itself is left, but
+the tree in itself does not exist. If all the property of a person is
+taken from him, the person himself is still left. The properties of a
+tree, however, are not properties in the same sense; they are qualities.
+If all the qualities and parts of a tree are gone, if only the tree in
+itself is left—then there is left nothing but the empty word tree, the
+idea of a tree.
+
+
+II. KANT’S VIEW OF SPACE AND TIME.
+
+Let us briefly consider the ground upon which Kant bases his view of the
+ideality of space and time. Kant asks:
+
+    “What then are time and space? Are they real existences? Or are
+    they merely relations or determinations of things, such however
+    as would equally belong to these things in themselves, though
+    they should never become objects of intuition; or _are they
+    such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently
+    to the subjective constitution of the mind_, without which
+    these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any
+    object?”[43] (Kr. d. r. V. § 2; “Meiklejohn,” p. 23.)
+
+We should say, to state our opinion briefly, that space and time are not
+“real existences,” i. e. they are not concrete objects, but they are real
+nevertheless; they are not material things; not thingish realities, yet
+they are objective properties of things. They are the forms of things
+and processes, and belong to the things whether they become objects of
+cognition or not. In this sense, they actually belong to the things in
+themselves, viz. to the objective things.
+
+Kant argues that space and time are not conceptions derived from outward
+experience; they have not been abstracted from sense-impressions. They
+are necessary representations _a priori_, they are not discursive ideas
+or generalisations, for there is but one space and one time, space being
+represented as infinite and time as eternal.
+
+From these arguments Kant draws the conclusions that space and time do
+not represent qualities of an object but that they are the form of all
+sensory phenomena, space being the form of the external, time of the
+internal sense. In other words, space and time belong to the subjective
+condition of the sensibility and not to the objective world.
+
+We answer that our conceptions of space and time are after all derived
+from experience. Space and time are abstractions. There is no time in
+itself. There is no space in itself. Space and time are not directly
+derived from outward experience, nor are they derived from the
+sense-elements of experience. Inner experience, i. e. reflection to the
+exclusion of sense-impression, the experimenting with pure forms, will
+lead to the construction of the concepts of space as well as of time.
+Space and time, magnitudes and numbers having been constructed in the
+mind of a thinking subject are applied to practical experience. When
+counting three trees we do not abstract the number “three” from the three
+trees, but we apply to them the system of numbers in our possession.
+
+Says Kant:
+
+    “We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves
+    of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough
+    think that no objects are found in it. It must therefore be
+    considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena and
+    by no means as a determination dependent upon them and is a
+    representation _a priori_, which necessarily supplies the basis
+    for external phenomena.”
+
+Space being the generalised concept of extended form, and time that of
+motion without reference to any contents, it is naturally impossible to
+think the non-existence of space and time. Thinking is an act, it is a
+process; and any act, any process, any event, is a reality which implies
+or presupposes the existence of the forms of reality. We can think of
+matter without reference to form, i. e. we can have the abstract idea
+of matter; but we cannot think that there is any matter void of form.
+This does by no means prove that form has nothing to do with matter. On
+the contrary, it proves that form and matter are inseparable. The form
+of existence need not therefore be called “the basis” of existence, it
+is simply one universal feature of existence. And the form of existence
+being bound up with existence itself, it is necessary that any thinking
+existence in so far as it is real, in so far as it is at the same time
+an object and part of the objective world should also be in possession
+of the conditions to evolve the idea of form out of itself through inner
+experience.
+
+This inner experience of experimenting with pure forms is also a kind of
+experience. It is not a purely subjective process; it is a subjective
+process to the thinking subject, which to other subjects, however, would
+appear as an objective process. The laws of pure form as stated in the
+sciences of purely formal thought, are not merely subjective; they
+possess objective validity. It is true and from our standpoint a matter
+of course that the laws of form are _a priori_, which means, they hold
+good for any pure form.
+
+Modern positivism, such as we defend it, is monistic. We consider the
+entire world as one great whole and do not forget that all noumenal
+representations of certain features of the world, of matter, mind, form,
+even of things and our own souls included, are mere abstractions. Reality
+itself remains undivided and indivisible. Abstract concepts are mental
+symbols invented to represent certain features of reality. But although
+we can in our mind separate these features and distinguish them from
+other features, in the world of reality they cannot be cut out or thought
+of as things in themselves. Granting the oneness of reality which dawns
+upon us instinctively before consciousness is fully matured, we are
+inevitably led to the conception that there is but one form of reality,
+which implies that there is but one space and one time.
+
+
+III. FORM NOT IMPORTED BY THE MIND INTO REALITY.
+
+Kant says, and in this we agree with Kant, that “all thought must
+directly by means of certain signs relate ultimately to _Anschauungen_.”
+The word _Anschauung_ (the “onlooking,” generally translated by
+“intuition”) means the immediate presence of sense-perception. Says Kant:
+“The effect of an object upon our faculty of representation is called
+sensation, and that intuition which refers to an object by means of
+sensation is called empirical intuition.” For instance, I see a rose: The
+image of the rose which I see is the appearance or the phenomenon. Kant
+continues:
+
+    “That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I
+    term its _matter_, but that which effects that the contents of
+    the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call
+    its _form_.”
+
+In other words matter is that which affects the senses and form is to
+be expressed in relations. The difference between the formal and the
+material is obvious. The formal is of great importance, nay, it is of
+paramount importance, but the formal is neither anything apart from the
+material nor is it a substance. Both concepts are disparate, but they
+have been derived by mental abstraction from the same reality.
+
+We fully agree with Kant when he continues:
+
+    “That in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which
+    they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be
+    itself sensation.”
+
+But we do not agree with Kant when from this proposition he derives the
+following conclusion:
+
+    “It is, then, the _matter_ of all phenomena that is given to us
+    _a posteriori_; the _form_ must lie ready _a priori_ for them
+    in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from
+    all sensation.”
+
+Here lies the great fallacy of Kant, which rests upon an erroneous
+statement and an actual distortion of fact. The phenomenon of a rose
+which I see before me is not merely sensory, but also formal. The
+phenomenon, i. e. the image of the rose (_die Anschauung_) is a sensation
+of a special form. The term sensation as it is generally used implies
+its having a special form. Accordingly the form does not, at least not
+from the beginning, lie ready _a priori_ in the mind; the form is given
+together with the sensation.
+
+Kant speaks of “that which is annexed to perception by the conceptions
+of understanding,” as if our understanding added the formal out of the
+mind to the sensory elements given by experience. What is the mind? The
+mind is a product of the world; it is a system of symbols representing
+the things of the world and their relations including such possible
+relations as are worthy of aspiring for. In short, the mind consists of
+ideas and ideals.[44]
+
+It has often been said that the mind is the creator of the sensory and
+noumenal world. This is incorrectly expressed, for mind _is_ the sensory
+and noumenal world itself. The sense-pictures, the thought-symbols, and
+the ideals of a man are actual parts of his mind. They are not products
+but constituents of his mind. Their organised totality is his mind
+itself. The activity which takes place in a mind, i. e. the combining,
+the separating, and recombining of memories, thoughts, and ideals are the
+actual realities, and if we speak of a man’s understanding, or reason,
+or any other so-called faculty, we have to deal with abstractions. The
+activity of mentally separating form and matter might be called by the
+general term understanding. However the faculty of understanding is not a
+distinct mental organ, it consists in the single acts of understanding,
+and the word understanding is a mental symbol representing them all
+together as if they were one thing.
+
+And certainly these acts of understanding as little import the formal
+into the world of sensation as the miner carries the metals into the
+mines. The formal, the relational, or the _a priori_, is first extracted
+out of the data of experience not otherwise than iron is gained out of
+the ores. The ore is not iron but it contains iron, the phenomenon of
+a rose is not purely a sense-impression, it is a sense-impression of
+a certain form. We are aware of the fact that mind is an entirely new
+creation different from the non-mental world, yet at the same time we
+maintain that the elements from which mind develops are the same as
+the elements of the non-mental world. Nature furnishes the entire raw
+material and whatever new creation the product of a new development is,
+nothing can be added to the raw material, of which the formal is the most
+indispensable part.
+
+The raw material of sensory phenomena as soon as it is worked out, and
+also the activity of working it out are called mind. Mind accordingly
+originates with the appearance of sentient substance as the organisation
+of feelings and the memories of feelings—these memories being conditioned
+through the preservation of the form of sentient substance. Mind is not
+something different from the world but must be considered as its product
+and highest efflorescence. Mind is made of the same substance as the
+universe and the mind-forms are the forms of objective existence.
+
+As soon as a system of forms has developed in a sentient being, thus
+constituting its mind, this system can again be referred to the
+objective forms of things. In this sense we can say with Kant, that the
+understanding imports form into phenomena; and this re-importation, this
+referring the objectively formal to the subjective system of formal
+thought, is an essential element in cognition.
+
+
+IV. PROFESSOR JODL’S VIEW OF THE THING IN ITSELF.
+
+The idea of a thing in itself independent of space and time and the
+unknowableness of the thing in itself are the basis of all agnosticism.
+And an agnostic tendency is at present predominant even among positive
+workers and thinkers. Agnosticism is still the philosophy of the day
+even among those who have surrendered its basis (which is Kant’s
+transcendental idealism) and accept the monistic world-conception.
+Friedrich Jodl, professor at the University of Prague and author of the
+well-known “History of Ethics,” in answer to a letter of mine formulates
+in concise terms this modernised view of a thing in itself. He writes:
+
+    “You are right. The thing in itself is a dangerous idea,—one
+    that easily leads astray. But so long as we have no better
+    expression to represent the relation for which it stands we
+    shall have to use it. You also accept the following three
+    momenta: (1) Objective existence or reality. (2) Effectiveness
+    of Reality upon consciousness, i. e. sensation. (3)
+    Effectiveness of sensation upon consciousness and reproduction
+    of sensation in consciousness, i. e. representation. Nobody,
+    however, can maintain that in sensation, and still less
+    in representation, the whole of reality will appear in
+    consciousness. First we learn from history what progress has
+    been made in the cognition of reality and secondly it is
+    obvious that we are infinitely far from an actual comprehension
+    of reality. We have strong reasons to suspect that there
+    are many processes in reality which in no way affect our
+    sensibility and cannot enter into consciousness, and we know
+    for sure that we do not comprehend—i. e. reconstruct from
+    them assumed causes—many things, indeed most things, which we
+    observe in their effects. Our cognition of nature, if we begin
+    to construct, always leads us to some _x_. It may be doubted
+    whether this _x_ is an unknown or an unknowable. In my opinion
+    it is both—anyhow we cannot eliminate it.
+
+    “I am convinced that many things which are unknown to-day and
+    appear as unknowable will be known and knowable in a thousand
+    years. But I doubt whether the total mass of the Unknowable has
+    been noticeably diminished. For the Unknowable is infinite and
+    the infinite if divided by any finite number can never produce
+    a finite number. Every solved problem contains new and greater
+    problems. What shall we call this? I believe that the term
+    “thing in itself” is after all the best expression. Whoever
+    wants to turn a mystic on account of it cannot be prevented.
+    This state of things can be brought out of existence by an act
+    of violence only.”
+
+It is most certainly true, as Professor Jodl says, that sensations do not
+depict the whole of reality. But why should they? Cognition is possible
+only by limiting the attention to a special point. Every sense organ is
+an organ of abstraction. Every sense depicts the effects of reality in
+its own way and in this way alone. It may freely be granted that there
+are many processes in reality which do not affect our sensibility. Yet
+there is nothing in reality which does not affect something in some
+way. If it did not, it could not be said to exist. The chemical rays
+of light do not affect our eye, they are invisible and were for that
+reason not noticed. But these rays are not without any effects. If we
+cannot observe them directly, we can invent sensitive plates or other
+instruments for observing their effects indirectly. Indirect observation
+makes it possible that the limitation of our senses does not result in a
+limitation of knowledge.
+
+Says Professor Jodl:
+
+    “Our cognition of nature if we begin to construct always leads
+    us to some _x_.”
+
+This sentence indicates that Professor Jodl’s and our conception of
+cognition are different. Cognition is not a reconstruction of assumed
+causes; it is a unification of our representative sensations or ideas.
+Something is again noticed, it is re-cognised, to be the same thing.
+Cognition is adaptation of new facts to our present stock of knowledge;
+it is the proper arrangement of new data in our system of mental
+representations. Cognition, accordingly, is the reduction of the unknown
+to terms of the known. How can it ever lead to an _x_? The positive
+conception of cognition is, as Kirchoff defines, it “an exhaustive and
+most simple description of facts.” It is a reconstruction of facts or,
+as Mach says, _Ein Nachbilden der Thatsachen_. Cognition is based upon
+_Anschauungen_; it will lead to an ultimate _x_, only in case we expect
+that cognition instead of being a description of facts will have to give
+us information about how it happens that facts exist, how they originated
+out of nothing.
+
+Professor Jodl’s thing in itself is not outside of Space and Time (as is
+Kant’s thing in itself) but it is the overwhelming infinitude of problems
+to be solved with which we cannot hope to get through even though our
+life lasted billions of light-years. Let me repeat here what I said in
+the second edition of “Fundamental Problems,”
+
+    “A philosophy which starts from the positive data of
+    experience, and arranges them in the system of a monistic
+    conception of the world, will meet with many great problems
+    and in solving them will again and again be confronted with
+    new problems. It will always grapple with something that is
+    not yet known. The unknown seems to expand before us like an
+    infinite ocean upon which the ship of knowledge advances. But
+    the unknown constantly changes into the known. We shall find no
+    real unknowable wherever we proceed. The idea of the unknowable
+    is like the horizon—an optic illusion. The more we advance,
+    the farther it recedes. The unknowable is no reality; the
+    unknowable can nowhere prevent knowledge nor can the horizon
+    debar a ship in her voyage, from further progress.” (p. 271.)
+
+Man’s knowledge has value as positive information concerning the facts
+he has to deal with, and the infinitude of the not known, the infinitude
+of other problems and things which he will never face, is of no
+consequence whatever. Positivism commences and has to commence with the
+positive facts of the given experience and not with the infinitude of
+possibilities which lie beyond our horizon. Compare knowledge to property
+and suppose a man is to buy a farm. Shall we discourage him with the idea
+that the whole amount of soil on the surface of the earth and of other
+planets is infinite, and this infinitude of all existences if divided by
+his finite little possession can never result in a finite number. Even
+if it were doubled, if it were multiplied a thousand times, it remains
+as good as nothing in comparison with the rest of the world which he
+cannot acquire. However, his possession is something to him, whatever the
+relation of infinite possibilities may be in proportion to it.
+
+The concept of infinitude serves a good purpose in its place, but we
+cannot use it for analogies in other fields or bring it in relation to
+concrete realities. We produce confusion and drop into mysticism as soon
+as we handle the idea of infinitude as if it were a positive thing. The
+infinite is a function which is mathematically expressed by 1/0 = ∞, and
+whenever we bring anything in relation to the infinite, we at once dwarf
+the greatest number no less than the smallest number into zero.
+
+Clearness of thought is the indispensable method of sound philosophy
+for constructing a positive world-conception, which in great outlines
+is a description of the facts of reality. By suffering mysticism as a
+legitimate conception either in science or in philosophy, we enhance the
+interests of those who prefer the chiaroscuro of vague notions to clear
+thought.
+
+
+V. CLIFFORD’S AND SCHOPENHAUER’S CONCEPTIONS OF THE THING IN ITSELF.
+
+When Clifford speaks of things in themselves he does not mean Kant’s
+thing in itself, he means neither the object independent of the thinking
+subject nor the thing independent of space and time. He means the thing
+as it would be if viewed from the thing itself.
+
+A man appears to other thinking beings as an active body, as an organism
+that is in motion; but to himself he appears as a feeling being. The
+subjectivity of things as they appear to the things themselves consists
+in our own case of states of awareness, and this subjectivity is called
+by Clifford the thing in itself.
+
+A certain brain motion is in its subjective aspect a feeling. This
+feeling is according to Clifford the thing in itself of the visible,
+observable, and measurable motion. The thing in itself of so-called
+inanimate beings is not feeling, but elements of feeling. In other words,
+the world-substance is everywhere in itself potentiality of feeling and
+Clifford therefore calls it “mind-stuff.”
+
+Schopenhauer arrives at his conception of the thing in itself practically
+in the same way. There is the world as it appears to us, the objective
+world of motion in space and time. What the kernel of this world may be,
+we can know from self-observation. The kernel of ourselves, Schopenhauer
+says, is Will; and the will is also the kernel of things; the will is the
+thing in itself.
+
+We understand by will the passage into action, i. e. an incipient
+motion of the organism if accompanied with the psychical element of
+consciousness, and this consciousness is a state of awareness of the will
+including its direction and aim. Will, as the term is generally used, is
+always conscious. Schopenhauer however speaks of the will as being blind,
+i. e. without knowledge, without awareness of itself and its aim. This
+indicates that he uses the word not in its original but in a figurative
+meaning.
+
+The fall of a stone may be characterised as a blind motion without
+awareness and without the stone’s having a consciousness as to its
+direction or aim; and in a similar (although not in the same) way
+Clifford speaks of the elements of feeling as being not rational. We
+agree with Schopenhauer that that factor in a stone which makes it fall
+when placed in a certain position is as much a natural process as the act
+of a man, only of a lower grade and a simpler kind. Schopenhauer calls
+that which both have in common “will.” Yet in common language we call the
+objective aspect of that which both processes have in common, “motion.”
+What then is the subjective aspect of a falling stone? It is not a state
+of awareness, it is no feeling, but it is the potentiality of a state of
+awareness, it is potential feeling. There _is_ a subjective aspect, but
+this subjective aspect is so far as we can judge of no account to the
+stone.
+
+That something in the stone which corresponds to man’s consciousness,
+viz. the stone’s subjectivity, is not mind, but it is potential mind.
+And potential mind is not as Mr. Conybeare expresses it “mind diluted,”
+potential mind is no mind at all.
+
+The world-substance as it exists in inorganic matter is not mind. But
+the universe taken as a whole, the All, is for that reason not less than
+mind. On the contrary, it is infinitely more than mind. The All is not
+brute force and inert matter only, the universe is a cosmos, and its
+subjectivity necessarily develops, according to the laws of form which
+characterise the cosmos throughout, into mind. We disagree with Professor
+Clifford most emphatically when he describes the mind-stuff of which
+according to his terminology the world consists, as not rational.
+
+The world it is true is not rational in its elements, but the world as
+a whole, the entire cosmos with its laws and especially in its formal
+order, is the prototype of all rationality. Human reason is rational
+only in so far as it conforms with, as it reflects, as it describes the
+order of the cosmos. The human mind is a microcosm. We do not call the
+macrocosm, in whose image the microcosm has been created, a mind, because
+we understand by the term mind not reality itself but reality pictured in
+symbols of feeling. We understand by mind the individual conception of
+the world as it is mapped out in the brain of a sentient being, and not
+the universe itself, not the all-being. We understand by mind a creature
+and not the creator, a soul and not God.
+
+The cosmos, the All, God, that which creates the mind, is not dead, not
+irrational, and not inferior to mentality. It is the source of all life,
+it is the condition of all order, it is the standard of all morality. All
+the minds that exist are but parts of it. In it, with it, and through it
+we live and shall live forever. For although we shall die, our being can
+never be blotted out. Existence knows no annihilation and life knows no
+death. What we call death is a dissolution of life in a special part,
+but the contents of a life, the thoughts, the ideas, and the ideals are
+preserved and transmitted, they are implanted into other minds; the soul
+continues to live. And this continuance of the life of the soul is not
+a mere dissolution in the All, it is not the immortality of force and
+matter; it is the preservation of its special existence, of its most
+characteristic and individual features for an immeasurably long period
+hence, which will last as long as the conditions of life remain favorable
+upon earth. Yet even if a whole solar system were broken to pieces, life
+will reappear; mind will be born again to struggle for truth and to
+aspire to live in conformity with truth.
+
+
+VI. THINGS AND RELATIONS.
+
+The proposition that things in themselves are unknowable finds a strong
+argument in the statement that we can know relations only, that all
+knowledge is relative. It is undoubtedly true that all knowledge is
+relative and knowledge is a knowledge of relations. But what is a
+relation? When I once proposed this question, I was answered:
+
+    “A relation is the connection between two things; it is that
+    something in which the one stands to the other, in short, it is
+    the betwixtness of things.”
+
+This is exactly what a relation is not. From such a definition of
+relation agnosticism will necessarily follow. It is a misstatement of
+the case, and when we come to follow out the idea, we shall be led into
+inextricable contradictions, and unless we revise the whole argument, we
+shall have to confess that we are at our wit’s end.
+
+The question, what is a relation? was one of the issues between the
+two great mediæval schools of philosophy, the Nominalists and the
+Realists.[45] The Nominalists answered: “A relation is a mere product of
+the mind,” while the Realists declared that “a relation without which the
+thing cannot be, is in the thing.”
+
+Both schools relied upon Aristotle’s authority. Aristotle had declared
+that matter is mere possibility of existence (it is δυνάμει ὄν) and form
+is that which makes it real, the formal is the real, form is existence
+or being (οὐσία). The metal of a statue, Aristotle says, is its matter,
+the idea of the statue is its form, both together make the real statue.
+The metal having had another form before, did not exist with the inherent
+purpose of being this metal of the statue. The metal is the mere
+potentiality of becoming a statue.[46] Hence, says Aristotle, not the
+matter but the form constitutes the reality of the statue, the form is
+that which is real, or that which makes actual, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, it is the
+being in completeness or actuality, ἐνετλεχείᾳ ὄν, i. e. that which makes
+a thing exist in its purpose (ἐν τέλει ἔχειν). If the formal alone is and
+makes real, relations must be real. This is in favor of the Realists.
+
+Yet Aristotle’s philosophy is not in every respect clearly worked out.
+In fact there are two Aristotles, the one being a Platonist, the other
+a naturalist, the one believing in universals, the other investigating
+concrete things and taking individuals as real beings. But both
+Aristotles and with them both parties of the schoolmen had no clear
+conception of the nature of ideas, what they are, and what they purport,
+and how we can discriminate between their subjective and objective
+elements. Ideas have a meaning. Is their meaning purely mental or has it
+an objective value? We say that it has.
+
+The same Aristotle who considered the formal as that which makes real,
+denied the objective existence of relations. He said that such qualities
+as greater, or smaller, double or half, indeed all relations (the πρός τι
+of things) did not belong to the things, but were added to them by the
+thinking subject. Ergo relations are mere products of the mind, they have
+no objective value. This was in favor of the Nominalists.
+
+Now it is true that some relations are purely mental in so far as the
+comparison upon which they rest is purely imaginary. An answer to the
+question, Who was the greater, Alexander or Cæsar? depends upon the
+standard of measurement which we create for the special purpose. Some
+such relations have no objective value, they are not facts but a play of
+imagination dependent on the recognition of the standard of measurement.
+But how is it, if we express the relation between the gravity of a stone
+and the whole mass of the earth as it manifests itself in the stone’s
+fall? Is that also a mere product of the mind? Certainly Newton’s laws
+describing gravitation in exact and mathematical formulas are a product
+of the mind, but this product of the mind has an objective value, it has
+a meaning, it describes facts, and these facts are certain relations
+between certain things.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The fault of the modern misconception of relativity lies in the
+assumption that the two or more things are considered as things in
+themselves. We are apt to consider the gravity of two masses, of a stone
+and of the earth, as a relation between two independent things. Here is
+the stone and there is the earth and the relation is considered as some
+third item, being the connection in which the one stands to the other.
+
+In reality there are not two things and, in addition to them a
+betweenness of the two things. The world is not a sum of things, not even
+a system of things, but a whole indivisible entirety and what we call
+things are abstractions which serve special purposes in the household of
+cognition. All things consist as it were of innumerable relations to all
+other things. When we abstract one special process which takes place in
+the province of what we are wont to call _two_ things, we have to deal
+with a relation.
+
+There are no relations of themselves and there are no things of
+themselves. Relations describe certain features of reality obtaining
+between what we call two or more things, and in this description all
+other features of which the real things consist are purposely omitted.
+
+There is no quality of things but it is at the same time a quality of
+relation. Every quality of a thing characterises it under a certain
+condition; it appears as an effect upon something and thus it is actual
+as a relation. Cognition analyses things into bundles of relations and
+all these relations together make up the things.
+
+The modern idea that we can know relations only and that there are
+things in themselves which are unknowable is an old error inherited
+from mediæval scholasticism, and its roots can be traced back to the
+philosophy of Aristotle. The difficulty disappears as soon as we
+consider the whole world (ourselves included) as an interacting whole,
+and that the conceptions “things” and “relations” have been invented
+for describing certain of its parts and certain of its interactions or
+interconnections.
+
+If we push the idea of things in themselves to the ultimate extreme
+we arrive at the atomistic conception of the universe. _Atoms are the
+things in themselves reduced to the point system._ If we consider the
+world as a heap of innumerable atoms, we are at a loss how to explain
+the interaction among these atoms. The atomist universalises the
+substance-abstraction and will be disappointed afterwards not to be able
+to deduce from his universalisation other qualities which are found in
+reality, such as the relations of things, their interconnections, their
+spontaneity of motion, the life of organised beings, and the mind of
+thinking creatures.
+
+Ideas are symbols and symbols have a meaning. The whole realm of
+mental representations may be viewed in their symbolism or in their
+significance. Considering their symbolism, ideas of things as well as of
+relations, are products of the mind, considering their meaning, ideas
+represent realities; in other words: their contents or that which they
+signify is real.
+
+It appears that neither Nominalism nor Realism is right; yet if we
+stretch them only a little, if we are allowed to interpret them in the
+light of a monistic world-conception, both are right. They cease to
+be contradictory and become complementary. Universals are real, say
+the Realists, i. e. the forms and relations of things are actualities.
+Universals are names, say the Nominalists, i. e. the relations and forms
+in which we describe the world are mental symbols.
+
+The Realists had the misfortune to defeat the Nominalists entirely,
+and thus had a chance to insist upon being right in every respect. All
+opposition having ceased, the errors of Realism grew in extraordinary
+exuberance. Nominalism in the mean time raised its head in opposition to
+the recognised authority of the church as well as the schools, slowly
+yet powerfully and irresistibly. The errors and the tyranny of Realism
+gave strength to the Nominalistic movement which reached its height in
+Kant’s philosophy. The Realists had gone to the extreme of declaring
+that universals were things, real substances, independent of single and
+concrete objects, and the Nominalists on the other hand, represented
+by Kant, went so far as to declare that all relations, time and space
+included were _mere_ products of the mind.
+
+If the relations are mere products of the mind, all knowledge being
+a knowledge of relations, knowledge becomes impossible. That last
+consequence was drawn by Kant and is emphatically insisted upon by
+agnosticism.
+
+There is but one world-conception that can dispense with these
+conclusions: it is that View which conceives of the All as a whole; and
+of knowledge as a description of its parts, qualities, and relations,
+ever mindful on the one hand that the parts are parts, that qualities
+and relations are certain features only, not entire realities, or
+isolated entities, and that the symbols thereof frequently overlap each
+other; on the other hand that there is nothing absolute,[47] and that
+there are no things in themselves.
+
+The relativity of knowledge, whether we conceive of it as the relativity
+of the object to the subject in general or as an appreciation of the fact
+that all knowledge gives and can give information of relations only, does
+not lead to the conclusion that knowledge is impossible. Relativity is a
+fundamental feature of knowledge, and we shall understand that it must be
+so if we consider that reality itself is a great system of relations.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The interconnection of all things with all things appears to be so
+complete, that if we intended to explain or understand one single fact
+fully and exhaustively in all its relations, past, present, and future,
+we should be obliged to give a complete description of the universe. Says
+Tennyson:
+
+    “Flower in the crannied wall,
+    I pluck you out of the crannies;—
+    Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
+    Little flower—but if I could understand
+    What you are, root and all, and all in all,
+    I should know what God and man is.”
+
+We might address in the same way anything else, an atom of hydrogen, a
+grain of sand as well as the sun, the action of a tiny speck of irritable
+protoplasm as well as the soul of man.
+
+
+VII. IS THE EGO A THING IN ITSELF?
+
+Prof. Lloyd Morgan in his excellent work “Animal Life and Intelligence”
+uses repeatedly the word “mind” as if it were a thing in itself.
+Professor Morgan is a monist and he does not intend the word to mean a
+thing in itself; yet such is the influence of language that we, all of
+us, unless we are constantly on our guard, will inadvertently slip into
+dualistic expressions. Professor Morgan says, with reference to certain
+sensations of animals (p. 309):
+
+    ‘From these stippled sensations the mind in all cases
+    elaborates a continuum.’
+
+The unity which arises out of stippled sensations and which through
+their interaction becomes a continuum is called mind. To speak of
+mind as working out the continuum is mythological language, it is the
+transformation of the abstract idea “mind” into a real and independent
+thing whose existence is conceived to be independent of the reality from
+which it has been abstracted.
+
+Again, Professor Morgan says: “Our constructs are literally our
+handiwork.” Our constructs, i. e. our mental signs constructed to
+represent realities, constitute our soul; they are we ourselves.
+
+Professor Morgan, as I understand him, does not believe in a mind
+behind the psychical facts of mental activity, he does not assume the
+pre-existence of mind to the continuum elaborated. His view of mind
+appears to be the same as ours. The more noteworthy, then, is his usage
+of the term “mind.” It is a remarkable instance of how language naturally
+inveigles us into a belief in things in themselves. Words seem to denote
+concrete existences and as soon as we use words in this way we are
+entangled in dualism.
+
+Prof. F. Max Müller as well as the late Prof. Thomas Hill Green,
+the founder of the Oxford transcendentalist school, start from this
+assumption, that man’s mental activity is performed by a something which
+is quite distinct from it. This something is the thing in itself of the
+human soul. Prof. F. Max Müller says:
+
+    “If mind is the name of the work, what is the name of the
+    worker?... It is what we may call the ego as personating the
+    self; it is what other philosophers call the monon. Let us
+    call therefore the worker who does the work of the mind in its
+    various aspects, the Monon or the Ego.”
+
+This conception which asks for the worker of the work is based upon a
+materialistic view of the human organism. An organism is not a dead
+machine which must be set a-going by somebody who attends to it.
+Organisms are active and not passive, they are living and not dead. Every
+part of an organism is a worker and so is the whole. And if we speak of
+its “life” we must bear in mind that “life” is an abstract which denotes
+a certain inseparable quality of the organism. The work and the worker
+are two abstracts of one and the same thing. The reality from which these
+terms have been abstracted is “something working.” This something working
+does not consist of a worker and his work, but the worker is in every
+part of his work. The worker of our mental activity is the work itself.
+Both are identical.
+
+The objection is made: “Whence does the activity come which appears in
+the realm of organised life.” The answer is: Activity is a universal
+quality of all existence. There is no such a thing as absolutely
+inert matter. Every chemical element combines with other elements
+spontaneously, according to its inherent nature and not through the
+influence of a worker manipulating its atoms. Spontaneity is a universal
+feature of reality. Nature is throughout self-working activity. And this
+its most remarkable character is preserved in its highest efflorescence
+in the soul of man.
+
+The present number of _The Monist_ contains a lucid presentation of the
+transcendentalist position by Mr. F. C. Conybeare, an Oxford scholar and
+a personal disciple of Professor Green, with special reference to the
+views of Prof. William Kingdon Clifford. Mr. Conybeare, like Prof. F. Max
+Müller, assumes a Self independent of the reality from which the idea of
+self has been abstracted, and he attempts to prove the existence of this
+self as follows:
+
+    “In truth there can be no relation of before and after between
+    the two terms except for a self which takes note of the one
+    disappearing and of the other appearing; and whenever we speak
+    of things following one another we tacitly presuppose a self
+    before whom the procession passes.”
+
+The transcendentalist adopts, in the realm of psychology, the error
+of atomism. If we accept the view that the world consists of isolated
+atoms, we are at a loss how to bring the atoms into relations; the unity
+of every group of atoms, every thing and every system of things will
+become a mystery. And if we look upon feelings as unrelated things in
+themselves, their connection becomes a deep problem. Mr. Conybeare solves
+this problem of the connection that obtains among the feelings supposed
+to be atomical, by postulating a relation-producing entity, called the
+self. He says:
+
+    “No link is left, save a connecting self.”
+
+And this assumed entity of a connecting self or ego is taken to be “the
+heart and centre of reality.” Reality, that which we have to deal with
+in real life and what is commonly called reality, appears as a second
+class of reality in comparison with this assumed thing in itself of our
+existence. The thing in itself is thus regarded as something realer than
+real; it is conceived to be a reality of a higher degree.
+
+Mr. Conybeare is very explicit in the explanation of his transcendental
+“self.” He says:
+
+    “Feelings constitute a conscious self when they become the
+    feelings of a conscious self and not before, for except as
+    gathered up in the unity of a self which has [sic!] memory and
+    remains the same throughout its differences, feelings can be
+    neither new, nor repeated, nor joined by links.”
+
+What does “self” mean? What can it mean? What is the “unity of the self”?
+These are questions which have not been answered to our satisfaction
+by the transcendentalists. Whenever they speak of the self, they lose
+themselves in mysticism. Their “self” is an assumed entity which they
+have carefully divested of everything real and actual. Their self is
+transcendental and not a being of the world; it is a myth.
+
+Let us describe the simplest possible instance of psychical activity.
+
+An irritation takes place in some sentient substance. This irritation
+produces an extra-commotion. We must say “extra-commotion” because
+all sentient substance is in a state of constant activity. This
+extra-commotion causes the sentient substance to assume a certain form,
+and while it lasts, a certain and special feeling takes place in some
+part of the sentient substance. This certain and special feeling ceases,
+as soon as the extra-commotion, caused through the irritation, abates.
+There can be no doubt that certain effects of this extra-commotion
+remain. Its trace is left in the sentient substance and this trace is
+preserved in the constant whirl of the sentient being’s normal activity.
+Now, we suppose that an irritation of the same kind takes place in the
+same sentient substance. This second irritation finds the substance no
+longer in the same condition. It finds the sentient substance prepared
+to receive it. The feeling which now appears is no longer a simple
+feeling. The second irritation causes a commotion as much as the first,
+and this commotion acts as a stimulant upon the trace left by the first
+irritation. This trace being again in a state of extra-commotion is
+revived and the same kind of feeling appears. Thus the second irritation
+is accompanied by a state of awareness in which two feelings are blended,
+the revival of the former feeling and the feeling of the present
+irritation.
+
+The preservation of traces left in sentient substance is the condition
+of memory. We understand by memory the psychical aspect thereof, and the
+act of reviving, so that their correspondent feelings will reappear, is
+called recollection.
+
+“Memory” has been the greatest stumbling-block to our psychologists as
+well as to our philosophers. Even modern works written from a positive
+standpoint treat memory frequently as a mysterious faculty of the mind.
+Mr. Conybeare speaks of the self as _having_ memory, while in fact,
+memory is one of the features, indeed the most important feature, of
+mind-activity.
+
+Says Mr. Conybeare:
+
+    “Such a feeling [of the togetherness of two feelings] would
+    involve memory and memory involves self-hood.”
+
+Memory does not involve any transcendental self-hood. True self-hood,
+viz. that which can reasonably be understood by self-hood, is not prior
+to, not the cause of memory; self-hood, i. e. the personality of a man,
+the organised unity of the psychical aspect of a human organism, is
+consequent upon, it is the effect of, memory. Self-hood is the product of
+memory.[48]
+
+The self is also called the ego. What is the ego?
+
+The ego is a Latin term used in philosophical language to denote the
+pronoun “I,” and the pronoun “I” is quite a definite nerve-structure
+situated in quite a definite place of the centre of language. As
+all words, so also the term “I” is a symbol. Its general meaning is
+unequivocal; it stands for the name of the speaker. It stands for Mr.
+Brown, if Mr. Brown speaks of himself, for Mr. Smith, if Mr. Smith speaks
+of himself, etc.
+
+What does Mr. Brown mean when he says, “_I_ speak, _I_ act, _I_ will, _I_
+feel pain, _I_ feel pleasure, _I_ intend,” etc.?
+
+When Mr. Brown speaks, a certain number of word-structures in the
+centre of language are in a state of commotion, innervating the muscles
+of speech. Correspondent to this physiological process, a state of
+consciousness obtains, which is an awareness of the situation. When
+he adds: “I say this,” it is again a special nerve-structure that is
+irritated into action and he might just as well say: “Mr. Brown says
+this.” The idea of Mr. Brown, viz. of his own personality, is just as
+much an idea as his idea of Mr. Smith. The main difference consists
+in the fact that the idea of one’s own personality is very much more
+important than the ideas representing other personalities.
+
+The nervous structure representing the feeling of the idea “I” must be
+the centre of innumerable nervous tracts connecting it with all those
+activities which when performed are thought of as done by ourselves.
+The “I do this” is almost constantly ready to fill the present state
+of consciousness and to accompany any action performed through the
+innervation of other brain structures.
+
+Sentient substance is not always actually feeling. It is feeling only
+when in a state of extra-commotion. Systems of sentient substance
+are called organisms; all its structures are interconnected and most
+so those structures in which sentiency as well as motory impulses
+are differentiated—viz. the nervous structures. The extra-commotions
+which agitate the different nervous structures, the memories of
+former sense-perceptions, of sounds, of words, of ideas depend upon
+the conditions of the moment. Now this and now another structure will
+represent the summit of commotion and the feeling of the strongest
+commotion at a given time will under normal conditions appear as the
+contents of consciousness. It is as it were the focus in which the
+attention of the whole organism is centralised. That which appears in
+the focus is clear and distinct, while the other weaker feelings rapidly
+disappear into the undistinguishable general feeling of the organism as a
+whole, commonly called cœnæsthesis or _Gemeingefühl_.
+
+The centre of attention is constantly changing; yet whenever a thinking
+creature stops to ask himself, who is doing this? Who is willing this?
+Who is thinking this? the answer is given: “I am doing this; I am willing
+this; I am thinking this.” The structure of the little pronoun “I” seems
+to be the most ticklish of all; it is always ready to force itself into
+the foreground.
+
+The answer, “I am doing this,” proposes the _totum pro parte_. The
+whole personality is supposed to do what a part of it is performing.
+The hands are executing this work; these hands of course are innervated
+from certain regions of the brain. Some parts of the personality are
+in a relative rest and have nothing to do with the work presently on
+hand. A commotion in a certain number of brain-structures represents the
+physiological aspect of a deliberation, perhaps the planning of some
+action. Psychologically considered certain ideas appear successively
+and sometimes simultaneously in the focus of consciousness. The ideas
+disagree and other ideas replace them until a combination is formed in
+which the ideas do agree. This state of agreement brings a temporary
+peace into the tumult of conflicting ideas; the plan is ready; it may
+pass into action at once, or, perhaps, the ego-structure will appear in
+consciousness and will quietly think: “I will do it.”
+
+When certain motory nerve-structures are innervated, they cause under
+normal conditions their respective muscles to contract, they produce
+motion. Under normal conditions the nervous process accompanying the idea
+“I will raise my arm” serves as an irritation upon the cortical centre of
+arm-raising, yet it is not the “I” that in some mystical way raises the
+arm. The idea “I” has as little and as much to do with this discharge of
+energy as any other idea. The idea “I” is not the power behind the veil
+that produces the will.
+
+What is will? As soon as some plan of action is joined with the idea
+that it should be executed, supposing it be not counteracted by any
+stronger idea that it should not be done, this combination represents
+a will. A will accordingly is the psychological aspect of an incipient
+action, and it is usually, or if it is not it can always be accompanied
+with the thought “I will it.” But this accompanying thought however is
+not the energy displayed in the act of willing.
+
+The “I will it,” or “I do it,” or “I perceive it” being always ready to
+appear together with the strongest idea in the field of consciousness,
+the term “ego” has acquired a specialised meaning. It means that part of
+a man’s personality which at the time is the contents of the “I will,” or
+“I think,” i. e. it is his present state of consciousness. Every organism
+is a coherent system and thus all the feelings of an organism naturally
+blend into a unity. The strongest feeling however appears in the normal
+state of waking in a distinct clearness thus representing a centre of
+consciousness.
+
+However, whether we use the term “ego” in the sense of the idea “I”
+meaning the whole personality of the speaker, or in the sense of the
+present centre of consciousness, it designates in either case a definite
+reality, the origin and action of which are natural facts and as plain as
+any other psychological phenomena.
+
+Neither the ego-idea nor the centre of consciousness are transcendental.
+The former is as little mystical as are the ideas dog, horse, man, etc.;
+the latter no less miraculous than any other feeling or display of
+sentiency.
+
+
+VIII. THE EGO-CENTRIC VIEW ABANDONED.
+
+The contrast between the old and the new psychology appears strongest
+in their conceptions of the ego. The former believes that the ego is
+“the thing in itself” of man’s soul and takes it to be the centre of
+all psychical phenomena, while the latter looks upon the ego-idea as
+one idea among many other co-ordinated ideas and considers the centre
+of consciousness as the strongest feeling at a given time, which as
+such naturally predominates over and eclipses the other feelings of the
+organism.
+
+The new psychology brings about a change of standpoint similar to
+that effected by the Copernican system in astronomy. In astronomy
+the geo-centric, and in psychology the ego-centric standpoint had to
+be abandoned. And all things seem to be upset to those who are still
+accustomed to the old conception. To them the physical and moral
+world-conceptions appear to become impossible. If the new view were
+correct, so they imagine, the entire universe would break to pieces. All
+our modes of speech are formed in accord with the old view. We speak of
+sunset and sunrise, and so in our daily conversation the little pronoun
+“I” plays a part which makes it seem as if the ego-idea were the centre
+of all soul-life and as if this “I” were the active agent in all acts of
+willing and doing.
+
+The advantage of the Copernican system lies in this, that we can think
+of the motions of the sun and the planets in a systematic and unitary
+conception without being either involved in contradictions or obliged to
+invent mysterious qualities in the stars for explaining the velocities,
+directions, or other phenomena of the celestial bodies. The most
+important advantage however is the practical applicability of the new
+theory.
+
+The old theory of the soul necessarily leads to mysticism. Fictitious
+facts of a transcendent character must be invented in addition to the
+facts observed, in order to explain the latter. The new theory after
+abandoning the ego-centric standpoint of the thing in itself of a soul
+shows the facts of psychic life in an harmonious and unitary conception.
+All facts agree among themselves and we are not in need of supplementing
+them with mysterious inventions. It must be emphasised, at the same time,
+that the new conception throws a new light upon ethics; it shows the
+error and perversity of all egotism, for it would be a mistake to act as
+if the ego were really the centre of soul-life.
+
+Here the new psychology comes in contact with religion. What is the
+practical aim of all the great religions of the world but a surrender
+of the ego, a renunciation of the self as the centre of our being, and
+the acceptance of the moral law as the regulative power of our actions?
+The new psychology gives a justification and a scientific explanation
+of Christian ethics while the latter from the standpoint of the old
+psychology necessarily appears as mystical and supernatural.
+
+
+IX. PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION.
+
+The ego, i. e. the centre of consciousness, is constantly shifting, while
+the personality of a man is relatively constant, certain important ideas
+being stable and thus lending character to the whole system of thoughts
+and intentions.
+
+The term personality indicating the self-hood of a man is used in several
+ways. First, we understand by a man’s personality his bodily appearance;
+secondly the whole system of his mentality, viz. his knowledge, his
+temperament, his character; thirdly the history of his life, past,
+present, and future; fourthly his position in life, his possessions,
+his connections, his influence, or at last we mean by it all these four
+items together. In all these applications the man and his personality are
+conceived as a unity. And they are a unity. Wherever the term unity is
+applicable, it is most certainly applicable here. All the many facts of
+the history of his life are one continuous process; all the parts of his
+body are parts of a system, and the world of his ideas also will under
+normal conditions bear a certain harmonious character. Wherever in any
+soul the concord among the ideas has been disturbed, a state of unrest
+will ensue until the peace of soul is restored in one or another way. But
+with the same necessity as every water surface tends to present a smooth
+level, so the ideas in one and the same soul tend to come to a state of
+agreement. As every water surface has its ripples so even that mind which
+has attained an undisturbed peace of soul is constantly confronted with
+some problems—be they ever so trifling—producing some slight disturbances
+in his life.
+
+The unity of a self, it is apparent, is the inevitable consequence
+of given conditions. It is not something which exists outside the
+personality and its constituent parts, it is in the personality and it
+develops together with it. Mr. Conybeare supposes that “the unity of
+a self remains the same throughout.” This is an error, and this error
+vitiates Mr. Conybeare’s whole conception of growth and evolution. He
+says:
+
+    “Properly speaking a thing can only be said to grow or develop
+    when it remains the same with itself all through the process
+    and unfolds therein capacities which were anyhow latent in it
+    to start with.”
+
+The truth contained in this proposition may be expressed thus: When a
+thing develops, some part of it remains the same during the change,
+so that a continuity is preserved. Yet every change of a part of an
+organism—such is the intimate interconnection of all its parts—produces
+an alteration, be it ever so small, of the whole unity. And in the course
+of evolution the character of the whole thing may be changed. Think of
+the growth of a caterpillar into a butterfly, or of an egg-cell into a
+man. However, the changes in the character of an adult man will become
+slighter and slighter the stronger certain features of his existence
+preserve their sameness, although the most stable personality will,
+nevertheless, be subject to, at least, unimportant changes as long as
+life lasts.
+
+Mr. Conybeare, like his master Professor Green and all the
+transcendentalists, is still under the influence of a belief in the
+thing in itself. The unity of an organism which is the product of the
+co-operation of its parts, is not some independent thing whose business
+it is to gather up their single activities and bring them into relation
+with one another. The unity of a self is the combination of all those
+relations which make of its parts a systematised whole, and this unity
+is changing together with its constituents; as a matter of fact, we have
+to state that it does _not_ remain constant or the same with itself.
+Mark that I do not deny the unity of the soul, nor do I underrate the
+enormous importance of this unity. But I do deny that this unity exists
+independent of its parts. It is as much immanent in its parts as is a
+melody in its notes. There is as little a transcendental self-hood as a
+melody in itself independent of its sounds.
+
+The assumption of a transcendental unity which throughout the process
+of evolution remains the same with itself naturally leads to a wrong
+conception of what Mr. Conybeare calls “latent capacities.” The terms
+potential existence and latent qualities are fertile and useful ideas but
+we must beware not to employ them incorrectly. Any heap of iron ore can
+be called a potential sword. This is a mode of speaking which expresses
+the possibility that the ore can be changed somehow into a sword. But the
+sword does not exist at all, not even as a latent quality of the ore.
+The ore has no latent qualities of that kind. Those qualities of the ore
+which represent the potential sword are very patent to everybody who
+knows the art of using them properly and changing them into an actual
+sword.
+
+We may say that the hen’s egg contains a potential chick; but this is a
+mere mode of speech devised to say that the egg can be changed into a
+chick under certain conditions. There is no chick at all contained in the
+egg and nothing that is like a chick.
+
+Evolution is not, as the name suggests, a process of unfolding; evolution
+is, as Christian Friedrich Wolff calls it, an “epigenesis,” i. e.
+the process of the additional growth of new formations. The chick is
+something different in kind from the egg. The unity of the egg-cell
+organism in the yolk is radically different from the unity of the
+full-fledged chick. The former shows traces of irritability but not
+of consciousness, while the latter exhibits unmistakable symptoms of
+psychical activity. The formation of the chicken-soul is a new formation
+as much as the growth of feathers. The feathers of the chick are an
+additional growth; there are no latent feathers in the egg. We might
+express ourselves to the effect that the egg contains the potential
+existence of feathers, but with the same logic we might say the egg
+contains a potential chicken broth.
+
+It is however true that something remains constant in the process of
+growth. There is a preservation of form in the constant change of
+material particles and this is the physiological basis of memory, so that
+a man of eighty may say “I remember when I was a child,” although not one
+particle of the substance of which the child consisted is left in him.
+The continuity produced through this preservation of form makes growth
+and evolution possible.
+
+The preservation of memory-structures constitutes the possibility of
+reviving the feelings of the past, it constitutes a preservation of
+soul. The material parts of the body are thrown out but the form being
+preserved, the soul remains. And this preservation of the soul is the
+basis of its additional growth through new and enlarged experience. The
+soul of the child is not lost in the man, it is preserved. It has lost
+certain features and at the same time it has gained new features, it has
+developed, and the unity of the soul has more or less changed with the
+development.
+
+What is true of the individual is also true of mankind. Mankind as a
+whole is different in the savage and in civilised society. Nevertheless
+the latter has developed from the former. Certain traits have been
+dropped, other radically new features have appeared. That which was
+valuable in the soul of primitive man is not lost. The better part of his
+soul still lives in the highest developed man of to-day; the continuity
+is preserved. And to-day all our moral instruction aims at this, so to
+live that our souls also will be preserved in the future evolution of
+humanity. The gist of ethics is to make the soul immortal.[49]
+
+
+X. PROFESSOR MACH’S POSITION.
+
+The problem, “Are there things in themselves?” is closely connected with
+the subject of my discussion with Professor Mach. Professor Mach as
+well as myself are aspiring to arrive at a consistent and harmonious or
+unitary world-conception. Both of us recognise that things in themselves
+have no room in a monistic philosophy, both of us recognise that concepts
+are means only of orientation, they are the mental tools of living beings
+developed as an assistance in dealing with the surrounding world. They
+are symbols in which the processes of nature are copied and imitated and
+which can serve for planning or modeling and thus predetermining the
+course of nature. So far we agree, but then there appears a difference
+which it is difficult for me to understand or formulate in precise terms.
+
+Professor Mach objects to the dualism of motion and feeling, which he
+declares he conceives as a unity not as a duality. But so do I. It
+appears to me that we must differ somehow in the method of constructing
+the unity. I see indeed a contrast of physical and of psychical. This
+contrast, however, in my conception does not belong to the object but to
+the subject. It is a contrast of our conception of things, but it is not
+a contrast existing objectively in the real things themselves. The world
+is not composed of the psychical and the physical, but certain features
+of the world are called physical, and others psychical. Both terms are
+abstracts.
+
+Professor Mach said in his first article and repeats it again in the
+present article that his former standpoint resembles very closely my
+present standpoint. When reading Professor Mach’s lectures of 1863,
+I took pains to look for the similarity, and finding many things in
+which I could agree I dropped the differences taking the agreements
+as the essential points. In reading, however, Professor Mach’s résumé
+of his former position as stated in this present article, I find that
+he attaches prominence to several points which I cannot endorse.
+I do not accept the theory that atoms feel, that they are endowed
+with consciousness. I have never spoken of atoms when dealing with
+psychological problems. The term “atom” is a chemical term invented
+as a help for thinking the equivalence of the weight of the elements
+which always combine in definite proportions. The term “atom” has in
+my opinion no sense if applied to other phenomena. The term “atom” has
+not been abstracted from psychical phenomena nor has it been invented
+for describing them. There is accordingly no probability that it can
+find there any appropriate application. We might as well expect that
+mathematical terms such as lines, points, circles, etc., are applicable
+in psychology. The idea of conscious circles or points can not in my mind
+be more absurd than that of conscious atoms. The rule must be observed
+that we can use abstractions made for a special purpose for that purpose
+only; they will not serve any other purpose as well. It is true that they
+are often employed as analogies, but in such cases, we must bear in mind
+that we are dealing with mere analogies.
+
+In addition to the impropriety of using the term atoms in psychology, it
+appears to me erroneous to attribute feeling or anything like feeling
+to physical processes of any description. Natural processes are so
+constituted, that under certain conditions, such as take place in animal
+organisms, they will develop feelings. Clifford speaks in this sense of
+the elements of feeling. Lloyd Morgan calls it metakinesis, and I find
+that feelings being simply states of awareness represent the subjectivity
+of natural processes. We have reasons to suppose that in the processes
+of unorganised nature this subjectivity is neither feeling nor anything
+like feeling: but the subjectivity of the natural processes is as it were
+the stuff out of which our own feelings are formed.
+
+I accept all the arguments of Professor Mach that our ideas are
+artificial products; and I am also anxious to distinguish in our ideas
+between that which describes facts and that which has been added to the
+description of facts in shape of theories or conjectures.
+
+The sense-pictures of objects and ideas also are not things but images
+and symbols of things created for the purpose of representing things;
+they are as Prof. Lloyd Morgan says, “constructs.” But these constructs
+are not mere fancy, they are not air-castles. They are constructed in
+order to imitate certain realities. Now, in building these constructs
+as an imitation or a copy of reality, we are often at a loss how to
+build them. There is for instance in the objective reality observed, a
+something somewhere high in the air, the basis of which is invisible,
+and being limited in our means of acquiring information we are ignorant
+of the real state of things. So in reconstructing or imitating the
+facts, we build scaffolds to support it, and we are too apt to forget
+that these scaffolds do not represent objective facts but are artifices
+to make certain facts, which we know in parts only, thinkable, i. e.
+representable without breaks in mental constructs.
+
+
+XI. TRUTH IN MYTHOLOGY.
+
+There is one point which I have emphasised and which it appears to me
+Professor Mach neglects, namely that our noumenal world of ideas has
+an objective meaning. The ideal constructs represent realities. They
+do not consist of scaffolds alone and there is no scaffold which has
+not been erected to help in building up representations of facts. Let
+us call the representation of facts positive science or simply truth
+and the scaffolding the mythology of science, and we shall see that the
+road to truth leads everywhere through mythology. Certain facts of the
+surrounding world impress themselves upon a sentient being and these
+impressions come to represent facts. These facts are not seen at once in
+their causal connection, they appear unconnected among themselves, and in
+the attempt to formulate them, to represent them, to construct them in
+mental images, we fill out the gaps of our knowledge with such inventions
+as are supplied by analogy.
+
+Mythology is, in religion as well as in science, the indispensable ladder
+to truth. We cannot build without scaffolds. So we cannot construct truth
+without mythology. We have to introduce allegorical expressions in order
+to fill out gaps with analogies.
+
+Mythology becomes fatal to the building up of truth, as soon as we
+consider it as truth itself. The scaffold is erected simply as an
+assistance for building and if the building is finished the scaffold
+should be torn down. The progress of science which is so much helped
+by mythology has periods of purification in which the mythology is
+discarded. This is sometimes a difficult task, because the very terms
+of science are mostly both at the same time truth and mythology,
+building-stones and scaffold.
+
+Take, for instance, the term atom. The chemist observes that the elements
+always combine in certain proportions and formulates the law of the
+equivalence of their atomic weights. In order to think this process, to
+reconstruct it in mental images, he imagines that matter consists of
+infinitely small particles of constant weight. This is a fiction useful
+for its purpose but it may be just as erroneous as the method employed
+in the infinitesimal calculus of thinking of a continuous curve as
+consisting of a broken line of infinitely small parts, or of thinking
+of a certain force as being composed of a parallelogram of forces. The
+parallelogram of forces is a scaffold helpful for representing in mental
+symbols the coexistence of different abstractions of the same kind (e. g.
+motions of a different velocity and direction). But this scaffold is not
+a mere scaffold, it is not erected without any purpose, its final aim is
+the description of facts.
+
+The proposition to consider light as rays traveling in straight lines
+is a scaffold, it is mythology; but this analogy contains a truth, it
+contains a real building-stone which should not be torn down with the
+scaffold. This truth is one-sided; it represents one feature of light
+and disregards other features. It disregards entirely the transversal
+oscillations of the ether, yet it describes another feature—viz., the
+transmission and refraction of light for the comprehension of which we
+need not take into consideration the undulation theory. The physicist
+calculates with his formula sinα/sinβ = _n_ the angle of refraction.
+There is certainly neither a sineα nor a sineβ in reality, but there are
+certain relations of reality which are described in these expressions and
+the action of the light has a definite quality which can be determined
+with the assistance of the formula sinα/sinβ = _n_.
+
+If the scientist succeeds in determining such real qualities of things,
+even though it be done with the assistance of mythology, he discovers
+a truth. He has with the help of his scaffolds succeeded in placing a
+building-stone where it belongs.
+
+Some scaffolds have to be torn down because they hinder further building;
+other scaffolds must remain because they assist us in modeling, and
+planning, and predetermining certain processes of nature. They are like
+staircases which enable us to reach with ease otherwise inaccessible
+places on towers or domes.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The idea that science is full of mythology appears strange to the
+non-scientific, and it is often overlooked by scientists themselves.
+But the idea that religious mythology in spite of its many irrational
+superstitions and wrong analogies beams with truth is also little heeded
+by the many. In fact, man’s method of reaching truth is the same in
+religion as in science.
+
+The religious ideas such as God and soul are mental constructs which
+copy certain realities; but these very terms, such as they are used,
+are mythological expressions; they are still surrounded by their
+scaffolds. Many people know by their own experience the usefulness and
+indispensability of the scaffold. Without the scaffold they would never
+have had an inkling of the truth, for the representation of which it was
+built, and it is natural that they consider the scaffold as the building
+itself. This is the reason why the narrow-minded orthodox denounce anyone
+who would lay hand on or tear down any part of the scaffold, which has
+become a hindrance to the further development of religious ideals.
+
+Positivism, i. e. the representation of facts without any admixture of
+theory or mythology, is an ideal which in its purity perhaps will never
+be realised. Nevertheless it is no _ignis fatuus_, no will-o’-the-wisp
+that leads us astray. Our science is constantly more and more
+approaching this ideal and the progress of humanity is intimately
+connected with it.
+
+Science has not merely a theoretic value, its aim and purpose consist
+in its application to practical life. Science is throughout ethical.
+Thus ethics has also its mythological phase. In agreement with Professor
+Mach (p. 204), we should find it ridiculous if one who presumes to be an
+ethical teacher of mankind would say:
+
+    “Man _must_ not be descended from monkeys,” “The earth _shall_
+    not rotate,” “Matter _ought_ not everywhere to fill space,”
+    “Energy _must_ be constant,” and so on.
+
+Why is it ridiculous? Because we cannot prescribe a certain deportment to
+facts. It is however not ridiculous to let a precise and carefully sifted
+knowledge of facts determine our own deportment.
+
+Science has to teach ethics. But here also we should distinguish between
+positive facts and mythology. Ethics based upon mere theories, upon
+our interpretations of nature which we add to facts, is mythological;
+positive ethics is simply that deportment which is suggested by a
+comprehension of the facts themselves.
+
+Mythological ethics may be quite correct, just as much so as the
+application of a mythological theory of science may be within certain
+limits reliable as a working hypothesis. But it is desirable to
+understand the nature of mythological ethics in order to distinguish
+between truth and fiction.
+
+When Professor Mach speaks of sensations as being the elements of the
+world and of things as being complexes of these elements he apparently
+does not use the word sensation in its usual sense. It has ceased to be
+an abstract term which represents one feature only of a process of nature
+and has become a symbol for an entire reality. And is not such a usage of
+terms as if they were not abstracts but the things themselves liable to
+lead to misconceptions?
+
+Professor Mach’s “elements,” it seems to me, are only elements, i.
+e. ultimate and unanalysable materials, if considered as terms of a
+psychological view of the world; they are not elements in the domains of
+other abstractions, such as are made by physiology or physics. Moreover,
+although this method eliminates the duality of soul and body, mind and
+matter, feeling and motion, it does not explain the problem.
+
+Professor Mach might answer that the problem as to the duality of mind
+and matter is a sham problem, just as much as the problem why do we
+see things upright when the retina picture of the eye shows the things
+inverted? But a problem is to him who has solved the problem always a
+sham problem. Every problem disappears as a problem as soon as it is
+solved. It is true that we see as little with the blind spot of the eye
+as with the skin of our back. The problem of the blind spot is not why
+do we not see with the blind spot, (which is simply a matter of fact,)
+but why do we not notice, when using only one eye, its lack of sight
+in a spot surrounded with sight-seeing structures? We have to employ
+artificial means to convince ourselves that we are really blind in that
+spot!
+
+All problems are merely subjective; they are a conflict between two
+conceptions and as Professor Mach himself says, the solution of problems
+consists in the adaptation of thought to facts, i. e. to new facts or new
+views of facts. By an adaptation of our thought to the enlarged field
+of vision the problem vanishes; it has ceased to be a problem. In fact
+it never existed as an objective phenomenon. There are no problems in
+nature. There are problems only to the investigating mind. But even the
+formulation of problems is a problem to be solved, and perhaps the most
+difficult and subtle kind of problems is to discover the flaw in wrongly
+formulated problems.
+
+The problem of the duality of body and soul, matter and mind, feeling
+and motion, ceases to be a problem to him who has worked his way through
+to a monistic conception, but to those who have not as yet succeeded in
+establishing a unitary view of these ideas, because they take them to be
+separate and distinct existences, it is a problem of great importance.
+
+
+XII. THE ONENESS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY.
+
+The world is not rigid being, but activity, not absolute existence but
+a system of changing relations, not an abstract _Sein_ but a concrete
+_Wirklichkeit_—a constant working of cause and effect. There is no
+dualism in this, for the _Wirklichkeit_ is one and undivided.
+
+Yet every relation admits of two standpoints, just as the line _AB_,
+which may serve to represent a certain and definite relation, is
+determinable from both ends, _A_ as well as _B_. Let us call _A_ the
+subject and _B_ the object. Neither _A_ nor _B_ is a reality, a whole
+complete _Wirklichkeit_. A thing in order to be real must be active, it
+must work, it must stand in relation to something else. _A_ is a mere
+mathematical point, but _AB_ representing a process does something, it
+performs work, it is real. A thing in itself, if it could exist at all,
+would be tantamount to non-existence, it would represent a _Sein_ without
+being _Wirklichkeit_. When bearing this in mind, it appears natural
+that the oneness of existence, representable in such relations as is
+that of _AB_ = -_BA_ will admit of two standpoints, _BA_ representing
+subjectivity, and _AB_ representing objectivity. We can consider the
+relation of the world at large to one special point (which latter may
+in its turn stand for a whole system of relations) or vice versa the
+relation of this point to the world at large. The former standpoint is
+that of the microcosm, or the soul, the latter that of the macrocosm or
+the universe; the former results in awareness, the latter appears as
+matter in motion. The former is subjectivity, the latter objectivity.
+
+Reality must not be conceived of as being a compound of the elements of
+feeling and of motion, of subjectivity and objectivity or of kinesis and
+metakinesis. I do not think there are atoms one-half of which contains
+the potentiality of sentience while the other half is freighted with
+energy. I conceive of reality as being one throughout, but, being
+throughout resolvable in relations, it will as a matter of course have
+two sides. What these two sides are like can be known through experience
+only, and experience teaches that under certain conditions the subjective
+side develops into feeling and consciousness, while the objective side is
+represented in the feeling of conscious beings as motions.
+
+This view explains the duality of our conception of psycho-physical
+facts, but it is certainly not dualism. The duality belongs to the
+scaffold not to the facts themselves. The facts can only be thought of
+as being one and undivided, and no conception can stand except it be
+monistic.
+
+Subjectivity and objectivity are terms that express relations and not
+things in themselves. There are, however, philosophers who show a great
+grief unless either the subjectivity of being, or the objectivity of
+being, or the unities in which things or personalities are gathered
+up, are considered as things in themselves. All those features of
+reality which appear to their conception unexplainable, such as the
+relations that obtain among things and especially the thoughts of
+thinking beings are supposed to be the effects of some transcendental
+entity, of a thing in itself. And if a philosophy denies the existence
+of transcendentalistic thought-entities or of any such things in
+themselves, which serve as cement to combine the _disjecta membra_ of
+their world-conception, it is generally declared to lead straight on to
+nihilism—not because the world itself but because their world-system
+would thereby be annihilated.
+
+All things that exist, if considered as separate things, will pass
+away; but if considered as parts of the all-existence of reality, they
+are eternal. In fact things are not separate things, in the sense of
+isolated, absolute, or abstract beings, although we may speak of them as
+such for our ephemeral purposes. All things that exist, the human soul
+included, are and will remain parts of the One and All.
+
+This destroys their individuality as little as a brick ceases to be a
+brick because it serves its part in the building of a dome. The soul of a
+man if his life be well spent, is not annihilated in death, his soul has
+become a living stone in the temple of humanity. It continues to live and
+marches on in the general progress of the race.
+
+We are parts of a great whole now, and we shall remain parts of the same
+great whole forever. We have never been and shall never be transcendental
+selfhoods or metaphysical egos, or any kind of things in themselves. Our
+personality is real life, it is actual being. As such it is bound up in
+the universal life of the One and All and no particle of it will be lost.
+We need not fear death, for the air we breathe is immortality.
+
+                                                                   EDITOR.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[43] Italics are ours. Kant affirms the italicised question.
+
+[44] The problem of “The Origin of the Mind” having been the subject of a
+former paper need not be discussed here. See _The Monist_, Vol i, No. 1,
+p. 69-86, and _The Soul of Man_, pp. 23-46.
+
+[45] It is scarcely necessary to mention that mediæval Realism is
+different from modern Realism.
+
+[46] Aristotle’s idea of matter being potential existence is a fiction.
+Fictions of that kind are useful for certain purposes, but we must not
+forget that they are fictions. We might just as well introduce any
+other system of fictions. For instance we might with certainly not less
+propriety look upon the idea in the mind of an artist as potential
+reality while its appearance in a material shape is conceived to produce
+actual reality.
+
+[47] The term “absolute” is for that reason neither meaningless nor
+redundant. It denotes a certain method of viewing things, but is not an
+objective quality of things.
+
+[48] See the chapter “Soul Life and the Preservation of Form” in _The
+Soul of Man_, p. 418.
+
+[49] The abandonment of the ego as a metaphysical being is not, as it
+appears to many, a surrender of the soul or of its immortality. That
+the immortality of the soul from the standpoint of modern psychology
+is preserved, that it appears in a new light, grander and nobler than
+before, and that this conception of immortality is of an enormous
+practical importance, have been the main incentives of Mr. E. C. Hegeler
+in founding _The Open Court_ and _The Monist_.
+
+
+
+
+LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+FRANCE.
+
+
+The recent work of M. F. PAULHAN, _Le Nouveau Mysticisme_, places us in
+the presence of a feature of modern life, if not extremely important, at
+least very curious.
+
+We assist at the formation of a new spirit. But what is it? What is its
+value? A reply to this question would exact a long and minute analysis
+of all social facts. M. Paulhan does not flatter himself that he has
+exhausted it, and he offers us only portions, although excellent and
+instructive, of the required work. He shows us in rapid review, the
+dissolution of the ancient world, the intellectual and moral anarchy
+which has to-day reached its highest possible point; he seeks, in the
+ruins amidst which we tread, the constructive elements of a new order of
+things, and makes an effort to foresee what it will be.
+
+“The scientific mind,” writes he, “the religious spirit, pity for
+suffering, the sentiment of justice, social mysticism, the attraction for
+mysterious perhaps dangerous facts that we begin to have a glimpse of,
+the kind of new power which the knowledge of them can give us, a general
+need of universal harmony: such are the principal characters of the
+spirit which is forming itself.” They are not, he himself says, all new.
+It is not the presence of these elements which is significant, but rather
+the singular combination in which they occur, and we could say, the
+precipitate that they give in the particular chemical solution where they
+find themselves thrown. In every case, the phenomenon does not affect
+entirely, it seems to us, the same characters, according to whether we
+observe it in the philosophic or scientific order, in the practical
+order, or in that of sentiment, which literature represents. The name
+of mysticism does not belong to every part of the new spirit equally;
+or more exactly, the spirit which is produced could well not be truly
+mysticism, but only a side phenomenon, and the very evident resurrection
+of the spirit which is disappearing.
+
+M. Paulhan, if I do not deceive myself, sometimes allows himself to be
+too much influenced by a certain literature, to which I do not allow a
+very great value, and of which even the sincerity may be suspected. It
+represents at first, to my mind, individual conditions, and it evidently
+impeaches some authors of a morbid diathesis. Many of our prophets, as
+is known in the _Quartier Latin_, have or affect vices which exclude by
+themselves all generating power. Then, it is very difficult, in our age,
+to appreciate exactly the relations of literature to the public mind,
+seeing the diversity of romantic books, and the correlation of one to
+the other is perhaps not so strict, so profound as it has been in other
+junctures of history. In short, the modern romance is a document the
+relative value of which needs to be established by a most severe critic.
+
+Some facts dominate the question, viewed as a whole. It is necessary to
+show the work of the scientific mind, which has the result of creating
+new mental habits. It is necessary to consider also that the disorder,
+_the spirit of evil_, so finely analysed by M. Paulhan, corresponds
+chiefly to the interpretations of ignorance, to the exaggerations of
+sentiment, and to the dreams, more or less monstrous, of inventive
+fantasy. It is necessary, finally, if they wish to augur of the future,
+to endeavor to disengage the laws of construction, still badly defined,
+of our political fabrics. The thought of M. Paulhan is good at bottom,
+and the materials with which he constructs the _possible future_ are
+taken from the positive conditions of our mental and social life: in the
+practical order, “co-operation” is added to the social systems already
+existing, although disturbed, such as the family and the nation; in the
+ideal order, the conception, beyond that of humanity, of a “cosmical
+whole,” and a “universe,” which, to repeat it after Comte, will be
+favorable to man, in a certain sense, seeing that he causes it to exist.
+
+We recommend the reading of this book. One’s time is never lost with
+a thinker of the stamp of M. Paulhan; he has the merit this time of
+disclosing to us in a few pages a vast horizon, where some points are
+delineated with clearness. Logicism has caused much evil in our country.
+Let us now beware of mysticism!
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+One of the most curious episodes of this new mysticism is assuredly
+the Buddhist preaching, begun in France by a small group of writers.
+M. AUGUSTIN CHABOSEAU, one of the representatives of this religious
+tendency, publishes a work, _Essai sur la philosophie boudhique_,[50]
+which it is expedient to mention. M. Chaboseau has thought it would be of
+interest to sum up in a volume the results of the studies on Buddhism,
+and to present it “such as science has proved it, that is to say very
+different from what Christian polemists, worldly amusers, theosophic
+fanatics, endeavor to disseminate.” He has had the ambition to write this
+volume, and for my part, I do not refuse him my curiosity.
+
+But that Buddhism truly contains a religious formula capable of
+attracting to it the souls of our Occident, I have difficulty in
+believing. This India is very far from us, and its confused philosophy
+is behind us. I do not think that the nations of to-day will return to
+a by-gone mode; and then, this doctrine of Sakya-Muni has something
+against it, that I hesitate to say, as it might seem puerile: its god is
+too fat. Its god or its sage, as you wish. Yes, that breadth of form,
+that opulence of flesh, taken as a mark of goodness and power, shocks
+our artistic taste. Do not forget that every religion which claims our
+will ought to satisfy our æsthetic sentiment: it is one of the essential
+factors of the religious sentiment, a compound sentiment where all
+the emotions of a race ought to find their harmony. The opposition of
+India to us, so striking in the ideal of the beautiful, still continues
+in metaphysical speculation. We are too moderate, too sober, for the
+debauches of imagination in which it delights. Buddhism will be to us
+only a passing excrescence, and I ask myself if it lives well in the
+souls where it has sincerely penetrated.
+
+I should have much to do to speak, in the briefest manner, of all the
+books or treatises, which in a direct or indirect manner relate either
+to the war of Aryanism against Semitism, and principally against the
+Christianism in which certain authors see the most disastrous conquest of
+Semitic genius; or to the reviving of mystic traditions, strange dreams,
+and monstrous desires; or to a religious restoration, of which the most
+ordinary prejudice is to assure the immortality of the soul and to reopen
+the beyond to man. These works are in general of slight value; they are
+the multiplication of decays, and we are compelled to consider them as
+social wastes, of which the abundance betrays unquestionably the bad
+health of the organism, or at least a difficult crisis of its evolution.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+But let us return to the works of philosophy properly so-called. What
+are we to think of that of M. F. RAUH? I deceive myself much if his
+_Essai sur le fondement métaphysique der la morale_ is considered of
+much service in his own circles. M. Rauh, who belongs to the philosophic
+youth, the youth of the age, can be well assured that the partisans of
+scientific morality will not upbraid him for “the admiration of high
+metaphysical thoughts” with which he does himself honor, but he can fear
+lest the metaphysicians accuse him of further compromising metaphysics by
+the denser obscurities he casts on it. One is stupefied to find again in
+a modern book a phraseology so made up of abstract words, of substantives
+with capitals, and logical shadows which affect the posture of realities.
+Much study, much work, without advancing one step, and still worse, in
+order to throw us again into the _culs-de-sac_ from whence we have had
+so much difficulty to disengage ourselves. All the profit one can derive
+from this dialectic is to contemplate at the end the vague shadow of its
+own body that is perceived on the wall.
+
+The metaphysicians of a certain school are not only reluctant to have
+to accept that morality is a natural formation, a social product, an
+historical fact; they wish further that the existence even of moral
+society should depend on the intelligence that they have of it, or of
+the explanation that they give of it. They affirm boldly, and these are
+the words even of M. Rauh, that “the fate of morality is united to that
+of metaphysics”—their metaphysics. This is a pretension as exorbitant as
+would be that of a naturalist who should refer the reality of the animal
+world to the idea he formed of zoölogical types, or that of a chemist
+who should subject the value of the positive results of science to a
+particular hypothesis as to the constitution of bodies.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There are certain difficulties of language to criticise in the work of
+M. ISIDORE MAUS, barrister in the Court of Appeals at Brussels, _De la
+justice pénale, étude philosophique sur le droit de punir_. A curious
+spectator, he tells us, of the battle waged between the new school of
+anthropology and the ancient penal jurisprudence, he seeks to divine the
+issue of it. It will probably end, according to him, in the formation of
+a medium penal jurisprudence, which will accept limited responsibilities,
+and which, while protecting society, will do its best “to give to
+punishment all the advantages it can.”
+
+It would be exaggerated no doubt, I willingly grant it, to take away from
+repression every mark of moral reparation, all weight of “reformative
+power”; but I am always shocked to hear partial responsibilities spoken
+of. From the social point of view, the responsibility remains perfect;
+it is united, indeed, to the very act of having caused injury, beyond
+all appreciation. From the point of view of the individual, the word
+responsibility has the grave inconvenience of implying that the quantity
+of liberty or free-will attributable to the delinquent is measured.
+It would be less compromising and more exact, to value simply the
+quality, the worth of the delinquent, according to the totality of
+his affective, intellectual, voluntary, and pathological character,
+according to the nature and the conditions of the act of which he is
+accused, etc. We should thus escape contradictions of words which easily
+become contradictions of fact; we should no more stumble at this latent
+difficulty of free-will, in medium cases—for _serious cases_ are never
+difficult. Words exercise a tyranny which jurists would do well to
+distrust.
+
+Is not this, moreover, just about what M. Maus means by his favorite
+formula—that justice ought “to individualise as much as possible”? It is
+a pity only that he does not present his conclusions with the requisite
+clearness. His exposition is not distinct and frank. He has mental
+habitudes, subtilities of reasoning, which are of value at the Palais,
+but which it is suitable to rid oneself of when writing a book: his would
+gain much by being entirely remodeled, made clear and disentangled.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+M. E. DE LAVELEYE offers to the public a fourth edition, revised and
+considerably augmented, of his great work, _De la propriété et de ses
+formes primitives_. We have not to recall the numerous facts which this
+work contains and the knowledge of which has become sufficiently general;
+nor to commend M. de Laveleye, who no longer expects fresh praises for
+it. I have only to express the regret that he should have retained the
+theory of property expounded in the last chapter of his book, or rather
+the metaphysical conception of right with which he connects it. It seems
+as if he wished to excuse himself from reducing property to the simple
+value of a fact, modifiable in its forms, by indicating as a fixed point
+an “order” which shall be the best, which shall be _known_ and _wished_
+of God, _sought_ and _realised_ by man.
+
+M. de Laveleye knows it as well as any one. Right is only a rule, an
+expression of the relations of men among themselves, in a determined
+geographical and historical medium. Its changes depend, in part on
+external conditions, in part on the characters of man himself, the
+state and variable equilibrium of his passions and of his mentality.
+If certain forms of right establish themselves proportionally, in the
+course of the life of nations, the fact is explained by the constancy
+and the universality of certain conditions, either physical or mental;
+the repetition of social arrangements, which produces ultimately a
+more stable structure and constitutes a sort of axis of development,
+is somewhat analogous, if we may be permitted this comparison, to the
+repetition of the essential elements in all architecture, or of the
+primitive forms in all the products of the ceramic art. What is the
+good of enveloping with mystery the ideal we create ourselves, and of
+rendering obscure a notion that we can positively explain? But let
+us leave here this little quarrel, for it does not touch the solid
+groundwork of the book.
+
+Still to signalise are: _Premiers principes métaphysiques de la
+science de la nature_, translated from Kant by M. M. CH. ANDLER and
+ED. CHAVANNES, who have written an interesting introduction _On the
+philosophy of nature in Kant_; and _L’Année philosophique, Iʳᵉ année_
+1890, published under the direction of F. PILLON, former manager of
+_La Critique philosophique_. There will be found in this last volume
+two profound studies, one by M. Renouvier on the phenomenist method,
+the other by M. Pillon on the criticism of the infinite, an excellent
+article by M. L. Dauriac on philosophy and particularly on the æsthetics
+of Guyau, finally a bibliography of French works which appeared in 1890.
+I wish good success to this publication; it will become valuable, and
+it will be still more so, in my opinion, if M. Pillon, will not recoil
+before the fatigue, no doubt sufficiently great, of adding to the
+Bibliography a critical sketch of the review articles published in the
+course of the year.
+
+                                                            LUCIEN ARRÉAT.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[50] Georges Carré, publisher. The other works mentioned in this article
+belong to the _Librarie Alcan_.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+RECENT GERMAN WORKS IN PSYCHOLOGY.
+
+
+A well-known alienist, Professor Pelman of Bonn, in a recently published
+work, advanced the assertion that the literary taste of the day pointed
+to a considerable decline of the intellectual health of the present
+generation. To him who assumes with Pelman some causal foundation of this
+state of affairs, it is indeed an alarming sight to pass in review the
+show windows of our great book centres Leipsic and Berlin and to discover
+the great number of editions that the products of the literature of a
+certain class are passing through.
+
+Among the books that are at present all the vogue, Tolstoï’s “Kreutzer
+Sonata” stands in the front rank. Numberless articles in the newspapers
+and the magazines have already made this wonderful work the subject of
+discussion, both from the æsthetical and from the moral point of view.
+Now comes a physician, who discusses the psychological aspect of the
+story, and discusses it in a manner which must claim our interest and to
+which in the main points it emphasises we cannot deny our assent.
+
+Dr. H. BECK has published at the house of Rauert and Rocco of Leipsic,
+a brochure bearing the title _Des Grafen Leo Tolstoï Kreutzer Sonate
+vom Standpunkte des Irrenarztes_, and arrives on the basis of a careful
+analysis at the result that Tosdnischew is a decidedly neuropathical
+character. Now as Tolstoï, on his own express declaration in his
+concluding remarks, places his own views in Tosdnischew’s mouth, this
+judgment respecting the principal character of the story also holds
+good in great measure of its author. Generally, indeed, Beck is very
+considerate towards Tolstoï’s person, in the expression of his opinions;
+but he is nevertheless very plainly outspoken when he says at the
+conclusion of his little book: “Let us characterise this monstrous
+product, the ‘Kreutzer Sonata,’ as that which it appears to every person
+of sound sentiments—as the emanation, namely, of a diseased brain, of a
+degenerated Psyche.”
+
+The Munich physician Dr. Puschmann, who in the year 1873 in a special
+treatise represented Richard Wagner, then still alive, as psychically
+diseased, has thus found, as we see, in a certain sense a successor
+in Dr. Beck. But while Puschmann’s pamphlet, having been occasioned
+by certain conditions of affairs in Munich, was written in a hostile
+spirit, and while the little book of Beck’s makes no secret of its
+author’s aversion to Tolstoï and his works, a notorious representative
+of unhealthy “young Germany,” the novelist Wilhelm Walloth, meets at
+other hands with an uncommonly tender treatment. There is indeed nothing
+remarkable in this, for if anyone is in need of tender treatment it is
+a man who is sick. But it is very remarkable that the diseased state of
+a nervous system should be accredited to the writer Walloth as a great
+poetic excellence.
+
+G. LUDWIGS, the author of the treatise _Wilhelm Walloth_, Leipsic, 1891,
+Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich, had in so far the advantage of Puschmann
+and Beck, that he was not placed under the necessity of originally
+demonstrating what the actual state of the nervous system of his hero
+was, from his works. This condition had already been established by
+expert physicians in a much talked of trial before the District Court of
+Leipsic for circulating obscene publications. Ludwigs was able therefore
+to proceed immediately with his problem of ascertaining the extent to
+which a diseased state of the nervous system had effect in Walloth’s
+novels and poems. His discussion of this last question possesses great
+interest for the psychologist, although the reader will find considerable
+difficulty in accommodating his thoughts to Ludwigs’s occasionally very
+singular style. Setting aside the odd expressions of Ludwigs, we may
+say that there is exhibited in a pre-eminent degree in the writings of
+Walloth, first, what the physicians call hyperæsthesia, and by this
+is meant not only an excessive sensitiveness of the senses but also—a
+condition that is connected with the last—an extraordinary intensity of
+the emotional activity. Secondly, are found numberless bold associations
+of ideas which are much better known to the physician than to the
+æsthetician.
+
+Unfortunately Walloth is not the only one of the representatives of
+“young Germany,” in whose works the characters of disease appear in such
+intensity, and the circumstance that books of this class are bought in
+such numbers and read in still greater, places the tastes and sentiments
+of a large portion of the educated German public in a questionable light.
+
+If we turn our glance away from the sensational phenomena of literature
+to the phenomena of ordinary life, which are not uncommonly enacted in
+the halls of justice, it is in first rank the incorrigible swindlers and
+sharpers that excite our attention. We have received on this subject from
+Dr. ANTON DELBRUECK, a physician of a Swiss insane asylum, an interesting
+little work bearing the title _Die pathologische Lüge und die psychisch
+abnormen Schwindler_, Stuttgart, 1891, Verlag von Ferdinand Enke. In
+this book the author makes an investigation of the gradual transition of
+a normal psychological process into processes exhibiting pathological
+symptoms, and shows, in so doing, by ample material, that in every kind
+of intentional deception the consciousness of intention can exhibit very
+different degrees of intensity and can imperceptibly sink in a succession
+of cases to zero. As a matter of course, Delbrück’s treatise is primarily
+of interest to medical experts and lawyers, but it will also be of
+interest in a secondary degree to all circles that devote their attention
+to psychological studies generally, particularly so to educators who
+have not infrequently to do with pathological lies, as G. Stanley Hall
+quite recently pointed out in a very instructive article in _The America
+Journal of Psychology_ on the lying of children, and as is developed in
+the work of Dr. Sollier, before mentioned in _The Monist_, entitled _La
+psychologie de l’idiot et l’imbécile_, which is also to be had in a very
+good German edition, translated by Paul Brie, under the title _Der Idiot
+und der Imbecille_, published by Leopold Voss of Hamburg.
+
+In the German edition of Sollier’s book Professor Pelman, whom we have
+above mentioned, has written an introduction in which he speaks of the
+work in words of praise similar to those expressed by Lucien Arréat in
+_The Monist_. “Sollier,” says he, “has put us into the possession of a
+psychology of mental imbecility, in a completeness in which hitherto
+it was not at our disposal.” Then follows another passage which we
+will also quote, as it forms an important supplement to the remarks
+of Arréat. It is this: “Imbecility had remained the step-child of the
+science of psychiatry and has not by any means met with the consideration
+which in view of its social importance is due to it. If we go through
+the works, as great in number as they are in voluminousness, which
+have been published in the style of Lombroso on criminals and their
+peculiar characteristics, we shall be unable to escape the impression
+produced in our minds that the characteristics of imbeciles portrayed by
+Sollier recur point for point in the typical criminal. Here as there,
+the same insufficiency of all ethical development, the same frivolity,
+and the same incapacity for being of use in society exist. That which
+in Sollier’s explanation decides the whole anthropological position of
+the imbecile—his anti-social, society-hostile attitude—is emphasised by
+all writers as the characteristic trait common to all criminals, and
+the description of imbeciles and criminals coincides as completely in
+this respect as if the same individual had sat for both pictures. The
+conclusions that follow from this can only enlist new adherents in the
+ranks of the anthropological school, and this result also I should place
+to the profit-account of the present book.”
+
+However profitable and necessary employment with the diseased states of
+the human soul may be, personally at least it is an unpleasant subject
+for us, and we are glad therefore that we may abandon this domain for the
+present letter.
+
+The occasion of this is afforded by a valuable gift from Prof. W. PREYER,
+formerly of Jena, now of Berlin. Professor Preyer has presented us with
+a rather large volume bearing the title _Wissenschaftliche Briefe von
+Gustav Theodor Fechner und W. Preyer. Nebst einem Briefweschsel zwischen
+K. von Vierordt und Fechner sewie mehreren Beilagen. Mit dem Bildnisse
+Fechner’s und vier Holzschnitten_. Hamburg und Leipsic, 1890. Verlag
+von Leopold Voss. The work contains a correspondence extending from the
+year 1873 to the year 1883, in which the two distinguished scientists
+discuss (chiefly) myo-physical and psycho-physical questions, and will
+be of great interest to many readers of _The Monist_, especially as it
+makes its appearance simultaneously with the issuing of a new edition of
+Fechner’s _Elemente der Psychophysik_ by Wilhelm Wundt.
+
+The much fought over and much disputed province of psycho-physics has
+also been entered on by a younger psychologist, who has already acquired
+a considerable name,—by Hugo Münsterberg, docent at the university of
+Freiburg in Baden. In his _Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie_,
+which are published in parts at indefinite periods by Mohr of Freiburg in
+Baden—three parts have already been published—Münsterberg raises, in the
+first place, a vigorous protest against Wundt; repudiating on the basis
+of the results of independent experiment the apperception hypothesis
+which has been propounded by the scientist mentioned, and producing proof
+that all kinds of so-called apperception are reducible to associations
+of the representative activity. Secondly, he offers us in the third part
+a new foundation on which to base psycho-physics. It is, of course,
+impossible, in so difficult a subject, to reproduce briefly yet clearly
+the developments to which Münsterberg devotes one hundred and twenty-two
+pages. But we will at least supply a few hints with regard to what this
+new foundation of psycho-physics is.
+
+In the first place, Münsterberg rejects the notion that prevails with
+Fechner and his school, that a powerful sensation is a multiple of a
+weaker one, by which the first can be measured. The stronger sensation
+is, says he, in comparison with the weaker one something wholly new;
+for, accurately considered, the intensity of a sensation is also of a
+qualitative nature. However, we are not by any means at liberty to infer
+from this that the measurement of psychical quantities is impossible.
+To appreciate this, it is first requisite that we should get clear
+ideas with respect to the psychological foundation of our physical
+measurements. The only foundation of these last is our muscular feeling,
+to this extent, that all measurement is founded on the measurement of
+quantities of space, time, and mass, and any estimate of the latter is
+only possible on the basis of the muscular feeling that enters as a
+factor in the conceptions involved. All physical measurement rests on the
+establishment, and therefore reproduction, of _like_ muscular sensations;
+on exactly the same foundation rests also all measurement of psychical
+quantities, of intensities of sensation, and since this foundation is
+the same, for this very reason the same justification is due to the
+measurement of psychical intensity as is due to physical measurements.
+This is the foundation on which the psycho-physics of Münsterberg is
+raised, which for a fuller view must be studied in the third part of the
+“Beiträge” itself.
+
+                                                                CHR. UFER.
+
+Altenburg, November, 1891.
+
+
+
+
+DIVERSE TOPICS.
+
+
+
+
+THE CLERGY’S DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE TO DOGMA AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
+WORLD-CONCEPTIONS.
+
+
+A late number of the _Gegenwart_ of Berlin (Vol. xl, No. 30) contained
+an article by Mr. Eugene Schiffer, a German justice, on the subject
+“World-Conception and the Office of Judge,” in which attention was called
+to the fact that the performance of duties, not only in the pulpit
+but in all the professions, and preëminently in the dispensation of
+justice through the courts, depends upon and stands in a more or less
+close connection with some definite world-conception; thus showing that
+religion of some kind forms and must form the background of the practical
+life of society. He says:
+
+    “The Church demands of its disciples as an indispensable
+    condition of serving her the confession of a certain
+    world-conception; she requires that every one who intends to
+    take upon himself her rights and duties, should in his inmost
+    heart agree with her concerning the contents of her faith,
+    especially concerning the dogmas on eschatology, on God and
+    world, body and soul, the origin and end of things; and this
+    is but a matter of course, for the essential part and also the
+    foundation of her activity lie in these very doctrines and in
+    their propagation. It is a hard and a severe demand. Although
+    on the one hand the morally free fulfilment of her requests
+    contains the germ of an harmonious development of life and
+    promises an extraordinary concentration and elevation of all
+    faculties, it leads on the other hand to serious conflicts, of
+    which the pages of history not less than the experiences of our
+    daily life exhibit innumerable and sad instances. We recollect
+    the terrible spiritual struggles in the souls of those who
+    commenced to doubt, and the outcome is generally a pitiful
+    catastrophe, either submission and hypocrisy with the weak,
+    or tribulation, renunciation, and ruin with those who thought
+    higher of truth than of their worldly emoluments.
+
+    “Most of the other professions and trades know nothing of the
+    indispensability of a certain world-conception. The merchant,
+    the mechanic, the lawyer, the soldier, the teacher, the
+    laborer, can upon the whole think concerning these highest
+    problems of life as they please. An inner and ideal conflict
+    between their views and their calling seems definitely
+    excluded. Outer and practical conditions—such as administrative
+    injunctions of a certain kind, the aspiration of progress, the
+    ambition to be better off, etc.—may sometimes produce conflicts.
+
+    “Yet this character of indifference concerning a general
+    world-conception which is found in the secular professions and
+    trades does not bear the stamp of permanence. For ultimately
+    the entire doing and achieving of every thinking man, so far
+    as it rises above the mere vegetative functions, is intimately
+    connected with that common world-conception which everywhere
+    influences and guides him. This is unnoticeable so long as the
+    harmony of the connection remains undisturbed, but it manifests
+    itself in consciousness as soon as its harmony is threatened
+    through some important change of any of its parts. Even to-day
+    a deep-going change is preparing itself; even now the struggle
+    about the world-conception is fought more severely and more
+    bitterly than ever and a new doctrine goes far enough to
+    uncover the ultimate roots of our civilisation, of our position
+    in life, of our calling; it attacks and shakes the present
+    world-conception.
+
+    “This implies the possibility of a conflict between the old
+    and the new faith even outside the pale of the church, and
+    this conflict may influence the choice of a calling. This
+    possibility has become an imminent probability concerning the
+    office of judge, especially the judge of a criminal court.
+
+    “The dispensation of justice rests to a great extent upon the
+    presupposition of guilt and the criminal law of to-day is
+    almost throughout built upon this idea of guilt. It is true
+    that this view has not always been taken. The Greek law and
+    the old Germanic law interfered even in the gravest cases
+    exclusively on account of the objective state of things without
+    taking into consideration the criminal intent of the defendant.
+    But this view was superseded in the former case by the Roman,
+    in the latter by the canonical law, both requiring the
+    conception of a moral and a subjective guilt, and at present
+    the criminal law of every civilised nation (with the sole
+    exception of the Chinese who threaten with capital punishment
+    him who accidentally kills no less than the intentional
+    murderer) rests upon the foundation of a belief in guilt.
+
+    “But there is no room for guilt in the materialistic
+    world-conception. Everything that happens, the activity of the
+    human soul included is to be explained according to mechanical
+    principles and thus the view that man’s will is not free is
+    proposed as one of its fundamental doctrines. While in this
+    way there is no possibility left that a man might have acted
+    differently than he actually did, this view takes away his
+    responsibility. And this movement which either cancels or
+    weakens the momentum of guilt, has taken hold of the minds of
+    men far beyond the circle of decided materialists.
+
+    “The foundation of our criminal law stands or falls with the
+    idea of guilt. With it stands and falls also the office of
+    the judge, whose duty is the dispensation and utilisation of
+    justice. He who does not believe in the possibility of guilt
+    cannot without inconsistency pronounce any one guilty. He who
+    as a matter of principle or at least within certain not well
+    defined limits denies the freedom of the human will can no
+    longer serve as a judge, certainly not as a criminal judge.”
+
+Justice Eugene Schiffer is a conservative man. He demands that for the
+protection of the old world-conception the office of judge should be
+carefully guarded against such intruders as are not in sympathy with the
+present world-conception. He says:
+
+    “Exactly as the church, in order to preserve herself and
+    to guard against her theology being diluted into a watery
+    philosophy of religion, is bound not to separate the conditions
+    of her life from a definite world-conception, so also justice,
+    in order to deserve its name, should oblige its servants to
+    take a definite position toward the ultimate world-problems....
+    He who does not accept in his conviction the moral foundations
+    of a certain calling, must not choose it, or if he has chosen
+    it, he must renounce it—or he must in his profession act
+    against his conviction—unless he risks being discharged from
+    his office on account of a neglect of duties.”
+
+We agree with Justice Schiffer in one most important point, viz.,
+the intimate connection of religion with practical life and of our
+world-conception with all our doing and achieving. But we differ from him
+in another no less important point, viz., in the proposition to prevent
+the present world-conception from undergoing a further growth and higher
+evolution. His proposition is nothing less than to make humanity and all
+its institutions stationary.
+
+Everything that exists has a natural right to defend its existence, and
+so has the present world-conception. But that which grows and develops
+out of the conditions of the present existence has also a natural
+right to attain existence. The ideal world of the “is to be” is not a
+non-existence, as it might appear to the unknowing, but a germ existence,
+and if there is no room for both the actual existence of the present
+state and the germ existence of a new state, a struggle will ensue. There
+are at present and always have been many spurious world-conceptions
+which if they overcame the present world-conception would lead humanity
+backward to the beginning of civilisation. Indeed most propositions of
+reform are reversals which would undo the results of evolution and reduce
+mankind to primitive conditions. The fermenting minds of those who still
+hope to cure all the ills and woes of society by one stroke, have not
+yet outgrown the idea of the perfection, nobility, and happiness of the
+so-called original state of nature,
+
+    “When wild in woods the noble savage ran.”
+
+Yet among all the plans of reform there is one which is correct,
+answering the wants of the time; and among all the world-conceptions
+which struggle to exist there is also one which is the legitimate outcome
+of the present world-conception. It is the present world-conception
+enlarged through additional experience and purified of certain errors.
+And it is an often repeated occurrence in history that the old and the
+new, father and son, have to fight with each other. The heir apparent
+either does not know that he is the child of his antagonist, or the
+latter the defendant of the present state does not know that he fights
+with his own son. This often repeated fact has found a mythological
+expression in the old Teutonic song of Hildebrand meeting in combat his
+son Hadubrand, a legend which in similar versions appears again in other
+Aryan sagas, the best known of which is the tale of Rustem’s struggle
+with Sohrab in Firdus’s great Iranian epic.
+
+Can the struggle between the old and the new world-conception be avoided?
+No, it cannot and should not, for the new has to prove its legitimacy
+by showing its intrinsic strength; it must show that it has the power
+to exist. The struggle cannot be avoided, but the bitterness, the
+severity, the barbarity of the struggle can be avoided. Let Hildebrand
+and Hadubrand measure swords in a spiritual encounter, let the vanquished
+ideas yield to the stronger ideas, and they will prepare the gradual
+change of an evolution instead of the sudden rupture of a revolution.
+
+Freedom of thought is always the best soil for a peaceful evolution
+but any system that binds the consciences of men and ties their ideas
+down to the average level of a certain age will be as dangerous as a
+boiler without a valve. There are periods of instability in history
+when the strengthening of the conservative spirit by imposing fetters
+upon the consciences of men appears useful and almost a condition for
+the development of some kind of a civilisation. This found expression
+in the historic legends of Lycurgus and Solon, binding their countrymen
+by oath not to alter the laws of the state. But these periods are after
+all ephemeral, and we ought to know by this time that we cannot bid
+the sun stand still or check the spirit of progress and the growth of
+mankind. There are nations which develop slowly because they rush into
+innovations, but there are other nations which have gone to the wall
+because of over-conservatism through which they were induced to suppress
+the freedom of thought and to deny the right of doubting the absolute
+validity of the prevailing world-conception.
+
+The proposition of Justice Schiffer to bind the conscience of the judge
+by an oath of allegiance to that world-conception which is at present
+recognised as orthodox, is actually a law in the constitution of the
+church, and conflicts in the consciences of clergymen are of a common
+occurrence. The opinion that a clergyman who has ceased to believe in
+certain dogmas of his church has to resign this position is very common
+among freethinkers as well as orthodox believers. At first sight this
+seems to be the only choice left to a man of honesty and a lover of
+truth. I held this opinion myself for a long time. There is nevertheless
+another view of the subject which caused me to change my opinion
+entirely, and I am glad to perceive that such a man as Mr. Moncure
+D. Conway who held himself a position in the church and having grown
+more and more liberal has retired from active service, declares most
+emphatically that a clergyman who has grown liberal should not resign
+but stay in the church and wait till the church forces him to leave his
+position. This is an honest course, a clergyman has a right to pursue it
+and he will thereby open the eyes of his fellow-men; he will further the
+interests of mankind, and people will thus be enabled to judge better
+whether or not it is just to impose these burdens upon the pastors of the
+church.
+
+Let us consider the case more closely. First, the oath which a young
+clergyman gives at his ordination is a promissory oath, and like all
+promissory oaths it holds good on the supposition that all the main
+conditions remain the same. If a man promises and binds himself by
+an oath to start to-morrow morning on a journey he does so on the
+supposition that it will be possible. So far as he can foresee it
+is possible, but incidents may happen which will make it impossible
+to-morrow. A promissory oath will be a weight on the conscience if it has
+to be broken, but it has no legal force. Thus soldiers swear an oath of
+allegiance to their king, and under ordinary circumstances there will be
+no cause for doubt as to the propriety of remaining faithful to the oath.
+But many cases of great perplexity will appear when a civil war splits a
+nation in twain so that brother stands against brother and faithfulness
+to the king may be the most degrading felony toward one’s highest and
+holiest ideals, perhaps also toward one’s bodily parents and nearest
+kin. Who does not recollect the sad end of Ludwig II, king of Bavaria.
+When the mind of the unfortunate monarch was too much deranged to leave
+him in possession of his royal power, a commission of several authorised
+men went to the castle where he resided to place him under the care of
+a physician. The king refused to receive the commission and ordered his
+faithful guards by whom he was surrounded to seize the commission, gouge
+out their eyes and treat them otherwise in the most outrageous way. The
+commission not being protected were for a moment in great danger, but
+happily the guards perceiving the seriousness of the situation did not
+execute the king’s orders and we might say,—broke their oath.
+
+Did they really break their oath? No, they did not, for when they were
+sworn to obey their sovereign master and lord, it was supposed that the
+king was and would remain in his right mind. He became insane and this
+changed the situation entirely.
+
+The oath of allegiance which the ministers of a church swear at their
+ordination is made in the bona fide conviction on both sides,—the church
+on the one side and the man that takes orders on the other side,—that
+the dogmas to which he pledges his troth are the truth. The oath holds
+good so long as a minister believes that the dogmas of the church are the
+truth; it still holds good so long as he considers it possible that they
+may be true. But the oath to believe them ceases to bind in the sense in
+which it was demanded as soon as a minister sees clearly that they are
+not true and that their truth is an actual impossibility. It ranks in the
+same category as the oath of allegiance to a sovereign who has become
+insane.
+
+But the case is more complex still. If promissory oaths have no legal
+force because in certain cases a man would have to act against the letter
+of the oath, have these oaths no binding power whatever, as soon as a
+minister recognises the incongruity of the church belief with truth? I
+should say that they have a binding power, yet this binding power must be
+sought not in the letter but in the spirit of the oath.
+
+One of the most prominent of juridical authorities, Prof. Rudolf von
+Jhering, has written a book entitled “Der Zweck im Recht.” He finds that
+all laws, all wills, all decrees have a purpose, and this purpose is
+their spirit. There are laws worded so badly that obedience to the letter
+of the law would under certain and unforeseen circumstances enforce
+exactly the contrary of that which the law was made for. Instances of
+this kind are of not an uncommon occurrence especially with regard to
+wills; testators and their legal advisors being often unable to formulate
+their intentions in a logical shape. Jhering maintains that a judge in
+construing a will, a decree, or a law has to find out the intention and
+purpose of the testator, the magistrate that gave the decree, or the
+legislator, and it is this intention or purpose with which his decisions
+have to agree. Supposing however that this purpose of a will or a law
+is wrong in itself or nonsensical, a judge has to construe it so that
+it will have sense. If the purpose is criminal the whole transaction is
+illegal, if it is irrational or illogical, it has to be interpreted so as
+to make it rational and logical. If it has reference to antiquated views,
+customs or institutions it has to be adapted to the corresponding modern
+views and to existing conditions.
+
+An instance from practical life will explain the last point. There are
+many institutions in Northern Germany which were founded as cloisters or
+monasteries. The nuns and monks have been engaged partly in teaching,
+partly in attending to the sick, and in other useful purposes. The funds
+of these institutions exist still, and serve now those purposes directly
+which they have served formerly indirectly through the service of nuns
+and monks. Most of them are employed for the maintenance of schools,
+some of them as hospitals, others as homes for unmarried daughters
+of government officials or for homeless aristocratic ladies without
+means, etc. These changes have been wrought by history as the natural
+consequence of new conditions. Many of them were made in actual violation
+of the letter of the testators’ will; yet they were made bona fide with
+the intention to remain faithful to its spirit? The question is not what
+a testator intended his will to be half a millennium ago, but what he
+would intend it to be in the living present, knowing all the changes
+which the progress of the times have wrought and having progressed with
+the times.
+
+Before we answer the question, What is the purpose of the minister’s
+oath? we should first see clearly, what is the purpose of the church. Is
+the purpose of the church really to be sought in the propaganda of some
+absurd dogmas? Or does not rather the preaching of these dogmas itself
+serve a purpose?
+
+The dogmas of Christianity were some time ago supposed to be the
+indispensable instruments of ethical instruction. All the churches are
+educational institutions to inculcate the moral ought on the basis of
+a popular world-conception. The church of England for instance is a
+national institute and it is not true that one church party has the
+right to impose its religious conception upon the rest of the nation.
+When the church was founded some crude notions were taken to be absolute
+truths and no man can at the present time be required to believe these
+crudities. All institutions are conservative but most conservative are
+the courts of justice and the church. The conservatism of jurisprudence
+is characterised in the saying which appears to be its leading principle
+_fiat justicia et pereat mundus_. Jurisprudence too often forgets that
+the dispensation of justice serves the purpose of sustaining life,
+of promoting the general welfare and enhancing the prosperity of the
+community; it overlooks the spirit and clings to the letter.
+
+Our justices are inclined to believe that if a new world-conception
+arises, (which by the bye will as we believe not be materialistic nor
+will it destroy the idea of moral responsibility, although it may
+change our views about guilt,) their whole system of jurisprudence
+will break down. They are afraid of a _pereat justicia et vivat
+mundus_. Justice Schiffer is not at all anxious to prove the truth of
+the old world-conception, he is satisfied with proving that the new
+world-conception is incompatible with the old view of justice. Criminal
+law means punishment and punishment presupposes the idea of guilt. He
+argues:
+
+“The question remains whether the conflict between the new and the old
+world-conception could be avoided by adapting our views of justice to the
+new world-conception; yet this question is to be denied, for the notions
+of guilt and punishment belong to each other according to logical,
+ethical, and moral principles. To punish without assuming guilt is as
+nonsensical as it is immoral.”
+
+It would lead us too far here to show that moral responsibility still
+subsists on the supposition of a strict determinism and that the
+criminal law with its punishments will not be abolished in the future.
+Yet there is no doubt that our views of punishment will have to be
+changed; indeed they have changed and how much they have changed, can
+be learned by a comparison of an execution of to-day with one of a few
+hundred years ago. The idea of punishment in the sense of inflicting
+pain as a retribution has gone and it has gone forever. There is no more
+burning of the criminal with hot irons, or twitching with hot tongs,
+or tearing out his tongue, or stretching on the wheel. The criminal is
+executed with as little pain to him as possible. Why this change? Because
+a new world-conception has entirely altered our views of punishment
+and it is going to alter them still more. Penology is not to be based
+upon sentimentality as some so-called philanthropists intend to do;
+nevertheless it is to and it will become humane because we have abandoned
+the old conception of guilt which as Justice Schiffer correctly states
+was a fundamental idea in the old jurisprudence, and this antiquated
+conception of guilt has partly but not as yet entirely been overcome.
+
+The church is in a position similar to that of the criminal law courts.
+A change of our world-conception has set in and the church is not as
+yet adapted to the change. The church having found it necessary for its
+purpose of preaching ethics to insist on the belief in a world-conception
+which demonstrates a moral world order, now attempts to perpetuate
+certain errors of our ancestors’ conception of this moral world-order.
+
+The oath of a clergyman having been asked and given bona fide on the
+supposition that the dogmas of the church were the truth, holds good
+still, but it must be construed as in similar cases a judge would have
+to construe a faulty will or an ill-worded law. It has to be construed in
+the spirit and not in the letter.
+
+Clergymen who have grown liberal should not leave the church. It is their
+duty to stay in the church and to make their influence felt to broaden
+the spirit of the church. If the church removes them from their position,
+they yield to the authority at present in power, but they should not
+yield without a struggle, to be conducted on their part modestly but
+firmly, with reverence toward their authorities, with tact and decency,
+but fearlessly and bravely, for they are fighting not only for their
+personal interests but for the progress of mankind, they are fighting for
+the holiest treasures of the church—for truth.
+
+The abolition of these burdens on the consciences of the clergy would
+be a natural consequence of repeated struggles. Let a pastor be bound
+to respect his church authorities, to obey them in all matters of
+administration, let him be bound to revere the ecclesiastical traditions
+of which he should never speak lightly, but do not prescribe to him a
+belief of any kind. Pledge him to serve the truth, to speak the truth and
+to live the truth; and that simple pledge will have more weight than the
+requirement to believe dogmas which, his superiors know but too well can
+no longer be believed literally but must be taken _cum grano salis_.
+
+Christ says concerning the observances insisted upon by the Scribes
+and Pharisees: “They bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne: and
+lay them upon men’s shoulders.” This passage is applicable also to the
+present system of ordination. Christ’s saying is read in the churches and
+it is, as most of his words are, as new to-day as it was at his time,
+but who thinks of its application to our present system of burdening the
+consciences of men?
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+
+
+A COMMENT BY PROF. F. MAX MÜLLER CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION ON EVOLUTION
+AND LANGUAGE.
+
+
+_To the Editor of The Monist:_
+
+I must thank you and Professor Romanes for the frank and searching
+criticism to which you have both subjected my article on “Thought and
+Language,” published in _The Monist_. You have shown that you care for
+truth and not for victory, and you have carefully abstained from any
+personal remarks which are so apt to embitter scientific controversy
+and in consequence to render its chief object, the discovery of more
+truth, illusory. We all have the same object, we all want to know what
+is true—why then should we not all work together, listen to friendly
+criticism, accept useful advice, confess our mistakes, and work as hard
+as we can in the special field allotted to each of us.
+
+As soon as I find a little more leisure, I shall not fail to reply fully
+to both your articles. At present I only write to you to defend myself
+against an undeserved charge brought against me by Professor Romanes.
+I had said that Professor Romanes had no right to speak of men like
+Noiré, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say nothing of Hobbes, with an air
+of superiority. Professor Romanes replies that he never mentioned Mr.
+Herbert Spencer at all, that it would have been well for me, if, before
+condemning his supposed treatment of Herbert Spencer, Huxley, and Noiré,
+I had looked at his Index. This is a serious charge. It would show a
+want of accuracy unpardonable in a scholar. It is true, Mr. Herbert
+Spencer’s name does not occur in the Index. But on p. 230 we read: “So
+here again we meet with additional proof, were any required, of the folly
+of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.” Now
+it is well known that it is Mr. Herbert Spencer who regards the copula
+as an essential ingredient of a proposition. I have shown that the facts
+of language are against Mr. Herbert Spencer, but I should not therefore
+think it right to charge him with folly. This will show that if I wrote
+without Index, I did not write without book.
+
+                               Yours truly,
+
+                                                            F. MAX MÜLLER.
+
+Oxford, Oct. 28, 1891.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK REVIEWS.
+
+
+SYNOPTIKER. APOSTELGESCHICHTE. Bearbeitet von Professor _H. J. Holzmann_.
+Zweite verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Freiburg, i. B.: Akademische
+Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr. 1892.
+
+This book is the first volume of the “Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament”
+edited by the Professors H. Holtzmann, R. A. Lipsius, P. W. Schmiedel,
+and H. v. Soden.
+
+No better man could have been selected for the first part of this great
+work than Prof. H. J. Holtzmann, who is not only a theologian of most
+comprehensive scholarship but also has devoted his energies to this
+special subject. He has lectured regularly for a number of years at
+the university of Strassburg six or eight times weekly on the synoptic
+gospels and three times weekly on the Acts. The principle of his
+method has been laid down in a former work of his, viz. “Lehrbuch der
+historisch-kritischen Einleitung in das Neue Testament.” The present book
+contains an enormously voluminous material condensed into a comparatively
+small space of 448 pp. large octavo. The author being a theologian his
+attitude toward his subject is naturally reverent, paying an unreserved
+homage to the greatness of Jesus. Yet at the same time his investigations
+are strictly scientific and in accordance with the rules of criticism
+as employed in any historical investigation. It is no exaggeration to
+consider Professor Holtzmann’s work as representative in the highest
+degree; it embraces the most complete knowledge at present attainable and
+that too in a most concise form as a practical handbook with parallel
+tables and indexes of reference for students of the New Testament.
+
+The author first formulates “the synoptic problem,” which has been solved
+after innumerable vain attempts by the so-called “Marcus-Hypothesis,”
+which is at present considered as satisfactory, because it alone fulfils
+every condition and explains all the difficulties. Holtzmann regards
+the figure of Christ as historical. The impression of his powerful
+personality was a living presence in the first congregation at Jerusalem.
+But all the interest centred in his words. The words of their Lord were
+faithfully preserved by oral tradition. Sentences so short and yet so
+pregnant with meaning as “Blessed are the peacemakers,” or “Ye are the
+salt of the earth,” “But let your communication be, Yea, yea: Nay,
+nay, etc.,” are so impressive that whoever has heard them once, will
+never forget them. The interest in the word was soon complemented by
+an interest in facts and events which was much later followed by an
+interest in dogma. The first differences among the Christians originated
+through the mission among the heathens. The gentile Christian became
+indifferent concerning the Jewish traditions and clung with all his
+religious enthusiasm to the Christ as his saviour. Christianity became
+a cosmic religion while the Jewish Christians still looked upon Christ
+as the Messiah of the people of Israel. The Jewish view of Christianity
+is represented by Matthew, the gentile view by Luke. Mark however does
+not show any development of dogma. According to Papias, the Apostle
+St. Peter had whenever it became necessary for an explanation of the
+words of Christ, occasionally told certain events of the life of Jesus;
+which were afterwards written down by Mark. We find in Mark, Matthew,
+and Luke the same building stones, but how differently arranged! Mark
+shows evidence of relating real facts of history, he begins with John
+the Baptist, tells us how Jesus became baptised, how he preached the
+kingdom of God; according to Mark, Jesus does not declare himself as the
+Messiah from the beginning. His activity grows by degrees, his disciples
+increase, he heals the sick, and it is from the mouth of these that
+he was first proclaimed as the Messiah. He becomes a power among the
+people and makes himself offensive to the authorities who consider him
+as dangerous and attempt to take his life. Jesus forbids those whom he
+heals to proclaim that he is the Messiah. He sends out his disciples not
+to preach him as the Messiah, but to proclaim the kingdom. At last in
+Peter the idea dawns that prompts him to declare: “Thou art the Christ.”
+Yielding before the persecution of his enemies, Jesus travels North and
+East and here he accustoms himself to the idea of a suffering son of man.
+His self-confidence increases and he travels courageously to Jerusalem
+where, as he could foresee, he would meet his fate. The drama of his
+life culminates in his word “ἐγώ εἰμι” (1462) in which he reveals his
+self-consciousness as being the Messiah. Being triumphantly hailed in
+Jerusalem by people of Galilee and such as believed in him he hastened
+his doom. It is not likely that Jesus could have publicly been held to
+be the Messiah for any length of time, for the Roman police was wont
+to suppress such movements without discrimination. They did not stop
+to investigate the case as to the character or motive of the movement
+whether or not it was purely religious or political. They never tolerated
+any “son of David” or “king of Israel” who held any influence over large
+masses of the people.
+
+While Mark still preserves the development of Jesus’s messianic
+consciousness, Luke as well as Matthew have entirely obliterated it.
+According to Mark, Jesus proclaims the kingdom; Matthew and Luke make
+him preach his person. They make Jesus proclaim himself as the Messiah
+from the very beginning and his command not to speak it out openly given
+to those whom he healed and also to his disciples has no sense here.
+Matthew has a liking for cabalistic numbers, there are three times
+seven generations the names of which are not without doing violence to
+historical facts adjusted to the pattern, there are three temptations,
+seven parables, etc. Throughout we notice reflection, purposive selection
+of the material, and artificial adjustment to a plan. The book has a
+tendency to show that Jesus was the King of Israel predicted by the
+prophets and in the psalms. Luke on the other hand has also a dogmatic
+programme. It is the gospel of gentile Christianity as founded by Paul.
+
+The critical school finds adversaries among theologians as well as
+unchristian thinkers, both of whom are apt to speak of fraud when
+religious books are written with certain dogmatic tendencies. Professor
+Holtzmann objects to such a view of the development of Christianity. He
+says that a religion which did not rouse sufficient enthusiasm to develop
+a religious poetry would be very poor and lifeless. Even the apocrypha of
+the New Testament are evidence of the vigor of the new religion, although
+we must be aware of the fact that the Church showed good judgment when
+adopting its canon to accept those which were full of moral meaning and
+to reject those which were mere myth without any deeper significance.
+
+We have given this abstract of one part of Holtzmann’s work with
+the omission of all the learned by-work for those not familiar with
+theological investigation. Similar results are obtained by an inquiry
+into the origin of the Acts. The apostles were the first and living
+representatives of the Christ. Out of the interest in the apostles’ words
+grew an interest in their actions and lives, and there are a great many
+writings of this subject preserved. One only has been received into the
+canon.
+
+It is impossible to follow Professor Holtzmann into the details of his
+work, but we can warmly recommend it as the best compendium existing, not
+only for the student of theology but for everybody who is interested in
+the results of the scientific criticism of the synoptic gospels and the
+Acts.[51]
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+SCHRIFTEN DER GESELLSCHAFT FUER PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG. Heft 2. Ueber
+Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie. By _Hugo Münsterberg_. Leipsic:
+Ambr. Abel. 1891.
+
+In this monograph Professor Münsterberg prepares the way for greater and
+more important work. His aim is to define the province of psychology and
+to investigate the methods which have to be employed. Psychology is not
+philosophy; accordingly the consideration whether there is a reality of
+an outside world does not belong here. The psychologist is not bound
+to wait till this and other metaphysical questions are decided with
+certainty; the reality of the outside world has simply to be assumed
+together with its cognisability.
+
+What means ‘to explain’? “To explain means simply to render clear that
+which is not clear or to reduce the unknown to the known, the complex
+to the simple (p. 104).... It is an indispensable presupposition of
+any natural science to consider nature as being capable of explanation
+(_erklärbar_), and this presupposition means that natural processes
+can be perfectly separated into most simple mechanical processes.
+This presumption can be realised to-day only on the basis of the
+atom-conception. It is accordingly not an experience, but a postulate
+of natural science to derive the whole material world-process from the
+mechanism of atoms. A description becomes an explanation in the measure
+in which it approaches this aim” (p. 105). The question is, whether in
+psychology, description can be supplanted by explanation, whether laws
+can be stated instead of mere rules.
+
+Professor Münsterberg takes that ground in psychology which as it appears
+to us is the only tenable ground, viz. that feelings are not motions
+and cannot be explained as converted physical processes. Professor
+Münsterberg says: “A sensation, a feeling, a will can never fill even
+the very smallest space. What is extended in space can never itself be
+a state of consciousness. To the psychologist this distinction is now
+a matter of course, so much so that it is difficult to call to one’s
+mind how much trouble it cost to acquire this insight. The object
+of psychology accordingly can never be an object in space, it can
+never be a process of motion, accordingly, even brain-irritation can
+under no circumstances ever become the object of psychology” (p. 97).
+Psychology has to investigate the psychical phenomena of the individual
+consciousness (p. 102), it has to separate it into its elements, i.
+e. those ingredients which are no longer divisible; which being done,
+psychology searches for the rules for the combinations of these psychical
+elements and shows us the different complex contents which are formed in
+this way by the elements up to that totality of single combinations which
+is given us as the contents of our spiritual personality (p. 103).
+
+“The question is, (1) Are there psychological processes in us, the
+development of which presents itself with immediate certainty as
+necessary, and (2) can we reduce all the individual and with them all the
+spiritual phenomena to such spiritual processes recognised as necessary?
+The first question can be affirmed, although only in a limited sense,
+and the second question must be unequivocally denied, thus making an
+immediate explanation of psychical phenomena impossible” (p. 107).
