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+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 ***
+
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Superscripts
+are represented in the forms ^Y or ^{TH}. Additional notes will be
+found near the end of this ebook.
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
+]
+
+
+
+
+                            THE GRAND FLEET
+                               1914–1916
+
+                   ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK
+
+
+                                   BY
+                       ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE
+                                OF SCAPA
+                         G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
+
+
+                 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS
+
+                             [Illustration]
+
+                                NEW YORK
+                        GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+
+
+
+
+                            COPYRIGHT, 1919,
+                       BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+
+
+                PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
+
+
+
+                             TO MY COMRADES
+                           OF THE GRAND FLEET
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from the outbreak
+of war until the end of November, 1916, is described.
+
+The writing of this record of the work of the Grand Fleet, of which
+little has been heard by the nation hitherto, has helped to fill in
+days of leisure. The manuscript was finished by the autumn of 1918,
+but publication was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice
+had been signed and the German Navy had, for all practical purposes,
+ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book. The final revision has
+been done hastily owing to my early departure for the Dominions, and
+in the circumstances I hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if
+any clerical errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances
+of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the proofs, and I am
+much indebted to him.
+
+The narrative necessarily includes an account of the gradual
+organisation and development of the Grand Fleet, and its bases, by
+successive steps, after the hoisting of my flag on the outbreak of
+hostilities; and the manner in which the changing conditions of naval
+warfare were met is also dealt with.
+
+Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that whilst the
+_principles_ of naval strategy are unchangeable, experience in war and
+changes in the weapons with which war is waged may profoundly affect
+the _application_ of those principles.
+
+The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo-Japanese war; in the
+short interval between 1904 and 1914 further great advances took place
+in the technique of warfare; these produced a striking influence on
+strategy and tactics during the late war.
+
+The reasons which made it necessary, during the war, to hide from
+public view the work of the Grand Fleet no longer exist, and it
+will no doubt be of interest to the nation to learn something of
+its operations, especially as, for various justifiable reasons,
+few despatches were issued dealing with its activities. So far as
+the Battle Fleet was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one
+exception, and that despatch was written and published when it was
+necessary to conceal a good deal from the enemy.
+
+As is inevitable, much of the information in this volume is of a
+technical character and, though interesting to seamen, may prove
+less so to the general reader. Those who take this view may decide
+that Chapters IV to X, inclusive, require only to be glanced at.
+Confidential matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has
+been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the light in later
+years.
+
+The main portion of the book is written in narrative form, but where it
+is thought that an explanation may be useful, as to the reasons which
+governed any particular movement or decision, such reason is given in
+order that opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding the
+purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped to achieve it.
+
+In some parts of the book reference is made to the Germans being
+superior to us in _matériel_. There were many directions, however,
+in which war experience showed the correctness of our views and the
+wisdom of our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of
+safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital ship, and we
+did gain advantage from the heavier calibre of our guns. Naval policy
+is pursued in peace conditions under inevitable disadvantages in a
+democratic country, because there are many claims on the Exchequer.
+Reviewing our pre-war programmes of ship construction and equipment,
+and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of the nation generally as to
+the imminence of war, it is matter for satisfaction that the Boards of
+Admiralty from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so
+much, and that when at last war became inevitable the nation had in
+control of its destinies at Whitehall a First Lord and a First Sea Lord
+who, accepting their responsibility, mobilised the Fleet before war was
+actually declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as, I
+hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand Fleet. The years of
+strenuous work and training carried out by the officers and men of the
+Fleet, which should never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent
+fighting machine, and bore ample fruit during the war.
+
+The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed generally the British
+lead. In this book reference is made to the general efficiency of the
+German Navy and of the good design and fine equipment of their ships.
+These points were never questioned by British naval officers, and the
+shameful surrender of the host of the German ships in 1918 did not
+alter the opinions previously formed. That surrender was the result of
+broken moral.
+
+More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafalgar, and after
+a century of controversy, the Admiralty considered it desirable to
+appoint a committee to decide whether that action was fought in
+accordance with the original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as
+embodied in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that the facts recorded
+in this book, and the comments accompanying them, constitute a clear
+statement of the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which it
+endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its mission.
+
+
+
+
+                               CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAPTER                                                           PAGE
+
+     I  THE OPENING OF THE WAR                                         1
+
+    II  GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS                         12
+
+   III  THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES                                 34
+
+    IV  DECLARATION OF WAR                                            88
+
+     V  THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA               115
+
+    VI  INCIDENTS AT SEA--NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914            155
+
+   VII  THE DOGGER BANK ACTION                                       187
+
+  VIII  GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES                                  221
+
+    IX  CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA                                    249
+
+     X  ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION                       264
+
+    XI  THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916                             300
+
+   XII  THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND                                        304
+
+  XIII  THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_continued_)                          341
+
+   XIV  THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_continued_)                          370
+
+    XV  REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND                         390
+
+   XVI  THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL         415
+
+  XVII  THE SUBMARINE PERIL TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE
+          ADMIRALTY                                                  445
+
+        APPENDIX I                                                   463
+
+        APPENDIX II                                                  490
+
+
+
+
+                             ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+
+  ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE, OF SCAPA, G. C. B., O. M., G. C. V. O.
+                                                     _Frontispiece_
+
+                                                             FACING PAGE
+
+  DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE
+    BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW                                  28
+
+  THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW                                 28
+
+  SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS                                     68
+
+  A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915                                     68
+
+  THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL
+    HALSEY), AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT
+    FITZHERBERT) ON BOARD H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_                          96
+
+  THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND AS DEPICTED BY A GERMAN ARTIST (_colour_)    336
+
+  H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYING
+    AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND                                         342
+
+  H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND           346
+
+  H.M.S. _SUPERB_ OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND              366
+
+
+
+
+                          PLANS AND DIAGRAMS
+
+
+                                 PLANS
+
+  PLAN                                                       FACING PAGE
+
+  1.  SCAPA FLOW AND THE ORKNEYS                                      48
+
+  2.  AREA OF OPERATIONS OF 10TH CRUISER SQUADRON                     74
+
+  3.  TYPICAL SWEEP, SEPTEMBER 8TH–11TH, 1914                        128
+
+  4.  APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS, OCTOBER 3RD–11TH, 1914, WHILST
+        CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING                                 138
+
+  5.  MOVEMENTS OF FLEET, JANUARY 23RD–25TH, 1915                    196
+
+  6.  OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF, MAY 2ND–5TH, 1916                    290
+
+  7.  OPERATIONS OF BATTLE CRUISER FLEET, 2 P. M. TO 6.15 P. M.,
+        MAY 31ST, 1916                                               316
+
+  8.  APPROXIMATE POSITION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 6.45 P. M.,
+        MAY 31ST, 1916                                               350
+
+  9.  APPROXIMATE POSITION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 7.15 P. M.,
+        MAY 31ST, 1916                                               358
+
+
+                               DIAGRAMS
+
+  DIAGRAM
+
+  1.  BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT OF THE BATTLE FLEET, MAY 31ST, 1916.
+
+  2.  SHOWING AN IMAGINARY DEPLOYMENT ON THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN.
+
+  3.  BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MOVEMENTS OF BATTLE FLEET AND BATTLE CRUISERS.
+
+  4.  OPERATIONS DURING THE NIGHT OF MAY 31ST–JUNE 1ST, AND ON
+        JUNE 1ST, 1916.
+
+
+
+
+                      THE GRAND FLEET, 1914–1916
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE OPENING OF THE WAR
+
+
+Early in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord,
+I had been offered and had accepted the command of the Home Fleets,
+which in the ordinary course would have become vacant in the following
+December on the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term of
+command, and public announcement was made of the intended appointment.
+
+Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years, and he and I had
+served together in China fourteen years before, when I was Flag Captain
+to Admiral--afterwards Admiral of the Fleet--Sir Edward Seymour. He
+had since had what is probably a unique period of sea service, passing
+from one appointment to another without an interval of half pay. Soon
+after his promotion to flag rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old
+Channel Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron in
+1907; two years later he became second in command in the Mediterranean,
+and on the expiration of his term there, in 1910, he returned to take
+up the appointment of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of
+the Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander-in-Chief in
+1910. The usual period for which the Commander-in-Chief of the Home
+Fleet was supposed to fly his flag was two years, but in 1913 the
+Admiralty, accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service,
+extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it was the approaching
+termination of this further period of command--to the regret of the
+Admiralty, for which I can speak from personal knowledge, and to the
+regret also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets--which led to my
+nomination in the spring of that year.
+
+In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe had assumed
+a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, informed me that
+in the event of hostilities occurring involving this country, it was
+considered necessary that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets
+should have the assistance of a second in command, and he added that I
+had been selected for the appointment, and it was desired that I should
+arrange with Sir George as to the ship in which I should fly my flag.
+
+Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very shortly afterwards,
+and it was decided between us that the battleship _Centurion_ should
+be my flagship. We discussed the slight reorganisation that this
+would involve in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised:
+Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H. Fitzherbert as
+Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E. Hardman Jones as Signal Officer;
+Lieut.-Commander R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander
+(N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet Paymaster H. H.
+Share as Secretary.
+
+On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, I was present at
+a dinner party given by Lord Morley at the United Services Club. The
+party was interesting, as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener,
+Mr. Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who figured later
+prominently in the War.
+
+During the two following days conferences took place at the Admiralty
+as to the disposition of the Fleet, etc., and, in view of the
+threatening political situation, the work of demobilisation after the
+King’s inspection at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises
+were suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord Kitchener, who
+was about to return to Egypt, on one or two occasions at the Admiralty
+during these days.
+
+On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second Sea Lord, which I
+had discharged since December, 1912, to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick
+Hamilton, K.C.B., and made my final preparations for joining the Fleet
+as second in command.
+
+I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following day, and during
+a conversation with Mr. Churchill and the Marquis of Milford Haven,
+the then First Sea Lord, it was intimated to me that, in certain
+circumstances, I might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to
+Sir George Callaghan.
+
+This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, and I protested
+against such an appointment being made on what might possibly be on
+the very eve of war. Nothing definite was settled. I left, however,
+with the impression that the change was not one that had been finally
+decided upon, but that it might take place. I left London the same
+night by the mail train for Wick, the Commander-in-Chief having
+informed me that he would send a vessel to meet me there.
+
+The idea that the change might be made occupied my thoughts during the
+journey to the North. As I thought over the possibility of a transfer
+of command at such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections.
+During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several telegrams to
+both the First Lord and the First Sea Lord on the subject. I dwelt
+strongly upon the danger of substituting, at such a juncture and at
+such short notice, an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet,
+for a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Command. I
+mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admiration and loyalty to the
+Commander-in-Chief that existed, and suggested as an alternative that I
+should act as his assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind
+that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his Chief of the Staff.
+In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated opinion, my views remained
+unaltered, although it did not occur to me that some anxiety might be
+felt that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand the strain of
+commanding the Fleet in the event of war. That, however, was a matter
+on which the Admiralty would be better informed than myself, and I
+had no hesitation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive
+telegrams.
+
+A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the _Boadicea_, the ship in which I
+made the passage to Scapa Flow, was not able to leave until late in the
+forenoon of August 2nd, and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon.
+
+When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, the knowledge of
+the event which was apparently impending made the interview both
+embarrassing and painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of
+the possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could not
+tell him.
+
+We discussed various arrangements, including the question of the
+defence of Scapa Flow, for which temporary but naturally inadequate
+measures were being energetically taken with the limited resources at
+the disposal of the Fleet.
+
+At about 4 A.M. on August 4th, I received Admiralty orders to open
+a secret envelope which had been handed to me in the train as I was
+leaving London, by an officer from the Admiralty. This envelope
+contained my appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet”--a
+new designation which must be explained later.
+
+On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded on board the _Iron
+Duke_ and found that the Commander-in-Chief had received orders to turn
+over the command to me.
+
+Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-Chief during my command
+of the 2nd Battle Squadron. He was, in addition, a personal friend,
+and I, like all those with whom he had been in contact, had the most
+profound respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over his
+command at _the_ moment of his life naturally caused me feelings of
+the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was impossible to dismiss the
+fear that the Fleet might conclude that I had been in some measure
+responsible for the change. This possibility had, of course, been
+present in my mind from the moment I left London, and it appeared to
+add to the objections to a change of command at such a juncture, since
+any idea of this nature prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling
+of loyalty to me as the new Commander-in-Chief.
+
+It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot close this
+portion of my narrative without paying a warm tribute to the manner
+in which Sir George accepted the Admiralty decision, which obviously
+came as a great shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant
+officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make the position easy
+for me, in entire disregard of his own feelings.
+
+It was decided that I should take over the Command on the following
+day, but a telegram having been received from the Admiralty ordering
+the Fleet to proceed to sea at once, I returned to the _Iron Duke_, and
+Sir George Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the _Sappho_ before
+its departure at 8.30 in the morning.
+
+At that hour I took over the Command from Sir George Callaghan, who
+then struck his flag.
+
+The following ten or fourteen days were a period of great strain and
+anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsibility as the command of the
+Grand Fleet at such short notice on the eve of war was in itself a
+matter not to be taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together
+the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the dispositions
+already made and those immediately required, and the whole problem was
+largely complicated by the fact that the port on which the Fleet was
+based was open to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only
+obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties of the
+Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were by no means insuperable.
+
+Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at superseding a valued
+chief and friend at such a moment. The one thing that helped me through
+this period was the great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by
+the staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their intense
+personal regret at his departure, gave me their very warm support,
+and concealed from me any trace of the feelings which they must have
+experienced at my presence amongst them under such exceptional and
+trying conditions. They behaved as naval officers always behave--in a
+true spirit of comradeship. The same may be said of the flag officers
+and captains in the Fleet, and indeed of every officer and man.
+
+Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with the exception
+of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied him to London. This staff
+included: Commodore A. F. Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain
+R. N. Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse, C.B., Flag
+Commander; Fleet Paymaster C. F. Pollard, C.B., Secretary; Commander
+the Hon. Matthew Best, War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods,
+Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless Officer;
+Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff Officer; Lieut. W. D.
+Phipps, Signal Officer.[A]
+
+    [A] Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the
+        Fleet, Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Commander
+        C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander, and Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T.
+        Weekes, Additional Secretary.
+
+When it became certain that I was to take command of the Fleet, I asked
+the Admiralty to appoint Rear-Admiral Charles Madden as Chief of the
+Staff; and I was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to act
+as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, the next
+senior flag officer in the Fleet.
+
+The composition of the Grand Fleet was:
+
+                  Fleet-Flagship--H.M.S. _Iron Duke_.
+
+             Attached Ships--H.M.S. _Sappho_, H.M.S. _Oak_.
+
+
+                              BATTLE FLEET
+
+
+                         _1st Battle Squadron_:
+
+    Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command).
+
+    Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command).
+
+  Battleships _Marlborough_ (Flag), _St. Vincent_ (Rear Flag),
+      _Colossus_, _Hercules_, _Neptune_, _Vanguard_, _Collingwood_,
+      _Superb_, _Bellona_ (attached Light Cruiser), _Cyclops_ (repair
+      ship)
+
+
+                         _2nd Battle Squadron_:
+
+            Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B.
+                             (in command).
+
+       Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in command).
+
+  Battleships _King George V._ (Flag), _Orion_ (Rear Flag), _Ajax_,
+      _Audacious_, _Centurion_, _Conqueror_, _Monarch_, _Thunderer_,
+      _Boadicea_ (attached Light Cruiser), _Assistance_ (repair ship).
+
+
+                         _4th Battle Squadron_:
+
+        Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O. (in command).
+
+  Battleships _Dreadnought_ (Flag), _Temeraire_, _Bellerophon_,
+      _Blonde_ (attached Light Cruiser).
+
+
+                         _3rd Battle Squadron_:
+
+           Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command).
+
+             Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command).
+
+  Battleships _King Edward VII._ (Flag), _Hibernia_ (Rear Flag),
+      _Commonwealth_, _Zealandia_, _Dominion_, _Africa_, _Britannia_,
+      _Hindustan_, _Blanche_ (attached Light Cruiser).
+
+
+                     _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+
+          Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command).
+
+  Battleships _Lion_ (Flag), _Princess Royal_, _Queen Mary_, New
+      _Zealand_.
+
+
+                        _2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
+
+         Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-Calthorpe (in command).
+
+  Cruisers _Shannon_ (Flag), _Achilles_, _Cochrane_, _Natal_.
+
+
+                           _3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
+
+               Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command).
+
+  Cruisers _Antrim_ (Flag), _Argyll_, _Devonshire_, _Roxburgh_.
+
+
+                       _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+
+                  Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command).
+
+  Light Cruisers _Southampton_ (Flag), _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_,
+      _Nottingham_.
+
+
+                            DESTROYER FLOTILLAS
+
+                             _Second Flotilla_:
+
+            Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in _Active_).
+
+  Destroyers _Acorn_, _Alarm_, _Brisk_, _Cameleon_, _Comet_, _Fury_,
+      _Goldfinch_, _Hope_, _Larne_, _Lyra_, _Martin_, _Minstrel_,
+      _Nemesis_, _Nereide_, _Nymphe_, _Redpole_, _Rifleman_, _Ruby_,
+      _Sheldrake_, _Staunch_.
+
+
+                             _Fourth Flotilla_:
+
+               Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in _Swift_).
+
+  Destroyers _Acasta_, _Achates_, _Ambuscade_, _Ardent_, _Christopher_,
+      _Cockatrice_, _Contest_, _Fortune_, _Garland_, _Hardy_, _Lynx_,
+      _Midge_, _Owl_, _Paragon_, _Porpoise_, _Shark_, _Sparrowhawk_,
+      _Spitfire_, _Unity_, _Victor_.
+
+
+                         _Mine-Sweeping Gunboats_:
+
+                   Commander L. G. Preston (in command).
+
+  H.M. Ships _Skipjack_ (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), _Circe_,
+      _Gossamer_, _Leda_, _Speedwell_, _Jason_, _Seagull_.
+
+  Shetland Patrol Force: _Forward_ (Scout) and four destroyers of the
+      River class.
+
+The above vessels formed the Fleet under the immediate command of
+the Commander-in-Chief at the outbreak of hostilities. In addition,
+there were in southern waters, and also under the command of the
+Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels:
+
+
+THE HARWICH FORCE
+
+This force, although an integral portion of the Grand Fleet, was based
+on Harwich. It was intended that it should join the Grand Fleet at
+sea, if possible, in the event of a fleet action being imminent, and
+for this reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet for
+battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so join the Fleet,
+nor did I expect that it would be able to do so. At the outbreak of war
+it was commanded by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. _Amethyst_ and
+comprised:
+
+
+                               _1st Flotilla_
+
+      Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in _Fearless_ with 20 destroyers.
+
+
+                               _3rd Flotilla_
+
+      Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in _Amphion_ with 15 destroyers.
+
+Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets, which Sir George
+Callaghan had commanded-in-chief, were the Second and Third Fleets:
+
+
+                                SECOND FLEET
+
+    (under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.).
+
+  Fleet-Flagship _Lord Nelson_, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and
+      Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons).
+
+
+                           _5th Battle Squadron_:
+
+  _Prince of Wales_ (Flag), _Agamemnon_, _Bulwark_, _Formidable_,
+      _Implacable_, _Irresistible_, _London_, _Queen_, _Venerable_.
+
+
+                           _6th Battle Squadron_:
+
+  _Russell_ (Flag), _Cornwallis_, _Albemarle_, _Duncan_, _Exmouth_,
+      _Vengeance_.
+
+
+                          _5th Cruiser Squadron_:
+
+                 Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command).
+
+                _Carnarvon_ (Flag), _Falmouth_, _Liverpool_.
+
+
+                          _6th Cruiser Squadron_:
+
+                   Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant (in command).
+
+             _Drake_, _Good Hope_, _King Alfred_, _Leviathan_.
+
+(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however, broken up immediately,
+and the ships transferred to other duties.)
+
+        _Minelayer Squadron_, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe.
+
+        H.M. Ships _Naiad_ (S.O.’s ship), _Andromache_, _Apollo_,
+        _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Latona_, _Thetis_.
+
+
+THIRD FLEET
+
+This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, consisting of
+our oldest battleships, and the 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser
+Squadrons, comprising our oldest cruisers.
+
+But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever associated with the
+Grand Fleet were the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under
+the command of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet
+shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being employed mainly
+on blockading duties. It was composed as follows:
+
+  _Crescent_ (Flag), _Edgar_, _Endymion_, _Gibraltar_, _Grafton_,
+      _Hawke_, _Royal Arthur_, _Theseus_.
+
+All submarines, except those of the B and C classes which were detached
+for the protection of our coast and ports from Rosyth southwards, were
+worked, in accordance with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were
+not, therefore, under my command. The C class submarines were unfit
+for oversea work, and our operations in enemy waters were therefore
+confined to boats of the D and E classes, of which we possessed a total
+of 8 D’s and 9 E’s, as against the German total of 28 boats of the U
+class.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS
+
+
+It is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the Navy had
+somewhat faded from public interest during the century that had elapsed
+since the Napoleonic Wars, the last occasion on which the inhabitants
+of this country had felt that their safety depended on maritime power.
+Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in a
+foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this matter, and to
+point out the all-important influence which Sea Power had exerted, and
+would exert, on history.
+
+Associations such as the Navy League had been formed, having as their
+object the enlightenment of our countrymen, and although a great work
+was done in this direction, the mere necessity for such work is an
+indication of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons
+of the past.
+
+I therefore offer no apology for making some reference to the use and
+purpose of the British Navy.
+
+The main objects for which our Navy exists may be shortly summed up
+under four heads:
+
+  1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea, this
+      being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly
+      one which is not self-supporting in regard to food.
+
+  2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic pressure to bear
+      on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus
+      compelling him to accept peace.
+
+  3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the passage and assist
+      any army sent overseas, and to protect its communications and
+      supplies.
+
+  4. To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas Dominions by
+      enemy forces.
+
+The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by
+destroying the enemy’s armed naval forces, and this is therefore the
+first objective of our Fleet. The Fleet exists to achieve victory.
+
+But history has always shown that it is a very difficult matter to
+impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, and that, instead of
+giving us the opportunity of destroying his armed naval forces, he
+usually keeps the main body of those forces--the Battle Fleet--in
+positions of safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant
+threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval Power, and force
+upon that Power a watching policy so that the enemy may be engaged,
+should he put to sea, before he is able to gain any advantage.
+
+The watching policy in the great wars of the Napoleonic era was
+carried out by keeping our squadrons, through fair or foul weather,
+in the vicinity of those ports of the enemy in which his fleet lay.
+Occasionally our ships were driven off by stress of weather, but
+they regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted. During
+this war, however, the advent of the submarine and destroyer, and,
+to a lesser extent, the use of the mine rendered such dispositions
+impossible.
+
+No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity of enemy bases
+without the certainty that she would fall an early victim to the
+attacks of submarines. Destroyers could, it is true, afford some
+measure of protection, but destroyers have a very limited range of
+action, and could not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even
+in good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical relief of
+the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the great numbers that
+would be required for this purpose.
+
+Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be overcome, the heavy
+ships would be so open to attack by enemy destroyers at night, if
+cruising anywhere near enemy bases, that they would certainly be
+injured, if not sunk, before many days had passed.
+
+These facts had been recognised before the War and a watching policy
+from a distance decided upon, the watch being instituted for the
+purpose of preventing enemy vessels from gaining the open sea, where
+they would constitute a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch
+maintained at a distance from the port under observation is necessarily
+only partial, except in circumstances where the enemy has to pass
+through narrow straits before gaining open water.
+
+The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend entirely on the number
+of watching vessels and the distance that those on board them can see.
+At night this distance is very short--on a dark night not more than a
+quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the average conditions
+of visibility obtaining in the North Sea, it is not more than six to
+eight miles.
+
+The North Sea, though small in contrast with the Atlantic, is a big
+water area of about 120,000 square miles in extent. The width across
+it, between the Shetland Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is
+160 miles, and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel) would
+need to be watched also if a patrol were established along this line.
+
+A consideration of all the circumstances had led to the adoption by the
+Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the
+Admiralty had determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in the
+event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that the Grand Fleet
+would control the North Sea, and that the Channel Fleet would watch the
+English Channel, thus, in combination, holding the enemy’s main force.
+
+To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main Battle Fleet
+should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a strategic position in the
+North Sea where it would act in support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying
+out sweeps to the southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be
+favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to action should it
+put to sea.
+
+This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the result of
+experience in the various naval manœuvres carried out in previous
+years in the North Sea. These had demonstrated quite clearly that the
+alternative policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North
+Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an impracticable
+one, it having been shown on many occasions that evasion of a single
+patrol line during the hours of darkness, or even daylight, under the
+conditions of visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is
+a very simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying regular
+patrol positions is always in peril of successful submarine attack; the
+loss of the cruisers _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_ showed this. It is
+also open to a concentrated attack by surface vessels.
+
+The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet
+were based, therefore, on this general idea, and when the Grand Fleet
+proceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 A.M. on
+August the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out this
+general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral
+Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in the Channel in accordance with the
+general strategic dispositions.
+
+The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand Fleet comprised the
+1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with their attached cruisers;
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron,
+strengthened by the addition of the _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_; the
+2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These dispositions
+continued in force for some three weeks, when the strong influence of
+the submarine on naval strategy began to make itself apparent.
+
+The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities of submarines
+were found, after a short experience of war, to need modification. In
+the first place, it became quickly apparent that the German submarines
+possessed a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably
+greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, for instance,
+looked upon as a considerable achievement for our submarines to keep
+the sea for a period of five to seven days, and they had not operated
+at any great distance from the coast. It is true that submarines had
+on occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but they were then
+usually escorted, or even towed, and the number of days from port to
+port did not approach the length of time for which German submarines
+remained at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans possessed a
+considerable superiority in the number of submarines which were capable
+of operating overseas, and the frequent sighting of enemy submarines
+as far north as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War,
+combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy had established
+a regular submarine patrol in the centre of the North Sea, made it
+evident that the German submarines would constitute a very serious
+menace to our heavy ships.
+
+The comparative strength in submarines in Home Waters at the outbreak
+of war was as follows:
+
+  _German_--
+
+      U Boats 28   of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea
+                     work, but were as good as our D class.
+
+  _British_--
+
+                 { of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining
+      D Class  8 {   units of the D class were not equal to the
+                 {   U boats.
+
+      E Class  9
+
+      C Class 34 } Unfit for oversea work and used only for local
+      B Class  3 }   defence of the coast or in the Channel.
+
+The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under construction, whilst
+we were building 19, apart from two experimental vessels of which
+nothing resulted.
+
+Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in pursuance of a
+policy introduced by the Admiralty in 1913–14 of widening the area of
+supply of these vessels. This policy had far-reaching and beneficial
+results on the subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it
+enabled us to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would
+otherwise have been the case.
+
+A change in previous naval practice was considered necessary at an
+early period, because vessels moving at anything but high speed,
+particularly in the case of a number of ships in company, ran very
+considerable risks in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to
+be operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers. This
+conclusion affected the movements and operations of the Battle Fleet,
+since the number of destroyers we possessed was quite inadequate to
+form a screen for a Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which
+constantly kept the sea. The number required, for such a screen to
+be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle Fleet alone as then
+constituted, and that number, 40, was all that we had stationed at the
+Northern Base. The fuel capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for
+them to remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days and
+nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for three or four
+times that period. Moreover, the destroyers could not be kept nearly
+so constantly at sea as the large ships owing to their requirements
+in the way of boiler-cleaning and the refit and adjustment of their
+more delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only the
+machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. The heavy ships, then,
+had two alternatives, either to remain at sea without a destroyer
+screen or to return to harbour with the destroyers. In the early
+days the first alternative was adopted, the risk being accepted, but
+minimised as far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part
+of the North Sea.
+
+A further danger soon made itself apparent. It became evident at an
+early period, as many naval officers had expected, in view of German
+language at the Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw
+overboard the doctrines of international law when he could gain any
+advantage by doing so. He accordingly proceeded at once to lay mines
+in positions where he thought they would be advantageous to his
+operations, in utter disregard of the safety, not only of British,
+but also of neutral merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very
+probable that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the
+North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might prove effective
+against the Grand Fleet, and that he would do this without issuing any
+warning to neutral countries. Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet
+were kept moving continuously in the central and southern waters of
+the North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay mines with
+little danger of his operations being witnessed (as he could carry
+them out under cover of darkness), it was evident that considerable
+risks might be incurred without our being aware of the fact. The policy
+of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried out with such
+success as to produce equality, or even inferiority, on the part of the
+British Fleet as compared with the German, in a comparatively short
+space of time. The only safeguard against such action which we could
+take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working ahead of the
+Battle Fleet. But the number of mine-sweepers that we possessed was
+wholly inadequate for such a task; and even if this had not been so,
+to carry out such an operation would have necessitated the speed of
+the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the maximum sweeping
+speed of mine-sweepers, and it would have been forced also to steer a
+steady course without zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships
+exceedingly vulnerable to submarine attack.
+
+The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace, combined with
+possible German action in regard to mine-laying, was to cause the
+Battle Fleet to confine its movements _under ordinary conditions_ to
+the more northern waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be
+taken of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers, and
+where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water and the distance
+from enemy bases, that the Germans would be able to lay mines without
+discovery.
+
+The fact that this course of action would be forced upon us as the
+submarine and destroyer menace grew had often been present in my mind
+in pre-War days, when I had expressed the view that the beginning of
+a naval war would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the
+larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have no doubt that
+this opinion was very generally held by officers of experience.
+
+The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was combined with the
+establishment of certain cruiser patrol _areas_ in the North Sea. These
+areas, which were purposely made large, were watched on a regular,
+organised plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high speed
+in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk to the cruisers to
+a minimum, whist at the same time they kept as effective a watch as
+possible, first, to intercept German war vessels that might be covering
+a raid on our coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to
+operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all merchant ships
+entering or leaving the North Sea should be closely examined in order
+to enforce the blockade.
+
+This patrol policy was associated with periodical sweeps of cruisers,
+supported by the Battle Fleet, down into the southern waters of the
+North Sea, the object being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if
+possible, and in any case, owing to our movements being probably
+reported to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to make them feel
+that they could never move a force to sea without the possibility of
+encountering our Fleet engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which
+we carried out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illustrated
+in accompanying plans. On these occasions the Battle Fleet was kept
+strictly concentrated during the southern movement, and was screened
+as far as possible by destroyers against submarine attack; and at
+times mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle Fleet.
+When this was not possible, owing to the small number of mine-sweepers
+available or the state of the weather, some of the older battleships
+of the 6th Battle Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed
+ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a minefield be
+encountered, these older ships would be the first to strike the mines,
+thus giving sufficient warning to enable me to manœuvre the more
+valuable ships clear of the field.
+
+This general policy was continued until the attack on the _Theseus_
+and loss of the _Hawke_, belonging to the 10th Cruiser Squadron, by
+submarine attack on October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the
+dispositions then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked to too
+great an extent when working without destroyers in the central part of
+the North Sea.
+
+The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the cruiser patrols to
+a safer position farther to the northward and eastward of the Shetland
+Islands, this being combined with a watch by the smaller craft on the
+Fair Island Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the North
+Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet was often kept either in
+a position westward of the Orkneys, where it was in support of the
+cruisers and at the same time formed a second blockade line, or it
+cruised to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser
+patrols working farther south.
+
+In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on the northern
+entrance to the North Sea, the principle kept in mind was the necessity
+for such an organisation of the patrols as to have, in so far as
+numbers permitted, two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were
+at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out of the North
+Sea were forced, so far as all human foresight could provide, to pass
+through the waters occupied by one of the two groups of ships during
+daylight hours; the distances apart were regulated according to the
+length of the night at the different seasons of the year.
+
+As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward and westward, it
+became possible to make use of the heavy ships to assist in blockade
+work without running undue risks from submarines, and the blockade
+increased correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, however,
+the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number of armed merchant
+cruisers enabled us to establish an effective blockade line by the
+use of these vessels alone, backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such
+were available. The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern
+and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base was shifted
+temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly. When this occurred, it did not
+affect the policy of frequent cruiser sweeps into the southern portion
+of the North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still
+continued.
+
+The dispositions that have been described took account naturally of two
+other very important factors.
+
+The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force to France. It
+was highly probable that the enemy would endeavour to interfere with
+this movement, and in the early days of the War it would not have been
+a difficult matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make
+at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of enterprise
+which surprised me, as I think it surprised most naval officers.
+
+The conditions for him were distinctly favourable. Our main Fleet was
+based, as he must have been aware, far away to the northward, and if he
+had timed an attack on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during
+which he reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers,
+were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a good chance
+of making the attack and returning to his base before that Fleet could
+intervene. Consequently, he would only have had to deal with the
+comparatively light forces based in southern waters. On the other hand,
+if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the Germans would
+have possessed no mean advantage.
+
+The enemy was provided with a large number of modern destroyers,
+and some of them would have been well expended over a Channel dash,
+which would in all probability have met with some success. During the
+transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet
+kept the sea as far as possible in order to cover the movement, but the
+destroyers were constantly returning to the base to fuel.
+
+The second factor which had considerable influence on Fleet
+dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a raid or invasion
+by the enemy. Such a move was not very likely in the earliest days of
+the War, when the nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary
+Force had not left the country. It is also probable that the enemy had
+few troops to spare for the purpose. But the chances became greater as
+we denuded the country of men, and the conditions in other respects
+became more favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and
+expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted, landings would
+probably be effected in the rivers on the East Coast, the entrances
+to which were either unprotected or inadequately protected. A beach
+landing on our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather, and
+the chances of encountering favourable conditions on arrival off the
+coast are not great, and I always doubted the attempt being made. In
+our rivers the opportunities are greater, and are not so dependent on
+fine weather, and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive
+in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready to be sunk
+across the channels (which are narrow and shallow), the ships being
+fitted with explosive charges below ready to blow out the bottoms in
+case of necessity. I mentioned the names of certain retired naval
+officers who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary preparations
+in a very few days. I believe that my proposals were carried out.
+
+The danger of raids, however, and the consequent responsibility thrown
+upon the Admiralty for their prevention, during a period when we had
+very little military force in the country, led to a division of the
+Fleet by Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had certain
+disadvantages from a strategic point of view.
+
+The 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of the “King Edward
+VII.” class, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron of four ships of the “County”
+class, were ordered to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers
+for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then to be faced was
+that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet having to engage the High Sea
+Fleet, since concentration with the 3rd Battle Squadron could probably
+not be effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of engaging.
+
+At this time the battle cruisers _Princess Royal_, _Invincible_,
+and _Inflexible_ were in the Atlantic operating against Von Spee’s
+squadron; and the _Australia_, _Indomitable_ had not joined the Grand
+Fleet. The _Tiger_ was not yet ready, so that at times our battle
+cruiser force consisted of only three ships, the _Lion_, _Queen Mary_,
+and _New Zealand_.
+
+Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet for the prevention
+of raids or invasion was a factor which had a considerable influence on
+naval strategy.
+
+If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in the North Sea,
+or if it was at sea for a cruise having exercises for its main object,
+there was bound to be present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief
+the chance that he might be required suddenly to move south to
+engage the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a landing.
+If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a moment very serious
+consequences might ensue, and therefore all cruiser sweeps or other
+operations had to be curtailed to prevent such a situation arising.
+
+One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our naval strategy
+throughout the War, namely, the bombardment of our undefended towns on
+the East Coast. Such bombardments were of no immediate military value
+to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Press,
+and the public, realised that the Navy should not be led into false
+strategy because of these bombardments, it was difficult for the Fleet
+to ignore them, and I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this
+fact.
+
+Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was quite impossible
+to ensure that the enemy would be brought to action after such an
+operation, since to attain this end it would have been necessary
+for the Fleet, or a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the
+southern portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even had
+it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keeping destroyers
+with the heavier ships, and in any case it was false strategy to divide
+the Battle Fleet, as such a course might well have resulted in disaster.
+
+The usual course adopted was to base the Battle Cruiser Fleet on
+Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise from that neighbourhood. The speed
+of the battle cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly
+superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but there was
+always some risk in this case of a ship being disabled; the flag
+officer in command would then have been faced with the unpleasant
+alternative of abandoning her or of risking his whole force to cover
+her retreat.
+
+Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the enemy ports, so
+as to obtain warning of their ships leaving, the difficulty would not
+have been so great, but our submarines in those days (the only class
+of vessel which could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted with
+wireless installations with which they could signal from the required
+positions, or indeed from positions anywhere near the enemy’s coast,
+and, in any case, it must be borne in mind that at night the exit
+of enemy vessels unobserved, even under the conditions of a close
+submarine look-out, is a comparatively easy matter.
+
+At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the condition of British
+naval bases. As is well known, the Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow
+during the latter days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition
+of the Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack, was
+brought very strongly into prominence by the presence of so valuable a
+Fleet at this Base.
+
+The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main entrances navigable by
+all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha, and Hoy Channels, and, in addition,
+has some more narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern
+side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of providing gun
+defences for this Base, which the Admiralty had decided a year or two
+before the War was to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on
+more than one occasion, after examination by a committee of officers
+on the spot; but, since finance governs defence, and the Admiralty
+from year to year had insufficient money for even more urgent needs,
+no action had been taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the
+German naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by enemy’s
+destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by submarines. Its main,
+indeed its only, safety against such attacks by submarines lay in
+the navigational difficulties attendant upon entry into the harbour,
+combined, as regards destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an
+enemy’s force being intercepted on its outward or homeward passage,
+or of its being successfully engaged in the vicinity of the base.
+The sailing directions laid great stress upon the difficulties of
+navigations in the approaches to this Base, due to the very strong and
+varying currents, but the Germans were well acquainted with the Orkney
+and Shetland Islands. They had indeed made it a practice to send ships
+to visit these islands fairly frequently before the War, and they were,
+therefore, as well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into
+Scapa Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main Fleet Base,
+they could deduce the fact, if they did not know it already, that the
+difficulties of entry were not insuperable.
+
+Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the arrival of the
+Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July, took immediate steps, with
+the resources at his disposal in the Fleet, to improvise defences for
+the Base against destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land
+some 12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount them at
+the entrances. No searchlights could, however, be provided, so that
+the guns were not of much value at night. Arrangements were also made
+for placing light cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to
+assist these defences. The further step, of course, was taken when
+the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols to the eastward
+of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in the Fleet, however, that
+these measures gave much security even against destroyer attack on a
+dark night, and, it gave no security whatever against submarine attack.
+Nothing but _obstructions_ of some kind could give that security. The
+matter was frequently discussed. Although many brains had been at work,
+no satisfactory anti-submarine obstruction had been devised. Under the
+urgent pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion generally
+held by experienced submarine officers was that, whilst the least
+important entrances, such as the Hoy, the Switha and the Holm Sound
+Channels, would be extremely difficult for the passage of a submarine,
+entry by the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a determined
+submarine officer. So much for the Base at Scapa Flow.
+
+At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better. The only entrance
+to this Base is comparatively narrow, and was defended against the
+entry of destroyers and larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted
+by the Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however, no boom
+protection against the entry of destroyers, and the conditions in
+regard to submarine attack were the same as at Scapa Flow, there being
+no obstructions.
+
+At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at Cromarty, namely, the
+harbour was defended by guns only against attack by destroyers. In this
+case, the guns were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at
+Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to submarine attack.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE BEING
+    REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW
+]
+
+Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of Fleets or Squadrons
+at anchor in any of the Bases used by the Grand Fleet was immense.
+For my part, I was always far more concerned for the safety of
+the Fleet when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceedingly
+brief periods which were spent there for coaling in the early days of
+the War, than I was when the Fleet was at sea, and this anxiety was
+reflected in the very short time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It
+was also the cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more
+than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a submarine in the
+anchorage, and considerable risks were accepted in getting the Fleet to
+sea in very thick weather at night on at least one of these occasions.
+
+I have often wondered why the Germans did not make greater efforts
+to reduce our strength in capital ships by destroyer or submarine
+attacks on our bases in those early days. They possessed, in comparison
+with the uses for which they were required, almost a superfluity of
+destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with ourselves, and
+they could not have put them to a better use than in an attack on Scapa
+Flow during the early months of the 1914–1915 winter.
+
+In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home waters fit for such
+an operation, all with a speed of, or exceeding, 30 knots, this number
+being in addition to a total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and
+with speeds varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for
+work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in the North Sea.
+
+This country had in home waters at the same period only 76 destroyers
+that could be compared with the German vessels in view of modern
+requirements, and 33 of these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76
+destroyers, 40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining
+36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large and fast
+destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to their small fuel
+capacity, were only of use in southern waters and were appropriated
+to Dover. And we possessed 25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a
+nominal speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot destroyer;
+the latter class was only fit for patrol work in the vicinity of the
+coast.
+
+It may be said that similar reflections to those I have mentioned might
+be made by the Germans as regards our own movements, and that they were
+surprised that we did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer
+is obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very short of
+destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware of the thoroughness
+of the defences of the German naval bases. We knew that they not only
+possessed the most powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew
+also that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and we were
+justified in assuming that they had protected their naval bases by
+extensive minefields. We, on the other hand, were entirely unprovided
+with this particular form of defence.
+
+In view of the known quality of German artillery and mine defences
+and the thorough nature of their organisation, my own view was that
+they also possessed, in all probability, anti-submarine defences.
+For these reasons, together with the important fact that the German
+rivers are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them in a
+submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack on their ships
+in harbour would meet with no success, and that we could not afford
+to expend any of our exceedingly limited number of destroyers, or
+submarines, in making an attack which would, in all human probability,
+be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the German defences proved
+the correctness of this view. I can only imagine that the Germans
+credited us, also, with possessing harbour defences and obstructions
+which in our case were non-existent, although we did our best in the
+Fleet to give the impression that we had obstructed the entrances, for,
+pending the provision of proper obstructions, we improvised various
+contrivances. It may have seemed impossible to the German mind that
+we should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for its very
+existence, in a position where it was open to submarine or destroyer
+attack.
+
+This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those responsible for
+the safety of our Fleet from the gravest anxiety whenever the more
+valuable ships were in the undefended harbours.
+
+A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet
+in the early part of the War shows the following figures. Only ships
+that had completed their training and were fit to fight in the line are
+included:
+
+
+BATTLESHIPS
+
+(B., British; G., German)
+
+  -----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+--------
+         Date      |Dreadnoughts|     Pre-   | Battle | Light  |Destroyers|Airships|Cruisers
+                   |            |Dreadnoughts|cruisers|cruisers|          |        |
+  -----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+--------
+  August 4th, 1914 |            |            |        |        |          |        |
+        B          |     20     |     8      |    4   |   12   |    42    |        |    9
+        G          |     13     |    16      |    3   |   15   |    88    |    1   |    2
+  October 1st, 1914|            |            |        |        |          |        |
+        B          |     20     |    12      |    6   |   12   |    42    |        |   10
+        G          |     15     |    16      |    3   |   14   |    88    |    3   |    2
+  January 1st, 1915|            |            |        |        |          |        |
+        B          |     21[B]  |     8      |    6   |   17   |    44    |        |   14
+        G          |     16     |    16      |    4   |   12   |    88    |    6   |    1
+  April 1st, 1915  |            |            |        |        |          |        |
+        B          |     23     |     8      |    9   |   18   |    54    |        |   17
+        G          |     17     |    16      |    4   |   14   |    88    |    6   |
+  October 1st, 1915|            |            |        |        |          |        |
+        B          |     25     |    10      |   10   |   25   |    66    |        |   15
+        G          |     17     |    16      |    4   |   15   |    88    |   12   |
+  -----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+--------
+
+    [B] 21 completed, but two of these (_Monarch_ and _Conqueror_) were seriously damaged
+        and one other battleship was refitting.
+
+The above list gives the vessels nominally available.
+
+In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s _selected_ and our
+_average_ moment, the following facts should be remembered, and were
+necessarily taken into account by me at the time:
+
+(_a_) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two light
+cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and perhaps one battle
+cruiser under refit, in addition to any other vessels that might be
+temporarily disabled.
+
+(_b_) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was refitting when
+planning an operation, and she could reinforce her Fleet by several
+light cruisers and two or more flotillas of destroyers from the Baltic.
+
+(_c_) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important factor on either
+side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in the case of our ships, the
+comparatively short range of their guns, due to the small amount of
+elevation of which their mountings admitted.
+
+(_d_) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers increased, were of great
+assistance to the enemy for scouting, each one being, in _favourable
+weather_, equal to at least two light cruisers for such a purpose.
+
+(_e_) Account is not taken in the British figures of the Harwich force,
+as this force could not be counted upon to effect concentration with
+the remainder of the Grand Fleet at the German selected moment.
+
+(_f_) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked the speed
+necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were very slightly faster than
+the battleships of the “Dreadnought” type, and, owing to their lack of
+speed, they were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an enemy
+Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On the other hand, they
+were very superior in fighting qualities to the German light cruisers.
+
+It will be seen from the above statements that the enemy had by far
+his best opportunity from the naval point of view in the early months
+of the War, as he was then much nearer equality of strength with the
+Grand Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap, which
+included minefields and submarines, with the High Sea Fleet as a bait,
+might have been very effective at any period of the War in inflicting
+considerable losses on us. The Germans had their best opportunities
+between November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915, the
+situation got steadily worse for the enemy.
+
+The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this review of relative
+naval strength, is that if this country in the future decides to
+rely for safety against raids or invasion on the Fleet alone, it is
+essential that we should possess a considerably greater margin of
+superiority over a possible enemy _in all classes of vessels_ than we
+did in August, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES
+
+
+The Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being only at the
+outbreak of the War, when it was so christened. As with the name, so
+with the organisation.
+
+The great majority of the really effective ships in the Grand Fleet
+were the outcome of the policy initiated by Admiral of the Fleet Lord
+Fisher of Kilverstone when he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord
+in 1904 in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of Lord
+Fisher’s first acts--and he carried through a number of other changes
+which reacted favourably on the efficiency of the Fleet for war--was
+the introduction of the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the
+_Dreadnought_, laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, was the
+earliest example. She was closely followed by the three “all-big-gun”
+battle-cruisers of the “Invincible” class, which were of the same
+programme--1905–6. Much criticism was levelled at the _Dreadnought_,
+but even more at the principle embodied in the battle-cruisers--ships
+with the speed of cruisers, but the same calibre armament as
+battleships. The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s conception.
+
+Our superiority _in capital ships_ at the outbreak of war was due
+to the efforts of the Boards presided over by Lord Selborne and his
+successors from 1904 onwards, and Lord Fisher held the post of First
+Sea Lord for five and a half years of that period. At the beginning
+of 1909, during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord, great
+efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance of a sufficient
+standard of superiority in capital ships over Germany, and to make good
+our deficiencies in destroyers. The nation has good reason for the
+most profound gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude he
+assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to the table on page
+31 will show the position that would have arisen if the four additional
+“Dreadnoughts” had not been included in the 1909–10 building programme.
+In the later Administration, presided over by Mr. Churchill, continued
+efforts were necessary, and were made, and steps were also taken with
+a view to meeting the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord
+Beresford had for some years been pointing out how essential it was to
+add largely to our programmes of light cruisers and destroyers.
+
+So much for construction in pre-War days when the Germans were carrying
+out their Navy Acts, one following the other in rapid succession.
+
+It is also of interest to note the part which Lord Fisher took in
+building up the Fleet organisation that existed in 1914. He introduced
+the system of manning the older ships, not in the first line, with
+nucleus crews composed of the principal officers and ratings. These
+ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very short
+time, into a condition in which they were fit to fight. This system
+superseded the old arrangement, by which ships not in full commission
+were not manned at all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the
+total number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was minimised
+by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably accepted now that in the
+circumstances existing at the time the nucleus crew system is far
+preferable; it raised the general standard of the whole Navy in British
+waters, and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Reserves
+on the outbreak of war.
+
+
+I.--THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND FLEET
+
+In the organisation existing before the War, the Home Fleets comprised
+the First, Second and Third Fleets--in fact, practically all ships in
+home waters which it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war.
+
+The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home Fleets into two
+parts.
+
+The _First_, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet, comprising the
+latest-built ships; the force stationed at Harwich; four ships of the
+6th Battle Squadron; the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second
+and Third Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from the
+Second Fleet.
+
+The _Second_, or Channel Fleet, included the older battleships, the
+5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, the 5th and 7th Cruiser
+Squadrons, and a sweeping flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was
+commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, when
+he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of the Grand Fleet.
+
+Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and
+the 5th Cruiser Squadron were manned before mobilisation with nucleus
+crews, and were consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at
+Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons and 7th Cruiser
+Squadron were not manned until mobilisation, and the crews consequently
+required training. This training was carried out near Plymouth, and
+the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command on September 3rd,
+1914.
+
+The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed as a look-out force
+in the Straits of Dover during the time that the Channel Battle Fleet
+was patrolling to guard the passage of the Expeditionary Force. They
+were subsequently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and
+three of them, the _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, were sunk whilst
+patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast.
+
+These, then, were the conditions when War opened. It was only natural
+that war experience should show very quickly the many directions
+in which we had to recast, or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to
+introduce new arrangements.
+
+Peace manœuvres, however useful, can never be a substitute for war
+experience. They are many factors which render peace manœuvres unreal.
+In the first place, the available ships have to be divided so as
+to form the opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far
+greater moment, the manœuvres occupy much too short a period, and
+many of the difficulties affecting both _matériel_ and personnel are
+not experienced; thirdly, the conditions of war cannot be reproduced
+without serious inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships;
+finally, in our own manœuvres there was a tendency in the rules to give
+the torpedo less than its proper value as a fighting weapon.
+
+But, more than all, it was the conditions under which war broke out
+that made it necessary for us in the Grand Fleet to build up what was
+almost a new organisation.
+
+(_a_) The submarine had just become a most formidable weapon; its
+development during the War was extraordinarily rapid.
+
+(_b_) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the start, but
+it also developed with great rapidity, as did the heavier-than-air
+machines.
+
+(_c_) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly developed by the
+enemy, both defensively and offensively.
+
+(_d_) The effective range both of the gun and of the torpedo was
+quickly shown to be much greater than had been considered possible
+before the War.[C]
+
+(_e_) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, and was put to
+many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days.
+
+    [C] In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out
+        at a maximum range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one
+        occasion, when the _Colossus_ fired at a target at 14,000
+        yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded.
+
+On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having the Fleet
+concentrated at the outbreak of war. People had often pictured war with
+Germany coming as a bolt from the blue, and even naval officers feared
+that when the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously
+been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might lead the
+Government to delay concentration with the result that our squadrons
+would be separated when war was actually declared. Fortunately, the
+Admiralty in the last days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong
+strategic position. For this action the nation should be grateful to
+the First Lord and First Sea Lord.
+
+It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, there
+was general expectation that a great Fleet action would at once be
+fought. No doubt this arose, partly, from the boastings of German naval
+officers in pre-War days, and partly from a knowledge of the great
+sacrifices the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively
+our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult to imagine that
+the High Sea Fleet (built at vast expense, and rightly considered
+by the enemy to be an efficient weapon of war) would adopt from
+the outset a purely passive rôle, with the inevitable result that
+German trade would be swept from the seas. But there were two factors
+tending to make the High Command adopt this course. First, there was
+the fear that action with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High
+Sea Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into Allied
+hands, with a consequent landing of Russian troops on German soil as
+the result. This fear had been present in the German mind ever since
+the days of Frederick the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during
+the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt, was that the German
+High Command realised that, if Germany adopted a defensive rôle with
+her Fleet, it created, by far, the most difficult situation for us.
+Repugnant as this might be to high-spirited German naval officers, it
+was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for, whilst the German High
+Sea Fleet remained “in being” as a fighting force, we could not afford
+to undertake operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particularly
+in the earlier period of the War when our margin of superiority at
+Germany’s “selected moment” was not great. The main disadvantage to
+the Germans, _apart from their loss of trade_, lay in the inevitable
+gradual weakening of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it
+is highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end responsible
+for the series of mutinies which broke out in the High Sea Fleet during
+1917 and 1918, culminating in the final catastrophe in November, 1918.
+In my view, the passive rôle was carried much too far.
+
+
+II.--THE STAFF ORGANISATION
+
+To pass to the development of the organisation.
+
+Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff work. In the days
+before the War, the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets
+consisted of the following officers:
+
+(_a_) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander, Flag-Lieutenant,
+and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was also, in a sense, on the Personal
+Staff.
+
+(_b_) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the Fleet with his
+Secretary, a Wireless officer, a Signal officer, and the clerical staff
+of the Secretary.
+
+In addition, the organisation provided for the appointment of two War
+Staff officers, on mobilisation for war.
+
+This was the Staff which, together with an additional Signal officer, I
+found in the _Iron Duke_, on assuming command of the Grand Fleet.
+
+It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir George Callaghan in
+December, 1914 (as was originally arranged before the War broke out, as
+I have explained), to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational
+side of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only for the
+Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my opinion, sufficient
+work and responsibility to occupy his whole time; and I had prepared
+an organisation of the Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with
+which the work should be divided into two distinct branches, the
+operations and the _matériel_ side, each with a secretariat. I had
+communicated my views to the officers selected for the Staff. This, in
+my judgment, was the correct line for any Naval Staff organisation, and
+it was later introduced by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff.
+
+When informed, just prior to the declaration of War, that I might be
+required to take over the command of the Fleet, I decided to ask, as
+the first step, for the services of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as
+Chief of the Staff.
+
+I had brought with me from London on my own Staff, as Second in Command
+of the Grand Fleet, a Captain (Captain Bentinck), with the title of
+Captain on the Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a
+Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and a Signal
+Boatswain. These, with the exception of Captain Bentinck (who joined
+Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender’s Staff), I took to the _Iron Duke_,
+and my Staff then comprised:
+
+  A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff.
+  A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet.
+  Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff.
+  A Flag-Lieutenant.
+  Three Signal officers.
+  Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two).
+  Three War Staff officers.
+  Two Signal Boatswains.
+  A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff.
+
+The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat with a
+suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this difficulty was
+somewhat serious when I doubled the staff on board the _Iron Duke_.
+However, it was successfully overcome. The Staff was organised into
+two branches--Operations and _Matériel_--the former directly under
+the Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Captain of
+the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the work of the Captain of
+the Fleet became, of necessity, very largely reduced, and he joined
+the operational side, arrangements being made by which either he or
+the Chief of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as
+we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on the advent of
+the submarine as an important factor in naval warfare, that it was
+essential that an officer should be constantly on the bridge who could
+take immediate action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as
+might be required.
+
+Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief was so frequently
+required, at a moment’s notice, owing to the swiftness with which a
+modern fleet moves, that I never left my sea cabin, which was under the
+bridge, to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was at sea.
+
+The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as already stated, under
+two headings. This division, as is clear from the above remarks,
+affected their duties in harbour more than when at sea. In the
+latter case the two branches combined, and the whole staff became
+“operational.”
+
+The Staff work under these conditions was carried out in the war-room,
+situated under protection, below the conning tower. Here the movements
+of our own ships were recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we
+were nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the bridge to this
+centre by the Signal officers, and the situation at any moment could be
+seen by a glance at the charts kept by the War Staff officer on duty.
+
+When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters, the work was
+shifted from the war-room to the Admiral’s shelter on the bridge, so
+that the situation could be seen by me more readily; and finally, when,
+as on May 31st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were nearing
+touch with one another, the “plot” of the movements as reported was
+continually under my observation.
+
+At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers engaged on the
+operational side were following the movements of such enemy vessels
+(chiefly, of course, submarines) as were known to be at sea, as well
+as those of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to
+ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet each other at
+night--when risk of collision would be incurred owing to ships not
+carrying lights, or in thick weather.) They put into execution the
+orders given by myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged in
+elaborating plans of future movements and drawing up the necessary
+orders for such movements as I had in contemplation. They were also
+engaged in arranging all gunnery, torpedo and other practices and
+exercises, and in the constant work of the production, revision and
+issue of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the Fleet.
+
+On the _matériel_ side, the Staff work comprised that of storing,
+provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions of instruction,
+training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits and repairs, etc.
+
+In action each member of the Staff had his own particular duty allotted
+to him. The secretaries took notes and recorded proceedings; certain
+officers had as their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me
+every movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to attend
+solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy, keeping me informed of
+their progress and of their possibilities; another dealt with all
+questions relating to concentration or distribution of fire, bringing
+to my notice any signals required to give effect to our preconceived
+arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty, one being
+responsible that all signals for tactical movements made visually
+were also made by “short distance” wireless telegraphy. One wireless
+officer worked in the main office and one in the auxiliary office.
+The Staff was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief free to
+take a comprehensive survey of the whole position, whilst ensuring
+that nothing that should be done was left undone. It must, however,
+be realised that the rapidity of movement of fleets is so great
+that, at critical moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the
+Flag Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make instant
+decisions; there is no time for consultation or for advice.