+The first question is to be affirmed in a limited sense, because “if
+certain premises are thought, the conclusion, it appears to us as a
+necessity, can be thought thus and not otherwise” (p. 108). But this
+is “a logical and not a psychological necessity.” To actually think
+the conclusion depends upon the will to think it. The will actually
+existing, the logical necessity becomes a psychological, for “the
+connection between the willing and the willed (_zwischen Willen und
+Gewolltem_) always appears to us as necessary.... Where there is inner
+will there is an inner necessity.” Now, in order to make explanations in
+the physical world, we supplement that which has been actually observed
+with not-observed connections. But we cannot, according to Münsterberg,
+in an analogous way supplement in the world of psychical phenomena the
+conscious states with any other kind of states which are not conscious,
+thus referring our spiritual life and acts of will to unconscious
+processes, for “the very nature of psychical states is consciousness,
+i. e. a state of being conscious. _Ihr Sein ist das bewusst-sein...._
+A state of consciousness, says Münsterberg, which is not conscious,
+is comparable not to a body which is not perceived, but to one which
+does not exist. Accordingly unconscious psychical phenomena do not
+exist. All psychical phenomena are directly given and the reduction of
+their combinations in a certain way through hypothetical psychological
+supplements is once for all excluded” (p. 110).
+
+We agree in all the main positions with Professor Münsterberg, but in the
+last mentioned point we disagree. Professor Münsterberg limits psychical
+states or feelings to states of consciousness without considering that
+there are subconscious and even unconscious feelings. By consciousness
+we understand those feelings alone which are concentrated so as to be
+connected with the ego, i. e. the present centre of consciousness. We
+assume that even the spinal ganglions of the brainless frog are feeling
+if the skin is irritated, but this feeling can never become conscious,
+it can no more be telegraphed to the central station so as to become
+co-ordinated with other feelings which are registered in the brain. The
+objection may be raised, We do not know whether the ganglion is feeling;
+and I should answer, I call feeling anything that is of the same nature
+as the elements of which consciousness consists, and we have all reasons
+to assume that there is such an elementary psychical accompaniment of
+the ganglionic irritations, and that consciousness rises from many such
+elements through their co-ordinate combination in the brain. Isolated
+feelings are never conscious, and consciousness is a co-operative system
+of feeling. This distinction between consciousness and feeling is a mere
+matter of terminology. If we find another terminology more practical
+we are willing to surrender ours. Yet such a distinction between
+consciousness and feeling seems to be necessary for a proper description
+of the psychical facts. The assumption of subconscious states and even
+of unconscious feelings is a great help in explaining the phenomena of
+consciousness. But unless we are grossly mistaken, our disagreement is
+merely apparent, for Professor Münsterberg, rejecting the idea of a
+psychological explanation, believes in the parallelism of psychical and
+physical phenomena. “The physical acts” (he says on p. 125) “reducible
+to mechanical axioms can be explained through causation, the psychical
+acts follow one another without inner necessity. If we connect both, we
+are enabled to transfer the necessity-connection of the physical upon
+the psychical and offer thus an explanation where otherwise description
+only was possible.” But in doing this, have we not supplemented those
+psychical elements which appear as conscious states by other psychical
+elements which have not entered into that combination which makes them
+actually conscious? It is an hypothetical addition for the sake of
+explanation, a _Hilfsconstruction_ just as much as the supposition of the
+existence of atoms or electric currents or other physical phenomena which
+are not directly observed, but indirectly in their effects only.
+
+Supplements are necessary for explanation wherever the immediate facts
+do not contain all the elements of a certain process. If an observable
+phenomenon has not its conditions in observable facts we hypothetically
+assume unobservable facts as its causes. But we may incidentally
+remark that description and explanation are not different in kind, but
+in degree. Explanation is an exhaustive description set forth in its
+greatest possible simplicity. An exhaustive description enumerates all
+the determinative factors of a process and it drops everything that
+is of no account, so that information is imparted with the greatest
+economy as well as completeness. An exhaustive description is a reliable
+guide to preascertain the outcome of a process, and reveals in this
+way the identity in the change, the continuity of the process and the
+conservation of matter and energy in their transformations, or, in
+other words, it reveals the necessity of the result. There is perhaps
+no natural science in which the processes can be exhaustively described
+without hypothetical supplements and so the science of psychology forms
+no exception to the general rule.
+
+The aim of psychology in its wider sense will be “to separate all the
+contents of consciousness into their elements, to state their laws of
+combination, and to seek in an empirical way for the diverse elementary
+psychical contents, their correspondent physiological irritations,
+in order to explain in this way mediately from the coexistence and
+succession of physiological irritations the purely psychological laws of
+combinations which as such are unexplainable” (p. 127).
+
+Our objection to this view resembles much some of the objections which
+Professor Münsterberg himself makes when speaking of the availability of
+the mathematical method so-called. He says: “Measuring and counting of
+psychological phenomena have been made repeatedly, directly as well as
+indirectly, and it has been proved that mathematics can be applied to
+psychology.... Nevertheless it would be a misuse of the word if we named
+these numerical descriptions an ‘application of the mathematical method.’
+If an historian of literature counts the poems and dramas of authors,
+if he also calculates how long it took them to write their literary
+products, who would call his work a mathematical history of literature?
+Even astronomy would be no mathematical science if we counted only the
+stars in the sky.” If the aim of psychological explanation were as
+Professor Münsterberg here asserts to be reached through the explanation
+of physiological states only, we should say, that the physiological
+method were alone admissible in psychology, a principle to which our
+author rightly objects. Psychical states sometimes demand a physiological
+explanation, and we cannot understand psychology without having a
+certain amount of physiological knowledge. Nevertheless, the explanation
+of psychical states and the necessity of certain connections must be
+understood mainly from the psychical elements themselves. Psychical
+elements, i. e. feelings, as has been explained on other occasions,
+have acquired and constantly do acquire meaning. This meaning which
+appears in sensation-symbols and thought-symbols and which is different
+in the different forms of feeling (correspondent to different forms of
+nervous action), creates a new domain,—the domain of spirit,—and thus
+psychical states are changed into spiritual facts. Suppose for instance
+that a merchant receives his mail; he opens a letter containing some
+important news which sets at once all his nerves into irritation, makes
+him neglectful of all other things in order to attend with great haste
+to one special affair. How can we explain this instance, or any other
+spiritual act through a consideration of physiological conditions. Is
+it not the meaning alone which special sense-impressions convey that
+produces the extraordinary effects? The physiologist would as little be
+able to detect this meaning through an analysis of the sense-impressions,
+as an electrician would be to understand the import of a telegram when
+measuring the strength of the electric current in the telegraph wires.
+The combinations of the purely psychical states may after all not be
+quite unexplainable, while their physiological concomitants are in many
+cases insufficient to account for spiritual interconnections.
+
+In discussing the methods of psychology Professor Münsterberg rejects the
+speculative and the mathematical methods; he claims a great importance
+(and we agree with him) for self-observation. But self-observation is
+no easy task; it requires a high degree of training. “He who does not
+understand botany cannot make observations of plant-life. The same things
+which call into play certain associations in the botanist are also seen
+by the layman, but they remain unobserved. Self-observation is in a
+similar way ... not without its presuppositions; it is dependent upon a
+rich store of ready associations” (p. 164).
+
+Psychological investigations under natural conditions are classified
+by Münsterberg according to their objects, as those of the normal man,
+the child, the savage, the insane, the animal, etc. In experimental
+psychology, psychopetal, psychofugal, and psychocentral processes are
+distinguished. For psycho-physiological investigations we have besides,
+(1) the immediate experiment in the laboratory, (2) the method of
+anatomy, (3) of comparative anatomy, (4) and of physiology. Professor
+Münsterberg concludes with an appeal to institute special professorships
+of psychology, which is at present a mere branch of philosophy. It
+takes all the energy of one man to keep abreast with the progress of
+psychological investigation. “No medical man, no lawyer, no theologian,
+or educator should enter into practical life without having passed an
+examination in psychology ... the growing generation of children, the
+sick, the criminal, and the comfort-seeking souls of mankind have to
+suffer if teachers, physicians, judges, and preachers are ignoramuses
+in the matter of human soul-life.... But here also the gods have placed
+sweat before virtue.”
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+LA PHILOSOPHIE DU SIÈCLE. By _E. de Roberty_. Paris: Félix Alcan.
+
+The author of the present work, which forms a volume of the Library of
+Contemporary Philosophy, is one of those disciples of the founder of
+French positivism who, while following in his footsteps to a certain
+point, do not hesitate to diverge from the beaten track when they think
+their leader has gone astray in his philosophic quest. M. de Roberty
+speaks of Comte with reverence as his first guide and his best master,
+and he finds in the very contradictions of the Master the germ of his own
+conception of the general trend of philosophic development.
+
+The fundamental thesis of the present work is that the three
+contemporaneous philosophic systems, those of Criticism, Positivism,
+and Evolutionism, are merely varieties of a single species, as strictly
+parallel manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general
+hypotheses. The basic identity of the thought of this century is shown
+by the ever increasing convergence of the great leading ideas, as
+exhibited in the prevailing theories of knowledge, by the preponderance
+of relativism, and of agnosticism. It reveals itself, especially in the
+similar conceptions formed by the most varied systems, not only of the
+essential characters of philosophy, its method, and the ends it ought to
+pursue, but also of the scientific laws which govern its evolution. We
+cannot follow the author through his discussion of all these points and
+we must therefore restrict ourselves to the most salient features of his
+argument.
+
+Modern philosophy is represented by three principal schools: Criticism
+which originated with Kant, Positivism founded by Comte, and Evolutionism
+introduced by Spencer. These three systems had a common ancestry,
+that of sensualism. The critical philosophy is the legitimate heir of
+sensuous idealism, and the positive philosophy the immediate descendant
+of sensuous materialism. The evolution philosophy is itself rooted in
+sensualism, but it is really a conciliator of the two great philosophies
+which preceded it, Criticism and Positivism. This conclusion, which
+appears to us just, is supported by various considerations to which
+reference here is not necessary. M. de Roberty bears testimony to
+the influence of the philosophy of Kant over the development of the
+evolutionist conception, which could be applied to society only by
+giving an apparent universality to the mechanical hypothesis. This was
+accomplished by Spencer, as it had been done to some extent by Comte.
+The popularity of the evolution philosophy is explained by the author
+as due to its admixture of agnosticism with a monism which captivates
+the masses “by the audacious assertion that it has raised all veils and
+resolved all enigmas.” Kant, Comte, and Spencer have equally seized this
+characteristic trait of the genius of our century. They each treat, says
+M. de Roberty, of the most transcendent problems of metaphysics, and
+place them carefully under the cover of the experimental method. Let us
+add that they are each different expressions of that genius, which marks
+the progress of the mental evolution of mankind.
+
+The second part of M. de Roberty’s work deals in the first place with the
+conceptions of philosophy, its nature and its end, framed by the three
+great modern systems. The confusion generally made between philosophy
+and science is first pointed out, the evil of which arises from the fact
+that allowance is not made for the progress of scientific knowledge. The
+author is strongly inclined to favor the idea of the general equivalence
+of science and philosophy, in the sense that every effect is identified
+with its cause. But as the effect is always modified with its cause,
+neither the content not the general conception of philosophy can remain
+unchangeable. Philosophy becomes thus the co-ordination of the sciences
+in view of their general and abstract finality—by which is meant simply
+the last term of an evolution—a conception of the world.
+
+In what do the conceptions of philosophy held by the criticist, the
+positivist, and the evolutionist, differ from that formulated by M. de
+Roberty? He affirms that they all entertain certain errors of method
+derived chiefly from ancient metaphysics. The prototype is found in Kant,
+who says that philosophy is a system of universal acquirements formed
+of abstract notions, and that it has for its aim the passage of our
+understanding from sensible to suprasensible knowledge. The latter is the
+_a priori_, the permanent and verifiable hypothesis, for each of them.
+It is the transcendental element which all modern philosophy has derived
+from the past, and which forms the bond of alliance between faith and
+knowledge. Of the three postulates of Spencer, the universal hypothesis
+is in the first, an Unknowable Force. The other two belong to psychology,
+proving that the English evolutionist, like Comte, confounds science with
+philosophy, which to him, as to his predecessors, is a simple theory of
+knowledge.
+
+Philosophy is a method which conducts to a conception of the world. But,
+says M. de Roberty, modern philosophies fail in that they deal with
+hypotheses. Now, although hypothesis is the soul of the special sciences,
+for philosophy it must always be a purely mental recreation. To render
+valid the universal hypothesis constructed by philosophers, it would be
+necessary that the sum of the final truths of science should include the
+sum of the phenomena which constitute nature.
+
+We cannot follow the author through his ingenious criticisms of Spencer’s
+great synthetic formula, to which he devotes the twelfth chapter of the
+present work, and which he characterises as the perfect type of the
+universal unverifiable hypothesis. Nor can we do more than give a passing
+glance at his views of the psychology of the three modern systems of
+philosophy. He affirms that the metaphysical transformation by criticism
+of psychology into philosophy left hardly anything to the special
+science. To positivism is due the conception of psychology as forming an
+integral part of biology, which has led to the important psycho-physical
+experiments of the present day. But the biological analysis of the
+individual should be followed by social analysis, the study of mental
+manifestations in society, in connection with which should be created a
+special concrete science to embrace the higher psychology, as pointed out
+by the author in his work “La Sociologie.” Science, art, and industry are
+a projection into the external world of the thinking, feeling, acting
+subject, and psychology ought also to be thus projected by fusion with
+biology, or with biology and sociology, which it is necessary to study if
+we would discover psychic laws.
+
+In the chapter on the Supremacy of Science, the author affirms that
+the philosophy which will result from the progress of psychology and
+sociology will present a striking contrast with all known metaphysical
+forms, but it will always remain a world-conception, and it will have
+to submit to the law of correlation which explains the character and
+destinies of its predecessor. Agnosticism, which invites men to bend
+before the _Deus ignotus_ of all religions, marks the fatal termination
+of ancient anthropomorphism, influenced by a progressive knowledge,
+and thus appears as the final integration of all theology. It also
+represents, however, the condition of incognisance to which the opposite
+state will succeed when the cycle of abstract sciences is completed and
+a really scientific psychology formed. Then hypotheses as to universal
+causes will receive their psychological solution, and it will remain for
+philosophy only to confront and co-ordinate them with the general results
+of other sciences. Having arrived at this point M. de Roberty formulates
+the conclusion that Philosophy and Science are terms which connote two
+principle _species_ in the vast _genus_ designated by the single term
+_knowledge_. The most marked trait of future philosophy will be the
+distinction of these two species, as their confusion was the most general
+character of the philosophy of the past. Philosophy and science will
+then be perfectly identified, but the identity will be general and not
+specific. Thus philosophy will not be positive in the sense of Comte, it
+will never _completely_ identify itself with science.
+
+In his last chapter, entitled “The Intellectual Series,” M. de Roberty
+continues his criticism of the views of Comte as to the law of the
+evolution of philosophy. He shows that, so far from this being the most
+general law of intellectual evolution, and therefore the supreme law of
+all social phenomena, philosophy is only one of three intermediate terms,
+the others being art and industry, by the aid of which the evolution
+of scientific ideas acts on the ensemble of the social evolution. The
+intellectual evolution is the direct consequence of the social fact, but
+the social evolution is subject to the laws of intellectual evolution,
+which embrace four great classes of conceptions, answering to the four
+well recognised groups of facts known as science, philosophy, art, and
+industry. We have here the same series of special evolutions as those
+supposed by Comte, with the important change, however, marked by the
+inversion of the first two members of the series. In this relation, the
+author affirms that Comte’s law of the three states is false so far
+as concerns the evolution of the sciences, and is of very secondary
+importance as regards the evolution of philosophy and the two succeeding
+evolutions.
+
+The author concludes his work with a criticism intended to show that the
+principal defects of Comte’s system arise from the confusion previously
+insisted on in relation to the first terms of the intellectual series,
+science and philosophy. That confusion is exhibited in the statement
+that among the ancients philosophy was developed before science and art.
+M. de Roberty, moreover, declares Comte’s theory that the industrial
+development is the point of departure of modern civilisation, leads to
+a complete subversion of the logical and historical. Instead of the
+useful or the proper being, as that theory would require, the foundation
+of the good and this, in its turn, the germ of the true, the true is
+the foundation of the beautiful, and of the good and the useful. But
+the true is more complex than supposed by Comte. It possesses at least
+two aspects, science and philosophy, which may be really distinguished,
+although the line which separates them is yet undetermined.
+
+We have given a summary of M. de Roberty’s general argument, instead of
+referring to particular propositions which may be open to criticism,
+because his work appears to us a very valuable contribution towards the
+elucidation of the important question as to the position of philosophy
+in relation to science. We shall look with much interest for the
+appearance of the author’s two further works which he announces as
+supplementary to the present one. That on Agnosticism is already in the
+press. The subject of the other work is Monism, which M. de Roberty
+characterises as “the chimerical pursuit which has essayed, through the
+ages, to fix the so-called unity of things, the extra or supralogical
+identity of phenomena.” This hypothetical monism of philosophy is dealt
+with incidentally in the present work. The “supralogical identity of
+phenomena” is a different kind of monism from that of _The Monist_.
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+UEBER BEWEGUNGSEMPFINDUNGEN. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung
+der Doctorwürde vorgelegt der hohen philosophischen Facultät der
+Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg i. B. By _Edmund Burke Delabarre_
+of Massachusetts. Freiburg in Baden: Hch. Epstein, 1891.
+
+Dr. Edmund Burke Delabarre introduces himself to the world of science
+with an excellent monograph on motion-sensations, based upon careful
+observations which were made in Professor Münsterberg’s psychological
+laboratory at Freiburg i. B. The subject of the dissertation is of
+great importance and there is much confusion prevalent at present
+even among the most prominent authorities. It appears to us that Dr.
+Delabarre has adopted the right view and he certainly defends it with
+great ability. Professor Wundt rejects in his Physiological Psychology
+all the theory of the so-called “muscle-sense” and admits that there
+is some truth in the three explanations devised as an explanation of
+our consciousness of performed motions, which thus would be a complex
+of (1) pressure-sensations, (2) specific muscle-sensations, and (3)
+innervation-sensations. This third kind of sensations is of a very
+hypothetical nature. The term signifies that, when muscles are innervated
+we are supposed to have a direct sensation of the innervation in the
+central nerve-organs; and this view is objected to by Münsterberg, who
+says that “a brain irritation which is not accompanied with centripetal
+effects or central after-effects of former muscular activity has its
+physiological consequences but excites no conscious states.” Thus,
+according to Dr. Delabarre, without the motion of the sense-organs,
+i. e. muscular activity, there is no consciousness; all consciousness
+derives its data from the periphery. Dr. Delabarre goes over the whole
+field of the literature of the subject and weighs all pros and cons. He
+finds that all cases are intelligible without the supposition of central
+innervation-sensations. He admits that the term muscle-sense is vague,
+but he believes that the term having been generally introduced may be
+retained. He defines it as that complex of sensations which results from
+muscular activity.
+
+The second part of the dissertation contains the reports of the
+experiments, describing the instruments used and the methods employed.
+
+We are informed that Dr. Delabarre has been appointed to the chair of
+psychology in Brown University.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+LE NIHILISME SCIENTIFIQUE. I. Dialogue entre le Doctor Oudèn et
+L’Etudiant Ti son Neveu. Rapporté par _P. Van Bemmelen_. Leide: E. J.
+Brill, 1891.
+
+Dr. Oudèn’s nephew thus summarises the scientific, or rather
+“philosophic” views of his uncle: “There is no God, but there is the
+world. In this world there are neither souls, nor mind, nor life; there
+is only matter and its elementary forces. Nevertheless these forces do
+not exist; there is only movement, the sole function of matter, which is
+inert. In its turn, matter has no reality; it is composed of geometrical
+points which are susceptible of movement. But as there is neither time
+nor space, there is no movement.” Nothingness is thus reached, but
+beyond is illusion, the _maja_ of the Hindoos, which explains all our
+conceptions of nature including that of our own being. This scientific
+_maja_ is not the semblance of a real world, but that of a world which
+does not exist, so that illusion and nothingness are the same thing. From
+which it follows that there is no illusion and no mind to be deceived!
+Mr. Van Bemmelen’s opuscule is an ingenious _jeu d’esprit_, evidently
+intended to exhibit a certain phase of speculation as a _reductio ad
+absurdum_.
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+DIRITTO SOCIALE TENTATIVO IN BOZZA. Dell’Avv. _Pietro Pellegrini_. Borga
+a Mozzano. 1891.
+
+There is no denying the activity of the statesmen and scholars of modern
+Italy in the cause of radical, social reconstruction and, as remarked by
+a recent traveller in Italy, in the “building up again a Commonwealth,
+founded on high principles of right and equality.” “Diritto Sociale,” in
+Italian jurisprudence, of course, relates to municipal and positive law,
+in its social-economical and social-political aspects. But, in a country
+with the municipal and political traditions of Italy, this “Diritto
+Sociale,” even in modern times, exhibits a tendency to crystallise into a
+kind of concrete, social religion. The Avvocato Signor Pietro Pellegrini,
+the learned author of this book, appears to feel deeply concerning the
+present condition of this branch of jurisprudence in Italy.
+
+In his preface the author says, that during the present century legal
+science has not made any very substantial progress; that the revolution
+of the last century, while asserting the famous rights of man, forgot
+the rights of juridic persons, of corporations, and law became an
+_individualista_—or, individualiser. On the strength of his juridic
+personality man thereupon engaged in a struggle for his rights on
+the vast social field, but he found himself alone—an individual and
+nothing more. As such, he could not form a juridic, social organism,
+but he merely sought to adapt himself to an actual, external juridic
+organisation, differing but slightly from old-time despotism. On this
+basis the State still continues to create municipal and positive laws,
+more or less adapts them to the facts of reality, arbitrarily creating
+juridic persons and administrative bodies, such as the _mandamenti_,
+_circondarii_, _provincie_ of the modern Italian kingdom—all of which are
+only hybrid administrative _entia_, that do not in the least satisfy a
+number of local public needs; and therefore, there is no harmony between
+individual men and the juridic persons, between the public administrative
+entia and the State, and there is bloody war among the States themselves.
+
+The ultimate cause of all this conflict is to be ascribed to the
+individualism of the law, in not recognising organic, juridic relations;
+and this, moreover, necessarily called forth the reaction of an
+exaggerated socialism.... Person has a much wider significance than
+individual; person cannot be isolated, individual, because, juridically,
+person implies an exchange of relations with others; hence, juridic
+persons ought to enjoy a greater legal authority than they actually
+enjoy in our modern jurisprudence. The _plasma sociale_, or the original
+social mould, is developed by degrees into a vital, practically real,
+organism, endowed with a physical body, that needs the material means
+of nutrition, in order to live, to preserve, and develop itself. These,
+however, do not exist; because nature furnishes only sufficient means to
+preserve man in a purely savage, animal condition. But, at least, there
+exist the sources, or fountain-heads, from which it is possible to derive
+the desired nutritive materials; on condition of molding or transforming
+those fountain-heads, and of assuming their efficacious, practical
+direction. In the individualised or individual system there takes place a
+struggle among the individuals for the possession of that nourishment, in
+which case, however, the sources themselves are appropriated rather than
+the nutritive materials they contain. Such is the exclusive nature of
+the social means of nutrition, present and future, through which a large
+number of individuals will be at the mercy of a few, while the notorious
+“rights of man,” remain powerless....
+
+The rights emanating from the organic concept of personality, together
+with the physico-economical laws of the fountain-heads of social
+nourishment, spontaneously furnish the equitable distribution of
+the nutritive materials to each organic member, so that there is no
+monopolising of those natural fountain-heads, but a normal nutrition of
+all the organs, according to their needs, and their actual capacity as
+juridically displayed....
+
+Those fountain-heads, besides being limited, are scattered through
+space, because it is impossible to unite or concentrate them on any
+particular point of the globe. Hence this _plasma sociale_ or social
+mold is distributed through space according to imperative laws, that
+result from the combined capacities of the respective juridic, that is,
+social persons, with the capacities of the respective sources of social
+nourishment—of different municipal organisations, of cities, townships,
+and villages. All these are pre-eminently juridic and social persons,
+each one possessing its peculiar functions, that cannot be exercised
+by other persons. The present work contains a lengthy but valuable
+introduction in four chapters, discussing the general concept of law; and
+thereupon the book is divided into three parts, in which are explained
+the principles and development of positive law in its respectively
+civil-social, social-economical, and social-political aspects. This work,
+throughout, presents a number of equally important and novel points of
+view, through which the author’s concept of an organic municipal and
+social law everywhere becomes the surest means of creating unity and
+harmony, not only within the general department of law, but also within
+the sphere of practical legislation.
+
+                                                                     γνλν.
+
+
+AN OUTLINE OF LOCKE’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. By _Mattoon Monroe Curtis_, M.
+A. Leipsic: Gustav Fock, 1890.
+
+This excellent study was presented to the University of Leipsic as the
+Inaugural Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and
+it is well deserving of publication, if for no other reason than the
+need of such a work. There appears to have been hitherto no complete
+account of Locke’s System of Ethics, which does not even find a place in
+Mackintosh’s “Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy.” The author has not
+been able to discover any trace of the treatise on Ethics which Locke
+proposed to write, but his published works “abound in ethical observation
+and severally took their rise from ethical considerations,” so that there
+is no deficiency of materials from which to ascertain his ideas on that
+subject.
+
+Mr. Curtis very justly remarks that it is important to ascertain an
+author’s views before criticising them, a truism which is not always
+acted on, as indeed was the case with Locke’s own critics. He does not,
+however, profess to criticise but, as the title of his work shows,
+to give an outline of Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. In his Preface he
+states that his author adopted the Stoic division of Philosophy into
+Physics, Ethics, and Logic. The object of Ethics, is described by Locke,
+in his noted “Essay,” as the seeking out of those rules and measures
+of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practice
+them. The end of this, is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of
+truth; but _right_, and a conduct suitable to it. In the application
+of its principles Locke may be said to have gone further than any of
+his predecessors and of most of his successors. As pointed out by Mr.
+Curtis, he maintains that the institutions of government, religion, and
+education are, in essence, ethical and that all are parts of a system
+which must be based upon, and be in harmony with, the fundamental
+physiological and psychological principles of human nature. This follows
+from Locke’s principle that the Individual, and not the Family, is the
+real social unit. Man is a rational, social, religious, and political
+being, and, therefore, “in the individual is contained, potentially, all
+institutionalism.”
+
+It must be noticed, however, that to Locke the moral dynamic in human
+society is the concept of God. He regards this idea “as a natural,
+formal, necessary and transcendental principle at the root of human
+nature and institutions, and consistently declares that the denial of it
+dissolves all,” as it alone gives a sufficient explanation and sanction
+to the principles of morality. This brings us to the very foundation of
+ethics. All depends, however, on our conception of God. Locke maintained
+that duty “cannot be understood without a law, nor a law be known or
+supposed without a law giver, or without reward or punishment.” His
+conception of God, therefore, was that of a law-giver, and he believed
+that the existence of God could be demonstrated not only by teleological
+argument, but also by psychological proof drawn from the being and nature
+of man. Locke was so thoroughly convinced of the dependence of morality
+on the existence of God, that, notwithstanding his general liberality of
+thought, he excluded atheists from toleration. He writes: “Promises and
+Covenants, and Oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no
+hold upon an Atheist.”
+
+It would be a mistake to suppose that, because Locke believed morality
+to be founded in our conception of God, he considered the moral law
+referable simply to the divine will, and therefore to be arbitrary and
+changeable. So far from this, he regarded the moral law as eternal
+and immutable, and affirmed that its cardinal principles could be
+discovered and laid hold of by the light of nature. As says Pfleiderer,
+when speaking of Locke and Wolff, “Locke also considers a supernatural
+revelation to be possible, and to have actually taken place in
+Christianity, but he insists as strongly as Wolff does, and even more
+logically, that this revelation must not in any way contradict the
+natural revelation given us by God in our reason.” Locke expressly
+declares, that the reason _is_ natural revelation, while revelation is
+natural reason enlarged. The latter he regarded as necessary because,
+although reason is sufficient for the virtuous, penalties must be relied
+upon for influencing the multitude; and in revelation the doctrine of
+immortality with future rewards and punishments is made known. Whether
+this revelation is true or false, the fear of future punishment has
+undoubtedly had a restraining influence over the vicious. But reason
+would not be sufficient for the virtuous without an inclination natural
+or acquired, to virtue. It is a question of disposition, and this will
+be virtuous or vicious, according to the conditions under which the
+individual has come into being and been “educated,” in the fullest sense
+of this term. Reason forms part of these conditions which, so far as they
+are not purely objective, are dependent on or referable to human nature;
+as, indeed, must be the supposed revelation of enlarged natural reason.
+
+In relation to the ethical life, Locke declares that happiness is the
+only idea which reason takes up out of the sphere of pleasure and pain,
+and yet that if we aim directly at happiness, we shall miss it. What then
+has to be done is to seek out “the rules and measures of human actions
+which lead to happiness.” This is the office of ethics, the end of which
+is virtue, and thus happiness and virtue are one. With Locke moral
+actions are only those that depend “upon the choice of an understanding
+and free agent.” The agent here intended is, as pointed out by Mr.
+Curtis, the man, and not the will. Locke says that the proper question
+in connection with freedom, is not “whether the will be free, but whether
+the man be free.” The will is determined by the mind, and liberty is
+“a power to act, or not to act, according as the mind directs.” In his
+“Thoughts concerning Education” Locke affirms that “the result of our
+judgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who
+could not be free, if his will were determined by anything but his own
+desire, guided by his own judgment.” The position of Locke is, says the
+author, that of Plato and Kant: Reason is given as the governor of the
+will, by its sway to constitute it good. Thence we may rightly conclude,
+that those who are not governed by reason have not true freedom.
+
+We have not space to consider the views entertained by Locke on
+Institutional Ethics, beyond referring to his doctrine that property
+rights are given only by labor, and not by occupation, and that labor
+is the source of all values. The latter doctrine cannot now be accepted
+as sound, whatever may be said as to the former, but Locke deservedly
+holds a high place as a political economist. He seems indeed to have
+been a kind of universal genius. Mr. Curtis refers to the remark made of
+him “that no philosopher since Aristotle has made and recorded so many
+valuable observations, or given so great a stimulus to human thought.”
+Any fresh light that can be thrown on the opinions entertained by so
+profound a thinker, especially on the important question of ethics, is of
+value and hence we welcome the present work as an acceptable addition to
+philosophic literature.
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+N. B.—Owing to lack of space, reviews of a number of new works have
+been crowded out of the present number of _The Monist_; among which the
+following will appear in No. 3: _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems
+in der Philosophie seit Kant_, by Dr. Edmund Koenig; _Spinoza’s
+Erkenntnisslehre in ihrer Beziehung sur modernen Naturwissenschaft
+und Philosophie_, by Dr. Martin Berendt and Dr. Julius Friedländer;
+_Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie_, by Dr. Th. Ziehen; _Handbook
+of Psychology_, by J. M. Baldwin; _An Essay on Reasoning_, by Edward T.
+Dixon; _Das Dasein als Lust, Leid und Liebe_, by Hübbe-Schleiden; _Die
+Bedeutung der theologischen Vorstellungen für die Ethik_, by Wilhelm
+Paszkowski; and _Einleitung in das Alte Testament_, by Prof. C. H.
+Cornill.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[51] A companion work on the Old Testament has been written by Professor
+Cornill. We shall review it in our next number.
+
+
+
+
+PERIODICALS.
+
+
+VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[52] Vol. II. No. 6. September, 1891.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. By _B.
+    Tchitcherin_.
+
+    PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN THEOCRACY IN THE FIFTH CENTURY. The
+    Cosmic Views of St. Augustine in his Genesis. By _Prince E.
+    Trubetzkoi_.
+
+    ETHICS OF LIFE AND OF THE FREE IDEAL (conclusion). By _K. N.
+    Ventzel_.
+
+    OPINIONS CONCERNING L. N. TOLSTOÏ. By _N. Strachoff_.
+
+    FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By _Vladimir Solovieff_.
+
+    SPECIAL PART: (1) Fundamental Moments in the Evolution of
+    the New Philosophy. Metaphysical Philosophy: Descartes and
+    Occasionalists. By _N. Grote_. (2) Measurableness of the
+    Simplest Mental Acts. By _E. Tchelpanoff_.
+
+    CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Philosophical
+    Periodicals. Book Reviews.
+
+    APPENDIX: 1) Recent Publications. 2) Transactions of the Moscow
+    Psychological Society.
+
+_Positive Philosophy and the Unity of Science._ This article is made up
+of extracts from a lengthy competitory dissertation presented by the
+author to the Moscow Psychological Society. The writer points out the
+fallacy of the “fundamental law” of the Comtist philosophy—the supposed
+gradual evolution of human thought through three successive phases,—the
+theological, metaphysical, and positive stage of development. The
+writer contends, that the so-called “positive stage,” as conceived by
+Comte, is really neither positive, nor even scientific, if we examine
+its main foundations. As all the world knows, Comte was not satisfied
+with the results of the particular sciences, but wished to effect their
+comprehensive unity. The writer lays stress on the fact that Comte failed
+to perceive the inward contradiction of his whole system. His followers,
+in order to overcome this difficulty, were compelled to advance still
+another step. Despite the teaching of Comte, they recognised in
+mathematics the whole of a science that derived its principles from
+experience. This is shown by Littré in his criticism of the system of
+Comte (_Aug. Comte et la Philosophie positive_, page 567), where Littré
+refers himself to the analysis of Stuart Mill in his Logic. The author,
+in order to reach a definite and satisfactory solution of this important
+problem, in his next, concluding article, will investigate the nature and
+alleged solidity of the mathematical principle.
+
+_The Philosophy of the Christian Clergy in the Fifth Century._ In
+analysing the whole literary activity of St. Augustine, we observe, in
+the evolution of his doctrine, three stages, that closely correspond
+to his own personal struggle against the three heresies of his
+time—Manicheism, Donatism, and Pelagianism. Yet all of these three
+stages are characterised by one and the same principle—the ideal unity
+of the Christian churches. This ideal aspiration reveals itself as a
+kind of constructive principle of the universe; as the supreme principle
+of a social organisation of humanity, as the substance and contents of
+subjective, human freedom. The Bishop of Hippona,—after thus having
+developed the several aspects of his doctrine against the heresies,—sums
+up, and concentrates his teaching, in its widest bearings, against
+the heathen. Here this Christian ideal attains its fullest and final
+expression, and is formulated as a _Civitas Dei_, as the unity of a
+universal, divine Sovereignty.
+
+_Ethics of Life and of the Free Ideal._ In concluding his exhaustive
+reflections on the subject of Guyau’s system of ethics, in which the
+writer frequently has occasion to cite the critical parallel views of
+A. Fouillé and of other English and Russian philosophers, Mr. Ventzel
+remarks, that his aim has been, not only to introduce M. Guyau’s
+system of ethics to his Russian readers, but also and mainly to show
+the relations of this system of ethics to moral obligation. The writer
+wishes to say in conclusion a few words about Guyau’s relation to ethical
+sanction. Guyau rejected any moral sanction, in the strict sense of
+the word, that was distinguished or detached from social sanctions, as
+such. In this sense he conceives moral sanction and moral obligation in
+his Ethics of Life, in his _Equisse d’une Morale_. If life, of itself,
+creates an obligation to work, simply, on the strength of our capacity to
+work, in such case life also will create its own ethical sanction. Even
+when generously giving itself away, life will without fail, again and
+again, find itself. No matter how it be cut short, life will preserve a
+vivid consciousness of its fulness and significance and will reappear in
+some other place and under other conditions; for, truly, nothing in this
+world lives and works in vain.
+
+_Opinions Concerning Leon N. Tolstoï._ Mr. Strachoff’s psychological
+study would doubtless possess an additional interest to western readers
+if the writer had really given an exclusively Russian estimate of
+Tolstoï’s character and intellectual activity. In this respect, however,
+we must not expect to find any very marked deviation from the well-known
+current views of the reading public of other nations. “The main cause,”
+Mr. Strachoff observes, “why people are incensed against Tolstoï, is to
+be found in the fact, that, of all men, Tolstoï has most widely deviated
+from universally received ethical notions, and that he antagonises his
+century, even in certain delicate problems, that will always be the
+dearest to mankind. You cannot help feeling this, when you listen to the
+clamour, reproach, and vituperation, that have been raised against him
+throughout the civilised world. For the rest, it seems rather odd, that,
+at the close of the nineteenth century, there should have risen such a
+number of deadly foes against an inoffensive writer and thinker like
+Tolstoï; and yet, long ago, we had been accustomed to the intemperate
+utterances of a host of enraged freethinkers, whom we have endured with
+patience and meekness. Why, accordingly, have we all of a sudden lost
+our patient tolerance, and why are we almost ready to start a systematic
+persecution against the thoughts and words of a book like the _Vasnaya
+Polyana_ (Clear Field)?... It must be admitted, that there is a certain
+originality in his writings. Every line possesses a freshness and novelty
+that are entirely his own; and yet his language is tame, and the subjects
+even more common than in other writers. He frequently describes the
+birth and death of very plain people. He tells us how these same people
+amuse themselves, eat, drink, and dance on feast-days, cut the hay, go to
+church, to confession, and so forth. Occasionally he tells how a jealous
+husband kills his wife,—a fact, that has been told in so many other
+literatures. But in anything he relates, he has the art of throwing a
+strong, clear light upon his subject, so that it seems to us, as if those
+time-worn scenes were seen and heard for the first time. In this consists
+the real originality of Tolstoï’s art. And he is the same in his ethical
+teachings. They strike us by their directness, vigor, sincerity; and for
+this very reason they powerfully arouse our love and our yearning for
+those deep, spiritual cravings that invite man to lead a higher life—“to
+live a god-like life.” Here also, at times, it appears to us, that we
+hear about those lofty aspirations for the first time; but when you pay
+close attention, you will find that his doctrine is really based on the
+ethics of the past, and you meet with traits of that self-same Christian
+doctrine with which you have been familiar from early childhood.”
+
+_From the Philosophy of History._ Mr. Solovieff, this time also, has
+chosen a title that scarcely conveys a definite idea of the aim and
+contents of his article, which describes the specific relations of the
+Christian idea to the historical evolution and political ideal of the
+nations of antiquity. (Moscow, 1891)
+
+                                                                     γνλν.
+
+
+MIND. October, 1891. No. LXIV.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    BELIEF. By _G. F. Stout_.
+
+    THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. (II.) By _H. R.
+    Marshall_.
+
+    THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. By _J. Donovan_.
+
+    INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. By _L. T. Hobhouse_.
+
+    DISCUSSION: (1) Dr. Münsterberg and Experimental Psychology. By
+    _E. B. Titchener_. (2) On the Origin of Music. By _H. Spencer_.
+
+    VALEDICTORY.
+
+Under “Belief” Mr. Stout includes every mode and degree of assent or
+dissent. To disbelieve a proposition is to believe its contradictory.
+Doubt is belief in a disjunctive judgment. In a former article he
+dealt with the “Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality.” He now
+treats of the various kinds of real existence; as follows. _The Real in
+Sensation._ The real as immediately apprehended in sensation must not be
+confounded with the percipient mind. Sensation as such is real in so far
+as it limits and controls the movement of attention, by restricting the
+range of subjective selection. _The Real in Judgments of Comparison._
+In and through the peculiar movement of attention in endeavoring to
+keep it fixed on _A_ in the very act of fixing it on _B_, the points of
+agreement and difference between _A_ and _B_ gradually emerge into clear
+consciousness. _Objective Attributes of Presentation._ Dr. Pikler’s
+theory of the psychology of Objective Existence fails to distinguish
+between the phenomena which are merely observed by voluntary attention
+and those which are actually produced by it. The act of introspection
+modifies more or less the mental processes which it examines. Their
+pre-existing strength and mode of operation can be ascertained only by
+elimination of the peculiar reinforcement or enfeeblement which they
+acquire by emergence into distinct consciousness. _The Objectivity of
+Space and Spatial Relations._ Although we can produce change of place
+by moving our bodies, according to our will, this freedom of selective
+selection has rigid limits imposed on it by the very nature of space.
+This control imposed on our freedom by the nature of the object
+constitutes its objectivity. The constant possibility of transition
+from one position to another is apprehended as inherent in the very
+nature of space independently of our will. Whenever I distinctly attend
+to the nature of a spatial limit, I must of necessity admit that space
+is boundless. What has been said about the objectivity of space in
+general applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the objectivity of space-relations
+as treated by the geometrician. The psychological conditions of my
+subjective certitude lie ultimately in the impassable barriers,
+arising from the very nature of space, which confine the freedom of
+my constructive movement. _Reality in the Association of Ideas._
+Association is a cause of belief. If certain contents of consciousness
+have once been copresented in a certain relation to each other, the
+reproduction of the one tends to bring about the reproduction of the
+other in the same relation in which they were originally copresented.
+A comparatively feeble association may command belief merely from the
+absence of counter-associations. This is the basis of Bain’s doctrine
+of primitive credulity. _Subconscious Conditions of Belief._ The
+presentations which successively emerge into the forms of consciousness
+are only fragmentary portions of the total mental system. Many, if not
+most, of our beliefs depend on the operation of subconscious elements
+which, in massive combination, co-operate to support a certain connection
+of ideas which appears in consciousness as an object of attention. But
+such massive support may arise from the connexion of the belief with
+practical interests or æsthetic enjoyments, or with some powerful organic
+sensation. _Apperception and Belief._ Ideal combinations may be separable
+or inseparable according as this or that apperceptive system happens to
+be predominant. This is best seen in its pathological exaggeration in
+the case of suggestible patients. Under normal conditions the necessary
+alternation of different apperceptive masses produces a corresponding
+variation in the conditions of belief. _The Real in the Products of
+Constructive Imagination._ The work of imagination either imposes an
+illusion on the mind, or it does not. In both cases there is a certain
+reference to reality. Illusion is a temporary and often more or less
+imperfect belief in the product of constructive imagination; a belief
+which can be indirectly produced or dissipated at will. _The Real as
+Physical Resistance._ In the experience of the irregular interruption
+of otherwise continuous series of muscular sensation, which, apart from
+this restriction, are producible at will, we apprehend real existence.
+The reality, however together with that of sensation as such, being
+communicated to the interpretations which we are constrained to put both
+upon sensations and their order, gives rise by a very complex process to
+the presentation of a physical world. _Conclusion._ The law of conflict
+is the psychological counterpart of the logical law of contradiction.
+
+In the present paper Mr. Marshall examines in detail his thesis that
+Pleasure and Pain are determined by the relations between the amount of
+activity in, and the nutritive conditions of the organ which determines
+the conscious content (_Mind_ No. 63). He states the psychological
+conditions for Pleasure to be: “A content which appears normally at
+regular intervals will tend to be indifferent. If it appear with
+hypernormal intensity or frequency suddenly in the course of the normal
+regularity, it will for a relatively short time appear as pleasurable,
+but this pleasurableness will soon fall away into indifference.” The
+psychological condition of Pain is said to be: “If a content which has
+already often appeared in consciousness appear with unusual frequency
+or exceptional intensity, it will ordinarily be accompanied at first by
+pleasure, which usually will wane until the content appears indifferent.
+If the hypernormal stimulus continue (except as after described) the
+content will become painful, and this pain will increase in amount, and
+having reached a maximum will decrease gradually until it disappears, but
+in general with it will also gradually disappear the content itself, not
+to reappear in consciousness for a considerable time, if ever. In some
+cases, however, if the content be not over intense, we may look for a
+gradual decrease of the pain felt at the beginning until a condition of
+indifference is reached.” Time is an essential factor in the process of
+organic repair. For each organ there will be a certain time after action
+has ceased at which recurrent activity will be most effective. Here we
+have the physical basis of the gratifications obtained through rhythms.
+There is also a relation of rhythm to pain. The throbbing of acute pain,
+so far as it is not directly traceable to _pressures_ of blood-supply,
+is probably indirectly traceable to the _rhythm_ of blood-supply.
+Turning to Psychology proper, the laws of Pleasure-Pain may be stated
+in terms of Attention. Pleasure, as involving the use of stored force,
+implies a continuance of activity in the organ of pleasurable content,
+and therefore a tendency to continuance of Attention upon that content.
+Pain, on the other hand, implies a tendency to cessation of activity
+in the organ of the painful content, and therefore the disappearance
+of the content. The notion that pleasure is mere absence of pain is
+denied by this theory, which accounts for the connexion, in a broad way,
+between Pleasure and Pain and activities respectively advantageous and
+disadvantageous. In relation to Ethics this theory teaches that the _act_
+of will, _per se_, is pleasurable as the outcome of the conditions of
+opposition which are anterior to the will-act. Further, action in the
+direction of the greatest desire is the most pleasant action. But this
+does not show that the effect of habit may not be such as to lead to
+action against the strongest desire and away from the greatest pleasure.
+Further, the object of desire, whilst it may be, is not necessarily the
+attainment of pleasure.
+
+A scrutiny of the psychological aspect of musical pleasure, says Mr.
+Donovan, will lead to the conviction that its origin required simpler
+psychological machinery than the origin of speech, which was possible
+only through the aid of that machinery. The ear is superior to the eye
+in respect of their relative contributions toward making up our mental
+life and activity. The superiority of the ear rests on its functional
+passivity. This allowed auditory impressions to force themselves into
+consciousness in season and out of season. The facts of history and
+ethnology which may be given a new aspect when regarded in the light of
+the analysis of music cover a very wide field, beginning with the first
+and rudest vestiges of communal sympathy and tribal glorification, and
+extending up to the national song or epic. It is peculiar to man to
+give expression to communal interest in a way which has nothing to do
+with life-caring instincts. That interest finds its first and rudest
+expression in bodily play-excitement: (1) bodily play-movements in
+imitation of actions, (2) rhythmic beating, (3) some approach to song,
+and (4) some degree of communal interest, display themselves as the
+most constant elements of all festal celebrations. If we start from the
+generally-accepted explanations of play-movements in animals, and grasp
+the ultimate reason why play-excitement became infused with the communal
+spirit, there will be no difficulty in tracing evidence of this spirit
+even where they are most hidden by accompanying habits. Success in a
+common enterprise tends to preserve it. The natural modes of expression
+of the communal elation follow, i. e. the bodily play-movements in
+imitation of the successful actions and the rhythmic beating. These
+movements give to consciousness preservative elements of sensation. Every
+step of tonal development was made in order to prove the effectiveness
+of the elements of sensation which could preserve the content of
+consciousness springing out of play-excitement and communal elation. The
+attention-drawing power a musical tone possessed was enhanced by the
+conditions of its production which ensured repetition in a persistent
+temporal succession. Animals’ excited cries were both before and after
+the stimulating rhythmic beating—produced tones. The same excitement
+which impelled to these cries also impelled to rhythmic beating, and thus
+produced a persistent auditory model for the cries. The philologist says
+that roots are elements of words which analysis can reduce no further.
+The psychologist can trace them back to the musical tones which became
+reproductive agents of the vague presentative elements of actions as they
+had been repeatedly held together in consciousness by the psychological
+machinery of nascent musical pleasure.
+
+In a previous article (_Mind_, No. 62) Mr. Hobhouse aimed at proving
+that all reasoning involved generalisation from observed facts, and
+that all such generalisation could be shown to proceed on a definite
+principle. There are two main ways in which Induction and Deduction may
+be distinguished. First we may distinguish the assertion of a universal
+from its application. The application of a universal to a particular case
+is represented by the syllogism in which the major is a general judgment
+and the minor a particular judgment of perception. When two judgments are
+compared they are found to be (1) Tautologous—the same assertion of the
+same fact. (2) Different statements of the same fact. (3) Assertions of
+different facts. A judgment expresses a relation between two terms, and
+hence two judgments may be said to assert the same fact when they assert
+the same relation between the same terms. But if either of the terms or
+the relation differs, then they assert different facts. Generalisation
+involves a universal principle connecting different facts. Syllogism does
+not. Syllogism appears as simply the opposite side of generalisation.
+In the latter we assert a universal for the first time, in the former
+we apply a universal already asserted. But in both we are dealing with
+the same relation of universal and particular. Whether we assert or
+apply our universal, the same ultimate logical fact, expressed in the
+axiom of Induction, is at the bottom of the process. But a different
+distinction may be drawn between Induction and Deduction. The whole
+process of bringing particular facts under universals by observation
+of similar particulars may be called Induction, while the combination
+of several universals in a chain of reasoning is called Deduction. In
+the first, Generalisation, we assert a universal on the ground of a
+particular, or a particular on the ground of a similar particular. In
+the second, Construction, we assert a relation between two universals
+on the ground of the relation of each to one or more intermediate
+relations. Construction involves generalisation at every step, and is a
+true reasoning process. The nature of the generalisation may be shown by
+the typical Deductive axiom. If, where two terms are in any way related
+to a third, a relation between the two is observed, then when any other
+two terms are similarly related to any third, the relation between these
+two will be similar to that observed between the first two. The simplest
+construction on which others rest is that of two relations to the same
+type, and this axiom applies to relations so understood. The axioms
+postulated by Reasoning lay down the conditions under which facts not
+presented may be known to exist, and they are thus distinguished from
+those principles called the “Laws of Thought.”
+
+Mr. Titchener severely criticises Dr. Münsterberg’s experimental
+psychology, pointing out various errors, and concludes that “whether the
+theories of the _Beiträge_ stand or fall, their experimental foundation
+has very little positive worth.”
+
+In reply to the criticisms in _Mind_, No. 63, Mr. H. Spencer points
+out that Dr. Wallaschek has overlooked a passage in which the former
+recognises rhythm as an essential component of music. He does not
+coincide with Dr. Wallaschek’s view, however, since it regards music as
+acquiring its essential character by a trait which it has in common with
+other things, instead of by a trait which it has apart from other thing.
+It is from the emotional element of speech that music is evolved—not from
+its intellectual element.
+
+After referring to the fact that harmony, as ordinarily understood and as
+spoken of by him, is concerned with the fundamental tones and ignores the
+overtones, Mr. Spencer states that he cannot accept Prof. Cattell’s view
+that harmony has been developed from melody. To establish the evolution
+of the one from the other, there must be found some identifiable
+transitions between the combinations of tones constituting _timbre_,
+which do not constitute harmony to our perception, and those combinations
+of tones which do constitute harmony to our perception.
+
+In his Valedictory on retiring from the Editorship of _Mind_, Professor
+Robertson refers to the establishment of the _Review_ in 1876, on the
+initiative of Professor Bain, by whom it has since been sustained, and he
+mentions that most of the experimental research has been contributed by
+the American hands “that have been or are now organising psychological
+laboratories over all the breadth of their own land.” (London: Williams
+and Norgate.)
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1891. Vol. II. No. I.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    THE UNITY OF THE ETHICS OF ANCIENT GREECE. By Prof. _Leopold
+    Schmidt_.
+
+    THE PROBLEM OF UNSECTARIAN MORAL INSTRUCTION. By _Felix Adler_,
+    Ph. D.
+
+    THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT. By Rev. _Hastings Rashdall_.
+
+    AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF OUR TIME. By Prof.
+    _Henry C. Adams_.
+
+    THE PREVENTION OF CRIME. By Dr. _Ferdinand Tönnies_.
+
+    THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF SOPHOKLES. By Prof. _Arthur Fairbanks_.
+
+    THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND. By Prof. _J. Platter_.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS.
+
+Prof. Schmidt’s article is a reply to a criticism of his work on the
+ethics of the ancient Greeks which had appeared in the _International
+Journal of Ethics_.
+
+Dr. Adler’s article is the introductory lecture of his course on Moral
+Instruction before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth. He refers
+first to the difficulty in the way of combining moral and religious
+instruction in the public schools arising from the difference in
+religious belief of the tax payers, and to the devices suggested to
+circumvent the difficulty. The first of these devices is that Catholics,
+Dissenters, and Jews, shall formulate a common platform of belief. There
+are two obvious objections to this proposal. It would leave out of
+account the party of the agnostics and be a gross injustice to them, and
+it would never content the really religious minds of any denomination. It
+would be acceptable only to the comparatively small class of so-called
+rationalists or theists pure and simple, and they have no right under
+the specious plea of reconciling the various creeds, in effect, to force
+their own creed upon the rest of the community. The second device is that
+religious and moral instruction combined shall be given in the public
+schools by persons of the several denominations. The high authority of
+Germany is invoked in favor of that system but Dr. Adler states that the
+example of Germany cannot be quoted as a precedent owing to the relation
+between the state and the schools in that country. The system, moreover
+is not a happy one as, agreeably to Professor Smith’s propositions that
+scientific instruction must be unsectarian and religious instruction must
+be sectarian, the latter ought to have no place in state schools, at
+least in a country where the separation of church and state is complete.
+To the third arrangement proposed, that each sect should build its own
+schools, and draw upon the fund supplied by taxation according to the
+number of children which it educates, there are two objections. Owing to
+the power of sects and their influence, direct and indirect, the rules
+and regulations prescribed by the state for the schools to conform to
+would not be enforced. And secondly, the purpose for which the public
+school exists would be defeated, as the sectarian schools tend to prevent
+the growth of that national unit which it is the very business of the
+public school to create and foster. The correct answer to the question
+as to the way in which to impart moral instruction so as to satisfy
+all parties will be the solution of the problem of unsectarian moral
+education. The answer is: It is the business of the moral instructor
+in the school to deliver to his pupil the subject matter of morality,
+but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a clear
+understanding of what is right and what is wrong, but not to enter into
+the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided. The
+conscience can be enlightened, strengthened, and always without once
+raising the question why. Professor Adler, it appears to us, overlooks
+the intimate connection between the two questions of what is wrong, and
+why is it wrong. With the “why,” which is the moral sanction so-called,
+he excludes the criterion of right and wrong and confines himself to
+conventional morality. Professor Adler proposes, that the material for
+the moral lessons should be “the stock of moral truths accepted by all
+good men.” This would be a very simple solution of the ethical problem.
+Mankind need no longer remain in doubt as to what good and bad is.
+We have only to accept the propositions of “all good men.” But where
+is the judge that shall decide who are to be considered as good men?
+Either Professor Adler considers his own views of moral goodness as
+authoritative and ultimate or his reasoning moves in a vicious circle.
+
+Professor Tönnies and the Rev. Hastings Rashdall discuss punishment as a
+preventive of crime. Professor Adams finds that the genius of invention
+established the factory system replacing the old domestic system of
+industry. The change of a society based upon tools into a society based
+upon machinery means that the worker has lost control over the conditions
+of labor which he now tries to regain. Arthur Fairbanks says that
+according to the ethics of Sophokles, conscience was sense of conformity
+to an æsthetic ideal. J. Platter of Zürich rejects Henry George’s theory
+as “nonsense.” (Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 1602
+Chestnut Street.)
+
+                                                                       ωκ.
+
+
+RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. September and October, 1891.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    L’IMMAGINAZIONE NELLE SUE RELAZIONI NORMALI E MORBOSE COLLA
+    SENSIBILITA. By _L. Ambrosi_.
+
+    L’ORIGINE INDIANA DEL PITAGORISMO SECONDO L. VON SCHRÖDER. By
+    _P. D’Ercole_.
+
+    LUIGI VIVES, PEDAGOGISTA DEL RINASCIMENTO. By _A. Piazzi_.
+
+    LA FILOSOFIA DI EMPEDOCLE. By _S. Ferrari_.
+
+_Imagination in its normal and diseased relations to sensibility._ The
+writer calls our attention to the endless variety of different and
+apparently contradictory things that are usually attributed to the
+faculty of imagination. To some this faculty of the human mind is the
+main cause of human errors, and with Montaigne they call it “la folle
+du logis”; but to others, imagination plays a rather important part in
+the discovery of great scientific theories. All unanimously admit, that
+imagination lends fuel to the flames of all kinds of evil passions; but
+on the other hand it cannot be denied, that imagination sustains the
+will in every work of great stress, or great sacrifice, by the vivid
+representation of an expected final success. All human votaries and
+possessors of this fleeting, inconstant mental faculty are by turns
+“happy, unhappy, sane, sick, wealthy or poor; it makes us believe, doubt,
+or deny reason; it makes fools and sages.” (Pascal, _Pensées_, Art. 3, §
+3). Yet how can the psychologist reconcile all this; how can he find the
+different circumstances, through which one and the same cause produces
+such an endless variety and discrepancy of facts? Several psychologists,
+who have tried to follow the flights of imagination throughout all its
+different manifestations by the sole aid of style and language, have
+been poets rather than true philosophers. Such was Delille in his poem
+_l’Imagination_; and such was even Professor Mantegazza himself, in that
+chapter of his _Physiology of Pleasure_, which he has dedicated to the
+“Gioie della fantasia,” where he describes this faculty with far more
+enthusiasm than scientific precision. Bonstetten, in his _Recherches sur
+la nature et lois de l’imagination_, Genève, 1807, is supposed to have
+been the first to give a minute and exclusively psychological analysis
+of imagination; but his investigations seem to prove, that a delicate
+subject of this kind, like certain volatile essences, evaporates at
+the moment we wish to analyse it, and cannot be defined by any strict
+scientific formulas and classifications. And yet, if we really wish
+to study the psychology of imagination, we must not be frightened by
+these difficulties, or regard them as insurmountable. We may not be
+able to reduce all these varied phenomena to very definite and limited
+categories, but it does not follow from this, that we have only to make
+a simple, empirical registration of these phenomena. As Michaut observes
+(_L’Imagination_, Introduction): “Wherever we find a general element,
+there also we shall find room for science.” Despite the inconstancy of
+the phenomena, it remains true, that also in the facts of imagination
+there is something constant and regular; that they are subject to laws,
+which might be probably severed from the phenomena, and be reduced to a
+certain unity and uniformity, without forgetting, at the same time, that
+this fleeting and delicate subject is not always reducible to absolutely
+strict classification.
+
+How are we, accordingly, to obtain that harmony and unity of view, that
+will unite and group all those diversified manifestations? Mind cannot
+be conceived as a collection of different states, but we have to assume,
+that within the Psyche there is something substantial; there is unity,
+constancy in its energy; and that this side of its being is also the
+principle of its transitory actions. We recognise therefore the existence
+of two distinct sources of spiritual energy, that will better make us
+understand the diversity of its products: on the one side, the soul
+itself, with the formal laws of its simple being, and, on the other side,
+the power or force of its sensible representations,—of its reactions.
+This distinction, applied to the present problem, will on the one hand
+cause us to consider images as the products of an activity of an inferior
+order, called psyche soul, but we shall behold on the other, that same
+soul, when it has freed itself from the tyranny of the senses, itself
+becoming properly what is called mind, its emancipation rising to the
+higher function of arranging and organising the images produced by the
+aid of the senses. Hence follows, that the relations of either conflict
+or harmony which these products of the soul have among each other, and
+to mind proper, will serve as a criterion of a classification, in which
+we have to take note: (1) of the reciprocal action between sensations
+and images; (2) of that between images and images; (in both of which
+instances the power of the products possesses an advantage over the power
+of mind;) and (3) of the action of mind upon images. By this road it
+will be possible to follow all the phases of the evolution of mind from
+the moment when overcome by obstinate images it is reduced to a life of
+disorder, incoherency, or, as it were, to death of mind, until the moment
+when in its own turn mind takes hold of the numerous images by which it
+is besieged, and by subjecting them to its own laws—to laws of unity and
+harmony—it creates out of that disorderly chaos of images the wonderful
+synthesis of science and works of art. From that instant we behold mind
+rise through a series of intermediate stages, from abject servitude to
+the loftiest heights of freedom, from a state of humiliating impotency to
+an unhampered display of its true, inward activity,—from folly to genius.
+In other words, it is chiefly this psychic activity, in all its different
+stages of development and power, that must be our guiding criterion in
+the study of the phases and phenomena of imagination.
+
+The writer, thereupon, seeks to explain the nature of this psychic
+activity in its application to images. He briefly investigates the
+origin of images, their immediate derivation from the sensations, and
+their intimate reciprocal connection, by virtue of which the one cannot
+be produced without the other; and whence there arise many different
+relations, that not only explain, but even enable us to classify a large
+number of facts relating to this mental faculty. The writer concludes
+with some general remarks on the diseases of imagination.
+
+_The Hindu Origin of Pythagorism according to L. von Schroeder._ This
+article was suggested by Dr. L. v. Schroeder’s monograph: _Pythagoras
+und die Inder. Eine Untersuchung über die Herkunft und Abstammung
+der Pythagorischen Lehren_. The discussion about the local origin of
+Pythagorism began with the ancients themselves, is being continued in our
+own time, and, from the nature of the subject itself, bids fair to be
+protracted for an indefinite period still. In recent times this arduous
+problem has invaded the domain of comparative ethnology, comparative
+religion, philology, in brief, of all the historical sciences, receiving,
+doubtless, striking and copious illustrations from all these, yet at the
+risk of almost losing sight of itself. In Pythagorism, as in certain
+other products of the human mind, it is difficult to discriminate with
+absolute historical certainty between “mine” and “thine.” The real
+solution of the problem may perhaps be found in the original unity of
+the evolution of the Indo-European mind. The writer, however, views
+the problem simply as one of comparative religion and the history of
+philosophy. The ancients advocated the Italic, or Tyrrhenian origin of
+the Pythagorean system, and among modern Italians, Vico and Gioberti have
+done the same. The Chinese origin was defended by Gladisch. The third,
+the Egyptian origin, also dates from antiquity, and in modern times has
+been ardently defended by Roth. The fourth, the supposed Hellenic origin,
+has had the greatest number of followers, and has been ably championed by
+Dr. Edw. Zeller in his work, _Die Philosophie der Griechen_. As regards
+the last, the alleged Hindu origin, this was suggested of course by the
+numerous striking analogies found between Hindu and Pythagorean doctrine.
+Still, all that has been said on the subject by Schroeder, Max Müller,
+Weber, and others, has failed to thoroughly convince the writer. In his
+next article he promises to show, that everything has induced him to
+believe that the Hindus themselves rather borrowed their doctrine of
+transmigration from the philosophical system of Pythagoras.
+
+_Luigi Vives. A Pedagogist of the Renaissance._ The interesting subject
+of this article is probably to this day but little understood or
+appreciated by the pedagogists of northern Europe. To this day, many
+among them seem ignorant of the fact, or, perhaps, are unwilling to
+frankly admit, that along with the Catholic revival, and the intellectual
+renaissance of the Latin nations, there was initiated the tradition of
+really humane pedagogics, founded on the nature of man, and, in its aim
+and workings, vastly superior to the educational systems of the nations
+beyond the Alps. It was an earnest, liberal, refining educational
+system, that professed an affectionate regard for youth. It banished
+corporal punishment, and addressed itself directly to the heart and the
+intelligence. The Jesuit maxim: “debetur pueris maxima reverentia,” still
+recalls the original spirit of this humane system of education. It is
+perhaps not an exaggeration to maintain, that, in the spirit of the time,
+it also aimed at the _beautiful_ in education. It was a declared enemy
+to any thought, speech or action in _bad form_. To the subject of this
+article, the Spanish bishop of Valencia, Louis Vives, is due the honor
+of having been one of the most ardent and successful promoters of this
+new educational system, and to have been the Jean Jacques Rousseau of
+his time. Vives was born in the year 1492, and died in the year 1540. He
+had studied at the University of Paris, and was an intimate friend of
+Erasmus of Rotterdam. He is moreover the author of a number of valuable
+educational works. Bishop Vives, however, must also be regarded as a
+clergyman, who in his practical career would at times find it difficult
+to reconcile his broad-minded scholastic ideals with the duties of
+his calling, and with the exaggerated ascetical tendencies by which
+he was surrounded. As a matter of fact, in a short time the church is
+seen practically to override all this liberal educational movement of
+the renaissance. Within the college- and convent-walls, in the Latin
+countries, the humane paternal pedagogics of the renaissance soon and
+easily degenerated into oppressive, injurious, personal surveillance, and
+an odious theocratic tyranny. With all our sincere admiration for the
+work initiated by men like Louis Vives, we must nevertheless maintain,
+that all, or nearly all, the ecclesiastic educational systems of the
+Latin countries during the following centuries, can scarcely lay valid
+claims to a place within the pale of true pedagogical science.
+
+_The Philosophy of Empedocles._ In this concluding article the writer
+exhaustively discusses the religious tenets and ethical precepts of
+Empedocles, as both appear in the Proëmium, in the third book on Physics,
+and in the poem of the “καθαρμοί”—or expiatory atonements.
+
+_Bibliography._ In this department we notice a lengthy review of Prof. E.
+Dal Pozzo di Mombello’s _Lectures on Monism_, delivered at the University
+of Perugia. In this number are also contained the _Bollettino Pedagogico
+Filosofico_, _Critical Notices_, and _Recent Publications_. (Rome.
+Tipografia delle Terme Diocleziane. 1891.)
+
+                                                                     γνλν.
+
+
+REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1891. No. II.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET CÉRÉBRALE. I.
+    Le Kantisme. By _A. Fouillée_.
+
+    DU RÔLE DE LA VOLONTÉ DANS LA CROYANCE. By _J. J. Gourd_.
+
+In discussing the part of the will played in belief, M. J. J. Gourd
+considers our belief in an ultra-phenomenal reality which he calls
+“metaphysical belief.” “All thought,” he says, “involves a relation,
+viz. a relation between subject and object. Every relation presupposes a
+comparison of its terms and this comparison is not established if the
+subject and object belong to different worlds. The subject is undoubtedly
+found in consciousness, the object must be there also. All the ingenious
+arguments to escape this conclusion are vain. Accordingly, one may well
+believe in the truth of the metaphysical belief, but this belief is not
+true.”
+
+M. G. Tarde, the great criminologist and an opponent of Professor
+Lombroso’s school reviews the penological and criminological literature
+of recent times in France, Italy, and Belgium.
+
+Alfred Fouillée revises in the article on “the origin of our intellectual
+and cerebral structure” several solutions of the problem of the nature
+of thought-forms, especially Kant’s view of the _a priori_. Strongly
+influenced by Schopenhauer, he makes of the great pessimist’s will-theory
+quite an original and peculiar application and finds that the question of
+“_idées-forces_” is also at the bottom of the question of the origin of
+ideas. In comparing the origin of ideas to the origin of solar systems,
+he says: “Ideas are the condensation of that which exists everywhere in
+a nebulous state into luminous centres and conscious focuses. Sensation
+is desire.” And he sums up his view in the sentence: “Nihil est in
+intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu et voluntate.” (Paris: Félix
+Alcan.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. II.
+No. 5.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    DIE SINNE DER VERBRECHER. By _C. Lombroso_ and _S. Ottolenghi_.
+    (Mit 4 Figuren.)
+
+    UEBER VERGLEICHUNGEN VON TONDISTANZEN. By _Gustav Engel_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+Cesare Lombroso and his assistant S. Ottolenghi communicate the results
+of their investigations of the senses of born criminals in a similar
+way as the former of the two had done in his “Studies in Criminal
+Anthropology,” _The Monist_, Vol. i, No. 2, p. 177 et sqq. Our authors
+say: “Since the days of the famous Greek sage who said that nothing came
+into the intellect save through the gateway of the senses, it could be
+foreseen that a study of the senses would become the gateway to ethics.”
+And, it is a fact recognised for some time but not as yet proved by exact
+methods that a lack of moral sense is often accompanied with an obtusity
+of the sense-organs. Dr. Azam’s famous Felida showed an entire absence of
+the moral sense when she was in a state of analgesia; Romanes has pointed
+out that the sensitiveness to pain is greater in tame animals than in
+wild beasts, this is especially noticeable in the dog. It is noteworthy
+also that savage peoples are almost insensible to pain while civilisation
+often increases sensibility till it becomes hyperæsthesia.
+
+Obtusity of the sense-organs in criminals should not be confounded
+however with the anæsthesia of criminals, because the rarity of
+laterality, the absence of isolated insensible places, the lack of motory
+anomalies, etc., exclude the supposition of hysteria.
+
+Our authors found among 15 criminal boys between 10 and 14 years no less
+than ten cases of absolute analgesia, which proves that this symptom
+cannot be the effect of alcoholism, syphilis, marasmus, or overwork of a
+special trade.
+
+Several anecdotes are told about the insensibility to pain. An old thief
+had his leg amputated with the greatest apathy: the operation done, he
+took the limb into his hand and joked about it. An inveterate murderer,
+his penal servitude being ended, was dismissed out of the bagnio of the
+island S. He asked the warden to be retained, because he did not know how
+to get food and shelter. His demand being refused, he opened his bowels
+with the handle of a spoon, went to bed as usual, and died without even a
+sigh. Mandrin, a criminal, shortly before his execution allowed himself
+to be cut in eight places without giving a sign of pain; criminal R.
+flayed the skin of his face with a piece of glass. In the penitentiary at
+Chatham during the years 1871 and 1872, 841 voluntary wounds and injuries
+were made. Among them 27 convicts had mutilated some limb, and in 17
+cases the limb had to be amputated.
+
+This obtusity of the sensory organs in criminals is supposed to be of
+a cortical origin and being similar to the phenomena of savage life is
+interpreted as atavism. Criminals show deficiencies in the senses of
+touch, smell, taste, and hearing, but not of sight. And this is analogous
+to the savage in whom the sense of sight is naturally very strong, and
+no criminal could execute numerous thefts or escape the arm of justice
+without a high development of the sense of sight.
+
+In the second article on comparisons of tone-distances Gustav Engel,
+Professor at the Royal High-school of Music in Berlin, takes occasion
+to explain his views of the subject with reference to the severe
+criticism of C. Stumpf on Carl Lorenz’s theory. Wilhelm Wundt had taken
+part in the discussion in favor of Lorenz. The subject of the article
+lies in the border-land between the physiology of hearing and music;
+and Professor Engel comes to the conclusion that affinity of tones, i.
+e. the interval-sense in a melodious succession does not lead to the
+same accuracy and reliability of hearing as their concord. He objects
+to the idea of an arithmetical difference as proposed by Lorenz and
+Wundt, and proves it through the fact that the Pythagorean tierce in
+the unaccompanied scale makes a less noticeable disturbance than in a
+concord, while the approximately pure tierce (which is too low only
+by a small fracture of a comma) is excellent in the concord while it
+causes a slight disturbance in the melody. Musical intervals are not
+identical with the geometrical intervals, yet they are based upon them as
+a selection made among innumerable possibilities for certain purposes.
+Their acceptance is established only in harmonic music, but this fact too
+adds some difficulties to the investigations made in this field, for if
+two tones sound together, we can no longer distinguish them separately,
+as would be required for the investigation; and if we let the one succeed
+the other their geometrical relation is no longer discerned with the same
+precision. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XV. Nos. 3
+and 4.
+
+CONTENTS of No. 3:
+
+    PSYCHISCHE UND PHYSISCHE ACTIVITÄT. By _H. Höffding_.
+
+    UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.
+    (Achter Artikel.) By _A. Marty_.
+
+    ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER MATHEMATIK. By _Chr. v. Ehrenfels_.
+
+    DER FOLGERUNGSCALCUL UND DIE INHALTSLOGIK. By _E. G. Husserl_.
+
+CONTENTS of No. 4:
+
+    DIE GESETZMÄSSIGKEIT DER PHYSISCHEN ACTIVITÄT. By _H. Höffding_.
+
+    ETHNOLOGIE UND ÆSTHETIK. By _E. Grosse_.
+
+    UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS.
+    (Erster Artikel.) By _F. Rosenberger_.
+
+    UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.
+    (Neunter Artikel). By _A. Marty_.
+
+    UEBER FERNWIRKUNG UND ANORMALE. WAHRNEHMUNGSFÄKHIGKEIT.
+    Methodologische Randglossen. By _M. Offner_.
+
+Prof. H. Höffding’s article on psychical and physical activity is an
+answer to a criticism by Professor Kroman. Professor Höffding had
+proposed, concerning the relation of the psychical to the physical, a
+theory which he called the “identity hypothesis,” according to which
+the physical and psychical activities are not different in their nature
+but only in their phenomenal appearance. K. Kroman, a countryman and
+colleague of H. Höffding—both are professors at the University of
+Copenhagen—rejected in his recent work “Logic and Psychology” the
+identity hypothesis and characterised it as “Duplicism,” a name against
+which Höffding protests. Kroman’s objections are as follows: _a_) Natural
+science knows of no reason to conceive of the relation of the psychical
+to the material in the way expressed by the identity-hypothesis. _b_)
+On the basis of the identity-hypothesis it remains unexplained how we
+can know anything about the external world. _c_) It is inexplicable how
+an identity can obtain of two so different things as are the bodily
+multiplicity and the psychical unity. Professor Höffding investigates
+these three objections separately and comes to the conclusion that
+his identity-hypothesis shows the relation between the psychical and
+material nature in a clear and simple light. It excludes on the one hand
+materialism and on the other hand spiritualism. The question whether
+either phenomenon, spirit or matter, represents the absolute nature of
+existence, cannot, according to Höffding, be answered. It appears to
+us that Professor Höffding’s position is sound in all main points and
+may be considered as that view which is most prevalent among modern
+psychologists. However, concerning the question whether spirit or matter
+represents the absolute nature of existence, we refer the reader to the
+editorial article “Are there Things in Themselves?” section XII, “The
+Oneness of Subjectivity and Objectivity.” In our opinion the question
+itself is illegitimate. Neither the subjectivity of spirit, nor the
+objectivity of matter represents the absolute nature of existence;
+both together form the nature of existence; and we omit here the word
+“absolute” purposely. The question as to which abstract, matter or
+spirit, represents the absolute nature of existence seems to us similar
+to the question which of the two terms _A_ and _B_ represents in the
+relation _A:B_ the absolute nature of the relation. The obvious answer is
+neither.
+
+The eighth article of A. Marty of Prague on Language-reflex is mainly of
+a controversial nature directed against L. Tobler’s article on the origin
+of language in the _Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie_. By Nativism,
+Marty understands the theory that certain involuntary articulate sounds
+are associated with certain ideas, while the so-called empirical theory
+attempts to explain the origin of the first words without such innate
+mechanical relations between sounds and concepts. Marty represents the
+empirical solution of the problem and objects to the extreme nativism,
+but he grants that Tobler’s modified nativism approaches very much to his
+own position.
+
+The longest article of the present number (63 pp.) is an essay full of
+valuable hints by Chr. v. Ehrenfels on the Philosophy of Mathematics.
+The epistemological basis of mathematics demands a psychological
+investigation of its contents. Accordingly the author proposes to present
+a psychological characterisation of the number-conceptions, from
+which he derives some conclusions concerning the theory of cognition.
+He investigates the origin of the unity conception which is generally
+defined as “positing a unit” or as “conceiving as a unit.” We usually
+believe that we abstract numbers directly from the objects, when we
+look for instance at one house with two doors and five windows. But
+this process of abstraction is not quite so direct as it seems. The
+number-conception is not taken from external observation, but carried
+into the same; yet this is done involuntarily and inadvertently so that
+it appears as if they were _eo ipso_ contained in it.
+
+What is the origin of the concepts “unity” and “multiplicity”? Two
+methods present themselves: 1) The concentration of attention and (2)
+the act of bringing into relation. The former produces a unity and,
+when successively directed to several objects, a series of units. The
+latter appears to be required by the consideration that the conception
+of a number is conditioned by acts of distinguishing. The number
+“two” requires two acts of distinguishing, “three” requires three,
+“four” requires six and the number _n_ requires _n_/2(_n_-1) acts
+of distinguishing. This explains why we can have clear and direct
+conceptions only of very low figures. The idea that a combination of both
+methods will explain the facts is by no means excluded. But there is a
+third source which may be used to explain the unity conception, viz.
+inner experience. “The unity of consciousness,” Ehrenfels says, “has been
+misused in philosophy to demonstrate the substantiality, simplicity,
+and indestructibility of the soul.” Nevertheless there is some truth in
+the unity idea, for the present psychical phenomena present themselves
+in a peculiar amalgamation, which admits of a comparison between two
+elements while it erects a barrier between the _ego_ and the _tu_. Our
+psychical contents will always appear to us as a unit; and on this basis
+we might declare that the unity conception is derived from this source.
+[Here Ehrenfels does not see that the concentration of attention is
+practically the same as the unity of consciousness, for attention means
+consciousness, and concentration produces unity.]
+
+Number-conceptions originate by counting. We disjoin things; for
+instance, we throw a number of apples into a basket, or we let the finger
+slide over the division lines of a measuring stick naming each unit while
+proceeding in the act. From such processes the function of counting
+can be abstracted while the details are neglected as unimportant. Most
+of the higher numbers are never directly but only indirectly realised.
+So for instance twenty is to many that number which will be reached by
+counting up to twenty, yet the single units of the number are lost sight
+of entirely. Such number-conceptions belong to the class of “indirect
+concepts” which represent objects not through marks belonging to the
+object itself, but originating through its relation to other objects.
+The basis of such indirect concepts had been called by Ehrenfels
+_Gestaltsqualitäten_, i. e. figure qualities, and by Meinong _fundierte
+Inhalte_ or founded contents. Thus indirect conceptions are parts
+contingent upon some such basis.
+
+Number-conceptions are not always clearly thought out and there are some
+helps to represent higher or more complex numbers. Thus we can think of
+ten as represented by the outside and inside corners of a pentagram,
+twelve as the edges of a cube, etc., and common among all nations is the
+usage of the fingers to represent numbers up to ten. Such helps are quite
+different from indirect number-conceptions and may be called figurative
+number-conceptions.
+
+That there are mathematical conceptions of magnitudes which have no
+objective analogon is quite natural, for there is even in an indirect
+conception no warrant for its objective reality; and we ought to
+consider how many word- and idea-combinations are possible without
+their possessing some analogous reality. Yet the so-called irrational
+cannot properly be called a number, it is the demand of a number which
+in fractions can sufficiently for certain purposes but never fully be
+realised.
+
+Negative numbers always presuppose a contrast and such conditions arise
+naturally wherever the fundamental ideas imply two opposite directions,
+for instance past and future in time, credit and debit in business, etc.
+It is a matter of course that there are in reality as little either
+positive or negative numbers, as there are positive or negative colors or
+sounds.
+
+Concerning the necessity idea, Ehrenfels says: “Nobody will consider
+it as possible that five plus seven will in some cases make any other
+number than twelve. We are confident that the same addition will under
+all circumstances yield the same sum.” Ehrenfels grants the psychical
+certitude of this but not the mathematical, and thinks that on this
+point there is a difference of opinion allowable. Here we disagree from
+Ehrenfels and refer the reader to former articles on kindred subjects in
+_The Monist_, especially the article on “The Origin of Thought-forms,”
+Vol. II, p. 111. We must bear in mind that in mathematics we are moving
+in a realm of pure forms and the statement 7 + 5 = 12 is, as the Germans
+express it, _eindeutig bestimmt_, i. e. it is determined exhaustively in
+one and the only one possible way. The numbers 7 and 5 being rigid, their
+sum and their product will also be rigid.
+
+This difference of opinion may be contingent upon a difference of the
+conception of the _a priori_. Ehrenfels defines as “a priori” such
+judgments which having come into our possession, are readily accepted
+without proof. We follow Grassmann in rejecting the acceptance of
+anything without proof, including the idea of mathematical axioms. The
+_a priori_ in our terminology becomes identical with that which pertains
+to formal thought: and it would make no difference whether the instance
+presented is as simple as 1 + 1 = 2 or extremely complex as are the
+differential calculus and logarithms. Accordingly we disagree also from
+Ehrenfels when he finds even in such additions as for instance 825 +
+217 = 1042 vestiges of an _a posteriori_ character. The employment of
+the logarithms accordingly appears to Ehrenfels also _aposterioristic_
+because the fruits of other peoples’ labors are utilised!
+
+Concerning John Stuart Mill’s view of the subject, Ehrenfels says that
+“it is still deeply entangled in the errors of that conception which it
+so bitterly opposes, viz. in the formalism of the old purely _a priori_
+conception. For only he who adheres to the view that all mathematics
+are deduced from a few axioms can think of attributing to those axioms
+the highest degree of plausibility which is assumed for them on the
+ground of comprehensive deduction.” We agree with Ehrenfels’s objection
+to Mill, but we cannot agree with his view that mathematics derives any
+elements from _a posteriori_ elements, although we grant that quite new
+departments are created simply by a different employment of certain
+functions. Accordingly mathematics cannot be derived from a few axioms
+only but is the products of certain functions.
+
+Ehrenfels calls attention to the fact that the mathematician operating
+with symbols often forgets entirely what he has to think of in connection
+with these symbols. “This is not strange,” he adds, “for thoughtless
+word-combinations present analogous instances, yet it is strange that
+the result almost without exception comes out right; _es stimmt!_” We
+object here; operations with mathematical symbols are not thoughtless
+combinations, at least, they are not meaningless. They are operations
+not with things, but with symbols representing certain relations among
+things. When gamblers play with chips representing real money, they need
+not think during the game of the value represented by a chip, and yet
+when the account is made, the result attained with the assistance of the
+chips will come out right. There is no reason to wonder at it. Chips like
+mathematical symbols might in a certain sense be called thoughtless, for
+certainly they do not think; but they are not thoughtless in the sense
+that they are meaningless, that nothing is thought by them.
+
+Ehrenfels apparently sees a problem where there is none and this is
+closely connected with another point. He looks upon the mathematician’s
+inability of thinking out in every respect the objective meaning of
+mathematical symbols as a shortcoming of man’s intellect. While it
+appears that we cannot think anything by many mathematical symbols (for
+instance by _a⁰ = 1_) except the symbol itself, the enormous success
+of mathematical thought is evidence that they must have some definite
+meaning although it is to be excogitated only by those beings who will
+transgress the average intelligence of to-day, the first germs of whose
+existence are the mathematical geniuses of the present generation. It
+appears to us that undoubtedly every mathematical symbol has a definite
+meaning, representing the result of some function. That the result will
+sometimes be unattainable or unrealisable, that especially all operations
+with zero make the whole calculation indefinite (which naturally arises
+from the nature of zero) does not alter the truth of this proposition in
+the least.
+
+We have to make one additional remark. The peculiarity of mathematics
+that we do not throughout our operations think out the meaning of the
+symbols is not a shortcoming of our intelligence, but the strength of
+mathematical science. The advantage of all the formal sciences and
+especially of mathematics consists in this that we _need not_ think out
+every detail, but that we can, through the assistance of mathematical
+symbols, perform the most intricate operations with machine-like
+exactness. The economy of thought produced in this way is not a
+deficiency of man’s mind, but a virtue.
+
+Prof. H. Höffding (in No. 4) insists upon the causal law as being
+indispensable in psychology. There are some people and among others his
+colleague Professor Kroman who regard moral motives as an exception.
+“Yet,” says Professor Höffding, “should the decisive moment of a decision
+not be determined by the causal law, the will could never be determined
+through a reflection on the possible effects of the action and thus every
+reason would be missing to attribute to man any responsibility.”
+
+E. Grosse expatiates on the proposition to apply the comparative method
+of ethnology to æsthetics. Ferd. Rosenberger proposes the following
+programme: “Knowledge is power; activity based upon such power is the
+cause of happiness. Therefore with the increase of knowledge, there is
+an increase of happiness, successful activity however is impossible
+without virtue. Therefore we conclude that an increase of happiness will
+be accompanied with an increase of virtue.” A. Marty in this his ninth
+article blames Steinthal for having misrepresented the eighteenth century
+theories of the origin of language.
+
+M. Offner reviews Dr. Charles Richet’s reports of his telepathic
+experiments, but the reviewer cannot assent to Richet’s opinion “that
+these facts possess a strange coincidence and that they are, probably,
+the result of a relation and not of pure chance.” (Leipsic: O. R.
+Reisland.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 1 and 2.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    ZUM BEGRIFF DER UNBEWUSSTEN VORSTELLUNG. By _E. v. Hartmann_.
+
+    UEBER DAS GEBET. EIN RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHISCHES FRAGMENT.
+    Sendschreiben an Herrn E. Renan in Paris. By _M. J. Monrad_.
+
+    WERKE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DES SOCIALEN LEBENS UND DER GESCHICHTE.
+    Erster Artikel (H. Spencer, Sociologie, Bd. III). By _F.
+    Tönnies_.
+
+    RECENSIONEN: H. Münsterberg, Beiträge zur experimentellen
+    Psychologie No. 3. Neue Grundlegung der Psychophysik. By _Th.
+    Ziehen_. W. Enoch Der Begriff der Wahrnehmung. By _P. Natorp_.
+    Ch. Bénard. L’esthétique d’Aristote et de ses successeurs. By
+    _A. Döring_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+The well-known philosopher Edward von Hartmann defines his position
+with reference to the idea of an unconscious representation. Granting
+that there are no unconscious sensations, perceptions, conceptions
+or memories, because feeling either is conscious or not at all, he
+introduces the idea of unconscious representations again as the most
+adequate determination. He says, “Either we must renounce all speaking
+and thinking of non-sensual objects or we must be satisfied with using
+figurative expressions.”
+
+M. J. Monrad, a Norwegian, argues, in the second article against M. E.
+Renan’s theory of prayer, whom he had visited some years ago in Paris,
+that prayer has after all an effect upon the objective world and it is
+not limited to a merely subjective and psychological influence. Monrad
+presupposes a belief in God, prayer bringing the individual in unison
+with God, changes the will of the individual into a co-ordinate willing
+of God and thus renders the individual a co-worker of God. This, however,
+should not be conceived to take place by magic and in contradiction to
+nature, but through nature, man using the laws of nature.
+
+F. Tönnies of Kiel gives an exposition of Mr. Spencer’s social views
+which are, briefly expressed, “the final victory of society over
+the state.” Professor Tönnies answers that “we all want a higher
+civilisation, but the development of a higher civilisation is not
+conditioned by the final victory of society over the state. On the
+contrary, it may be said that it depends upon a victory of the state over
+society in so far as public rights will supersede private rights.... The
+truth is that state and society are contingent, the one upon the other
+and also limiting each other.” (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[52] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._ In the Russian language.
+
+
+
+
+                  VOL. II.      APRIL, 1892.      NO. 3.
+
+                                THE MONIST.
+
+
+
+
+THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY EXAMINED.
+
+
+In _The Monist_ for January, 1891, I endeavored to show what elementary
+ideas ought to enter into our view of the universe. I may mention that on
+those considerations I had already grounded a cosmical theory, and from
+it had deduced a considerable number of consequences capable of being
+compared with experience. This Comparison is now in progress, but under
+existing circumstances must occupy many years.
+
+I propose here to examine the common belief that every single fact in
+the universe is precisely determined by law. It must not be supposed
+that this is a doctrine accepted everywhere and at all times by all
+rational men. Its first advocate appears to have been Democritus the
+atomist, who was led to it, as we are informed, by reflecting upon the
+“impenetrability, translation, and impact of matter (ἀντιτυπία καὶ φορὰ
+καὶ πληγὴ τῆς ὕλης).” That is to say, having restricted his attention
+to a field where no influence other than mechanical constraint could
+possibly come before his notice, he straightway jumped to the conclusion
+that throughout the universe that was the sole principle of action,—a
+style of reasoning so usual in our day with men not unreflecting as to be
+more than excusable in the infancy of thought. But Epicurus, in revising
+the atomic doctrine and repairing its defences, found himself obliged
+to suppose that atoms swerve from their courses by spontaneous chance;
+and thereby he conferred upon the theory life and entelechy. For we now
+see clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular hypothesis in
+physics is to open an entry for the calculus of probabilities. Already,
+the prince of philosophers had repeatedly and emphatically condemned the
+dictum of Democritus (especially in the “Physics,” Book II, chapters
+iv, v, vi), holding that events come to pass in three ways, namely,
+(1) by external compulsion, or the action of efficient causes, (2) by
+virtue of an inward nature, or the influence of final causes, and (3)
+irregularly without definite cause, but just by absolute chance; and this
+doctrine is of the inmost essence of Aristotelianism. It affords, at
+any rate, a valuable enumeration of the possible ways in which anything
+can be supposed to have come about. The freedom of the will, too, was
+admitted both by Aristotle and by Epicurus. But the Stoa, which in every
+department seized upon the most tangible, hard, and lifeless element,
+and blindly denied the existence of every other, which, for example,
+impugned the validity of the inductive method and wished to fill its
+place with the _reductio ad absurdum_, very naturally became the one
+school of ancient philosophy to stand by a strict necessitarianism, thus
+returning to the single principle of Democritus that Epicurus had been
+unable to swallow. Necessitarianism and materialism with the Stoics went
+hand in hand, as by affinity they should. At the revival of learning,
+Stoicism met with considerable favor, partly because it departed just
+enough from Aristotle to give it the spice of novelty, and partly because
+its superficialities well adapted it for acceptance by students of
+literature and art who wanted their philosophy drawn mild. Afterwards,
+the great discoveries in mechanics inspired the hope that mechanical
+principles might suffice to explain the universe; and though without
+logical justification, this hope has since been continually stimulated
+by subsequent advances in physics. Nevertheless, the doctrine was in
+too evident conflict with the freedom of the will and with miracles to
+be generally acceptable, at first. But meantime there arose that most
+widely spread of philosophical blunders, the notion that associationalism
+belongs intrinsically to the materialistic family of doctrines; and thus
+was evolved the theory of motives; and libertarianism became weakened.
+At present, historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles, great
+and small; so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great
+vogue as now.
+
+The proposition in question is that the state of things existing at any
+time, together with certain immutable laws, completely determine the
+state of things at every other time (for a limitation to _future_ time
+is indefensible). Thus, given the state of the universe in the original
+nebula, and given the laws of mechanics, a sufficiently powerful mind
+could deduce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every
+letter I am now writing.
+
+Whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the
+mind is under the rigid governance of a necessity co-ordinated with that
+of the physical world, will logically be carried to the proposition
+that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws
+of mechanics determine everything that happens according to immutable
+attractions and repulsions. In that case, that instantaneous state of
+things from which every other state of things is calculable consists
+in the positions and velocities of all the particles at any instant.
+This, the usual and most logical form of necessitarianism, is called the
+mechanical philosophy.
+
+When I have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every
+fact in the universe is precisely determined by law, the first answer
+has usually been that the proposition is a “presupposition” or postulate
+of scientific reasoning. Well, if that is the best that can be said for
+it, the belief is doomed. Suppose it be “postulated”: that does not
+make it true, nor so much as afford the slightest rational motive for
+yielding it any credence. It is as if a man should come to borrow money,
+and when asked for his security, should reply he “postulated” the loan.
+To “postulate” a proposition is no more than to hope it is true. There
+are, indeed, practical emergencies in which we act upon assumptions of
+certain propositions as true, because if they are not so, it can make no
+difference how we act. But all such propositions I take to be hypotheses
+of individual facts. For it is manifest that no universal principle can
+in its universality be compromised in a special case or can be requisite
+for the validity of any ordinary inference. To say, for instance, that
+the demonstration by Archimedes of the property of the lever would fall
+to the ground if men were endowed with free-will, is extravagant; yet
+this is implied by those who make a proposition incompatible with the
+freedom of the will the postulate of all inference. Considering, too,
+that the conclusions of science make no pretence to being more than
+probable, and considering that a probable inference can at most only
+suppose something to be most frequently, or otherwise approximately,
+true, but never that anything is precisely true without exception
+throughout the universe, we see how far this proposition in truth is from
+being so postulated.
+
+But the whole notion of a postulate being involved in reasoning
+appertains to a by-gone and false conception of logic. Non-deductive,
+or ampliative inference is of three kinds: induction, hypothesis, and
+analogy. If there be any other modes, they must be extremely unusual
+and highly complicated, and may be assumed with little doubt to be of
+the same nature as those enumerated. For induction, hypothesis, and
+analogy, as far as their ampliative character goes, that is, so far as
+they conclude something not implied in the premises, depend upon one
+principle and involve the same procedure. All are essentially inferences
+from sampling. Suppose a ship arrives in Liverpool laden with wheat
+in bulk. Suppose that by some machinery the whole cargo be stirred up
+with great thoroughness. Suppose that twenty-seven thimblefuls be taken
+equally from the forward, midships, and aft parts, from the starboard,
+centre, and larboard parts, and from the top, half depth, and lower
+parts of her hold, and that these being mixed and the grains counted,
+four fifths of the latter are found to be of quality _A_. Then we
+infer, experientially and provisionally, that approximately four fifths
+of all the grain in the cargo is of the same quality. I say we infer
+this _experimentally_ and _provisionally_. By saying that we infer it
+_experientially_, I mean that our conclusion makes no pretension to
+knowledge of wheat-in-itself, our ἀλήθεια, as the derivation of that word
+implies, has nothing to do with _latent_ wheat. We are dealing only with
+the matter of possible experience,—experience in the full acceptation
+of the term as something not merely affecting the senses but also as
+the subject of thought. If there be any wheat hidden on the ship, so
+that it can neither turn up in the sample nor be heard of subsequently
+from purchasers,—or if it be half-hidden, so that it may, indeed, turn
+up, but is less likely to do so than the rest,—or if it can affect our
+senses and our pockets, but from some strange cause or causelessness
+cannot be reasoned about,—all such wheat is to be excluded (or have
+only its proportional weight) in calculating that true proportion of
+quality _A_, to which our inference seeks to approximate. By saying that
+we draw the inference _provisionally_, I mean that we do not hold that
+we have reached any assigned degree of approximation as yet, but only
+hold that if our experience be indefinitely extended, and if every fact
+of whatever nature, as fast as it presents itself, be duly applied,
+according to the inductive method, in correcting the inferred ratio,
+then our approximation will become indefinitely close in the long run;
+that is to say, close to the experience _to come_ (not merely close by
+the exhaustion of a finite collection) so that if experience in general
+is to fluctuate irregularly to and fro, in a manner to deprive the ratio
+sought of all definite value, we shall be able to find out approximately
+within what limits it fluctuates, and if, after having one definite
+value, it changes and assumes another, we shall be able to find that out,
+and in short, whatever may be the variations of this ratio in experience,
+experience indefinitely extended will enable us to detect them, so as
+to predict rightly, at last, what its ultimate value may be, if it have
+any ultimate value, or what the ultimate law of succession of values may
+be, if there be any such ultimate law, or that it ultimately fluctuates
+irregularly within certain limits, if it do so ultimately fluctuate.
+Now our inference, claiming to be no more than thus experiential and
+provisional, manifestly involves no postulate whatever.
+
+For what is a postulate? It is the formulation of a material fact which
+we are not entitled to assume as a premise, but the truth of which is
+requisite to the validity of an inference. Any fact, then, which might
+be supposed postulated, must either be such that it would ultimately
+present itself in experience, or not. If it will present itself, we
+need not postulate it now in our provisional inference, since we shall
+ultimately be entitled to use it as a premise. But if it never would
+present itself in experience, our conclusion is valid but for the
+possibility of this fact being otherwise than assumed, that is, it is
+valid as far as possible experience goes, and that is all that we claim.
+Thus, every postulate is cut off, either by the provisionality or by the
+experientiality of our inference. For instance, it has been said that
+induction postulates that, if an indefinite succession of samples be
+drawn, examined, and thrown back each before the next is drawn, then in
+the long run every grain will be drawn as often as any other, that is to
+say postulates that the ratio of the numbers of times in which any two
+are drawn will indefinitely approximate to unity. But no such postulate
+is made; for if, on the one hand, we are to have no other experience of
+the wheat than from such drawings, it is the ratio that presents itself
+in those drawings and not the ratio which belongs to the wheat in its
+latent existence that we are endeavoring to determine; while if, on
+the other hand, there is some other mode by which the wheat is to come
+under our knowledge, equivalent to another kind of sampling, so that
+after all our care in stirring up the wheat, some experiential grains
+will present themselves in the first sampling operation more often than
+others in the long run, this very singular fact will be sure to get
+discovered by the inductive method, which must avail itself of every sort
+of experience; and our inference, which was only provisional, corrects
+itself at last. Again, it has been said, that induction postulates that
+under like circumstances like events will happen, and that this postulate
+is at bottom the same as the principle of universal causation. But this
+is a blunder, or _bevue_, due to thinking exclusively of inductions
+where the concluded ratio is either 1 or 0. If any such proposition were
+postulated, it would be that under like circumstances (the circumstances
+of drawing the different samples) different events occur in the same
+proportions in all the different sets,—a proposition which is false and
+even absurd. But in truth no such thing is postulated, the experiential
+character of the inference reducing the condition of validity to this,
+that if a certain result does not occur, the opposite result will be
+manifested, a condition assured by the provisionality of the inference.
+But it may be asked whether it is not conceivable that every instance
+of a certain class destined to be ever employed as a datum of induction
+should have one character, while every instance destined not to be so
+employed should have the opposite character. The answer is that in that
+case, the instances excluded from being subjects of reasoning would not
+be experienced in the full sense of the word, but would be among these
+_latent_ individuals of which our conclusion does not pretend to speak.
+
+To this account of the rationale of induction I know of but one objection
+worth mention: it is that I thus fail to deduce the full degree of
+force which this mode of inference in fact possesses; that according to
+my view, no matter how thorough and elaborate the stirring and mixing
+process had been, the examination of a single handful of grain would
+not give me any assurance, sufficient to risk money upon, that the next
+handful would not greatly modify the concluded value of the ratio under
+inquiry, while, in fact, the assurance would be very high that this ratio
+was not greatly in error. If the true ratio of grains of quality _A_ were
+0.80 and the handful contained a thousand grains, nine such handfuls out
+of every ten would contain from 780 to 820 grains of quality _A_. The
+answer to this is that the calculation given is correct when we know
+that the units of this handful and the quality inquired into have the
+normal independence of one another, if for instance the stirring has been
+complete and the character sampled for has been settled upon in advance
+of the examination of the sample. But in so far as these conditions are
+not known to be complied with, the above figures cease to be applicable.
+Random sampling and predesignation of the character sampled for should
+always be striven after in inductive reasoning, but when they cannot be
+attained, so long as it is conducted honestly, the inference retains some
+value. When we cannot ascertain how the sampling has been done or the
+sample-character selected, induction still has the essential validity
+which my present account of it shows it to have.
+
+I do not think a man who combines a willingness to be convinced with a
+power of appreciating an argument upon a difficult subject can resist the
+reasons which have been given to show that the principle of universal
+necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning. But then
+the question immediately arises whether it is not proved to be true, or
+at least rendered highly probable, by observation of nature.
+
+Still, this question ought not long to arrest a person accustomed to
+reflect upon the force of scientific reasoning. For the essence of
+the necessitarian position is that certain continuous quantities have
+certain exact values. Now, how can observation determine the value of
+such a quantity with a probable error absolutely _nil_? To one who is
+behind the scenes, and knows that the most refined comparisons of masses,
+lengths, and angles, far surpassing in precision all other measurements,
+yet fall behind the accuracy of bank-accounts, and that the ordinary
+determinations of physical constants, such as appear from month to month
+in the journals, are about on a par with an upholsterer’s measurements
+of carpets and curtains, the idea of mathematical exactitude being
+demonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous. There is
+a recognised method of estimating the probable magnitudes of errors in
+physics,—the method of least squares. It is universally admitted that
+this method makes the errors smaller than they really are; yet even
+according to that theory an error indefinitely small is indefinitely
+improbable; so that any statement to the effect that a certain continuous
+quantity has a certain exact value, if well-founded at all, must be
+founded on something other than observation.
+
+Still, I am obliged to admit that this rule is subject to a certain
+qualification. Namely, it only applies to continuous[53] quantity. Now,
+certain kinds of continuous quantity are discontinuous at one or at
+two limits, and for such limits the rule must be modified. Thus, the
+length of a line cannot be less than zero. Suppose, then, the question
+arises how long a line a certain person had drawn from a marked point
+on a piece of paper. If no line at all can be seen, the observed length
+is zero; and the only conclusion this observation warrants is that the
+length of the line is less than the smallest length visible with the
+optical power employed. But indirect observations,—for example, that the
+person supposed to have drawn the line was never within fifty feet of the
+paper,—may make it probable that no line at all was made, so that the
+concluded length will be strictly zero. In like manner, experience no
+doubt would warrant the conclusion that there is absolutely _no_ indigo
+in a given ear of wheat, and absolutely _no_ attar in a given lichen.
+But such inferences can only be rendered valid by positive experiential
+evidence, direct or remote, and cannot rest upon a mere inability to
+detect the quantity in question. We have reason to think there is no
+indigo in the wheat, because we have remarked that wherever indigo is
+produced it is produced in considerable quantities, to mention only
+one argument. We have reason to think there is no attar in the lichen,
+because essential oils seem to be in general peculiar to single species,
+if the question had been whether there was iron in the wheat or the
+lichen, though chemical analysis should fail to detect its presence,
+we should think some of it probably was there, since iron is almost
+everywhere. Without any such information, one way or the other, we
+could only abstain from any opinion as to the presence of the substance
+in question. It cannot, I conceive, be maintained that we are in any
+_better_ position than this in regard to the presence of the element of
+chance or spontaneous departures from law in nature.
+
+Those observations which are generally adduced in favor of mechanical
+causation simply prove that there is an element of regularity in nature,
+and have no bearing whatever upon the question of whether such regularity
+is exact and universal, or not. Nay, in regard to this _exactitude_, all
+observation is directly _opposed_ to it; and the most that can be said
+is that a good deal of this observation can be explained away. Try to
+verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your
+observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures
+from the law. We are accustomed to ascribe these, and I do not say
+wrongly, to errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for such
+errors in any antecedently probable way. Trace their causes back far
+enough, and you will be forced to admit they are always due to arbitrary
+determination, or chance.
+
+But it may be asked whether if there were an element of real chance in
+the universe it must not occasionally be productive of signal effects
+such as could not pass unobserved. In answer to this question, without
+stopping to point out that there is an abundance of great events
+which one might be tempted to suppose were of that nature, it will be
+simplest to remark that physicists hold that the particles of gases
+are moving about irregularly, substantially as if by real chance, and
+that by the principles of probabilities there must occasionally happen
+to be concentrations of heat in the gases contrary to the second law
+of thermodynamics, and these concentrations, occurring in explosive
+mixtures, must sometimes have tremendous effects. Here, then, is in
+substance the very situation supposed; yet no phenomena ever have
+resulted which we are forced to attribute to such chance concentration of
+heat, or which anybody, wise or foolish, has ever dreamed of accounting
+for in that manner.
+
+In view of all these considerations, I do not believe that anybody, not
+in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science,
+can maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to
+law is clearly proved, or even rendered particularly probable, by any
+observations hitherto made. In this way, the determined advocate of exact
+regularity will soon find himself driven to _a priori_ reasons to support
+his thesis. These received such a sockdologer from Stuart Mill in his
+Examination of Hamilton, that holding to them now seems to me to denote
+a high degree of imperviousness to reason; so that I shall pass them by
+with little notice.
+
+To say that we cannot help believing a given proposition is no argument,
+but it is a conclusive fact if it be true; and with the substitution
+of “I” for “we,” it is true in the mouths of several classes of minds,
+the blindly passionate, the unreflecting and ignorant, and the person
+who has overwhelming evidence before his eyes. But that which has been
+inconceivable to-day has often turned out indisputable on the morrow.
+Inability to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass
+in regard to a number of beliefs,—unless endowed with extraordinary
+obstinacy and obtuseness. His understanding is enslaved to some blind
+compulsion which a vigorous mind is pretty sure soon to cast off.
+
+Some seek to back up the _a priori_ position with empirical arguments.
+They say that the exact regularity of the world is a natural belief, and
+that natural beliefs have generally been confirmed by experience. There
+is some reason in this. Natural beliefs, however, if they generally
+have a foundation of truth, also require correction and purification
+from natural illusions. The principles of mechanics are undoubtedly
+natural beliefs; but, for all that, the early formulations of them were
+exceedingly erroneous. The general approximation to truth in natural
+beliefs is, in fact, a case of the general adaptation of genetic products
+to recognisable utilities or ends. Now, the adaptations of nature,
+beautiful and often marvellous as they verily are, are never found to
+be quite perfect; so that the argument is quite _against_ the absolute
+exactitude of any natural belief, including that of the principle of
+causation.
+
+Another argument, or convenient commonplace, is that absolute chance is
+_inconceivable_. This word has eight current significations. The Century
+Dictionary enumerates six. Those who talk like this will hardly be
+persuaded to say in what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable.
+Should they do so, it would easily be shown either that they have no
+sufficient reason for the statement or that the inconceivability is of a
+kind which does not prove that chance is non-existent.
+
+Another _a priori_ argument is that chance is unintelligible; that is
+to say, while it may perhaps be conceivable, it does not disclose to
+the eye of reason the how or why of things; and since a hypothesis can
+only be justified so far as it renders some phenomenon intelligible, we
+never can have any right to suppose absolute chance to enter into the
+production of anything in nature. This argument may be considered in
+connection with two others. Namely, instead of going so far as to say
+that the supposition of chance can _never_ properly be used to explain
+any observed fact, it may be alleged merely that no facts are known
+which such a supposition could in any way help in explaining. Or again,
+the allegation being still further weakened, it may be said that since
+departures from law are not unmistakably observed, chance is not a _vera
+causa_, and ought not unnecessarily to be introduced into a hypothesis.
+
+These are no mean arguments, and require us to examine the matter a
+little more closely. Come, my superior opponent, let me learn from your
+wisdom. It seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a
+manifest instance of chance.
+
+“While you would hold a throw of deuce-ace to be brought about by
+necessity?” [The opponent’s supposed remarks are placed in quotation
+marks.]
+
+Clearly one throw is as much chance as another.
+
+“Do you think throws of dice are of a different nature from other events?”
+
+I see that I must say that _all_ the diversity and specificalness of
+events is attributable to chance.
+
+“Would you, then, deny that there is any regularity in the world?”
+
+That is clearly undeniable. I must acknowledge there is an approximate
+regularity, and that every event is influenced by it. But the
+diversification, specificalness, and irregularity of things I suppose is
+chance. A throw of sixes appears to me a case in which this element is
+particularly obtrusive.
+
+“If you reflect more deeply, you will come to see that _chance_ is only a
+name for a cause that is unknown to us.”
+
+Do you mean that we have no idea whatever what kind of causes could bring
+about a throw of sixes?
+
+“On the contrary, each die moves under the influence of precise
+mechanical laws.”
+
+But it appears to me that it is not these _laws_ which made the die turn
+up sixes; for these laws act just the same when other throws come up. The
+chance lies in the diversity of throws; and this diversity cannot be due
+to laws which are immutable.
+
+“The diversity is due to the diverse circumstances under which the
+laws act. The dice lie differently in the box, and the motion given to
+the box is different. These are the unknown causes which produce the
+throws, and to which we give the name of chance; not the mechanical law
+which regulates the operation of these causes. You see you are already
+beginning to think more clearly about this subject.”
+
+Does the operation of mechanical law not increase the diversity?
+
+“Properly not. You must know that the instantaneous state of a system
+of particles is defined by six times as many numbers as there are
+particles, three for the co-ordinates of each particle’s position, and
+three more for the components of its velocity. This number of numbers,
+which expresses the amount of diversity in the system, remains the same
+at all times. There may be, to be sure, some kind of relation between
+the co-ordinates and component velocities of the different particles, by
+means of which the state of the system might be expressed by a smaller
+number of numbers. But, if this is the case, a precisely corresponding
+relationship must exist between the co-ordinates and component velocities
+at any other time, though it may doubtless be a relation less obvious
+to us. Thus, the intrinsic complexity of the system is the same at all
+times.”
+
+Very well, my obliging opponent, we have now reached an issue. You think
+all the arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one
+dose, in the beginning, if there was a beginning, and that the variety
+and complication of nature has always been just as much as it is now. But
+I, for my part, think that the diversification, the specification, has
+been continually taking place. Should you condescend to ask me why I so
+think, I should give my reasons as follows:
+
+1) Question any science which deals with the course of time. Consider
+the life of an individual animal or plant, or of a mind. Glance at the
+history of states, of institutions, of language, of ideas. Examine the
+successions of forms shown by paleontology, the history of the globe
+as set forth in geology, of what the astronomer is able to make out
+concerning the changes of stellar systems. Everywhere the main fact is
+growth and increasing complexity. Death and corruption are mere accidents
+or secondary phenomena. Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot
+point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called
+death. Races, at any rate, do not die out except under unfavorable
+circumstances. From these broad and ubiquitous facts we may fairly infer,
+by the most unexceptionable logic, that there is probably in nature some
+agency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased;
+and that consequently the rule of mechanical necessity meets in some way
+with interference.
+
+2) By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the
+universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow
+bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually,
+and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety
+and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really
+_sui generis_ and new can be said to be accounted for. The ordinary view
+has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world, has
+to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least,
+that variety can spring only from spontaneity, and yet denies without
+any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity, or else shoves
+it back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since. The
+superior logic of my view appears to me not easily controverted.
+
+3) When I ask the necessitarian how he would explain the diversity and
+irregularity of the universe, he replies to me out of the treasury of his
+wisdom that irregularity is something which from the nature of things we
+must not seek to explain. Abashed at this, I seek to cover my confusion
+by asking how he would explain the uniformity and regularity of the
+universe, whereupon he tells me that the laws of nature are immutable and
+ultimate facts, and no account is to be given of them. But my hypothesis
+of spontaneity does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; that is, it
+explains the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what
+each lawless event is to be. At the same time, by thus loosening the
+bond of necessity, it gives room for the influence of another kind of
+causation, such as seems to be operative in the mind in the formation of
+associations, and enables us to understand how the uniformity of nature
+could have been brought about. That single events should be hard and
+unintelligible, logic will permit without difficulty: we do not expect
+to make the shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural
+and reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic does expect things
+_general_ to be understandable. To say that there is a universal law, and
+that it is a hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore
+of which can never be inquired into, at this a sound logic will revolt;
+and will pass over at once to a method of philosophising which does not
+thus barricade the road of discovery.
+
+4) Necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole
+action of the mind a part of the physical universe. Our notion that
+we decide what we are going to do, if as the necessitarian says, it
+has been calculable since the earliest times, is reduced to illusion.
+Indeed, consciousness in general thus becomes a mere illusory aspect of
+a material system. What we call red, green, and violet are in reality
+only different rates of vibration. The sole reality is the distribution
+of qualities of matter in space and time. Brain-matter is protoplasm
+in a certain degree and kind of complication,—a certain arrangement of
+mechanical particles. Its feeling is but an inward aspect, a phantom.
+For, from the positions and velocities of the particles at any one
+instant, and the knowledge of the immutable forces, the positions at all
+other times are calculable; so that the universe of space, time, and
+matter is a rounded system uninterfered with from elsewhere. But from
+the state of feeling at any instant, there is no reason to suppose the
+states of feeling at all other instants are thus exactly calculable; so
+that feeling is, as I said, a mere fragmentary and illusive aspect of the
+universe. This is the way, then, that necessitarianism has to make up
+its accounts. It enters consciousness under the head of sundries, as a
+forgotten trifle; its scheme of the universe would be more satisfactory
+if this little fact could be dropped out of sight. On the other hand,
+by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how
+little,—be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount,—we gain room to
+insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is
+needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it
+is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence; and in so doing
+we resolve the problem of the connection of soul and body.
+
+5) But I must leave undeveloped the chief of my reasons, and can
+only adumbrate it. The hypothesis of chance-spontaneity is one whose
+inevitable consequences are capable of being traced out with mathematical
+precision into considerable detail. Much of this I have done and find the
+consequences to agree with observed facts to an extent which seems to me
+remarkable. But the matter and methods of reasoning are novel, and I have
+no right to promise that other mathematicians shall find my deductions as
+satisfactory as I myself do, so that the strongest reason for my belief
+must for the present remain a private reason of my own, and cannot
+influence others. I mention it to explain my own position; and partly to
+indicate to future mathematical speculators a veritable goldmine, should
+time and circumstances and the abridger of all joys prevent my opening it
+to the world.
+
+If now I, in my turn, inquire of the necessitarian why he prefers to
+suppose that all specification goes back to the beginning of things,
+he will answer me with one of those last three arguments which I left
+unanswered.
+
+First, he may say that chance is a thing absolutely unintelligible, and
+therefore that we never can be entitled to make such a supposition.
+But does not this objection smack of naïve impudence? It is not mine,
+it is his own conception of the universe which leads abruptly up to
+hard, ultimate, inexplicable, immutable law, on the one hand, and to
+inexplicable specification and diversification of circumstances on the
+other. My view, on the contrary, hypothetises nothing at all, unless it
+be hypothesis to say that all specification came about in some sense,
+and is not to be accepted as unaccountable. To undertake to account for
+anything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would, indeed, be
+futile. But this I do not do. I make use of chance chiefly to make room
+for a principle of generalisation, or tendency to form habits, which I
+hold has produced all regularities. The mechanical philosopher leaves
+the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is
+pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to chance. I attribute
+it altogether to chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of a
+spontaneity which is to some degree regular. It seems to me clear at any
+rate that one of these two positions must be taken, or else specification
+must be supposed due to a spontaneity which develops itself in a certain
+and not in a chance way, by an objective logic like that of Hegel. This
+last way I leave as an open possibility, for the present; for it is as
+much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own theory is.
+
+Secondly the necessitarian may say there are, at any rate, no observed
+phenomena which the hypothesis of chance could aid in explaining.
+In reply, I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing
+complexity, which appears to be universal, and which though it may
+possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all
+the appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety
+itself, beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe:
+no mechanism can account for this. Then, there is the very fact the
+necessitarian most insists upon, the regularity of the universe which for
+him serves only to block the road of inquiry. Then, there are the regular
+relationships between the laws of nature,—similarities and comparative
+characters, which appeal to our intelligence as its cousins, and call
+upon us for a reason. Finally, there is consciousness, feeling, a patent
+fact enough, but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher.
+
+Thirdly, the necessitarian may say that chance is not a _vera causa_,
+that we cannot know positively there is any such element in the universe.
+But the doctrine of the _vera causa_ has nothing to do with elementary
+conceptions. Pushed to that extreme, it at once cuts off belief in the
+existence of a material universe; and without that necessitarianism
+could hardly maintain its ground. Besides, variety is a fact which must
+be admitted; and the theory of chance merely consists in supposing this
+diversification does not antedate all time. Moreover, the avoidance of
+hypotheses involving causes nowhere positively known to act—is only a
+recommendation of logic, not a positive command. It cannot be formulated
+in any precise terms without at once betraying its untenable character,—I
+mean as rigid rule, for as a recommendation it is wholesome enough.
+
+I believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all the important
+reasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity, and have shown
+their nullity. I earnestly beg that whoever may detect any flaw in my
+reasoning will point it out to me, either privately or publicly; for if
+I am wrong, it much concerns me to be set right speedily. If my argument
+remains unrefuted, it will be time, I think, to doubt the absolute
+truth of the principle of universal law; and when once such a doubt
+has obtained a living root in any man’s mind, my cause with him, I am
+persuaded, is gained.
+
+                                                             C. S. PEIRCE.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[53] _Continuous_ is not exactly the right word, but I let it go to avoid
+a long and irrelevant discussion.
+
+
+
+
+PSYCHICAL MONISM.
+
+
+In modern thought, ever since Descartes introduced into the conception
+of all-comprising nature that perplexing distinction between thinking
+and extended substance, the problem of reconciling so radical a dualism
+has formed the main task of those who have busied themselves with
+philosophical interpretation.
+
+In the light of the Cartesian system there seemed to exist two entirely
+disparate, independent worlds; the one in individual consciousness, the
+other outside of it; the one made of mental, the other of material stuff.
+
+How to conceive these two antithetical worlds, as interdependent
+constituents of one and the same unitary nature is, after many discarded
+attempts, still the principal endeavor of systematic thinking.
+
+Every student of philosophy knows how Descartes himself ascribed the
+evident concordance and intercommunication of the two worlds to the
+miraculous decree and intervention of the Deity; how Spinoza sought to
+overcome the distracting dilemma by proving that the two substances are
+but attributes of one single absolute substance; how Leibnitz made both
+realms, that of inwardness and that of outwardness, form a consistent
+universe and keep consonant time by means of a divinely pre-established
+harmony; and how numbers of less illustrious devices likewise failed to
+gain general acceptance.
+
+A more important part in the development of modern thought was played by
+those other attempts, which strove to reach a monistic interpretation
+by showing that nature in all its manifestations is constituted, either
+solely by mind and its original endowments; or, on the contrary, solely
+by matter and its original endowments. Thinkers versed in physical
+science felt inclined to look upon the material world as the matrix of
+all natural occurrences; while those versed in psychical science were apt
+to conceive the mental world as containing within itself all there is of
+nature.
+
+The physical hypothesis has proved its eminent efficiency by leading to
+a vastly more correct and faithful knowledge of the perceptible universe
+than had ever been previously attained.
+
+Still, from the psychical standpoint it became nevertheless evident
+beyond contention, that all so-called qualities of matter, all that
+in any way enters into our perception of it, is composed of nothing
+but mental constituents. And this means simply, that, whatever we
+are actually conscious of, must of necessity form part of our own
+consciousness, and not of anything outside of it.
+
+As to the truth of this fundamental psychological conception there is no
+longer any dispute among philosophers. But there remains to be solved
+the all-important question, whether or not there exists outside this
+consciousness of ours, either beyond its peripheral, perceptual range,
+or beyond its central, conceptual sphere, another world which it merely
+symbolically reveals. And in case such another extra-conscious world is
+found actually to exist, how it comes to constitute, together with the
+world of consciousness, that unitary system of being of which we mentally
+and bodily seem to form part.
+
+Professor Dewey in a series of articles in _Mind_ (Nos. 41, 42, 49,
+57) and in one recently published in this journal (Vol. II, No. 1)
+advocates—more profoundly and consistently than has been done before
+by any Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian—the view, that consciousness itself
+intuits all phenomena of nature by force of its own intrinsic activity,
+imparting to them their significance as knowledge by discriminating
+their specific position and value within its own all-comprising organic
+totality of being. He believes thus in no other world than that of
+self-consciousness; asserting that neither its perceptual nor its
+conceptual content are significative of any reality beyond.
+
+The editor, though an ardent defender of cosmic Monism, is by no
+means a convert to such purely psychical monism. He maintains, on the
+contrary, in the same issue of _The Monist_ (p. 85), that, “The mental
+picture of a tree becomes a symbol for a special object outside of us,
+and is projected to the place where experience has taught us to expect
+that object.” Consequently, the mental picture refers as knowledge
+to something outside of us, to something not forming part of our
+consciousness.
+
+The present writer believes likewise, that the perceptual tree is merely
+a mental symbol signalising an extra-mental, sense-stimulating existent;
+and that the value of this symbol as knowledge consists altogether in
+its implication of the existence of an entity subsisting outside our own
+being and its consciousness, and having power to affect our sensibility
+in definite more or less recognised ways.
+
+The editor and the present writer assert then, that the content of
+perceptual consciousness forms merely a symbolical representation of a
+corresponding reality subsisting outside consciousness; while Professor
+Dewey acknowledges as really existent only self-consciousness, and
+nothing outside of it, either peripherically stimulating the senses, or
+centrally imparting universality to individual intelligence.
+
+The former view frankly admits duality in nature, so far as conscious
+and extra-conscious existence are concerned. And in order to overcome
+this dualism of _ordo idearum_ and _ordo rerum_—essentially the same
+dualism as bequeathed to us by Descartes—it has to show how the world
+within consciousness with its “mental picture,” and the world “outside of
+us” containing the existent symbolically represented; how these totally
+disparate worlds come to constitute a unitary nature, whose divers modes
+of existence are throughout interdependently connected.
+
+It is clear that the reality symbolised by the “mental picture”—if any
+such reality actually exists—can be known to us solely as thus mentally
+symbolised, and not known to us in any way as it subsists extra-mentally
+“outside of us,” as it subsists in itself when not thus symbolically
+represented by our casual and intermittent perception of it.
+
+The mental picture being a mere representative symbol must needs differ
+_toto genere_ from the non-mental existent symbolised thereby. We know
+only what as mental representation is forming part of our consciousness.
+We cannot possibly know anything we are not conscious of. The entity
+“outside of us,” the “thing in itself”—if it at all exists—is therefore
+as such of necessity unknown to us. This confession of ontological
+ignorance is unavoidably involved in the acceptance of a symbolised
+reality “outside of us.”
+
+The complex and prodigious difficulties in the way of a monistic
+interpretation, when we start with the dualistic presupposition of a
+conscious and an extra-conscious world, are all effectively circumvented,
+as soon as with Professor Dewey we deny altogether the existence of a
+world of “things-in-themselves” or sense-affecting existents, and roundly
+assert that consciousness as such constitutes, comprises, and has direct
+knowledge of ultimate reality; that it is in fact itself the absolute
+all-sufficient and all-efficient entity.
+
+To understand the philosophical strength and influence of a position so
+strangely at variance with that of current common sense, which holds as
+self-evident the existence of body as well as mind, we have somewhat to
+probe its deep-laid foundations in the history of modern thought.
+
+It was rendered plausible through Descartes’s, Locke’s, Berkeley’s, and
+Hume’s philosophical argumentation, that what we are consciously aware
+of, what is actually present to us as perception or “idea,” and therewith
+as the world at large, is altogether made up of a more or less complex
+combination of our own actual and remembered sensations.
+
+The conscious content itself was thus necessarily held to constitute
+the exclusive object of philosophical research. And by starting with
+sensations as its primordial elements, and taking all “ideas,” or facts
+of memory, to be but faint reproductions of such elements, it became the
+task of investigators “of the human mind” to analyse the given content of
+consciousness into these its assumed elements, and to discover the “laws”
+or general ways of their combination.
+
+Proud of its purely experiential method, concerned about nothing but what
+is actually found present in consciousness, this mode of philosophising
+disclaimed, in consequence, all knowledge of any “power” giving rise
+from without to sensorial “impressions” and their order of conscious
+emergence. And it ignored likewise the existence of any “power” combining
+and systematising them from within; and, moreover, of any entity for whom
+the sensorially constituted experience had intelligent significance.
+
+Such nominalistic, sensorial idealism has until lately reigned supreme
+in English philosophy. Previous to the new departure introduced by it
+philosophical interpretation had always followed the method of conceptual
+evolution, carried on according to the rules of formal or deductive
+logic. It took some widely inclusive, ready-made concepts as its starting
+points or major premises, and extracted therefrom all knowledge that
+seemed to be implicitly contained in them.
+
+Even Kant in his younger days had no idea that valid knowledge or
+truth could possibly be attained in any other way than by logically
+deducing it from ready-made premises. At a later period he learned from
+Hume to distinguish between what he termed analytical and synthetical
+propositions, and what had been called by the former thinker connection
+between vivid impressions or matter of fact on the one side, and
+connection between their faint copies or the so-called ideas on the other
+side.
+
+The discovery on the part of Kant, that our knowledge of the actual
+connection of matters of facts has in every instance to be learned from
+direct experience and cannot be ratiocinatively deduced from ready-made
+general notions, was a complete revelation to him. It changed his entire
+way of thinking, and became the starting-point of his system of critical
+or transcendental philosophy. He saw clearly, that, if all instructive
+cognition is gained, and has always been gained, solely by means of
+actual experience, if it has been synthetically built up bit by bit as
+directly given to us, without our being able to construct a valid system
+of knowledge transcending in any way actual experience; that reason then
+as a knowledge-constituting faculty is impotent, and that metaphysics,
+as the science of a realm of intelligible existence, must be ever more
+rejected as a pure illusion.
+
+Kant’s thought, like that of most of our own rationalistic thinkers, was
+however predominantly swayed by the belief in an intelligible world,
+the veritable home of man’s spiritual being, where it eternally abideth
+in close communion with a supreme creative intelligence. After a brief
+attack of Humian scepticism, the theologically trained, though rationally
+wide-awake and profound thinker, set out to examine the faculties of
+reason with a view to discover a philosophically legitimate ingress
+into that cherished realm of intelligible subsistence. Hitherto reason
+had been effectively used in philosophy only as an analytic instrument.
+Real knowledge being, however, as proved by Hume, a matter of synthesis,
+it would evidently be making proper way toward a rationally conceived
+intelligible world, if it could be proved that reason is itself in
+possession of synthetical powers.
+
+After many years of profound meditation in this direction, Kant gave
+its results to the philosophical world. He had become convinced that
+mathematical truth, instead of being analytically derived as hitherto
+believed, is on the contrary built up synthetically by intelligence
+itself, and this without the aid of externally imparted experience; that
+intelligence is therefore efficient to form synthetical propositions _a
+priori_. It followed, as a matter of course, that time and space in which
+mathematical figurations take shape, are not conditions of existence
+outside of us, but original forms of our own perceptive faculty, and that
+intelligence by dint of its synthetical powers constructs mathematical
+figurations within these perceptual forms. And finally the conclusion
+was reached that time and space, the empty forms of perception,
+being themselves wholly deficient of any kind of activity, it must
+be intelligence alone which possesses synthetical efficiency, which
+exercises in fact whatever activity is operative in the conscious world.
+
+But though Kant enthroned intelligence as the creator of pure
+mathematics, and endowed it with the exclusive gift of synthetical
+efficiency, he did not see his way to constitute it also the creator of
+the sense-given material that comes experientially to fill the empty and
+passive forms of perception. Against all denunciations of his system as
+purely idealistic, he insisted that there exists outside our being and
+its consciousness a world of things-in-themselves, having power to affect
+our sensibility, so that time and space, its receptive forms, become
+filled with experiential, though wholly unsynthetised material.
+
+Reluctantly, though in faithful adherence to the unbiassed results of
+his investigation, he was at last led to declare that intelligence or
+reason as an instrument of knowledge—called by him theoretical reason in
+contradistinction to practical reason, conceived as the leading principle
+of moral conduct;—that such theoretical reason has power only over
+sensorially given material, and is incapable of attaining knowledge of
+the intelligible sphere.
+
+Still Kant regarded his so-called categories or synthetical functions
+of reason as modes of activity, belonging not only to individual
+reason, but to reason in general. And on the strength of this realistic
+generalisation he attributed to them the power of imparting necessity to
+synthetical propositions, such propositions—otherwise merely subjective
+or empirical—being rendered thereby objective or universally valid.
+He showed, moreover, that the relation of every kind of knowledge
+to a common centre of all-inclusive awareness,—that this “synthetic
+unity of apperception” as he called it,—presupposes an intelligible
+ego, whose veritable nature becomes however nowise manifest within
+our time-and-space-conditioned experience. And he taught that an
+all-comprehending intelligible being had to be hypostatised in order to
+complete the totality of rational knowledge.
+
+Thus, instead of giving us a monistic philosophy, Kant’s theoretical
+speculations disclosed, on the contrary, a tripartite world. At the
+centre the non-manifest intelligible ego in communion with a supernatural
+sphere, and conceived as the veritable bearer of the synthetical reason.
+In the median and only known region the synthetical reason itself,
+constructing and cognising nature, by synthetically elaborating the
+chaotic manifold in time and space. And at the periphery, beyond our own
+being and its perception, an unknowable realm of things-in-themselves
+affecting our sensibility.
+
+So complex an appearance did existence assume under Kant’s critical
+inspection. Contemplative man, however, never ceases to hanker after a
+monistic world-conception. Though individualised, he feels himself one
+with universal being, and strenuously strives to understand how those
+bonds of union are established, and what part he in verity is playing in
+this stupendous drama of being and becoming.
+
+To most philosophers, before Kant, knowledge seemed to be given to us
+ready-made, first conceptually as innate ideas or universal notions; and
+then perceptually as the finished image of an outside world.
+
+Kant has exerted, and still exerts, a controlling influence over
+thinkers by having systematically demonstrated, that not only knowledge,
+but nature itself as we know it, is constructed by powers inherent in
+our own being. He taught that we ourselves, by force of our combining
+and ordering intellectual organisation, fashion out of meaningless
+sense-material the wondrous world we know. And, moreover, that by force
+of our intelligible being we have power to bend the otherwise rigorously
+mechanical course of nature in compliance with moral injunctions.
+
+No wonder that so inspiriting a philosophy electrified to new vigor and
+valiant self-reliance the dogmatically slumbering life of German thought.
+And it was Fichte, above all other followers of Kant, who by his fervent
+exposition kindled in crowds of hearers the vivifying spark of this “new
+philosophy” of all-efficient intelligence.
+
+Fichte is the real father of such psychical monism as has recently found
+so proficient an expounder in Professor Dewey. Fichte understood, what
+Kant failed to see, that the “dynamical idealism” of nature-constituting
+reason involves, not merely the _elaboration_ of sense-given material,
+but the _out and out production_ within consciousness of the entire
+world of perception. For perception undeniably takes place within our
+own being, and must therefore be, as regards matter as well as form, the
+outcome of powers inherent in ourselves. Between a consistent dream and
+the apperception of reality the difference lies merely in our feeling, in
+the latter instance, compelled in a peculiar manner to perceive what we
+perceive. But this feeling of compulsion is likewise a constituent of our
+own consciousness, and, moreover, under the influence of hallucinations
+even this test of reality fails us.
+
+According to Fichte’s matured thought, our being consists altogether
+in intellectual activity, an activity rendering explicit by means of
+self-consciousness what it already implicitly contains. And it is
+universal being that becomes thus self-conscious in us. Infinite reason,
+constituting a system of ideas, a spiritual organisation, is the fount
+and origin of all existence, its own self-revelation becoming manifest in
+finite beings.
+
+Thus, by force of logical consistency, was eliminated from Kantian
+transcendentalism the world of things-in-themselves as superfluous
+to all-constituting intelligence. And the unification of individual
+self-consciousness with universal intelligence was established
+by considering individual self-consciousness as partaking in the
+self-revealing activity of universal intelligence.
+
+Hegel elaborated systematically the psychical or idealistic monism thus
+foreshadowed in Fichte’s later writings. Philosophical interpretation
+turns principally upon the source and import of consciousness. And from
+the recognition of the fact, that all constituents of perception form
+part of this consciousness of ours, it obviously follows that objects,
+and indeed the entire objective world realised in perception and solely
+as perception; that the realisation of this entire world of perceptual
+objects is in verity realisation of a world contained in our own being or
+subject. Subject and object are therefore, from this point of view, at
+bottom identical; the objective world—our human bodies included—being a
+self-revelation of our all-comprehending subject. Mind as well as matter,
+that which we call mental and that which we call material, are thus mere
+abstract terms denoting the subjective and objective sides of one and the
+same reality.
+
+This reality transcendental idealism declares to be “intellectual
+activity.” It is intellectual activity which—from its point of view—is
+revealing itself in the conscious content, becoming thus self-conscious.
+This process of recognition of one’s self as subject-object, as the
+unitary essence and completion of both, is what Hegel calls the “Idea.”
+And with him theoretical or logical self-recognition and practical
+or ethical self-realization coincide as “Absolute Idea.” For to think
+absolute truth and to will its realisation are but two sides of one and
+the same activity. Thought, intelligence, reason, knowing itself as in
+every sense veritable being is thus the absolute One and All.
+
+Such out and out psychical monism is the legitimate outcome of a
+conception which takes the content of consciousness to be ultimate
+reality, signifying nothing beyond itself; and which then constitutes a
+spiritually conceived entity, called thought, intelligence, or reason, as
+the originator and bearer of such consciousness.
+
+After a period of glorious triumph the Hegelian philosophy of
+self-evolving intelligence became a general laughing-stock at home and
+abroad. This ignominious fate overtook it, first in consequence of its
+fawning prostitution by the master himself to the reactionary service
+of Church and State; and then also in consequence of the ridiculous
+“pyrotechnical” abuse of its dialectical method by the “Young-Hegelians.”
+
+However, by “going back to Kant,” the teachings of transcendental
+idealism have in our time once more gained the ascendency, and have
+succeeded not only in conquering materialism, but also in invading and
+almost supplanting English experientialism.
+
+In Germany, after a season of complete estrangement between science and
+philosophy, a re-approachment was effected by the Neo-Kantian movement.
+It originated principally in the recognition on the part of science, that
+sense-perception is above all a psychical and not a purely physiological
+process, a mental not a material fact; that therefore the effort to
+arrive at a correct “theory of knowledge” is by no means a vain endeavor,
+and that psychics as well as physics deserves a place in the hierarchy of
+sciences.
+
+In England and America the Neo-Kantian movement owed, on the other hand,
+its success, above all, to such theistic rationalism as found popular
+expression in “Robert Elsmere.” In Professor Caird’s words it is said
+to afford a means for the “vindication of the religious consciousness.”
+And this it accomplishes “by an objective or absolute synthesis,”
+which establishes “the indivisible unity of the intelligence and the
+intelligible world,” “the unity of man as spiritual with an absolute
+spirit.”
+
+Dr. Hutchison Sterling’s “Secret of Hegel” gave the first effective
+impulse to this transcendental mode of thinking among university men
+of a speculative turn. The late Thomas Hill Green of Oxford and Prof.
+Edward Caird of Glasgow became its foremost exponents, and made numerous
+converts. The former by elaborately disclosing, by force of Kant’s
+principle of synthetical reason, the insufficiency of the sensorial
+experientialism generally accepted in England since Locke’s “Essay
+Concerning Human Understanding.” The latter by consistently developing
+the idealistic and transcendental implications of this same principle of
+synthetical reason.
+
+As repeatedly noticed, and never to be lost sight of, transcendental
+idealism derives its convincing force from the undeniable truth, that
+whatever we are directly aware of forms part of our own consciousness.
+This involves the indivisible unity of such fact as we are directly
+conscious of and the faculty through which we are conscious of it. This
+unity of the realising self and the realised world, of object and subject
+as content of consciousness; or rather the unity of the objective and
+subjective factors of it, this subject-object oneness of conscious states
+and occurrences is an irrefutable truth, from which one has to start,
+whatever direction one may take. You assert, then, that that which exists
+thus interblended as consciousness is itself ultimate reality, and you
+will encounter but little difficulty in deducing therefrom a pretty
+plausible psychical monism. For the power through which and as which
+this ultimate reality exists is then immanent in us individually. And
+when this power is conceived as intelligence or spirit, and the world
+at large as existing solely as content of this spirit’s consciousness,
+or indeed as such consciousness itself, it is clear that our own
+self-and-world-awareness must be—according to this view—identical in
+essence with the spiritual power which is ultimate and universal Reality.
+
+In self-consciousness, when regarded as a totality of all actual and
+potential awareness, our feelings as well as the perceptual objects
+composed of them constitute an organically completed order. They all
+stand in definite and interdependent relations to our unitary being.
+This all-comprising being has time and space as modes of gradual
+self-realisation, but is not—according to transcendentalism—itself in
+time and space. And this is undeniably true, so far at least as the being
+that combines all transient events of experience into a unitary system
+of permanent knowledge cannot possibly itself form part of the ephemeral
+flux of conscious states experienced by it.
+
+Still the multifold individuations of the ultimate reality into
+separate personal self-consciousnesses and deciduous bodily organisms
+forms the great, if not insuperable, obstacle in the way of psychical
+monism. If, on the one hand, we take with Green and Professor Caird
+individual self-consciousness as a “reproduction,” and not as a mere
+phase of universal consciousness; and on the other hand admit a natural
+and gradual development “of man as an animal organism,” instead of
+proving such natural development to be a misconception of our time
+and space bound recognition, we are far from having as yet succeeded
+in establishing a consistent psychical monism on Kantian lines. His
+tripartite world remains ununified.
+
+To achieve its unification is, however, after a profound study and
+appreciation of the difficulties to be encountered, the arduous task
+Professor Dewey has courageously undertaken. To accomplish his purpose
+he has to show how individual consciousness proves itself to be ultimate
+reality, and as such identical with universal consciousness; how man,
+appearing among other perceptible objects in multifold individuated
+specimens as a gradually developed organism, is nevertheless in reality a
+complete, all-comprising entity, not essentially subject to time, space,
+or numerical limitations. And he has to make clear how all conscious
+content, including the external world as well as the feeling and thinking
+subject, has no other existence and significance than in and for
+consciousness.
+
+Professor Dewey maintains that individual consciousness is in reality
+one with universal consciousness, because it comprehends within itself
+subject-and-object-consciousness; the abiding consciousness of oneself
+as an ever-changing individual, and that of the world at large, though
+figured in transient groups of sensations. This being so, that which
+is thus the bearer and realiser of all being and becoming in nature,
+cannot itself form part of this becoming, but must—according to
+Professor Dewey’s view—be eternal and absolute. The all-comprehending
+consciousness—and there is no existence outside of it—is thus identical
+with universal intelligence, identical with that eternally active
+intelligence which is everlastingly creating the organic synthesis of all
+being and becoming.
+
+“Consciousness the ultimate fact reveals itself as reason.” Sensations
+have no self-existence, no meaning in themselves. They exist only as
+intellectually apprehended and for intelligence alone. It is from
+intellectual interpretation that they receive their entire significance.
+On solicitation of sensations the ideal content of universal intelligence
+becomes partially and interruptedly revealed to individual consciousness.
+The sole office of sensations is to give in us occasion to this
+self-realisation of the eternal content of intelligence.
+
+Professor Dewey establishes his psychical monism by discovering
+self-consciousness as the Absolute, the One and All. Individual idealism
+or so-called solipsism, such as expounded by Fichte in his earlier
+writings from the side of intellect, and in the writings of English
+experientialists from the side of sensation, this individual idealism
+presents itself likewise as a psychical monism, but as an absurdly narrow
+one. Professor Dewey points out how it fails to understand that by
+constituting mind, as such, the ego or subject for which all experience
+exists, it artificially divides our unitary consciousness into two
+separate constituents, and takes the subjective constituent to be the
+bearer and realiser of the objective constituent; while in reality both
+constituents are but elements of consciousness in general; are in fact
+completely unified in eternal and absolute consciousness.
+
+Now it is perfectly true, that during conscious awareness object and
+subject-consciousness are inextricably interblended so as to constitute
+a unified experience. It is true also, that the veritable subject that
+thus consciously experiences, and that furthermore imparts intelligent
+meaning to such experience, cannot itself form part of these its own
+fragmentary and transient moments of awareness. Comprehending them all,
+it must evidently be an enduring, at least a relatively persistent being.
+It is undoubtedly to such a persistent being or subject that experience
+gradually accrues, and in whom it is all retained and organised into more
+or less systematic order.
+
+But is there the least warrant for assuming that this persistent subject,
+weaving thus intelligent experience out of its transient conscious
+states, is itself “consciousness” or “intelligence”?
+
+Intelligent consciousness is very obviously only one of the functions
+of the persistent subject, and by no means its being or essence. And
+the experience accruing to it, that at least of the external world,
+bears nowise the characteristics of Platonic reminiscence, does nowise
+consist in self-revelation, in the becoming explicitly aware of what
+already implicitly existed within itself. We may indeed say, that our
+emotions, when aroused, constitute such self-revelation. But, for
+instance, yonder visual figuration, consisting of nothing but colored
+forms, though intelligently interpreted as a landscape with plains,
+woods, and creeks; interpreted thus by the aid of no end of former
+experience; this landscape now perceived by me for the first time was
+certainly not implicitly immanent in my consciousness previous to all
+my individual experience. Its conscious realisation does assuredly not
+render explicit as objective experience what for ever has been an organic
+member of my self-consciousness. What is immanent in my being—not in my
+consciousness—is the sensorial faculty of symbolically picturing whatever
+sense-affecting agent is placed before me. The conscious picture itself
+is an evanescent phenomenon, having no steadfast existence or reality.
+
+To assert—as is usually done by transcendentalists and by Professor Dewey
+among them—that our individual experience, when—as mostly occurs—not
+actually conscious to ourselves, exists then nevertheless as conscious
+content of a universal being; to venture such an utterly gratuitous
+assertion, even when merely hypothetically advanced, transcends all
+legitimate inference from given facts. When declared to be positively
+justified by given facts, it all too obviously betrays the theological
+bias by which it is inspired, the set purpose of vindicating the
+religious consciousness which has faith in “the unity of man as spiritual
+with an absolute spirit.”
+
+Through consciousness we indeed become aware of the divers faculties
+of our being, together with their functionally accruing experience.
+All this, however, rises into conscious awareness only at times, when
+casually awakened. To give to the vast system of consciously latent being
+and experience the name of “consciousness,” to call that “consciousness”
+whose principal distinction is to constitute a persistent subject
+with an organised system of experience abiding for the most part in
+extra-conscious latency; to do this only because all this extra-conscious
+existence may and does at times become more or less conscious; this is
+surely committing the fatal error of denoting a state of things by its
+outright opposite.
+
+There is no denying that most of the content of our being is usually
+not present in consciousness. Consequently, abiding thus outside
+consciousness, it cannot possibly form part of consciousness either
+individual or universal.
+
+Nothing could be more to the point than Professor Dewey’s statement,
+that “only a living actual fact (let us say existent instead of fact)
+can preserve within its unity that organic system of differences in
+virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being.” There is not the
+least doubt that the subject, who at times is conscious of more or less
+of his experience, is exactly such an existent as here described. But
+consciousness, though the medium in which and through which everything
+is realised, is itself but an intermittent function of that living
+actual subject which preserves within its unity the organic system of
+differences in virtue of which it lives and moves and has its being. The
+consciousness of the subject conveys information to it only interruptedly
+and in broken bits. These become organically unified into a more or less
+consistent totality of experience. But this process of unification takes
+place, not in the dream like stuff which makes up consciousness, but in
+the persistent, extra-conscious matrix whence our ever lapsing, ever
+renewed moment of conscious awareness emerges ready-made.
+
+The subject capable of thought and feeling becomes thinkingly and
+feelingly manifest to _itself_, when its functions through which
+consciousness arises are in operation; becomes manifest as bodily active
+to _other sentient beings also_, when its functions through which such
+activity arises are in operation.
+
+But if the real nature of the experiencing subject is not
+self-consciousness or intelligence, what then can it be?
+
+Idealists, and with them Professor Dewey, become such by believing that
+the perceptually realised objects are themselves veritable reality,
+and not mere symbols of extra-conscious reality. Now can they in all
+sincerity bring themselves to believe that a baby—to use one of Professor
+Dewey’s illustrations—which experiences a sensation, say a pain caused
+by the prick of a pin, that this pain-experiencing baby is no other
+than that colored form within the perceptual consciousness of may be
+half a dozen spectators; and that it is the perceptual pin within the
+consciousness of each of them that has pricked the baby and caused the
+pain?
+
+Does the pain-experiencing baby derive its existence from the fact that
+the intellect of the spectator interprets the perceptual form within his
+consciousness to signify a baby, which has forever implicitly formed part
+of the organic content of his own self-consciousness?
+
+Surely the pain experienced by the baby is not experienced by the
+perceptually realised baby, not by the baby existing as interpreted
+perception in the consciousness of him who perceives it. The pain
+experienced by the baby does nowise form part of the consciousness
+of the perceiver. Consequently and incontestably, the subject that
+experiences the sensation, that experiences in fact any kind of feeling
+or thought, is itself an extra-conscious being, a being only casually and
+symbolically realised in consciousness.
+
+And if the perceptual baby is merely a conscious symbol signalising
+an extra-conscious existent, then all perceptual existence, all that
+constitutes what we perceptually realise as nature, symbolises likewise
+an extra-conscious reality, a reality that has power so to affect our
+sensibility as to arouse in us perceptual representations of itself and
+its characteristics.
+
+The matter stands then exactly as denied by Professor Dewey. It is
+indeed the “baby thing-in-itself which is affected,” and it is “a
+world thing-in-itself which calls forth the sensation.” It is not, as
+maintained by Professor Dewey the baby known to him as his own perception
+which experiences the sensation by having been pricked within the
+beholder’s consciousness by a perceptually constituted pin.
+
+But if the entity, which affects the beholder’s sensibility and awakens
+in him the percept of a baby, exists in verity outside his, the
+beholder’s, consciousness, and is known to him only as thus symbolically
+pictured by his own percept; such sense-affecting entity is, on the other
+hand, nowise to be construed as the unknowable “First Cause,” nowise as
+that protean Persistent Force, which Mr. Spencer imagines capable of
+assuming every kind of mental or material appearance.
+
+The so-called material or physical modes which constitute in the beholder
+the perceptually realised baby, and the so-called immaterial or mental
+modes which are experienced by the baby as his sensations and emotions;
+these material and mental modes are in no sense the manifestation of an
+“Absolute Force” or “inscrutable Power,” as our Spencerians would lead us
+religiously, and almost theologically to believe.[54]
+
+The material modes that constitute the perceptually realised baby are
+awakened in the beholder by a definite sense-affecting existent, which is
+thus revealing not only its bare presence, but most vividly and minutely
+also its perceptible and distinguishing characteristics. And in the same
+manner it makes also known that it is interdependently connected with
+the vast system of sense-affecting entities, that constitutes nature in
+general.
+
+All reality is interdependently conditioned. The “Unconditioned Reality”
+of the Hamiltons, Mansels, and Spencers, has nowhere any existence,
+either in consciousness or outside of it. It is altogether a fictitious,
+superfluous, and most misleading conception.
+
+As regards the mental modes experienced by the baby, they are evidently
+exclusively his own affections as a highly and most specifically
+organised being, and not by any means are they modes of appearance of
+that most empty abstraction “The Unknowable,” that has with so many
+believers usurped the throne of their former anthropomorphic Deity.
+
+This coiled up thing over there, is it a rope or a snake? I see it move,
+and my intellect interprets it to be a snake. Surely the significance
+of the interpretation does not consist in my realising what was already
+implicitly contained in my consciousness, but in knowing that in contact
+with the being out there, which forms no part whatever of myself
+though perceptually realised by me, I shall become affected in certain
+additional ways taught by former experience.
+
+Will any unbiassed and competent judge assert that the far-fetched
+idealistic interpretation is more in accordance with what we really
+experience, than the very simple one here given?
+
+No doubt the immediate object of physical observation is not the
+thing-in-itself, but its perceptual realisation. It is such, however,
+only as symbolical representation of something subsisting outside
+consciousness, only as a conscious affection awakened with compulsory
+force in the observer from without. The observer offers his diversely
+differentiated and delicately attuned sensibilities to the outside world
+and carefully notices its specific modes of reaction upon definite modes
+of stimulation. This in truth is the method of scientific observation,
+from which all conclusions regarding the characteristics of nature are
+drawn.
+
+The conscious subject phylogenetically evolved in constant interaction
+with the medium in which he lives and moves and has his being, possesses
+realising faculties so adjusted as to correctly subserve his needs in
+relation to such a medium. He then furthermore uses these faculties
+in order to gain a fuller and more accurate knowledge of further
+perceptible characteristics of this same medium.
+
+A monistic interpretation of nature cannot possibly be reached by
+assuming consciousness or intelligence to be ultimate reality, and
+as such the One and All. It can be reached only by recognising that
+consciousness is a function of subjects that stand in definite relations
+to the rest of nature, and have power along with the other constituents
+of nature so to affect the sensibility of other sentient beings as to
+cause to arise therein the symbolical representation of themselves.
+
+Systematised experience consists in the organised totality of such
+symbolical representations. And this organised totality of experience
+exists as potential possession of the subject in extra-conscious
+latency, in what we figuratively call memory. Emerging on occasion
+into consciousness it reproduces more or less faithfully the order and
+connection of the manifold that constitutes the sense-affecting universe.
+
+In highly developed sentient subjects self-realisation or the “inner
+life,” which arises from the activity of their emotional and above all
+their social nature, gains predominant influence over their sensual and
+perceptual experience, urging them so to transform the given aspect of
+the outer world as to render it subservient to the aspirations of that
+inner life.
+
+                                                        EDMUND MONTGOMERY.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[54] Mr. Spencer grapples with the problem of ultimate reality from
+three different and widely divergent standpoints. First, by assuming
+that our out and out conditioned nature and knowledge presupposes the
+existence of an “Unconditioned Reality,” he arrives at the conception of
+an “Absolute Cause.” Second, by attributing—in keeping with the principle
+of the Conservation of Energy, all physical and psychical activity to the
+interconvertible play of modes of force, he arrives at the conception
+of an “Absolute Force,” whence all these manifest modes proceed;
+hinting, moreover, that, as our experience of force-manifestation is
+of a psychical nature, the “Absolute Force” may rather be conceived as
+psychical than as physical. Third, besides explaining at times that
+the psychical and physical modes, instead of being interconvertible,
+are only two different aspects of one and the same reality—and
+contrary to his assumption of the interconvertibility of psychical and
+physical modes proceeding from an Absolute Force, he advocates in his
+_Transfigured Realism_ the view, that our perceptual consciousness
+figures representatively the corresponding characteristics of a world of
+things-in-themselves. No wonder that Spencerians are getting somewhat
+mixed, as the saying is.
+
+
+
+
+THE CONSERVATION OF SPIRIT AND THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
+
+
+The consideration of the relation that subsists between body and mind is
+a topic that has led to several theories, one of which has found favor
+with many on account of its supposed monistic implications. Dr. Carus in
+his work “The Soul of Man” seems to adopt that theory, and his method of
+explaining the matter is one of notable superiority. He says:
+
+    “Matter and mind (the elements of feeling) are to be considered
+    as one—not the same, but one. They are as inseparable as are
+    the two sides of a sheet of paper. If we look at it from the
+    mind side its activity represents itself as elements of feeling
+    and all kinds and degrees of actual feelings. If we look at it
+    from the matter side its activity represents itself as motions
+    or as all kinds of potential and kinetic energy.”
+
+This doctrine of a double-faced unity has no doubt been favored because
+it has seemed the best and perhaps the only refuge available against
+the various forms of dualism. Still this same doctrine is very far from
+inducing that final pacification of mind which we rightly expect from a
+competent theory. It is open to the charge of being arbitrary, and it
+brings no access of insight.
+
+The expressions of those whom we must suppose to be well affected towards
+any doctrine that gives promise of a monistic issue show this to be the
+case. Thus Tyndall says:
+
+    “I do not think that he (i. e. the materialist) is entitled
+    to say that his molecular groupings and his molecular motions
+    explain everything. In reality they explain nothing. The
+    utmost that he can affirm is the association of two classes
+    of phenomena of whose real bond of union he is in absolute
+    ignorance. _The problem of the connection of body and soul is
+    as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the prehistoric
+    ages._”
+
+And Huxley protests that,
+
+    “How anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes
+    about as a result of irritating nervous tissue is _just as
+    unaccountable_ as the appearance of the Djinn when Alladin
+    rubbed his lamp.”
+
+In truth those who might be expected to speak with considerable reserve
+in regard to the inabilities of human attainment have emphasised without
+due sobriety the insuperable aspects of the problem. The past history
+of culture should have counseled caution, especially in view of the
+certainty that consciousness is _somehow_ dependent upon nerve action.
+
+It is submitted that the recent progress of science should induce a
+hopeful temper of mind on this question. Not only have physiology and
+psychology brought to light more results in the last decades than in
+centuries past, but in positive monism and formal thought philosophy
+has also attained to a clearness of method which will prove beneficial
+to all special investigations. A clear and concise statement of the
+new positivism is found in the chapter Form and Formal Thought of
+“Fundamental Problems” by Dr. Carus. Any one who has watched the
+development of the algebra of thought and the philosophy of logic, will
+naturally expect signal aid towards the solution of the world-questions
+from a proper consideration of form and the laws of form. In Dr. Carus’s
+book and especially in the above mentioned chapter will be found a most
+popular exposition of that subject.
+
+Those who hold that form and formal thought is the very constituted means
+by which our information with respect to real existence may be improved,
+ought to regard it a decided step towards the solution of any hitherto
+apparently inexplicable problem, if we only but find ourselves able to
+_formulate_ an idea or process that mediates between the known and the
+unknown, and represents to our insight how it is possible to think of a
+phenomenon in accordance with notions that yield perceptible imagery.
+
+Riemann in what has been well characterised as his “stupendous” essay on
+“The hypotheses that lie at the basis of geometry” remarks:
+
+    “We are quite at liberty to suppose that the metric relations
+    of space in the infinitely small do not conform to the
+    hypotheses of geometry; _and we ought in fact to suppose it if
+    we can thereby obtain a simpler explanation of phenomena_.”
+
+So also Jevons in his “Principles of Science” commenting on “The
+Character of the Experimentalist” refers to the audacity of speculation
+that characterised Faraday and that was the leading of his efforts
+towards some of his most brilliant discoveries. He says:
+
+    “We have only to notice the profound conviction in the unity of
+    natural laws, the active powers of inference and imagination,
+    _the unbounded license of theorising_.”
+
+Theory must precede experiment. We must formulate before we can verify.
+The words of Faraday: “Let us encourage ourselves by a little more
+imagination prior to experiment,” shows us the method he followed.
+
+Recent developments in connection with the study of electricity supply us
+with at least an analogy that may instruct us as to how we may _suppose_
+the appearance of consciousness as a result of nerve action.
+
+The nature of electricity has long been an unformulated thesis. That it
+may be produced by the motion of matter is proved by every dynamo in
+operation: indeed the oldest experiments in static electricity are to the
+same effect.
+
+At the present time it seems to be an acceptable doctrine or at least a
+good working hypothesis that electricity and magnetism are manifestations
+of that once hypothetical medium called _the ether_.
+
+Prof. G. F. Fitzgerald in his opening address before Section A of the
+British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1888 made these
+very important remarks:
+
+    “In a presidential address on the borderlands of the known,
+    delivered from this chair, the great Clerk Maxwell spoke of it
+    as an undecided question whether electro-magnetic phenomena are
+    due to direct action at a distance or are due to the action of
+    an intervening medium. The year 1888 will ever be memorable as
+    the year in which this great question has been experimentally
+    _settled_ by Hertz in Germany. Henceforth I hope no learner
+    will fail to be impressed with the theory—_hypothesis no
+    longer_—that electro-magnetic actions are due to a medium
+    pervading all known space.”
+
+That the ether really exists: that it is a proved fact and that it is
+the substantial basis out of which electricity and magnetism arises,
+are pretensions too momentous to remain unchallenged if they lacked
+good evidence in their favor. Yet instead of awakening dissent among
+the critical hosts of science, these utterances of Professor Fitzgerald
+have not only been received as voicing the convictions of the scientific
+world but they are confirmed from time to time by the sometimes tacit and
+sometimes express assent of all who discourse upon the matters involved.
+
+Prof. Oliver Lodge, one of the leading scientific men of England and an
+acknowledged authority upon the subject has recently published a work
+entitled “Modern Views of Electricity.” In his preface he says:
+
+    “Few things in physical science appear to me more certain than
+    that what has so long been called electricity is a form or
+    rather a mode of manifestation of the ether.”
+
+He supposes the ether as a compound of two constituents corresponding
+to positive and negative electricity. Each of these constituents has
+affinities, cohesions, or entanglements with the various kinds of
+matter, which affinities, cohesions, or entanglements are greater or
+less according to the kind of matter involved, so that by the motions of
+certain sorts of matter under proper conditions the two constituents of
+the ether are torn apart or separated, or in the language of dynamics,
+strained. But at the same time these constituents also tend with
+unceasing persistence to reunite and saturate one another into a state of
+absolute neutrality. Separate, these constituents show an existence and
+an energy towards one another. United neither of them shows any existence
+at all nor any efficacy whatever. They are as though they did not exist.
+
+It is of small moment to the present purpose whether or not this
+electrical theory is well grounded. In either case its very formulation
+supplies us with a suggestion as to how it is possible to think of
+consciousness as a product of nerve action.
+
+Just as the ether is supposed as the substantial basis out of which in
+consequence of the motion of matter electricity and magnetism becomes
+manifest, so may we suppose an analogous (perhaps the same) basis
+surrounding and permeating all things, and out of which in consequence of
+nerve action, consciousness becomes manifest.
+
+Why may we not suppose this consciousness basis, (which suppose we name
+spirit,) to be the ultimate substance which being variously modified
+by energy manifests in one case the phenomena of mind, in another the
+phenomena of electricity, magnetism, etc., and then again in a third case
+that phenomenon, mass, or inertia, which is the essential attribute of
+matter?
+
+As with the ether in the absence of any cause that separates it so that
+electricity and magnetism become manifest, so spirit may be supposed
+to be utterly without manifestation and neutral until nerve action
+modifies its condition, when like electricity in the one case, so here,
+consciousness becomes manifest.
+
+Why may we not imagine spirit as composed of two constituents
+corresponding to feeling and volition which united saturate one another
+into neutrality, but which separated by nerve action manifest feeling
+that tends to pass into volition, or volition that tends to pass into
+feeling? This would be in accordance with the phenomena if of reflex
+action which is supposed to be the elementary type of mentality.
+
+This is in harmony with the views of the author of “The Soul of Man,” for
+he, although for other reasons, also explains the origin of consciousness
+from tension. He says:
+
+    “Consciousness is an intensified state of feeling caused
+    through tension. It lies between a want and its satisfaction.
+    Satisfaction not being immediately attainable, feelings are no
+    longer in a state of equilibrium, and it is this tension which
+    concentrates and intensifies feeling into consciousness.
+
+    “It appears that consciousness never arises without a certain
+    tension. Days spent in an idyllic life flow away almost
+    unconsciously; there is little friction, there are no problems
+    to be solved; there are no unsatisfied wants, or if there are
+    any, they are quickly and easily attended to. There is no need
+    of consciousness, there is not much tension to call it into
+    play, so life passes dreamlike as a tale that is told. The
+    more life is burdened with problems that demand a man’s full
+    care and deliberation, and the stronger are his attempts to
+    solve the problems of his situation, the more intense will his
+    consciousness be.
+
+    “It appears to me very doubtful whether conscious beings could
+    exist in a world—if such a world were possible at all—where the
+    struggle for existence was unknown; for it is the struggle for
+    existence that presents the first and most imperative problems
+    to living and feeling beings.”
+
+Spirit or the elementary basis of consciousness considered as a
+quantity, would on this supposition remain the same, but the forms of
+its manifestations would change. There would be more or less straining
+of spirit and accordingly more or less manifestation of consciousness.
+Or to formulate it in one sentence, we would have to postulate _the
+conservation of spirit_.
+
+Such a supposition or some similar supposition if tolerable would
+bring our ideas into some sort of accord with scientific customs of
+explanation, and would extricate our minds from that state of utter
+stultification into which they are cast whenever they are confronted with
+the relations of body and mind.
+
+                                                       FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.
+
+
+
+
+ON CRIMINAL SUGGESTION.
+
+
+A widely known criminal trial has brought before thoughtful minds, on
+both sides of the water, this question, viz.: Whether a subject in a
+hypnotic condition possesses any free will, and whether in such a state,
+it is possible to transform him into a criminal or at least, for the time
+being into becoming an accomplice in crime! It is not the first time
+that this question has been agitated; indeed at the very beginning of
+Mesmerism, as it was then called, this idea was brought forward.
+
+It was clearly formulated by Dr. Charpignon, whose own opinion
+nevertheless is, that it was “much easier to restore moral rectitude to a
+somnambulist who had fallen therefrom, than to pervert the integrity of
+character of a woman of high moral standing.” In 1866 Dr. Liébeault, in
+his work on, “Sleep and Kindred States of Being,” of which at that time
+there were but six copies sold, coincides entirely with this opinion. The
+passage is too noticeable, not to be quoted in its entirety. (P. 524.)
+
+    “We may postulate, as a first principle, that a subject during
+    the state of magnetic sleep, is at the mercy of the hypnotiser.
+    I have made experiments that have confirmed me in this opinion;
+    I have many a time, removed the hats of such persons, searched
+    their pockets, drawn off the rings from their fingers, untied
+    their shoes, etc., ... without their having noticed the action
+    at all, or having made the least resistance, the isolation into
+    which I had thrown them, being the cause of this absence of all
+    consciousness....
+
+    “How very grave, the possibilities, are which may ensue from
+    this state of being, we may readily conceive! What I have
+    advanced here, is the result of certain experiments which I
+    made upon a young girl, who, while being very intelligent in
+    her natural waking condition, became during hypnotic sleep the
+    most cross-grained and wilful person I had ever had to deal
+    with. Nevertheless I always ended by mastering her will. I was
+    able to excite in her mind the most criminal resolves; I roused
+    her passions to a high degree. I was able to cause her to fall
+    into a violent rage with a person, to fly out upon her with a
+    knife in her hand; having displaced in her mind the sentiment
+    of friendship, still armed with that instrument, I sent her to
+    stab her best friend, whom I told her she saw in front of her;
+    she obeyed, the knife burying itself in the wall opposite. I
+    almost prevailed upon another young girl, who was however less
+    under the influence, to kill her own mother, and though she
+    wept, she actually prepared to do the deed.
+
+    “After all, it has been known for a fact, that a man, who, up
+    to that moment, was of sound mind, hearing a voice continually
+    repeating: ‘Kill your wife. Kill your children’—has obeyed this
+    command, incited thereto by an irresistible impulse; and shall
+    the hypnotic subject already predisposed to hallucination,
+    escape this same involuntary impulse? I am firmly convinced,
+    after having made many other experiments, that a subject to
+    whom is suggested the commission of any bad action, will carry
+    out the crime after his awakening, by reason of what has
+    now become in him a fixed idea. The most moral will become
+    vitiated, the highest-minded perverted.
+
+    “If it has already been found possible to reform a woman
+    of loose morals and bring her to abandon entirely her evil
+    courses, why cannot the reverse be effected and by the same
+    means? It would be in the power of the magnetiser to suggest to
+    his subject, not only to become a tale-bearer, a calumniator,
+    a thief, dissolute, etc., at some period subsequent to the
+    magnetic sleep, but, he might use him, for example, as the
+    instrument of his personal vengeance and the poor dreamer,
+    unmindful of the primary incitement to the criminal action,
+    would commit on another’s account, instead of on his own, the
+    evil deed, prompted and forced on thereto, by the irresistible
+    suggestion and will, imposed upon him by another person. And
+    when the crime shall have been consummated, where shall he find
+    the medical jurist, who can hold up to Justice, the torch which
+    is to throw the Light of Truth upon the act, and challenge the
+    innocency of a man, who, up to the moment of the crime never
+    exhibited the slightest sign of insanity, had shown every mark
+    of a sound mind and yet, when convicted of the dreadful deed,
+    states with every apparent sign of good faith, that he has
+    committed it of his own accord? And who can tell whether such
+    cases have not already taken place.”
+
+These momentous words passed unnoticed. At that time, the world did not
+believe in Hypnotism. M. M. Richot and Charcot restored it to a place
+of honor. The School of the Salpêtrière made its advent, and saw in
+Hypnotism a pathological condition. Simultaneously with this school of
+thought, there arose the rival one at Nancy, which following its leader,
+Dr. Liébeault, saw in hypnotism, only a psychological phenomenon. One of
+the masters in this school, M. Liégeois, Professor of the Faculty of Law,
+in 1884, in his pamphlet on “Hypnotic Suggestion, in relation to Civil
+and Criminal Law” also propounded to the public this idea of criminal
+suggestion.
+
+M. Liégeois, like M. Liébeault, did not confine himself merely to theory.
+He went on to demonstrate and prove his thesis by conclusive experiments.
+
+Strange to say, the Salpêtrière took issue on this point, adopting and
+defending the opposite opinion.
+
+I would now ask permission to raise my own voice in this debate, and I am
+the more emboldened so to do, inasmuch as my own personal observations
+and the study which I have brought to bear on this matter, have caused me
+to pass, so to speak, from one rival camp to the other. The thesis upheld
+by the School at Nancy, while it found in me at first an adherent, finds
+me to-day an adversary.
+
+Just a word about myself to the readers of _The Monist_.
+
+I have always been a believer in Magnetism. At the outset, and until
+towards 1875, merely on the faith of books, later, because I had been
+present at one or two more or less public exhibitions. And it appears
+singular enough, that though thus imperfectly trained in the knowledge
+of it, I should have explained, as I did in 1869, the ecstasies and
+the stigmata of the celebrated Louise Lateau, as coming simply from
+auto-suggestion; and that even to-day, there should be neither jot nor
+tittle to subtract from what I then wrote, regarding it.
+
+I only began practising magnetism at the commencement of 1886. I was
+returning from a visit to the Salpêtrière whither I had been attracted by
+my doubts on this very transference of thought and from which I returned
+with my doubts intensified. I have already recounted, in a series of
+articles, that appeared in less than a year in the _Revue Philosophique_
+(“Upon Memory in Hypnotic Subjects”; “On the influence of Imitation
+and Education in Somnambulism, as exhibited in the so-called hypnotic
+sleep”; etc.) my experiences, observations, and inductions. Not to speak
+of my contributions to the Magazines, and notably to the _Revue de
+l’Hypnotisme_, I introduced hypnotism into the science course of the
+Royal Academy of Belgium by means of two works. One, on the “Origin,” the
+other on the “Extent of the Curative Effects of Hypnotism” (1887-1890).
+Besides many other polemical writings in favor of the liberty of holding
+public exhibitions (“Letters to M. Chiriar, Representative,” 1888.
+“Magnetisers and Physicians,” 1890). I related at length what M. Charcot
+and his pupils had shown me in Paris, as well as what M. M. Liébeault,
+Bernheim, and Liégeois, had let me witness at Nancy (“A Visit to the
+Salpêtrière,” 1886—“A Visit to the School at Nancy,” 1889).
+
+At the time then, that I took upon myself to hypnotise, I firmly believed
+that the subject became the property of the magnetiser; passing over,
+as of no importance, the manifest resistances that I met with at every
+point and in every form on the part of subjects, who, in all other
+respects I found perfectly adapted to such experiments; as for instance,
+one who permitted his tongue to be pierced with a large darning needle
+by my sceptical colleague, Dr. Masius; and to be burned several times,
+both with a red hot iron and by thermocautery, by my colleague, the
+surgeon Von Winiwarter, both these experiments having reference to the
+curative effects of hypnotism. Thus, adhering entirely to the belief
+of M. M. Liébeault and Beaunis, at the close of 1886 (“A Visit to the
+Salpêtrière”) I wrote these words:
+
+    “M. Beaunis’s statement is perfectly exact. The somnambulist,
+    in the hands of the hypnotiser, is less than the _corpse_,
+    which the perfect disciple of Loyola should resemble. He is a
+    slave, with no will other than that of his ruler, and in order
+    to fulfil the commands laid upon him, he will push precaution,
+    prudence, cunning, dissimulation and falsehood, to their
+    extremest limits. He will open and shut doors noiselessly, walk
+    in his stockings; will listen and watch, with what keen sight,
+    what acute hearing! He will remember anything and everything
+    you want him to, will forget all you desire him to forget. He
+    will, in good faith, accuse a perfectly innocent man before a
+    Court of justice. He will have seen everything, that in reality
+    he has never seen, if you command him so to do; he will have
+    heard, what he never could have heard and done everything that
+    he never could have done. He will swear by his Household Gods,
+    that he has acted throughout, of his own free will, without any
+    external pressure, will invent motives if need be, and will
+    completely protect and cover his hypnotiser.
+
+    “Theoretically, such a power is the most dangerous thing on the
+    face of the earth! I believe though, that practically, with the
+    exception of what might relate to physical or moral abuses or
+    tampering with testamentary wills, there is actually little or
+    no danger. It appears to me the fear of this has been unduly
+    exaggerated.”
+
+In a foot-note of mine, while mentioning with highest praise the memoir
+of M. Liégeois, I added further: “I do not express any alarm that I
+cannot show a good reason for.” Among other reasons, I pondered on the
+difficulty, say rather, the impossibility there is, of obtaining from the
+subject an absolute abnegation of will-power, whilst at the same time we
+allow him to retain the necessary free will to cope with any unforeseen
+accidents which might occur to compromise the fulfilment of the thought
+and action suggested.
+
+Two or three months later I should not have expressed myself thus; and
+hence the remarks that accompany the experiments related in my articles
+on Hypnotic Consciousness, _Revue Philosophique_, Feb., March, 1887,
+experiments which took place about a year previous to this (see the
+note to the contributed articles, Feb. 1887, p. 119). It may there be
+noticed that my assent is tempered by certain marked reservations. I
+was even then opposing practice to theory, i. e. I narrowed down these
+apprehensions of danger to two legitimate causes of alarm, viz. attempts
+against morals, and tampering with testamentary wills.
+
+Upon these two points I am still of the same opinion, with this
+exception, that what I then feared probable, I now regard as exceedingly
+problematic. I mean to say, that a villain who was contemplating the
+perpetration of a crime, would not easily find an accomplice in a subject
+of good moral standing. And in any case, I still think as I thought then,
+that such an accomplice would not only be inapt, but compromising. It
+is this latter point, I wish to demonstrate to you, by the following
+criticism upon an experiment never before published.
+
+At the end of May, of last year, I was passing through Nancy with some
+friends, among whom was Dr. L. Frédéricq, Professor of Physiology at the
+University of Liège. We were spending the evening at M. Beaunis’s house
+together with M. M. Liébeault, Bernheim, and Liégeois. Naturally this
+question of Criminal Suggestion came upon the _tapis_ and was discussed
+in all its phases, without advancing one step towards its solution. We
+made an engagement to meet at the hospital on the following day, where M.
+Bernheim invited me to be present at an experiment, which he maintained
+would convince me. I will relate at length the occurrence, for in such
+cases, the slightest details may acquire very great importance.
+
+M. Bernheim threw into the magnetic sleep a great, tall fellow, quite
+easily influenced, and whose illness did not prevent him from walking
+about in the ward.
+
+“Presently, when you have waked up, you will go and steal an orange from
+the patient that you see over there, in that bed opposite. Remember that
+what you are going to do is very wrong; it is strictly forbidden by
+honesty and by the law, and you will run the risk of being punished.”
+The man is waked. He appears to be collecting his thoughts. He rubs his
+forehead, he is visibly meditating something.
+
+“What is the matter with you? What are you thinking about?” I ask him.
+
+“Nothing.”
+
+“You seem preoccupied.”
+
+“Well, yes, I have to do something.”
+
+“What?”
+
+“I am not obliged to render you an account of my actions.”
+
+“Ah! one would almost say you were meditating some mischief, where are
+you going?”
+
+“That’s no business of yours.”
+
+“Oh! very well then, I shall watch you and follow you.”
+
+I follow him; he walks towards his companion’s bed, glances at the
+orange, then leaning up against the window, he calls me to admire some
+cherries growing on a potted plant. He keeps quite still. Why? Simply
+because I had told him that I intended to watch him, _otherwise my
+presence would not have troubled him in the least_. During this time, M.
+Bernheim had acquainted the other patient with the intended proceeding,
+he nevertheless having heard the whole transaction. “I do not think
+he will do it,” said he to the Doctor, “he is one of my mates and he
+wouldn’t steal from me.” I walk away and join the group of persons
+present. I say to M. Beaunis, that this experiment will prove nothing,
+he answers me by a gesture of surprise. The subject, as soon as he sees
+me go away and _thinks that I am not watching him any more_, stretches
+out his hand, seizes the orange that is behind his mate’s pillow, _the
+latter meanwhile looking full at him_. A score for M. Bernheim, but one
+also for M. Delbœuf! I should need twenty pages at least of commentary on
+this experiment. But I shall only allow myself to point out the essential
+points.
+
+This hypnotised subject then, or to speak more correctly, this man
+to whom a thought has been suggested, after I had warned him that I
+was watching him, and from whom I never took my eye, goes with the
+unerringness, so to speak, “of the falling stone,” to carry out the
+suggested action, not however without a certain distrust of me, and
+this only, because he had been forewarned. And moreover in his dim
+consciousness, it is I alone, whom he is watching in that clumsy fashion,
+in order to seize upon some momentary forgetfulness on my part. He
+has never noticed at all, that his mate is intently watching him and
+following his every movement with open eyes; so he steals the orange
+from under his very nose! Let us not forget that it was M. Bernheim
+the house physician, who suggested to him to take the orange. But M.
+Frédéricq himself would equally well have fulfilled that command, even
+preceded as it was by the little homily, recorded above. Why should he
+have disobliged M. Bernheim? But indeed, the logic of my opponents is
+very weak. If, say they, a somnambulist resists criminal suggestion, it
+is because he is not a susceptible subject, or, that the experiment has
+been ill conducted, or, that the suggestion has not been strong enough.
+At that rate, it is useless to continue experimenting, if failure is
+always to be explained away. On my side, I might with equal reason,
+argue, that they had been dealing with some licentious mind, as yet all
+unknowing its inner self, or with a born criminal or a latent thief; and
+though I object to this kind of argument, it would often prove to be more
+legitimate reasoning than theirs. Who among us is absolutely virtuous?
+How many actions which the law calls criminal have we committed, or might
+we commit, under the pressure of circumstances, without a shadow of
+remorse? But let us further examine this experiment.
+
+Our subject then put the orange in his trousers’ pocket which stuck
+out very noticeably. This man might be a criminal, but he was not a
+dissembler. Looking him straight in the face I said: “What have you been
+doing?”
+
+“Nothing, I have just done my errand.”
+
+“You have stolen!”
+
+“What nonsense!”
+
+“What have you got in your pocket?”
+
+“Nothing” (notice the absurdity of this reply).
+
+“What do you mean?”
+
+“Nothing!”
+
+“What do you call that?”
+
+“Why! it’s an orange! it’s a very fine orange! _Ma foi!_ I can’t imagine
+how it came there!”
+
+M. Bernheim intervenes: “You took it from a fellow-patient, from a
+comrade! That was very wrong.”
+
+“Yes, that’s so, but I wanted it. Look! did you ever see such a fine
+orange? I took a fancy to it and I determined to have it. Besides, _he
+hadn’t seen it_(!) It’s not stealing when it isn’t missed.”
+
+Then I asked: “What is that you said?”
+
+“Why, yes, it is not stealing to take what nobody misses,” answers he,
+with a scarce perceptible cunning and significant wink.
+
+A few minutes later, after we had ceased noticing him, he came up to M.
+Frédéricq of his own accord laughingly told him that he was in the habit
+of abstracting tobacco from his companions on this same ground, that if
+they never missed it, it was not stealing. “It is all in fun, you know!”
+
+I conclude therefore, that this subject had in him latent tendencies to
+theft, or if you prefer it, to pilfering. And dare any of us, honestly
+confess to himself that we have not, deep down in ourselves, the germs
+of any such vices? Who among the most upright of us, does not consider
+himself perfectly entitled to defraud the government, or to get the
+better of a Railway Company, or quietly to appropriate an object which he
+may casually find?
+
+M. Liégeois will very likely say to me: “We will grant that this
+experiment has not fulfilled the desired requirements; the subject has
+not very high moral qualities, and he juggled a little. But here now, are
+some experiments absolutely unimpeachable.” Thereupon M. Liégeois relates
+the histories of Miss E..., of N..., of Mme. G..., and of Mme. C... Here
+are the facts as collated by him in the Gouffe trial.
+
+_First narrative._ M. Liégeois believed that he had produced in Miss E...
+such absolute automatism, so complete an annihilation of moral sense and
+of all liberty of action, that he caused her, without moving a muscle, to
+place the muzzle of a revolver close to her mother and fire upon her. The
+youthful criminal appeared completely awake and far calmer than were the
+witnesses of this scene. (Take notice of this.) Her mother, immediately
+reproaching her and telling her that she might have killed her, Miss
+E... answers smiling, with a great deal of common sense: “I have not
+killed you, since you are speaking to me now.”—“Is any one likely to
+believe that this is merely pretence and acting,” adds M. Liégeois, “that
+a daughter will amuse herself by firing at her mother with a revolver,
+_which she does not know is not loaded_, simply to deceive the public?”
+
+Well, shall I say it? The hypothesis of simulation, the simulation which
+is practised in the hypnotic state appears to me to be the only plausible
+explanation. The calm, smiling attitude of Miss E... is an unanswerable
+proof of this. I have no doubt that if in a dream she had seen herself
+firing at her mother, she would have suffered as in a terrible nightmare.
+
+Lately, it was in the beginning of January, I dreamed I was present at
+a sale of paintings. Among others exposed for sale, there was a long
+picture, nineteen or twenty feet high and less than three feet wide,
+representing the assumption of some saint. Hardly had the auctioneer
+mentioned the price, 6,000 francs, than I made a sign of assent. It is
+knocked down to me. I start for home with my purchase, but on the way I
+am seized with remorse. Where shall I hang the religious picture? And
+even if I find a place for it on the staircase what will it look like in
+my house, with its old black frame and its extraordinary dimensions? And
+what a price to have paid, at such a moment when the house bills are
+pouring in! In the midst of these reflections, I woke up, my heart was
+beating tumultuously and during the remainder of the night I continued
+under the most disagreeable impressions. In spite of my knowing that I
+was awake and reasoning with myself, congratulating myself that it was
+nothing but a dream, the enormity of my absurd action weighed upon my
+mind and I kept continually dreading the reproaches of my family, when
+they should learn the stupid bargain I had made. How widely different
+is this mental distress from the placid, smiling condition of Miss E...
+and how naturally one is brought to suppose that during the hypnotic
+state the subject is not even under the sway of the ordinary illusions of
+dreamland.
+
+M. Liégeois affirms that Miss E... _was not aware that the pistol was
+not loaded_. I do not believe it. Upon what grounds are we to infer that
+a somnambulist is an imbecile? You and I, and everybody would easily
+surmise that M. Liégeois’s revolver was not loaded! Then why should not
+Miss E... surmise the same? Is it not for the very reason that he handed
+it to her, to fire at her mother, that she would opine as much? Might
+she not have gathered this from the attitude of the spectators, full of
+expectancy unmixed by any apprehension? and might she not have wished to
+astonish them by her docility and _sang-froid_? All sorts of suppositions
+are both rational and possible. Besides all this, somnambulists who
+are absorbed in the work in hand, generally speaking, show a quicker
+and surer perspicuity; their sensibilities are finer, their quickness,
+their memory, overstep the ordinary limits as exhibited in their normal
+state. Do we not hear of scholars, who in the hypnotic sleep, learn their
+lessons in a very short time and write their essays admirably? I have
+recorded in the _Revue Philosophique_, August, 1886, some facts about a
+subject, upon whom I experimented before one of my classes.
+
+    “The experiment I am about to give an account of might serve
+    very well as the explanation of many a miracle. B.[55] is in
+    the hypnotic sleep. We wish to give him some peculiar order,
+    which he shall execute, after he is awake, at a special
+    signal. The signal is to be a knock given by me on the desk;
+    the action, to carry a glass of water (a carafe of water
+    and glass being on a chair) to the student Eucher. He does
+    not know any of the fifteen students present, nor has he yet
+    heard their names. The pupils take their places, without any
+    special order, some standing, some sitting. B. is awakened.
+    We chat a little. I give the signal. B. rises, fills a glass,
+    and _without the slightest sign of hesitation_, carries it
+    to the student mentioned before, who was sitting on one of
+    the back benches, beside a fellow student. We looked at each
+    other with stupefaction. The intention of the experiment had
+    been, to see how he would obey an obscure command. There
+    were in my audience, certain persons, with leanings toward
+    belief in second-sight. This result seemed to overthrow all my
+    convictions. I again throw him into the sleep, and I command
+    him to carry a glass of water to the student Gérard; we are
+    all standing, awaiting with impatient curiosity what will take
+    place. B. fills the glass and this time sends a questioning
+    look over all the spectators, presents the glass first to one,
+    then to another, and finally I had to point out the student
+    Gérard, to whom he brought the water and made him drink it. I
+    again put him to sleep, and asked him to whom he carried the
+    first glass of water. To M. Eucher—Did you know him? No—How did
+    you recognise him?—By his attitude, he looked as if he wanted
+    to hide away.”
+
+And this is how the mystery was solved. We had unconsciously prepared
+the scene, and it was this preparation which betrayed us. But it is none
+the less a remarkable example of the perspicuity shown by somnambulists.
+This goes to prove that hypnosis, instead of dulling the understanding,
+sharpens it.
+
+The second of M. Liégeois’s experiments appears to me quite as open to
+suspicion, and exactly for the same reasons.
+
+    “I offered N. a white powder, of the nature of which he is
+    ignorant; I said to him: ‘Pay great attention to what I am
+    about to tell you. This paper contains arsenic. You will go
+    presently to such a street to your Aunt’s Mme. M. _who is here
+    now_. You will take a glass of water, carefully dissolve the
+    arsenic in it and then you will offer it to your Aunt.’ ‘Yes
+    Sir’—That evening I received the following note from Mme. M.:
+    ‘Mme. M. begs leave to inform M. Liégeois that the experiment
+    succeeded perfectly. Her nephew offered her the poison.’ The
+    criminal remembered nothing about it, and it was very difficult
+    to persuade him that he had indeed wished to poison an Aunt for
+    whom he had a deep affection. The automatism had been complete.”
+
+I cannot help seeing here an erroneous line of reasoning. They
+conclude, from the absence of all remembrance, that the somnambulist
+is an automaton, and from this they go on to deduce that he swallows
+everything that is said to him. But, since he listens to the voice of
+his hypnotiser; since he knows that to accomplish the behest, he must
+do things that have not been expressly pointed out, though they are
+understood in the execution of the deed:—such as to get the water from a
+well or pump—why do they not allow that he is able also to reflect upon
+the nature of the deed which he is told to do? Why is it that N..., who
+is aware that he is being used in an experiment, cannot say to himself
+during his hypnotic state, that this is only an experiment, that the
+paper does not contain arsenic, that M. Liégeois never would really want
+him to poison his aunt, _his aunt who is present at the time, and who
+hears every word_?
+
+I repeat again, a hypnotic subject is not an idiot—quite the reverse. All
+the precaution which M. Liégeois takes to render the experiments reliable
+and conclusive, turns against the proof desired. Can you imagine the
+poisoner, Dr. Castaing, saying to his servant before Hypolite Ballet,
+whom he intended to kill, “Here is some poisoned wine, you will presently
+give it to the sick man, whom you see over there in that bed.” If he had
+done this, he would not have been condemned to lose his head, but they
+would simply have shut him up in a lunatic asylum. And, as far as that
+goes, the servant might easily, without any suspicion being attached to
+the action, have given the poison to Hypolite Ballet, and the latter have
+drunk it.
+
+But we have dallied long enough over these absurd suppositions. Let us
+pass on now to the third narrative:
+
+M. Liégeois caused Mme. G... to fire at M. P..., an ex-magistrate. In
+order to show clearly that the revolver was loaded, M. Liégeois fired a
+shot in the garden and came in, showing a piece of card-board, through
+which the ball had passed. “With absolute unconsciousness and perfect
+docility Mme. G... advances to M. P... and fires. Being questioned
+on the spot by the Chief Magistrate (who was present at the _séance_)
+she avows the crime with entire indifference. She has killed M. P...
+_because he was not pleasing to her_(!) They can arrest her; she knows
+quite well what awaits her. If they take away her life, she will pass
+into the other world like her victim, whom she sees stretched out, and
+bathed in his own blood. They ask her whether it was not I who suggested
+to her the idea of the murder. She denies it, and says she did it
+spontaneously; that she alone is guilty; she is resigned to her fate, she
+will accept without complaint the consequences of her deed.”
+
+The more I meditate to-day upon these experiments, the less they appear
+to me to prove what it is desired they should. This perfect tranquillity
+of Mme. G..., her generosity in not inculpating M. Liégeois; her
+resignation to the fate that awaits her, establish entirely the fact that
+she is present in mind and knowledge of events; and just because of this
+very attitude, that she possesses her full presence of mind. She never
+dreamed for an instant that she would really kill M. P.... She plays
+her part conscientiously, she faithfully recites a lesson which she has
+learned by heart and with which she intermingles side play of her own,
+childish tricks, as for instance, saying that _her victim had displeased
+her_. Let us recall to mind the patient who stole an orange, _because it
+was a fine one_. That Mme. G.... sees M. P.... bathed in his own blood,
+is more than doubtful. I can produce numberless proofs of facts that go
+to prove that fictitious somnambulists are not dupes of the illusions
+suggested to them; their calmness proves this. That it is possible to
+make them commit an action dangerous to themselves or to others, I am not
+prepared to deny. I will explain myself later upon this point. But from
+this state, to that of criminal participation, there is an incalculable
+distance.
+
+That the somnambulist repeats a lesson that he has learned, is shown
+forth by M. Liégeois’s fourth narrative.
+
+    “Mme. C.... was to give some arsenic in a liquid to M. D....
+    who was thirsty. But M. D.... asked a question that I had not
+    foreseen; he asked what was in the glass. With a frankness that
+    precluded all idea of simulation Mme. C.... answered ‘Arsenic.’
+
+    “I was then obliged to amend my suggestion, and I said: ‘If you
+    are asked what is in the glass, say it is sweetened water.’
+
+    “Mme. C.... answered the question the second time, ‘Sweetened
+    water.’
+
+    “Very courageously M. D.... swallowed the supposed poison.
+    Questioned by the Chief Magistrate Mme. C. remembers nothing;
+    she had seen nothing, done nothing, given no drink to any one.
+    She does not know what they are talking about.”
+
+Again all this is proof to me, that Mme. C. feels that she is being told
+to perform an innocent action. It would have been interesting to have
+awakened her in the middle of the act, to see whether she would have
+remembered her thoughts, just at the moment when she was giving the
+drink to M. D.... I am not sure but that she would have answered like
+Miss E... that she had no doubt the poison was imaginary, and the scene
+prearranged.
+
+We have seen M. D... ask an unforeseen question, which upset the carrying
+out of the crime. We have witnessed M. Bernheim’s patient steal an orange
+under the nose of its proprietor, who was looking at him. Admitting,
+therefore, that all had been foreseen, that M. Liégeois had warned
+Mme. C... of all the possible questions that might be put to her; that
+M. Bernheim had strongly recommended his subject to commit his theft
+secretly, and that every possible detail had been perfectly carried
+out—should we have even then a faithful transcript of a crime? Can we
+have the unerring certitude from these occurrences, that a subject in the
+hypnotic sleep, a bona fide somnambulist will allow himself to be used as
+an accomplice by a veritable criminal?
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In the preceding paragraphs, I carefully analysed the slightest details
+invalidating experiments, in which the hypnotic subject acts the part
+of a criminal, in a fictitious crime. I was able to show, that in all
+these tests, there had been certain suspicious traits suggesting doubt
+as to the complete illusion of the actor therein, and I finally added:
+Supposing that everything had worked smoothly, i. e. that everything had
+been foreseen and that the subject had not been tripped up anywhere, are
+we authorised in maintaining that a subject thus far unimpeachable as
+regards a fictitious crime, would accomplish this same deed in reality? I
+answer, No.
+
+In order to justify this denial, it will be necessary for us to enter
+into the Psychology of Hypnosis.
+
+A person in the hypnotic sleep, as well as in the natural sleep, is not
+so absolutely withdrawn from the real world about him as is generally
+supposed. The hypnotic subject even less so, than the sleeper, for the
+former remains in intelligent communication with his magnetiser. If the
+latter tells him to take a book from a table upon which is an inkstand,
+some boxes, a statuette, he will pick up the book and not any of the
+other objects. If he is enjoined to walk straight before him in a room
+encumbered with chairs he will manage to avoid them, and even if the
+illusion is pushed further he may knock up against them, but the action
+will be done quite cautiously. And this is why, in public séances, he
+never hurts himself, in spite of the wildness and apparent excitement of
+his movements. This is also the reason, that in experiments intended to
+demonstrate this absolute automatism, the preparation for the proposed
+crime, the attitude of the spectators, while the subject is carrying out
+his part, the integrity of the person who is suggesting the action, the
+calmness of the intended victim; all these things, render the suggestion
+less illusive than even an ordinary dream would be.
+
+M. Liégeois asks this question at the conclusion of his first narrative:
+“Where is the spectator, who could believe that this scene was only a
+melodrama with clever acting; and that a daughter for her amusement,
+and solely to deceive an audience, would fire an unloaded revolver at
+her mother?” To this I answer: And why should she not play her part in
+this melodrama, when she sees M. Liégeois devise it, her mother lend her
+co-operation, and the audience watch it with curiosity and interest?
+
+Here again we find the same fallacy in the argument: Because a subject
+does not reveal what is going on within himself, and only puts into
+visible speech what is suggested to him, it is taken for granted that he
+is going through a mental process identical with that of his magnetiser.
+But allow me to ask in my turn: Will it be easily credited, that a
+daughter, would, deliberately and without a trace of feeling, shoot at
+her mother, unless, she fully believed the action would have no serious
+consequences, and that the person who had suggested this impious deed,
+was only requiring her to act a part?
+
+Hypnotic subjects do not take long to realise that they are being used
+as tests in experiments. Some are always gracious in responding to them,
+many end by refusing to lend themselves to be used in such fashion,
+especially in public séances. All these details go far to prove that in
+hypnosis, the subjects retain, at least a partial independence.
+
+If a sleeper, who dreamed he was murdering his mother, should behold
+her terrified, beseeching, invoking the pity of her son, calling for
+help to the horrified spectators, he would feel that he was induced
+to commit this deed by some sort of motive, which, absurd or unlikely
+though it might be, would still be the controlling power; in a word, the
+dream would be in reality a kind of incoherent and unreal drama, though
+composed of very real elements, in which horror would play a very present
+part. But if he should see his ostensible victim smiling and conversing
+with him amidst a company animated only by a sentiment of curiosity, he
+might well suspect, even in his sleep, that what he sees and what he
+is doing, is a pure delusion. And this is exactly what he would say to
+himself, should it come into his head to fire upon a _magistrate_, and
+for the reason _that his looks displeased him_.
+
+These prearranged scenes fail in verisimilitude and no more deceive the
+actors in them, than they do the spectators or the author.
+
+To this you may object: But, if the pistol had been loaded, Miss E. would
+have shot her mother! This rests upon the supposition that the mother and
+the spectators, still believed it to be unloaded, otherwise, their terror
+alone, would have been quite sufficient to call back the subject to the
+reality. And even with this assumption, this murder-test would have borne
+a greater resemblance to a simple homicide from imprudence. By this I
+mean to say, that so far as the spectators, the victim, and the assassin
+were concerned, the act would not have been changed in its character,
+simply because the magnetiser, had by mistake, given a loaded instead of
+an unloaded pistol to the subject. I need hardly remark that a real crime
+would never be perpetrated in this manner.
+
+Thoroughly convinced though I was, of the impossibility of making
+experiments that would entirely fathom this question, circumstances
+nevertheless, allowed me once more to make a test which is well adapted
+to show that it is not as easy as some may think, to transform an
+hypnotic subject into a murderous automaton.
+
+J... is that excellent somnambulist to whom my experiments have given a
+certain notoriety. It is she together with her sister, whom I made use
+of in my studies on “Memory in Hypnosis,” on “Imitation,” and “Hypnotic
+Consciousness.” She it is, who three several times allowed herself to be
+experimented upon by blistering on corresponding parts of the body; and
+notably in one case where in accordance with suggestion no inflammation
+took place.[56] She is tall, robust, intelligent, industrious, healthy.
+She is now married and has had a child. The _accouchement_ took place in
+the hypnotic sleep. The case being in the hands of M. Fraipont, Professor
+of Obstetrics in the University of Liège; and never was the power of
+hypnotism more remarkably exhibited.[57] In the case of this patient
+there remained no trace of remembrance whatever, after awakening.
+
+I have gone into these details merely to show the reader that no
+better subject could have been found for my purpose. I have in another
+place (see _Revue Philosophique_, article on “Hypnotic Consciousness”)
+pointed out certain traits in her case, which at my _début_, were
+strongly calculated to make me a believer in the absolute servility of
+the hypnotic subject; traits which I shall subsequently recall to your
+attention and comment upon.
+
+To judge more fairly of the value of the experiment, I must further
+state, that J. is both resolute and courageous. During several summers
+she remained in the country in the environs of Seraing in attendance upon
+my wife who was in ill-health, and in whose room she slept. After the
+summer vacation it often happened that she spent the whole night alone
+with her. At the head of the bed hung a six-barrelled revolver, loaded; a
+precaution that we had taken on account of the well-known strikes which
+took place in 1886, amongst the workmen of the numerous factories in our
+neighborhood.
+
+In the summer of 1887 I happened to be absent. A man came one night,
+prowling round the garden and fumbling at the lock of the door, which he
+even tried to force. The barking of the dogs wakened J., she opened the
+window, perceived the man, took the revolver and went down into the hall
+watching for the moment in which to fire at the nocturnal visitor. The
+man hearing the noise slipped away with celerity. And the same year that
+this occurrence took place, J. slept on the first floor with her loaded
+revolver hanging on a nail beside her bed.
+
+The 24th Feb. 1888, without communicating my intentions to anybody
+except to my daughter, and that only at the very moment of beginning the
+experiment, I discharged the revolver. It was six o’clock in the evening.
+A young lady, (herself an hypnotic subject,) and my daughter, were seated
+at a table, cutting out articles from a newspaper, which they afterwards
+tied up in bundles. I called J. and at the moment she opened the door, I
+hypnotised her by a motion. I said to her in an agitated tone—“Here are
+some thieves, who are carrying off papers.”—J. came quickly forward and
+turning towards me said: “No sir, they are playing with them—Why sure
+enough they are taking them.” Then she walked resolutely up to them and
+tore the papers out of their hands, put them on the table in front of her
+and in an imperious tone said: “Don’t you touch them any more.”
+
+I—“You are never going to let those knaves remain in the house—run and
+fetch the revolver” (it was in the adjoining room). J. ran without
+hesitation. She returned holding the weapon in her hand and stood on the
+threshold. “Fire,” cried I.
+
+“Sir, we must not kill them.”
+
+“Thieves? Why certainly!”
+
+“No sir! I will not kill them.”
+
+“You must.”
+
+“I won’t do it.” And she walked backwards still holding the revolver, I
+following her and energetically reiterating my command. “I won’t. I won’t
+do it. I will not murder.” She then placed the revolver on the floor but
+_cautiously_. She continued to go backwards, I, meanwhile insisting and
+following her. “I will not do it.”—Having come to a dead stand in the
+corner of the room, she repulsed me violently and I thought it prudent to
+awaken her, upon which she came to herself smiling in her usual pleasant
+manner. She remembered, however, nothing whatever, although at the sight
+of the revolver lying on the floor, she seemed to have a kind of vague
+recollection. She did not seem at all discomposed in manner. If this
+scene had taken place in a dream, she would certainly have exhibited more
+excitement.
+
+This is what we may term conclusive evidence, that is to say if ever
+negative evidence can be called so. Let us comment now upon these facts.
+
+It will be noticed that J. is not the dupe of the hallucination to which
+she has been subjected. She does not take either of the young ladies
+for thieves, nor the newspapers for valuable papers. Her first answer
+is very significant—“No sir, they are playing with them.” Besides which
+her expression, her attitude, the manner in which she looked at the
+two reputed thieves, and tore the newspapers out of their hands, had
+something so keenly observant, so prepared, so theatrical, that both my
+witnesses and myself could not possibly believe her actions ingenuous. I
+have often questioned her about the illusions that I suggested to her. I
+asked her for example, if, when I appeared to her under another aspect,
+for instance under the appearance of a young man, with clustering locks
+and a black beard, she ever perceived anything of my real resemblance.
+She invariably answered, that she saw my actual person, as it were in a
+cloud, behind the figure which I had called up before her mental vision.
+It is very probable that she recognised my daughter and her friend in the
+persons whom I pointed out as the robbers. I might have assured myself of
+this by causing her to recall her thoughts at the time. I am aware that
+the opponents of this opinion challenge, and not unreasonably, tests made
+in this manner because they have doubts about the suggestion.
+
+If then the facts were such as are related, J. was playing a rôle not
+perhaps strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary acting, knowing
+that she was reciting a part, but feeling nevertheless that she had a
+certain part to play and must enter into the spirit of it.
+
+It is incontrovertible that the hypnotic subject really does play his
+part in precisely this fashion. When, for example, you extend his arm and
+defy him to put it down he seems to make an effort to lower it, but in
+reality he does not bring the required muscles into play at all. If you
+bid him keep his hand open, he never dreams of using the flexor muscles.
+Again, if the spectators try to change the position of either hand or
+arm, they meet with energetic resistance.
+
+You will ask me how it was that J. did not carry out her acting all
+through? Why, after she had gone for the revolver with such deliberation,
+she did not fire it? It was because, the action being so rapid in its
+development, she had no time for reflection; she must have thought and
+she actually did believe, that the revolver was loaded as it always was.
+This is proved by the precaution with which she handled it and put it on
+the floor. It is evident that she thought it was a dangerous game. If I
+had known how the affair would terminate, I would have taken the pistol
+and told her that I would fire myself, in order to see what her thought
+and action would have been. But notwithstanding all this, supposing she
+had fired could we have concluded from this, that she really had latent
+murderous tendencies? We could not have drawn any legitimate conclusions
+even yet. For if, as we have just stated, J. was not entirely withdrawn
+from her actual surroundings, she might naturally suppose that I was only
+joking, and that I should never make her fire on my own child, and on
+this account she need not feel any anxiety in fulfilling the order that I
+had given her.
+
+The problem is a serious one. It is also a psychological problem. I have
+already partially disclosed the solution which I myself am led to give
+to it, and I can best translate my thoughts by these words and in the
+following formula: Persons in hypnosis will only execute acts similar to
+those they would naturally perform in dreams. I have asked a number of
+persons, among others, those connected with the law, whether they had
+ever dreamt they committed murders or robberies, and up to the present
+time all have answered in the negative. And yet, lawyers interrogate
+criminals, and it would be quite within the realm of possibility through
+one of those duplications of personality which I pointed out in my work
+on “Sleep and Dreams,”[58] that they should take up for an instant the
+rôle of an assassin. This is not an impossible supposition. Does it ever
+happen that the novelist or the actor, in portraying or impersonating an
+infamous character, the creation of his imagination, does so identify
+himself for the nonce, with his own invention, that even in sleep, for
+a brief space, he incorporates himself, so to speak, into the fictitious
+personage he has evoked. There are some very curious investigations
+to make on this subject. But even if any positive facts could be
+gathered from this, we should still be left in doubt, as to whether by
+post-hypnotic suggestion the subject would continue to carry out the same
+rôle.
+
+Doubtless, an anatomist may dream that he is dissecting a body, but
+could we produce an hypnotic condition such as to make him use the
+knife as freely upon a living body? Can I make a butcher believe that
+a child is a sheep? I consider the thing to be perfectly feasible, yet
+my thesis is not at all weakened by this concession. We will take it
+for granted that, animated by evil designs you proceed to hypnotise
+beforehand, the anatomist and the butcher, and then bring them at a given
+moment to the victim! And let us further imagine that the combination
+succeeds perfectly. How will you manage to veil in deepest secrecy all
+your previous manœuvres and cast a semblance of likelihood over the
+culpability of your accomplices?
+
+Will not the old adage, _Cui bono_, be quoted against you? In order to
+insure perfect impunity, you would have to overcome such an accumulation
+of material _impedimenta_, the lightest of which would suffice to
+dissipate all apprehensions in the minds of those in whom chimerical
+fears have not entirely obliterated their common sense. It is therefore
+evident that in so far as we know now, from experiments intended to
+test this theory and these possibilities of Criminal Suggestion, no
+positive results can be obtained. These criminal actions, so appositely
+named—Laboratory Crimes—bear no resemblance to actual ones.
+
+If this debate is ever to be closed it can only be before a Criminal
+Court when a Troppman, a Pranzini, or an Eyraud, shall have been the
+operator, and it shall have been clearly shown, what interest the
+assassin had in making use of a so-called, unconscious and automatic
+accomplice. Then only, shall we be able to appreciate to what degree
+hypnotism may become a dangerous enemy to society at large. And even
+then, we shall have to remind ourselves that all our medicines are
+poisons and that they have the power of destroying even more surely, than
+that of healing.
+
+Thus the problem is still unsolved.
+
+Here is a story told me by Dr. Liébeault. He, or perhaps it was M.
+Bernheim, or both together, hypnotised a workman and told him to steal
+a couple of little plaster figures, that were used as ornaments on the
+mantel-piece in a house where he was working. He did so. The affair had
+been forgotten for some time because the suggestion had not been carried
+out on the spot. About three months after the occurrence, this same
+workman was arrested for stealing a pair of trousers from the front of a
+shop. Upon which the previous hypnotic suggestion was remembered.
+
+My opinion is that the workman—and how many there are of the same
+calibre—had a very slight regard for _meum and tuum_. This reminds us
+of that hospital patient, whom we saw pilfering the tobacco from his
+comrades, and I do not think it was at all necessary to have thrown
+the workman into the hypnotic sleep in order to make him steal the
+statuettes. But from another point of view, this experiment, which did
+not prove anything, might give rise to party arguments from those who
+deem it desirable to maintain that it was the initiatory suggestion that
+first gave this man the taste for stealing.
+
+To sum up in a few words this portion of my investigation; the result of
+my experiments and of my analyses is this: that the experiments of my
+opponents prove nothing.
+
+For the present I shall confine myself to this purely negative conclusion.
+
+But there are other grounds besides experiments on which we may examine
+this question. We can do so by careful observation and minute analysis of
+the actions of hypnotised persons.
+
+I have said before that the degree of morality observable in the dreams
+of the subject, gives the measure of what may be expected from him during
+hypnosis.
+
+According to my opinion, hypnotism is less powerful in inciting to
+actions of grave moral import, than the corrupting influence of word or
+example, the love of gold, or the excitement of the passions.
+
+All truly scientific experiments have brought into prominence the analogy
+between physiological and incited dreams, and to-day we may say that this
+is the doctrine of the future. Thus if an hypnotic subject admits without
+opposition that he is made of sugar, or of glass, that he feels he is
+melting in the rain, or being broken to atoms by the awkwardness of the
+bystanders; if he thinks he is a lamp, or allows himself to be trundled
+along like a wheelbarrow; if such a subject, I repeat, refuses to steal
+a purse, or to receive an embrace, the conclusion forces itself upon one
+that the hypnotic subject has more power over himself than some persons
+would wish us to believe; in spite of his docility, there are some things
+he absolutely refuses to do.
+
+If then, reasoning by analogy has ever been legitimate, it is surely so
+in this case, when the inference can be drawn that the man who refuses to
+give a blow will refuse to use a knife; and that the woman who refuses
+to give a token of affection will certainly refuse to allow of serious
+tampering with morals.
+
+Let us then pay close attention to what observation may teach us.
+
+I shall hope to be able to demonstrate by actual facts, that persons in
+an hypnotic condition, preserve at least a sufficient portion of their
+intelligence, their reason, together with freedom of action, to prevent
+them from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits
+approve of.
+
+                                                               J. DELBŒUF.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[55] A lad of about 15, very bright. Has been one of Donato’s subjects.
+Very susceptible and having been hypnotised in a great many public
+séances.
+
+[56] See my pamphlet on _The Origin of Curative Effects in Hypnotism_.
+
+[57] See _Revue de L’Hypnotisme_. April, 1891.
+
+[58] _Sleep and Dreams_, p. 24 et seqq. (Paris: Félix Alcan).
+
+
+
+
+LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+FRANCE.
+
+
+When, some ten years ago, M. de Roberty published in the _Review of
+Positive Philosophy_ a series of articles, under the title of the
+“New and the Old Philosophy,” I was much impressed by the work. The
+conception of the three types; the idealistic, the materialistic, and the
+sensualistic, under which nomenclature he ranged the various philosophic
+systems, seemed to bring order into the history of philosophy. He also
+proceeded to treat, after the same manner and in a very happy way, the
+“law of the three states” of Auguste Comte, by this means rectifying
+and justifying the latter. The law of the three states, wrote M. de
+Roberty, corresponds with the present state of philosophy, which is again
+explained by science, so that to whatever measure knowledge may attain
+to, it will be equalled by philosophy, which borrows its types and its
+characteristics from the sequence of facts, at the point where it leaves
+the sphere of explanatory hypotheses.
+
+Since then M. DE ROBERTY has completed by a new study, his first work on
+this subject. In the “Unknown” he has laid his finger on one of the weak
+points of modern positivism; perhaps by dint of searching into details,
+he has shown himself a little too severe on Comte in the book about
+which I am going to speak to-day, _The Philosophy of the Century_ (_La
+Philosophie du Siècle._).
+
+This book contains a thoughtful criticism of the three doctrines that
+occupy contemporaneous thought; and which are: criticism, positivism,
+and evolutionism. He considers these in conformance to his _criterium_,
+as simply the varieties of one single species and the absolutely
+identical manifestation of a common fund of beliefs and hypotheses held
+generally by all. According to him critical philosophy derives its
+direct origin from idealism. Positive philosophy, from materialism; and
+the philosophy of evolution from sensualism. Going further still, he
+considers critical philosophy as the legitimate outcome of sensualistic
+idealism; and positive philosophy, similarly, as the product of
+sensualistic materialism. Sensualism is thus the common ancestor; the
+three systems inter-penetrating each other. But the promoters of these
+systems must be judged with equity, put back into their proper places,
+and ranged according to their epochs. In my opinion, a philosophical
+doctrine is valuable, not so much by the clear solutions it affords us,
+as by its methods of procedure, may I say, even by the coloring it gives
+to thoughtful minds.
+
+I do not hesitate to recognise in Kant, the strong, rough-handed workman
+of modern philosophy; in Comte, the most utilitarian; in Spencer the
+subtlest as well as the most successful. Kant possesses the greatest
+speculative vigor; Comte, the clearest scientific turn of mind; Spencer,
+the keenest conception of, and insight into, psychological subjects.
+Taking these philosophers as a whole, Spencer, in spite of his merits,
+appears to me the least original, the least remarkable of the three.
+His universal metaphysics has feet of clay. The classification of the
+sciences that he wished to substitute for that of Comte is obscure,
+devoid of general utility; in short the influence of Comte on succeeding
+generations will be more considerable than Spencer’s, if indeed there are
+any philosophers who will be bold enough to avow themselves deliberately
+as Comtists.
+
+This contradiction should not surprise us. It not seldom happens that the
+influence of a master continues even when his doctrines have suffered
+shipwreck. We notice this in the great schools of thought of the
+present day. We may say with truth, that the criticists are inclined to
+dialectics; the positivists, to methods and systems; the evolutionists
+to facts. The first excel in the analysis of ideas, but they expose
+themselves to be lost in abstractions. The second endeavor to reduce to
+a system all scientific matter, but they run the risk of being either
+rigorists or becoming too elementary. The last while making rapid strides
+in the genesis of the subtler phenomena of life, incur the danger of
+accepting arbitrary _liaisons_, or of remaining in an inchoate condition.
+Each one possesses most valuable qualities, which it would be desirable
+indeed to meet with in the same mind. Each has rendered services which it
+is but just to recognise and which it would be unwise to disregard.
+
+The main thing is always to be able to understand one another upon the
+question of what philosophy means and its relation to science. What M. de
+Roberty cares most for, in all his writings, is the elucidation of this
+problem. We must concede, that it is one which is worth striving after.
+And it is surely not asking too much if we demand of every philosopher,
+that he shall know, more or less, what is meant by philosophising.
+
+Philosophy will be, in the future, very much what it has always been in
+the past, a general _conception of the world_. This is a fixed fact for
+M. de Roberty. Is it true that philosophy preceded science, or, that on
+the contrary it has always been and will continue to be subsidiary to
+it? Many are, we know, partisans of the first opinion; it has seemed to
+them that the sciences have separated little by little from the hazy and
+indistinct conglomerate which bore the name of theology, metaphysics,
+in a word, of philosophy. M. de Roberty does not hesitate to adopt the
+contrary opinion. Philosophy, according to him, has always sprung from
+science, it has always been the equal of science. But though he proclaims
+this equality as existing between science and philosophy, this does not
+in the least oblige him to recognise any equality in their manifestations
+“in history.” The knowledge of a given science, implies a certain
+_conception of the world_; this is the supreme law of philosophical
+evolution. Philosophy is an abstract science of general interest, having
+for its end, the integration of the documentary evidence furnished
+by the various sciences. Comte was strongly imbued with this truth.
+Spencer made it his own, but he makes a more serious mistake than his
+predecessor, when he asserts that philosophy is able to “play an active
+part” in scientific discovery. In the opinion of M. de Roberty, it is
+neither the antecedent of science, nor is it even to be called an art.
+Must it then be called a science? Or is it to be comprehended in science?
+Neither the one, nor the other. He prefers rather to regard it as a link
+(“_un trait d’union_”) between these two different kinds of intellectual
+activity, science and art. The mental faculties may, he tells us, aim
+at subjugating nature, either in a direct manner, the result of which
+will be called science; or in an indirect way, in which case we name it
+art; or they may have still a third intention, taking a kind of middle
+course between the utility of _science_ and the indirect utility of art,
+which while actively participating in both, facilitates as well the
+transition from one to the other, from which springs _philosophy_. “Most
+unmistakably identical,” says he finally, “are the elements which produce
+a particular combination, in the one, they are called science, in the
+other philosophy.”
+
+But we must not confound the two propositions. “If a house is to be
+built of brick, does that mean that we are not to distinguish between
+the materials required in its erection?—that we are to apply to its
+construction, the ingredients and the procedures used in the making and
+firing of bricks? We never should build a house if we acted thus.”
+
+Let us not misunderstand this comparison! The house here spoken of is
+entirely figurative. The hypothesis which underlies it is universally
+accepted, but its primal condition is always wanting—i. e. universal
+knowledge. It would be presumptuous indeed, to draw, to-day, the plans
+and define the style of architecture which shall be used in our future
+philosophical habitation, since we do not yet possess even the materials
+wherewith to build it. We can only hope to erect such a temporary
+shelter, a fort, that may be swept away in a few hours, whenever the
+enemy shall have discovered an explosive powerful enough to blow it into
+atoms. I do not care very much, I confess, for the distinction spoken of
+“between a direct and an indirect utility” and the idea of philosophy
+forming a link between art and science. This way of representing the
+facts of the case, seems to me both cumbersome and incomplete. I will
+not stop here to discuss it. The thoughtful study of M. de Roberty is
+not compromised by such a small detail, and I would rather remember the
+positive teaching which is given in the very striking book that I have
+just been criticising.
+
+“Philosophy and science,” writes the author, “are terms which define
+two principal _species_ of the vast _genus_ designated under the one
+name,—knowledge.” The most marked trait of the philosophy of the future,
+will be the _distinction_ between the two species, as _confusion_ was the
+predominant characteristic of the philosophy of the past.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The work of M. de Roberty gave us a methodic history of philosophy.
+That of M. F. PICAVET, _The Ideologists—An Essay on the Scientific,
+Philosophic, Religious, etc., ideas and theories in France since 1789_,
+stretches over a very vast area of descriptive history. His book
+conducts us from Condorcet to Destutt de Tracy, and Cabanis; from these
+to Degérando and Laromiguière; it embraces thus nearly the whole of
+the philosophy of the eighteenth century, which it carries back to the
+seventeenth, from thence following the thread of its history, through
+the intervening years, down to our own times. The name “Ideologist” is
+vague, as are all the rest of the battle-cries which are used by the
+leaders of parties, or that their adversaries may make use of against
+them. Ideology, in the sense used by Destutt de Tracy, signifies, that
+philosophers must confine themselves to psychological research, more
+particularly to that which concerns the origin and the formation of
+ideas, an immense field, embracing philology, ethnology, etc. With
+regard to the wrong sense which Napoleon attached to this word, it was
+justified in a certain measure by the pretensions of the philosophers in
+governing life, politics, and law, by doubtful hypotheses, which did not
+often accord with practice. It cannot be denied that since the time of
+Rousseau, we pass much too easily from theory to action, and that we fall
+back too readily on our imagination, to supplement our actual experience.
+We find in M. Picavet’s book, new and valuable information about all the
+men who have contributed to the intellectual life of the French nation,
+during and since the time of the Revolution. We can trace there the
+origin of certain doctrines, which have appeared to spring up suddenly
+before our eyes, and shall often be extremely surprised by what we shall
+read there. It is a most valuable and important work, showing an enormous
+amount of erudition, fine critical acumen, and a rare descriptive talent.
+It is quite voluminous (more than 600 pp. 8vo.), and some might indeed
+consider that it could have been more condensed. But it is primarily a
+book of reference, in whose pages we shall surely not complain of finding
+a large amount of information, when we refer to it.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+With the book of M. BERNARD PÉREZ, _Le Caractère, de l’enfant à l’homme_,
+(Character, from Childhood to Manhood), we leave the domain of philosophy
+and history to enter into that of psychology. M. Pérez modestly disclaims
+all pretension to founding a science of character. Nevertheless, that
+which he has given us and produced here, bears the stamp of originality
+in a subject in which authors have hitherto only repeated one another.
+His work is composed of two parts, of which the second forms the
+completion of, or rather a commentary on, the first. We find here, to
+start with, a classification of characters, illustrated by portraits
+which render the developments more tangible; secondly, a study on the
+common combinations of the principle traits of personality.
+
+The classification of M. Pérez is founded on movements, that is to say
+it is displayed in sufficiently complete groups connected with some
+distinct mode of expression, such as rapidity, slowness, and energy of
+movements. It offers the practical advantage of substituting for the four
+or six temperaments of the old schools, which are frequently hard to
+distinguish, classes more flexible and distinguished by visible gestures
+which betray, more or less clearly, their physiological foundation. M.
+Pérez has provisorily established six of these classes. He distinguishes
+the vivacious, the vivacious-ardent, the ardent, the sluggish, the
+sluggish-ardent, and lastly the balanced type. The last category is
+in my judgment a sort of utility-box, apparently designed to receive
+specimens which we are at a loss where else to put. For one of two things
+is certainly true, either this balance is an insignificant trait or it
+is one that is dominant in the person, and it is absolutely necessary to
+state which.
+
+Many will undoubtedly question this doctrine that the movements of
+a person express all his character and that consequently they are
+competent to reveal it to us. We might maintain, indeed, that if the
+movements supply us with the labels of each class, it is not always to be
+distinctly seen how the different traits of character and of intelligence
+(the author does not separate the two, and gives his reasons for so
+doing) subordinate themselves to one another and vary with the motor sign
+chosen to express them. There can be no question, however, that rapidity,
+energy, or slowness of movement, do not have certain actual and profound
+connections with our visceral and cerebral functions, and that the motor
+sign is easy to be made use of, although it does not reach all the facts
+which it is employed to describe, and although the explanation of these
+facts still remains to be sought in the physiological substratum.
+
+M. Pérez has secondly attempted a systematisation of character-traits, by
+successively studying the relations of gaiety and sadness, irascibility
+and gentleness, courage and fear, kindness and malevolence, self-love and
+will, with the principal emotional intellectual and volitional traits
+of character. He has perceived, instinctively as it were, that the
+pointing out of generic, specific, and individual marks does not possess
+its entire worth except on the condition that we also point out _the
+subordination_ of the same, and he has given this factor much prominence
+in the last chapters of his book. This portion of the work is replete
+with subtle observations, and ingenious and profound reflections, but it
+is fragmentary in character, a half-way production, I might say, between
+the disconnected literature of the moralist and a reasoned and methodical
+description such as ethology ought to furnish later on, after the manner,
+if possible, of the natural sciences.
+
+The desiderata which I here briefly refer to, are not set forth to
+diminish the value of the work of M. Pérez. It will in its present form
+render great services, and I should not be at all surprised if the
+terminology which he has invented should pass into the language of the
+day, as it is convenient and easily lends itself to the description of
+character-portraits. Even readers who shall find here much to criticise,
+will not refuse to accord to it real and solid merit.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+After the work of M. Pérez, a study of my own naturally ranges itself—_La
+Psychologie du peintre_[59]—concerning which I ask permission to
+offer a few remarks. I have set myself the problem, in this work, of
+determining a professional type, and I have chosen one of those which
+are certainly the most distinctly defined. If other authors could give
+us the psychology of the musician, of the lawyer, of the physician, and
+of the geometer, such a task would not be an indifferent performance in
+what concerns our knowledge of _character_, and we should arrive at the
+construction of a natural history of society from a different point of
+view and by different methods from those at the disposal of the novelist.
+We should accomplish, unquestionably, the passage from general and
+_abstract_ psychology, to _concrete_ psychology.
+
+Do professional types really exist? and if they exist, what are they
+composed of? The question as I view it, is not bereft of interest for the
+psychologist. We do, no doubt, find among painters, vivacious, sluggish,
+and ardent individuals, and we may indeed, in studying this or that
+particular painter, discover in him some one or other of the combinations
+described by M. Pérez. But that does not stand in the way of the growth
+and constitution of social types, and individuals may find a natural
+place in the different categories of a general classification without
+ceasing to belong to their professional category in consequence of a
+natural self-grouping of their intellectual faculties, and a definite
+tendency of the traits of their emotional nature. It would be justifiable
+to say, at the same time simplifying and enlarging a little the facts,
+that originally our viscera form our character but our cerebral organism
+forms our profession; and if it is true furthermore that a certain
+physiological state brings with it a definite intellectual mode of
+operation, it is none the less true that the same culture of the mind and
+the long-continued habits of a profession are apt to impose upon one’s
+personality a definite discipline and mean equilibrium of tendencies and
+sentiments; and it is in this sense that it has seemed to me we are at
+liberty to speak of a professional type without equivocation or violence.
+
+Those who will not accept this manner of looking at this subject will
+find, I hope, some additional interest in my work on the score of the
+special questions which are treated of there: the heredity of genius,
+memory, the classification of the sentiments (implied rather than
+formulated), the relations of the will to the design considered as
+writing, the evolution of art in its connection with visual analysis,
+and so forth. There is here a sufficiently abundant supply of materials
+capable of being wrought up in social psychology and the criticism of
+art. But it does not become me to bestow praises on my own work, and it
+would be too easy for me to subject it to criticism. My readers will
+find in it themselves the weak portions, without my pointing them out to
+them; and it would be a source of great pleasure to me to have the same
+assurance that they will discover in it qualities which I do not perceive
+there.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There remains still to be mentioned _La Première partie d’une étude sur
+la théorie du droit musulman_,[60] by SAVVAS PACHA, one time governor
+and governor general, one time minister of public works and foreign
+secretary of Turkey. Savvas Pacha—a Christian of Greek descent—has held
+high positions in the Ottoman Empire and is esteemed as one of the most
+learned men in Islamic law who have ever lived. His book therefore
+demands the greatest consideration; it will not possess less interest for
+philosophers than for statesmen and jurists. In my opinion, works of this
+class should be consulted by psychologists as much as by sociologists; we
+are too much inclined nowadays to neglect certain social studies which
+offer us valuable information respecting the genius of races and the
+conditions of their moral existence.
+
+The work of Savvas Pacha will undoubtedly contribute much toward the
+elucidation of some mooted points of very first importance; I should like
+to mention—the history of creation, and the exposition of the principles
+of a law which rules more than a million human beings and is intimately
+interwoven with their political life; a more exact knowledge of the
+Semitic genius; an estimate of the relations which have existed between
+the juridical metaphysics of the Semitic peoples and that of the schools
+of Greece, between the Mohammedan law and the Roman law in provinces once
+Romanised but afterwards subjected to the empire of the Caliphs.
+
+It does not seem at all doubtful that the ontology of Aristotle in
+particular has exercised an influence on the philosophy of the Arabian
+jurisconsults. A second truly remarkable fact, too, is not the new
+ontology which they have produced, but the use they have made of it in
+their legislative fabrics. It is impossible to enter into details here; I
+limit myself to the mere pointing out of the facts.
+
+With respect to the originality of the institutions that belong to the
+period of the first Abbassids, the same has been contested by a number of
+historians. M. Renan, among others has maintained that they are the work
+of the Iranian genius. Savvas Pacha refutes this opinion in a peremptory
+manner, and we shall no longer be able to deny, after having read him,
+that the Mohammedan civilisation, with the _corpus juris_ which stands
+for its most perfect production, has really proceeded from the genius of
+the races that bore the banner of Islam from the confines of China to the
+Straits of Gibraltar.
+
+Shall I add that we may deduce from this work, so learned and so
+suggestive, the elements of an instructive comparison between two grand
+divisions of human history whose evolution seems still to be pursued on
+lines wholly apart—that which we call Christianity and that which has
+sprung from the teachings of Mohammed?
+
+I fervently hope that Savvas Pacha will not delay the publication of
+the other works which he has promised. When they appear he will have
+furnished us with the most considerable work which we possess on the
+institutions of a great division of humanity, still too little known to
+us.
+
+                                                            LUCIEN ARRÉAT.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[59] All the works so far mentioned are published by F. Alcan.
+
+[60] Published by Marchal et Billard, Paris.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+GERMANY.
+
+
+Productions of a literary-historical character are under certain
+circumstances also entitled to mention in a philosophical magazine,
+especially if they present to us the intellectual development and
+physiognomy of an individual or of a community in a scientific manner, as
+is done in the _Essays_ of KARL WEIGAND which have just been published by
+Merhoff, of Munich. Of the larger essays contained in this book we will
+especially mention those on Voltaire, Rousseau, Baudelaire, and Taine, to
+which in psychological respects a high value is to be accorded, and which
+although not exactly easy are nevertheless pleasant reading.
+
+Viewed from this standpoint the _History of North American Literature_ by
+KARL KNORTZ (Berlin, 1891, Lustenöder) hardly admits of consideration;
+not even Edgar Allen Poe, who in the psychological point of view is of
+unexceptionally great importance, is in any respect profoundly treated.
+The work is made up of a series of well written articles which first no
+doubt were published in newspapers and magazines for the public at large.
+We deem it proper, however, to mention the work in this place, because it
+contains a chapter on the philosophical literature of North America, in
+which, we must admit, philosophy does not appear to the best advantage.
+The representatives of philosophy in North America, the author says,
+are in the main doctors of divinity and securely installed university
+professors, and this department of study has therefore no dangerous
+connections; the gentlemen calmly wend their way along the ancient and
+well-trodden path of the aprioristic philosophers and proscribe without
+any ado all modern innovations, Darwinism in particular.
+
+As they have not as yet consigned the belief in God and immortality and
+the freedom of the will to the lumber-room of traditional opinions, and
+as they are as a rule only superficially acquainted with the results of
+the exact sciences, despite the fact that many assure us of the contrary,
+they accordingly fancy that they are easily able to solve the imagined
+chief problem of philosophy, the reconciliation of religion and science.
+
+This judgment may contain much that is true, but from the little that
+we personally know of things in North America, is to be decidedly
+restricted. Moreover, we by no means share the low opinion which the
+author entertains of all attempts to reconcile religion and science.
+Religion is a phenomenon of too great antiquity and its influence
+in the life of nations is too thoroughly established to entitle us,
+on the ground of science with which it is still involved in violent
+conflict, summarily to disregard it; and consequently every attempt at
+reconciliation is worthy of the best efforts of the noblest. It is of
+course a question whether we shall ever arrive at the point where we
+will completely understand _all_ religious things, but we certainly
+must with time arrive at a point where religion shall no longer contain
+inconsistencies, contain nothing, that is, of which the absurdities are
+patent.
+
+There was indeed, in Germany also, a time when the belief was very
+widely spread that religion as compared with science might be ignored
+completely; it was the time when Ludwig Büchner and Karl Vogt were so
+much read, when the magazine _Gartenlaube_ counted its greatest number
+of readers. But this time is long since past, and just as since that
+time employment with philosophy, especially with ethics, has become
+more comprehensive, so also the interest in religio-philosophical
+questions, which aim at a reconcilement of the two hostile powers, has
+been considerably augmented. Aside from the German productions which have
+been written in a conciliatory tone, like the book, to give an example,
+of Moriz Carrière on Christianity and the Modern World Conception,
+foreign works of this same class have also been much read, particularly
+Drummond’s _Natural Law in the Spiritual World_, to which indeed in
+our judgment no particular value is attributable, as it does not help
+us to any real knowledge but contents itself with analogies which
+scientifically are absolutely worthless.
+
+Recently the little treatise _Ernste Gedanken_ of the Saxon officer VON
+EGIDY (Leipsic, 1891, Wilh. Wigand) has been much talked about. The
+reformatory effect of this brochure has, indeed, hitherto been very
+slight and will hardly become more extensive in the future, but the
+response that it has met with in the widest circles of the German public,
+proves that many ardent friends of religion anxiously desire that the
+dogmatic shackles and integuments shall be stripped from the body of the
+Christian beliefs, and that it shall appear, in the clearest and purest
+light, that which it is, the religion of love.
+
+Theological criticism has not taken an exactly favorable attitude towards
+the little book of Lieut. Egidy, and even the liberals, who pay the
+fullest credit to the good intentions of the author call attention to the
+fact that the greater part of what Egidy advances has been said before
+and said better, and that there is an almost absolute lack of positive
+proposals to be adopted. The Egidy movement will thus probably have, they
+conclude, no lasting effects.
+
+We cannot indeed absolutely say that these critics are wrong, if we
+are at all conversant with the development of protestant theology.
+A very instructive and opportune work in this respect is a book
+of the well-known Berlin professor OTTO PFLEIDERER, who, as his
+religio-philosophical treatises evidence, himself belongs to the
+reconcilers of Christianity and the modern world-conceptions. In the
+year 1889, at the instigation of the editor of the Library of Philosophy
+issued by Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. of London, he published in the
+English language a work on _The Development of Protestant Theology
+since Kant and in Great Britain since 1825_, and this same work has now
+just appeared in German (published by Mohr of Freiburg) in a somewhat
+more extended form. As its title proclaims, and as its belonging to the
+Library of Philosophy would signify, the work is chiefly concerned with
+the influence which philosophy has exercised on theological thought.
+To make this influence plain, the author presents at the start, in the
+form of an introduction, a concise but extremely lucid exposition of the
+philosophical doctrines that especially demand consideration in this
+direction. Of German philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,
+and of English, Herbert Spencer are treated of at length.
+
+In view of the great respect which Hegel still enjoys in America, it will
+perhaps interest many of the readers of _The Monist_ if I give here an
+utterance of Pfleiderer, which in the point of view of the history of
+religion is also deserving of consideration, at least on the part of
+those who are recognised adherents of evolutionism.
+
+“No other branch of inquiry,” says Pfleiderer, “owes so much to Hegel as
+History; the arbitrary construction of details from the philosophical
+concept which had crept in by Hegel and his immediate followers, has
+of course been discarded by exact historical inquirers, but there has
+remained that profounder conception of historical life generally as a
+development of the common mind of all ages and nations, conformable
+to law, dominated by ideas, and aiming at necessary general purposes;
+there has remained that profounder insight into the intricate play of
+phenomena, into the kernel of things and men, into the dominating ideas
+that lie as guiding impulses at the foundation of even the apparent
+disharmony of individual passions; there has remained that unprepossessed
+understanding for the necessity of even the contrarieties and struggles,
+for the errors and passions of men, for conflict is the father of all
+things, as Hegel says with Heraclitus, and as it is only through the
+struggle of partial rights and one-sided truths that the whole truth of
+the idea can force its way into existence; there has remained finally
+that intelligent respect for the heroic figures of history in which the
+genius of a people and of an age have been incarnated, which as the
+instruments of a higher power have awakened the thought that slumbered
+in all souls, given it clear expression, and infused in it life by their
+mighty deeds. Neither a Leopold Ranke, nor a Thomas Carlyle, nor a
+Ferdinand Christian Bauer would be conceivable without Hegel’s philosophy
+of history.”
+
+Pfleiderer expresses himself here very cautiously concerning Hegel, and
+in other passages his caution is extended further still. Nevertheless, it
+will seem to many as if that philosopher has been too highly estimated by
+Pfleiderer. Especially will the followers of Herbart be dissatisfied, who
+was involved in violent combat with Schelling and Hegel. It is not the
+place here to enter minutely into this subject; but it is to be mentioned
+that the name of Herbart does not occur once in this large book. Perhaps
+Pfleiderer is of Edward Zeller’s opinion who says in his “History of
+Modern Philosophy,” that the philosophy of Herbart has proved itself
+unfruitful. It must be confessed, indeed, that the philosophy of Hegel
+has proved itself for religious doctrine very fruitful; but whether we
+should be satisfied with its results is quite a different question. Be
+that however as it may; still, after Schoel has presented Herbart’s ideas
+concerning religion in a special work, since men like Drobisch, Thilo,
+and Strumpell have further elaborated these ideas; since particularly
+Ziller in his Ethics has also profoundly treated religious problems in
+the sense of Herbart, it is no longer allowable to omit the name of
+Herbart when we treat of the modern philosophy of religion.
+
+In other respects also we are not always in full accord with the author.
+So, for example, in Hausrath’s _Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte_, a work
+to which we ourselves are very much indebted, the perfection of the form
+of the presentment is justly praised, as is also the merit of having
+inserted into the greater setting of universal history the development
+of early Christianity; but it is not mentioned that Hausrath has often
+allowed himself to be misguided into combinations whose flimsiness cannot
+escape the notice even of the lay student.
+
+But these are only slight deficiencies of a work that is otherwise
+excellent and full of matter, closing with the words: “This much is
+certain, that the labors of the best and wisest of all the theologians of
+our century, who have here been passed in review before the eyes of the
+reader, however different the paths may be which individually they have
+entered upon, have yet been all directed to the one end that Christianity
+shall strip itself of its dogmatic coverings and fetters and evince its
+world-conquering power in the ethical idealism of a love that unites us
+with God and joins together the hands of humanity into the federation of
+brotherhood.”
+
+If this aim were universal, that is if it were also recognised by the
+theologians, a not inconsiderable portion of the dispute between religion
+and science would be done away with, and the sole question would then
+turn on the contrariety of theological and philosophical ethics. But even
+respecting this point a settlement would be much sooner brought about,
+if those concerned would evince the same spirit of reconciliation as
+HANS GALLWITZ, city pastor of Sigmaringen, has recently done in his book
+_Das Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart_ (Göttingen, 1891, Vandenhoeck
+and Ruprecht). The author, it is true, deals critically not only with
+the philosophical ethics of a Paulsen and a Wundt, but also with the
+theological ethics of a Hermann and a Kaftan; still the settlement of
+things with the philosophers forms the bulk of this rather extensive
+work, the contents of which we cannot of course give here. Gallwitz also
+speaks in considerable detail of Kant, whom he opposes in respect of the
+psychological questions here involved, wholly rejecting anything like
+a transcendental will. If we must agree with him in this respect, we
+can nevertheless not follow him in his assumption of a special ethical
+constitution of the soul.
+
+In conclusion let me note the titles of two works to which I shall revert
+in a subsequent letter. On _The Psychology in Kant’s Ethics_ Dr. ALFRED
+HEGLER of Tübingen presents a meritorious and compendious treatise of 300
+pages (Freiburg, 1891, Mohr), and Professor HOSTINSKY of Prague publishes
+an exposition and interpretation, based on the sources, of _Herbart’s
+Æsthetics_, in which, as is well known, ethics and æsthetics in the
+restricted sense are wholly severed from psychology.
+
+                                                                CHR. UFER.
+
+
+
+
+CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.
+
+
+
+
+THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.
+
+
+_To the Editor of The Monist_:
+
+SIR—I am glad to hear that Prof. Max Müller intends to answer our
+double-barrelled criticism of his article on the above subject.
+Meanwhile, however, I should like to say a few words with regard to the
+point which he selects for immediate response (see _The Monist_, Jan.
+1892, p. 286). And my object in saying these few words is to remove from
+his mind the idea that with regard to the point in question I had the
+smallest intention of bringing against him “a serious charge of want of
+accuracy, unpardonable in a scholar.” On the contrary, as regards this
+point I was simply defending myself from _his_ charge against _me_—to
+wit, the charge of arrogance.
+
+In his article on “Thought and Language” he observed, “Professor Romanes
+has no right to speak of men like Noiré, Huxley, Herbert Spencer, to say
+nothing of Hobbes, with an air of superiority.” In answer to this charge
+I stated the bare facts of the case,—viz. that in my book I had alluded
+to Noiré merely for the sake of stating his theory as to the origin
+of speech, and of expressing my large measure of agreement therewith;
+that I had quoted Huxley only in places where my argument needed
+authoritative opinions on matters of comparative anatomy; that I had
+only once mentioned Hobbes, and then in order to back by his authority a
+philosophical doctrine for which I was contending; and, lastly, that I
+had never mentioned Herbert Spencer at all. Now, if my critic feels that
+a mere statement of these facts amounts to a serious charge against him
+as a scholar, I can only express my regret that he should have imposed on
+me the necessity of stating them.
+
+But what now is his reply to this simple statement of facts? Briefly,
+he drops his own “serious charge” as regards Noiré, Huxley, and Hobbes,
+and takes his stand upon the case of Herbert Spencer. “It is true,” he
+says, “Mr. Spencer’s name does not occur in the index. But on p. 230 we
+read: ‘So here again we meet with additional proof, were any required,
+of the folly of regarding the copula as an essential ingredient of a
+proposition.’ Now it is well known that it is Herbert Spencer who regards
+the copula as an essential ingredient of a proposition.” As if it were
+one man alone who takes this view, and that man Herbert Spencer! Or as
+if Herbert Spencer’s name were so specially identified with it, that
+in calling it a philosophically foolish view I expected my readers to
+understand a disrespectful allusion to him! Surely my critic knows as
+well as I do that this question touching the function of the copula
+is one which has been debated for centuries; and therefore that with
+much more show of reason he might accuse me of making an attack on the
+President of the United States, on the ground that I had expressed a
+decided opinion in favor of free trade.
+
+But more than this. So far is it from being “well known that it is
+Herbert Spencer who regards the copula as an essential ingredient of a
+proposition,” that I am under the necessity of asking Prof. Max Müller
+for references in proof of such a statement. Chapters X and XI of the
+“Principles of Psychology” (Vol. II) are those which, as far as I am
+aware, most nearly approach the subject. Yet the word “copula” does not
+once occur in them. Moreover, with all that Mr. Spencer has there said
+upon the nature and structure of propositions I am, and always have been,
+in full agreement.
+
+                             Yours faithfully,
+
+                                                        GEORGE J. ROMANES.
+
+Oxford, Feb. 12.
+
+
+
+
+A DEFENSE OF LITTRÉ.
+
+
+_To the Editor of The Monist._
+
+If all the readers of _The Monist_ for October were acquainted with the
+life and writings of Littré I should not have to defend him against your
+criticism, as everyone could see that there is more truth than poetry
+in my sonnet. But I fear that “the voice, the spirit, and the soul of
+Positivism” is not so well known as he deserves to be, and I venture to
+ask for space to reply.
+
+Proceeding in order, I should like to correct the impression left by the
+following passage: “Comte had not nominated a successor who should in his
+place be the _Directeur du positivisme_. Littré had forfeited this honor
+on account of his quarrels with Comte in which he strongly sided with
+Madame Comte against her husband.” The misunderstanding between the two
+men had a more serious origin than these family squabbles and arose from
+the fact that Littré would not follow Comte through the mystic vagaries
+of the _Politique Positive_. He admits that being under his intellectual
+ascendency he went too far on the new way, but he soon found that the
+master was violating his own method and, having to choose between them,
+he held to the method. Littré’s refusal to join Comte in his adhesion
+to the régime of the coup d’état of 1851 was the immediate cause of the
+rupture. His “excessive tolerance” did not extend to the Bonapartes, whom
+he detested cordially. It is characteristic of the man that he continued
+his yearly subscription to the fund that he had created for his friend’s
+support notwithstanding this break in their relations.
+
+As to his tolerance, I think with you that he carried it a little too far
+in his own family. Greater firmness might have spared us the vision of
+priests bedeviling him in his agony and dragging his body in triumph to
+holy ground. But the case that you take as an example does not seem to
+me conclusive. It was not necessary to possess his knowledge of history
+in order to appreciate the difficulties attendant upon interference with
+his catholic wife in the education of their daughter, and as success was
+impossible he wisely limited his endeavor to fields unobstructed by the
+“eternal feminine.”
+
+Seriously, we admit that Littré was tolerant to excess, but not that the
+attitude of his philosophy is, as you say, “mere scepticism leading to
+indifferentism.” In the words of M. Wyrouboff, who aided him for many
+years in editing the magazine called _La Philosophie Positive_, “men, no
+matter how superior they may be, are never abstract formulas interpreting
+with equal facility all the parts of a mental conception; they always
+represent a mixture of strength and weakness in variable proportions....