+
+
+III.--PREPARATION OF CRUISING ORDERS
+
+One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand Fleet after
+the declaration of War was to lay down definitely the various
+cruising orders for the Battle Fleet and its “look-out” screen of
+battle-cruisers, cruisers and light cruisers. There had been much
+discussion for some years before the War as to the best disposition of
+cruisers ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that had
+been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but war experience led
+to a series of diagrams being drawn up giving the cruising stations of
+all the various classes of cruisers and other light craft under the
+different conditions that might exist. These included diagrams showing
+the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards enemy waters,
+under conditions of ordinary visibility, by day, or in low visibility
+by day, both with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in company and without
+it; a similar diagram when moving away from enemy water by day (this
+being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack by destroyers
+as the fleet steered away from enemy waters); diagrams were got out
+for steering towards or away from enemy waters at night; and, finally,
+diagrams were prepared, both for day and night, for the dispositions of
+the cruisers and other light forces after an action.
+
+Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle Fleet itself, both
+by day and at night, were similarly drawn up. Some of these were
+specially designed to give such safety from submarine attack as was
+possible to the main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of
+destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of fuel, or other
+causes. The dispositions for use at night provided for the use of
+destroyer attack, and were designed to give safety from collision, due
+to squadrons inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when
+showing no lights; this was a very possible event during the course
+of a long night when a very slight error in steering, or a slight
+difference in compasses, will rapidly bring two squadrons together that
+started the night five miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons
+separated, as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful
+submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons gave greater
+freedom of movement in the case of destroyer attack. At the same time
+it was necessary to provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at
+daylight.
+
+The question of submarine screens was taken up at the commencement of
+war. This matter had naturally been considered before the War, but was
+in its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition of a
+screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter when there is no
+lack of destroyers, the case is different when a fleet is very short
+of the requisite number, as was our experience, and one destroyer had
+often to be disposed to endeavour to do the work of two.
+
+Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore, drawn up to meet the
+different conditions resulting from the presence of varying numbers of
+destroyers, or a decreased number of ships requiring to be screened,
+and also providing for the ships being in various formations. In
+November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was seventeen.
+
+Early in the War the danger of successful submarine attack on warships
+at sea, whether in company or proceeding singly, had impressed on us
+the necessity of taking every precaution for safety, and the practice
+of the fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally
+adopted in accordance with my directions. In the case of a fleet or
+squadron, the usual practice was to carry out the alterations of course
+by turning the ships together; occasionally the turn was made “in
+succession,” but this was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns
+were occasionally made at fixed time intervals without signal.
+
+Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner in which officers
+of watches kept station in a fleet, since there is no better practice
+than keeping station on a line of bearing, a far more difficult matter
+to the novice than keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute
+the excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915 and 1916
+very largely to this early experience. Much theoretical investigation
+was instituted to determine the method of zigzagging, both in a fleet
+and in a single ship, which gave the greatest protection against
+submarine attack, and actual experiments took place with our own
+submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions; the flag
+officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance in this as in all
+other matters.
+
+The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the instructions
+subsequently issued to merchant ships, and the value of zigzagging
+in reducing the danger of submarine attack was clearly shown during
+the year 1917 by the comparative immunity of merchant ships that
+complied with the orders as compared with those that did not do so.
+Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship into danger, but
+this was exceptional as compared with the general immunity given.
+
+When the convoying of merchant ships through the submarine zone was
+instituted in 1917, after I had returned to the Admiralty, the Grand
+Fleet experience was again of value in the preparation of instructions.
+
+The supremely important question of how best to handle in action the
+large and increasing Fleet engaged my attention from the commencement.
+In drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of the Fleet,
+both when cruising and in action, I availed myself of the advice and
+assistance of the experienced flag officers commanding the various
+Squadrons. Much discussion took place on these matters, and many of the
+dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual experiment at sea
+before being incorporated in the orders.
+
+The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle Fleet from its
+cruising formation was a matter of the greatest importance, and
+constant practice in carrying out this manœuvre under every varying
+condition was given to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were
+introduced having as their object the simplification and shortening of
+the manœuvre, with a view to bringing the heaviest possible fire to
+bear on the enemy’s fleet as quickly as possible. Orders were drawn
+up to meet cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy might
+be sighted at short range, and immediate independent action by a
+divisional Flag Officer would be necessary.
+
+In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of the Fleet for
+action was complicated by the presence of the 3rd Battle Squadron of
+pre-Dreadnoughts--the vessels of the “King Edward VII.” class--as the
+speed of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less than that
+of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured to solve this problem
+by practical experience. Much depended on the tactics likely to be
+adopted by the enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty lay in the
+fact that if the 3rd Battle Squadron was placed on one flank of the
+Battle Fleet when in cruising order and deployment towards that flank
+became necessary in conformity with an enemy movement, thus placing
+the slow 3rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the whole
+Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14 knots, in order to have
+the necessary reserve of speed in hand. If, on the other hand, the
+3rd Battle Squadron was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet
+speed was again reduced to that attainable by this squadron. It was
+desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle Fleet which would
+admit of the 3rd Battle Squadron being in the rear after deployment,
+in whichever direction deployment took place. There was still the
+objection, which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced
+upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the van.
+
+The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre-Dreadnought
+Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought Squadrons, with a view to the
+slow squadron turning in the opposite direction to the remainder on
+deployment, and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought
+Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the 3rd Battle
+Squadron into effective action.
+
+[Illustration: Plan N^{o.} 1]
+
+The question was not one of importance subsequent to April, 1915, from
+which date our superiority in battleships of the Dreadnought type was
+sufficient to give me confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under
+suitable conditions, could be crushed in action without the aid of
+the 3rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter of 1914–15, when our
+superiority in Dreadnoughts was frequently very slight, and the enemy
+possessed two pre-Dreadnought Battle Squadrons, our 3rd Battle
+Squadron was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet.
+
+The Battle Orders indicated the position to be occupied by our
+battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers on deployment,
+as well as that of the fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of
+ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the
+Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued shortly after war
+commenced were modelled on a Battle memorandum which I had prepared
+when in command, first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd
+Battle Squadron. But the changing situation soon made alterations and
+additions necessary, and the Orders were under constant revision.
+
+The tactics to be pursued by the different units of the Fleet in action
+under all conceivable conditions were provided for as far as possible.
+
+Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that the
+Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after deployment control
+the movements of all the squadrons comprising that fleet under the
+conditions of modern action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the
+great length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, and
+increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity for wide
+decentralisation of command, _after the deployment_ of the fleet for
+action, was emphasised.
+
+As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid on this
+point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, of course, kept
+fully acquainted with the general ideas under which the Fleet would
+act, so that they might be able to interpret my wishes when acting
+independently. Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close
+watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that squadrons
+could conform to his movements. The general lines on which I intended
+to engage were defined. These included the range at which it was
+intended to open the engagement, the range below which it was not
+intended to close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks to
+be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to this rule which
+might become necessary. Emphasis was laid on the supreme necessity for
+a free use of our own torpedoes when opportunity occurred.
+
+After the experience of the engagement on January 24th, 1915, between
+the battle-cruisers, and especially as our superiority increased and
+the High Sea Fleet gave no sign of a desire to engage, the conviction
+became stronger than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy
+would fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of
+tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines and torpedoes,
+_since a retiring fleet is in a position of great tactical advantage in
+the employment of these weapons_. The Tactical Board was in constant
+use for a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the other
+flag officers.
+
+In the earliest stages of the War, when the German submarine strength
+was not great, one of the main problems to be considered in regard to
+a fleet action was the employment of our destroyers and light cruisers
+to attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to counter his
+similar attacks, which, owing to his great superiority in destroyers,
+was a matter of supreme importance. The knowledge, too, that his light
+cruisers and destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships,
+were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with us) made it
+necessary to take into account the probability that he would use this
+form of attack at the commencement of a general action, or during
+the stages leading up to it. Later, when his submarines increased
+in number, the method of countering the use of such vessels by the
+enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action, had also to be
+considered, particularly as it was not until 1916 that the Grand Fleet
+was provided with any submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that
+submarines which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea became part of
+the organisation.
+
+The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo attack by the enemy,
+if the fleets were approximately abeam of one another, and the risks
+run by the centre and rear were pointed out, as were the different
+conditions produced in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had a
+position of torpedo advantage.
+
+The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater as the War
+progressed, owing to the advance made in the technique of these
+weapons. Before the opening of hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had
+a maximum range of about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements in our
+torpedoes as the War progressed, including a great increase in range,
+and we had every reason to believe that the Germans were making similar
+progress, and that the range of their torpedoes was as much in excess
+of the pre-War range as was that of our own weapons.
+
+The threat of successful torpedo attack even from battleships in the
+line was, therefore, an important factor to be taken into account,
+with the ships of the opposing fleets formed in single line at the
+close intervals which are necessary for successful co-operation and
+the concentration of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation
+into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet action was
+constantly proceeding, but the single line, or a modification of it,
+was, under most conditions, the best that could be devised.
+
+It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be manœuvred for
+advantage in gunnery position, it might be necessary to engage under
+unfavourable gunnery conditions in order to prevent the enemy reaching
+his own waters.
+
+Several new manœuvres were introduced and practised by the Fleet with
+a view to countering possible tactics on the part of the enemy. These
+included a “turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious attack
+by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the course of the Fleet
+without impairing its organisation to meet enemy tactics necessitating
+such a move; rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other
+new tactical methods were introduced as time progressed to meet the
+changing conditions of modern warfare.
+
+Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the conduct of the Fleet
+after an action, so far as it was possible to foresee the conditions
+that might arise. The object was to arrange to continue the attack by
+light craft, whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter-attack
+by light forces.
+
+In the orders which were issued for the guidance of the destroyers both
+before, during, and after an action, endeavour was made to provide for
+all these contingencies. The stations of the flotillas, including the
+Harwich flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each had
+its particular duties assigned to it. General directions were given for
+the employment of the destroyers, wide latitude being reserved to the
+officers commanding flotillas.
+
+The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for.
+
+The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser, cruiser and light
+cruiser when in cruising order, or in action, or after an action, were
+defined, particular emphasis being laid on the necessity for ships in
+the van, when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advantage in
+regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the same time engaging
+enemy vessels of a similar class and preventing torpedo attacks on our
+own Battle Fleet from developing.
+
+Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the General Cruiser
+Instructions, that after gaining touch with the enemy the first
+essential was to maintain that touch. Instructions were also given that
+in the event of the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our
+Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were to push
+on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It will be seen later
+that this situation arose during the Jutland battle.
+
+The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the principle that _in
+action_ their primary function was the destruction of the similar enemy
+vessels if present, and, after their destruction or in their absence,
+to attack the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their
+duty was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle Fleet,
+whilst denying similar information to the enemy. The Vice-Admiral
+commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was given a free hand to carry out
+these general instructions.
+
+The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the ships of the “Queen
+Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to provide for the battle-cruisers
+being either absent or present. In the former event, this squadron
+took the place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our
+battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle Squadron was
+ordered to take station ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet
+in the case of a deployment towards Heligoland, and in rear of the
+Battle Fleet in the case of deployment _away from_ Heligoland. The
+object of this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet at
+a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after deployment. In
+order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron to carry out its functions in
+action, it was stationed between the Cruiser Line and the main Battle
+Fleet when in cruising order.
+
+The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their duties in action
+as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers and torpedo craft, to
+support our destroyers, and to attack the enemy’s battle line with
+torpedoes. For this purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were
+required to be in the van on deployment.
+
+The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the fact that
+they should carry out an early attack on the enemy’s Battle Fleet,
+commencing their attacks in clear weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet
+were engaged. Under conditions of low visibility, they were instructed
+to attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be engaged. It was
+pointed out that destroyers closing the enemy’s Battle Fleet for the
+purpose of an attack were also in the best position for preventing
+successful attacks on our own fleets.
+
+As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the Grand Fleet, in
+1916, instructions for their conduct before, during, and after action
+were drawn up. Instructions for two other classes of vessel, namely,
+mine-layers and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of
+the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having been attached to the
+Fleet from the commencement of War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing,
+however, but slow speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during
+1915.
+
+
+IV.--THE TRAINING OF THE FLEET
+
+Inseparable from the question of the management of the Fleet before
+and during action was that of the working together of its units at sea
+by day and at night. This matter was, of course, one to which great
+attention had been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he handed
+over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine trained to a very
+high pitch of perfection by an officer who was a past master in fleet
+training.
+
+But it was inevitable that war conditions should make even greater
+demands on the skill of the personnel than had previously been
+necessary, and in no direction was this more necessary than at night,
+the number of ships in company being far greater than had previously
+been usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling added to
+the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, fleets cruising
+on dark, stormy nights without showing any lights, did so for
+comparatively short periods, during which the more experienced officers
+could, to a certain extent, remain on deck.
+
+Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed more than a very
+dim light at the stern, and frequently not even that, adding greatly
+to difficulties of fleet cruising. Consequently provision had to be
+made for ensuring safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and
+considerable foresight and great skill on the part of officers was
+necessary.
+
+Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility pass close
+to one another during hours of darkness were warned beforehand of the
+danger, and arrangements made so that they should be aware of each
+other’s positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions so as
+to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which otherwise might
+open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all sorts were similarly warned so
+far as this was possible, but in their case the conditions, owing to
+difficulties of communication, were frequently much more embarrassing.
+
+Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night had to be such as
+to reduce to a minimum the necessity for signals, whilst giving freedom
+of action in an emergency. What applied to conditions of darkness
+applied equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring safety
+in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, could not as a rule be
+employed, since the blasts might give warning to the enemy and place
+the Fleet open to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the
+other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in close company
+with the larger ships for screening purposes against submarines led,
+in the case of sudden fog, to a difficult situation, as, before the
+Fleet could safely carry out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the
+destroyers clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by the
+large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued to meet all these
+conditions, and the best testimony to the training of the Fleet prior
+to the War was the remarkable freedom from accident during the early
+months after the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly
+commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by no means handy
+vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation, was also a source of
+great gratification to me, and must have been most satisfactory to the
+officers and men concerned.
+
+The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly in light
+craft, the higher speeds attained by its units, the extreme importance
+of reducing signalling by wireless at sea to an absolute minimum,
+except in the presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate
+attention on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements.
+Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to be stopped, because by
+means of _directional_ wireless stations the positions of ships using
+wireless telegraphy could be determined by the enemy. As time went on,
+we felt that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and in some
+cases even the _name_ of the ship so signalling. This we deduced from
+the fact that we ourselves made progress in this direction. The fact of
+a German fleet being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if
+much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally concluded that the
+enemy could similarly locate any of our squadrons using the same means
+of communication. That was an inevitable inference.
+
+The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in the first place,
+to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled and elaborate orders, to
+reduce the amount of signalling that would ordinarily be required after
+the Fleet had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the
+Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions that could be
+anticipated, and whilst this made the orders somewhat lengthy so as to
+meet every possibility, the object was achieved.
+
+Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea in daylight,
+arrangements were made to pass signals in and out between the most
+advanced cruisers and the Fleet Flagship by searchlight, except in the
+presence of the enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time
+occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet manœuvring when
+much to the southward of the latitude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of
+Aberdeen, was also carried out by visual signalling.
+
+Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the Fleet to
+enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not possible to use visual
+signalling at night, except with carefully shaded lamps which were
+only visible at a distance of about a quarter of a mile, and then only
+by the ship addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at
+night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort had then
+to be made to wireless, but by signalling before dark all expected
+movements during the night, and by arranging the course of the Fleet
+so that few alterations were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost
+absolute wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when important
+information from the Admiralty and elsewhere was to be transmitted to
+the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior officers of squadrons, or to single
+ships when at sea engaged in operations, etc., and early in the War
+we had to devise a method by which this could be done without calling
+up the ships in question by wireless, thus necessitating a reply from
+them, and thus possibly acquainting the enemy of their position.
+
+After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of communicating
+the required information without causing the ship herself to
+divulge her position was devised by the Fleet Wireless officer,
+Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and
+gradually was greatly extended during the later stages of the War.
+
+It must not be thought that, because wireless signalling at sea
+was restricted, it was not intended to make full use of it when
+necessary and when silence was no longer required, such as when the
+fleets were within sight of one another. On the contrary, a great
+advance was made during the War in the use of wireless telegraphy for
+manœuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in every other direction. So
+proficient did the ships become under the organisation introduced
+by Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very
+efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in 1916
+I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as much ease and
+rapidity as by visual signals. At the beginning of the War ten minutes
+to a quarter of an hour would elapse before I could be sure that all
+ships had received a manœuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole
+Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to three minutes.
+This great improvement was due to new methods introduced, as well as to
+incessant practice in harbour.
+
+Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was very considerable
+indeed, and I owed a great debt of gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander
+Nicholson, the other wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and
+the wireless officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress
+was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme shortage of wireless
+personnel for the expanding Fleet and the large number of auxiliary
+vessels commissioned, we were forced to discharge many of the best
+operators in the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by
+boys trained in the Wireless School established by the Fleet at Scapa
+Flow.
+
+A point which war experience brought into considerable prominence
+was the difficulty of distinguishing, with sufficient rapidity,
+enemy vessels from our own ships both before, and, more particularly
+during, action. The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but
+was greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. Steps were
+taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrangements made for certain
+distinguishing marks visible at long distances to be worn during
+daylight by our own surface vessels. The question of identification at
+night was more difficult, and although we effected improvement in this
+respect also, the results were not so satisfactory.
+
+Of the original experimental work carried out by the Fleet at Scapa
+Flow none was more important than that connected with the safety of
+ships from mines. Early in the War it had become obvious that there was
+danger of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful mine
+attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work of the mine-sweepers;
+these vessels could not work far afield, and in bad weather could not
+work even close to their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to
+proceed to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable.
+
+A solution of this difficulty was required. Commander Cecil V. Usborne,
+of the _Colossus_, in these circumstances proposed to me the trial of
+an apparatus which he suggested should be towed from the bows of ships;
+it was intended to fend off any mine encountered, provided the ship did
+not strike it absolutely “end on.” I ordered immediate trials; all the
+necessary _matériel_ was provided with Fleet labour and appliances,
+and starting with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until
+a series of experiments commenced in large ships, battleships and
+cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A. L. Duff and A. C. Leveson in charge
+of the experiments and great progress was made, although absolute
+success was not obtained.
+
+Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, visited
+the base at this juncture, and, knowing his inventive turn of mind,
+I discussed the matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant
+Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for effecting the required
+object. His idea was to utilise apparatus which he had devised earlier
+for other purposes. His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than
+that devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the manufacture
+of appliances by outside manufacturers. I urged the Admiralty to take
+up the question at once; this was done, and the experiments, started
+at Portsmouth, were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as preliminary
+success had been obtained.
+
+The two devices were then tried over a considerable period at Scapa
+Flow, still under the immediate direction of Rear-Admirals Duff
+and Leveson, who threw themselves wholeheartedly into the task,
+Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional
+absence. After many disappointments the Burney system was proved to be
+successful, and I at once requested that manufacture on a large scale
+should be proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate character,
+and many persons at first were sceptical as to its value, owing partly
+to early difficulties in manipulation. But Rear-Admirals Duff and
+Leveson rendered the greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and
+gradually it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had become possessed
+of a most valuable safeguard. By the time I relinquished the Command a
+very large number of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and
+some light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working well.
+Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improvement was constantly being
+effected, with the result that during 1917 the fitting was universal.
+During that year it was instrumental in saving several warships from
+damage by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was also
+considerable.
+
+The initial idea was that of Commander Usborne, and both he and
+Lieutenant Burney displayed much energy in working out their respective
+devices. But it was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final
+success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson eventually brought
+the appliance to perfection, with the result that it was generally
+adopted. A modified arrangement of the same nature was fitted to
+merchant ships during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value.
+
+As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early stage of my Command
+to the necessity for constant improvement in the fighting efficiency
+of the Grand Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was
+considerable, left me under no delusions as to its character. I had
+made it my business to keep myself very fully acquainted with German
+progress. I had first been brought into close touch with the modern
+German Navy during service in China from 1899 to 1902, which included
+the Boxer campaign, when I saw a great deal of its officers and men.
+I had then formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent
+touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had convinced me that in
+_matériel_ the Germans were ahead of us, and that the personnel, though
+lacking the initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the
+British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and trained. I knew
+also that the German Fleet was in no way short of officers; this was
+the case with us owing to the constant political pressure in the years
+before the War, and I expected that this shortage of officers would be
+a great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch of the German
+Navy from which I expected very good work was the destroyer service. I
+had seen German destroyers manœuvring.
+
+Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our officers, how efficient
+was the gunnery and torpedo work of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid
+had been its advance in the year or two before the War. A great
+increase had been made in the allowance of ammunition for practice.
+Before the War this was much higher than our own, and there was no
+doubt in my mind that the German allowance would be well expended.
+Indeed, we had obtained information which placed this beyond question.
+
+I was well acquainted personally with many of the flag officers and
+captains in the German Navy and had some idea of their views on naval
+warfare. Amongst those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl, the
+then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral von Lans,
+commanding a Battle Squadron, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval
+Staff, who later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral von
+Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Commander-in-Chief of the
+High Sea Fleet, who succeeded Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval
+Staff, and Admiral von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore
+batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowledge of these
+officers led me to expect good work in the High Command, and I also
+expected that they would be well supported.
+
+It is interesting to record that I took part in a Conference of Allied
+naval officers in a pagoda at the end of the Great Wall of China in
+company with Admiral von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain
+in China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts, in 1900,
+and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me as Chief of the Staff to
+Admiral--afterwards Admiral of the Fleet--Sir Edward Seymour, when I
+was wounded during the international expedition for the relief of the
+Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on several subsequent
+occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans, who was in command of the
+_Iltis_ at the capture of the Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer
+campaign.
+
+My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong reason, had no others
+existed, for making me desirous of doing all that was possible to
+increase our own gunnery and torpedo efficiency.
+
+The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground in Kiel Bay, with
+every appliance for carrying out gunnery exercises, and I felt sure
+that they had rendered it safe from any hostile attack, and that the
+German Fleet would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as
+time progressed.
+
+We were not in so fortunate a position. There had been no recent
+opportunity for carrying out gunnery and torpedo exercises and
+practices; Scapa Flow had not been used as a base for such work in
+peace time, except for destroyers, and consequently no facilities
+existed there, although the proximity of Cromarty, which _had_ been a
+Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a certain extent
+at a later period. But there was no protected area outside the harbour
+where practices could be carried out in safety, and the harbour itself
+was not at first secure against submarine attack. Much use, however,
+was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty later when submarine
+obstructions had been provided, and the Germans had obligingly laid
+a mine-field which protected the practice area from seaward. At the
+commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to depend on fleet
+resources for the provision of targets for gunnery practices, and the
+practices themselves were carried out under conditions which laid the
+ships open to submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the
+work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity provided by
+constant sea work in the first months of the War was, however, utilised
+to carry out such gunnery practices as the conditions admitted.
+
+At first the custom was for the Fleet to use small targets which the
+ships carried with them. These were unsuitable; their small size
+rendered them frequently invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea,
+and I felt that the Fleet could not make progress under such conditions.
+
+Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted to, but no really
+suitable rocks existed, and, in any case, practice at them eventually
+involved too much risk of submarine attack, as the German submarines
+began to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards the end
+of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase in the number of
+destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to the provision of submarine
+obstructions at Cromarty, to carry out gunnery practices at long ranges
+at targets in the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that
+period.
+
+Later still, battle practice targets were brought to Scapa Flow, and
+the long-range firing was carried out in the Pentland Firth, a still
+more convenient place.
+
+Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for all the preliminary
+gunnery practices which could be carried out with guns up to 6-inch
+in calibre, and also for night firing and for torpedo work. The
+fine stretch of water was secure from submarine attack after the
+obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise by day and
+night without danger of attack. The Flow was simply invaluable for this
+purpose. Ships were firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control
+exercises, carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing with
+attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight until dark.
+
+After dark, night firing was frequently carried out, and occasionally
+a division of battleships was exercised in steaming in company, without
+lights, in order to give the officers of watches practice. When the
+constant sea work of the earlier months of the War gave place to
+occasional cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of the Fleet
+was maintained at a remarkably high standard as a result of the work in
+Scapa Flow.
+
+During the period 1914–16 a marked advance was undoubtedly made in
+gunnery efficiency. At an early period of the War a memorandum was
+issued pointing out the necessity for increased attention to drill
+and organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon, and it was
+obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers and men. I knew that we
+had to deal with an enemy who would be as perfect as constant drill
+could ensure.
+
+A great extension of the system of Director Firing, by which one
+officer or man could lay and fire all the guns, was made. The situation
+in this respect before the War was that a few ships had been fitted for
+the system, which had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a
+very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value compared
+with the alternative system; there was considerable opposition to it,
+and the great majority of the ships were not fitted. In some cases the
+system was not favoured even in the ships provided with it.
+
+It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out competitive trials of the
+Director System and the alternative system already in use, and the
+results of these trials had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion
+of the great value of the Director System. I was able to press these
+views on my return to the Admiralty at the end of 1912 as Second Sea
+Lord, and it was then decided to provide all the later ships with the
+arrangement. Little progress had, however, been made when the War
+broke out, only eight battleships having been fitted.
+
+Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the assistance of Sir Percy
+Scott and the warm support of Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by
+which the battleships and battle-cruisers were supplied with this
+system, without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard for
+the purpose. The necessary instruments were manufactured at various
+contractors’ shops, and the very laborious task of fitting them, and
+the heavy electric cables, on board the ships was carried out by
+electricians sent to the various bases. The complicated work naturally
+took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays occurred; but
+gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy Scott rendering invaluable
+assistance at headquarters.
+
+As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy guns mounted in
+turrets, and by the date of the Battle of Jutland there were few ships
+that were not supplied with the system, although six of those last
+fitted had not had much experience with it.
+
+The conditions under which that action was fought converted any
+waverers at once to a firm belief in the Director System, and there was
+never afterwards any doubt expressed as to its great value.
+
+Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work, and the system
+was extended to smaller vessels. This had been the intention even
+before the action, but there were then still many who were unconvinced.
+However, during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was pressed
+forward, and the system became universal for all guns and in all
+classes of ships.
+
+The improvement in what may be termed the application of existing
+methods of fire control may now be mentioned. Throughout the War
+we had gradually, as the result of practice, increased greatly the
+effective range at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid
+on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the target in
+order to obtain early hits. Improvement was perhaps most rapid in the
+five or six months following the Jutland action. In this action the
+Fire Control Instruments, as adopted in the Service, which were the
+outcome of the work of naval officers, were found to meet the gunnery
+requirements most successfully. The only important improvement that was
+made was the provision of additional means for keeping the observation
+of Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Various
+committees were formed immediately after the battle in order that full
+advantage might be taken at once of our experience. The result was the
+introduction of new rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition
+to greatly increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered it
+difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment by dodging tactics.
+
+[Illustration: SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS]
+
+[Illustration: A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915]
+
+In order to cope more successfully with the latter development, more
+experiments were ordered, having as their object the determination of
+the inclination of the enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and
+various methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended to the
+Fleet. The most promising at the time that I relinquished command of
+the Fleet was that proposed by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N.,
+the range-finding expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this
+inclination problem for some years. A great increase in the rapidity
+with which the fall of shot were “spotted on” to a target resulted from
+all this work. It is not too much to say that the interval between
+opening fire and the moment at which the salvoes began to “straddle”
+the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of fire when the
+enemy was “straddled” was very greatly increased. The new firing rules,
+by standardising the system of correcting fire, produced a marked
+increase in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two
+ships was concentrated on to one target and generally paved the way for
+the solution of many gunnery problems which the Fleet had previously
+been unable to solve completely.
+
+The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as a result of our
+experience of the German use of this device. Prolonged experiments were
+carried out at Scapa Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best
+method of using smoke screens, and they were also used during battle
+tactics and during range-finder exercises. The trials included the use
+of smoke shell as well as funnel and artificial smoke.
+
+In another direction efforts were made to increase efficiency. The
+Jutland battle convinced us that our armour-piercing shell was inferior
+in its penetrative power to that used by the Germans, and immediately
+after the action I represented this with a view to immediate
+investigation. A Committee sat to consider the matter. In 1917, as
+First Sea Lord, I appointed a second Committee.
+
+With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of a particular
+calibre as used at Jutland the shell would, with oblique impact at
+battle range, _break up whilst holing a certain thickness of plate_,
+and the shell could not, therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s
+ships. A shell of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee,
+of the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and range _pass
+whole through a plate of double the thickness_ before exploding and
+could therefore with delay action fuse penetrate to the magazines of a
+capital ship. Had our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing
+shell at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being
+only damaged, would probably not have been able to reach port. The
+manufacture of these new type shells for the Fleet was well advanced
+before the end of 1917.
+
+The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in action, from ships,
+from destroyers, and from submarines, was also greatly increased. The
+torpedo practices at Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character,
+were of the greatest possible use.
+
+The real cause underlying the improvement was the great keenness
+displayed by officers and men. Their one idea was to strive for the
+highest efficiency, and there was never apparent the least sign of
+weariness or staleness in repeating time after time exercises and
+practices with which they were so familiar. No tribute that I can
+pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in this connection could be
+sufficiently high. I know that under my successor the improvement in
+fighting efficiency continued.
+
+Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel of the German Navy,
+culminating in the surrender for internment of the majority of their
+capital ships, the Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in
+action the methods adopted as a result of our experience during the
+first two years of war, and perfected by two years’ further training.
+Had the German fleet come out to battle a terrible punishment awaited
+it!
+
+Mention has been made of the development of aircraft during the War.
+The possibilities resulting from the use of the air for reconnaissance
+work, for assisting in the direction of gunfire, and, finally, for
+offensive operations, were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but
+for a considerable period the lack of suitable machines hindered
+development. The first decisive step taken was the fitting out of the
+_Campania_, a passenger ship of the Cunard Line, as a sea-plane carrier
+to be attached to the Battle Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force
+and, later, the Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller
+vessels, the _Vindex_ and _Engadine_, carrying a few sea-planes. They
+had been used in operations in the Heligoland Bight, but without much
+success, owing to the difficulty experienced in getting sea-planes to
+rise from the water except in the finest weather.
+
+With the arrival of the _Campania_ at Scapa, we were able to
+investigate the difficulties attending the use of aircraft from ships
+as then fitted and to indicate the direction in which improvement was
+desirable and possible. It was apparent that little improvement could
+be expected so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from
+the water. The first step, therefore, was to improve the arrangements
+for flying off from the deck of the _Campania_. The ship returned to
+Liverpool at the end of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations
+might be effected; these were not completed until the late spring of
+1916; during the alterations, the _Campania_ was also, at my request,
+fitted to carry a kite balloon.
+
+The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite balloons had been
+demonstrated during the Dardanelles operations, and the _Menelaus_,
+kite balloon ship, was sent to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon
+obvious that we could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a
+fleet action unless they were flown from the ships themselves, and
+experiments were carried out, under the direction of Vice-Admiral
+Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the 4th Battle Squadron, having as
+their object the best method of fitting and using kite balloons from
+warships. Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one being
+that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand the tension of
+the balloon during strong winds. The Kite Balloon Section at Roehampton
+gradually solved the difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority
+of the flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided with kite
+balloons, and were experiencing their utility. From this beginning,
+great developments took place in providing vessels of all classes,
+including light cruisers, destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite
+balloons; the balloon was used in the case of the smaller vessels for
+anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the heavy ships it was
+used for observation and correction of fire.
+
+Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier had proceeded,
+but not with the same rapidity. It was evident to me in 1916 that for
+anti-Zeppelin work we should look towards the aeroplane flying from
+the deck, rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise
+from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe for the step,
+owing to the landing difficulty, and the first efforts of the Royal
+Naval Air Service lay in the direction of providing a type of sea-plane
+that would fly well off the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were
+fairly successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air craft
+machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until the aeroplane was
+adopted for the work; and this took place in 1917, when progress became
+rapid, and continued until the end of the War.
+
+There remains the question of the airship, which was also being
+developed during the period 1914–16, but as this matter was not within
+the province of the Fleet, it is unnecessary to touch upon it here.
+
+
+V.--THE BLOCKADE
+
+The story of the development of the Grand Fleet would be incomplete
+without reference to the Blockade, and, in particular, to the work
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. In the early days of the War, the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class--vessels
+at least twenty years old; and during August, 1914, the Admiralty
+commissioned three armed merchant ships, the _Mantua_, _Alsatian_ and
+_Oceanic_, to strengthen the squadron for blockade work; the latter
+ship was lost by shipwreck in September of that year.
+
+The Blockade in those early days was carried out by the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron and by the other cruiser squadrons attached to the Grand
+Fleet. During November, 1914, the ships of the “Edgar” class were
+withdrawn owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the ships’
+companies utilised to commission a number of additional armed merchant
+cruisers. By the end of December, 1914, the squadron consisted of
+eighteen ships, being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships.
+A very large proportion of the officers and men of the reconstituted
+10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mercantile Marine.
+
+The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels called for a
+considerable organisation for their maintenance; they were based on
+Liverpool for all the heavy work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced
+base at Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland Islands, was
+gradually developed, and obstructed against submarine attack. The work
+of organisation was carried out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded
+the squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stileman, the Senior
+Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom we were much indebted for hearty
+co-operation and efficient organisation at the base.
+
+The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting and boarding all
+vessels bound into or out of the northern entrance to the North Sea,
+and this work could obviously not be carried out in the face of the
+German submarines without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was
+greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examining vessel
+was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat. As the number of
+German submarines increased, the squadron was necessarily withdrawn
+to positions further removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the
+Blockade line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from the Orkneys
+and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to Iceland, and when freedom
+from ice rendered passage round the north of Iceland possible, ships
+operated in that neighbourhood.
+
+A careful organisation of the movements of the ships was necessary to
+cover such an immense area of the sea, and to provide that all ships
+should, as far as possible, be intercepted. Even in the case of ships
+of such large coal endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not
+possible to keep much more than one-half the number in commission on an
+average on the patrol line at the same time. The remainder were either
+in port refitting and refueling, or were _en route_ to and from the
+bases. The distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool was
+some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in the passage each way.
+
+[Illustration: _Plan N^{o.} 2._
+
+    Chart showing in pecked lines the area in which the ships of the
+    10^{th.} Cruiser Squadron usually worked after about the middle of
+    the year 1915; the positions of the ships being constantly changed.
+
+    Prior to this the areas were in the vicinity of A.B.C.D.G.
+]
+
+When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run the gauntlet
+of enemy submarines, which were passing down the west coast of the
+Hebrides and Ireland, and as no destroyers were available with which
+to screen them against attack, the risk was considerable. They had
+also to face the constant danger of mine-fields. Several ships of
+the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with a resultant heavy
+loss of life.
+
+Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the boarding parties was
+very arduous. The preliminary examination could not be carried out
+without boarding, and the manner in which the boats of the squadron
+were handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in northern
+latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship of the officers and
+men. In this boarding work the fishermen of the Newfoundland Royal
+Naval Reserve, hardy and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous
+service.
+
+The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually from its inception,
+as is well known, and after a time the percentage of vessels that
+evaded the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron became so low as to
+be almost negligible. The procedure adopted was to send all ships,
+preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any suspicion, into
+Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where regular examination services
+were instituted. The ships were taken in under the supervision of an
+armed guard, sent on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards
+underwent many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their lives in
+ships which were torpedoed by German submarines, and in many cases,
+particularly in badly found sailing ships, they underwent great
+hardships. The guards were also the means of saving more than one such
+ship from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew refused
+to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact and discretion on
+the part of the officer in charge, usually a junior officer of the
+Royal Naval Reserve, were necessary in his dealings with the neutral
+captains. The whole question of the efficiency of the Blockade--as
+shown by the returns furnished to me from Headquarters--was constantly
+under review by my Staff and myself.
+
+The fate of the detained ship was decided in London on receipt of the
+report of examination. As was perhaps natural, the sentence on many
+ships’ cargoes pronounced in London was not accepted without question
+from the Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with reference
+to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were naturally very critical of
+any suspicion of laxity in passing, into neutral countries bordering on
+Germany, articles which we suspected might find their way into Germany,
+and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the Admiralty,
+and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when that Ministry was
+established. The difficulties with which the Foreign Office was faced
+in regard to neutral susceptibilities were naturally not so apparent
+in the Fleet as to the authorities in London, and though many of our
+criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some possibly
+incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were of use. Indeed,
+they were welcomed in London as giving the naval point of view. The
+decisive effect of the Blockade did not become apparent until the end,
+when the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an influence on
+the result of the War this powerful weapon had exercised. Even those
+who during the War had been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised
+at the last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result of
+the silent pressure of Sea Power.
+
+
+VI.--THE GRAND FLEET BASES
+
+Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected state of the Grand
+Fleet bases against submarine attack in the early part of the War. The
+matter was one of supreme importance, and formed the subject of very
+urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains were at work on
+the problem at the Admiralty, at the bases, and in the Fleet itself.
+
+The first step was that taken under the direction of Captain Donald S.
+Munro, the King’s Harbour Master at Cromarty, who devised a system of
+submarine obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep-water
+obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing to his energy and
+driving power, the entrance to Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by
+October 26th, 1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for Cromarty
+another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R., under the command of
+Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of
+Scotland, suggested a method for providing an obstruction for the
+Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by the end of October, 1914, and
+was also entirely successful.
+
+As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I requested that
+obstructions on similar lines should be fitted to the three main
+entrances to Scapa Flow, the Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to
+be attempted) being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the
+supply of the necessary material were experienced, and the first line
+of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance was not completed until December
+29th, 1914, the first line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and
+that in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile officers and men
+of the Fleet had improvised obstructions, first at Lough Swilly and
+Loch na Keal, and later at Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough
+security against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychological
+value. These obstructions, which were kept in existence even after the
+completion of the more efficient methods of dealing with the problem,
+involved much labour.
+
+Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disadvantages attendant
+on basing the Fleet so far north as Scapa Flow, were discussed between
+Sir Henry Jackson (then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that,
+with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of intercepting
+the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and of dealing with landing
+raids covered by the High Sea Fleet, were so considerable as to make
+it eminently desirable to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this
+were feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the result I
+suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions across the Firth of Forth,
+which would admit not only of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that
+anchorage, but would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being
+carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the Forth, so that
+the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its fighting efficiency. Many
+senior officers in the Grand Fleet were not in favour of the idea,
+for two reasons: first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy
+with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at Scapa; and,
+secondly, that practices could not be so efficiently carried out in the
+Forth. There was much weight in both these objections, although the
+difficulties of carrying out practices in the Forth were exaggerated;
+but the strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and the
+scheme was proceeded with as proposed.
+
+That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe carrying out of
+practices was completed by December, 1916, and the whole of the new
+obstructions were in place by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is
+true, than the anticipated date. The result certainly justified the
+conclusion arrived at. When the conditions made it at all probable
+that the High Sea Fleet might put to sea for an operation in southern
+waters, the Grand Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the
+undoubted disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by
+skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers responsible.
+
+The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack was
+only one of the many factors necessary for their development. In
+pre-War days, although it had been decided that the use of northern
+bases would be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the bases
+had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It is, perhaps,
+desirable to remove any misunderstanding as to the causes of this
+failure.
+
+(_a_) The decision had not long been taken, and
+
+(_b_) The necessary financial provision was lacking.
+
+Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa Flow was affected,
+and, under the second, that at Rosyth, where for some time progress in
+the development of the base had been arrested.
+
+The Admiralty had taken steps to make some preparations at Cromarty,
+in so far as the provision of gun defences against attack by surface
+vessels was concerned, but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a
+fleet beyond a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one of the
+floating docks at southern yards.
+
+In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted our Fleet to
+the north, all the conveniences for the maintenance of that fleet were
+still in the Channel ports. The first step was the transference of the
+large floating dock from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty
+Firth, together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were housed in
+a merchant ship captured from the Germans. Workshops were fitted up
+on shore under the energetic superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund
+R. Pears and his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with
+great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invaluable to the
+Grand Fleet.
+
+Invergordon gradually developed into a great repairing base. A second
+and smaller floating dock was purchased early in 1916 at my request
+and placed there, and by the middle of that year the base had attained
+large proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapidity and
+success, including the repairs of battleships after the Jutland battle,
+and the great extension in armoured-deck protection fitted to ships
+after the same action.
+
+Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at Invergordon
+since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow the same possibilities as a
+repairing base did not exist, although a floating dock for destroyers,
+for which many requests had been made, was eventually obtained and
+placed there.
+
+But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all knowledge in other
+directions. In August, 1914, the base organisation consisted only of
+the seagoing Fleet repair ships _Cyclops_ and _Assistance_. At an
+early stage the _Cyclops_ was connected to a shore telegraph cable off
+the village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a floating post
+office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a few drifters) which
+were first requisitioned. Rear-Admiral Francis S. Miller was appointed
+to her as the Senior Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which
+the great demands on her accommodation were met was a standing wonder
+to me. In the early part of the War, officers on Admiral Miller’s
+staff and others were obliged to make their sleeping berths, as best
+they could, on the deck or on top of their writing-tables, and it was
+surprising that the overcrowding in all directions did not affect
+health. But the work went on very successfully in the most inconvenient
+circumstances.
+
+Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing to the weather
+conditions, to move the base organisations from the north to the
+south-west side of Scapa Flow. The anchorage at Long Hope was selected,
+whilst the Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta,
+and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store ships,
+and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope and Hoy Sound. Prior to
+this, the importance of the organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands
+had increased to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment of
+a Senior Flag Officer in general command of the whole district, and of
+the defences in particular.
+
+So much of my time was being occupied in deciding and pressing forward
+the work of organisation of the base and its obstructions and defences,
+in dealing with the numerous questions relating to the patrol of the
+coast by coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant
+ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding such vessels, in
+considering questions affecting the occupation of land for the erection
+of defences, in the requisitioning of trawlers and drifters, etc., that
+it was becoming difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet
+work proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who suggested that he
+should waive his seniority in order to serve as my junior officer,
+was appointed Vice-Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands. This
+left Rear-Admiral Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly
+heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of a mass of work
+outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest possible benefit in every
+way. Under Sir Stanley Colville’s most able direction, the completion
+of the organisation for the general defences of the Islands, the work
+of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of submarine
+obstructions was effected, and the work pushed forward. Captain Stanley
+Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of very wide experience, was appointed to
+superintend the work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under
+his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties due to
+bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to Scapa Flow were either
+blocked by sunken ships or obstructed by nets, mines, and other devices.
+
+The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning of the War consisted
+of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns landed from the Fleet, were gradually
+reinforced by four-inch and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the
+whole being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.-Colonel
+Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was housed in huts, erected
+temporarily for the purpose, and although with the handiness which
+characterises a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the officers and
+men eventually made themselves comfortable even under such weather
+conditions as are experienced at Scapa Flow, they endured a very
+considerable amount of hardship in the early days with their accustomed
+cheerfulness.
+
+And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and staying qualities
+of the crews of the trawlers that supported the submarine obstructions,
+particularly those at Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in
+positions in which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly
+and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a few yards of a
+rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them and bringing on board tons
+of water. The skippers knew that they had to stick it out for the sake
+of the safety of the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and
+under these conditions they did their duty in a manner which calls for
+the highest praise.
+
+Meanwhile the development of the base proper proceeded apace. One of
+the earlier arrivals was the old cruiser _Impérieuse_, which was used
+as a post office, depot, and general overflow ship to the _Cyclops_.
+The number of trawlers and drifters, which had their home at Scapa Flow
+and which were engaged on patrol or mine-sweeping work, attendance on
+the Fleet, garrison, or on the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased
+with great rapidity during the winter of 1914–15; on September 1st,
+1914, the number was _nil_, and it reached a total of some four
+yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by the summer
+of 1915. These vessels all looked to the _Cyclops_, _Assistance_ and
+_Impérieuse_ for refit, pay, food, and for every conceivable want.
+Gradually the number of base ships was increased, culminating in the
+arrival of the old battleship _Victorious_ about March 6, 1916, as the
+“home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the Fleet, fitting the
+Director System, increasing the protection to decks and magazines,
+carrying out minor repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent
+tasks.
+
+Mention has been made of the large number of colliers, oilers, store
+ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used by the Fleet. At one time
+this caused some criticism, based principally on the time spent by the
+colliers at the Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the necessity
+for this. There were no facilities at the base for the storage of
+coal, either in lighters or on shore. Consequently, the whole of the
+coal required at the base was necessarily kept on board the colliers.
+The actual number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep
+at the base during the first two years of war was determined by the
+necessity for coaling the Fleet and getting it to sea again with the
+utmost possible rapidity. We could not contemplate such a situation
+as the Fleet arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing
+owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of information
+being received simultaneously that the High Sea Fleet was at sea and
+covering a landing raid on our coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital
+importance to the Empire.
+
+Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I gave the
+number necessary to enable almost the whole Fleet to be fuelled
+simultaneously; in other words, the number of colliers was dependent on
+the number of coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction
+was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some ships
+requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of two such ships using
+one collier in succession; but, broadly speaking, the requirements were
+as stated. When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum,
+they return to Cardiff to refill to economise tonnage.
+
+At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of coal by rail
+to Grangemouth and its transshipment to colliers there. As we needed
+colliers as coal-storing ships, so also we required ammunition ships to
+carry a proportion of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There were
+no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on shore. The number of
+ships required for this service was, however, much smaller.
+
+Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great advantage over shore
+storage; should strategic conditions necessitate a change of base, the
+coal, ammunition and other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The
+same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating docks.
+
+A consideration of all these facts connected with the development
+of fleet bases will show that this question necessarily required a
+good deal of attention on the part of my Staff and myself, and was
+incidental to the development of the Grand Fleet.
+
+
+VII.--THE PERSONNEL AND ITS WELFARE
+
+Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by no means the least
+important, was that of the moral and spirit of the personnel. It is,
+of course, impossible to exaggerate the importance of this question
+as an element in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of
+war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours spent in
+harbour were fully occupied in coaling and storing the ships; but these
+conditions could not be continued indefinitely. As the months passed
+with no sign of enemy vessels at sea and time in harbour increased
+as compared to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find some
+diversion for the minds of the officers and men.
+
+The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out under the
+superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, then commanding the
+1st Battle Squadron. Always alive to the necessity for providing
+occupation, recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started
+considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a divergent nature
+as batteries for the defence of the submarine obstructions then in
+progress, football grounds for the men, a golf course for the officers,
+and landing piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventually
+divided out amongst the various squadrons. A rifle and pistol range
+were also constructed, and several piers built. The whole of the work
+was carried out, I may add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen”
+ship, the s.s. _Ghourko_, was fitted up by the Junior Army and Navy
+Stores, and this vessel played an important part in the harbour life
+of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores and provisions of all sorts,
+available for use by all ships, but particularly of the smaller vessels
+which could not send their mess stewards far afield in search of a
+change of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical and
+cinema entertainments took place on board frequently. She was also
+fitted with a boxing ring, and squadron boxing competitions were held
+on board with great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures
+of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catholics and
+Nonconformists.
+
+The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost. Officers lectured
+on board their ships to the ships’ companies on every subject, the War
+included, and much good resulted.
+
+Education was freely developed. The Admiralty provided, at my request,
+schoolmasters in large numbers, and classes for the boys and voluntary
+classes for the men in the evenings in harbour were very well attended.
+
+And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to the utmost extent
+possible. This took the form principally of football, rowing regattas,
+athletic sports and boxing. The keenness displayed in all these sports
+was a certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign of
+staleness.
+
+The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over periods of tedium
+and weariness, which are most calculated to undermine discipline.
+Occupation and interest are the surest antidotes to discontent and
+unrest, and never during the first two and a half years did I see
+signs of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thoroughly
+happy and contented, treated the War as being in the day’s work, and
+looked forward eagerly to the day on which their enemy would give them
+the opportunity for which they were waiting, and for which they kept
+themselves thoroughly efficient and fit.
+
+In those days the officers got to know the men even better than they
+had done before, and the spirit of comradeship between all ranks became
+correspondingly closer. Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have
+desired to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than that
+which animated the officers and men of the Grand Fleet.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+DECLARATION OF WAR
+
+
+At 8.30 A.M. on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea
+in compliance with Admiralty orders. The ships accompanying the
+Fleet-Flagship _Iron Duke_ were the vessels of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and
+4th Battle Squadrons, the light cruisers _Southampton_, _Birmingham_,
+_Boadicea_, _Blonde_ and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla; the
+cruisers _Shannon_, _Natal_ and _Roxburgh_, and the light cruisers
+_Nottingham_, _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_, which were at Rosyth with the
+2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to meet the Fleet at a rendezvous
+in Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 1.30 E. The light cruisers _Bellona_ and
+_Blanche_ were left behind to coal.
+
+A report received from the Admiralty that three German transports had
+passed the Great Belt on the evening of August 1st had led to the 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron, with the cruisers _Cochrane_ and _Achilles_, and the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the evening of
+August 3d to cruise to the southward of the Fair Island Channel during
+the night.
+
+The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep east as far as
+Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers to carry out a wide sweep to
+the southward and south-westward. These orders were in conformity with
+the general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for the Grand
+Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at establishing a blockade;
+at preventing the enemy forces from getting into the Atlantic to
+interfere with the operations of our cruisers engaged in protecting
+our own trade as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and
+at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to the enemy.
+Pursuant to these orders, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron were directed to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61
+N., working eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriving
+there at 4 P.M., thence to sweep to the S.E. until 5 A.M. on August
+5th, when they were on a line drawn S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat.
+59.25 N. with the eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The _Antrim_
+and _Argyll_, being short of fuel, were detached during the evening of
+August 4th to coal at Scapa.
+
+The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the cruisers and light
+cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla was detached to Rosyth to fuel.
+This first sweep was begun in northern waters because the North Sea
+is narrower at this point, and also because it afforded opportunity
+of intercepting vessels which might have left German ports two days
+previously in anticipation of hostilities. The cruiser sweep was
+supported by the Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E.,
+turning at 3 A.M. on August 5th to the westward.
+
+The 3rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled to leave Scapa 30 per
+cent. short of fuel owing to the paucity of colliers, was detached to
+that base at 8.30 P.M. on the 4th, to complete with coal.
+
+During the night information was received by wireless telegraphy that
+war had been declared against Germany at midnight, 4th–5th August, and
+the following gracious message was received from His Majesty the King
+and was communicated to the Fleet:
+
+    “At this grave moment in our National History, I send to you and
+    through you to the officers and men of the Fleet of which you have
+    assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your
+    direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal
+    Navy, and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her
+    Empire in the hour of trial.”
+
+During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised to the northward
+of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with Admiralty telegraphic orders; the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as
+four light cruisers and the _Lowestoft_, and the 4th Flotilla was sent
+to Invergordon for a similar purpose. In the afternoon, the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron and the cruiser _Devonshire_, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron, were detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet
+turned to the southward at 3 A.M. on the 6th to meet the 3rd Battle
+Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat. 59 N., Long. 1.0 E.
+
+During August 6th the following reports were received:
+
+(_a_) Two German cruisers were reported passing Trondhjem going north.
+(This came from the Admiralty.)
+
+(_b_) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north-west end of the
+Shetlands going north. (This was a local report.)
+
+(_c_) The German liner _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_ was stated to have
+passed through the Stronsay Firth, Orkneys, bound east, during the
+night of the 5th–6th. (Local report.)
+
+The destroyer _Oak_ was despatched to search the vicinity of the
+Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained no confirmation of the report.
+
+(_d_) It was reported that the Germans had established a base in Lat.
+62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact position unknown).
+
+A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in confirmation of
+the last report, but a British trawler reported that a large number
+of German merchant ships had assembled in the West Fiord and in the
+harbours of the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Norway. Reports as
+to the Germans having established a base on the Norwegian coast were
+very persistent during the early days of the War. These reports were
+probably to some extent due to the ideas prevailing before the War
+as to German intentions in this respect, these views being naturally
+coloured by the frequent visits of the German High Sea Fleet in peace
+time to Norwegian waters, particularly to the vicinity of Trondhjem.
+
+In 1911, when I commanded the Atlantic Fleet, arrangements had been
+made for me to visit Norwegian ports at the same time as the High Sea
+Fleet, in order to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with,
+it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis intervened, and
+the visit was postponed. The meeting took place in 1914, when a portion
+of the 2nd Battle Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir
+George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week, very shortly
+before the outbreak of war.
+
+During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet cruised
+between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the
+eastward between Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward
+along the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa Flow, the
+3rd Battle Squadron being detached to the N.E. to cover them. The
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after
+refuelling; the 2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the
+north-eastward; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with orders to
+search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for submarines prior to the
+arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at 6 A.M. on the 7th
+to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
+arrived at 10 A.M., and during the day the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with
+the 2nd Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian
+coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Battle
+Squadron. No sign of a German base could be discovered, and the force
+was ordered back to Scapa to fuel.
+
+The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed, owing to the
+inadequate number of colliers, many of those present being also
+unsuitable for the work of rapid coaling. The lack of lubricating
+oil for the 3rd Battle Squadron also caused trouble, but these early
+difficulties, although a source of considerable anxiety at the
+commencement of hostilities, were overcome later.
+
+The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was the defenceless
+nature of the base at Scapa, which was open to submarine and destroyer
+attacks. Whilst the Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could
+be afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off the various
+entrances and to patrol outside the main entrance; but these measures
+were no real defence against submarines, and the position was such that
+it was deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour longer
+than was absolutely necessary for fuelling purposes. Accordingly, at
+6.30 P.M. on the same day, the Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea,
+being screened through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark
+by the 4th Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass round the
+Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to provide some protection against
+destroyer attack, a request was forwarded to the Admiralty asking
+that two of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the main
+entrances. This measure was approved and a reply was received that the
+_Hannibal_ and _Magnificent_ were being despatched.
+
+The _Russell_, _Albemarle_ and _Exmouth_, of the 6th Battle Squadron,
+belonging originally to the Channel Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the
+Grand Fleet on the night of the 7th–8th.
+
+At 9.30 P.M. on the 8th the battleships _Orion_, _Monarch_ and _Ajax_
+were detached to carry out target practice, and the remainder of the
+Fleet proceeded to the south-eastward from Fair Island, carrying out
+Fire Control Exercises; but, on receipt of a report from the _Monarch_
+that a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the practice was
+stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the 2nd Flotilla being
+directed to search for the submarine. At 6.30 P.M. the officer of the
+watch on board the _Iron Duke_ sighted a periscope and altered course
+to ram; the same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the
+_Dreadnought_, but was not seen again.
+
+At 4 A.M. on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N., Long. 1.9 E.
+
+Shortly afterwards the _Orion_ reported a strong smell of oil, and
+bubbles were seen on the surface, and the _Birmingham_, commanded by
+Captain A. M. Duff, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been
+screening ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, claimed to
+have rammed and sunk the German submarine U 15, which she had sighted
+on the surface. This initial success was hailed with great satisfaction
+in the Fleet. Subsequent information showed that the _Birmingham_
+had been handled with great promptitude. During daylight of August
+9th, the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron were cruising
+in company, the noon position being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and
+as the presence of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was constantly
+zigzagging, the ships altering course by “Blue Pendant” turns, that is,
+turning together by signal.
+
+At midnight, 9th–10th, the position of the _Iron Duke_ was Lat. 57.51
+N., Long. 1.2 E.
+
+On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty requesting that
+the movements of the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) might be directed
+from the Admiralty, whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet
+remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be sufficiently
+conversant with the conditions in the south for the Commander-in-Chief
+to control these movements. This plan was adopted and continued
+throughout the War.
+
+On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as follows:
+
+At 5 A.M. the _Iron Duke_ parted company from the Fleet and proceeded
+to Scapa in order that the Commander-in-Chief might communicate by land
+wire with the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the work at
+the fleet bases. The _Iron Duke_, with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and
+the _Falmouth_, _Liverpool_ and _Bellona_, arrived at Scapa at 2.30
+P.M., the 2nd Flotilla forming a submarine screen through the Pentland
+Firth.
+
+The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north under the command of
+Sir George Warrender to a position to the westward of the Shetlands,
+in accordance with telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty,
+where it was considered that the submarine danger in the North Sea
+was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was
+detached to sweep a wide area to northward and westward in advance of
+the Battle Fleet, which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north
+as Lat. 60 N.; this flotilla was then detached for operations on the
+Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The latter force was directed to search for
+a suspected German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavanger Fiord.
+The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the operation of
+endeavouring to locate this base--if it existed--with due regard to
+the susceptibilities of the Norwegians. Commodore W. E. Goodenough,
+commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stavanger in the
+_Southampton_ and was assured by the Norwegian authorities that no base
+had been formed in that vicinity by the enemy.
+
+The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the _Falmouth_ left Scapa at 10 P.M. on
+the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the _Hannibal_
+and _Magnificent_ having arrived at Scapa at 4 P.M. These two
+battleships were stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to
+Scapa Flow against attack by destroyers.
+
+Rear-Admiral Miller, who arrived in the _Hannibal_, was placed in
+administrative charge of the base and of the local defences, and
+arrangements were made for the local Territorial Force and other
+inhabitants of the Orkneys and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch
+the harbours. Telephonic communication round the coast was established
+by degrees.