+It seemed as if intellectual activity had absorbed all the living forces
+of his (Littré’s) being, leaving in the place of physical activity only
+the faculty of passive resistance to the will of others.” This refers
+to the man in his old age but in youth he was an athlete of remarkable
+strength. Renan said of him: “While his temperament was calm his mind was
+revolutionary, and therefore he never gave way. In July 1830, he was in
+the first line of those who broke into the place du Carrousel and George
+Farcy was shot through by his side.” I am tempted to quote a little
+more from this master of words. “So great was his love of truth that,
+perhaps alone in our century, he could retract without lessening himself.
+Truth led him like a child.... It is not well to be too perfect.... His
+apparent negations were only the extreme reserve of a mind that dreads
+hazardous appreciations. He was so much afraid of going beyond what he
+saw clearly that he often stopped short of it. Hesitation that implies a
+thousand times more delicate worship of the eternal ideal than the rash
+solutions that satisfy superficial minds.”
+
+Even in old age there were no signs of “indifferentism” in his conduct.
+In the words of Pasteur, “At the Mesnil he was consulting physician for
+the whole village (always gratuitously). Continuing his labors till three
+o’clock in the morning, the light of his lamp shone afar during the night
+like a beacon that reassured the sick. It was known that at the first
+call, M. Littré would leave his work and go wherever his aid was needed.”
+
+These are the words of men that knew him, but my first-hand opinion of
+him was formed solely from his writings and his public acts as senator,
+etc.; fancy such a man in _our_ senate!
+
+The note in which you say that I attended positivistic lectures
+(Comte’s?) in France together with Mr. Frederic Harrison is a flattering
+anachronism.
+
+Littré’s father received a sword of honor while in the navy for beating
+off an English ship of superior force, and the son’s philosophy prompts
+not only to action but to action, if necessary, in the good old fashioned
+positive way.
+
+My second objection refers to the line where you say that your positivism
+“has nothing to do with Comte or with any of Comte’s disciples,” and,
+leaving Comte aside, I hope to show that you and Littré are much better
+friends than you imagine. A view noted by him on p. 27, Vol. 1, of his
+magazine, _La Philosophie Positive_, ought to assure this happy result.
+
+In the preface of your valuable work entitled “Fundamental Problems” you
+draw particular attention to the part that treats of “Form and Formal
+Thought,” which, you say, discusses a subject of fundamental importance.
+“A correct conception of form and the laws of form will clear away many
+mysteries; it will afford a satisfactory explanation of causality and
+shed a new light on all the other problems of philosophy.”
+
+The part referred to begins thus: “In the introduction to his ‘Critique
+of Pure Reason,’ Immanuel Kant proposes the question: How are synthetical
+Judgments _a priori_ possible? on the solution of this problem the
+whole structure of his philosophy rests, which he characterises as
+_Transcendental Idealism_.” (“A priori, as used in the limited sense by
+Kant, is purely formal knowledge, while a posteriori is identical with
+experience.”)
+
+Further on I read, “Our own views grew out of a study of Kant’s
+Transcendentalism”; and the first words of your “Conclusion” are these:
+“Although Kant’s Transcendental Idealism cannot be considered as a final
+solution of the basic problem of philosophy, it nevertheless pursues the
+right method and has thus actually led us to a solution which, we hope,
+will in time be recognised as final.”
+
+In looking for the difference between the two solutions to find the
+part in yours that belongs to you alone, I see on p. 50 of “Fundamental
+Problems” that “Kant thinks it is a strange and wonderful fact that
+our formal thought (the rules of arithmetic, mathematics, logic, etc.,
+which are _a priori_) agrees so precisely with the highest (i. e. the
+most general) laws of nature, which can be ascertained and verified by
+experience. Kant sees only two ways of solution. Either the laws of pure
+reason, he says, have been gathered by experience from nature, or, on
+the contrary, the laws of nature have been deduced from our _a priori_
+rules. The former solution is impossible, since the formal sciences
+are proven to have been formulated with the exclusion of all sensory
+experience. ‘Therefore,’ says Kant, ‘the second solution only remains.
+Reason dictates its laws to nature’; i. e. ... the sensory impressions
+are the raw material only from which the well-ordered whole of nature, as
+an object of science, is created by the synthetic faculty of reason....
+Kant has taken into consideration two ways only. He overlooks the third
+and most obvious explanation.... The third possibility is that which has
+been propounded in the foregoing pages. According to our explanation, the
+formal (the highest or most general) laws of nature and the formal laws
+of thought are identical. Their agreement is not wonderful but inevitable
+as both are expressions of the forms of existence in general.”
+
+This then is your “solution of the basic problem of philosophy.”
+
+Turning back to page 34, I find under the title “The Origin of the A
+Priori”: “Kant answers the question ‘How are synthetic judgments _a
+priori_ possible?’ by showing that such synthetic judgments undoubtedly
+exist.” “He might have ventured a step further by proposing another
+question: ‘What is the origin of the _a priori_?’ Only by answering
+this question could he have shown _how_ synthetic judgments _a priori_
+are possible. This he did not do, and the omission has produced great
+confusion among German, French, and English thinkers.” On the next
+page, 36, I find “According to our view, form is a property of reality
+as well as of our cognition. Formless matter does not exist. Form and
+matter as they exist in reality, are inseparable.... Knowledge also
+in its primitive shape, when it is, so to say, natural and crude, is
+an intimate combination of sense-perceptions and formal cognition.
+The sense-perceptions are the real substance of knowledge, while
+formal cognition is the principle which arranges and systematises
+sense-experiences.” ... “Logic does not create order and system in our
+brain, but it makes us conscious of the order that naturally grew in our
+mind.”
+
+In the division entitled “The Order of Nature” you say that “Formal
+thought represents the mere laws of thought in their abstractness, and
+has been acquired by abstraction. The mere forms of thought exhibit
+a wonderful regularity.... This regularity of formal thought, which
+is expressed in all logical laws, arithmetical calculations, and in
+all mathematical conceptions, has naturally grown in our mind as the
+psychical expression of a physical regularity in the arrangement of the
+various brain-structures and their combinations. The arrangement of
+brain-structures in certain regular forms has been effected in accordance
+with the same laws that govern the development of forms generally.”
+
+This answer to the question, “What is the origin of the _a priori_” is
+what you call the corner-stone of your positivism, which, you say, “it is
+to be hoped, will prove the only true Monism.”
+
+Now I give my translation of Littré’s view, which he published in 1867,
+in an article entitled “The Three Philosophies.”
+
+“The effective certainty that the mathematical laws of number, of figure
+and of motion are at the base of physical phenomena, and the inductive
+belief that they are equally at the base of chemical and of biological
+phenomena induce me to note here a view upon the relation that must be
+found between subjective phenomena and objective phenomena, that is to
+say upon the relation that causes the subject to draw from the object
+a science and laws. The nervous substance, which is the organ of all
+intelligence, is made up of material elements which arrive with their
+conditions; and when this substance becomes capable of thinking, it
+passes under the conditions proper to the elements that form it; which
+results in (_se traduit par_) a science and its laws. The material
+work that takes place in the brain while it fulfils its office, is, as
+is known, a work of nutrition, which consists of a chemical exchange
+of molecules. Every chemical action is, in turn, equivalent to a
+certain quantity of heat; and again, this heat is equivalent to a
+certain quantity of motion. Thus thought, no matter how we represent
+to ourselves the relation to nervous substance, is connected with
+mathematical modes of which it becomes conscious when it becomes
+luminous. Not that I would in any way have it understood that thought
+is but an equivalent of heat or of motion. Far from that, equivalence
+is not identity; and whenever we change from one degree to another in
+the natural and scientific order we meet a new unknown which is the
+characteristic of this degree. The induction that leads us to connect
+thought with mathematical conditions, leads us also to connect it with
+physical, chemical, and biological conditions, of which it is necessarily
+participant. Finally, when, at the highest point, it arrives face to face
+with itself, it studies itself experimentally like the rest, and forms
+its own doctrine. If it attempts to go out metaphysically into space,
+it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements, turns in a
+circle without issue and falls back upon itself. If, on the contrary, it
+makes the same attempt towards nature from which it emanates, then the
+ways open, science is established, and positive philosophy appears. The
+material constitution of the nervous substance is the point of junction
+between the human mind and laws or general facts. If I had been younger,
+I should have made a work of this view, not a paragraph; but old age must
+hasten.”
+
+I have translated more than was necessary so as to give the “view” as
+a whole. Does it not contain the answer to your question, “What is the
+origin of the _a priori_”?
+
+Though Littré solved your “basic problem of philosophy” he did not attach
+so much importance to this solution as you do because his philosophy is
+based upon a generalisation from all facts and not upon any one fact,
+however important it may be.
+
+“Positive Philosophy is the conception of the world that results from the
+systematised ensemble of the positive sciences” and does not depend upon
+the solution of any psychological problem, although it recognises the
+importance of all psychological facts.
+
+Your originality lies in your application of Littré’s discovery.
+
+The reader has his choice between Littré’s positivism and your
+neo-Kantism, but if he side with you he must at least thank Littré for
+the solution on which your philosophy is based.
+
+You say that “Comtean Positivism, especially as it is represented by
+Littré, consists mainly if not exclusively of the doctrine to ‘let
+metaphysics alone.’” Is this fair to the man that solved your “basic
+problem of philosophy” in a paragraph?
+
+Positivism as represented by Littré gives due importance to the
+subjective element. He recognised that three essentials were necessary
+to the completion of Comte’s philosophy: a political economy, a cerebral
+theory, and what, for want of a better name he termed the subjective
+theory of humanity. This last comprised ethics, æsthetics, and
+psychology. Speaking of a confusion that obscures the whole discussion
+relative to psychology, he says: “_Cerebral theory_, _mental_ or
+_psychological theory_ are taken in two very different senses, which
+are never distinguished. These terms signify sometimes the organic
+conditions under which intelligence manifests itself, sometimes the
+formal conditions under which the intellect operates. As soon as these
+two significations are separated we perceive the means of settling the
+debate as to the place of psychology; for to the question: Where should
+these two orders be studied? it will be answered that the first should
+be studied in anatomy, physiology, zoölogy, the evolution of ages,
+pathology, it belongs therefore without contest to biology; but it will
+be answered that the second should be studied in the total development
+of history and in the application to all the modes of cognition; it
+belongs incontestably to philosophy. Thus there are two psychologies,
+one biological, the other philosophical, one relating to the individual
+man, the other to the collective man, one furnishing what is necessary
+in order to pass from biology to sociology, the other examining the
+subjective instrument by the light of all positive knowledge. But
+this complement of philosophy I do not call psychology, I call it the
+_subject-theory_ of _humanity_; because while including psychology, it
+includes much more.” That is to say; ethics and æsthetics.... “In the
+order of the positive method it is at first by means of the object that
+human knowledge is built up, and we end with the subject.” “The theory of
+the subject is the indispensable complement of the theory of the object.”
+
+Of positive philosophy Littré says: “While it constructs the series of
+the partial philosophies and thus embraces all objective knowledge, it
+constructs at the same time the series of effective methods and thus
+embraces all logical power. I borrow this expression from M. Comte, who
+so happily named these effective methods the logical powers of the human
+mind. When it has terminated its first series it is found to have also
+terminated the second. Thus the ensemble of the methods represents the
+function of the subject; the ensemble of the partial philosophies, the
+function of the object.”
+
+Is this what you call a “one-sided philosophy”?
+
+You say that Littré is the worst kind of a metaphysician because he
+maintains that we can know nothing about first and final causes; I quote
+him to show his position: “Positive philosophy is at the same time a
+system that comprises all that is known of the world, of man and of
+society, and a general method including all the ways by which things have
+been learned. What is beyond, either, materially, the depths (fond) of
+boundless space, or, intellectually, the endless enchainment of causes,
+is absolutely inaccessible to the human mind. But inaccessible does not
+mean null or non-existent. Immensity, both material and intellectual,
+holds by a narrow tie to what we know and becomes by this alliance a
+positive idea of the same order; I mean to say that by touching and
+bordering it, this immensity appears in its double character, reality and
+inaccessibility. It is an ocean that washes our shore, and for which we
+have neither bark nor sail, but whose clear vision is as salutary as it
+is formidable.” _Aug. Comte et la Phil. Pos._, 2d Ed., p. 519.
+
+As Littré had found this shore encumbered with the wrecks of expeditions
+that had started out in search of first causes and final causes, it is no
+wonder that he was a little timid. His metaphor needs explanation in the
+light of other passages, otherwise it might seem to discourage pursuit
+of the unknown. He did not discountenance hypotheses but he was very
+much afraid of our inclination to take guesses for truth; and this, by
+the way, is the reason why he is not appreciated in this country, where
+we are so fond of guessing. What he really did was to discourage those
+navigators who would go in search of the Jumping-off-place, for the best
+that can befall them is to come back to where they started. The men that
+know the earth is round are the only men that find new worlds.
+
+In answer to your statement that Littré’s philosophy “is an inventory
+rather than a plan to guide science in its further evolution” I will only
+repeat in his words, what he has shown so well, that “positive philosophy
+is the ensemble of human knowledge, disposed according to a certain order
+which enables us to grasp its connections and its unity, and to draw from
+it the general directions for each part and for the whole.”
+
+You say that “Littré rejects the evolution theory and its attempts to
+explain ethics.” I quote him from _La Philosophie Positive_, March, 1880:
+“Positive philosophy does not deny the evolution of ethics; far from
+doing so, it maintained and inculcated this evolution long before the
+utilitarian doctrine made it its ethical pivot.”.... “General morality,
+born of the gradual culture of the sentimental basis of the human
+soul under the social protection of progressive centres, is entirely
+disinterested, and this is what makes its purity and its force.”
+
+In your philosophy you have a god and a religion, in his we have the same
+things, but as they are so different from what is generally understood by
+these terms, we use others. Here are some of the _Paroles de Philosophie
+Positive_: “In the eyes of history, there are no false religions, there
+are only incomplete religions which make their way through time and
+perfect themselves.... The definition of religion is taken from its
+office, which is: to put education, and consequently moral life, en
+rapport with the conception of the world at each phase of humanity.
+Whoever examines this definition will find that it satisfies all the
+conditions of religion, either in the past, the present, or the future.
+It will be perceived that theology is not inherent in the religious
+idea. It was not always there in the past; for we cannot give the name
+of theology to primordial fetichism, which addressed its worship to
+neighboring objects, nor to the religions that adore natural agents, such
+as air, wind, night, dawn; it is with polytheism that theology begins. As
+for the future, general science, conceiving the world differently from
+the way in which it was conceived during the reigns of the successive
+religions, takes an office equivalent to the religious office, and must
+in its turn place education and moral life in accord with the universe as
+it appears to us.”.... “We do not outrage the old doctrine, whose past
+is glorious and venerable; but there is a public for which it is a dead
+letter; and it is to this public that we address ourselves and for this
+public that we labor.”
+
+Is this not aspiration to be in unison with “the order of the world,”
+which you call God? And when Littré traces this aspiration back to its
+organic origin is he not explaining what you affirm?
+
+Our philosophies are not perfect, but we must apply them, such as they
+are, to the needs of the day. The most pressing of all these needs, in
+my opinion, is unity of action among those who are animated with the new
+spirit.
+
+Let us pull together.
+
+                             Very truly yours,
+
+                                                        LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
+
+
+
+
+ÉMILE LITTRÉ’S POSITIVISM.
+
+
+An editor cannot make it a rule to accept criticisms of considerable
+length which have reference to a remark incidentally made in a book
+review. The present case, however, although it belongs in this category,
+is of a peculiar nature. First, the remark on Littré was made by the
+editor himself, and accordingly he feels personally responsible for it;
+secondly, it contains a brief delineation of Littré’s character as a man
+and as a philosopher in the way in which he is usually regarded by the
+most prominent historians of philosophy. Mr. Belrose presents Littré in
+quite a new light and quotes passages in corroboration of his conception
+of Littré which are perhaps not generally known, for they are buried in
+articles of the positivistic journal _La Philosophie Positive_, and this
+journal enjoyed neither a long life nor a large circulation; nor is it
+to be had in any of the libraries accessible to me. Seventeen editorial
+articles were republished in bookform, (_La Science. Au point de vue
+philosophique, par_ É. LITTRÉ. Paris, 1873), but the article “The Three
+Philosophies” is not among them.
+
+If Mr. Belrose’s conception of Littré proves to be true, I shall not
+only gladly correct my own wrong view of Littré, but I wish also to call
+attention to the fact that he has been misrepresented by almost all and
+certainly by the best and most painstaking philosophical historians.
+
+I cannot however in the main points accede to Mr. Belrose’s view and will
+have to sustain my former opinion that M. Littré was an agnostic. He
+made it a matter of principle to suspend his opinion on some of the most
+fundamental philosophical problems, which he considered as inaccessible.
+His positivism, accordingly, differs _toto cœlo_ from the positivism
+presented in _The Monist_. His philosophy, like that of Comte, is so far
+as I understand it, a policy of let-metaphysics-alone. It gives up the
+struggle with metaphysics as a hopeless undertaking. Therefore, I should
+say, Littré’s positivism has not conquered metaphysics, and although it
+lets metaphysics alone, metaphysics plays an important part in it. Littré
+is an agnostic and like every agnostic that believes in the unknowable, a
+metaphysician without knowing it.
+
+The doctrine of the three stages of knowledge, viz., the theological,
+metaphysical, and positive stages, appears to me of less importance. The
+doctrine of the three stages is at the same time not properly a Comtean
+idea; Comte adopted it from Turgot, the great statesman and one of the
+greatest men as a thinker and also as a character that ever lived and who
+is too little appreciated as such.
+
+The main doctrine of Comte’s positivism is the doctrine that first and
+final causes cannot be known, and we must abandon our search for them;
+that human knowledge is limited to the middle, while the two ends are
+inaccessible. These insoluble questions, he declares, have made no
+progress from the beginning. Mr. Lewes in his book “Comte’s Philosophy of
+the Sciences” expresses this agnosticism in the following words (p. 31):
+“Our province is to study her [nature’s] laws, to trace her processes,
+and, thankful that we can so far penetrate the divine significance of the
+universe, be content—as Locke wisely and modestly says—to sit down in
+quiet ignorance of all _transcendent_[61] subjects.”
+
+This idea has so far as I am aware never been given up by Littré; it
+remained the basis of his belief in the unknowable and his works abound
+in expressions that concerning the main problems of life, “the positive
+philosophy will neither assert nor deny anything.”
+
+Littré concludes the last article of his volume “La Science” with the
+following words:
+
+    “Le domaine ultérieur est celui des choses qui ne peuvent
+    pas être connues. La science positive professe de n’y rien
+    nier, de n’y rien affirmer; en un mot, elle ne connaît pas
+    l’inconnaissable, mais elle en constate l’existence. Là est la
+    philosophie suprême; aller plus loin est chimérique, aller moin
+    loin est déserter notre destinée.”
+
+This quotation alone, I think, settles the first main point at issue.
+
+Now I maintain that Comte’s view of causation where he refers to first
+and final causes is fundamentally wrong; causation is transformation
+and causality is the formula under which we comprehend the changes of
+matter and energy that take place. The expressions first and final causes
+are misnomers (see “Fundamental Problems,” the chapter The Problem of
+Causality). First cause is either the starting point of a series of some
+longer chain of causes and effects, or as the term is generally applied
+or rather misapplied, stands for the last ground or reason, i. e. the
+answer given to the ultimate question why?, which is the most general
+_raison d’être_ that would explain and contain all the other and less
+general _raisons d’être_ regarding the nature of existence. The term
+final cause, again, means either the last cause in a series of causes or
+(and so it is generally used) it is a misnomer for purpose; and the final
+cause supposed to be inaccessible to human comprehension is the purpose
+of the existence of the world at large. I object to there being three
+kinds of causes. There is one kind of causality only, and the causes of
+this causality in all the causal processes with which we are confronted
+are perfectly intelligible.
+
+The problem of the first cause of the origin of our world, viz. the
+solar system and the milky way, was attacked first by Kant and later by
+Laplace, and the latter, without knowing of Kant’s solution, solved it
+in the main in the same way. All recent investigations stand upon this
+Kant-Laplace hypothesis so called, having added corrections only as to
+details. Shall we declare that these labors are vain and gratuitous
+efforts of vague speculations? Littré says, with reference to such
+speculations, concerning the past and future states of the world (le
+monde):
+
+    “La dissémination primordiale de la matière qui devait le
+    composer, la dissémination future de la matière qui le compose,
+    dépassant toute expérience, dépassent toute conjecture.”
+
+If I misunderstand Littré, it appears to me a pardonable mistake.
+
+Yet is not the problem as to the origin of the world at large, why
+matter and energy exist at all, insolvable? Littré says that the
+positive cosmogonies, such as the doctrine of evolution do not touch
+the absolute; they have nothing to do with first and final causes. He
+says: “Les cosmogonies positives la [i. e. la place des cosmogonies
+religieuses] remplissent, non pas qu’elles aient la prétention ni le
+pouvoir de pénétrer dans l’absolu et d’embrasser, les causes premières et
+finales.”—l. c., p. 560.
+
+That kind of causality which is sometimes called “ontological,” having
+reference to the existence, not of single things as transformations from
+other things, but of the world at large and formulated in such questions
+as how did the universe itself, the world as a whole, originate, is
+properly speaking no causality, it is not a question concerning a cause,
+but concerning a _raison d’être_. However without haggling about the
+words cause and _raison d’être_, this ontological causality so called
+is by no means beyond human comprehension. The ontological question
+has found a very definite answer in the formulation of the law of the
+conservation of matter and energy; which declares that existence at
+large did not originate, the total amount of matter as well as of energy
+existed always and will exist always. It has not been created; it is
+uncreatable and indestructible; it is eternal.
+
+Littré is quite explicit in declaring that the positive philosophy lets
+alone all theological and metaphysical problems. It is neither atheistic
+nor theistic, and does not side with either materialism or spiritualism.
+He says:
+
+    “Ni spiritualiste, ni matérialiste, la philosophie positive
+    écarte de la science générale les débats que la science
+    particulière a depuis long temps et à son grand profit
+    rejetés.”—Preface d’un disciple in Comte’s “Course de Phil.
+    pos.” p. xxvii.
+
+Littré characterises as the main object of the positive philosophy, “to
+give to philosophy the positive method of the sciences, to the sciences
+the idea of the unity of philosophy.” He says: “Ainsi fut accompli ce
+qu’on doit appeler l’œuvre philosophique du dix-neuvième siècle, donner
+à la philosophie la méthode positive des sciences, aux sciences l’idée
+d’ensemble de la philosophie.” Preface, p. viii.
+
+I am in perfect agreement with Littré that this is the object of
+positivism; but, if I understand Littré correctly, I disagree from his
+conception of the positive method. He limits the positive method to what
+he calls “experience,” and excludes every notion of the _a priori_.
+Littré apparently misunderstood the proper meaning of Kant’s idea of
+the _a priori_, for he used as a matter of course the _a priori_ method
+wherever it was indispensable, so for instance in mathematics and in the
+application of mathematics.
+
+Mr. Belrose says:
+
+[Littré] “solved your basic problem of philosophy [i. e. what is the
+origin of the _a priori_] in a paragraph.”
+
+The problem of the _a priori_ reasoning is the question “Why can we
+know certain things before we have tested them by experiment? Man has
+not arrived by experience but by pure reasoning at the conclusion that
+the sum of the angles of every plane triangle has 180 degrees. How is
+he justified in declaring _a priori_ that the angles of a certain plane
+triangle make up 180 degrees, although he has not measured them?” This
+problem is the fundamental problem of the scientific or positive method;
+it is the same problem which Mr. Charles S. Peirce discusses in his
+article (see pp. 321 et seqq. of the present number of _The Monist_), for
+the problem of apriority is identical with the question of necessity.
+
+Littré has, so far as I know, never discussed the problem of apriority
+and necessity. He has simply rejected the idea of the _a priori_ as
+the method of a false metaphysics, which is incompatible with the _a
+posteriori_ method of positive science. The passage quoted by Mr. Belrose
+most certainly does _not_ contain a solution of the problem. Littré
+declares therein that every chemical action is equivalent to a certain
+quantity of heat; and again this heat is equivalent to a certain quantity
+of motion. Thus, he says, thought is connected with mathematical modes
+of which it becomes conscious. Thought, he adds, is not an equivalent of
+heat or motion, for equivalence is not identity, but it is connected with
+mathematical conditions. This means that that kind of brain-action which
+represents conscious thought, depends upon definite proportions. But
+what in all the world has this idea to do with the problem of apriority?
+The phrase “mathematical modes” (which is misleading in this passage) is
+an unfortunate expression for “proportions” and we must add that Littré
+is mistaken when he says that the nervous substance when it becomes
+luminous, becomes conscious of these mathematical modes with which it is
+connected. Aside from “luminous” being simply an allegorical expression
+for conscious, it is wrong to say that the nervous substance becomes
+conscious of the mathematical modes of heat as they are proportioned in
+the brain. A sentient being knows through sensation nothing about the
+mechanism or the mechanical proportions of its own sentient structure.
+Sensation is the act of a becoming conscious not of the sentient
+structure itself but of the meaning which this sentient structure has
+acquired, and a consciousness of the mathematical modes which according
+to Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences ought to be the beginning of
+knowledge develops at a very late period. Any explanation of the origin
+of _a priori_, be it ever so brief, would lead us too far away from the
+points of our controversy. It is sufficient here to point out that the
+passage quoted by Mr. Belrose, contains no solution of the problem of
+our knowledge and certitude of mathematical, arithmetical, and other
+purely formal laws. On the contrary, this very passage is replete with
+error; it is a misstatement of facts and does not even bring to light the
+difficulties of the problem.
+
+Littré was prejudiced against the _a priori_, and his prejudice induced
+him to underrate its importance. I read in one of Littré’s passages
+quoted by Mr. Belrose:
+
+    “If it [thought] attempts to go out metaphysically into space,
+    it is reduced to combining subjectively its own elements, turns
+    in a circle without issue and falls back upon itself.”
+
+The _a priori_ method of thought subjectively combining its own elements,
+is by no means a turning in a circle without issue so that in the end it
+will fall back upon itself. The _a priori_ method of thought subjectively
+combining its own elements is employed by arithmetic, mathematics, and
+logic, and we are confronted with the astonishing fact that rules, or
+formulas, or calculations which were made by pure thought subjectively
+combining its own elements, are applicable and hold good as reliable
+guides in our experiments. If there were no _a priori_, how could we
+foretell or, what is more still, how could we predetermine the course
+of nature? The _a priori_ has been wrongly employed by the so-called
+metaphysical philosophers to give us information about the substance and
+essence of the world. But the misapplication of the _a priori_ is no
+reason for denouncing it as radically wrong.
+
+The existence of the _a priori_ is an undeniable fact. Kant was
+right in recognising it in its sweeping importance, yet he was wrong
+in his interpretation of the _a priori_, which according to his
+transcendentalism was based exclusively upon a peculiarity of the mind
+and not upon the nature of things. The positivists in France did not only
+object to the wrong interpretation of the transcendentalists but also
+denied the existence of the _a priori_. Accepting the principle that
+every knowledge must ultimately be a statement of facts, the question
+How is the _a priori_ to be based upon facts? became in my conception of
+philosophy the burning problem which was next in order as a conciliation
+between Kant and Comte.
+
+The French positivists, foremost among them Comte and Littré, have not
+given us an explanation of what is true and false in the theological
+and metaphysical notions of first and final causes, of the _a priori_
+of God, of substance, of force, etc.; they have simply abandoned the
+investigation of these ideas which are after all the most important tools
+in the household of the human mind for scientific and ethical purposes;
+and thus they have, in spite of their positivism in questions of detail,
+retained the metaphysical method of _a priori_ reasoning which is quite
+legitimate in the formal science but out of place concerning facts. Take
+for instance the following argument concerning the materiality of things:
+
+    “Là, c’est à dire dans les sciences positives, on ne connaît
+    aucune propriété sans matière, non point parce que, _a priori_,
+    on y a l’idée préconçue qu’il n’existe aucune substance
+    spirituelle indépendante, mais parce que, _a posteriori_,
+    on n’a jamais rencontré la gravitation sans corps pesant,
+    la chaleur sans corps chaud, l’électricité sans corps
+    électrique, l’affinité sans substances de combinaison, la
+    vie, la sensibilité, la pensée, sans être vivant, sentant et
+    pensant.”—_La Science_, p. 307.
+
+I do not mean to say that there are immaterial or spiritual substances,
+but I should say that any purely _a posteriori_ argument in favor of
+their non-existence is insufficient. Would Littré mean that a Zulu
+should declare that ice cannot exist because he has never seen water
+frozen as hard as a stone? Any amount of experience, i. e. all _a
+posteriori_ evidence, is in parts and will out of itself never acquire
+universal validity.
+
+How strongly Littré is still implicated in the metaphysical method of
+applying _a priori_ ideas to _a posteriori_ experiences can be learned
+from the following statement:
+
+    “Le monde est constitué par la matière et par les forces de
+    la matière: la matière dont l’origine et l’essence nous sont
+    inaccessible; les forces qui sont immanentes à la matière. Au
+    delà de ces deux termes, matière et force, la science positive
+    ne connaît rien.” Preface, p. ix.
+
+The metaphysical ideas, matter and force, are _a priori_ notions of
+mystical entities or things in themselves, and thus it appears natural
+that experience should know nothing of them. But real matter and actual
+force are not unknowable existences. They can be known. We know something
+of them and positive science is engaged in broadening and deepening this
+knowledge. Says Littré:
+
+    “Les propriétés physiques sont manifestes en toute substance,
+    dans quelque état qu’elle soit, isolée ou non isolée, et
+    s’exercent sur les masses; les propriétés, n’apparaissent
+    qu’entre deux substances, ont besoin de la binarité et
+    s’exercent sur les molécules; enfin les propriétés vitales
+    dépassant la binarité, ne sont compatibles qu’avec un état
+    moléculaire plus composé.” Preface, p. x.
+
+One of the fundamental principles of positivism, as I conceive it,
+is the definition of knowledge as a description of facts or of their
+properties. We call certain properties of the facts (i. e. the objects
+of our experience) matter and others force. When we say that we do or do
+not know a certain phenomenon we mean that we have or have not as yet
+succeeded in placing them properly in that system of thought-symbols of
+which our mind consists. Yet there is no sense in speaking of matter and
+force as being unknowable while the properties of matter and force are
+said to be manifest and appearing under certain conditions.
+
+I have presented the main reasons why I still hold that there is a
+radical difference between Littré’s view of positivism and my own.
+Littré is an agnostic and he was an agnostic before that name had been
+invented. His objection to metaphysicism consists in the doctrine not
+that the object of metaphysics is a chimerical non-existence, but that
+the object of metaphysics exists yet it cannot be known. Thus Littré is
+as much a metaphysician as those philosophers whom he censures for their
+metaphysical views. He does not censure them for believing that the
+metaphysical exists, but for believing that it is knowable and attempting
+to investigate its nature.
+
+As to the hierarchy of the sciences I shall simply quote a few extracts
+from Eugen Dühring’s criticism of Comte. Dühring says (_Krit. Gesch. der
+Phil._, p. 486):
+
+    “If Comte’s _positivism_ were nothing more than what we have
+    here laid down, its main contents would, strange enough,
+    consist in _negativity_. The criticism of a certain kind of
+    metaphysics, viz. of an ontology phantastical to a greater or
+    lesser extent, would form its most significant character. The
+    other element which consists in presenting a hierarchy and
+    unitary conjunction of some of the sciences which are called
+    positive in the usual sense of the term, cannot pretend to
+    be philosophy in the higher sense of the word or even to be
+    useful for science. A general view of knowledge, whether it
+    consists of six or sixty volumes, does not add the least iota
+    to the contents of our knowledge.... We cannot expect that a
+    specialist should be pleased with a hierarchical sketch of his
+    science, especially if the delineations are filled out with
+    details of which he would be a better judge.”
+
+It is true, and I concur in this with the French positivists, that a
+positive philosophy must be a systematic arrangement of knowledge. But I
+conceive it to be the philosopher’s work, not to take an inventory of the
+sciences, but to define the fundamental concepts of scientific enquiry
+and to elucidate the methods of cognition. Such fundamental concepts
+are the ideas, truth and criterion of truth, cause and effect, mind,
+thought, knowledge, ethics, etc. Concepts are the tools of thought and
+the practice of using them correctly has to be learned.
+
+Positivism is not the original invention of a world-system, but the
+systematising of statements of facts so as to produce a world-system.
+The old philosophers gave us first a world-system, from which and in
+accord with which they defined their views of truth, cognition, cause,
+etc. They began to build their philosophy from the top down. Positivism
+begins from the bottom and is building up to the top with the assistance
+of the special sciences. A positive philosophy is inseparable from, but
+it cannot be replaced by, the sciences. The field of philosophy is to
+superintend the method and the plan of building, so as to compare the
+details and bear in mind the unity of the whole. In this sense Dühring
+says in criticising Comte (p. 486):
+
+    “However, concerning the form of the connections of methodical
+    reflections, something can be done. Yet it must be possible
+    to separate everything of such a kind and also new insights,
+    so as to constitute a special branch of knowledge. Otherwise
+    they will escape the specialists’ attention.... Not only Comte
+    but all philosophers given to the idea of systematisation and
+    construction of particular knowledge have made attempts in
+    this direction which at most may range as sketches or popular
+    presentations in a higher sense.”
+
+Concerning Littré’s view of Comte’s religious vagaries Dühring says (p.
+483):
+
+    “His [Comte’s] biographer, the Academician Littré of Paris,
+    and also Stuart Mill are right in considering ‘The Course of
+    Positive Philosophy’ as the main and fundamental work which is
+    decisive as a contribution of his and a source of instruction
+    to the world. However, they are very one-sided when they
+    overlook that the philosopher even in his vagaries exhibited a
+    universality of mind which remains superior to the standpoint
+    of either Littré or Mill.”
+
+I agree with Mr. Belrose that Comte’s religion as he conceived it
+consists of vagaries, but the main idea of developing the religions
+of the past which, as Littré says, are not false but only incomplete
+religions, into a religion that shall be in accord with the science of
+our day is no vagary, but a great and an important ideal.
+
+Far be it from me to belittle Littré because I disagree from him in
+some fundamental questions. He was in his time, he is still, and will
+remain for ever a star of first magnitude in our philosophical galaxy.
+That which I consider as his errors does not detract from his greatness.
+Were not Kant’s mistakes in a similar way closely interwoven with his
+greatest merits? It is flattering to me that Mr. Belrose finds an
+agreement between his master’s and my views concerning the basic problem
+of philosophy, but I cannot discover it. Yet I gladly acknowledge that
+there exists an agreement of aim, and this agreement of aim which finds
+its truest expression in the word “positivistic” is perhaps of greater
+importance than the agreement of views.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[61] Italics are not mine.
+
+
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON SOME POINTS IN JAMES’S PSYCHOLOGY.[62]
+
+
+In calling attention to some objections to the views advanced by
+Professor James on the subjects of Belief, Emotion, and Will, it is only
+justice to myself to express the admiration I feel for his work as a
+whole. The thoroughly scientific spirit which pervades it, the author’s
+candor in admitting and his skill in surmounting difficulties, his
+learning and his originality, his aptness in illustration, and the energy
+and vivacity of his style combine to make it full of interest as well as
+instruction. It is because it should be, and doubtless will be widely
+influential, that it is important that any doubtful positions assumed in
+it should be subjected to a careful examination.
+
+I shall endeavor to avoid any misrepresentation of the views which I
+combat, but space will not allow me to do full justice to the arguments
+by which they are supported, if such a thing is possible for an
+antagonist. For this, I must refer the interested reader to the original
+book. If what I have to say should have the effect of increasing the
+number of its readers, I shall not have written altogether in vain,
+whether I succeed or fail in setting the truth in a clearer light.
+
+
+I. BELIEF.
+
+Professor James entitles the chapter devoted to this subject “The
+Perception of Reality,” and defines belief to be “the mental state
+or function of cognising reality.” He explains that, “As used in the
+following pages, ‘Belief’ will mean every degree of assurance, including
+the highest possible certainty and conviction” (Vol. II, p. 283).
+
+According to this definition, erroneous beliefs, such, for instance, as
+the belief that the earth is flat, stationary, and the centre of the
+universe, or the delusion of an insane man that he is Jesus Christ, are
+cognitions of reality. Professor James would probably say that they are
+realities to the mind entertaining them, and it is true that the feeling
+of belief is the same, whether the thing believed be true or false.
+I think, however, that it is more customary to use the verb which he
+employs in connection with beliefs which agree with the objective facts,
+and that the “feeling” or “sense” of reality would be a better term than
+“perception” or “cognition.”
+
+This, however, is not, to my mind, the most serious objection to the
+definition. Although Professor James does not use the word “knowledge”
+in this connection, it seems evident, from the passage quoted above, and
+from what he says elsewhere, that he considers all kinds, as well as all
+degrees of certainty to be beliefs. It seems to me evident, on the other
+hand, that many of our cognitions of reality are not properly called
+beliefs. As an instance, I will quote the illustration with which he
+opens the discussion of “The Various Orders of Reality” (p. 287).
+
+    “Suppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting for
+    experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the form of a
+    visual impression (whether faint or vivid is immaterial) of a
+    lighted candle against a dark background, and nothing else, so
+    that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire universe
+    to the mind in question. Suppose, moreover (to simplify the
+    hypothesis), that the candle is only imaginary, and that no
+    ‘original’ of it is recognised by us psychologists outside.
+    Will this hallucinatory candle be believed in, will it have a
+    real existence for the mind?
+
+    “What possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion have
+    that the candle is not real? What would doubt or disbelief
+    of it imply? When _we_, the onlooking psychologists, say the
+    candle is unreal, we mean something quite definite, viz.
+    that there is a world known to _us_ which _is_ real, and to
+    which we perceive that the candle does not belong; it belongs
+    exclusively to that individual mind, has no status anywhere
+    else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in a fashion, for it forms
+    the content of that mind’s hallucination; but the hallucination
+    itself, though unquestionably it is a sort of existing fact,
+    has no knowledge of _other_ facts; and since those _other_
+    facts are the realities _par excellence_ for us, and the only
+    things we believe in, the candle is simply outside of our
+    reality and belief altogether.
+
+    “By the hypothesis, however, the mind which sees the candle
+    can spin no such considerations as these about it, for of
+    other facts, actual or possible, it has no inkling whatever.
+    That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty of
+    attention is absorbed by it. It _is_, it is _that_; it is
+    _there_; no other possible candle, or quality of this candle,
+    no other possible place, or possible object in the place, no
+    alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable;
+    so how can the mind help believing the candle real? The
+    supposition that it might possibly not do so is, under the
+    supposed conditions, unintelligible.”
+
+I readily grant that it is, under the supposed circumstances,
+unintelligible that the candle should be thought to be unreal, but it
+seems to me equally so that it should be believed to be real. What does
+Professor James mean by a belief in the reality of the candle under such
+conditions? Nothing more than that the mind is conscious of a sensation
+which we know, but it does not, is like that produced by the sight of
+a candle. This sensation is certainly a reality, and the only possible
+reality to that mind. Professor James must, then, be understood as
+maintaining that a sensation, pure and simple, is a belief in an object
+exciting the sensation. If, for instance, the first consciousness of the
+supposed mind were the odor of a rose, or the whistle of a locomotive,
+he must admit that the mind would believe in the rose or the locomotive.
+If I have a headache, or am hungry or tired, I not only have beliefs
+about these sensations, but the headache, the hunger, the weariness, are
+themselves beliefs. Now I submit that this is contrary to all ordinary
+use of language. It is, perhaps, impossible for an adult, with his mind
+full of memories of past experiences, to have a sensation without some
+sort of a belief about it, but although the sensation and the belief
+may be inseparable, they are not indistinguishable, and, as a matter of
+fact, every one does distinguish between his sensations and his beliefs
+about them. I do not think it would be quite correct to say even of an
+adult who had never seen or heard of a candle, that, on seeing one for
+the first time, he would believe in the reality of the candle, although
+doubtless he would believe he saw something real—a real flame, for
+instance.
+
+If it be admitted that sensations are entitled to be called beliefs,
+it seems impossible to stop short of the conclusion that all states of
+consciousness are beliefs.
+
+Emotions and volitions are as much realities as sensations, and are known
+as such by the mind that experiences them. That memory and imagination
+involve belief, is too evident to need discussion. But if this be the
+case, the chapter on belief could have been very greatly abbreviated—need
+not in fact, contain more than four words. To say that all consciousness
+is belief would perhaps simplify matters, but it would not advance our
+knowledge very much, nor would it accord with the ordinary use of the
+word, which has reference to a particular kind of consciousness, which
+every one knows, however hard he may find its definition.
+
+It seems to me, therefore, that Professor James’s definition of belief
+is defective in two ways. There are beliefs which are not cognitions
+of reality, and there are cognitions of reality which are not beliefs.
+Especially in regard to the latter class, I think that the definition
+confuses a distinction that is real and important, between different
+kinds of knowledge. We know our sensations, emotions and volitions in a
+way which differs not only in degree but in kind from any usual, or, I
+think, legitimate sense of the word “Belief.”
+
+Perhaps it would be the safer course to rest content with pointing out
+the objections to the author’s definition without laying myself open
+to retaliation by attempting one of my own, but it does not seem to me
+impossible to give one which will include all that is understood by the
+term and nothing more. I should say that belief is the sense or feeling
+of relation between mental objects. That we have belief whenever we have
+this feeling, seems to me too plain to require argument, and I am unable,
+after a good deal of reflection, to call to mind any belief that is not
+included in the definition. If I see, or imagine that I see a lighted
+candle, it may excite in my mind a great variety of beliefs, as, that the
+flame is hot, that the light and heat are caused by the chemical union of
+oxygen with carbon and hydrogen, that the material of which the candle
+is composed is wax, paraffine or tallow, that it has a cotton wick, that
+it is of a certain size, weight, and color, and so on indefinitely.
+All of these are evidently ideas of relation. To say “flame,” or “hot”
+does not express a belief, unless something else is understood, but to
+say “flame is hot” does so. If I say that the color red is equal to the
+square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle, I fail to express
+a belief because the mind perceives no relation between the objects, and
+the answer to such a statement would be, not that it is or is not true,
+but that it has no meaning. The only cases which occur to me in which it
+might be plausibly argued that a belief did not involve the feeling of
+relation are such impersonal expressions as “it rains,” or, “it is cold.”
+The exception, however, is only apparent, arising from the erroneous
+idea that everything which is implied in language must be expressed.
+When we say, “it rains,” we mean, “rain is falling.” In either form of
+language, the thought conveyed is that of the relation of the drops of
+water and their motion. The stock-broker, with his prearranged code,
+may communicate the ideas of a long sentence in a single word, or the
+Freemason may do the same to the initiated by a gesture. In such a case,
+it would be absurd to contend that no relation is felt or communicated
+because there is no formal subject or predicate.
+
+Whatever may be thought of the sufficiency of my definition, I risk the
+assertion that it includes all beliefs that can be affirmed, denied or
+doubted. We never question our sensations, emotions or volitions—we
+have them, are aware of them, and that is the end of the matter. It is
+the relations of our sensations to each other, and to our pleasures
+and pains, our choices and rejections, that involve us in all sorts of
+perplexities. The whole question of the grounds of belief in general, and
+the truth or falsehood of particular beliefs is a question of relations.
+It is, then, in the sense indicated above that I shall use the word
+hereafter.
+
+Having settled the definition, it may be worth while to consider for
+a moment whether this feeling of relation, which can only be known by
+experience, is enough like any other mental states to be classed with
+them. On this point Professor James says: “_In its inner nature, belief,
+or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions
+than to anything else._ Mr. Bagehot distinctly calls it the ‘emotion’
+of conviction. I just now spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles
+more than anything else what in the psychology of volition we know as
+consent. Consent is recognised by all to be a manifestation of our active
+nature. It would naturally be described by such terms as ‘willingness’
+or the ‘turning of our disposition.’ What characterises both consent
+and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation through the advent
+of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the
+exclusion of contradictory ideas. When this is the case, motor effects
+are apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, characterised
+by repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately connected
+with subsequent practical activity. This inward stability of the mind’s
+content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we shall
+presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason
+that we believe something else that contradicts the first thing.
+Disbelief is thus an incidental complication to belief, and need not be
+considered by itself.” (P. 283).
+
+I am unable to satisfy myself whether, in the above passage, Professor
+James has in mind the feeling of belief or other feelings which often
+accompany it. The “cessation of theoretic agitation,” “willingness,”
+“turning of our disposition,” are accompanied by feelings which I should
+say are not only like, but identical with emotion. In the case of old,
+confirmed beliefs, however, theoretic agitation ceased, and the turning
+of the disposition occurred, if at all, long ago, and I am unable to
+recognise anything resembling emotion in my belief that two and two make
+four, that cows eat grass, that iron is a metal, and many others that
+might be mentioned. Nor do these beliefs, at the present time, give rise
+to motor effects, which, so far as I am able to see, only result from
+such beliefs as are, directly or indirectly, associated with emotion.
+If such beliefs as I have mentioned are not purely intellectual, as
+distinguished from emotional phenomena, I should be at a loss to know
+where the distinction is to be made between “the head” and “the heart.”
+The sense of relation seems to me to be the most purely intellectual of
+all the mental functions, and, although it may give rise to all sorts of
+emotions, the more settled, undisturbed and unquestioning the belief,
+the less likely is it to give rise to any but the feeling of calm, which
+seems to me to be the antithesis of emotion. I should say that belief is
+a feeling _sui generis_, without enough analogy with any other to justify
+classing them together.
+
+I have already quoted the illustration with which Professor James opens
+the discussion of the subject of Reality. After quoting from Spinoza,
+to the same effect, the supposed case of a horse with wings imagined to
+be real in the absence of any contradictory thought, he goes on to say:
+“The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when
+that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. _Any
+object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as
+absolute reality._” (P. 288). Elsewhere he says:
+
+    “... _all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are
+    believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they
+    clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by
+    affirming that their terms are the same as the terms of those
+    other propositions._” (P. 290).
+
+This, I think, is stated too strongly, at least, in the latter quotation.
+A proposition that is uncontradicted will be believed, but it is not
+necessary that the contradictory proposition should be believed in
+order that the first may fail of belief. I believe nothing, at present,
+contradictory of the proposition that it is now raining in Boston. I
+think it not improbable that such may be the case, but at the same time
+the contrary proposition is present to my mind, that it may not be
+raining in Boston, and the result is the state of mind which Professor
+James very properly regards as the opposite of belief—doubt. But
+supposing that a proposition is presented to the mind, which, being for
+the time uncontradicted, is believed, and that subsequently another,
+contrary proposition is presented, is it certain that the latter will
+be disbelieved? May not a state of doubt replace belief in this case
+also? Or supposing that two propositions, which have been believed
+independently, are brought into juxtaposition in such a way as to show
+that they are inconsistent, how are we to determine which if either,
+shall be believed? Professor James seems to teach that it is a matter of
+choice.
+
+    “That we can at any moment think of the same thing which
+    at any former moment we thought of is the ultimate law of
+    our intellectual constitution. But when we now think of it
+    incompatibly with our other ways of thinking of it, then we
+    must choose which way to stand by, for we cannot continue to
+    think of it in two contradictory ways at once. _The whole
+    distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of
+    belief, disbelief and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental
+    facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the
+    same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose
+    which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard._[63]
+    The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the attributes
+    adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered to real
+    existence; while the subjects disregarded become imaginary
+    subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous attributes, and
+    the existence disregarded an existence in no man’s land, in the
+    limbo ‘where footless fancies dwell.’” (P. 290).
+
+The doctrine that belief is, in the last analysis, a matter of choice
+is a prominent feature of Professor James’s teaching, to which I shall
+have occasion to refer again. It seems to me to involve him in some
+inconsistencies. For the present, it should be noted that he admits the
+reality of every mental object in its proper relations.
+
+    “If I merely dream of a horse with wings, my horse interferes
+    with nothing else and has not to be contradicted. That horse,
+    its wings, and its place are all equally real. That horse
+    exists no otherwise than as winged, and is moreover really
+    there, for that place exists no otherwise than as the place
+    of that horse, and claims as yet no connection with the other
+    places of the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad
+    into the _world otherwise known_, and say, for example, ‘That
+    is my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where
+    she stands in her stall,’ the whole case is altered; for now
+    the horse and place are identified with a horse and place
+    otherwise known, and _what_ is known of the latter objects is
+    incompatible with what is perceived of the former. ‘Maggie
+    in her stall with wings! Never!’ The wings are unreal, then,
+    visionary. I have dreamed a lie about Maggie in her stall.” (P.
+    289).
+
+Here, the dream is a reality, and the winged horse is as really a part of
+it as the mare Maggie is of the outside world. The reality of the winged
+horse in the one case, and his unreality in the other, depend on his
+relations to other mental objects. So, for instance, if any one should
+say that a mermaid was a creature with the portion of a man from the
+waist up united to the body and limbs of a horse, I should be justified
+in contradicting him, and saying that it was not a mermaid but a centaur
+that he had in mind. It would not be a valid answer to say that there
+were really no such things as mermaids and centaurs. In mythology, a
+centaur has as definite a structure as a giraffe has in zoölogy, and
+it is as inexcusable to confound the one as the other with anything
+else. This point is amplified by the author in a section on “The Many
+Worlds,” in which the various objects of thought are found in their
+proper relations, and out of which each one selects a world of practical
+realities, according to his dominant habits of attention. _In the
+relative sense_, in which we contrast reality with unreality, or consider
+one object more real than another,
+
+    “_Reality means simply relation to our emotional and active
+    life_ ... in this sense, whatever excites and stimulates our
+    interest is real.” (P. 295).
+
+    “_Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with
+    my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt._” (P. 298).
+
+This power of exciting and stimulating our interest, Professor James
+finds to be possessed in a pre-eminent degree by sensations, which thus
+become, directly or indirectly, our tests of reality, and among which
+those which are pleasurable or painful hold the first rank. Next to them,
+if not of equal power, are emotions.
+
+    “The greatest proof that a man is _sui compos_ is his ability
+    to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting
+    idea. To give this power is the highest result of education.
+    In untutored minds the power does not exist. Every exciting
+    thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To
+    conceive with passion is _eo ipso_ to affirm.” (P. 308).
+
+Professor James’s account of the grounds of belief seems to me inadequate
+in that it fails to show the connection between our sensations and
+emotions and other mental states and our beliefs. Why is it that the
+sight of the heavenly bodies, for instance, awakens in different minds
+such diverse beliefs as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems of
+astronomy? What does a man who is frightened believe? What belief would
+necessarily result from a colic? It is not enough to say that sensations
+and emotions are connected with belief; we want to know how they are
+connected.
+
+Bearing in mind the definition of belief as the sense of relation between
+objects, the question resolves itself into the origin of feelings of
+relation. As relations are of various kinds, they may be suggested to the
+mind by different circumstances. They may, I think, be divided into three
+classes:
+
+1) Relations of likeness and unlikeness. These result from the
+comparison and discrimination of objects. All the beliefs involved
+in the recognition and classification of objects arise in this way.
+When, on seeing a certain object, I say that it is a bay horse, and
+will weigh about eleven hundred pounds, I give expression to relations
+of comparison. The comparison may be immediate, between objects
+simultaneously present to the senses, or alike present only to memory
+or imagination, or between a present object and a remembered one, or
+mediate, by comparison of two or more objects with some other. All
+mathematical truths are of this kind.
+
+2) Relations of cause and effect, of substance and quality, of whole and
+component parts, of order in time and space, are due to association.
+When I say of the horse that his movements are caused by muscular
+contractions, that he is of a gentle disposition, that he has a bony
+skeleton and red blood, that he is five years old and is harnessed
+to a carriage, I express relations of association. In his chapter on
+Association Professor James says:
+
+    “_Belief_ in anything _not_ present to sense is the very
+    lively, strong, and steadfast association of the image of that
+    thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the
+    sensation persists the image cannot be excluded from the mind.”
+    (Vol. I, p. 598).
+
+I do not think it is a fact that the image of the thing believed in need
+be associated with any present sensation. I am not aware, for instance,
+that there is, at present, any such association in my belief in the
+existence of the city of Constantinople, or that Queen Victoria is
+reigning in England. The associations in these and similar cases are with
+objects of memory and not with present sensations. On the other hand,
+what we mean by belief in a present object always involves memory of the
+past. When we say that we believe in anything, we either mean that it is
+like other things of the same sort of which we have had experience, or
+that it stands in some other relation to them. Complete loss of memory
+would not only destroy all our past beliefs, but, if it were permanent,
+would prevent our ever forming any new ones. The universe, in such a
+case, would be a mere chaos of sensations.
+
+In order that things may be associated, they must first be discriminated,
+otherwise, as Professor James has shown, in his chapter on Discrimination
+and Comparison, they are thought of, not as associated things, but as
+one thing. In like manner, when discriminated things have once been
+associated, the tendency is, in the absence of contrary experience, to
+think of them as belonging together. A child, attracted by the brightness
+of the teapot, touches it and burns his fingers. He naturally expects the
+teapot to be hot the next time he sees it. He is told that his Christmas
+gifts were brought down the chimney by Santa Claus. Until the statement
+is contradicted, he believes it. Why should he not? Or the association
+of things in the mind may come about without any external suggestion.
+I remember that the first time that I ever heard a person snore, the
+thought came into my mind that the strange noise was made by a bear, and
+I lay awake most of the night, in fear of being devoured. The tendency
+is to think of things as related in the way in which they are first
+presented to the mind, until they come up in some different relation.
+This seems to be the explanation of the tendency to “believe as much as
+we can,” to “affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived,”
+of which Professor James speaks. With increased experience, we find that
+there is a difference in the uniformity of associations, and accordingly
+the coincidence of two or more things is associated with the doubt
+whether or not the association is a constant one.
+
+3) In addition to the relations considered above, there are some which,
+although expressed in terms of association and comparison, seem to me to
+have a different origin. That the whole is greater than any of its parts
+is a relation of comparison; that a thing cannot be in two different
+places at the same time, that every event has a cause, that there is
+an external world, are relations of association. Although they do not
+arise independently of experience, they contain more than is given in
+experience, and the uniformity and firmness with which they are believed
+can, it seems to me, only be accounted for by the assumption of an innate
+propensity to look upon things as related in these ways.
+
+So far as I am able to judge, beliefs always arise in one or another
+of these three ways. But a still more interesting question, from the
+practical point of view, than that of the origin of beliefs, is that of
+the comparative validity of the various grounds of belief. Are they all
+of equal worth, and if not, is there any way of determining which are to
+be given the preference, or is belief, like taste, a matter about which
+“_non disputandum_”?
+
+Professor James does not go very deeply into the discussion of this
+question. As we have seen, he assigns to sensation the greatest efficacy
+in producing belief, and discusses the comparative power of various
+sorts of sensations in this respect. Emotion he makes a close second.
+But the question which gives us the more reliable information, in cases
+in which they conflict, he does not discuss at all. As a matter of fact,
+there is no doubt that a man under the influence of strong emotion often
+draws different conclusions from the evidence of his senses from those
+at which he would arrive in its absence. Is he warranted in doing so?
+Would any degree of personal interest warrant a man in believing or
+disbelieving the doctrine of transubstantiation, the Newtonian theory of
+gravitation, the Mosaic or the Darwinian view of the origin of species?
+There is no doubt that belief on such subjects as these is influenced by
+our interest, real or supposed, in one or the other view, and perhaps
+Professor James would say that he deals with the working of minds as they
+are, not as we imagine that they ought to be, but the general knowledge
+that a class of considerations is reliable or the reverse is another
+thing that not only ought to, but actually does affect our beliefs, and
+the question of the method to be pursued in ascertaining the actual
+relations of things, of forming true beliefs instead of false ones, is
+one which hardly ought to be ignored in a discussion of the subject.
+
+Referring to the three classes of relations already considered, it is, I
+think, evident that there are differences in the way in which they affect
+our belief. In comparison, the essential thing is the accuracy of the
+observation. One who has once fully comprehended the proof that the sum
+of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, is as sure of
+it as he could be after any amount of experience. In comparing sensible
+objects, we may, it is true, and our belief confirmed by repetition, but
+this is only in case that we doubt whether the comparison was rightly
+made in the first place. That red does not look like blue, nor sweet
+taste like sour, we are as certain on one trial as a hundred. If we
+apply a foot measure to an object eight inches long, nothing can add
+to our certainty that they are not of the same length. In matters of
+association, on the other hand, a great deal depends on the uniformity of
+the association—the number of times that we have experienced it without
+contrary experience. When I hear a crow, for instance, I believe that it
+is black, because all the crows that I have ever seen have been so. A
+sheep I assume to be white, but with a less degree of confidence, because
+black sheep are more numerous than white crows. In the case of a horse,
+I have no belief in regard to the color within a certain range, unless
+I have some means of knowing about the particular animal in question.
+If I were told that my friend had bought a horse, I should have no idea
+whether it was bay, or black, or white, or some mixture of these colors.
+If, however, I were told that the natural color of my friend’s horse
+was green, I should be much more confident that the statement was false
+than if the same person should tell me he had seen a white crow, for,
+the same reason that I should more readily believe in a black sheep than
+in the latter. In the customary use of the word, I might say I _knew_
+it was not so. In the case of intuitive judgments experience has little
+or nothing to do with the strength of belief. The adult man is no more
+firmly convinced of the existence of something external to himself than
+the child, and, although he may come to doubt it on speculative grounds,
+he no more fails than the child to show by his actions that he has a
+practical faith in it.
+
+In many, if not most of our beliefs, all of these elements are present.
+If I see an orange, for instance, I have the intuition of externality,
+the comparison with other oranges that I have already seen, and
+associations of internal structure, taste, smell, and the like. All of
+these, and very possibly some emotion, as, for instance, a desire to eat
+it, may arise, simultaneously or so nearly so as not to be distinguished
+in time, as parts of a single mental state.
+
+There is one kind of association, of importance enough to deserve
+mention, of which Professor James makes no mention. The beliefs, or
+alleged beliefs of other people have an influence on our minds which
+is, I think, not inferior to that of emotion. The man who can, without
+misgiving, maintain an opinion which contradicts all that he learned
+in childhood and all that is held by those whose good opinion he most
+values is, I fancy, quite as rare as he who can suspend judgment in the
+presence of an emotionally exciting idea. Most of us take our religious,
+political, scientific, and practical beliefs at second hand, from the
+friends with whom we associate or the books and papers we read. Take a
+young man out of his home and put him, for instance, in college, and it
+will probably work a change in his moral standards, not necessarily for
+the better. At home, if he knew of a theft, or an assault, he would very
+probably be ready to bring the offender to justice, but if the offender
+is his classmate, and the sufferer a member of the succeeding class, he
+will very probably think it a more shameful thing to report the wrong
+than to do it. At the same time, he doubtless considers it utterly
+reprehensible that ignorant Italian peasants should feel in the same way
+about betraying their neighbors who are guilty of robbery or murder.
+
+Coming now to the influence of emotion on belief, it will not, I presume,
+be disputed that it comes about by way of association. Professor James,
+as we have seen, holds that “every emotionally exciting thought, in
+the natural man, carries credence with it.” I suspect that this is true
+only in the sense that, in the absence of experience, not only every
+exciting thought, but every thought is believed. However this may be,
+in respect to the natural man, I think it is pretty certain that, in
+the case of such artificial beings as those who reflect on the causes
+of their emotions and beliefs, it will be found that in order for an
+idea to excite our emotions, a certain degree of belief is necessary.
+Professor James illustrates his position by the fact that a man can
+walk along a curbstone without any apprehension of falling, because
+the thought of falling awakens no emotion of dread, while on the edge
+of a precipice the emotion caused by the thought of the consequences
+of a mis-step may quite overcome his belief in his ability to keep his
+balance. But a chamois-hunter or an acrobat will pass along the same
+place without the slightest apprehension, not because he does not think
+of what would happen if he should fall, nor because he has more liking
+than any one else for being dashed to pieces, but because he has what the
+inexperienced man lacks, entire confidence in his ability to avoid the
+danger.
+
+Since I began writing the last paragraph, a number of thoughts have
+passed through my mind, any one of which would be sufficiently exciting
+if I believed in them, as, that I may die within the next half hour;
+that I may fall heir to a fortune, and the like, none of which have
+produced any emotional disturbance, because I do not believe that there
+is any probability of their being true. Why was it that not only the
+medical profession but the public in general became so much interested,
+recently, in the announcement that Dr. Koch had discovered a substance
+that promised to be a cure for tuberculosis? Partly on account of the
+interests involved, but at least equally because his reputation was such
+as to inspire confidence in what he said. There are plenty of medicines
+advertised in the newspapers for which greater claims are made than
+Dr. Koch made for his discovery, which fail to arouse any such general
+interest. These examples are probably enough for illustration of the
+familiar fact that belief is the most common cause of emotion, and that a
+thought that is not believed is apt to leave us unmoved.
+
+Nevertheless, it is a notorious fact that emotion has a great deal to do
+with determining the sort and degree of evidence which is satisfactory
+to us. Love and hate, respect and contempt, affect our beliefs in regard
+to the character of their objects in matters entirely independent of the
+qualities which originally inspired the feelings. We find it an easy
+matter to believe that a man whose religious or political opinions we
+think pernicious is a bad man in matters which have nothing to do with
+his opinions, and may find it almost incredible that one whom we like
+personally should think differently from ourselves on matters in which we
+are deeply interested. But what particular evil we shall believe of the
+person whom we dislike, or good of the one whom we like, depends entirely
+on circumstances. A man, for instance takes a dislike to a stranger
+on account of some lack of good manners. Whether he shall suspect him
+of being a clergyman or an infidel, a drinker or a prohibitionist, a
+Sunday-school teacher or a gambler, or both, is likely to depend very
+largely on his own tastes and principles in regard to such matters.
+So, on the other hand, his views in regard to religion, temperance and
+gambling, are probably due in great measure to the practice of the
+people whom he likes. A woman who has been brought up with a horror of
+drunkenness hears that a man with whom she is violently in love is a
+drinker. She will probably disbelieve it at first, but if she becomes
+convinced of the truth of the report, she will very likely come to think
+that a drunkard need not be such a bad fellow after all. If there is any
+one thing that more affects our beliefs than what the people we like say,
+it is what they do.
+
+In like manner, emotional states without any definite object, such as
+we call moods if they are transient, and disposition or temperament if
+they are habitual, color our belief, not by originating any definite
+propositions, but by making us receptive to those that tend to confirm
+them. It is not when a man is broken in spirit by repeated calamities
+that he is most ready to believe that “where there’s a will there’s a
+way,” nor in the flush of youth, health and triumph that the doctrine
+that “all is vanity,” comes home to his heart. In whatever way such
+states of mind come about, whether as a result of original constitution,
+or of experience, or of disease, they make the mind inhospitable to
+whatever does not harmonise with them. In the case of insanity, this
+disposition may outweigh the plainest evidence of the senses, so that
+a man may believe that he is rolling in wealth and luxury when he is
+destitute of the ordinary comforts of life, or that his wife and children
+are dead when they are present before his eyes. In a lower degree, most
+of us probably have experience of something of the sort in “fits of the
+blues,” but while the general character of the belief may be decided
+by the emotional tone of the mind, its precise form is determined by
+the man’s interests. Low spirits would not be likely, for instance, to
+effect a man’s opinion as to the probable course of the stock market,
+unless he were in some way interested in stocks, and the view favored by
+his emotional condition would depend on the side of the market on which
+his interest lay. Beliefs which, in our ordinary state of mind, are not
+associated with any strong feeling, such as mathematical truths and the
+physical and chemical laws of matter, remain unaffected in all kinds and
+degrees of emotional disturbance.
+
+It seems clear, then, that, as a matter of fact, emotions affect our
+beliefs through association. It is not difficult to see how this comes
+about. Emotions tend to perpetuate themselves. A man who is in high
+spirits will laugh at vexations which, if he were in an irritable frame
+of mind would seem intolerable. We allow liberties to our friends which
+would offend us in persons to whom we are indifferent. The same inertia
+of the mind which is shown in these cases offers a resistance to any
+thought that tends to disturb it. If I like a man and hate dishonesty,
+evidence that the man is dishonest calls up at the same time two contrary
+emotional states, which cannot subsist together. One of three things must
+happen; either the association of the feeling of liking with the person
+of the man, or of that of repugnance with dishonesty, or of the quality
+of dishonesty with the man must be given up, or at least impaired. But
+the feeling of affection for my friend and that of hatred for the alleged
+fault are old established associations, while that of dishonesty with
+his personality is a new one, which, in order to find lodgement, must
+expel the original inhabitant. Although I may have formed no definite
+association of honesty with him, the difficulty is of precisely the same
+sort as if I had. In either case it is the breaking up of an habitual
+association.
+
+Such being the way in which emotion affects belief, its value as a
+ground of belief must be determined in the same way as in other cases
+of association. If any emotion is so exclusively connected with some
+definite object that the one is never present without the other, we are
+warranted in inferring the existence of the object from the presence of
+the emotion, as Robinson Crusoe inferred from the human footprints on the
+sand that men had been there. As a matter of fact, there is comparatively
+little uniformity in associations of this kind. The same things affect
+different persons differently, and the same persons differently at
+different times. Our hopes and fears are sometimes realised and
+sometimes disappointed, and people to whom, on slight acquaintance, we
+feel attracted, often develop qualities of a different kind from what
+we expected as we come to know them better. If I am fond of money, and
+also of idleness, or of friendship, and also of having my own way at all
+times, it does not follow that taking my ease is the way to get rich, nor
+that always insisting on my own way is the course to make friends. The
+most, I think, that can be said in favor of emotion as a ground of belief
+is, that its existence presupposes the existence of some object adapted
+to excite it. Avarice may be said, in a sense, to prove the existence of
+wealth—if there were no wealth there would doubtless be no avarice—but
+not that a particular avaricious man will be wealthy. Fear implies the
+existence of harm, but not necessarily that harm is coming upon the
+one that fears. These are matters in which we can apply the test of
+experience to our beliefs, and it seems evident that emotion adds nothing
+to our knowledge. We know the things independently of the emotions they
+excite, and every one recognises that to expect a thing merely because we
+either desire or fear it is, in matters which we can test by experience,
+utterly fallacious.
+
+But there are matters lying outside the range of our experience in regard
+to which it is often confidently asserted that our desires and fears are
+sufficient proof of their reality—a view in which I cannot agree. If it
+could be shown that we long for something of an entirely different kind
+from anything we have known, that might perhaps be an argument in favor
+of its existence, but such is not the case. The wish for immortality,
+for instance, is nothing more than the wish for life. Probably there
+are but few who would not rather have immortality without death than
+after it, but experience has at last convinced the most hopeful that
+this is not to be expected, and the search for fountains of youth and
+elixirs of life has few devotees. We want life, and we have life; we want
+happiness, and we know happiness, whether we ourselves have it or not,
+but to say that the fact that we want more than we get of both is a
+reason for supposing that we shall ever have all that we want of either
+is to reason in a way which we should all see to be fallacious if applied
+to things of every-day life. I conclude, then, that the emotions which
+a belief excites are utterly valueless as a test of its truth, and that
+we may expect that, both with individuals and the race, emotion will
+play a smaller and smaller part in belief as true knowledge and culture
+increase. This is not saying that, in cases of doubt, it is unreasonable
+to hope that things may turn out as we wish.
+
+As to innate beliefs, it is enough to say that we cannot altogether rid
+our minds of them, and that they answer perfectly the purpose of working
+hypotheses. A man may question the reality of an external world to his
+heart’s content, but if he runs his head against a wall, or drops a brick
+on his toe, it will hurt him just as much as the most thorough-going
+materialist. The consequence is that such a doubt does not affect our
+conduct. Abstractly, these beliefs do not all impress us with the same
+degree of certainty. That the same thing cannot be in two different
+places at once, is, I think, felt to be more absolutely and necessarily
+true than that there is such a necessity in the order of events as is
+implied in the idea of causation, but for all practical purposes we are
+as sure of the one as of the other.
+
+I have already quoted Professor James’s assertion of our ability to
+choose which among different ways of thinking of the same we shall
+adhere to and which disregard. Perhaps the most prominent feature of his
+teaching on the subject of belief is that it is an active, not a passive
+state of the mind—a choice, not a necessity. One or two more quotations
+on this point will make this plain.
+
+    “As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give
+    reality to whatever objects we think of, for they are really
+    phenomena, or objects of our passing thought, if nothing
+    more. But, _as thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what
+    seems to us a higher degree of reality to whatever things we
+    select and emphasise and turn to WITH A WILL_. These are our
+    _living_ realities, and not only these, but all things that are
+    intimately connected with these (p. 297).
+
+    “Now the important thing to notice is that the difference
+    between the objects of belief and will is entirely immaterial,
+    as far as the relation of the mind to them goes. All that the
+    mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and
+    consents to its existence, espouses it, says ‘it shall be my
+    reality.’ It turns to it, in short, in the interested emotional
+    way” (p. 320).
+
+Although the doctrine is stated, in these and other passages, without
+qualification, it is hard to reconcile it with some other statements. He
+devotes a chapter to “Necessary Truths,” and says:
+
+    “We _must_ attach the predicate ‘equal’ to the subject
+    ‘opposite sides of a parallelogram’ if we think those terms
+    together at all” (p. 617).
+
+I do not know that it makes much difference whether we say that, in a
+case like this, we cannot think differently of the same, or that, having
+thought so, we cannot choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which
+to disregard. The proposition that a horse is a vertebrate animal cannot
+be called a necessary, _a priori_ truth, but I find it as impossible to
+think of a horse that is not a vertebrate animal as of a parallelogram
+with the opposite sides unequal. A figure with the opposite sides unequal
+would not be a parallelogram, and anything that was not animal and
+vertebrate would not be a horse. Whether the difficulty in the two cases
+is the same or not, it is clear that, by Professor James’s admission,
+here is a restriction of our choice as to what we will believe.
+
+Again, he speaks of pleasurable and painful sensations as
+“belief-compelling.” Compulsion, so far as it exists, excludes choice,
+and if this expression is justified it implies another limitation on the
+freedom of belief.
+
+With regard to painful sensations, it seems to me that the fact is that
+they, and their associations, force themselves on our attention, rather
+than that we “select, and emphasise and turn to them with a will.” If I
+have a toothache, I may believe that if I retain the tooth it will keep
+me in pain for a long time, and if I have it extracted, that will also
+be a painful process. It does not seem to me that the expressions quoted
+above accurately describe my state of mind in regard to either of these
+beliefs.
+
+According to Professor James, when a man becomes convinced that he is
+financially bankrupt, or that he has lost his good name, or that he
+is suffering from an incurable and fatal disease, it is because he
+“espouses” this view of the matter, “consents to its existence,” says
+“it shall be my reality.” This notwithstanding that such a belief may
+drive him to determine that, so far as in him lies, all existence, all
+reality shall cease; to consent to death and espouse the grave. Would
+not the criminal who hears his death-sentence pronounced prefer, if he
+could, to disbelieve his eyes and ears, and to feel that it was all a bad
+dream? So far as I can judge with regard to many unwelcome beliefs, they
+are not like the highwayman who offers the alternative of “your money or
+your life,” but like him who throws you down, binds and robs you without
+offering any choice.
+
+Perhaps the most striking example of the view under consideration is
+found in a foot-note on p. 318, in which, after quoting, with approval, a
+statement of Royce that “The ultimate motive with men of every-day life
+is the will to have an external world,” he goes on to say:
+
+    “This immixture of the will appears most flagrantly in the fact
+    that although external matter is doubted often enough, minds
+    external to our own are never doubted. We need them too much,
+    are too intensely social to dispense with them. Semblances
+    of matter may suffice to react upon, but not semblances of
+    communing souls. A psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery
+    of our wants, and, so far as I know, has never been seriously
+    entertained.”
+
+Leaving aside the question whether any one who really disbelieved that
+there was any reality, outside of his own mind, in objects of sense,
+could believe in the existence of that which he only infers from the
+conduct of those objects, it seems to be distinctly stated that the
+reason of these beliefs is, not that we cannot help believing so, but
+that we choose to believe so, and not otherwise, and that we are able,
+having so chosen, to believe as we wish. That there may be no doubt as to
+the sense in which the term “Will” is used, I will quote the explanation
+with which he opens his chapter on that subject:
+
+    “We desire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of things which
+    at the moment are not felt, had, or done. If with the desire
+    there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply
+    _wish_; but if we believe that the end is in our power, we
+    _will_ that the desired feeling, having or doing shall be real;
+    and real it presently becomes, either immediately upon the
+    willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled” (p.
+    486).
+
+Now each one must judge for himself whether this, or anything like this
+is the way in which he came to believe in an external world. Judging from
+my own experience, I should say that the reason we originally have such
+a belief is that it arises spontaneously in our minds, and that, for a
+long time, it never occurs to us that it can be otherwise. However that
+may be, I am certain that when the contrary possibility was presented
+to my mind, it struck me as strange, rather than dreadful, and that I
+firmly believe many things that seem to me far more hideous than the
+doctrine that I am the universe. So far as society is concerned, if I
+can _be_ Shakespeare and Milton and Goethe, Plato and Bacon, Newton and
+Darwin, Luther and Columbus and Washington, as well as all the people
+of my acquaintance, it strikes me that I can be pretty good company for
+myself. To use the universality of the belief as a proof of its voluntary
+nature seems to me very much such an argument as to say that because all
+bodies attract each other in the ratio of their mass and inversely as the
+square of the distance, the falling of a stone must be a purely voluntary
+matter. I do not see what stronger argument, in a case like this, could
+be made for the necessity of a belief than the alleged fact that no one,
+under any circumstances, is free from it.
+
+Now, if we substitute the term “Propensity” for “Will” in the passage
+quoted above, it would seem to me an entirely accurate description of
+the facts, and I can only understand how the authors quoted could take
+the ground they do except on the assumption that all propensities, or
+at least all which prevail, are choices or volitions. That such is not
+the case seems to me clear enough in regard to belief from some of
+the instances which I have already mentioned, but it will perhaps be
+still more evident from cases in which belief is not in question. The
+propensity to remember and constantly think of painful and distressing
+things, which we would gladly banish from our thoughts, or such things as
+silly rhymes and trifling tunes; to tremble and lose our presence of mind
+in danger, when we have most need of the full use of all our faculties;
+to express our emotions by muscular movements when we wish to conceal
+them, and many others that might be mentioned, are examples of the fact
+that an invincible propensity may be quite the reverse of a choice.
+
+That belief is an activity of the mind may be freely admitted. The
+mind—whatever the substratum of our states of consciousness may be—is
+not a receptacle, to hold indifferently whatever may be poured into
+it nor a sheet of blank paper, on which this or that may be written
+by circumstances; it has a character of its own, and reacts to its
+environment. What the reaction shall be depends both on the character of
+the mind and what is presented to it, but it seems incorrect to assume
+that all the dispositions of the mind are of the nature of desires or
+aversions. In the last analysis of which we are capable, our character
+is probably due to our physical constitution, original and acquired, and
+our beliefs may be profoundly affected by a few glasses of whiskey or an
+attack of fever. Whether the reactions of the matter of which our brains
+are formed are as invariable as those of inorganic matter need not be
+discussed here; the present point is that while belief is a sense of the
+relations of things as they are, the essence of will is the desire to
+have them otherwise than as they are. To make belief a matter of choice
+is the same as to say that I may at the same time choose that things
+shall be as they are and otherwise.
+
+Professor James closes the chapter with a practical observation:
+
+    “If belief consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man
+    on an object, how _can_ we believe at will? We cannot control
+    our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will
+    abruptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently,
+    produces instantaneous conversions for us. She suddenly puts
+    us in an active connection with objects to which she had till
+    then left us cold. ‘I realise for the first time,’ we then say,
+    ‘what that means!’ This happens often with moral propositions.
+    We have often heard them; but now they shoot into our lives;
+    they move us; we feel their living force. Such instantaneous
+    beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will. But
+    _gradually_ our will can lead us to the same results by a very
+    simple method; _we need only in cold blood act as if the thing
+    in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and
+    it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with
+    our life that it will become real_. It will become so knit with
+    habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which
+    characterise belief. Those to whom God and Duty are now mere
+    names can make them much more than that, if they make a little
+    sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known in
+    moral and religious education that I need say no more” (p. 321).
+
+The above passage seems to me to illustrate at the same time the force
+of Professor James’s rhetoric and an occasional tendency on his part to
+be carried away by it into statements that are altogether too sweeping.
+In an immense proportion of cases, the method that he recommends is
+precisely the surest way to convince ourselves that the thing in question
+is _not_ real. It is the method which the small boy takes to convince
+himself that the gun is not loaded; the drunkard and spendthrift to
+satisfy themselves that their vices will not bring them into poverty and
+disgrace. A man may sit all day at the fork of the road, and believe that
+the broad way does not lead to destruction, but when he puts his belief
+in practice he discovers the truth. So far as practical matters, capable
+of being brought to the test of experience, are concerned, it can only be
+said that _if they are real_, we shall convince ourselves that such is
+the case by acting as if they were real. Doubtless Professor James had
+not such prosaic things as these in mind when he wrote the passage, but
+a method that will not serve us in regard to such questions as whether
+water will wet us or fire burn us, can hardly be called infallible. But
+even in regard to questions that must always remain matters of opinion
+it is not true in the unqualified sense in which Professor James puts
+it. Probably many men, brought up in the belief that it was their duty
+to observe the first day of the week by religious worship because the
+Hebrews were required to abstain from labor on the seventh day, have come
+to modify their belief without any material change in their practice,
+and even the belief in regard to the nature and attributes of God may be
+affected in advance of a change in the conduct based upon it.
+
+The law of association in this regard is subject to the same limitations
+as we have already found to hold in respect to other matters.
+Associations of action with belief have a tendency to strengthen it, but,
+as in the case of emotion, they may be overcome by other considerations,
+and it is entirely possible for a man to go on for the better part of
+a lifetime in punctilious conformity to usages which in his heart he
+despises, and break out in open rebellion at last. From the ethical
+point of view, the advice which seems to be implied, of deliberately
+choosing a way of setting doubts at rest which is as efficacious on the
+side of error as of truth, of vice as of virtue, seems to me, to say the
+least, of doubtful tendency. We must often act in doubtful cases, and
+take the risk, amongst others, of thus confirming ourselves in error,
+but certainly there can be no more solemn motive for weighing well our
+beliefs before committing ourselves to them by action than the fact that
+we may, by habit, pervert our moral sense, blind our judgment and stifle
+our conscience.
+
+To the man who believes that there is a universe, of which he forms an
+infinitesimal part, and that all his interests depend on his attitude
+toward the power that works in it, it is of infinitely more interest to
+know how he can know the truth than how he can convince himself of this
+or that. Shall truth be our master, to be followed and obeyed, though he
+command us to give up all else that we hold dear, or our servant, to be
+employed as suits our passion or caprice, and dismissed when he will no
+longer serve our purpose?
+
+This is perhaps the most momentous question that we are called on to
+decide. The man who makes the wrong choice may or may not attain what he
+seeks, but though he gain the whole world, he will lose his own soul.
+
+                                                          W. L. WORCESTER.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[62] _The Principles of Psychology_, by William James, Professor of
+Psychology in Harvard University. In two volumes. New York: Henry Holt &
+Company, 1890.
+
+[63] The italics, in this and my other quotations, are the author’s.
+
+
+
+
+THE NATURE OF MIND AND THE MEANING OF REALITY.[64]
+
+
+Professor William James’s supposition of “an hallucinatory candle” seen
+by a “new born mind entirely blank and waiting for experience to begin”
+is an impossible and self-contradictory figment. We might as well speak
+of the dry Niagara falls employed in the manufacture of some material
+goods out of nothing. For, first, a mind entirely blank is no mind
+and, secondly, a blank mind if it could exist at all, would have no
+hallucinations. An hallucinatory candle can be produced only out of the
+memories or the combination of memories of former candle-sensations. A
+blind man sees in his dream no colors, and a deaf man hears no symphonies.
+
+A new-born babe is already in possession of many inherited memories. Thus
+the first sense-impressions after the babe’s birth find the organism,
+especially its skin, nerves and muscles predisposed for their reception.
+The babe’s organism accordingly presents an instance of a relative but
+not of an absolute blank; an absolute blank of a something that is to
+develop into mind can mean only a lump of sentient matter at the moment
+of formation. As soon as it is formed it is exposed in every second
+of its existence to innumerable impressions which fill the blank with
+contents and these contents are the mind that is developing.
+
+Sentient substance is not at rest, but like a flame it is possessed of
+an incessant activity. The form of this activity is both extraordinarily
+plastic and stable. It is plastic, for every impression together with the
+reaction of the impression modifies it and leaves a trace: it is stable
+for the traces of all the impressions and reactions are preserved.
+
+The first sense-impression of a lump of sentient substance produces an
+irritation which objectively considered is a commotion of the sentient
+substance and subjectively considered a feeling, the substance being
+sentient _ex hypothesi_. This first and primitive feeling is meaningless,
+for it has not, and cannot have, any reference to any other feeling,
+memory or mind, and meaning is created through the interaction of
+feelings with memories of feelings.
+
+Some later sense-impression of the same kind will not only produce
+the same irritation but also serve as an irritation to awaken the
+memory-trace left by the former sense-impression. The new feeling will
+melt into one with the reawakened memory of the former feeling. In the
+long run many traces of the same kind which are, as it were, deposited
+in the same place will constitute an organ predisposed to receive the
+correspondent impressions; and now a sense-impression received by such an
+organ may be called a sensation. A sensation is not merely a feeling, it
+is a feeling of a special kind and it is felt to be of a special kind. In
+other words, a sensation is a feeling that has acquired meaning; and this
+meaning is the product of the interaction and coöperation of feelings
+and memories. Sensations have become symbols representing the cause of
+the sense-impression which produced the sensation, and ideas are symbols
+of a higher order representing either whole classes of a certain kind
+of causes of sense-impressions or certain features thereof, or certain
+relations among them.
+
+Thus every mind is a system of sentient symbols. These symbols being as
+it were pictures intended somehow to represent or allegorically speaking
+to portray things are called “ideas,” while the things symbolised are in
+their totality called objective existence or “reality.”
+
+Considering the nature of mind, it is obvious that there cannot be
+an entirely blank mind. We might as well speak of an entirely blank
+picture. But an entirely blank picture is a canvas and no picture at
+all. That a mind which is not as yet a mind can have neither sensations
+nor hallucinations is almost self-evident. Similarly there is no sense
+in saying that a picture that consists of an utter blank and thus is
+properly speaking no picture at all but an empty canvas, either does or
+does not correctly represent a certain object.
+
+The word “real” is used in two senses (1) as a name for everything that
+exists and (2) to signify that kind of existence which is the object of
+our sensory and mental experience, i. e. the objective world so-called.
+The former of these two definitions is more comprehensive; for it
+includes the realm of mentality, the ideal world of subjectivity. The
+latter is used in contrast to the subjective world of mental life and
+thus expressly excludes the ideal realm of the mind and of mental symbols.
+
+The questions as to What is reality? and Is there anything real at all?
+must not be formulated as they are by Professor James, in terms of belief
+but in a statement of facts and by defining certain facts as real.
+
+An hallucination is real in the first sense of the word; it is an actual
+existence; it is a feeling taking place in the mind of some organism.
+It is also real in the second sense of the word in so far as it is a
+vibration of a brain structure. However an hallucination is not real
+in the second sense of the word in so far as its meaning has not its
+correspondent analogue.
+
+Let the meaning of a certain mental symbol be a candle, under which
+name we comprise a certain group of experiences, and let the cerebral
+structure of this mental symbol be awakened by another stimulus than
+that which is generally called a candle. Those experiences which as a
+group are called a candle are of a certain kind. If a piece of paper
+approaches the lighted candle, it will burn. An hallucinatory candle will
+leave the paper intact, although the person who has the hallucination may
+see the paper burn. Thus the ideas or images of objects are built up of
+experiences which have taught us that under certain conditions certain
+events happen; in consequence of certain actions there are constantly
+certain reactions taking place. Reality consists of such facts; it is the
+sum total of all reactions; reality is the nature of objects which react
+somehow.
+
+Those who jump at the conclusion that our subjective sensations, such as
+colors, tastes, sounds, etc., must be regarded as objective properties
+of things, are grossly mistaken. Our sensations are not qualities of
+things but subjective phenomena: they do not inform us about the nature
+of things, but reveal to us how things affect our senses. Those however
+who deny or doubt objective existence are no less mistaken. The world
+is not a subjective phenomenon of sensations, but an objective existence
+symbolised in sensations.
+
+The question is not “Does reality exist?” but “What is Reality?” or
+“What is the meaning of ‘real’?” When we say “Objects are real,” we
+mean that they resist, they react, their presence produces somehow some
+effect. When we say, We ourselves are real, we mean that we react upon
+the objects with which we come in contact, we mean, that in our bodily
+existence we are objects in an objective world.
+
+Actions and reactions are taking place. This is a fact. He who denies
+it is like the man who declares that he is not at home; he contradicts
+himself: for the denial of a question is a reaction upon an action. The
+term reality is the symbol of the nature of actions and reactions in
+their efficacy, it denotes the essence of facts and thus the question
+“Does reality exist?” has no sense. We denote that which exists, that
+which acts and reacts, that which is a fact, or howsoever we may
+express it, by the word “reality.” We might deny that the reactions of
+the objective world are constant, or that a certain idea of a certain
+reaction is erroneous, viz. that the reaction if put to the test would
+prove to be different from what it was expected—but all these denials and
+doubts which are of daily occurrence in the domain of science presuppose
+that there are reactions taking place and reality or objective existence
+is only a collective name for these reactions and their nature. The name
+object still preserves the idea of reaction, for object is that which
+reacts upon touch, which resists, which is objected.
+
+We shall lose ourselves in inextricable confusion by making a matter of
+doubt and belief what is really a statement of facts. To speak of a doubt
+or belief in the reality of things in general is tantamount to speaking
+of a belief in our experiences which, whatever their particular nature
+may be, are facts. And to doubt our experiences, not the correctness
+of a particular experience, but experience in general, i. e. the very
+existence of experience is tantamount to doubting our own being.
+
+A consideration of what we mean by an hallucination can best make clear
+what we mean, and rationally can only mean, by reality. A real candle is
+a mental symbol of something which will under certain conditions react
+in a certain way. An hallucinatory candle is also a mental symbol, but
+the thing which it purports to mean, does not exist; i. e. there is
+nothing that will react. The symbol is there, but not that something the
+existence of which the symbol of the idea “candle” would indicate.
+
+This method of dealing with the problem of the old naïve realism and the
+pseudo-critical idealism of former times is not based upon the assumption
+of the reality of things (which means, of the reality of reality); it
+is simply a careful formulation of the problem to prevent our being
+entangled all about with contradictions; it is the method of rendering
+clear the basic principle of positivism, that all knowledge is a
+description of facts, which description of facts is made for the purpose
+of, dealing with facts.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[64] This article was suggested by Dr. W. L. Worcester’s criticism on
+Professor James’s Psychology. When Dr. Worcester discusses Professor
+James’s supposition of an hallucination in a blank mind, saying that it
+would be “the only possible reality of that mind,” he almost seems to
+adopt Professor James’s views of the subject himself. Clearness about
+such fundamental terms as mind and reality, are so much needed that the
+following remarks may not be out of place as a further explanation of the
+subject. Exactness in fundamental and general terms will save much labor
+in detail work.
+
+
+
+
+MONISM NOT MECHANICALISM.
+
+COMMENTS UPON PROF. ERNST HAECKEL’S POSITION.
+
+
+Prof. Ernst Haeckel’s Anthropogeny, the fourth edition of which appeared
+of late,[65] brings again into prominence that conception of monism which
+identifies the monistic view with mechanicalism.
+
+A review of this book has appeared already in _The Open Court_, No.
+231, in which we called attention to the great merits of a work which
+has become a household book, not only for the scientist, but for every
+educated reader who is interested in man and the origin of man. Our
+knowledge in Anthropogeny, certainly, will influence not only our general
+world-conception, but through our general world-conception it will extend
+its influence not only over every branch of science but also into the
+broader fields of man’s daily life and his practical morality.
+
+Professor Haeckel is the most popular naturalist of to-day and there
+is no one, perhaps, who has made a more effective propaganda for the
+monistic world-conception than he. So it is almost a matter of course
+that his definition of monism is generally accepted as the standard.
+We have formulated our view of monism in a way which in principle and
+general outlines concurs with the commonly accepted usage of the term,
+yet it deviates from it in some important points which are perhaps not
+merely matters of detail. It will be difficult to say how far we agree
+and how far we disagree with Professor Haeckel’s monism because those
+subjects in which we disagree, have never been elaborated by him, and we
+are inclined to believe that he would modify some of his expressions, if
+he devoted a quiet hour’s thought to the objections we have to make to
+his definitions.
+
+Professor Haeckel’s monism being mechanicalism savors strongly of
+materialism. He says in the latest edition of his “Anthropogenie” which
+is now before us, Vol. II, p. 851:
+
+“There can be no doubt that a thorough consideration and unprejudiced
+deliberation of these facts will lead to a decisive victory of that
+philosophical conception which with one word we call monistic or
+mechanical in opposition to the dualistic and teleological. Upon the
+latter are based most of the philosophical systems of antiquity, of
+the mediæval times, and also of the present time. The mechanical or
+monistic philosophy declares that certain and immutable laws obtain
+everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally,
+that a necessary causal connexus obtains everywhere in phenomena and,
+accordingly, that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole, a
+monon. Monism moreover maintains that all phenomena are produced alone
+through mechanical causes (_causæ efficientes_) not through premeditated
+purposive causes (_causæ finales_).”
+
+And in the first lecture “The History of Evolution and Philosophy,” (p.
+15) he says:
+
+    “We shall clearly recognise in the following investigations how
+    the most wonderful enigmas of human and animal organisations,
+    heretofore considered as inaccessible, have become accessible
+    to a natural solution through Darwin’s reform in the doctrine
+    of evolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless
+    efficient causes.”
+
+In agreement with these views, Professor Haeckel regards the terms
+necessity and mechanicalism as equivalent terms. He rejects any kind of
+teleology, any kind of final causes, and also the freedom of the will.
+He opposes the so-called moral world-order as contradictory to the idea
+that the world is regulated by mechanical law and he adopts the latter to
+the exclusion of the former. All these points come out very strongly and
+clearly in Professor Haeckel’s letter to the editor of _The Open Court_,
+where his view of monism is graphically presented in a concise tabular
+form.
+
+We here reproduce this table from No. 212 of _The Open Court_, for the
+convenience of our readers:
+
+  =======================+=======================+========================
+          MONISM.        | FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS. |         DUALISM.
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+  Inseparable.           | Matter and force.     | As a matter of
+                         | God and world.        |  principle distinct
+                         | Soul and body.        |  entities.
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+  Mechanicalism.         | Life.                 | Vitalism.
+  Necessary evolution.   |                       | Teleological creation.
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+  Universal (conservation| Immortality.          | Individual.
+   of energy).           | Freedom of will.      | A person’s will being
+  Determinism.           |                       |  absolutely free.
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+  Causæ efficientes.     | Causation.            | Causæ finales.
+   (Efficient causes.)   |                       |  (Final causes.)
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+  Regulated by mechanical| World-order.          | So-called “Moral.”
+   law.                  |                       |
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+  Inseparable and subject| Inorganic and organic | As a matter of
+   to the same laws.     |  nature.              |  principle distinct
+                         |                       |  and subject to
+                         |                       |  different laws.
+  -----------------------+-----------------------+------------------------
+
+Now we agree with Professor Haeckel in one main point, viz. “that certain
+and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as
+much as in nature generally, and that the knowable world forms throughout
+a unitary whole, a monon.” But we cannot agree to his proposition that
+“the wonderful enigmas of organised life are accessible to a natural
+solution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes.”
+We grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all
+motions that take place in the world; even the motions of the brain
+take place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular
+mechanics. But a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which
+is not motion. If it were applicable it would not be desirable, for
+it would be of no avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to
+mechanical phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon,
+and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling, or
+rather and more accurately expressed, being the special meaning of a
+very complex feeling, is not a mechanical phenomenon either. It is true
+that when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the
+brain of an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place.
+The nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite
+amount of energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are
+almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring the definite
+amount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a
+man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical
+explanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of
+what the nature of the idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.
+
+We know that Professor Haeckel when he so vigorously insists on
+mechanicalism, opposes those philosophers who believe that there are
+motions which cannot be explained by mechanical laws. We side with
+Professor Haeckel against any one who maintains that some motions are
+mechanical (molar or molecular) and others are exceptions to the laws of
+mechanics, representing a kind of hypermechanics. But we cannot admit the
+explanation by mechanical laws of non-mechanical phenomena.
+
+Professor Haeckel speaks of purposeless efficient causes—_zwecklos
+thätige Ursachen_. He speaks of efficient causes, as excluding final
+causes. He is right in his objection to final causes as the term is
+commonly used. But while there are causes that are _zwecklos_, there
+are no causes that are _ziellos_. Every process of causation takes a
+definite course, it has a certain and definable direction. The end of
+this direction need not be a conscious aim, but it is an aim whatever it
+be, it is a _Ziel_. In this sense every efficient cause is at the same
+time a final cause. The gravitating stone has no purpose, yet it has an
+aim. So the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a
+very definite aim. And this aim of the evolution of organised life is
+determined by factors of a very complex nature. One of these factors is
+almost imperceptible at the beginning, but it is of a constantly and
+rapidly growing importance; and this factor is the psychical element
+that appears with organised life. This factor is nothing supra-natural,
+nothing extra-natural, and yet it is not something material or
+mechanical. It is this factor which in its highest efflorescence changes
+aims into purposes, and with this change it creates again a new factor of
+evolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order
+and thus to advance the further progress of mankind. This aspiration is
+in one word called morality.
+
+When we speak of a moral world-order we mean that such moral behests
+as were formulated in prescripts by Confucius, by Buddha, by Moses,
+by Jesus, and other moral teachers of mankind have an objective and
+immutable foundation in the nature of things. The mechanical law in the
+province of motions, the logical law in the realm of thought, geometrical
+proportions in mathematics, the regularity of natural laws, etc., form in
+our world-conception a part of this moral world-order. The laws of social
+life are not opposed to them but correlative.
+
+The purpose of a man’s action reveals his character, and the character
+of the man is his innermost nature. In an analogous way the aim of
+evolution and especially the aim of the evolution of organised beings
+reveals the character, the innermost nature of the universe. Psychic life
+is absent so far as we can see in the primordial world substance as it
+appears in the form of a nebula; it is absent still in the primordial
+state of planets. It appears with the subjective states of awareness that
+rise into existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised
+matter is, in comparison with man’s subjectivity, to be considered as
+a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of awareness, which we have
+reasons to doubt, it is apparently without meaning; it does not symbolise
+external objects; it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim
+of evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that the
+subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature.
+And the aim of psychical life being the development of moral ideals, we
+are very well justified in speaking of the world-order as moral. When
+speaking of the world-order as moral we mean that the moral prescripts of
+the great ethical teachers of mankind are founded in and derived from the
+world-order of nature.
+
+There is one objection to calling the world-order moral, and we therefore
+dislike to use the phrase. It is this: Morality means conformity to
+a certain standard. The standard is not moral, but those who do or
+do not conform to it are moral or immoral. Therefore if there is any
+truth in the idea of God it is this that there is a standard for human
+conduct to conform to, there is an authority which has to be obeyed
+and this authority is God. To speak of God as moral or immoral is
+anthropomorphism. If “God” means anything, it means that power of the
+world-order obedience to which is called morality. If we say God is
+moral, God ceases to be God, the moral authority above him to which he
+has to conform would be the really true God. Thus logically the personal
+conception of God leads to a superpersonal conception of God.
+
+These are in brief our objections to Professor Haeckel’s definition
+of monism as being identical with mechanicalism and perhaps also with
+materialism. My opinion that Professor Haeckel may after all accede to
+our view of monism is based upon an interesting and friendly conversation
+which I enjoyed with him several years ago in Jena. Professor Haeckel
+is not the one-sided naturalist that he is often represented to be by
+orthodox clergymen. He does not see the workings of the natural laws
+only, he sees also the moral aspect to which a consideration of the
+natural laws leads. That his books emphasise the former without entering
+into the problems of the latter is natural for a scientist, but he
+personally is certainly even broader than are his books, and I should say
+that his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by an
+antiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions, show the deeply
+religious spirit of his character.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[65] _Anthropogenie oder Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen._
+Keimes-und Stammesgeschichte. By Ernst Haeckel. Mit 20 Tafeln, 440
+Holzschnitten und 25 genetischen Tabellen. Vierte, umgearbeitete und
+vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig: Engelmann.
+
+
+
+
+MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE ON NECESSITY.
+
+
+Mr. Charles S. Peirce is one of those thinkers who in the investigation
+of a subject go right down to the bottom of the problem. This
+appears to me the more conspicuously so, as the result to which his
+investigations lead stand in a strong contrast to my own views. Yet I
+cannot help admiring the boldness of his trenchant critique which finds
+the difficulties at the point where really the main difficulty of all
+philosophical inquiry lies buried. It lies buried, i. e. it does not
+appear on the surface of things. If it lay on the surface, our most
+superficial thinkers would naturally light on it; but most of them walk
+their way in peace, unmolested by the question, Is there any truth in the
+idea of necessity. An editorial treatment of this problem may be expected
+in a forthcoming number of _The Monist_.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK REVIEWS.
+
+
+EINLEITUNG IN DAS ALTE TESTAMENT. By _C. H. Cornill_, Professor at the
+University at Königsberg.
+
+When Darwin and his followers first gave to the world the astonishing
+results of their studies, few were those who at once recognised the
+importance of the new theories and still fewer those who readily accepted
+them. But within the last thirty years, gradually but steadily the
+number of those who have adopted as virtually true the hypotheses of the
+new school, has been increasing until to-day those are in the minority
+who teach a view different from Darwin on the origin and evolution
+of the universe. The history and fate of the new studies in Biblical
+criticism bear a striking analogy to the reception accorded to Darwinian
+researches. At first they were met with well nigh universal opposition.
+They were declared to be subversive of the holiest interests of religion.
+They were held to rob the Bible of its glory. But by slow degrees the
+first passion yielded to wiser counsel. Curiosity led to the examination
+of the new positions; and in consequence in ever widening circles the
+conviction gained ground that far from taking away from the dignity of
+the old Hebrew literature, these new investigations and the method upon
+which they footed, lent new lustre to the collection of ancient writings.
+And to-day the battle has been won by the school of Wellhausen and
+Kuenen. Few are those who to-day urge the old views on the authorship
+date and historical succession of the several parts composing what is
+called the O. T. or even on the canonisation of the whole collection.
+
+The startling assumptions of Wellhausen, Graf, and their Dutch colleagues
+had their forerunners, as had Darwin and Wallace. But when George and
+Vatke in the fourth decade of our century and Reuss, in his first
+academic lectures, virtually anticipated the lines of research of their
+later successors, the world was too busy with other matters to give their
+labors much attention. (Cfr. this work, p. 8.) For all this, primitive
+orthodoxy had only few representatives in this domain, at least in
+Germany. While Hävernick and Keil and Hengstenberg, are ranged on the
+extreme right of the line defending with all the resources of a vast
+erudition the traditional views, the middle ground is occupied by such
+men as Ewald, and Hitzig, and the teacher of these De-Wette, a school
+of critics that to-day yet counts among its protagonists such men as
+Dillmann and Schrader and Kittel. With Graf, a new era may be said to
+have begun for Biblical criticism. Notwithstanding the violent opposition
+encountered, the school has won the day. Its greatest triumph was perhaps
+the acquiescence in its positions shortly before his death by that master
+of Biblical science, Professor Delitzsch of Leipzig. What the cardinal
+point of contention is between the warring camps, is well known. It is
+the relative age and position of what is technically designated as the
+Priestly code, in the Hexateuch. According to the new school this portion
+is the capping stone of the edifice, as it were. For Dillmann it is
+pre-exilic; for Wellhausen post-exilic.
+
+The book before us places itself without equivocation on the standpoint
+of this latest criticism. It is thus another leaf in the laurel wreath
+crowning the men of the new dispensation. For the name of the author is
+guarantee of the scholarly character of the work; and views which have
+the endorsement of a man of the renown and the scholarship of Professor
+Cornill carry the presumption of having truth on their side. Professor
+Cornill is however, a new-comer in this special field. His life work, as
+he himself says, lies in another province of the vast realm of Biblical
+critical studies. His fame is associated with his critical edition of
+the text of Ezekiel, a work which will forever stand as the best guide
+for all who would venture on the dangerous ground of conjectural textual
+emendations. For Cornill was the first to lay down the method which above
+all must be followed in so venturesome a task and his new version is the
+classic illustration of the correctness of his method of proceeding. That
+a man who has established for himself the reputation of being methodic
+and painstaking almost to a fault, a man who is dowered with critical
+acumen of the highest order, should after going anew over the whole
+ground cast the weight of his scholarly authority in favor of the views
+of the new critical school is a fact the significance of which cannot be
+blinked. We are indeed glad that the publishers entrusted this number of
+their intended series of manuals for theological students, to a scholar
+who had hitherto not written _ex cathedra_ on this particular subject.
+Thus was ensured a new and impartial examination of all the points
+involved.
+
+The ends which this series of manuals is to serve, decided of course the
+style and scope of this work. Of introductions (_Einleitungen_) to the O.
+T. there was no scarcity; but (see preface) they were either too bulky
+and too full and thus did not answer the requirements of the student,
+not yet a scholar; or they were too brief, mere “ponies” as we here in
+America would say, intended to be learnt by heart for the purpose of
+passing a good examination. The difficulty thus consisted in combining
+thoroughness with the necessary brevity without sacrificing lucidity.
+No mere results on the other hand were to be stated. The student was to
+be initiated into the course of the investigations, the reasons for the
+conclusions and thus his interest was to be awakened and the way prepared
+for independent research on his own part. That the author has succeeded
+in carrying out this his programme, every section of the book confirms.
+His fear that the full analysis in paragraph 12, of the priestly code
+will be found to be out of place in an “outline of this kind” is
+groundless. We do not hesitate that this very section is the gem of the
+whole work full as it is of numerous passages which cannot but stir to
+profitable reflection the student. None can lay this book aside without
+confessing that he has gained a “Gesammtanschauung,” an insight into
+the unity and coherence of the new views, apt to convince all earnest
+and unbiased minds of the truth that in this science (_Wissenschaft_)
+criticism is standing on firm ground. In the selection of the books
+named at the head of each chapter, or in the course of the discussion,
+the Professor has displayed most consummate skill. There is scarce one
+important work which with profit may be consulted but is mentioned; and
+what is more in the right connection. This feature is not the least
+valuable in the whole work; the student thus has at ready command a
+bibliography which excludes the chaff and stores the wheat.
+
+But let us dwell a little more specifically on the plan and execution
+and the contents of this book. Two plans may suggest themselves to
+the writer of an “introduction” of this kind. He may attempt to give
+a picture of the rise of literature among the ancient Hebrews and
+treat of the different writings which have come down to us, often the
+fragments of larger works, in the order of their composition and at the
+same time connect with this discussion the reasons for departing from
+the traditional views as to their dates and so forth and for assigning
+them to a new age. This would be virtually writing a history of the
+literature. It is this plan which Reuss adopted. But according to our
+Professor, investigation has not proceeded far enough to make such a
+history possible. He even doubts whether it ever will (p. 2). Perhaps his
+verdict is justified. At all events he is right when he urges that in
+such a sequence much which belongs to the branch which he is to teach,
+will scarcely find its proper or organic place. And therefore it was a
+wise conclusion of his to adhere to the second plan, the traditional, for
+such _Einleitungen_ which treats of the different books in the order of
+the Hebrew canon and finally takes up the discussion of such questions
+as the collection of the canon, the condition of the text, the different
+ancient versions and their value for the reconstruction, if possible, of
+the true original. But what is an _Einleitung_? It is that theological
+“discipline” which concerns itself about holy scripture as a book. It is
+its business to fix the time when and the manner how the several writings
+were composed, which now collectively form the holy scriptures, again it
+is one of its main objects to understand at what period and under what
+conditions the several writings were collected and also the manner of
+the tradition of this collection down to us. The method of this inquiry
+can be none other but the historic critical. To this definition of the
+character of this discipline, to retain this German name, none will take
+exception. It is both succinct and complete. The second paragraph gives a
+full survey of the history of the studies in this field. It covers within
+the brief space of ten pages the results of scholarly labors extending
+over a period of over fourteen hundred years. It is not a dry enumeration
+of names and book titles. Under each scholar, the salient element of his
+contribution is emphasised. The living principle of these studies is thus
+illustrated in its growth and successive development. Take for instance
+this description of Wellhausen’s method, and in a similar manner that
+of all other predecessors or co-laborers is brought out: “At the hand
+of the history of the cultus and that of tradition, he shows how these
+two lines of development run parallel to each other, how the religious
+process of evolution at every halt and turn finds its expression and at
+the same time its corroboration in the productions of literature: Israel
+and Judaism are two concepts radically different from each other; it is
+the canon that differentiates Judaism from old Israel.” Paragraph three
+states the author’s reasons for treating the single books first before
+taking up the discussion of their collection into a canon, and also why
+the apocrypha are excluded. These not being in the canon, are foreign to
+the purposes of an introduction into the canon books. None will deny that
+the Professor’s arguments on these points are irrefutable. His inquiry
+into the age of the art of writing among the Hebrews concludes this
+general preliminary. He is of the opinion that as far back as the memory
+of the Hebrews goes, they were acquainted with this art as nowhere there
+is a sign that among them there was a dim recollection of an analphabetic
+period. Recent finds have made it plain that during the reign of the
+Pharaoh of the exodus a lively correspondence was kept up between
+Palestine and Egypt, while for the reign of David the names of his court
+officials is documentary proof that there were writers at his court. The
+use of the pen must have been pretty general among the people as is shown
+by Judges viii, a chapter which belongs to the oldest layer of historical
+compositions.
+
+Our space is too limited to abstract every chapter of this remarkable
+book. Much as we should like to do this, and especially as in this
+manner alone we can hope to do justice to its merits, we must confine
+ourselves, now that we come to the “special introduction” to a few
+selections taken from the discussion of the main points in reference to
+books which have been the centre of critical study. The Pentateuch as
+is natural receives the lion’s share of the author’s attention. We have
+no hesitancy in saying that his is the best exposition of the modern
+views which has yet come under our notice. The Pentateuch cannot be the
+work of Moses; internal evidence, as already pointed out by Aben Esra,
+Hobbes, Peyrerius, and Spinoza, render the traditional assumption of
+Mosaic authorship untenable. But the Pentateuch cannot be the work of
+one author. The critical labors of one and a half century, sketched
+most skillfully, has made it plain that the Pentateuch has been “worked
+together” from four independent original writings, (_Quellenschriften_)
+a yahwistic work, J. an elohistic, E. a Deuteronomistic D. and a
+priestly which after Kuenen is denoted as P. On this general division
+the scholars are agreed, the relative age of the separate parts alone
+is yet under controversy. In paragraph seven an analysis is given of
+the first four books as assigned to the three sources. Deuteronomy
+occupies a position of its own. It is characteristically different in
+language and thought from the others; it is something essentially new
+and is in itself homogeneous. In the main Deuteronomy is the book of
+the covenant mentioned in II. Kings xxiii; this original D. is now
+incorporated in chapters xii, xiii, xiv-xvii, where however certain
+verses and even parts of verses must be eliminated. Perhaps xxviii, or
+as Professor Cornill argues, something more succinct but of the same
+general nature, a curse, may have belonged to the original D. This must
+have been the book published under such extraordinary circumstances
+in 621. Who is its author? It presents itself as the work of Moses.
+But this is characteristic of the tendency of the age to take a great
+man as the father of a new literary production, a tendency which was
+perfectly well understood and was far above the level of a literary
+deception. Its early manifestation in D. is merely proof that even then
+Moses was among the people the law-giver _par excellence_. The author
+of D. must be looked for in the circle of the pious who in consequence
+of Manasse’s retrogression were bound all the more closely unto each
+other. In other words among the men of the prophetic party, who must have
+had influence also over certain priestly orders, for D. is a compromise
+and an alliance between the prophets and the priests. Besides these
+components of original D. the book contains in its present form additions
+and duplicates which partly are historical and hence are denoted by
+D.h, partly parenetic, hence D.p; but again in these are many later
+interpolations. For the particulars in this regard, we must refer to the
+work of Cornill itself. His analysis displays a keen eye and will on the
+whole be sure to be accepted as final. The date of D. being 621, what
+is the time of the other great sources of the present Pentateuch. It
+is clear that D. is acquainted with the “book of the covenant” Ex. xx,
+23.-xxiii, 33. and with both Decalogues (?). Thus it was acquainted with
+JE. P. on the other hand is totally unknown. The historical portions of
+D. confirm this deduction from the legislative pieces. JE is clearly
+known to D. while of a knowledge of P. there is not the least trace.
+How far back of 621 may we go to fix the date of both J. and E.? The
+period of the first kings seem to be the limit, or more particularly
+the reign of David. But which of the two is the elder, J. or E.? There
+can be no question that J. is. For he is more naïve as appears from
+a comparison among others of chapters Gen. xx, 1-17, xxi 22-32 which
+belong to E., with chapter Gen. xxvi. 1-33 which is J.’s. E. appears
+to be a theological recasting of J. E. is the work of the Northern
+kingdom. Joseph always appears as the leader of his brothers and other
+features confirm this impression. The year 722, when in the Northern
+realm national consciousness was at its high water mark may then be
+supposed to be the _terminus ad quem_. But is E. as we have it a literary
+unit? Kuenen has proven that it is not. A century after its original
+composition a second edition so to speak must have been made with a
+view to meet the requirements and prejudices of the Judaic population
+of the South. Ex. chapters 32-33, are of great decisive importance in
+this connection. They are a rebuke for the golden calf worship at Dan
+and Bethel. Thus E. is divided again into two E.1 and E.2, to which come
+yet other later amplifications f. i. Num. xxi, 32-35. E.1 then belongs
+to the reign of Jeroboam II (750); and E.2 is the work of a later author
+living in Judah and under the influence of prophetic ideas. The locality
+of J. is a point of controversy. Cornill sides with those who maintain
+that his home is the Southern kingdom of Judah. The incidents in the
+Patriarchal biographies which seem to weaken such an assumption are
+explained as original traits of tradition which J. had no interest to
+change. J. again is not a literary unit; it compromises J.1, J.2, and
+even J.3. The reasons for these subdivisions are clearly given in the
+book. J. must have been composed in its different parts between 850-625.
+The priestly code occupies a whole paragraph, the signal merit of which
+we have noticed above. This is indeed the master-piece of a great
+critical master. The many points which are involved in the discussion of
+this mooted problem are treated with a clearness and a calmness which
+carry conviction to the most sceptical. P. presents a spiritual unity
+but not a literary. P. is the offspring of P.1 an old priestly record
+and P.2 a narrative and legislative composition which is as it were
+the substance and skeleton of P. around which younger accretions have
+gathered at different times for which Cornill in order to simplify his
+symbols proposes the designation of P.x. J. S. Vater as early as 1805 has
+proven that in the so-called Mosaism, of the influence in literary and
+legislative respect of our P. there is no evidence before the captivity.
+Wellhausen and Kayser and Kuenen have demonstrated what for Vatke was a
+dim suspicion. Dillmann, Kittel, and Delitzsch as little as Baudissin
+have succeeded in saving the pre-exilic character of P. Certain it is
+that before Esra 458 (444), this code had no official recognition. From
+Nehemiah we have the proof that our P. corresponds to the “Book of the
+Law of Moses” which was read at the great assembly in October 444. On the
+other hand the book of Chronicles is based on P. as it details history,
+as it would have been, if P. had been the law regulating life and liturgy
+and temple service. Had P. been known before D. what reason should the
+priest have had who promulgated it to substitute for it another code
+less advantageous for his own order? P. is clearly a development of
+D. D. presents itself as something new in all of its demands, in its
+insistence on centralisation, in one sanctuary and in one priestly order
+on the legitimacy of the tribe of Levi exclusively. Of the tabernacle
+there is not one syllable in the whole of the pre-exile literature.
+It is a clear projection into antiquity of the Deuteronomic Central
+sanctuary. The relations of P. to Ezekiel make this still plainer. This
+prophet is the link of transition between D. and P. The omissions in the
+festal cycle of E. can only be explained that this prophet-priest was
+unacquainted with P. The captivity is thus the time for the composition
+of P. in the main. Its emphasis on circumcision as the sign of the
+covenant which decides the connection with the chosen seed and nation,
+is proof of this. And the chronology finally corroborates all previous
+inferences as the chronology of Genesis which is so important a part
+of P. is unmistakably a reconstruction after certain principles of the
+Babylonian history of the beginnings. (Oppert.) P. was written during
+the century from Ezekiel to Esra (570-458). It was not merely P.2 that
+Esra read before the assembled people. P.1 and P.2 seem thus to have
+been united even at this time. But it is not to be assumed that under
+Esra P. was already a part of the other portions of our Pentateuch. P.
+itself contains parts which are later than Esra. P.x is undoubtedly
+later and these additions are easily explained on the very assumption
+of the official introduction of P. P. is not the work of an individual;
+it is that of a whole school, a school which naturally formed in the
+captivity. Besides these “source-writings,” the Pentateuch contains
+smaller pieces of great antiquity mostly of a poetic character which
+had for a long time an independent existence. Such is Gen. xlix, Exodus
+xv, and others. Exodus xxi-xxiii, the so-called book of the covenant,
+requires also a treatment by itself. It is characteristic of this book
+that it ignores totally the Decalogue. Kuenen has solved the difficulties
+in which this collection of judicial precedents is involved by pointing
+out that it is the predecessor of D. D. is merely the substitute for
+this. As it is older than E. and is the precipitate of the unwritten law
+of the earlier kingly period, we place its date in the ninth century.
+Lev. xvii-xxvi while betraying in many regards affinity with P. is still
+distinct from it. It stands between Ezekiel and P.; it is one of the many
+priestly Thoroth which undoubtedly were current among the class whom
+they concerned. How now did these component parts finally combine? This
+is elucidated in paragraph fourteen. First J. and E. were put together,
+by an editor of Jehovistic leanings, whom Wellhausen has styled Rj. (R.
+standing for German Redacteur, Editor). This Rj. worked over, and that
+often decidedly, his materials in keeping with his own convictions. This
+Rj. probably lived about 650. His position is pre-deuteronomic. A second
+editor combined the work of Rj. with D. He is designated as Rd. His
+was the placing of the old book of the covenant near Sinai in order to
+gain room for Deuteronomy. He thus became the cause of much confusion.
+He lived during the second half of the Babylonian captivity. JED. was
+finally combined with P. by a third editor (Rp.) who is characterised by
+considerable reverence for the old documents. He omitted much to guard
+against repetition but at the same time where the relations differed he
+preserved them most faithfully and endeavored to place them into their
+proper position and connection. Rp. was thus virtually the author of our
+Pentateuch. But living after Esra even with him the Pentateuch was not
+yet closed. Many younger hands had a share in its final shaping. Glosses
+were added or crept into the text, as is shown by comparison with the
+lxx. The book of Joshuah is a necessary continuation and complement of
+the Pentateuch.
+
+But here we must stop quoting in detail. Much as we should desire to
+reproduce Cornill’s own words relating to other Biblical books, want
+of space precludes even the attempt. Suffice it to say that as in his
+treatment of the Pentateuch, so every question bearing on Biblical
+criticism is handled with the skill of the master. At whatever turn we
+ask information of this book we receive it most abundantly. This is
+indeed a students book. It stimulates while it instructs. It leads while
+it describes the road passed over. In the discussion of the critical
+problems on the Psalms, the prophets Isaiah and Zechariah, on the final
+collection of the canon, the translation of the Bible and the relation of
+the different recensions to each other, the historical books as distinct
+from Chronicles, and Esra, and so forth, every point is treated with a
+lucidity of style and a fulness of material which is the rare gift of
+a man who is saturated with his science and loves it for its own sake.
+This book is destined to rank among the classics. Its earnest study and
+repeated consultation can therefore be recommended to all who wish to
+inform themselves about the method and the achievements of the critical
+schools. The kindred book by Driver, recently published will not make
+a translation into English of Cornill’s manual less desirable. We take
+leave from the author with a feeling of great gratitude for the pleasure
+and the profit we derived from his contribution to the literature of
+Biblical scholarship. The book is well printed and singularly free from
+typographical errors.
+
+                                                         DR. E. G. HIRSCH.
+
+
+THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. An Inaugural Lecture.
+By _Andrew Seth_, M. A. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons.
+1891.
+
+As stated by the author, this lecture deals, not with the circle of
+the philosophical sciences, but only with the subjects traditionally
+associated with a Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland.
+These subjects belong to the three-fold classification of logical,
+psychological, and metaphysical, or philosophical in the strict sense.
+They therefore embrace the study of the conditions to which valid
+reasoning must conform, the investigation, introspectively and otherwise,
+of the phenomena of consciousness, and the study of the two-fold question
+of knowing and being, which as epistemology and metaphysics are included
+under the designation of Philosophy. These three lines of learning are
+cognate, and the first two are in a measure introductory to the third, or
+at least, says Professor Seth, if we go beneath the surface they lead us
+into the very heart of philosophical difficulties. The lecturer refers in
+his sketch of the present outlook in these three departments of science
+to the marvellous activity displayed in the department of psychology. All
+the influences at work may be said to meet and come to fruition in Mr.
+Ward’s “masterly treatise” in the “Encyclopædia Britannica” and “the rich
+and stimulating volumes” of Professor James, of Harvard. Experimental
+psychology is now widely spread in Germany and has been enthusiastically
+taken up in America, “where every well-equipped college aims at the
+establishment of a psychological or psycho-physical laboratory.”
+Professor Seth thinks, however, that the experimental psychologists
+magnify their office overmuch. The field of experiment is necessarily
+limited to the facts of sensation, the phenomena of movement, and the
+time occupied by the simpler mental processes. The results are often
+so contradictory as to leave everything in doubt, and where definite
+results are obtainable, their value is often not apparent. Moreover,
+many of the results are of a purely physiological nature, and are only
+by courtesy included in psychological science. We would remark on this,
+that without the experiments the results would not have been obtained
+and that their value will become apparent when the methods of experiment
+are perfected. After referring to the critical function of philosophy as
+a doctrine of knowledge, Professor Seth states that as constructive it
+should lay special stress on a _teleological_ view of the universe. By
+this is meant, that philosophical teleology should concentrate itself
+upon the proof that there is an end of evolution, “that there is an
+organic unity or purpose binding the whole process into one and making
+it intelligible—in one word, that there _is_ evolution and not merely
+aimless change,” such as is supposed in a purely mechanical view of the
+universe. As to the nature of the end, although the lecturer accepts
+Hegel’s view that all things are relative to man as rational, he cannot
+accept “the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of
+men.”
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+DER MENSCHLICHE WELTBEGRIFF. By Dr. _Richard Avenarius_, Ord. Professor
+der Philosophie an der Universität Zürich. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland. 1891.
+
+This monograph is as it were a self-confession. The author endeavors
+to attain clearness in his own philosophical standpoint. He looked
+back upon the path he has traveled and feels that “the solution of
+the problem-attained is fundamentally a personal self-liberation”
+(Preface, ix). This book is most commendable reading to all idealists
+and agnostics. It is an interesting and instructive little work,
+tracing with a keen psychological criticism the vagaries of certain
+philosophical conceptions, through which not alone the author but the
+thinkers of mankind in general have strayed. The philosopher begins
+with what Avenarius calls the “natural world-conception.” But this
+natural world-conception leads to contradictions and the evil spirit of
+speculation leads us in a circle through the barren fields of idealism.
+Avenarius asks: “Is the world really of such a nature that it appears
+unitary and consistent only to the superficial thinker, while it
+leads every one astray who attempts to grasp it more precisely in its
+entirety—the more so the more consistently the thinker proceeds?” (p.
+xiii.)
+
+The author proposes the question: “In what consists the inevitableness
+of the contradiction to which every general world-conception seems to
+have led? Or, if the world really be unitary what is the evil spirit that
+leads those astray who hunger and thirst after a true cognition of the
+world?”
+
+The author has entirely abandoned the idealistic standpoint, an
+inclination to which he showed in his first publication, “Philosophie
+als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses.”
+He says: “Doubt of the correctness of my way heretofore pursued was
+induced through the barrenness of theoretical idealism in the field
+of psychology; and yet cognition and experience should belong to this
+science as psychological ideas.”
+
+The author in explaining the development of thought as it takes place in
+man proceeds in a personal way, so much so that every idealist ought to
+be satisfied. There are whole pages which teem with _ME_’s and _I_’s.
+The method of notation is what might be called American. Europeans often
+complain about our abbreviations, the Y. M. C. A., the S. A. S., the C.
+B. & Q. Ry., etc., which are great puzzles to the uninitiated new-comer.
+In a similar way Avenarius introduces such algebraic signs as _R_ and
+_E_, which means reality and the sensations which our fellow-men are
+supposed to have. _M_ is Man, _T_ is fellow-man. _T₁_ is the bodily
+appearance of _T_, it is _R_; while _T₂_ is the _E_ of _T_, i. e. his
+soul or spirit. _C_ is the nervous central organ, etc. Thus Avenarius
+says (p. 18):
+
+“I can in a relative consideration assume _R_ to be the condition of
+changes in the _E_ values, supposed to exist in _M_, only if _M_ and in
+_M_ the system _C_ are parts of my supposition,” and in a note (p. 117)
+he adds:
+
+“The skeleton in Goethe’s poem, ‘The Dead’s Dance,’ scents without an
+organ of smell, sees without eyes, thinks without a brain; it also
+moves without muscles. To consider such acts as true is now universally
+declared to be superstition. The time will come when the assumption of
+psychical phenomena without the coördination of the system _C_ will
+universally be considered in the same way.”
+
+The first three chapters remind us very much of W. K. Clifford’s article
+“On the Nature of Things in Themselves.” But the article is nowhere
+mentioned and it is most probable that it is unknown to the author. If
+Avenarius had known Clifford’s view, he might have presented his ideas
+with more economy of space. But if he did not know Clifford’s article,
+the coincidences of procedure and to a great extent also of the result
+attained are the more remarkable. What Avenarius calls the _E_ values are
+termed by Clifford “ejects,” and the formation of ejects is called by
+Avenarius “introjection.”
+
+On page 52 we read the following sentence on the three phases of the
+cognition of the data of experience:
+
+“The first phase alone, that of ingenuous empiricism, cognises, i.
+e. explains the totality of these facts without the assistance of
+a non-sensible ... the second that of ingenuous realism conceives
+the non-sensible as supersensible, and the third, that of ingenuous
+criticism, as the pre-sensible. The epithet ingenuous has reference to
+the foundation, not to the doctrinary system built upon it. That which
+makes the said realism and criticism ingenuous is a survival of the
+ingenuous empiricism.”
+
+The theory which conceives the external cause of an experience as an
+object, effecting _in_ the subject sensations, passes successively
+through the following views. The object is said to be (1) not within
+the range of experience, (2) not within the range of cognition, (3)
+not-existing. Thus it reaches _via_ agnosticism its climax in idealism
+and “pure experience becomes a something that is never truly experienced,
+it becomes the totality of mere or pure sensations” (p. 62).
+
+The third part of the pamphlet is devoted to “the restitution of the
+natural world-idea.” Here the author comes, at least in some expressions,
+very close to the solution editorially upheld in _The Monist_. Avenarius
+says: “The task is ... to _describe_ the what of my experience so as to
+make a practical application of it in my dealings with my fellow-men” (p.
+79).
+
+Professor Avenarius sums up his conclusions in the term “empirio-critical
+principal-coördination” which he defines as the inseparability of
+the ego-experience from the surrounding experience. “The ego and the
+surrounding belong in the same sense to every experience. It is a
+co-ordination peculiar to all experience” (p. 83). If we understand
+Avenarius correctly he means to say, to express it in our terms, that
+there is no object but there is a subjective aspect of it, no subject but
+it appears objectively. Thus there is no subjectivity in itself and there
+is no objectivity in itself. This is exactly our position, which we call
+Monism.
+
+The “introjection” was according to Avenarius the evil spirit that led
+speculation astray. To get rid of this evil spirit the proposition is
+made to discard “introjection” and replace it by the empirio-critical
+principal-coördination. But closely considered the latter is only
+an improved modification of the former, and this plan would better
+be characterised as discarding the error implied in that kind of
+introjection theory which assumes that sensations alone are given. The
+data of experience are not mere feelings, not mere subjectivity, as
+is maintained by the idealist; nor are they mere objectivity, as is
+maintained by the ingenuous realist; the data of experience are states
+of subject-objectness, they are feelings of a certain kind possessing
+objective significance, and the ideas subject as well as object are
+abstractions made in a late stage of mental development from this one
+inseparable whole of subject-objectness (see _The Monist_ I, No. 1, pp.
+78-79).
+
+Avenarius says in a note (p. 132), “The question should not be ‘Why do we
+believe in the reality of an external world?’ but ‘Why did we not believe
+that the external world is real?’” We should say that neither question
+is admissible. We should first ask: What do we mean by real? Reality is
+the sum total of our experiences, including the meaning of sensations
+and ideas, and finds its special application in their reliability. The
+question, Is the candle I see real? means, Does it react in special ways?
+Every name of a special object signifies a certain group of actions or
+reactions observable by the subject. This is what we _call_ real and the
+idealist would have to deny the existence of his own experience to deny
+the reality of objects in this sense.
+
+Avenarius’s books are not easy reading to the English and American
+student, for his style is sometimes heavy and his constructions are
+involved. So are his thoughts. But his thoughts show the earnest thinker;
+the evolution of his views goes in the right direction and his works
+deserve the attention of his co-workers in the philosophical field.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+DIE BEDEUTUNG DER THEOLOGISCHEN VORSTELLUNGEN FÜR DIE ETHIK. By Dr.
+_Wilhelm Paszkowski_. Berlin: Mayer & Müller. 1891.
+
+Religion originates everywhere, according to the author, in the
+self-consciousness of man who feels himself an acting and willing being
+limited by and dependent upon greater and higher powers. The religious
+relation consists in the regulation of his actions as well as his will
+with reference to the ordinances of these powers. Dr. Paszkowski lets
+all the best known religions pass in review before our eyes, tracing
+in all of them the connection between the properly religious elements
+and morality and singling out those religious factors which are most
+effective in determining man’s will in a moral way. In the second part
+of the little volume he endeavors to show in how far the ecclesiastical
+organisation of religion in dogma and cult have strengthened and in how
+far they have weakened this result.
+
+Concerning the most important dogma, which is the belief in immortality,
+Paszkowski declares that it had its undoubted effects favorable and
+unfavorable upon the social and moral life of mankind. It has prevented
+some crimes while it has enhanced others. The question is, he says,
+whether an individual immortality such as the religions usually picture
+it, is tenable or not. Modern science and anthropology seem to have
+proved it an illusion. Yet, as Paulsen says, the belief in immortality is
+not a mere imagination. Every reality and so also man’s life is eternal.
+It is nonsensical to think of death as a finality. That which has been
+alive is a necessary, an eternal and inexpugnable part of reality and can
+never again be blotted out. Through death the continuance of a man’s life
+is cut off, but the contents of his life can never again be annihilated.
+The real is in its very nature eternal. Paszkowski adds to Paulsen’s
+remarks that man should find the norm of moral action in his relation to
+his fellow-men and posterity, so that morality need not depend upon any
+religious views. He will also have to act morally after he has resigned
+the belief in the reality of the beautiful immortality-dream as it is
+presented by enthusiastic religiosity.
+
+It appears to us that if the usual conception of immortality is
+scientifically untenable it devolves upon the moral teacher to present an
+immortality conception that is tenable. The true immortality conception
+will never enhance crimes, it will always have a favorable effect upon
+the morality of mankind. Furthermore man’s relation to mankind and also
+to the universe is of a religious nature. The social order to which
+man has to conform is one part of those powers a recognition of which
+constitute religion. If these powers are conceived to be outside the
+world we have a supernatural deity, if they are the highest, best,
+and greatest of, and in the world itself, we have an immanent deity
+and ethics still remains intimately connected with and dependent upon
+religion.
+
+This it appears must be after all the author’s meaning, for he says in
+prominent print, p. 89: “So long as there are men religion will not
+cease, for it is one of the constitutional elements of human nature.” “In
+the same measure as religion becomes spiritual, the moral conceptions
+also will be purified, the mere ceremonial and the cult-element will lose
+their importance in religion” (p. 92). “To divide the ethical factor from
+the religious, as a matter of principle, will be seen to be impossible.
+We can only conciliate the one with the other, both having originated out
+of the same source of emotions” (p. 90).
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+DAS WAHRNEHMUNGSPROBLEM VOM STANDPUNKTE DES PHYSIKERS, DES PHYSIOLOGEN
+UND DES PHILOSOPHEN. Beiträge zur Erkenntnisstheorie und empirischen
+PSYCHOLOGIE. By Dr. _Hermann Schwarz_. Leipsic: Duncker & Humbolt 1892.
+
+Dr. Hermann Schwarz treats the most fundamental problem of
+philosophy—viz. that of perception. He says in the preface: “There is
+a triple state of facts to which obvious yet strange as it appears to
+thought, the attention of the naturalist and the philosopher is drawn:
+the physical, the physiological, the psychical.” The physical is the
+empire of mechanical motion that can be observed with great accuracy to
+take place everywhere. The physiological is the fact that when certain
+impressions produce mechanical effects upon the nerves, the result
+consists in certain sense-data; nervous action is accompanied with
+sensation. The psychical state of things exhibits the fact that whether
+or not we want it to be so, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and touches
+are always referred to external things, never to the own internal states
+of the mind. Every one of these facts is strange in itself, for every
+one represents the contrary of what might be expected _a priori_. Who
+would expect that the machine-like world of jostling atoms and the
+glorious world of colors and sounds should have anything in common? And
+the sense-organs appear to the physiologist as mere physical apparatuses
+modifying the ether-vibrations somehow. We do not see on the one hand how
+consciousness can acquire information concerning the external world and
+on the other hand, how motions can develop something so heterogeneous
+as is consciousness. If we were confronted with one set of facts only,
+everything would be plain, but this triple set of facts produces a
+problem, it makes an explanation necessary and to this explanation Dr.
+Schwarz has devoted a careful investigation of some four hundred and odd
+pages.
+
+Schwarz distinguishes two elements in what he calls “ingenuous realism,”
+(1) its methodology and (2) its metaphysics. The methodology of physical
+science consists in arranging the sense-data, while the metaphysics
+assume that the objectivity of the sense-data is correctly represented
+as “things, qualities, and effects.” Natural science arrived at a
+scepsis of the usual metaphysics of naïve realism by a correction of the
+ingenuous-realistic method, and Kant by critically investigating the
+background or frame of its theory of cognition. The question is, What is
+altered by physical science in the conception of ingenuous realism, what
+by physiology, what by philosophy and why?
+
+In the consciousness of an ingenuous realist the data of touch receive a
+preference over those of the other senses, which is due to their greater
+stability. The color of an object disappears, the sounds cease, while the
+objects remain comparatively the same things to the sense of touch. Thus
+they are considered as the real objects having certain qualities which
+produce the phenomena of the other senses. This view is called by Schwarz
+the first methodological dogma of ingenuous realism. The second dogma is
+the conception that sense-data are considered as relatively permanent. So
+colors are conceived to exist objectively in the dark, an error which has
+been sufficiently explained by Helmholtz in his “Physiological Optics,”
+§ 26. The third dogma completes the second; it is the view that the
+relative permanence or disappearance of the qualities of objects depends
+upon causes. Fire is said to be the cause which makes a wire red-hot. The
+ingenuous realist knows no reciprocal causation, no action and reaction,
+no _Wechselwirkung_. He assumes in addition to the objects certain
+force-beings which are regarded as the causes of all change. The sun is
+said to produce light.
+
+Schwarz explains very well how this view of ingenuous realism naturally
+arises and also how in the progress of thought it naturally corrects
+itself. Suppose there were thinking beings with whom smell took the
+place of touch and sight, would not their world-conception be based upon
+the data of the sense of smell as is ours upon the data of mechanical
+motions? If the females of a certain butterfly (_Frostspanner_) are
+caught in the country and placed at a great distance in some house of
+the city, the males will be seen on the next morning in great numbers
+fluttering before the window of the room in which the females are kept.
+What a perfection of the sense of smell while the senses of touch and
+sight are very poorly developed! The dog owes his intelligence mainly
+to the development of the sense of smell. Would not beings whose
+intelligence is mainly due to the sense of hearing rather attempt to hear
+the world than to grasp or comprehend it,—to _behorchen_ rather than to
+_begreifen_?
+
+Ingenuous realism is not consistent, and its methodology leads to
+alterations of its metaphysics. We shall have to attribute either to
+all the sense-data objective reality or to none of them. The data of
+touch cannot be treated as exceptions and thus we have the alternative
+either to return from our scepsis to realism, not to the ingenuous but
+to a critically modified view of it, or to adopt the extremest form of
+idealism, be it that of Berkeley or the subjectivism of Fichte.
+
+The author (not unlike Professor Avenarius in his book “Der menschliche
+Weltbegriff”) takes the former view. He says in the concluding chapter
+(_Die Mängel der Ding-an-sich-Hypothese_): “This view, viz. that of
+ingenuous realism, will in the end of our inquiry be seen to be not only
+the most natural, and practically considered the most useful metaphysical
+theory, but also that conception which is freest from all theoretical
+obscurities” (p. 381).
+
+We believe that the book which contains much valuable material, would
+have been more useful than it actually is, if a chapter had been added
+containing a summary of the whole inquiry and delineating in great
+outlines the critically modified form of realism whose most appropriate
+name we should say is monism—not materialism or mechanicalism which
+allows all facts to be swallowed up by the conception that the world
+consists only of matter in motion, but that monism which is a unitary
+view of the whole, mindful of the fact that the sense-data as well as our
+concepts are one-sided aspects only of the one and all. If we bear this
+truth in mind we shall avoid from the beginning the three dogmas (alias
+errors) of ingenuous materialism.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+DIE ENTWICKELUNG DES CAUSALPROBLEMS IN DER PHILOSOPHIE SEIT KANT. Studien
+zur Orientirung über die Aufgaben der Metaphysik und Erkenntnisslehre.
+(Part II.) By Dr. _Edmund Koenig_. Leipsic: Otto Wigand.
+
+The present work forms the conclusion of a volume published by Dr. Koenig
+in 1888, entitled _Die Entwickelung des Causalproblems von Cartesius
+bis Kant_. This same subject is here pursued in the history of modern
+philosophy since Kant.
+
+The problem of causality, according to Dr. Koenig, has two aspects, an
+epistemological and a metaphysical. The pre-Kantian efforts dealt chiefly
+with the latter, the post-Kantian more principally with the former. The
+latter, the metaphysical question, is, How do things in the world of
+reality produce effects in one another? The former, or that which relates
+to the theory of knowledge, is, (1) What is the logical foundation of
+the idea of causality, what do we imply when we set up two objects
+as cause and effect, and (2) By what right and to what extent are we
+justified in imputing to the axiom of causality an objective validity?
+With respect to the latter, the epistemological, point of view, Hume and
+Kant believed they had established indisputably that experience as given
+does not furnish sufficient grounds either for the idea or the axiom of
+causality. On the other hand, others, like Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer,
+and Trendelenburg, hold, that causality is given us in experience, that
+we apprehend the causal relation subsisting between things, together with
+the things. Herbart maintains that the idea of the causal relation has
+been reached by the logical elaboration of experience in conformity with
+the general laws of logical thought. Mill and Spencer see in this idea an
+element that goes beyond experience, but justify it only psychologically,
+not logically. According to Lotze, Riehl, Wundt, v. Hartmann, Volkelt,
+the idea is either wholly or partly of intellectual origin. Finally,
+Comte and a few modern scientists look upon the idea of causality as
+logically valueless and scientifically superfluous.
+
+This is, in brief, the opinions of the greatest thinkers whom Koenig
+treats of, respecting the logical composition of the idea of causality.
+But another question, that namely as to the character of the relation
+in which in the causal judgment the notions of the concrete causes
+and their effects exist, is one closely allied with this. Some hold,
+(Trendelenburg, Goering, Herbart, Hamilton, Spencer,) that the relation
+is one of identity; others that it is synthetical. This aspect is also
+developed in connection with the last-named thinkers.
+
+With respect to the axiom of causality, we find diametrically opposed to
+each other the doctrines of empiricism and apriorism; but a number of
+intermediate opinions have also established themselves. Of the first,
+Schopenhauer, Lotze, and Volkelt are representatives, but only the theory
+of the first-named is developed at length. The empiricism of Mill and
+Goering meets with exhaustive treatment, as does the opposed view of
+Laas, Riehl, and Wundt and the conciliatory view of Spencer.
+
+With respect to the metaphysical aspect of the question, above-mentioned,
+we find the modes of conception of phenomenalism and realism opposed.
+The latter only is, in the nature of its doctrine, required to explain
+ontologically the coming about of the causal relation in reality; the
+former does not recognise Being in itself, and hence there can be no
+causal connection of such. Schopenhauer’s attempt (the view of the
+forces of nature as the emanation of a Universal Will), and the splendid
+ontological theories of Herbart and Lotze are regarded by Dr. Koenig
+as being no more a solution of the problem than were the efforts of
+their famous predecessors Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibnitz. These
+dogmatic realists, as Koenig calls them, proceed from the assumption of
+the knowableness of the absolute; opposed to them, in this regard, are
+Spencer, Von Hartmann, and Volkelt, the critical realists, the first of
+whom gives an ontology that is a vague and metaphysical rendering of the
+principle of the conservation of energy, the two last of whom impute a
+transcendental ontological significance to the idea of causality.
+
+The connection, Dr. Koenig concludes, is thus apparent and definite
+between the metaphysical and epistemological divisions of the question.
+The ontologist, unless he proceed dogmatically, must prove, that
+the notion of causality in the form in which critical analysis has
+established it as a valid and indispensable empirical idea, calls
+inevitably for the notion of an absolute reality and of a state of things
+in that reality corresponding to the forms of the connection given.
+Therefore, the logical analysis of the idea of causality is in any
+philosophy, pre-eminently determinative of its whole position and bearing.
+
+On the whole, then, in the treatment of the problem forming the subject
+of this work, four comparatively independent views are found opposed
+to one another and considered in this opposition; viz., Sensualism and
+Intellectualism, Positivism and Rationalism, Empiricism and Apriorism,
+Realism and Phenomenalism. The author views the result of his researches
+to be, the proof of the untenability of Sensualism, Rationalism,
+Empiricism, and Realism, so far as this, by an historico-critical
+analysis, is possible.
+
+This is but a brief sketch of the treatment pursued by the author.
+The author’s own view has been barely hinted at. He is a Kantian. He
+calls himself a “transcendental idealist.” Dr. Koenig’s developments,
+appreciative, acute and pointed as they are, are too detailed and
+exhaustive to be separately taken into discussion here; but we may
+illustrate his point of view by a summary of a few remarks of his on the
+ontological problem as solved by physics. They are as follows.
+
+The _natural_ modes of thought cling irresistibly to the notion of
+a constant substratum; this being so, how does process, how does
+change spring from an invariability of existence? Physical science
+answers, by _force_; which exists as a constant potentiality of the
+substratum, is now active, now latent. Dr. Koenig maintains that in
+this physical science accomplishes nothing towards the solution of the
+present problem; it does not by its notion of force make intelligible
+the _acting_ of bodies on each other, for when it comes to define the
+mode of action of force it involves itself in hopeless difficulties.
+What is the consequence then, of this dilemma of science, where it can
+neither render plain the “nature” of the material substratum, nor the
+nature of “force,” which is, so to speak, the source of the activity of
+the substratum? It is either agnosticism, which places limits to our
+knowledge, and which Dr. Koenig rejects as unbecoming true thought, or
+it is that theory which regards the phenomena alone as real and views
+the concepts of theoretical physics as the mere shifts and helps of
+thought whereby we bring the phenomena into connection with one another.
+This latter view also Dr. Koenig cannot accept. His express contention
+is, that we can interpret, _ontologically_, the phenomena of reality
+by the notions of substance, force, etc.; he holds that the position
+of transcendental idealism is the correct theory here, the position
+namely that matter and force conceived as transcendent, independent
+entities cannot be _thought away_, because substantiality and causality
+are _forms_ of transcendental apperception, which alone can make
+nature an object of cognition; matter and force must, for purposes of
+empiric observation, of necessity possess the same reality as phenomena
+themselves.
+
+In connection with this subject Dr. Koenig contests Mach’s doctrine, that
+natural laws are simple economical descriptions of phenomena; he contends
+that “law” is the foundation of natural science, and particularly so the
+law of causality.
+
+This, however, does not say much. For the formal laws _in themselves_
+are empty. The law, the axiom of causality may, _a priori_, be without
+exception; but this circumstance, the _conviction_ we may call it,
+offers us no hold on nature. When we investigate nature we have to
+perceive _definite facts_; about which we formulate particular laws or
+statements. The law of causality, however, does not help us to _discern_
+the determinative facts or features of any phenomenon. It simply says
+that _if_ we have hit upon the determinative facts and formulated a law
+describing them, that law holds good throughout all nature. But what is
+to tell us _what_ the characteristic and determinative features of a
+given event are and when we have lighted on them? The law of causality?
+Surely not. The law of causality cannot tell us that for falling bodies
+_v_ = _gt_, i. e. that _t_ is decisive. It simply says that when once
+this fact has been _discerned_ it holds universally good. But it would
+have asserted the same thing with regard to Galileo’s first (false)
+assumption, namely that _v_ = _Cs_. If, then, the law of causality cannot
+tell us what those features are between which the causal connection is
+assumed to exist, what is to tell us? Our observation simply, which
+must be tested by experience. But our observation has no limits placed
+to it except this, that it shall select some fact that _represents_ the
+phenomenon and best and most easily enables _us_ to represent it. And
+there is nothing that requires that there should be only _one_ feature
+or _one_ aspect of an event by which it is representable; there may
+be several, as the development of science proves. Accordingly, what
+selection we make may depend on arbitrary and historical circumstances.
+And this, as we take it, is Prof. Mach’s contention. If it is true, Dr.
+Koenig’s criticism of Mach’s view does not hold in its whole extent.
+
+Dr. Koenig’s treatment of the separate representative thinkers is
+exhaustive and in an eminent degree scientific. His work is distinguished
+by accuracy and pointedness of characterisation, and by special
+knowledge of great range. It is a valuable contribution which he has
+given us, to the study of the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and he
+has been true to his promise, as we judge, critically to discuss and not
+summarily to dispose of the opinions of others.
+
+                                                                     μκρκ.
+
+
+EINE NEUE DARSTELLUNG DER LEIBNIZISCHEN MONADENLEHRE AUF GRUND DER
+QUELLEN. By _Eduard Dillmann_. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland, 1891.
+
+The author is an admirer of Leibnitz’s monadology which he considers
+as “the most beautiful, most perfect fruit of philosophic thought and
+the most glorious system to be found in the history of philosophy.”
+This enthusiasm however is not shown in panegyrics but in a careful
+investigation of the great master’s work and we should scarcely know
+the attitude of the author toward the philosopher whose thoughts he
+discusses, if he did not give vent to his feelings in a few sentences of
+the concluding chapter. The rest of the book consists of purely critical
+and historical studies by a sober and cool-headed scholar. Leibnitz’s
+system as it is represented in our histories of philosophy and as it is
+currently conceived lacks a unitary and leading idea, so that many of
+its most fundamental propositions appear to be at variance. Mr. Dillmann
+maintains that Leibnitz’s philosophy as it really is does not lack this
+unity; he has made an extensive and most diligent study of Leibnitz’s
+works and proves with great plausibility through the assistance of many
+pertinent quotations the justice of his cause.
+
+Leibnitz’s monadology is according to Dillmann essentially a conciliatory
+system. It attempts to reconcile the world-conceptions of his time. The
+mechanical explanation of nature as it was proposed in modern times and
+according to which all processes should be conceived as motions of bodies
+is harmonised with the formalistic views of classical antiquity and of
+the schoolmen which seeks for the causes of all phenomena in substantial
+forms. In aiming at such a combination, he had to show that all single
+phenomena of bodies and also their qualities had some ground and that
+the principle of the body itself consisted in a substantial form. This
+led him to conceive of bodies and of all things not as phenomena of an
+external world but as representations in the mind, and thus an entirely
+new standpoint was gained (p. 511). Representations are the inner states
+of Monads (p. 318). Monads are substances because representations are
+units; for representations are the many expressed in a unity (p. 319).
+Every monad is a concentration of the universe (p. 313). It is as if God
+had multiplied the universe as often as there are souls (p. 314). Every
+substance is a little world in itself, expressing the great world of the
+universe. The substance imitates in its little world what God does in the
+universe (p. 313).
+
+Leibnitz’s God-idea has suffered most from a misconception of the
+fundamental idea of his system. Dillmann declares that the traditional
+view, especially Fischer’s, is in conflict with the philosopher’s own
+words. While Fischer says that Leibnitz’s God has created the substances
+and arbitrarily endowed them with their natures, Dillmann maintains on
+the ground of ample quotations that Leibnitz considers the forms of all
+possible existences as given: not even God can alter them. God however
+can and did compare all possible worlds, and then created that which his
+wisdom found to be the best world. “God,” says Leibnitz, “does not select
+a general Adam, but such a one,” i. e. an individual Adam, “whose perfect
+representation is found among all the possible beings which exist in
+the ideas of God. The nature of every creature is determined by eternal
+truths which are in the understanding of God independent of his will.”
+“God’s decree consists alone in the decision arrived at after having
+compared all possible worlds and having admitted into existence that one
+which is the best of all.”
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+LEITFADEN DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE IN 14 VORLESUNGEN. By Dr.
+_Th. Ziehen_, Docent in Jena. Mit 21 Abbildungen im Text. Jena: Gustav
+Fischer. 1891.
+
+The merits of these 14 lectures on physiological psychology are
+thoroughness, lucidity, and conciseness; the whole book is a pamphlet
+of 174 pp. only. The method of presentation is in all its detail work
+positive, stating the facts as they have been found to be by experience
+and as they are corroborated by experiment. Upon the whole it is a good
+résumé of the present state of knowledge. A translation would be very
+desirable and it is to be hoped that some of our psychologists will
+undertake the work.
+
+The contents are briefly as follows: I. Contents and scope of psychology.
+II. Sensation, association, action. III. Stimulus, sensation. IV.
+Taste, smell, touch. V. Hearing. VI. Vision. VII. Affective aspect of
+sensation (pleasure and pain). VIII. Sensation, memory, concept. IX.
+Association of ideas. X. Judgment and syllogism. XI. Attention, voluntary
+thought, the ego (Ziehen says: “psychologically considered the simple
+ego is a theoretical fiction,” p. 139). XII. Diseased thinking, sleep,
+hypnosis. XIII. Action, expressive motions, language. XIV. Will, general
+conclusions.
+
+Although Dr. Ziehen’s pamphlet is upon the whole an excellent treatise,
+we cannot agree with the author in several questions which are of great
+importance in their consequences.
+
+Dr. Ziehen acknowledges that the specifically nervous processes, a
+sensible stimulus and a reaction, which latter is a motory effect,
+cannot be explained from physical laws alone (p. 4). Yet at the same
+time he denies that the fact that the reflexes are adapted to a purpose
+(_Zweckmässigkeit_) proves the presence of a psychical parallelism.
+“Pflüger,” he says, “was wrong in attributing for this reason to the
+spinal cord a spinal-cord-soul.” The _Zweckmässigkeit_ of reflexes (i.
+e. their being adapted to a purpose) has originated not otherwise than
+the _Zweckmässigkeit_ of the color of the bird’s plumage, i. e. through
+natural selection and inheritance. This argument might be admissible,
+if we had not to account for the gradual origin of consciousness also.
+There was a time when our personal consciousness did not exist, and there
+was also a time when no conscious being lived upon the earth. Unless we
+assume that consciousness suddenly appeared, creating out of its own
+subjectivity alone the objective world which appears to us as what we
+call matter in motion, we shall have to adopt some monistic view of the
+subject. To consider the psychical states as known and the objectivity of
+existence as utterly unknown is no monism.
+
+Dr. Ziehen is opposed to the idea of psychical parallelism which he
+conceives to be dualism, but he proposes a spiritual monism in its stead,
+the difficulties of which he does not explain. It is to be regretted
+that Dr. Ziehen has not understood the main idea of the parallelism
+doctrine. He says in a foot-note (p. 6): “In the most extreme way, but
+with quite insufficient reasons Lewes has maintained the omnipresence
+of consciousness.” This is a misstatement of Lewes’s view, which by the
+bye is held by the reviewer also, although he confesses that the term
+parallelism is inappropriate and leads to misunderstandings. The theory
+of parallelism, (at least as the reviewer holds it) is not dualistic
+but monistic. It implies that the subjectivity and objectivity of
+existence are two different abstractions of one and the same reality.
+Its parallelism is a parallelism of these two sets of abstraction, while
+the reality from which they have been derived is one throughout. There
+exist no subjects that are not objects to other subjects, and every
+object admits of a subjective aspect. There is a something supposed to
+be present throughout nature which under certain conditions appears as
+consciousness. This certain something is called by Clifford elements
+of feeling, by Lloyd Morgan metakinesis, it has been characterised in
+the editorials of _The Monist_ as the subjectivity of existence, and
+the presence of this something in the spinal cord was called by Pflüger
+_Rückenmarksseele_.
+
+It appears to me that if we could explain the well adapted reaction of
+nervous substance without assuming a psychical element in it, we could
+explain the whole process of evolution and the historical development of
+mankind, without the assumption of consciousness. Yet it is obvious that
+even the explanation of the color of the bird’s plumage by the theory
+of natural selection and heredity presupposes the presence of psychical
+elements somewhere. Either the bird and his mates show a color sense, or
+his enemies do, whose persecution he escapes, or the animals upon whom he
+preys do. Man’s entire existence, physical and psychical, including his
+feelings of pleasure and pain, can be explained by the theory of natural
+selection and heredity; yet this is no proof that psychical elements do
+not exist in him.
+
+It has become customary at present to define “psychical” as that only
+which appears in states of consciousness, and to exclude subconscious and
+unconscious states. Dr. Ziehen says: “Everything given in consciousness
+and that alone is conscious” (p. 3). Yet he introduces after all the
+expression “psychically latent,” “latent memory pictures,” and similar
+expressions. Dr. Ziehen says, “We cannot even have a conception of that
+which an unconscious idea can be”; yet what is a latent memory-picture
+but an unconscious idea?
+
+There are two kinds of unconscious ideas: (1) Latent ideas. Every man’s
+brain is full of latent ideas, i. e. of memory-pictures which are at
+present unconscious but can become conscious at once if their activity
+is roused by an appropriate stimulus. (2) Ideas unrelated to the
+centre of consciousness. Those active ideas which, although at present
+in a state of activity, are unrelated to the centre of consciousness
+that constitutes the ego of the man, remain unconscious. Unconscious
+cerebration (which takes place in dreams, in diseased brains and also in
+certain phases of healthy brains being, as it were, a by-play of their
+conscious activity) need not be destitute of feeling. Any pain may be
+lessened when our attention is called away from it. The nervous disorder
+remains the same, the feeling substance of the nervous structures in
+which the pain was perceived also remains the same, its activity and
+throbbing pulsations do not cease. Yet if we succeed in separating its
+immediate relation to the centre of consciousness it sinks down into
+subconsciousness. There is no reason for assuming that the feeling, no
+longer perceived, is wiped out entirely.
+
+While Dr. Ziehen’s pamphlet is a presentation of the results of positive
+science, we were astonished to find in the first chapter the following
+statement: “Later on we shall have to investigate whether there are for
+all psychical phenomena such material parallel processes in the central
+nervous system, and our answer will be decidedly in the negative.”
+And again we find in the schedule of psychology a distinction between
+(_a_) psychical processes _not_ contingent upon cerebral functions
+(transcendental psychology), and (_b_) psychical processes contingent
+upon cerebral functions (physiological psychology). These statements
+are the more perplexing as the author joins the opposition made by
+Münsterberg against Professor Wundt’s idea of apperception, which is
+rejected as metaphysical, mystical, and even animistic. While we cannot
+in all points agree with Professor Wundt’s theory of apperception,
+which received a critical examination by Professor Delabarre (see _The
+Monist_ II, No. 2, p. 297), we can most positively say that Dr. Ziehen
+in so far as he classes Wundt’s view among the dualistic theories,
+misunderstands Wundt’s position. Wundt’s physico-psychical parallelism
+cannot be identified with the metaphysical fiction of a subject, be
+this subject called ego or soul.[66] Wundt says in a late publication
+of his: “Psychology of to-day, since Kant has shown the way, seeks the
+nature of the soul again, as did Aristotle of yore, in the facts of the
+spiritual life themselves and not in an unknowable ‘thing in itself’....”
+_Deutsche Rundschau_ of 1891, p. 203. Wundt’s “apperception” is no
+metaphysical being, but simply means the focus of perception, the centre
+of consciousness. Wundt is certainly not infallible and we are inclined
+to believe that in some details he is mistaken. He is nevertheless one
+of the very greatest leaders among the investigators of the soul and his
+monism as well as his antimetaphysical tendencies cannot be doubted.
+
+Ziehen reaches his monism by considering objective existence, as
+it appears to us and which we call matter, as “something utterly
+unknowable.” He says, “The psychical series alone is given.... Thus the
+psycho-physical dualism or parallelism is apparent only. Considering
+that the psychical series alone is given, we shall understand, that we
+had repeatedly to face in our investigations such factors in which the
+material foundations are missing. I here remind you of the projection
+of our sensations into space and time, for which we could not find a
+psycho-physical explanation.”
+
+We hope that Dr. Ziehen will soon find occasion to explain his
+philosophical views. Such an explanation may throw light on his
+psychological theory. We do not as yet see how he can solve without
+inconsistency the many difficulties in which his philosophical standpoint
+will involve his psychology.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+PSYCHOLOGIE DER SUGGESTION. By _Dr. Hans Schmidkunz_. Stuttgart,
+1892,—pp. 425. Large 8vo.
+
+The rapidly increasing devotion to the study of Hypnotism has yielded
+many valuable results, both practical and theoretical. Its application
+to the cure of disease—psychotherapeutics—has been most extensively
+introduced and bids fair to become the representative in scientific form
+of the germ of truth buried amongst the vast rubbish-heap of suspicious
+practices and pseudo-scientific “isms.” New light has been thrown on the
+questions of responsibility and the legal aspects of slightly abnormal
+states. Education and ethics, it has been more than hinted, are to find
+practical aids in hypnotism; while in the light of modern scientifically
+recognised phenomena, many of the events influential in the development
+of religions find a rationalistic interpretation. But the science which
+more than all others, the study of hypnotism is destined to enrich, is
+that of Experimental Psychology; and it is this phase of the subject to
+which Dr. Schmidkunz has devoted his volume.
+
+The central core of the whole subject is the fact of suggestion,—a fact
+so comprehensive that it is almost easier to say what it is not than what
+it is. If we make allowance for that portion of our conduct that is based
+upon individual acquisitions and proceeds by logically reasoned steps,
+all the rest is more or less the result of suggestions, of one kind or
+another. To appreciate the psychology of this process it is necessary
+to appreciate its varieties and universality. We receive suggestions
+from things and deeds; the sight of food makes us hungry; the sight of
+our neighbor consulting his watch induces a strong desire to know what
+time it is. Words are powerful implements of suggestion; we accept those
+doctrines that we hear about us and are influenced much more frequently
+than we are convinced. The personal factor in suggestion is important;
+to some we feel attracted and accept as leaders, while others excite
+repulsion and antagonism. The indirectness of the process of suggestion
+is to be noted; in most cases we are quite unconscious of the influences
+exerted upon us and by which our conduct is guided, and this ignorance of
+the motives of our acts, Spinoza tells us, is the cause of the illusion
+of free will. Sympathy, imitation, the contagion of masses, the action
+of the mind upon the body, the formation of public sentiment,—all
+exemplify the process of suggestion and add their testimony to its power
+and domain.
+
+We must recognise, too, that our suggestibility is a variable phenomenon;
+at some moments we are self-assertive and determined, at others passive
+and readily following another’s lead. Sometimes we take the reins in
+our own hands, and again allow the vehicle to find its way as it will.
+Every night we pass into a condition in which conscious control is
+abandoned and logic gives way to suggestion. A trifling illness, a dose
+of medicine may increase our suggestibility, and place us in a position
+allied to that of the hypnotic subject. All this prepares the way for
+recognising as the distinctive characteristic of the hypnotic condition,
+an exaggerated suggestibility. Not alone is there a ready yielding to
+every suggestion of the operator, but functions normally not under
+volitional control may be appealed to and utilised by the slighter and
+subtler processes of hypnotic suggestion. The variable threshold between
+the voluntary and the involuntary is shifted to a surprising extent. That
+complex interrelation of centres with which the sense of personality is
+intimately connected yields to the same influences and makes possible an
+experimental study of this vexed problem.
+
+This, then, is the Psychology of Suggestion, the contribution that
+Hypnotism makes to Psychology. It lays stress upon the great rôle
+this process plays in every day mental life and thus asks us to see
+in hypnotism a condition closely allied to the normal, and simply
+illustrating in an unusually striking way, one great factor in our mental
+composition. It rearranges the hierarchy of mental faculties and finds
+a more important place for suggestion than has been before accorded
+to it. From a somewhat obscure and sporadic phenomenon occasionally
+entering into mental states, it is raised to the dignity of one of the
+most frequent, most important, most fertile generalisations of scientific
+psychology. Whether one fully agrees with this position or not, it is
+certainly a service to have it so comprehensively, even if at times
+prolixly stated, and to be assured that the study of Psychology is
+deriving as much benefit from the researches in hypnotism as are the more
+practical sciences.
+
+                                                                     J. J.
+
+
+HYPNOTISME, SUGGESTION, PSYCHOTHEROPIE. Études Nouvelles par le _Dr.
+Bernheim_, Professeur à la Faculté de médécine de Nancy. Paris: 1891.
+Octave Doin, pp. 518.
+
+The literature of the new science of Hypnotism continues to increase with
+unabated pace; most of the contributions consist of studies of a few
+cases or a brief exposition of a single point, in most cases of points
+relative to the application of hypnotism to disease. The present volume,
+however, is of special importance not alone because of the authority that
+Dr. Bernheim’s name brings with it,—but because of the comprehensiveness
+and the skill and interest of the exposition. It is supplementary to Dr.
+Bernheim’s former volume, “Suggestive Psychotherapeutics,” (1886-87,
+English translation, 1889) and reflects the progress that has resulted
+from continued and systematic observation. The therapeutic interest in
+it naturally finds most complete representation and about half the volume
+is devoted to the description of cases cured or benefited by suggestive
+treatment. Although nervous complaints predominate in these well arranged
+and well described cases, yet the method is shown applicable to all the
+ills that flesh is heir to. While this portion of the volume will be of
+greatest interest to the medical world, the psychologist will find most
+food for reflection in the first and more theoretical half of the book.
+He will find there an interesting historical sketch illustrating how
+processes similar to those now studied as hypnotism have been in use from
+ancient times; how all the various healers, and the various processes
+and agencies used by them, involve different modes of application of the
+one principle of suggestion. “It is the human imagination that works
+miracles.”
+
+Suggestion is defined as the act by which an idea is introduced in
+the brain and accepted by it, and thus many of the means by which one
+person influences another under every day, normal circumstances would be
+included in the term. Hypnotism is simply one of the most important and
+efficient methods of producing a state of increased suggestibility. In
+every day life we have abundant evidence of the tendency of ideas to be
+realised in actions; with every change in thought and emotion there is
+associated some motor expression, too subtle perhaps for analysis and
+description, but still present and significant. Under excitement and
+nervous strain these motor accompaniments of thought are increased and
+serve as the basis of the muscle reader’s skill. Again the possibility
+of disbelief and of recognising the illusory character of a sensation
+involve the control of higher directing powers; the accumulated
+experience of the past passes sentence upon the new candidate. If we
+imagine a condition in which this form of control is abolished, we should
+have a subject accepting as real almost any idea or sensation that is
+suggested to him, and expressing freely and unreservedly his acceptance
+of the same. And this it is that hypnotism does. It builds upon the
+natural credulity which it is the difficult task of reason to shape and
+control, and brings into prominence the automatic, subconscious phases
+of mental action. It does not endow subjects with new faculties or
+deprive them of their individuality, but shows in a strangely perverted
+perspective the various faculties and processes that go to build the
+endlessly complex elements of a personality. This “suggestion” view of
+hypnotism is the contribution of the Nancy School, and is fast becoming
+the recognised view of science; one will nowhere find a clearer and more
+convincing exposition of it than in Dr. Bernheim’s pages.
+
+It is clearly impossible to summarise the various details that make
+up the body of the volume; but all the important topics are discussed
+and result in conclusions unusually free as well from vagueness as
+from narrowness. The processes inducing the state, the proportion of
+susceptible individuals, the various kinds and stages of hypnotism,
+its relation to sleep and other normal states, the rôle of memory in
+hypnotism, the interesting post-hypnotic, negative and retroactive
+hallucinations, its relation to hysteria, its possible use in
+crime,—these are some of the chief topics treated. The volume is a
+valuable contribution to the literature of the subject, reflects its most
+recent acquisitions, and would well merit a presentation in an English
+translation.
+
+                                                                     J. J.
+
+
+HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. In two volumes; Senses and Intellect, and,
+Feeling and Will. By _James Mark Baldwin_, M. A., Ph. D., Professor in
+the University of Toronto. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1891.
+
+These are two books diligently worked out, the former of 343, the latter
+of 397 pp. They cover almost the entire field of psychology excluding
+however the treatment of such abnormal states as are Mental Pathology
+and Hypnotism. The author is a disciple of Dr. McCosh, and is strongly
+influenced by Wundt, of Leipzig, and Rabier, of Paris; yet he has
+developed an independent view of the nature of the soul which perhaps
+comes nearest to that of Prof. William James, of Harvard. The two books
+are actually two parts of one work, the one complementing the other. The
+former however is not, as the name suggests, an exposition of the nature
+of the senses in their relation to or as the basis of the intellect; it
+is an inquisition into consciousness, sensation, perception, association,
+imagination, rational thought, and kindred subjects. The latter, after
+an introduction of 50 pp., characterising the mechanism of the nervous
+system, treats of feeling as sensation, as pleasure and pain, as interest
+and belief, as emotion, and passes over to the subject of a motor
+consciousness, or will, ending in a chapter on volition.
+
+Professor Baldwin states that “after we enter consciousness we find a
+principle of apperception to which there is no analogy in physiological
+integration,” adding in a foot-note: “Since the section of the ‘Unity
+of Composition’ theory was written, Professor James has published an
+acute criticism in substantial agreement with it, and the passage quoted
+makes reference to the sixth chapter of Professor James’s Psychology
+in which he rejects the so-called ‘mind-stuff,’ theory, declaring a
+self-compounding of mental facts to be inadmissible and proposes at last
+what he calls ‘soul-theory.’” Professor James in this chapter commits the
+mistake indicated in the editorial of the last number of _The Monist_ (p.
+248) that he considers things as things in themselves and then looks for
+a relation producing principle. He says:
+
+“In the parallelogram of forces, the ‘forces’ themselves do not combine
+into the diagonal resultant; a _body_ is needed on which they may
+impinge, to exhibit their resultant effect.”
+
+“Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each
+one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let
+each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a
+consciousness of the whole sentence.”
+
+Thus Professor W. James is in need of what he calls a “medium.” He says:
+
+“_All the ‘combinations’ which we actually know are EFFECTS, wrought by
+the units said to be ‘combined,’ UPON SOME ENTITY OTHER THAN THEMSELVES._
+Without this feature of a medium or vehicle, the notion of combination
+has no sense.”
+
+We observe that feelings which originate through the impressions of
+the outer world upon some sentient organism, enter into relations to
+each other, as naturally as things are in relations, or under certain
+circumstances will enter more closely into relations with each other.
+The “soul” accordingly is postulated by Professor James as a medium to
+combine the effects of the manifold brain processes in order to “escape
+the absurdity of supposing feelings which exist separately and then ‘fuse
+together’ by themselves. The separateness is in the brain-world, on
+this theory, and the unity in the soul world, and the only trouble that
+remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort
+of world or existent thing can affect or influence another at all.” This
+is dualism and we suppose that Professor James is conscious of it.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR PHYSIOLOGISCHEN MORPHOLOGIE DER THIERE. II.
+ORGANBILDUNG UND WACHSTHUM. By Dr. _Jacques Loeb_. Mit 2 Tafeln in
+Lithographie und 9 Figuren im Text. Würzburg: Georg Hertz. 1892.
+
+Dr. Jacques Loeb formerly of Zürich and lately returned from the
+Zoological station at Naples has been appointed Professor at Bryn Mawr
+College, Pennsylvania. Former publications of his were reviewed in _The
+Monist_ I, No. 2, p. 300. The present pamphlet is a continuance of his
+investigations in physiological morphology. Some of his experiments are
+made with _Antennularia antennina_ (a hydroid polyp) and the author
+describes how without mutilation, simply by giving the creature a fixed
+position he succeeded in making it develop certain organs in certain
+places, thus proving gravitation to be an important factor in determining
+the growth of certain limbs. Dr. Loeb adds a few articles on the
+dependence of the longitudinal growth and also of the regeneration of
+Tubularia upon the concentration of the salt-water. His experiments with
+_Ciona intestinalis_ (a solitary ascidia) prove that (1) a section in the
+side of the oral orifice as well as of the anus will cause the formation
+of ocelli on the margin of the section, (2) after an extirpation of the
+central nervous system the reflexes continue although with a higher
+threshold of the stimulus, and (3) the ciona is capable of developing the
+central nervous system again.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+DAS DASEIN ALS LUST, LEID, UND LIEBE. Die altindische Weltanschauung in
+neuzeitlicher Darstellung. Ein Beitrag zum Darwinismus. Mit 2 Tondrucken,
+24 Zeichnungen und 10 Tabellen. By Dr. _Hübbe-Schleiden_. Braunschweig:
+C. A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1891.
+
+The author of this book is Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden, editor of _The Sphinx_,
+a monthly magazine published in Germany which professes to “lay down
+historically and experimentally the supersensible World-Conception upon
+a monistic basis.” Love of Mysticism is the main feature of _The Sphinx_
+as well as Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden’s book. _The Sphinx_ contains reports
+of cases of telepathy and is quite serious in investigating the spook
+of a haunted house. The present book contains the author’s confession
+of faith. The symbols by which he depicts his world-conception reveal
+a cabalistic taste, and we believe that the illustrations will be
+rather repugnant to the man of science, as they give the impression of
+fantasticism. The main idea of the book is to modernise the old Hindoo
+view that “Kama” desire or _Lust_ is the ground of all being, as is said
+in the Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad (IV, 4, 5): “Man consists entirely of
+desire (_Kama_); as is his desire, so is his will (_Kratu_); as is his
+will, so is his life (_Karma_, i. e., activity); as is his life, so is
+his fate.”
+
+Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden rejects the Hindoo view of a migration of soul in
+so far as it suggests the idea of something personal; he prefers to
+speak of a transformation of soul. This, he says, has been and it may be
+called “metaphysical Darwinism”, and we must confess that the nucleus
+of the idea touches the most vital point of all the problems of life.
+We cannot explain ethics and the ethical instinct of man without taking
+into consideration that man lives and aspires for something that will
+outlast his individual existence. The author says: “Why do you strive
+for something higher, for perfection, for completion or whatever your
+aim may be called? Why all that, if you imagine that your individuality
+has only this one life upon earth and you can realise only a very small
+part of what you strive for? Why all your trouble, if the main thing is
+in vain?” We agree with the author that our moral instinct, our ideals
+and aspirations which are most powerful realities in life point to a life
+beyond the grave, they indicate that death is no finality and evolution
+teaches us that our souls actually continue to exist. Our souls in their
+individual features are parts only of the whole evolution of our race and
+these very individual features of our souls can be and will be preserved
+in the future generations.
+
+Dr. Hübbe-Schleiden’s book is characteristic of a strange tendency of
+our time to combine the results of modern science with the old notions
+of occultism. There is in it a psychological and ethical truth overgrown
+with a fanciful imagination.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+MAX MÜLLER AND THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE. A Criticism. By _William Dwight
+Whitney_, Professor in Yale University. New York: D. Appleton and
+Company. 1892.
+
+The Professors W. D. Whitney and F. Max Müller are not on good terms.
+They do not only disagree on several fundamental and many minor points,
+concerning the science of language, but their warfare, as is well known,
+is at the same time of a personal nature. The present little volume is a
+criticism of the new edition of Max Müller’s “Science of Language.” The
+great Yale philologist recognising that this work of his antagonistic
+Oxford colleague “is still the principal and most authoritative text-book
+of that study,” and noting that “its author has gained no new light from
+the criticisms that have been made upon his work,” feels called upon to
+warn the reader that “it may not be trusted where it is untrustworthy and
+so do harm to the science which it was intended to help.” The title of
+the book, according to Professor Whitney, ought to be “Facts and Fancies
+in Regard to Language and Other Related Subjects.”
+
+Schleicher says: “Languages are natural organisms which, without
+being determinable by the will of man, grew and developed themselves
+in accordance with fixed laws.... Its method is on the whole and in
+general the same with that of the other natural sciences.” Professor
+Whitney censures Max Müller for calling the first part of Schleicher’s
+proposition “sheer mythology,” and then adopting the inference made
+therefrom considering the science of language as a physical science. Now
+it is true that the expression “organism” must not be taken literally;
+languages are not animals or plants, but they have some quality that is
+comparable to animals and plants. Their life and the development of their
+life is in many respects analogous to the life of organisms. Professor
+Whitney regards language as “a body of conventional signs for ideas” and
+protests against Prof. Max Müller’s usage of the word “conventional” as
+if it implied “a convention of people gathered to discuss and decide
+on the words and forms by which conceptions should be represented.” In
+contradistinction to Max Müller who holds that philology is a physical
+science, Professor Whitney regards it as an historical science. “Physical
+science,” says Max Müller, “deals with the works of God, historical
+science with the works of man.” Thus optics is a physical science,
+painting an historical science. Whitney declares that individuals
+initiate changes and the community either accepts and uses them, making
+them language by its use or rejects and annuls them by refusing to use
+them. In one word Max Müller says language is φύσει, a product of nature,
+and Whitney says it is θέσει, an institution of man. We believe that
+Professor Whitney stands almost alone in his conception of language.
+
+Another no less important point is Professor Whitney’s objection to Prof.
+Max Müller’s proposition of the Identity of Language and Thought. Here
+Professor Whitney will find many supporters for his case; but we must
+add that Prof. Max Müller does not exactly mean what he says. He means
+by identity inseparableness. It is not so much Max Müller’s position
+that should be attacked as his misleading terminology. Concerning the
+origin of language Professor Whitney finds an instructive parallel in the
+beginnings of writing which were mutually intelligible signs, or in the
+written language of mathematics. “So we do no longer see,” he says, “the
+two and three strokes in our figures 2 and 3, although they are really
+there disguised from view.” This is a good simile, and undoubtedly _cum
+grano salis_ true. But it is rather strange that Professor Whitney should
+find Noiré’s theory of the origin of language “utterly fantastic.”
+
+These are fundamental differences. There are some more, less important
+points such as the etymology of king being the Sanskrit _janaka_. Max
+Müller proposes a very improbable reason for the change of meaning in the
+Lat. _fagus_, O. Germ. _boka_ (beech), Greek _phegos_, Lat. _quercus_,
+and Germ. _foraha_ (fir). Professor Whitney might have mentioned that a
+more probable reason for this change has been proposed of late by those
+who seek the home of the Aryans in Europe. A migrating people would
+naturally have called in their old home the beech, in their new the oak
+“a tree with edible fruit.” The same method is applicable to explain the
+change of meaning in _forah-a-quercus_ which means in northern countries
+a fir and in Italy an oak.
+
+Professor Whitney sums up his case as follows (p. 77): he finds “language
+study ... declared on transparently false grounds, to be a physical
+science, and language an existence which man had no part in making
+and changing; dialectic growth misunderstood, families of language
+regarded as exceptional, and a ‘Turanian’ barathrum arranged to catch
+all little-known varieties of speech; antecedent unity of dialect taught
+in one case and denied in another; a word held to be killed by the
+least mispronunciation; _conventional_ explained to mean ‘voted by a
+convention’; thought and its expression viewed as inseparable, and even
+identical; the origin of language seemingly ascribed to an instinctive
+ding-dong of the tongue—and so on; to complete the list would be almost
+to give a table of principal contents of the two volumes—and a style of
+discussion used throughout which indicated that the author was playing
+with his subject rather than investigating it seriously.... The book is
+not science, but literature. Taken as literature, it is of high rank, as
+the admiration of the public sufficiently testifies; its author has a
+special gift for interesting statement and illustration, for lending a
+charm to the subjects he discusses; and he carries captive the judgments
+of his hearers and of many of his readers. He is a born _littérateur_.”
+
+Professor Whitney concludes: “Now as heretofore, I rest my defense on not
+the just intent alone, but the real substantial justice of my criticisms;
+if they are unfounded, I deserve reprehension for making them; if they
+are right, then there is nothing, either in the degree of importance of
+the subjects to which they relate, or in the personality against whom
+they are directed, to call for their condemnation.”
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+SEIFENBLASEN. Moderne Märchen. By _Kurd Lasswitz_. Hamburg and Leipsic:
+Leopold Voss. 1890.
+
+“Märchen,” in the province of science, we are inclined to believe are
+a prize problem for our modern poets. Who will solve it? Kurd Lasswitz
+has made an attempt and considering the great difficulty of the problem,
+we are not inclined to criticise him. The author, who has worked in
+scientific fields and has proved his ability as a close student, exhibits
+in these “soap-bubbles” a fertile imagination and poetic invention. Most
+of his sketches fall short of the ideal märchen of science as we conceive
+it, but their reading is suggestive and deserves the attention of those
+whose disposition favors the creation of a middle ground between science
+and poetry.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[66] Ziehen declares (p. 129) that the problem of physiological
+psychology consists in reducing the different forms of thinking up to
+the most complex argumentation to simple associations of ideas and its
+laws. Wundt says, that there are many psychical idea-combinations which
+cannot be explained simply by association of ideas. So, Ziehen continues
+(p. 130), Wundt assumes above idea associations a special faculty of the
+soul called apperception, which serves now as attention, now as will, but
+is in either case a metaphysical faculty of the soul, the active subject
+which independent of mechanical causality is said to be the cause of
+these phenomena.—I do not think that anyone who knows Wundt will accept
+this as a fair representation of his views.
+
+
+
+
+PERIODICALS.
+
+
+REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
+
+CONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 192
+
+    UN PROBLÈME D’ACOUSTIQUE PSYCHOLOGIQUE. By _L. Dauriac_.
+
+    LES ORIGINES DE NOTRE STRUCTURE INTELLECTUELLE ET CÉRÉBRALE.
+    II. L’ÉVOLUTIONNISME. By _A. Fouillée_.
+
+    LÉONARD DE VINCI ARTISTE ET SAVANT. By _G. Séailles_.
+
+    SUR LES DESSINS D’ENFANTS. By _J. Passy_.
+
+    SUR UN CAS D’INHIBITION PSYCHIQUE. By _A. Binet_.
+
+CONTENTS: January, 1892. No. 193.
+
+    LE PROBLÈME DE LA VIE. By _Dunan_.
+
+    LA MALADIE DU PESSIMISME. By _B. Pérez_.
+
+    PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CUBA: F. VARELA, J. DE LA LUZ. By
+    _J.-M. Guardia_.
+
+    VARIÉTÉS: LE PROBLÈME D’ACHILLE. By _J. Mouret_.
+
+CONTENTS: February, 1892. No. 194.
+
+    LES MOUVEMENTS DE MANÈGE CHEZ LES INSECTES. By _A. Binet_.
+
+    LE PROBLÈME DE LA VIE (2nd article). By _Dunan_.
+
+    PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS DE CUBA (concluded). _J.-M. Guardia_.
+
+    REVUE GÉNÉRALE: JUSTICE ET SOCIALISME, D’APRÈS LES PUBLICATIONS
+    RÉCENTES. By _Belot_.
+
+One of the problems of the unique and great work of Carl Stumpf’s
+“Tonpsychologie” is the subject of L. Dauriac’s essay. The question
+is when several sounds enter the ear at the same time, the plurality
+of which is not directly known, do you have your information through
+an inner sense? Does every unit of the irritation correspond to a
+distinct unit of sensation? Is there in consciousness a simultaneousness
+of sensations similarly as outside of consciousness there is a
+simultaneousness of vibrations? M. Dauriac maintains that Stumpf’s
+question can be answered only on the ground of metaphysical postulates,
+and if preconceived solutions are to be excluded, it must be considered
+as insoluble.
+
+Alfred Fouillée, in his second article on the origin of our intellectual
+and cerebral structure, which treats on evolutionism, comes to the
+conclusion that the hypothesis which in the most simple way explains the
+agreement of thoughts and objects is the doctrine of a radical unity
+generally called Monism.
+
+J. Passy notes certain characteristic and psychologically interesting
+features of the drawings of children.
+
+M. A. Binet presents two physiognomical pictures of the same face, one
+representing disgust or scorn, the other a good-humored and happy smile.
+The upper parts of both faces are exactly alike and yet the eyes of
+the former look disdainful while the very same eyes of the latter are
+full of jest and merriment. This is the fact. M. Binet psychologically
+interprets the fact as a phenomenon of automatic inhibition. The fact is
+interesting, but its interpretation seems doubtful.
+
+Charles Dunan discusses the metaphysical aspect of the problem of life.
+
+B. Pérez’s article is a contribution to pathological psychology with
+special reference to M. Magalhâes’s work on the subject. Pessimism,
+M. Pérez says, is a disease only if exaggerated, yet he believes that
+medico-psychological studies which consider the relation between the
+physical system and morality are very helpful even if carried too far.
+
+M. J.-M. Guardia’s article will have a special interest for Americans.
+Three men arose in Spain of late, Valentin Almirall, M. L. Mallada,
+and J.-M. Escudor, who spoke bold and hard words of truth to their
+country. Cuba is the hen that lays golden eggs for Spain, but the Cubans
+are treated with great contempt in Spain; and yet the Spaniards are
+by no means their intellectual superiors, for while Spain is poor in
+philosophy, Cuba is the only country of Latin America where philosophy
+has taken root. M. Guardia sketches in the first article the history and
+philosophy of Don Félix Varélay y Moralès who is the harbinger of the
+other Spanish-Cuban philosopher, José de la Luz. The second article in
+the February number treats of the latter (1800-1862) whom Guardia calls
+the master.
+
+George Mouret with reference to Frontera’s book on Zeno’s argument
+against motion makes a few remarks concerning the Eleatic sophism about
+Achilles and the tortoise.
+
+An injury of a thalamus opticus produces in horses and other animals
+the effect of their making rotatory movements when intending to walk
+straight on. Forel proved that a similar effect is produced in ants by a
+lesion of one of their lobes. M. Binet publishes in the present essay his
+experiments on certain water-beetles, exhibiting diagrams of their normal
+and abnormal walk. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vols. II
+and III.
+
+CONTENTS: November, 1891. No. 6.
+
+    UEBER BRÜCKES THEORIE DES KÖRPERLICHEN SEHENS. By Dr. _C. du
+    Bois-Reymond_.
+
+    MEIN SCHLUSSWORT GEGEN WUNDT. By _C. Stumpf_.
+
+    ERWIDERUNG. By _O. Flügel_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+CONTENTS: December, 1891. No. 1.
+
+    VERSUCH, DAS PSYCHOPHYSISCHE GESETZ AUF DIE FARBENUNTERSCHIEDE
+    TRICHROMATISCHER AUGEN ANZUWENDEN. By _H. v. Helmholtz_.
+
+    UNTERSUCHUNGEN ÜBER BINOKULARES SEHEN MIT ANWENDUNG DES
+    HERINGSCHEN FALLVERSUCHS. By Dr. _Richard Greeff_.
+
+    BEMERKUNGEN ZU DEM AUFSATZE VON DR. SOMMER “ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER
+    SPRACHE.” By Prof. _A. Pick_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+Dr. C. du Bois-Reymond believes that corporeal vision is either produced
+by one eye running in succession over several places or two eyes viewing
+two aspects of the object. Mach’s theory of the influence of shade upon
+the production of the third dimension in vision which affords quite a
+new and a better explanation of the phenomenon is not mentioned. Stumpf
+closes his controversy with Wundt with a few remarks in answer to Wundt’s
+reply (in _Philos. Studien_ VII, pp. 298-327); and Flügel objects to
+Professor Rehmke’s proposition made in a criticism of Flügel’s book “Die
+Seelenfrage,” that Herbart’s psychology, being atomism, is at bottom
+materialism.
+
+Dr. Richard Greeff describes Hering’s apparatus for investigating the
+cause of binocular vision. Wheatstone believes that the perspective
+of the two retina pictures produces the effect of corporeality while
+Brücke declares that it is mainly due to muscle-sensations. Hering sides
+with Wheatstone, and the experiments as described by Greeff prove that
+the third dimension is unfailingly perceived whenever the ocular axes
+diverge, while in other cases the same result is not attained.
+
+Dr. Sommer had presented in a former article the facts of an interesting
+case of aphasia, (see _The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 629) where the
+patient, his name is Voit, could remember and pronounce words only when
+writing them. Prof. A. Pick objects to Dr. Sommer’s regarding the case as
+contrary to our present experience and following two French authorities
+Ballet and Bernard, adduces cases of Aphasia by right-sided hemiphlegia
+where patients could read only when they were able to write or represent
+to themselves the writing motions of their hand. Thus one patient of
+Charcot could only read print, and not written words “because,” as
+he said, “it was easier for him to reproduce in his mind the written
+letter.” This reminds one of the case a deaf-mute who said: “I feel
+whenever I think of the motions of my fingers although they are perfectly
+at rest. I see internally an image of my moving fingers.” Professor Pick
+concludes that the case Voit is a good argument against Max Müller’s
+proposition of the identity of language and thought. Max Müller however
+includes in his conception of word any symbol of an idea. The finger
+motion of a deaf-mute is a word, and the writing motion of Voit is also a
+word, according to Professor Max Müller’s theory.
+
+Prof. H. v. Helmholtz publishes the tables of his experiments in applying
+the psycho-physical law upon color differences of trichromatic eyes, and
+presents the three fundamental colors diagrammatically in an equilateral
+triangle in the centre of which lies white. A curve winding round
+this centre shows the relation of the rainbow spectrum in the system
+of three fundamental colors. The results do not as yet agree with the
+investigations of A. König and C. Diterici who make similar inquiries
+with bichromatic eyes. (Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 1.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    BEITRÄGE ZUR LOGIK. (Erster Artikel.) By _A. Riehl_.
+
+    DIE DIMENSIONEN DER WAHRSCHEINLICHKEIT UND DIE EVIDENZ DER
+    UNGEWISSHEIT. By _Ad. Nitsche_.
+
+    UEBER DIE FORTSCHREITENDE ENTWICKLUNG DES MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS.
+    II. By _F. Rosenberger_.
+
+    ERNST PLATNER’S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN
+    ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. I. By _B. Seligkowitz_.
+
+    UEBER SPRACHREFLEX, NATIVISMUS UND ABSICHTLICHE SPRACHBILDUNG.
+    X. By _A. Marty_.
+
+Prof. A. Riehl begins in this number a series of articles on logic. The
+first two chapters are (1) concepts and definitions. Riehl distinguishes
+between a definition and a predicating sentence (_Aussage_), for
+instance, “Space has three dimensions,” is a mere definition, but “Space
+is the form of our intuition,” is an _Aussage_. (2) Conceptual sentences
+and judgments. The former are merely representative and cannot as the
+latter be said to combine or separate ideas.
+
+Ad. Nitsche criticises Johannes v. Kries’s idea that the calculus
+of probabilities is admissible only if the chances are equivalent.
+Equivalent Chances (_gleiche Spielräume_), he objects, are apparently
+impossible, yet he admits that upon the degree of a knowledge of the
+conditions will depend the reliability of the probability.
+
+The Object of B. Seligkowitz’s article is to rescue from oblivion a
+philosopher who especially as a critic of Kant deserves to be better
+known than he is, Ernst Platner (1744-1818.)
+
+The tenth and concluding article of A. Marty on the origin of language
+reviews Paul Regnaud’s work _Origine et philosophie du langage_.
+(Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. December, 1891. Vol. IV. No. 2.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AMONG THE GREEKS. By
+    _Charles A. Strong_.
+
+    STUDIES FROM THE LABORATORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
+    UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, Ph. D.
+
+    THE SIZE OF SEVERAL CRANIAL NERVES IN MAN AS INDICATED BY THE
+    AREAS OF THEIR CROSS-SECTIONS. By _Henry H. Donaldson_, Ph. D.
+
+    VISUALISATION AS A CHIEF SOURCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HOBBES,
+    LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME. By _Alexander Fraser_, B. A.
+
+    ANATOMICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BRAIN AND SEVERAL SENSE-ORGANS
+    OF THE BLIND DEAF-MUTE, LAURA DEWEY BRIDGMAN. II. By _Henry H.
+    Donaldson_, Ph. D.
+
+    PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. I. Nervous System. By Prof. _H. H.
+    Donaldson_.
+
+    A LABORATORY COURSE IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. II. By _E. C.
+    Sanford_.
+
+    PSYCHIATRY. PSYCHOSES FOLLOWING ACUTE SURGICAL AND MENTAL
+    AFFECTIONS AND IN MULTIPLE NEURITIS. By _William Noyes_, M. D.
+
+The post mortem examination of Laura Bridgman shows a brain in which the
+olfactory bulbs and nerves, the optic nerves, the auditory nerves, and
+possibly the glossopharyngeal, had all been more or less destroyed at
+their peripheral ends. This destruction caused a degeneration—most marked
+in the optic nerves—which extended towards the centres and involved them
+indirectly.... This case represents a maximum loss in these defective
+senses with a minimum amount of central disturbance, thus offering the
+very best sort of opportunity for education by way of the surviving
+senses.... Mental association was for Laura Bridgman limited to various
+phases of the dermal sensations and the minor and imperfect senses of
+taste and smell.... The motor centre there had lost some, but not all its
+associative connections. (Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1892. Vol. II. NO. 2.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL. By _Brother
+    Azarias_.
+
+    THE THREE RELIGIONS. By _J. S. Mackenzie_, M. A.
+
+    THE ETHICS OF HEGEL. By _Rev. J. Macbride Sterrett_.
+
+    A PALM OF PEACE FROM GERMAN SOIL. By _Fanny Hertz_.
+
+    AUTHORITY IN THE SPHERE OF CONDUCT AND INTELLECT. By _Prof. H.
+    Nettleship_, Oxford.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS.
+
+Brother Azarias paraphrases and praises the ethics of the Papal
+Encyclical. J. S. Mackenzie starts from Kant’s famous remarks that two
+things fill our minds with reverence, the starry, heavens above and the
+moral law within. The worship of these two separately and the worship of
+them in combination are set forth as the three great religions of the
+world. Fanny Hertz pleads for the abolishment of war. She quotes largely
+from Bertha Suttner’s novel, “Die Waffen nieder,” and from Friederich’s
+letters. Authority, according to Professor Nettleship, is “the power
+which in the sphere of conduct, in the long run determines our practice
+and in the sphere of intellect in the long run determines our assent.”
+There are roughly speaking four kinds of authority: (1) the authority
+of law, (2) the authority of religious bodies, (3) the authority of
+society or public opinion and (4) the authority of great men. Where
+is the seat of authority? “For each individual,” Professor Nettleship
+maintains, “the absolute guide can, in the long run be no other than his
+own conscience.” The origin of conscience and the criterion whether the
+voice of conscience be true or not are not explained. (Philadelphia:
+_International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+MIND. New Series. No. 1. January, 1892.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    PREFATORY REMARKS. _The Editor._
+
+    THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. (1) General Principles. By _W. E.
+    Johnson_.
+
+    THE IDEA OF VALUE. By _S. Alexander_.
+
+    THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL’S DIALECTIC. (1) By _J. Ellis
+    McTaggart_.
+
+    THE LAW OF PSYCHOGENESIS. By _Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan_.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS: The Feeling-Tone of Desire and Aversion. By _Prof.
+    H. Sidgwick_. Sur la Distinction entre les Lois ou Axiomes et
+    les Notions. By _George Mouret_.
+
+    CRITICAL NOTICES.
+
+W. E. Johnson says: “As a material machine is an instrument for
+economising the exertion of force, so a symbolic calculus is an
+instrument for economising the exertion of intelligence. And, employing
+the same analogy, the more perfect the calculus, the smaller would be the
+amount of intelligence applied as compared with the results produced.” He
+continues:
+
+“But as the exertion of _some_ force is necessary for working the
+machine, so the exertion of _some_ intelligence is necessary for working
+the calculus.”
+
+Here we feel inclined to stop our author. That which makes of a certain
+amount of metal, brass, and wood a machine, is the form in which they
+are composed, and this form is instrumental in using a certain amount of
+energy for doing a certain kind of work. Intelligence is not analogous
+to force but to the form of force. Not intelligence is necessary to run
+the instrument of intelligence, but some power, some force, some energy,
+and this power needed for running the instrument of intelligence, as it
+exists in man, is generally called will. So we are at variance with Mr.
+W. S. Johnson from the outset. Mr. Johnson from his standpoint considers
+it “important to examine the kind and degree of intelligence that are
+demanded in the employment of any symbolic calculus. It will appear that
+the _logical_ calculus stands in a unique relation to intelligence; for
+it aims at exhibiting, in a non-intelligent form, those same intelligent
+principles that are actually required for working it.”
+
+We abstain here from discussing the details of this highly suggestive
+article which contains much that is of interest to logicians. The author
+claims especially with regard to his interpretation of the universal and
+particular that his results exactly correspond with the interpretation
+given by Dr. Venn and Mr. Peirce, and worked out by Dr. Keynes.
+
+The Germans distinguish between _Urtheil_ and _Beurtheilung_, the first
+being judgment in general, the latter a judgment that declares something
+to possess value from the view of truth, beauty or goodness. In this
+sense Mr. S. Alexander deals with the idea of value. He states two main
+principles. (1) That value is “the efficiency of a conscious agent
+to promote the efficiency of society” and this, the author says, was
+maintained indirectly in opposition to the view that value was determined
+by pleasure. (2) That value is itself no something separable from other
+mental facts by a wide gulf, but was itself a fact of a purely natural
+order. “Sollen” is one kind of “Sein.”
+
+Mr. J. Ellis McTaggart in discussing the changes of method in Hegel’s
+Dialectic arrives at a conclusion which according to the author must
+be admitted to be quite un-Hegelian. Hegel apparently regarded the
+procession of the categories with its advance through oppositions and
+reconciliations as presenting absolute truth. From this the author
+dissents, “for,” he says: “the true process of thought is one in which
+each category springs out of the one before it, and not by contradicting
+it, but as the expression of its deepest nature, while it, in its turn,
+is seen to have its deepest reality in again passing on to the one
+after it. There is no contradiction no opposition, and consequently no
+reconciliation. There is only development, the rendering explicit what
+was implicit, the growth of the seed to the plant. In the actual course
+of the dialectic this is never attained. It is an ideal which is never
+quite realised, and from the nature of the case never can be quite
+realised. In the dialectic there is always opposition, and therefore
+always reconciliation. We do not go straight onward, but more or less
+from side to side. It seems inevitable, therefore, to conclude that
+the dialectic does not completely and perfectly express the nature of
+thought.”
+
+Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan starting from the proposition that “the business
+of consciousness is the control of action” shows that “we identify
+ourselves rather with the action of our control centres than with our
+lower animal instincts. Through experience we learn, and habits being
+formed by individual repetition become innate.” Professor Morgan reviews
+use-inheritance natural selection, sexual selection, the law of beauty,
+and conduct and verification with regard to psychogenesis. “Our nature,”
+he says, “is intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and sensitive”:
+
+“The false is rejected as incongruous to our nature as intellectual;
+the ugly is avoided as incongruous to our nature as æsthetic; the wrong
+is shunned as incongruous to our nature as moral; so is the painful, so
+far as possible, avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive....
+The guidance of pleasure and pain is of great importance—so great that
+some are found to argue that in moral matters we are influenced solely
+by considerations of happiness.... Only by extending the meaning of the
+words pleasure and pain so as to be coextensive with what I have here
+termed congruous and incongruous can it be said that our actions and
+our thoughts are determined by pleasure and pain.” (London: Williams &
+Norgate.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. I, No. 1. January, 1892.
+
+CONTENTS of No. 1.
+
+    PREFATORY NOTE.
+
+    THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND IDEALISM. By Prof. _John Watson_.
+
+    PSYCHOLOGY AS SO-CALLED “NATURAL SCIENCE.” By Prof. _George T.
+    Ladd_.
+
+    ON SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MUSICAL SYSTEM. By
+    _Benj. Ives Gilman_.
+
+    REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
+
+CONTENTS of No. 2:
+
+    PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS. By Prof. _Andrew
+    Seth_.
+
+    A PLEA FOR PSYCHOLOGY AS A “NATURAL SCIENCE.” By Prof. _William
+    James_.
+
+    ON SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE MUSICAL SYSTEM.
+    II. By _Benj. Ives Gilman_.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS: Dr. Münsterberg’s Theory of Mind and Body and its
+    Consequences. By _Charles A. Strong_.
+
+    REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
+
+This is a new magazine which will be an additional proof that the
+philosophical interest in America is by no means so poor as the
+inhabitants of the old world generally suppose it to be. The character
+of the journal, it is to be expected, will be in harmony with the
+publications of its scholarly editor, Prof. J. G. Schurmann, whose
+position is clearly set forth in a little volume of his “Belief in God,”
+in which he conceives God in three ways (1) as the cause or ground of the
+world (2) as the realising purpose of the world, and (3) as the father of
+spirits.
+
+Professor Watson reviews in an elaborate article Edward Caird’s work
+“The Critical Philosophy of Emanuel Kant.” “The philosophy of Kant,”
+says Watson, “was accepted at first by submissive disciples, but it had
+afterwards to submit to a severe process of criticism which culminated
+in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. The synthesis of Kant, as based upon
+an untenable opposition of the phenomenal and the real, was weighed
+and found wanting.... We must be grateful to any one who helps us,
+not merely to see Kant, but to see beyond him. This is the task which
+Professor Caird, in his exhaustive work on the Critical Philosophy, has
+set himself to perform,” and adds Watson, “he has done it in a way that
+leaves nothing to be desired.”
+
+Professor Ladd criticises Professor James’s Psychology as so-called
+natural science.
+
+“What we wish to have in the name of cerebral psychology, is a
+description, in terms of a comprehensible theory of molecular physics;
+and, also, a statement of the formulæ which define the relations between
+the molecular changes and the ‘corresponding’ orders of mental phenomena.
+But this is precisely what Professor James avoids doing, even to the
+extent which so-called ‘nerve-physiology’ makes possible. And, nothing
+worthy of the name ‘science’ _is_ possible for any one in this branch of
+cerebral psycho-physics.”
+
+Professor James replies to the criticism in the second number of _The
+Philosophical Review_. He says:
+
+“Psychology is to-day hardly more than what physics was before Galileo,
+what chemistry was before Lavoisier. It is a mass of phenomenal
+description, gossip, and myth, including, however, real material enough
+to justify one in the hope that its study may become worthy of the
+name of natural science at no very distant day. I wished, by treating
+Psychology _like_ a natural science, to help her to become one.”
+
+Professor Ladd is a transcendentalist and Professor James has great
+expectations of the work inaugurated by the Society for Psychical
+Research.
+
+Theoretically they stand much nearer than practically, as well indicated
+by Professor James’s remark:
+
+“In Professor Ladd’s own book on ‘Physiological Psychology,’ that ‘real
+being, proceeding to unfold powers that are _sui generis_, according to
+laws of its own,’ for whose recognition he contends, plays no organic
+part in the work, and has proved a mere stumbling block to his biological
+reviewers.”
+
+He adds in a foot-note:
+
+“I mean that such a being is quite barren of particular consequences. Its
+character is only known by its reactions on the signals which the nervous
+system gives, and these must be gathered by observation after the fact.
+If only it were subject to successive reincarnations, as the theosophists
+say it is, so that we might guess what sort of a body it would unite with
+next, or what sort of persons it had helped to constitute previously,
+those would be great points gained. But even those gains are denied us;
+and the real being is, for practical purposes, an entire superfluity,
+which a _practical_ psychology can perfectly well do without.”
+
+Andrew Seth, the well-known coryphæus of philosophy and psychology
+at Edinburgh, presses the importance of distinguishing the different
+standpoints of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Locke,
+Berkeley, Hume and other English as well as Continental thinkers “speak
+sometimes from one point of view, sometimes from the other without being
+aware that the two points of view are different.”
+
+“Psychology, assuming the existence of a subject or medium of
+consciousness, seeks to explain, mainly by the help of association or
+processes practically similar, how out of the come-and-go of conscious
+states, there are evolved such subjective facts as perceptions, the
+belief in an independent real world, and the idea of the Ego or subject
+himself.... Metaphysics has to do with the ultimate nature of the reality
+which reveals itself alike in the consciousness which knows and the world
+which is known.... The epistemological thing-in-itself to be identified
+with the metaphysical essence.... The problem of knowledge and the Real,
+is the question which Epistemology has to face.” (Boston, New York,
+Chicago: Ginn & Co.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[67] Vol. III. No. 11. January, 1892.
+
+CONTENTS:
+
+    POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. Part V.
+    Sociology. By _B. Tchitcherin_.
+
+    COUNT GIACOMO LEOPARDI AND HIS PESSIMISM. Part IV. Continued
+    from No. 10 of this review. (Conclusion.) By _V. Stein_.
+
+    AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE.
+    (Conclusion.) By _M. Menzhir_.
+
+    J. V. KIRYEBSKII AND THE ORIGIN OF MUSCOVITE SLAVOPHILISM.
+    Public lecture delivered November 20, 1891, for the benefit of
+    the rural districts suffering from the bad harvests. By _Paul
+    Vinogradoff_.
+
+    FOUILLÉ AND THE METAPHYSICS OF THE FUTURE. Part III. General
+    estimate of Fouillé’s views. Continued from No. 10 of this
+    review. (Conclusion) By _Aleksei Vnedenskii_.
+
+    TELEPATHY. To be concluded in the next number. By _M.
+    Petrovo-Solovo_. [This is a review of the publications of and
+    the work done by the Society for Psychical Research in England.]
+
+    SPECIAL PART: (1) Wundt’s System of Philosophy. By _K.
+    Ventzel_. (2) Hegel’s Ontology. By _N. P. Hilyaroff-Platonoff_.
+    New Researches on Plato. By _A. Kozloff_.
+
+    CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. Review of Russian and Foreign
+    Periodicals. Book Reviews. Bibliographical Index of recent
+    Philosophical works. Answer to an anonymous letter received
+    by N. Strachoff on the subject of his article: “Opinions
+    concerning L. N. Tolstoï.” By _N. Strachoff_. Transactions of
+    the Moscow Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.)
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[67] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._
+
+
+
+
+                  VOL. II.      JULY, 1892.      NO. 4.
+
+                                THE MONIST.
+
+
+
+
+OUR MONISM.
+
+THE PRINCIPLES OF A CONSISTENT, UNITARY WORLD-VIEW.
+
+
+The question, What are the essential features of Monism? was brought home
+to me when I read in the last number of _The Monist_ the critical remarks
+made with reference to the new edition of my “Anthropogeny.” I shall
+here endeavor briefly to draw up the outlines of my conception of the
+world in a manner which will indicate the most characteristic features
+of my views. Thus both the agreements with and the divergences from the
+position editorially upheld in _The Monist_ will plainly appear.
+
+As is the case with the majority of philosophical differences, so also
+in the present instance I find that the divergences which exhibit
+themselves in our respective unitary conceptions of the world are in part
+only apparent and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of
+our fundamental ideas. But this will, perhaps, be made clearer by the
+following methodically arranged eight theses.
+
+
+I. MONISM.
+
+Like all general concepts of fundamental scope, that of monism also
+is liable to different definitions and divergent modifications,—the
+natural result of individual differences of subjective conception. In the
+determinate sense in which monism is at present employed by the majority
+of philosophers and physical inquirers, the sense which I believe I
+was the first to establish in 1866 in my “General Morphology” (Vol. I,
+p. 105), it denotes a unitary or _natural_ conception of the world, in
+opposition to a _supernatural_ or mystical one, that is, in opposition
+to _dualism_. For us, accordingly, there exists (in the sense of Goethe)
+_no_ opposition whatsoever between nature and mind, between World and
+God. Mental existences, “spirits,” outside nature, or in opposition to
+nature, do not exist. What are commonly termed the “mental sciences,”—for
+example, philology, history, and philosophy,—are in reality simply a part
+of _physical philosophy_, of _Natur-philosophie_. The latter discipline
+embraces, in our opinion, the entire body of human knowledge; it is
+based upon _empiricism_, on the experiences, the observations, and the
+experiments of physical inquiry; but it does not become _philosophy_
+until it has brought together and united its empiric products, abstracted
+general laws from its isolated experiential facts, and _synthetised_ the
+isolated results which _analysis_ has empirically ascertained.
+
+
+II. MECHANICALISM.
+
+Since an early date, this important fundamental concept has frequently
+been used in three different and divergent senses, namely:
+
+_A._ In its widest sense, as synonymous with _monism_; wherein mechanical
+causes (_causæ efficientes_), in the sense of Kant, are assumed as the
+sole effective causes and are placed in opposition to the teleological
+causes (_causæ finales_) in the sense of dualism. “Mechanical conception
+of the world” is in this sense synonymous with “monistic conception of
+the world.”
+
+_B._ In its more restricted sense, as a universal _motion_-principle
+of physics, so that, for example, the postulated ether-vibrations of
+optics, of electricity, and so forth, as well as the grosser material
+oscillations of acoustics, heat, and so forth, are designated as
+mechanical processes subject to definite laws. “Mechanical natural
+philosophy,” in this sense, is identical with _physics_.
+
+_C._ In its narrowest sense, as that _branch_ of physics which deals
+with the grosser and visible processes of _motion_; as gravitation,
+locomotion, and the phoronomy of organisms. Mechanics, in this the most
+restricted sense, is viewed as opposed to optics, acoustics, etc., as the
+usages of the schools indicate.
+
+Since, now, the phrases “mechanical laws” and “mechanical
+explanation,” at the present day even, are frequently understood in
+these three distinct senses, no end of misunderstandings arise. Such
+misunderstandings may be best avoided, perhaps, by retaining the notion
+of mechanics in its narrowest (_C_) sense, and by substituting _physics_
+for the next narrower sense (_B_) and _monism_ for its most extended
+sense (_A_).
+
+
+III. PSYCHISM.
+
+In exactly the same way as the idea of mechanicalism, so also that of
+psychism is employed in a three-fold divergent sense. As in the former
+case _motion_, so here _feeling_ is conceived, now as a universal
+world-principle, now simply as a vital activity of all organisms, now
+simply as the particular mental activity of man.
+
+_A._ In its widest sense: _Panpsychism_. All matter is ensouled, because
+all natural bodies known to us possess determinate chemical properties,
+that is to say react uniformly and by law when subjected to the
+determinate chemical (i. e. molecular-mechanical) influences of other
+bodies: _chemical affinity_. Simplest example: sulphur and quicksilver
+rubbed together form cinnabar, a new body of entirely different
+properties. This is possible only on the supposition that the molecules
+(or atoms) of the two elements if brought within the proper distance,
+mutually _feel_ each other, by attraction move towards each other; on the
+decomposition of a simple chemical compound the contrary takes place:
+repulsion. (Empedocles’s doctrine of the “love and hatred of atoms.”)
+
+_B._ In its more restricted sense: _Biopsychism_. The _organisms_ alone
+are regarded as “ensouled,” because here the chemical processes are
+more complicated and more striking (producing motions in cyclically
+repeated succession) than in the case of the so-called “dead matter” of
+the inorganic bodies. In particular does organic “irritability” appear
+here as a higher form of the physical reaction called “_Auslösung_”
+[the setting free, disengagement], and “soul-activity” (reflexes)
+again as a higher form of irritability. However, all the phenomena
+of organic life ultimately admit of being reduced to “mechanical”
+(or “physico-chemical”) processes that differ from the processes of
+the inorganic world only in point of degree or quantitatively, not
+qualitatively. (“General Morphology,” I, Chap. V; VII, pp. 109-238.
+“Natural Creation,” VIII, First Edition, Lecture XV.)
+
+_C._ In its narrowest sense: _Zoopsychism_. Irritability, or universal
+organic soul-activity, such as is the attribute of all organisms,
+(identical with “life,”) reaches a higher stage through abstraction,
+through the formation of _ideas_. _Feeling_ and _will_ become more
+distinctly separated. This real soul-life, which is the attribute only
+of the higher animals, passes through a long succession of different
+stages of development, the most perfect of which is the soul of man.
+The so-called “freedom of the will” is apparent only, as each single
+volitional action is determined by a chain of precedent actions which
+ultimately rest either upon _heredity_ (propagation) or upon _adaptation_
+(nutrition). As these last are (“mechanically”) reducible to molecular
+motions, the same also holds true of the former.
+
+
+IV. THEISM.
+
+The idea of god that alone appears to be logically compatible with
+monism, is pantheism (or “cosmotheism”) in the sense of Goethe and
+Spinoza. God according to this view is identical with the sum-total
+of the force of the universe, which is inseparable from the sum-total
+of the matter of the universe. In opposition to this view stands
+_anthropotheism_. This is the outcome of dualism, which places God
+as a personal being in opposition to the “world” created by him,
+and consequently is always forced in its reasonings to resort to
+anthropomorphic expedients.
+
+
+V. MATERIALISM.
+
+The most important differences of form in which this much misunderstood
+and variously interpreted movement of philosophy has presented itself,
+may be classed as follows:
+
+_A._ In its most extended sense: as synonymous with _monism_ (or with
+mechanicalism). All the phenomena of the world are founded upon material
+processes, upon _motions_ (mechanicalism) or upon _feelings_ (psychism),
+both of which, as fundamental qualities, are inseparable from matter.
+Immaterial forces or immaterial “spirits” (minds) are unknown to us. As
+Goethe once said, “Mind can never exist and act without matter, matter
+never without mind.”
+
+_B._ In its more restricted sense: originally matter alone exists and
+creates _secondarily_ force (or “mind”). The fallacy of this view lies in
+its regarding the two things “matter and force” as disjoint and separate.
+According to our view the two are inseparably connected,—united in each
+atom from the very first.
+
+
+VI. SPIRITUALISM.
+
+This phase also of the world-conception has been the subject of the same
+misunderstandings and perverted conceptions as its apparent opposite,
+materialism.
+
+_A._ In its most extended sense, spiritualism is susceptible of
+identification with _psychism_—consequently also with monism. For
+_feeling_ (pleasure and pain) is just as much a thoroughly universal and
+fundamental property of matter (of each atom!) as is _motion_ (attraction
+and repulsion). Every single “spirit” is inseparably united with some
+“matter.”
+
+_B._ In its more restricted sense: originally force alone exists and
+creates _secondarily_ matter. This view, which is very old and very
+widely spread (“creation of the world”), is just as false and as
+one-sided as its contrary (5 _B_).
+
+
+VII. IMMORTALISM.
+
+The “belief in immortality” is scientifically (_critically_) tenable only
+as a _general_ proposition, and is in this case identical with the most
+universal law of physics, the _conservation of energy_ (coincidently,
+of course, the conservation of matter). On the other hand, the widely
+disseminated _dogmatic_ belief in a _personal_ immortality, a belief
+supported by the mass of the ecclesiastical religions, and of utmost
+importance as the consciously or unconsciously assumed _base_-axiom of a
+great number of philosophical systems, is, _scientifically_, absolutely
+untenable. The “human soul” (i. e. the sum-total of the individual
+life-activity: feeling, motion,—will,—and idea) is simply a transient
+developmentary phenomenon—a very highly developed “vertebrate-soul.”
+
+
+VIII. COSMISM.
+
+The determinate, and, as I believe, logical, form of the conception of
+the world, the principles of which I have advocated for thirty years,
+and whose most important aspects have been briefly outlined in the
+preceding paragraphs, may also be designated _cosmism_, to the extent
+that it proceeds from the fundamental idea that _cosmogeny_ or the
+“world-process,” as world-_development_, is, within certain limits,
+(within the limits namely of a reduction to the basic notions: matter
+and its two inseparable fundamental qualities motion and feeling,) a
+_knowable_ natural process. Cosmism is opposed, thus, to _agnosticism_.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+One highly important principle of my monism seems to me to be, that
+I regard _all_ matter as _ensouled_, that is to say as endowed with
+_feeling_ (pleasure and pain) and with _motion_, or, better, with the
+power of motion. As elementary (atomistic) attraction and repulsion
+these powers are asserted in every simplest chemical process, and
+on them is based also every other phenomenon, consequently also the
+highest-developed soul-activity of man. For the comprehension of this
+_graduated_ psychical development of matter perhaps my three stages will
+be useful: III _A._ (Panpsychism), III _B._ (Biopsychism), III _C._
+(Zoopsychism). So too consciousness, as the highest psychical action and
+the one most difficult to be explained, is in my views imply a higher
+stage of brain-activity, based upon the association, the abstraction,
+and centralisation of groups of ideas. Perhaps I have expressed myself
+poorly in these expositions, as I am little accustomed to dealing with
+philosophical axioms abstractly, and am too exclusively engaged in the
+concrete activity of my own special department. I cherish the hope,
+however, of being able within two or three years to devote more of my
+time to purely philosophical labors; when my work with the Challenger
+material, which has now absorbed twelve years of unremitting toil, is
+ended, my special zoological activity will have been completed; and I
+shall then find the opportunity of contributing more frequently to your
+highly valued magazines _The Monist_ and _The Open Court_.
+
+                                                            ERNST HAECKEL.
+
+
+
+
+THE MAGIC SQUARE.
+
+
+I.
+
+INTRODUCTORY.
+
+Among the philosophies of modern times there is no other which emphasises
+so much the importance of form and formal thought as the monism of _The
+Monist_. An expression thereof is found in the following passages:
+
+    “The order that prevails among the facts of reality is due
+    to the laws of form. Upon the order of the world depends its
+    cognisability.
+
+    “... The laws of form are no less eternal than are matter and
+    energy and ‘Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass,
+    one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law!’
+
+    “The laws of form and their origin have been a puzzle to all
+    philosophers. ‘Ay, there’s the rub!’ The difficulties of Hume’s
+    problem of causation, of Kant’s _a priori_, of Plato’s ideas,
+    of Mill’s method of deduction, etc., etc., all arise from a
+    one-sided view of form and the laws of form and formal thought.”
+
+Considering the great results which engineering and other applied
+sciences accomplish through the assistance of mathematics, we must
+confess that the forms of thought are wonderful indeed, and it is not
+at all astonishing that the primitive thinkers of mankind when the
+importance of the laws of formal thought in some way or another first
+dawned on their minds, attributed magic powers to numbers and geometrical
+figures.
+
+We shall devote the following pages to a brief review of magic squares,
+the consideration of which has made many a man believe in mysticism.
+And yet there is no mysticism about them unless we either consider
+everything mystical, even that twice two is four, or join the sceptic in
+his exclamation that we can truly not know whether twice two might not be
+five in other spheres of the universe.
+
+[Illustration: ALBERT DÜRER’S ENGRAVING
+
+MELANCHOLY OR THE GENIUS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE OF MECHANICS]
+
+The author of the short article on “Magic Squares” in the English
+Cyclopædia (Vol. III, p. 415), presumably Prof. DeMorgan, says:
+
+    “Though the question of magic squares be in itself of no use,
+    yet it belongs to a class of problems which call into action
+    a beneficial species of investigation. Without laying down
+    any rules for their construction, we shall content ourselves
+    with destroying their magic quality, and showing that the
+    non-existence of such squares would be much more surprising
+    than their existence.”
+
+This is the point. There obtains a symphonic harmony in mathematics which
+is the more startling the more obvious and self-evident it appears to him
+who understands the laws that produce this symphonic harmony.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+On the wood-cut named “Melancholia”[68] of the famous Nuremberg painter,
+Albrecht Dürer, is found among a number of other emblems, which the
+reader will notice in our reproduction of the cut, the subjoined square.
+This arrangement of the sixteen natural numbers from 1 to 16 possesses
+the remarkable property that the same sum 34 will always be obtained
+whether we add together the four figures of any of the horizontal rows
+or the four of any vertical row or the four which lie in either of the
+two diagonals. Such an arrangement of numbers is termed a magic square,
+and the square which we have reproduced above is _the first magic square
+which is met with in the Christian Occident_.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 1.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 1|14|15| 4|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    |12| 7| 6| 9|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 8|11|10| 5|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    |13| 2| 3|16|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+Like chess and many of the problems founded on the figure of the
+chess-board, the problem of constructing a magic square also probably
+traces its origin to Indian soil. From there the problem found its way
+among the Arabs, and by them it was brought to the Roman Orient. Finally,
+since Albrecht Dürer’s time, the scholars of Western Europe also have
+occupied themselves with methods for the construction of squares of this
+character.
+
+The oldest and the simplest magic square consists of the quadratic
+arrangement of the nine numbers from 1 to 9 in such a manner that the sum
+of each horizontal, vertical, or diagonal row, always remains the same,
+namely 15. This square is the adjoined.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 2.
+
+    +-+-+-+
+    |2|7|6|
+    +-+-+-+
+    |9|5|1|
+    +-+-+-+
+    |4|3|8|
+    +-+-+-+
+]
+
+Here, we will find, 15 always comes out whether we add 2 and 7 and 6, or
+9 and 5 and 1, or 4 and 3 and 8, or 2 and 9 and 4, or 7 and 5 and 3, or 6
+and 1 and 8, or 2 and 5 and 8, or 6 and 5 and 4.
+
+The question naturally presents itself, whether this condition of the
+constant equality of the added sum also remains fulfilled when the
+numbers are assigned different places. It may be easily shown however
+that 5 necessarily must occupy the middle place, and that the even
+numbers must stand in the corners. This being so, there are but 7
+additional arrangements possible, which differ from the arrangement
+above given and from one another only in the respect that the rows at
+the top, at the left, at the bottom, and at the right, exchange places
+with one another and that in addition a mirror be imagined present with
+each arrangement. So too from Dürer’s square of 4 times 4 places, by
+transpositions, a whole set of new correct squares may be formed. A magic
+square of the 4 times 4 numbers from 1 to 16 is formed in the simplest
+manner as follows. We inscribe the numbers from 1 to 16 in their natural
+order in the squares, thus:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 3.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 2| 3| 4|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 5| 6| 7| 8|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 9|10|11|12|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    |13|14|15|16|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+We then leave the numbers in the four corner-squares, viz. 1, 4, 13, 16,
+as well also as the numbers in the four middle-squares, viz. 6, 7, 10,
+11, in their original places; and in the place of the remaining eight
+numbers, we write the complements of the same with respect to 17: thus 15
+instead of 2, 14 instead of 3, 12 instead of 5, 9 instead of 8, 8 instead
+of 9, 5 instead of 12, 3 instead of 14, and 2 instead of 15. We obtain
+thus the magic square
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 4.
+
+    =34              =34
+       \             /
+        +--+--+--+--+
+        | 1|15|14| 4|=34
+        +--+--+--+--+
+        |12| 6| 7| 9|=34
+        +--+--+--+--+
+        | 8|10|11| 5|=34
+        +--+--+--+--+
+        |13| 3| 2|16|=34
+        +--+--+--+--+
+         34 34 34 34
+]
+
+from which the same sum 34 always results. It is an interesting property
+of this square that any four numbers which form a rectangle or square
+about the centre also always give the same sum 34; for example, 1, 4,
+13, 16, or 6, 7, 10, 11, or 15, 14, 3, 2, or 12, 9, 5, 8, or 15, 8, 2,
+9, or 14, 12, 3, 5. We may easily convince ourselves that this square is
+obtainable from the square of Dürer by interchanging with one another the
+two middle vertical rows.
+
+
+II.
+
+EARLY METHODS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ODD-NUMBERED SQUARES.
+
+Since early times rules have also been known for the construction of
+magic squares of more than 3 times 3, or 4 times 4 spaces. In the first
+place, it is easy to calculate the sum which in the case of any given
+number of cells must result from the addition of each row. We take the
+determinate number of cells in each side of the square which we have to
+fill, multiply that number by itself, add 1, again multiply the number
+thus obtained by the number of the cells in each side, and, finally,
+divide the product by 2. Thus, with 4 times 4 cells or squares, we get:
+4 times 4 are 16, 16 and 1 are 17, and one half of 17 times 4 is 34.
+Similarly, with 5 times 5 squares, we get: 5 times 5 are 25, and 1 makes
+26, and the half of 26 times 5 is 65. Analogously, for 6 times 6 squares
+the summation 111 is obtained, for 7 times 7 squares 175, for 8 times 8
+squares 260, for 9 times 9 squares 369, for 10 times 10 squares 505, and
+so on. The Hindu rule for the construction of magic squares whose roots
+are odd, may be enunciated as follows: To start with, write 1 in the
+centre of the topmost row, then write 2 in the lowest space of the
+vertical column next adjacent to the right, and then so inscribe the
+remaining numbers in their natural order in the squares diagonally
+upwards towards the right, that on reaching the right-hand margin the
+inscription shall be continued from the left-hand margin in the row just
+above, and on reaching the upper margin shall be continued from the lower
+margin in the column next adjacent to the right, noting that whenever we
+are arrested in our progress by a square already occupied we are to fill
+out the square next beneath the one we have last filled. In this manner,
+for example, the last preceding square of 7 times 7 cells is formed, in
+which the reader is requested to follow the numbers in their natural
+sequence (Fig. 5).
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 5.
+
+    =175                              =175
+        \                             /
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         |30 |39 |48 | 1 |10 |19 |28 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         |38 |47 | 7 | 9 |18 |27 |29 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         |46 | 6 | 8 |17 |26 |35 |37 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         | 5 |14 |16 |25 |34 |36 |45 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         |13 |15 |24 |33 |42 |44 | 4 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         |21 |23 |32 |41 |43 | 3 |12 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+         |22 |31 |40 |49 | 2 |11 |20 |=175
+         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+          175 175 175 175 175 175 175
+]
+
+For the next further advancements of the theory of magic squares and
+of the methods for their construction we are indebted to the Byzantian
+Greek, Moschopulus, who lived in the fourteenth century; also, after
+Albrecht Dürer who lived about the year 1500, to the celebrated
+arithmetician Adam Riese, and to the mathematician Michael Stifel, which
+two last lived about 1550. In the seventeenth century Bachet de Méziriac,
+and Athanasius Kircher employed themselves on magic squares. About
+1700, finally, the French mathematicians De la Hire and Sauveur made
+considerable contributions to the theory. In recent times mathematicians
+have concerned themselves much less about magic squares, as they have
+indeed about mathematical recreations generally. But quite recently the
+Brunswick mathematician Scheffler has put forth his own and other’s
+studies on this subject in an elegant form.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 6.
+
+                     | 7|
+                     |  |
+                  | 6|  |14|
+                  |  |  |  |
+               | 5|  |13|  |21|
+            +==+==+==+==+==+==+==+
+            | 4|  |12|  |20|  |28|
+         ---|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---
+           3|  |11|  |19|  |27|  |35
+      ------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|------
+        2   |10|  |18|  |26|  |34|   42
+    --------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---------
+     1     9|  |17|  |25|  |33|  |41    49
+    --------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---------
+        8   |16|  |24|  |32|  |40|   48
+      ------|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|------
+          15|  |23|  |31|  |39|  |47
+         ---|--+--+--+--+--+--+--|---
+            |22|  |30|  |38|  |46|
+            +==+==+==+==+==+==+==+
+               |29|  |37|  |45|
+                  |  |  |  |
+                  |36|  |44|
+                     |  |
+                     |43|
+]
+
+The best known of the various methods of constructing magic squares of an
+odd number of cells is the following. First write the numbers in diagonal
+succession as in the preceding diagram (Fig. 6). After 25 cells of the
+square of 49 cells which we have to fill out, have thus been occupied,
+transfer the six figures found outside each side of the square, without
+changing their configuration, into the empty cells of the side directly
+opposite. By this method, which we owe to Bachet de Méziriac, we obtain
+the following magic square of the numbers from 1 to 49:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 7.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 4|29|12|37|20|45|28|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |35|11|36|19|44|27| 3|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |10|42|18|43|26| 2|34|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |41|17|49|25| 1|33| 9|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |16|48|24| 7|32| 8|40|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |47|23| 6|31|14|39|15|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |22| 5|30|13|38|21|46|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+
+III.
+
+MODERN MODES OF CONSTRUCTION OF ODD-NUMBERED SQUARES.
+
+The reader will justly ask whether there do not exist other correct
+magic squares which are constructed after a different method from that
+just given, and whether there do not exist modes of construction which
+will lead to all the imaginable and possible magic squares of a definite
+number of cells. A general mode of construction of this character
+was first given for odd-numbered squares by De la Hire, and recently
+perfected by Professor Scheffler.
+
+To acquaint ourselves with this general method, let us select as our
+example a square of 5. First we form two auxiliary squares. In the
+first we write the numbers from 1 to 5 five times; and in the second,
+five times, the following multiples of five, viz.: 0, 5, 10, 15, 20.
+It is clear now that by adding each of the numbers of the series from
+1 to 5 with each of the numbers 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, we shall get all the
+25 numerals from 1 to 25. All that additionally remains to be done
+therefore, is, so to inscribe the numbers that by the addition of the
+two numbers in any two corresponding cells each combination shall come
+out once and only once; and further that in each horizontal, vertical,
+and diagonal row in each auxiliary square each number shall once appear.
+Then the required sum of 65 must necessarily result in every case,
+because the numbers from 1 to 5 added together make 15, and the numbers
+0, 5, 10, 15, 20 make 50.
+
+We effect the required method of inscription by imagining the numbers
+1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (or 0, 5, 10, 15, 20) arranged in cyclical succession,
+that is 1 immediately following upon 5, and, starting from any number
+whatsoever, by skipping each time either none or one or two or three etc.
+figures. Cycles are thus obtained of the first, the second, the third
+etc. orders; for example 3 4 5 1 2 is a cycle of the first order, 2 4 1
+3 5 is a cycle of the second order, 1 5 4 3 2 is a cycle of the fourth
+order, etc. The only thing then to be looked out for in the two auxiliary
+squares is, that the same “cycle” order be horizontally preserved in all
+the rows, that the same also happens for the vertical rows, but that the
+cycle order in the horizontal and vertical rows is different. Finally we
+have only additionally to take care that to the same numbers of the one
+auxiliary square not like numbers but _different_ numbers correspond in
+the other auxiliary square, that is lie in similarly situated cells. The
+following auxiliary squares are, for example, thus possible:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 8.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |3 |4 |5 |1 |2 |
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |5 |1 |2 |3 |4 |
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |2 |3 |4 |5 |1 |
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |4 |5 |1 |2 |3 |
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+and
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 9.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 0|10|20| 5|15|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 5|15| 0|10|20|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |10|20| 5|15| 0|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |15| 0|10|20| 5|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |20| 5|15| 0|10|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+Adding in pairs the numbers which occupy similarly situated cells, we
+obtain the following correct magic square:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 10.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 3|14|25| 6|17|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |10|16| 2|13|24|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |12|23| 9|20| 1|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |19| 5|11|22| 8|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+    |21| 7|18| 4|15|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+It will be seen that we are able thus to construct a very large number
+of magic squares of 5 times 5 spaces by varying in every possible manner
+the numbers in the two auxiliary squares. Furthermore, the squares thus
+formed possess the additional peculiarity, that every 5 numbers which
+fill out two rows that are parallel to a diagonal and lie on different
+sides of the diagonal also give the constant sum of 65. For example:
+3 and 7, 11, 20, 24; or 10, 14 and 18, 22, 1. Altogether then the sum
+65 is produced out of 20 rows or pairs of rows. On this peculiarity is
+dependent the fact that if we imagine an unlimited number of such squares
+placed by the side of, above, or beneath an initial one, we shall be
+able to obtain as many quadratic cells as we choose, so arranged that
+the square composed of any 25 of these cells will form a correct magic
+square, as the following figure will show:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 11.
+
+     2|13|24|10|16| 2|13|24|10|16| 2
+    --+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--
+     9|20| 1|12|23| 9|20| 1|12|23| 9
+    --+--+--+--+--+==============+--
+    11|22| 8|19| 5¦11|22| 8|19| 5¦11
+    --+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦—
+    18| 4|15|21| 7¦18| 4|15|21| 7¦18
+    --+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦—
+    25| 6|17| 3|14¦25| 6|17| 3|14¦25
+    --+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦—
+     2|13|24|10|16¦ 2|13|24|10|16¦ 2
+    --+--+========¦=====+--+--+--¦—
+     9|20¦ 1|12|23¦ 9|20¦ 1|12|23¦ 9
+    --+--¦--+--+--+=====¦========+--
+    11|22¦ 8|19| 5|11|22¦ 8|19| 5|11
+    --+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--
+    18| 4¦15|21| 7|18| 4¦15|21| 7|18
+    --+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--
+    25| 6¦17| 3|14|25| 6¦17| 3|14|25
+    --+--¦--+--+--+--+--¦--+--+--+--
+     2|13¦24|10|16| 2|13¦24|10|16| 2
+    --+--+==============+--+--+--+--
+     9|20| 1|12|23| 9|20| 1|12|23| 9
+    --+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--
+    11|22| 8|19| 5|11|22| 8|19| 5|11
+]
+
+Every square of every 25 of these numbers, as for example the two
+dark-bordered ones, possesses the property that the addition of the
+horizontal, vertical, and diagonal rows gives each the same sum, 65.
+
+As an example of a higher number of cells we will append here a magic
+square of 11 times 11 spaces formed by the general method of De la
+Hire from the two auxiliary squares of Figs. 12 and 13. From these two
+auxiliary squares we obtain by the addition of the two numbers of every
+two similarly situated cells, the magic square, exhibited in Diagram 14,
+in which each row gives the same sum 671.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 12.
+
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 8 | 9 | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 10| 11| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 13.
+
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    |110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 55| 66| 77| 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 88| 99|110| 0 | 11| 22| 33| 44| 55| 66| 77|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 14.
+
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 1 | 13| 25| 37| 49| 61| 73| 85| 97|109|121|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 36| 48| 60| 72| 84| 96|108|120| 11| 12| 24|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 71| 83| 95|107|119| 10| 22| 23| 35| 47| 59|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    |106|118| 9 | 21| 33| 34| 46| 58| 70| 82| 94|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 20| 32| 44| 45| 57| 69| 81| 93|105|117| 8 |
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 55| 56| 68| 80| 92|104|116| 7 | 19| 31| 43|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 79| 91|103|115| 6 | 18| 30| 42| 54| 66| 67|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    |114| 5 | 17| 29| 41| 53| 65| 77| 78| 90|102|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 28| 40| 52| 64| 76| 88| 89|101|113| 4 | 16|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 63| 75| 87| 99|100|112| 3 | 15| 27| 39| 51|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 98|110|111| 2 | 14| 26| 38| 50| 62| 74| 86|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+]
+
+
+IV.
+
+EVEN-NUMBERED SQUARES.
+
+Of magic squares having an even number of places we have hitherto
+had to deal only with the square of 4. To construct squares of this
+description having a higher even number of places, different and more
+complicated methods must be employed than for squares of odd numbers
+of places. However, in this case also, as in dealing with the square
+of 4, we start with the natural sequence of the numbers and must then
+find the complements of the numbers with respect to some other certain
+number (as 17 in the square of 4) and also effect certain exchanges of
+the numbers with one another. To form, for example, a magic square of 6
+times 6 places, we inscribe in the 12 diagonal cells the numbers that in
+the natural sequence of inscription fall into these places, then in the
+remaining cells the complements of the numbers that belong therein with
+respect to 37, and finally effect the following six exchanges, viz. of
+the numbers 33 and 3, 25 and 7, 20 and 14, 18 and 13, 10 and 9, and 5 and
+2. In this way the following magic square is obtained.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 15.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1|35|34| 3|32| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |30| 8|28|27|11| 7|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |24|23|15|16|14|19|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |13|17|21|22|20|18|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |12|26| 9|10|29|25|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |31| 2| 4|33| 5|36|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+This square may also be constructed by the method of De la Hire, from two
+auxiliary squares with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 0, 6, 12, 18,
+24, 30 respectively. In this case, however, the vertical rows of the one
+square and the horizontal rows of the other must each so contain two same
+numbers thrice repeated that the summation shall always remain 21 and 90
+respectively. In this manner we get the magic square last given above
+from the two following auxiliary squares:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 16.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 5| 4| 3| 2| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 6| 2| 4| 3| 5| 1|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 6| 5| 3| 4| 2| 1|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 5| 3| 4| 2| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 6| 2| 3| 4| 5| 1|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 2| 4| 3| 5| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+and
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 17.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 0|30|30| 0|30| 0|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |24| 6|24|24| 6| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |18|18|12|12|12|18|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |12|12|18|18|18|12|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 6|24| 6| 6|24|24|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |30| 0| 0|30| 0|30|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+It is to be noted in connection with this example that here also as in
+the case of odd-numbered squares, it is possible so to inscribe six
+times the numbers from 1 to 6 that each number shall appear once and only
+once in each horizontal, vertical, and diagonal row; for example, in the
+following manner:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 18.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 2| 3| 4| 5| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 2| 4| 6| 1| 3| 5|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 3| 6| 5| 2| 1| 4|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 5| 3| 1| 6| 4| 2|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 6| 5| 4| 3| 2| 1|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 4| 1| 2| 5| 6| 3|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+But if we attempt so to insert, in a like manner, the other set of
+numbers 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 in a second auxiliary square, that each
+number of the first auxiliary square shall stand once and once only in
+a corresponding cell with each number of the second square, all the
+attempts we may make to fulfil coincidently the last named condition will
+result in failure. It is therefore necessary to select auxiliary squares
+like the two given above. It is noteworthy, that the fulfilment of the
+second condition is impossible only in the case of the square of 6, but
+that in the case of the square of 4 or of the square of 8, for example,
+two auxiliary squares, such as the method of De la Hire requires, are
+possible. Thus, taking the square of 4 we get
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 19.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 2| 3| 4|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 4| 3| 2| 1|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 2| 1| 4| 3|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 3| 4| 1| 2|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+and
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 20.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 0| 4| 8|12|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 8|12| 0| 4|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    |12| 8| 4| 0|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+    | 4| 0|12| 8|
+    +--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+The reader may form for himself the magic square which these give.
+
+The existence of these two auxiliary squares furnishes a key to the
+solution of a pretty problem at cards. If we replace, namely, the
+numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 by the Ace, the King, the Queen, and the Knave, and
+the numbers 0, 4, 8, 12 by the four suits, clubs, spades, hearts, and
+diamonds, we shall at once perceive that it is possible, and must be so
+necessarily, quadratically to arrange in such a manner the four Aces,
+the four Kings, the Four Queens, and the four Knaves, that in each
+horizontal, vertical, and diagonal row, each one of the four suits and
+each one of the four denominations shall appear once and once only. The
+auxiliary squares above given furnish the appended solution of this
+problem:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 21.
+
+    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
+    | CLUBS  | SPADES | HEARTS |DIAMONDS|
+    |  ACE   |  KING  | QUEEN  | KNAVE  |
+    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
+    | HEARTS |DIAMONDS| CLUBS  | SPADES |
+    | KNAVE  | QUEEN  |  KING  |   ACE  |
+    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
+    |DIAMONDS| HEARTS | SPADES | CLUBS  |
+    |  KING  |  ACE   | KNAVE  | QUEEN  |
+    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
+    | SPADES | CLUBS  |DIAMONDS| HEARTS |
+    | QUEEN  | KNAVE  |  ACE   |  KING  |
+    +--------+--------+--------+--------+
+]
+
+To fix the solution of the problem in the memory, observe that, starting
+from the several corners, each suit and each denomination must be placed
+in the spots of the move of a Knight. If we fix the positions of the four
+cards of any one row, there will be only two possibilities left of so
+placing the other cards that the required condition of having each suit
+and each denomination once and only once in each row shall be fulfilled.
+
+Of magic squares of an even number of places we have up to this point
+examined only the squares of 4 and of 6. For the sake of completeness we
+append here one of 8 and one of 10 places. The mode of construction of
+these squares is similar to the method above discussed for the lower even
+numbers.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 22.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1|63|62| 4| 5|59|58| 8|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |56|10|11|53|52|14|15|49|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |48|18|19|45|44|22|23|41|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |25|39|38|28|29|35|34|32|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |33|31|30|36|37|27|26|40|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |24|42|43|21|20|46|47|17|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |16|50|51|13|12|54|55| 9|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |57| 7| 6|60|61| 3| 2|64|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 23.
+
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 1 | 99| 3 | 97| 96| 5 | 94| 8 | 92| 10|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 90| 12| 88| 14| 86| 85| 17| 83| 19| 11|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 80| 79| 23| 77| 25| 26| 74| 28| 22| 71|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 31| 69| 68| 34| 66| 65| 37| 33| 62| 40|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 60| 42| 58| 57| 45| 46| 44| 53| 49| 51|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 50| 52| 43| 47| 55| 56| 54| 48| 59| 41|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 61| 32| 38| 64| 36| 35| 67| 63| 39| 70|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 21| 29| 73| 27| 75| 76| 24| 78| 72| 30|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 20| 82| 18| 84| 15| 16| 87| 13| 89| 81|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 91| 9 | 93| 4 | 6 | 95| 7 | 98| 2 |100|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+]
+
+The magic squares of even numbers thus constructed are not the only
+possible ones. On the contrary, there are very many others possible,
+which obey different laws of formation. It has been calculated, for
+example, that with the square of 4 it is possible to construct 880, and
+with the square of 6, _several million_, different magic squares. The
+number of odd-numbered magic squares constructible by the method of De la
+Hire is also very great. With the square of 7, the possible constructions
+amount to 363,916,800. With the squares of higher numbers the multitude
+of the possibilities increases in the same enormous ratio.
+
+
+V.
+
+MAGIC SQUARES WHOSE SUMMATION GIVES THE NUMBER OF A YEAR.
+
+The magic squares which we have so far considered contain only the
+natural numbers from 1 upwards. It is possible, however, easily to
+deduce from a correct magic square other squares in which a different
+law controls the sequence of the numbers to be inscribed. Of the squares
+obtained in this manner, we shall devote our attention here only to such
+in which, although formed by the inscription of successive numbers, the
+sum obtained from the addition of the rows is a determinate number which
+we have fixed upon beforehand, as _the number of a year_. In such a case
+we have simply to add to the numbers of the original square a determinate
+number so to be calculated, that the required sum shall each time appear.
+If this sum is divisible by 3, magic squares will always be obtainable
+with 3 times 3 spaces which shall give this sum. In such a case we divide
+the sum required by 3 and subtract 5 from the result in order to obtain
+the number which we have to add to each number of the original square.