+
+Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen over the Orkneys
+on the evening of the 10th, and the _Centurion_ reported having sighted
+an airship north of the Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence
+was attached to these reports, which in the early days of the War were
+very frequently received.
+
+_August 11th._--The _Iron Duke_ left Scapa and rejoined the Battle
+Fleet at 5 P.M. in Lat. 60.8 N., Long. 3.28 W. The Battle Fleet
+was then exercised in forming line of battle, and also carried out
+sub-calibre gun practice. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after
+completing its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa to fuel at 8
+P.M. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and 4th
+Flotilla, having completed their examination of the Norwegian coast,
+returned, some to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30 miles from Kinnaird
+Head. The _Drake_, flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant, which
+had joined the Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the
+Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old cruisers of the
+“Edgar” class, had by this time been established on a northern patrol
+area between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast, under the command
+of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair.
+
+On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe, on the north-west
+coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling base for the Fleet, and
+Rear-Admiral Richard P. F. Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the
+base.
+
+A week of war had now elapsed without any move whatever being made
+on the part of the High Sea Fleet; the only German naval activities
+had been mine-laying in southern waters during the first two days of
+the War, together with some submarine activity in the North Sea. The
+British Fleet during the week had been largely occupied in boarding all
+merchant vessels sighted, and in instituting as strict a blockade as
+was possible.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL
+    HALSEY), AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT
+    FITZHERBERT), ON BOARD H. M. S. “IRON DUKE”]
+
+_August 12th._--The Battle Fleet to the westward of the Orkneys (noon
+position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.) was exercised during the
+forenoon and afternoon at battle tactics and carried out gunnery
+practices between 4 and 8 P.M.; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to
+fuel, arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the
+3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal, and to test
+the suitability of this base and its capability for defence against
+submarine attack.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been fuelling at Scapa, left
+before dark on the 12th to cruise west of the Orkneys with orders to
+economise fuel in view of a projected operation to the southward.
+
+The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the _Falmouth_ swept 100 miles to the
+south-eastward from Kinnaird Head during the day, and then returned to
+Cromarty to fuel.
+
+The _Bellona_ and _Liverpool_ swept to the south-eastward of the
+Pentland Firth during the day and night of the 12th, together with
+one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as a guard against destroyer attack on the
+Fleet whilst coaling.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern patrol. A report was
+received from Rear-Admiral Grant, in the _Drake_, that the position in
+the Faroe Islands was quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed.
+The _Drake_ remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe
+Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were sent to assist
+her in her work of blockade.
+
+Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears was on this date appointed in charge of the
+Fleet Base at Cromarty.
+
+The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer from Hamburg had
+arrived in England and reported that there were fourteen enemy
+battleships at Cuxhaven on the 9th inst., together with several
+mine-layers; that there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and
+Heligoland, and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the
+entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite news of the
+enemy’s main fleet.
+
+_August 13th._--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was coaling at Scapa
+during the day, and the 3rd Battle Squadron coaling and storing at Loch
+Ewe. My object in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry
+into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with a second base
+in the event of Scapa Flow becoming untenable by submarine attack.
+
+The _Albemarle_ relieved the _Liverpool_ and _Bellona_ on patrol to the
+eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these two ships returning to
+Scapa to fuel.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of the Orkneys; the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coaling; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at sea
+sweeping to the south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The _Falmouth_ was now
+attached to this squadron.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the _Drake_ were on the northern and
+Faroe patrols. During the day the Commander-in-Chief held a conference
+with the Flag officers of the Fleet and explained the operations
+contemplated on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 P.M. the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the westward, except two ships which
+had not finished coaling, the operation having been again delayed owing
+to an insufficient number of colliers being provided. They followed
+later.
+
+The _Ajax_ reported a turret defective, and was sent back to effect
+repairs with the aid of the _Cyclops_.
+
+_August 14th._--During the forenoon the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and
+battle cruisers were carrying out target practice. Noon position of the
+_Iron Duke_, Lat. 59.11 N., Long. 4.27 W.
+
+At 2 P.M. all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd Battle Squadron from
+Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squadron, rejoined the Flag, and battle
+exercises, including deployments, were carried out till 7 P.M.
+
+At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair Island Channel on
+its way to carry out a sweep in the North Sea.
+
+During the night of the 14th–15th all squadrons were moving towards a
+concentration rendezvous in the North Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadrons being Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 A.M. on the 15th;
+the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was Lat. 59.7 N., Long.
+0.40 W., at 4 A.M. the 15th; for the mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long.
+3.45 E., at 6 P.M. the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+from the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 A.M. on the 15th.
+
+Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a usually reliable
+source had been received at the Admiralty indicating that the Germans
+intended carrying out a very extensive mine-laying policy in British
+waters in the event of war between the two countries. The actual
+positions of many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it
+was apparent, provided the information were correct, that the enemy
+intended to lay mines regardless of their effect on mercantile traffic,
+whether British, Allied, or neutral.
+
+The proceedings of the mine-layer _Köningen Louise_ in the first days
+of war tended to confirm this view, and consequently it was thought to
+be quite probable that mine-fields of an extensive character might be
+laid in the North Sea, in positions where they might be expected to be
+effective against any movement of our Fleet, particularly any southward
+movement.
+
+The small margin of superiority which we possessed over the
+German fleet, as compared with the immense difference in our naval
+responsibilities, made it very necessary that precautions should be
+taken to safeguard the most valuable of our ships from such a menace
+when operating in waters that might be mined.
+
+It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers accompanied the
+Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, although the speed of the Fleet
+was necessarily reduced by their presence in order to admit of sweeping
+operations, and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased,
+and although the sweeping operations could only be carried out in an
+exploratory fashion, there _was_ the chance that the danger incurred by
+taking the whole Fleet over possible mine-fields might be much reduced.
+
+Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers to sea as their
+presence was more necessary in the vicinity of the bases, the practice
+was introduced of placing one of the older battleships of the 6th
+Battle Squadron ahead of each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in
+order that these less valuable ships might first discover the mines
+instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and men of the 6th
+Battle Squadron named their Squadron the “Mine Bumping Squadron” on
+this account.
+
+_August 15th._--At noon the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 58.16 N.,
+Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in company in cruising order and
+steering to the eastward, preparatory to turning south. The plan of
+operations included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by
+cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, together with
+the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two of our submarines had been
+ordered to be off the Ems and two off the Jade by 6 A.M. on the 16th.
+
+During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes arrived at Scapa for
+reconnaissance work from the base.
+
+_August 16th._--At 4 A.M. the _Iron Duke_ was in Lat. 56.43 N., Long.
+4.5 E. At 8 A.M., no report having been received of the sighting of
+any German vessels, the Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to
+continue the sweep until 9.30 A.M. At this time the Fleet-flagship
+_Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E., the battle
+cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The only
+enemy vessel seen was one submarine by the _New Zealand_ at 10.35 A.M.
+in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E.
+
+The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at 9.30 A.M., the
+cruisers being then well to the southward of the latitude of the Horn
+Reef, the whole Fleet turned to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a
+north by west course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging.
+
+Rear-Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, reported that the
+sweep of the southern force had been unproductive.
+
+The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for a northerly sweep,
+spreading from the Norwegian coast, for a distance of 150 miles, to the
+westward, with the Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron
+swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along that coast as
+far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird Head, with the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron prolonging and supporting. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+extended the front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle
+Squadron.
+
+The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of the Battle Fleet
+until dusk, and then was stationed 12 miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, spread 10 miles apart, covered the area between the Battle
+Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas remained
+with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine screen by day, and
+keeping in rear of the Fleet at night.
+
+The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the Battle Fleet when on
+the southerly course, acted as a submarine screen during the passage
+to the northward. During the night of the 16th–17th the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser Squadron to
+Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern patrol, and the 6th Battle
+Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla mine-sweepers and 3rd Battle Squadron
+proceeded to Scapa to fuel.
+
+_August 17th._--At 7.15 A.M. the Dreadnought Battle Fleet altered
+course to pass through the Fair Island Channel, and the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron rejoined. The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed
+astern during the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at
+daylight. The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout daylight.
+
+At noon the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 58.59 N., Long. 1.35 E. At
+midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long. 2.25 W., and at 8 A.M. the 18th, Lat.
+58.44 N., Long. 4.47 W.
+
+The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep sighted only neutral
+vessels and proceeded to work in an area designated as No. 5 (eastward
+from Kinnaird Head). Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E.
+
+This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach to the Pentland
+Firth, both for blockade purposes and as an outpost position for the
+Fleet at Scapa.
+
+At this time, the northern and central parts of the North Sea were
+divided into certain numbered areas in which cruisers could be directed
+by wireless to work without the necessity of making a long signal.
+
+The various areas were approximately placed as follows:
+
+  Area No. 1.--Covering the route round the north end of the
+               Shetland Islands from the southward and eastward.
+
+  Area No. 2.--Covering the Fair Island Channel to
+               south-eastward, working down to the line Kinnaird
+               Head--Udsire.
+
+  Area No. 3.--South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys
+               to Lat. of Kinnaird Head, with a width of about 50 miles
+               from the line Noss Head--Kinnaird Head.
+
+  Area No. 4.--South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird
+               Head--Udsire Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from
+               Kinnaird Head.
+
+  Area No. 5.--South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird
+               Head--Udsire Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian
+               territorial waters.
+
+  Area No. 6.--South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird
+               Head--Udsire Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from
+               Kinnaird Head.
+
+  Area No. 7.--Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between
+               50 and 150 miles from the English coast.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to resume the northern
+patrol; the _Drake_, and the two ships acting with her, were ordered to
+return to Scapa to coal, and directions were given for the other two
+ships to rejoin the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the day
+the _Orion_ developed serious condenser defects, necessitating retubing
+her condensers. A telegram was sent to the Admiralty requesting that
+new condenser tubes might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with
+dockyard workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile arrangements
+were made for giving fleet assistance to the _Orion_, and for all
+suitable spare condenser tubes from the fleet to be sent to her on
+arrival.
+
+The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet had by this
+time become very serious, and was causing me much anxiety; in reply
+to strong representations to the Admiralty, a telegram was received
+explaining the position and the efforts being made to rectify matters.
+
+The Admiralty also informed me of the great importance that was
+attached to the efficiency of the northern patrol, and stated that four
+armed merchant ships were being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron.
+
+The constant sea work had by this time shown the inadequacy of the
+engine-room implements of all ships for war conditions, and, in
+consequence of representations to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen
+were sent to Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The
+benefit derived from this measure was very considerable.
+
+Two Fleet messenger vessels, the _Cambria_ and _Anglia_, arrived at
+Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for communication between the
+bases, for carrying mails and despatches, and for boarding duties.
+
+_August 18th._--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe to
+fuel early in the afternoon; it was accompanied by the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron which was without the _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_. The
+attached cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending the
+entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were capable of doing
+it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet patrolled the entrance.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached to Scapa at daylight
+to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been by this
+time established at Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the
+ships when proceeding to fuel. The _Alsatian_, an armed merchant ship,
+joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
+
+The _Assistance_ arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair ship, and was
+connected to the shore telegraph system.
+
+Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west of the Shetlands,
+during the night of the 18th–19th. Enquiry showed this rumour to be
+false.
+
+The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear-Admiral Arthur
+Christian, with his Flag in the _Sapphire_, had been placed in command
+of all forces in the southern portion of the North Sea, namely, Cruiser
+force C, the destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained,
+these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and were
+independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag.
+
+This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss of the _Cressy_,
+_Aboukir_ and _Hogue_, Cruiser force C being abolished, and the command
+of the destroyer and submarine forces reverting to their own senior
+officers.
+
+_August 19th, 21st, 22nd._--The Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron remained in harbour during the 19th, coaling, storing,
+cleaning boilers, and taking in additional ammunition up to a maximum
+storage. With the exception of the _Orion_, these ships left on the
+20th at 6.30 P.M. for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and
+Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the 21st. The
+battle cruiser _New Zealand_ was ordered to the Humber to join the
+_Invincible_.
+
+As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our submarines in the
+Heligoland Bight were being followed and watched by German trawlers
+fitted with wireless, I informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat
+such vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol Area 1 alternately, and to
+carry out target practice in the Cromarty Firth, _en route_ to the
+patrol area.
+
+The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was interfered with by fog
+and the Fleet did not form up until late at night, and passed through
+the Fair Island Channel into the North Sea during the early morning
+of the 22nd. The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics during the day,
+and in the afternoon was joined by the 2nd Flotilla as a submarine
+screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 1.30 E. The position of the _Iron Duke_
+at midnight, 22nd–23rd, was Lat. 59.34 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to
+southward.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been detained at Scapa by
+fog during the 21st, carried out target practice to the westward of the
+Orkneys on the 22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15
+N., Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now comprising the _Drake_ and
+_King Alfred_, which were ordered to work between Scotland and Norway
+in areas to the southward of the position named.
+
+There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted except one submarine
+in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E., on August 20th. The Admiralty informed
+me on this date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for Cromarty
+northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided on before the War. It
+was, therefore, suggested that one of the boy artificers’ floating
+workshops should be sent north to work in conjunction with the dock.
+Steps were taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost on
+passage in bad weather near Portland.
+
+_August 23rd._--The Battle Fleet remained cruising in the North Sea in
+support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the weather being misty, with rain.
+The 3rd Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at
+daylight, the 24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, were
+sweeping to the southward as far south as Lat. 56 N.; the _Alsatian_
+was sent with the 6th Cruiser Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point,
+on the southern coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships,
+trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial waters at
+this point, and, if so, to capture them. One-half of the 2nd Flotilla
+was screening the Battle Fleet, the second half searching for a
+submarine reported east of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the
+_Ruby_ of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 P.M., and course
+altered to avoid her.
+
+The destroyers _Rifleman_ and _Comet_ collided in a fog, the latter
+being considerably damaged.
+
+The _Sappho_ was sent to search North Rona Island, a statement having
+been received indicating that it might possibly have been used by the
+enemy as a base for aircraft. She reported, after examination, that the
+island was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose.
+
+The _Ajax_ reported having burnt out a boiler, and the Admiralty was
+asked to instruct the contractors to send to Scapa men and tubes for
+retubing it.
+
+The _King Edward VII._ reported cracks in the inner A tubes of two of
+her 12-inch guns.
+
+_August 24th._--The Battle Fleet cruised between the Orkneys and the
+Norwegian coast, and carried out battle tactics during the forenoon,
+the weather becoming too thick in the afternoon.
+
+The 1st Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to fuel, as well as
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter being relieved by the
+3rd Cruiser Squadron. The remainder of the cruisers continued their
+sweeping operations as on the 23rd.
+
+_August 25th._--The 3rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to relieve the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate support of the cruisers at 6 A.M.,
+and while _en route_ to its position captured an Austrian steamer, the
+_Attila_. The remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground,
+arriving at Scapa at 7.30 A.M. on the 26th, with the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron to fuel. The _Agincourt_, a new battleship which was bought
+from Turkey when still in an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head
+and entered with the Fleet.
+
+At 5.30 P.M. a submarine was sighted from the bridge of the _Iron
+Duke_, and the Fleet manœuvred clear of the position. One-half of
+the 4th Flotilla, which had screened the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea,
+joined the Commander-in-Chief at 5 P.M., and was ordered to search for
+this submarine, but without result. The _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser
+Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at 4 A.M., the 25th, owing
+to condenser trouble.
+
+The _Dominion_ reported two of her 12-inch guns cracked. The _King
+Edward VII_. left Scapa for Devonport to change her two guns, which had
+also cracked, Vice-Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship
+_Dominion_.
+
+The weather was thick during the night of the 25th–26th, but the fog
+lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet to enter Scapa.
+
+_August 26th._--The _Iron Duke_, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla, were at Scapa fuelling.
+
+The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th Flotilla, left to
+join the 3rd Battle Squadron at sea, their departure having been
+delayed for some hours by thick fog.
+
+The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 P.M. for Rosyth to coal.
+
+The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 P.M. to coal, the _King
+Alfred_ at Scapa, and the _Alsatian_ at Liverpool; the arrangements in
+the large merchant-ships were such as to render coaling from colliers a
+difficult and slow progress.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the _Mantua_, left the northern
+patrol to coal at Scapa.
+
+During the day the Admiralty informed me of some operations which the
+southern forces were intended to carry out in the Heligoland Bight on
+the 28th, and directed that the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron should join
+in the operations. I made urgent representations as to the necessity of
+supporting the force with battle cruisers, and informed the Admiralty
+that I was sending the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to take part. I
+requested that the Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the
+Commodore, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed direct by the
+Admiralty of the positions which the other ships would occupy, and that
+the senior officers of the southern force taking part should also be
+informed of the presence of the battle cruisers and 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron.
+
+On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived to join the Fleet,
+experience having shown that the number of deck complements, as well as
+the engine-room complements, required increasing, principally owing to
+the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so constantly manned at
+sea--by day against submarine attack, and by night against destroyer
+attack.
+
+_August 27th._--On this date I wired to the Admiralty proposing
+the erection of two wireless stations in the Orkneys for local
+communication, and a directional station to assist in locating the
+positions of German ships using wireless. The remainder of the Battle
+Fleet proceeded to sea at 6 P.M. to join the 1st and 3rd Battle
+Squadrons at 7 A.M. on the 28th to the south-eastward of the Orkneys in
+Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as
+a submarine screen.
+
+On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the Pentland Firth
+was inaugurated by the Mine-laying Squadron which was not required at
+the time for mine-laying operations, with the object of ensuring a
+closer watch on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland Firth, and
+the _Oceanic_, an armed merchant cruiser, which had joined the Fleet,
+was detached to carry out a patrol to the westward of the Fair Island
+Channel in order to control the traffic at this point.
+
+Information was received from the Admiralty of the existence of mined
+areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head and Tynemouth. The positions of the
+two latter minefields appeared to corroborate the information obtained
+prior to the outbreak of war.
+
+A collision occurred at 9.30 P.M. between the _Bellerophon_ and the
+s.s. _St. Clair_, which was passing through the Fleet. The _St. Clair_
+was damaged, but the damage to the _Bellerophon_ was not serious.
+
+_August 28th._--The weather was misty with a visibility of 4 to 6 miles
+until the evening, when it cleared slightly. The Battle Fleet during
+the day proceeded to the southward, the noon position being Lat. 58.19
+N., Long. 0.21 E., with cruisers in advance.
+
+The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tactics. The sweep
+of light forces into the Heligoland Bight which took place at dawn
+was successful in bringing enemy light forces to action. The official
+despatches relating to this operation are given in an Appendix. The
+events may be shortly described here. At 6.53 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt,
+commanding the Harwich force, which had swept into the Heligoland Bight
+during the night to cut off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and
+chased her. From 7.20 to 8 A.M. the _Arethusa_ and the 3rd Flotilla
+were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making for Heligoland,
+sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the _Arethusa_, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s
+flagship, which had been in commission only a few days, sighted two
+enemy light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later by
+the light cruiser _Fearless_. At 8.25 A.M. a hit from the _Arethusa_
+wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy ships, and they both
+steamed at once for Heligoland, which was then sighted, and our ships
+turned to the westward. The _Arethusa_ had been considerably damaged
+during the action and had suffered several casualties.
+
+At 10.55 A.M. another German light cruiser was sighted by the
+_Arethusa_, and on being attacked by the _Fearless_ and destroyers
+turned away; she reappeared at 11.5 and engaged the _Arethusa_ and
+_Fearless_ and was attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again
+turned away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed Sir David
+Beatty of the position, and that officer proceeded at full speed to
+his support. The light cruiser _Mainz_ had been attacking the somewhat
+disabled _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_ at about 11.30 A.M. and had
+suffered very severely in the action, being practically disabled.
+The arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore
+Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured her destruction.
+
+Between 12.37 P.M. and 1.45 P.M. the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron engaged two other German light cruisers, one
+of which was sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in a
+sinking condition.
+
+Even thus early in the War the difference between the behaviour of
+British and German seamen was noticeable. On the British side, in
+addition to other assistance rendered to the survivors of the _Mainz_
+(which had been sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer _Firedrake_,
+proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of them being
+wounded. A German light cruiser opened fire on the British destroyers
+engaged in picking up survivors from the German destroyer V187 when
+that vessel was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for the
+destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the rescue work. The
+British submarine E4 afterwards took our officers and men out of these
+boats and left some unwounded Germans to take the other boats, which
+contained German wounded, to Heligoland.
+
+In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser Squadron was
+directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving the armed merchant cruisers
+farther to the northward. The object was to give a better chance of
+intercepting enemy vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war
+by establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance courses,
+one of which would in all probability be crossed of necessity during
+daylight hours, even if the second were passed through at night.
+
+_August 29th._--This was a bright, fine day, with high visibility.
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at sea with three divisions of
+the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and carrying out battle tactics and other
+exercises.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to fuel at 7 P.M.,
+in company with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the _Liverpool_ being
+detached to Rosyth to land the German prisoners captured in the
+Heligoland Bight on the 28th.
+
+The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Area No. 5, which the 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron left during the day for Cromarty to fuel.
+
+The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron were in Area No. 6;
+the mine-layers were in Area No. 3.
+
+During the day the _Oak_ arrived from Scapa with telegrams and
+despatches for me and returned with similar correspondence for the
+Admiralty. The _Oak_ was usually employed on this duty while the _Iron
+Duke_ was at sea during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent
+visits to a base rendering this essential.
+
+Some risk from submarine attack was naturally involved during the
+time that the _Iron Duke_, or any other heavy ship, was stopped to
+communicate. The risk was recognised, and, as the number of enemy
+submarines increased, it became undesirable to incur it, and the
+practice of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was abandoned;
+the longer time spent in harbour tended to reduce the necessity for
+the practice to some extent, but during the early part of the War this
+was the only means of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was
+constantly at sea.
+
+The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our eastern coasts
+caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at this time the desirability of
+the patrol flotillas working somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for
+an increase as soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to
+work off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to work in
+the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also forwarded.
+
+The Fleet messenger _Cambria_ was brought out to work with the Battle
+Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant ships owing to the shortage
+of light cruisers for this work.
+
+_August 30th._--In the afternoon the Dreadnought Battle Fleet shaped
+course for Scapa, and arrived at 7 A.M. on the 31st to fuel, the 3rd
+Battle Squadron being ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to
+support the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern
+portion of Area 5.
+
+The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was continued as
+usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the Area at 3 A.M. on the 31st
+to fuel at Scapa.
+
+During the day the _Assistance_ returned to Scapa from Loch Ewe as
+base ship, and the _Illustrious_ arrived there as defence ship for the
+entrance. I had decided her position during my previous visit.
+
+As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I was informed that trawlers
+were being taken up and armed for patrol duties as rapidly as possible,
+and that arrangements for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the
+subject of correspondence between the Admiralty and myself, had been
+approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields at the entrances.
+
+_August 31st._--A sweep towards the Scottish coast of all vessels at
+sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in consequence of information
+having been received pointing to the possibility of mine-laying by the
+enemy in the vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the
+night of August 31st–September 1st; the sweep was arranged to intercept
+the enemy mine-layers on their return trip. But it was unproductive,
+no mine-laying having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep
+were the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron.
+
+In consequence of urgent representations as to the insufficiency of
+.303 rifle ammunition for the Army, all ships disembarked 50 per cent.
+of their ammunition of this calibre at the end of August for conveyance
+to Woolwich.
+
+Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but a very small
+number of rifles, as well as many machine-guns, were landed from the
+Fleet for use by the Army.
+
+A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battleships was held on
+board the _Iron Duke_ on August 31st in order to discuss with them the
+subject of tactics in action.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA
+
+
+On September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd and 4th
+Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, cleaning boilers, storing, and taking in
+ammunition, etc. The Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier,
+on the north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with torpedo
+nets had them out, as was customary, unless colliers or store-ships
+were alongside.
+
+The _Falmouth_, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was anchored to the
+westward of Holm Sound, and the remainder of this squadron formed the
+outer or southward line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam.
+The weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at times.
+
+At 6 P.M. the _Falmouth_ reported the periscope of a submarine in
+sight inside the harbour, and immediately opened fire, four rounds
+being fired by this ship; she reported having probably hit the
+submarine. Directly afterwards the _Vanguard_, one of the outer line
+of battleships, also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope,
+as did one of the E class destroyers, which was patrolling between the
+Fleet and the Hoxa entrance.
+
+The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh immediately steam
+was ready, which was at 8.30 P.M., and to endeavour to locate the
+submarine and keep her under.
+
+The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice, was also
+instructed to weigh at once and search for the submarine. The whole of
+the ships present were ordered to raise steam with all despatch, and
+to prepare for torpedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters,
+steamboats, motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready and which
+could be collected, were at once organised in detachments to steam up
+and down the lines at high speed and outside the Fleet, with the object
+of confusing the submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted.
+Colliers and store-ships which had steam ready were directed to weigh
+and to go alongside the battleships that were not fitted with torpedo
+nets, in order to act as a form of protection against torpedoes fired
+at these valuable vessels. All ships in the outer lines were directed
+to burn searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine.
+
+At about 6.30 P.M. the _Drake_ reported a submarine in sight from that
+ship, thus confirming the earlier reports.
+
+The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon as steam was
+ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 P.M. the weather was exceedingly
+thick inside the harbour and considerable difficulty was experienced
+in getting the Fleet out, as at this time there were no navigational
+facilities of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick
+weather; but by 11 P.M. all the ships had left the harbour without
+accident, and, although there was a dense fog outside, the Fleet
+cleared the Pentland Firth successfully.
+
+The _Assistance_ was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left after the Fleet,
+reporting having sighted a submarine in the entrance whilst going out.
+The 2nd Flotilla was left behind to locate and, if possible, destroy
+the submarine, and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa
+and Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet the Fleet
+at 7 A.M. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct from destroyers,
+remaining in the harbour was the _Cyclops_, lying off Scapa with
+the telegraph and telephone cables on board, and directions were
+given to Rear-Admiral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the
+mine-sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the _Falmouth_.
+
+No trace of a submarine was discovered, and subsequent investigation
+showed that the alarm _may_ have been false, the evidence not being
+conclusive either way. The incident, however, made it clear that
+protection against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as
+the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open to this form
+of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible action, in the event of
+an alarm being given of the presence of a submarine, was to take the
+Fleet to sea, and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time
+from a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity was
+created, which would be bad for moral, and the ships were deprived of
+opportunities for cleaning boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which
+experience was showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the
+Fleet was to be maintained.
+
+The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty and proposals were
+made for blocking all the entrances to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and
+Hoy entrances, by sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending
+the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance, Rear-Admiral
+Miller was directed to requisition a large number of net-drifters.
+The plan was to lay drift nets in the entrance to be watched by the
+drifters, the nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating
+on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might be indicated
+by the buoy moving with the net.
+
+The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances were,
+meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of submarines through
+them, but it was realised that these were considerable. The opinion was
+formed, however, that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable
+difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine commander.
+
+By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers consisted of
+vessels of the E class. A request was made for basing a hunting
+flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall, these vessels being intended to
+guard the approaches to the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine
+hunters generally. It was also suggested that a monetary reward should
+be offered to the personnel of any trawler through whose agency a
+submarine was captured or destroyed.
+
+The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had been strengthened by the addition
+of a flotilla of trawlers, and the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers
+were continuously employed in keeping certain fixed channels of
+approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines. These vessels
+were, therefore, not available for anti-submarine work, except to the
+detriment of their mine-sweeping duties.
+
+On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were employed in Area
+No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron.
+
+From September 1st to September 5th the Battle Fleet remained at sea,
+cruising in the area between the north-east coast of Scotland and the
+coast of Norway, in support of the cruiser squadrons working to the
+southward, and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises of the
+Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional gunnery practice. The
+_Orion_, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, was still absent from the Fleet,
+retubing condensers; the _King Edward VII._ rejoined on the 2nd, after
+exchanging defective guns; and the _Dominion_ was then detached to
+Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strengthened by the arrival
+of the _Inflexible_ from the Mediterranean, and was employed during
+this period in support of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the
+Battle Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises.
+
+During the period under review reports from time to time of the
+sighting of enemy submarines appeared to indicate that they were
+working on a line Ekersund-Pentland Firth, the line which they were
+apparently occupying during the first few days of the War, when U 15
+was sunk by the _Birmingham_.
+
+Information received on September 3d suggested that enemy cruisers
+might have passed, or might be intending to pass, into the North Sea
+via the Skagerrak. The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and
+accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were, therefore, directed to sweep to
+the entrance to the Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th,
+starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E., at 4 A.M. that
+day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons were to make
+a detour to the south-westward with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+the latter proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons to
+Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Flotilla,
+was directed to sweep on a wide front towards the Pentland Firth on
+the Ekersund-Pentland line in search of enemy submarines, which it was
+hoped might be caught on the surface at night. Thence the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron was to proceed to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla
+to the westward of the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning
+to Longhope at 9 P.M. on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla, which had
+been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at the same time to sweep the
+western portion of the Ekersund-Pentland line for submarines, and then
+to return to Longhope.
+
+These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels of any sort were
+sighted, except that at 6.30 A.M. on the 5th the _Thetis_, mine-layer,
+working south-eastward of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel,
+thought to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on the position, but the ship was
+eventually identified as one of our own vessels.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe at 4 P.M. on the 5th
+to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats having been previously detached to
+that base to search the entrance for mines.
+
+During the early days of September frequent reports were received of
+enemy mines having been discovered on the east coast, and several
+vessels were sunk, as a consequence, including the gunboat _Speedy_.
+It appeared that the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels
+flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well as from
+regular mine-laying ships. The large number of vessels trading on the
+east coast and of fishing craft at sea, both British and neutral,
+greatly increased the difficulty of preventing these operations. The
+task of boarding and examining even a considerable percentage of these
+vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser sweeps were showing this
+daily. The Admiralty’s attention was drawn to the matter, and the
+question was raised of establishing some restrictions, particularly as
+regards the areas in which fishing should be permitted.
+
+The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights was also
+proposed, the burning of which enabled the enemy to fix his position
+accurately when engaged in mine-laying operations. This policy of the
+extinction of lights, thus started, gradually became general, and
+eventually only the most important lights were exhibited at night, and
+the large majority of these were only shown when requests were made
+by men-of-war who required them for entering port, the time of their
+exhibition being thus reduced to a minimum.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe until 6 A.M. on
+September 7th, and then proceeded to sea. The _Orion_ was left behind
+to complete work on her condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on
+September 9th, having been absent for twenty-one days.
+
+The _Agincourt_, the new battleship which since commissioning had
+been engaged in gunnery and torpedo practices either at Scapa or to
+the westward of the Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea
+on September 7th in order to give her officers experience in working
+with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty in carrying out her
+practices because she had not been supplied with “sub-calibre” guns,
+and this deficiency could not be made good for some months; this caused
+much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However, she was manned
+with officers and a ship’s company of a very high standard and, in
+spite of all disadvantages, the early gunnery practices carried out by
+her in company with the Fleet showed that she would eventually prove to
+be a most valuable addition to the Fleet.
+
+Representations had been made by me to the Admiralty that the
+presence of a senior Flag officer in general command of the Orkneys
+and Shetlands, who would be responsible for the defences of these
+islands and the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual
+administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient fully to
+occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller.
+
+Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted the post, and as
+it was very desirable that the officer holding this position should be
+junior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the
+compliment of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to
+myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities.
+
+He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch Ewe on September 6th,
+to confer with me before taking up his appointment. He accompanied me
+to sea in the _Iron Duke_ on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was
+embarked on board the _Oak_ to the westward of the Orkneys, and took
+up his command on arrival. The result was immediately most beneficial.
+He was able to devote his whole time to the questions of defence and
+organisation and relieved me of all these matters which had, as was
+inevitable under the previous arrangement, occupied so much of my time
+in harbour and so much of my thoughts at sea.
+
+On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock arrived safely at
+Cromarty.
+
+During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded northward
+from Loch Ewe _en route_ to the North Sea, and passed through the Fair
+Island Channel at 10 P.M., being joined at 4 A.M. by the 3rd Battle
+Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth after dark on
+this date and proceeded to the north-eastward, being joined at 4 A.M.
+on the 8th by the _Sappho_ and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla.
+These smaller vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in
+order to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine attack,
+consequent on stopping for this purpose. The 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron swept to the south-eastward of Area 6 during daylight on
+the 8th, and during the night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was
+on a patrol area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and
+Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of intercepting possible
+enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet carried out gunnery practices and
+exercised battle tactics during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at
+dark proceeded to the southward to support an extensive sweep into the
+Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to carry out on September
+10th. The dispositions for this sweep were generally as follows:
+
+The 1st and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported by the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to the northward, and
+the 7th Cruiser Squadron to the westward, swept out the Heligoland
+Bight from east to west, commencing from a position some ten to twelve
+miles from Heligoland, which position was to be reached one hour before
+dawn. The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread
+20 miles ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E. at 8 A.M.
+on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12 knots speed of advance.
+
+The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons to the
+southward, cruised to the north-westward of Heligoland until 11 A.M.
+on the 10th, by which time it was clear that the sweep had been
+unproductive. No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one
+seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd Flotilla was
+stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen, and to assist
+the attached cruisers in boarding duties during the day, and the
+4th Flotilla, which had been working with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadrons, principally for boarding duties, was also directed to join
+the Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason of the
+thick weather did not do so until 2 P.M. Owing to the large number of
+trawlers that were met with, nearly all of which were flying neutral
+colours, the boarding duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion
+attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken wireless
+signals were noticed to be very strong after the Fleet had passed these
+vessels; but close examination failed to reveal anything suspicious in
+those that were boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any
+of them.
+
+The conditions on September 10th were very unfavourable for the sweep
+into the Bight. Thick weather prevailed both before and after daylight,
+and the visibility varied from between two and five miles. The mist
+prevented the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle Fleet for
+eight hours, a circumstance which would have had awkward consequences
+had the High Sea Fleet been encountered with its full complement of 80
+to 100 destroyers, as might have been the case in such close proximity
+to German ports.
+
+It was noted at the time that the conditions were very unfavourable
+for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility combined with the glare
+produced by the occasional sunshine and absence of wind. A passage in
+the notes made on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows:
+
+“The weather conditions ... were very unfavourable for a general action
+owing to the low visibility and the glare caused by brilliant sunlight
+and absence of wind.... The conditions make it impossible for the
+Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to know what is going on
+in the van and rear ... besides being entirely favourable to tactics
+largely based on the employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers.
+
+“In addition there are great difficulties in concentrating detached
+ships and flotillas and in forming the Fleet prior to battle, also in
+the recognition of ships and destroyers.”
+
+This passage is of interest because of its bearing on the Jutland
+battle some two years later when somewhat similar conditions prevailed.
+
+The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much impression on my
+mind that special daylight recognition devices which could be seen at
+a considerable distance were subsequently devised and used by our own
+light cruisers and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy.
+
+When it became evident that there were no enemy vessels to engage,
+I organised a sweep to the northward on a large scale, with a view
+to intercepting any enemy ships that might be at sea and of closely
+examining all merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with.
+
+The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N., Long. 4.0 E., the
+dispositions being:
+
+    The _Invincible_ (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers) and the
+    _Inflexible_, to sweep towards Dundee.
+
+    3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of advance.
+
+    1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11 knots speed
+    of advance.
+
+    2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed of
+    advance.
+
+    All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted.
+
+    The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more included the
+    _New Zealand_) to be in general support.
+
+    The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to extend
+    the sweep to the eastward.
+
+These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2.
+
+At 3 A.M. on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn to N. 16 E., and,
+later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was stationed in a new area, No. 7,
+between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.30 N., between 50 and 150 miles from
+the coast. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal; the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron rejoined
+the Battle Fleet, and the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ were sent to
+Scapa to coal, as well as the 3rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of
+destroyers screening these vessels into the base.
+
+During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron carried out battle tactics and gunnery exercises, and the
+Battle Fleet then proceeded to Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel.
+
+During the passage south and north numerous reports of floating mines
+were received. The majority proved to be fishermen’s bladders which at
+this time were being frequently reported by merchant ships as floating
+mines.
+
+The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the 3rd meridian of
+East Long. between the parallels of 55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been
+established by the 1st and 3rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight
+destroyers and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the
+“Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy mine-layers. I was
+also informed that a patrol of the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch
+coast, was being maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames
+approaches.
+
+On September 11th the _Hibernia_ reported a 12-inch gun cracked, the
+fifth since the outbreak of war!
+
+On the same day salvage operations on the armed merchant-cruiser
+_Oceanic_, which had gone ashore in a fog on Foula Island on September
+8th, were abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke up
+eventually.
+
+Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears reported that the Portsmouth floating dock
+would be ready for work on September 21st, a very smart piece of
+mooring work having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the King’s
+Harbour Master.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe coaling, storing and
+cleaning boilers, etc., from 5 P.M. on September 13th until 6 P.M.
+on September 17th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the
+_Inflexible_ and _Invincible_, remained at Scapa until September 18th.
+Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and
+7 were carried out by the 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and
+the Mine-layer Squadron, supported by the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_
+and 3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning of September
+14th for the purpose. The armed merchant-cruisers _Alsatian_ and
+_Mantua_ were patrolling eastward of the Shetlands.
+
+Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to make general
+arrangements with the Admiralty for the defence of that base, and on
+September 17th the First Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War
+Staff, the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S) and (T)
+arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The bombardment and capture
+of Heligoland was also discussed. The proposals had been previously
+forwarded to me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined
+by myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of Staff, and by
+the Flag officers commanding the Battle Squadrons. The opinions of
+these officers against the operation were unanimous. It had not been
+suggested that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation, except
+as a supporting force; the older battleships were intended for this
+purpose. But the arguments against the operation were overwhelmingly
+strong. It was pointed out that ships were no match for heavy
+fortifications such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that direct
+fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory would be ineffective
+against well-placed, heavily protected and well-concealed land guns;
+that, even if a storming party were able to land and to capture the
+island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated as it was
+close to German naval bases, for if we could take it in a fortified
+condition, it would be far easier for the Germans to recapture it
+with the fortifications demolished; that it would be under continuous
+attack by sea and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured,
+would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly in southern waters,
+which, owing to the number of small craft then available, was an
+impossibility. Aircraft spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct,
+was at that time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited
+for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors which, later on,
+carried out such useful work on the Belgian coast. After a conference,
+at which the Flag officers were present, I thought that the idea would
+be abandoned.
+
+This was not the case, however, and the matter was taken up later
+at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, commanding the
+Channel Fleet. His view coincided with those expressed by the Flag
+officers at the Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared
+to carry out any orders that might be given him. The idea was not
+finally abandoned for some time. The opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and
+myself were identical, as indeed were those of every Flag officer with
+whom I discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior Flag
+officer.
+
+[Illustration: SWEEP OF SEP^{T.} 8^{TH.} TO 11^{TH.} 1914.]
+
+Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s visit was that of
+operations in the Baltic, but as no large operations of this nature
+could be attempted without the assistance of Allied battleships, in
+order to maintain supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no
+steps were taken.
+
+By this date a regular programme of dockings and refits for all ships
+was recognised as necessary, and battleships were now being detached
+one at a time for this purpose. For some months after the commencement
+of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than four days
+for docking and for the execution of the most urgent work, except in
+cases of accident or very serious defects, as our margin of superiority
+was none too large, and we were already experiencing a good deal of
+trouble with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up for the
+work of retubing; but the work achieved in the four days was a very
+fine tribute to the dockyard organisation and to the industry of the
+dockyard men.
+
+The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of September 17th,
+the _Erin_, a new battleship bought, incomplete, from Turkey, being
+in company for the first time in order to accustom her officers to
+working the ship with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to
+the westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the 18th, but was
+interfered with by bad weather--a frequent experience. The Battle
+Fleet then proceeded into the North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel,
+the position at midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.13 W.,
+and course south. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa with the
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of the 19th, and the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at the same time, all for the southward
+for a sweep into the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet,
+in search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a thorough
+examination of trawlers suspected of acting as look-out vessels for the
+enemy.
+
+While on passage south during the 19th the Battle Fleet was exercised
+at battle tactics. At midnight on the 19th the Battle Fleet was in
+position Lat. 58.3 N., Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 A.M. on the 20th, in
+Lat. 57.8 N., Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The
+2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa in time to meet the
+Battle Fleet at 8 A.M. on the 21st, but, owing to bad weather, the
+orders were cancelled and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the
+4th Flotilla, which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers. During
+daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised towards the Norwegian
+coast to the northward of Lat. 57 N., in support of the battle cruisers
+engaged in examining trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher
+Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 P.M. to rendezvous, at 5 A.M. on
+the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with the 3rd Battle Squadron,
+which had been coaling at Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the
+Commander-in-Chief.
+
+At 7 A.M. on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 55.45 N.,
+Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of the battle cruisers having
+reported at 6.20 A.M. from a position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52
+E., that the weather was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers
+being carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned and the
+Fleet turned to the northward, as it was considered that an incomplete
+examination would do more harm than good.
+
+During this period the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was working in Area 7,
+and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in Area 6, as usual; the _Alsatian_ and
+_Mantua_, with the _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping
+down the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their patrol east
+of the Shetlands, where they were joined by the armed merchant ship
+_Teutonic_.
+
+The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and joined the Battle
+Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron respectively on the 21st.
+
+All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped between 4 P.M.
+on the 20th and 4 P.M. on the 21st, in order that the enemy should not
+become aware of the movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might
+prevent the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly deprive us
+of our opportunity of catching it.
+
+During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an extensive sweep
+was carried out during daylight of the 21st. The Battle Fleet covered a
+front of 40 miles, and battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front
+to the eastward and westward.
+
+On the evening of the 21st I was informed by wireless telegraphy from
+the Admiralty of a report that a German force of two light cruisers,
+with destroyers and submarines in company, had been sighted from
+Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the northward. The whole Fleet was
+turned to the southward at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to
+cover a front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward, sweeping
+to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the enemy vessels if they
+had continued a course to the northward. The sweep to the northward
+was continued until 10 A.M. The _Iron Duke_ was in position Lat. 59
+N., Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel towards the
+Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W. During the 22nd, visibility
+was very good, but no enemy vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys
+during the night, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron being
+detached to support the cruisers searching in the North Sea areas.
+
+At 7.45 A.M. on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals from the _Cressy_
+were intercepted indicating that the _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ had been
+sunk by submarines in Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 3.41 E. These vessels were
+patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast, under Admiralty
+orders. No further details were received, beyond a wireless signal from
+Commodore (S), at 11.30 A.M., that he was proceeding in the _Fearless_
+with seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to intercept the
+enemy submarines on their way back. The Commander-in-Chief, thereupon,
+ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (from the southern position of Area
+7) to proceed at once to support the Commodore (S). By directions,
+however, given by the Admiralty these orders were cancelled, and the
+forces returned.
+
+At 10.30 P.M. I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers to proceed at
+once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report had been received that
+the German liner _Brandenburg_, lying at that port, was likely to
+sail. Constant reports to this effect were received for several days,
+and the _Brandenburg_ was heard using her wireless telegraphy on
+September 25th. The patrol was maintained until September 28th, when
+contradictory reports were to hand--one that she had been seen at sea
+on the 27th, and the other that she was being interned by the Norwegian
+Government. The latter report proved to be correct. The patrol was then
+moved to a position off the Utvoer Lighthouse, Lat. 61.3 N., Long. 4.30
+E., to intercept the German destroyer _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_, said
+to be leaving a Norwegian port.
+
+During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and battle cruisers
+attempted to carry out gunnery practices, but thick weather interfered.
+The force returned to Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd
+Battle Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th.
+
+On the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron proceeded from Area 7 to
+sweep up the Norwegian coast, thence going to Cromarty to coal. The
+squadron arrived there on the evening of the 25th.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until the evening of
+the 25th, when it proceeded out to the westward of the Orkneys; on the
+26th bad weather again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale
+being experienced. This moderated on the morning of the 27th, when the
+Battle Fleet was to the eastward of the Shetlands, but increased again
+to a very strong gale during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles
+per hour and a very heavy confused sea.
+
+A considerable amount of damage was done to wireless masts, topmasts,
+etc., and several ships had boats damaged or washed away. The ships of
+the “Iron Duke” class took in large quantities of water through their
+6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted at such a low level.
+The gale continued during the 28th, veering to the northward, and
+moderated on the 29th, on which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved
+to the southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met and
+screened by destroyers which had not been able to join the Fleet at sea
+owing to the bad weather.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the morning of the 26th,
+and proceeded to the Norwegian coast, sweeping down as far as the
+Naze in search of enemy ships, particularly the s.s. _Prinz Friedrich
+Wilhelm_, reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also to support
+the _Drake_, _Nottingham_, _Falmouth_, and two destroyers, which had
+been sent to the vicinity of the Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The
+latter vessels had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for
+enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers experienced very
+heavy weather on their return across the North Sea, and some anxiety
+was felt for their safety.
+
+The 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the 26th, and on the
+29th was sent to watch off the entrances to Bergen in Norway for
+the German s.s. _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_. The squadron returned to
+Cromarty on October 1st. On the 28th the _Princess Royal_ left the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to fuel, _en route_)
+to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian troops about to leave the
+Dominion for the United Kingdom. The _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_,
+which had been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the purpose
+of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the 3rd Battle
+Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from Scapa on the arrival of
+the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Additional precautions against attack
+by submarines were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on
+this occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a considerably
+increased number in the North Sea. These precautions included more
+numerous patrols by destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the
+entrances to Scapa, and necessarily involved a greatly increased strain
+on the destroyers.
+
+Further precautions against submarine attack were also found necessary
+in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival of light cruisers at Leith for
+refit were temporarily suspended by Admiralty orders owing to the
+presence of submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at the
+destroyer _Stag_, and another at a torpedo boat off May Island on the
+25th. The destroyer _Cheerful_ was also fired at on the 26th.
+
+The month of October, 1914, opened with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
+at Scapa, with the exception of the _Ajax_, which was _en route_ to
+Devonport to refit, and the _Audacious_, which was on passage from
+Devonport after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were at sea
+supporting the cruisers, except the _Exmouth_, of the 6th Battle
+Squadron, which was at Devonport refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, the _Invincible_, and the _Inflexible_, were at Scapa; the
+_Princess Royal_ was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to
+Halifax.
+
+Of the cruisers, the _Devonshire_, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, was
+refitting at Cromarty; the _Theseus_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was
+returning from the White Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian
+officers; the _Mantua_ and _Alsatian_, armed merchant-cruisers, were at
+Liverpool, coaling and making good defects.
+
+Of the destroyer flotillas, the _Active_ and five destroyers of the 2nd
+Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla, were absent refitting.
+
+On October 1st regulations were brought into force under which a large
+number of coastal navigational lights were extinguished, as also were
+regulations closing the east coast ports to neutral fishing craft;
+other regulations were issued to control the movements of fishing
+vessels in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under which
+additional coastal navigation lights were extinguished (principally in
+the North of Scotland), became effective.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until 5 P.M. on October
+2nd, and then proceeded into the North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron sailed at daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted
+2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the _Invincible_ and
+_Inflexible_, with the _Sappho_ and three mine-layers, left at 2 P.M.
+on October 3rd.
+
+On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took up pre-arranged
+positions designed to secure a close watch over the northern portion of
+the North Sea, partly with a view to an interception of all traffic,
+and partly to ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the North Sea
+during the ensuing week. The main object was the protection of an
+important convoy of Canadian troops, which was crossing from Halifax,
+and which the battle cruiser _Princess Royal_ and the battleship
+_Majestic_ had been sent to meet and to protect. The _Princess Royal_
+arrived at the rendezvous at 8 P.M. on October 7th, and waited for the
+convoy, which was two and a half days late.
+
+The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during the period Oct.
+3rd–11th approximately as follows:
+
+    The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island
+    Channel from the western side.
+
+    The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruisers, the
+    _Sappho_ and three mine-layers, was stationed to the northward and
+    eastward of the Shetland Islands.
+
+    The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion of
+    Area No. 4.
+
+    The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5.
+
+    The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5.
+
+    The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island
+    Channel.
+
+    The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread,
+    worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle Squadron
+    to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle Squadron was
+    utilised to watch the waters between the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
+    and Norwegian territorial waters.
+
+    The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern
+    approaches of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian
+    coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle
+    Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to the
+    bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and for
+    shelter when the weather necessitated this.
+
+These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3.
+
+The _Princess Royal_ met the Canadian convoy in Lat. 49.45 N., Long.
+27.5 W., at 8 P.M. on October 10th. On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet passed to the westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until
+daylight on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, with the _Teutonic_, being withdrawn from the patrol
+north of the Shetlands to a patrol line north-west from Sule Skerry
+lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N., Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th
+and remaining there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for
+Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged in this operation
+returned to their bases for fuel, except the 3rd Battle Squadron (the
+ships of which had coaled two at a time during the operation) and the
+cruiser squadrons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel.
+
+Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the following incidents
+occurred. On October 2nd the _Alsatian_ took six concealed Germans off
+a Danish steamer. At 5 A.M. on October 7th a submarine was reported
+inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and by the _Assistance_;
+she was fired at by the latter ship, in misty weather. On receipt of
+the report I ordered all vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a
+division of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the submarine.
+Later investigation indicated that the report was well founded.
+
+On October 9th the _Alsatian_ sighted an enemy submarine in Lat. 61.42
+N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same day at 3 P.M. the _Antrim_, flagship
+of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was
+missed by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the _Antrim_
+just failed to ram after the attack; numerous reports of enemy aircraft
+having been sighted on the East and West coasts of Scotland were also
+received.
+
+On October 10th the _Liverpool_ and one-half of the 4th Flotilla were
+sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the islands in the vicinity of
+Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N., Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they
+were not being used as German submarine bases, in view of the attack
+on the _Antrim_ in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour to this idea.
+
+Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the northward, two or three
+at a time, during the operations, to carry out gunnery practices by day
+and by night. Thick fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and
+ships detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable difficulty
+in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly resulted in a serious collision
+between a battleship of the 6th Battle Squadron and one of the
+Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of
+each other on opposite courses.
+
+On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the morning of October
+12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville reported that a partial submarine
+obstruction was in place across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even
+a partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine attack on the
+Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had given me much anxiety since
+the beginning of hostilities.
+
+[Illustration: APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS OCT^{R.} 3^{RD.} TO 11^{TH.}
+1914.
+
+WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING.]
+
+On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser tubes of the
+_Iron Duke_ were in a bad condition, although the ship was quite
+new, and that the condensers would need either complete, or
+partial, retubing. The discovery was very disconcerting when taken in
+conjunction with the case of the _Orion_, the condensers of which ship
+had been retubed during September; it naturally led to suspicion being
+directed to the condenser tubes generally of other ships, from which
+reports of cases of tubes occasionally giving out were being received.
+
+The whole question was taken up with the Admiralty, requests being
+made that all available spare tubes should be sent at once to the
+Northern bases, together with some dockyard fitters who could assist
+the artificers of the Fleet in the work of retubing. Representations
+were also made as to the urgent necessity of increasing the stock of
+reserve tubes in case the defects became general in the Fleet owing to
+the ships being so constantly under steam at sea. The task of replacing
+the defective tubes in the _Iron Duke’s_ condensers was begun at once,
+with the help of the artificers of the Fleet, and the _Centurion_ was
+detailed as the spare Fleet-Flagship in case of emergency. But at this
+time the _Iron Duke_ was not kept specially in harbour for retubing
+work, this being carried out as opportunity occurred, although under
+considerable difficulties, since the labour of suddenly preparing for
+sea, with a condenser undergoing retubing, was very appreciable. The
+manner in which this heavy work was taken in hand and rapidly completed
+in several ships, largely by Fleet labour, demonstrated the extreme
+efficiency and very fine spirit of the engine-room departments of the
+ships of the Grand Fleet.
+
+From the 12th to the 16th October the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons
+remained at Scapa, and at 6 P.M. on the 16th they left to carry out
+target practice to the westward of the Orkneys. The 2nd Battle Squadron
+left Scapa on the evening of the 13th to support the cruisers in the
+North Sea; it joined the 3rd Battle Squadron already there, the ships
+of which were being detached to Scapa two at a time to fuel and to
+overhaul their machinery. It was found necessary to give these ships,
+with reciprocating engines, five days off duty periodically in order to
+carry out necessary adjustments.
+
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
+and two divisions of destroyers, left Scapa at 5.30 P.M. on the 12th,
+to carry out a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea. This force
+swept on the 13th on a broad front down to the Dogger Bank, thence to
+the Norwegian coast, and to the northward on the 14th in conjunction
+with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (which was then prolonging the sweeping
+line), without sighting any enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and
+light cruisers took up a position on the 15th to support the cruiser
+squadrons on patrol, the destroyers proceeding to Lerwick to fuel.
+
+The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron remained at Scapa. The 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron was working the N.E. corner of Area 6, and the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron at this period was working the south-western portion of Area
+No. 6. At 1.15 P.M. on October 15th the _Theseus_ reported that a
+torpedo, which had missed, had been fired at her in Lat. 57.50 N.,
+Long. 0.33 E.
+
+On receipt of this report orders were given that the ships of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron, on patrol, were to be withdrawn to the northern
+corner of the area, and later, at 8 P.M., orders were sent that
+they were to join the 2nd Battle Squadron still farther north, and
+to be used by the battleships (which were spread for the purpose of
+intercepting trade or enemy’s ships) for boarding purposes. Meanwhile
+the senior officer of the 10th Cruiser Squadron ships operating in Area
+6 (H.M.S. _Edgar_) reported that he could get no reply to wireless
+signals from the _Hawke_. The _Swift_, with a division of destroyers,
+was ordered to proceed from Scapa at high speed to the last reported
+position of the _Hawke_ in Lat. 57.47 N., Long. 0.12 E., to search
+for the ship. Two other divisions of destroyers were sent, later on,
+to assist the _Swift_. It is to be noted that a submarine had been
+reported off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast at 8.30 A.M. on the 14th,
+but this report did not reach the _Iron Duke_ until the afternoon of
+the 15th.
+
+The _Swift_ reported on the 16th having picked up a raft with an
+officer and 20 men, survivors of the _Hawke_, which had been sunk by
+a submarine in Lat. 57.40 N., Long. 0.13 W., on the 15th. Shortly
+after sighting the raft, the _Swift_ was attacked by the same or
+another submarine (it was thought by more than one) whilst engaged in
+her work of rescue, and torpedoes were fired at her. Captain Wintour
+subsequently stated that he was only able to effect the rescue by
+manœuvring at high speed in the midst of the wreckage, etc., using
+the destroyers with him to screen his movements. His experience was
+an unpleasant one, as he naturally desired to remain on the spot
+until he had ascertained with certainty that he had picked up all the
+survivors, and this he proceeded to do with praiseworthy persistence,
+bringing them to Scapa. On the 16th reports were also received that the
+destroyers _Alarm_ and _Nymphe_ had been attacked by submarines to the
+eastward of the Pentland Firth, and that the _Nymphe_ had rammed the
+submarine that had attacked her. Later examination of the _Nymphe’s_
+bottom by divers showed that her starboard propeller was damaged.
+
+At 4.18 P.M. on the same day, the 16th, it was reported from one of the
+shore batteries that a submarine was close into the Switha entrance to
+Scapa Flow. The ships inside were immediately ordered to raise steam
+with all despatch, and the usual precautions were taken of patrolling
+the harbour with every available small craft, including destroyers,
+tugs, trawlers, drifters and picket-boats; and colliers and store-ships
+were as usual sent alongside the battleships, which were not fitted
+with torpedo nets, as a precaution.
+
+The scene in the harbour on such occasions was a busy one. Small craft
+of every nature were patrolling at the sight of a periscope; all guns
+were manned; torpedo nets, where fitted, were placed in position;
+and every effort was made to ensure that the Fleet was as adequately
+guarded by the available patrol craft as circumstances admitted. All
+large ships except the repair ships _Cyclops_ and _Assistance_ left
+harbour during the night, the _Iron Duke_ joining the 1st and 4th
+Battle Squadrons west of the Orkneys.
+
+At noon on the 17th Sir Stanley Colville, who had been requested to
+organise a careful search for the reported submarine, signalled that
+a submarine was believed to be inside Scapa Flow and had been hunted,
+but not actually located. Reports had been received that officers and
+men on board several of the destroyers, and the gunboat _Leda_, had
+seen the periscope of the submarine, and that a torpedo had actually
+been fired at one of the hunting vessels. It was, however, ascertained
+subsequently that this torpedo was one which had been accidentally
+discharged by one of our own destroyers.
+
+The accuracy or otherwise of these reports has never yet been
+determined with certainty, but many of the officers engaged in the
+search were convinced at the time that a submarine was actually inside,
+and that they had seen her. Indeed, a good many rounds were fired
+during the day at objects which were thought at the time to be a
+periscope.
+
+The reports signalled to me convinced me that, until the matter was
+cleared up with certainty, and until some more absolute security
+against submarine attack on the Fleet at anchor could be provided, it
+was courting disaster to base battleships or battle cruisers at Scapa
+Flow. We had seen in the loss of the _Hawke_ that enemy submarines
+could quite well operate in northern waters, and it was thought to be
+only a matter of time before they would attempt an attack on the Fleet
+in Scapa Flow, if indeed the attempt had not already been made.
+
+I decided, therefore, that it was necessary to seek for a temporary
+base which could be used with safety whilst the submarine obstructions
+at Scapa were being perfected. The incident that had already occurred
+at Loch Ewe cast doubt on the safety of that base, since it was
+unprovided with any obstructions at all and the depth of water made it
+impossible to improvise them with Fleet resources.
+
+Accordingly I looked for other and more easily obstructed ports, and
+eventually decided on Lough Swilly for the main part of the Fleet,
+and Loch-na-Keal in the Island of Mull for the ships for which
+berthing-space could not be found at Lough Swilly. Both ports possessed
+comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly the water was so
+shallow as to make it difficult for a submarine to enter submerged.
+It was also a “defended port” and therefore possessed an organisation
+which would be useful for regulating the entry of ships.
+
+The extensive dispositions necessitated by the temporary change of base
+were at once ordered. Colliers, store-ships, and auxiliaries of one
+kind and another, which were either _en route_ to, or at, Scapa Flow,
+were diverted to the new bases; the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron were ordered to Loch-na-Keal to fuel and to improvise
+anti-submarine obstructions at the entrance; and the _Illustrious_
+was ordered there from Loch Ewe to act as guard ship; the 1st and 4th
+Battle Squadrons and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron were detached to
+cruise to the north-westward of the Hebrides for blockading purposes,
+and to carry out practices; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron and 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were sent to Lough
+Swilly to coal. The cruiser blockade and look-out line was withdrawn
+farther to the northward owing to the danger from submarines incurred
+in operating in the central or southern portions of the North Sea
+on a regular patrol, and the impossibility of providing destroyers
+as a screen for the ships. The new line was to the northward of the
+Shetland Islands, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and armed
+merchant-cruisers carried out the patrol. There were, therefore, two
+lines of blockade, one formed by the heavy ships north-westward of the
+Hebrides, the second to the northward of the Shetland Islands. The
+organisation was such that it was probable that vessels attempting to
+evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines during daylight
+hours. In making these new dispositions it was still intended to keep
+the North Sea itself under observation by frequent cruiser sweeps.
+
+Numerous reports of submarines in the Minch at this time led to the
+_Active_ and two divisions of destroyers being sent there to search
+for them, and the remainder of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were divided
+between blockade duty in the Pentland Firth, work at Scapa Flow, and
+in the vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands, and with the ships at
+Loch-na-Keal and Lough Swilly.
+
+On October 21st the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Cromarty to
+coal. Owing to the receipt of information from the Admiralty early that
+day, that it was reported that some German cruisers, destroyers and
+submarines had left Danzig on October 17th for the North Sea, the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were ordered to
+leave their bases that morning, proceed into the North Sea, and sweep
+down on a broad front to the Skagerrak, screened by the 4th Flotilla
+of destroyers. The latter had to be sent back to their base on October
+22nd owing to heavy weather. The remainder of the force swept up to the
+Skaw without sighting any enemy vessels, then north along the Norwegian
+coast, and proceeded, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to Cromarty and
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa.
+
+On October 21st a submarine was reported just outside Cromarty by an
+armed trawler, and another report was received of one having been
+sighted by the destroyer _Lynx_. The submarine obstruction at Cromarty,
+designed by Captain Munro, had now been completed, and the base was
+considered secure. It would, however, only accommodate a small portion
+of the Fleet.
+
+The dispositions given above were maintained until October 22nd, when
+the _Iron Duke_, 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, the _Active_ and two
+divisions of destroyers of the 2nd Flotilla, arrived at Lough Swilly.
+The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons and 2nd Cruiser Squadron took their
+place to the north-westward of the Hebrides as an outer blockade line
+and support for the cruiser squadrons. The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+and four destroyers were detached to the southern part of the North
+Sea on the 23rd to support the Commodore (T) in carrying out aerial
+operations in the Heligoland Bight. The operations failed owing to the
+difficulty the sea-planes experienced in rising off the water, and the
+2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron returned to Cromarty.
+
+On arrival of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons at Lough Swilly,
+steps were immediately taken to lay an anti-submarine obstruction at
+the entrance, and this was very smartly completed with the limited
+resources of the squadrons by 4 P.M. on the 23rd, and for the first
+time since the declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure base.
+Wire hawsers provided by the ships of the Fleet were suspended at
+varying depths between six colliers which were anchored across the
+entrance, with target rafts as intermediate supports.
+
+It was a fairly effective obstruction, and armed steamboats from the
+fleet patrolled near it with destroyers as a support.
+
+The relief to those responsible for the safety of the Fleet was
+immense, and attention was at once turned to the well-being of the
+personnel, which had been pressed very hard, and to improving the
+efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work. Battle practice
+targets were ordered over from Lamlash, in the Island of Arran, a
+pre-War practice base, with the intention of carrying out practice in
+the waters north-west of Ireland. The work of retubing the condensers
+of the _Iron Duke_ was once more taken in hand, and ships were given
+the opportunity of overhauling and adjusting machinery, steam being
+put back to longer notice than had previously been possible. The
+anti-submarine defence was continually strengthened and improved during
+the stay of the Fleet, and the colliers supporting it were gradually
+replaced by trawlers and drifters.
+
+In order to give the men some much-needed diversion and exercise a
+pulling regatta was organised and held on October 26th, and the men
+were landed for route marches as frequently as possible during the
+stay of the ships at Lough Swilly.
+
+On the 26th a submarine was reported inside Cromarty harbour, but Sir
+David Beatty, who was there with the battle cruisers, stated, after
+investigation, that he did not consider the report was true.
+
+Discussions took place with the Admiralty during the stay of the Fleet
+at Lough Swilly on the subject of trawlers for the patrol of the
+Minches and vicinity, and the requirements were given as thirty-six
+trawlers for this service, which was considered next in importance to
+the provision of an adequate patrol force of this nature for the waters
+in the vicinity of the bases at Scapa Flow and Cromarty.
+
+The stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly was rendered memorable by the
+unfortunate loss of the _Audacious_, then one of our most modern
+battleships.
+
+Orders had been given to the 2nd Battle Squadron to carry out target
+practice against the two battle practice targets obtained from Lamlash,
+and the squadron left Loch-na-Keal on the evening of October 26th
+for a rendezvous in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 8.30 W., at daylight on the
+27th, where the targets which had left Lough Swilly in tow of two
+tugs, the _Plover_ and _Flying Condor_, escorted by the light cruiser
+_Liverpool_, were to be met.
+
+The squadron was in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 8.30 W. at 9 A.M. on the 27th,
+preparing for the practice, when at that hour the _Audacious_ struck
+a mine whilst turning. The explosion resulted in the flooding of the
+port engine-room and partly flooding the centre engine-room. It was
+not clear at the time whether the ship had been mined or torpedoed.
+The _Monarch_ having reported sighting a submarine at 11 A.M., a
+precautionary signal was made to Sir George Warrender to keep the
+squadron clear of the _Audacious_.
+
+Meanwhile all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers and other small
+craft were sent from Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal to assist the
+_Audacious_ and to prevent the submarine (if one were present) from
+doing further damage; and the armed boarding steamer _Cambria_ escorted
+the collier _Thornhill_ (provided with towing hawsers) to the scene.
+The hospital-ship _Soudan_ was ordered out to give help to survivors
+in case the _Audacious_ sank or to the injured, and the _Liverpool_
+was directed to stand by her, but to keep moving at high speed. The
+battleship _Exmouth_ was put at “short notice” ready to tow the
+_Audacious_ in if necessary. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding
+the 1st Battle Squadron, came on board the _Iron Duke_ to suggest that
+he should proceed to the scene to render any assistance, an offer of
+which I very gladly availed myself, as Sir George Warrender, in the
+2nd Battle Squadron, could not close the ship whilst the danger of
+submarine attack existed.
+
+Shortly after the _Audacious_ struck the mine, the s.s. _Olympic_,
+on passage from the United States to Liverpool, closed the ship on
+learning of the disaster, and Captain Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., who was
+in command, at once volunteered to help in any way possible. Captain
+Dampier, of the _Audacious_, asked that his ship might be taken in tow
+and brought into Lough Swilly, and Captain Haddock, disregarding the
+danger of submarine attack or of being mined, took immediate steps to
+carry out this request. Unfortunately a considerable sea was running,
+which increased during the day. In spite of the most magnificent and
+seamanlike handling of the _Olympic_ by Captain Haddock, and later in
+the day excellent work on the part of the master of the _Thornhill_,
+the hawsers constantly parted, owing to the state of the sea and the
+weight of the _Audacious_, the stern of that ship being almost awash
+by the afternoon. The two ships were worked in a manner which Sir
+Lewis Bayly reported as beyond praise. The attempts to tow the injured
+ship had to be abandoned before dark, and Sir Lewis Bayly, Captain
+Dampier and the few officers and men who had remained on board to work
+the hawsers, etc., were taken off the _Audacious_ by 7.15 P.M. The
+remainder of the ship’s company had been removed without accident,
+in spite of the heavy sea, in the course of the day by destroyers,
+trawlers, and other small craft, and in the boats of the _Audacious_.
+
+The work of the destroyers on this occasion was, as usual, of the
+greatest value, and the exceedingly seamanlike handling of the _Fury_
+by Lieutenant-Commander Sumner, who, in the teeth of the greatest
+difficulties, took heavy wire towing hawsers between the _Audacious_
+and the towing ships on several occasions, elicited from Sir Lewis
+Bayly expressions of warm admiration. Arrangements were made for the
+_Liverpool_ to stand by the _Audacious_ during the night, but at 9
+P.M. she suddenly blew up with great violence and sank. The cause of
+this explosion was never ascertained with certainty. At the time the
+ship blew up the _Liverpool_ was not far distant, and a good deal of
+_débris_ fell on the deck of that ship, killing one petty officer. This
+was the only casualty due to the loss of the _Audacious_.
+
+Meanwhile, at 1.8 P.M., information reached me from Kingstown that the
+s.s. _Manchester Commerce_ had been sunk on the night of the 26th by a
+mine in the vicinity of the disaster to the _Audacious_, and at 4.40
+P.M. a report came from Malin Head that a four-masted sailing vessel,
+the _Caldaff_, had also struck a mine in the neighbourhood on the
+previous night.
+
+These unfortunately belated reports disposed at once of any idea that
+submarines had attacked the _Audacious_, and at 5 P.M. the _Exmouth_
+sailed from Lough Swilly to attempt to tow her in. Steps had already
+been taken to warn outward and homeward bound vessels of the existence
+of the mine-field and to divert all traffic clear of it; and all
+mine-sweeping gunboats were ordered to Lough Swilly to locate the exact
+limits of the mine-field and to sweep a clear passage along the north
+coast of Ireland.
+
+On the arrival of the s.s. _Olympic_ at Lough Swilly, orders were given
+that no communication between the ship and the shore was to take place.
+I wired to the Admiralty suggesting that the loss of the _Audacious_
+should be kept secret for as long as possible, so that the enemy should
+not learn of it, as the fact would afford him encouragement at a time
+when the military situation was extremely critical for the Allies, and
+also because, as a general policy, it was desirable to conceal from the
+enemy any serious losses of which he could otherwise have no immediate
+knowledge.
+
+This procedure was approved for the time, because of the military
+situation, and the _Olympic_ was kept at Lough Swilly for several days.
+This was necessary as she had on board a considerable number of United
+States passengers, and it was known that they had taken photographs of
+the _Audacious_ in a sinking condition.
+
+Amongst these passengers was Mr. Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel
+Company, and it was made known to me after a day or two that he
+had come over on very important business connected with War Office
+contracts, and wished to proceed to London. After an interview with
+him, this was agreed to, and I asked him to call on Lord Fisher of
+the Admiralty in connection with the construction of some submarines
+which I ascertained from him that his firm was in a position to build
+very rapidly and which would be of the greatest value to us. He did
+this, and with the most satisfactory results, as ten submarines were
+constructed--as he promised--in the extraordinarily short space of five
+months. These vessels were most useful to us later.
+
+The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough Swilly during the
+remainder of October; the 2nd Battle Squadron proceeded to Lamlash on
+the 29th to coal, and to Lough Swilly on November 1st; the 3rd Battle
+Squadron went to Scapa on the 27th; and the 6th Battle Squadron to
+Lough Swilly.
+
+On October 27th a trawler reported very suspicious movements on the
+part of a large steamer to the westward of the island of Sule Skerry
+(west of the Orkneys). It appeared possible that the ship might be a
+German mine-layer, and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa was sent
+to a position 120 miles from Fair Island on the Fair Island--Heligoland
+line, to intercept her on returning, with orders that, at daylight on
+the 29th, she should spread widely and sweep towards Fair Island, then
+sweeping over to the Norwegian coast near Jaederen’s Point, spreading
+at daylight on the 30th and sweeping up a line approximately N. 15
+W. from Heligoland, before returning to Scapa. Destroyers of the 4th
+Flotilla were also sent out from Scapa on the 28th in search of the
+suspected vessel, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were disposed
+so as to cut her off if she passed to the north of the Shetlands. The
+ship was not sighted, and no mines had been laid.
+
+The Grand Fleet was considerably weakened at this time apart from the
+loss of the _Audacious_. The _Ajax_ had developed condenser defects;
+the _Iron Duke_ had similar troubles; the _Orion_ had to be sent to
+Greenock for examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to be
+defective; the _Conqueror_ was at Devonport refitting, and the _New
+Zealand_ was in dock at Cromarty. The _Erin_ and _Agincourt_, having
+been newly commissioned, could not yet be regarded as efficient, so
+that the Dreadnought Fleet only consisted of 17 effective battleships
+and 5 battle cruisers; the German Dreadnought Fleet at the time
+comprised 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, with the _Blücher_ in
+addition. The margin of superiority was, therefore, unpleasantly small
+in view of the fact that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and
+the Grand Fleet only 42.
+
+During the stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly numerous reports of the
+presence of submarines on the west coast of Scotland were received, a
+large number of the reports coming from the coast watchers. Destroyers
+were sent on many occasions to search the localities from which the
+reports emanated, and the various harbours that could be used by
+submarines as a base were frequently examined. At this period it was
+considered possible that enemy submarines, acting so far from their
+home ports as the west coast of Scotland, would be working from a short
+or from a floating base. It was not thought--from experience with our
+own submarines--that they would be self-supporting at this distance,
+and the best method of limiting their activities, if not destroying
+the submarines, was to find their base. Later experience, and a
+closer knowledge of German submarines, however, showed that they were
+independent of such bases.
+
+It is very doubtful whether any enemy submarines passed to the westward
+of Scotland during October. We, at any rate, found no certain evidence
+that they were present, in spite of the very numerous reports of their
+being sighted. Similarly, reports were constantly being received of
+air-craft (both Zeppelins and aeroplanes) being seen in the north of
+Scotland; many of the rumours were of the most circumstantial nature,
+some coming even from warships. It is quite certain that these reports
+were founded on optical illusions, and it may be said that little
+credence was attached to them at the time.
+
+But the currency of many rumours in those early days of the War,
+sometimes supported by statements of the most plausible character,
+were not only embarrassing, but frequently involved a great deal of
+unproductive cruising, for it was impossible to ignore anything which
+would enable us to find out the enemy’s movements or intentions.
+
+At the end of October, news came of the unfortunate wreck of the
+hospital ship _Rohilla_ off Whitby, with considerable loss of life.
+
+About this time the German land forces occupied the Belgian coast. The
+effect of this occupation on naval strategy was considered in the Grand
+Fleet, and Sir Lewis Bayly and I discussed the blocking of Zeebrugge
+by sinking ships across the channel. Sir Lewis Bayly considered the
+scheme feasible, and wrote to me on the subject. I then suggested to
+the Admiralty that such an operation should be carried out. It was not
+considered practicable by the Admiralty at the time. It is perhaps of
+interest to note that the subject was discussed as early as 1914.
+
+Some two years later I caused the question to be reconsidered after
+taking up the appointment of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty (it had
+been under consideration between 1914 and 1917). More than one plan
+was discussed between Admiral Bacon (commanding the Dover patrol)
+and myself; one idea, which I favoured, was to utilise ships of the
+“Apollo” class, cutting down their upper works to render them less
+visible during approach. Meanwhile, other schemes for driving the enemy
+from the Belgian coast were in operation, so the question of blocking
+was deferred. In September, 1917, when it became clear that the object
+in view would not be effected by military operations during that year,
+I gave directions to the Plans Division of the Naval Staff, of which
+Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes had recently become the head, that plans
+for blocking Zeebrugge were to be prepared; later, after considering
+an independent proposal by Sir Reginald Bacon for attacking the mole
+by landing parties from monitors run alongside it, I decided that
+the operation was to be combined with the landing on the Zeebrugge
+mole. The main objective for the landing was the destruction of enemy
+destroyers known to be lying alongside the mole, and I considered that
+this landing would also be very useful in creating a diversion to
+facilitate the approach of the block ships. The scheme was eventually
+approved by me in November, 1917, and the training of the storming
+party and selection of the block ships were taken in hand.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+INCIDENTS AT SEA--NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914
+
+
+On November 1st I left Lough Swilly to confer at the Admiralty with the
+First Lord and the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, who had relieved the
+Marquis of Milford Haven in this post. During this conference, held on
+November 2nd, the requirements of trawlers, drifters, etc., for the
+patrol of the vicinity of the various fleet bases, the Minches, and the
+waters surrounding the Orkneys and Shetlands were discussed at length
+and decisions reached. The defence of the bases was also considered.
+I stated that the requirements of patrol vessels for the Orkney and
+Shetland areas were a total of 72, and for the Minches of 36.
+
+The future general naval policy was also discussed, one of the main
+questions being that of the 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons joining the
+Channel Fleet. It was determined that this step should be taken and
+the necessary orders were given. I agreed to it with some reluctance,
+as there was obviously no prospect of the 3rd Battle Squadron being
+able to join the Dreadnought Fleet before a Fleet action if stationed
+in southern waters, and a dispersion of the Fleet, which resulted in
+the main Battle Fleet having but a slender preponderance of strength
+over the High Sea Fleet, was a measure which was open to considerable
+objection. The increasing necessity for refitting our ships, which
+involved sending them as far away as Portsmouth or Devonport, combined
+with the failures in condenser tubes that were occurring, led to two,
+or three, or even more battleships being absent at a time, on passage,
+laid up, or refitting. At the German selected moment, our main Battle
+Fleet might well at this period have been reduced to 18 ships (all
+Dreadnoughts), whilst the High Sea Fleet was just rising to a strength
+of 16 Dreadnoughts and 16 pre-Dreadnoughts.
+
+Later, however, after the raid on East Coast towns, the 3rd Battle
+Squadron was again detached from the Channel Fleet and based on Rosyth,
+with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron; the two squadrons arrived there on
+November 20th after passing west of Ireland and coaling at Scapa. The
+6th Battle Squadron remained in southern waters. The object which it
+was desired to attain by this last distribution, which was ordered
+from the Admiralty, was to have a naval force based farther south than
+Scapa, to be more immediately available in the case of an attempt by
+the enemy to land a hostile force on our east coast.
+
+I returned to Lough Swilly at noon, November 3rd, and found the Fleet
+under orders from the Admiralty to proceed to Scapa at once. These
+orders were cancelled after my arrival, and the movements of the Battle
+Fleet left to my discretion. I proceeded to sea with the 1st, 2nd and
+4th Battle Squadrons at 3.45 P.M. and, passing south of Tory Island,
+made for the vicinity of the Bills Rocks on the coast of Galway, for
+target practice, which was carried out on the 4th, the Fleet then
+proceeding to the northward.
+
+The Battle Fleet was screened out of Lough Swilly by the 2nd Flotilla,
+which then left for Scapa. This flotilla had been employed during the
+stay at Lough Swilly in providing patrols off the entrance and in
+hunting for submarines, reports of which were very frequent.
+
+Prior to leaving Lough Swilly, news arrived from the Admiralty that
+the light cruiser _Undaunted_, of the Harwich force, was being chased
+by several German vessels in southern waters, and that hostile
+battle cruisers had been sighted off Gorleston. These occurrences
+had, presumably, led to the ordering of the Fleet to Scapa. As it
+was thought that the operations of the German battle cruisers might
+be part of a general movement, orders were sent to the 3rd Battle
+Squadron to join the Commander-in-Chief at Scapa, the 1st and 2nd
+Battle Cruiser Squadrons being directed to proceed with all dispatch
+towards Heligoland, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron; the 2nd and
+6th Cruiser Squadrons were ordered to Scapa to coal, and the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron to the Shetlands for the same purpose, ready for
+eventualities. These orders were cancelled when it became apparent that
+the German movement was local, and that our ships would be too late to
+intercept the enemy. On this occasion, the German cruiser _Yorck_, when
+returning to port, struck a German mine and sank.
+
+The base at Loch-na-Keal was abandoned when the Fleet left Lough
+Swilly, and the obstructions removed by the battleship _Illustrious_.
+
+On November 3rd the Admiralty issued a general notice proclaiming the
+North Sea as an area in which hostile operations were being carried
+out, and pointing out the danger incurred by neutral vessels which
+entered the North Sea without first ascertaining the steps necessary
+for safety.
+
+On November 5th the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ left Cromarty for
+Devonport by Admiralty orders, prior to proceeding to search for
+Admiral von Spee’s squadron in the South Atlantic. This order, the
+necessity for which was apparent, and the subsequent results of which
+were undoubtedly of high value, had, however, the effect of still
+further weakening the Grand Fleet.
+
+The _Iron Duke_, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons cruised
+between the Hebrides, Faroe Islands and Shetlands after November 4th,
+and carried out gunnery practices and battle exercises as opportunity
+occurred. The 1st Battle Squadron was sent to Scapa to coal on the 7th,
+the 2nd Battle Squadron on the 8th, and the _Iron Duke_ and 4th Battle
+Squadron arrived there on the 9th.
+
+The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were engaged on blockade work
+during this period.
+
+On November 6th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron and one-half of the 4th Flotilla, was sent from
+Cromarty to carry out a sweep of the North Sea, passing through the
+following positions, namely:
+
+  1. Lat. 56.0  N.
+     Long. 1.30 E.
+  2. Lat. 57.50 N.
+     Long. 5.0  E.
+  3. Lat. 60.10 N.
+     Long. 3.15 E.
+  4. Lat. 61.20 N.
+     Long. 3.0  E.
+  5. Lat. 61.0  N.
+     Long. 1.0  E.
+  6. Lat. 58.50 N.
+     Long. 0.0   .
+
+thence the Battle Cruiser Squadron and destroyers were to go to
+Cromarty and the light cruisers to Scapa.
+
+The new battle cruiser _Tiger_, which had been working up gunnery
+and torpedo practices at Bantry Bay in the south of Ireland, arrived
+at Scapa on November 6th to continue her practices and to join the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. It was felt that she would prove a very
+welcome reinforcement when efficient, since the departure of the
+_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had left us in a questionable position
+with regard to battle cruisers as compared with the Germans.
+
+After the Battle Fleet left Lough Swilly, and in consequence of
+information sent to me by Admiral Colville as to the slow progress
+being made with the submarine obstructions, orders were given to the
+various ships to prepare sections of rope net submarine detectors for
+use in the entrances to Scapa Flow, and these were rapidly placed
+in position by the Fleet in Hoxa, Switha and Hoy Sounds when the
+ships arrived at Scapa, armed trawlers being detailed to watch each
+section. It was very disappointing to find on returning to the base
+that so little headway had been made with the supply of material for
+the permanent submarine wire net obstruction, and that the Fleet was
+still, therefore, open to submarine attack. The increase in the number
+of patrol trawlers, however, for service in the vicinity of the base
+gave some protection to the entrances, and relieved the hard-pressed
+destroyers to a welcome extent.
+
+At this time the watching and blockading cruisers were disposed in
+areas between the Shetland Islands, Faroe Islands, and Iceland and to
+the north-westward of the Hebrides, but the whole of the cruisers were
+beginning to show signs of overwork.
+
+The Rear-Admiral commanding the 10th Cruiser Squadron reported that
+all his ships, which were very old, were showing increasing signs of
+needing thorough repair at a dockyard, and arrangements were put in
+hand for sending them, three at a time, to the Clyde. In addition, the
+_Antrim_, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, reported condenser defects;
+the _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, was at Scapa making good
+defects, which were constantly developing, and the _King Alfred_ and
+_Leviathan_, of the same squadron, were refitting at dockyard ports. In
+spite of these incidents, however, large numbers of steamers were being
+intercepted daily by cruisers, battleships and destroyers, and sent
+into Kirkwall for examination. About this time the increase in the
+number of patrol craft at Scapa made it necessary to add considerably
+to the administrative organisation at that base, and requests were
+sent to the Admiralty to provide depôt ships for the local defence
+destroyers, the patrol trawlers, and the other small craft, as well as
+adequate administrative staffs.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until November 17th with
+steam ready at from two to three hours’ notice, and on that date the
+2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron,
+and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a half flotilla as a screen, left
+their bases to take up positions for preventing a suspected attempt on
+the part of the enemy to send some ships into the Atlantic. The 2nd
+Battle Squadron worked to the westward, and the remaining vessels to
+the eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron returned to Scapa on the 20th and the
+2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the 21st.
+
+A heavy gale was experienced in the northern part of the North Sea and
+in the waters surrounding the Orkneys and Shetlands from November 11th
+to November 13th, and all work in the harbour had to be suspended,
+ships lying with steam up, whilst at sea most of the cruisers were
+obliged to lay to. At Scapa all the sea-plane sheds were wrecked by the
+gale, and the sea-planes damaged.
+
+During this stay of the Battle Fleet at Scapa the routine was
+introduced of carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices inside the
+harbour, two or three ships being under way at a time for the purpose.
+This routine was subsequently carried out whenever the Fleet, or any
+portion of it, was at Scapa and the greatest possible benefit was
+derived from it. It was found possible to carry out practice from all
+guns, up to and including 6-inch, inside the harbour by day and night,
+besides the ordinary sub-calibre firing and torpedo practices by ships,
+and by destroyers attacking ships, or divisions of ships.
+
+On November 11th, the battle cruiser _Princess Royal_ sailed for
+Halifax, by Admiralty orders, for the purpose of strengthening the
+North American Squadron in operations against Admiral von Spee’s
+squadron, should it appear in northern waters. I protested, as
+Commander-in-Chief, against sending so powerful a ship as the _Princess
+Royal_, armed with 13.5-inch guns, since her absence left our Battle
+Cruiser Squadron inferior in strength to the German battle cruiser
+force. I suggested that the _New Zealand_, carrying 12-inch guns, was,
+owing to her economical coal consumption, more suited to the work
+required and strong enough for the purpose. However, the _Princess
+Royal_ sailed and remained absent from the North Sea until the
+beginning of January, 1915.
+
+At this period, reports of enemy submarines being sighted, more
+particularly by shore observers in the Hebrides, Orkneys and Shetlands,
+were very numerous, and destroyers and patrol craft were frequently
+being sent to search suspected bases or sheltered bays in which
+submarines might be taking refuge. All such searches were, however,
+fruitless, although in many cases the reports were very circumstantial
+and convincing.
+
+On November 18th the mine-sweeping gunboats, whilst searching the
+Fair Island Channel, sighted a submarine on the surface and chased
+her at a speed of 18 knots, but could not overhaul her. The submarine
+subsequently dived. This incident was the first practical proof of the
+high surface speed possessed by German submarines.
+
+Destroyers were sent out immediately from Scapa to assist in the
+search, with orders to use their searchlights after dark in order to
+force the submarine to keep under water and so exhaust her batteries.
+The search, however, proved abortive, although continued for 24 hours.
+The use of searchlights for this purpose, begun on this occasion,
+became common later on.
+
+A submarine was sighted by the 2nd Battle Squadron at 9 A.M. on the
+19th, well to the westward of the Orkneys, and this may have been the
+vessel chased by the mine-sweepers.
+
+During the gale on November 12th, the ships of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron--the old “Edgar” class of cruisers--which were on patrol
+between the Shetlands and Faroe Islands had suffered much damage, many
+of them showing signs of leaking and straining; boats and ventilators
+were washed away; and water in large quantities found its way below.
+It became evident that these old ships were not sufficiently seaworthy
+to withstand the winter gales of northern latitudes without first
+undergoing a thorough repair, and arrangements were made to send them,
+three at a time, to the Clyde for survey and refit. The survey of the
+first three, however, revealed that some months’ work would be required
+to make them efficient for winter blockade duty, and it was then
+decided by the Admiralty to pay off the whole squadron, and to utilise
+the crews to commission armed merchant ships, which would be far more
+suitable, as they could keep the sea for much longer periods.
+
+The ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been using Swarbachs Minn,
+a harbour in the Shetland Islands, as an occasional coaling base. This
+was evacuated on November 20th in consequence of the receipt of a
+report that a submarine attack on the harbours in the Shetland Islands
+was probable, all of these harbours being, at that time, defenceless
+against such attack. On leaving the base, the ships of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, not already at a refitting port, were ordered to dockyard
+ports to pay off.
+
+On November 20th, during practice, a lyddite common shell detonated in
+one of the 9.2-inch guns of the _Achilles_, and the muzzle of the gun
+was blown off, eleven of the gun’s crew being injured. This occurrence
+cast doubt on the safety of the whole of the lyddite shell afloat, and
+restrictions on their use were issued, but were eventually removed,
+after the withdrawal of all suspected shell of this nature.
+
+At dusk on November 22nd the Grand Fleet left its bases for the purpose
+of carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, and to support an aerial
+operation in the Heligoland Bight. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were included in this movement, and met
+the remainder of the Fleet at sea at 9.30 A.M. on November 23rd in
+Lat. 57.40 N., Long. 2.30 E.
+
+The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron, 6th Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd and 4th Flotillas, took part
+in the operation, the Fleet proceeding south in cruising order, with
+destroyers screening the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+against submarine attack by day. The channel eastward of the Pentland
+Firth was, as usual, searched by the mine-sweeping gunboats prior to
+the departure of the Fleet.
+
+The Commodore (T) from Harwich, with three Light Cruisers and eight
+destroyers, was directed to co-operate in the aerial operations. During
+daylight on the 23rd opportunity was taken to carry out two tactical
+exercises. The _Iron Duke’s_ position at midnight was Lat. 56.55 N.,
+Long. 4.11 E. Ships were ordered to be at action stations by dawn on
+the 24th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron and a division of destroyers, was detached in the
+afternoon of the 23rd with directions to be in Lat. 55.10 N., Long.
+6.20 E. by 5.30 A.M. on the 24th.
+
+The _Drake_ reported her port engine disabled at 1 P.M. on the 23rd,
+and had consequently to be sent back to Scapa.
+
+During the night the Admiralty informed me that the aerial operations
+had been abandoned, as it was thought that the enemy had a force
+present in the Bight, which would be too strong for our detached
+vessels. I then directed the Commodore (T) to meet the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron at its daylight position in Lat. 54.50 N., Long. 7.6 E., and
+thence to proceed towards Heligoland and endeavour to draw any enemy
+forces that might be encountered towards our Fleet. The 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed also to
+proceed to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to give any necessary support.
+
+The weather on the 24th was fine and bright with high visibility.
+The Commodore (T) reconnoitred Heligoland and reported at 10.40 A.M.
+that there was smoke behind the island, and ships steaming to the
+southward; and that he had sighted a submarine. The Rear-Admiral of
+the 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 11 A.M. that he had only sighted
+destroyers, and that he could not draw the enemy towards him, and so
+was returning to the northward with Commodore (T). The Vice-Admiral
+of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, who was supporting, turned to the
+northward shortly afterwards, his noon position being Lat. 54.47 N.,
+Long. 6.35 E. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was attacked at 12.35 P.M. by
+an aeroplane, which dropped five bombs near the _Liverpool_, which was
+in company.
+
+The Battle Fleet cruised in support, the 10 A.M. position of the
+_Iron Duke_ being Lat. 55.23 N., Long. 5.30 E. At 2 P.M. the Battle
+Fleet turned to the north-westward, sighting the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron astern at 3.30 P.M. The battle cruisers and light cruisers
+were stationed 15 miles to the eastward of the Battle Fleet during the
+night, and the necessary dispositions were taken to provide against a
+destroyer attack during the night.
+
+On November 25th two more tactical exercises were carried out. During
+the afternoon the wind increased, and thick weather set in, and by
+daylight on the 26th a heavy southerly gale was blowing, so the
+attached cruisers were sent to the bases for shelter. The 1st Battle
+Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron, and the destroyers, had been detached at midnight on the 25th
+for Scapa, Rosyth and Invergordon respectively. The original intention
+was to take the remainder of the Fleet farther north for target
+practice, but it was abandoned owing to the bad weather, and the _Iron
+Duke_, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron
+arrived at Scapa on the 27th.
+
+During the absence of the Fleet, the German submarine U 18 was rammed
+at 12.20 P.M. November 24th by mine-sweeping trawler No. 96, one mile
+off the Hoxa entrance to Scapa. U 18 was damaged in the collision,
+dived, hit the bottom and received further damage. All the available
+patrol craft were ordered to the spot most promptly by the Vice-Admiral
+commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands and hunted her. She finally came
+to the surface and surrendered off Muckle Skerry in the Pentland
+Firth. The submarine sank as the crew came on deck, the sea cocks,
+probably, having been previously opened. The commanding officer of the
+submarine, who had apparently intended to try to enter Scapa Flow,
+expressed great surprise to Admiral Colville at the absence of the
+Fleet. It seemed possible that he had been deterred from his attempt
+by the sight of the buoys across the entrance, probably suspecting the
+presence of an obstruction which, however, was _not_ there. The sinking
+of the submarine caused the greatest gratification to the local defence
+forces at Scapa and acted as an incentive to further efforts. It was
+also, probably, a deterrent to further attacks on the Fleet at Scapa,
+as the circumstances in which U 18 was sunk were kept most secret in
+order that the enemy might be led to think that her destruction was due
+to nets or mines. Indeed, it is very likely that this incident and the
+secrecy observed had important results in preventing the loss of ships
+of the Grand Fleet when at anchor in Scapa Flow.
+
+Great submarine activity occurred at this time in the vicinity of the
+Orkneys and Shetlands. The _Dryad_ sighted a submarine on the 24th in
+Lat. 58.35 N., Long. 1.45 W.; a second was sighted by an armed trawler
+off Copinsay on the same day; and a third was sighted from the shore,
+proceeding to the eastward through the Pentland Firth. On the 25th U
+16 was sighted by a collier and trawler in Lat. 58.46 N., Long. 2.15
+W., and later by the mine-sweeping gunboat _Skipjack_ not far from this
+position.
+
+On the return of the Fleet arrangements were made for constructing,
+with Fleet resources, net obstructions across the Hoy entrance to Scapa
+Flow, and, in view of the attempt of U 18, all patrols were stiffened
+to the utmost extent possible.
+
+During November 27th and 28th the strong gale continued, interfering
+considerably with the work on the submarine obstructions. Several
+reports of the sighting of submarines in harbours in the north of
+Scotland, the Orkneys and Shetlands were received during the last
+days of November, and destroyers and patrol craft were kept very busy
+in searching the various bays and harbours. In many cases charges
+were exploded on the bottom in bays in which it was considered that a
+submarine might be lying, in the hope of forcing her to the surface. No
+known result, however, was obtained.
+
+The Fleet remained in the various bases until the end of the month,
+the ships in Scapa Flow carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices
+and working at the obstructions. The _King George V._, which had
+just returned from refit at a dockyard, developed condenser defects
+necessitating partial retubing; she was the fourth battleship in which
+this defect had occurred since the War started, a period of only four
+months, and it will be realised that such wholesale breakdowns caused
+me uneasiness.
+
+During November the work of sinking block-ships in all the entrance
+channels to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, was carried
+out. Unfortunately the block-ships had been sent up in a light
+condition without cement ballast which, I was informed, could not be
+supplied, and they began in many cases to break up or to shift their
+position during the winter gales. This fact, combined with the great
+difficulty experienced in sinking them in the exact positions required
+owing to the strong tides prevailing (up to at least eight knots in
+strength), and the very short periods of slack water, rendered the work
+of blocking only partially effective.
+
+At the end of November the effective state of the Grand Fleet was as
+follows:
+
+  Fleet-Flagship: the _Iron Duke_.
+
+  _1st Battle Squadron_:
+        7 ships, the _Neptune_ being away refitting.
+
+  _2nd Battle Squadron_:
+        7 ships, of which one, the _King George V._, was disabled,
+        retubing condensers.
+
+  _3rd Battle Squadron_ (Pre-Dreadnoughts):
+        7 ships, one ship refitting at twelve hours’ notice for steam,
+        and the 8th ship returning from a dockyard refit.
+
+  _4th Battle Squadron_:
+        5 ships (complete).
+
+  _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (the _Princess Royal_ having been detached to North
+        America).
+
+  _2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
+        3 ships. The _Shannon_ was refitting.
+
+  _3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _6th Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        5 ships. The _Liverpool_ was refitting.
+
+  _2nd Flotilla_:
+        15 destroyers (5 refitting).
+
+  _4th Flotilla_:
+        15 destroyers (5 refitting).
+
+  _10th Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Nil_ (paid off).
+
+  _Armed Merchant-Cruisers_:
+        2 (2 were coaling at Liverpool).
+
+  _Mine-sweeping Gunboats_:
+        5 (3 were refitting).
+
+The two new battleships, the _Emperor of India_ and _Benbow_, the
+former flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, C.B., had arrived at
+Berehaven in the south of Ireland on December 1st to “work up” after
+commissioning. On the same date the _Leviathan_ arrived at Cromarty
+to act as flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron under the orders of
+Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore. His flag was transferred to her from
+the _New Zealand_ on December 2nd.
+
+On the night of December 2nd a very violent gale sprang up at Scapa
+Flow, during which several ships dragged their anchors, in spite of
+two anchors being down and steam up; the gale lasted until the morning
+of the 4th. All communication between ships in Scapa Flow, even by
+drifter, was suspended, and the light cruisers at sea on patrol were
+forced to lie to. An officer and one man were washed overboard from a
+picket-boat sheltering under the stern of a store-ship and drowned.
+
+On December 3rd Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, lately in command of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, hoisted his flag in the armed merchant ship
+_Alsatian_ to command the merchant cruisers attached to the Grand
+Fleet, which were now constituted as the new 10th Cruiser Squadron.
+
+At 1.45 P.M. on December 3rd the destroyer _Garry_, Commander W. W.
+Wilson, of the local defence force, reported that she was engaging a
+submarine at the Holm Sound entrance to Scapa Flow. This submarine was
+possibly sheltering there from the bad weather. Destroyers and trawlers
+were at once sent out to assist, and the submarine was last reported
+diving to seaward. Several rounds from her 12-pounder gun were fired by
+the _Garry_ at the submarine’s conning tower, but apparently without
+effect, and an attempt to ram her also failed owing to the heavy sea
+and very strong tides. The submarine and the _Garry_ fired torpedoes
+at one another, the submarine’s torpedo passing under the stern of the
+_Garry_. All ships were directed to raise steam for leaving harbour on
+receipt of the first report from the Garry, from which it was not clear
+whether the submarine had passed through Holm Sound into the harbour,
+but this order was cancelled when it was ascertained that she was
+outside.
+
+On December 4th all the mine-sweeping gunboats attached to the Grand
+Fleet were sent to Sheerness by Admiralty direction for the purpose of
+carrying out sweeping operations off the coast of Belgium; trawlers
+were then the only sweeping vessels left with the Grand Fleet.
+
+On December 5th another heavy gale was experienced, lasting until the
+following morning, and all small craft at sea were forced to shelter.
+
+In consequence of representations made to the Admiralty of the
+inadequacy of the mine-sweeping force at this time attached to the
+Grand Fleet, owing to the withdrawal of the gunboats, steps were taken
+to fit out eight small steamers for the purpose, and I was informed
+that they would arrive on various dates during the month of December.
+These vessels did not prove very satisfactory as mine-sweepers in
+northern waters, and were withdrawn later for use in the Mediterranean.
+
+During the stay of the Fleet in Scapa Flow work on the improvised
+submarine obstructions was continued by naval parties with all possible
+speed, and, meanwhile, work on the permanent obstructions was in hand,
+though progressing but slowly, owing to the difficulty experienced in
+fitting out the trawlers at Inverness with the necessary winches and
+providing the required moorings.
+
+On December 6th bad weather was again experienced. Orders were issued
+on this date for a sweep down the North Sea, but were cancelled on
+receipt of information from the Admiralty that the recent bad weather
+had caused a very large number of mines to break adrift in the
+southern portion of the North Sea. On the same day the light cruiser
+_Sappho_ and three armed boarding steamers were sent to Loch Ewe
+and based there with orders to work north-west of the Hebrides for
+the interception of trade; the force of armed boarding steamers was
+increased later. These vessels were mostly Irish mail packets. Rather
+extensive alterations were necessary, after they had been sent up,
+before they were fit for their duties.
+
+During the early part of December the ships of the 2nd and 6th Cruiser
+Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were mainly engaged in
+Areas 3, 4 and 6; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was at Rosyth and working to
+the eastward from that base.
+
+On December 7th Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore, K.C.B., assumed
+command of the newly constituted 1st Cruiser Squadron, and the
+_Leviathan_ and _Duke of Edinburgh_ arrived at Scapa on that date;
+the _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, with the above ships, comprised the
+squadron. On December 7th, two merchant ships, the s.s. _Michigan_
+and _City of Oxford_, disguised as men-of-war, arrived at Scapa.
+These vessels, with several others, had been fitted out at Belfast
+by Admiralty orders with dummy turrets and guns, and altered with a
+view to representing certain British battleships and battle cruisers.
+The whole of these were formed into a squadron under the command of
+Commodore Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., of _Olympic_ fame, and termed the
+Special Service Squadron. The disguise of the ships was carried out
+very cleverly, though presumably at considerable expense. They would
+have been of value had it been possible to select vessels of a suitable
+speed, but the highest speed attainable by any vessel in the squadron
+was not more than nine to ten knots, whilst the speed of the squadron
+as a whole did not exceed seven knots. The ships could not under these
+conditions accompany the Fleet to sea, and it was very difficult to
+find a use for them in home waters. Commodore Haddock was, later,
+detached with the squadron to Loch Ewe, where the ships were worked
+up to carry out fleet movements. This he did most successfully, so
+that, had the ships possessed the requisite speed, use might have been
+made of them as a squadron for various decoy purposes. But, under the
+conditions existing, this was impossible, and eventually the squadron
+was disbanded with the exception of one vessel; the experiment was
+tried of sending her to sea disguised as a disabled man-of-war with a
+considerable heel to one side, and with patrol craft accompanying her
+as if for protection, in the hope that a submarine might be induced
+to attack her and so afford the patrols an opportunity of sinking the
+submarine.
+
+This scheme, however, met with no success. All the vessels were
+restored to their original conditions for trading purposes, with the
+exception of some which were sent to the Mediterranean and to North
+America, where it was reported that they were of some use.
+
+On December 8th another gale was experienced. The _Thunderer_, which
+had developed condenser defects, left for Devonport on the 8th for
+refit and for retubing condensers; yet another case of this defect!
+
+On December 9th the 1st Battle Squadron proceeded to sea to cruise to
+the north-westward of the Shetland Islands and to carry out gunnery
+practices as convenient. In consequence of bad weather the Vice-Admiral
+sent the attached cruiser _Bellona_ back to Scapa for shelter.
+
+On December 10th the new battleships _Benbow_ and _Emperor of India_
+arrived from Berehaven to strengthen the 4th Battle Squadron, and
+proved very welcome additions to the Fleet. They, as well as all
+other new ships joining, necessarily spent several weeks in practices
+before becoming efficient to join the Fleet at sea, or to take part in
+action. Owing to the hurried completion of these two ships, a great
+deal of fitting work was also required before they were in a proper
+condition, and this delayed their practices considerably. On the 11th
+another gale was experienced which lasted until the 14th. The weather
+during this period was very bad, and ships at sea (including the 1st
+Battle Squadron which returned to Scapa on the 12th) met with very bad
+weather. Destroyers on patrol were unable to maintain their stations
+and were forced to run for shelter, and one of them, the _Cockatrice_,
+suffered some damage.
+
+On the 12th the work of retubing the port condenser of the _King George
+V._ was completed; the starboard condenser was not taken in hand owing
+to the small margin of superiority of the Battle Fleet over the High
+Sea Fleet at this time.
+
+During this stay of the Battle Fleet some very necessary work in the
+ships of the “Iron Duke” class was partially carried out. These ships
+were the first modern battleships fitted with 6-inch guns for their
+secondary armament, and the gunports were very low. Early in the War
+it was found necessary to unship the ports altogether, as the sea
+washed them away constantly. Water then had free access to the inside
+of the ship through the opening between the revolving shield and the
+ship’s side, and, except in fine weather, water entered freely. In bad
+weather the water, as deep as three to four inches, was continually
+washing about the living decks and finding its way below through the
+open hatches, to the great discomfort of the ship’s company, who were
+continually wet, and to the detriment of efficiency. Arrangements were
+devised on board the _Iron Duke_ to overcome this trouble, and steps
+taken to have all the necessary fittings made at various contractors’
+yards. A partial bulkhead was fitted in rear of the guns to confine
+the water which entered the ship, and watertight indiarubber joints
+provided between the gun shields and the ship’s side. The result was
+satisfactory, and similar changes were made in the ships of the “Queen
+Elizabeth” class and in the _Tiger_. The two after 6-inch guns, which
+were on the main deck level, were removed altogether at the first
+opportunity, and the ship’s side and armour completed in the after
+embrasure in all these ships, as it was apparent that these guns could
+never be worked at sea, being only a few feet above the water line.
+The guns themselves were mounted in new unarmoured casemates on the
+superstructure deck level. The work connected with the forward 6-inch
+guns was entirely carried out at Scapa, with the ships at short notice
+for steam, and in some cases the workmen remained in the ships and
+continued the work at sea.
+
+On December 12th serious defects in the boilers of the _Liverpool_
+became apparent and the speed of the ship was limited to 17 knots. This
+defect, which first showed itself in this ship, gradually affected the
+boilers of the same type in all ships so fitted, as they experienced a
+certain degree of wear, and from this time onwards there was usually
+one, and occasionally two, light cruisers paid off for the purpose of
+carrying out the necessary repairs which occupied a period of two or
+three months. This reduction in the number of efficient light cruisers
+was serious, at a time when our numbers compared badly with those
+possessed by the enemy.
+
+On December 14th directions were given to the 2nd Battle Squadron
+and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa, the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron at Cromarty and all the available destroyers which were at
+that base, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, to proceed to
+sea to meet at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.20 N., Long. 0.10 W., at 2.30
+P.M. on December 15th, the force then to proceed to the southward
+with a view to sweeping the western portion of the North Sea. The 2nd
+Battle Squadron--without the _Thunderer_, which was refitting, and,
+therefore, comprising only six ships--left Scapa early on the 15th, but
+in passing through the Pentland Firth the attached cruisers _Blanche_
+and _Boadicea_ were seriously damaged by the heavy sea running as
+the result of the late exceptional gales, and were forced to return.
+The _Boadicea_ had her bridge washed away and lost several men swept
+overboard and drowned. This ship was sent to the Clyde for repairs;
+the damage to the _Blanche_ being less was made good at Scapa. The
+number of destroyers accompanying the force was, unfortunately, very
+inadequate, the 2nd Battle Squadron being unprovided with any vessels
+of this class, as the weather conditions in the Pentland Firth made
+it out of the question for destroyers to go to sea from Scapa. It
+was decided not to postpone the sweep on this account. I ordered all
+available destroyers out from Cromarty in the hope that the weather
+conditions in the Moray Firth might be better than at Scapa; only seven
+were available, however, and I therefore asked the Admiralty to direct
+the Commodore (T), with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, to meet
+the northern force at a southern rendezvous at daylight on December
+16th. This proposal was not carried out, however, the Harwich force,
+which was at sea, remaining a considerable distance to the southward.
+
+Whilst the force was on passage to the southward, the destroyers
+_Lynx_, _Ambuscade_, _Unity_, _Hardy_, _Shark_, _Acasta_ and
+_Spitfire_--which had left Cromarty with the battle cruisers and on
+reaching the rendezvous were stationed 10 miles ahead of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron--sighted and became engaged before daylight on December
+16th with a strong force of enemy destroyers, and, later, with one
+enemy cruiser and three light cruisers. The destroyers appeared to
+be screening ahead of the other vessels and both destroyers and
+cruisers were engaged by our small destroyer force. It was difficult
+to ascertain the result of the engagement so far as the German vessels
+were concerned, although the _Hardy_ claimed to have hit a light
+cruiser at close range; the _Hardy’s_ steering-gear was disabled by
+enemy fire, two men killed and one officer and 14 men wounded. The
+_Ambuscade_ and _Lynx_ were also holed, the _Lynx_ having one man
+wounded. The _Hardy_ finally withdrew under escort of the _Lynx_. The
+engagement caused our own destroyers to become scattered and separated
+from the Battle Squadron, and in the course of the day they proceeded
+to various east coast ports to repair and refuel, the _Hardy_ being
+escorted to the Humber by the _Spitfire_. No report of this engagement
+reached me at the time. My first information of the presence of enemy
+forces in the vicinity of our coast was obtained by intercepting
+at 8.55 A.M. a wireless message from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral
+commanding the 2nd Battle Squadron, timed 8.35 A.M., stating that
+Scarborough was being shelled. The Grand Fleet was at once ordered to
+raise steam, and left at 12.15 P.M., steering for a position Lat. 57
+N., Long. 2.30 E. The weather had now moderated sufficiently to allow
+of destroyers accompanying the Fleet.
+
+Meanwhile Sir George Warrender, who was in command of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron and was the senior officer of the forces at sea, on receipt
+of the Admiralty telegram had turned to the northward to endeavour to
+intercept the enemy forces on their return passage. Wireless signals
+were intercepted in the _Iron Duke_ indicating that the scout _Patrol_
+was being engaged by two enemy battle cruisers and that battleships or
+battle cruisers were off Scarborough and light cruisers off Hartlepool.
+I knew that a gap between two mine-fields laid by the enemy off our
+coast existed between Lat. 54.20 N. and 54.40 N. and concluded that any
+enemy forces operating off our coasts would pass through this gap. At
+10 A.M., therefore, after intercepting the various messages mentioned
+above, I reminded the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron and
+the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by wireless that
+this gap existed, and that the enemy would probably emerge there, and
+Sir George Warrender at 10.26 A.M. directed Sir David Beatty to pass
+through the gap towards our coast. The Admiralty at 10.30 signalled,
+however, to the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron that the enemy
+was probably returning towards Heligoland, and that he should keep
+outside the mine-fields and steer to cut off the enemy. Sir George
+Warrender then directed Sir David Beatty to obey this latter order.
+
+I had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea from Rosyth immediately
+on receipt of the first news of the enemy, and Vice-Admiral Bradford,
+whose squadron was at short notice for steam, left at 10 A.M. with
+directions from me to proceed to lat. 55.50 N., Long. 1.10 W., my
+object being for this force to intercept the enemy should he pass out
+to the northward of the German minefields instead of through the gap
+between them.
+
+Sir George Warrender, with the 2nd Battle Squadron, the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron being in company, was informed of these dispositions by me.
+At 11.40 A.M. he signalled that at 12.30 P.M. he would be in Lat. 54.24
+N., Long. 2.0 E. Sir David Beatty, with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was to the north-westward of the
+Battle Squadron, and the Commodore (T) some 60 miles to the southward,
+having been ordered by the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron,
+at 10.28 A.M., to steer for a position in Lat. 54.20 N., Long. 1.30
+E. The weather throughout the whole morning had been very misty, with
+a visibility of about five miles, and sufficient sea to cause a great
+deal of spray when ships were steaming at high speed.
+
+At 11.30 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_ (1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron), sighted an enemy light cruiser and destroyers
+steering to the southward, gave chase with the _Birmingham_ and engaged
+them; owing to the spray washing over the ship, and to the mist, no
+result was visible. Three other enemy light cruisers, or cruisers, were
+sighted to the south-westward shortly before 11.50 A.M., at about which
+time touch with these vessels was lost.
+
+At 12.16 P.M., German cruisers and destroyers were sighted in Lat.
+54.23 N., Long. 2.14 E. by the 2nd Battle Squadron distant about
+five miles on a bearing north by west, steering to the eastward,
+having evidently come out through the gap in the mine-fields as was
+anticipated; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at this time was some 15
+miles north of the Battle Squadron. It seems probable that the German
+force passed either between our 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, or ahead of the former and astern of the latter. On
+sighting our Battle Squadron, which turned to close, the enemy steered
+to the northward and disappeared shortly afterwards in the mist,
+steaming at high speed, and without being engaged by the 2nd Battle
+Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron did not sight any enemy
+forces.
+
+The escape of the enemy’s force was most disappointing, seeing that
+our own squadrons were in a very favourable position for intercepting
+the raiders. Low visibility was the main reason for their escape, but
+the absence from the Battle Squadron (through the bad weather in the
+Pentland Firth) of its attached cruisers and of a sufficient force of
+destroyers was a contributory cause, as well as the fact of our light
+cruisers having lost touch with the enemy at 11.50.
+
+At 3 P.M. the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron informed me of
+the main features of the position, and stated that he was in Lat. 54.43
+N., Long. 1.55 E., steering to the northward, with the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron, adding that he had ordered the battle cruisers and light
+cruisers to rejoin him.
+
+At about 2 P.M. the Admiralty informed me that it was thought, from the
+information given by our directional stations, that other ships of the
+High Sea Fleet were probably at sea, and at 6.30 P.M. I gave all our
+forces a rendezvous at which to meet at 6 A.M. on the 17th.
+
+The force from Scapa, consisting of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+with the 2nd Flotilla, and the 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons,
+met at this time the force under Sir George Warrender, the 3rd Battle
+Squadron under Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, and the Commodore (T)
+with three light cruisers, and proceeded to the southward. During
+the afternoon of the 17th the Admiralty was able to ascertain (by
+directional wireless telegraphy) and to inform me that the ships of the
+High Sea Fleet, previously reported, were now in harbour.
+
+Opportunity was then taken of the whole Fleet being in company with
+the Commodore (T) to carry out a battle exercise. At dusk the Commodore
+(T) was detached to Harwich, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron to Rosyth, the 2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd Flotilla to Scapa,
+and the _Marlborough_ to Rosyth, for the purpose of allowing Sir Lewis
+Bayly and Sir Cecil Burney to exchange commands in accordance with
+orders received from the Admiralty by wireless telegraphy when at sea.
+
+The light cruiser _Bellona_ and the flotilla leader _Broke_ collided
+during the battle exercises, and were seriously damaged, being sent to
+Rosyth under the escort of the _Devonshire_.
+
+During the 17th wireless messages intercepted in the _Iron Duke_ showed
+that the enemy raiding force had laid a large number of mines off the
+Yorkshire coast and that some British and neutral merchant ships had
+been sunk as a result.
+
+During December 18th the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained at sea to
+the eastward of the Orkneys, and in the evening the battleships shaped
+course for Scapa, arriving on the 19th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reaching Cromarty on the same day. The
+1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons also proceeded to Cromarty, and the 6th
+Cruiser Squadron remained out on patrol.
+
+During the 18th a submarine was reported inside Scapa Flow, and the 2nd
+Battle Squadron raised steam; but investigation showed that the report
+was not well founded.
+
+The strength of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 18 ships,
+and directions were given by me to the Rear-Admiral commanding to
+establish patrols as follows:
+
+    Patrol A.--North of the Faroes and to westward of Long. 5.30 W.
+
+    Patrol B.--North of the Shetlands and to westward of Long. 1.0 W.
+
+    Patrol C.--South of the Faroes and to westward of a line joining
+    Sydero and Sule Skerry lighthouses.
+
+    Patrol D.--West of the Hebrides and a line N.½W. from St. Kilda.
+
+The _Sappho_ and the seven armed boarding-steamers, now available, were
+based on Loch Ewe, and completed the blockade line between Patrol D and
+the Hebrides. They were, however, shifted later on to Scapa, where they
+were employed on patrol and boarding duties in the approaches to the
+Pentland Firth, or at sea with cruiser squadrons.
+
+On December 20th a report was received that the submarine obstruction
+in Hoxa Sound had been found to be pierced; this led to steam being
+raised by all ships at Scapa, and the usual search by small craft was
+ordered; boats were also sent to explode charges on the bottom in the
+vicinity of the damaged portion of the submarine obstruction, where
+it was thought a submarine might have been entangled. Another alarm
+took place later, due to some trawlers inside Scapa Flow mistaking the
+concussion due to the explosion of these charges for torpedoes and
+firing warning signals in consequence. The precautions were kept in
+force until after daylight on the 21st. On that date Vice-Admiral Sir
+Cecil Burney arrived at Scapa in the _Marlborough_ and assumed command
+of the 1st Battle Squadron, Sir Lewis Bayly taking over the command of
+the Channel Fleet.