+If the sum desired is even but not divisible by 4, we must then subtract
+from it 34 and take one fourth of the result, to obtain the number which
+in this case is to be added in each place. If, for example, we wish to
+obtain the number of the year 1890 as the resulting sum of each row, we
+shall have to add to each of the numbers of an ordinary magic square of
+4 times 4 spaces the number 464; in other words, instead of the numbers
+from 1 to 16 we have to insert in the squares the numbers from 465 to
+480. As the number of the present year 1892 is divisible by 11, it must
+be possible to deduce from the magic square constructed by us at the
+conclusion of Section III a second magic square in which each row of 11
+cells will give the number of the year 1892. To do this, we subtract from
+1892 the sum of the original square, namely 671, and divide the remainder
+by 11, whereby we get 111 and thus perceive that the numbers from 112 to
+232 are to be inscribed in the cells of the square required. We get in
+this way the preceding square, from which _one and the same sum, namely
+1892, can be obtained 44 times_, first from each of the 11 horizontal
+rows, secondly from each of the 11 vertical rows, thirdly from each of
+the two diagonal rows, and fourthly twenty additional times from each
+and every pair of any two rows that lie parallel to a diagonal, have
+together 11 cells, and lie on different sides of the diagonal, as for
+example, 196, 122, 158, 205, 131, 167, 214, 140, 187, 223, 149.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 24.
+
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+    | 112| 124| 136| 148| 160| 172| 184| 196| 208| 220| 232| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 147| 159| 171| 183| 195| 207| 219| 231| 122| 123| 135| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 182| 194| 206| 218| 230| 121| 133| 134| 146| 158| 170| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 217| 229| 120| 132| 144| 145| 157| 169| 181| 193| 205| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 131| 143| 155| 156| 168| 180| 192| 204| 216| 228| 119| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 166| 167| 179| 191| 203| 215| 227| 118| 130| 142| 154| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 190| 202| 214| 226| 117| 129| 141| 153| 165| 177| 178| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 225| 116| 128| 140| 152| 164| 176| 188| 189| 201| 213| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 139| 151| 163| 175| 187| 199| 200| 212| 224| 115| 127| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 174| 186| 198| 210| 211| 223| 114| 126| 138| 150| 162| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-------
+    | 209| 221| 222| 113| 125| 137| 149| 161| 173| 185| 197| = 1892
+    +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+     1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892 1892
+]
+
+
+VI.
+
+CONCENTRIC MAGIC SQUARES.
+
+The acuteness of the mathematicians has also discovered magic squares
+which possess the peculiar property that if one row after another be
+taken away from each side, the smaller inner squares remaining will
+still be magical squares, that is to say, all their rows when added
+will give the same sum. It will be sufficient to give two examples here
+of such squares, (the laws for their construction being somewhat more
+complicated,) of which the first has 7 times 7 and the second 8 times 8
+places. The numbers within each of the dark-bordered frames form with
+respect to the centre smaller squares which in their own turn are magical.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 25.
+
+    +--+---+---+--+--+---+---+
+    | 4|  5| 6 |43|39| 38| 40|
+    +--++================++--+
+    |49||15| 16|33|30| 31|| 1|
+    +--||--++========++--||--+
+    |48||37||22|27|26||13|| 2|
+    +--||--||--+--+--||--||--+
+    |47||36||29|25|21||14|| 3|
+    +--||--||--+--+--||--||--+
+    | 8||18||24|23|28||32||42|
+    +--||--++========++--||--+
+    | 9||19| 34|17|20| 35||41|
+    +--++================++--+
+    |10| 45| 44| 7|11| 12| 46|
+    +--+---+---+--+--+---+---+
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 26.
+
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 1 | 56| 55| 11| 53| 13| 14| 57|
+    +---++=====================++---+
+    | 63||15| 47| 22| 42| 24|45|| 2 |
+    +---||--+==============++--||---+
+    | 62||49||25| 40| 34|31||16|| 3 |
+    +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+
+    | 4 ||48||28| 37| 35|30||17|| 61|
+    +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+
+    | 5 ||44||39| 26| 32|33||21|| 60|
+    +---||--||--+---+---+--||--||---+
+    | 59||19||38| 27| 29|36||46|| 6 |
+    +---||--++=============++--||---+
+    | 58||20| 18| 43| 23| 41|50|| 7 |
+    +---++=====================++---+
+    | 8 | 9 | 10| 54| 12| 52| 51| 64|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+]
+
+In the first of these two squares the internal square of 3 times 3 places
+contains the numbers from 21 to 29 in such a manner that each row gives
+when added the sum of 75. This square lies within a larger one of 5 times
+5 spaces, which contains the numbers from 13 to 37 in such a manner that
+each row gives the sum of 125. Finally, this last square forms part of
+a square of 7 times 7 places which contains the numbers from 1 to 49 so
+that each row gives the sum of 175.
+
+In the second square the inner central square of 4 times 4 places
+contains the numbers from 25 to 40 in such a manner that each row gives
+the sum of 130. This square is the middle of a square of 6 times 6 places
+which so contains the numbers from 15 to 50 that each row gives the sum
+165. Finally, this last square is again the middle of an ordinary magic
+square composed of the numbers from 1 to 64.
+
+
+VII.
+
+MAGICAL SQUARES WITH MAGICAL PARTS.
+
+If we divide a square of 8 times 8 places by means of the two middle
+lines parallel to its sides into 4 parts containing each 4 times 4
+spaces, we may propound the problem of so inserting the numbers from 1
+to 64 in these spaces that not only the whole shall form a magic square,
+but also that each of the 4 parts individually shall be magical, that
+is to say, give the same sum for each row. This problem also has been
+successfully solved, as the following diagram will show.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 27.
+
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    | 1| 4|63|62|| 5| 8|59|58|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    |64|61| 2| 3||60|57| 6| 7|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    |42|43|24|21||34|35|32|29|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    |23|22|41|44||31|30|33|36|
+    +===========++===========+
+    |13|16|51|50|| 9|12|55|54|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    |52|49|14|15||56|53|10|11|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    |38|39|28|25||46|47|20|17|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+    |27|26|37|40||19|18|45|48|
+    +--+--+--+--++--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+The 4 numbers in each row of any one of the sub-squares here, gives 130;
+so that the sum of each one of the rows of the large square will be 260.
+
+Finally, in further illustration of this idea, we will submit to the
+consideration of our readers a very remarkable square of the numbers from
+1 to 81. This square, which will be found on the following page (Fig.
+28), is divided by parallel lines into 9 parts, of which each contains 9
+consecutive numbers that severally make up a magic square by themselves.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 28.
+
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 31| 36| 29|| 76| 81| 74|| 13| 18| 11|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 30| 32| 34|| 75| 77| 79|| 12| 14| 16|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 35| 28| 33|| 80| 73| 78|| 17| 10| 15|
+    +===========++===========++===========+
+    | 22| 27| 20|| 40| 45| 38|| 58| 63| 56|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 21| 23| 25|| 39| 41| 43|| 57| 59| 61|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 26| 19| 24|| 44| 37| 42|| 62| 55| 60|
+    +===========++===========++===========+
+    | 67| 72| 65|| 4 | 9 | 2 || 49| 54| 47|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 66| 68| 70|| 3 | 5 | 7 || 48| 50| 52|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+    | 71| 64| 69|| 8 | 1 | 6 || 53| 46| 51|
+    +---+---+---++---+---+---++---+---+---+
+]
+
+Wonderful as the properties of this square may appear, the law by which
+the author constructed it is equally simple. We have simply to regard the
+9 parts as the 9 cells of a magic square of the numbers from I to IX and
+then to inscribe by the magic prescript in the square designated as I the
+numbers from 1 to 9, in the square designated as II the numbers from 10
+to 18, and so on. In this way the square above given is obtained from the
+following base-square:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 29.
+
+    +----+----+----+
+    | IV | IX | II |
+    +----+----+----+
+    | III| V  | VII|
+    +----+----+----+
+    |VIII| I  | VI |
+    +----+----+----+
+]
+
+
+VIII.
+
+MAGIC SQUARES THAT INVOLVE THE MOVE OF THE CHESS-KNIGHT.
+
+What one of our readers does not know the problems contained in the
+recreation columns of our magazines, the requirements of which are to
+compose into a verse 8 times 8 quadratically arranged syllables, of
+which every two successive syllables stand on spots so situated with
+respect to each other that a chess-knight can move from the one to the
+other? If we replace in such an arrangement the 64 successive syllables
+by the 64 numbers from 1 to 64, we shall obtain a knight-problem made
+up of numbers. Methods also exist indeed for the construction of
+such dispositions of numbers, which then form the foundation of the
+construction of the problems in the newspapers. But the majority of
+knight-problems of this class are the outcome of experiment rather than
+the product of methodical creation. If however it is a severe test of
+patience to form a knight-problem by experiment, it stands to reason that
+it is a still severer trial to effect at the same time the additional
+result that the 64 numbers which form the knight-problem shall also form
+a magic square.
+
+This trial of endurance was undertaken several decades ago, by a
+pensioned Moravian officer named Wenzelides, who was spending the last
+days of his life in the country. After a series of trials which lasted
+years he finally succeeded in so inscribing in the 64 squares of the
+chess-board the numbers from 1 to 64 that successive numbers, as well
+also as the numbers 64 and 1, were always removed from one another in
+distance and direction by the move of a knight, and that in addition
+thereto the summation of the horizontal and the vertical rows always
+gave the same sum 260. Ultimately he discovered several squares of this
+description, which were published in the _Berlin Chess Journal_. One of
+these is here appended:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 30.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |47|10|23|64|49| 2|59| 6|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |22|63|48| 9|60| 5|50| 3|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |11|46|61|24| 1|52| 7|58|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |62|21|12|45| 8|57| 4|51|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |19|36|25|40|13|44|53|30|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |26|39|20|33|56|29|14|43|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |35|18|37|28|41|16|31|54|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |38|27|34|17|32|55|42|15|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+The move of the knight and the equality of the summation of the
+horizontal and vertical rows, therefore, are the facts to be noted here.
+The diagonal rows do _not_ give the sum 260. Perhaps some one among our
+readers who possesses the time and patience will be tempted to outdo
+Wenzelides, and to devise a numeral knight-problem of this kind which
+will give 260 not only in the horizontal and vertical but also in the two
+diagonal rows.
+
+
+IX.
+
+MAGICAL POLYGONS.
+
+So far we have only considered such extensions of the idea underlying
+the construction of the magic square in which the figure of the square
+was retained. We may however contrive extensions of the idea in which
+instead of a square, a rectangle, a triangle, or a pentagon, and the
+like, appear. Without entering into the consideration of the methods for
+the construction of such figures, we will give here of magical polygons
+simply a few examples, all supplied by Professor Scheffler:
+
+1) The numbers from 1 to 32 admit of being written in a rectangle of 4 ×
+8 in such a manner that the long horizontal rows give the sum of 132 and
+the short vertical rows the sum of 66; thus:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 31.
+
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 1|10|11|29|28|19|18|16|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    | 9| 2|30|12|20|27| 7|25|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |24|31| 3|21|13| 6|26| 8|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+    |32|23|22| 4| 5|14|15|17|
+    +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+2) The numbers from 1 to 27 admit of being so arranged in three regular
+triangles about a point which forms a common centre, that each side of
+the outermost triangle will present 6 numbers of the total summation 96
+and each side of the middle triangle 4 numbers whose sum is 61; as the
+following figure shows:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 32.
+
+    26     3     6    10    24    27
+             20   9   11   21
+       18                       2
+                 16   17
+               15        8
+           22                5
+                    12
+                  7   13
+              4          23
+                    19
+                 1     14
+
+                    25
+]
+
+3) The numbers from 1 to 80 admit of being formed about a point as common
+centre into 4 pentagons, such that each side of the first pentagon from
+within contains two numbers, each side of the second pentagon four
+numbers, each of the third six numbers, and each side of the fourth,
+outermost pentagon eight numbers. The sum of the numbers of each side of
+the second pentagon is 122, the sum of those of each side of the third
+pentagon is 248, and that of those of each side of the fourth pentagon
+254. Furthermore, the sum of any four corner numbers lying in the same
+straight line with the centre, is also the same; namely, 92.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 33.
+
+                           1
+                       26     54
+                    31            49
+                 10       15         80
+             76       36      44         9
+          50       70            72         32
+       55       71        16        66         27
+    5        45       25     65         37        2
+          11        61    60     24         14
+     30        20                     17        53
+           40        56         59        43
+       35        21                 64        48
+             69        57    58         73
+         6                                  79
+          77   75  62             23  67   8
+            46   41 19  22   63  18  38  33
+              51  12 39  68 74  42 13  28
+                4  29 34  7 78 47 52  3
+]
+
+4) The numbers from 1 to 73 admit of being arranged about a centre,
+in which the number 37 is written, into three hexagons which contain
+respectively 3, 5, and 7 numbers in each side and possess the following
+pretty properties. Each hexagon always gives the same sum, not only when
+the summation is made along its six sides, but also when it is made along
+the six diameters that join its corners and along the six that are
+constructed at right angles to its sides; this sum, for the first hexagon
+from within, is 111, for the second 185, and for the third 259.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 34.
+
+                 1  5  6 70 60 59 58
+               63                    8
+             62     19 53 46 22 45      9
+           61     20              24     64
+         2      48     31 42 38     49     57
+       3      47     39        40     44     56
+    67      51     41     37     33     23      7
+      66      50     34        35     54     11
+        65      25     36 32 43     26     12
+          10      30              27     13
+            17      29 21 28 52 55     72
+              18                     71
+                 16 69 68 4 14 15 73
+]
+
+
+X.
+
+MAGIC CUBES.
+
+Several inquirers, particularly Kochansky (1686), Sauveur (1710), Hugel
+(1859), and Scheffler (1882), have extended the principle of the magic
+squares of the plane to three-dimensioned space. Imagine a cube divided
+by planes parallel to its sides and equidistant from one another,
+into cubical compartments. The problem is then, so to insert in these
+compartments the successive natural numbers that every row from the right
+to the left, every row from the front to the back, every row from the top
+to the bottom, every diagonal of a square, and every principal diagonal
+passing through the centre of the cube shall contain numbers whose sum is
+always the same. For 3 times 3 times 3 compartments, a magic cube of this
+description is not constructible. For 4 times, 4 times 4 compartments a
+cube is constructible such that any row parallel to an edge of the cube
+and every principal diagonal give the sum of 130. To obtain a magic cube
+of 64 compartments, imagine the numbers which belong in the compartments
+written on the upper surface of the same and the numbers then taken
+off in layers of 16 from the top downwards. We obtain thus 4 squares of
+16 cells each, which together make up the magic cube; as the following
+diagrams will show:
+
+[Illustration:
+
+     First Layer    Second Layer     Third Layer    Fourth Layer
+    from the Top.   from the Top.   from the Top.   from the Top.
+    +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+
+    | 1|48|32|49|   |63|18|34|15|   |62|19|35|14|   | 4|45|29|52|
+    +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+
+    |60|21|37|12|   | 6|43|27|54|   | 7|42|26|55|   |57|24|40| 9|
+    +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+
+    |56|25|41| 8|   |10|39|23|58|   |11|38|22|29|   |53|28|44| 5|
+    +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+
+    |13|36|20|61|   |51|30|46| 3|   |50|31|47| 2|   |16|33|17|64|
+    +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+   +--+--+--+--+
+]
+
+The same sum 130 here comes out not less than 52 times; viz. in the first
+place from the 16 rows from left to right, secondly from the 16 rows from
+the front to the back, thirdly from the 16 rows counting from the top
+to the bottom, and lastly from the 4 rows which join each two opposite
+corners of the cube, namely from the rows: 1, 43, 22, 64; 49, 27, 38, 16;
+13, 39, 26, 52; 61, 23, 42, 4.
+
+For a cube with 5 compartments in each edge the arrangement of the
+figures can so be made that all the 75 rows parallel to any and every
+edge, all the 30 rows lying in any diagonal of a square, and all the
+4 rows forming any principal diagonal shall have one and the same
+summation, 315.
+
+Just as the magic squares of an odd number of cells could be formed with
+the aid of _two_ auxiliary squares, so also odd-numbered magic cubes can
+be constructed with the help of _three_ auxiliary cubes.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    First Layer from Top.   Second Layer from Top.  Third Layer from Top.
+    +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+    |121| 27| 83| 14| 70|   | 2 | 58|114| 45| 96|   | 33| 89| 20| 71|102|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 10| 61|117| 48| 79|   | 36| 92| 23| 54|110|   | 67|123| 29| 85| 11|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 44|100| 1 | 57|113|   | 75|101| 32| 88| 19|   | 76| 7 | 63|119| 50|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 53|109| 40| 91| 22|   | 84| 15| 66|122| 28|   |115| 41| 97| 3 | 59|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+    | 87| 18| 74|105| 31|   |118| 49| 80| 6 | 62|   | 24| 55|106| 37| 93|
+    +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+
+                Fourth Layer from Top.      Lowest Layer.
+                +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+                | 64|120| 46| 77| 8 |   | 95| 21| 52|108| 39|
+                +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+                | 98| 4 | 60|111| 42|   |104| 35| 86| 17| 73|
+                +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+                |107| 38| 94| 25| 51|   | 13| 69|125| 26| 82|
+                +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+                | 16| 72|103| 34| 90|   | 47| 78| 9 | 65|116|
+                +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+                | 30| 81| 12| 68|124|   | 56|112| 43| 99| 5 |
+                +---+---+---+---+---+   +---+---+---+---+---+
+]
+
+In this manner the preceding magic cube of 5 times 5 times 5 compartments
+is formed, in which, it may be additionally noticed, the middle number
+between 1 and 125, namely 63, is placed in the central compartment; by
+which arrangement the attainment of the sum of 315 is assured in the four
+principal diagonals and the 30 sub-diagonals. The condition attained in
+the magic squares, that the diagonal-pairs parallel to the sub-diagonals
+also shall give the sum 315 is not attainable in this case but is so in
+the case of higher numbers of compartments.
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+Musing on such problems as are the magic squares is fascinating to
+thinkers of a mathematical turn of mind. We take delight in discovering
+a harmony that abides as an intrinsic quality in the forms of our
+thought. The problems of the magic squares are playful puzzles, invented
+as it seems for mere pastime and sport. But there is a deeper problem
+underlying all these little riddles, and this deeper problem is of a
+sweeping significance. It is the philosophical problem of the world-order.
+
+The formal sciences are creations of the mind. We build the sciences of
+mathematics, geometry, and algebra with our conception of pure forms
+which are abstract ideas. And the same order that prevails in these
+mental constructions permeates the universe, so that an old philosopher,
+overwhelmed with the grandeur of law, imagined he heard its rhythm in a
+cosmic harmony of the spheres.
+
+                                                              H. SCHUBERT.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[68] The term melancholy meant in Dürer’s time, as it did also in
+Shakespeare’s and Milton’s, “thought or thoughtfulness.” Says Milton in
+_Il Penseroso_:
+
+    “Hail, thou Goddess, sage and holy,
+    Hail divinest melancholy
+      Whose saintly visage is too bright
+      To hit the sense of human sight,
+    And therefore to our weaker view
+    O’erlaid with black, staid Wisdom’s hue.”—I, 12.
+
+Thought that does not lead to action produces a gloomy state of mind.
+Thoughtfulness which cannot find a way out of itself is that melancholy
+which engenders weakness,—a truth which is illustrated in Hamlet.
+Shakespeare still uses the words thought and melancholy as synonyms,
+saying:
+
+                      “The native hue of resolution
+    Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.”
+
+Dürer’s melancholy does not represent the gloominess of thought, but the
+power of invention. Soberness and even a certain sadness are considered
+only as an element of this melancholy, but on the whole the genius of
+thought appears bright, self-possessed, and strong.
+
+Dürer represents the Science of Mechanical Invention as a winged female
+figure musing over some problem. Scattered on the floor around her lie
+some of the simple tools used in the sixteenth century. A ladder leans
+against the house, that assists in climbing otherwise inaccessible
+heights. A scale, an hour-glass, a bell, and the magic square are hanging
+on the wall behind her.
+
+At a distance a bat-like creature, being the gloom of melancholy, hovers
+in the air like a dark cloud, but the sun rises above the horizon, and at
+the happy middle between these two extremes stands the rainbow of serene
+hope and cheerful confidence.
+
+
+
+
+MR. SPENCER ON THE ETHICS OF KANT.
+
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer published in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July 1888
+and in the _Popular Science Monthly_ for August of the same year an
+article on “The Ethics of Kant” in which he so strangely misrepresents
+Kant’s position that Kant to any uninitiated reader must appear not only
+as superficial and shallow, but even as palpably nonsensical.
+
+Mr. Spencer’s article on “The Ethics of Kant” is a severe criticism
+mainly of the nonsensical idea, erroneously imputed to Kant, of a will
+that has no end. At the same time Mr. Spencer reproaches Kant with
+assuming the simplicity of conscience and believing in a non-evolutionary
+origin of the minds of living beings.
+
+In reply to Mr. Spencer an editorial article appeared in _The Open
+Court_ under the caption “Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant” (Nos.
+51 and 52), which was supplemented by another article entitled “Kant on
+Evolution” (No. 158), the latter being elicited by a renewed attack of
+Mr. Spencer upon Kant’s views (which appeared in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313).
+
+Mr. Spencer has republished his article “The Ethics of Kant” together
+with many other older articles in a work of three volumes entitled
+“Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative,” 1891, in which he
+repeats the following sentence:
+
+    “Thus the basis of the argument by which Kant attempts to
+    justify his assumption that there exists a good will apart from
+    a good end, disappears utterly; and leaves his dogma in all its
+    naked unthinkableness.”
+
+To this sentence he adds the following foot-note as a reply to my
+criticisms:
+
+    “I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant
+    less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming
+    that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of
+    our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not
+    contradicted himself. My knowledge of Kant’s writings is
+    extremely limited. In 1844 a translation of his ‘Critique of
+    Pure Reason’ (then I think lately published) fell into my
+    hands, and I read the first few pages enunciating his doctrine
+    of Time and Space: my peremptory rejection of which caused
+    me to lay the book down. Twice since then the same thing has
+    happened; for, being an impatient reader, when I disagree with
+    the cardinal propositions of a work I can go no further. One
+    other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made aware
+    that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies have
+    been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond
+    this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my
+    supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped
+    short with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets, was due
+    to the fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of
+    thought anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin
+    inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis. Dr. Paul
+    Carus, who, shortly after the publication of this article
+    in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July, 1888, undertook to
+    defend the Kantian ethics in the American journal which he
+    edits, _The Open Court_, has now (Sept. 4, 1890), in another
+    defensive article, translated sundry passages from Kant’s
+    ‘Critique of Judgment,’ his ‘Presumable Origin of Humanity,’
+    and his work ‘Upon the different Races of Mankind,’ showing
+    that Kant was, if not fully, yet partially, an evolutionist in
+    his speculations about living beings. There is, perhaps, some
+    reason for doubting the correctness of Dr. Carus’s rendering
+    of these passages into English. When, as in the first of
+    the articles just named, he failed to distinguish between
+    consciousness and conscientiousness, and when, as in this
+    last article, he blames the English for mistranslating Kant,
+    since they have said ‘Kant maintained that Space and Time are
+    intuitions,’ which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere
+    described him as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_
+    of intuition, one may be excused for thinking that possibly
+    Dr. Carus has read into some of Kant’s expressions, meanings
+    which they do not rightly bear. Still, the general drift of
+    the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must
+    have believed in the operation of natural causes as largely,
+    though not entirely, instrumental in producing organic forms:
+    extending this belief (which he says ‘can be named a daring
+    venture of reason’) in some measure to the origin of Man
+    himself. He does not, however extend the theory of natural
+    genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.
+    When he speaks of an organic habit ‘which in the wisdom of
+    nature appears to be thus arranged in order that the species
+    shall be preserved’; and when, further, he says ‘we see,
+    moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby,
+    after the development of the same, he is destined for social
+    intercourse,’ he implies divine intervention. And this shows
+    that I was justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space
+    and Time, as forms of thought, are supernatural endowments. Had
+    he conceived of organic evolution in a consistent manner, he
+    would necessarily have regarded Space and Time as subjective
+    forms generated by converse with objective realities.
+
+    “Beyond showing that Kant had a partial, if not a complete,
+    belief in organic evolution (though with no idea of its
+    causes), the passages translated by Dr. Carus show that he
+    entertained an implied belief which it here specially concerns
+    me to notice as bearing on his theory of ‘a good will.’ He
+    quotes approvingly Dr. Moscati’s lecture showing ‘that the
+    upright walk of man is constrained and unnatural,’ and showing
+    the imperfect visceral arrangements and consequent diseases
+    which result: not only adopting, but further illustrating,
+    Dr. Moscati’s argument. If here, then, there is a distinct
+    admission, or rather assertion, that various human organs are
+    imperfectly adjusted to their functions, what becomes of the
+    postulate above quoted ‘that no organ for any purpose will be
+    found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for
+    that purpose’? And what becomes of the argument which sets out
+    with this postulate? Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for
+    enabling me to prove that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a
+    good will’ is, by his own showing, baseless.”
+
+Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticisms is surprising in more than one
+respect.
+
+First, without even mentioning the objections I make he discredits my
+arguments by throwing doubt upon the correctness of the translations of
+the quoted passages.
+
+Secondly, he alleges, with a view of justifying his doubt, that in the
+first of my articles I “failed to distinguish between consciousness and
+conscientiousness.”[69]
+
+Thirdly, Mr. Spencer declares that I had “read into some of Kant’s
+expressions, meanings which they do not rightly bear.”
+
+Fourthly, Mr. Spencer bases this opinion upon a double mistake: he blames
+me for not distinguishing between the Kantian phrases that “Space and
+Time are intuitions” and that they are “forms of intuition.”
+
+Fifthly, acknowledging after all that Kant had at least “a partial belief
+in organic evolution,” Mr. Spencer accuses him of inconsistency.
+
+Sixthly, several statements concerning Kant’s views are made not because
+Kant held them but because Mr. Spencer assumes for trivial reasons that
+he is “justified in ascribing them to him.”
+
+Seventhly, these statements so vigorously set forth are accompanied by
+Mr. Spencer’s remarkably frank confession of unfamiliarity with the
+subject under discussion.
+
+It may be added that Mr. Spencer calls my criticisms “defensive
+articles.” He says that “I undertook to defend the Kantian ethics”;
+while, in fact, my articles are aggressive. Kant needs no defense for
+being misunderstood, and it would not be my business to defend him, for
+I am not a Kantian in the sense that I adopt any of the main doctrines
+of Kant. On the contrary I dissent from him on almost all fundamental
+questions. In ethics I object to Kant’s views in so far as they can be
+considered as pure formalism.[70] I am a Kantian only in the sense that
+I respect Kant as one of the most eminent philosophers, that I revere
+him as that teacher of mine whose influence upon me was greatest, and
+I consider the study of Kant’s works as an indispensable requisite for
+understanding the problems of the philosophy of our time. Far from
+defending Kant’s position, I only undertook to inform Mr. Spencer of what
+Kant had really maintained, so that instead of denouncing absurdities
+which Kant had never thought of, he might criticise the real Kant.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I shall now take up the details of Mr. Spencer’s reply:
+
+
+I.
+
+I am sorry to see that Mr. Spencer, instead of frankly acknowledging
+his errors, has taken refuge in discrediting the translations, which
+might very easily have been examined either by himself or by friends of
+his; especially as the German original of the most important passages,
+wherever any doubt might arise, and also of those expressions on the
+misconception of which Mr. Spencer bases his unfavorable opinion of Kant,
+were added in foot-notes.
+
+
+II.
+
+But Mr. Spencer adduces, as if it were a fact, an instance of my grave
+mistakes. He says that I failed to distinguish between “consciousness”
+and “conscientiousness.” Mr. Spencer makes much of a small matter, which,
+if it were as he assumes, would have to be considered as a misprint.
+
+Mr. Spencer’s statement is so positive that it must make on any reader
+the impression of being indubitably true. However, in the whole first
+article of mine, and indeed in both articles, “conscientiousness”
+is nowhere mentioned and it would be wrong to replace the word
+“consciousness” in any of the passages in which it occurs by
+“conscientiousness.”
+
+I should be glad if Mr. Spencer would kindly point out to me the
+passage which he had in mind when making his statement, for since there
+is not even so much as an occasion for confounding consciousness and
+conscientiousness, I stand here before a psychological problem. Mr.
+Spencer’s statement is a perfect riddle to me. Either I have a negative
+hallucination, as psychologists call it, so that I do not see what is
+really there, or Mr. Spencer must have had a positive hallucination. That
+which Mr. Spencer has read into my article, was never written and it is
+not there. The alleged fact to which he refers, does not exist.
+
+This kind of erroneous reference into which Mr. Spencer has inadvertently
+fallen is a very grievous mistake. It appears more serious than a simple
+slip of the pen, when we consider that Mr. Spencer uses the statement for
+the purpose of incrimination. He justifies upon this exceedingly slender
+basis his doubt concerning the correctness of the translations of the
+quoted passages, and Mr. Spencer’s doubt concerning the correctness of
+these translations is his main argument for rejecting my criticisms _in
+toto_.
+
+It is not impossible, indeed it is probable, that Mr. Spencer meant
+“conscience” instead of “conscientiousness.” There is one passage in
+which a superficial reader might have expected “conscience” in place of
+“consciousness.” However that does not occur in any of the translations,
+but in a paragraph where I speak on my own account. This passage appears
+in the appended reprint on page 23, line 14. Whatever anybody might have
+expected in that passage, I certainly intended to say “consciousness,”
+and only a hasty reader, only he who might merely read the first line of
+the paragraph, would consider the word “consciousness” a mistake.
+
+To avoid any equivocation, however, even to hasty readers, and to guard
+against a misconstruction such as Mr. Spencer possibly has given to the
+sentence, I propose to alter the passage by adding a few words as follows:
+
+    “It is quite true that _not only conscience, but_ every state
+    of consciousness is a feeling,” etc.
+
+The italicised words are inserted, simply to show that here I mean
+“consciousness,” and _not_ “conscience.” For the rest, they do not alter
+in the least the sense of the sentence. In this passage as throughout the
+whole article the terms “consciousness,” and “conscience” have been used
+properly.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Observing that Mr. Spencer appears to have committed the same mistake for
+which he erroneously blames me, I do not mean to say that he “failed to
+distinguish between” conscientiousness and conscience. I should rather
+regard it as trifling on my part if I drew this inference from what is
+either a slip of the pen or an oversight in proof-reading. But it strikes
+me that that knavish rogue among the fairies whom Shakespeare calls Puck
+and scientists define as chance or coincidence played in a fit of anger
+and perhaps from a sentiment of pardonable irony a humorous trick upon
+Mr. Spencer. The moral of it is that when an author censures his fellow
+authors with undue severity for things that might be mere misprints, he
+should keep a close eye on his own printer’s devil.
+
+
+III.
+
+Mr. Spencer discredits my knowledge of Kant. He says of me:
+
+    “One may be excused for thinking that possibly Dr. Carus has
+    read into some of Kant’s expressions, meanings which they do
+    not rightly bear.”
+
+I did not give Mr. Spencer any occasion for making this personal
+reflection. I do not boast of any extraordinary familiarity with Kant’s
+writings. There are innumerable German and also English and American
+scholars and philosophers who know Kant almost by heart. But the question
+at issue is not what I conceive Kant’s ideas to be, but what Kant has
+really said, and I was very careful in letting Kant speak for himself.
+
+My criticism of Mr. Spencer’s conception of Kant consisted almost
+exclusively in collating and contrasting Mr. Spencer’s views of Kant with
+quotations from Kant’s works. How can I read anything into some of Kant’s
+expressions, if I present translations of the expressions themselves,
+adding thereto in foot-notes the original whenever doubts could arise?
+And the general drift of the quotations alone suffices to overthrow Mr.
+Spencer’s conception of Kant.
+
+The truth is that Mr. Spencer committed the mistake himself, for which
+he censures me unjustly. “Mr. Spencer has read into some of Kant’s
+expressions meanings which they do not rightly bear.”
+
+
+IV.
+
+But Mr. Spencer adduces a fact, which, if it were as Mr. Spencer
+represents it, would show an inability on my part of making important
+distinctions. He says of me:
+
+    “He blames the English for mistranslating Kant, since they have
+    said ‘Kant maintained that Space and Time are intuitions,’
+    which is quite untrue, for they have everywhere described him
+    as maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ of intuition.”
+
+This is a double mistake: (1) Kant and his translators did not make
+the distinction of which Mr. Spencer speaks, and (2) the quotation Mr.
+Spencer makes from my article is represented to mean something different
+from what it actually means in the context.
+
+Before I speak for myself as to what I actually said, let us state the
+facts concerning Kant’s usage of the terms “intuitions” and “forms of
+intuition.”
+
+Kant defines in § 1 of his “Critique of Pure Reason” what he understands
+by “Transcendental Æsthetic.” He distinguishes between “empirical
+intuition” (_empirische Anschauung_) and “pure intuition” (_reine
+Anschauung_). He says:
+
+    “That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of
+    sensation, is called an empirical intuition.”
+
+Representations contain besides that which belongs to sensation some
+other elements. Kant says:
+
+    “That which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be
+    arranged under certain relations, I call its _form_.”
+
+And later on he continues:
+
+    “This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition.”
+
+These are Kant’s phrases in J. M. D. Meiklejohn’s well known translation.
+The term “pure intuition” is repeated again and again, and we find
+frequently added by way of explanation the phrases “as a mere form
+of sensibility,” “the mere form of phenomena,” “forms of sensuous
+intuition,” and also (as Mr. Spencer emphasises as the only correct way)
+“forms of intuition.”
+
+Kant says:
+
+    1) “_Diese reine Form der Sinnlichkeit wird auch selber reine
+    Anschauung heissen._ § 1.
+
+    2) “_Zweitens worden wir von dieser (der empirischen
+    Anschauung) noch alles abtrennen, damit nichts als reine
+    Anschauung und die blosse Form der Erscheinungen übrig bleibe._
+    § 1.
+
+    3) “_Raum ... muss ursprünglich Anschauung sein._ § 3.
+
+    4) “_Der Raum ist nichts anderes als nur die Form aller
+    Erscheinungen äusserer Sinne._ § 3.
+
+    5) “_Der Raum aber betrifft nur die reine Form der Anschauung._
+    (This passage appears in the first edition only, the paragraph
+    containing it is omitted in the second edition.) § 3.
+
+    6) “_Die Zeit ist ... eine reine Form der sinnlichen
+    Anschauung...._ § 4.
+
+    7) “_Es muss ihr[71] unmittelbare Anschauung zum Grunde
+    liegen._ § 4.
+
+    8) “_Die Zeit ist nichts anderes als die Form des inneren
+    Sinnes._ § 6.
+
+    9) “_... dass die Vorstellung der Zeit selbst Anschauung sei._
+    § 6.
+
+    10) “_Wir haben nun ... reine Anschauung a priori, Raum und
+    Zeit._ § 10. _Beschluss der transcendentalen Æsthetik._”
+
+These quotations do not pretend to be exhaustive, nor is that necessary
+for the present purpose.
+
+Kant, as we learn from these quotations, makes no distinction between
+_reine Anschauung_ and _Form der Anschauung_. He uses most frequently the
+term _reine Anschauung_ and designates in several places Space and Time
+simply as _Anschauung_. (See the quotations 3, 7, and 9.) So far as I can
+gather from a renewed perusal, the expression proposed by Mr. Spencer,
+“form of intuition,” _Form der Anschauung_, occurs only once and that too
+in a passage omitted in the second edition.
+
+It is almost redundant to add that the English translators and
+interpreters of Kant follow the original pretty closely. Accordingly it
+is actually incorrect “that they have everywhere(!) described Kant as
+maintaining that Space and Time are _forms_ of intuition.” In addition
+to the quotations from Meiklejohn, I call Mr. Spencer’s attention to
+William Flemming’s “Vocabulary of Philosophy” (4th ed., edited by Henry
+Calderwood) which reads _sub voce_ “Intuition,” p. 228 with reference to
+Kant’s view:
+
+    “Space and time are _intuitions_ of sense.”
+
+To say “Time and Space are forms of intuition” is quite correct according
+to Kantian terminology. No objection can be made to Mr. Spencer on that
+ground. But to say “Time and Space are intuitions” is also quite correct,
+and Mr. Spencer is wrong in censuring the expression.
+
+Why does Mr. Spencer rebuke me so severely on a point which is of no
+consequence? He appears confident that I have betrayed an unpardonable
+misconception of Kant’s philosophy. But having pointed out by quotations
+from Kant that this is not so, I shall now proceed to explain why the
+quotation which Mr. Spencer makes from my article, although the eight
+words in quotation marks are literally quoted, is a misquotation. It
+is torn out of its context. I did not blame the English translators
+of Kant at all, but I blamed his interpreters, among whom the English
+interpreters (not all English interpreters, but certainly some of them)
+are the worst, for “mutilating Kant’s best thoughts, so that this hero of
+progress appears as a stronghold of antiquated views”; and as an instance
+I called attention to the misconception of Kant’s term _Anschauung_,
+saying:
+
+    “How different is Kant’s philosophy, for instance, if his
+    position with reference to time and space is mistaken! ‘Time
+    and Space are our _Anschauung_,’ Kant says. But his English
+    translators declare ‘Kant maintained that space and time
+    are intuitions.’ What a difference it makes if intuition
+    is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the English
+    intuitionalist school instead of its being taken in the
+    original meaning of the word _Anschauung_.”
+
+The word “intuition” implies something mysterious; the word _Anschauung_
+denotes that which is immediately perceived, simply, as it were, by
+looking at it. So especially the sense-perceptions of the things before
+us are _Anschauungen_.
+
+Mr. Spencer, believing that he had caught me in making unawares a
+blunder, tears the passage out of its context, ignores its purport,
+makes a point of an antithesis which had nothing in the world to do
+with the topic under discussion, only to throw on me the opprobrium
+of incompetence. Even if Mr. Spencer’s antithesis of “intuition” and
+“forms of intuition” were of any consequence (as, unfortunately for Mr.
+Spencer, it is not), it would count for nothing against me because I did
+not speak of “forms” in the passage referred to, I simply alluded to one
+misinterpretation of the term _Anschauung_, which is quite common among
+English Kantians. It was not required by the purpose I had in view, to
+enter into any details as to what kind of _Anschauung_ I meant, and an
+allusion to “form” or to any other subject would have served only to
+confound the idea which I intended to set forth in the paragraph from
+which Mr. Spencer quotes.
+
+Misquotation of this kind, into which Mr. Spencer was inveigled by a
+hasty reading, should be avoided with utmost care, for it involves an
+insinuation. It leads away from the main point under discussion to side
+issues, and it misrepresents the author from whom the quotation is made.
+It insinuates a meaning which the passage does not bear and which was not
+even thought of in the context out of which it is torn.
+
+Mr. Spencer quotes the passage as if I had preferred the term “intuition”
+to the term “form of intuition,” or at least, as if I had no idea that
+Kant conceives Time and Space as “forms.” Yet Mr. Spencer in trying to
+make out a point against me betrays his own lack of information. Kant
+insisted most emphatically on calling the forms of our sensibility (i. e.
+space and time) “_Anschauungen_.”
+
+But Mr. Spencer’s case is worse still. While he insists upon the
+statement that according to the translators of Kant space and time are
+“forms of intuition,” which is at least correct, he uses twice in the
+very same paragraph the expression that according to Kant “space and
+time are forms of thought,” which is incorrect. The forms of thought
+according to Kantian terminology are not space and time but the domain of
+the transcendental logic. Anyone who confounds the two terms “forms of
+intuition” and “forms of thought” proves himself unable to form a correct
+opinion on Kant’s philosophy. That is just characteristic of Kant that
+he regards time and space not as thought, nor as forms of thought, but
+as _Anschauungen_ and in contradistinction to sense-intuitions (i. e.
+sensations) he calls them _reine Anschauungen_ or _Formen der Anschauung_.
+
+
+V.
+
+Mr. Spencer commenting upon his criticism of Kant’s idea of a Good Will,
+says:
+
+    “I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant
+    less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming
+    that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of
+    our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not
+    contradicted himself.
+
+    “Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for enabling me to prove
+    that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a good will’ is, by his
+    own showing, baseless.”
+
+Kant’s idea of a good will has nothing to do with evolution, and we can
+abstain here from discussing whether or not Kant was an evolutionist.
+Whether evolution is true or not, what difference does it make to the
+proposition, that a good will is the only thing which can be called good
+without further qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_)? Pleasure is good,
+but it is not absolutely good, there are cases in which pleasure is a
+very bad thing. We must qualify our statement and limit it to special
+cases. A good will, however, says Kant, is in itself good under all
+circumstances.
+
+Did Mr. Spencer prove the baselessness of Kant’s proposition by proving
+evolution? Is it inconsistent to believe in evolution and at the same
+time to regard a good will as absolutely good, as good without reserve or
+limitation? I think not!
+
+
+VI.
+
+Mr. Spencer in admitting that “the general drift of the passages quoted
+makes it tolerably clear that Kant must have believed in the operation of
+natural causes ... in producing organic forms,” adds:
+
+    “He does not, however, extend the theory of natural genesis to
+    the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.”
+
+How does Mr. Spencer prove his statement? Does he quote a passage from
+Kant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism? No, Mr. Spencer does
+not quote Kant, and it would be difficult to find a passage to suit that
+purpose. Mr. Spencer adduces a few unmeaning phrases gleaned at random
+and torn out of their context, and from these phrases he concludes
+that Kant believed in the supernatural. Kant spoke somewhere of “the
+wisdom of nature” who has things so arranged that the species might be
+preserved. If the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be
+taken literally, the phrase might prove that Kant believed nature to be a
+wise old woman. Kant spoke further of “the germ of reason placed in man
+whereby he is destined to social intercourse.” Does the usage of the word
+“destined” really “imply divine intervention,” as Mr. Spencer says? Mr.
+Spencer adds:
+
+    “And this [viz. Kant’s usage of these phrases] shows that I was
+    justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space and Time,
+    as forms of thought [sic!], are supernatural endowments.”
+
+What might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation!
+
+Kant did not introduce any supernatural explanations; on the contrary, he
+proposed to exclude “supernatural genesis.” He says e. g. in a passage of
+the “Critique of Judgment” quoted on page 41 of the appendix:
+
+    “If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised
+    beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded ... therefore it
+    cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by anyone who
+    has had to do with philosophy.”
+
+And furthermore Kant rejects the partial admission of the supernatural,
+saying:
+
+    “As though it were not the same to make the required forms
+    arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world as
+    during its progress.”
+
+Mr. Spencer charges Kant with inconsistency. We do not intend to say that
+Kant was in all the phases of his development consistent with himself.
+But we do say that the charge of Mr. Spencer against Kant consists in
+this: the real Kant has said things which are incompatible with Mr.
+Spencer’s view of Kant.
+
+This settles the sixth point.
+
+
+VII.
+
+Mr. Spencer’s reply to my criticism is a very strange piece of
+controversy and I have actually been at a loss, how to account for it.
+
+The situation can be explained only by assuming that Mr. Spencer,
+being an impatient reader, when finding out that he disagreed with my
+propositions, could go no further and wrote his reply to me without
+having read my articles. This is very hard on a critic who, carefully
+avoiding everything that might look like fault-finding, is painstakingly
+careful in giving to the author criticised every means of investigating
+the truth himself and helps him in a friendly way to correct his errors.
+
+There is only one consolation for me, which is, that I am in good
+company. The great thinker of Koenigsberg is very severely censured in
+almost all of Mr. Spencer’s writings for ideas which he never held. And
+now Mr. Spencer confesses openly and with ingenuous sincerity, that his
+knowledge of Kant’s writings is extremely limited. But why he condemns a
+man of whom he knows so little Mr. Spencer does not tell us.
+
+Mr. Spencer says:
+
+    “My knowledge of Kant’s writings is extremely limited. In 1844
+    a translation of his “Critique of Pure Reason” (then I think
+    lately published) fell into my hands, and I read the first few
+    pages enunciating his doctrine of Time and Space: my peremptory
+    rejection of which caused me to lay the book down.
+
+    “Twice since then the same thing has happened; for, being
+    an impatient reader, when I disagree with the cardinal
+    propositions of a work I can go no further.
+
+    “One other thing I knew. By indirect references I was made
+    aware that Kant had propounded the idea that celestial bodies
+    have been formed by the aggregation of diffused matter. Beyond
+    this my knowledge of his conceptions did not extend; and my
+    supposition that his evolutionary conception had stopped short
+    with the genesis of sun, stars, and planets was due to the
+    fact that his doctrine of Time and Space, as forms of thought
+    [sic] anteceding experience, implied a supernatural origin
+    inconsistent with the hypothesis of natural genesis.”
+
+Kant has been a leader in thought for the last century. It is very
+important to criticise his ideas wherever they are wrong, but his errors
+cannot be conquered by _ex cathedra_ denunciations.
+
+Darwin’s habits in investigating and weighing the pro and con of a
+question were very different from Mr. Spencer’s, and Darwin’s success is
+in no small degree due to the sternness with which he adhered to certain
+rules of reading and studying. We find in his “Autobiography” certain
+reminiscences labeled “important” from which the following is most
+instructive:
+
+    “I had also, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely,
+    that whenever a published fact, a new observation or a thought,
+    came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to
+    make a memorandum of it without fail, for I had found by
+    experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to
+    escape from the memory than favorable ones.”
+
+Experience teaches that we can learn most from those authors with whom we
+do not agree. The ethics of reading and studying demand other habits than
+laying a book down when we disagree with its cardinal propositions. Such
+habits prevent progress and create prejudices.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Mr. Spencer has not answered my criticism at all. Mr. Spencer did
+not even take into consideration the passages quoted from Kant. He
+republished all the false statements of Kant’s views, so inconsiderately
+made, together with all the perverse opinions based upon them. The
+assurance with which Mr. Spencer makes statements which have no
+foundation whatever is really perplexing even to a man who is well
+informed on the subject, and it will go far to convince the unwary
+reader. What, however, shall become of the general tenor of philosophical
+criticism and controversy if a man of Mr. Spencer’s reputation is
+so indifferent about being informed concerning the exact views of
+his adversary, if he is so careless in presenting them, if he makes
+positively erroneous statements on confessedly mere “supposition,” and
+finally, if in consequence thereof he is flagrantly unjust in censuring
+errors which arise only from his own too prolific imagination?
+
+We feel confident that Mr. Spencer will explain his side of the question
+satisfactorily. His mistakes being undeniable, we do not believe that he
+will seek to deny them. Yet we trust that Mr. Spencer as soon as he finds
+himself at fault, will not even make an attempt at palliation, that he
+will not blink the frank acknowledgment of his misstatements and also of
+having treated Kant with injustice. A man who has devoted his life to the
+search for truth will not suffer any blot to remain on his escutcheon.
+
+                                                                   EDITOR.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[69] This article “Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant” was
+electrotyped at the time it appeared in _The Open Court_. It is appended
+to this number of _The Monist_ as documentary evidence of the fact, that
+there is not even so much as an occasion in the article for confounding
+“consciousness” and “conscientiousness.”
+
+[70] See _Fundamental Problems_, pp. 197-206; and _The Ethical Problem_,
+p. 32, seq., especially p. 33, lines 18-20.
+
+[71] Second edition reads “_ihnen_” in place of “_ihr_,” viz. _der Zeit_.
+The word “_ihnen_” refers to _Theilvorstellungen der Zeit_.
+
+
+
+
+WHAT DOES ANSCHAUUNG MEAN?
+
+
+Mr. Spencer’s erroneous statement that Kant conceives space and time as
+forms of thought instead of forms of intuition induces me to make a few
+explanatory remarks concerning the term _Anschauung_.
+
+Kant means that space and time are immediately given in experience and
+not inferences drawn from the data of experience; they are not thoughts,
+but objects of direct perception.
+
+Sense-impressions are data, they are prior to ideas, the latter being
+constructions made out of sense-impressions. Sense-impressions are
+facts, but ideas are of an inferential nature; they are (to use Lloyd
+Morgan’s excellent term) constructs. Now Kant claims that space and
+time are in the same predicament: they also are immediately given, they
+also are _Anschauungen_. Kant did not trouble himself much to prove
+that they are forms; he seems to have taken that for granted. But he
+was very careful to show that they are not ideas, not thoughts, not
+abstractions, not generalisations, but that they are as direct data
+as are sense-impressions and he calls the knowledge which man has by
+directly facing the object of knowledge “_Anschauung_.”
+
+The conclusion which Kant draws from this may be characterised as follows:
+
+Sensations are not things but appearances; they are subjective, not
+objective, they are not the objects themselves but what our sensibility
+makes of objects. Space and time being _Anschauungen_, Kant argues that
+they are of the same kind as the sense-data of knowledge, that they
+are inherent in our nature. Thus Kant maintains: “Sensations are the
+products of our sensibility, and space and time are the forms of our
+sensibility.”
+
+The word _Anschauung_ has been a _crux interpretum_ since translations
+have been made from Kant, and it is quite true that no adequate word to
+express it, exists in English. I enjoyed of late a discussion on the
+subject with Mr. Francis C. Russell who called my attention to several
+notes in _The Journal of Speculative Philosophy_. The following is from
+the pen of Dr. W. T. Harris (Vol. II, p. 191):
+
+    “Through a singular chance, the present number of the journal
+    contains two notes from two contributors on the proper
+    translation of the German word _Anschauung_. Mr. Kroeger holds
+    that the word _Anschauung_, as used by Fichte and also by Kant,
+    denotes an act of the Ego which the English word _Intuition_
+    does not at all express, but for which the English word
+    ‘contemplation’ is an exact equivalent. Mr. Peirce suggests
+    that no person whose native tongue is English will translate
+    _Anschauung_ by another word than _Intuition_. Whether there
+    is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German
+    on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is
+    certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an
+    equivalent for the word under consideration both by English
+    and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the
+    ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no
+    English verb _intuite_ (at least in the Dictionaries), and
+    the reader will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn (in the
+    translation of Kant’s _Kritik_) for it, is _contemplate_,
+    and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent
+    translation of Fichte’s Popular Works (London, 1849).”
+
+Mr. Charles S. Peirce says:
+
+    “No person whose native tongue is English will need to be
+    informed that contemplation is essentially (1) protracted (2)
+    voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for
+    that which is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner
+    can convince himself of this by the proper study of English
+    writers. Thus, Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding,
+    Book II., chap. 19, § 1) says, ‘If it [an idea] be held
+    there [in view] long under attentive consideration, ’tis
+    _contemplation_”; and again, (_Ibid._, Book II., chap. 10, § 1)
+    ‘Keeping the _Idea_, which is brought into it [the mind] for
+    some time actually in view, which is called _Contemplation_.’
+    This term is therefore unfitted to translate _Anschauung_;
+    for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily
+    protracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental
+    presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of
+    an impression in the mind, and seldom, if ever, an action.
+
+    “To the translation of _Anschauung_ by intuition, there is,
+    at least, no such insufferable objection. Etymologically the
+    two words precisely correspond. The original philosophical
+    meaning of intuition was a cognition of the present manifold
+    in that character; and it is now commonly used, as a modern
+    writer says, ‘to include all the products of the perceptive
+    (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act of
+    consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an
+    _individual_, thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the
+    condition of distinct existence in space and time.’ Finally, we
+    have the authority of Kant’s own example for translating his
+    _Anschauung_ by _Intuitus_; and, indeed, this is the common
+    usage of Germans writing Latin. Moreover, _intuitiv_ frequently
+    replaces _anschauend_ or _anschaulich_. If this constitutes a
+    misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself
+    and nearly all his countrymen” (_ibid._ p. 152 et seqq.).
+
+Mr. Peirce adds the following explanation concerning the term intuition
+in another note (_ibid._ p. 103):
+
+    “The word _intuitus_ first occurs as a technical term in St.
+    Anselm’s Monologium. He wished to distinguish between our
+    knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and, in
+    the next world, of God, also); and thinking of the saying of
+    St. Paul, _Videmus nunc per speculum in œnigmate: tunc autem
+    facie ad faciem_, he called the former _speculation_ and the
+    latter _intuition_. This use of ‘speculation’ did not take
+    root, because that word already had another exact and widely
+    different meaning.
+
+    “In the middle ages, the term ‘intuitive cognition’ had two
+    principal senses, 1st, as opposed to abstractive cognition,
+    it meant the knowledge of the present as present, and this is
+    its meaning in Anselm; but 2d, as no intuitive cognition was
+    allowed to be determined by a previous cognition, it came to
+    be used as the opposite of discursive cognition (see Scotus,
+    In sentent. lib. 2, dist. 3, qu. 9), and this is nearly the
+    sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly the sense in
+    which Kant uses it, the former distinction being expressed
+    by his _sensuous_ and _non-sensuous_. (See Werke, herausg.
+    Rosenkrantz, Thl. 2, S. 713, 31, 41, 100, u. s. w.)
+
+    “An enumeration of six meanings of intuition may be found in
+    Hamilton’s Reid p. 759.”
+
+If we have to choose between the two translations “intuition” and
+“contemplation,” we should with Mr. Peirce decidedly prefer the
+word “intuition.” The word contemplation corresponds to the German
+_Betrachtung_ and all that Mr. Peirce says against it holds good. But
+we must confess that the term intuition (as Mr. Peirce himself seems to
+grant) is not a very good translation either. The term intuition has
+other meanings which interfere with the correct meaning of _Anschauung_
+and was actually productive of much confusion.
+
+The English term intuition is strongly tinged with the same meaning that
+is attached to the German word _Intuition_. It means an inexplicable
+kind of direct information from some supernatural sources, which mystics
+claim to possess as the means of their revelations. In this sense
+Goethe characterises it satirically in Faust (Scene XIV). Mephistopheles
+describes the process as follows:
+
+    A blessing drawn from supernatural fountain!
+    In night and dew to lie upon the mountains;
+    All Heaven and Earth in rapture penetrating;
+    Thyself to Godhood haughtily inflating;
+    To grub with yearning force through Earth’s dark marrow,
+    Compress the six days’ work within thy bosom narrow,—
+    To taste, I know not what, in haughty power,
+    Thine own ecstatic life on all things shower,
+    Thine earthly self behind thee cast,
+    And then the lofty intuition [with a gesture] at last.
+
+The satire is good on _Intuition_ but it would not apply to _Anschauung_,
+for the latter word excludes rigidly any mysticism or supernaturalism
+which the former essentially involves. To employ the term “intuition” for
+both ideas must necessarily weaken the meaning of _Anschauung_.
+
+Besides we should bear in mind that the German _Anschauung_ is
+vernacular and should find a correspondent Saxon word. Such Latin words
+as intuition convey in English as much as in German the impression of
+being terms denoting something very abstract. Vernacular terms much more
+strongly indicate the immediateness and directness which is implied in
+_Anschauung_. In my conversation with Mr. Russell, we tried to coin a
+new word that should cover the meaning of _Anschauung_ as an act of
+“atlooking” and the word “atsight” readily suggested itself.
+
+The word “atsight” is an exact English equivalent of the German
+_Anschauung_. It describes the looking at an object in its immediate
+presence. At the same time the word is readily understood, while
+philologically considered, its formation is fully justified by the
+existence of the words “insight and foresight.”
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+One of the most important of Kant’s doctrines is the proposition that
+all thought must ultimately have reference to _Anschauung_, i. e. to
+atsight. Through atsight only the objects of experience can be given us.
+All speculations not founded upon this bottom rock of knowledge are mere
+dreams. This is the maxim of positivism and it is the basis of all sound
+philosophy. Says Kant in the “Anhang” to his Prolegomena (in reply to a
+critic who had misunderstood his idealism) as a summary statement of his
+views:
+
+    “_Der Satz aller echten Idealisten, von der eleatischen Schule
+    an bis zum Bischof Berkley, ist in dieser Formel enthalten:
+    ‘alle Erkenntnis durch Sinne und Erfahrung ist nichts als
+    lauter Schein, und nur in den Ideen des reinen Verstandes und
+    Vernunft ist Wahrheit.’_
+
+    “_Der Grundsatz, der meinen Idealismus durchgängig regiert
+    und bestimmt, ist dagegen: ‘Alles Erkenntnis von Dingen, aus
+    blossem reinen Verstande oder reiner Vernunft, ist nichts als
+    lauter Schein, und nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahrheit.’_”
+
+    “The doctrine of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic School
+    down to Bishop Berkeley is contained in this formula: All
+    cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but
+    illusion; and in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason
+    alone is truth.
+
+    “The principle, however, that rules and determines my idealism
+    throughout is this: All cognition out of pure understanding
+    or pure reason is nothing but mere illusion and in experience
+    alone is truth.”
+
+Kant then proposes in order to avoid equivocation to call his views
+“formal or critical idealism,” adding that his idealism made any other
+idealism impossible. Criticism truly is the beginning of philosophy as
+an objective science. It gives the _coup de grace_ to those worthless
+declamations which still pass among many as philosophy. Says Kant:
+
+    “_So viel ist gewiss: wer einmal Kritik gekostet hat, den ekelt
+    auf immer alles dogmatische Gewäsche._”
+
+    “That much is certain: He who has once tasted critique will be
+    forever disgusted with all dogmatic twaddle.”
+
+It is strange that in spite of Kant’s explicit declaration, which leaves
+no doubt about the positive spirit that pervades the principles of his
+philosophy, he is still misunderstood by his opponents no less than by
+those who profess to be his disciples.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+There is no occasion now to treat the subject exhaustively, but it may be
+permitted to add a few remarks on Kant’s proposition that space and time
+are atsights.
+
+We must distinguish three things:
+
+1) Objective space.
+
+2) Space as atsight, and
+
+3) Space-conception.
+
+Space as atsight is the datum. It is the immediate presence of relations
+among the sensory impressions. This, however, is not as yet that
+something which we generally call space. That which generally goes by the
+name of space is a construction built out of the relational data that
+obtain in experience and we propose to call it space-conception. Our
+space-conception, accordingly, (and here I include the mathematician’s
+space-conception) is based upon space as atsight, but it is more
+than atsight. It is an inference made therefrom, it is the product
+of experience. Space-conception, however, is as are all legitimate
+noumena, no mere subjective illusion, it possesses objective validity;
+it describes some real existence and this real existence represented in
+space-conception is what may be called objective space.
+
+Objective space is the form of reality. Space as atsight is the form of
+sensibility. Space as space-conception is a construct of an abstract
+nature and serves as a description or plan of the form of reality.
+
+The same is true of Time. Time as atsight is the relation of succession
+obtaining in the changes of experience. Time as time-conception is the
+noumenon constructed out of these data to represent that feature of
+reality which may for lack of a better term be called objective time.
+
+Briefly: Space and Time are not things, not essences, not entities,
+but certain features of existence. They are the forms of reality. When
+existence finds a representation in the feelings of a sentient being,
+time and space appear as their forms, and these forms furnish the
+material out of which are built the conceptions of Space and Time.
+
+                                                                   EDITOR.
+
+
+
+
+THE LAW OF MIND.
+
+
+In an article published in _The Monist_ for January 1891, I endeavored
+to show what ideas ought to form the warp of a system of philosophy, and
+particularly emphasised that of absolute chance. In the number of April
+1892, I argued further in favor of that way of thinking, which it will be
+convenient to christen _tychism_ (from τύχη, chance). A serious student
+of philosophy will be in no haste to accept or reject this doctrine; but
+he will see in it one of the chief attitudes which speculative thought
+may take, feeling that it is not for an individual, nor for an age, to
+pronounce upon a fundamental question of philosophy. That is a task for
+a whole era to work out. I have begun by showing that _tychism_ must
+give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities
+of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a
+Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialised
+and partially deadened mind. I may mention, for the benefit of those who
+are curious in studying mental biographies, that I was born and reared
+in the neighborhood of Concord,—I mean in Cambridge,—at the time when
+Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they
+had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or
+from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the
+East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against
+Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted
+any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured
+bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul,
+unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface,
+modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical
+investigations.
+
+The next step in the study of cosmology must be to examine the general
+law of mental action. In doing this, I shall for the time drop my tychism
+out of view, in order to allow a free and independent expansion to
+another conception signalised in my first _Monist_-paper as one of the
+most indispensable to philosophy, though it was not there dwelt upon;
+I mean the idea of continuity. The tendency to regard continuity, in
+the sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of prime importance in
+philosophy may conveniently be termed _synechism_. The present paper
+is intended chiefly to show what synechism is, and what it leads to.
+I attempted, a good many years ago, to develop this doctrine in the
+_Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ (Vol. III.); but I am able now
+to improve upon that exposition, in which I was a little blinded by
+nominalistic prepossessions. I refer to it, because students may possibly
+find that some points not sufficiently explained in the present paper are
+cleared up in those earlier ones.
+
+
+WHAT THE LAW IS.
+
+Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but
+one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to
+affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of
+affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the
+power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with
+other ideas.
+
+I set down this formula at the beginning, for convenience; and now
+proceed to comment upon it.
+
+
+INDIVIDUALITY OF IDEAS.
+
+We are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced, as passed from mind to
+mind, as similar or dissimilar to one another, and, in short, as if they
+were substantial things; nor can any reasonable objection be raised to
+such expressions. But taking the word “idea” in the sense of an event in
+an individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone
+forever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea. These two
+ideas are not present in the same state of consciousness, and therefore
+cannot possibly be compared. To say, therefore, that they are similar
+can only mean that an occult power from the depths of the soul forces
+us to connect them in our thoughts after they are both no more. We may
+note, here, in passing that of the two generally recognised principles of
+association, contiguity and similarity, the former is a connection due to
+a power without, the latter a connection due to a power within.
+
+But what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at
+all, any longer? They are utterly unknowable. What distinct meaning can
+attach to saying that an idea in the past in any way affects an idea in
+the future, from which it is completely detached? A phrase between the
+assertion and the denial of which there can in no case be any sensible
+difference is mere gibberish.
+
+I will not dwell further upon this point, because it is a commonplace of
+philosophy.
+
+
+CONTINUITY OF IDEAS.
+
+We have here before us a question of difficulty, analogous to the
+question of nominalism and realism. But when once it has been clearly
+formulated, logic leaves room for one answer only. How can a past idea be
+present? Can it be present vicariously? To a certain extent, perhaps; but
+not merely so; for then the question would arise how the past idea can
+be related to its vicarious representation. The relation, being between
+ideas, can only exist in some consciousness: now that past idea was in no
+consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it; and
+that did not embrace the vicarious idea.
+
+Some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in
+any sense be present. But that is hasty and illogical. How extravagant,
+too, to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion!
+Yet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bonds of
+possible experience as a Kantian thing-in-itself.
+
+How can a past idea be present? Not vicariously. Then, only by direct
+perception. In other words, to be present, it must be _ipso facto_
+present. That is, it cannot be wholly past; it can only be going,
+infinitesimally past, less past than any assignable past date. We are
+thus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the
+past by a series of real infinitesimal steps.
+
+It has already been suggested by psychologists that consciousness
+necessarily embraces an interval of time. But if a finite time be meant,
+the opinion is not tenable. If the sensation that precedes the present
+by half a second were still immediately before me, then, on the same
+principle the sensation preceding that would be immediately present, and
+so on _ad infinitum_. Now, since there is a time, say a year, at the end
+of which an idea is no longer _ipso facto_ present, it follows that this
+is true of any finite interval, however short.
+
+But yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time; for
+if it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no
+veracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore,
+forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal
+interval of time.
+
+This is all that is requisite. For, in this infinitesimal interval,
+not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense, that is,
+considered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration;
+but also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is _ipso
+facto_ continuous. In fact, this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness
+is a direct feeling of its contents as spread out. This will be further
+elucidated below. In an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the
+temporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end,—not, of course,
+in the way of recognition, for recognition is only of the past, but in
+the way of immediate feeling. Now upon this interval follows another,
+whose beginning is the middle of the former, and whose middle is the end
+of the former. Here, we have an immediate perception of the temporal
+sequence of its beginning, middle, and end, or say of the second, third,
+and fourth instants. From these two immediate perceptions, we gain a
+mediate, or inferential, perception of the relation of all four instants.
+This mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object represented,
+spread over the four instants; but subjectively, or as itself the subject
+of duration, it is completely embraced in the second moment. [The reader
+will observe that I use the word _instant_ to mean a point of time, and
+_moment_ to mean an infinitesimal duration.] If it is objected that,
+upon the theory proposed, we must have more than a mediate perception
+of the succession of the four instants, I grant it; for the sum of the
+two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal, so that it is
+immediately perceived. It is immediately perceived in the whole interval,
+but only mediately perceived in the last two thirds of the interval.
+Now, let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of
+comparative perception; and it is plain that the last moment will contain
+objectively the whole series. Let there be, not merely an indefinite
+succession, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time;
+and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole
+time in the last moment. In this last moment, the whole series will
+be recognised, or known as known before, except only the last moment,
+which of course will be absolutely unrecognisable to itself. Indeed,
+even this last moment will be recognised like the rest, or, at least be
+just beginning to be so. There is a little _elenchus_, or appearance
+of contradiction, here, which the ordinary logic of reflection quite
+suffices to resolve.
+
+
+INFINITY AND CONTINUITY, IN GENERAL.
+
+Most of the mathematicians who during the last two generations have
+treated the differential calculus have been of the opinion that an
+infinitesimal quantity is an absurdity; although, with their habitual
+caution, they have often added “or, at any rate, the conception of an
+infinitesimal is so difficult, that we practically cannot reason about it
+with confidence and security.” Accordingly, the doctrine of limits has
+been invented to evade the difficulty, or, as some say, to explain the
+signification of the word “infinitesimal.” This doctrine, in one form or
+another, is taught in all the text-books, though in some of them only as
+an alternative view of the matter; it answers well enough the purposes of
+calculation, though even in that application it has its difficulties.
+
+The illumination of the subject by a strict notation for the logic
+of relatives had shown me clearly and evidently that the idea of an
+infinitesimal involves no contradiction, before I became acquainted with
+the writings of Dr. Georg Cantor (though many of these had already
+appeared in the _Mathematische Annalen_ and in _Borchardt’s Journal_,
+if not yet in the _Acta Mathematica_, all mathematical journals of the
+first distinction), in which the same view is defended with extraordinary
+genius and penetrating logic.
+
+The prevalent opinion is that finite numbers are the only ones that we
+can reason about, at least, in any ordinary mode of reasoning, or, as
+some authors express it, they are the only numbers that can be reasoned
+about mathematically. But this is an irrational prejudice. I long ago
+showed that finite collections are distinguished from infinite ones
+only by one circumstance and its consequences, namely, that to them
+is applicable a peculiar and unusual mode of reasoning called by its
+discoverer, DeMorgan, the “syllogism of transposed quantity.”
+
+Balzac, in the introduction of his _Physiologie du mariage_, remarks that
+every young Frenchman boasts of having seduced some Frenchwoman. Now, as
+a woman can only be seduced once, and there are no more Frenchwomen than
+Frenchmen, it follows, if these boasts are true, that no French women
+escape seduction. If their number be finite, the reasoning holds. But
+since the population is continually increasing, and the seduced are on
+the average younger than the seducers, the conclusion need not be true.
+In like manner, DeMorgan, as an actuary, might have argued that if an
+insurance company pays to its insured on an average more than they have
+ever paid it, including interest, it must lose money. But every modern
+actuary would see a fallacy in that, since the business is continually
+on the increase. But should war, or other cataclysm, cause the class
+of insured to be a finite one, the conclusion would turn out painfully
+correct, after all. The above two reasonings are examples of the
+syllogism of transposed quantity.
+
+The proposition that finite and infinite collections are distinguished by
+the applicability to the former of the syllogism of transposed quantity
+ought to be regarded as the basal one of scientific arithmetic.
+
+If a person does not know how to reason logically, and I must say that
+a great many fairly good mathematicians,—yea, distinguished ones,—fall
+under this category, but simply uses a rule of thumb in blindly drawing
+inferences like other inferences that have turned out well, he will,
+of course, be continually falling into error about infinite numbers.
+The truth is such people do not reason, at all. But for the few who do
+reason, reasoning about infinite numbers is easier than about finite
+numbers, because the complicated syllogism of transposed quantity is not
+called for. For example, that the whole is greater than its part is not
+an axiom, as that eminently bad reasoner, Euclid, made it to be. It is a
+theorem readily proved by means of a syllogism of transposed quantity,
+but not otherwise. Of finite collections it is true, of infinite
+collections false. Thus, a part of the whole numbers are even numbers.
+Yet the even numbers are no fewer than all the numbers; an evident
+proposition since if every number in the whole series of whole numbers be
+doubled, the result will be the series of even numbers.
+
+                         1, 2, 3, 4,  5,  6, etc.
+                         2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, etc.
+
+So for every number there is a distinct even number. In fact, there are
+as many distinct doubles of numbers as there are of distinct numbers. But
+the doubles of numbers are all even numbers.
+
+In truth, of infinite collections there are but two grades of magnitude,
+the _endless_ and the _innumerable_. Just as a finite collection is
+distinguished from an infinite one by the applicability to it of a
+special mode of reasoning, the syllogism of transposed quantity, so,
+as I showed in the paper last referred to, a numerable collection is
+distinguished from an innumerable one by the applicability to it of
+a certain mode of reasoning, the Fermatian inference, or, as it is
+sometimes improperly termed, “mathematical induction.”
+
+As an example of this reasoning, Euler’s demonstration of the binomial
+theorem for integral powers may be given. The theorem is that _(x+y)ⁿ_,
+where _n_ is a whole number, may be expanded into the sum of a series
+of terms of which the first is _xⁿy⁰_ and each of the others is derived
+from the next preceding by diminishing the exponent of _x_ by 1 and
+multiplying by that exponent and at the same time increasing the exponent
+of _y_ by 1 and dividing by that increased exponent. Now, suppose this
+proposition to be true for a certain exponent, _n_ = _M_, then it
+must also be true for _n_ = _M_ + 1. For let one of the terms in the
+expansion of _(x+y)ᴹ_ be written A_xᵖy𐞥_. Then, this term with the two
+following will be
+
+=Transcriber’s Note:= Unicode has no subscript q character, so the Greek
+subscript phi character ᵩ is used in these formulæ to represent it.
+Italics have been removed for readability.
+
+    Axᵖy𐞥 + A(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₁)xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺¹ + A(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₁)(ᵖ⁻¹⁄ᵩ₊₂)xᵖ⁻²y𐞥⁺²
+
+Now, when _(x+y)ᴹ_ is multiplied by _x+y_ to give _(x+y)ᴹ⁺¹_, we multiply
+first by _x_ and then by _y_ instead of by _x_ and add the two results.
+When we multiply by _x_, the second of the above three terms will be the
+only one giving a term involving _xᵖy𐞥⁺¹_ and the third will be the only
+one giving a term in _xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²_; and when we multiply by _y_ the first
+will be the only term giving a term in _xᵖy𐞥⁺¹_, and the second will be
+the only term giving a term in _xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²_. Hence, adding like terms,
+we find that the coefficient of _xᵖy𐞥⁺¹_in the expansion of _(x+y)ᴹ⁺¹_
+will be the sum of the coefficients of the first two of the above three
+terms, and that the coefficient of _xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²_ will be the sum of the
+coefficients of the last two terms. Hence, two successive terms in the
+expansion of _(x+y)ᴹ⁺¹_ will be
+
+    A[1+(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₋₁)]xᵖy𐞥⁺¹ + A(ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₁)[1+(ᵖ⁻¹⁄ᵩ₋₂)]xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺²
+
+    = A(ᵖ⁺𐞥⁺¹⁄ᵩ₊₁)xᵖy𐞥⁺¹ + A(ᵖ⁺𐞥⁺¹⁄ᵩ₊₁). (ᵖ⁄ᵩ₊₂)xᵖ⁻¹y𐞥⁺².
+
+It is, thus, seen that the succession of terms follows the rule. Thus if
+any integral power follows the rule, so also does the next higher power.
+But the first power obviously follows the rule. Hence, all powers do so.
+
+Such reasoning holds good of any collection of objects capable of being
+ranged in a series which though it may be endless, can be numbered so
+that each member of it receives a definite integral number. For instance,
+all the whole numbers constitute such a numerable collection. Again, all
+numbers resulting from operating according to any definite rule with
+any finite number of whole numbers form such a collection. For they may
+be arranged in a series thus. Let F be the symbol of operation. First
+operate on 1, giving F(1) Then, operate on a second 1, giving F(1,1).
+Next, introduce 2, giving 3rd, F(2); 4th, F(2,1); 5th, F(1,2); 6th,
+F(2,2). Next use a third variable giving 7th, F(1,1,1); 8th, F(2,1,1);
+9th, F(1,2,1); 10th, F(2,2,1); 11th, F(1,1,2); 12th, F(2,1,2); 13th,
+F(1,2,2); 14th, F(2,2,2). Next introduce 3, and so on, alternately
+introducing new variables and new figures; and in this way it is plain
+that every arrangement of integral values of the variables will receive a
+numbered place in the series.[72]
+
+The class of endless but numerable collections (so called because they
+can be so ranged that to each one corresponds a distinct whole number) is
+very large. But there are collections which are certainly innumerable.
+Such is the collection of all numbers to which endless series of
+decimals are capable of approximating. It has been recognised since the
+time of Euclid that certain numbers are surd or incommensurable, and
+are not exactly expressible by any finite series of decimals, nor by a
+circulating decimal. Such is the ratio of the circumference of a circle
+to its diameter, which we know is nearly 3.1415926. The calculation of
+this number has been carried to over 700 figures without the slightest
+appearance of regularity in their sequence. The demonstrations that this
+and many other numbers are incommensurable are perfect. That the entire
+collection of incommensurable numbers is innumerable has been clearly
+proved by Cantor. I omit the demonstration; but it is easy to see that to
+discriminate one from some other would, in general, require the use of an
+endless series of numbers. Now if they cannot be exactly expressed and
+discriminated, clearly they cannot be ranged in a linear series.
+
+It is evident that there are as many points on a line or in an interval
+of time as there are of real numbers in all. These are, therefore,
+innumerable collections. Many mathematicians have incautiously assumed
+that the points on a surface or in a solid are more than those on a line.
+But this has been refuted by Cantor. Indeed, it is obvious that for every
+set of values of coördinates there is a single distinct number. Suppose,
+for instance, the values of the coördinates all lie between 0 and + 1.
+Then if we compose a number by putting in the first decimal place the
+first figure of the first coördinate, in the second the first figure of
+the second coördinate, and so on, and when the first figures are all
+dealt out go on to the second figures in like manner, it is plain that
+the values of the coördinates can be read off from the single resulting
+number, so that a triad or tetrad of numbers, each having innumerable
+values, has no more values than a single incommensurable number.
+
+Were the number of dimensions infinite, this would fail; and the
+collection of infinite sets of numbers having each innumerable
+variations, might, therefore, be greater than the simple innumerable
+collection, and might be called _endlessly infinite_. The single
+individuals of such a collection could not, however, be designated, even
+approximately, so that this is indeed a magnitude concerning which it
+would be possible to reason only in the most general way, if at all.
+
+Although there are but two grades of magnitudes of infinite collections,
+yet when certain conditions are imposed upon the order in which
+individuals are taken, distinctions of magnitude arise from that cause.
+Thus, if a simply endless series be doubled by separating each unit into
+two parts, the successive first parts and also the second parts being
+taken in the same order as the units from which they are derived, this
+double endless series will, so long as it is taken in that order, appear
+as twice as large as the original series. In like manner the product of
+two innumerable collections, that is, the collection of possible pairs
+composed of one individual of each, if the order of continuity is to be
+maintained, is, by virtue of that order, infinitely greater than either
+of the component collections.
+
+We now come to the difficult question, What is continuity? Kant confounds
+it with infinite divisibility, saying that the essential character of
+a continuous series is that between any two members of it a third can
+always be found. This is an analysis beautifully clear and definite;
+but unfortunately, it breaks down under the first test. For according
+to this, the entire series of rational fractions arranged in the order
+of their magnitude, would be an infinite series, although the rational
+fractions are numerable, while the points of a line are innumerable.
+Nay, worse yet, if from that series of fractions any two with all that
+lie between them be excised, and any number of such finite gaps he made,
+Kant’s definition is still true of the series, though it has lost all
+appearance of continuity.
+
+Cantor defines a continuous series as one which is _concatenated_ and
+_perfect_. By a concatenated series, he means such a one that if any
+two points are given in it, and any finite distance, however small, it
+is possible to proceed from the first point to the second through a
+succession of points of the series each at a distance from the preceding
+one less than the given distance. This is true of the series of rational
+fractions ranged in the order of their magnitude. By a perfect series, he
+means one which contains every point such that there is no distance so
+small that this point has not an infinity of points of the series within
+that distance of it. This is true of the series of numbers between 0 and
+1 capable of being expressed by decimals in which only the digits 0 and 1
+occur.
+
+It must be granted that Cantor’s definition includes every series that
+is continuous; nor can it be objected that it includes any important
+or indubitable case of a series not continuous. Nevertheless, it has
+some serious defects. In the first place, it turns upon metrical
+considerations; while the distinction between a continuous and a
+discontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical. In the next place, a
+perfect series is defined as one containing “every point” of a certain
+description. But no positive idea is conveyed of what all the points
+are: that is definition by negation, and cannot be admitted. If that
+sort of thing were allowed, it would be very easy to say, at once, that
+the continuous linear series of points is one which contains every point
+of the line between its extremities. Finally, Cantor’s definition does
+not convey a distinct notion of what the components of the conception of
+continuity are. It ingeniously wraps up its properties in two separate
+parcels, but does not display them to our intelligence.
+
+Kant’s definition expresses one simple property of a continuum; but
+it allows of gaps in the series. To mend the definition, it is only
+necessary to notice how these gaps can occur. Let us suppose, then, a
+linear series of points extending from a point, _A_, to a point, _B_,
+having a gap from _B_ to a third point, _C_, and thence extending to
+a final limit, _D_; and let us suppose this series conforms to Kant’s
+definition. Then, of the two points, _B_ and _C_, one or both must be
+excluded from the series; for otherwise, by the definition, there would
+be points between them. That is, if the series contains _C_, though
+it contains all the points up to _B_, it cannot contain _B_. What is
+required, therefore, is to state in non-metrical terms that if a series
+of points up to a limit is included in a continuum the limit is included.
+It may be remarked that this is the property of a continuum to which
+Aristotle’s attention seems to have been directed when he defines a
+continuum as something whose parts have a common limit. The property may
+be exactly stated as follows: If a linear series of points is continuous
+between two points, _A_ and _D_, and if an endless series of points be
+taken, the first of them between _A_ and _D_ and each of the others
+between the last preceding one and _D_, then there is a point of the
+continuous series between all that endless series of points and _D_, and
+such that every other point of which this is true lies between this point
+and _D_. For example, take any number between 0 and 1, as 0.1; then, any
+number between 0.1 and 1, as 0.11; then any number between 0.11 and 1, as
+0.111; and so on, without end. Then, because the series of real numbers
+between 0 and 1 is continuous, there must be a _least_ real number,
+greater than every number of that endless series. This property, which
+may be called the Aristotelicity of the series, together with Kant’s
+property, or its Kanticity, completes the definition of a continuous
+series.
+
+The property of Aristotelicity may be roughly stated thus: a continuum
+contains the end point belonging to every endless series of points which
+it contains. An obvious corollary is that every continuum contains its
+limits. But in using this principle it is necessary to observe that a
+series may be continuous except in this, that it omits one or both of the
+limits.
+
+Our ideas will find expression more conveniently if, instead of points
+upon a line, we speak of real numbers. Every real number is, in one
+sense, the limit of a series, for it can be indefinitely approximated
+to. Whether every real number is a limit of a _regular_ series may
+perhaps be open to doubt. But the series referred to in the definition
+of Aristotelicity must be understood as including all series whether
+regular or not. Consequently, it is implied that between any two points
+an innumerable series of points can be taken.
+
+Every number whose expression in decimals requires but a finite number of
+places of decimals is commensurable. Therefore, incommensurable numbers
+suppose an infinitieth place of decimals. The word infinitesimal is
+simply the Latin form of infinitieth; that is, it is an ordinal formed
+from _infinitum_, as centesimal from _centum_. Thus, continuity supposes
+infinitesimal quantities. There is nothing contradictory about the idea
+of such quantities. In adding and multiplying them the continuity must
+not be broken up, and consequently they are precisely like any other
+quantities, except that neither the syllogism of transposed quantity, nor
+the Fermatian inference applies to them.
+
+If A is a finite quantity and _i_ an infinitesimal, then in a certain
+sense we may write A + _i_ = A. That is to say, this is so for all
+purposes of measurement. But this principle must not be applied except
+to get rid of _all_ the terms in the highest order of infinitesimals
+present. As a mathematician, I prefer the method of infinitesimals to
+that of limits, as far easier and less infested with snares. Indeed,
+the latter, as stated in some books, involves propositions that are
+false; but this is not the case with the forms of the method used by
+Cauchy, Duhamel, and others. As they understand the doctrine of limits,
+it involves the notion of continuity, and therefore contains in another
+shape the very same ideas as the doctrine of infinitesimals.
+
+Let us now consider an aspect of the Aristotelical principle which is
+particularly important in philosophy. Suppose a surface to be part red
+and part blue; so that every point on it is either red or blue, and, of
+course, no part can be both red and blue. What, then, is the color of the
+boundary line between the red and the blue? The answer is that red or
+blue, to exist at all, must be spread over a surface; and the color of
+the surface is the color of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of
+the point. I purposely use a vague form of expression. Now, as the parts
+of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a
+curved boundary are half of them red and half blue, it follows that the
+boundary is half red and half blue. In like manner, we find it necessary
+to hold that consciousness essentially occupies time; and what is
+present to the mind at any ordinary instant, is what is present during a
+moment in which that instant occurs. Thus, the present is half past and
+half to come. Again, the color of the parts of a surface at any finite
+distance from a point, has nothing to do with its color just at that
+point; and, in the parallel, the feeling at any finite interval from the
+present has nothing to do with the present feeling, except vicariously.
+Take another case: the velocity of a particle at any instant of time is
+its mean velocity during an infinitesimal instant in which that time
+is contained. Just so my immediate feeling is my feeling through an
+infinitesimal duration containing the present instant.
+
+
+ANALYSIS OF TIME.
+
+One of the most marked features about the law of mind is that it makes
+time to have a definite direction of flow from past to future. The
+relation of past to future is, in reference to the law of mind, different
+from the relation of future to past. This makes one of the great
+contrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical force, where
+there is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in time
+than between moving northward and moving southward.
+
+In order, therefore, to analyse the law of mind, we must begin by asking
+what the flow of time consists in. Now, we find that in reference to any
+individual state of feeling, all others are of two classes, those which
+affect this one (or have a tendency to affect it, and what this means we
+shall inquire shortly), and those which do not. The present is affectible
+by the past but not by the future.
+
+Moreover, if state _A_ is affected by state _B_, and state _B_ by state
+_C_, then _A_ is affected by state _C_, though not so much so. It
+follows, that if _A_ is affectible by _B_, _B_ is not affectible by _A_.
+
+If, of two states, each is absolutely unaffectible by the other, they are
+to be regarded as parts of the same state. They are contemporaneous.
+
+To say that a state is _between_ two states means that it affects one
+and is affected by the other. Between any two states in this sense lies
+an innumerable series of states affecting one another; and if a state
+lies between a given state and any other state which can be reached by
+inserting states between this state and any third state, these inserted
+states not immediately affecting or being affected by either, then the
+second state mentioned immediately affects or is affected by the first,
+in the sense that in the one the other is _ipso facto_ present in a
+reduced degree.
+
+These propositions involve a definition of time and of its flow. Over and
+above this definition they involve a doctrine, namely, that every state
+of feeling is affectible by every earlier state.
+
+
+THAT FEELINGS HAVE INTENSIVE CONTINUITY.
+
+Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity
+than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist
+unless there is something to undergo change, and to undergo a change
+continuous in time, there must be a continuity of changeable qualities.
+Of the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form but
+a feeble conception. The development of the human mind has practically
+extinguished all feelings, except a few sporadic kinds, sound, colors,
+smells, warmth, etc., which now appear to be disconnected and disparate.
+In the case of colors, there is a tridimensional spread of feelings.
+Originally, all feelings may have been connected in the same way, and the
+presumption is that the number of dimensions was endless. For development
+essentially involves a limitation of possibilities. But given a number of
+dimensions of feeling, all possible varieties are obtainable by varying
+the intensities of the different elements. Accordingly, time logically
+supposes a continuous range of intensity in feeling. It follows, then,
+from the definition of continuity, that when any particular kind of
+feeling is present, an infinitesimal continuum of all feelings differing
+infinitesimally from that is present.
+
+
+THAT FEELINGS HAVE SPATIAL EXTENSION.
+
+Consider a gob of protoplasm, say an amœba or a slime-mould. It does
+not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell,
+though its functions may be less specialised. There is no doubt that
+this slime-mould, or this amœba, or at any rate some similar mass of
+protoplasm feels. That is to say, it feels when it is in its excited
+condition. But note how it behaves. When the whole is quiescent and
+rigid, a place upon it is irritated. Just at this point, an active motion
+is set up, and this gradually spreads to other parts. In this action, no
+unity nor relation to a nucleus, or other unitary organ can be discerned.
+It is a mere amorphous continuum of protoplasm, with feeling passing
+from one part to another. Nor is there anything like a wave-motion. The
+activity does not advance to new parts, just as fast as it leaves old
+parts. Rather, in the beginning, it dies out at a slower rate than that
+at which it spreads. And while the process is going on, by exciting the
+mass at another point, a second quite independent state of excitation
+will be set up. In some places, neither excitation will exist, in others
+each separately, in still other places, both effects will be added
+together. Whatever there is in the whole phenomenon to make us think
+there is feeling in such a mass of protoplasm,—_feeling_, but plainly no
+_personality_,—goes logically to show that that feeling has a subjective,
+or substantial, spatial extension, as the excited state has. This is, no
+doubt, a difficult idea to seize, for the reason that it is a subjective,
+not an objective, extension. It is not that we have a feeling of bigness;
+though Professor James, perhaps rightly, teaches that we have. It is that
+the feeling, as a subject of inhesion, is big. Moreover, our own feelings
+are focused in attention to such a degree that we are not aware that
+ideas are not brought to an absolute unity; just as nobody not instructed
+by special experiment has any idea how very, very little of the field of
+vision is distinct. Still, we all know how the attention wanders about
+among our feelings; and this fact shows that those feelings that are not
+co-ordinated in attention have a reciprocal externality, although they
+are present at the same time. But we must not tax introspection to make a
+phenomenon manifest which essentially involves externality.
+
+Since space is continuous, it follows that there must be an immediate
+community of feeling between parts of mind infinitesimally near together.
+Without this, I believe it would have been impossible for minds external
+to one another, ever to become coördinated, and equally impossible for
+any coördination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of
+one brain.
+
+
+AFFECTIONS OF IDEAS.
+
+But we are met by the question what is meant by saying that one idea
+affects another. The unravelment of this problem requires us to trace out
+phenomena a little further.
+
+Three elements go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic quality
+as a feeling. The second is the energy with which it affects other
+ideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate
+sensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past. The third
+element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it.
+
+As an idea spreads, its power of affecting other ideas gets rapidly
+reduced; but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged. It is long
+years now since I last saw a cardinal in his robes; and my memory of
+their color has become much dimmed. The color itself, however, is not
+remembered as dim. I have no inclination to call it a dull red. Thus, the
+intrinsic quality remains little changed; yet more accurate observation
+will show a slight reduction of it. The third element, on the other
+hand, has increased. As well as I can recollect, it seems to me the
+cardinals I used to see wore robes more scarlet than vermilion is, and
+highly luminous. Still, I know the color commonly called cardinal is on
+the crimson side of vermilion and of quite moderate luminosity, and the
+original idea calls up so many other hues with it, and asserts itself so
+feebly, that I am unable any longer to isolate it.
+
+A finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series
+of feelings; and when these become welded together in association,
+the result is a general idea. For we have just seen how by continuous
+spreading an idea becomes generalised.
+
+The first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living
+feeling. A continuum of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but
+still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal,
+entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of
+boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt.
+
+Second, in the presence of this continuity of feeling, nominalistic
+maxims appear futile. There is no doubt about one idea affecting another,
+when we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping
+itself into the other. Nor can there any longer be any difficulty about
+one idea resembling another, when we can pass along the continuous field
+of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had
+marked.
+
+Third, consider the insistency of an idea. The insistency of a past idea
+with reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further
+back that past idea is, and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought
+up into coincidence with the present. Here we must make one of those
+inductive applications of the law of continuity which have produced such
+great results in all the positive sciences. We must extend the law of
+insistency into the future. Plainly, the insistency of a future idea with
+reference to the present is a quantity affected by the minus sign; for it
+is the present that affects the future, if there be any effect, not the
+future that affects the present. Accordingly, the curve of insistency is
+a sort of equilateral hyperbola. [See the figure.] Such a conception is
+none the less mathematical, that its quantification cannot now be exactly
+specified.
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Now consider the induction which we have here been led into. This curve
+says that feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness
+is already affectible and already affected. In fact, this is habit, by
+virtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by a
+bond that had already been established between it, and another idea while
+it was still _in futuro_.
+
+We can now see what the affection of one idea by another consists in.
+It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the
+affecting idea as subject. So when a feeling emerges into immediate
+consciousness, it always appears as a modification of a more or less
+general object already in the mind. The word suggestion is well adapted
+to expressing this relation. The future is suggested by, or rather is
+influenced by the suggestions of, the past.
+
+
+IDEAS CANNOT BE CONNECTED EXCEPT BY CONTINUITY.
+
+That ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is sufficiently
+evident to one who reflects upon the matter. But still the opinion may
+be entertained that after continuity has once made the connection of
+ideas possible, then they may get to be connected in other modes than
+through continuity. Certainly, I cannot see how anyone can deny that the
+infinite diversity of the universe, which we call chance, may bring ideas
+into proximity which are not associated in one general idea. It may do
+this many times. But then the law of continuous spreading will produce a
+mental association; and this I suppose is an abridged statement of the
+way the universe has been evolved. But if I am asked whether a blind
+ἀνάγκη cannot bring ideas together, first I point out that it would not
+remain blind. There being a continuous connection between the ideas, they
+would infallibly become associated in a living, feeling, and perceiving
+general idea. Next, I cannot see what the mustness or necessity of this
+ἀνάγκη would consist in. In the absolute uniformity of the phenomenon,
+says the nominalist. Absolute is well put in; for if it merely happened
+so three times in succession, or three million times in succession, in
+the absence of any reason, the coincidence could only be attributed to
+chance. But absolute uniformity must extend over the whole infinite
+future; and it is idle to talk of that except as an idea. No; I think we
+can only hold that wherever ideas come together they tend to weld into
+general ideas; and wherever they are generally connected, general ideas
+govern the connection; and these general ideas are living feelings spread
+out.
+
+
+MENTAL LAW FOLLOWS THE FORMS OF LOGIC.
+
+The three main classes of logical inference are Deduction, Induction,
+and Hypothesis. These correspond to three chief modes of action of the
+human soul. In deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or
+association by virtue of which a general idea suggests in each case
+a corresponding reaction. But a certain sensation is seen to involve
+that idea. Consequently, that sensation is followed by that reaction.
+That is the way the hind legs of a frog, separated from the rest of the
+body, reason, when you pinch them. It is the lowest form of psychical
+manifestation.
+
+By induction, a habit becomes established. Certain sensations, all
+involving one general idea, are followed each by the same reaction; and
+an association becomes established, whereby that general idea gets to be
+followed uniformly by that reaction.
+
+Habit is that specialisation of the law of mind whereby a general idea
+gains the power of exciting reactions. But in order that the general
+idea should attain all its functionality, it is necessary, also, that
+it should become suggestible by sensations. That is accomplished by a
+psychical process having the form of hypothetic inference. By hypothetic
+inference, I mean, as I have explained in other writings, an induction
+from qualities. For example, I know that the kind of man known and
+classed as a “mugwump” has certain characteristics. He has a high
+self-respect and places great value upon social distinction. He laments
+the great part that rowdyism and unrefined good-fellowship play in the
+dealings of American politicians with their constituency. He thinks that
+the reform which would follow from the abandonment of the system by which
+the distribution of offices is made to strengthen party organisations
+and a return to the original and essential conception of office-filling
+would be found an unmixed good. He holds that monetary considerations
+should usually be the decisive ones in questions of public policy. He
+respects the principle of individualism and of _laisser-faire_ as the
+greatest agency of civilisation. These views, among others, I know to
+be obtrusive marks of a “mugwump.” Now, suppose I casually meet a man
+in a railway-train, and falling into conversation find that he holds
+opinions of this sort; I am naturally led to suppose that he is a
+“mugwump.” That is hypothetic inference. That is to say, a number of
+readily verifiable marks of a mugwump being selected, I find this man
+has these, and infer that he has all the other characters which go to
+make a thinker of that stripe. Or let us suppose that I meet a man of a
+semi-clerical appearance and a sub-pharisaical sniff, who appears to look
+at things from the point of view of a rather wooden dualism. He cites
+several texts of scripture and always with particular attention to their
+logical implications; and he exhibits a sternness, almost amounting to
+vindictiveness, toward evildoers, in general. I readily conclude that
+he is a minister of a certain denomination. Now the mind acts in a way
+similar to this, every time we acquire a power of coördinating reactions
+in a peculiar way, as in performing any act requiring skill. Thus, most
+persons have a difficulty in moving the two hands simultaneously and in
+opposite directions through two parallel circles nearly in the medial
+plane of the body. To learn to do this, it is necessary to attend, first,
+to the different actions in different parts of the motion, when suddenly
+a general conception of the action springs up and it becomes perfectly
+easy. We think the motion we are trying to do involves this action, and
+this, and this. Then, the general idea comes which unites all those
+actions, and thereupon the desire to perform the motion calls up the
+general idea. The same mental process is many times employed whenever we
+are learning to speak a language or are acquiring any sort of skill.
+
+Thus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one reaction
+become united under one general idea followed by the same reaction;
+while by the hypothetic process, a number of reactions called for by one
+occasion get united in a general idea which is called out by the same
+occasion. By deduction, the habit fulfils its function of calling out
+certain reactions on certain occasions.
+
+
+UNCERTAINTY OF MENTAL ACTION.
+
+The inductive and hypothetic forms of inference are essentially probable
+inferences, not necessary; while deduction may be either necessary or
+probable.
+
+But no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its
+character. In whatever manner the mind has reacted under a given
+sensation, in that manner it is the more likely to react again; were
+this, however, an absolute necessity, habits would become wooden and
+ineradicable, and no room being left for the formation of new habits,
+intellectual life would come to a speedy close. Thus, the uncertainty of
+the mental law is no mere defect of it, but is on the contrary of its
+essence. The truth is, the mind is not subject to “law,” in the same
+rigid sense that matter is. It only experiences gentle forces which
+merely render it more likely to act in a given way than it otherwise
+would be. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity
+in its action, without which it would be dead.
+
+Some psychologists think to reconcile the uncertainty of reactions with
+the principle of necessary causation by means of the law of fatigue.
+Truly for a _law_, this law of fatigue is a little lawless. I think it is
+merely a case of the general principle that an idea in spreading loses
+its insistency. Put me tarragon into my salad, when I have not tasted
+it for years, and I exclaim “What nectar is this!” But add it to every
+dish I taste for week after week, and a habit of expectation has been
+created; and in thus spreading into habit, the sensation makes hardly
+any more impression upon me; or, if it be noticed, it is on a new side
+from which it appears as rather a bore. The doctrine that fatigue is
+one of the primordial phenomena of mind I am much disposed to doubt.
+It seems a somewhat little thing to be allowed as an exception to the
+great principle of mental uniformisation. For this reason, I prefer to
+explain it in the manner here indicated, as a special case of that great
+principle. To consider it as something distinct in its nature, certainly
+somewhat strengthens the necessitarian position; but even if it be
+distinct, the hypothesis that all the variety and apparent arbitrariness
+of mental action ought to be explained away in favor of absolute
+determinism does not seem to me to recommend itself to a sober and sound
+judgment, which seeks the guidance of observed facts and not that of
+prepossessions.
+
+
+RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW.
+
+Let me now try to gather up all these odds and ends of commentary and
+restate the law of mind, in a unitary way.
+
+First, then, we find that when we regard ideas from a nominalistic,
+individualistic, sensualistic way, the simplest facts of mind become
+utterly meaningless. That one idea should resemble another or influence
+another, or that one state of mind should so much as be thought of in
+another is, from that standpoint, sheer nonsense.
+
+Second, by this and other means we are driven to perceive, what is
+quite evident of itself, that instantaneous feelings flow together into
+a continuum of feeling, which has in a modified degree the peculiar
+vivacity of feeling and has gained generality. And in reference to such
+general ideas, or continua of feeling, the difficulties about resemblance
+and suggestion and reference to the external, cease to have any force.
+
+Third, these general ideas are not mere words, nor do they consist in
+this, that certain concrete facts will every time happen under certain
+descriptions of conditions; but they are just as much, or rather far
+more, living realities than the feelings themselves out of which they
+are concreted. And to say that mental phenomena are governed by law does
+not mean merely that they are describable by a general formula; but that
+there is a living idea, a conscious continuum of feeling, which pervades
+them, and to which they are docile.
+
+Fourth, this supreme law, which is the celestial and living harmony,
+does not so much as demand that the special ideas shall surrender
+their peculiar arbitrariness and caprice entirely; for that would be
+self-destructive. It only requires that they shall influence and be
+influenced by one another.
+
+Fifth, in what measure this unification acts, seems to be regulated only
+by special rules; or, at least, we cannot in our present knowledge
+say how far it goes. But it may be said that, judging by appearances,
+the amount of arbitrariness in the phenomena of human minds is neither
+altogether trifling nor very prominent.
+
+
+PERSONALITY.
+
+Having thus endeavored to state the law of mind, in general, I descend
+to the consideration of a particular phenomenon which is remarkably
+prominent in our own consciousnesses, that of personality. A strong
+light is thrown upon this subject by recent observations of double and
+multiple personality. The theory which at one time seemed plausible that
+two persons in one body corresponded to the two halves of the brain
+will, I take it, now be universally acknowledged to be insufficient.
+But that which these cases make quite manifest is that personality is
+some kind of coördination or connection of ideas. Not much to say, this,
+perhaps. Yet when we consider that, according to the principle which we
+are tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea,
+and that a general idea is a living feeling, it is plain that we have at
+least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality.
+This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended
+in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time
+embrace it in all its fulness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is
+present and living, though specially colored by the immediate feelings
+of that moment. Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a moment, is
+immediate self-consciousness.
+
+But the word coördination implies somewhat more than this; it implies
+a teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this
+teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end;
+it is a developmental teleology. This is personal character. A general
+idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in
+the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious.
+
+This reference to the future is an essential element of personality.
+Were the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for
+development, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be
+no personality. The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is
+mechanical. This remark has an application to the philosophy of religion.
+It is that a genuine evolutionary philosophy, that is, one that makes the
+principle of growth a primordial element of the universe, is so far from
+being antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator, that it is really
+inseparable from that idea; while a necessitarian religion is in an
+altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated. But a
+pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of
+growth, is at once scientifically unsatisfactory, as giving no possible
+hint of how the universe has come about, and hostile to all hopes of
+personal relations to God.
+
+
+COMMUNICATION.
+
+Consistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this paper,
+I am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in
+continuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be
+affected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds,
+that what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind
+hide-bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification;
+and in that diversification there is life. When an idea is conveyed
+from one mind to another, it is by forms of combination of the diverse
+elements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union of a
+tender color with a refined odor. To such forms the law of mechanical
+energy has no application. If they are eternal, it is in the spirit
+they embody; and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical
+necessity. They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas.
+Precisely how primary sensations, as colors and tones, are excited, we
+cannot tell, in the present state of psychology. But in our ignorance, I
+think that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in essentially
+the same manner as the other feelings, called secondary. As far as
+sight and hearing are in question, we know that they are only excited
+by vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the chemical senses
+are probably not more simple. Even the least psychical of peripheral
+sensations, that of pressure, has in its excitation conditions which,
+though apparently simple, are seen to be complicated enough when we
+consider the molecules and their attractions. The principle with which
+I set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated
+to the nerves by continuity, so that there must be something like them
+in the excitants themselves. If this seems extravagant, it is to be
+remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation
+of sensation, which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact
+absolutely inexplicable and ultimate. Now absolute inexplicability is a
+hypothesis which sound logic refuses under any circumstances to justify.
+
+I may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or otherwise to
+telepathy. I have no decided answer to give to this. At first sight, it
+seems unfavorable. Yet there may be other modes of continuous connection
+between minds other than those of time and space.
+
+The recognition by one person of another’s personality takes place by
+means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious
+of his own personality. The idea of the second personality, which is as
+much as to say that second personality itself, enters within the field of
+direct consciousness of the first person, and is as immediately perceived
+as his ego, though less strongly. At the same time, the opposition
+between the two persons is perceived, so that the externality of the
+second is recognised.
+
+The psychological phenomena of intercommunication between two minds have
+been unfortunately little studied. So that it is impossible to say, for
+certain, whether they are favorable to this theory or not. But the very
+extraordinary insight which some persons are able to gain of others from
+indications so slight that it is difficult to ascertain what they are, is
+certainly rendered more comprehensible by the view here taken.
+
+A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In
+considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine
+of a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit
+that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that
+person and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be
+the case, the question arises how it is possible that the existence of
+this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer
+that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and
+eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones
+most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial.
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+I have thus developed as well as I could in a little space the
+_synechistic_ philosophy, as applied to mind. I think that I have
+succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for
+explanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly
+inexplicable; and further that it carries along with it the following
+doctrines: 1st, a logical realism of the most pronounced type; 2nd,
+objective idealism; 3rd, tychism, with its consequent thorough-going
+evolutionism. We also notice that the doctrine presents no hindrances to
+spiritual influences, such as some philosophies are felt to do.
+
+                                                             C. S. PEIRCE.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[72] This proposition is substantially the same as a theorem of Cantor,
+though it is enunciated in a much more general form.
+
+
+
+
+MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE’S ONSLAUGHT ON THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
+
+
+The problem of necessity lurks at the bottom of all problems, and
+according as we accept or reject the idea of necessity we shall be led to
+two entirely different world-conceptions.
+
+The conception of indeterminism generally offers itself first to the
+doubting mind; and it is apparently a pleasant idea. It promises
+freedom, it leaves room for the imagination, it makes the world and
+its possibilities wide, much wider than it could be on the plan of
+determinism. Determinism is at first sight an oppressive notion and we
+naturally shrink from it. It seems to destroy the freedom of the will
+and all moral responsibility. From infinite possibilities it narrows the
+world down to one single actuality; and thus it seems to destroy all the
+charms of life.
+
+The former view may be represented as conceiving the all-power of
+the whole in which and through which we live as a well meaning and
+yielding ruler or a kind-hearted parent who if strongly plied with
+prayer, will for a trifle in order to please an importune favorite
+change his decisions. The dispensations of his government will be
+full of exceptions, of private cabinet decrees, of counter orders and
+irregularities. The latter view, however, would represent the entirety
+of the All as an inexorable and uncompromising sovereign, or as a severe
+educator, a stern father who unfalteringly clings to his principles.
+He leaves full independence to his children, he does not prevent their
+mistakes, yet rigidly lets them bear the consequences of their actions.
+He never answers prayers except that the prayer itself has its educating
+effects upon him who prays; but he never alters objective facts for the
+sake of him who requests his interference, and he never makes exceptions
+either in favor or disfavor of anybody. In brief; the God of him who
+accepts the former view, will be Chance, while the God of him who accepts
+the latter view will be Law.
+
+The choice between the two views seems to remind us of the choice left
+to the heroes of our fairy tales. He who chooses that which appears
+pleasant will be led into inextricable confusion, he who chooses that
+which appears rigid and oppressive will be led on a path where in spite
+of many difficulties he will be able to make firm and certain steps and
+will arrive at clearness as well as moral freedom. It is not the golden
+casket that contains Portia’s picture.
+
+Science constantly operates on the basis of the maxim that there is no
+chance, that everything that happens, happens as it does with necessity.
+The question is, Is this maxim a mere assumption, a non-verifiable
+working hypothesis; or is there any reliable evidence in its favor? Is it
+true, and if it is, how can it be proved?
+
+
+I.
+
+DAVID HUME REDIVIVUS.
+
+Mr. Charles S. Peirce’s article entitled “The Doctrine of Necessity
+Examined,” which appeared in the last number of _The Monist_, must have
+been a surprise to many thinking readers. It must have affected them in
+a somewhat similar manner as Hume’s “Treatise of Human Nature” affected
+Kant. It roused him from his dogmatic slumber: He abandoned dogmatism
+but nevertheless did not accept Hume’s skepticism; he remained positive;
+yet he propounded a better positive view than was the old dogmatism; he
+established in philosophy the method of critique.
+
+The parallelism between David Hume, who doubted the validity of our
+conception of causation, and Mr. Charles S. Peirce who denies the
+universality of the doctrine of necessity, is very marked in more than
+one respect. It is, in spite of many differences, a case of close
+analogy, and the answer which we shall have to give to either, will in
+many respects be suited to both. Both shake the ultimate ground of
+scientific research at its very root. Both call in question the most
+fundamental concept upon which all our methods of investigation and
+philosophy rest. Both challenge the reliability of an idea of which few
+would hesitate to say that it is all but universally accepted. In fact
+the ideas “causation” and “necessity” are more than kin. If analysed,
+many of their elements will be found to be actually identical. Thus the
+one cannot be either established or doubted without establishing or
+doubting the other. Accordingly Mr. Peirce, in some respect, repeats
+David Hume’s onslaught upon the current conception of the basis of human
+knowledge with the more formidable weapons which a century of close
+thought and scientific investigation have furnished him.
+
+If Kant’s answer to Hume had been satisfactory, Mr. Peirce probably
+would not have renewed the attack or he would have had to modify it
+considerably. Kant, however, whom we both, Mr. Peirce as much as I
+myself, admire as a master of philosophic thought, did not solve the
+question satisfactorily. Yet Kant pointed out the way of solving it,
+which was the middle way between dogmatism and scepticism, called by him
+and his followers “Criticism,” and it is this way on which we trust is
+safest travelling.
+
+Mr. Peirce is right that the doctrine of necessity cannot be
+“postulated,” for “to postulate a proposition is no more than to hope it
+will be true.” The doctrine of necessity is, indeed, usually treated as
+a postulate, and Mr. Peirce’s attack appears formidable because he shows
+the weakness of the arguments which are commonly brought forward in its
+favor and which we grant to be insufficient.
+
+Mr. Peirce says (_The Monist_, II, 3, p. 330):
+
+    “In view of all these considerations, I do not believe that
+    anybody, not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting
+    the logic of science, can maintain that the precise and
+    universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved, or even
+    rendered particularly probable, by any observations hitherto
+    made. In this way, the determined advocate of exact regularity
+    will soon find himself driven to _a priori_ reasons to support
+    his thesis. These received such a sockdologer from Stuart Mill
+    in his Examination of Hamilton, that holding to them now seems
+    to me to denote a high degree of imperviousness to reason; so
+    that I shall pass them by with little notice.”
+
+Mr. Peirce is right when saying that necessitarianism must be founded
+on something other than observation. Observation is _a posteriori_; it
+has reference only to single facts, to particulars; yet the doctrine
+of necessity, if there is anything in it at all, is of universal
+application. The doctrine of necessity, let us not be afraid to pronounce
+it clearly, is of an _a priori_ nature. The scientist assumes _a priori_,
+i. e. even before he makes his observations or experiments, as a general
+law applicable to every process which takes place, that, whatever
+happens, happens of necessity in consequence of a cause and in conformity
+to law, so that the same cause under the same circumstances will produce
+the same effects. If all the _a priori_ reasons, as Mr. Peirce maintains,
+received a sockdologer from Stuart Mill, then indeed we shall have to
+abandon the idea of necessity as the superstition of a past and erroneous
+philosophy and we shall have to start the world of science over again.
+
+Mr. Peirce denies the strict regularity of natural law and introduces an
+element of chance. He says (ibid. p. 336):
+
+    “To undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it
+    is due to chance would, indeed, be futile. But this I do not
+    do. _I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle
+    of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold
+    has produced all regularities._[73] The mechanical philosopher
+    leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted
+    for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to
+    chance. I attribute it altogether to chance, it is true, but
+    to chance in the form of a spontaneity which is to some degree
+    regular.”
+
+Mr. Peirce is the pathfinder of a new and as yet untried road. He strikes
+out boldly into the tumultuous ocean of chance, hoping to find in his
+journey the connection between the East and the West, between contrasts
+that seem to him otherwise unconnectible. The confidence of the bold
+discoverer is set forth in the warnings he gives to all seafaring people.
+He attempts to frighten the ill-informed minds who might innocently
+venture out in other directions; and he will thus naturally prevent
+many from falling either into the Charybdis of doubting the propriety
+of applying the logic of probabilities to the problem of necessity
+and causation in general, or, worse still, into the Scylla of the _a
+priori_. The former, he tells us denotes “a state of case-hardened
+ignorance respecting the logic of science,” the latter “a high degree of
+imperviousness to reason.”
+
+Mr. Peirce is well known as one of the keenest logicians now living.
+Considering this fact I am slow to take up arms against him in defending
+a case which he so strongly brands beforehand. I must from the beginning
+plead guilty to a belief in necessity, and having critically revised
+my view once more I cannot help upholding it. I am fully conscious of
+the fact that hundreds, thousands, and millions of single experiences
+(which in Kantian terminology are called _a posteriori_ arguments) cannot
+establish a solid belief in necessity, nor can any imaginable number of
+sequences prove the rigidity of causation, and I confess freely that I
+support my thesis with _a priori_ reasons. Yet at the same time attention
+must be called to the fact that neither Mr. Hamilton nor Mr. Mill had any
+adequate conception of the _a priori_, and Mr. Mill’s sockdologer does
+not disturb in the least the assurance of my view; for the _a priori_
+can, in my opinion, be based upon the firm ground of experience.
+
+All the many sense-experiences at our command, if considered singly,
+cannot constitute knowledge. In order to weave the woof of the _a
+posteriori_ into coherent cloth we want the warp of the _a priori_, and
+I do not see how we can do without it. But the _a priori_ is not that
+mystical hocus-pocus of absolute truth with its impertinent assumptions
+such as it is presented by pseudo-Kantians and justly denounced by Mill;
+it is not as Mr. Peirce brands it an “I cannot help believing,” it is
+not a “natural belief,” nor is it as others conceive it an innate idea.
+It is, briefly described, simply and solely formal knowledge, such as 2
+× 2 = 4, to which we attribute universality and necessity and with the
+assistance of which we are enabled to predict and predetermine certain
+results beforehand (i. e. _a priori_). We might invent a new name for the
+_a priori_, the latter having become odious through the denunciations of
+its enemies and worse still, having been distorted beyond recognition
+through the misuse to which it was put by its defenders and suppositional
+friends. Yet that would be another question, and the idea of the _a
+priori_, i. e. of formal knowledge involving universality and necessity
+would remain the same.
+
+The universality and necessity of formal knowledge are as a rule taken
+for granted by scientists. But philosophy can take nothing for granted,
+and the problem rises: How is the belief in the universality and
+necessity of formal knowledge to be justified? Mr. Peirce’s onslaught on
+the doctrine of necessity is a challenge to answer this question.
+
+
+II.
+
+CAUSATION NOT MERE SEQUENCE.
+
+Mr. John Venn published some twenty-five or six years ago an excellent
+treatise called “The Logic of Chance.” This work opened the eyes of many
+to the great importance of the calculus of probabilities as a method
+of science which was of much wider application than had before been
+suspected. This admirable work we may boldly say marks a new epoch in the
+study of logic, it opened new vistas, and many expectations created by
+it have since been realised. Yet it is to be regretted that the author
+adopts Hume’s erroneous conception of causality and thus implicitly
+paves the way which Mr. Peirce has actually followed and which leads
+to a denial of the doctrine of necessity. Concerning “the doctrine of
+universal causation” Mr. Venn says, in Chapter XIV:
+
+    “We will employ the word simply in the sense which is becoming
+    almost universally adopted by scientific men, viz. that of
+    invariable unconditional sequence.
+
+    “It is in this sense that the word _cause_ is used by Mr.
+    Mill....
+
+    “This meaning of the term is rapidly becoming the popular, or
+    rather, the popular scientific one.”
+
+This idea of “sequence” however was exactly Hume’s mistake, adopted by
+Mr. Mill and through Mr. Mill popularised among English thinkers. If
+the nature of cause and effect were really constituted by invariable
+sequence, then the night might be called the effect of the day because
+night is invariably consequent upon day.
+
+Hume, taking the ground that cause and effect constitute a sequence,
+attempted a synthesis of both; he searched for a proof of their identity
+and failed. And it was natural that he failed, for cause and effect are
+so radically different that we cannot bring them into the formula of an
+equation as “cause = effect.” There is no cause that is equal to its
+effect.
+
+Hume should have considered causation as one single process, and instead
+of attempting a synthesis, he should have made an analysis. The analysis
+would have shown that cause and effect are two abstract and correlative
+terms of one whole and inseparable event. Cause is not identical with
+effect, but the whole event is identical with itself.
+
+If my finger touches a key of the piano, a chord is struck; the chord
+swings and produces certain air-vibrations. In this process from the
+beginning to the end all the energy employed and the mass of the material
+particles remain in amount the same, yet there is a change of form taking
+place. Causation is not mere sequence, but a sequence of quite a special
+kind. It is a sequence of two states which belong together as an initial
+and a final aspect of one and the same event.
+
+So long as we know of two events simply that they follow one another,
+although the sequence may in every case be invariable and unexceptional,
+we are not justified in calling them cause and effect. No amount of
+experience is sufficient to constitute causation by a mere synthesis of
+sequences, and to have appreciated this truth is the immortal merit of
+the great Scotchman who boldly took the consequence of the argument and
+acquiesced in scepticism.
+
+The problem, however, is not so desperate as Hume thought. If Hume
+could have considered his argument in the light which the law of the
+conservation of matter and energy sheds upon it, he would most likely
+have abandoned his scepticism; for causality is perfectly intelligible if
+conceived not as a synthesis of two radically different events, but as a
+process of transformation, of which the prior state is called cause and
+the final one effect.
+
+That two radically different events, which are not thought of as
+transformation, invariably follow each other without our being able to
+discover any connection between them, will naturally appear as a mystery;
+but that two forms are radically different things, although they may be
+forms of the same amount of matter and energy, is no mystery. The effect
+is, or may be, something entirely new.
+
+The configuration of things as it appears in the effect, did not exist
+before. But for that reason, it is no creation out of nothing, it is not
+an incomprehensible event, it is no miracle.
+
+It is a very wonderful thing that two congruent regular tetrahedrons,
+when put together, will form a hexahedron, but the laws of form do
+perfectly and satisfactorily explain it. Supposing we had no idea of the
+laws of form or only an incoherent and fragmentary knowledge of them,
+should we not look upon the result of this combination as a strange and
+incomprehensible mystery. Two heaps of flour one poured upon the other
+will give one heap of the same kind and shape but of a larger size.
+However, the combination of the two four-sided bodies does not produce
+another four-sided body doubly as large as any of the two four-sided
+bodies. Nor does it produce an eight-sided body. It produces a six-sided
+body, which is something quite new. The result is not contained in the
+conditions singly, for no one can say that six-sidedness is a quality
+implicitly contained in four-sided bodies.
+
+The process of combining hydrogen with oxygen into water (H₂O) is
+an immensely more complex case, and the qualities resulting from a
+difference of density as well as configuration are entirely unknown to
+us. There is nevertheless no reason whatever to consider the process
+as different in principle; it is a case of transformation in which the
+amount of matter and energy remains the same.
+
+Whatever the value of the logic of chance may be for scientific reasoning
+in establishing gradations of certainty and formulating the reliability
+of a certain belief, we deny most positively its applicability to the
+principle of causation in general. If we ask what the chance is of a
+combination of two congruent tetrahedrons becoming a hexahedron, we must
+answer that the probability is exactly 1, which means certainty, and
+certainty is but another name for necessity.
+
+Mr. Peirce does not object to necessity in certain cases, he objects
+to necessity being a universal feature of the world. He objects to the
+rigidity of causation in so far only as to allow a trifle of chance to
+enter into nature.
+
+One or two cases or even a hundred, and a thousand, nay millions of
+millions of cases in which causation is explicable as transformation
+is no proof that this must always be so. Mr. Peirce may grant and most
+likely he does grant that causation in a definite set of experiences is
+transformation, yet what guarantee do we have for saying that it is the
+only kind of causation. Might there not be room in this world for another
+causation which for lack of a full comprehension of its nature, we may
+call the causation of chance?
+
+We answer that form is a quality of this world, not of some samples of
+it, but throughout, so far as we know of existence even in the most
+superficial way, and thus we know beforehand or _a priori_ that the laws
+of form hold good so far as our telescopes sweep through space. We are
+ignorant as to the qualities dependent upon special forms of matter or
+energy, and we can acquire any knowledge thereof only through experience;
+but that is no reason to doubt the validity of causation in general,
+or to surmise the probability of there being somewhere a different
+arrangement of nature.