+
+On the 21st the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron left
+Cromarty for Rosyth in obedience to directions from the Admiralty that
+the battle cruisers and light cruisers were to be based on the latter
+port. This change was one result of the Scarborough raid.
+
+The mine-sweeping gunboats rejoined the Grand Fleet on this date.
+
+On December 23rd the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with the _Iron
+Duke_, proceeded to sea to the westward of the Orkneys, and carried out
+target practice at the Sulis-Ker Rock, north of the Hebrides, on the
+24th, passed through the Pentland Firth at 6 P.M. on that date, and
+proceeded into the North Sea for a sweep into southern waters.
+
+During daylight of the 25th the 1st Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla
+and the 6th Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, the 3rd Battle Squadron, the
+3rd Cruiser Squadron, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, and the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons
+and 4th Flotilla from Cromarty met the _Iron Duke_, and the 2nd and
+4th Battle Squadrons at given rendezvous between Lat. 56.45 N., Long.
+1.30., and Lat. 56.14 N., Long. 3.20 E.
+
+Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney was under treatment on board a hospital
+ship and too unwell to take his squadron to sea. Admiral Sir Stanley
+Colville was, therefore, directed to hoist his flag on board the
+_Marlborough_ and to assume temporary command of the 1st Battle
+Squadron.
+
+The whole Fleet was together by 1.20 P.M. on the 25th, steering
+south-south-east at 15 knots. At 1.40 P.M. the _Birmingham_ and
+_Southampton_, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, both sighted
+submarines about 15 miles to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet.
+
+The Battle Fleet was then gradually turned from the
+south-south-eastward course to north-north-eastward until 3 P.M., being
+then in position Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 3.43 E. Course was altered to
+north-north-west at 3.15 P.M. and speed reduced. At 9.15 P.M. the Fleet
+again turned to the southward, speed having to be reduced owing to the
+sea becoming too heavy for the destroyers. By midnight a south-westerly
+gale was blowing.
+
+At 8 A.M. on December 26th the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.58 N., Long.
+2.16 E., with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron 40 miles to the southward; a speed of 11 knots was the most
+that the destroyers could keep up without risk of serious damage, and,
+as the weather was getting rapidly worse, they were detached at 8.10
+A.M. to their bases.
+
+By 10 A.M. a whole gale was blowing from the south-eastward. The sweep
+was abandoned and course altered to the northward. At 11 A.M. the
+Rosyth and Cromarty squadrons were ordered to proceed to their bases,
+the _Indomitable_, which had joined the Fleet at 8 A.M. from the
+Mediterranean, being ordered to Rosyth, there to join the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron. The destroyers and light cruisers suffered somewhat
+from the gale, the 2nd Flotilla unfortunately losing three men, and
+from the light cruiser _Caroline_ one man was washed overboard.
+
+Bad weather continued during the passage north with a very rough sea,
+and on nearing the Pentland Firth the Dreadnought Battle Fleet found
+the conditions to be exceptionally severe, with a following wind which
+caused the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead of the ships. The
+ships were directed to enter Scapa Flow in the following order: 2nd
+Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron; the 2nd
+Battle Squadron was timed to enter at 6 A.M.--some time, of course,
+before daylight, which, at this period of the year at Scapa Flow, is
+about 8.30 A.M.
+
+As the rear subdivision of the 2nd Battle Squadron approached the
+entrance, the ships as usual having no lights showing, the _Monarch_
+altered course and stopped to avoid a patrol trawler which she suddenly
+sighted close under her bows. The _Conqueror_, astern of her, was
+unable to avoid the _Monarch_ and the two ships collided; the stern
+of the _Monarch_ and the starboard bow of the _Conqueror_ were very
+seriously damaged, rendering both ships unseaworthy. They were brought
+into the harbour and safely berthed.
+
+Meanwhile, the 1st Battle Squadron, following astern of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron, entered safely. The _Iron Duke_ was leading the 4th Battle
+Squadron, and, on intercepting the wireless messages indicating that
+something was wrong, I stood through the Pentland Firth to the westward
+with the 4th Battle Squadron until the situation had become clearer.
+The dawn was very late and a furious gale was blowing, with a very
+heavy sea and strong tide in the Firth. These conditions made the
+handling of the battleships very difficult when they turned through 16
+points to return to the eastward.
+
+The _Iron Duke_ and 4th Battle Squadron entered at 10 A.M. The whole
+Fleet remained with two anchors down and steam up on account of the
+weather until 1 P.M., when the wind and sea moderated, and by the
+morning of the 28th normal conditions were resumed. As a result of the
+gale, it was necessary to send the destroyers _Hope_, _Redpole_ and
+_Ruby_ to dockyards for repairs.
+
+On the 28th a new Light Cruiser Squadron, termed the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron, was formed, consisting of the _Falmouth_ (Flag
+of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), _Gloucester_, _Yarmouth_ and
+_Dartmouth_.
+
+Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney now resumed command of the 1st Battle
+Squadron.
+
+Enemy submarines were active at the entrance to the Firth of Forth at
+this time; a torpedo was fired at T.B. No. 33 and another at T.B. No.
+31 on the 25th, and two submarines were sighted during the 28th off the
+entrance to the Tay.
+
+Temporary repairs to the _Monarch_ and _Conqueror_ were begun as soon
+as the weather permitted, and the former ship was able to leave Scapa
+for Devonport for thorough repair on December 29th. It was found
+necessary to obtain salvage plant and assistance in the case of the
+_Conqueror_, which had sustained very extensive underwater injury over
+a considerable length, and Captain Young, of the Liverpool Salvage
+Association, for whose services I applied at once, was sent up with
+the salvage ship _Rattler_, arriving on December 31st. The _Conqueror_
+was taken into Switha Sound and the repair ship _Assistance_ secured
+alongside her, and excellent temporary repairs were effected by the
+18th January, by the staff of the _Assistance_, Captain Betty, R.N.,
+and by the salvage artificers under Captain Young.
+
+The second condenser of the _King George V._ was taken in hand for
+retubing at this time.
+
+At the end of 1914 the condition of the Fleet was:
+
+  Fleet-Flagship: _Iron Duke_.
+
+  _1st Battle Squadron_:
+        8 ships (complete).
+
+  _2nd Battle Squadron_:
+        4 ships (the _Conqueror_ and _Monarch_ being disabled and the
+        _King George V._ retubing her second condenser).
+
+  _3rd Battle Squadron_:
+        7 ships (_Commonwealth_ refitting).
+
+  _4th Battle Squadron_:
+        7 ships (complete) but two new ships, the _Benbow_ and _Emperor
+        of India_, not yet efficient.
+
+  _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        5 ships (_Princess Royal_ was away).
+
+  _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        3 ships (_Black Prince_ refitting).
+
+  _2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _6th Cruiser Squadron_:
+        2 ships (complete).
+
+  _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        2 ships (2 not joined).
+
+  _10th Cruiser Squadron_:
+        14 ships (4 coaling and refitting).
+
+  _2nd Flotilla_:
+        16 destroyers (4 refitting).
+
+  _4th Flotilla_:
+        17 destroyers (3 refitting).
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE DOGGER BANK ACTION
+
+
+Developments in the intelligence system at the Admiralty, initiated at
+the outbreak of war by Rear-Admiral Henry F. Oliver, the Director of
+the Intelligence Division, and an improvement in the efficiency of our
+directional wireless stations and of wireless telegraphy generally, led
+to our being able to obtain more reliable knowledge of the movements of
+enemy vessels. The result was that it had become unnecessary towards
+the end of 1914 to keep the Fleet so constantly at sea in anticipation
+of enemy movements. It was very desirable to spare the ships to
+some extent since it was increasingly evident that the War would be
+prolonged, and we had already had several warnings that the strain of
+constant sea work was telling on the efficiency of the machinery. Two
+very disquieting examples of this were the failure of condenser tubes
+on a large scale, particularly in the battleships, and the trouble
+developing in the boilers of a very considerable number of light
+cruisers.
+
+The problem of training personnel was also beginning to prove serious.
+In order to commission the large number of new ships which had been
+laid down since Lord Fisher, full of energy and ideas, had taken up
+the office of First Sea Lord (the number, of all sorts, building and
+projected, being more than 600), it became evident that it would be
+necessary to remove trained men from the Grand Fleet and to replace
+them with boys or untrained landsmen. Under these conditions the
+individual efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work, as
+well as in such matters as signalling (visual and wireless) and the
+other factors which are essential in a fighting ship, could only be
+maintained if we could spend sufficient time in harbour, during which
+regular instruction could be given; this instruction to be followed by
+frequent practices under way, in conditions where the ships would not
+be liable to attack by enemy submarines, and need not, therefore, be
+screened by the overworked destroyers. The organisation for carrying
+out this work at Scapa Flow was, therefore, greatly elaborated.
+
+Steps were taken to start a school for training young wireless
+operators at Scapa, first on board each ship, and, later, in a
+specially fitted merchant ship. The want of wireless operators had
+been most seriously felt since the War began. In addition to the needs
+of new warships of all classes in this respect, the requirements for
+merchant ships, trawlers and other patrol craft were immense and
+could not be met. In this branch of instruction Lieut.-Commander
+R. L. Nicholson, the Fleet wireless officer on my staff, carried out
+invaluable work in organising and starting the school. The training of
+young ratings in visual signal duties was also taken in hand vigorously
+under Commander A. E. Wood and the signal officers of the Fleet. The
+Grand Fleet became, in effect, a great school for turning out trained
+personnel for the Navy as a whole, whilst still keeping watch over the
+High Sea Fleet, and controlling the North Sea and its northern exit,
+thus carrying out its rôle as the centre and pivot of the whole naval
+side of the War.
+
+Early in 1915 the subject of the instruction and education of the
+midshipmen also exercised my attention. On mobilisation all the cadets
+had been removed from Dartmouth and sent to sea, with their training,
+of course, very incomplete. During the first months of the War, when
+the ships were either at sea or, if in harbour, were coaling, it was
+impossible to give these young officers any regular instruction, and,
+whilst they were learning much that would be invaluable to them in
+the future, it was evidently highly desirable that their systematic
+education should be continued as far as was possible during a war.
+
+Steps were accordingly taken in this direction. The first essential
+was to obtain naval instructors for the ships carrying midshipmen. The
+policy of the Admiralty, for some years before the War, had been to
+reduce gradually the number of naval instructors afloat, the idea being
+that the training at the Colleges and on board the training cruisers
+rendered the presence of instructors at sea unnecessary. I never held
+this view personally, but, in any case, it was clear that, as the
+cadets had gone to sea with less than half their course completed,
+further instruction at sea was necessary. The specialist officers
+afloat could not undertake this work under war conditions and strong
+representations were, therefore, made to the Admiralty on the subject.
+Eventually a number of gentlemen were entered specially for this
+instructional work and, after a short course of training in navigation
+at Greenwich, were sent to the Fleet, where their work proved to be of
+great value to the rising generation of officers.
+
+The blockade was becoming daily more effective, although the blockading
+cruisers worked at so great a distance from the German coast. The only
+interference ever attempted by the enemy was by submarine attack or
+by mines, and during the year 1915 no great success was achieved by
+them in this respect when the conditions are considered. The regular
+blockading squadron, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was assisted in its
+work by the sweeps of our cruisers and light cruisers, accompanied
+occasionally by the Battle Fleet. In addition to the discharge of
+these duties, the Battle Fleet engaged in periodical cruises, during
+which battle exercises were carried out for the purpose of maintaining
+efficiency in the handling of the ships and squadrons and of giving
+the fresh officers, who were frequently joining the Fleet, to replace
+others required for the new ships, experience in the work of the Grand
+Fleet under the novel war conditions.
+
+Pursuant to this general policy, the Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained
+in harbour until January 10th, and then left for a cruise to the
+westward of the Orkneys and Shetlands. Gunnery practices were carried
+out by day and at night, as well as battle exercises, and the Fleet
+returned to Scapa during the day and the night of the 13th. The 3rd
+Battle Squadron left Rosyth on the 12th for a cruise in the North Sea,
+and on the night of the 13th–14th passed to the westward of the Orkneys
+for gunnery practice, returning to Rosyth on the 15th.
+
+Other events of interest during the first fortnight of January were
+the return of the _Princess Royal_ from North American waters on the
+1st; a short cruise in the centre of the North Sea by the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron between the 3rd and
+the 5th, and by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron between the 6th and the 8th;
+a cruise by the 1st Cruiser Squadron to the westward of the Orkneys
+between the 4th and 6th, and by the 6th Cruiser Squadron between the
+6th and the 9th, and the 10th and 14th. On January 4th the _King George
+V._ completed the work of retubing her condenser.
+
+On the 9th all ships at Scapa raised steam ready for leaving, in
+consequence of a report of a submarine being sighted in Hoy Sound, and
+available destroyers and trawlers were sent to patrol in the vicinity
+of the Hoy anti-submarine Fleet obstructions until the Battle Fleet
+left harbour on the 10th.
+
+Gales were experienced at Scapa on the 1st, 13th, 16th and 19th of
+January.
+
+On January 15th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted,
+under Vice-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore, K.C.B., whose flag was
+transferred from the _Leviathan_, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, to the
+_New Zealand_; the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron then comprised the _New
+Zealand_, _Indomitable_ and _Invincible_ (the last not having yet
+arrived). Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., took command of
+the 1st Cruiser Squadron in place of Sir Gordon Moore, flying his flag
+in the _Defence_, which took the place of the _Leviathan_; the latter
+vessel was transferred to the 6th Cruiser Squadron. Rear-Admiral A. C.
+Leveson, C.B., relieved Sir Robert Arbuthnot as Rear-Admiral in the 2nd
+Battle Squadron, flying his flag in the _Orion_.
+
+On the 17th the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for a cruise in the centre and southern
+portions of the North Sea, and on the 19th, at dawn, arrived in
+position Lat. 55 N., Long. 5.30 E. to support Commodore Tyrwhitt in
+carrying out a reconnaissance in Heligoland Bight. Nothing was sighted
+beyond an airship and a sea-plane, and the force was ordered to return
+to its bases and arrived during the night of the 20th–21st.
+
+On the 18th the Admiral commanding at Queenstown reported that a
+German mine had been washed ashore at Portrush, as well as bodies and
+wreckage, apparently belonging to the _Viknor_, an armed merchant
+cruiser of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Anxiety had been felt as to the
+safety of the _Viknor_ for two or three days owing to no reply to
+wireless signals being received from her, and the ships of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron had been directed to search for her. The report from
+Portrush pointed to the probability that she had struck a mine off the
+north coast of Ireland, either in the _Audacious_ minefield or a field
+further to the southward, and had been lost with all hands in the very
+heavy weather prevailing at the time in this vicinity. All traffic
+round the north of Ireland was stopped until sweepers were able to
+examine the whole area.
+
+At this time a large number of German mines were being constantly
+reported both in the North Sea and on the west coasts of Scotland and
+Ireland, having evidently broken adrift from their moorings in the
+heavy weather which had been generally prevalent. These mines, which
+were not safe when adrift, as provided for under The Hague Convention,
+were a source of some danger to ships, particularly at night. On the
+18th the battleship _Superb_, having developed defects in one of her
+turbines, was sent to Portsmouth. She was absent from the Fleet until
+March 11th.
+
+On January 19th, the orders for the 10th Cruiser Squadron (blockading
+squadron) were somewhat modified by me; the new centre lines of patrol
+positions being:
+
+    Patrol A.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 62.20 N., Long.
+    10.0 W.
+
+    Patrol B.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 61.10 N., Long.
+    1.15 E.
+
+    Patrol C.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 59.40 N., Long. 9.0
+    W.
+
+    Patrol D.--Eastern line of patrol to be 80 miles in the direction
+    335° from St. Kilda.
+
+The ships were ordered to patrol on east and west courses on each side
+of the centre line at a speed of at least 13 knots by day, zigzagging.
+
+At the same time four ships were directed to carry out a special patrol
+of the Norwegian coast between the parallels of 62 N. and 62.20 N.
+This patrol was maintained until the 22nd. As indicating the growing
+work of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the efficiency of
+the blockade, the Rear-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron reported
+on January 18th that 80 ships had been intercepted by his squadron
+since December 26th, 52 of which were eastward-bound. The strength
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 21 ships, exclusive of
+the _Viknor_, the loss of which ship with her fine ship’s company was
+deeply regretted.
+
+A patrol to the eastward of the Pentland Firth was at this period
+being worked by the _Sappho_ and five armed boarding-steamers, which
+were supported at night by one or two cruisers or light cruisers as
+necessary.
+
+The _Monarch_ returned from being repaired at Devonport on the 20th.
+Temporary repairs to the _Conqueror_ had been completed about January
+18th, but the ship was detained pending more favourable weather
+conditions; on the 21st she left for a southern dockyard, escorted by
+four destroyers. On clearing the Pentland Firth, however, she found
+that the sea was too heavy for the passage to be made with safety in
+her damaged condition, and the ship returned to Scapa, where further
+work was taken in hand and it was decided that it would be necessary to
+dock her in the floating-dock at Invergordon to effect more permanent
+repairs for the passage south than could be carried out by divers at
+Scapa. She reached Invergordon on January 24th.
+
+On January 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth left for a sweep in the southern
+portion of the North Sea, in conjunction with the Harwich force. The
+remainder of the Grand Fleet acted in support. The 1st and 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadrons (except the _Queen Mary_, which was absent refitting)
+and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed to a rendezvous, where
+the Commodore (T), with available destroyers and light cruisers, was
+ordered to meet them.
+
+The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were ordered to the
+vicinity of the battle cruisers’ rendezvous.
+
+The _Iron Duke_, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st,
+2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+available destroyers of 2nd and 4th Flotilla (a total of 28 destroyers)
+left Scapa during the evening of the 23rd and proceeded towards the
+same rendezvous.
+
+At 7.20 A.M. the _Aurora_, of the Harwich force, reported that she was
+in action with enemy vessels; at 7.30 A.M. Sir David Beatty reported
+enemy battle cruisers and cruisers in sight in Lat. 54.53 N., Long.
+3.32 E., steering east. At 7.55 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported his position as Lat. 55.10
+N., Long. 3.32 E., and enemy vessels in sight, consisting of battle
+cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, steering between south-east
+and south. On receipt of these reports the Battle Fleet increased to 19
+knots speed, and steered to support the battle cruisers, and the 3rd
+Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which were further to the
+southward, were ordered to steer for Heligoland at full speed, to act
+in immediate support. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was also sent on
+ahead at full speed to join the other forces.
+
+The proceedings of the force under Sir David Beatty are best described
+in his report given in an Appendix.
+
+During the early part of the engagement Sir David Beatty kept me
+informed of his position and proceedings, but at 11.30 A.M. a report
+was received from Sir Gordon Moore that he was heavily engaged with the
+enemy battle cruisers in Lat. 54.21 N., Long. 5.4 E. The fact that this
+report was made by this officer caused me some uneasiness at first, as
+it implied that the _Lion_ could not signal, but as the Rear-Admiral
+made no mention of any casualty to the _Lion_, I concluded the cause
+was some breakdown in her wireless arrangements and that all was well.
+
+At 11.50 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron, reported the enemy steering south-east at 25 knots, and at
+noon that he had lost touch with them; at 12.5 P.M. Rear Admiral Sir
+Gordon Moore reported that he was retiring north-west, and, later,
+north-north-west, that the _Blücher_ was out of action, and that the
+remaining enemy battle cruisers were out of sight; he added that the
+_Lion_ had hauled out of action. He gave his position as Lat. 54.19 N.,
+Long. 5.22 E.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet’s position at noon was Lat. 56.29 N.,
+Long. 3.22 E., with the cruisers 15 miles ahead and the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron ahead of the cruisers. At 1.15 Rear-Admiral Moore
+reported in reply to my enquiry that Sir David Beatty was on board the
+_Princess Royal_, that the _Lion_ was damaged and detached; Sir David
+Beatty then reported that the _Lion’s_ speed was reduced to 12 knots,
+that the _Blücher_ had been sunk, and two other enemy battle cruisers
+seriously damaged, and that he was covering the retirement of the
+_Lion_, which was steaming with her starboard engine only.
+
+The hit which disabled the _Lion_ was a piece of luck for the enemy.
+
+At 2 P.M. Vice-Admiral Bradford, commanding the 3rd Battle Squadron,
+reported that he was turning to the northward, having all the battle
+cruisers in sight. The 3rd Battle Squadron was sighted from the _Iron
+Duke_ at 3.30 P.M., and stationed on the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Sir
+David Beatty had meanwhile directed the _Indomitable_ at 3.38 P.M. to
+take the _Lion_ in tow, and this operation was effected by 5 P.M. At 4
+P.M. the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 4.7 E., and at
+4.30 P.M. the battle cruisers were in sight from the _Iron Duke_. The
+Battle Fleet then turned to the northward, keeping in company with the
+battle cruisers until dark.
+
+At 7 P.M. the _Lion’s_ starboard engine became disabled and the speed
+was still further reduced.
+
+At dusk the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and all destroyers of
+the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with the Battle Fleet, except those vessels
+which were short of fuel, had been detached to assist the remaining
+destroyers in screening the _Lion_ and her escort against destroyer and
+submarine attack. The heavy ships, battleships and battle cruisers,
+stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo attack. The night passed
+without incident, the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the
+battle cruisers during the darkness. Wireless messages were sent on the
+24th to the Senior Naval Officer, Tyne, to send out tugs to meet the
+_Lion_, and this was done.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the battle cruisers remained cruising
+in the North Sea during daylight on the 25th, except the 3rd Battle
+Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which were detached to Rosyth at 8
+A.M.
+
+[Illustration: MOVEMENTS FROM JAN^Y. 23^{RD}. TO 25^{TH}. 1915.]
+
+During these operations many floating mines were sighted and sunk.
+
+The battle cruisers proceeded to Rosyth at dusk, and the Battle Fleet
+to Scapa, except the _Iron Duke_ and _Centurion_, which were sent to
+Cromarty, the _Iron Duke_ to dock and refit and the _Centurion_ to act
+as “stand by” Fleet-Flagship during the refit. The _Lion_ arrived at
+Rosyth at 6.35 A.M. on the 26th in a dense fog and was taken up harbour
+for temporary repairs, the _Assistance_ being sent from Scapa to Rosyth
+to help in the work. The main injury to the _Lion_ was caused by two
+hits under water, which pierced the feed tank and displaced an armour
+plate; the permanent repairs were completed on the Tyne, the work
+being carried out by the aid of coffer dams, there being no dock there
+capable of taking the ship. Her casualties consisted of 11 men wounded.
+The only other battle cruiser that received injury was the _Tiger_, in
+which ship Engineer Captain Taylor, a most valuable officer, and five
+men were killed, 11 being wounded; the material damage to the ship was
+slight.
+
+The enemy, as the result of this action, suffered the total loss of the
+_Blücher_; and two battle cruisers, the _Derfflinger_ and _Seydlitz_,
+sustained severe injuries, a serious fire or explosion occurring in
+one of the after turrets of one ship, which put that, or possibly both
+after turrets, out of action and caused a large number of casualties
+amongst the crew. It was ascertained at a later date from German
+prisoners that the condition of one, if not of both ships on return
+to harbour was very serious; the casualties, as well as the material
+injury, were heavy. It was stated subsequently that the _Derfflinger_
+had 60 killed and 250 wounded, and the _Seydlitz_ about 100 killed.
+
+One of our destroyers, the _Meteor_, was damaged in the action, but
+was towed back to port and repaired.
+
+On the 26th the 6th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted and composed of
+the _Drake_, _Leviathan_ and _Cumberland_, and a 7th Cruiser Squadron
+was formed under the command of Rear-Admiral A. W. Waymouth, consisting
+of the _Minotaur_ (flagship), _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_. The 1st and
+6th Cruiser Squadrons were sent to Scapa, and the 2nd and 7th to
+Cromarty.
+
+The _Britannia_, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, grounded in the Firth of
+Forth in the fog on her way back to Rosyth, was ashore for 36 hours,
+and suffered considerable damage, necessitating repairs at a dockyard.
+
+On the 27th January the 1st Cruiser Squadron and a division of
+destroyers sailed to cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea and
+returned on the 30th, being relieved by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. On
+January 28th the battle cruisers _Princess Royal_ and _Queen Mary_,
+with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, left Rosyth to support operations
+being carried out in the Heligoland Bight by Commodore Tyrwhitt and
+Commodore Keyes on January 30th and 31st. Owing to fog the operations
+could not be carried out, and the force returned to its bases on the
+30th.
+
+A report of a submarine inside Cromarty Harbour on the 29th caused
+ships to raise steam preparatory to leaving, and all small craft to
+search for the submarine, but on investigation it was considered that
+the report was unreliable.
+
+On January 30th enemy submarines appeared in the Irish Sea, one of them
+opening fire on Walney Island, where the works of Messrs. Vickers,
+Limited, are situated. At about this date, owing to marked enemy
+submarine activity in the Irish Sea, the ships of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron were directed to coal temporarily at Loch Ewe instead of at
+Liverpool, and two divisions of Grand Fleet destroyers were detached to
+the Irish Sea to assist in hunting the submarines.
+
+During January the number of drifting German mines in the North Sea was
+very considerable. Many were sighted and sunk by the Fleet when at sea;
+the 2nd Cruiser Squadron alone, when on patrol on the 30th and 31st
+January sinking 12 mines.
+
+At the end of January the condition of the Grand Fleet was as follows:
+
+BATTLE FLEET
+
+  _Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship, refitting.
+
+  _1st Battle Squadron_:
+        7 ships (_Superb_ was away).
+
+  _2nd Battle Squadron_:
+        6 ships (_Conqueror_ was unserviceable).
+
+  _4th Battle Squadron_:
+        7 ships (complete).
+
+  _3rd Battle Squadron_:
+        6 ships (_Commonwealth_ and _Britannia_, refitting).
+
+  _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        2 ships (_Lion_ was effecting temporary repairs;
+        the _Tiger_ refitting).
+
+  _2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        1 ship (_Indomitable_ refitting after a fire, due to defective
+        electric circuits).
+
+  _1st Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
+        3 ships (_Natal_ refitting).
+
+  _3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
+        3 ships (_Roxburgh_ refitting).
+
+  _6th Cruiser Squadron_:
+        3 ships (complete).
+
+  _7th Cruiser Squadron_:
+        3 ships (complete).
+
+  _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (complete).
+
+  _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        4 ships (_Liverpool_ refitting).
+
+  _2nd Flotilla_:
+        11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).
+
+  _4th Flotilla_:
+        11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).
+
+The shortage of destroyers at this period was exceedingly marked.
+
+During February the Battle Fleet remained in harbour. No enemy
+movements took place or were expected as several changes were
+being made in the High Sea Fleet commands; the principal of these
+was the relief of Admiral von Inghenol by Admiral von Pohl as
+Commander-in-Chief. It was anticipated that the new Flag officers would
+exercise their squadrons in order to become familiar with them before
+attempting any operations.
+
+The opportunity was taken of refitting the _Iron Duke_, and the ship
+remained at Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth, until February 23rd.
+It was becoming desirable to give the officers and men of the Battle
+Fleet some change from Scapa Flow, where there were no opportunities
+for landing for exercise or recreation, and arrangements were made by
+which battle, as well as cruiser squadrons should visit Invergordon
+periodically for this purpose. The 2nd Battle Squadron accordingly
+arrived at this base on February 24th.
+
+During the first half of February, 1915, eight destroyers were absent
+from the Grand Fleet flotillas, working in the Irish Channel against
+submarines, leaving only a total of 20 to 22 available for the Fleet;
+an insufficient number for screening purposes. This deficiency made it
+desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour, except in an emergency.
+
+The enemy’s submarine activity became much more marked during February.
+Early in the month the German Admiralty proclaimed that after February
+18th all the waters round the British Isles would be declared unsafe
+for merchant-ships of all nationalities, and intimated that Allied
+merchant-ships would be destroyed in these waters and that neutral
+merchant-ships ran similar risks. Enemy submarines began to operate
+in increasing numbers in the English Channel, to the westward of the
+English Channel, in the Irish Sea and off the west coast of Ireland, as
+well as on the east coast of England, and the losses of merchant-ships
+from submarine attack became serious. The destroyers of the Grand
+Fleet that remained at the northern bases were kept fully employed in
+searching for and hunting reported submarines.
+
+In addition to the maintenance of the blockade by the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, cruiser and light cruiser squadrons carried out various
+patrol and search operations during the month. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+cruised in the centre portion of the North Sea from February 1st to
+3rd; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron cruised off the Shetland Islands from the
+11th–13th, then swept down the Norwegian coast and returned to Cromarty
+on the 15th; the new 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out a sweep in
+the southern portion of the North Sea between the 16th and 20th with
+destroyers in company; the new 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron cruised to
+the westward of the Shetlands for exercise between the 15th and 18th,
+then passed into the North Sea and swept to the southward, returning
+to Scapa on the 20th; the 1st Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 17th
+for the vicinity of the Norwegian coast, swept down towards the Naze
+and then returned to patrol north of the Shetlands until the 21st, when
+the squadron arrived at Scapa; the four light cruisers attached to the
+Battle Fleet, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Boadicea_, and _Blonde_, with four
+destroyers, left Scapa on the 18th for a line N. 37 E. 60 miles long
+from Lat. 57.30 N., Long. 0.30 W., with directions to sweep towards the
+Naze by day and patrol the line at night; they remained on this duty
+until the 21st. The 7th Cruiser Squadron cruised to the westward of the
+Fair Island Channel from the 19th to the 22nd, and available destroyers
+of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were patrolling to the eastward of the
+Fair Island Channel and the Moray Firth respectively during the same
+period.
+
+The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Rosyth on the 23rd
+to cover the Fleet mine-sweepers whilst searching for mines along a
+projected Fleet track in the North Sea, but, the sea being too heavy
+for mine-sweeping, the squadron carried out a patrol instead until the
+25th, when the mine-sweeping operations took place, lasting until the
+27th, when the squadron returned to Rosyth.
+
+This searching mine-sweep was carried out because of the increasing
+probability of the enemy laying mines intended to catch our heavy
+ships when proceeding towards the southern portion of the North Sea,
+and the consequent necessity for a periodical examination of a route
+which the Fleet could traverse with some safety. This policy was
+maintained throughout the period of my command, alternative routes
+being periodically examined; although it was obviously impossible to
+carry out this examination frequently, it did afford some chance of a
+mine-field being discovered before serious losses were sustained by the
+Fleet.
+
+During the month of February a reorganisation of the battle cruiser
+and light cruiser squadrons was carried out by Admiralty orders, and
+a “Battle Cruiser Fleet” instituted under the command of Sir David
+Beatty, with the title Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet.
+
+The organisation was as follows:
+
+  _Lion_, Fleet-Flagship.
+
+  _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Princess Royal_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), _Queen
+        Mary_, _Tiger_.
+
+  _2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Australia_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham), _New
+        Zealand_, _Indefatigable_.
+
+  _3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Invincible_ (to be Flag), _Inflexible_,[D] _Indomitable_.
+
+  _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Galatea_ (Broad pennant of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair),
+        _Cordelia_, _Caroline_, _Inconstant_.
+
+  _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Southampton_ (Broad pennant of Commodore W. E. Goodenough),
+        _Nottingham_, _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_.
+
+  _3rd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
+        _Falmouth_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), _Yarmouth_,
+        _Gloucester_, _Liverpool_.
+
+    [D] The _Inflexible_ had not yet joined by the end of February.
+
+The Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an integral portion of the Grand
+Fleet. In some respects the term “Fleet” was an unfortunate selection,
+as it implied, incorrectly, an independent organisation. On my taking
+office as First Sea Lord at the end of 1916, the title was altered to
+the more appropriate one of Battle Cruiser Force.
+
+The _Australia_ joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth on February
+17th, and the _Invincible_, having concluded the very successful
+operations in the South Atlantic under Sir Doveton Sturdee, which
+culminated in the destruction of Admiral von Spee’s Squadron of
+cruisers and light cruisers, arrived at Scapa for gunnery practices
+during the latter part of February, and joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+at Rosyth early in March; the _Indefatigable_ also arrived on the 24th
+from the Mediterranean.
+
+The _Tiger_ arrived in the Tyne on February 1st for refit, and left
+again on the 8th. The _Lion_ reached the Tyne for repairs on February
+9th, remaining there for the remainder of the month. The strength of
+the destroyer force working with the Grand Fleet was increased on
+February 19th by the addition of the light cruiser _Fearless_ and two
+divisions of destroyers from the 1st Flotilla. These vessels had been
+relieved at Harwich by new destroyers of the “M” class. This addition
+brought the destroyer force actually with the Grand Fleet up to a total
+of 48, and further additions were now gradually made from the 1st
+Flotilla at Harwich as new destroyers were completed to relieve them.
+
+His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet on February 27th by
+visiting the ships based on Rosyth.
+
+In the course of February the destroyers of the “River” or “E”
+class, based at Scapa for local defence, were replaced, by Admiralty
+directions, by destroyers of the “C” class (old 30-knot type). This
+change, although dictated by the general naval situation, limited
+considerably the range of activity of the local defence vessels, owing
+to the poorer sea-going qualities of the destroyers of the “C” class.
+
+During the month the destroyer _Erne_ was wrecked off Rattray Head
+on the Aberdeen coast, and became a total loss; the _Goldfinch_ went
+ashore in a fog in the north of the Orkneys and was also lost; the
+_Sparrowhawk_ also went ashore, but was got off, though considerably
+damaged. The armed merchant-cruiser _Clan McNaughton_, of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron, was lost with all hands during the month, the
+supposition being that she foundered in one of the numerous heavy
+gales. Although a prolonged search was carried out, only a certain
+amount of wreckage was found. The loss of this ship and her efficient
+ship’s company brought once more into prominence the excellent work
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the risks to which the ships were
+subjected.
+
+The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were daily increasing, and
+the number of ships passing the blockade line unexamined was becoming
+very small. During one week in February sixty-seven vessels were
+intercepted and eighteen of them sent in with prize crews on board.
+
+During February the old battleships _Hannibal_ and _Magnificent_ were
+relieved as guard-ships by the old cruisers _Crescent_ and _Royal
+Arthur_.
+
+Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas
+Gamble in the command of the 4th Battle Squadron during the month;
+Admiral Gamble’s period of command had expired. Sir Doveton Sturdee,
+who had served as Chief of the Naval Staff early in the War, came to
+the Fleet fresh from his Falkland Islands victory.
+
+The weather at the northern bases during February was less boisterous
+than usual. There was a good deal of misty and foggy weather in the
+early part of the month, and a considerable amount of snow towards the
+end.
+
+During March the principal movements of the Fleet were as follows:
+
+From the 4th to the 10th, the 6th Cruiser Squadron was, with the
+_Orotava_ of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, cruising off the Norwegian
+Coast.
+
+From the 7th to the 10th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was cruising in
+the northern portion of the North Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd,
+and 7th Cruiser Squadrons and the 4th Flotilla; and the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet was also cruising during the same period in the central part
+of the North Sea. The opportunity was taken of carrying out various
+battle exercises. The 2nd Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser Squadron did
+not return with the remainder of the Battle Fleet on the 10th, but
+remained at sea until the 11th. The 4th Flotilla was forced to shelter
+at Lerwick from the 7th to the 9th owing to bad weather. From March
+10th to the 13th the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were
+cruising in the centre portion of the North Sea.
+
+From the 16th to the 19th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet again cruised
+in the northern and central parts of the North Sea, accompanied
+by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, and the 2nd Flotilla. The 2nd Flotilla, however, could not
+remain at sea on the 17th owing to bad weather and was sent back to
+Scapa. A collision occurred between the _Nemesis_ and _Nymphe_, which
+necessitated the docking of both vessels for repairs. The flotilla
+was ordered out again from Scapa early on the 18th, but only seven
+destroyers were available, and they reached the Fleet at 2 P.M. on that
+date.
+
+The Battle Fleet and cruisers carried out a strategical exercise in
+the early morning of the 18th, and then steered for the bases, a
+projected second exercise being abandoned as the Fleet was by this time
+in an area which was not considered safe from submarine attack; the
+visibility was also very high, and it was suspected that at least one
+enemy submarine might be in the neighbourhood.
+
+At noon the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 58.21 N., Long. 1.12 E.,
+zigzagging at a speed of 15 knots, and the 4th Battle Squadron had just
+been detached to proceed to Cromarty, when at 12.18 P.M. Vice-Admiral
+Sir Cecil Burney commanding the 1st Battle Squadron signalled that a
+submarine’s periscope had been sighted from the _Marlborough_, the
+leading ship of the port wing column, and that a torpedo fired by the
+submarine had passed just astern of the _Neptune_, the rear ship of the
+column. The Fleet was at once turned away from the submarine 12 points
+to starboard (ships turning together) and speed was increased to 17
+knots.
+
+At 12.30 P.M. the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing under the stern
+of the remainder of the Battle Fleet and signals were being made
+to Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee to steer clear of the position
+in which the submarine was sighted, but before any movement was
+effected the officer of the watch, Lieutenant-Commander Piercy, of the
+_Dreadnought_ of that Squadron, sighted a periscope close to, one point
+on the port bow, the submarine apparently steering a southerly course
+and zigzagging. Captain Alderson, commanding the _Dreadnought_, at once
+altered course direct for the submarine, increased speed, followed,
+and rammed her. The bow of the submarine came out of the water and her
+number, U 29, was plainly visible. She sank immediately. The _Blanche_,
+which passed close to the spot, reported a large quantity of wreckage,
+one article of clothing and much oil and bubbles on the surface, but no
+survivors.
+
+It seems probable that the captain of the submarine, after firing at
+the 1st Battle Squadron, was confused by the movements of the 4th
+Battle Squadron crossing astern of the remainder of the zigzagging
+Fleet, at high speed, and in trying to get clear failed to observe the
+_Dreadnought_ until too late. The _Dreadnought_ was admirably handled.
+
+On arrival of the Fleet in harbour I wired to the Admiralty urging that
+the fate of U 29 should be kept secret. The secrecy regarding the loss
+of this submarine, commanded by Commander Weddingen, was much resented
+in Germany, and many accusations of treacherous conduct levelled at the
+British, probably in the hope that we might give information as to her
+fate. The policy of secrecy was certainly correct, as it left the enemy
+entirely ignorant of our methods, and possibly had some effect of the
+moral of the submarine crews.
+
+The Fleet steered to the eastward until well clear of the area in case
+other submarines were present, and then shaped course for the bases,
+arriving on the 19th.
+
+On March 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases with the intention of
+carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, but the plan was abandoned and
+the Fleet returned to its bases on the following day.
+
+The principal movements of destroyers during March, additional to the
+regular patrols and fleet movements, were as follows:
+
+From March 2nd to March 5th search was made by a half flotilla for a
+number of oil drums reported as moored in certain areas in the North
+Sea. The report indicated that the enemy might be refuelling submarines
+in this manner; the search disposed of the supposition.
+
+From March 8th to March 10th the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland,
+Sir Robert Lowry, in conjunction with Vice-Admiral Bradford, who was
+the Senior Flag Officer of Grand Fleet ships at Rosyth, and was,
+therefore, responsible for all movements of these ships from the Rosyth
+base, organised a search on a large scale for a submarine reported to
+be operating off the Aberdeenshire coast. The vessels employed in this
+operation comprised trawler patrols and destroyers of the 1st Flotilla,
+and they were rewarded on March 10th by forcing the submarine--U 12--to
+the surface, when H.M.S. _Ariel_, very skilfully handled, succeeded in
+ramming and sinking her. Ten of her crew of twenty-eight were rescued.
+The _Ariel_ was considerably damaged, and was docked at Leith for
+repairs.
+
+On March 20th and 21st a division of destroyers hunted a submarine in
+the Moray Firth without success.
+
+On March 12th the _Faulknor_ and six destroyers were detached from the
+Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against submarines in the Irish Sea.
+
+In the course of the month the small steamers, specially fitted as
+mine-sweepers for the Grand Fleet, were withdrawn for service abroad.
+The increasing number of mines in the North Sea and the paucity of
+mine-sweepers led me to decide on March 22nd to fit eight destroyers
+each from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with light mine-sweeps, and the
+work was taken in hand. These vessels were intended to augment the
+regular force of mine-sweepers in an emergency, as it was felt that a
+movement of the High Sea Fleet for an important naval operation would
+in all probability be preceded by extensive mine-laying outside the
+Fleet bases, and a much stronger sweeping force than we possessed was
+required to enable a passage for the Fleet to be rapidly cleared.
+
+The _Conqueror_ rejoined the Fleet on March 6th after effecting repairs
+which had been carried out by Messrs. Cammell Laird at Liverpool with
+most commendable rapidity.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron experienced a further loss during March, the
+_Bayano_ being sunk by a submarine off Corsewall Point, Galloway, on
+March 11th, with considerable loss of life.
+
+In the course of this month Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant succeeded
+Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham in command of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
+the latter succeeding Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon Moore in command of the
+2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron; Vice-Admiral Patey transferred his flag
+from the _Australia_ to the _Leviathan_ to proceed to the West Indies
+as Commander-in-Chief, and the 6th Cruiser Squadron was broken up, the
+ships being transferred to service abroad.
+
+The enemy submarines were very active against merchant shipping during
+March, and our losses were considerable, both from this cause and from
+mines.
+
+During March the weather at the northern bases was not very boisterous,
+but a great deal of mist and fog was prevalent during the first
+fortnight, and during the last fortnight snow fell on at least seven
+days. An average of fifty-six ships per week was intercepted by the
+ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month.
+
+During April, 1915, intended Fleet movements were prevented on several
+occasions by bad weather, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron and other ships
+at sea experienced exceptional gales; the principal movements carried
+out were as follows:
+
+From the 5th to the 8th the 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+and five destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the North Sea
+(central portion), and from the 5th to the 9th the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+with eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the northern
+portion of the North Sea.
+
+On April 8th the _Lancaster_, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, and the
+_Caribbean_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were detached to watch the
+Norwegian coast between Lat. 62 and 64 N.
+
+On April 11th the whole Grand Fleet proceeded to sea; the Battle Fleet
+met the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth,
+and cruised in the centre portion of the North Sea during the 12th
+and 13th, returning to the various bases on the 14th to fuel. The
+opportunity was taken of carrying out battle exercises.
+
+Whilst the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was passing down east of the
+Orkneys at 2.30 P.M., and was being met by the 2nd and 4th Flotillas,
+which had come out to screen the ships in, the _Neptune_ reported
+having sighted a submarine’s periscope, but as the Fleet was steaming
+at 18 knots and the destroyers were taking up screening stations it was
+not considered that successful attack was probable, and the Fleet held
+its course for Scapa.
+
+Submarines were also sighted during the day by the _Antrim_ in Lat.
+57.18 N., Long. 1.2 E., and by the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 58.15
+N., Long. 2.40 E., but no successful attack resulted.
+
+The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea again for a sweep in southern waters
+on the 17th, and at 8 A.M. on the 18th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet,
+with the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons looking out ahead and the
+2nd and 4th Flotillas screening, was in Lat. 57.25 N., Long. 1.4 E.,
+steering at 18 knots’ speed for a position in Lat. 56.30 N., Long.
+3.30 E., where it was intended to meet the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth.
+
+The junction took place at 4 P.M., the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
+had been ordered to a position a little farther south, arriving there
+at this time. No enemy vessels having been sighted, the whole Fleet
+was turned to the northward shortly before dusk, when in the vicinity
+of the Little Fisher Bank, to the westward of Northern Denmark.
+During the night the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+were detached to return to Rosyth, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas to
+Scapa; the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, was directed to cruise
+independently on the 19th; and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the
+1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, proceeded to the eastward of the
+Shetlands; target practice was carried out during daylight of the
+19th and the night of the 19th–20th, and the Battle Fleet returned to
+its bases at Scapa and Cromarty during the night of the 20th–21st and
+fuelled. During the cruise the _Achilles_, of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron,
+reported sighting a submarine at 2.40 P.M. on the 18th.
+
+On the 19th the _Albemarle_ and _Russell_, of the 6th Battle Squadron,
+which had rejoined the 3rd Battle Squadron from the Channel ports, were
+detached from Rosyth to Scapa for practices.
+
+The Grand Fleet again proceeded to sea on the night of the 21st for
+another sweep towards the Danish coast, and at 8 A.M. on the 22nd
+the forces from Scapa and Cromarty, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th
+Battle Squadrons, _Russell_ and _Albemarle_, 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser
+Squadrons, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, were in position Lat. 58.4
+N., Long. 0.27 E.
+
+At 4.30 P.M. the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron joined
+the Commander-in-Chief, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station ahead
+of the cruiser screen. At dusk no enemy ships had been sighted and the
+Fleet turned to the northward again, the _Iron Duke’s_ position being
+Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 4.53 E.
+
+The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet were detached to return to Rosyth during the night, and the
+remainder of the Fleet arrived at the Scapa and Cromarty bases on the
+23rd.
+
+During these two southerly sweeps the Fleet sighted a large number of
+neutral steamers and trawlers which were closely examined, but nothing
+suspicious was found, although the interception of German wireless
+messages, when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the trawlers, raised
+suspicions that they were acting as look-out vessels; this suspicion
+was strengthened by carrier pigeons being sighted from various ships.
+
+One Norwegian steamer which was found to be carrying magnetic ore to
+Rotterdam was sent to the Firth of Forth.
+
+Movements of interest of individual ships during April included the
+arrival of the _Lion_ at Rosyth on the 7th after completion of all
+repairs, the arrival of the new Battleship _Warspite_, of the “Queen
+Elizabeth” class, at Scapa on the 13th, and the commissioning on the
+26th of four more mercantile vessels to join the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
+
+The _Invincible_ was sent to the Tyne to change some of her 12-inch
+guns, which had become worn during the Falkland Island engagement.
+
+On April 10th Rear-Admiral Tottenham succeeded Rear-Admiral Waymouth in
+command of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, the latter officer’s health having
+unfortunately broken down.
+
+On April 7th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
+rearranged somewhat in view of the lengthening of the days:
+
+  Patrol Area A was north of the Faroes, the centre line being
+                  occasionally shifted.
+
+  Patrol Area C had as its centre a line from Cape Sydero in
+                  the Faroe Islands to Lat. 58.30 N., Long. 8.0 W.
+
+  Patrol Area E was north of Iceland.
+
+  Patrol Area F was south of Iceland.
+
+  Patrol Area G had as its centre the meridian of 3° E. Long.
+                  between Lat. 62 N. and 63½ N. A cruiser was sent to
+                  strengthen the patrol in this area.
+
+During the month the average number of vessels intercepted weekly by
+the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was 68, of which an average
+number of 23 was sent in weekly for examination.
+
+Enemy submarines were very active in April, and destroyers were sent
+out frequently from the Fleet bases to endeavour to destroy craft
+reported in the vicinity--particularly in the neighbourhood of the
+Fair Island Channel--but no success was achieved, except in the case
+of the _Ariel_ and U 12. The look-out and navigational arrangements
+for the Pentland Firth were improved during April by the establishment
+of telephonic communications between Scapa and the Island of Swona.
+Arrangements were also gradually perfected for obtaining the exhibition
+of all navigational lights and fog signals in the Pentland Firth on
+demand by our ships at all times. The weather at Scapa during April was
+bad.
+
+Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th. There
+was a great deal of mist and fog during the latter part of the month as
+well as a moderate amount of snow.
+
+The enemy laid a large mine-field in the middle of the southern portion
+of the North Sea during April, thus pursuing the policy which it was
+expected he would adopt, regardless of the interests of neutrals.
+Fortunately, information as to its existence was obtained in time
+to prevent any of our ships from falling victims to the mines. But
+the mine-field was undoubtedly well placed strategically so as to
+interfere with the freedom of movement of our Fleet in southern waters
+if it were endeavouring to bring the High Sea Fleet to action, since
+it necessitated our ships making a wide detour to the eastward or
+westward to reach the waters to the southward of the mine-field; it was
+doubtless laid with this object in view.
+
+In May the Grand Fleet flotillas were much occupied in endeavouring
+to locate and destroy enemy submarines, and the movements of the
+heavy ships were curtailed during the month owing to the absence of
+destroyers for the purpose of acting as a submarine screen.
+
+The principal work of the destroyers in this connection--officers
+and men showing a fine spirit in carrying out what were frequently
+fruitless searches--was as follows:
+
+    _May 1st–3rd._--The 2nd Flotilla was engaged in operations against
+    enemy submarines reported, first, in the Fair Island Channel and,
+    then, to the eastward and south-eastward of the Pentland Firth. The
+    flotilla did not succeed in gaining touch with the submarines.
+
+    _May 5th–7th._--One half of the 1st Flotilla was searching for a
+    submarine off the Aberdeenshire coast, without result.
+
+    _May 7th._--One division of the 2nd Flotilla was acting against a
+    submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel, and then proceeded
+    to work down the shipping route west of the Hebrides and Ireland in
+    the hope of catching a submarine attacking trade.
+
+    _May 8th._--Half the 4th Flotilla was searching for submarines off
+    the east coast of the Orkneys.
+
+    _May 10th–11th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching
+    for a submarine reported to be off North Ronaldshay; later, this
+    division was reinforced by all available destroyers from Scapa,
+    with orders that the force was to continue the search during the
+    night, burning searchlights to assist the work and cause the
+    submarine to submerge, thus exhausting her battery power.
+
+    _May 13th._--Six destroyers were searching for a submarine reported
+    west of Thurso.
+
+    _May 15th._--A division of the 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to operate
+    against a submarine off Aberdeen.
+
+    _May 16th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching for a
+    submarine reported approaching the Fair Island Channel.
+
+    _May 19th–20th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was acting against
+    a submarine reported west of the Orkneys.
+
+The principal Fleet movements during the month were:
+
+_May 2nd to May 5th._--Two forces, each consisting of two light
+cruisers and eight destroyers, were engaged in carrying out a
+thorough examination of all vessels, especially fishing craft, found
+in the areas usually traversed by the Fleet during southerly sweeps
+in order to ascertain whether any were acting as German look-out
+ships under neutral colours. A considerable number of vessels were
+examined, especially trawlers, and some were sent in for more detailed
+examination at the bases, but nothing incriminating was discovered.
+
+Between May 5th and 10th the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron cruised in the northern portion of the North Sea, being
+screened out from Rosyth by a half flotilla. On the return towards
+Rosyth in Lat. 56.49 N., Long. 0.39 E., and before being met by the
+screening destroyers, the 3rd Battle Squadron, two torpedoes were fired
+by a submarine; they were aimed apparently at the _Dominion_, but both
+missed. The squadron was in division in line ahead, steaming at 15
+knots, and was zigzagging at the time.
+
+On May 6th the mine-layer _Orvieto_ and eight destroyers left Scapa to
+carry out a mine-laying operation in the Heligoland Bight. The force
+ran into a dense fog, and a collision occurred between the destroyers
+_Comet_ and _Nemesis_, the latter being seriously damaged. The force
+was directed to return and left Scapa again on the 8th, carrying out
+the operation successfully during the night of the 10th–11th; it
+returned on the 12th.
+
+The light cruisers _Phaeton_ and _Royalist_ left Scapa on May 12th for
+a position north of the Shetlands, in order to intercept a neutral
+steamer reported to have left Bremerhaven on May 11th with wireless
+installations on board. The C Patrol of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+was also moved to a position to intercept this vessel, and the light
+cruiser _Sappho_ and armed boarding steamer _Amsterdam_ were placed on
+the western side of the Fair Island Channel. The force returned on the
+14th, the report proving to be incorrect.
+
+The whole Grand Fleet carried out a sweep of the central part of the
+North Sea between May 17th and 19th, the forces from Scapa, Cromarty
+and Rosyth meeting at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 0.0 at 7
+A.M. on the 8th, and sweeping to the south-eastward at a speed of 16
+knots until the afternoon, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet some thirty to
+fifty miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The Fleet returned to its bases
+on the 19th, not having sighted any hostile vessels. Battle tactics
+were exercised during the passage north.
+
+On May 21st the Fleet mine-sweepers, which had been sent to Aberdeen
+beforehand in readiness, left with an escort of two light cruisers to
+examine the mine-field reported to have been laid in the centre of
+the southern portion of the North Sea. Two of the sweepers collided
+in a fog on leaving Aberdeen, and another went ashore; the remainder
+proceeded and located the north-east corner of the mine-field on the
+22nd and 23rd; they returned to Aberdeen on the 24th, after examining
+_en route_ a position in which it was reported that paraffin barrels
+were moored. These were destroyed. It was thought that they might be
+intended for German submarines.
+
+Whilst the Fleet sweepers located the north-east corner of the
+mine-field, paddle sweepers, under the escort of two light cruisers
+from Harwich, located the south-west corner. The search was
+subsequently continued under the same conditions, and the limits of the
+mine-field, which covered a large area south of Lat. 56 N. and east of
+Long. 2.30 E., were determined. The enemy made no attempt to interfere
+with the sweeping operations, if indeed he was aware of them.
+
+On the 21st the patrol, comprising the _Sappho_ and armed boarding
+steamers, hitherto maintained in an area east and south-east of the
+Pentland Firth, was moved temporarily to the west of the Firth on
+account of submarine activity. Destroyers from the Grand Fleet replaced
+the original patrol at night, the interception of mercantile traffic
+being carried out by the armed boarding steamers to the westward. The
+destroyer _Rifleman_ grounded in a fog on the 22nd, necessitating
+docking for repairs.
+
+A new form of anti-submarine operation was begun on May 23rd by the
+Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland (Admiral Sir R. Lowry). This
+consisted of two C-class submarines operating with an armed trawler,
+the idea being that the trawler should invite attack by a submarine,
+thus giving our submarines an opportunity of sinking the enemy by
+torpedo attack.
+
+On May 24th the Admiralty telegraphed that Italy had entered the War on
+the side of the Allies.
+
+On the next day I proceeded in the _Iron Duke_ to Rosyth to confer with
+Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea
+Lord. The conference took place on the 26th and was of an important
+nature. The general naval policy, so far as it concerned the Grand
+Fleet, was discussed, and arrangements made as to the procedure to be
+followed in future. Sir Henry Jackson asked that Commodore Everett
+might join him at the Admiralty as Naval Assistant, and, with the
+consent of Commodore Everett, this was arranged. His place as Captain
+of the Fleet was filled by Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., of the
+_New Zealand_. It was with great regret that I parted with Commodore
+Everett; his long experience in the Fleet under Sir George Callaghan
+and his intimate knowledge of fleet work and unfailing tact had been
+of the greatest possible assistance. The _Iron Duke_ returned to Scapa
+on the morning of the 28th. On the 26th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace
+Hood, C.B., had hoisted his flag in the _Invincible_ as Rear-Admiral
+commanding the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The battleship _Queen
+Elizabeth_ arrived at Scapa from the Dardanelles on the same day.
+
+From May 29th to 31st the Grand Fleet carried out another sweep in the
+North Sea, the direction on this occasion being towards the Dogger
+Bank. The forces from Scapa and Cromarty concentrated in Lat. 57.35
+N., Long. 0.0 at 7.15 A.M. on the 30th, and steered to the southward
+at 17 knots’ speed. The Rosyth force steered for a point farther south
+and was in sight from the cruiser line at 9.30 A.M., being ordered to
+keep ahead of the Fleet. The sweep was continued until the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet was in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. No enemy vessel
+was sighted.
+
+The Fleet then turned to the northward and, owing to a northerly swell,
+speed had to be reduced on account of the destroyers. During the night
+the Rosyth force was detached to its base. Speed was increased as the
+weather improved, and the Scapa and Cromarty forces arrived on the
+morning of May 31st. The _Iron Duke_ left Scapa for Cromarty during the
+afternoon of May 31st, and arrived that evening.
+
+During the month the procedure of moving squadrons between Scapa and
+Cromarty was continued. At this period a second line of submarine
+obstructions, which was designed to prevent the entry of destroyers,
+as well as submarines, into Scapa Flow, advanced considerably towards
+completion. Progress was also made with the laying of mine-fields
+at the entrance. The anchorage at Swarbachs Minn, in the Shetlands,
+had been selected as a secondary coaling base for the ships of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, and steps were taken to prepare a submarine
+obstruction for the entrance, and to provide the necessary labour for
+coaling the ships from colliers.
+
+The blockade work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued actively
+during the month, the average number of ships intercepted per week
+being 62, and the average number sent into port for closer examination,
+16.
+
+The weather at Scapa during the month was misty, fog being experienced
+on the 5th, 6th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 27th and 28th, and snow on the 11th
+and 12th. The wind during the month was not strong.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES
+
+
+In the early summer of 1915 there was a vague impression in some
+quarters, unsupported, so far as I am aware, by any confirmatory
+evidence, that the enemy might exhibit greater activity at sea. But
+during June, so far as could be ascertained by our intelligence system
+and by our submarine patrols, the Germans made no attempt to move to
+sea, but concentrated attention on increased submarine activity. The
+Grand Fleet, for various reasons unconnected with this development,
+spent the greater part of the time in harbour, exercising in Scapa
+Flow, the ships from the Rosyth base being sent up in pairs to exercise
+and carry out gunnery and torpedo practices. The opportunity of this
+change of base was usually taken for a searching sweep whilst _en
+route_ between the bases, so that the North Sea was continually under
+observation.