+
+Thus we come to the conclusion that the calculus of probabilities is not
+applicable to the order of the world as to whether it may or may not
+be universal. And in corroboration of this our position we quote the
+following passage from a high authority in the science of logic, who is
+no less than Mr. Charles S. Peirce himself. “Illustrations of the Logic
+of Science,” (_Popular Science Monthly_, 1877, p. 714):
+
+    “The relative probability of this or that arrangement of
+    Nature is something which we should have a right to talk about
+    if universes were as plenty as blackberries, if we could put
+    a quantity of them in a bag, shake them well up, draw out a
+    sample, and examine them to see what proportion of them had
+    one arrangement and what proportion another. But, even in
+    that case, a higher universe would contain us, in regard to
+    whose arrangements the conception of probability could have no
+    applicability.”
+
+Mr. Peirce is still more emphatic in another passage which reads (ib.
+1878, p. 205):
+
+    “If any one has ever maintained that the universe is a pure
+    throw of the dice, the theologians have abundantly refuted him.
+    ‘How often,’ says Archbishop Tillotson, ‘might a man, after
+    he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag, fling them out upon
+    the ground before they would fall into an exact poem, yea,
+    or so much as make a good discourse in prose! And may not a
+    little book be as easily made by chance as this great volume
+    of the world?’ The chance world here shown to be so different
+    from that in which we live would be one in which there were
+    no laws, the characters of different things being entirely
+    independent; so that, should a sample of any kind of objects
+    ever show a prevalent character, it could only be by accident,
+    and no general proposition could ever be established. Whatever
+    further conclusions we may come to in regard to the order of
+    the universe, thus much may be regarded as solidly established,
+    that the world is not a mere chance-medley.”
+
+Here follows a close reasoning of several pages which ends (on p. 207)
+with a paragraph beginning with the words:
+
+    “This shows that a contradiction is involved in the very idea
+    of a chance world.”
+
+And a long paragraph on p. 208 winds up with these sentences:
+
+    “The actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of a
+    polyp. The interest which the uniformities of Nature have for
+    an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence.”
+
+This is exactly the position which I defend. If universes were as plenty
+as blackberries we might talk about the order of other universes. They
+might be four- or five- or _n_-dimensional. Yet even in all these cases
+they would not be void of form. The four-dimensional universe would have
+another arrangement, but its laws would be none the less orderly, none
+the less regular, and a higher universe would contain them all. Supposing
+there were four- or five-dimensional space somewhere, we could state
+with absolute precision all the formal laws by which bodies of so many
+dimensions were governed.[74]
+
+The order of form and the rigidity of formal laws is as universal and
+omnipresent as God. They encompass our path and our lying down, they have
+beset our behind and before. If we ascend up into heaven they are there,
+if we make our beds in hell, behold they are there. If we take the wings
+of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there
+they shall lead us and hold us.
+
+
+III.
+
+MR. PEIRCE’S LOGIC OF SCIENCE.
+
+In spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between Mr. Peirce’s
+and our own world-conception, we must state that there are many
+most important points of agreement. Mr. Peirce says in his article
+“Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” (ibid. p. 3 and 7):
+
+    “The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration
+    of what we already know, something else which we do not know....
+
+    “The settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry.”
+
+There are according to Peirce several methods of settling opinion, which
+swayed humanity in an historic succession: (1) The method of tenacity.
+Doubt being an uneasy and dissatisfied state, we cling tenaciously not
+merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe. (2) The
+method of authority, which is that of the Roman Church and of all great
+political and religious institutions of the past. (3) The _a priori_
+method, by which Mr. Peirce understands the fixing of belief agreeably to
+reason, i. e. to the subjective conviction of the individual thinker. All
+these methods have their merits, says Mr. Peirce (ibid. p. 13):
+
+    “The _a priori_ method is distinguished for its comfortable
+    conclusions. It is the nature of the process to adopt whatever
+    belief we are inclined to, and there are certain flatteries
+    to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature, until we
+    are awakened from our pleasing dream by some rough facts. The
+    method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind....
+    But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its
+    strength, simplicity, and directness.”
+
+It is apparent that the merit of the _a priori_ method so called
+is really a vice. The _a priori_ method so called is the basis of
+agnosticism. If according to my reason this, and according to your reason
+that, may be the truth, where does truth remain? If truth is purely
+subjective, truth becomes impossible. The method of settling belief
+agreeably to our individual tempers is the death of objective truth, of
+science and philosophy.
+
+Mr. Peirce fully recognises the practical importance of thought. He says:
+
+    “The production of belief is the sole function of thought”
+    (ibid. p. 289).
+
+    “Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions” (ibid. p.
+    5).
+
+    “What is belief? First, it is something that we are aware of;
+    second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it
+    involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action,
+    or, say for short, a _habit_” (ibid. p. 291).
+
+    “Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as
+    the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how
+    subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so
+    fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
+    practice” (ibid. p. 293).
+
+Mr. Peirce is very far from considering philosophy as a mere matter of
+speculation or theory without practical importance. He says:
+
+    “What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe,
+    how to think of the _ensemble_ of things, is a fundamental
+    problem in the theory of reasoning.”
+
+The _a priori_ method, so called by Mr. Peirce, translated into practical
+life is not only the death of truth but also of morality. The objective
+criterion of truth is gone, and with it goes the objective standard of
+right and wrong. If that is true which seems so to my individual reason,
+then that is right which pleases me best. What is right to me might be
+wrong to you. Thus this method leads either to moral indifference, or to
+basing ethics upon the greatest amount of pleasure attainable, (Hedonism,
+as represented by Mr. H. Spencer, Prof. Harald Höffding, Professor
+Gizycki, and others,) or to relying upon the individual conscience as an
+absolute and ultimate authority.[75]
+
+The method of settling opinion agreeably to individual reason is at
+present the most fashionable and widely spread conception, and it shows
+its influence in the almost universal acceptation of agnosticism to-day.
+Is that the final decision with which we have to rest satisfied? If it
+were, we would better return to the method of authority or tenacity.
+No, it is not the sum of all wisdom. The _a priori_ method so called
+represents a period of transition, which, if persistently pursued, will
+lead to the bankruptcy of thought, the desperate appearance of which is
+well disguised in the big sounding and modesty-parading term agnosticism.
+And here we return to the exposition of Mr. Peirce’s views. Mr. Peirce
+does not accept the _a priori_ method, he believes in “the logic of
+science.” Mr. Peirce says:
+
+    “To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a
+    method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by
+    nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something
+    upon which our thinking has no effect.... The method must be
+    such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the
+    same. Such is the method of science” (ibid. p. 11.)
+
+    “That whose characters are independent of how you or I think is
+    an external reality” (ibid. p. 298).
+
+    “All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the
+    processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will
+    give one certain solution to every question to which they can
+    be applied.... They may at first obtain different results, but,
+    as each perfects his method and his processes, the results
+    will move steadily together toward a destined centre.... The
+    opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
+    investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
+    represented in this opinion is the real” (ibid. pp. 299-300).
+
+The word “fated” must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands it. He adds
+in a foot-note:
+
+    “Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and cannot
+    be avoided.”
+
+
+IV.
+
+NECESSITY IN THOUGHT PRESUPPOSES NECESSITY IN FACTS.
+
+I have thus outlined Mr. Peirce’s views, not only because his line of
+reasoning[76] is admirable and deserves to be universally known and
+recognised, but also because it seems to me to have some bearing upon the
+question at issue.
+
+If the ultimate conclusion of every man concerning reality shall be the
+same, there must be some truth in the idea of necessity. If there is an
+opinion “fated to be ultimately agreed to,” we are confronted in our
+representation of reality with something that is inevitable. Shall there
+be necessity in thought but not in that of which all our ideas are but
+images and symbols? We can conceive of the necessity in the ideal realm
+of thought only as a reflection of that necessity which pervades the
+original and prototype of our thought, which lives in reality.
+
+
+V.
+
+MR. PEIRCE’S EVOLUTIONISM.
+
+I have tried to find an explanation of Mr. Peirce’s position which
+appears to me self-contradictory and I believe I have found the key that
+will explain it.
+
+I read somewhere a stray remark of Mr. Peirce’s in which he demanded
+that evolutionism should be thorough-going. The conception of evolution
+in vogue at present, he said, stops short at a certain point, and
+substitutes for an explanation the unknowable. Mr. Peirce says:
+
+    “Does not space call for some explanation? Is not that a
+    half-way philosophy which in these our days does not explain,
+    or at least hold out some promise of explaining, why space
+    is continuous, why it has such a wonderful uniformity in all
+    its parts, why there are neither more nor less than three
+    dimensions everywhere, why every closed curve can, by a
+    continuous change of position, size, and form, be brought into
+    coincidence with every other, and why the three angles of a
+    triangle make exactly one hundred and eighty degrees, or at
+    least so very closely so that we cannot tell whether they make
+    more or less?”
+
+Mr. Peirce does not intend to halt before these problems, but to explain
+them and carries the principle of evolution to its ultimate conclusions,
+so as to explain from it not only the forms of living organisms but also
+the laws of nature including the laws of space. Mr. Peirce declares in
+his article “The Architecture of Theories” (_The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 2,
+p. 165):
+
+    “Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be
+    accounted for.... Law is _par excellence_ the thing that wants
+    a reason.”
+
+And what he means by it is further elucidated in his article “The
+Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (_The Monist_, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 334):
+
+    “That single events should be hard and unintelligible, logic
+    will permit without difficulty: we do not expect to make the
+    shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural and
+    reasonable by any amount of cogitation. But logic does expect
+    things _general_ to be understandable. To say that there is a
+    universal law, and that it is a hard, ultimate, unintelligible
+    fact, the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired
+    into, at this a sound logic will revolt; and will pass over
+    at once to a method of philosophising which does not thus
+    barricade the road of discovery.”
+
+It is perfectly true that “law is _par excellence_ the thing that wants
+a reason,” and any explanation that explains it by the assumption of an
+unknowable is unphilosophical. I agree with Mr. Peirce that we must not
+halt here; but I have no confidence in his method of explanation. Mr.
+Peirce’s original idea, then, and I should add, his main mistake, is that
+he proposes to explain the origin of natural law by evolution.
+
+In his legitimate anxiety to explain law, Mr. Peirce declares chance to
+be exempt therefrom. He says:
+
+    “That a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and
+    sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation.” (_The
+    Monist_, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 165.)
+
+But chance in our opinion needs exactly as much explanation as anything
+else. Mr. Peirce very improperly identifies “that which cannot be
+accounted for” with “that which need not be accounted for.” Absolute
+chance, if it existed, would _not_ so much _not_ call for a particular
+explanation as actually be unexplainable, and being incapable of
+explanation, it would have to be considered as an unintelligible fact,
+as inscrutable, incomprehensible, and mystical. On the assumption that
+chance need not be accounted for, Mr. Peirce builds the architecture of
+his theory. He says:
+
+    “Chance is first, law is second, the tendency of habits is
+    third.”
+
+The application of this general statement is set forth in the following
+passage:
+
+    “In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second,
+    General conception Third, or mediation. In biology, the idea of
+    arbitrary sporting is first, heredity is second, the process
+    whereby the accidental characters become fixed is third.”
+
+How little after all we can escape the determinism of law as being a
+feature of the world will be seen from the fact, that the explanation
+for the evolution of law is presented by Mr. Peirce as being itself a
+law, i. e. a formula describing a regularity supposed to obtain in facts.
+Does not Mr. Peirce’s formula, supposing it to be true, deserve the same
+reproach which he casts upon natural law in general, viz., that it is “a
+hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact, the why and wherefore of which can
+never be inquired into”?
+
+
+VI.
+
+WORLD-CONSTRUCTIONS.
+
+There are two methods of philosophising, one starts with ideas which
+are supposed not to need any explanation, the other starts from facts
+and uses facts as data. The former is the method of the constructionist
+or ontologist, the latter that of the positivist. The constructionist
+attempts to beget a world-theory in the same way that God was supposed
+to have created the world; he attempts to bring it into being either
+out of a real nothing or out of something like nothing. He constructs a
+world-theory out of the self-evident, out of the absolute, out of the
+indubitable, or out of that the contrary of which is inconceivable. The
+positivist, however, employs facts as the given material, which he works
+out into a consistent and systematic whole. The former view is synthetic
+and constructive, the latter is analytic and descriptive. The former view
+is the method of Hegel, Oken, and also of Mr. Spencer, the latter is the
+method of all scientists and the ideal of the positive philosophy.
+
+Mr. Peirce although very positivistic in his logic of science, must in
+philosophy still be counted among the constructionists.
+
+Chance is to Mr. Peirce as much absolute as was to Hegel the idea
+of “abstract being,” which as such, Hegel said, is equivalent to
+“non-being.” Non-being need not be accounted for. So Hegel starts with
+this idea, and finding that “becoming” is the oscillation between being
+and non-being launches his abstract thought upon the terra firma of
+reality.
+
+In the same way and with similar ingenious ingenuity Oken starts
+the world with zero. Zero or non-being need not be accounted for.
+Its existence calls for no particular reasons. What is zero? We can
+conceive it as “0 = 1 - 1.” Thus we have “+1” and “-1,” two units. The
+whole world, according to Oken, is only a disintegration of Nothing,
+an equation of enormous complexity but always equal to zero. And that
+explains the world!
+
+Mr. Spencer, adopts “the principle of setting out with propositions of
+which the negations are unconceivable,” without being aware that any
+inveterate belief or prejudice can be defended from that standpoint.
+The principle is purely subjective. It does not admit of any objective
+verification and limits knowledge to individual conception. If Mr.
+Spencer’s principle were admissible, we could not refute the adversaries
+of the Copernican system, when they declare that the rotation of the
+earth up on which we stand is inconceivable. The maxim that that
+proposition is most certain the negation of which is inconceivable might
+after all, and it actually did very often, come into conflict with facts.
+Many propositions are now confidently accepted which were formerly
+declared to be positively inconceivable.
+
+Mr. Peirce, I say, starts the world with an abstract idea of a something
+of which he assumes we need not give any account, as did the great
+ontologists of former times. He constructs, agreeably to his reason, a
+theory of the way in which the world might have originated, and thus he
+falls into the mistake criticised by himself as the _a priori_ method.
+Yet the weakest point of Mr. Peirce’s system is that his “absolute
+chance” begets order; irregularity becomes law by practice, as if by a
+sufficiently prolonged shaking the dice would by and by acquire the habit
+of turning up the same faces each time.
+
+The present world-conception of the scientist regards natural laws as
+eternal. The order that prevails in these laws constitutes the principle
+of evolution and changes the chaos of a nebula into a well-arranged
+planetary system. Thus the original chaos is properly speaking no chaos.
+It is in all its parts regulated by law and only appears chaotic in
+comparison with more advanced stages of evolution.
+
+Desirous to account for the regularities of nature Mr. Peirce proposes
+the idea that nature in the beginning was a real, true chaos, without
+order, without laws, the single actions of reality taking place
+irregularly and in a sportive manner. Absolute chance prevailed.
+Everything was undetermined, exactly as much so as a man is undetermined
+in his action before his belief is settled. Yet a man, by and by, forms
+a belief and acts accordingly, not once or twice, but often, until a
+habit is formed. Thus Mr. Peirce assumes, Nature’s actions are first
+undetermined, they may be of this kind or of another kind. The same
+particle of reality may under the same conditions act in different ways,
+yet it acts somehow; it acts again, and repeats a certain kind of action
+more frequently than others, thus forming habits. Laws according to Mr.
+Peirce are the habits acquired by nature.
+
+The proposition of Mr. Peirce’s logic of science points out another
+method of constructing a world-conception. The recognition of reality in
+the sense as he conceives it, admonishes us that our world-conception
+should be a picturing, a mirroring, an imitation of the objective world
+of facts. It should not be the architecture of a theory, but first
+an analysis and then a reconstruction of experience; it should be a
+description of facts, methodically arranged.
+
+
+VII.
+
+FACTS AND LAWS.
+
+That which we call natural law is not the description of a certain
+special and concrete form of existence which is now or then and here
+or there, but of some general quality of facts which is everywhere and
+always. The former, i. e. every special and concrete form of existence,
+can be explained by evolution, the latter, i. e. natural law, cannot. The
+former has to be accounted for by the law of causation, the latter by the
+principle of sufficient reason. And it is this distinction between cause
+and reason which Mr. Peirce does not seem to have regarded.
+
+Every special form of existence must, at least theoretically, be
+traceable as the effect of some cause and every law of nature must be
+explainable by showing its connection with other natural laws. The only
+thing in the world of which we cannot and need not give account is the
+existence of facts itself, or being in general, which is the stubborn
+presence of reality in us ourselves and also outside of us, objected
+to our own being as an independent power to which we have to adapt our
+conduct. We need not prove its existence, for it exists. If anything
+is ultimate, facts are ultimate; and cognition is nothing but the
+reconstruction of facts for the purpose of orientation among them, it is
+a methodical description of reality in the symbols of the feelings that
+exist in sentient beings.
+
+A scientist having observed a special process of nature, describes it,
+if possible, in such a way that it is recognised as a transformation. A
+description of this kind is called an explanation. It renders the process
+intelligible to us; it is complete and exhaustive. In order to make such
+a description available for comprehending other cases of the same or
+similar kind, we have to introduce another principle, which is that of
+economy. We must single out those features which are common to a certain
+class and remove all diversity and specificalness. All specificalness
+and diversity are transient features due to special conditions; they
+disappear with these special conditions. Thus the notion of natural law
+involves as an essential characteristic and fundamental quality the
+absence of the incidental and the temporal.
+
+Natural laws describe the facts of nature _sub specie aeternitatis_. They
+cease to be natural laws in the proper sense of the word as soon as they
+are conceived, like legal laws, as products of evolutions, which have
+appeared in time and may disappear again. Eternity is the characteristic
+feature of a natural law, it is its backbone, the essence of its being,
+its _conditio sine qua non_.
+
+Thus in considering a natural phenomenon we are led to distinguish
+between its cause and its reason: Its cause is something special, it is
+an individual event, happening in time, and accordingly being transient;
+it is an occurrence of some kind, it is a single and definite fact.
+However its reason is not anything special, it is something general;
+it is not a single and definite fact, but it is a law of universal
+application; it is not transient, but a conception of things in which the
+incidental and temporal are eliminated. A reason is applicable to all
+cases of the same kind and also to all cases of any time. A cause, i. e.
+a fact, if it truly exists, is real (not true); a law, i. e. a reason,
+if it really obtains in nature, is true (not real), and any attempt at
+explaining natural laws as a product of evolution, being based upon the
+view that regards them as causes not as reasons, as real not as true, as
+a description of temporal existences, not as viewing facts _sub specie
+aeternitatis_, must from the outset be a failure.[77]
+
+Mr. Peirce attempts to explain natural laws as if they were single and
+concrete facts. Where we have to look for reasons he evidently employs
+the method of searching for causes. He treats that which in its very
+nature is eternal, as if it were temporal. He regards the everlasting,
+the imperishable, the immutable as if it had originated, as if it were
+transient, as if it were the product of a development.
+
+
+VIII.
+
+LAWS NOT INEXPLICABLE.
+
+But is not Mr. Peirce justified in declaring that law remains
+unexplained? Is law really as he says “hard, ultimate, inexplicable,
+immutable”? Law is to be regarded as immutable but not as ultimate or
+inexplicable, and thus Mr. Peirce’s denunciation of natural law is not
+justified. All natural laws must be conceived as forming one system
+ascending from the lower to the higher, from the more special to the
+more general. And the more comprehensive law represents in each case the
+reason for the less comprehensive law which is comprised in it. Thus we
+must finally reach the most general or all-comprehensive law, which is a
+description of that which is a universal quality of existence.
+
+There is wrong notion prevalent among many thinkers that the most
+comprehensive description (law or reason) of a certain kind should,
+as in a nutshell, contain and immediately explain all that which it
+embraces, so that if once in its possession, we should be omniscient as
+to all the rest. The most universal law is looked upon as the centre of
+existence—_das Innerste der Welt_. If we could but get there, we should
+solve all the world-problems by mere intuition. This is the old error of
+the students of magic, whose hope is expressed by Faust when he says:
+
+    “_Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt_
+    _Im Innersten zusammenhält._”
+
+    That I may detect the inmost force
+    Which binds the world and shapes its course.—_Bayard Taylor._
+
+Comprehension is not attained simply by finding out and stating the most
+general feature of a certain class of facts; comprehension does not alone
+consist of generalisation but also of discrimination. The differences
+among less general laws must be recognised as results of special
+conditions. And any knowledge of a general law reveals nothing about the
+special conditions under the influence of which the same law will work
+differently.
+
+It is but too often overlooked that the more general a statement is, the
+less it will contain, the vaguer it will appear, the emptier it must be.
+There is no royal road to cognition and mere generalisation is of no
+avail. We shall have to investigate the details of every case and view
+it in its relation to the general law. The general law must be viewed
+under those conditions which will invariably produce the same special
+modifications.
+
+But do not the most general reasons remain uncomprehended? Do we not at
+last arrive at an ultimate law which, then, must be hard and inexplicable?
+
+Those laws which appear in every respect to be universal are the formal
+laws of mathematics, arithmetic, and their kindred sciences. And all
+these formal sciences are not only _not_ mystical, unintelligible, and
+inexplicable, but they are the most perspicuous, most reliable, and most
+certain knowledge we possess. All their theorems admit of the most rigid
+demonstration, and the last shadow of mysticism has been removed by
+Hermann Grassmann. Owing to his searching investigations we are no longer
+in need of axioms which were formerly supposed to be the indispensable
+basis of mathematics.
+
+There is however a basis of formal thought left which we cannot dispense
+with; that is the idea of sameness, generally formulated as the law of
+identity. Is perhaps the law of identity by which all the regularities
+of nature are to be accounted for, inexplicable? Hardly! The idea of
+sameness has a solid basis in the facts of experience.[78]
+
+
+IX.
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+The contrast between Determinism and Indeterminism is old, yet Mr.
+Peirce has worked out quite a new aspect of Indeterminism and places it
+upon a basis that appears to be a more solid foundation than it ever
+before possessed. At the same time he succeeds in making some of its
+consequences so plausible, that in this new garb it will appeal more
+strongly than before to scientifically trained minds. With all deference
+to the logical acuteness of Mr. Peirce and with all admiration for the
+originality and depth of his thought, we cannot, however, accede to the
+new philosophy which he proposes.
+
+Mr. Peirce’s propositions go to the core of all problems, they upset
+everything that has heretofore been considered as firm ground, they
+question the most fundamental concepts of the world-conception upon
+which all scientific reasoning and the methods of the positive philosophy
+rest. Thus they set us a-thinking and will help us to attain greater
+clearness on points which are to all of us of greater concern than may
+at first sight appear. For the fundamental problems of philosophy have
+a deep practical importance. Their importance is less noticeable, less
+obvious, but at the same time more sweeping the more fundamental they are.
+
+Let us here in concluding this article consider only one, but the most
+striking one, of the consequences to which both views lead.
+
+Indeterminism leads to a conception of God which although we may call
+it “mind” and place it at the beginning of the world, is pure chance or
+the indeterminateness of an arbitrary sporting. Determinism on the other
+hand leads to a recognition of God as that something in nature that is
+as it is, that has been and will be. Science, whose method of cognising
+the truth is and can only be to know in parts, attempts to describe the
+partial qualities of this something in natural laws.
+
+It is of great consequence in practical life whether God is what the
+name Jahveh intends to convey, eternal and unalterable being, immutable
+sameness in the perpetual flux, irrefragable law in the changes of
+evolution, or whether it is the Τυχή of the pagans, i. e. indeterminable
+and absolute chance, unaccountable, irregular, capricious, and uncertain.
+
+The God-idea is the basis of ethics. It matters little whether we use or
+avoid the name God, for the atheist has also a God-idea in his conception
+of that existence in which he lives and moves and has his being. This
+God-idea is always the ground from which we derive our rules of conduct;
+and whenever we change, not our terminology but our idea of God, we shall
+as a matter of consistency have to change our views of ethics also.
+
+                                                                   EDITOR.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[73] Italics are ours.
+
+[74] See _Fundamental Problems_, p. 55.
+
+[75] This is the position of the Societies for Ethical Culture which are
+not confessedly but practically agnostics. Professor Adler’s position is
+characterised in _The Monist_, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 567, 599, and _The Open
+Court_ Nos. 225 and 234. Mr. Salter bases ethics upon “the immovable rock
+of conscience.” (See his _Ethical Religion_, p. 295.)
+
+[76] Ernst Schroeder in his great work _Vorlesungen über die Algebra der
+Logik_ adopts in the main the results of Peirce. A sketch of Mr. Peirce’s
+line of thought, (his _Gedankengang_, as Schroeder calls it,) is found in
+the _Einleitung_, pp. 107-118.
+
+[77] I laid down my views on the subject in a short monograph of only 82
+pages, entitled _Ursache, Grund und Zweck, eine philosophische Abhandlung
+zur Klärung der Begriffe_ (Dresden: R. von Grumbkow, Hof. Verlag, 1883).
+In all main points I maintain the same standpoint still. See also
+_Fundamental Problems_, the chapter on Causality, pp. 79-91 and 96-109.
+
+Since the publication of my German pamphlet my confidence that we can,
+(not only in the special sciences such as chemistry, mineralogy, botany,
+etc., but also in philosophy) arrive at truth, has rather been confirmed
+than shaken. We can create a common ground on which all philosophers
+agree, as much as mathematicians agree concerning the Pythagorean
+theorem. But in order to achieve this ideal, philosophers must abandon
+all attempts at originality. The hankering after originality is an
+inherited evil in the family of philosophers. The first philosophers
+were poets, priests, and prophets; later on in the natural evolution
+of human culture, a differentiation of their combined functions took
+place. Originality is a virtue in the poet but a vice in his brother,
+the philosopher. The philosopher’s ideal must be to free himself of all
+individualism, subjectivity, and original conceptions; he must become
+strictly objective. He must renounce his personal likes and dislikes, and
+make his soul a mirror of nature, faithfully and correctly to represent
+the facts and nothing but the facts. This is the ethics of philosophical
+inquiry, and the philosophy that takes its stand on this principle we
+call positivism.
+
+Almost all divergencies of importance in the different philosophical
+systems can be traced to different conceptions or rather misconceptions
+of causation.
+
+This last century since Kant has been the most fertile age of original
+world-theories, all different in style and manner of construction, but
+all alike in so far as the author of each system had strained his utmost
+efforts to be original. Thus all these world-theories were so many
+beautiful poems on ontology, they were so many grand air-castles produced
+by the magic wand of a fairy-tale causation. The philosopher’s aspiration
+must not be to present original ideas but to reach that one solution
+which any other unbiassed thinker must find, to express that truth which
+in the end will have to be recognised universally, to formulate facts in
+objective exactness. The degree of originality in philosophic thought
+marks the degree of aberration from the common aim of the one sole
+solution, and the greatest source of original ideas is the confusion of
+cause and reason, of _Ursache_ and _Grund_, of event and law, of fact and
+truth.
+
+[78] I expect to discuss the problems of sameness, of chance, of
+mechanicalism, and the freedom of will in the next number of _The Monist_
+under the caption _The Doctrine of Necessity: Its Basis and its Scope_.
+
+
+
+
+LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+FRANCE.
+
+
+Professor Lombroso is unremitting in bringing up new facts in support
+of his doctrines. His _Nouvelles Recherches de Psychiatrie et
+d’Anthropologie criminelle_ (New Researches in Psychiatry and Criminal
+Anthropology) comprise a good many, gathered from the latest works
+relating to criminality. In adding psychiatry to anthropology in the
+title to this volume, writes the learned author, “I return to my
+starting point and to the true source of these studies, which is only
+a clinical demonstration, but a more perfect one, of what is called in
+old psychiatry, moral insanity and masked epilepsy.” Lombroso may be
+reproached with a certain exaggeration, a certain haste, in his views
+respecting criminal man: yet can we conceive of an opinionated inquirer
+who would not have faith in his work, and who could resist the desire
+to generalise from the facts already obtained? But I have little doubt
+that the works of his school will end in producing a precise conception,
+which will force itself on the attention of legislators and jurists. I
+say _precise_, because one has a glimpse of the truth in criticising
+the evidence offered to us in such variety, though what one perceives
+sometimes vanishes.
+
+How can we conceive of the criminal type? This is a prime question on
+which it is not useless to insist. Crime, as M. Tarde tells us, has
+become a real profession in our modern societies. Although there is some
+truth in it, we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the subtle
+form of this paradox. There is no want of delinquents carrying on a
+business; the army of crime recruits itself from all classes, it includes
+peasants and workmen, chemists and physicians, lawyers and merchants,
+soldiers and poets, that is to say, subjects possessing some one at least
+of the aptitudes which form a calling. We have here, then, on the one
+side, wretches destitute of all aptitude for a trade, and on the other
+men who do not adhere to the exercise of their profession, although
+capable of making use of it. The delinquent appears to us, in short,
+as stricken with some degree of professional incapacity, and if crime
+has become a profession in some sort, the criminals of every category
+first represent, if I may thus say, a professional or social waste. The
+study of the causes and the signs of this waste is just what has been
+undertaken.
+
+The social causes of crime have often been put in prominence. They are
+numerous, and persons unacquainted with these questions are inclined to
+attribute the largest proportion of crimes and offences to distress and
+misery. But, according to the inquiries of Morrison, for example—and by
+the confession also of M. Troal, of whom I shall speak immediately—misery
+rarely produces crime, and if we examine carefully, one after the other,
+the social causes of crime, we shall soon be convinced that poverty,
+drunkenness, etc., feed criminality by producing degeneracy of the race,
+rather than that they directly arouse the criminal.[79] We are compelled
+then to seek the immediate reason for a crime in the criminal himself,
+and to learn to distinguish the delinquent by means of the methods fixed
+upon by anthropologists and physicians.
+
+At first, as we know, Lombroso recognised only one criminal type. He has
+since found that there are many. The distinction between the thief and
+the murderer is classical. Benedikt has described the born vagabond;
+Brouardel, the feminine type. It is always necessary in describing a
+type to resort to the methods of natural history, to pass in review the
+emotional and intellectual characters, the physiological or functional
+characters, the anatomical or morphological characters, and endeavor
+to seize certain constant correlations between the signs one has been
+successful in observing. The delinquent may be described as abnormal
+from the emotional standpoint, and as deficient or perverted from the
+intellectual point of view. We could then begin by describing exactly
+certain intellectual and emotional types, and it is no exaggeration
+to say that experienced magistrates in their way have done so, those
+even who, with M. Proal, we shall see to be the most hostile to
+anthropological theories. But they are reluctant to admit any relations
+between the moral agent and physical nature, whereas the new school, on
+the contrary, makes every effort to discover and determine them.
+
+How far is it successful? That is the question.
+
+If we take the ensemble of the emotional and intellectual characters, we
+shall affirm with Professor Pelman (whose opinion Mr. Christian Ufer has
+made known in _The Monist_) that the portrait of the imbecile traced by
+Sollier corresponds strongly to that of the born criminal of Lombroso.
+We shall aver also that this portrait does not answer equally well for
+all kinds of delinquents, and that we pass gradually from the malignant
+imbecile to the average or mediocre man. The same observation applies
+when we study the physiognomical characters of which the little book of
+Lombroso furnishes a great variety. We shall have evidently to consider,
+with respect to physiognomical characters and physical marks, a strong
+type (certainly inborn), a weak type, and, I would add, an _acquired_
+type.
+
+If we take functional anomalies—those of touch, sight, etc.—we shall be
+struck with their number as well as with their importance, and, I may say
+in passing, the alienist physicians who continue to be the adversaries
+of Lombroso discover every day fresh examples of them, which could
+give to the conception of the type, the reality they still deny it to
+possess. The latest discovery, and certainly one of the most striking,
+is that which Ottolenghi has just made, in the clinic of Lombroso
+himself, respecting the visual field of epileptics and of the morally
+insane. According to the researches of Ottolenghi, the visual field will
+be remarkably limited, both with epileptics not in paroxysms, and with
+born delinquents, but more often with the latter. They present a partial
+hemiopia, vertical and heteronymous; the periphery of the field is
+sinuous and irregular. This discovery tends, then, to confirm the analogy
+of epilepsy with criminal tendencies; it will furnish a sign of the first
+order for a well marked category of delinquents.
+
+Let us pass on to morphological characters. The abundance of evidence
+is truly extraordinary, and one cannot abstain from remarking, in this
+relation, that a certain number of the anomalies designated ought to
+be found, and indeed are found, in morally healthy subjects, and that
+therefore they do not alone suffice to furnish a ground of distinction
+from the medium normal type. As certain functional anomalies are not
+wanting either in many subjects whose morality remains perfect, it would
+be necessary to aim, it seems to me, at establishing an approximate
+_quantum_ for the criminal type, or rather for the _kinds_ which ought to
+lead, by sensible gradations, from the most pronounced type to that which
+is the least so. Some scattered elements of this work will be found in
+the book of Lombroso; the studies of Clouston on the palate (deformation
+of the palate existed in 19 per cent. of the general population, 61
+per cent. of imbeciles, 35 per cent. of criminals, and 33 per cent. of
+madmen); the monographs of Ottolenghi and Roncoroni on the pathological
+anomalies of 100 criminals, with an indication of the number and the
+nature of the anomalies, etc.
+
+In short, it cannot be questioned that the new school holds its ground
+well, since it circumscribes and makes more and more precise the object
+of its researches. In my humble opinion, it is of importance for it to
+get rid of hazardous or useless explanations, for it to tell us as little
+as possible of remote atavism—for if heredity is constant, it is not
+possible to trace it link by link as far as the deluge!—and finally for
+pure anthropologists and psychiatrists to beware of themselves drawing
+practical conclusions from their doctrines. The applications concern
+jurists, and constitute a question of another kind, into which other
+considerations also enter.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In the juridical domain, a French magistrate, M. LOUIS PROAL, has
+just published a considerable work, _Le Crime et la Peine_ (Crime and
+Punishment) which is truly the performance of an adversary, but not of
+such an adversary as M. Tarde. M. Proal is an irreconcilable, and all
+his dialectic—charged a little too much with citations of which many are
+useless or prove nothing—turns on the absolute affirmation of free-will.
+He flatters himself to have demonstrated freedom, in which he is wrong.
+It is a matter of faith, as criticists have very well perceived. Human
+science can know only determinism; it proves only what it finds.[80]
+
+M. Proal claims then to found on free-will the two principles of the
+moral responsibility of the delinquent, and the moral character of
+punishment, in opposition to the purely social point of view in which
+the new criminalists place themselves. The physical anomaly of the
+criminal seems to him a chimera, and he goes so far as to deny, or falls
+little short of it, the relations of frenzied impulsion with degeneracy.
+Willingly, perhaps, he would accept as truly mad and irresponsible only
+the insane, those who are shut up forever in the asylums!
+
+Certainly, M. Proal possesses the experience of the magistrate, he
+has erudition and triumphs easily, in details, by the defects and
+deficiencies of the doctrine he combats. His objections, nevertheless, do
+not touch the general conception which connects crime, in a great number
+of cases, with the disorders of the living machine. He is not willing
+for the criminal to differ from the honest man otherwise than by his
+inclinations and will, as though will and inclinations had no dependence
+on the state of our organs, and as though heredity entered for nothing
+into the “personal factor” of character! He is not averse to saying that
+moral and physical decadence is always the effect of criminality, as
+though it was never its cause! He allows with that attenuations of moral
+responsibility, resulting from physiological and physical influences, as
+though a weakened responsibility was a true moral responsibility in the
+sense he understands, and as though the judge had the means of deciding
+at what moment morbid evolution involves irresponsibility!
+
+These absolute principles once established, he defines an offense “the
+violation of a social duty,” and he grants that the judge “ought to take
+account of the importance of the social evil resulting from the crime.”
+It is sufficient for him that the _intention_ and the _responsibility_
+is appreciated, in order to attach the penalty to morality. In default
+of which, writes he, there would be no more justice. It is a noble
+solicitude, that of wishing to justify punishment in the eyes of the
+guilty person himself, and to inflict it on him as an expiation of the
+evil he has committed. But here an error is fallen into, which is, in
+my opinion, to suppose that the law punishes “morally.” The law has
+not the power to inflict moral chastisement. It strikes the delinquent
+materially, in his goods, in his person; the rest depends not on the
+judge who applies the law, but on the judge who is in ourselves,
+the avenger more or less severe according to the complex incidences
+of education and heredity. Moral chastisement can exist only in the
+conscience of the delinquent, and, if this conscience is wanting, or
+nearly so, all the affirmations of the judge cannot cause the punishment
+to have the quality of moral expiation for the guilty. The criminal will
+submit to it through force, and the magistrate will apply it by necessity.
+
+Such is, I think, the true situation. The new school of criminology
+will introduce reforms in the practice of the tribunals and in the
+administration of the penal laws; it will not change justice and could
+not compromise morality. And now pardon me for adding to these some
+further remarks, in connection with the books of which I have still to
+speak.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The interests and the passions of men, habits too long acquired to alter,
+can be considered as the immediate and constant motives of societies,
+the _vis à tergo_ of their evolution. Political theories work on a
+pre-existing social matter, and more or less in the direction of the
+tendencies which have produced the state of things that they aspire to
+reform or overturn. In a general manner, they possess then neither the
+power necessary to create, attributed to them by utopists, nor the power
+to destroy, which makes them appear so formidable to conservatives.
+Without denying all efficiency to the intellectual ideal, it is
+permissible to say that its action has a bearing purely conditional,
+and that the revolutions of growth of social organisms never absolutely
+depend on the theorist who establishes its diagnosis, and endeavors to
+regulate its march. We behold, in a word, history making itself, rather
+than that we make it ourselves and according to our inclination. It is
+hardly possible for us to foresee the remote effects of our inventions,
+of our discoveries. In sociology as well as in physics, man remains the
+servant and the interpreter of nature.
+
+There is in this, if I am not deceived, a reason for reassuring ourselves
+concerning certain alarming predictions as to the future of our
+civilisation. In his book _La Civilisation et la Croyance_ (Civilisation
+and Belief), the second edition of which has just appeared, M. CHARLES
+SECRÉTAN estimates that our societies will sink down, at least that they
+will neither return to a purified Christianity—a Christianity that has
+never yet been practised—nor restore the great principles of the free
+soul and of God. M. Secrétan is a brilliant writer and has a noble heart,
+and his book contains at least one truth of the first order, always good
+to repeat, which is that nothing durable is founded on hatred. He dare
+not flatter himself, however, that his warnings will be listened to, his
+lessons observed. Perhaps he exaggerates the real dangers which menace
+us, because he enlarges, unknown to himself, the rôle of philosophic
+doctrines, and attributes to the mind a kind of discretionary power over
+the sentiments and the interests of mankind.
+
+Here we have the intellectualist mistake. It appears chiefly in the
+revolutionist propaganda which agitates our Europe, and of which M.
+J. BOURDEAU makes known the ideas and the progress, in a clear and
+interesting manner, in his work _Le Socialisme allemand et le Nihilisme
+russe_ (German Socialism and Russian Nihilism). It is a fact well worthy
+of remark, that the genial promoter of the theories of Fourier, St.
+Simon, and others—I refer to J. J. Rousseau—had had the conjecture of a
+social physiology: fragments of his that have been published show well
+that he did not regard the age of gold as one of savagery, and that
+he foresaw the part that human nature had to do in our calculations
+of government. What is found just in his writings could even well be
+intimately connected with this naturalist point of view. But he lived
+in the century _par excellence_ of rationalism, where such ideas could
+be neither developed nor understood; he constructed the political world
+according to reasoning, and I shall not be far wrong in thinking that
+socialism represents in its turn, definitively, at least in its essential
+features, a last offshoot from this rational school which has already, a
+hundred years ago, made us the villainous present of Jacobinism.
+
+Absolute communism has no chance of ever realising itself. Neither Karl
+Marx, nor Engels, has ventured even to indicate the possible form of
+the society of which they dream. The action of the socialists, in turn,
+could have as its result the substitution for our régime of excessive
+individualism and of disordered democracy, a régime of corporations and
+of more regular co-operation, by one of those reversions to institutions
+anciently delineated that history presents to us, and which respond to a
+sort of “law of oscillation” of social phenomena. There is no occasion,
+however, to give it long consideration to establish that these returns
+do not exclude novelty, for the apparent form of social arrangements is
+of less moment than the nature of the ideas and of the relations which
+sustain them, and here is what I would readily call a “law of progressive
+repetition.” As to the exact sense of the evolution which there manifests
+itself, the great task of disengaging it falls to the sociologists. But
+the school of Marx has wished to see things only from one side, and his
+theory, which is too simple, does not embrace the complexity of the
+phenomena.[81]
+
+Without any pretension to renew the face of the world and to interpret
+economic phenomena in favor of an arbitrary thesis, M. AD. COSTA, in his
+opuscule _Alcoholisme ou Épargne_ (Alcoholism or Thrift) places before
+us the truly immediate question of socialism, in the presence of this
+“social dilemma” which reformers willingly mask in their discourses:
+on one side, alcoholism, life from day to day, the unreasonable and
+momentary illusion that one imbibes with stimulants, the wasting of daily
+resources, finally the pauperism which leads to social servitude; on the
+other side, thrift under all its forms, a provident life ordered with
+intelligence, abstention from dangerous stimulants, progressive comfort
+and increasing happiness, more and more freedom. Yes, here are the two
+issues between which the workers have to choose. Those who read this
+little book can learn there, both what milliards of salaries alcohol has
+devoured, and what misery both physical and moral it engenders, and the
+degradation that it brings to those who give themselves up to it. To
+many this may be only the small side of a great problem. Without thrift
+and the qualities which render it possible, there is neither family nor
+morality. How can a man pretend to possess instruments of labor when he
+deteriorates the chief of all, his own living machine? How can a social
+class have the illusion to believe that a revolution ever profits him who
+is neither able nor capable of preparing and conducting it?
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The last work of M. E. DE LAVELEYE, _Le Gouvernement dans la Démocratie_
+(Democratic Government),[82] published a few months before his death,
+treats chiefly of the organisation of public powers. This question has
+importance to-day, writes the learned author, only in relation to the
+great questions which will agitate the world of to-morrow, the social
+question and the religious question. Conservatives make use of government
+as a brake; revolutionists seek to seize hold of it as a lever. The fact
+is that our Europe marches towards democracy. But will democracy give
+us freedom? On what conditions can it form an acceptable régime and one
+compatible with high culture?
+
+It is not necessary for me to explain here the reasonings and conclusions
+of M. de Laveleye. His book, to speak the truth, is less a book than a
+collection of Review articles and historical sketches. The politics of
+action will find in it too much theory, and philosophers will regret the
+absence of master-ideas. It is well to read this work for its practical
+advice and the rich details that it contains; we must not look there for
+a real historical or social conception.
+
+The sentiment which is dominant, finally, in all the writings of which
+I have just spoken is inquietude, and unfortunately it is only too well
+justified. We see, in our Occident, alcoholism increasing with salaries,
+the hatred of classes with wealth, immorality with enfranchisement,
+public burdens with political progress, the aggregation of individuals
+with great industry, criminality even with education. The wealth acquired
+is compensated for by new evils; it seems that all our conquests have the
+result of putting social order in peril, and that the civilisation of
+which we are so proud is bound, in a short time, to become bankrupt.
+
+We have, nevertheless, a weighty capital with which to restore ourselves,
+and it is only right to say that it is beginning to be applied. But we
+must give up some errors as to which it is good time to open one’s eyes.
+One of the gravest, certainly, is always to place instruction before
+education, and the mind before the heart. We have allowed to drop, at
+the same time with religion, the difficult task of forming moral habits.
+Let us understand in a word that, in a society, the most valuable thing
+is neither the steam engine, nor the bank note, but the man himself,
+and that in the man even it is not ability or special knowledge but
+_character_.
+
+                                                            LUCIEN ARRÉAT.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[79] I reserve, as well understood, the question of education, in order
+to simplify matters here.
+
+[80] A ground of mutual understanding would be supplied by accepting
+the distinction proposed by P. Carus between _constraint_, which alone
+excludes freedom, and _necessity_, which leaves our will free within
+the limits of our character. Already Plotinus had written: “How can it
+be said of this being (he who obeys his nature) that he obeys, if he is
+not constrained to follow something external?” (6th _Enn._ lib. viii.)—I
+recommend to the curious on these questions the book of M. BERTAULD,
+_Méthode Spiritualiste, Esprit et Liberté_. M. Bertauld places freedom
+in _autonomy_, which is perfectly reconcilable with psychological
+determinism; there is on the contrary, he declares, no radical
+contradiction between determinism and free-will, and indeterminism is
+an absurd conception. The work is well written, and I do not intend to
+belittle it by mentioning it in a simple note.
+
+[81] In this relation, I will particularly refer to the great work, in
+course of publication, of M. B. MALON, _Le Socialisme intégral_, and I
+recommend at the same time the article _Justice and Socialism_ of M.
+Belot, which has been much spoken of, in the number for February last of
+the _Revue Philosophique_.
+
+[82] All the works mentioned in this article are published by F. Alcan.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+GERMANY.
+
+
+In the January number of _The Monist_ I mentioned a treatise written
+by G. Ludwigs, in which the novels of Wilhelm Walloth were criticised,
+and expressed my surprise that in the work discussed a personality
+unquestionably diseased was stamped as a poet of almost the first order.
+Much that then struck me as strange and was unclear to me, was later
+rendered plain and intelligible; and the explanation was not long in
+forthcoming.
+
+As the newspapers shortly afterwards announced, Ludwigs was simply the
+pseudonym of a sixteen year old gymnasium student of Darmstadt, who had
+already attracted the attention of wider circles by the poems he had
+written. It happens at times that individualities of this description
+bear out in the advanced years of their life the promise of their youth.
+Extraordinary things were to be expected, though I cannot say _hoped_,
+of Ludwigs; but the expectation was not fulfilled. He, an instance of
+real decadence, yet a boy in years, voluntarily took his own life,
+deeply mourned by his literary associates, the “Young Germans,” in whose
+magazine _Die Gesellschaft_ a brother of the deceased is now publishing
+biographical notes and literary remains—novels and poems—all more of a
+psychological than literary interest. The biographical notes plainly
+mark out a personality smitten with psychosis and suffering in a marked
+degree with hyperæsthesia, and the literary remains reflect this mental
+condition; light-sensations especially playing an important rôle. His
+nervous system was too weak to assert itself permanently against the
+outer world. This pressure, which objectively considered was not at all a
+powerful one, did not admit of the rise of a powerful sense of life; and
+especially oppressive to the precocious youth was the life of the school
+in the most varied ways, and in an unexpected moment the flame of his
+life went out.
+
+As psychologists, we should find considerable interest in the study
+of this phenomenon of Ludwigs. We must admire his abilities and his
+capacity for work, which not only enabled him to perform his duties as
+a student of the gymnasium, but also left him time enough, in addition
+to his literary work, to employ himself with the psychological writings
+of Wundt and Münsterberg, which he desired to turn to account in the
+field of poetry. We must mourn too his sad fate. But we have no reason to
+_glorify_ such a diseased personality, as is done on many sides in the
+April number of _Die Gesellschaft_.
+
+But this is a peculiar characteristic of the Young-German writers and
+their confrères abroad, that they make the diseased take the place of
+the sound, and the ugly of the beautiful, and thus help greatly to
+undermine the health of the common mind. There are it is true a goodly
+number of trusting souls who believe that we may regard with security and
+composure, the endeavors and tendencies of the naturalistic apostles, as
+our taste in literature and art—a few cases excepted—can surely not be
+reversed into its opposite. On this point, perhaps, those who so think
+are not wrong. But the stage may easily be reached where literary taste
+no longer remains determinative, and the place of the æsthetical interest
+in things is taken by the scientific, before whose judgment-seat no
+difference of the beautiful and the hideous exists.
+
+This view is the direct outcome of philosophical materialism. The latter
+doctrine may at present, it is true, be regarded in all its main points
+as definitively overthrown, so far as philosophy is concerned; but in
+the domain of _belles lettres_—a term not quite allowable here—the wave
+which it has created still sweeps mightily onward. Two new works seek
+to break its force, which have been published in the series _Gegen den
+Materialismus_ edited by Dr. Schmidkunz (Stuttgart: Krabbe). The first
+treatise bears the title _Materialismus und Æsthetik_ and has no less a
+person as author than MORIZ CARRIÈRE; the second treats of _Materialism
+in Literature_ and is the production of the northerner OLA HANSSON. I
+am unable to say that these two treatises have especially satisfied me.
+Both authors look at the subject too one-sidedly from the point of view
+of æsthetics, and have not by far given a sufficient recognition to the
+psychological aspect of the subject. I recognise indeed with Carrière,
+in spite of all the apparent mutability of taste, a normative æsthetics;
+but that man bears within him an ideal of life, as the seed does the
+plant with its blossom and its fruit, I am unable for psychological
+reasons to concede. I grant that I find with Ola Hansson psychology is so
+far poorly represented in the naturalistic literature as the growth and
+evolution of character is made to appear a much too simple process; and
+I concede furthermore that the evolution of character in the individual
+case is very far removed from anything like resemblance to an example
+in mathematics, inasmuch as quantities may be lacking us in such a case
+which are absolutely necessary to be taken account of for a correct
+solution of the problem; but these missing quantities need not for that
+reason be at all matters of mystery, in their true nature wholly unknown
+to us.
+
+To what limits the domain of mystery has shrunk and to how great an
+extent its expressions may be made intelligible and to a certain degree
+even may be “regulated,” provided, equipped with thorough knowledge, we
+courageously look the things in the face, is exemplified in a marked
+degree by a voluminous work of the above mentioned Dr. Schmidkunz. The
+so-called Suggestion passed for a long time as something wonderful
+and had to rest its defence in the hands of the representatives of a
+psycho-physical mysticism as opposed to a “surface”-psychology which
+in the words of Du Prels occupied itself exclusively with surface work
+without penetrating to the depths. SCHMIDKUNZ now points out in his
+_Psychologie der Suggestion_ (Stuttgart, 1892: Ferdinand Enke) in a
+very comprehensive manner what others had very plainly hinted at before
+him, namely, that in the case of a very great number of phenomena we
+have, exactly viewed, to deal only with some very simple and quite
+explainable things which unite in the composition of what is commonly
+called suggestion. The contents of the work, however, are not exhausted
+with this; under the influence of a tremendous scope of reading, the
+author treats the whole domain of suggestion, and if he understood more
+perfectly the art of good writing, he would have earned a much greater
+gratitude than that which in any event is his due.
+
+Schmidkunz touches repeatedly in his work upon a domain which still
+belongs to the most obscure of the history of civilisation, namely
+witchcraft and the trials of witches. This topic, likewise viewed from
+a psychological point of view, forms the subject of a special treatise
+by SNELL, entitled _Hexenprocesse und Geistesstörung_ (Munich, 1891:
+J. F. Lehmann). In this book no rôle is ascribed to suggestion, but as
+the title indicates the treatment centres about the question of what
+significance mental disorders generally may have possessed in the trials
+of witches. The author concedes that demented persons became the victims
+of the trials for witchcraft either because they had rendered themselves
+by their character open to the suspicion of a compact with the devil,
+or because they had by self-obtrusion directly drawn upon themselves
+this persecution, but asserts nevertheless, that the number of demented
+persons that fell victims to the trials for witchcraft, was comparatively
+very small. Mental disorder however played in so far a great rôle in the
+trials for witchcraft as demented persons, especially such as suffered
+from hysteria, became false witnesses and brought sound and healthy
+people into the hands of the persecuting judges.
+
+As I am now treading the province of psychiatry, I will mention, that
+WILHELM GRIESINGER’S celebrated work _Pathologie und Therapie der
+psychischen Krankheiten_ has just been published in its fifth edition
+under the direction of Dr. Levinstein-Schlegel, the director of the
+Maison de Santé in Schöneberg (Berlin: August Hirschwald). I do not of
+course specify this work solely for the sake of the physicians who may be
+readers of _The Monist_, but am rather impelled to the act by a universal
+psychological consideration, for Griesinger in the first edition of
+the work also made a name for himself as a psychologist. It appeared
+originally in 1845, and possessed a compass of 396 pages; the fifth
+edition numbers 1100 pages and has increased considerably in size as
+compared with the fourth. Whether the augmentations have added anything
+to the value of the work is a question which must first be submitted for
+answer to our physicians. In psychological respects its value has in so
+far been very much increased as the experiential data have assumed much
+greater proportions: the psychological analysis however has been somewhat
+neglected.
+
+Psychological analysis in fact is not the strong side of the majority of
+our psychiatrists. What Griesinger and still more so Spielmann sought
+after in this direction, has been greatly forced in the background.
+As a general rule our inquirers content themselves with a description
+of symptoms and the construction of a more than copious nomenclature,
+in the midst of which the connections are Very easy to be overlooked.
+Among the commendable exceptions is to be named in this respect the
+well-known Vienna professor THEODOR MEYNERT. In addition to his extensive
+psychiatrical works he has also published a considerable number of
+lectures and discourses partly in magazines and partly in separate
+brochures. These discourses are now presented in collected form in a
+book entitled _Sammlung von populärwissenschaftlichen Vorträgen über den
+Bau una die Leistungen des Gehirns_ (Vienna, 1892, Wilhelm Braumüller).
+The most noticeable discourses are the following: The Significance of
+the Brain for the World of our Ideas; The Mechanics of the Cerebral
+Structure; On the Feelings; On Illusion; On the Significance of the
+Development of the Forehead; The Mechanics of Physiognomy; Brain and
+Culture; The Co-operation of the Parts of the Brain; On Artificial
+Disturbances of the Psychic Equilibrium. No words need be wasted in the
+recommendation of the book of Meynert.
+
+                                                                CHR. UFER.
+
+
+
+
+DIVERSE TOPICS.
+
+
+
+
+PROFESSOR HAECKEL’S MONISM.
+
+
+There are two Latin proverbs which are both good rules for
+controversialists who seek for the truth on different roads. The one
+reads: _In verbis simus faciles dummodo conveniamus in re_, the other
+reads: _In verbis simus difficiles ut conveniamus in re_. A difference
+of terms often prevents two thinkers from noticing that they actually
+agree. Therefore let us be lenient in terms and never lose sight of their
+meaning and purport. On the other hand terms are not indifferent, and
+the selection of terms should not be regarded as arbitrary. In order to
+arrive at a solid and permanent agreement, permanent because it is based
+upon objectively demonstrable truth, we have to be scrupulously careful
+with our terminology; and we must not allow the arbitrary employment of
+terms where they are inappropriate. An inappropriate usage of terms will
+lead us astray and involve us in confusion and error.
+
+Says Professor Haeckel:
+
+    “The divergences which exhibit themselves in our respective
+    unitary conceptions of the world are in part only apparent
+    and in part occasioned by the divergent significances of our
+    fundamental ideas.”
+
+This seems to me very true and, indeed, I have very good evidence that it
+is true. Professor Haeckel writes in his letter to me:
+
+    “I have marked in _red_ those passages of your kind review of
+    my ‘Anthropogeny’ in which I agree with you and in _blue_ those
+    in which I differ.”
+
+Now I find all those passages where I should have anticipated an
+objection on Professor Haeckel’s part marked red, while a blue mark
+appears where in my opinion there is only a difference of terminology. It
+is the following sentence on page 441:
+
+    “Psychic life is absent so far as we can see in the primordial
+    world-substance as it appears in the form of a nebula; it is
+    absent still in the primordial state of planets. It appears
+    with the subjective states of awareness that rise into
+    existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised
+    matter is, in comparison with man’s subjectivity, to be
+    considered as a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of
+    awareness, which we have reasons to doubt, it is apparently
+    without meaning; it does not symbolise external objects;
+    it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim of
+    evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that
+    the subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its
+    innermost nature.”
+
+This difference is probably a difference of terminology only, for I
+insist most strongly on the doctrine that all nature is alive. However, I
+make a difference between “life” and “soul.” Nature is alive throughout,
+but it is not ensouled; the action of chemical elements and of the
+falling stone are no psychical actions.[83]
+
+Another blue stroke appears at the following passage:
+
+    “We grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve
+    for all motions that take place in the world; even the motions
+    of the brain take place in strict obedience to the laws of
+    molar and molecular mechanics. But a mechanical explanation
+    is not applicable to that which is not motion. If it were
+    applicable it would not be desirable, for it would be of no
+    avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to mechanical
+    phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon,
+    and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a
+    feeling, or rather and more accurately expressed, being the
+    special meaning of a very complex feeling, is not a mechanical
+    phenomenon either.”
+
+The subsequent sentences are again approved by Professor Haeckel; they
+are marked red:
+
+    “It is true that when a feeling takes place and when an
+    idea is thought in the brain of an organised being, that a
+    certain nervous action takes place. The nervous action is
+    a motion and this motion represents a definite amount of
+    energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are
+    almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring
+    the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into
+    kinetic energy when a man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not
+    the idea and by a mechanical explanation of the brain-motion
+    we have not even touched the problem of what the nature of the
+    idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.”
+
+We do not understand how Professor Haeckel can object to the view that
+ideas and feelings are no motions. We fully grant that the nervous
+action that takes place when an idea is thought is a motion, and that,
+considered as a brain-action, it is mechanically explainable. But by
+feeling we understand not the brain-action but a state of awareness, and
+states of awareness are not objective phenomena, they are subjective
+phenomena; whereby we do not at all deny that there are no feelings which
+must not in their objective existence at the same time be supposed to be
+brain-motions.
+
+Feelings are not motions but ideas are still less motions. Ideas are
+the meanings which certain feelings that are representative of certain
+sets of experiences have acquired. Is the meaning of a word a motion?
+Can the significance of words be mechanically explained? The meaning of
+ideas, the significance of words, the representativeness of feelings are
+phenomena which have nothing to do with motions but constitute a domain
+of their own.
+
+Professor Haeckel in our opinion can mean only that there are no feelings
+in themselves, but all our feelings are at the same time brain-motions,
+and as such they are mechanical phenomena. We have to add, however, that
+an explanation of the mechanism of brain-action does not as yet explain
+the significance of mental operations.
+
+Professor Haeckel insists so strongly upon his view of monism as being
+mechanicalism that this seems to mark a difference in our conceptions
+which might be of consequence.
+
+I was very glad to notice the long strokes of red along the passages
+which contain my proposition that “the evolution of organised life is a
+natural process having a definite aim”; further, along the paragraphs
+concerning the world-order as being moral in so far as the world-order is
+the basis of morality, and also those which represent God as being that
+power of the world-order obedience to which is called morality.
+
+Professor Haeckel’s agreement with these passages indicates that those
+expressions of his to which we should take exception, and which he
+employs again in his article of the present number, might not be regarded
+as divergences.
+
+Professor Haeckel’s definition of God appears to us insufficient, and
+also his definition of immortality.
+
+God is not only the sum-total of matter and force, God is also that
+quality of the world which the naturalist describes in natural laws.
+God is the life of the world, he is that feature of existence which
+makes mind and knowledge possible. In addition he is that which men
+call progress, the ideal of the future that lives in our souls and the
+principle of evolution in nature.
+
+There is a deeper truth too in the doctrine of immortality. There is a
+conservation of matter and energy, but there is also a preservation of
+soul. Says Professor Haeckel, “the human soul is a very highly developed
+vertebral soul.” If that is so, the soul of our fossil ancestors
+continues to live in us. This soul has been altered, it is true, but the
+alterations are not so much a loss as a gain. The alterations consist in
+the additional growth of new powers and represent a higher development.
+All that which was worth preserving has been preserved.
+
+And as it has been in the past, so we can confidently expect that it
+will be in the future. All that is worth preserving of our souls will be
+preserved in the ages to come. Our souls will live and develop to higher
+possibilities. They will be transmitted from generation to generation,
+advancing on the unlimited path of evolutionary progress.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[83] We intend to express our views more fully in a special article to be
+published in a subsequent number of _The Monist_.
+
+
+
+
+THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.
+
+
+There was during the last winter great excitement in Germany, concerning
+a new school-bill proposed by the chancellor Caprivi, and the late
+Prussian minister of cultus, Zedlitz-Trützschler. This school-bill
+proposed to take the direction of the public schools out of the hands of
+scientific men and transfer it to the clergy. The idea of the Emperor
+was to let the education of the young be guided in a religious spirit. He
+intended to wage a war against atheism.
+
+Among the pamphlets which were written during the crisis, is especially
+noteworthy the monograph of the late minister of cultus, Herr von Gosler,
+whom we should count among the most conservative of Prussian officials.
+His opposition, accordingly, is the more remarkable, and his objections
+had much weight with the Emperor.
+
+The Emperor has withdrawn the bill. Nevertheless, the spirit of
+ultra-conservatism, which shows itself in an outspoken hostility against
+science, still remains strong enough, and new onslaughts upon the
+progressive policy in school and church, may be expected in the future.
+The question is timely still and will remain timely until there be a
+common agreement concerning the principles of education, so that our
+school politics may no longer be decided by and subjected to partisan
+strife.
+
+Attacks that are made upon the very spirit of the institution of our
+civilisation and the political crises following thereupon are beneficial
+in one respect. They make people pause; they make them reconsider the
+principles by which they allow their conduct to be regulated. They make
+men conscious of the maxims that ought to underlie their lives and which
+generally are accepted by the majority without much reflection. The
+Prussian school-bill has indeed exercised a wholesome influence, for it
+called attention to the importance of principles and roused the German
+nation from religious indifference. During the conflict many scientists
+and professors of universities, who as a rule interfere little with
+politics, have raised their voice in warning, and many valuable ideas
+were expressed that found a strong echo in the heart of the people.
+
+There are two articles written by German professors which have commanded
+very wide attention inside and outside of Germany. The one article
+was written by Professor Haeckel of Jena, in the _Freie Bühne_, the
+most important passages of which appeared at the time in _The Open
+Court_, No. 243. The other article was written by Friedrich Jodl, of
+Prague. It appeared first in the Augsburger _Allgemeine Zeitung_, and
+was republished in pamphlet form by Cotta, in Stuttgart. The former
+is an enthusiastic appeal to let science, which is the basis of our
+civilisation, remain the basis of our educational maxims in schools and
+universities. The latter discusses the philosophical principles of the
+conflict.
+
+We are greatly in sympathy with the spirit in which Professor Jodl
+has treated his subject. Nay, more, we substantially agree with him
+concerning all main facts, and also concerning the sense in which our
+future development should be directed. Nevertheless there are points of
+disagreement, which we consider of sufficient importance to point out and
+explain.
+
+The ultra-conservative party stands upon the platform that there can be
+no morality without religion, and no religion without dogmatism. For this
+reason dogmatism should rule supreme in the schools, and science should
+be subservient to religious creed. That this means curtailment of the
+freedom of investigation, and the suppression of the liberty of science,
+is understood by all the parties concerned. The liberals so apprehend it,
+and the ultra-conservatives do not deny it. In the face of this situation
+Professor Jodl proposes the question, “Is there a humanitarian morality
+possible?” (p. 8 of the pamphlet “Moral, Religion, und Schule.”) He says:
+
+    “A mere glance into the numerous anthologies of the moral
+    wisdom of all times and centuries, shows that the agreement
+    concerning moral ideas and norms is much greater, and it
+    recedes much more into the dim past than is usually assumed.
+    The writings of Laotse and Confutse, the popular literature
+    of Buddhism, the fragments of old Egyptian law, the didactic
+    poetry of Islam, contain a great wealth of moral wisdom, and
+    treasures of the noblest ethical sentiment which the Christian
+    Occident likes to regard as its own exclusive property.
+    Especially the ancients, whose civilisation, in spite of much
+    opposition, is still the basis of our civilisation, furnish us
+    with a series of the most beautiful moral types and ideals,
+    and there we find, beside many valuable features of Christian
+    ethics, other no less valuable gems which we seek for in vain
+    in the old Christian morality, and which were not recognised
+    until Christianity came into contact with the Teutonic nations
+    of northern Europe. Our ultra-conservatives argue that without
+    catechisms humanity would stand helpless before the question of
+    what is right and wrong, and what the growing generation should
+    be taught in order to make them useful and honorable members of
+    society.”
+
+In opposition to these views Professor Jodl urges that
+
+    “If society of to-day can at all tolerate that such doctrines
+    as Christian morality are taught in our schools as the
+    foundation of practical conduct of life, this is possible only
+    because the ethics of the old biblical Christianity has, in
+    the course of centuries, grown to be something quite different
+    from what it was in the beginning. The throughout communistic,
+    labor-abhorring, world-hating, miracle-infatuated morality of
+    original Christianity, constantly dreaming of the collapse
+    of the world near at hand, and suited only to the demands of
+    the paupers of the time, could only be changed and adapted
+    to the conditions of later periods of radically different
+    conditions, with great difficulty. The Catholic church has
+    done much to accomplish this purpose, and in a still higher
+    degree Protestantism has made many concessions to humanitarian
+    ethics and practical reason. These concessions, however, must
+    appear from the historical standpoint, as adulterations of the
+    Christian ideas. Exactly in the degree that Christian morality
+    in modern times has remained a living power, it has ceased
+    to remain Christian in the historical sense.... The tendency
+    of the whole development of the modern world is to conceive
+    the moral norms as natural conditions of human society, and
+    to understand them in their connection of the individual with
+    the whole. This thought and sentiment must become in the child
+    a living power, and morality cannot expect in this respect
+    help from religion. Religion knows only the relation of the
+    individual to God, as it is expressed in the mystical ideas of
+    sin and mercy. Religion knows no duties and goals for humanity,
+    but only for the egotistic desire of salvation for the
+    individual. Religion knows no progress, no evolution, but only
+    eternal life or eternal damnation. The civilised nations of
+    Europe had to go through with many hard struggles in order to
+    arrive at the idea that there is a humanitarian, and a natural,
+    morality, in comparison with which all religious dogmatism must
+    be considered as indifferent additions. Only on the basis of
+    this conviction is it possible that there exist to-day so many
+    religious confessions of faith, and among them also those
+    who are religious without having any special confession. Here
+    lies the great duty of our time for enlightened legislation,
+    for our schools, to take care that the universal Christian
+    be developed from the narrow dogmatism, and, further, the
+    universal human ideal, from the universal Christian. To expect
+    this of the clergy of the different religious societies, would
+    be a mistake.... The theological spirit and the principle of
+    free investigation, are irreconcilable adversaries. Every
+    religion, of whatever denomination it may be, is stable in its
+    very nature. It pretends to be eternal truth, and whenever it
+    compromises with the idea of progress, it does so reluctantly,
+    and in the form of concessions.”
+
+We agree with Professor Jodl in his opinion that our present dogmatic
+religions are entirely unfit to understand the demands of the present.
+And it is true that the humanitarian ideas of morality have been slowly
+developed from the crude and immature notions of the apostolic times. The
+aim of our moral development must be humanitarian ethics. But we disagree
+with professor Jodl that we cannot expect a further evolution of our
+moral ideas from the clergy.
+
+It seems to me that here lies the important difference between the old
+and the new world. Conditions favor religious progress in America,
+while the conditions in Europe cut off all hope and produce an ominous
+stagnancy.
+
+The clergy of the old world, in Germany as well as in England, and in
+all Catholic countries, are appointed only on the condition of being
+ultra-conservative in religious matters, as well as otherwise. No young
+man whose enthusiasm would carry him so far as to suggest reforms on
+broader humanitarian principles, would be admitted in the church as
+ministers. And if he had been admitted by mistake, he would meet with
+a fate similar to that of the Abbé Lamennais, whose experiences are
+admirably described by George Julian Harney, in No. 213 of _The Open
+Court_.
+
+The situation is greatly different in America. Our clergymen, our
+congregations, our churches, are perhaps more orthodox in many respects,
+and especially in their belief, than those of Europe. Nevertheless, they
+are more liberal in principles, and they are less obstinate concerning
+dogma. Most of our churches here do not even possess dogmatic creeds, or
+confessions of faith. The clergy of the Baptists, the Congregationalists,
+the Unitarians, are not bound by oath before taking orders; to believe
+in sundry articles and to preach certain doctrines which are supposed
+to be absolute truth. The Baptists, it is true, are as a rule very
+orthodox and very dogmatic, but they are liberal in spite of it, open to
+conviction, and not averse to going onward with the times. This attitude
+of the American clergy must appear inconsistent to Europeans who can, in
+ecclesiastical affairs, only judge from their own experiences. And it
+may be that their position is as much inconsistent as was for instance
+that of Newton, who considered the trash he wrote on some theological
+questions concerning the apocalypse as infinitely superior to his
+mathematical and astronomical works and did not see that the recognition
+of the law of gravitation would go far toward freeing humanity from many
+of those nonsensical ideas which he cherished so highly.
+
+In former times I was inclined to blame the clergy for the lack of
+progressiveness in the churches, but I have come to the conclusion that
+not the clergy are to be blamed for retarding the broadening of the
+religious spirit, but the lay-members of the churches. I am personally
+acquainted with several clergymen of different denominations, Christian
+as well as Jewish, who conceive it their duty to point out the way of
+progress and to further the spirit of a scientific world-conception in
+religious matters. They advance exactly as quickly and exactly as far as
+they can in working out of the narrow dogmatism of the religious views of
+their flock the ideas of a broad humanitarianism.
+
+It has often happened that clergymen, encouraged by their congregations,
+have grown too broad in the opinion of their narrower brethren, and it
+was customary, in former years, to cast them out according to the old
+fashion of dealing with heretics, which is still customary in European
+churches. The churches have become more careful here, for, whenever such
+a case happened, these liberal clergymen were, as a rule, not deserted
+by their congregations. Thus every act of removing a clergyman usually
+led to a schism, and it seems that, at least to some extent, the churches
+have of late given up their policy of removing heretics within their
+ranks.
+
+This much is certain, that many among the American clergy are ready to
+progress with the times, and to accept the truth wherever they find it.
+In Europe religion is dictated to the people from above by government and
+church authority. The clergymen are servants of these authorities. Their
+consciences are not bound, as they ought to be, to teach the truth and
+nothing but the truth, but to teach the doctrines which their employers
+bid them teach. And this policy is still considered right and natural,
+even among liberal minded people.
+
+In America the clergy are exponents of the views of their congregations.
+In Europe the congregations are separated from their pastors by a deep
+gap: there is no gap between the congregation and the clergy in America.
+Both are in the closest contact. Our congregations are more orthodox than
+European congregations; therefore our clergy is more sincerely orthodox,
+and more honestly narrow, than the European clergy. The European clergy
+are more scholarly, yet at the same time there may be more hypocrites
+among them in Europe who know better than they preach. But there is no
+doubt that with a further development of intellectuality and scientific
+insight, our congregations will become broader and more liberal and
+more humanitarian, and, with the congregations, our clergy are bound to
+develop in the same lines.
+
+European theology is much superior to American theology in scholarly
+critique, in historical investigation, and in philosophical depth.
+Nevertheless, we must not hope from European theologians that they
+will undertake the great work of reform that is so much needed in our
+churches, which is nothing less than to reconcile religion with science;
+to let religion develop into a religion of science, preaching boldly and
+unreservedly those humanitarian ethics which stand upon the principles
+of truth; that is, of scientifically proved truth, which finds the
+sanction of the moral “ought” in the facts of experience.
+
+Professor Jodl says:
+
+    “The main objection of the supporters of dogmatism in school
+    politics is this: They propose it is not so much religion that
+    is needed in education; not the contents of ecclesiastical
+    doctrines, but to give to morality a foundation; to give it
+    what science calls the sanction of ethical rules.... From this
+    standpoint, every attempt that is liable to weaken the ethics
+    of religious sanction must appear equivalent to the attempt of
+    abolishing criminal law and penal institutes, and to deliver
+    the peaceful citizens into the hands of murderers and robbers.”
+
+Professor Jodl continues:
+
+    “The nature of religious sanction consists in this: that the
+    moral rules are conceived as the behests of an all-powerful,
+    omniscient being, that promises to immortal man for their
+    fulfilment, eternal rewards, and for their non-fulfilment
+    eternal punishment in the life beyond.”
+
+In opposition to this view Professor Jodl maintains that
+
+    “Man’s morality, on the one hand, has never been preserved from
+    error by an outlook into the beyond of heaven and hell, and, on
+    the other hand, there have never been missing those impulses
+    that originate in the depths of human nature working in the
+    line of moral ideas.”
+
+These impulses are, according to Professor Jodl, the purely moral
+sanction of conscience. And conscience is represented as, and in another
+place called, “the natural sanction of morality.”
+
+This view of regarding conscience as the natural sanction of morality
+does not appear to us as a happy expression, and it seems to us that
+Professor Jodl did not intend it as it might be understood. For Professor
+Jodl speaks in another passage of “the natural impulses of morality as
+having their sanction in _experience_.”
+
+If that be so, conscience would not be the ultimate authority, but
+conscience would have to be regulated and corrected by a rationalised
+experience.
+
+If “the natural impulses of morality have their sanction in experience,”
+the ultimate authority would be the facts represented in experience; and
+the facts of experience, in their totality, are nothing more or less than
+the whole universe with its natural laws and conceived in its cosmical
+order. The universe, the All, nature, or whatever you call it, is indeed
+an omnipotent reality which man cannot resist, and in which he can live
+only by adapting himself to its laws. If this ultimate authority of the
+natural laws be called by the religious term “God,” we shall see at once
+that the old dogmatic religions express a very deep truth in mythological
+language. The ultimate sanction of morality is not our conscience, but
+that omnipotent power which resides in the objective world of realities,
+in the cosmical order of the universe.
+
+We might as well say that everybody shall regard his watch as the
+ultimate standard of time as to make his conscience the criterion of
+morality. May everybody use his watch wisely and regulate it well. And so
+may everybody revise his conscience and investigate diligently whether
+it agrees with the laws of that all-power of which we are a small part
+and through which alone we exist.
+
+Professor Jodl praises very highly the French institution of a so-called
+purely moral instruction in the public schools. Father H. Gruber,
+however, points out some serious shortcomings in this system of moral
+education, resulting from a lack of principle. (See _Stimmen aus
+Maria-Laach_, Freiburg i. B., 1892, No. 4.)
+
+It is apparent that moral commands cannot be based upon purely subjective
+notions or ideals, they must be based upon some objective authority which
+is a power that enforces obedience. Such a power exists. It is the world
+in which we live. It is that All-being of which we are a part. And that
+feature of nature which enforces that conduct which we call moral is
+named God in the terminology of religious language.
+
+A consideration like this points out the way to a reconciliation between
+science and religion. There is a truth in the old religions, and this
+truth need only be purified from the errors that cluster about it, hiding
+its grandeur, beauty, and importance. Let the church and its authorities
+recognise science and the principle of free investigation; let them
+be ready to accept the scientific methods of research; let them be
+willing to accept truth as it can be proved by arguments and verified by
+experience as well as by experiments; and we need no longer worry about
+dogmatism and the narrowness of their sectarian doctrines. All these
+accidental features of religion will, then, pass away, and we shall have
+a religion which the scientist and the philosopher can embrace.
+
+This is what we call the Religion of Science; and the Religion of Science
+is bound to be the religion of the future. The Religion of Science will
+not abolish the religions of the past, but it will develop them, broaden
+them, perfect them, into the cosmical religion of humanitarianism.
+
+To teach an ethics that either has no sanction, or whose sanction is
+built upon the diverging opinions of individuals, will not do. Ethics
+must be based upon the sanction of some objective authority, and the
+recognition of an objective authority, of a power which enforces a
+certain kind of conduct, being religion, we say that no ethics can be
+without a religious basis.
+
+The problem at present is not how to teach irreligious ethics—all such
+attempts are failures at the start; but to change the mythology of
+the old religions into a clear, scientific conception of the natural
+conditions which demand of man that he should observe those rules which
+we are wont to call moral.
+
+                                                                     P. C.
+
+
+
+
+THE FUTURE POSITION OF LOGICAL THEORY.
+
+
+In last October’s number of _The Monist_, Professor John Dewey gives a
+sketch of what in his view is “the present position of logical theory.”
+According to this the basis of the position seems to be that “the only
+possible thought is the reflection of the significance of fact,” and
+that therefore logic, which is the science of the laws of thought,
+rests in reality on an objective basis. He supports Hegel in denying
+“the existence of any faculty of thought which is other than the
+expression of fact itself.” Now it is doubtless the case that this is
+the position at present taken up by a large number of logicians, but as
+this position seems to me to be fundamentally erroneous I should like
+to put before your readers what I hope will be “the future position of
+logical theory.” I have elsewhere worked out in some detail a theory of
+reasoning which differs from that commonly accepted chiefly in this,
+that it recognises not two, but three kinds of reasoning, which I call
+Objective, Subjective, and Symbolic. Reasoning is commonly divided into
+two branches, denoted by various pairs of terms, such as Objective and
+Subjective, Inductive and Deductive, Empirical and Formal. The lines
+of division indicated by these various pairs of terms are not quite
+identical; but they none of them indicate what seems to me the most
+important distinction of all, namely that between real, and symbolic
+argument. There _does_ exist (I will not say a “faculty of thought,” but)
+a method of argument which “is other than the expression of fact itself,”
+whether of objective or of subjective fact. The term “formal reasoning”
+is indeed often used to denote this kind of argument, but this is a bad
+name to give it, since it seems to imply, and frequently is held to
+imply, that it deals with the _forms_ of objective or subjective facts,
+whereas in reality it deals only with symbols, which are arbitrarily
+defined, and which do not necessarily correspond to any things whatever,
+whether objective or subjective. That this kind of argument not only
+exists, but flourishes is evident as soon as it is grasped that pure
+mathematics is nothing but a branch of symbolic logic. It may be that
+there exists somewhere a fact of which any conceivable mathematical
+formula might be regarded as the reflexion, but it must surely be evident
+that it was not to the reflexion of such facts that mathematical formulæ
+in general owe their existence or validity. It may perhaps be true “that
+fact, reality is significant,” and even that thoughts are themselves such
+significant realities, but it is the thoughts that are given to us first,
+or rather sensations which are the elements of thoughts, and we can only
+infer the realities from them, and not _vice versa_.
+
+The essence of my theory of logic may be briefly stated thus. The
+meaning of a logical term contains two parts, its denotation and its
+connotation. Either of these parts may be laid down arbitrarily as its
+_definition_, leaving the other part which I call its _import_ to be
+found out by experience. To understand both parts of the meaning of any
+term is therefore to possess real knowledge. Pure symbolic reasoning
+deals only with the definitions of terms, and is not therefore founded
+on real knowledge, nor can it alone ever lead to real knowledge. Thus
+if in any proposition the definitions of the terms are deducible from
+one another, the proposition may be proved symbolically and is what I
+call a truism: it gives no real information. But if the definitions of
+the terms are independent of each other, and yet not inconsistent, the
+proposition can only be intended to assert the identity of the imports
+of the terms; it therefore ascribes import to the terms and gives real
+information, whether true or false. If any terms in a symbolic argument
+are however known to have real import, it may be ascribed to them in
+real propositions, and any conclusions of the argument which contain only
+such terms will _ipso facto_ be made to yield real information, which may
+be new in the sense that it was not before recognised, though it was of
+course implied in the real assertion or assertions which ascribed import
+to the terms of the symbolic argument.
+
+It is in this way possible to separate any science into two branches,
+one of which consists purely of symbolic argument founded on definitions
+alone, while the other may be expressed in a series of propositions,
+the definitions of whose terms are independent of each other, and which
+ascribe real import (whether objective or subjective) to the terms of the
+symbolic science, or some of them.
+
+This is as far as pure logic can go. The question how the truth of any
+real propositions comes to be known is not, in my opinion, any part of
+logical theory, but belongs to metaphysics. However that is no reason for
+not discussing it here, especially as it is the chief question discussed
+in Professor Dewey’s paper.
+
+“Truth” means some sort of consistency in a proposition. We may compare
+a symbolic argument to a game with counters, the rules of which are laid
+down arbitrarily, and to say that a given conclusion of such an argument
+is true only means that the game has been “played fair.” But the truth of
+a real proposition does not depend on any arbitrary rules. It expresses
+a consistency between two real facts, either that two named groups of
+things possess certain common attributes, or that certain of the things
+possessing named groups of attributes are identical. The essential
+element of all real knowledge is then a connecting link between a thing
+and an attribute, such as is afforded by a well-understood word.
+
+Now the only “things” which we can apprehend directly are our subjective
+sensations and conceptions. We can compare two or more sensations or
+conceptions, and recognise in them common attributes. Thus I can say
+of my own knowledge that the sensations I denote by “the taste of
+sugar” and “the taste of lead acetate” have a common attribute, which
+I call “sweetness.” This is a real assertion, for its truth is not
+deducible from the definitions of its terms, and yet I know, by direct
+apprehension, that it is true. But it is only a subjective truth. The
+corresponding objective assertion would be sugar and acetate of lead
+both produce, when tasted, the sensation of sweetness. And I have no
+direct apprehension of this fact. That the tastes referred to in the
+former proposition were produced by objective things denoted by the terms
+sugar and acetate of lead, can only be inferred by the process called
+induction, which can never lead to a positive or necessary truth.
+
+Thus we may from a pure symbolic science proceed one step further, to a
+subjective science, by the aid of direct apprehension, and the results
+of such a subjective science may in certain cases attain the position
+of absolute, or necessary truths. But on the other hand, all objective
+sciences must rest on induction. Now the true nature of induction is,
+I am persuaded, commonly misapprehended, because it is not realised
+sufficiently clearly that the prime data of induction are not themselves
+objective, but subjective facts. An “objective fact” is really only
+an hypothesis, postulated to account for certain of our subjective
+sensations. The only justification for making such an hypothesis is
+that it actually does explain certain sensations, and the measure of
+its probability (for we can never assert it as a necessary certainty)
+is the number and complexity of the sensations which it accounts for.
+The first of all such objective hypotheses is that we have an objective
+environment to whose action our sensations, or some of them, are due.
+This suggests at once a more general hypothesis, commonly known as the
+law of causation, namely that the conditions obtaining in the objective
+universe at any one moment are the effective causes of those obtaining
+at the next, and so at any subsequent moment. These two hypotheses,
+together with certain subsidiary ones, do suffice to account for an
+enormous number, if not all, of our sensations, and so we are justified
+in entertaining them. But to leave out the notion of _effective_
+causation, and to substitute a mere rule of sequence, is to remove the
+only justification we have for assuming the hypothesis of causation at
+all. It is perhaps conceivable that the hypothesis may be false, that
+our sensations are not “caused by” an objective environment but if so
+what reason remains for believing in that environment at all? I can never
+know anything whatever about an objective universe, unless some of my
+sensations about which alone I know anything directly, are caused by
+that universe. It is perhaps thinkable that there should be an objective
+universe in which events occur which in no sense _cause_ my subjective
+sensations, but to which those sensations nevertheless happen to
+correspond; but if this is so the sensations afford me no ground whatever
+for believing in the occurrence of the events, or the objectivity of the
+universe.
+
+Well then, the essence of induction is the assumption of an hypothesis to
+account for observed facts—first of all of directly observed sensations,
+and then of facts assumed to be objective in virtue of the primary
+hypothesis. That this account of induction is the true one is I think
+particularly enforced by the consideration of those cases to which at
+first sight it does not seem to apply. A common example of induction is
+afforded by our belief that the sun will rise to-morrow. That it has
+risen every morning for the last four thousand years or more is no reason
+whatever for believing that it will rise to-morrow, unless it is held to
+point to some explanatory hypothesis. Such an hypothesis has actually
+been framed by astronomers, and no one would now pretend to found his
+belief in the sun’s rising to-morrow on the mere fact that it has often
+risen before, but would go on to explain that it must rise unless the
+earth were to stop revolving, etc. If at Monte Carlo the red turned up
+ten times running, would that be any reason for expecting it to turn up
+again, the eleventh time? No, it would not unless the succession of reds
+seemed to point to some explanatory hypothesis, such as a defect in the
+roulette. Again, the fact that in the last fifty years the death rate
+in London has been about twenty-eight per thousand would be no reason
+for believing that it will be about that figure this year except on
+the assumption that the constancy of the death rate indicated certain
+constant causes, which we have no reason to believe have been altered
+this year.
+
+Having once assumed that our environment is objective, and as a corollary
+the hypothesis of causation, the whole of physical science follows,
+step by step. Subsidiary hypotheses are introduced at each stage and
+justified by the way they account for observed results. To show how a
+single hypothesis is capable of explaining a large number of observed
+results, the full meaning of the hypothesis is elucidated by symbolic
+reasoning. By such reasoning it is for example shown that the same
+hypothesis, of universal gravitation, is capable of accounting, not only
+for the movements of the stars, but for the tides, the flow of rivers,
+the falling of unsupported bodies, the rising of balloons, the movements
+of the balance in Cavendish’s experiment, and so on. That such wide
+extensions of an hypothesis are possible tends greatly to confirm, not
+only the hypothesis itself, but the fundamental hypotheses of objectivity
+and causation also. But it does not prove either the one or the others.
+We cannot know anything about the objective universe with absolute
+certainty, but we may reasonably believe a certain hypothesis about it
+with any degree of conviction we think suitable; that is we may (and of
+course we actually do) act on all occasions _as if_ we knew absolutely
+that they were true.
+
+We may then believe, and I for one do believe, not only in the
+objectivity of the universe, but that even my own subjective sensations
+are mere bye-products of that universe. I _believe_ that objective facts
+are, if I may so express it, more real than subjective sensations; that
+in fact the objective universe might have existed, and might exist again
+without any subjective element in it anywhere. But I cannot _know_
+this, it is with me a matter of faith. Thus I cannot agree with Hegel,
+that “all possible thought is the reflexion of the significance of
+fact” (except perhaps in the sense that thought is the reflexion of the
+significance of certain changes in the grey matter of the brain) for
+this would seem to imply that stupid or contradictory thoughts reflected
+stupid or contradictory significance in certain facts. But I believe that
+men of science are gradually evolving a system of thought which will
+more and more faithfully reflect the significance of fact, and that thus
+science is actually building up truth. But all science must begin with,
+and be founded upon, subjective knowledge, and therefore any theory of
+positivism contradicts itself for it must be founded on faith. Science
+is thus founded on faith, faith in things not directly apprehended, just
+as truly as religion is. It is only because we unconsciously acquire
+this faith in our infancy, and that it is in most cases amply justified
+by subsequent experience, that we do not even recognise the fact that it
+is faith, in exactly the same sense that belief in God is. But just as
+men have sometimes lost their faith in God, so it may happen to a man to
+loose his faith in reality, and logic is quite as incapable of shaking a
+man out of the one position as out of the other.
+
+This I take it is the key to the agnosticism of such men of science as
+Mr. Huxley. I do not for a moment suppose that Mr. Huxley believes less
+than most men; he probably has good grounds for believing a great deal
+more. Only he rightly refuses to say that he _knows_ facts of which
+he can have had no direct apprehension and which he can only infer
+more or less probably, to be true. Hypotheses which as we push our
+investigations are shown to be capable of explaining more and more facts,
+that is, ultimately, more and more sensations, will in the end come to
+be believed in without doubt or hesitation. If a man says he _knows_ the
+law of gravitation to be true, he commits a logical blunder; but there
+is nothing to prevent a scientific man from believing in any miracle
+or prodigy, so long as the account he gives of it does not contradict
+itself. Not only may two equally reasonable men form very different
+estimates of the probability of the same event, even with the same
+evidence before them, but one man may put his faith to a proposition with
+admittedly much lower degree of probability than would be required to
+convince another. Only, a scientific man will always distinguish between
+what he knows and what he believes, and will admit that though he has
+made up his mind to act _as if_ he knew to be true the propositions he
+only believes to be so, yet another man may reasonably take a different
+view of any one of them.
+
+                                                          EDWARD T. DIXON.
+
+Trin. Coll., Cambridge, Jan. 8, 1892.
+
+
+
+
+COMTE AND TURGOT.
+
+
+On page 410 of the last number of _The Monist_, it was stated that the
+doctrine of the three stages of knowledge was not properly a Comtean idea
+but belonged to Turgot. The following letter from Professor Schaarschmidt
+of Bonn informs us of the passages in Turgot where the statement of the
+doctrine is found:
+
+    _To the Editor of The Monist_:
+
+    To your note of inquiry of the 22d of last month I have the
+    honor to reply, that the Comtean theory of the _trois états_
+    may be traced back to utterances of Turgot made by him in his
+    _Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l’esprit humain
+    prononcé le 2me décembre 1750_—namely in the Sorbonne. You will
+    find the discourse referred to in the edition of the works of
+    Turgot which I now have before me, namely that of Guillaumin,
+    Paris, 1844, in Vol. II, at pages 597 et seqq. The passage in
+    question is found at p. 600-601. However, it is highly probable
+    that the so-called _loi des trois états_ was _directly_
+    transmitted to Comte by St. Simon, who reproduced the idea
+    of Turgot in his _Introduction aux travaux scientifiques du
+    XIXme Siècle_, at pages 62-63. For Comte was dependent in many
+    respects on St. Simon, while it is probable that he had never
+    studied Turgot. To St. Simon, in fact, is due the expression
+    “philosophie positive,” as well as the germ-notion of the
+    division of the Sciences, which Comte further elaborated.
+
+                                                      SCHAARSCHMIDT.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK REVIEWS.
+
+
+DARWIN AND AFTER DARWIN. I. THE DARWINIAN THEORY. By _George John
+Romanes_, M. A., LL. D., F. R. S. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Chicago:
+The Open Court Publishing Co. 1892.
+
+In the present work by Professor Romanes, who may be regarded as the
+special exponent of Darwin’s theory of organic evolution, we have a
+complete and systematic presentation of “Darwinism according to Darwin.”
+It is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered by the author in 1889
+before the Royal Institution, London, and forms only part of a much more
+extensive treatise on the Darwinian theory, embracing the early history
+of biology, and a discussion of the further developments of the theory
+subsequent to the death of the great naturalist who gave it birth. The
+present part is limited to what is distinctly Darwinian, dealing with it
+and with the main objections raised against the general theory of organic
+evolution it enforces.
+
+The subject naturally divides into two parts, and Professor Romanes
+accordingly deals with it in two sections, in the first of which he
+considers organic evolution as a fact, stating the main evidences in
+support of the doctrine, while in the second section he furnishes “the
+evidences which thus far have been brought to light touching the causes
+of organic evolution considered as a process.” The author points out
+in his introductory remarks, that in order to establish a theory of a
+continuous transmutation of species, which is what is meant by organic
+evolution, it is not necessary to furnish proof of _all_ the natural
+causes which have been at work. The issue is between the theory of a
+supernatural cause, as operating immediately in numberless acts of
+special creation, and the theory of “natural causes as a whole whether
+these happen, or do not happen, to have been hitherto discovered.”
+Moreover, the discussion is concerned only with the origin of species,
+and not with that of life, as to which the author says with truth,
+“although in the opinion of most biologists it is a question which we may
+well hope will some day fall within the range of science to answer, at
+present, it must be confessed, science is not in a position to furnish so
+much as any suggestion upon the subject; and therefore our wisdom as men
+of science is frankly to acknowledge that such is the case.”
+
+The idea of evolution implies continuity, and the author refers to
+the fact that the uniformity of nature’s method in the production of
+phenomena to which continuity is due, recognised in other fields of
+science, strongly recommended the theory of organic evolution for
+acceptance on merely antecedent grounds. There is another important fact,
+from the antecedent point of view, to which Professor Romanes draws
+attention. He states it in the words of Mr. Wallace, who lays down as a
+general law that “every species has come into existence coincident both
+in space and time with a pre-existing and closely allied species.” This
+is a necessary consequence of natural evolution, but no reason can be
+assigned for it on the theory of special creation, and the existence of
+such a correlation may be regarded as a test-question between the two
+theories.
+
+The direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in
+the first section of the present work is considered under the several
+heads of classification, Morphology, Embryology, Palæontology, and
+Geographical Distribution. As to the first of these subjects, the object
+of classification has been the arranging of organisms in accordance
+with their natural affinities. Organisms have been compared for the
+purpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most
+invariable occurrence, and therefore of the most typical significance,
+and the author shows that “all the general principles and particular
+facts appertaining to the natural classification of plants and animals,
+are precisely what they ought to be according to the theory of genetic
+descent; while no one of them is such as might be—and indeed, used, to
+be—expected upon the theory of special creation.” In connection with
+the important subject of Morphology, the author, after showing that the
+theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains
+all the known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an
+organism presents, devotes himself especially to the argument from
+rudimentary structures. These are of such general occurrence that they
+are found in every species, and such obsolescent or vestigial structures,
+as the author terms them, are of great value as evidence for the theory
+of evolution, particularly those found in adult man. To human vestigial
+structures the author pays particular attention, his observations being
+accompanied by excellent illustrations from nature. It is noteworthy that
+he abandons the flattening of the tibia in man, and the disposition of
+valves in human veins, as arguments in support of man’s natural origin,
+which is abundantly supported, however, by reference to other rudimentary
+organs.
+
+The science of Embryology is of special importance, on account of the
+history it affords of the _process_ of evolution, and thus supplying
+evidence of the fact, although the author remarks, “the foreshortening of
+developmental history which takes place in the individual lifetime may
+be expected often to take place, not only in the way of condensation,
+but also in the way of excision.” To understand the argument from
+embryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual
+life in the ovum, and for this purpose to consider the phenomena
+of reproduction in their most simple form. In connection with this
+subject, Professor Romanes, after examining the features in which
+the cell-division of protozoa differs from that of metazoa, and after
+considering the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a
+physiological continuity between growth and sexual reproduction, points
+out that the constructive argument in favor of evolution derived from
+embryology commences with the fertilisation of the metazoal ovum. As
+this first stage has not been adequately treated by any other writer,
+the author deals with it at considerable length. The later stages of
+individual development, including that of the vertebrata, on the lines
+of Haeckel’s ideal primitive vertebrate, are more concisely treated.
+The science of embryology, covers the whole field of animal life, and
+it is not surprising therefore that it is considered by the author and
+other evolutionists as furnishing the strongest support to the theory of
+evolution.
+
+As to the palæontological evidence, Professor Romanes does not ascribe
+to it the paramount importance which it has in popular judgment.
+Nevertheless he asserts that, not only is no positive proof against the
+theory of descent to be drawn from a study of palæontology, but it proves
+two very important general facts in favor of it. These are that from the
+earliest to the latest times there has been a constant and progressive
+increase in the diversity of types both of animals and plants, and that
+“through all these branching lines of ever-multiplying types, from the
+first appearance of each of them to their latest known conditions, there
+is overwhelming evidence of one great law of organic nature—the law of
+gradual advance from the general to the special, from the low to the
+high, from the simple to the complex.” These general facts are supported
+by detailed consideration of fossil horns, bones, teeth and shells, which
+supply four special lines of evidence. The evolution of mammalian limbs
+with particular reference to the hoofed animals is treated with a fulness
+its importance requires.
+
+As the geological argument is concerned with the distribution of species
+in time, so that based on the present geographical distribution of
+animal and plant species is concerned with their distribution in space.
+This, although not regarded by the author as a crucial test between the
+rival theories of creation and evolution, is declared to be one of the
+strongest lines of evidence in favor of the latter. The general facts
+relied on are, the discontinuity of distribution of certain species, the
+absence of any _constant_ correlation between habitats and animals or
+plants suited to live upon them, and the presence in every biological
+region of species related to other species in genera, and usually also
+genera related to other genera in families; this correlation between a
+geographically restricted habitat and the affinities of its fauna and
+flora being repeated over and over again throughout the earth’s surface.
+But further, the correlation between habitats and their animals and
+plants is not limited to the now existing species, that is, the dead
+and living species are allied, showing that the latter are modified
+descendants of the former. Moreover, where the areas of distribution are
+not restricted, through species wandering away from their native homes,
+the course of their wanderings is marked by the origination _en route_ of
+new species. Another important consideration is that a double correlation
+exists in the geographical distribution of organic types. That between
+the geographical restriction and natural affinity among inhabitants of
+the same areas has already been mentioned. The second is the correlation
+between _degrees_ of geographical restriction and _degrees_ of natural
+affinity. This is consonant with the theory of descent with modification,
+as “the more distant the affinity, and therefore, _ex hypothesi_, the
+larger and the older the original group of organisms, the greater must
+be the chance of dispersal.” These general considerations are supported
+by detailed illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic and
+terrestrial organisms. The author shows that an examination of the
+faunas and floras of oceanic islands establishes the general law “that
+_wherever_ there is evidence of land-areas having been for a long time
+separated from other land-areas, there we meet with a more or less
+extraordinary profusion of unique species, often running up into unique
+genera.” There is, moreover, a constant correlation between the _degree_
+of this peculiarity, and the time during which the fauna and flora have
+been isolated. The author concludes this part of his argument by the
+forcible observation that “if the doctrine of special creation is taken
+to be true, then it must be further taken that the one and only principle
+which has been consistently followed in the geographical disposition of
+species, is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear
+that they were not thus deposited at all, but came into existence where
+they now occur by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and
+correlative modification.”
+
+The second part of this work, that which treats of selection, under the
+two heads of Natural Selection and Sexual Selection, although in some
+respects the most important, does not need to be noticed so fully as that
+which deals with the facts of natural evolution. After stating the theory
+of natural selection, the author notices various fallacies connected
+with it which are largely prevalent among the adherents of Darwinianism,
+although nowhere fallen into by Darwin himself, and the still greater
+fallacies found in the writings of his opponents. In the two following
+chapters Professor Romanes, after stating the main arguments in favor
+of the theory of natural selection, reviews the main objections which
+have been urged against it. The first argument is that, as a matter of
+observation, “the struggle for existence in nature does lead to the
+extermination of forms less fitted for the struggle, and thus makes room
+for forms more fitted.” The second argument, which the author considers
+of overwhelming significance, is that there is not a single instance, in
+either the vegetable or the animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct
+which is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species. Its
+importance may be judged by the fact that Darwin considered that a single
+instance to the contrary would invalidate the whole theory of natural
+selection. The third argument is based on the facts connected with the
+variation of animals and plants under domestication. Ocular evidence
+of the value of this argument is furnished by a series of drawings
+prepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons, and of
+eight other animals. As special illustrations of natural selection the
+author considers the subjects of protective colouring, warning colours,
+and mimicry. In referring to his treatment of the criticisms of the
+natural selection theory, in the course of which he deals with the main
+objections, we cannot do more than mention that based on the possession
+by the skate of an electric organ, which, owing to the weakness of
+its discharges, cannot apparently be of any use to the animal. This
+difficulty seems to be unexplainable according to the principles of
+natural selection, and Professor Romanes, in admitting the fact, remarks
+that it is of a magnitude and importance “altogether unequalled by that
+of any other single case—or any series of cases—which has hitherto been
+encountered by the theory.”
+
+The last chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of the
+theory of Sexual Selection, which was suggested by Mr. Darwin to furnish
+a scientific explanation of the wide generality of beauty in organic
+structures. It is an observed fact that sexual selection does take place
+among the higher animals, and it is inferred that, the selection has
+reference to an æsthetic taste on the part of the animals themselves;
+and that this cause is adequate to explain the phenomena of beauty
+presented by such animals. After stating the evidence in favor of these
+conclusions, the author considers at length Mr. Wallace’s views on the
+subject. These constitute the objections urged against the theory of
+sexual selection, of the truth of which, however, Darwin shortly before
+his death expressed himself as remaining firmly convinced.
+
+Professor Romanes concludes his present volume with a few general remarks
+on the philosophical relations of Darwinism to the facts of adaptation
+on the one hand and to those of beauty on the other. In none of these,
+says the author, do we meet with any independent evidence of supernatural
+design, although there is abundant evidence throughout organic nature of
+natural causation. And yet natural causation furnishes no disproof of the
+existence of a Supreme Being. The whole of organic and inorganic nature
+is made subject to one rule of government, but “the ulterior and ultimate
+question touching the nature of this government as mental or non-mental,
+personal or impersonal, remains exactly where it was.” Moreover, if
+there be an intelligent First Cause, of whose Will all secondary causes
+are the expression, their operation must be uniform, so far as the Will
+is consistent, and therefore it must appear as what we call mechanical.
+Thus according to the pure logic of the matter, “the proof of organic
+evolution amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural process.”
+
+In an appendix to Chapter V, Professor Romanes offers suggestions as to
+the imperfection of the geological record, and meets various objections
+against the theory of organic evolution on that ground. But we must now
+leave this excellent work, which will undoubtedly answer the expectation
+with which it was prepared, of being “a compendium, or handbook, adapted
+to the requirements of a general reader or biological student, as
+distinguished from those of a professed naturalist.”
+
+It is enriched by a very good portrait of Darwin, in whose footsteps
+the author has sought to tread by “avoiding dogmatism on the one hand,
+and undue timidity as regards general reasoning on the other.” In
+his introductory observations he dwells on the remarkable influence
+exercised by Darwin over the method of investigation of organic nature,
+by treating the discovery or accumulation of facts, not as an end, but
+as a means for generalisation, thus bringing natural history into a line
+with other inductive sciences.
+
+The value of the work is materially increased by the addition of numerous
+well executed original illustrations, besides various plates derived from
+Haeckel’s works and other sources, some of them American. It has also a
+good Index which will add much to its usefulness.
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+GRUNDRISS DER NATURLEHRE FÜR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN. Von
+Dr. _E. Mach_. Ausgabe für Gymnasien. Mit 358 Abbildungen. 315 pp. Vienna
+and Prague: F. Tempsky. Leipsic: G. Freytag.
+
+The principles that have guided Professor Mach in the preparation of
+these outlines of Physics, are in the main as follows:
+
+The concepts and notions of physical science should not be set forth
+dogmatically, but should be presented as much as possible under the
+influence of the actual natural facts that lead to them. Hypotheses
+and theories should be employed only when actually necessary. Long
+mathematical developments and pages of formulæ only impede the scholar’s
+total view of his subject and afford of themselves no insight. _Logical_
+finish should not be sought after in elementary presentations; the method
+of the inculcation of truths should, so to speak, be _psychological_: the
+method of their acquisition.
+
+From the brief statement of these guiding principles, the reader will
+observe that Professor Mach’s conception of the proper form of an
+elementary text-book, differs greatly from that usually entertained.
+The method of presentation is not the dogmatic, the “logical,” which
+sets forth a science as a ready-made and perfected, mystically created,
+product; but the genetic, the historical, the natural. We are constantly
+made aware, in the study of this book, of what knowledge really means
+and what it does not. We are not treated, in its introductory chapter,
+as we are in most of the text-books of Physics, to disquisitions on the
+insolubility of the questions What is Matter, What is Energy, What is
+Force, and to like professions of metaphysical ignorance, which make us
+wonder how people can request us to read hundreds of pages about things
+it is impossible to have knowledge of; but we are presented throughout
+with a simple statement and description, in terms of facts, of what
+our fundamental, as well as our derived, notions _are_, and what their
+import. It is unnecessary to say that the need of such a book is very
+great. And it is pleasant, constantly to discover how well its idea
+has been executed. Concise, unburdened by unnecessary and self-evident
+developments, it is in our judgment a model of elementary exposition.
+
+With characteristic modesty, Professor Mach disclaims all pretension to
+having fully realised his conception, and views his performance simply as
+an attempt. The book was submitted, before publication, to a number of
+competent educators, whose advice in regard to alterations was frequently
+acted upon.
+
+                                                                     μκρκ.
+
+
+NOUVELLES RECHERCHES DE PSYCHIATRIE ET D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _C.
+Lombroso_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892.
+
+Prof. C. Lombroso’s activity reaches a climax that is almost superhuman.
+He contributed to the Italian Archives of Psychiatry two articles,
+one of which proves that, at least in Italy, the sense of touch is
+weaker in women than in men; it is still weaker and more irregular in
+criminal women than in normal women. (Archiv. di. Psichiatr. Sc. pen.
+ed. Antrop. Vol. XII, 1891, p. 1-6). The other article (l. c. p. 58-108)
+is an inquiry concerning thought-transmission, which contains besides a
+critical review of the usual rubbish of so-called telepathic phenomena
+two strange observations. The first is the case of a low-bred hysterical
+lad who does not possess the faculty claimed by him to understand
+telepathically the intentions of whosoever employs him, but strange
+enough, if sufficiently charged with whiskey, is able to read any writing
+through the envelope with closed eyes. The other case is a somnambulistic
+compositor, who sets type correctly in the state of somnambulism.
+Blindfolded he draws the figures drawn behind his back upon a slate, and
+hypnotised he guesses the numbers which the experimenter thinks. Lombroso
+is one of our greatest psychologists, but these experiments perhaps with
+the same subjects should be repeated by other psychologists so as to make
+sure of their correctness. Lombroso concludes that there seems to be some
+foundation in thought-transmission.
+
+The present little volume of new researches applies Lombroso’s theories
+concerning morphological abnormalities of the criminal type in the
+anthropological field. It appears natural that the criminal type should
+show abnormal features, but sometimes Lombroso’s eagerness to discover
+abnormal features, even in political criminals such as Charlotte Corday,
+is exaggerated. At least we must confess that many abnormalities appear
+very frequently among peaceful and law-abiding citizens. The Corday
+skull, although a trifle platycephalic, is beautifully rounded and
+normal. M. Topinard finds no abnormal features but Lombroso maintains
+that its platycephaly is doubly abnormal and he adds: “The capacity of
+the skull is 1.360 cubic centimeters while those of Parisian women is
+1.337. Must we not conclude that its capacity exceeds the average?” We
+read on p. 124 and sq.: “The more our women will be forced to enter
+the economical struggle for existence, the more will they become
+criminals.... The result (of letting them enter public life) will be to
+lower the nature of women.”
+
+The booklet is very instructive even to those who disagree with the
+professor, for it is full of facts and valuable observations.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE ALGEBRA DER LOGIK. (Exakte Logik.) By Dr. _Ernst
+Schröder_. Erster Band mit viel Figuren im Texte. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner.
+1890.
+
+Professor Mach says, “The essence of science is economy of thought.”
+If that is so, there is no discipline more imbued with the spirit of
+science than algebra. When operating with algebraic symbols we cease
+to think out the whole calculation at every stage, and we are enabled
+to keep track of the different factors, and of their mutual relations
+during the operation from the beginning to the end. In common arithmetic
+these factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous numbers
+which increase and decrease without betraying the way by which they were
+reached. Algebraic symbols generalise calculation, and thus we have
+the advantage of calculating from the resultant formula any particular
+example with machine-like exactness and without the trouble of going
+over the whole operation again. The ease with which we can operate
+with symbols brings it about that we sometimes out-run our thought and
+the correct result may be obtained by an operator who only partially
+understands the operation, just as an engineer is able to run a machine
+the mechanism of which he but partially understands.
+
+Mathematics having gained so great advantages through the introduction of
+algebraic symbols, the question suggests itself whether the same method
+might not with some advantage be introduced into the other provinces of
+formal science, especially in the domain of logic. The first logicians
+who borrowed signs from algebra and introduced them into logic by
+generalising their meanings, were two Germans, Gottfried Ploucquet and
+Johann Heinrich Lambert. Ploucquet wrote “Principia de substantiis et
+phaenomenis, accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa, cui
+praemittitur commentatio de arte characteristica universali,” Frankfort
+and Leipsic, 1753, ed. II. 1764.[84] Lambert’s investigations on the
+subject are found in his “Logische Abhandlungen.” Prof. Venn, in his
+“Symbolic Logic,” p. xxxii, says of Lambert, “He fully recognised that
+the four algebraic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
+and division, have each an analogue in Logic; that they may here be
+respectively termed aggregation, separation, determination, abstraction,
+and be symbolised by +, -, ×, :. He also perceived the _inverse_ nature
+of the second and fourth as compared with the first and third; and no one
+could state more clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with
+the logical signification.”
+
+The algebra of logic which through the work of these ingenious men,
+had received so favorable a start, was very soon neglected; yet it was
+revived after some time in England by Boole, DeMorgan, and Jevons. It
+remained for quite a while the almost exclusive property of the English
+where at the present time Prof. Venn may be considered as the greatest
+English authority on the subject. Venn’s works were rivalled by an
+American scholar, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the same who has contributed
+several articles to _The Monist_. The algebra of logic which had been
+so long neglected in Germany, is now reviving in the country of its
+first birth. The author of the work, the first volume of which lies now
+before us for review, is Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnicum of
+Karlsruhe in Baden. The second volume is not yet worked out in detail,
+but its publication may be expected in one or two years. The whole work,
+when completed, will be the most comprehensive treatise on the algebra
+of logic that has as yet appeared. The plan and treatment of Professor
+Schröder’s “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik” exhibit that uncommon
+thoroughness and exhaustiveness, for which German scholars are justly
+famous. The book, in one word, will be the standard work on the algebra
+of logic for a long time to come.
+
+It would lead us here too far to review or to sketch the main contents
+of Professor Schröder’s work, which, it seems to us, is difficult to
+explain without entering into the details and thus going beyond the scope
+of mere review. But we shall briefly set forth the chief foundations
+upon which Schröder builds his algebra of logic. Professor Schröder has
+inscribed two mottos on the title page of his book, but we confess that
+we suspect at least one of them is intended to be ironical; it certainly
+seems to have been selected when the author was in a mood of humor. Being
+conscious of the great value of theoretical speculation, he quotes from
+Goethe the following Mephistophelian sentiment:
+
+    “I say to thee, a speculative wight
+    Is like a beast on moorlands lean,
+    Led circling there by some malicious sprite
+    While all around lie pastures fair and green.”
+
+There are two kinds of speculation: first, that which attempts to find
+out by pure thought a substantial extension of knowledge; and secondly,
+that which investigates the methods of inquiry. The former is futile, the
+latter is fruitful. The former is that which Goethe censures. To censure
+the latter would be a grave mistake. The man who would try to forge bread
+out of iron must meet with disappointment, but the smith who invented and
+shaped the plow did more for the production of bread than many thousand
+farmers taken together, although it may be he did not raise a blade of
+wheat. Speculation that attempts to find out things by mere brooding
+is _prima facie_ wrong; but speculation that constructs the methods of
+investigation is the basis of all progress in science.
+
+The other motto of Schröder’s book is Goethe’s saying: “Man is not born
+to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the point where the
+problem begins and then to keep within the limits of the comprehensible.”
+It would be well to compare this saying of Goethe’s with another one by
+the same author which is “Man should hold fast to the belief that that
+which seems incomprehensible, is comprehensible. Otherwise, he would
+not investigate.” Schröder follows rather the spirit of the second than
+that of the first quotation. He says on p. 105 of the recent volume,
+with reference to some critical remarks made by the late Professor
+Lotze of Göttingen, who was more brilliant and ingenious than exact
+in his philosophical views and who showed an undisguised dislike for
+any severe method that has recourse to numbers, figures, schedules, or
+classifications, as does the algebra of logic: “If Lotze concludes his
+logic with the wish that German philosophy should rise to the attempt at
+comprehending the course of the world instead of merely calculating it,
+we should answer, Could we first calculate it, then we should certainly
+comprehend it so far as comprehension on earth is possible.” But how
+is it possible? Simply by properly limiting and defining the field of
+investigation; and here we can see that the first saying of Goethe’s
+should not be construed in such a way as to appear contradictory to the
+second.
+
+Every thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension, but he extends
+them so that the stock of knowledge increases in every generation,
+and there is no probability that we shall ever reach the limits of an
+absolutely incomprehensible. There is no solid progress to be made by
+making wild raids in the domain of the unknown, a method which is pursued
+only by dreamers and metaphysicians. We must start from the boundary
+of the present stock of knowledge, and let our progress be confined
+to single well defined and limited problems. How a solution of the
+world-problem is possible in this sense, is explained by Schröder on p.
+103: “The answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows,
+which resists all attempts at breaking it. As a whole it withstood, but
+it yielded to him who untied the bundle and broke the arrows singly. The
+difficulties which present themselves to the progress of knowledge can
+also only be overcome singly, and in their one-sidedness. In the division
+of labor thus produced, lies exactly the advantage and the strength of
+the diverse disciplines,—_qui trop embrasse, mal étreint_.”
+
+Professor Schröder advertises his book with the following words:
+
+“From the title the reader will observe that here the deductive or formal
+logic alone is treated. The calculative treatment of the deductive
+logic, through which this discipline is redeemed from the fetters by
+which through the power of habit, word-language has bound the human
+mind, should deserve, more than anything else the name ‘Exact Logic’!
+This method alone can give to the laws of valid inference, their most
+pregnant, concise, and clear expression, and is thus enabled to reveal
+numerous and important gaps,—why not mistakes,—in the older presentations
+of the subject.”
+
+“Since the appearance of the author’s ‘Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls,’
+this method of treatment has made progress of highest importance,
+especially through the works of the Americans, Mr. Charles S. Peirce and
+his school. To Mr. Peirce, more than to anybody else, is due the merit
+of having built a bridge from the older and purely verbal treatment
+of our discipline to the new calculative method; a bridge which the
+professional philosophers rightly found lacking and to which lack is well
+to be ascribed the fact that the new method received only a partial and
+bewildered attention. Through Mr. Peirce’s works, upon which also the
+author has had some influence, the theory is now so far developed and
+perfected that for the first and main part of its whole system, a final
+presentation and arrangement may be obtained.”
+
+“Endeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive
+presentation, the author desires to offer at the same time and in
+a systematic way a handbook of the most valuable materials of the
+literature of the subject which especially in the English language, is
+quite considerable.”
+
+The book addresses two kinds of readers which are of a greatly different
+turn of mind, and it will go far in reconciling the methods of both, the
+mathematicians and the philosophers.
+
+In the preface Schröder says, “In consideration of the formulæ which
+appear in the book, it may be wise to state, that no mathematical
+training or any specific knowledge is presupposed to be known by the
+reader. We might repeat the words of Dedekind, prefixed to one of his
+books: ‘Everybody can understand this work who is in possession of what
+is generally called, common-sense.’ But we may add another saying from
+another author: ‘The beaux esprits certainly, who are not accustomed to
+the severe demands of thought, will very soon turn away from it.’”
+
+The introduction is comparatively long, comprising no less than 125
+pages. But, considering that it is more than an introduction, that it
+explains the foundation on which the whole work rests, it is not too
+long, for it forms an essential and indeed the most important part of
+the book. Schröder discusses in it the character and the limitation of
+his problem. He explains induction, deduction, contradiction and valid
+inference. He considers the nature of signs and names. He says, on p.
+38: “Humanity, it appears, does not rise above the absolute zero of
+civilisation and the level of animal life, until it develops the activity
+of denotation and symbolising. And there is indeed nothing to which the
+human mind owes so much for its progress as to the signs of things.
+
+“The sign which speaks in attitude and gesture to emotion, speaks in word
+and sentence to the intellect. And it possesses, in accordance with the
+laws of the association of ideas, the power of producing in the person
+addressed certain ideas.
+
+“While the sign coalesces with the idea, it reacts upon thought itself.
+Through signs the ideas which otherwise would remain confused and vague,
+are analysed and they become as separate elements, a permanent possession
+over which the thinking mind has forthwith free control. Through the sign
+we distinguish, we fix differences and make them ready for new peculiar
+combinations. The sign, is as it were, the handle by which we take hold
+of the objects of thought. Through the sign only, the idea is liberated
+from the elements of sense, which are attached to it, and is enabled to
+rise into the sphere of generalisation. Thus thinking is on the one hand
+liberated, on the other determined by the sign.
+
+“Further, through the sign alone which makes it possible that the same
+idea the same purpose can live in many, there is _one_ will, _one_ soul,
+and a community of human aspirations exists upon which is based the life
+of mankind as a life of individuals in society. And this again is the
+basis of our morality and civilisation.
+
+“The efficacy of the sign spoken is considerably increased by the
+invention of writing.”
+
+Professor Schröder discusses those two methods of logic which are known
+by the names: the Logic of Intension and the Logic of Extension. (_Logik
+des Inhaltes_, and _Logik des Umfangs_.) This leads to a discussion of
+definition, the categories, and conceptual writing which would find
+its ideal in a system of pasigraphy, or universal language, for the
+perfection of which an algebra of logic would be indispensable.
+
+The symbols employed by Schröder are borrowed to a great extent from
+Peirce, but they are considerably improved and it is probable that
+Schröder’s innovations will be universally accepted.
+
+We purposely refrain here from discussing the particulars of Schröder’s
+work, stating only in a general way that his proposition of a new symbol
+for subsumption, (he proposes to replace the old symbol [symbol] by
+[symbol] to signify “equal to or subsumed under”), his treatment of the
+symbols 0 and 1, the former representing an absence of certain marks,
+or as it has been called their “incompossibility,” as being excluded by
+the presence of other marks; the other the universe of the whole subject
+under discussion, and all the other problems which he separately treats
+in his lectures are admirably presented and command almost throughout
+the reader’s consent. We now conclude our review with the quotation of
+the last paragraph of Schröder’s introduction on p. 125. Having declared
+that “logical inquiry should not be judged from the short-sighted or
+narrow-minded, not to say _borné_, utilitarian standpoint,” he points out
+the great practical importance of his science, saying:
+
+“Similarly, as with other sciences, so logic also may be expected to
+realise and produce undreamed of results, which may incidentally bring
+about, in a most surprising way, incalculable advantages. Let me only
+point out one thing. Since the impulse which this science has of late
+received, there have been already constructed three logical machines
+which although we grant, scarcely deserve their name, because their
+efficacy remains still very rudimentary, may be compared to Papin’s pot
+that in a more advanced state became the steam-engine. Indeed, nobody can
+presage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed,
+which would be analogous to, but more perfect than the calculating
+machines. The latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much
+fatiguing thought-work, just as the steam-engine has been successful in
+relieving him from physical labor.
+
+“To be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing, and
+least so in such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from
+trees.”
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. By _Karl Pearson_, M. A. With 25 figures in
+the text. London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane. Imported by Charles
+Scribner’s Sons, New York.
+
+We are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of Professor
+Karl Pearson’s “Grammar of Science.” The work is a comparatively popular
+and also brief exposition of the modern ideal of scientific inquiry.
+“The goal of science is clear—it is nothing short of the complete
+interpretation of the universe. But that goal,” adds the author, “is an
+ideal one—it marks the _direction_ in which we move and strive.”