+
+On June 11th, however, the Grand Fleet went to sea for a cruise
+in northern waters principally for gunnery practices and battle
+exercises, which were carried out on a large scale. On this occasion
+the sea-planes working from the _Campania_ were utilised, so far as
+I am aware, for the first time in history in observing the movements
+of the squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large hostile
+fleet. From this beginning, there was a great development in the work
+of heavier-than-air craft operating with a fleet. The first step
+was the provision of a flying-off deck in a ship for sea-planes,
+as the extreme difficulty experienced by sea-planes in rising from
+the water, except in very fine weather, rendered the provision of a
+flying-off deck essential; the next was the substitution of aeroplanes
+for sea-planes, working from special carriers; and, finally, the
+provision of flying-off platforms in fighting ships themselves, first
+in light cruisers, afterwards in battle cruisers, and, eventually,
+in battleships; these successive developments were rendered possible
+by the progressive improvement in aircraft. In this way, naval power
+was given the assistance which air power could give it, both in
+reconnaissance and in making its gunnery more effective.
+
+The Scapa force proceeded to the westward through the Pentland Firth
+on the 11th. It carried out target practice at special targets towed
+by colliers to the north-westward of the Shetlands on the 12th, being
+joined by the Cromarty force (the 1st Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser
+Squadron) that evening; the fleet then separated for night-firing.
+
+The Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had also left Rosyth on the 11th,
+carried out night-firing on the 12th, and the whole Grand Fleet
+practised battle exercises on the 13th, the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+afterwards firing at the targets which were towed by colliers, and
+rejoining my flag at daylight on the 14th. On that day further battle
+exercises were carried out. The _Campania_, with her sea-planes, again
+took part in these exercises, and an improvement in the scouting work
+of the sea-planes was noticeable. The Fleet then returned to the
+various bases, the Scapa force passing westward of the Orkneys.
+
+Whilst the main portion of the Grand Fleet was exercising in northern
+waters, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with
+one-half of the 1st Flotilla, cruised in the central portion of the
+North Sea.
+
+Other operations during the month included:
+
+From the 1st to the 3rd, and the 5th to the 7th, further mine-sweeping
+operations were carried out by the Fleet sweepers and paddle sweepers
+in connection with the German mine-field in the southern portion of
+the North Sea, the operation being covered by four light cruisers
+and a force of destroyers. The work of clearing that portion of the
+mine-field, which it was decided to sweep up, was completed on the
+7th. On several days during the month a force from Harwich, comprising
+light cruisers and destroyers, was cruising off the Dutch coast with
+the object of intercepting and attacking zeppelins. The force did not,
+however, meet with any success.
+
+From the 4th to the 7th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with three armed
+boarding-steamers and three destroyers, operated on the two trade
+routes, St. Abbs Head to the Skagerrak and Rotterdam to Norwegian
+ports, examining all vessels encountered; nothing of special interest
+occurred. But when returning during a thick fog to Scapa the armed
+boarding-steamer _Duke of Albany_ grounded on the Lother Rock, Pentland
+Firth, at 4 A.M. on the 7th, remained ashore for seven days, and was
+considerably damaged.
+
+From the 18th to the 21st the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the light
+cruisers _Nottingham_ and _Birmingham_, of the 2nd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, accompanied by four destroyers, swept across the North Sea,
+steering to the eastward from Rosyth to the entrance to the Skagerrak,
+thence to the coast of Norway and back to Rosyth. This force was
+attacked by at least three submarines during the sweep, and torpedoes
+were fired at the _Birmingham_ on the 19th, and at the _Argyll_, the
+_Roxburgh_ (on two occasions), and the _Nottingham_ on the 20th. Two
+torpedoes were fired at the _Nottingham_. These ships were proceeding
+at high speed and all the attacks failed, except the second attack
+on the _Roxburgh_ (Captain C. R. de C. Foot), which was hit in the
+bows by a torpedo at 2 P.M. on the 20th in Lat. 56.47 N., Long. 0.38
+E. Fortunately, the damage was well forward, and the _Roxburgh_ was
+able to maintain a speed of 14 knots during her return to Rosyth, all
+available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla being sent out to meet and
+screen her in. At the time of the attack the _Roxburgh_ was proceeding
+at high speed and zigzagging, with one destroyer screening her. The
+ship was considerably damaged, and her repairs at a dockyard occupied a
+lengthened period.
+
+The incident furnished an example of the risks run by heavy ships
+cruising in the North Sea in waters frequented by submarines,
+unless accompanied by a much stronger screen of destroyers than it
+was possible to provide owing to the paucity of destroyers and the
+immense amount of work required of them. It was noted at the time, and
+considered to be suspicious, that a large fleet of trawlers flying
+neutral colours was fishing in the neighbourhood of these submarine
+attacks.
+
+As a result a force comprising three armed boarding-steamers and
+three destroyers was despatched from Scapa on June 26th to examine a
+fleet of neutral fishing vessels working to the south-eastward of the
+Pentland Firth and on the ordinary track of the Fleet when proceeding
+to sea. Six vessels were sent in for detailed examination, but nothing
+suspicious was found on board. The fishing fleet, however, shifted its
+ground to a position clear of the track of the Fleet.
+
+Operations against enemy submarines carried out by Grand Fleet forces
+during June included the following:
+
+    _June 1st to 2nd._--A division of destroyers endeavoured, without
+    success, to locate and attack a submarine 60 to 80 miles to the
+    eastward of May Island.
+
+    _June 4th to 5th._--Two destroyers and two sloops operated against
+    a submarine, with a supposed tender, to the eastward of the
+    Pentland Firth.
+
+    _June 5th._--The armed trawler _Hawk_, of the Peterhead area,
+    disabled submarine U 14 by gun fire and sank her by ramming at 7.30
+    A.M. in Lat. 57.15 N., Long. 0.32 E. One officer and 21 men were
+    rescued. It was a fine exploit, typical of the consistently good
+    work of the vessels of the Peterhead patrol; it was a success that
+    was specially welcome at this time when submarines were very active
+    in northern waters.
+
+There were many other engagements between auxiliary patrols and
+submarines during the month, but no other _certain_ successes. It was
+believed that at least one submarine was sunk in a deep mine-field
+which had been laid at my request off Tod Head on the Aberdeen
+coast. Appended are notes of further operations against the enemy’s
+under-water craft:
+
+    _June 18th and 19th._--Anti-submarine operations by three
+    destroyers and sloops were carried out in the Fair Island Channel.
+
+    _June 20th._--Four destroyers were operating against submarines to
+    the westward of the Orkneys.
+
+    _June 21st and 22nd._--The _Botha_ and eight destroyers of the 1st
+    Flotilla were operating against submarines in an area between Lat.
+    56.20 and 57.10 N. and Long. 1 E. to 1 W.
+
+    _June 21st._--Four destroyers and six gunboats were operating to
+    the east of the Pentland Firth against a submarine.
+
+    _June 23rd._--Submarine U 40 was sunk 50 miles S.E. by S. of Girdle
+    Ness at 9 A.M. by submarine C 24, working in company with a trawler.
+
+    _June 23rd._--A division of destroyers was sent to operate against
+    a submarine to westward of the Fair Island Channel.
+
+    _June 24th–26th._--Three sloops were engaged in searching for a
+    submarine to the eastward of Orkneys and Shetlands.
+
+    _June 26th._--A large force, comprising 20 armed trawlers from
+    Granton in the Firth of Forth, began to operate against submarines
+    in an area round Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E., remaining out until July
+    7th. Two armed trawlers, with C class submarines in company, were
+    also operating to the southward of this position.
+
+    _June 30th–July 1st._--A force of eight destroyers was operating
+    against submarines in the Fair Island Channel.
+
+The anti-submarine operations by destroyers or sloops met with no
+success. The invariable difficulty was the provision of a sufficiently
+large number of vessels to keep the submarine down long enough to cause
+her to exhaust her battery power, a period of some 48 hours. When
+destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet were used for anti-submarine
+operations at any distance from the base, the disadvantage of their
+not being available to accompany the Fleet to sea in an emergency
+had to be accepted. This would have led to awkward results had the
+Fleet proceeded to sea with any considerable shortage of destroyers
+for screening purposes on passage south and for Fleet purposes during
+a Fleet action. The dilemma was one which faced me during the whole
+period of my command of the Fleet.
+
+My experience convinced me that anti-submarine operations by destroyers
+in such open waters as existed near the northern bases had but little
+prospect of success unless undertaken by a considerably larger number
+of vessels than were usually available at Scapa for such operations; a
+contributory reason for the shortage of destroyers was that in addition
+to the operations carried out by the heavy ships, cruisers and light
+cruisers, for which the presence of destroyers was necessary, there was
+a constant call on these vessels for escort work during the movements
+of single ships or of squadrons between bases.
+
+Other events of interest during this month included:
+
+The formation of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron of new light cruisers
+under the command of the late Commodore Le Mesurier, C.B., in the
+_Calliope_. This squadron was attached to the Battle Fleet, and in
+cruising order at sea was usually stationed from three to five miles
+ahead of the Battle Fleet to act as an advanced submarine screen
+forcing submarines to dive. From this position it could reach the
+van of the Fleet on deployment for action, and was stationed there
+for the purpose of attacking enemy destroyers with gunfire and the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes. It was a squadron on which, as
+Commander-in-Chief, I kept a hold so that I might be certain it would
+be at my disposal when action with the enemy was joined. Other light
+cruiser squadrons, which occupied an advanced position in the cruiser
+screen, could not be depended upon with the same certainty to occupy
+the van position to which they were allotted during a fleet action,
+since they might become engaged with enemy vessels of the same class.
+
+The battle cruiser _Inflexible_ joined the Fleet from Gibraltar on June
+19th.
+
+The _Liverpool_ left to pay off on the 26th for repair to boilers.
+Rear-Admiral W. B. Fawckner took charge of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+base at Swarbachs Minn on the 18th.
+
+During the month observation mine-fields at the entrance to Cromarty
+and off Hoy Sound, Scapa Flow, were completed.
+
+A short visit was paid to the Fleet at Scapa Flow by the Archbishop
+of York on the 26th. He held a Fleet Confirmation in the _Iron
+Duke_, a great open-air service on Flotta Island, many thousands of
+officers and men attending; there was another service at Longhope,
+and, in addition, he visited the majority of the ships. He was indeed
+indefatigable and left amidst the most sincere expressions of regret.
+To me personally his visit gave the greatest pleasure. From Scapa he
+passed to Invergordon, where, during a two days’ stay, he held a large
+open-air service, and visited most of the ships based there, moving on
+to Rosyth, where an impressive open-air service took place in one of
+the large graving-docks.
+
+The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued throughout the
+month, an average of 73 ships being intercepted weekly and 15 sent in
+for detailed examination.
+
+A serious attack was made by an enemy submarine on the fishing fleet
+some 50 miles to the eastward of the Shetlands on the night of the
+23rd–24th June, about 16 drifters being sunk by bombs and gunfire. This
+incident emphasised the necessity for better control over the movements
+of our fishing vessels in northern waters and of providing some form of
+protection for them. Steps were taken in both directions, although they
+naturally resulted in some unavoidable reduction in the operations of
+the fishing fleet.
+
+The weather at Scapa during June was very misty, fog or mist being
+experienced on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and
+30th.
+
+During July, 1915, fleet movements were kept to the lowest possible
+minimum owing to a threatened strike in the Welsh coal-fields, which
+eventually took place on the 18th, and caused considerable anxiety as
+to its effect on Fleet movements.
+
+From the 11th to the 14th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the 1st, 2nd
+and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd
+and 4th Flotillas, and the _Campania_ cruised in the vicinity of the
+Shetland Islands and carried out a series of battle exercises during
+the cruise. The Battle Cruiser Fleet made a sweep between the 11th and
+13th down to the Dogger Bank. Whilst the Battle Fleet was at sea the
+destroyer flotillas were sent into Balta Sound (Shetland Islands) to
+complete with fuel in case a move south on the part of the Battle Fleet
+became necessary.
+
+On the 28th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with two ships of the
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron, and 14 destroyers of the 1st and 4th Flotillas
+from Rosyth and Scapa, together with Commodore Tyrwhitt and four light
+cruisers and 12 destroyers from Harwich, left their bases to carry out
+an operation in the Skagerrak, with the object of intercepting trade
+and searching for any enemy vessels. Only one German vessel (a trawler)
+was encountered, and she was sunk after removal of the crew. A Danish
+steamer was sent in to a British port with a guard on board and the
+force returned to their various bases on the 31st.
+
+As the threatened coal strike limited the movements of the coal-burning
+heavy ships, the oil-burning destroyers were used for anti-submarine
+work to a greater extent than would have been desirable if greater
+activity of the Fleet had been anticipated.
+
+Operations against enemy submarines included:
+
+On July 1st the _Hampshire_ reported that a torpedo had been fired
+at her in the Moray Firth. Twelve destroyers and all available local
+patrol vessels were sent to endeavour to locate and sink the submarine.
+The steamboats from the ships at Cromarty were also despatched to
+operate in the various bays in the Moray Firth, where a submarine
+might elect to lie on the bottom. The boats exploded a large number
+of charges on the bottom in the hope of forcing any submarine to the
+surface. The operations were abandoned on the evening of the 2nd, the
+submarine not having been located.
+
+On the 4th a division of the 2nd Flotilla hunted for another submarine
+reported in the Moray Firth.
+
+From the 5th to the 10th the sea-plane carrier _Campania_, with a
+flotilla leader, eight destroyers, four sloops and a large number
+of trawlers and net-drifters, operated against submarines that were
+reported to be passing through the Fair Island Channel, being based
+on Pierowall Harbour, in the north of the Orkneys. The destroyers,
+sloops and patrol vessels operated in conjunction with the sea-planes.
+No success was achieved, however, although these extensive operations
+covered a large area.
+
+On the night of the 16th a division of destroyers operated against
+a submarine reported to the southward of the Pentland Firth, off
+Duncansby Head, but again without result.
+
+From the 15th to the 19th six sloops and seven gunboats were despatched
+against submarines in the Fair Island Channel and north of the
+Shetlands, the _Campania’s_ sea-planes again assisting from Pierowall
+Harbour. Destroyers were also helping during a portion of the period
+covered by the operations. On the 16th the gunboat _Speedwell_ reported
+having sighted the periscope of a submarine, ramming her at a speed
+of 15 knots. The submarine was struck on her starboard quarter at an
+angle of 10 degrees, but there was, unfortunately, no evidence to show
+that she was sunk, although it was probable that she was considerably
+damaged. She was not seen again. On the same day a submarine was
+reported by the armed yacht _Zaza_, as being in a drift-net 12 miles
+east-north-east from Fair Island. Local patrol vessels, gunboats and
+four destroyers concentrated on the position and explosive charges
+were fired, but without certain result. From the 25th to the 27th a
+sub-division of destroyers searched, fruitlessly, a large area to the
+northward of the Hebrides for submarines and a reported submarine base
+ship. They were assisted by four sloops operating in the area from the
+26th to the 30th.
+
+On the 18th and 19th a division of destroyers was engaged in moving a
+neutral fishing fleet away from an area to the eastward of the Firth
+of Forth where they interfered with Fleet operations. Submarine C 27
+had for some little time been operating against submarines in the North
+Sea from Scapa, in tow of a trawler, to which vessel she was connected
+by telephone. This idea, which had first been conceived at the Rosyth
+base, had also been put into operation at Scapa, the arrangements being
+made under the direction of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville. On July 20th
+the trawler _Princess Louise_, Lieutenant Morton, R.N.R., being in
+command, with Lieutenant Cantlie, R.N., a submarine officer, on board,
+was towing Submarine C 27 (Lieutenant-Commander Dobson) in a submerged
+condition when a German submarine, U 23, was sighted 1¼ miles off on
+the port bow. C 27 was informed by telephone, telephonic communication
+then breaking down. U 23 opened fire at a range of 2,000 yards on the
+_Princess Louise_. Lieutenant Cantlie, being unable to communicate
+further with C 27, slipped the tow and proceeded to abandon the trawler
+with every appearance of haste. U 23 closed to within 600 yards and
+stopped. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Dobson, hearing nothing
+further by telephone, but noticing the splash and explosion of the
+projectiles in the water, got well clear of the trawler after slipping,
+and then brought his periscope to the surface for a look around.
+He sighted U 23 about 900 yards off, closed to a good position for
+attack within 500 yards, and fired his first torpedo, which missed.
+His second shot hit; there was a heavy explosion, and U 23 sank; four
+officers and six men were picked up out of a crew of 34. The whole
+attack was exceedingly well managed and a very well deserved success
+scored, which reflected much credit on all concerned in the operations.
+
+On the 26th a submarine was engaged about 120 miles east of Dundee by
+the armed trawler _Taranaki_, which claimed to have sunk her.
+
+On the 27th an engagement took place between the armed trawler No. 830
+and a submarine to the southward of St. Kilda, the trawler reporting
+that the submarine was hit several times by gunfire and considered to
+have been badly damaged.
+
+Other events of interest during the month included an attempt by the
+_Digby_ to tow the Norwegian steamer _Oscar II._, damaged by collision
+with the _Patuca_ on July 1st, into Stornoway, the destroyers _Fury_
+and _Staunch_ being detached from Scapa and local patrol vessels from
+Stornoway to assist. In spite of perseverance under very bad weather
+conditions, during which the ships and the destroyers were handled with
+great ability, the _Oscar II._ sank on the night of the 3rd.
+
+An expedition consisting of the armed merchant-ship _Columbella_, the
+sloop _Acacia_ and the two trawlers _Arley_ and _Mafeking_, left Scapa
+on July 29th for Bear Island and Spitzbergen to search for a reported
+German submarine base and wireless station. These vessels carried out
+as thorough a search as was possible, in face of the ice-fields in the
+neighbourhood of the islands; but no trace of a submarine base was
+discovered, nor could it have been possible for one to operate under
+such conditions.
+
+The average figures per week for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the
+month were:
+
+Number of ships intercepted, 62; number of ships sent in with armed
+guards, 10; number of ships on patrol, 15; number of ships refitting,
+coaling or on passage to or from base, 9.
+
+German submarines were active in the vicinity of the ships of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, and the _Columbella_ was
+unsuccessfully attacked on the 21st.
+
+Some armed boarding steamers were detailed to assist the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron during the month, being withdrawn from the patrol eastward of
+the Pentland Firth.
+
+The anti-submarine defence of the base at Swarbachs Minn was
+practically completed during the month.
+
+An event of great interest to the officers and men of the Fleet was
+a visit from His Majesty the King, who arrived at Scapa on July 7th,
+crossing from Thurso in the _Oak_, escorted by a portion of the 2nd
+Flotilla. During His Majesty’s visit he stayed with Admiral Sir Stanley
+Colville at Longhope and spent two very busy days with the Fleet.
+His Majesty visited all the flagships, and a large number of the
+officers and men of the ships of each division of the Battle Fleet and
+of each vessel in the cruiser squadrons were assembled on board the
+various flagships and passed before the King. His Majesty reviewed the
+officers and men of the smaller vessels, destroyers, sloops, etc., on
+the island of Flotta, visited hospital ships, and reviewed the great
+mass of auxiliary vessels anchored in Scapa Flow, being greeted with
+enthusiastic loyalty by the crews of these vessels: visited the various
+shore batteries, and inspected the anti-submarine defences and the boom
+vessels. The weather was bad, but the programme was carried out in
+spite of these conditions. The officers and men of the Fleet derived
+the utmost encouragement from His Majesty’s gracious visit. The King
+made the following signal to the Commander-in-Chief as the _Oak_ left
+the Fleet, escorted by a portion of the 4th Flotilla:
+
+    “I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long-cherished
+    desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most interesting days
+    spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and admiration for the
+    splendid force which you command with the full confidence of myself
+    and your fellow-countrymen.
+
+    “I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the
+    officers and men of the Fleet. I realise the patience and
+    determined spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting
+    and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links all
+    ranks together.
+
+    “Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever the day of
+    battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its old glorious
+    traditions.”
+
+In reply to His Majesty’s gracious message, I expressed the
+appreciation of the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, adding that it
+was “my conviction that the glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in
+the hands of those I have the honour to command.”
+
+During August the coal strike continued to influence Fleet movements to
+a certain extent.
+
+On August 2nd the _Iron Duke_, the 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st
+Cruiser Squadron carried out target practice from Cromarty. This was a
+new departure, the practice hitherto having been limited to firing at
+a small target towed by other ships or by a collier to the northward
+or eastward of the Shetlands, or firing at a rock. Both were highly
+unsatisfactory methods, which did not enable the gunnery efficiency of
+ships to be either tested or greatly improved. Accordingly I decided
+to risk sending ships out from Cromarty to fire at a large target of
+the pattern used in peace practices; it was towed across the Moray
+Firth, the ships firing and the towing vessels being protected from
+submarine attack by destroyers, sloops and gunboats. The system was an
+improvement, although very expensive in the employment of destroyers,
+etc. It was continued until practice in the Pentland Firth took its
+place. The usual procedure was for two ships, screened by destroyers,
+to be on the firing ground at a time, firing either independently or
+with concentrated fire, with two more vessels approaching the firing
+ground ready to fire when the first pair had finished. On completion
+of practice the first pair returned to harbour and were met at the
+entrance by the third pair, to which they turned over their destroyers.
+Careful organisation insured that ships did not have to wait at the
+entrance, nor was there delay for the target to be turned round for the
+return run. A large number of destroyers, sloops or gunboats, patrolled
+to seaward of the target to prevent submarines from approaching. The
+total number usually employed screening and patrolling during a day’s
+firing was from 22 to 28.
+
+The _Iron Duke_, with the 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Cruiser
+Squadron, proceeded to Scapa on completion of the practice, being
+relieved later by another battle squadron and cruiser squadron in
+accordance with the routine which had been established of changing
+bases periodically. The special service ship No. 6 left Scapa for
+Rosyth, with two destroyers, to endeavour to “draw” submarines to
+attack her and give the destroyers an opportunity of engaging them; but
+no attack took place.
+
+From August 5th to the 9th extensive anti-submarine operations were
+carried out to the westward of the Orkneys by a force consisting of
+nine destroyers, six sloops, five gunboats and a large number of patrol
+trawlers. The operations covered a very large area, the general idea
+being to compel any submarine intending to pass round the Shetland
+Islands or through the Fair Island Channel to submerge for a period
+that would exhaust her batteries and eventually bring her to the
+surface to recharge. The limited duration of darkness in northern
+latitudes assisted the operations of the hunting vessels. No _certain_
+success was attained. A submarine was sighted on the 6th at 7 P.M.,
+and a heavy explosion, under water, close to the sloop _Hollyhock_ at
+9.30 P.M. on the same night might have been due to a submarine coming
+to grief, while another submarine was sighted at 10.30 A.M. on the 7th.
+Examination of a sailing vessel found in the vicinity of this latter
+submarine was unproductive.
+
+The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on August 6th to cruise off
+the Norwegian coast, and the battleships _Albemarle_ and _Russell_, of
+the 6th Battle Squadron, arrived at Scapa for practices, having left
+the Channel Fleet.
+
+On August 7th I returned in the _Iron Duke_ to Cromarty in order to
+meet the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer who were about
+to visit Invergordon. At 9 A.M. on the 8th a wireless report was
+received in the _Iron Duke_ that a submarine was attacking a steamer
+off Rosehearty on the southern shore of the Moray Firth. The “duty”
+destroyer division was ordered to sea at once, and the remaining
+three available destroyers followed shortly afterwards. Meanwhile,
+the destroyer _Christopher_, already on patrol in the Moray Firth,
+reported herself in action at 11 A.M. with the submarine, which had
+submerged, the report stating that the merchant-ship had been sunk. The
+second destroyer on patrol, the _Midge_, assisted in the search for the
+submarine, as did the remaining destroyers and patrol trawlers, without
+result. At 10 A.M. the trawler mine-sweepers, which had been carrying
+out the usual routine sweep on the southern shore of the Moray Firth,
+reported the discovery of a mine-field to the northward of Banff, and
+several reports were received during the day of drifting mines being
+sighted along the coast and in the Firth. All destroyers were ordered
+in at 4 P.M., except the two on patrol and any others in touch with the
+submarine, and vessels remaining on patrol were given the limits of the
+mine-field as far as they had then been ascertained.
+
+Such investigation as could be hurriedly carried out during the day,
+by signal and wireless, revealed the fact that a yacht and a trawler
+on patrol on the night of the 7th–8th had sighted strange lights, but
+without identifying the vessel carrying them, and it became apparent
+that a German surface mine-laying vessel had been at work. The night
+had been somewhat misty. Directions were at once sent by wireless
+to the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, still at sea, to proceed at full
+speed towards the Horn Reef to endeavour to intercept the returning
+mine-layer, and the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, from Rosyth,
+were also sent out for the purpose; the Admiralty was also informed,
+and as a result the Harwich force was sent on the same mission.
+
+As the other squadrons proceeded, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was
+directed to the Skagerrak in case the mine-layer endeavoured to return
+by that route, whilst the remaining light cruiser squadrons made for
+the Horn Reef. All the mine-sweepers and the destroyers engaged in
+the anti-submarine operation mentioned earlier were recalled to fuel
+with all despatch, and sweeping by the Fleet mine-sweepers, trawlers
+and destroyers, organised on a large scale, was begun on the 9th
+and continued until clear routes for the ships at Cromarty and for
+merchant-ships, gradually extending to 10 miles in width, had been
+swept on both the northern and southern shores of the Moray Firth.
+These sweeping operations were greatly delayed by persistent fog,
+although a clear channel sufficiently wide to admit of the exit of the
+squadrons at Cromarty was quickly swept. The _Campania_ was sent to
+Cromarty, so that her sea-planes might assist to locate the mines, but
+in the rather thick waters of the Moray Firth they were of no use for
+this purpose.
+
+On the afternoon of the 9th news was received that the destroyer _Lynx_
+had been sunk by a mine at 6 A.M. that morning in a position stated to
+be two miles to the northward of the mine-field as then located. It was
+very regrettable that only three officers and 21 men were saved out of
+her fine ship’s company; those lost included her captain, Commander
+John F. H. Cole, an officer of great promise. The loss of such a
+comparatively shallow draft vessel showed that some of the mines had
+been laid near the surface, and mine-sweeping operations were suspended
+near the time of low water.
+
+At 4.30 P.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich force, reported that
+the German mine-layer _Meteor_, which had been sighted by his vessels
+in the vicinity of the Horn Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her
+own crew and that he had subsequently rescued four officers and 39
+men, survivors of the armed boarding-steamer _Ramsey_, who had been
+prisoners on board the _Meteor_. The _Ramsey_ had been on patrol
+south-east of the Pentland Firth, and it was ascertained from the
+survivors later that she had sighted and closed the _Meteor_, which
+was disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, shortly after daylight on
+August 8th, with the intention of boarding her. On closing, however,
+the _Meteor_ suddenly showed her true character; her powerful armament,
+hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the _Ramsey_, which was
+returned by the latter ship’s greatly inferior armament of 12-pounder
+guns. But the surprise was too complete and the odds too heavy, and the
+_Ramsey_ was sunk very quickly with her colours flying, four officers
+and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by the _Meteor_.
+Acting-Lieut. P. S. Atkins, R.N.R., the senior surviving officer of the
+_Ramsey_, came north to report himself to me, and gave full details
+of his experiences. He stated that when the officers of the _Meteor_
+abandoned and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt’s force,
+the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board a neutral fishing
+vessel. Shortly afterwards the British light cruisers passed close
+to the fishing vessel, and Lieut. Atkins signalled to the Commodore,
+stating that they were survivors of the _Ramsey_ and asked to be taken
+off. He added that the Commodore, who was at that time being attacked
+by both aircraft and submarines, replied, “Steer south-west; I will
+return and pick you up.”
+
+Lieut. Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the _Meteor_ to steer
+south-west, but the Germans naturally enough objected, as they desired
+to make their own coast. However, in spite of the fact that the British
+were unarmed and numerically very inferior, their arguments prevailed
+and a south-west course was steered for a short time until another
+fishing vessel was sighted; the British suggested transferring to
+her; this was agreed to by the Germans. As the British were leaving,
+the German captain, Konstten-Kapitän von Knorr, asked Lieut. Atkins
+if he had any money, to which he replied, “How could I, seeing that
+you picked me up in pyjamas?” Captain von Knorr pressed money on him,
+but Lieut. Atkins said that he did not see that he would require
+it. However, he eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him
+an English £5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record so
+gentlemanly and courteous an act, which stands out in strong contrast
+to the usual behaviour of German naval officers during the War. The
+money was given to me, and I sent it to the Admiralty, asking that it
+might be repaid, with the thanks of the British for the courtesy shown
+to our prisoners of war.
+
+The 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons were ordered to return to
+their bases on receipt of the news of the sinking of the _Meteor_.
+
+The mine-sweeping operations in the Moray Firth on August 9th showed
+that the mine-field was larger than had been at first reported, and
+additional paddle mine-sweepers were sent from the Clyde to assist the
+other vessels.
+
+Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were on board the _Iron Duke_ from the 7th
+to the 9th, and various matters of importance were discussed. When
+questioned as to urgent requirements I pressed for the building of a
+large number of sloops, a class of vessel which had proved most useful,
+both as mine-sweepers and as patrol vessels, and which could supplement
+the numerous destroyers then building, which took much longer to
+complete.
+
+The persistence of the fog at this period is shown by the fact that the
+_Agincourt_, returning to Scapa from Portsmouth, was unable to enter
+the base for 36 hours after passing Cape Wrath, only 60 miles distant,
+and was forced to cruise to the westward, making repeated attempts at
+entry. The _Ajax_ was similarly delayed in entry for 12 hours during
+the same period.
+
+On August 10th the armed merchant-ship _India_, of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine off the coast of
+Norway with considerable loss of life.
+
+Four destroyers were sent on August 13th to locate and engage a
+submarine that had attacked one of the Fleet mine-sweepers. They did
+not succeed in finding her, but on the following day an armed yacht
+engaged a submarine off the Aberdeen coast and claimed to have hit her
+by gunfire; and the trawler _Shamrock_ claimed to have run over another
+submarine.
+
+The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, the 4th Light Cruiser
+Squadron from Scapa, and seven destroyers carried out a search between
+the 16th and 18th for enemy vessels in the northern and central portion
+of the North Sea, sweeping towards the Skagerrak, and covering a large
+area by wide zigzags.
+
+The _Iron Duke_ returned to Scapa from Cromarty on the 16th.
+
+From the 18th to the 21st the _Lion_, with the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was cruising in the North Sea
+and carrying out exercises off the Shetland Islands, proceeding to
+Scapa for practices on the 21st, and returning to Rosyth on the 23rd.
+
+On August 18th the Fleet mine-sweeper _Lilac_, Lieut.-Commander Leslie
+Fisher, while at work on the Moray Firth mine-field, struck a mine.
+The whole fore part of the ship was destroyed and the wreck of it hung
+down from the after part, causing her to draw 30 feet of water forward,
+instead of the usual nine to ten feet. The weather was very bad and
+a heavy sea running, but by great persistence and good seamanship,
+aided by very gallant work on the part of her own crew and that of the
+_Hollyhock_, Captain Preston, senior officer of Fleet mine-sweepers,
+who was in command of the _Hollyhock_, succeeded in towing her to
+Peterhead. She was eventually reconstructed and rejoined the Fleet
+mine-sweeping flotillas. The value of this class of vessel was clearly
+shown by the incident.
+
+Eight destroyers from Scapa, with a flotilla leader, were carrying out
+on August 23rd and 24th anti-submarine operations in the Fair Island
+Channel, and a division was similarly employed east of May Island, in
+the Firth of Forth.
+
+Between August 24th and 26th the 3rd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons
+exchanged bases, between Scapa and Rosyth, carrying out a wide search
+of the North Sea _en route_, destroyers screening the ships by day.
+
+On the 24th Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G., relieved Rear-Admiral
+Hugh Evan-Thomas in the 1st Battle Squadron, the latter officer being
+designated to take command of the new 5th Battle Squadron (five ships
+of the “Queen Elizabeth” class), as it was formed.
+
+On August 30th–31st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers,
+searched to the eastward of May Island for enemy vessels; and from
+August 31 to September 1st the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied
+by four destroyers, was cruising between the Firth of Forth and the
+Dogger Bank for the same purpose.
+
+During the month the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons carried out target
+practice in the Moray Firth, and all battle squadrons and cruiser
+squadrons proceeded to sea for cruises, independently, from their
+bases, screened by destroyers.
+
+His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visited Sir Stanley Colville at
+Longhope during the month, remaining for six days. He went on board
+many of the ships of the Grand Fleet.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron report for the month showed the average
+weekly results as follows: Ships intercepted, 65; ships sent in, 13;
+number of vessels on patrol, 14; number refitting, coaling or _en
+route_ to or from patrol, 9.
+
+The weather at Scapa was very misty. Fog or mist was experienced on the
+3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 31st.
+There were no gales.
+
+On August 3rd the large floating-dock from the Medway, which had been
+towed to the Tyne, was reported as ready for use.
+
+On the 29th the old light cruiser _Brilliant_ arrived at Lerwick to
+act as guard and depot ship at that base, which was being developed as
+a secondary examination base for vessels sent in by the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron.
+
+An extended patrol to the south-eastward of the Pentland Firth during
+the month was maintained by three armed boarding steamers and three
+destroyers.
+
+The principal events of September, 1915, may perhaps be given most
+conveniently and briefly in diary form:
+
+On September 1st eight destroyers, fitted for mine-sweeping, swept
+the waters to the westward of the Pentland Firth. This was the first
+occasion on which destroyers were used for this purpose.
+
+September 1st and 2nd.--The _Black Prince_ and four light cruisers,
+with six destroyers, carried out a sweep to the eastward from Scapa.
+
+September 2nd–5th.--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadrons, and the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron were cruising
+in northern waters. Destroyers screened the Fleet out and back, but
+did not remain with it during the cruise, being kept at the base,
+ready fuelled, in case it became necessary to move to the southward.
+Battle exercises and night-firing were carried out during the cruise,
+as opportunity offered. The battleship _Superb_ reported sighting the
+periscope of a submarine.
+
+On September 2nd the Fleet was visited by five French gentlemen of
+eminence, and a representative of the United States Press. This was
+the first visit paid to the Grand Fleet base by anyone not immediately
+connected with the Service, and we were flattered that the occasion
+should have brought to Scapa Flow representatives of our gallant Allies
+from across the Channel. The Fleet left immediately after the visit,
+and an opportunity was afforded our visitors of seeing the ships leave
+harbour.
+
+September 4th.--Another mine-sweeping sloop, the _Dahlia_, Lieutenant
+G. Parsons, R.N., struck a mine in the Moray Firth mine-field during
+sweeping operations. She was very badly damaged; Lieut. Parsons himself
+was severely injured. The ship reached Invergordon with the loss of
+three killed and one missing. She was subsequently repaired.
+
+September 7th.--The 3rd Cruiser Squadron left Scapa, with destroyers,
+swept down in the direction of the Horn Reef, and arrived at Rosyth on
+the 9th without sighting enemy vessels. Visibility was low during the
+sweep.
+
+September 8th.--The 7th Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth, with destroyers,
+swept out to the eastward, towards the Skagerrak, then turned to the
+northward and arrived at Scapa on the 10th.
+
+Two destroyers were damaged by collision with steamers in a fog on the
+8th, necessitating repairs at a dockyard in both cases.
+
+September 10th–12th.--The _Lion_, with the 1st and 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and 16 destroyers,
+was cruising in the North Sea to cover mine-laying operations carried
+out by our mine-layers in the Heligoland Bight, the remainder of the
+Grand Fleet being, as was usual on such occasions, at short notice
+for steam. The _Fearless_ and a destroyer, part of the force with
+the battle cruisers, collided while at sea, the former sustaining
+considerable damage.
+
+September 11th.--The _Patia_ and _Oropesa_, of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, collided; the _Patia_ was seriously damaged, and was
+brought into port under convoy of a destroyer and armed trawlers with
+considerable difficulty, being unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine
+_en route_.
+
+September 12th.--Submarine E 16, attached to the Grand Fleet flotilla,
+was sent to the coast of Norway from Aberdeen to operate against an
+enemy submarine thought to be operating in those waters. On the 15th
+E 16 sighted a hostile submarine off the Norwegian coast and sank her
+with a torpedo. This success, one of the earliest achieved by one
+submarine operating against another, was very encouraging after the
+somewhat similar success of C 27 in July.
+
+September 17th.--The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers,
+left Rosyth to sweep to the Skagerrak. They returned on the 19th,
+without having sighted any enemy vessels.
+
+September 23rd.--The destroyer _Christopher_ was damaged in collision
+with the armed boarding-steamer _King Orry_ in a fog.
+
+September 26th.--The s.s. _Caribbean_, which had been fitted out
+as a receiving-ship for dockyard workmen, encountered very heavy
+weather whilst _en route_ from her port to Scapa, and got into serious
+difficulties, taking in a great deal of water. Her wireless distress
+calls off Cape Wrath were answered by sending to her assistance the
+light cruiser _Birkenhead_ from Scapa, together with tugs and yachts
+from Scapa and Stornoway. At 4.45 A.M. on the 27th the _Birkenhead_ and
+patrol vessels, which were then standing by, took off most of the crew
+of the _Caribbean_, which sank at 7.30 A.M., unfortunately with the
+loss of 15 lives.
+
+During the month the battle and cruiser squadrons carried out
+independent cruises by day and at night from the Scapa and Rosyth
+bases, being screened by destroyers during the exercises. The squadrons
+of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, also, all visited Scapa for the purpose of
+carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices.
+
+A widely extended patrol by one or more light cruisers with destroyers,
+working to the south-eastward from Scapa, was maintained during the
+month, in order to guard against any attempt at mine-laying in the
+Pentland Firth by enemy vessels disguised as merchant-ships. Similar
+precautions were taken at Rosyth. This patrol was henceforth regularly
+established when the conditions of the moon rendered attempted
+mine-laying operations at night probable.
+
+The sweeping operations in the Moray Firth were continued on a large
+scale throughout the month, and clear channels on each shore were
+provided. Up to September 19th, 222 mines had been accounted for out
+of the 450 which survivors of the _Ramsey_ stated had been laid by the
+_Meteor_. The Moray Firth mine-field, in the centre of the Firth, was
+purposely left undisturbed, as it formed an excellent anti-submarine
+defence in that position and reduced the area to be patrolled by our
+vessels.
+
+The 3rd Cruiser Squadron became non-existent during the month, two
+ships being detached by the Admiralty on special service, and the
+remaining two sent into port for somewhat extensive repairs.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s _weekly average_ for the month worked out
+at:
+
+Ships intercepted, 64; sent in with armed guards, 11; number of
+vessels on patrol, 13; number absent or _en route_ to or from patrols,
+10.
+
+The weather at Scapa showed fog or mist on the 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th,
+14th, 18th, 23rd and 24th; a very heavy gale occurred between the 25th
+and 28th, during which great damage was done to the anti-submarine
+obstructions at Scapa, and a good deal of damage was suffered on the
+mainland in the north of Scotland, a portion of the Highland Railway
+being washed away.
+
+Between June and August, 1915, I had pressed upon the Admiralty my
+opinion that we should carry out a much more comprehensive mining
+policy in the Heligoland Bight. I had urged this early in the War,
+but the view taken at the Admiralty was that mining on any large
+scale would impede both our submarine operations and also any Fleet
+operations that might be undertaken in those waters. I felt that unless
+we adopted one of two policies--namely, either a close watch by surface
+ships on the exits from the German bases, or an extensive mining
+policy--we could never feel that we should receive sufficient warning
+of the exit of enemy forces as to prevent mischief being done. The
+close blockade by surface ships was not a feasible operation in view
+of the number of craft at our disposal and the submarine danger; our
+submarines were too few in number and had not the necessary means of
+communication to take the place of surface ships.
+
+I could see no alternatives to very extensive mining, limited only by
+the number of mines that could be produced. The mining proposed by
+me was intended to hamper the operations of both surface vessels and
+submarines. I pointed out that earlier in the War the view had been
+expressed to me by the Admiralty that we should not risk our cruisers
+too freely in the North Sea owing to the submarine danger, and that,
+if we adhered to this policy, it was impossible to insure that the
+exits to the Fleet bases would not be mined by surface mine-layers,
+as the _Meteor_ incident had shown, and as was also indicated by the
+success of our own infrequent mining excursions to the Heligoland Bight.
+
+The correspondence resulted in increased activity on the part of our
+mine-layers, but the success of our work was unfortunately handicapped
+by defects in the pattern of mine in use at that time, especially as
+against submarines.
+
+In 1917, shortly after my return to the Admiralty, I undertook a
+very extensive mining policy. In the previous year, during Sir Henry
+Jackson’s period as First Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was
+designed, the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him.
+This was one of the replies to the submarine. One hundred thousand
+of these mines were ordered by me early in 1917 to carry out various
+schemes for mining the Heligoland Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later
+in 1917, with the assistance of the United States, provision was made
+for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the Northern
+Barrage. It was not until the large supplies of mines became available
+in the autumn that really effective results against submarines by
+mining began to be achieved, although the operations of German surface
+vessels had previously been hampered to a very considerable extent.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA
+
+
+During the later months of 1915 the Grand Fleet continued to sweep
+and control the North Sea in spite of the enemy’s efforts to effect
+attrition by submarines and mines. On October 1st the 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, with destroyers escorting, left Rosyth and proceeded towards
+the Little Fisher Bank; on reaching that locality the squadron turned
+to the north-westward and steered towards Scapa, arriving on the 3rd.
+The line thus swept was the possible course of enemy mine-laying or
+other vessels, proceeding towards, or returning from, the vicinity of
+Scapa and Cromarty. No enemy ships were sighted.
+
+On October 2nd the battleship _Barham_, Flagship of the new 5th Battle
+Squadron, arrived at Scapa.
+
+Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron (now comprising
+six light cruisers) and nine destroyers, left Harwich on the 6th to
+sweep towards the Skagerrak in search of enemy vessels, particularly
+fishing trawlers, which were suspected of acting as outpost vessels.
+The operation on this occasion was fruitful in result; 14 German
+trawlers were captured and sent in; one was also sunk. As usual during
+such operations when a supporting force was not actually at sea, the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet was kept at short notice for steam, to be ready to
+put to sea if required.
+
+On October 10th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa and swept
+down to the Little Fisher Bank, and thence to Rosyth with the same
+object in view as that of the Harwich force, being met at daylight on
+the 11th by destroyers from Rosyth, and arriving at that base on the
+12th. On this occasion the operation gave no result.
+
+The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle
+Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light
+Cruiser Squadron, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, left Scapa on the
+13th, and proceeded into the northern portion of the North Sea for a
+cruise. Owing to bad weather the destroyers were sent back on the 11th,
+one, the _Mandate_, being damaged by a heavy sea; the _Ardent_ and
+_Fortune_ collided, the former vessel being damaged. The fleet carried
+out battle exercises during the cruise, and returned to the bases
+at Scapa and Cromarty on the 15th, on which day the new battleship
+_Canada_ joined the Grand Fleet.
+
+On October 18th the Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser
+Squadron and destroyers, sailed to operate off the Danish coast, north
+of the Horn Reef, against any enemy vessels found there. The _Lion_,
+with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, left
+Rosyth to support the Harwich force, which closed the Danish coast
+at daylight on the 19th, then steered to the north-westward, till
+dark, returning afterwards to Harwich. The search was unproductive,
+no enemy vessels being sighted. The _Lion_ and 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron proceeded towards Cromarty, but were diverted to Scapa during
+the night of the 19th–20th, owing to a report of suspicious vessels,
+possibly mine-layers, being sighted off Noss Head. These vessels were
+subsequently identified as two of our own trawlers.
+
+On October 22nd three divisions of destroyers were sent from Scapa to
+hunt a submarine off Fair Island, but were forced to return owing to
+bad weather.
+
+On October 27th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with two armed
+boarding-steamers, left Scapa to search the northern portion of the
+North Sea, returning on the 30th. Nothing was sighted.
+
+On October 30th Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron
+and destroyers, left Harwich for another sweep off the Danish coast.
+His force passed through a position some 70 miles north-west of
+Heligoland before daylight on the 21st, steered for the Little Fisher
+Bank, and thence to Harwich. A portion of the Battle Cruiser Fleet kept
+steam at short notice during the operation, which was unproductive,
+except for the interception of an ore-laden neutral steamer which was
+sent in to a British port.
+
+On October 30th the _Birkenhead_ and _Liverpool_, newly commissioned
+light cruisers, left Scapa for a searching and exercise cruise in the
+northern portion of the North Sea, and returned to Scapa on November
+1st.
+
+During October squadrons cruised independently in the North Sea from
+Scapa, as in previous months, by day and at night. The ships of the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet, as well as the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth
+and squadrons from Scapa, proceeded to Cromarty, in turn, in order to
+carry out long-range firing at towed targets in the Moray Firth, being
+screened from submarine attack by destroyers. Squadrons from Rosyth
+proceeded also to Scapa to carry out practices.
+
+A patrol, comprising the _Sappho_ and eight armed whalers, based
+on Peterhead, was instituted as a guard against further attempted
+mine-laying in the Moray Firth. The Peterhead and Cromarty
+mine-sweeping vessels, which had been working under the Senior Officer
+of Fleet mine-sweepers (Captain Preston) for the clearance of the Moray
+Firth mine-field, reverted to their proper commands, and arrangements
+were made for a constant sweep by mine-sweeping trawlers of the channel
+along the south shore of the Moray Firth, which was that used by ships
+based on Cromarty when concentrating with the remainder of the Grand
+Fleet in the North Sea. It was essential to ensure that this channel
+was kept clear of mines so long as any portion of the Grand Fleet was
+based on Cromarty.
+
+It may not be out of place here to state the patrol arrangements
+existing in the vicinity of the Pentland Firth at this time. Usually
+three armed boarding-steamers and three destroyers were patrolling to
+the eastward of the Firth. They moved to the northward during daylight
+and worked for a considerable distance to the south-eastward of the
+Firth at night. An extended patrol, usually consisting of a light
+cruiser and a destroyer, also worked from Peterhead. A patrol of one or
+two destroyers was maintained at night off Noss Head on the north shore
+of the Moray Firth. Destroyers were kept off the entrance to Hoy Sound
+and Holm Sound, and a large number of trawlers near the Hoxa Sound
+entrance. In bad weather the eastern destroyer patrol was withdrawn
+to work between Swona Island and the land to the eastward and to the
+north-westward. The old local defence destroyers also carried out
+patrol work off the entrance, and off Kirkwall. These particulars are
+of interest as conveying some idea of the sea work in a restricted area
+which had to be carried out in all weathers.
+
+From October 1st to October 11th the Fleet Flagship _Iron Duke_ was
+refitting at Invergordon.
+
+On October 28th the _Argyll_, _en route_ from Devonport to Rosyth
+to rejoin the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, grounded on the Bell Rock, near
+Dundee, early in the morning in thick weather, and became a total
+wreck; all hands were taken off in a heavy sea by destroyers from
+Rosyth. The destroyers were exceedingly well handled under very
+difficult conditions. On the following day the _Arlanza_, of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron, which had been sent to the White Sea, struck a mine
+and was seriously damaged, but succeeded in reaching the Yakanski
+anchorage, in the neighbourhood. Repairs were impossible during the
+winter and the greater part of her crew was, therefore, brought home in
+the _Orcoma_, of the same squadron which had been sent north for the
+purpose.
+
+From October 29th to October 30th a heavy gale was experienced at
+Scapa, and considerable damage was done to the anti-submarine defences
+and to the block-ships at the entrances. Fog or mist was experienced on
+October 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th, 16th and 30th.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s work showed as a weekly average the
+following figures: Ships intercepted, 56; sent in, 16; number on
+patrol, 14; number absent, 8. The bad weather experienced interfered
+with the work of the squadron.
+
+On November 2nd the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st,
+2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the
+destroyers of the 4th and 11th (old 2nd) Flotilla left for a cruise
+to the westward of the Orkneys. The destroyers were sent back on the
+3rd owing to bad weather. Battle exercises and sub-calibre firing took
+place during the cruise, which was otherwise uneventful; the Fleet
+arrived at Scapa and Cromarty on November 5th, being screened in by the
+destroyers.
+
+On November 6th the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, with
+destroyers, left Scapa and Rosyth respectively, to carry out an
+operation in the Skagerrak. The force was timed to arrive at the
+eastern end of the Skagerrak at dawn on the 7th, and to sweep westward
+during daylight in order that our ships should be between the enemy and
+his Baltic base if enemy ships were sighted. The _Lion_, with the 1st
+and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and destroyers, left Rosyth in time
+to be in a supporting position by daylight on the 7th. A large number
+of vessels were boarded by the destroyers, but nothing suspicious was
+encountered, and the forces returned to the bases on November 8th.
+
+During the night of November 6th–7th the battleship _Hibernia_, flying
+the flag of Rear-Admiral S. Fremantle, with the _Zealandia_ and
+_Albemarle_, passed through the Pentland Firth to the westward _en
+route_ for southern ports and the Mediterranean. A strong wind was
+blowing against the spring tides, and a very heavy sea was running in
+the Firth, as was not unusual. Whilst passing through the Firth the
+_Albemarle_, Captain R. A. Nugent, shipped two heavy seas which washed
+away her fore bridge, with everyone on it, and even displaced the roof
+of the conning tower; hundreds of tons of water flooded the decks and
+poured down below. An officer and one man were washed overboard and
+drowned, and several men injured; Captain Nugent found himself on the
+upper deck amidst the wreckage of the bridge. The _Hibernia_, which
+was ahead, turned to assist the _Albemarle_, and an urgent signal for
+assistance was received on board the _Iron Duke_. One of the emergency
+cruisers at Scapa was directed to raise steam with all despatch; the
+_Hibernia_ arrived in with the _Albemarle_ at daylight. The ship
+presented an extraordinary sight, the sea having made a clean sweep of
+her bridge and everything on it. In all our experience of the Pentland
+Firth, we had never witnessed such havoc before. The _Zealandia_ was
+also obliged to turn back to repair her gunports, damaged by the sea in
+the Firth.
+
+The next few days were marked only by comparatively trifling incidents.
+On November 6th the _Birkenhead_, which had recently been commissioned,
+completed her practices at Scapa and joined the 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadron at Rosyth. Two days later the _Princess Margaret_ laid mines
+successfully in the Heligoland Bight; on the 9th the _Crescent_,
+harbour-defence vessel at Hoy Sound, was withdrawn and left to pay off;
+and the _Matchless_, of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, struck a drifting
+mine in southern waters, her stern being blown off.
+
+On the 12th Submarine E 17 was sent into the Kattegat to reconnoitre
+and ascertain whether any German trawlers or other vessels were
+working there. She returned on the 19th and reported in the negative.
+On the night of the 15th–16th the s.s. _Kristianiafiord_, of the
+Norwegian-American line, a ship which had been endeavouring on other
+occasions to evade the blockading squadron, was intercepted by the
+_Teutonic_ in high latitudes; she was steaming fast without lights,
+and was sent to Kirkwall for examination. In this and in other similar
+cases the ships ran great risk of being mistaken for enemy vessels and
+sunk, since the methods employed by the Germans made it very difficult
+to abstain from opening fire on vessels without running the serious
+danger of our own ships being sunk by surprise attack. In the case of a
+ship carrying a large number of passengers, like the _Kristianiafiord_,
+the risk taken was very great and could not be justified.
+
+On November 16th the 7th Cruiser Squadron, without the _Donegal_, but
+accompanied by the _Liverpool_ and one armed boarding-steamer, left
+Scapa to patrol an area north of the Shetlands and Faroe Islands, with
+a view to intercepting possible raiders or other vessels.
+
+At noon on the 18th a report reached me that an enemy three-funnelled
+cruiser had been seen on the 17th to pass through the Danish Sound
+going north. The possible objectives of this vessel, if the report were
+true, appeared to be either mine-laying off our bases or an attempt to
+interfere with the White Sea traffic, the Admiralty having informed me
+on the 16th that large consignments of arms and ammunition would be
+passing from France to the White Sea during November and December. In
+view of the fact that the news had reached me too late to intercept
+this vessel in southern waters, the dispositions made were as follows:
+
+The _Donegal_, which had left Scapa on the 17th to cruise along the
+trade route to the White Sea, was directed to rendezvous with the
+_Orcoma_ (a ship of the 10th Cruiser Squadron on patrol off the
+Norwegian coast), and to patrol the parallel of Lat. 66 N. between the
+meridians of 5.30 E. and 7.30 E.
+
+The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa for a position Lat.
+63 N., Long. 4 E., there to meet the 7th Cruiser Squadron, already at
+sea. Both squadrons, widely spread, were to sweep to the northward
+along the Norwegian coast, as far as the Rost Islands, and to cruise to
+the westward of the Lofoten Islands during daylight of the 20th, then
+returning to their base. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa and
+proceeded north, the ships spread to cover a wide area to the westward
+of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, in order to protect the Archangel trade.
+The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa on the 18th to sweep to
+the eastward, with orders to return to Cromarty on the 19th.
+
+Strong destroyer patrols were despatched from Scapa and Rosyth to
+prevent mine-laying off the bases, and one Battle Cruiser Squadron was
+put at short notice for steam. No enemy vessels were sighted, and the
+_Donegal_ eventually proceeded to the White Sea, being accompanied by
+the _Minotaur_ as far as the North Cape.
+
+On November 19th three submarines proceeded from Harwich to the
+Kattegat to obtain information relative to the presence of any enemy
+vessels.
+
+On November 23rd the _Warspite_ rejoined the 5th Battle Squadron, after
+having been for some weeks under repair in the Tyne, owing to injuries
+sustained through grounding in the Firth of Forth.
+
+On November 28th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth for a cruise in
+the northern portion of the North Sea, during which cruiser exercises
+and gunnery practices were carried out; the squadron returned to Rosyth
+on December 2nd.
+
+From November 22nd to December 7th, the _Donegal_ and _Hampshire_ were
+protecting the White Sea trade, working on the trade route and coaling
+at Alexandrovsk.
+
+During the month independent squadron exercise cruises from the bases
+were continued, as was target practice from Cromarty.
+
+The figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron gave as a weekly average:
+Ships intercepted, 30; sent in, 9; number on patrol, 10; absent
+at ports or _en route_, 9; on special service, 3. The bad weather
+experienced during the month interfered considerably with the boarding
+operations of the squadron and also hampered Fleet movements.
+
+On December 1st the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st
+and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and the
+_Minotaur_ of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to the westward for
+a cruise. Battle exercises were carried out on the 2nd and 3rd, and
+the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty on December 4th. The exercises
+were specially intended to represent the conditions that might arise if
+the High Sea Fleet tried to draw the Grand Fleet over areas in which
+mines had been laid or in which submarines were operating. During
+the exercises the _Barham_ and _Warspite_ of the 5th Battle Squadron
+collided, both being considerably damaged. They were escorted to Scapa
+for temporary repairs and left later, the _Barham_ for Invergordon and
+the _Warspite_ for Devonport.
+
+On December 8th the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth, swept to
+the eastward to the Little Fisher Bank, and returned on the 10th.
+
+From the 11th to the 13th two ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
+were cruising to the eastward of the Fair Island Channel.
+
+On December 12th Submarines D 7 and D 8, which were based temporarily
+on Blyth, were directed to leave for the Norwegian coast to operate
+against enemy trade and against enemy submarines. D 7 was directed to
+make the Ryvingen Light during the dark hours and then to cruise to
+intercept trade between Ryvingen and Arendal, and between Ryvingen and
+the west coast of Denmark. It was anticipated that this might draw
+enemy submarines to the northward from German ports to try to sink D 7,
+and D 7 was directed to be back at Ryvingen 36 hours after she expected
+that the first vessel she examined had reached port, so that she might
+be ready to attack enemy submarines sent after her. D 8 was directed to
+cruise on a bearing 270° from the Hantsholm Light (coast of Denmark)
+in order to intercept enemy submarines sent after D 7. Bad weather
+prevented D 7 leaving before December 15th. The enemy was apparently
+not drawn, and no success was obtained.
+
+On December 15th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Scapa for a sweep to the
+south-eastward, and returned on the 17th.
+
+Two neutral ships, steaming at high speed at night without lights on
+the 15th and 16th, evidently intending to evade the blockade, were
+intercepted by the 10th Cruiser squadron and sent into Kirkwall.
+
+On December 20th Commodore Tyrwhitt left Harwich with the 5th Light
+Cruiser Squadron, to sweep to the Danish coast, and the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet was kept at the usual short notice for steam during the time that
+he was absent until the 23rd.
+
+On December 24th the 1st Cruiser Squadron left Scapa to search the
+central portion of the North Sea. During the day anxiety was felt as
+to the safety of the destroyers _Porpoise_ and _Morning Star_, which
+had been escorting a Russian ice-breaker to the northward and which
+had hove to near the Fair Island Channel in a heavy gale during the
+23rd. The 1st Cruiser Squadron was directed to spread and search for
+them, and the _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_ were also sent from Scapa to
+endeavour to gain touch. Both the destroyers, however, reached Cromarty
+in safety, the _Porpoise_ on the 25th, and the _Morning Star_ on the
+26th, after having experienced very heavy weather. Many compartments
+were flooded, and very considerable damage was done. They had been
+handled with great ability during the exceptionally heavy weather. The
+1st Cruiser Squadron, with the _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_, returned to
+Scapa on the 26th.
+
+On the 24th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron also proceeded from Rosyth
+to search the North Sea, down to the vicinity of the Dogger Bank,
+thence towards the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. No enemy
+vessels were sighted. The weather in the North Sea at this period was
+very severe, and the _Sappho_, which was supporting the armed trawler
+patrol to the north-eastward of Peterhead, lost her rudder in a heavy
+sea.
+
+On the 30th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with destroyers, left Rosyth and carried out a sweep to the
+south-eastward, returning on the 31st.
+
+On the same day, a lamentable disaster occurred, the cruiser _Natal_
+(Captain Eric Back) being blown up in Cromarty harbour with great loss
+of life. Captain Back was amongst those who lost their lives. It was
+reported by adjacent vessels at 3.25 P.M. that the ship was on fire,
+and at 3.30 P.M., before any action could be taken, the ship blew up
+and sank, the explosion taking place in her after magazines. Steps were
+taken to deal with the situation in case the explosion had been caused
+by an enemy submarine having entered the harbour, but it soon became
+evident that this was not the case. Examination of the wreck by divers
+later showed no signs of any external explosion. A court-martial was
+subsequently held at Chatham to investigate the causes of the disaster,
+but the conclusions were not made public.
+
+During the month of December independent exercises from the Fleet bases
+were continued, as well as target practice from Cromarty. As to the
+latter, an interesting practice was carried out by the _Iron Duke_ at
+the range, and under the conditions of battle practice before the War,
+in order to ascertain, by examining the actual hits made on the canvas
+of the target, whether the pre-War standard of shooting was being
+maintained. Some uncertainty existed owing to the great increase in the
+ranges at which practices were carried out during the War, namely,
+16,000 to 19,000 yards, as compared with the 9,500 yards, which was the
+maximum peace range. The result was very satisfactory and indicated a
+most decided advance on pre-War accuracy of fire.
+
+On December 13th the first target practice was carried out in the
+Pentland Firth. This was in the nature of an experiment and, being
+successful, practice in this locality was later substituted for
+practice in the Moray Firth; it was far more convenient for the main
+Fleet base and much less extravagant in the use of screening and
+protecting destroyers.
+
+On December 16th Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, K.C.B., relieved
+Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., in command of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron, on the termination of the latter officer’s three years’
+command.
+
+During December patrols seaward of the bases were strengthened and
+considerably extended during the first and fourth quarters of the moon
+in order to frustrate any attempted mine-laying on the part of the
+enemy. This “dark night” patrol subsequently became a matter of routine.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average showed: Ships intercepted,
+35; sent in, 14; number of ships on patrol, 12; number at bases or _en
+route_, 7; number on special service, 2.
+
+The long nights and bad weather were responsible for the reduction in
+the number of vessels intercepted. During December fog or mist were
+experienced at Scapa on the 15th, 22nd, 25th and 26th; gales on the
+6th, 8th and 23rd; and snow on the 3rd, 4th, 8th and 12th. Although the
+weather at Scapa Flow was fairly good, gales in the North Sea and to
+the westward of the Orkneys were frequent and violent during the month.
+
+Before turning to the events of 1916 it is of interest to notice
+the work of the “decoy ships,” known later by the name of “Q” ships,
+fitted out at Scapa during the year 1915. These vessels, five in
+number, were designed to sink enemy submarines by inducing the latter
+to close them for the purpose of attack by gun fire or by torpedo. The
+same system was employed in southern waters, and was developed greatly
+during the year 1917. At Scapa in 1915 and 1916 the ships were manned
+principally by volunteers from the Grand Fleet, or from the depôt
+ships at the base. Colliers or store-ships were selected for their
+size and general suitability for the work, and they were fitted with
+a very carefully concealed armament, which was kept hidden until the
+submarine was within point-blank range, so that fire opened on her must
+be immediately effective; unless the submarine was holed in less than
+a minute after fire was opened on her she could submerge and escape,
+and probably torpedo the decoy ship as well. The five ships, the
+_Prince Charles_, _Vala_, _Duncombe_, _Penshurst_ and _Glen Isla_, were
+fitted up by Captain Farrington of the _Cyclops_, under the direction
+of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville and were marvels of ingenuity. Their
+usual cruising-ground was in the vicinity of the Orkneys, Shetlands, or
+Hebrides, or towards the Norwegian coast, or the White Sea, or down the
+east coast of Scotland. They worked on a route that was freely used by
+merchant-ships and altered their appearance according to their route so
+as to give them the look of vessels usually trading on that route.
+
+Many stories of the “Q” ships have been told in the Press and need
+not be repeated here, but a high tribute must be paid to the extreme
+gallantry and splendid discipline of the officers and men who manned
+these vessels. I had personal knowledge of the work of the vessels
+operating from Scapa. Their opportunities for engaging submarines
+successfully were rare, and the work in the small ships in the heavy
+seas encountered in northern latitudes was very arduous; there was
+never any lack of volunteers for the duty, the difficulty always being
+that of selection from the large number of officers and men anxious to
+serve. It is satisfactory to record that the first submarine sunk by a
+decoy ship fell a victim to a vessel working from Scapa Flow.
+
+On July 25th, 1915, the _Prince Charles_ (Lieutenant W. P.
+Mark-Wardlaw--of Admiral Colville’s staff--in command) sighted, near
+North Rona Island, the Danish steamer _Louise_, stopped and with a
+submarine close to. When the submarine sighted the _Prince Charles_ she
+proceeded at full speed towards her and opened fire at 5,000 yards’
+range. Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw stopped his engines and went through the
+usual process of lowering boats in a great hurry. The submarine, which
+was the U 36, closed to within 500 yards, still on the surface, and at
+that range the _Prince Charles_ revealed her true character, unmasked
+her guns, and opened a most accurate fire with her two 6-pounders and
+two 3-pounders. The U 36 was immediately holed, and two men killed
+in the conning tower. She was unable to dive and sank stern first; 4
+commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 9 men were saved by the
+_Prince Charles_.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION
+
+
+The year 1916 opened and still no general action had been fought in
+the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet continued to dominate, paying
+its price--though not so heavy as might have been expected--for the
+influence it exerted on all the operations--naval, military and
+economic--to which the country had by that time been committed in face
+of the active operations pursued by enemy submarines and mine-laying
+craft.
+
+On January 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth to cruise in the
+northern part of the North Sea, and returned during the night of the
+8th–9th.
+
+The facility with which enemy mines could be laid in the vicinity of
+naval bases during the long winter nights, when there was little or no
+moon (as shown, _inter alia_, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland
+Bight, which, though not very frequent in 1916, became constant in
+1917), led me to extend still further the patrols from the bases at
+such times; from January 2nd to January 10th inclusive, the patrol
+vessels (two light cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about
+140 miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the Pentland
+Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 P.M. each day. Similar patrols
+were ordered to be instituted from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however,
+instead of mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected
+the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the purpose, possibly
+because of the considerable mercantile traffic using this route. The
+patrols in this direction did not extend so far from the base, the sea
+being very frequently too heavy in the winter months; the practice was
+to search the route periodically for mines.
+
+The weather early in January had been very bad, and both sweeping and
+patrol work were impracticable. In these circumstances the enemy raider
+_Moewe_, disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably
+passed up the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland
+Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field between Cape
+Wrath and a position about north from Strathie Point, on the Scottish
+coast, on the night of January 1st or 2nd. The work of the _Moewe_ was
+facilitated by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and Sule Skerry
+Island were necessarily exhibited at night for the sake of the large
+mercantile traffic using the Pentland Firth and the Minches.
+
+On January 6th, at 7 A.M., the pre-Dreadnought battleship _King Edward
+VII._, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, left Scapa for Belfast to refit,
+and at 10.47 A.M., when in Lat. 58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent
+explosion occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain Maclachlan
+first reported that the ship had been torpedoed, but later came to the
+conclusion that she had been mined, as was eventually found to be,
+undoubtedly, the case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both
+engine-rooms filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing at the time
+with a rising sea.
+
+As soon as the report was received at Scapa the flotilla leader
+_Kempenfelt_ and 12 destroyers were sent out to assist and to keep
+the submarine under, if one were present. Tugs were also despatched.
+Meanwhile the collier _Melita_, which had arrived on the scene,
+proceeded to take the _King Edward VII._ in tow, assisted by the
+_Kempenfelt_; but the ship was very low in the water and unmanageable,
+and the tow parted. At 4 P.M., the battleship having by this time a
+heavy list, Captain Maclachlan decided to abandon her for the night,
+and the destroyers _Musketeer_, _Marne_, _Fortune_ and _Nessus_ were
+taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they embarked all
+hands without loss of life, although the destroyer _Musketeer_ received
+considerable injury from projections on the side of the battleship.
+The destroyer _Nessus_ and a tug stood by the _King Edward VII._ until
+8.10 P.M. when she turned over and sank. The _Africa_, also of the
+3rd Battle Squadron, _en route_ from Belfast to Scapa, passed safely
+through the mined area a few hours before the _King Edward VII._ was
+mined--a very fortunate escape!
+
+Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing between Cape
+Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large force of mine-sweepers was
+detached to ascertain the limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear
+a passage along the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch
+Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape Wrath, and some
+on Scapa, but continuous bad weather interfered with the sweeping
+operations to such an extent that, between January 7th and January
+21st, no sweeping was possible except close in shore in sheltered
+water. On January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet Bay, near
+Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the loss of the _King Edward
+VII._ was thereby removed.
+
+On January 7th the battleship _Albemarle_ left Scapa for Archangel,
+and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth to operate in the Skagerrak;
+she returned on the 16th, having met with no success.
+
+On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was experienced at
+Scapa. The oiler _Prudentia_ drifted across the bows of the _Iron Duke_
+during the night and sank, and one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier,
+a tug and three trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an
+hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The _Iron Duke_ was
+undamaged.
+
+Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+on patrol suffered considerable damage from the heavy seas. The month
+of January, as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally
+bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over the whole North
+Sea. Great injury was done to all the anti-submarine obstructions at
+Scapa, many of them being entirely destroyed. In order to make the base
+temporarily as secure as possible from submarine attack, the Fleet was
+directed to make and lay improvised net obstructions.
+
+On January 24 the destroyer _Talisman_ reported that a torpedo had been
+fired at her off Blyth. The _Botha_ and 10 destroyers were sent out
+from Rosyth to locate and destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing
+of her.
+
+On January 25th the _Ebro_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, picked up a
+dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and towed her to Lerwick, arriving on
+the 28th.
+
+On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers,
+and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with five destroyers, left Rosyth
+for operations in the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and
+destroyers, during daylight on the 27th, swept through the Skagerrak to
+the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron being in support. The ships
+then moved to the northward; at daylight on the 28th, the whole force,
+joined by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from
+Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and again swept
+into the Skagerrak. The squadrons then returned to their respective
+bases. During the operations the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+was at short notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted
+outside territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of the 4th Light
+Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of small vessels passing along the
+Norwegian coast inside territorial waters.
+
+On January 28th the senior officer of the mine-sweepers reported that
+he had swept a clear channel along the north coast of Scotland from
+Cape Wrath to Scapa, between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field
+laid by the _Moewe_. This channel was instituted for warships only for
+use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were directed to steer to the
+northward from Cape Wrath, thence to make Noup Head, on the north-west
+coast of the Orkneys, passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa;
+all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair Island Channel
+to their destination.
+
+During the month of January gunnery practices were carried out, both in
+the Moray Firth and in the Pentland Firth.
+
+The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were much restricted by the
+bad weather experienced, the weekly average showing:
+
+Number of ships intercepted, 21; number sent in, 8; number of ships on
+patrol, 11; number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 10;
+number on special service, 2.
+
+Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbourhood on January 5th,
+6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd,
+24th and 30th. The weather during the month both at Scapa and in the
+whole northern area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered
+the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements of all small
+craft.
+
+Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by night from the
+various bases were continued in January, as was the change of base of
+the Rosyth squadrons to Scapa and Cromarty for practices.
+
+At 6 A.M. on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers
+left Scapa, steering towards the little Fisher Bank, whence the
+destroyers returned to Scapa, and the squadron proceeded to sweep up
+the Norwegian coast during daylight hours and thence to Scapa. These
+sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was considered probable
+that enemy raiders, attempting to pass out of the North Sea, would hug
+the coast on passage.
+
+On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at
+sea endeavouring to intercept zeppelins returning from raiding our east
+coast. The fishing trawler _King Stephen_ on this day sighted Zeppelin
+L 19 in a sinking condition in the North Sea.
+
+On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate off the Norwegian
+coast. She returned on the 13th.
+
+On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded to a position about
+150 miles to the south-eastward from Scapa for patrol during the night
+and returned on the 8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried
+out a similar patrol, returning on the 9th.
+
+On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla, operating from
+the Humber under the orders of the Rear-Admiral of the East Coast,
+was attacked by enemy torpedo craft in the vicinity of the Dogger
+Bank, and the _Arabis_ was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending
+further information as to the strength of enemy forces at sea, the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night of the 10th–11th,
+and proceeded to the southward; the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed
+from Harwich; and the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at
+Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and move to
+the southward. The situation became clear during the 11th, when it was
+evident that the enemy’s force, which had consisted only of destroyers,
+had returned to its base.
+
+At 10.30 P.M. (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 0.20
+E.) orders were given for the Grand Fleet to return to its bases, and
+the squadrons arrived on the 12th.
+
+From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the armed
+boarding-steamers _Dundee_ and _Duke of Clarence_, from Scapa,
+swept from that base to the Utvoer Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N., Long.
+40.31 E.), thence down the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed
+boarding-steamers returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted were two
+enemy submarines off the coast of Norway.
+
+On February 18th the new battleship _Malaya_, the gift of the Federated
+Malay States, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.
+
+On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were sent to the Skagerrak to
+examine and board merchant-vessels with a view to stopping the iron
+ore trade from Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the
+submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part of their cruise,
+to operate against two enemy submarines reported off the Norwegian
+coast. They returned on February 28th, not having met, outside
+territorial waters, the submarines or with any vessels which were
+engaged in the iron ore trade.
+
+On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were sent without result
+to operate against a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel.
+
+On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 7th
+Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas,
+left Scapa before daylight for a watching and exercise cruise in the
+northern part of the North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight,
+in conjunction with the Harwich force, had been intended, but was
+abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore Tyrwhitt that the
+weather and other conditions were unsuitable for his operations. Battle
+exercises took place during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet, which left Rosyth at 1.30 P.M. on the 26th, joined the Battle
+Fleet at 8 A.M. next day. During that day further battle exercises were
+carried out, including deployments of the whole Grand Fleet from its
+cruising order, so that the battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers
+and destroyers might become accustomed to taking up the stations
+assigned to them on deployment under certain conditions. The exercises
+were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned to its bases on the
+28th.
+
+During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine-sweeping sloops
+patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys to prevent mine-laying in the
+approaches to the base.
+
+On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept any enemy vessel
+that might be attempting to pass out into the North Sea. Information
+from neutral sources had led to a belief in the possibility of such an
+attempt being made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the
+information was received after the event, that is, it was reported that
+the vessel in question had already left German waters. The dispositions
+were made, therefore, on this assumption, and in making them it was
+necessary to place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be
+expected to pass through in daylight.
+
+The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship, whether her
+mission were mine-laying near our bases, or an attempt to pass out
+into the Atlantic. The _Patia_ and _Columbella_, of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, were directed to patrol a line running north-east from Lat.
+61.45 N., Long. 0.50 E., and ships of the same squadron on the C Patrol
+line were directed to extend this line to the north-eastward. The
+_Alcantara_ and _Andes_, of the same squadron, already on a special
+patrol line, were ordered to remain in their position till further
+orders. Two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers
+left Rosyth at 8 P.M. on the 28th to patrol the area covering the
+Farn Island--Skaw and the May Island--Skaw trade routes, working to
+the eastward. Early on the 29th the _Comus_ and the _Calliope_, of
+the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the 28th with two
+destroyers for areas in the vicinity of Lat. 58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E.,
+and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 3.0 E. respectively, were directed to patrol
+lines 40 miles long, running 50° to 230° respectively from a position
+in Lat. 61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The _Blanche_, which had also sailed, was
+ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The _Minotaur_ and a
+destroyer were sent to patrol the Fair Island passage during daylight
+on the 29th. Steps were also taken to cover the approaches to the
+Pentland Firth against mine-laying.
+
+At 8.55 A.M. on the 29th the _Andes_, Captain G. B. Young, R.N.,
+reported by wireless that an enemy vessel was in sight in Lat. 61.58
+N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave her course, speed and description; her
+enemy character was assumed owing to her movements. The _Alcantara_,
+Captain T. E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight of the
+_Andes_, but sighted her at 9.10 A.M. chasing a strange vessel, joined
+in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 A.M., being then about 6,000 yards from
+her, ordered her to stop. She complied and informed the _Alcantara_
+that she was the Norwegian s.s. _Rena_ from Rio to Trondjhem. She was
+flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted on her sides. At
+9.40 A.M. the _Alcantara_, then about 2,500 yards on the quarter of
+the stranger, began to hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding.
+At this moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her hitherto
+concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian ensign and staff overboard
+and hoisting a German ensign at the main. But she still showed the
+Norwegian flag on her sides, where it was displayed throughout the
+action. At the close range at which fire was opened hitting commenced
+immediately, and as the first hits on the _Alcantara_ cut all her
+communications, Captain Wardle experienced great difficulty in passing
+orders to the guns. But the enemy’s fire was returned quickly and with
+effect, in spite of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went
+ahead and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of which
+hit the _Alcantara_ between the boiler-rooms at about 10 A.M., causing
+them gradually to fill.
+
+By 10.15 A.M. the enemy was badly on fire and stopped. A few minutes
+later, at 10.22 P.M., boats were observed to be leaving her and the
+_Alcantara_ ceased firing. The latter ship was by this time listing
+heavily and was abandoned shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 A.M. The
+_Andes_, which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range than the
+_Alcantara_, rendered assistance to the boats of the two ships.
+
+On receipt of the first signal from the _Andes_, the _Calliope_,
+_Comus_ and _Blanche_ had been ordered to the scene at full speed. The
+_Comus_, Captain Alan G. Hotham, R.N., the nearest vessel, with the
+destroyer _Munster_, arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E.,
+as the _Alcantara_ was sinking. The _Munster_ picked up the crew of
+the _Alcantara_, and as the enemy raider still had colours flying the
+_Comus_ proceeded to sink her by gunfire and to pick up the survivors
+in her boats. The _Calliope_ and _Magic_ arrived at 1 P.M., but, not
+being required, returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned
+out to be the disguised raider _Grief_, armed with four 5.9-inch guns
+and two torpedo tubes; she had a complement of 306, of whom 209,
+including many wounded, were rescued by the _Comus_ and _Andes_.
+
+The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying out blockade work
+under modern conditions when dealing with an unscrupulous enemy. A
+raider disguised as a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most
+difficult customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had perforce
+to be treated as “suspect” after an incident of this nature. It is not
+possible to examine a vessel without boarding her, and, except in very
+fine weather, it is necessary for the boarding ship to be close to
+the suspected ship before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously
+cannot pull long distances. The experience of the _Alcantara_ showed
+the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An attempt to solve
+the problem was made by informing all neutrals that, when any of our
+vessels displayed a certain signal, the ship to be boarded should steam
+towards the boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away.
+But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously dependent to
+a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals, which was not always in
+evidence.
+
+Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties which did
+not exist in the days of our forefathers, not the least being the
+advent of the torpedo and the submarine. The German method of solving
+such difficulties was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did
+not, and never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of any
+seaman belonging to the Allied nations.
+
+During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights, combined with more
+favourable weather, gave the 10th Cruiser Squadron better opportunities
+for the blockade, and the average weekly results were: Number of ships
+intercepted, 39; number sent in, 111; number of ships on patrol, 12;
+number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number
+detached on special service, 1.
+
+Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on February
+6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual exchange of bases for practices
+and the independent squadron exercises at sea from the bases were
+carried out during the month.
+
+On March 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentlemen visited
+the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in the evening. The party
+included M. Danchenko, Count Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir Nabakoff, M.
+Bashmakoff, M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky.
+
+On March 2nd the new battleship _Valiant_, a vessel of the “Queen
+Elizabeth” class, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.
+
+Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the Kattegat to intercept
+trade and to ascertain the situation there on the chance of any enemy
+vessels being found. She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day
+the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and exercise cruise
+in the centre portion of the North Sea. On the 6th the remainder of
+the Grand Fleet proceeded into the North Sea for a southerly sweep,
+concentration being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the
+“Long Forties,” the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on the
+meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became very unfavourable
+for destroyers, and speed had eventually to be reduced to such an
+extent that the sweep was abandoned, and the Fleet returned to its
+bases on the 7th.
+
+On March 9th a patrol consisting of one cruiser and one armed
+boarding-steamer was instituted in an area north of the Shetlands.
+It was designed to cover the track of vessels _en route_ between the
+north of Iceland and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity
+of Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was considered
+probable that this route might be taken by enemy raiders as well as
+by vessels attempting to evade the blockade. The patrol was continued
+throughout the year, although occasionally modified in details and
+frequently doubled in strength. It was eventually successful in
+intercepting and sinking the German raider _Wolf_, in the spring
+of 1917, the _Achilles_ (Captain F. M. Leake, R.N.) and the armed
+boarding-steamer _Dundee_ (Commander Selwyn Day, R.N.R.) being the
+vessels engaged in this operation. This patrol was also of use for
+blockade work.
+
+On March 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a division
+of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth at 7.30 A.M. for
+operations off the Norwegian coast, the objective being the capture
+of any enemy merchant-ships found outside territorial waters between
+Ekersund and the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German
+merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian ports, and especially
+Narvik, occasionally ventured outside territorial waters in this
+locality. It was the only locality, besides the vicinity of Stadlandet,
+in which they did so venture, and in which, therefore, there was a
+chance of capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the southward of the Naze
+for supporting purposes. It was also intended that the remainder of the
+Grand Fleet should be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly
+gale sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accompanying the
+Battle Fleet, and this portion of the programme was cancelled; Sir
+David Beatty was informed that, if the weather conditions farther
+south prevented his destroyers from screening the battle cruisers, the
+latter should return to their base and a light cruiser squadron be
+left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The conditions being
+unfavourable for destroyers, this course was adopted. The weather
+eventually became too bad for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain
+their speed, and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed.
+
+Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on March 14th to intercept
+contraband trade and for reconnoitring purposes. She did not sight any
+enemy vessels, but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying
+contraband.
+
+The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at sea on March 14th
+and 15th, and the _Roxburgh_ and two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th
+for another sweep on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the
+Naze. This was again unproductive.
+
+The cruiser _Theseus_ left Barry on the 15th for Alexandrovsk in the
+White Sea. On the same date the cruiser _Crescent_, _en route_ from
+Scapa to the south, was fired at and missed by a submarine south of the
+Hebrides.
+
+On the 19th the light cruiser _Calliope_, with two destroyers, left
+the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with orders to proceed to the
+Naze and sweep _up_ the Norwegian coast to Udsire; and the _Comus_
+and two destroyers left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep _down_
+the Norwegian coast to the Naze, the object being again the capture
+of any German merchant-ships found outside territorial waters in this
+locality. The _Calliope_ was forced to put in to Rosyth owing to a
+serious fire occurring in her after boiler-room. The _Comus_ completed
+her sweep in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels.
+
+On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out aerial operations
+off the Danish coast, involving an attack on the enemy’s zeppelin
+shed at Tondern, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet left early that day to
+cover the operation. In the course of the operations the destroyers
+of the Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up returning
+sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the southward of the Horn
+Reef for this purpose. Some German outpost trawlers were encountered
+here by the destroyers; they were engaged and destroyed. But during
+the engagement the destroyer _Medusa_ was rammed by the destroyer
+_Laverock_, being very seriously damaged. The _Medusa_ was taken in
+tow, but, the weather becoming very bad, the towing hawser parted, and
+all attempts to get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels
+were in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident that
+the enemy would be aware of the incident by means of his directional
+wireless system, since a good deal of wireless signalling on the part
+of our ships had been necessary. It was expected, therefore, that he
+would send out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark
+hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in view of
+the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt rightly judged it expedient
+to abandon and sink the _Medusa_, and gave orders to this effect. The
+ship’s company of the _Medusa_ was taken off in a most seamanlike
+manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the _Lassoo_.
+
+Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was difficult for
+Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact conditions, but during the
+night of the 25th, having sent his destroyers ahead, he steered with
+his light cruisers in order to pass to the northward of the enemy’s
+North Sea mine-field. At about 10 P.M. two enemy destroyers were
+sighted on the port bow of the _Cleopatra_ (flying Commodore Tyrwhitt’s
+broad pennant) at a distance of about 800 yards. Their presence was
+betrayed by the flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of
+the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the enemy. The
+_Cleopatra_ at once opened fire and headed for the destroyers, and when
+it was seen that they were crossing from port to starboard, Captain
+Loder Symonds of the _Cleopatra_ ported his helm and rammed the second
+destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically in half. There
+was a tremendous crash, followed by what seemed to be two explosions,
+one possibly a boiler explosion, and the second due to either a mine
+or depth-charge, causing considerable damage to the stem piece of the
+_Cleopatra_. The injury was subsequently found to be far too great to
+have been caused by the impact alone. The sudden alterations of course
+by the _Cleopatra_, combined with the gunfire and explosions, had
+thrown the squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and
+navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the _Cleopatra_,
+in separating from the sinking destroyer, found herself across the
+_Undaunted’s_ stem; the latter was somewhat seriously damaged, and
+reported subsequently that she could only steam at slow speed. The
+Commodore, therefore, remained near the _Undaunted_ for the night.
+
+Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left Rosyth on the 24th
+to cover the operations, was in the vicinity of the Harwich force, and,
+on the morning of the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the
+_Undaunted_, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force swept back
+towards her position, not sighting any enemy vessels. Three of the
+light cruisers covered the _Undaunted_ during her passage to the Tyne,
+where she was sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced
+in locating the _Undaunted_, owing to a difference in “dead reckoning”
+between the various ships. In order to be prepared for eventualities
+the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of
+the 25th–26th, heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa
+and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility was also
+very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang up when the snow ceased.
+During the early afternoon of the 26th the wireless reports from the
+Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and the
+_Undaunted_ cleared up the situation, the latter ship reporting herself
+as hove to until the weather moderated.
+
+By 4.30 P.M., when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,”
+the sea had become so heavy and steep that destroyers with the Battle
+Fleet could not safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the
+whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern waters, and
+the _Undaunted_ was approaching a safe area, the 5th Battle Squadron
+was detached at high speed, without destroyers, to assist in covering
+her passage back to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet
+and cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and Cromarty. The
+_Iron Duke_ convoyed the destroyer flotillas in order that they could
+be given their position, as the coast was approached. The weather
+moderated during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the
+27th. Two destroyers collided off Noss Head just before daylight on the
+27th, one, the _Michael_, being somewhat seriously damaged.
+
+By 8 A.M. on the 27th the _Undaunted_ was in Lat. 56.35 N., Long. 2
+E., and the 5th Battle Squadron returned to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet arriving at Rosyth on the 27th.
+
+The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st and 7th Cruiser
+Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas again proceeded
+to sea on March 29th, for a watching and exercise cruise in the
+northern part of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on
+the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st, the destroyers
+having to return independently as they were unable to maintain Fleet
+speed through bad weather conditions.
+
+During March the system of carrying out target practice in the Pentland
+Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of in the Moray Firth was regularly
+instituted, and no further practices took place in the Moray Firth
+during the year 1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory
+in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that of towing the
+target in the strong tides of the Pentland Firth.
+
+On March 19th the battleship _Hercules_, which had been laid up at
+Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly six weeks, completed her
+repairs. These were carried out with the assistance of artisans from
+the engine contractors.
+
+The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth for the purpose
+of practices continued.
+
+The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average for March showed: Number of
+ships intercepted, 43; number sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number
+absent at bases, or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number on special
+service, 1.
+
+A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced during the month,
+and the weather generally in northern waters was bad, gales occurring
+on the 6th, 11th, 12th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th.
+
+On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth and attacked Leith
+and Edinburgh, but did not make any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The
+2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of intercepting
+some of them during their return passage, but saw nothing of them.
+
+On April 3rd the _Devonshire_ and two destroyers left Rosyth and
+proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Udsire lighthouse,
+and swept thence to the Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or
+neutrals with contraband which might be found outside territorial
+waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic in territorial
+waters was reported.
+
+On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate against enemy
+submarines on the route which it was thought was taken by them between
+the Shetlands and Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about
+30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not, however,
+sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine operations of this nature by
+the submarines attached to the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent
+intervals during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever any craft
+were available for this purpose; the plan of operations was constantly
+varied. The general scheme was to place our craft in positions through
+which hostile submarines were expected to pass, or along the routes
+which they usually took.
+
+On April 6th the _Roxburgh_ left Rosyth with two destroyers, to repeat
+once again the operation of sweeping down the Norwegian coast from
+Udsire to the Naze. The search was again unproductive.
+
+On April 12th the armed liner _Campania_ returned from a lengthy
+refit at Liverpool, during which the ship had, at my request, been
+provided with a “flying-off” deck for her sea-planes, as experience
+throughout the War had shown conclusively that it was of little use
+to depend on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the most
+advantageous conditions, and that the only system which would give
+reasonable certainty of the machines being able to get into the air
+when required was to fly them from the ship. At the same time I
+formed the conclusion, after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of
+the _Campania_, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service, that the
+sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown from ships, since
+the weight of the floats of sea-planes greatly limited their climbing
+powers, their radius of action and their speed. This alteration to the
+_Campania_ was the commencement of the system, gradually introduced,
+of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships with
+scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from the ship under practically
+all conditions. I make no apology for referring again to this subject
+in view of its importance.
+
+The _Campania_ had also been fitted to carry a kite balloon aft, for
+use for spotting the fall of shot and for reconnaissance purposes. This
+fitting was the beginning of the arrangement, gradually introduced
+during 1916, of carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success
+in large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being also
+provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small craft, an
+arrangement which proved to be of great use for anti-submarine and
+convoy work.
+
+On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
+modified; “A” and “C” patrols took up a line running from Lat. 56.30
+N., Long. 11.30 W. to Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles
+apart and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed to the
+northward of Iceland.
+
+On April 20th a force left to carry out an extensive sweep into the
+Kattegat, designed (1) to intercept and examine all mercantile traffic,
+(2) to operate against enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any
+enemy vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the movements in the
+Kattegat of the light forces, which it was intended should be sighted
+from neutral shores in the expectation that they might be reported to
+the enemy by his agents.
+
+The force included three submarines, which were ordered to positions
+commanding the northern entrance to the Sound, and the Great and Little
+Belts, so that enemy forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might
+be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was decided to move
+south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef with the whole Grand Fleet,
+the object being to induce the enemy to keep the ships of the High
+Sea Fleet in North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic,
+where they might cause interference with the relaying the Russian
+mine-fields, an operation which became necessary at this season of the
+year after the ice had broken up. It was thought that the appearance
+of the Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would
+probably effect this object better than the operation in the Kattegat.
+Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the 21st, with orders
+for the battle and cruiser squadrons to concentrate on the morning of
+the 22nd in a given position to the eastward of the “Long Forties,”
+whilst the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead of the
+Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were ordered to an area from which they
+could concentrate later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if
+required.
+
+At 2.30 P.M. of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was detached,
+with three destroyers, to proceed to the Skagerrak, with directions
+to arrive in the vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to
+sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet was ordered to
+push ahead, and at 6 P.M. of the 22nd was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26
+E., cruising in an area north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight,
+when it was intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather,
+which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Battle Fleet, with
+cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered to the eastward from Scapa
+until shortly before dark, and then altered course to South 18 East for
+the Horn Reef, to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the
+23rd.
+
+The weather had been gradually thickening since 3 P.M., and at 6 P.M.
+Sir David Beatty reported that the _Australia_ and _New Zealand_ had
+collided in a fog and had received damage necessitating both ships
+returning to their base. By 10 P.M. the Battle Fleet and cruisers
+were also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night. It
+was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such conditions with
+so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers and destroyers, when to
+the westward of the Little Fisher Bank, were accordingly turned to the
+northward, the order of turning being rear squadrons first and thence
+to the van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special signals
+had been introduced to provide for such circumstances, and were of
+great use on this occasion.
+
+In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty was experienced
+in carrying out the turn in the dense fog that prevailed, especially
+amongst the destroyers, and three of them, namely, the _Garland_,
+_Ardent_ and _Ambuscade_, were in collision; the _Ardent_ was so
+seriously damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her back to
+a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a neutral steamer,
+in passing through the Fleet in the fog, collided with the battleship
+_Neptune_, doing considerable injury to that ship.
+
+The weather cleared somewhat during the morning, and the Fleet cruised
+to the westward of the Little Fisher Bank until it was certain that
+the damaged destroyers were safely on their way to their bases. The
+operations were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable, and
+the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the Fleet remaining
+out for a further twenty-four hours, so as to repeat the sweep to the
+Horn Reef on the following day.
+
+The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th, fuelled, and
+again proceeded to sea for another movement south during the evening
+of that day, the 5th Battle Squadron being sent on in advance of
+the remainder of the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and
+strengthen the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of the
+_Australia_ and _New Zealand_, damaged in collision.
+
+At 4.6 A.M. on the 25th, however, whilst steering to the southward, a
+report was received from Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the
+Harwich force, that he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light
+cruisers in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once influenced
+the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet increased to full
+speed, and shaped a course to pass down the searched channel to the
+westward of the German mine-field to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+and the 5th Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course
+designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during their expected
+return passage to their ports. At 4.20 A.M. the Admiralty informed me
+that the enemy was bombarding Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser
+Squadron was in touch with the enemy’s ships; and at 5.40 A.M. the
+Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle cruisers in sight
+steaming to the eastward.
+
+At 11 A.M. the _Iron Duke_, with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, was
+in Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron were about 35 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70
+miles to the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the
+south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as appeared
+later, having evidently only just barely missed cutting the enemy off
+from his base. The Battle Fleet stood on to the south-eastward until
+the afternoon, when it became evident that the Germans had escaped to
+their bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and shaped
+course for the bases, arriving on the 26th.
+
+On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty as to the steps
+which could be taken to minimise the danger of a recurrence of such
+raids on unfortified towns on the south-east coast as that of the 25th.
+Although they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly a
+great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants, and might result
+in much loss of life. I suggested that the placing of the 3rd Battle
+Squadron in the Humber or in the Thames might act as a deterrent,
+and in any case would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy
+ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting injury by
+submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet, if, by good fortune,
+we happened to be cruising sufficiently far to the southward at the
+time. The presence of the squadron in southern waters would be useful,
+also, in the unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good
+backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of movement,
+due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy submarines in southern waters,
+were considerable. I pointed out that since the arrival of the 5th
+Battle Squadron and the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was
+no longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships of the
+“Revenge” class were also approaching completion. The proposal was
+adopted, and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed
+for the Humber on the 29th, _en route_ to the Medway. On that port the
+3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the ships of the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron being gradually withdrawn for service in foreign waters. The
+Admiralty also stationed some of the monitors in the more important
+undefended ports.
+
+During the month of April a policy, suggested by me, of placing the
+Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead of in light cruisers, was
+adopted. This was made possible by the completion of several vessels of
+the class. The object was to add the light cruisers thus released to
+our all too slender light cruiser force.
+
+The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during April
+were:
+
+Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10; number of ships on
+patrol, 12; number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9;
+number on special service, 1.
+
+A very considerable amount of mist and fog was experienced during the
+month, and gales on the 8th, 16th and 24th.
+
+On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the vicinity of the
+Horn Reef. The operation was covered by the Grand Fleet. One of its
+objects was, as before, to attract the attention of the enemy’s naval
+forces to the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually drawn
+out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand Fleet in southern
+waters would soon become known to the enemy from neutral sources, with
+the result that vessels of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations
+in the Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North Sea
+ports. From information obtained subsequently from reliable sources, it
+appeared that the operation produced the intended result. Between the
+afternoon of May 2nd and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases.
+
+The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers convoying the
+sea-plane-carriers _Vindex_ and _Engadine_, proceeded to a position
+just north of the Horn Reef, arriving at dawn on May 4th; the objective
+of the sea-planes was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer
+_Abdiel_ proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd–4th to the
+southward of the Vyl Lightship on the expected track of enemy vessels
+_en route_ to the North Sea via the Horn Reef. The mine-layer _Princess
+Margaret_ was directed to lay mines on the same night across the
+expected route taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route
+passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were completed
+without any interference on the part of the enemy.
+
+Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn Reef, three
+to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three to positions off
+Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of the 3rd.[E]
+
+    [E] Two of our submarines collided while submerged off the Horn
+        Reef, one being slightly damaged.
+
+The Battle Cruiser Fleet and destroyers proceeded to a position for
+supporting the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, near the Horn Reef, with
+directions to arrive at daylight on the 4th, and the Battle Fleet,
+with its cruiser squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the
+destroyer flotillas, to a supporting position to the northward of
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The list of ships absent from the Fleet on
+this occasion, owing to refit, repair, or to being engaged on other
+operations, is given below; it is useful as showing the reduction that
+takes place in the nominal numbers comprising a watching fleet at any
+given moment: Battleships, _Ajax_ and _Dreadnought_; battle cruisers,
+_New Zealand_, _Australia_, _Invincible_; cruisers, _Black Prince_,
+_Warrior_, _Donegal_; light cruisers, _Southampton_, _Gloucester_,
+_Blonde_; destroyers, 3 from the 1st Flotilla, 6 from the 2nd Flotilla,
+3 from the 11th Flotilla. During the passage south, the 4th Light
+Cruiser Squadron was detached to endeavour to locate a zeppelin
+reported by directional wireless to be in the centre of the North Sea
+(zeppelins had been seen off the north-east coast on the night of the
+2nd). The search was unsuccessful, but the zeppelin descended off
+Stavanger later and was destroyed.
+
+On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea-planes seemed from the
+Battle Fleet to be ideal, but, once more, the difficulty of getting
+these machines to rise from the water was experienced, a slight sea
+being sufficient to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the
+attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped bombs on the
+objective. The remainder were damaged by the sea.
+
+At 10 A.M. a zeppelin, L 7, was sighted by the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron and attacked by gunfire by the _Galatea_ and _Phaeton_. She
+was damaged sufficiently to cause her to descend near submarine E 31 in
+the vicinity of the Vyl Lightship. E 31 completed her destruction and
+rescued seven survivors.
+
+[Illustration: OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF MAY 2^{ND.} TO 5^{TH.} 1916.]
+
+The Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Horn Reef during May 4th, no
+enemy vessels being sighted, and then returned to its various bases.
+A thick fog was experienced during the return passage, which was made
+without incident; the Cromarty force was, however, taken to Scapa,
+as a submarine had been reported off Tarbet Ness in the Moray Firth.
+
+On May 9th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa to carry out
+another sweep on the Norwegian coast between the Naze and Udsire
+Lighthouse. The squadron was divided, two ships proceeding to the Naze
+and two to Udsire, arriving in position at daylight on the 10th and
+then sweeping towards each other. One neutral steamer, carrying iron
+ore for Lübeck, was intercepted outside territorial waters and sent in.
+On the same day the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for Scapa,
+searching the central portion of the North Sea _en route_.
+
+On the 9th, 11th and 13th the ships on the northern patrol off the
+Shetlands moved in to Stadlandet for a short period, on the chance of
+intercepting ships outside territorial waters.
+
+On the 14th an unsuccessful search for a reported submarine was carried
+out to the south-east of the Pentland Firth.
+
+On the 15th Submarines D 7 and E 30 left for the Kattegat to operate
+at the northern end of the Sound and off Anholt Island. One German
+merchant-steamer was intercepted and sunk outside territorial waters
+off the Kullen on the 22nd by E 30. On the 18th another submarine was
+sent to operate off Goteberg in Sweden. She returned on the 25th, not
+having sighted any enemy vessels.
+
+On the same day a reliable report was received that an exceptionally
+large force of enemy submarines was now operating in the North Sea,
+and additional precautions were taken at all the bases to strengthen
+the patrols and to protect inward- and outward-bound vessels. The
+Vice-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was warned to be ready to
+move all his patrol lines to given alternative positions, and on the
+19th was directed to move his ships to the most western of these
+lines. Precautions against mine-laying by submarines were also taken,
+and the waters to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” through which the
+Fleet usually passed when on passage south, were examined by the Fleet
+mine-sweepers, protected by destroyers, on the 21st and subsequent
+days. These vessels searched without result on the 22nd for a submarine
+which was being chased by a patrol vessel in this neighbourhood.
+
+On the 21st the _Donegal_ and two destroyers were sent to the vicinity
+of the entrance to Bergen to intercept a steamer which, it was thought,
+had passed through the 10th Cruiser Squadron blockade during a fog. The
+ship however, called later at Kirkwall, and the force was recalled.
+
+On the 23rd the first of a series of deep mine-fields in the Moray
+Firth, which I had requested might be laid with the object of catching
+enemy submarines, was placed in position by the mine-layer _Biarritz_.
+
+On the 24th the _Donegal_ and an armed boarding-steamer were sent to
+patrol off Stadlandet with a view to intercepting ships engaged in the
+iron ore trade from Narvik. This, as before stated, was one of the few
+positions at which ships were obliged for navigational reasons to leave
+territorial waters.
+
+On the 24th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, which had
+been at Rosyth, left for another search off the Norwegian coast from
+the Naze to Udsire, and thence to Scapa. The search was unproductive.
+
+On the 26th two submarines were despatched to operate against enemy
+submarines off the Norwegian coast, and, on the same date, the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers, left, via the searched
+channel, to carry out a reconnaissance to the southward of the German
+North Sea mine-field. The squadron proceeded as far east as Long. 6 E.,
+but, unfortunately, sighted nothing.
+
+The _Broke_ and 12 destroyers left on the 27th to search for a
+submarine reported to have been sighted to the eastward of the Pentland
+Firth, and returned on the 28th, not having seen her; but on the
+27th Trawler Unit No. 42, working from Peterhead, reported having
+engaged and sunk a submarine at 12.45 P.M. in Lat. 57.10 N., Long.
+1.20 E., thus adding one more success to the record of this patrol. On
+the 30th Fleet-sweeper _Gentian_ was missed, in a position about 40
+miles due east of the Pentland Firth, by a torpedo fired evidently by
+the submarine that had been hunted on the 28th. A half flotilla and
+sea-planes were sent out to search, and a submarine was sighted at 3.45
+P.M. near the position given, but she dived and got clear away.
+
+The movements of the Fleet between the time of leaving and returning to
+the bases in connection with the Battle of Jutland are given in Chapter
+XI., but some mention may be made of an incident which occurred on the
+night of May 31st. A report was received at Scapa that an enemy raider
+might be attempting to escape into the Atlantic. The Vice-Admiral of
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron was directed to assume a patrol north of the
+Shetlands in accordance with a plan which had been pre-arranged to meet
+such a case. On June 3rd, after the return of the Fleet to its bases,
+light cruisers were sent out to patrol to the north-westward of the
+Orkneys, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron was then directed to fall back
+to a position farther west to form a second patrol line. Nothing came
+of the matter.
+
+During the month of May the weekly average results of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron showed: Number of vessels intercepted, 55, besides 17
+trawlers; number sent in, 18; number of ships on patrol, 11; number
+absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number on special
+service, 2.
+
+A good deal of fog and mist was experienced during the month, the worst
+periods being from the 17th to the 20th, 24th, 26th, and the 28th to
+30th.
+
+During the month of May the firing exercises in the Pentland Firth
+continued, as did the usual exchange of bases between squadrons.
+
+During the months of March, April and May, a flotilla of submarines had
+been gradually organised as a unit of the Grand Fleet. It was named
+the 11th Submarine Flotilla, was based on Blyth, with the _Titania_ as
+parent ship and the _Talisman_ and _Trident_ as attendant destroyers.
+Separate spheres of activity for the Grand Fleet submarine flotillas
+and for the submarine flotillas based on Harwich and Yarmouth were
+also arranged, the dividing line running from a position a little
+to the southward of the Horn Reef to Flamborough Head. The line was
+subsequently slightly altered once or twice as the strength of the
+Grand Fleet submarine flotillas increased, but the general principle
+was that the Grand Fleet submarines worked to the northward of such a
+line and the remaining submarines to the southward.
+
+It may not be out of place here to mention the organisation for
+getting the Grand Fleet to sea from its bases to any desired point of
+concentration with rapidity and safety, and of bringing the Fleet back
+into the bases in face of probable submarine or mine attack.
+
+As the Grand Fleet increased in size, and the danger from mine and
+submarine grew, so the problem of leaving Scapa Flow and re-entering
+that base with safety became more complicated. The necessity for the
+Fleet leaving harbour in the shortest possible time and with the
+fewest possible number of signals was obvious. Similarly on returning
+the various squadrons had to enter the base with the least practicable
+delay in order to avoid giving submarines engaged in watching the
+approaches an opportunity for getting into positions for attacking
+the squadrons in rear, after having sighted those in the van. The
+operations, both of departure and entry, were rendered all the more
+difficult owing to the very strong and erratic tides experienced in the
+Pentland Firth, while all ships navigating at night had to be navigated
+without showing lights.
+
+The usual method of departure from Scapa was as follows: A “Preparatory
+Signal for leaving Scapa” consisting of one word was made as soon as
+I decided to take the Fleet to sea. On receipt of this “Preparatory
+Signal” all ships raised steam for 18 knots at two hours’ notice.
+Patrol destroyers were recalled by the Commodore (F) for refuelling.
+All officers and men absent on patrol duty in drifters were also
+recalled, and every preparation was made for leaving harbour. The
+Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands warned the outer patrols
+that the Fleet might be leaving shortly.
+
+Whilst the Fleet was raising steam in readiness to be off at two hours’
+notice a signal was made which indicated the time at which the first
+squadron to leave was to move ahead from the anchorage, together with
+the speed to be maintained after passing the submarine obstructions.
+No further signals were necessary. The organisation provided for the
+order in which squadrons were to leave, as well as the interval between
+squadrons or divisions, which in daylight was usually one mile from the
+rear ship of one squadron, or division of four ships, to the leading
+ship of that following, or two miles at night. The organisation also
+provided for successive squadrons or divisions being taken alternately
+north or south of the Pentland Skerries if the Fleet proceeded to the
+eastward, in order that the interval between those following the same
+course might be increased.
+
+In the strong tides, particularly at night, some such procedure had to
+be adopted, because the tide was not felt until the ships were clear of
+Swona Island, and then the effect of it, if running to the westward,
+and particularly at the period of spring tides, when it has a speed of
+10 knots, was to bring a leading squadron or division back on top of
+that in rear of it. Frequently also a ship, emerging from slack water
+into the strength of the tide, would be caught by the tide on the bow,
+and, unless the greatest possible care was taken to watch the steering
+(and even sometimes in spite of every care), the ship would be turned
+round through 8, 12 or even 16 points,[F] becoming a danger to those
+astern of her, as she would be almost unmanageable for a time. Such a
+situation on a dark night, with a large fleet showing no lights, was
+not pleasant, and it speaks well for the skill shown in handling the
+ships that no accident occurred from this cause.
+
+    [F] 8 points = 90 degrees.
+
+The practice in regard to the destroyers, when they accompanied the
+Fleet (as was necessary after the first twelve months of war), was
+for the various groups which were detailed by the Commodore (F) to
+screen the squadrons or divisions of the heavy ships, to meet them
+just outside the submarine obstruction and screen them from there in
+daylight, or on moonlight nights, and to form astern on dark nights, in
+readiness to re-establish the screen at daylight. In the early days of
+the War, and indeed for the first eighteen months, the practice was for
+the destroyer flotillas to be stationed some 10 miles from the Battle
+Fleet at night in order to avoid any chance of their being sighted and
+mistaken for enemy destroyers; but this procedure caused considerable
+delay in forming the submarine screen at daylight, and in thick weather
+the destroyers frequently experienced difficulty in finding the Battle
+Fleet. Consequently, it became the practice to keep the destroyers
+actually in company at night, and this procedure was undoubtedly
+preferable.
+
+After the various squadrons had passed the Pentland Skerries, the
+organisation provided for their taking certain defined routes; the
+usual practice was to use three routes with the squadrons divided
+between them, the routes being about seven miles apart.
+
+A concentration point, which the squadrons would reach at the ordered
+speed shortly after daylight, was given in the departure signal, and
+the squadrons closed in on this point at the appointed time, so that
+the whole Battle Fleet, including detachments coming from Cromarty,
+was concentrated shortly after daylight, with the cruisers in their
+assigned positions scouting ahead.
+
+The organisation of the Battle Fleet provided for the strongest
+squadron being on the eastern flank, because it was considered that the
+enemy would invariably make towards his bases if touch was gained, and
+it was desired to have our strongest squadron in the van.
+
+The “departure” organisation was carefully worked out by my Staff and
+very minutely described in the Grand Fleet orders. It was most useful,
+the whole Fleet, comprising frequently 50 or more battleships, cruisers
+and light cruisers, and as many as 50 destroyers, being in daylight
+under weigh in one hour, and clear of the harbour in an hour and a half
+after the signal was made to proceed; on dark nights this time was
+lengthened by half an hour.
+
+When returning to Scapa Flow, the usual practice was for the time of
+entry to be arranged so that the leading squadrons passed the Pentland
+Skerries shortly before dawn, in order to minimise the danger from
+submarine attack; but it was not, of course, always possible to arrange
+the time of entry in this manner. In returning to Scapa, when the
+arrival was thus timed for dawn, the different squadrons were disposed,
+as a rule, in two separate lines, the lines being some five miles apart
+and the squadrons in each line having an interval of about three miles
+between them. One line would enter the Pentland Firth by passing north
+of the Pentland Skerries and the other by passing south of these rocks,
+the object being to confuse any enemy submarines that might be watching
+the approaches, and also to get the Fleet into the Firth as quickly
+as possible, as once in the tideway there was little to fear from
+submarine attack.
+
+If the Fleet entered Scapa Flow during darkness, the ships anchored
+in the centre of the Flow in certain specified berths, and waited for
+daylight before taking up their berths in the Fleet anchorage; towards
+the end of my period of command, however, coloured lights were arranged
+to be placed as leading-marks for the Fleet anchorage, so that ships
+could proceed to their final berths under all conditions.
+
+As regards mines, an exploratory search of the channel intended to be
+used was always carried out, if time permitted, before the Fleet left,
+and similarly before it returned. Three channels were used, each some
+7 to 10 miles in width--one passing up the east side of the Orkneys,
+one running to the eastward from the Pentland Skerries, and one passing
+down the Scottish coast for a short distance and then to the eastward.
+Usually the second of these channels was used.
+
+The principal difficulty with which we had to deal when leaving or
+returning was fog. In a really dense fog there was great risk in
+attempting to leave Scapa with a large fleet, owing to the strong tides
+to be encountered in the Pentland Firth, and nothing but the gravest
+emergency would have justified the attempt being made. If it became
+really necessary, an organisation had been provided to meet the case,
+and the attempt would have been made. The interval between the various
+squadrons would have been considerably greater, and the time occupied
+in leaving would have been correspondingly increased.
+
+The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases, Cromarty and
+Rosyth, were, of course, simpler, owing to the absence of the very
+strong cross-tides, but fog was even more prevalent at Rosyth than
+at Scapa, and the operation of leaving with a considerable number of
+ships was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed under
+difficulties on very numerous occasions and with remarkable freedom
+from accident during my period of command. The approach to the Firth
+of Forth in thick weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were
+experienced in making the land when the position of the ships had not
+been accurately ascertained by sights for some time before approaching
+the base. These approaches could have been mined by the enemy with
+great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently enterprising,
+and it was a standing wonder to me that the attempt was never made.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916
+
+
+It may not be out of place here to touch upon the general naval
+situation in the spring of 1916--that is, on the eve of the Battle of
+Jutland. What were the strategical conditions? To what extent was it
+justifiable to take risks with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks
+the full consequences of which could not be foreseen owing to the new
+conditions of naval warfare?
+
+The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our available capital
+ships. There was very little in the way of reserve behind it. The
+battleships _not_ included in the Grand Fleet were all of them
+pre-Dreadnoughts and therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted
+of seven ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, two ships of the “Lord
+Nelson” class, and four of the “Queen” class, all of these ships being
+in the Mediterranean except five of the “King Edward VII.” class. They
+were required there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the
+operations in the Ægean. Five of our light cruisers were also in the
+Mediterranean.
+
+The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in the Mediterranean,
+but, owing to political considerations and their duty in watching
+the Austrian Fleet, there was little prospect of their leaving that
+locality.
+
+It is interesting to compare this situation with that existing a
+century earlier. In September, 1805, the month before Trafalgar, the
+disposition of British ships in commission in home waters and the
+Mediterranean is given in the following table:
+
+  ------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+-------
+                          |                    | Ships  |          | Sloops  |
+          Station         | Commander-in-Chief | of the | Frigates |   and   | Total
+                          |                    |  Line  |          |  small  |
+                          |                    |        |          | vessels |
+  ------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+-------
+  From Shetland to Beachy |                    |        |          |         |
+    Head                  | Lord Keith         |   10   |    15    |   155   |  180
+  Channel                 | Port Admirals      |        |     1    |    51   |   52
+  Guernsey and Jersey     | Sir J. Saumarez    |        |     2    |    12   |   14
+  Off Ushant, etc.        | Admiral Cornwallis |   26   |    15    |    20   |   61
+  Irish                   | Lord Gardner       |        |    10    |    14   |   24
+  Mediterranean           | Lord Nelson        |   26   |    19    |    24   |   69
+  In port refitting and   |                    |        |          |         |
+    destined to reinforce |                    |        |          |         |
+    Lords Nelson and      |                    |   11   |     7    |    17   |   35
+    Cornwallis            |                    |        |          |         |
+  ------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+-------
+
+In addition to Nelson’s force of 26 capital ships and 19 frigates, the
+Navy had, therefore, in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean
+a yet more numerous force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates. The main
+portion of this force was with Cornwallis off Ushant, and was watching
+Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had 155 sloops and
+small vessels.
+
+In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital ships (including
+battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light cruisers, we had in
+commission in home waters and the Mediterranean only 13 capital ships
+(all of pre-Dreadnought types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light
+cruisers. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had, exclusive of
+the Grand Fleet and Harwich force, about 60 destroyers (mostly of old
+type), 6 P boats, and 33 old torpedo boats.
+
+In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the line in England,
+besides 10 under construction in Russia, and 36 frigates. In May, 1916,
+we had building five capital ships and about nine light cruisers.
+
+A consideration of these figures will show that the situation at the
+two periods under review was very different, in that, in 1805, the
+force engaged at Trafalgar was only a relatively small portion of the
+available British Fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the
+large majority of the vessels upon which the country had to rely for
+safety.
+
+Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I had written to
+the Admiralty pointing out the dangers which an intelligent use of
+submarines, mines and torpedoes by the Germans, before and during a
+Fleet action, would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the
+tactics which I had intended to employ to meet the expected German
+movement in order to bring the enemy to action in the shortest
+practicable time and with the best chance of achieving such a victory
+as would be decisive. I stated that with new and untried methods of
+warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.
+
+I received in reply an expression of approval of my views and of
+confidence in the manner in which I proposed to handle the Fleet in
+action.
+
+Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the margin of
+superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Sea Fleet justify me in
+disregarding the enemy’s torpedo fire or meeting it otherwise than by
+definite movements deduced after most careful analysis of the problem
+at sea with the Fleet and on the tactical board.
+
+The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet were taken into
+account in making this decision. There was also a possibility that the
+Grand Fleet might later be called upon to confront a situation of much
+wider scope than that already existing.
+
+The position gradually improved after 1916. During the latter half of
+that year the remaining ships of the “Royal Sovereign” class joined
+the Grand Fleet, and greatly increased the ratio of strength of the
+Fleet as compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it was also
+possible to withdraw the four battleships of the “Queen” class from the
+Adriatic. This greatly eased the manning situation. And in April, 1917,
+the culminating event was the entry of the United States of America
+into the War on the side of the Entente. In December, 1917, the United
+States sent a division of battleships to join the Grand Fleet, and it
+was apparent that we could count upon the whole battleship strength of
+the United States Navy, if required, to second our efforts.