+
+The best part of the book is in our opinion the introductory chapter
+which sets forth “the scope and method of science” and shows the need of
+a “Grammar of Science.” Says the author in the summary of this chapter:
+
+“The scope of science is to ascertain truth in every possible branch
+of knowledge. There is no sphere of inquiry which lies outside the
+legitimate field of science. To draw a distinction between the scientific
+and philosophical methods is obscurantism.”
+
+The present generation is in a state of fermentation. While one man
+finds a restlessness, a distrust of all authority, a questioning of the
+basis of all social institutions and long established methods, another
+pictures for us a golden age in the near future. One teacher propounds
+what is flatly contradicted by a second. We require some guide in the
+determination of our actions, and not for our own private but also our
+public duties. “Every citizen is thrust into an appalling maze of social
+and educational problems; and if his tribal conscience has any stuff
+in it, he feels that these problems ought not to be settled, so far as
+he has the power of settling them, by his own personal interests, by
+his individual prospects of profit or loss. He is called upon to form a
+judgment apart from his own feelings and emotions if it possibly may be—a
+judgment in what he conceives to be the interests of society at large.
+
+“How is such a judgment to be formed?” The answer is by science. Such
+a judgment can only be based on a clear knowledge of facts, on an
+appreciation of their sequence and relative significance. The judgment
+based upon them ought to be independent of the individual mind which
+examines them, and this frame of mind which is that of the scientist is
+an essential of good citizenship. Not as if the scientist were _eo ipso_
+a good citizen, but society has an interest in the propagation of the
+methods of modern science. Sound citizenship will be promoted by training
+the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts.
+
+How much a grammar of science is needed can be learned from the confusion
+that prevails concerning the fundamental concepts of science. Says
+Pearson:
+
+“Anything more hopelessly _illogical_ than the statements with regard
+to force and matter current in elementary text-books of science, it is
+difficult to imagine; and the author, as a result of some ten years’
+teaching and examining, has been forced to the conclusion that these
+works possess little, if any, _educational_ value; they do not encourage
+the growth of _logical_ clearness or form any exercise in scientific
+method.
+
+“The views expressed in this _Grammar_ on the fundamental concepts of
+science, especially on those of force and matter, have formed part of
+the author’s teaching since he was first called upon to think how the
+elements of dynamical science could be presented free from _metaphysics_
+to young students.”
+
+Professor Pearson calls attention to the danger that arises from two
+modes of thought, viz. that of the metaphysician and that of the
+agnostic. He says:
+
+“The poet is a valued member of the community, for he is known to be a
+poet; his value will increase as he grows to recognise the deeper insight
+into nature with which modern science provides him. The metaphysician is
+a poet, often a very great one, but fortunately he is not known to be a
+poet, because he clothes his poetry in the language of apparent reason,
+and hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the
+community. The danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may
+check scientific research is, perhaps, not very great.”
+
+Fortunately the danger that arises from metaphysicism is past. “For,”
+adds Pearson, “The day has gone by when the Hegelian philosophy
+threatened to strangle infant science in Germany;—that it begins to
+languish at Oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country
+of its birth. The day has gone by when philosophical or theological
+dogmas of any kind can throw back, even for generations, the progress of
+scientific investigation.”
+
+The scientist will, it is true, often have to confess: “There I am
+ignorant.” But it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited
+field of thought which it occupies to-day. Professor Pearson continues:
+
+    “It is true that this view is not held by several leading
+    scientists, both in this country and Germany. They are not
+    content with saying, ‘We _are_ ignorant,’ but they add, with
+    regard to certain classes of facts, ‘Mankind must _always_ be
+    ignorant.’ Thus in England Professor Huxley has invented the
+    term _Agnostic_, not so much for those who are ignorant as for
+    those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields.
+    In Germany Professor E. du Bois-Reymond has raised the cry:
+    ‘_Ignorabimus_’—‘We shall be ignorant,’ and both his brother
+    and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that
+    with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible.
+    We must, however, note that in these cases we are not concerned
+    with the limitation of the scientific method, but with the
+    denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to
+    knowledge. Now I venture to think that there is great danger in
+    this cry: ‘We _shall_ be ignorant.’ To cry ‘We are ignorant,’
+    is safe and healthy, but the attempt to demonstrate an endless
+    futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches
+    despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the
+    present restless activity of science, may we not do better
+    to accept as our watchword that of Galilei: ‘Who is willing
+    to set limits to the human intellect?’—interpreting it by
+    what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man’s
+    intellectual powers.”
+
+The introductory chapter presents the general plan of Professor Pearson’s
+book. The following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan.
+The headings of these chapters are: II, The Facts of Science; III, The
+Scientific Law; IV, Cause and Effect—Probability; V, Space and Time; VI,
+The Geometry of Motion; VII, Matter; VIII, The Laws of Motion; IX, Life;
+X, The Classification of the Sciences.
+
+Professor Pearson follows Professor Ernst Mach in his expositions
+(especially in Chap. II) very closely, and especially refers to the
+latter’s contributions to _The Monist_. Pearson emphasises with Mach
+the distinction between the conceptual and perceptual, between ideas
+or noumena and sensations. He rejects, as does Professor Mach, the
+assumption of unknowables beyond our groups of sense-impressions, saying:
+“It is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of
+sense-impression in which we live” (p. 88), and yet he says in another
+passage on p. 134: “There is mystery enough in the chaos of sensations
+and in its capacity for containing those little corners of consciousness
+which project their own products, of order and law and reason, _into an
+unknown and unknowable world_.”
+
+It appears to us that the deeper reason of this apparent inconsistency
+can be traced to the author’s conception of the import of knowledge. He
+follows Kirchhoff in the acceptance of the theory that scientific law is
+a brief description of facts in mental shorthand. But at the same time he
+follows Clifford and Mach too closely; the former in the respect that we
+can know the “how” only and not the “why,” and the latter in overlooking
+the fact that concepts are symbols which stand for something and have a
+meaning. Pearson says on p. 145, “Science describes how they [motions]
+take place, but the _why_ remains a mystery.” But should we not, we ask,
+rather supplant the old and metaphysical conception of the “why” (the
+sense of it as here implied) by a better and more correct conception? The
+metaphysical “why” is not so much a mystery as it is the incorporation of
+an illegitimate problem. The “why” of positive science demands as answer
+an exhaustive description of those conditions which as the outcome of a
+definite transformation inevitably produce a certain phenomenon.
+
+But here we must criticise Professor Pearson’s view of “description,”
+as well also as his view of causation. Cause and effect are to him, as
+they were to Mill, mere sequences; necessity belongs exclusively to
+the conceptual realm, and is “illogically transferred to the world of
+perceptions.”
+
+An exhaustive description will trace the process of causation, and
+whenever we succeed in this we have answered the question “why” in the
+only sensible meaning it possesses. Sense-impressions do _not_, as
+Professor Pearson expresses it, “shut us in,” so that the beyond remains
+a mystery to us. Sense-impressions represent the beyond of reality and
+they represent it in such a way as to enable us to deal with it properly.
+This representation is knowledge and thus the world is _not_ unknowable.
+The world is full of mystery, but knowledge itself is not mysterious.
+Having sense-impressions and interpreting them in our conceptual
+inferences we know something of the world.
+
+We are not prepared to accept Professor Pearson’s views that “change is
+perceptual, motion conceptual,” and also that “we are not compelled to
+postulate a space outside of self for phenomena” (p. 196). We should
+say that our concepts, the concepts motion and space included, represent
+certain features of reality. We might give a special name to those
+features of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space,
+but we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time
+denying the validity of the concepts.
+
+Says Professor Pearson, “All things move—but only in conception” (p.
+385). “What moves in conception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves
+because we conceive it to move.” These propositions have no meaning if
+pronounced from our standpoint. Observe also that Professor Pearson
+inculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the
+word in the formula on page 341 which begins as follows: “Every corpuscle
+in the _conceptual_ model of the universe must be _conceived_ as
+moving....” When we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in
+the conceptual model, but also in reality there is an action taking place
+which we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge
+only of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we
+describe as mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety.
+The point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to
+deal with them properly. If it does it answers the purpose.
+
+In spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with
+the author of “The Grammar of Science,” for we agree with respect to the
+principles of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our
+differences to a common test on the basis of these principles. Moreover,
+the attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take
+ourselves. We quote from a former publication of his, the following
+passage[85]:
+
+    “I set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought
+    is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long
+    ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am ready to put
+    a railing round the ruins, that they may be preserved from
+    desecration and serve as a landmark. Indeed I confess to have
+    yawned over a recent vigorous inditement of Christianity, and
+    I promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was
+    anxious that I should read a work entitled: _Natural Law in the
+    Spiritual World_, which he told me had given quite a new width
+    to the faith of his childhood.”
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIE DER ARITHMETIK. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen.
+By Dr. _E. G. Husserl_. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.
+
+The present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the
+philosophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of
+psychological and logical investigations, the scientific foundation
+for a future construction of this discipline, which would be of equal
+value to the mathematician and philosopher. The first volume which is
+now before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality, unity, and
+number, so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect
+symbolisation. The second part considers the symbolical representations
+of plurality and number, and the author attempts to show that the fact
+of our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number
+determines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author
+calls “Anzahlenarithmetik.”
+
+The author criticises several theories which in different ways explain
+the origin of plurality and unity. There is one theory which explains
+the origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness; there is another
+one which explains the origin of number from a succession in time. F.
+A. Lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception and Bauman
+declares there is something mathematical in the external world which
+corresponds to the mathematical in us. The theory of difference held
+by Jevons, Schuppe, and Sigwart, is declared to be superior to all
+others, but even that is rejected by the author. Jevons says, “Number
+is but another name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with
+difference rises plurality.... Abstract number then, is the empty form
+of difference.” Dr. Husserl objects: if numbers are all empty forms of
+difference, what makes the difference between two, three, four, etc.? The
+contents of these numbers are very different. The inability of defining
+this difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference.
+Dr. Husserl proposes what he calls “collection” as a special method of
+combination by which unities are formed.
+
+Although the book contains many valuable suggestions, it is very hard
+reading. The author’s views are not at all clearly set forth. Neither
+is the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a
+clue to the plan of the book, nor is there any index that might give us
+assistance in finding out the most characteristic passages. The reader is
+supposed to read the book right through, in order to understand detached
+chapters or even sentences. And even then we are not sure whether or not
+we have understood the author’s propositions the consistency of which is
+not as apparent as it might be expected. For, after having criticised
+so many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas, plurality,
+unity and number, and after having proposed definitions, explanations,
+and analyses of his own, we find on p. 130 a passage where these ideas
+are incidentally declared to be incapable of definition. Speaking of
+Frege’s theory, Dr. Husserl says, “As soon as we come down to elementary
+concepts, all definition has an end. Such concepts as quality, intensity,
+place, time, etc., cannot be defined. The same is true of elementary
+relations, and of those concepts upon which they are founded. Equality,
+similarity, gradation, whole and part, plurality and unity, etc., are
+concepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition.
+All we can do in such cases is to produce the concrete phenomena from
+which they have been abstracted, and to explain the method of this
+process of abstraction. One can, where it is necessary, exactly fence in
+(umgrenzen) by diverse circumscriptions, the concepts in question, and
+thus prevent confusion with kindred concepts.” We must confess that we do
+not understand the author’s idea; what is an act of defining if not an
+“umgrenzen,” a fencing in of the concept? The book contains many similar
+passages, which, it seems to us, are not properly thought out by the
+author. But the subject is a difficult one, and, as the author says in
+the preface, “A work of this kind should, with regard to the difficulties
+of the problem it treats, be judged with leniency.”
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY. Both or Neither. By the Rev. _Daniel
+Lyons_. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Chicago: A. C. McClurg &
+Co.
+
+This little book of Dr. Lyons’s is got up in a much more substantial
+and prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from
+Catholic quarters. It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the _Nihil
+obstat_ of a Catholic “censor deputatus” and with the _Imprimatur_ of the
+Bishop of Denver. In this book, therefore, the reader may be sure that he
+possesses a correct exposition of Catholic doctrine.
+
+The purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis,—a thesis always
+insisted upon by the Catholic church,—“that Christianity, to maintain
+its rightful hold on the reason and conscience of men, needs a living,
+infallible Witness to its truths and principles; a living, infallible
+Guardian of its purity and integrity, and a living, infallible
+Interpreter of its meaning.” By Christianity Dr. Lyons means “that body
+of sacred truths which the Almighty revealed through the _ministry_ of
+Christ and His Apostles.”
+
+We italicise the word “ministry,” for on this word hinges in our
+judgment the main and unmistakable argument of Dr. Lyons’s advocacy.
+If the results of modern Biblical criticism are at all true, the
+“Church,” so-called, must have existed before the New Testament. And
+in establishing the authority of the church, the Catholic theologians
+regard and use the Bible merely as an “historical narrative, whose
+trustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same
+way as that of any other history, sacred or profane.” They take their
+argument “for the institution, mission, and authority of the Church
+from the Bible as a mere human record of the sayings and doings of our
+Divine Lord and His Apostles.” What is the mission of the church? “_And
+he said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to
+every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he
+that believeth not shall be damned._” These are awful powers, and awful
+are the sanctions placed by the same Divine letter-patent in the hands
+of the institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great
+complexity and peculiar nature of the Holy writings, in view of their
+recognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation, does
+not such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily
+and logically imply a concession of Infallibility—of infallibility, let
+us add, as _technically_ understood. “Who can suppose that God would
+formally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear
+and accept His teaching under the severest of penalties, and at the same
+time not secure that teacher against the possibility of teaching error
+for truth? Suppose the Church thus commissioned by God did actually teach
+error, even then would not all (there is no exception made), by reason of
+the divine command, be bound to believe? And in that case would not God
+Himself be accountable for the erroneous belief? I conclude, therefore,
+that the formal commission to teach the Gospel in God’s name, and by His
+authority, joined to the express command to believe carries with it a
+pledge of the divine assistance of Infallibility as a guarantee to all
+men that in yielding the obedience of faith, they are perfectly secure
+against all danger of error.” This inference is incorporated in a dogma,
+a “Catholic dogma,” of infallibility, which is this: “that the Pope, by
+virtue of a special supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit of Truth
+promised to him, in and through St. Peter, is exempt from all liability
+to err when, in the discharge of his Apostolic Office of Supreme Teacher
+of the Universal Church, he defines or declares, in matters of or
+appertaining to Christian faith or morals, what is to be believed and
+held, or what is to be rejected and condemned by the faithful throughout
+the world. This definition substantially embodies the whole Catholic
+teaching on the subject of Infallibility.”
+
+Dr. Lyons’s arguments are well put and well reasoned out. He sees
+clearly where the vulnerable point of the present condition of the
+Christian churches lies,—which the majority of Protestant theologians
+do not see. He sees clearly, though he does not say it, that the
+rococo superstructure of neo-Christian dogmatism was long and long ago
+undermined by science and that it is now toppling in the minds of the
+unscientific generally; and he justly advises all who have set their
+hearts on the preservation of the subtle and irrelevant externalities
+of religion, to forsake their ancient dwelling-place and seek a safe
+and easy abode in the grandly simple and grandly spacious, Roman temple
+of Papal infallibility. That edifice is safe against the artillery of
+science. It has by one simple act placed itself beyond the reach of all
+scientific attacks. For science, or rather the _method of science_,
+directly owes its origin to the consciousness of our individual
+liability to error and the consequent aspiration of man to establish an
+_objective_ criterion of truth. If it attempted to demolish doctrines
+of infallibility of any kind, it would simply seek to justify its own
+foundations, which it has long ago done. In so far as the doctrine of
+infallibility is the only logical outcome of a dilemma in which the
+Christian church has, discreetly or indiscreetly, implicated itself,
+science has no objection to it; or for that matter to any other
+conclusion that logically results from premisses it does not grant.
+The question really most worthy of the attention of the “thoughtful,”
+“truth-seeking,” and “religious” mind, as Dr. Lyons styles it, is not the
+doctrine of infallibility, but the questions, What is religion, What is
+God, etc., etc.; and such questions the _truth_-seeking mind will find
+it impossible to answer arbitrarily: it must, perforce, answer them in
+conformity with that objective criterion of truth called science. And
+such subjects are as much the object of science as are motion and matter.
+
+                                                                     μκρκ.
+
+
+DER SATZ VOM GRUNDE ALS PRINZIP DES SCHLIESSENS. By Dr. _Franz Erhardt_.
+Halle a. S.: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.
+
+This little pamphlet of fifty-six pages, written and published to
+acquire for the author the _venia legendi_ at the philosophical faculty
+of the University of Jena, treats the several figures of the syllogism
+from the standpoint that the middle term of the premisses is, logically
+considered, the consequence (_Folge_) of the subject and the reason
+(_Grund_) of the predicate in the conclusion. A few remarks are added on
+induction and analogy, without, however, entering into the problem as
+to the rôle which the method of induction plays in the evolution of the
+method of deduction.
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+AGNOSTICISME. Essai sur quelques Théories pessimistes de la Connaissance.
+By _E. de Roberty_. Paris: Félix Alcan.
+
+By the publication of this little book M. de Roberty redeems a promise
+made in his larger work, on the philosophy of the present century,
+already reviewed in _The Monist_ (January, 1892). The pessimist
+theories of knowledge of which he treats are the three systems, those
+of Criticism, Positivism, and Evolutionism, to which he reduces
+contemporaneous philosophy. As these systems are regarded as parallel
+manifestations of a common stock of beliefs and general hypotheses, they
+must equally adopt the doctrine of Agnosticism. It is the aim of the
+present work to point out the several forms assumed by this doctrine and
+to show its falsity by an examination of the principles on which it is
+based. The author properly insists on the importance of distinguishing
+between the affirmation of the unknown and that of the unknowable. The
+recognition of the former is essential to all progress in knowledge,
+but the latter is “the direct negation of all possibility whatever of
+utilising the deficiencies of knowledge,” and leads infallibly to the
+worship of ignorance. The best definition of the mental phenomenon
+of agnosticism, says M. de Roberty is the _pessimism_ of the theory
+of knowledge, and it is not for nothing therefore that Kant preceded
+Schopenhauer in the development of idealism.
+
+Modern agnosticism is based on the old notion of the separation of the
+phenomenon from the noumenon, and it was Kant who cleared it from its
+early theological and metaphysical conceptions. He affirmed the reality
+of the “thing in itself” as a fundamental postulate, and then declared
+that we can know nothing of things considered in themselves. Among
+the conceptions formed by the human mind through the exercise of its
+imaginative faculty are three which exhaust the entire content of the
+Unknowable. Thus it may be reduced to the idea of a reality other than
+that of which we are sensible; to the idea of a subject which perceives
+in a different manner from the real subject; and finally to the idea that
+our cerebral organisation reveals the world to us under delusive colors,
+all of which M. de Roberty declares to be simple fiction. His own ideas
+on the subject will appear later on.
+
+Positivism stands towards materialism in the same relation as criticism
+stands towards idealism, whose noumenon becomes the unknowable thing
+in itself; as the simple matter of materialism becomes the unknown
+existence about which positivism says we can neither affirm nor deny
+anything. Modern agnosticism may be regarded thus as representing the
+long sought synthesis of the purest materialism and the most transcendent
+spiritualism, and it offers a striking demonstration of the fundamental
+equivalence of the hypotheses hitherto formulated as to the origin and
+essence of things. It proves also, says M. de Roberty, that the great
+law of the identity of contraries is applicable directly to all our
+very general conceptions. Contradictory as they seem to be, universal
+postulates must, by virtue of that law, be fundamentally identical. This
+introduces a discussion of the antinomies, developed but not invented
+by modern criticism, which found in them ample justification for its
+conclusion of the reality of the unknowable.
+
+The double antinomy of time and space is regarded by the author as always
+presenting itself under the aspect of a long chain of contradictions
+which are manifestly merely verbal. The opposition between finite and
+infinite may be resolved into the distinction between concrete and
+abstract, between particular and general, if infinity is taken as
+synonymous with, or the perfect substitute for, general and abstract
+quantity, the universal attribute of things isolated from the things
+themselves. As to the problems connected with the ideas of a vacuum,
+matter, force and motion, M. de Roberty supposes them to have a purely
+psychological solution. Such ideas go beyond the “conceptive” capacity
+of mechanics and belong to psychology considered, not as a branch of
+philosophy, or as philosophy itself, but as a science of abstract
+concepts.
+
+The philosophy of evolution, although monistic in the sense that it
+recognises the law of the identity of opposites, shows itself not to
+be so in reality by its doctrine of the unknowable. In this monism and
+agnosticism contradict each other, as it is contrary to reason “to
+affirm at the same time the identity of every phenomenon and their
+unknowability. The first marks the supreme term of the second. Identity
+in general serves to define knowableness. So that, if we remain on
+the elevated summits of pure abstraction too long, we run the danger
+anticipated by the law of identity of contraries. We fall directly
+into the error of taking the apparent negation of identity or of pure
+knowledge, the unknowable, for something really distinct, really
+separated from the knowable.” This is the illusion of Spencer and of
+all the philosophers who have undertaken the difficult task of applying
+monism as a corrective of agnosticism.
+
+M. de Roberty concludes the present work with a discussion of the
+relation between idea and reality, the thought and the object thought of,
+in which he gives us his opinion on that disputed point. He says that
+what philosophy calls “the object” is composed essentially of external
+nature, in which is included our own organism. Very complicated systems
+of motions are transmitted to the grey nuclei or opto-striated bodies
+of the central regions of the brain. Here these motions determine new
+motions of which the totality is described in psycho-physics by the term
+“unconscious ideation.” But this internal motion, continually tending to
+become again an initial or external motion, gives rise to unconscious
+reflex activity. The motion passes by the white nerve-fibres to the
+cortical periphery of the brain which becomes “the seat of a phenomenon,
+an excitation, a motion which prolongs or repeats the immediately
+preceding phenomenon, excitation, or motion, while giving it a shorter
+and more steady action.” The sensations and the reflex-actions derived
+from them traverse the opto-striated nuclei without retardation and
+without giving rise to any system of ideas; while consciousness resides
+in the systemisation or union of the same sensations and reflex-actions.
+The notion of the ego results from the union or memory of certain ideas,
+sensations, and actions, which before their union and preservation by
+the cerebral cortex were unconscious. But before becoming unconscious
+ideas, those “intellectual virtualities” were in every other part of the
+organism, and in all the media which surround it, as, “manifestations
+of energy or of motion, it may be objective phenomena.” Thus, says M.
+de Roberty, if the universe is composed of two parts, the ego and the
+non-ego, it can be affirmed that they form an uninterrupted circuit.
+He supposes that when the cosmical energy has produced the phenomena
+of unconscious mentality in the brain-centres, it is divided into two
+currents, one of which returns to its source and becomes directly cosmic
+energy again, and this will be the fate of the other current also when
+the life of the organism ceases.
+
+This view the author supports by a consideration of the morphological
+and functional difference supposed to exist between the facts which
+constitute the notion of the “ego” and the primordial facts of
+unconsciousness comprised under the generic denomination of the
+“non-ego.” He regards conscious ideas as the telegraphic alphabet, the
+stenographic writing of the cosmos. Consciousness serves to coördinate
+the incoherent crowd of events which at each instant invades the normal
+brain. In these we may see effects of the cause called “universe,” and
+therefore its representatives and substitutes, which they could not
+be unless there was identity between the two. Thus the “ego” could be
+defined as the final synthesis of the “symbolic abridgments,” of the
+micrographical abbreviations, of the “non-ego.” Thus the ego serves only
+for the purpose of concentrating or condensing, so to say the non-ego,
+which it represents in a manner more or less durable and efficient.
+
+This monistic theory gets rid of the unknowable and therefore is a great
+improvement on that of the materialist or of the idealist. Nevertheless
+it requires further elaboration. There is no difficulty in understanding
+that cosmic motion may become transformed within the organism into a
+feeling. This still, however, leaves unaccounted for the existence of the
+organism itself. A true monism will, therefore, require that the organism
+must be in some way identifiable with the cosmos. This is the true
+problem that has to be solved, and its solution will be greatly aided by
+the overthrow of agnosticism, against which M. de Roberty has made so
+vigorous and successful an attack in the present volume.
+
+                                                                        Ω.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[84] See Aug. Friedr. Böck. _Sammlung von Schriften, welche den logischen
+Calcul des Prof. Pl. betreffen_, Frankfort and Leipsic, 1766.
+
+[85] The book from which we quote, namely _The Ethic of Freethought_,
+like the book here under discussion, contains much detail matter in which
+we differ most emphatically from the author; (he is, for instance, in our
+opinion very unjust to Martin Luther;) but it seems to us that he pursues
+an aim that we have in common with him.
+
+
+
+
+PERIODICALS.
+
+
+ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. III.
+Nos. 2 and 3.
+
+    UEBER DIE EMPFINDLICHKEIT DES GRÜNBLINDEN UND DES NORMALEN
+    AUGES GEGEN FARBENÄNDERUNG IM SPEKTRUM. By _E. Brodhun_.
+
+    KÜRZESTE LINIEN IM FARBENSYSTEM. By _H. v. Helmholtz_.
+
+    DIE RAUMANSCHAUUNGEN UND DIE AUGENBEWEGUNGEN. By _Th. Lipps_.
+
+    EINE BEOBACHTUNG ÜBER DAS INDIREKTE SEHEN. By _Th. Wertheim_.
+
+    UEBER EINIGE EIGENTÜMLICHKEITEN DES TASTSINNS. By _G. Sergi_.
+
+    BEITRÄGE ZUR VERGLEICHENDEN PSYCHOLOGIE. I. Das Verhalten
+    wirbelloser Tiere auf der Drehscheibe. By _K. L. Schaefer_.
+
+    GEGENANTWORT AUF DIE ERWIDERUNG VON O. FLÜGEL. By _J. Rehmke_.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+The value of the first article on the sensitiveness of the green-blind
+and the normal eye in perceiving color-variations in the spectrum
+consists mainly in the three diagrams that exhibit the results obtained
+in the author’s experiments.
+
+Professor H. v. Helmholtz published in a former number his attempt at
+propounding “a formula which should play the same part in the province
+of color-sensations as the formula of the length of the linear element
+plays in geometry.”... As geometry begins with the concept of a shortest
+line between two points, so our fundamental formula in this subject shall
+enable us to find that series of transitions between two given colors
+for which the sum of the perceptible differences is a minimum. Helmholtz
+proposes to call them “shortest color-lines” and comes to the conclusion
+that the whole domain of these apparently irregular phenomena are easily
+subsumed under a generalised formulation of Fechner’s law.
+
+Professor Th. Lipps criticises Wundt with regard to the latter’s
+theory of measuring the visual field by ocular motion. Wundt’s theory,
+he declares, is in need of several auxiliary hypotheses, such as the
+assumption that certain ocular motions are supposed to be more difficult
+than others: the visual field is said to possess the form of a spherical
+surface, etc. The author maintains that ocular motions do contribute to
+the construction of our space-conception, but in a different way than
+Wundt assumes. The most interesting part of the article appears to be the
+discussion of the genesis of the third dimension which is not given in
+the data of sensation but added to them as a judgment concerning these
+data. It is an interpretation of the data. There are still psychologists
+who regard the third dimension as immediately given. Professor Lipps
+refers as an instance to Prof. William James’s article “The Perception
+of Space” in (_Mind_, Vol. XII), where the latter declares that “no
+arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists, to be
+impossible.” While Wundt says that to the resting eye the form of the
+visual field is spherical because the sky appears to us as spherical;
+Lipps declares that we might just as well say that the visual field of
+the resting eye is a plane, because the earth appears to us as a level
+surface. We attribute to the visual field the form which certain reasons
+prompt us to. Certain convergences of the eyes induce us to place certain
+points at certain distances. We read, as it were, the distances out of
+the convergences of the ocular axes. Accordingly, when we cease to feel
+any difference in our feeling of convergency we cannot help attributing
+the same “depth” throughout to all the things with respect to which such
+feeling is wanting, and we place all objects beyond a certain range upon
+a spherical surface. Thus Lipps interprets the spherical form of the
+firmament as the result of our using both eyes, which use from habit has
+become the form of monocular vision also, and not as Wundt does from the
+spherical form of each visual field, which by habit has been transferred
+to binocular vision. There is a strange fact that distances on the left
+side are overestimated in comparison with those on the right side; and
+this fact is also claimed by Professor Lipps to be incompatible with
+Professor Wundt’s theory, but in favor of his own views.
+
+Th. Wertheim has made an observation which tends to prove that positive
+as well as negative fluctuations of light-intensity, cause the
+disappearance of objects indirectly seen.
+
+G. Sergi publishes the results of his investigations concerning the
+sense of touch made in the Institute for Anthropology and Experimental
+Psychology at the University of Rome.
+
+Karl L. Schaefer’s results of experiments with invertebrate animals
+upon the rotatory table show that in the beginning a counter-rotation
+takes place, but not in all animals. It does not take place in some
+caterpillars; it does take place in black beetles, ants, flies, earwigs,
+provided they are at the time in actual motion. There is no after-affect
+from the rotation and thus they are not subject to vertigo as are the
+vertebrates. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. XVI. No. 2.
+
+    BEITRÄGE ZUR LOGIK. (Zweiter Artikel. Schluss.) By _A. Riehl_.
+
+    ERNST PLATNER’S WISSENSCHAFTLICHE STELLUNG ZU KANT IN
+    ERKENNTNISSTHEORIE UND MORALPHILOSOPHIE. (Zweiter Artikel.
+    Schluss.) By _B. Seligkowitz_.
+
+    UEBER BEGRIFF UND GEGENSTAND. By _G. Frege_.
+
+    BEMERKUNGEN ZU RICHARD AVENARIUS’S “KRITIK DER REINEN
+    ERFAHRUNG.” By _R. Willy_.
+
+A. Riehl discusses in the second instalment of his “Contributions to
+Logic” the forms of judgment and the different kinds of conclusion. B.
+Seligkowitz concludes his article on Ernst Platner’s relation to Kant,
+setting forth the former’s criticism of the latter’s views of synthetic
+judgments _a priori_, his moral theology, his psychological ideas, and
+moral philosophy. G. Frege explains his view of “concept and object” with
+reference to the idea of Benno Kerry, who does not recognise between the
+two any absolute difference. (Leipsic: Reisland.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 3 and 4.
+
+CONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 3.
+
+    DIE WIRKLICHKEIT ALS PHÄNOMEN DES GEISTES. By _A. Rosinski_.
+
+    RECENSIONEN.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+CONTENTS: May, 1892. No. 4.
+
+    UEBER DAS ABSOLUTE GEHÖR. By _J. v. Kries_.
+
+    DIE ZWEITEN PURKINJESCHEN BILDER IM SCHEMATISCHEN UND IM
+    WIRKLICHEN AUGE. By _L. Matthiessen_.
+
+    BESPRECHUNGEN.
+
+    LITTERATURBERICHT.
+
+Adolf Rosinski describes reality as a phenomenon of the mind and,
+following Quäbicker, he regards “the real as belonging to that complex
+which is given us in appearance. Being (_Wesen_) is not behind or beyond
+appearance; Being, being that which exists, existence is appearance.
+Appearance shows nothing but that which is in Being, and there is in
+Being nothing which is not manifested.” (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)
+
+There are but few musicians who are able to recognise directly and
+without reference to another note, the pitch of a sound. This ability
+is called by musicians “absolutes Gehör.” Professor Kries investigates
+in a long article, the conditions of this absolute musical ear so
+called, exhibiting the difficulties of an explanation without arriving
+at a definite result, which, however, may be expected from further
+investigations of the subject. Mr. Matthiessen’s article on the second
+Perkinje-pictures, in the ideal and the real eye, consists exclusively
+of measurements and calculations of the curvature of the lens. The same
+number contains an appreciative and long (37 pp.) review of Prof. W.
+James’s “Principles of Psychology.” (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. April, 1892. Vol. IV. No. 3.
+
+    ON CERTAIN PECULIARITIES OF THE KNEE-JERK IN SLEEP IN A CASE OF
+    TERMINAL DEMENTIA. By _William Noyes_, M. D.
+
+    THE GROWTH OF MEMORY IN SCHOOL CHILDREN. By _T. L. Bolton_, A.
+    B.
+
+    STUDIES FROM THE LABORATORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
+    UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, Ph. D.
+
+    THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF REALISM. By _Alexander Fraser_,
+    A. B.
+
+    PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE: I. Nervous System. By Prof. _H. H.
+    Donaldson_, Clark University; II. Association, Reaction. By
+    Prof. _J. McK. Cattell_, Columbia College; III. Hypnotism and
+    Suggestion. By Prof. _Joseph Jastrow_, University of Wisconsin;
+    IV. Sight.
+
+    LETTERS AND NOTES.
+
+Dr. Noyes’s investigations seem to corroborate the theory that not only
+the lower but also “the higher activities of the brain are also subject
+to a rhythmic rise and fall synchronous with vascular dilatation and
+contraction.” Mr. Bolton publishes the results of his examination of the
+span of memory in the Grammar Schools of Worcester, Mass. The memory
+span measuring the power of concentrated and prolonged attention,
+increases with age rather than with the growth of intelligence. The
+girls have better memories than the boys. Memory can be increased by
+practice. The tests made before and after school do not show that the
+pupils suffer fatigue from the day’s work. Memory-images before they
+are completely lost first suffer a confusion of order, then a loss of
+certain of its elements which are often replaced by similar elements.
+Previous ideas being one of the factors of confusion. Professor Jastrow’s
+article presents a description of a series of experiments made in his
+psychological laboratory. He reproduces the Zöllner figures, briefly
+summarising their different interpretations by Zöllner, Hering, Aubert,
+Classen, Lipps, Hoppe, Wundt, Pisco, and Helmholtz. He further presents a
+study of involuntary movements of the hand on the glass plate apparatus,
+and describes the experiments of time measurement in classifying ideas,
+and in finding a given object within a given field. Mr. Fraser defends
+the Natural Realism of the Scotch school, making the tactumotor sense the
+ultimate test of reality. (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
+
+CONTENTS: April, 1892. No. 196.
+
+    LES PROCESSUS NERVEUX DANS L’ATTENTION ET LA VOLITION. By
+    _Charlton Bastian_.
+
+    LA RESPONSABILITÉ. By _F. Paulhan_.
+
+    REVUE GÉNÉRALE: LE SPIRITISME CONTEMPORAIN. By _Janet_
+    (_Pierre_).
+
+    ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS: Der Positivismus vom Tode August
+    Comte’s bis auf unsere Tage. By _H. Gruber_. Die Psychologie
+    der Suggestion. By _H. Schmidkunz_.
+
+    TRAVAUX DU LABORATOIRE DE PSYCHOLOGIE PHYSIOLOGIQUE: Etude
+    expérimentale sur deux cas d’audition colorée. By _Beaunis and
+    Binet_. Etude sur un nouveau cas d’audition colorée. By _Binet
+    and Philippe_.
+
+CONTENTS: May, 1892. No. 197.
+
+    DU SENS DE L’INÉGALITÉ. By _G. Mauret_.
+
+    LA RESPONSABILITÉ (concluded). By _F. Paulhan_.
+
+    LE PROBLÈME DE LA VIE (third and last article). By _Dunan_.
+
+    ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS: Leçons cliniques sur l’hystérie
+    et l’hypnotisme By _Pitres_. Corps et âme. Essais sur la
+    philosophie de St. Thomas. By _J. Gardair_. Agnosticisme.
+    By _E. de Roberty_. La physique de Straton de Lampsaque.
+    By _Rodier_. Das Wahrnehmungsproblem vom Standpunkte des
+    Physikers, des Physiologen und des Philosophen. By _H. Schwarz_.
+
+    REVUE DES PÉRIODIQUES ÉTRANGERS: Vierteljahrsschrift für
+    wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
+
+    CORRESPONDANCE ET INFORMATIONS.
+
+The processes of attention and volition lie at the basis of all our
+mental and physical activities. Mr. Charlton Bastian discusses their
+nervous condition and comes to the conclusion _Voluntas et intellectus
+unum et idem sunt_. M. Paulhan treats the problem of responsibility under
+healthy and morbid conditions, in two consecutive articles. M. Mouret,
+whose former articles on relations will be reviewed in a future number by
+Mr. F. C. Russell, treats in a long article of the sense of inequality.
+M. Ch. Dunan concludes his essay on the problem of life, viewing the
+subject from a rather metaphysical standpoint. M. Pierre Janet presents
+us with a very accurate review of the importance of the contemporary
+spiritism and spiritualism. He calls attention to the fact that modern
+psychology owes to the researches of the spiritualists, many new,
+startling, and interesting facts. He does not share their standpoint, yet
+his review is kind and sympathetic. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII.[86] Vol. III. No. 12. March, 1892.
+
+    POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE. (Continuation).
+    By _B. N. Tchitcherin_. Article crowned by the Psychological
+    Society of Moscow.
+
+    HOW DOES THE MINISTRATION TO THE GENERAL GOOD OF ALL RELATE TO
+    THE CARE FOR THE SALVATION OF OUR OWN SOUL? A letter to the
+    Editor. By the _Archimandrite Antonii_.
+
+    HUXLEY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF THE
+    WORLD.
+
+    TELEPATHY. (Concluded.) By _Petrovo-Solovo_.
+
+    THE BASIS OF ETHICAL OBLIGATION. By _N. Grote_.
+
+    SPECIAL DEPARTMENT. About Ethical Fragments from Democritus. By
+    _J. Radloff_. One of the Possible Cosmic Theories. A Study. By
+    _A. Wilkins_.
+
+    CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. I. Review of Periodicals. II.
+    Review of Recent Publications. Transactions of the Moscow
+    Psychological Society. (Moscow, 1892.)
+
+
+MIND. New Series. No. 2. April, 1892.
+
+    PLEASURE AND PAIN. By _A. Bain_.
+
+    THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL’S DIALECTIC. II. By _J. Ellis
+    McTaggart_.
+
+    THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. By _E. Bradford
+    Titchener_.
+
+    THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. II. By _W. E. Johnson_.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS: Dr. Münsterberg and his Critics. By _S. Alexander_.
+
+    CRITICAL NOTICES.
+
+Prof. A. Bain criticises Mr. H. R. Marshall’s theory of pleasure and
+pain as being determined by the relation between the energy given out
+and the energy received, saying that it leaves a very large region
+untouched and inexplicable. J. Ellis McTaggart defends the Hegelian
+dialectic system which, he declares, “is not so wonderful or mystic
+as it has been represented to be. It makes no attempt,” he says, “to
+deduce existence from essence; it does not even attempt to eliminate the
+element of immediacy, in experience, and to produce a self-sufficient
+and self-mediating thought.” E. Bradford Titchener gives a general
+survey of the researches carried out in Wundt’s Institute, and of the
+other psychological contents of the _Philosophische Studien_, from the
+date of Professor Cattell’s paper on “The Psychological Laboratory at
+Leipsic” to the present time. W. E. Johnson, in his paper on “The Logical
+Calculus,” brings out some of the underlying principles and assumptions
+which belong equally to the ordinary Formal Logic, to Symbolic Logic,
+and to the so-called Logic of Relatives. Prof. S. Alexander takes
+issue with Mr. Titchener’s criticism of Professor Münsterberg’s
+psychological investigations. Mr. Titchener’s article which appeared
+in the October number of _Mind_, 1891, leaves the impression that the
+whole of the work under review is valueless. “Many of his objections,”
+however, says Professor Alexander, “refer to unimportant points, and
+the graver theoretical ones are really groundless,” and thus the
+critic “has contrived to give a one-sided judgment by neglecting the
+other considerations which give Dr. Münsterberg’s work its value and
+significance.” (London: Williams & Norgate.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+THREE AMERICAN MAGAZINES.
+
+INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. April, 1892. Vol. II. No. 3.
+
+    ECONOMIC REFORM SHORT OF SOCIALISM. By _E. Benj. Andrews_.
+
+    PLEASURE AND PAIN IN EDUCATION. By _Miss M. S. Gilliland_,
+    London.
+
+    THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST DOCTRINE AND ETHICS. By Prof.
+    _Maurice Bloomfield_.
+
+    THE THREE RELIGIONS. (Concluded.) By _J. S. Mackenzie_, M. A.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS AND REVIEWS.
+
+    THE SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.
+
+THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. I. No. 3. May, 1892.
+
+    HERBERT SPENCER’S ANIMAL ETHICS. By Prof. _Henry Calderwood_.
+
+    THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF AUTHORITY. By Prof. _J. Macbride
+    Sterrett_.
+
+    WHAT IS REALITY? By _David G. Ritchie_.
+
+    NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. By Dr. _B. C.
+    Burt_.
+
+    A MATHEMATICAL VIEW OF FREE WILL. By Prof. _J. E. Oliver_.
+
+    DISCUSSIONS: Professor Ladd’s Criticism of James’s Psychology.
+    By Prof. _J. P. Gordy_.
+
+    REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
+
+THE NEW WORLD. Vol. I. No. 1. March, 1892.
+
+    THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. By _Lyman Abbott_.
+
+    THE HISTORIC AND THE IDEAL CHRIST. By _Charles Carroll Everett_.
+
+    THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL RELIGION IN AMERICA. By _J. G. Schurmann_.
+
+    THE COMMON, THE COMMONPLACE AND THE ROMANTIC. By _William
+    Rounseville Alger_.
+
+    ABRAHAM KUENEN. By _Crawford Howell Toy_.
+
+    THE THEISTIC EVOLUTION OF BUDDHISM. By _J. Estlin Carpenter_.
+
+    “BETWEEN THE TESTAMENTS.” By _Thomas R. Slicer_.
+
+    THE NEW ORTHODOXY. By _Edward H. Hall_.
+
+    THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By
+    _Charles B. Upton_.
+
+    INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
+
+    BOOK REVIEWS.
+
+There have sprung up within the last two years not less than four
+American magazines of progressive thought, which now compete in the
+proposition of their religious and philosophical conceptions to the
+world. These four magazines are, in the chronological order in which
+they were founded, _The Monist_, _The International Journal of Ethics_,
+_The Philosophical Review_, and _The New World_. _The Monist_ represents
+that world-conception which takes its stand upon facts and systematises
+facts into a unitary view. Thus it recognises the methods of science
+as the methods of all knowledge, to the exclusion of supernatural
+revelation, or intuitionalism, or any kind of mysticism. But _The Monist_
+does not rest satisfied with this. _The Monist_ preaches a religion; and
+the prophets of this religion are not only the great ethical teachers
+of mankind, but everybody who reveals truth, Kant and Comte, Kepler,
+Copernicus, Darwin, and all living representatives of scientific inquiry.
+Thus _The Monist_ is a magazine that points out the religious import of
+science and philosophy.
+
+_The International Journal of Ethics_ follows in the same line in so
+far only as it has nothing to say to the old orthodox conceptions of
+religion. It tries to teach a higher morality, but in establishing ethics
+it pursues quite another course. It is the organ of the Ethical Societies
+and the leaders of the Ethical Societies are confident that they can have
+ethics not only without theology but also without religion, science, or
+philosophy. They consider the world-conception of a man as something
+indifferent, or unessential, in ethics, and by proposing a non-committal
+policy with respect to religious and philosophical views, they expect
+to be the better fitted to preach good conduct. (Philadelphia:
+_International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S. Twelfth Street.)
+
+_The Philosophical Review_ represents a philosophical conception
+which has still a strong hold upon the Universities on this side of
+the Atlantic. Transcendentalism, metaphysicism, and that theological
+philosophy which still operates with supernatural quantities, or at
+least has not discarded the dualistic features of supernaturalism, are
+represented in its columns. Certainly they are well represented and by
+their best upholders of the present time, and authors of more modern and
+positivistic views are not excluded. Exactly so in _The Monist_, the
+representatives of metaphysicism and those who still believe in the dual
+existence of man, in his self, or ego, and his transcendental existence
+are welcome; but there is nevertheless a fundamental difference in the
+world-conception of the two magazines. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn &
+Co.)
+
+_The New World_ is the latest new-comer in the field of magazine
+literature, and we welcome its appearance most cordially. There are
+strongly marked differences between _The New World_ and _The Monist_,
+for the former is a theological magazine that deepens religion with the
+assistance of philosophy while the latter, rather the reverse, is a
+philosophical magazine that widens philosophy and applies it to practical
+life so as to become a religion. But for that very reason _The New World_
+seems to meet _The Monist_ half way. _The New World_ is an offshoot of
+modern theology. Its contributors come largely from the ranks of the
+maturest unitarian thinkers. They practically accept the principles of
+criticism and scientific inquiry and thus they are approaching rapidly
+that common goal of human thought, which _The Monist_ propounds as the
+leading maxim of philosophy and religion, namely, to regard nature as the
+only revelation and experience as our guide in life; to base religion
+upon and to derive ethics from a critically-sifted statement of facts.
+(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.)
+
+                                                                      κρς.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[86] _Questions of Philosophy and Psychology._
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX TO THE MONIST, VOL. II, NO. 4
+
+
+                             KANT AND SPENCER
+
+             TWO ARTICLES REPRINTED FROM NOS. 51, 52, AND 158
+                             OF THE OPEN COURT
+
+                           1. THE ETHICS OF KANT
+                           2. KANT ON EVOLUTION
+
+                                    BY
+                              DR. PAUL CARUS
+
+                                 CHICAGO:
+                     THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
+
+
+
+
+THE ETHICS OF KANT.
+
+IN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER’S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM.
+
+
+Mr. Herbert Spencer has published in _The Popular Science Monthly_ for
+August, an essay on the Ethics of Kant; a translation of this article
+had appeared in the July Number of the _Revue Philosophique_, and it
+cannot fail to have been widely noticed. It is to be regretted that
+unfamiliarity with the German language and perhaps also with Kant’s
+terminology has led Mr. Spencer into errors to which attention is called
+in the following discussion.[87]
+
+Mr. Spencer says:
+
+    “If, before Kant uttered that often-quoted saying in which,
+    with the stars of Heaven he coupled the conscience of Man, as
+    being the two things that excited his awe, he had known more
+    of Man than he did, he would probably have expressed himself
+    somewhat otherwise.”
+
+Kant, in his famous dictum that two things excited his admiration, the
+starry heaven above him and the conscience within him, contrasted two
+kinds of sublimity.[88] The grandeur of the Universe is that of size and
+extension, while the conscience of man commands respect for its moral
+dignity. The universe is wonderful in its expanse and in its order of
+mechanical regularity; the conscience of man is grand, being intelligent
+volition that aspires to be in harmony with universal laws.
+
+Mr. Spencer continues:
+
+    “Not, indeed, that the conscience of Man is not wonderful
+    enough, whatever be its supposed genesis; but the wonderfulness
+    of it is of a different kind according as we assume it to
+    have been supernaturally given or infer that it has been
+    naturally evolved. The knowledge of Man in that large sense
+    which Anthropology expresses, had made, in Kant’s day, but
+    small advances. The books of travel were relatively few, and
+    the facts which they contained concerning the human mind as
+    existing in different races, had not been gathered together and
+    generalized. In our days, the conscience of Man as inductively
+    known has none of that universality of presence and unity of
+    nature which Kant’s saying tacitly assumes.”
+
+Mr. Spencer apparently supposes that Kant believed in a supernatural
+origin of the human conscience. This, however, is erroneous.
+
+Mr. Spencer’s error is excusable in consideration of the fact that some
+disciples of Kant have fallen into a similar error. Professor Adler, of
+New York, who attempts in the Societies for Ethical Culture to carry into
+effect the ethics of Pure Reason, maintains that the commandments of the
+_ought_ and “the light that shines through them come from beyond, but its
+beams are broken as they pass through our terrestrial medium, and the
+full light in all its glory we can never see.”
+
+Ethics based on an unknowable power, is mysticism; and mysticism does not
+essentially differ from dualism and supernaturalism.
+
+Kant’s reasoning is far from mysticism and from supernaturalism. He
+was fully convinced that civilized man with his moral and intellectual
+abilities had naturally evolved from the lower state of an animal
+existence. We read in his essay, “Presumable Origin of the History
+of Mankind” (Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte. Editio
+Hartenstein, Vol. IV, p. 321):
+
+    “From this conception of the primitive history of mankind it
+    follows that the departure of man from the paradise represented
+    to him by his reason as the earliest place of sojourn of his
+    race, has been nothing else than the transition from the rude
+    condition of a purely animal existence to the condition of a
+    human being; a transition from the leading-strings of instinct
+    to direction by reason, in a word, from the protectorate of
+    nature to a status of freedom.”
+
+The view that the conscience of man is innate, in the sense of a
+non-natural, of a mysterious, or even of a supernatural origin, is
+untenable. Those disciples of Kant who entertain such views have
+certainly misinterpreted their great master, and the passages adduced by
+Mr. Spencer from so many sources are sufficient evidence of the fact that
+“there are widely different degrees” [we should rather say kinds] “of
+conscience in the different races.” Mr. Spencer continues:
+
+    “Had Kant had these and kindred facts before him, his
+    conception of the human mind, and consequently his ethical
+    conception, would scarcely have been what they were. Believing,
+    as he did, that one object of his awe—the stellar Universe—has
+    been evolved,[89] he might by evidence like the foregoing
+    have been led to suspect that the other object of his awe—the
+    human conscience—has been evolved; and has consequently a
+    real nature unlike its apparent nature.” ... “If, instead of
+    assuming that conscience is simple because it seems simple to
+    careless introspection he had entertained the hypothesis that
+    it is perhaps complex—a consolidated product of multitudinous
+    experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by
+    self—he might have arrived at a consistent system of Ethics.”
+    ...
+
+    “In brief, as already implied, had Kant, instead of his
+    incongruous beliefs that the celestial bodies have had an
+    evolutionary origin, but that the minds of living beings on
+    them, or at least on one of them, have had a non-evolutionary
+    origin, entertained the belief that both have arisen by
+    Evolution, he would have been saved from the impossibilities of
+    his Metaphysics, and the untenabilities of his Ethics.”
+
+Mr. Spencer believes that Kant had assumed conscience to be “simple,
+because it seems simple to careless introspection.” But there is no
+evidence in Kant’s works for this assumption. On the contrary, Kant
+reversed the old view of so-called “rational psychology” which considered
+conscience as innate and which was based on the error that consciousness
+is simple. Des Cartes’s syllogism _cogito ergo sum_ is based on this
+idea, which at the same time served as a philosophical evidence for
+the indestructibility and immortality of the _ego_. The simplicity of
+consciousness had been considered as an axiom, until Kant came and showed
+that it was a fallacy, a paralogism of pure reason. Dr. Noah Porter has
+written, from an apparently dualistic standpoint, a sketch entitled “The
+Ethics of Kant,” in which he says:
+
+    “The skepticism and denials of Kant’s speculative theory
+    in respect to noumena, both material and psychical, had
+    unfortunately cut him off from the possibility of recognizing
+    the personal _ego_ as anything more than a logical fiction.”
+
+Kant says in his “Critique of Pure Reason”:[90]
+
+    “In the internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the
+    _Ego_ is but the consciousness of my thought.... From all this
+    it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere
+    misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at
+    the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition
+    of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is
+    applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than
+    the unity in _thought_, by which no object is given; to which
+    therefore the category of substance cannot be applied.”[91]
+
+Concerning the statement that Kant had believed in the non-evolutionary
+origin of living beings, we quote from his essay on _The Different Races
+of Men_, Chap. III, where Kant speaks of “the immediate causes of the
+origin of these different races.” He says:
+
+    “The conditions (_Gründe_) which, inhering in the constitution
+    of an organic body, determine a certain evolutionary process
+    (_Auswickelung_[92]) are called, if this process is concerned
+    with particular parts, _germs_; if, on the other hand, it
+    touches only the size or the relation of the parts to one
+    another, I call it _natural capabilities_ (_natürliche
+    Anlagen_).”[93]
+
+And in a foot-note Kant makes the following remark:
+
+    “Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science
+    (_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the
+    same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural
+    phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired
+    the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now and
+    through what succession of modifications they have passed in
+    order to have arrived, in every respect, to their present
+    state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely
+    lack, would teach us the changes that have affected the form
+    of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the
+    earth (plants and animals), that they have suffered by natural
+    transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the
+    prototype of the original species, that they have experienced.
+    It would probably trace a great number of apparently different
+    varieties back to species of one and the same kind and would
+    convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural
+    Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.”[94]
+
+Kant has nowhere, so far as we know, made any objection to the idea of
+evolution. But he opposed the theory that all life should have originated
+from _one single_ kind. In reviewing and epitomizing Joh. Gottfr.
+Herder’s work, “_Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_,” Kant says:
+
+    ... “Book II, treats of organized matter on the earth.... The
+    beginnings of vegetation.... The changes suffered by man and
+    beast through climatic influences.... In them all we find one
+    prevailing form and a similar osseous structure.... These
+    transitional links render it not at all impossible that in
+    marine animals, in plants, and, indeed, possibly in so-called
+    inanimate substances, one and the same fundamental principle
+    of organization may prevail, although infinitely cruder and
+    more complex in operation. In the sight of eternal being, which
+    beholds all things in one connection, it is possible that the
+    structure of the ice-particle, while receiving form, and of
+    the snowflake, while being crystallized, bears an analogous
+    relation to the formation of the embryo in a mother’s womb....
+    The third book compares the structure of animals and plants
+    with the organization of man.... It was not because man was
+    ordained to be a rational creature that upright stature was
+    given him for using his limbs according to reason; on the
+    contrary he acquired his reason as a consequence of his upright
+    stature.... From stone to crystals, from crystals to metals,
+    from metals to plant-creation, from thence to the animal,
+    and ultimately to man, we have seen the form of organization
+    advancing, and with it the faculties and instincts of creatures
+    becoming more diversified, until at last they all became united
+    in the human form, in so far as the latter could comprise
+    them.... As the body increases by food, so does the mind by
+    ideas; indeed, we notice here the same laws of assimilation, of
+    growth, and of generation. In a word, an inner spiritual man is
+    being formed within us, which has a nature of its own and which
+    employs the body as an instrument merely.... Our humanity is
+    merely a preliminary training, the bud of a blossom to come.
+    Step by step does nature cast off the ignoble and the base,
+    while it builds and adds to the spiritual and continues to
+    fashion the pure and refined with increasing niceness; thus are
+    we in a position to hope from the artist-hand of nature that in
+    that other existence our bud of humanity will also appear in
+    its real and true form of divine manhood.” ...
+
+[Herder’s idea of evolution would stand on the whole if his conception of
+“the spiritual” did not imply a preternatural agent.]
+
+    “The present state of man is probably the link of junction
+    between two worlds.... Yet man is not to investigate himself in
+    this future state; he is to believe himself into it.”
+
+Kant makes no objection whatever to the evolutionary ideas of Herder.
+But Herder was not free from supernaturalism and from fantastic ideas
+in reference to the future development of man. He had not yet dropped
+the dualistic conception of the ‘duplicity’ of man and believed in the
+immortality of a distinct spiritual individual within his body. Kant’s
+objection, therefore, is two-fold; 1) against Herder’s supernaturalism
+which leads him beyond this world; and, 2) against the descent of _all_
+species from _one and the same genus_. He says:
+
+    “In the gradation between the different species and individuals
+    of a natural kingdom, nature shows us nothing else than the
+    fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction and
+    preserves the species alone.... As concerns that _invisible_
+    kingdom of active and independent forces, we fail to see why
+    the author, after having believed he could confidently infer
+    from organized beings, the existence of the rational principle
+    in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to
+    him merely as spiritual nature, instead of lifting it out of
+    chaos through the structural form of organised matter.... As
+    to the gradation of organized beings, our author is not to
+    be too severely reproached, if the scheme has not met the
+    requirements of his conception, which extends so far beyond
+    the limits of this world; for its application even to the
+    natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing. The slight
+    differences exhibited when species are compared with reference
+    to their common points of resemblance, are, where there is
+    such great multiplicity, a necessary consequence of just this
+    multiplicity. The assumption of common kinship between them,
+    inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another and all
+    from one original and primitive species, or from one and the
+    same creative source (Mutterschoss)—the assumption of such
+    a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that reason
+    shrinks from them, and we cannot attribute this idea to the
+    author without doing him injustice. Concerning his suggestions
+    in comparative anatomy through all species down to plants,
+    the workers in natural science must judge for themselves
+    whether the hints given for new observations, will be useful
+    and whether they are justified.... It is desirable that our
+    ingenious author who in the continuation of his work will find
+    more _terra firma_, may somewhat restrain his bright genius,
+    and that philosophy (which consists rather in pruning than in
+    fostering luxuriant growth) may lead him to the perfection of
+    his labors not through hints but through definite conceptions,
+    not by imagination but by observation, not by a metaphysical or
+    emotional phantasy but by reason, broad in its plan but careful
+    in its work.”
+
+Kant rejected certain conceptions of evolution, but he did not at all
+show himself averse to the idea in general. He touched upon the subject
+only incidentally and it is certain that he did not especially favor or
+entertain the belief in a non-evolutionary origin of living beings.
+
+Before proceeding to the main points of his criticism, Mr. Spencer calls
+attention to what he designates as Kant’s _abnormal_ reasoning. Mr.
+Spencer says:
+
+    “Something must be said concerning abnormal reasoning as
+    compared with normal reasoning.” ...
+
+    “Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the
+    negation is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of
+    which the affirmation is inconceivable, and therefrom proceeds
+    to draw conclusions” ...
+
+    “The first sentence in Kant’s first chapter runs thus: ‘Nothing
+    can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,
+    which can be called good without qualification, except a Good
+    Will.’” ...
+
+    “Most fallacies result from the habit of using words without
+    fully rendering them into thoughts—passing them by with
+    recognitions of their meanings as ordinarily used, without
+    stopping to consider whether these meanings admit of being
+    given to them in the cases named. Let us not rest satisfied
+    with thinking vaguely of what is understood by ‘a Good Will,’
+    but let us interpret the words definitely. Will implies the
+    consciousness of some end to be achieved. Exclude from it every
+    idea of purpose, and the conception of Will disappears. An
+    end of some kind being necessarily implied by the conception
+    of Will, the quality of the Will is determined by the quality
+    of the end contemplated. Will itself, considered apart from
+    any distinguishing epithet, is not cognizable by Morality at
+    all. It becomes cognizable by Morality only when it gains its
+    character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated end as
+    good or bad.” ...
+
+    “Kant tells us that a good will is one that is good in and for
+    itself without reference to ends.”
+
+It is unfortunate that Mr. Spencer misunderstood the first sentence of
+Kant’s book (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_). Kant does not
+speak of “a good will without qualification,” nor does the expression
+“without qualification” refer to “a will without reference to ends.” Kant
+speaks of good will in opposition to other good things. Nothing, he
+says, can without qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_) be called good,
+except a good will.[95] Dr. Porter sums up the first page of Kant’s essay
+in the following words:
+
+    “The first section of the treatise opens with the memorable
+    and often-quoted utterance, that ‘nothing can be possibly
+    conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called
+    good without qualification, except a good will.’ If character
+    is compared with gifts of nature, as intelligence, courage,
+    and gifts of fortune, as riches, health, or contentment, all
+    these are defective, ‘if there is not a good will to correct
+    their possible perversion and to rectify the whole principle of
+    acting, and _adapt it to its end_.’[96] A man who is endowed
+    with every other good can never give pleasure to an impartial,
+    rational spectator unless he possesses a good will. ‘Thus a
+    good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of
+    being worthy of happiness.’ ... ‘Moreover, a good will is good
+    not for what it effects but for what it intends, even when it
+    fails to accomplish its purposes, ... as when the man wills
+    the good of another and is impotent to promote it, or actually
+    effects just the opposite of what he proposes or wills.’”
+
+In the passages quoted by Dr. Porter, Kant speaks of “the _end_ to which
+good will adapts other goods”; and in another passage of the same book,
+Kant directly declares that “it is the _end_ that serves the will as
+the objective ground of its self-determination.” Mr. Spencer must have
+overlooked these sentences. Kant says:
+
+    “The will is conceived as a power of determining itself to
+    action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And
+    such a power can only be met with in rational beings. _Now it
+    is the END that serves the will as the objective ground of its
+    self-determination_, and this end, if fixed by reason alone,
+    must hold equally good for all rational creatures.”
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Mr. Spencer interrupts his essay on the Ethics of Kant by a digression
+on Kant’s conception of time and space. It would lead us too far at
+present if we would follow Mr. Spencer on this ground also. A comparison
+of Spencer’s remarks on the subject with Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”
+will show that Kant’s view of space and time is radically different from
+that view which Mr. Spencer represents as the Kantian conception of time
+and space.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Kant rejects the idea that happiness is the end and purpose of life
+and at the same time he declares that ethics must be based not on the
+pursuit of happiness but on the categorical imperative or more popularly
+expressed on our sense of duty.
+
+Mr. Spencer argues:
+
+    “One of the propositions contained in Kant’s first chapter is
+    that ‘we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself
+    with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness,
+    so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.’” ...
+
+    “That which Kant should have said is that the _exclusive_
+    pursuit of what are distinguished as pleasures and amusements
+    is disappointing.” ...
+
+    “It is not, as Kant says, guidance by ‘a cultivated reason,’
+    which leads to disappointment, but guidance by an uncultivated
+    reason.”
+
+The passage quoted by Mr. Spencer from Kant, reads in its context as
+follows:
+
+    “In the physical constitution of an organized being we take it
+    for granted[97] that no organ for any purpose will be found
+    in it but such as is also the fittest and best adapted for
+    that purpose. If in a being possessing reason and will, the
+    preservation, the prosperity, in a word, the happiness of that
+    being, constituted the actual purpose of nature, nature had
+    certainly adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end,
+    had it made the reason of that being the executive agent of its
+    purposes in this matter. For all actions that it had to perform
+    with this end in view, and the whole rule of its conduct, would
+    have been far more exactly prescribed by _instinct_, and this
+    end would have been far more safely attained by this means than
+    can ever take place through the instrumentality of _reason_.”
+    ...
+
+    “As a matter of fact we find that the more a cultivated
+    reason occupies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and
+    happiness, the farther does the person possessing it recede
+    from the state of true contentment; and hence there arises in
+    the case of many, and pre-eminently in the case of those most
+    experienced in the exercise of reason, if they are only frank
+    enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology or hate of
+    reason; for after weighing every advantage that they derive,
+    I will not say from the invention of all arts facilitating
+    ordinary luxury, but even from the sciences, (which after
+    all are in their eyes a luxury of the intellect,) they still
+    discover that virtually they have burdened themselves more with
+    toil and trouble than they have gained in point of happiness,
+    and thus, in the end, they are more apt to envy than contemn
+    the commoner type of men who are more immediately subject to
+    the guidance of natural instinct alone, and who do not suffer
+    their reason to influence in any great degree their acts and
+    omissions.”
+
+Kant uses the expression “cultivated reason” not in opposition to
+“uncultivated reason,” but to “instinct” as that inherited faculty
+which teaches a being to live in accordance with nature and its natural
+conditions, without the interference of thought and reflection.
+
+That uncultivated reason would lead to disappointment, Kant never would
+have denied. He would have added: “It does more, it leads to a speedy
+ruin.”
+
+But if reason does not produce happiness, what then is the use of reason?
+Kant answers, reason produces in man the good will.
+
+It is reason which enables man to form abstractions, to think in
+generalizations and to conceive the import of universal laws. When his
+will deliberately and consciously conforms to universal laws, it is good.
+Kant says:
+
+    “Thus will (viz. the good will) can not be the sole and whole
+    Good, but it must still be the highest Good and the condition
+    necessary to everything else, even to all desire of happiness.”
+    ...
+
+    “To know what I have to do in order that my volition be good,
+    requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexperienced
+    in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for
+    all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself:
+    Can’st thou so will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become a
+    universal law? Where it can not become a universal law, there
+    the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that, too, not
+    by reason of any disadvantage consequent thereupon to thee or
+    even others, but because it is not fit to enter as a principle
+    into a possible enactment of universal laws.”
+
+If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible
+enactment of universal laws, it will be found in harmony with the
+cosmical laws; if not, it must come in conflict with the order of things
+in the universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persistently adhered
+to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) to certain ruin.
+
+Concerning the proposition that happiness may be regarded as the purpose
+of life Kant in his review of Herder’s “Ideen zur Philosophie der
+Geschichte der Menschheit” (Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the relativity
+of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life:
+
+    ... “First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a
+    child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs
+    of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions
+    of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in
+    exact conformity with the individual’s ideas and the degree
+    of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was
+    born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a
+    comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence
+    to one class of men or to one generation over another....
+    If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim
+    of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own
+    happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps
+    that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheite had never been
+    visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to live
+    in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we
+    could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they
+    should exist at all and whether it would not have been just as
+    well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and
+    cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only
+    through pure enjoyment?”
+
+Concerning the mission or purpose of humanity and its ultimate
+realization, Kant interprets Herder’s views as follows:
+
+    “It involves no contradiction to say that no individual
+    member of all the offspring of the human race, but that
+    only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung).
+    The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The
+    philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole
+    is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of
+    this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a quite
+    useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the
+    design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.”
+
+We learn from the passages quoted from Kant that his idea of good will is
+neither mystical and supernatural, nor is it vague. It is a conception
+as logically and definitely defined as any mathematical definition.
+Good will in the sense in which Kant defines it, is only possible in
+a reasonable being by the power of its reason. The good will is the
+intention of conforming to universal principles and thus of being in
+harmony with the All. This good will is the corner-stone of Kant’s
+ethics; it appears as the categoric imperative of duty, so to act that
+the maxim of one’s conduct may be fit to become a universal law. It is
+formulated in another passage: “Act so as if the maxim of thy conduct by
+thy volition were to become a natural law.”
+
+It is easily seen that, in Kant’s conception, the _ought_ of morals (viz.
+of the categoric imperative) does not stand in contradiction to the
+_must_ of natural laws. Kant’s conception is monistic, not dualistic.
+Kant says:
+
+    “The moral _ought_ is man’s _inner_, _necessary_ volition as
+    being a member of an intelligible world and is _conceived_ by
+    him as an ought only in so far as he considers himself also as
+    a member of the sensory world.”[98]
+
+Our way of explaining it would be: Man _feels_ in his activity the
+categoric imperative as an ought. So the snow crystal, if it were
+possessed of sensation, would _feel_ its formation as an “ought.” But
+both are, and to an outside observer will appear, as a “must.”
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+In the Spencerian system of ethics, which is utilitarianism, the moral
+maxim or the idea of duty is not distinguished from the feeling of
+pleasure or pain that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts, and their
+consequences. This lack of distinction induces Mr. Spencer to consider
+man’s pursuit of happiness as the basis of ethics. Accordingly the
+aim of ethics, he maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the
+realization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the means. The
+end of ethics is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
+
+It is strange that Mr. Spencer’s essay contains a passage which, although
+intended as a point of objection to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant’s
+ethics, and a refutation of Mr. Spencer’s own views. While denying the
+statement that “a cultivated reason, if applied with deliberate purpose
+to the enjoyment of life and happiness, will fail to produce true
+satisfaction,” Mr. Spencer says:
+
+    “I assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal
+    experiences. In the course of my life there have occurred
+    many intervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit
+    of happiness was the sole object, and in which happiness was
+    successfully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the
+    fact that I would gladly live over again each of those periods
+    without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of
+    any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties.”
+
+This statement, if it proves anything, proves that happiness is one thing
+and duty is another; it proves that Kant’s theory of ethics, which is
+based on the discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness, is
+correct, and that Mr. Spencer’s theory which identifies duty with the
+pursuit of happiness, is wrong.
+
+However, we must in this place express our opinion that Mr. Spencer’s
+statement _cannot_ be quite correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant
+though the drudgery part of it may have been, was undoubtedly accompanied
+and followed by a certain satisfaction, which perhaps was less in
+quantity, but certainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from
+the mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation of the intrinsic
+and of the moral worth of pleasures, the quality alone should be taken
+into consideration, not the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical
+hedonism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose pleasures and
+pains are of a higher kind, of a nobler form, and of a better quality, is
+morally and generally the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics
+would be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the quality of pleasure or
+happiness; it would be an aspiration to evolve toward a higher plane of
+life, to shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler, greater,
+and more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says, “unceasing progress.”
+
+Mr. Spencer’s assertion, if taken in the sense in which it stands, is a
+contradiction of his ethical theory. But even if Mr. Spencer had declared
+that the discharge of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction,
+as it truly does, there would still remain a deep gap between his and
+Kant’s ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces ethics to mere worldly prudence; he
+says that we must do the good in order to be happy, and for the sake of
+its utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be in agreement with
+universal law. Mr. Spencer says:
+
+    “But now, supposing we accept Kant’s statement in full, what
+    is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be desired,
+    and, in one way or another, the thing to be achieved.” ...
+
+    “An illustration will best show how the matter stands. To
+    a tyro in archery the instructor says: ‘Sir, you must not
+    point your arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will
+    inevitably miss it; you must aim high above the target, and you
+    may then possibly pierce the bull’s-eye.’ What now is implied
+    by the warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is
+    to hit the target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark
+    that it will be missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in
+    the remark that to be hit, something higher must be aimed at.
+    Similarly with happiness. There is no sense in the remark that
+    happiness will not be found if it is directly sought, unless
+    happiness is a thing to be somehow or other obtained.” ...
+
+    “So that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end,
+    there lies the inavoidable implication that it _is_ the end.”
+
+The pursuit of happiness is by no means repudiated by Kant as wrong or
+immoral; it is only maintained to be insufficient as a foundation of
+ethics. Kant’s remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly
+sought has no reference to his own ethics. Kant, speaking from the
+standpoint of one who takes the view of utilitarianism, says that if a
+cultivated reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life and
+happiness, it will meet with a failure.[99]
+
+Any other explanation of the moral _ought_ than that from the Good Will,
+Kant declares to be _heteronomy_. Will would no longer be itself, and the
+principle of action would lie in something foreign to the will. Kant says:
+
+    “Will in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the
+    object by its relation to the will would impose the law upon
+    the will.... This would admit of hypothetical imperatives
+    only: ‘I ought to do a certain thing, because I want something
+    else.’ The moral and therefore categorical imperative, on the
+    contrary, says: ‘I ought to act so or so, even if I had nothing
+    else in view.’ For instance: the hypothetical imperative
+    of heteronomy says: ‘I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to
+    preserve my honor.’ The categorical imperative says: ‘I ought
+    not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to
+    shame.’”
+
+Mr. Spencer quotes the following passage from Kant:
+
+    “I omit here all actions which are already recognized as
+    inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this
+    or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are
+    done _from duty_ can not arise at all, since they even conflict
+    with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform
+    to duty, but to which men have _no_ direct _inclination_,
+    performing them because they are impelled thereto by some
+    other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish
+    whether the action which agrees with duty is done _from
+    duty_, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this
+    distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject
+    has besides a _direct_ inclination to it. For example, it is
+    always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an
+    inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce
+    the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed
+    price for every one, so that a child buys of him as well as any
+    other. Men are thus _honestly_ served; but this is not enough
+    to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty
+    and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it;
+    it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might
+    besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers, so
+    that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one
+    over another[!]. Accordingly the action was done neither from
+    duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish
+    view.
+
+    “On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one’s life, and,
+    in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do
+    so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men
+    take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no
+    moral import. They preserve their life _as duty requires_, no
+    doubt, but not _because duty requires_. On the other hand,
+    if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away
+    the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind,
+    indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected,
+    wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving
+    it—not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim
+    has a moral worth.
+
+    “To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this,
+    there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that
+    without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find
+    a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight
+    in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work.
+    But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind,
+    however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no
+    true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations.”
+    (pp. 17-19)
+
+Kant’s metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics what pure mathematics
+is to applied mathematics, or what logic is to grammar. Kant’s method of
+reasoning _in abstracto_ everywhere shows the mathematical bent of his
+mind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein, IV), p. 258, he says:
+
+    “As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics
+    and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy
+    (the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied
+    philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature.
+    By this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical
+    principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human
+    nature but that they must be existent by themselves _a
+    priori_,—whence, for human nature, just as well as for _any_
+    rational nature, practical rules can be derived.”
+
+Schleiermacher says:
+
+    “A good is any agreement (“unity”) of definite sides [certain
+    aspects] of reason and nature.... The end of ethical praxis
+    is the highest good, _i. e._, the sum of all unions of nature
+    and reason.... The moral law may be compared to the algebraic
+    formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the course
+    [path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to the
+    curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument
+    arranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to
+    the formula.” (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.)
+
+Kant declares in other passages that in examples taken from practical
+life, it will be difficult to separate clearly and unmistakably the
+sense of duty as the real moral motive from other motives, inclinations,
+habits, etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral value of
+motives is to be considered _in abstracto_. This is necessary for a clear
+conception of the essential features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on
+other occasions highly praised the power of generalization, which indeed
+is fundamentally the same faculty, as thinking _in abstracto_; here,
+however, he does not follow Kant’s argument, but declares “that the
+assumed distinction between sense of duty and inclination is untenable.”
+He says:
+
+    “The very expression _sense_ of duty implies that the mental
+    state signified is a feeling; and if a feeling it must,
+    like other feelings, be gratified by acts of one kind and
+    offended by acts of an opposite kind. If we take the name
+    conscience, which is equivalent to sense of duty, we see the
+    same thing. The common expressions ‘a tender conscience,’ ‘a
+    seared conscience,’ indicate the perception that conscience
+    is a feeling—a feeling which has its satisfactions and
+    dissatisfactions, and which _inclines_ a man to acts which
+    yield the one and avoid the other—produces an _inclination_,”
+    (p. 476).
+
+It is quite true that every state of consciousness is a feeling, but
+we can and must discriminate between consciousness or feeling and the
+idea or thought which becomes conscious, in which the feeling appears,
+and which is, so to speak, the special form of a certain feeling. The
+consciousness and its special form, the feeling and the mental object
+of feeling, are in reality one and the same. Yet they are different and
+must _in abstracto_ be well distinguished. Mr. Spencer’s method is that
+of generalization, but generalizing can lead to no satisfactory results,
+if it is not constantly accompanied by discrimination. We must generalize
+and discriminate.
+
+If a certain group of states of consciousness takes the form of a
+logical syllogism, it must not be expected that logic will find its
+explanation in feeling, although it cannot be denied that all the
+states of consciousness are feelings. Not the feeling in this case is
+to be explained, but logic. In our generalizations we must discriminate
+_in abstracto_ between the feeling and the idea which feels. We must
+positively abstract from feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling
+of logical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant. Mr. Spencer’s method
+of explaining ethics, if applied to logic, would be as follows: “Man’s
+logical sense is a very complex feeling and has developed from simple
+percepts such as can be observed in the lowest animals; percepts are
+a higher evolved form of reactions against irritations such as take
+place in protoplasm. The old method of explaining logic is that of
+deduction, modern logic will be inductive. Formerly pure logic was
+considered as a science _a priori_; but the evolution-philosophy shows
+that logic is developed by steps, it appears _a priori_ to the individual
+now, but it is in reality a consolidated product of multitudinous
+experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self. Logical
+sense accordingly finds its explanation in most simple feelings. Our
+conceptions of logically incorrect feelings will be more and more
+avoided because they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant; logical
+correctness is striven for because of the feeling of satisfaction that
+accompanies the conception of a logically correct conclusion.”
+
+Sense is feeling, there can be no doubt. Logical sense and mathematical
+sense are feelings and if a person thinks a mathematical axiom or a
+logical syllogism or an ethical maxim, he has a feeling. Logical sense
+of reason is the product of evolution, and it cannot be denied either
+that one man has a more logical or mathematical or moral sense than
+another. But it does not follow that an explanation of mathematics, or
+logic, or ethics, must be derived from feeling pleasure and pain, or
+happiness. On the contrary we must abstract from feeling altogether and
+concern ourselves with the object of feeling only, which is the idea
+or the special form in which and as which feeling appears. States of
+consciousness (never mind whether they are painful or pleasurable) must
+be considered as moral if their mental object, _i. e._, the idea, the
+thought, the motive, the form in which feeling becomes manifest, is in
+harmony with the universal order of things.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Mr. Spencer declares that the world would be intolerable “if Kant’s
+conception of moral worth were displayed universally in men’s acts.”
+And it must be acknowledged that Kant’s ethics in their logical and
+irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the literary world of his time
+with the grandeur and sublimity of ethics; Kant’s ethics also astounded,
+and overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer appeared to be the
+fervid enthusiasm of sentiments; it congealed into the cold idea of duty
+which can be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the correctly
+calculated gear of a machine. Objections have been raised by some of
+Kant’s own disciples; but it must be known that the Kantian view of
+ethics does not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it excludes
+them only from an estimation of the moral worth of actions. Kant gave the
+_coup de grace_ to all sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical
+questions too long. Mr. Spencer says:
+
+    “If those acts only have moral worth which are done from a
+    sense of duty ... we must say that a man’s moral worth is
+    greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of duty
+    is such that he does the right thing not only apart from
+    inclination but against inclination. According to Kant,
+    then, the most moral man is the man ... who says of another
+    that which is true though he would like to injure him by a
+    falsehood; who lends money to his brother though he would
+    prefer to see him in distress.”
+
+Schiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in his Xenions a similar
+objection to this corollary of the ethics of pure reason. He says:
+
+    “Willingly serve I my friends; but ’tis pity, I do it with pleasure.
+      And I am really vexed, that there’s no virtue in me!”
+
+And he answers in a second distich:
+
+    “There is no other advice than that you try to despise friends,
+      And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands.”
+
+The difficulty is removed under the following consideration: A man with
+good inclinations is less exposed to temptation than a man with bad
+inclinations. If both act morally under conditions otherwise the same,
+the latter has shown greater strength of moral purpose than the former.
+The former’s character (viz., his inherited inclinations and habits which
+represent the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,) is more
+moral than that of the latter. But the latter deserves more credit than
+the former for overcoming the temptation; he has in this special act
+shown more moral strength of will than his more fortunate and morally
+higher advanced fellow-man. To those who have accepted the Kantian view,
+Mr. Spencer’s and Schiller’s objection can serve as a warning, not to
+lose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a reasonable being, he
+is at the same time a feeling creature. The instinctive faculties of man,
+the so-called subconscious states, are the basis of his consciousness.
+They form the roots of his soul from which spring the clear conceptions
+of his reason. The more man’s habits and inclinations agree with morals,
+the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical advancement and
+moral progress.
+
+Similar objections have also been made to Kant’s mechanical explanation
+of the origin of the planetary systems and milky ways. It seemed as if
+the divinity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of gravity. In his
+poem “The God’s of Greece,” Schiller complains:
+
+    “Fühllos selbst für ihres Künstlers Ehre,
+      Gleich dem todten Schlag der Pendeluhr,
+    Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere,
+      Die entgötterte Natur.”
+
+    “Dead even to her Master’s praise,
+      Like lifeless pendulum’s vibration,
+    Lo, godless Nature now obeys,
+      Slave-like, the law of gravitation.”[100]
+
+Such objections are always raised when a scientific explanation destroys
+the mystic view that a spirit or at least something unexplainable is
+the supposed cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so closely
+connected and intimately interwoven with our errors that truth appears
+hostile to sentiment, and it becomes difficult to part with errors
+sanctified by emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear thought
+is an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism is the only possible poetry
+to the taste of the sentimental.
+
+Now it cannot be denied that a one-sided knowledge not only appears
+rigid, it truly _is_ so, and will be destructive of such emotions as
+reverence, awe, æsthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most
+essential feature of science and philosophy, and how negative, how
+desolate and melancholy appear the results of criticism! But the pruning
+process of criticism is very wholesome, and true science will only profit
+by discarding the vagueness of indistinct conceptions. Alpine lakes that
+are really deep can only gain by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine
+science and broad philosophy will only show the depth of truth into which
+by all its lucidity our emotions can plunge without ever finding it
+shallow or fathoming it in all its profundity.
+
+Kant’s doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand the severest test.
+
+Ethics, in the sense of the word as used by Kant, can be found in
+man only, in so far as he is a reasonable being. A truly reasonable
+being does not allow himself to be guided by impulses but is led by
+maxims. Inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct. Not he who
+in instinctive good-naturedness acts morally, is the ethical man, but
+he who deliberately and consciously considers himself a representative
+of the general order of things. The man, who adopts such maxims as can
+become universal principles, identifies his will with the laws of the
+universe. Man’s moral dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in
+instinctive inspirations; it is based upon his reason and is developed in
+so far only as he makes use of his reason.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[87] Quotations from Mr. Spencer’s essay will be distinguished
+by quotation-marks, while those from Kant will appear in hanging
+indentations.
+
+[88] Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: 1) the mathematical, and
+2) the dynamical. His definitions are: 1) sublime is that in comparison
+with which everything else is small; and 2) sublime is that the mere
+ability to conceive which shows a power of emotion (Gemüth), the latter
+transcending any measurement by the senses. [1) Erhaben ist, mit welchem
+im Vergleich alles andere klein ist. 2) Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken
+zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüths beweist, das jeden Maasstab der Sinne
+übertrifft. Editio Hartenstein, Vol. V, pp. 257, 258.]
+
+[89] The stellar Universe, of course, has not been evolved; Mr. Spencer
+means that according to Kant’s mechanical explanation the planetary
+systems and milky ways of the stellar Universe are in a state of constant
+evolution.
+
+[90] Translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, pp. 244, 249.
+
+[91] Compare also Kant’s “Prol. zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik,” § 46.
+
+[92] We call attention to Kant’s peculiar expression, in this passage, of
+_Auswickelung_ which has now yielded to the term _Entwickelung_.
+
+[93] Die in der Natur eines organischen Körpers (Gewächses oder Thieres)
+liegenden Gründe einer bestimmten Auswickelung heissen, wenn diese
+Auswickelung besondere Theile betrifft, _Keime_; betrifft sie aber nur
+die Grösse oder das Verhältniss der Theile unter einander, so nenne ich
+sie _natürliche Anlagen_.
+
+[94] Wir nehmen die Benennungen _Naturbeschreibung_ und _Naturgeschichte_
+gemeiniglich in einerlei Sinne. Allein es ist klar, dass die Kenntniss
+der Naturdinge, wie sie _jetzt sind_, immer noch die Erkenntniss von
+demjenigen wünschen lasse, was sie ehedem _gewesen_ sind und durch
+welche Reihe von Veränderungen sie durchgegangen, um an jedem Ort
+in ihren gegenwärtigen Zustand zu gelangen. Die _Naturgeschichte_,
+woran es uns noch fast gänzlich fehlt, würde uns die Veränderung der
+Erdgestalt, imgleichen die der Erdgeschöpfe (Pflanzen und Thiere), die
+sie durch natürliche Wanderungen (sic! I take it as a misprint for
+_Wandelungen_) erlitten haben, und ihre daraus entsprungenen Abartungen
+von dem Urbilde der Stammgattung lehren. Sie würde vermuthlich eine
+grosse Menge scheinbar verschiedener Arten zu Racen ebenderselben
+Gattung zurückführen, und das jetzt so weitläuftigte Schulsystem der
+Naturbeschreibung in ein physisches System für den Verstand verwandeln.
+
+[95] The original of the first sentence reads: “Es ist überall nichts in
+der Welt, ja überhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne
+Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille.”
+
+[96] _Italics are ours._
+
+[97] The phrase “we take it for granted” (in the original “nehmen wir es
+als Grundsatz an)” reads in the translation quoted by Mr. Spencer: “we
+take it as a fundamental principle.” Mr. Spencer objects to the passage
+declaring that there _are_ many organs (such as rudimentary organs) in
+the construction of organized beings which serve _no_ purpose. This
+however does not stand in contradiction to Kant’s assumption that organs
+of organized beings serve a special purpose. The rudimentary organs have
+under other conditions served a purpose for which they then were fit and
+well adapted and are disappearing now because no longer used.
+
+[98] Das moralische Sollen ist also ein eigenes nothwendiges Wollen als
+Gliedes einer intelligiblen Welt, und wird nur sofern von ihm als Sollen
+gedacht, als er sich zugleich wie ein Glied der Sinnenwelt betrachtet.
+Ed. Hartenstein vol. IV. p. 303.
+
+[99] The passage referred to is quoted in full on page 16.
+
+[100] Slightly altered from B. W. BALL’S translation in THE OPEN COURT,
+p. 83.
+
+
+
+
+KANT ON EVOLUTION.
+
+IN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER’S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM.
+
+
+It is very strange that Mr. Herbert Spencer will again and again attack
+the philosophy and ethics of Kant for views which Kant never held.[101]
+It is possible that there are disciples of Kant who deny the theory of
+evolution. Yet it is certain that Kant himself is not guilty of this
+mistake. Thinkers who reject the theory of evolution are in this respect
+as little entitled to call themselves disciples of Kant as, for instance,
+the Sadducees were to call themselves followers of Christ. Kantian
+philosophy was foremost in the recognition of the need of evolution, and
+that at a time when public interest was not as yet centered upon it.
+
+Mr. Spencer’s merits in the propagation of the theory of evolution are
+undeniable, and he deserves our warmest respect and thanks for the
+indefatigable zeal he has shown in the performance of this great work,
+for the labors he has undergone, and the sacrifices he has made for it.
+Yet recognising all that Mr. Spencer has done, we should not be blind to
+the fact that Kant’s conception of evolution is even at the present day
+more in conformity with the facts of natural science than Mr. Spencer’s
+philosophy, although the latter commonly goes by the name of the
+philosophy of evolution.
+
+It is painful to note that in many places where Mr. Spencer refers to
+Kant’s philosophy, he does it slightingly, as though Kant were one of the
+most irrational of thinkers. Kant’s reasoning is denounced as “abnormal”
+and “vicious.” I find such phrases as, “It is a vice of Kant’s
+philosophy ...,” “If Kant had known more of Man than he did ...,” etc.
+Mr. Spencer characterises Kant’s method as follows:
+
+    “Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the
+    negative is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of
+    which the affirmation is inconceivable, and proceeds to draw
+    conclusions therefrom.”
+
+These attacks of Mr. Spencer on Kant are not justifiable. Kant is not
+guilty of the faults for which he is arraigned by Mr. Spencer.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It is, however, fair to state that these misunderstandings appear
+excusable if the difficulties are borne in mind with which the English
+student of Kant is confronted. First, Kant cannot be understood without
+taking into consideration the historical development of his philosophy,
+and, secondly, most translations of the fundamental terms, he employs,
+are so misleading that errors can scarcely be avoided.
+
+Kant’s philosophy is by no means a perfected system; it rather represents
+(as perhaps necessarily all philosophies do) the development of a
+thinker’s mind. The “Critique of Pure Reason” especially shows traces
+of the state of Kant’s mind at different periods, and thus it is that
+we discover passages which closely considered will be found to be
+contradictory. When reading this remarkable work we feel like travelers
+walking over the petrified relics of a powerful eruption. There are
+strata of ideas of the oldest formation close to the thoughts of a recent
+date. There are also vestiges of intermediate phases. Here they stand
+in the petrification of printed words, peacefully side by side, as
+memorials of a great revolution in the development of human thought. It
+is this state of things which more than anything else makes of Kant’s
+writings such difficult reading. At the same time it is obvious that we
+cannot simply take the results of Kant’s philosophy; we must follow him
+in the paths by which he arrived at any given proposition.
+
+There is no philosopher that has been worse misinterpreted than Kant;
+and the English interpreters of Kant have succeeded in mutilating his
+best thoughts so that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of
+antiquated views. Mistranslations or misconceptions of his terms are
+to a great extent the cause of this singular fate. As an instance we
+mention the errors that attach to Kant’s term _Anschauung_. _Anschauung_
+is the present object of our senses; it is the impression a man has
+from looking at a thing and might have been translated by “perception”
+or perhaps “sensation.” It is usually translated by “intuition.” The
+_Anschauung_ of objects comprises the data of knowledge, and they are
+previous to our reflection upon them. An intuition in the sense of the
+English Intuitionalists is defined as “a presentation which can be
+given previously to all thought,” yet this presentation is supposed
+to be a kind of revelation, a knowledge that comes to us without our
+contemplation, a cognition the character of which is immediate as well as
+mysterious; in short something that is supernatural.
+
+How different is Kant’s philosophy, for instance, if his position
+with reference to time and space is mistaken! “Time and Space are our
+_Anschauung_,” Kant says. But his English translators declare: “Kant
+maintained that space and time are intuitions.” What a difference it
+makes if intuition is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the
+English Intuitionalist School instead of its being taken in the original
+meaning of the word _Anschauung_.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Any one who knows Kant through Mr. Spencer’s representations only, must
+look upon him as having the most perverse mind that could possibly
+exist; and yet it is Kant from whom Spencer has indirectly derived the
+most characteristic feature of his philosophy. What is Mr. Spencer’s
+agnosticism but a popularisation of Kant’s view that things in themselves
+are unknowable?
+
+We conclude from the animosity which Mr. Spencer shows toward Kant that
+he does not know how much in this respect he agrees with Kant, how much
+he has unconsciously imbibed from the _Zeitgeist_ which in part was
+formed under the influence of this huge error of the great philosopher.
+
+I feel confident that any clear thinker who studies Kant and arrives
+along with him at the “thing in itself” will soon free himself from this
+error of Kantian thought. Kant himself suggests to us the method by which
+we are to find the way out of agnosticism. As a proof I quote the views
+of two independent thinkers; both influenced by Kant’s criticism but
+neither a blind follower. Professor Mach says:
+
+    “I have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early
+    in my life, at about the age of fifteen, I happened to find
+    in the library of my father Kant’s ‘Prolegomena to Any
+    Future Metaphysic.’ The book made at that time a powerful,
+    ineffaceable impression upon me that I never afterwards
+    experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical
+    reading. Some two or three years later I suddenly discovered
+    the superfluous rôle that ‘the thing in itself’ plays.” _The
+    Monist_, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65 and 66.
+
+And Schiller guided by similar considerations says in one of his Xenions:
+
+    “Since Metaphysics, of late, without heirs to her fathers was gathered:
+    Under the hammer are now ‘things in themselves’ to be sold.”
+
+The latest attack of Mr. Spencer upon Kantism is in the article “Our
+Space-Consciousness,” in _Mind_, written in reply to Professor Watson.
+Mr. Spencer there repeats his misconception of Kantism, so that I feel
+urged to utter a few words of protest against his gross misrepresentation
+of Kant’s views. I shall confine myself mainly to quotations from Kant’s
+works—and the passages quoted will speak for themselves. Should there
+indeed be any disciples of Kant who are, as Mr. Spencer says, “profoundly
+averse to that evolutionary view which contemplates mind as having had a
+genesis conforming to laws like those conformed to by the genesis of the
+body,” these quotations will suffice to prove that they have misconstrued
+the views of their master. Philosophers hostile to the theory of
+evolution had better select another patron for their ideas. Kant is too
+radical a mind to protect those men who in the domains of thought give
+the signal for retreat.
+
+Mr. Spencer adopted the evolution theory as it was presented by Von Baer,
+who explains “_Entwickelung_” as a progress from the homogeneous to the
+heterogeneous.
+
+Baer’s “Developmental History of Animals” was published in 1828. Mr.
+Spencer adopted the theory in 1854. But the history of the theory of
+evolution is older than Von Baer’s book. Professor Baer concludes
+his work with a few corollaries among which near the end we find the
+following passage:
+
+    “If we survey the contents of the whole Scholia, there
+    follows from them a general result. We found that the effect
+    of generation continues to advance from a part to a whole
+    [Schol. 2.]; that in development, self-dependence increases
+    in correspondence with its environment [Schol. 2.], as well as
+    the determinateness of its structure [Schol. 1.]; that in the
+    internal development special parts shape themselves forth from
+    the more general, and their differentiation increases [Schol.
+    3.]; that the individual, as the possessor of a fixed organic
+    form, changes by degrees from more general forms into more
+    special [Schol. 5.].
+
+    “The general result of our inquiry and consideration can now
+    well be declared as follows:
+
+        “That the developmental history of the individual is the
+        history of increasing individuality in every relation; that
+        is, Individualisation.
+
+    “This general conclusion is, indeed, so plain, that it needs
+    no proof from observation, but seems evident _a priori_. But
+    we believe that this evidentness is merely the stamp of truth,
+    and therefore is its guarantee. Had the history of development
+    from the outset been perceived as just expressed, it could and
+    should have been inferred, that the individual of a determinate
+    animal type attains to this by changing from a general into
+    a special form. But experience teaches everywhere, that
+    deductions are always safer if their results are discovered
+    beforehand by observation. Mankind would have obtained a still
+    greater intellectual possession than it really has, had this
+    been otherwise.
+
+    “But if this general conclusion has truth and contents, it is
+    _one fundamental idea_ which runs through all forms and degrees
+    of animal development, and governs every single relation. It is
+    the same idea that collected in space the distributed particles
+    into spheres and united them in solar systems; which caused the
+    disintegrated dust on the surface of our metallic planet to
+    grow up into living forms; but this idea is nothing else than
+    life itself, and the words and syllables in which it expresses
+    itself, are the different forms of life.”
+
+These corollaries were not inserted by Baer because he intended to
+proclaim a new truth, but simply to excite a popular interest in a
+strictly scientific work, in order to extend the circle of its readers.
+Baer says in the preface:
+
+    “So much about the first part. In order to procure for the
+    work readers and buyers, I have added a second part in which
+    I make some general remarks under the title of Scholia and
+    Corollaries. They are intended to be sketches of the confession
+    of my scientific faith concerning the development of animals,
+    as it was formed from the observation of the chick and by other
+    investigations.”
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The “Encyclopædia Britannica” says of Baer that he “prepared the way for
+Mr. Spencer’s generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law
+of all evolution.”[102]
+
+Baer declares that individualisation is “the one fundamental idea that
+goes through _all_ the forms of cosmic and animal development.” The
+generality of the law of evolution is clearer in the language employed
+by Baer, in the full context of the Scholia than appears from the short
+statement of the “Encyclopædia Britannica.” Nevertheless it is clear
+enough in the quoted passage that Baer made a statement of universal
+application. How can such a universal statement be made more general?
+
+We must add here that Mr. Spencer and his disciples overvalue the
+importance of generalisation. It is not the power of generalisation that
+makes the philosopher and the scientist but the power of discrimination.
+The habit of generalising whatever comes under our observation is very
+common among the uneducated and uncivilised, and almost nine tenths of
+human errors arise from unwarranted generalisations.
+
+In Kant’s time the interest in the theory of evolution was confined to a
+few minds. It is well known that Goethe was one of its most enthusiastic
+supporters.[103] In the middle of the eighteenth century there were
+three views proposed to explain the origin and the development of
+organised beings: (1) Occasionalism, (2) the theory of Evolution, and
+(3) the theory of Epigenesis. Occasionalism maintained that God created
+on each new occasion a new animal. The word evolution was used in a
+different sense from that in which it is now understood: evolutionism, as
+maintained by Bonnet, Haller, and others, was the view that the sperma
+contained a very small specimen of the animal that was to grow from it.
+The hen’s egg was supposed to contain an excessively minute but complete
+chicken. The theory of epigenesis, however, propounded in 1759 by Caspar
+Friedrich Wolff in his “Theoria Generationis,” explained development
+by additional growth, and it is this theory of epigenesis which later
+on, after the total defeat of the old evolutionism, was called (but
+improperly) the evolution theory. The word “evolution” has thus again
+admitted the erroneous idea of an unfolding.
+
+In Kant’s time the battle between the occasionalists, the evolutionists,
+and the adherents of the epigenesis theory was hot indeed; and Kant
+unquestionably gave preference to the epigenesis theory. The most
+important passage on the subject appears in his “Critique of Judgment.”
+It is as follows:
+
+    “If now the teleological principle of the generation of
+    organised beings be accepted, as it would be, we can account
+    for their internally adapted form either by _Occasionalism_
+    or by _Prestabilism_.[104] According to the first, the
+    supreme world-cause would, in agreement with its idea, on the
+    occasion of every coition directly give the proper organic
+    form to the material thereby blended; according to the second,
+    it would have implanted into the original products of its
+    designing wisdom merely the power by means of which an organic
+    being produces its like and the species itself is constantly
+    maintained and likewise the death of individuals is continually
+    replaced by their own nature, which is operating at the same
+    time for their destruction.
+
+    “If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised
+    beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded, and with it the use
+    of reasoning in determining the possibility of such kinds of
+    products; therefore, it cannot be supposed that this system is
+    accepted by any one who has had to do with philosophy.”
+
+    “As to _Prestabilism_, it can proceed in a two-fold manner,
+    namely, it considers every organic being produced by its like,
+    either as the _educt_ or as the _product_ of the first. The
+    system which considers generated beings as mere _educts_ is
+    called that of _individual preformation_, or also the _theory
+    of evolution_; that which makes generated beings _products_ is
+    named the system of _epigenesis_. The latter can also be called
+    a system of _generic preformation_, because the productive
+    power of those generating was virtually preformed to agree with
+    the internal adapted arrangements that fell to the lot of their
+    race. The opposing theory to this view should be named that
+    of individual preformation, or still better, the _theory of
+    evolution_.”
+
+    “The defenders of the theory of evolution, who exempt each
+    individual from the formative power of nature, in order to
+    derive the same directly from the hand of the Creator, would
+    not dare to permit this to happen in accordance with the
+    hypothesis of occasionalism, so that coition would be a mere
+    formality, a supreme national world-cause having decided to
+    form every particular fœtus by direct interference, and to
+    resign to the mother only its development and nourishment.
+    They declared themselves in favor of preformation, _as though
+    it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a
+    supernatural manner at the beginning of the world, as during
+    its progress_; and as if a great multitude of supernatural
+    arrangements would not rather be dispensed with through
+    occasional creation which were necessary in order that the
+    embryo formed at the beginning of the world should, throughout
+    the long period up to its development, not suffer from the
+    destructive forces of nature, but endure and maintain itself
+    intact; moreover, an immensely greater number of such preformed
+    beings would be made than ever would be developed, and with
+    them as many creations be thus rendered unnecessary and
+    purposeless. They still, however, resign at least something to
+    nature, in order not to fall in with complete hyperphysics,
+    which can dispense with explanation from nature. They still
+    held fast indeed, to their hyperphysics; even finding in
+    monsters (which it must be impossible to regard as designs
+    of nature) cases of adaptation which call for admiration,
+    although the only purpose of that adaptedness might be to make
+    an anatomist take offence at it as a purposeless adaptedness,
+    and have a sense of melancholy admiration. Yet they could
+    not well fit the generation of hybrids into the system of
+    preformation, but were obliged still further to endow the sperm
+    of male creatures with a designedly acting power, whereas they
+    had otherwise accorded it nothing except mechanical force to
+    serve as the first means of nourishment of the embryo; yet
+    this designedly acting force, in the case of the products of
+    generation between two creatures of the same kind, they would
+    grant to neither of them.
+
+    “If on the contrary the great advantage was not at once
+    recognised which the theory of epigenesis possessed over the
+    former in view of the experimental foundation on which the
+    proof of it rested; yet reason would be especially favorably
+    predisposed from the outset for this mode, of explanation,
+    inasmuch as it regards nature—with reference to the things
+    which originally can be conceived as possible only in
+    accordance with the theory of causality and design, at least
+    so far as propagation is concerned—as self-producing and
+    not merely as developing, and thus with the least possible
+    employment of the supernatural, leaves all that comes
+    afterwards, from the very beginning on, to nature: without
+    concerning itself with the original beginning, with regard to
+    the explanation of which physics in general miscarries, try
+    with what chain of causes it may.”
+
+Kant recognises neither the stability of species nor any fixed limits
+between them. And this one maxim alone suffices to prove that he was
+of the same opinion as the great biologist who wrote the “Origin of
+Species.” Kant says (Ed. Hart. III. p. 444):
+
+    “_Non datur vacuum formarum_, that is, there are not different
+    original and primitive species, which were, so to say, isolated
+    and separated by an empty space from one another, but all the
+    manifold species are only divisions of a single, chief, and
+    general species; and from this principle results again this
+    immediate inference: _datur continuum formarum_, that is, all
+    differences of species border on each other, and allow no
+    transition to one another by a leap, but only through very
+    small degrees of difference, by which we can arrive at one
+    from another; in one word, there are no species or sub-species
+    which, according to reason, would be _next_ each other in
+    affinity, but intermediate species are always possible, whose
+    difference from the first and second is less than their
+    difference from one another.”
+
+In Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” (§. 80) we find the following passage:
+
+    “The agreement of so many species of animals, with reference
+    to a definite, common scheme, which appears not only to be
+    at the foundation of their bony structure, but also of the
+    arrangement of their other parts, in which, by abridgment of
+    one and prolongation of another, by envelopment of this and
+    unfolding of that, a wonderful simplicity of plan has been able
+    to produce so great a diversity of species—this agreement casts
+    a ray of hope, although a weak one, in the mind, that here,
+    indeed, something might be accomplished with the principle of
+    the mechanism of nature, without which in general there can be
+    no physical science.
+
+    “This analogy of forms, so far as they appear, notwithstanding
+    all their diversity, to be produced after the model of a common
+    prototype, strengthens the conjecture of a real relationship
+    between the same by generation from a common ancestral
+    source, through the gradual approach of one animal species to
+    another, from man, in whom the principle of design appears
+    to be best proved, to the polyp, from this to the moss and
+    lichen, and finally to the lowest stage of nature perceptible
+    to us, to crude matter, from which and its forces, according
+    to mechanical laws (like those which work in the production
+    of crystals), the whole technic of nature (which is so
+    incomprehensible to us in organised beings that we imagine
+    another principle is necessitated for their explanation)
+    appears to be derived.[105]
+
+    “The Archæologist of nature is now free to make that great
+    family of beings (for such we must conceive it, if the
+    uninterrupted relationship is to have a foundation) arise out
+    of the extant vestiges of the oldest revolutions, following
+    every mechanism known to him or which he can suppose.”
+
+Kant adds in a foot-note:
+
+    “An hypothesis of such a kind can be named a daring venture of
+    reason, and there may be few of the most sagacious naturalists,
+    through whose minds it has not sometimes passed. For it is not
+    absurd, as the _generatio equivoca_, by which is understood
+    the production of an organised being through the mechanical
+    action of crude unorganised matter. But it would still be
+    _generatio univoca_ in the common understanding of the word,
+    in so far only as something organic was produced out of
+    another organic body, although specifically distinguished
+    from it; for instance, if certain aquatic animals by and by
+    formed into amphibia, and from these after some generations
+    into land animals. _A priori_ this does not contradict the
+    judgment of pure reason. Only experience shows no example
+    thereof; according to it, rather, all generation which we know
+    is _generatio homonyma_ (not mere _univoca_ in opposition to
+    production out of unorganised material), that is, the bringing
+    forth of a product homogeneous in organisation, with the
+    generator; and _generatio heteronyma_, so far as our actual
+    experience of nature goes is nowhere met with.”
+
+The treatise “Presumable Origin of Humanity,” Kant sums up in the
+following sentence:
+
+    “From this representation of the earliest human history it
+    results, that the departure of man from what, as the first
+    abode of his kind, his judgment represented as Paradise, was
+    no other than the transition of mere animal creatures out of
+    barbarism into man, out of the leading-strings of instinct into
+    the guidance of reason, in a word, out of the guardianship of
+    nature into the state of freedom.”
+
+In his work “Upon the Different Races of Mankind,” Kant discusses the
+origin of the species of man in a way which would do honor to a follower
+of Darwin. It is written in a spirit which recognises the difference of
+conditions as the causes that produce different species. We select a few
+passages from this work.
+
+In a foot-note we read:
+
+    “Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science
+    (_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the
+    same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural
+    phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired
+    the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now, and
+    through what succession of modifications they have passed in
+    order to have arrived, in every respect, at their present
+    state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely
+    lack, would teach us the changes that have effected the form
+    of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the
+    earth (plants and animals) that they have suffered by natural
+    transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the
+    prototype of the original species that they have experienced.
+    It would probably trace a great number of apparently different
+    varieties back to a species of one and the same kind, and would
+    convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural
+    Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.”
+
+We adduce another passage, no less remarkable in clearness, which proves
+that Kant has a very definite idea, not only of the gradual evolution of
+man, but also of the survival of the fittest:
+
+    “The cry which a child scarcely born utters, has not the tone
+    of misery, but of irritation, and violent rage; not the result
+    of pain, but of vexation about something; probably for the
+    reason that it wishes to move itself and feels its incapacity,
+    like a captive when freedom is taken from him. What purpose
+    can nature have in providing that a child shall come with a
+    loud cry into the world, which for it and the mother is, in the
+    _rude natural state_, full of danger? Since a wolf, a pig even,
+    would in the absence of the mother, or through her feebleness
+    owing to her delivery, be thus attracted to devour it. But
+    no animal except man as he now is announces with noise its
+    new-born existence; which in the wisdom of nature appears to
+    be arranged _in order that the species shall be preserved_. We
+    must also assume that in what was an early epoch of nature for
+    this class of animals (namely in the period of barbarism) this
+    outcry of the child at its birth did not exist; consequently
+    only later on a second epoch appeared, after both parents had
+    arrived at that degree of civilisation which was required for
+    home-life; yet without knowing how and by what interweaving
+    causes nature arranges such a development. This remark leads us
+    far; for example, to the thought whether after the same epoch,
+    still a third did not follow accompanied by great natural
+    revolutions, during which an orang-outang or a chimpanzee
+    perfected the organs which serve for walking, for feeling
+    objects, and for speech, and thus evolved the limb-structure of
+    man; in which animals was contained an organ for the exercise
+    of the function of reason, which by social cultivation was
+    gradually perfected and developed.”
+
+Kant’s view concerning the origin of the biped man from quadruped animal
+ancestors is most unequivocally stated.
+
+In a review of Dr. Moscati’s Lecture upon the difference of structure in
+animals and in men, Kant says:
+
+    “Dr. Moscati proves that the upright walk of man is constrained
+    and unnatural; that he is indeed so constructed that he may
+    be able to maintain and move in this position, but that,
+    although by needful and constant habit he formed himself thus,
+    inconvenience and disease arise therefrom, which sufficiently
+    prove, that he was misled by reason and imitation to deviate
+    from the first animal arrangement. Man is not constructed
+    internally different from other animals that go on all fours.
+    When now he raises himself his intestines, particularly
+    the embryo of pregnant individuals, come into a pendulous
+    situation and a half reversed condition, which, if it often
+    alternates with the lying position or that on all-fours, cannot
+    precisely produce specially evil consequences, but, by constant
+    continuance, causes deformities and numerous diseases. Thus,
+    for example, the heart, because it is compelled to hang free,
+    elongates the blood vessels to which it is attached, assumes
+    an oblique position since it is supported by the diaphragm and
+    slides with its end against the left side—a position wherein
+    man, especially at full growth, differs from all other animals,
+    and thereby receives an inevitable inclination to aneurism,
+    palpitation, asthma, chest-dropsy, etc., etc. With the upright
+    position of man the mesentery, pulled down by the weight of the
+    intestines, sinks perpendicularly thereunder, is elongated and
+    weakened, and prepared for numerous ruptures. In the mesenteric
+    vein which has no valves, the blood moves slowly and with
+    greater difficulty (it having to ascend against the course of
+    gravity) than would happen with the horizontal position of the
+    trunk....”
+
+    “We could add considerably to the reasons just adduced to
+    show that our animal nature is really quadrupedal. Among all
+    four-footed animals there is not a single one that could not
+    swim if it accidentally fell into the water. Man alone drowns,
+    except in cases where he has learned to swim. The reason is
+    because he has laid aside the habit of going on all-fours; for
+    it is by this motion that he would keep himself up in the water
+    without the exercise of any art, and by which all four-footed
+    creatures, who otherwise shun the water, swim....”
+
+    “It will be seen, accordingly, that the first care of nature
+    was that man should be preserved as animal for _himself and
+    his species_, and for that end the position best adapted to
+    his internal structure, to the lay of the fœtus, and to his
+    preservation in danger, was the quadrupedal position; we see,
+    moreover, that a germ of reason is placed in him, whereby,
+    after the development of the same, he is destined for _social
+    intercourse_, and by the aid of which he assumes the position
+    which is in every case the most fitted for this, namely, the
+    bipedal position,—thus gaining upon the one hand infinite
+    advantages over animals, but also being obliged to put up with
+    many inconveniences that result from his holding his head so
+    proudly above his old companions.”
+
+[[106] In the double-leaded quotation on pages 43 and 44 Kant speaks
+about the explanation of organised life from man down to the polyp
+“according to mechanical laws like those which work in the production
+of crystals,” and he adds, in organised beings the whole technic of
+nature is so incomprehensible to us “that we imagine another principle is
+necessitated for their explanation.”
+
+This “other principle” would be the principle of design, or the
+teleological explanation of phenomena. In his old age Kant inclined more
+to teleology than in his younger years, and it is for this reason that
+Professor Ernst Haeckel accuses Kant of inconsistency.
+
+After having pointed out that “Kant is one of the few philosophers
+that combine a well-founded knowledge of the natural sciences with
+extraordinary precision and depth of speculation” and further that “he
+was the first who taught ‘the principle of the struggle for existence’
+and ‘the theory of selection.’” Haeckel says in his “Natürliche
+Schöpfungsgeschichte,” 8th edition, p. 91:
+
+    “Wir würden daher unbedingt in der Geschichte der
+    Entwickelungslehre unserem gewaltigen Königsberger Philosophen
+    den ersten Platz einräumen müssen, wenn nicht leider diese
+    bewundernswürdigen monistischen Ideen des jungen Kant später
+    durch den überwältigenden Einfluss der dualistisch christlichen
+    Weltanschauung ganz zurückgedrängt worden wären.”
+
+This “influence of the dualistic Christian world-conception” is according
+to Haeckel, Kant’s recognition of a teleological causation in the realm
+of organised life. Haeckel says on the same place:
+
+    “Er behauptet, dass sich im Gebiete der anorganischen Natur
+    unbedingt sämmtliche Erscheinungen aus mechanischen Ursachen,
+    aus bewegenden Kräften der Materie selbst, erklären lassen, im
+    Gebiete der anorganischen Natur dagegen nicht.”
+
+Haeckel does not stand alone in denouncing the old Kant. Schopenhauer
+distinguishes between the author of the first and the author of the
+second edition of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” regarding the former
+only as the real Kant. These accusations are not without foundation, but
+we believe with Max Müller that they have been unduly exaggerated.
+
+As to teleology for which Kant’s preference appears to be more strongly
+marked in his later than in his younger years we should say that it is
+a problem that should, in an historical investigation, as to whether or
+not Kant was a consistent evolutionist, be treated independently. No one
+can deny that there is an adaptation to ends in the domain of organised
+life. It is not so much required to deny teleology in the domain of
+organised nature as to purify and critically sift our views of teleology.
+There is a kind of teleology which does not stand in contradiction to the
+causation of efficient causes so called.
+
+Mr. Spencer’s denunciations of Kant would have some foundation, if he had
+reference to the old Kant alone. But everyone who censures Kant for the
+errors of his later period is bound to qualify his statement, and indeed
+whenever such strictures of Kantism appear I find them expressly stated
+as having reference to “the old Kant.”
+
+That Kant who is a living power even to-day is the young Kant, it is
+the author of the first edition of the “Critique of Pure Reason.” He is
+generally called “the young Kant,” although he was not young; he was,
+as we say, in his best years. The old Kant who proclaimed that he “must
+abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith” is a dead weight
+in our colleges and universities. The young Kant is positive, the old
+Kant is agnostic. The young Kant was an investigator and naturalist of
+the first degree; he gave an impetus to investigation that it had never
+before received from philosophy. The old Kant, I should not exactly say
+reverted but certainly, neglected the principles of his younger years
+and thus became the leader of a reactionary movement from which sprang
+two offshoots very unlike each other but children of the same father;
+the Oxford transcendentalism as represented by Green and the English
+agnosticism as represented by Mr. Spencer.
+
+It is strange that Mr. Spencer has so little knowledge concerning the
+evolution of the views he holds. If he were more familiar with the
+history of the idea “that the world-problem is insolvable,” he would show
+more reverence toward the old Kant and his mystical inclinations; for
+Kant, whatever Mr. Spencer may say against it, is the father of modern
+agnosticism.[107]]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The history of Mr. Spencer’s philosophical development shows that the
+first idea which took possession of his mind and formed the centre of
+crystalisation for all his later views was M. Condorcet’s optimism.
+Condorcet believed in progress; he was convinced that in spite of all the
+tribulations and anxieties of the present, man would at last arrive at
+a state of perfection. He saw a millennium in his prophetic mind, which
+alas!—if the law of evolution be true—can never be realised. Condorcet
+died a martyr to his ideals. He poisoned himself in 1799 to escape death
+by the Guillotine.
+
+The influence of Condorcet’s work _Esquisse d’un tableau historique
+des progrès de l’esprit humain_ is traceable not only in Mr. Spencer’s
+first book, “Social Statics,” published in 1850, but in all his later
+writings. How can a true evolutionist believe in the Utopia of a state
+of perfect adaptation? Does not each progress demand new adaptations?
+Take as an instance the change from walking on four feet to an upright
+gait. Did not this progress itself involve man in new difficulties, to
+which he had to adapt himself? Let a labor-saving machine be invented,
+how many laborers lose their work and how many others are in demand! The
+transition from one state to the other is not easy, and as soon as it is
+perfected new wants have arisen which inexorably drive humanity onward on
+the infinite path of progress which can never be limited by any state of
+perfection. There is a constant readjustment necessary, and if we really
+could reach a state of perfect adaptation human life would drop into the
+unconsciousness of mere reflex motions.
+
+Any one who understands the principle of evolution and its universal
+applicability, will recognise that there can be no standstill in the
+world, no state of perfect adaptation. Our solar system has evolved, as
+Kant explained in his “General Cosmogony and Theory of the Heavens,” out
+of a nebula, and is going to dissolve again into a nebular state. So our
+social development consists in a constant realisation of ideals. We may
+think that if we but attain our next and dearest ideal, humanity will be
+satisfied forever. But as soon as we have realised that ideal, we quickly
+get accustomed to its benefits. It becomes a matter of course and another
+ideal higher still than that just realised appears before our mental gaze.
+
+Herder, in his “Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind,” not
+unlike Mr. Spencer, was also under the spell of the Utopian ideal, that
+humanity will reach at last a state of perfect happiness. Kant, in his
+review of Herder’s book, discusses the relativity of happiness and its
+insufficiency as a final aim of life. He says:
+
+    “First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a
+    child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs
+    of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions
+    of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in
+    exact conformity with the individual’s ideas and the degree
+    of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was
+    born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a
+    comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence
+    to one class of men or to one generation over another....
+    If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim
+    of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own
+    happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps
+    that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheiti had never been
+    visited by more civilised peoples and were ordained to live
+    in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we
+    could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they
+    should exist at all, and whether it would not have been just
+    as well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and
+    cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only
+    through pure enjoyment?”
+
+    “It involves no contradiction to say that no individual
+    member of all the offspring of the human race, but that
+    only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung).
+    The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The
+    philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole
+    is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of
+    this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a very
+    useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the
+    design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.”
+
+It is indubitable that Kant’s views of evolution agree better with the
+present state of scientific investigation, than does Mr. Spencer’s
+philosophy, which has never been freed from Condorcet’s ingenuous
+optimism. The assumption of a final state of perfection by absolute
+adaptation is irreconcilable with the idea of unceasing progress, which
+must be true, if evolution is a universal law of nature.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[101] See Mr. Spencer’s article in _Mind_, No. LIX, p. 313.
+
+[102] The passage in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_ on Baer runs as
+follows:
+
+“In his _Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere_, p. 264, he distinctly tells
+us that the law of growing individuality is ‘the fundamental thought
+which goes through all forms and degrees of animal development and all
+single relations. It is the same thought which collected in the cosmic
+space solar systems; the same which caused the weather-beaten dust on
+the surface of our metallic planet to spring forth living beings.’ Von
+Baer thus prepared the way for Mr. Spencer’s generalisation of the law of
+organic evolution as the law of all evolution.”
+
+[103] See Haeckel, _Goethe on Evolution_, No. 131 of _The Open Court_.
+
+[104] _Præstabilismus_, that is, the theory that the phenomena of nature
+are the result of pre-established law.
+
+[105] The proposition that Kant is no easy reading found an unexpected
+and strong opposition. Immediately after the publication of this article,
+Sept. 4th, 1890, Mr. Charles S. Peirce made the following incidental
+remark in a letter to the author dated Sept. 6th, 1890: “I have heard
+too much of Kant’s being hard reading. I think he is one of the easiest
+of philosophers; for he generally knows what he wants to say, which is
+more than half the battle, and he says it in terms which are very clear.
+Of course, it is quite absurd to try to read Kant without preliminary
+studies of Leibnizian and English philosophers, as well as of the
+terminology of which Kant’s is a modification or transmogrification. But
+there is a way of making out what he meant, while such writers as Hume
+and J. S. Mill, the more you study them the more they puzzle you.”
+
+[106] This passage on pages 48, 49, and 50 which is enclosed in brackets
+did not appear in _The Open Court_. It has been added since and is
+published here for the first time.
+
+[107] In this connection we call attention to a book, _Kant und Darwin,
+ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entwickelungslehre_, Jena, 1875, by Fritz
+Schultze, formerly Privat docent in Jena, now Professor of philosophy at
+the Polytechnic Institute in Dresden. This little book is a collection
+of the most important passages of Kant’s views concerning evolution,
+the struggle for existence, and the theory of selection, and it is
+astonishing to find how much Kant had to say on the subject and how
+strongly he agrees with and anticipates Darwin. If Kant had not lived
+before Darwin one might be tempted to conclude that he was familiar with
+his _Origin of Species_ and _The Descent of Man_.
+
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 76880 ***