+
+Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light cruiser and
+destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet increased steadily after the
+Battle of Jutland, and to a very considerable extent reduced the danger
+of successful torpedo attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface
+craft. The inclusion of the K. class submarines--submarines of high
+speed--in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very probable that any losses
+suffered by us by submarine attack would be more than compensated by
+enemy losses from the same cause.
+
+In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in regard to battle
+cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory, the general effect of all these
+considerations upon the tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be
+overwhelming. The position was assured, and we could have afforded to
+take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most unwise.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+
+
+On May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet fought the
+action which has become known as the Battle of Jutland. The despatch[G]
+describing the battle, as published some weeks later, was not quite
+in its original form as written by me. After a conference held at the
+Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some of them because
+it was considered that certain passages might convey useful information
+to the enemy, and others because it was thought to be undesirable to
+draw attention to certain features of British design. Amongst the
+latter was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our earlier
+battle cruisers.
+
+    [G] See Appendix.
+
+Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause our battle cruisers,
+with their attendant light cruisers, to occupy when at sea an advanced
+position, often at a considerable distance from the Battle Fleet.
+Battle cruisers were designed and built in order that they might keep
+in touch with the enemy and report his movements when he had been
+found; hence the heavy guns which they carried. They were intended
+to find the enemy for the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy’s
+strength in order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not
+been adopted the enemy’s battle cruisers could not have been brought to
+action on such occasions as the engagement of January 24th, 1915. And
+in the cases of raids on our coast, the battle cruisers were always
+sent ahead at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle
+cruisers.
+
+Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the middle of 1916 and
+the heavier armaments carried by our ships, the real risk involved
+in this policy was that of our battle cruisers being drawn on to the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled.
+Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would, owing to their
+higher speed, have no difficulty in clear weather in keeping out of
+range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still
+maintaining touch with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the
+added support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been
+grouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to the absence of the 3rd
+Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow, the tactical advantage of our ships was
+even stronger, provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an
+excess of speed over the fastest enemy’s Battle Squadron.
+
+In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, I had felt it
+necessary on the highest grounds, as well as only just to the officers
+and men of our battle cruisers, to give some explanation of the heavy
+losses incurred by our ships in the early part of the action, when we
+were opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long range,
+by four battleships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, comprising the
+5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy battle cruisers, which were not
+then supported by the German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter
+showed that one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately
+protected by armour as compared with the German vessels of the battle
+cruiser type. It was considered undesirable to draw attention to this
+publicly while the war was in progress.
+
+The relative values of protection and gun power had frequently engaged
+my serious attention. It was also a subject of much discussion amongst
+writers on naval matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting
+that all available weight should be put into gun power and that ships
+should be left practically without armour. Their views were based on
+the argument that “the best defense is a powerful offensive.” Although
+this argument is very true when applied to strategy, the War has shown
+its fallacy as applied to _matériel_. The loss of the _Good Hope_,
+_Monmouth_, _Queen Mary_, _Indefatigable_, _Invincible_, _Defence_,
+and _Warrior_, and the considerations to which these losses gave rise,
+convinced naval officers afloat, even if they did not convince others
+less intimately associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships
+with inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those which
+possess them to a considerably greater degree, even if the former are
+superior in gun power. The conviction was strengthened by the knowledge
+we obtained, that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire,
+torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were yet taken
+safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive qualities, but,
+partly, to the limitations of our armour-piercing shell at that time.
+
+There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters, when comparing
+the relative strength of the British and German Fleets for the purpose
+of future provision of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make
+comparison only on the basis of the _gun power_ of the vessels of the
+two Navies. Great superiority in fighting qualities on the part of the
+British Fleet was suggested by this blindness to other considerations.
+During my pre-War service at the Admiralty this question was often
+under discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of argument
+as being very misleading, and pointed out that the true comparison lay
+between the _displacement_ of the ships of the various classes, because
+if we assumed, as War experience has since shown that we were justified
+in assuming that the German naval designers and constructors were not
+inferior in ability to our own, it was obvious that, taking ships of
+equal displacement and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if
+our vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans must possess
+superiority in some other direction. It was well known at the Admiralty
+that their superiority lay in greatly increased protection, combined
+with heavier torpedo armament.
+
+We were also aware that the German vessels were fitted with small tube
+boilers, which were very economical in weight for a given horse-power,
+and, consequently, the German vessels obtained thereby a further
+advantage, the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the
+ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted a different
+disposition of the weight available in each ship.
+
+The tables on pp. 308–11 give particulars of the armament, protection,
+and displacement of the capital ships of the two Navies engaged in the
+Battle of Jutland, so far as they are known to me.
+
+The main facts revealed by an examination of these tables are:
+
+
+BATTLESHIPS
+
+    1. The German ships of any particular period were of considerably
+    greater displacement as compared with contemporary British ships.
+
+    2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour than
+    their British contemporaries.
+
+
+TABLE I
+
+BRITISH BATTLESHIPS
+
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |                                  ARMOUR                                  |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             |           |   Designed   |       |   Fuel   | Main and   | Submerged |       |              |        |        | Secondary |        |            |
+  Ships                      | Programme |     load     | Speed | capacity | secondary  |  torpedo  | Main  |    Upper     | Belt   | Belt   |   gun     | Turret | Protective |      REMARKS
+                             |           | displacement |       |          |    guns    |   tubes   | belt  |    belt      |  at    |  at    | battery   | front  |   decks    |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              | bow    | stern  | armour    | plates |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             | Year      |    Tons      | Knots |   Tons   |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Royal Sovereign” Class (5)| 1913–14   |   25,750     | 21.5  |  3,400   |  8, 15″    |     4     |  13″  |      6″      |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |  13″   | 1″ to 4″   | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 14, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck and
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | above that.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Queen Elizabeth” Class (5)| 1912–13   |   27,500     | 25.0  |  3,400   |  8, 15″    |     4     |  13″  |      6″      |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |  13″   | 1″ to 3″   | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Iron Duke” Class (4)      | 1911–12   |   25,000     | 21.0  |  4,300   | 10, 13″.5  |     4     |  12″  | 9″ and 8″    |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |  11″   | 1½″ to 2½″ | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “King George V.” Class (3) | 1910–11   |   23,000     | 21.0  |  4,000   | 10, 13″.5  |     2     |  12″  | 9″ and 8″    |   4″   |   2½″  |    nil    |  11″   | 1½″ to 4″  | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Orion” Class (4)          | 1909–10   |   22,500     | 21.0  |  4,100   | 10, 13″.5  |     2     |  12″  | 9″ and 8″    |   4″   |   2½″  |    nil    |  11″   | 1½″ to 4″  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 13, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Canada_                   | Emergency |   28,000     | 22.75 |  3,800   | 10, 14″    |     4     |   9″  | 7″ and 4½″   |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |  10″   | 1½″ to 4″  | Side armoured up
+                             |    War    |              |       |          | 12, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck and
+                             | Programme |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | above that.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Erin_                     |   Ditto   |   23,000     | 21.0  |  2,800   | 10, 13″.5  |     3     |  12″  | 9″ and 8″    |   4″   |   4″   |    5″     |  11″   | 1½″ to 3″  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 16, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Agincourt_                |   Ditto   |   27,500     | 22.0  |  3,800   | 14, 12″    |     3     |   9″  |      6″      |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |  12″   | 1″ to 1½″  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 20, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Hercules” Class (3)       | 1909–10   |   20,000     | 21.0  |  3,700   | 10, 12″    |     2     |  11″  |      8″      |   2½″  |   2½″  |    nil    |  11″   | 1½″ to 4″  | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to main deck only.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “St. Vincent” Class (2)    | 1907–8    |   19,250     | 21.0  |  3,700   | 10, 12″    |     2     |  10″  |      8″      |   2″   |   2″   |    nil    |  11″   | ¾″ to 3″   | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 13, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Bellerophon” Class (3)    | 1906–7    |   18,600     | 21.0  |  3,500   | 10, 12″    |     2     |  10″  |      8″      |   6″   |   5″   |    nil    |  11″   | ¾″ to 3″   | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Dreadnought_              | 1905–6    |   17,900     | 21.0  |  4,000   | 10, 12″    |     4     |  11″  |      8″      |   6″   |   4″   |    nil    |  11″   | ¾″ to 3″   | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 20, 12 pds.|           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+
+
+TABLE II
+
+BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS
+
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |                                  ARMOUR                                  |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             |           |   Designed   |       |   Fuel   | Main and   | Submerged |       |              |        |        | Secondary |        |            |
+  Ships                      | Programme |     load     | Speed | capacity | secondary  |  torpedo  | Main  |    Upper     | Belt   | Belt   |   gun     | Turret | Protective |      REMARKS
+                             |           | displacement |       |          |    guns    |   tubes   | belt  |    belt      |  at    |  at    | battery   | front  |   decks    |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              | bow    | stern  | armour    | plates |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             | Year      |    Tons      | Knots |   Tons   |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Tiger_ (1)                | 1911–12   |   28,500     | 29.0  |  6,800   |  8, 13″.5  |     2     |   9″  |      6″      |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |   9″   | 1″ to 3″   | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 6″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck and
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | above that.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Lion” Class (3)           | 1909–10   |   26,350     | 28.0  |  4,600   |  8, 13″.5  |     2     |   9″  |      6″      |   4″   |   4″   |    nil    |   9″   | 1″ to 2½″  | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 15, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “New Zealand” Class (3)    |           |   18,800     | 26.0  |  4,000   |  8, 12″    |     2     |   6″  |              |   4″   |   4″   |    nil    |   7″   | 1″ to 2½″  | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 14, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to main deck.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Inflexible” Class (3)     | 1905–6    |   17,250     | 25.0  |  3,800   |  8, 12″    |     4     |   6″  |              |   4″   |   nil  |    nil    |   7″   | ¾″ to 2½″  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 4″     |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+
+
+TABLE III
+
+GERMAN BATTLESHIPS
+
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |                                  ARMOUR                                  |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             |           |   Designed   |       |   Fuel   | Main and   | Submerged |       |              |        |        | Secondary |        |            |
+  Ships                      | Programme |     load     | Speed | capacity | secondary  |  torpedo  | Main  |    Upper     | Belt   | Belt   |   gun     | Turret | Protective |      REMARKS
+                             |           | displacement |       |          |    guns    |   tubes   | belt  |    belt      |  at    |  at    | battery   | front  |   decks    |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              | bow    | stern  | armour    | plates |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             | Year      |    Tons      | Knots |   Tons   |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “König” Class (4)          | 1911–12   |   25,390     | 23.0  |  4,200   | 10, 12″    |     5     |  14″  |     10″      |   6″   |   6″   |    8″     |  14″   | 2½″ to 3″  | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 14,  5″.9  |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck and
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | above that.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Kaiser” Class (5)         | 1909–11   |   24,410     | 21.0  |  3,700   | 10, 12″    |     5     |13″.75 |      9″      |   7¾″  |   7¾″  |    7¾″    |  11¾″  | 1½″ to 4″  | Ditto, but at
+                             |           |              |       |          | 14,  5″.9  |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | after end side
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | only armoured
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | up to main deck.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Heligoland” Class (4)     | 1908–9    |   22,440     | 20.5  |  3,100   | 12, 12″    |     6     |11″.75 |    7¾″       |   7¾″  |   7¾″  |    7¾″    |  11¾″  | 1½″ to 2¾″ | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 14,  5″.9  |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to main deck and
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | above that.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Nassau” Class (4)         | 1907–8    |   18,600     | 20.0  |  2,800   | 12, 11″    |     6     |11″.75 |    7¾″       |   6″   |   4″   |    6½″    |  11″   | 2″ to 4¾″  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12,  5″.9  |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+
+
+TABLE IV
+
+GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS
+
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |                                  ARMOUR                                  |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             |           |   Designed   |       |   Fuel   | Main and   | Submerged |       |              |        |        | Secondary |        |            |
+  Ships                      | Programme |     load     | Speed | capacity | secondary  |  torpedo  | Main  |    Upper     | Belt   | Belt   |   gun     | Turret | Protective |      REMARKS
+                             |           | displacement |       |          |    guns    |   tubes   | belt  |    belt      |  at    |  at    | battery   | front  |   decks    |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              | bow    | stern  | armour    | plates |            |
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+                             | Year      |    Tons      | Knots |   Tons   |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  “Derfflinger” Class[H]     | 1911–12   |   26,180     | 28.0  | 5,600    |  8, 12″    |     4     |  12″  |      8″      |   5″   |   5″   |    7″     |  11″   | 1″ to 3.2″ | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 14,  5″.9  |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | to upper deck with
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | above that.
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Seydlitz_                 | 1910–11   |   24,610     | 26.75 | 3,700    | 10, 11″    |     4     |  11¾″ |      8″      |   4″   |   4″   |    6″     |  10″   | 1″ to 3¼″  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12, 5″.9   |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Moltke_                   | 1908–9    |   22,640     | 27.25 | 3,200    | 10, 11″    |     4     |  11″ }|  tapering    |   4″   |   4″   |    5″     |  10″   | ? same as  | Ditto
+                             |           |              |       |          | 12,  5″.9  |           |      }|              |        |        |           |        | _Seydlitz_ |
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |      }|              |        |        |           |        |            |
+  _Von der Tann_             | 1907–8    |   19,100     | 26.0  | 2,900    |  8, 11″    |     4     |   9¾″}|              |   4″   |   4″   |    5″     |   9″   | ? same as  | Side armoured up
+                             |           |              |       |          | 10,  5″.9  |           |      }|              |        |        |           |        | _Seydlitz_ | to main deck with
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | secondary battery
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | armoured to upper
+                             |           |              |       |          |            |           |       |              |        |        |           |        |            | deck.
+  ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------
+
+    [H] _Lutzow_ was similar.
+
+
+TABLE V
+
+Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships of the same
+date. N. B.--The German figures are approximate.
+
+  -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------
+                         |              | Weight of | Weight of deck |       | Length  |
+                         | Displacement |   armour  |   protection   | Total | of ship | Beam
+  -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------
+  BATTLESHIPS--          |              |    Tons   |      Tons      | Tons  |   Feet  | Feet
+    _Monarch_    British |    22,500    |   4,560   |     2,010      | 6,570 |   545   | 88½
+    _Kaiser_     German  |    24,410    |   5,430   |     3,130      | 8,560 |   564   | 95
+                         |              |           |                |       |         |
+  BATTLE CRUISERS--      |              |           |                |       |         |
+    _Queen Mary_ British |    27,000    |   3,900   |     2,300      | 6,200 |   660   | 89
+    _Seydlitz_   German  |    24,610    |   5,200   |     2,400      | 7,600 |   656   | 93½
+  -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------
+
+  _Note._--Similar comparisons between other ships of the same date would show similar results.
+
+
+    3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour _to the
+    upper deck_, whilst nine of the earliest British Dreadnoughts
+    were provided with armour protection to the _main deck only_, thus
+    rendering them far more open to artillery attack. The “Orion” class
+    of battleship and the “Lion” class of battle cruiser, designed
+    during my service at the Admiralty as Controller, were the first of
+    our Dreadnoughts armoured to the upper deck.
+
+    4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships was in
+    nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries,
+    whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in _all cases_
+    considerably greater in the German ships.
+
+    5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually greater than
+    in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision more complete.
+
+    6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo
+    tubes than the British vessels.
+
+
+BATTLE CRUISERS
+
+    1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater displacement
+    than their British contemporaries.
+
+    2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than their
+    British contemporaries.
+
+    3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection
+    above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being provided
+    with protection to the upper deck.
+
+    4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions,
+    including deck protection, as well as more complete watertight
+    subdivisions.
+
+    5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo
+    tubes than the British ships.
+
+As against the additional protection of the German ships our vessels
+of contemporary design were provided in all cases with heavier turret
+guns, whilst the German ships carried heavier secondary armaments.
+
+A point of considerable interest, which should also be mentioned
+because it was to prove important, was that the Germans possessed
+a delay-action fuse which, combined with a highly efficient
+armour-piercing projectile, ensured the burst of shell taking place
+_inside_ the armour of British ships instead of _outside_, or whilst
+passing through the armour, which was the case with British shells of
+that date fired against the thick German armour.
+
+The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was not widely
+different, although the British ships, as a rule, were fitted to carry
+more fuel. Although I arranged, after the first few months of war, to
+reduce the amount of fuel carried by our ships very considerably--in
+fact, by more than 25 per cent.--I was unable to reduce it further in
+coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the protection afforded
+by the coal, since in our case it was necessary to be prepared to do a
+considerable amount of steaming at high speed, involving expenditure
+of coal, before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have been
+unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with coal below what I may
+call the “safety line.” On the other hand, it was well known that,
+as the Germans had no intention of fighting an action far from their
+bases, they had effected a very much greater reduction in the quantity
+of fuel carried with consequently a corresponding advantage in speed.
+
+There was yet one other matter of great importance, namely, the
+vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies in regard to under-water
+attack. Here the Germans possessed a very real advantage, which stood
+them in good stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes:
+
+1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside the ships, and in
+many cases its greater thickness.
+
+2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer skin of the ship
+and the consequent additional protection to under-water attack afforded
+thereby.
+
+In regard to the first point, the great majority of our ships only
+carried partial internal protection, that is, protection over a portion
+of the length of the ship. The protection was usually confined to the
+region of the magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran
+throughout the length of the vessel.
+
+As to the second point, it was possible to place the protective
+bulkhead farther “inboard” in the German ships without cramping
+machinery and magazine spaces, because the ships themselves were of
+much greater beam. Consequently the explosion of a mine or a torpedo
+against the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the
+protective bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of the ships
+than was the case with a British vessel. The result was that, although
+it is known that many German capital ships were mined and torpedoed
+during the war, including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans
+have not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought
+battleship _Pommern_ and the battle cruiser _Lutzow_, whose injuries
+from shell fire were also very extensive.
+
+On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or torpedoed, rarely
+survived. The recorded instances of escape are the _Inflexible_ (mined
+in the Dardanelles) and the _Marlborough_ (torpedoed at Jutland), and
+in the latter case, although the torpedo struck at about the most
+favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in reaching port.
+
+The question will be asked why it was that British ships were under
+this disadvantage. The reply is that the whole of our Dreadnought
+battleships, designed before the War, were hampered by the absence
+of proper dock accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked to
+me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the mistake of building
+our ships before we had proper dock accommodation for them, whilst
+in Germany they had provided the dock accommodation first and had
+designed the ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since
+docks took a long time to construct, the German policy involved delay
+in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of a type, and hence our margin
+of superiority in 1914. As each successive type of Dreadnought was
+designed, our constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they
+went beyond a certain beam the number of docks available would be
+insufficient; and it was always a matter of great difficulty to obtain
+money with which to construct adequate docks. Docks make no appeal
+to the imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money. The
+result was that August, 1914, found us with a superiority in ships,
+but woefully lacking in dock accommodation; and for this reason alone
+a Fleet action early in the War, resulting in considerable damage to
+heavy ships, would have produced embarrassing results.
+
+It is only just to our very able constructive staff at the Admiralty to
+point this out; it was one of the reasons which led to the German ships
+being much better equipped to withstand under-water attack than were
+our own. It is devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in
+mind in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided for the
+Fleet.
+
+The matter is one of which I have considerable personal knowledge,
+since it came within my province as Controller in 1909–11 and was also
+given to me to examine whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless
+to say that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out with
+emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as will be shown, as
+an introduction in a consideration of the Battle of Jutland, if that
+action is to be rightly judged.
+
+In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential to bear
+in mind that the time of receipt of signals, especially of reports
+emanating from the bridge of a ship, is not a true indication of the
+time at which the officer making the report began his task. A varying
+but considerable interval is bound to elapse; this includes the time
+taken to write out the report, transmit it to the wireless office or
+signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode it on board the receiving
+ship, write it out and transmit it to the bridge. The interval is
+greater with wireless than with visual signals.
+
+
+I.--THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET’S ACTION
+
+The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose of carrying out
+one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea. The orders from me under
+which the Fleet acted were as follows:
+
+Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle Squadron from
+Cromarty, was directed to pass through a position in Lat. 58.15 N.,
+Long. 2.0 E., and to meet the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 P.M.
+on the 31st at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.
+
+Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the
+5th Battle Squadron, was directed to proceed to a position in Lat.
+56.40 N., Long. 5 E., economising fuel in the destroyers as much as
+possible; it was expected that he would be in that position by about 2
+P.M. on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand to the northward
+to get into visual touch with the Battle Fleet.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  Operations of
+  BATTLE CRUISER FLEET
+  II·00 p.m to VI·15 p.m. 31^{st}. May.]
+
+The _Iron Duke_ and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, together with the
+3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the newly commissioned light cruisers
+_Chester_ and _Canterbury_, which had been carrying out gunnery and
+torpedo practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of May
+30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15
+E., having met the 2nd Battle Squadron _en route_ at 11.15 A.M. in
+Lat. 58.13 N., Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed before
+sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards the Horn Reef from
+the position in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.
+
+At 2 P.M. on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about 18 miles to the
+north-westward of the position (A), being actually in Lat. 57.57 N.,
+Long. 3.45 E., in organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly
+delayed for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary practice of
+examining trawlers and other vessels met with _en route_ to be carried
+out without causing the examining vessels to expend unnecessary fuel
+in regaining station. We had to be on our guard against scouts. The
+divisions were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in the order:
+1st–6th Divisions (screened by the 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas) with
+the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet.
+The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were stationed 16
+miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six miles apart on a line of
+direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; the cruisers being eight miles apart
+and their positions being in the order from east to west:
+
+                               (F.)        (F.)
+  _Cochrane_    _Shannon_   _Minotaur_   _Defence_   _Duke of Edinburgh_   _Black Prince_
+                                .            .
+                                .            .
+                                .        _Warrior_
+                                .
+                                .
+                            _Hampshire_ (linking ship 6 miles astern of the _Minotaur_)
+
+The attached cruisers, the _Active_, _Boadicea_, _Blanche_, and
+_Bellona_, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and the 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers _Chester_ and _Canterbury_,
+about 20 miles ahead, the whole steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the
+speed of _advance_ being 14 knots.
+
+The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below:
+
+                                              Line of Advance.
+                                                     ^
+                                                     |
+                                                     |
+
+       1st Div.             2nd Div.       3rd Div.             4th Div.        5th Div.          6th Div.
+  _King George V._(F.)   _Orion_ (F.)   _Iron Duke_ (F.F.)   _Benbow_ (F.)   _Colossus_ (F.)   _Marlborough_ (F.)
+  _Ajax_                 _Monarch_      _Royal Oak_          _Bellerophon_   _Collingwood_     _Revenge_
+  _Centurion_            _Conqueror_    _Superb_ (F.)        _Temeraire_     _Neptune_         _Hercules_
+  _Erin_                 _Thunderer_    _Canada_             _Vanguard_      _St. Vincent_     _Agincourt_
+
+  F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship.
+
+It may be added in further explanation that the flagships of the Battle
+Fleet were:
+
+  _Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship.--Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe
+            (Commander-in-Chief).
+
+  _King George V._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram,
+            Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron.
+
+  _Orion._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in the
+            2nd Battle Squadron.
+
+  _Superb._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in the
+            4th Battle Squadron.
+
+  _Benbow._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Commanding
+            the 4th Battle Squadron.
+
+  _Colossus._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral in
+            the 1st Battle Squadron.
+
+  _Marlborough._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding
+            1st Battle Squadron and second in command of the Grand
+            Fleet.
+
+The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, with destroyers,
+were at 2 P.M. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. 4.40 E., and had turned to the
+northward, steering N. by E., speed 19½ knots, in the order:
+
+The _Lion_ and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead,
+screened by the light cruiser _Champion_ and 10 destroyers of the 13th
+Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead
+three miles E.N.E. of the _Lion_, screened by six destroyers.[I] The
+5th Battle Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W. of
+the _Lion_, being screened by the light cruiser _Fearless_ and nine
+destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser Squadrons formed a
+screen eight miles S.S.E. from the _Lion_, ships spread on a line of
+direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to
+east:
+
+              2nd Light Cruiser                 3rd Light Cruiser                  1st Light Cruiser
+                  Squadron                          Squadron                           Squadron
+  _Southampton_ (F.)    _Nottingham_    _Falmouth_ (F.)   _Birkenhead_       _Inconstant_     _Galatea_ (F.)
+  _Birmingham_          _Dublin_                          _Gloucester_       _Cordelia_       _Phaeton_
+
+    [I] These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but
+        happened to be at Rosyth.
+
+It should be added that the flagships were:
+
+  _Lion._--Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David
+            Beatty.
+
+  _Princess Royal._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock,
+            commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
+
+  _New Zealand._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, commanding
+            2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
+
+  _Barham._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding 5th
+            Battle Squadron.
+
+The _Engadine_, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between the light
+cruisers _Gloucester_ and _Cordelia_, and the light cruiser _Yarmouth_
+acted as linking ship between the _Lion_ and the light cruiser screen.
+
+The first report of enemy vessels was received from the _Galatea_, the
+flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, commanding the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron, who, at 2.20 P.M., sighted two enemy vessels
+to the E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a neutral
+steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possibilities of the
+situation, immediately turned his fleet to the S.S.E., the course for
+the Horn Reef, so as to get between the enemy and his base.
+
+At 2.35 P.M. the _Galatea_ reported a large amount of smoke “as from
+a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a report that the vessels were
+steering north. The course of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered
+to the eastward and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being sighted
+at 3.31 P.M. and identified as five battle cruisers accompanied by
+destroyers.
+
+Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their
+direction, and, judging the situation accurately, spread to the
+east without waiting for orders, forming a screen in advance of the
+heavy ships. Our Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels
+of a similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with his broad pendant in the
+_Southampton_, came in at high speed towards the battle cruisers and
+formed ahead of them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 P.M. sighted
+enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E.
+
+On receipt of the _Galatea’s_ report, Sir David Beatty ordered the
+_Engadine_ to send up a sea-plane to scout to the N.N.E. This was
+the first time that sea-planes had been used for reconnaissance work
+with a fleet in an action, and the event is notable for that reason.
+The low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-plane,
+with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant
+Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was able, by flying low
+under the clouds, to identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the
+report being received on board the _Lion_ at 3.30 P.M. The sea-plane
+was under heavy fire from the light cruisers during the observation. By
+this time the line of battle was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser
+Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the
+destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station ahead. The
+course was E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, the speed 25
+knots, and the range 23,000 yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on
+a line of bearing in order to clear the smoke.
+
+The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the movements of the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the
+weather was favourable, the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E.,
+and the visibility good.
+
+Meanwhile the wireless reports from the _Galatea_ to the _Lion_ had
+been intercepted on board the _Iron Duke_, and directions were at once
+given to the Battle Fleet to raise steam for full speed, the ships
+being at the time at short notice for full speed. The cruisers had been
+ordered to raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 P.M. the Battle
+Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 P.M. I directed
+Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships of the situation. The
+earliest reports from the _Galatea_ had indicated the presence of light
+cruisers and destroyers only, and my first impression was that these
+vessels, on sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via
+the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels and were
+consequently not in so much danger of being cut off as if they turned
+to the southward. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well
+placed for cutting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place,
+was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 P.M., on the
+receipt of the information of the presence of enemy battle cruisers, it
+was directed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. About 3.40 P.M. I received
+a report from Sir David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers
+and a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the same time.
+
+As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was reported, course
+was altered in the Battle Fleet to close our battle cruisers, and speed
+increased as rapidly as possible. By 4 P.M. the “Fleet Speed” was 20
+knots, being higher than had previously been obtained. Zigzagging was
+abandoned on receipt of the _Galatea’s_ first report. The battleships
+were also directed to keep clear of the wake of the next ahead in order
+to prevent loss of speed from the wash.
+
+At 3.48 P.M. the action between the battle cruisers began at a range
+of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened by the two forces practically
+simultaneously. At the commencement the fire from the German vessels
+was rapid and accurate, the _Lion_ being hit twice three minutes after
+fire was opened, and the _Lion_, _Tiger_ and _Princess Royal_ all
+receiving several hits by 4 P.M.; observers on board our own ships were
+also of opinion that our fire was effective at that stage.
+
+At about 4 P.M. it was evident by the accuracy of the enemy’s fire
+that he had obtained the range of our ships, which was then about
+16,000 yards. The enemy bore well abaft the beam, and course was
+altered slightly to the southward to confuse his fire control. Course
+was altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose. The
+German ships frequently zigzagged for the purpose of confusing our fire
+control.
+
+At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very rapid and
+accurate; the _Lion_ received several hits, the roof of one of her
+turrets being blown off at 4 P.M. At about 4.6 P.M. the _Indefatigable_
+was hit, approximately at the outer edge of the upper deck level in
+line with the after turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an
+explosion followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell out
+of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit by another salvo
+forward, turned over and sank.
+
+About this time (4.8 P.M.) the 5th Battle Squadron came into action,
+opening fire at a range between 19,000 and 20,000 yards. This slower
+squadron was some distance astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason
+partly of the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and partly
+of the light to the eastward having become less favourable, difficulty
+was experienced in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being
+visible at a time. At 4.12 P.M. the range of the enemy’s battle
+cruisers from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was altered
+from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire had slackened owing to the
+increase in range.
+
+The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing the line of
+our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the periscopes of enemy
+submarines were also made by more than one ship.
+
+In accordance with the general directions given by Sir David Beatty
+to the destroyers to attack when a favourable opportunity occurred,
+the _Nestor_, _Nomad_, _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_,
+_Obdurate_, _Nerissa_, _Moorsom_, _Morris_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_
+moved out at 4.15 P.M.; at the same time a similar movement took place
+on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser and 15 destroyers.
+Both sides first steered to reach an advantageous position at the
+van of the opposing battle cruiser lines from which to deliver their
+attack, and then turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement
+at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the enemy lost
+two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in addition, his torpedo
+attack was partially frustrated; some torpedoes were fired by the
+enemy, two of which crossed the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which
+had been turned away to avoid the attack.
+
+During this action, which reflected the greatest credit on our
+destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing to their having
+dropped back towards the rear of our line, were not in a good position
+to attack the enemy’s battle cruisers with torpedoes. The _Nestor_,
+_Nomad_, and _Nicator_, most gallantly led by Commander the Hon.
+E. B. S. Bingham in the _Nestor_, were able to press home their
+attack, causing the enemy’s battle cruisers to turn away to avoid
+their torpedoes. The _Nomad_ was damaged and forced to haul out of
+line before getting within torpedo range of the battle cruisers, but
+the _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ succeeded in firing torpedoes at the battle
+cruisers under a heavy fire from the German secondary armaments. The
+_Nestor_ was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser,
+and remained stopped between the lines. She was sunk later by the
+German Battle Fleet when that force appeared on the scene, but not
+before she had fired her last torpedo at the approaching ships. The
+_Nomad_ was also sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but
+this vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. In
+both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying circumstances
+was shown by the officers and men. It is gratifying to record that
+a considerable proportion of the ship’s company of both destroyers
+was picked up by German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed
+the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle cruisers, the
+_Nicator_ was able to rejoin her flotilla. The _Moorsom_ also attacked
+the enemy’s Battle Fleet and returned. In the meantime, the _Petard_,
+_Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_ succeeded in firing torpedoes
+at long range (7,000 yards) at the enemy’s battle cruisers. For his
+gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack Commander the Hon.
+E. B. S. Bingham, who was rescued from the _Nestor_ and taken prisoner
+by the Germans, received the Victoria Cross.
+
+Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships had become very
+fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle cruisers began to be
+noticeable, the third ship in the line being observed to be on fire
+at 4.18 P.M., whilst our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were also
+inflicting and receiving some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of
+the fire from the enemy’s vessels was deteriorating at this period;
+our own ships were much handicapped by the decreasing visibility, due
+partly to the use by the enemy of smoke screens, under cover of which
+he altered course to throw out our fire.
+
+The flagship _Barham_, of the 5th Battle Squadron, received her first
+hit at 4.23 P.M.
+
+At about 4.26 P.M. a second disaster befell the British battle
+cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy’s battle cruisers hit the
+_Queen Mary_ abreast of “Q” turret and a terrific explosion resulted,
+evidently caused by a magazine blowing up. The _Tiger_, which was
+following close astern of the _Queen Mary_, passed through the dense
+cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal of material
+fell on her decks, but otherwise the _Queen Mary_ had completely
+vanished. A few survivors from this ship and from the _Indefatigable_
+were afterwards rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine
+ships with their splendid ships’ companies was a heavy blow to the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature of the disaster adding
+to its magnitude.[J]
+
+    [J] I was not aware of the loss of the _Queen Mary_ and
+        _Indefatigable_ until the morning of June 1st.
+
+At 4.38 P.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_, Flagship of
+the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been scouting ahead of the
+Battle Cruisers, reported that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight
+bearing S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position. Sir
+David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting the Battle Fleet
+at 4.42 P.M. turned the battle cruisers 16 points in succession to
+starboard. This movement was followed by the enemy’s battle cruisers,
+and Sir David Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn his
+ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commodore Goodenough led
+the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron to a favourable position from which
+to observe the movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, within 13,000
+yards’ range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very heavy fire,
+clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded several reports of their
+position and movements; the skilful manner in which the Commodore,
+aided by his captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly
+saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant manœuvring of
+the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron during the engagement,
+the position of the _Southampton_, as obtained by reckoning, was
+somewhat inaccurate, as was to be expected. This fact detracted from
+the value of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by latitude
+and longitude, as reported from time to time to the _Iron Duke_,
+was consequently incorrect. This discrepancy added greatly to the
+difficulty experienced in ascertaining the correct moment at which
+to deploy the Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the
+direction of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however, inevitable
+under the conditions.
+
+The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the southward in their
+pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably in excess of that which
+the Battle Fleet could attain, resulted in opening the distance between
+the two forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty’s
+force to the northward, the _Iron Duke_ and the _Lion_ were over 50
+miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles per hour.
+
+As soon as the position of the _Lion_ was known after the receipt of
+the report of enemy battle cruisers being in sight, Rear-Admiral the
+Hon. H. S. Hood was directed to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir
+David Beatty’s force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to
+the Rear-Admiral. The latter officer reported his own position and gave
+his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots. At the same time the Battle
+Fleet was informed that our battle cruisers were in action with the
+enemy’s battle cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral
+Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company with Sir David
+Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being received, with a report that
+his squadron was in action.
+
+At this time I was confident that, under the determined leadership
+of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our best and fastest
+battleships and six battle cruisers, very serious injury would be
+inflicted on the five battle cruisers of the enemy if they could be
+kept within range.
+
+The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, which was
+communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not cause me any uneasiness in
+respect of the safety of our own vessels, since our ships of the 5th
+Battle Squadron were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not,
+however, expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of 24 knots;
+the information furnished to me at this time gave the designed speed of
+the fastest German battleships as 20.5 knots only. Even after making
+full allowance for the fact that our ships were probably carrying
+more fuel and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving
+the Germans credit for some excess over the designed speed, no doubt
+existed in my mind that both our battleships and our battle cruisers
+with Sir David Beatty could keep well out of range of the enemy’s
+Battle Fleet, if necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I
+learned later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron,
+_when going at its utmost speed_, found considerable difficulty
+in increasing its distance from the enemy’s 3rd Battle Squadron,
+consisting of ships of the “König” class, and on return to Scapa I
+received a report from the Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron
+with a speed of _23 knots_ for a short period, this being the first
+intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable by them.
+
+To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between the battle cruisers
+was renewed during the retirement of our ships to the northward, and
+the two leading ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, the _Barham_ and
+_Valiant_, supported our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two
+rear ships of that force, the _Warspite_ and _Malaya_, engaged the
+leading ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet as long as their guns would
+bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards.
+
+The light cruiser _Fearless_, with destroyers of the 1st Flotilla,
+were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, and the light cruiser
+_Champion_, with destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle
+Squadron. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in
+the rear during the southerly course, now took up a position on the
+starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During this northerly run
+the fire from our ships was very intermittent, owing to the weather
+thickening to the eastward, although the enemy was able at times to
+fire with some accuracy.
+
+From 5 P.M. until after 6 P.M. the light was very much in favour of
+the enemy, being far clearer to the westward than to the eastward. A
+photograph taken on board the _Malaya_ at 5.15 P.M. towards the western
+horizon established this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted
+against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 yards
+distant.
+
+Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 minutes after
+5.12 P.M. owing to the enemy’s ships being invisible, fire being
+reopened at about 5.40 P.M. on the enemy’s battle cruisers, three or
+four of which could be seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of
+some 14,000 yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed
+to be effective, the _Lion_ alone firing some 15 salvoes during this
+period.
+
+At 5.10 P.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, which had rejoined the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet after assisting the _Engadine_ with her sea-plane, fired
+a torpedo at the enemy’s line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000
+yards from a favourable position--two points before the beam of the
+enemy’s leading battle cruiser.
+
+At 5.35 P.M. the _Lion’s_ course was gradually altered from N.N.E.
+to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements and resulting
+position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also
+gradually hauled to the eastward, being probably influenced in this
+movement by reports received from their light cruisers, which were by
+this time in contact with the light cruiser _Chester_ and in sight of
+our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hood.
+
+The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.
+
+At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full speed to reinforce
+Sir David Beatty. At 5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the _Invincible_
+(Flag), _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_, in single line ahead in that
+order, with the destroyers _Shark_, _Christopher_, _Ophelia_, and
+_Acasta_, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had the light cruiser
+_Canterbury_ five miles ahead and the light cruiser _Chester_ bearing
+N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was
+rapidly decreasing. According to the _Indomitable’s_ report, objects
+could be distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings,
+and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according to
+the same report, the visibility varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards,
+although other reports place it higher at times.
+
+At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the
+south-westward, and the _Chester_ turned in that direction to
+investigate, and, at 5.36 P.M., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser
+on the starboard bow, with one or two destroyers in company. The
+_Chester_ challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west to
+close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel was
+hostile.
+
+As the _Chester_ closed, course was altered to about north in order
+to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a bearing
+favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy well abaft the
+port beam of the _Chester_ and on an approximately parallel course.
+During the turn the _Chester_ sighted two or more light cruisers astern
+of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser opened fire
+on the _Chester_, the latter replying immediately afterwards, at a
+range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility at this time, judging by
+the distance at which the enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the
+_Chester_, could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth
+salvo hit the _Chester_, put No. 1 gun port out of action, and killed
+and wounded a large proportion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3
+port guns. The light cruisers sighted by the _Chester_ undoubtedly
+belonged to one of the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the
+starboard bow of their battle cruisers.
+
+Captain Lawson of the _Chester_, in view of the superior force to
+which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards the 3rd
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy’s light cruisers, all of
+which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy
+vessels turned after the _Chester_, and during the unequal engagement,
+which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully manœuvred
+his ship with a view to impeding the accuracy of the hostile fire,
+realising that she was in no condition to engage such superior forces
+successfully in her damaged state.
+
+The _Chester_ closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and took station
+N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at a later
+phase of the action. The ship suffered considerable casualties, having
+31 killed and 50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were
+disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above the water
+line. It was on board the _Chester_ that the second Victoria Cross of
+the action was earned, posthumously, by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class,
+who was mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, whose
+age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained standing alone at a
+most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action,
+with the guns’ crew, dead and wounded, all round him.
+
+Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadron at 5.40 P.M., and Rear-Admiral Hood turned his ships to
+starboard and brought the enemy light cruisers, which were engaging
+the _Chester_, and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his
+port bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port quarter of the squadron.
+As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood made out his position he led his squadron
+with the _Canterbury_ between the enemy and the _Chester_, on a course
+about W.N.W., and at 5.55 P.M. opened an effective fire on the German
+light cruisers with his port guns, at a range of about 10,000 to
+12,000 yards. The enemy vessels turned away from this attack and fired
+torpedoes at the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were
+seen later from the _Indomitable_. At about 6.10 P.M. the _Invincible_
+and _Indomitable_ turned to starboard to avoid these torpedoes, three
+of which passed very close to the latter ship, and ran alongside within
+20 yards of the vessel. The _Inflexible_ turned to port.
+
+Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted astern of the first
+group, and the four British destroyers, _Shark_, _Acasta_, _Ophelia_
+and _Christopher_, attacked them and the large destroyer force in
+company with them, and were received by a heavy fire which disabled
+the _Shark_ and damaged the _Acasta_. On board the _Shark_ the third
+V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain, Commander Loftus
+Jones, this award also being, I regret to say, posthumous.
+
+The attack of the British destroyers was carried out with great
+gallantry and determination, and having frustrated the enemy’s torpedo
+attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones
+turned his division to regain his position on our battle cruisers.
+At this moment three German vessels came into sight out of the mist
+and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the _Shark_ and causing
+many casualties on board; Commander Loftus Jones was amongst those
+wounded. Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, commanding the _Acasta_, came
+to the assistance of the _Shark_, but Commander Loftus Jones refused
+to imperil a second destroyer, and directed the _Acasta_ to leave him.
+The _Shark_ then became the target for the German ships and destroyers.
+Commander Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged
+gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be placed in the tube and
+fired; but whilst this was being done the torpedo was hit by a shell
+and exploded, causing many casualties. Those gallant officers and men
+in the _Shark_ who still survived, continued to fight the only gun left
+in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The captain was now
+wounded again, his right leg being taken off by a shell; but he still
+continued to direct the fire, until the condition of the _Shark_ and
+the approach of German destroyers made it probable that the ship would
+fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders for her to be
+sunk, countermanding this order shortly afterwards on realising that
+her remaining gun could still be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit
+by two torpedoes, and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors
+were picked up the next morning by a Danish steamer. In recognition of
+the great gallantry displayed, the whole of the survivors were awarded
+the Distinguished Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin,
+Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. Hope, A.B.;
+C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; T. W. Swan, Stoker.
+
+At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of our advanced
+cruiser line, which at 5 P.M. was about 16 miles ahead of the Battle
+Fleet, the latter being at that time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E.,
+steering S.E. by S. at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to
+decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to
+be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard flank had
+closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 P.M. The 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron was about 16 miles due east of the advanced cruiser
+line, but was steering more to the southward on a converging course at
+a speed of about five knots faster.
+
+At 5.40 P.M. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, and shortly
+afterwards ships were seen from the _Minotaur_ to be emerging from the
+mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the senior officer of the cruiser line, had
+recalled the ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing
+and had ordered them to form single line ahead on the _Minotaur_. He
+then made the signal to engage the enemy, namely, the ships in sight
+ahead; but before fire was opened they replied to his challenge and
+were identified as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the westward.
+
+At 5.47 P.M. the _Defence_, with the _Warrior_ astern, sighted on a
+S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard bow) three or four enemy
+light cruisers, and course was altered three points to port, bringing
+them nearly on a beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in
+the _Defence_, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each ship fired three
+salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The salvoes fell short, and the
+_Defence_ altered course to starboard, brought the enemy first ahead,
+and then to a bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention
+of closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 P.M.,
+and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers were falling
+in close proximity to the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_. These ships
+opened fire with their port guns at 6.5 P.M. and shortly afterwards
+passed close across the bows of the _Lion_ from port to starboard.
+One light cruiser, probably the _Wiesbaden_, was hit by the second
+salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and nearly
+stopped. Our ships continued to close her until within 5,500 yards.
+From about 6.10 P.M. onwards they had come under fire of guns of heavy
+calibre from the enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as
+gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently bent
+on finishing off his opponent, and held on, probably not realising
+in the gathering smoke and mist that the enemy’s heavy ships were at
+fairly close range. At about 6.16 P.M. the _Defence_ was hit by two
+salvoes in quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up and
+the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an officer as Sir Robert
+Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s company as the officers and men of
+the _Defence_ was a heavy blow. The _Warrior_ was very badly damaged
+by shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain Molteno was
+able to bring his ship out of action, having first seen the _Defence_
+disappear. From diagrams made in the _Warrior_ it appears that the
+German battle cruisers turned 16 points (possibly with a view either
+to close their Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled
+_Wiesbaden_), engaged the _Defence_ and _Warrior_, and then turned back
+again. This supposition is confirmed by sketches taken on board the
+_Duke of Edinburgh_ at the same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist,
+however, it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the
+observations on board the _Warrior_ it is certain that the visibility
+was much greater in her direction from the enemy’s line, than it was in
+the direction of the enemy from the _Warrior_. Although the _Defence_
+and _Warrior_ were being hit frequently, those on board the _Warrior_
+could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, and it
+is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert Arbuthnot not
+realising that he was at comparatively short range from the German
+battle cruisers until he was already under an overwhelming fire.
+
+The _Warrior_ passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at the period
+when the steering gear of the _Warspite_ had become temporarily
+disabled.[K]
+
+    [K] _Cf._ page 350.
+
+The _Duke of Edinburgh_, the ship next to the westward of the _Defence_
+and the _Warrior_ in the cruiser screen, had turned to close these
+ships when they became engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in
+accordance with a signal from the _Defence_. The _Duke of Edinburgh_
+joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on her starboard
+bow, did not follow the other ships across the bows of the battle
+cruisers, as to do so would have seriously incommoded these vessels;
+she turned to port to a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron.
+
+The _Black Prince_ was observed from the _Duke of Edinburgh_ to turn
+some 12 points to port at the same time that the _Duke of Edinburgh_
+turned, but her subsequent movements are not clear; the German accounts
+of the action stated that the _Black Prince_ was sunk by gunfire at
+the same time as the _Defence_, but she was not seen to be in action
+at this time by any of our vessels, and, moreover, a wireless signal,
+reporting a submarine in sight and timed 8.48 P.M., was subsequently
+received from her. It is probable that the _Black Prince_ passed to
+the rear of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 P.M., and that during the
+night she found herself close to one of the German battle squadrons,
+and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In support of this theory, the
+German account mentions that a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk
+in that manner during the night. None of the ships of this class was
+present during the engagement, but the _Black Prince_ might well have
+been mistaken for a ship of this type in the circumstances.
+
+[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AS DEPICTED DY A GERMAN ARTIST,
+SHOWING THE “WIESBADEN” SINKING BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES
+
+The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out
+between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918]
+
+We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 6.10 P.M. at the
+termination of their engagement with enemy light cruisers, turning to
+avoid torpedoes fired at them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood
+sighted the _Lion_ and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at about
+6.16 P.M. hoisted the signal to his squadron to form single line ahead,
+and turned to take station ahead of the _Lion_ and to engage the
+hostile battle cruisers, which at 6.20 P.M. were sighted at a range of
+8,600 yards.
+
+A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and the fire of the
+squadron was judged by those on board the _Invincible_ to be very
+effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, who was on the bridge of the _Invincible_
+with Captain Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer
+in the fore control, at about 6.30 P.M., saying, “Your firing is very
+good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every shot is telling.” At
+about 6.34 P.M. the _Invincible_, which had already been hit more than
+once by heavy shell without appreciable damage, was struck in “Q”
+turret. The shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander
+Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion followed
+immediately, evidently caused by the magazine blowing up, and the
+ship broke in half and sank at once, only two officers, including
+Commander Dannreuther, and four men being subsequently picked up by
+the destroyer _Badger_. The British Navy sustained a most serious loss
+in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, one of the most distinguished
+of our younger flag officers, and in Captain Cay and the officers and
+men of his flagship. The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships
+even at the close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact
+that the officers in the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ were under the
+impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, whilst officers
+in the _Inflexible_, stationed between these two ships in the line,
+reported that her fire was being directed at a battleship of the
+“Kaiser” or “König” class, and that only one ship could be seen.
+
+Just before the loss of the _Invincible_, the 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, had carried out an
+effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s battle cruisers; both the light
+cruisers _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ fired torpedoes at the leading
+battle cruiser. It was thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark
+as a heavy under-water explosion was felt at this time.
+
+After the loss of the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_ was left as leader
+of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the _Invincible_ had been
+passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close the enemy
+ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard
+for the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 P.M., the battle
+cruisers being clear of the leading battleships (which were bearing
+N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the
+_Inflexible_ and _Indomitable_ took station astern of the _New Zealand_.
+
+The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The _Chester_
+with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead
+of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser screen, encountered some of the light
+cruisers composing the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing
+so, drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, which, with the _Canterbury_ and destroyers, turned to about
+W.N.W. to assist the _Chester_ and to engage the enemy vessels.
+
+In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made by four
+British destroyers on the enemy’s light cruisers. This attack was
+apparently thought by the Germans to come from the flotillas with the
+Battle Fleet, as far as can be judged from their report of the action;
+the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly mistaken
+by their vessels for the van of our Battle Fleet, since mention is made
+in the German report of the British Battle Fleet having been sighted
+at this time by the German light forces, steering in a westerly or
+north-westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High
+Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.
+
+So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time,
+the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course
+before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually
+hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then,
+to west, _but it was not until_ 8 P.M. _that a westerly course was
+being steered_.
+
+The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser
+engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
+The ship engaged by the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ was apparently the
+_Wiesbaden_. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been
+another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took
+place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening
+fire at 5.55 P.M., and the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ (the 1st Cruiser
+Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about
+5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly
+possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed,
+that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel.
+
+Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer _Onslow_,
+commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey, which at 6.5 P.M. sighted
+an enemy’s light cruiser in a position on the bows of the _Lion_
+and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. The _Onslow_ closed
+and engaged the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between 2,000
+and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged by shell fire,
+succeeded in closing a German battle cruiser to attack with torpedoes;
+she was struck by a heavy shell before more than one torpedo could
+be fired. Lieut.-Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all
+torpedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not the case,
+closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting
+the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The
+_Onslow’s_ engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer _Defender_,
+Lieut.-Commander Palmer, closed her at 7.15 P.M. and took her in tow
+under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night and
+the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought her back to home
+waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care of a tug.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_)
+
+
+II.--THE BATTLE FLEET IN ACTION
+
+The “plot” made on the reports received between 5 and 6 P.M. from
+Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and the report
+at 4.45 P.M. from Sir David Beatty in the _Lion_ giving the position
+of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet,
+might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and that the cruiser
+line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight the enemy nearly ahead of
+the centre. Obviously, however, great reliance could not be placed on
+the positions given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
+had been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. I
+realised this, but when contact actually took place it was found that
+the positions given were at least twelve miles in error when compared
+with the _Iron Duke’s_ reckoning. The result was that the enemy’s
+Battle Fleet appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had
+expected, and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated.
+There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning on board the
+_Iron Duke_, as the movements of that ship could be “plotted” with
+accuracy after leaving Scapa Flow, there being no disturbing elements
+to deal with.
+
+The first accurate information regarding the position of affairs was
+contained in a signal from the _Black Prince_, of the 1st Cruiser
+Squadron (the starboard wing ship of the cruiser screen), which was
+timed 5.40 P.M., but received by me considerably later, and in which
+it was reported that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south,
+distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were our own
+vessels.
+
+Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, I had
+directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause the range-finder
+operators to take ranges of ships on bearings in every direction and
+to report the direction in which the visibility appeared to be the
+greatest. My object was to ascertain the most favourable bearing in
+which to engage the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice being
+exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibility appeared to be
+best to the southward.
+
+At 5.45 P.M. the _Comus_ (Captain Hotham), of the 4th Light Cruiser
+Squadron, which was stationed three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet,
+reported heavy gunfire on a southerly bearing, i.e., three points from
+ahead, and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing
+south-south-west although no ships could be seen.
+
+At about 5.50 P.M. I received a wireless signal from Sir Robert
+Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting having sighted ships
+in action bearing south-south-west and steering north-east. There was,
+however, no clue as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind
+that they might be the opposing battle cruisers.
+
+At 5.55 P.M. a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
+leading the starboard wing division in the _Marlborough_, inquiring
+what he could see. The reply was: “Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the
+starboard bow.” This reply was received at about 6.5 P.M.
+
+The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position of the enemy’s
+Battle Fleet and its formation caused me to continue in the Battle
+Fleet on the course south-east by south at a speed of 20 knots, in
+divisions line ahead disposed abeam to starboard, the _Iron Duke_ at 6
+P.M. being in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYING
+    AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND]
+
+The information so far received had not even been sufficient to justify
+me in altering the bearing of the guides of columns from the _Iron
+Duke_ preparatory to deployment, and they were still, therefore, on the
+beam. The destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening
+formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direction of
+deployment before stationing them for action.
+
+At 5.56 P.M. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported strange vessels in sight
+bearing south-south-west and steering east, and at 6 P.M. he reported
+them as British battle cruisers three to four miles distant, the _Lion_
+being the leading ship.
+
+This report was made by searchlight and consequently reached me shortly
+after 6 P.M., but as showing the interval that elapses between the
+_intention to make a signal_ and the actual receipt of it (even under
+conditions where the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid
+delay, and the signal staff is efficient), it is to be noted that
+whereas the report gave the bearing of our vessels as south-south-west,
+notes taken on board the _Colossus_ placed our battle cruisers one
+point on the starboard bow of that ship, that is, on a south-south-east
+bearing and distant two miles at 6.5 P.M.
+
+Shortly after 6 P.M. we sighted strange vessels bearing south-west from
+the _Iron Duke_ at a distance of about five miles. They were identified
+as our battle cruisers, steering east across the bows of the Battle
+Fleet. Owing to the mist it was not possible to make out the number of
+ships that were following the _Lion_.
+
+At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the position of
+the enemy’s Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire were visible from ahead
+round to the starboard beam, and the noise was heavy and continuous.
+Our cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, but the fact that they
+were not closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents
+could hardly be battleships.
+
+In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to clearing up the
+situation without altering the formation of the Battle Fleet, a signal
+had been made to the Battle Fleet at 6.2 P.M. to alter course leaders
+together, the remainder in succession, to south (a turn of three
+points). Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 knots to allow of
+the ships closing up into station. Immediately afterwards it became
+apparent by the sound of the heavy firing that enemy’s heavy ships
+must be in close proximity, and the _Lion_, which was sighted at
+this moment, signalled at 6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers
+bore south-east. Meanwhile, at about 5.50 P.M., I had received a
+wireless report from Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron, to the effect that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore
+south-west from their Battle Fleet; in other words, that his Battle
+Fleet bore north-east from his battle cruisers.
+
+In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our battle cruisers
+were steering east, and observing that Sir David Beatty reported at
+6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-east, it appeared
+from Commodore Goodenough’s signal that the enemy’s Battle Fleet must
+be _ahead_ of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it seemed to me
+almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could have passed the battle
+cruisers. The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of
+the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer.
+
+The conviction was, however, forming in my mind that I should strike
+the enemy’s Battle Fleet on a bearing a little on the starboard bow,
+and in order to be prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to a
+south-east course, leaders together and the remainder in succession,
+and the destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 P.M., to
+take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order disposed
+them as follows:
+
+[Illustration]
+
+There was, however, a very short interval between this signal to
+the destroyers and the signal for deployment, and consequently the
+destroyers did not reach their positions before deployment. The
+subsequent alterations of course to the southward and westward added to
+their difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations
+at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The correct position for the
+two van flotillas on deployment was three miles ahead of the Fleet, but
+slightly on the engaged bow.
+
+At 6.1 P.M., immediately on sighting the _Lion_, a signal had been made
+to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet.
+This signal was repeated at 6.10 P.M., and at 6.14 P.M. he signalled:
+“Have sighted the enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west”; this
+report gave me the first information on which I could take effective
+action for deployment.
+
+At 6.15 P.M. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in the _Barham_, commanding
+the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled by wireless that the enemy’s
+Battle Fleet was in sight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was
+not reported in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I
+concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir Cecil Burney
+had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron at 6.7 P.M. as in sight,
+bearing south-west from the _Marlborough_.
+
+The first definite information received on board the Fleet-Flagship of
+the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet did not, therefore, come in
+until 6.14 P.M., and the position given placed it thirty degrees before
+the starboard beam of the _Iron Duke_, or fifty-nine degrees before the
+starboard beam of the _Marlborough_, and apparently in close proximity.
+There was no time to lose, as there was evident danger of the starboard
+wing column of the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German
+Battle Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 P.M. a
+signal was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port
+wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being assumed that the
+course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle
+cruisers.
+
+Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our battle
+cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was danger of the
+fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them.
+
+During the short interval, crowded with events, that had elapsed since
+the first flashes and sound of gunfire had been noted on board the
+_Iron Duke_, the question of most urgent importance before me had been
+the direction and manner of deployment.
+
+As the evidence accumulated that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was on our
+starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the _Iron
+Duke_, the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the
+starboard or on the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was
+to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the Fleet
+into action at the earliest possible moment, but it became increasingly
+apparent, both from the sound of gunfire and the reports from the
+_Lion_ and the _Barham_, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close
+proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in
+such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead
+of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the
+operations of destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the
+van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle
+Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers
+during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the Fleet into
+confusion at a critical moment.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+  H. M. S. “ROYAL OAK” AND “SUPERB” ASTERN, AND “THUNDERER” AHEAD]
+
+The further points that occurred to me were, that if the German ships
+were as close as seemed probable, there was considerable danger of
+the 1st Battle Squadron, and especially the _Marlborough’s_ Division,
+being severely handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet
+before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist. The 1st
+Battle Squadron was composed of many of our weakest ships, with only
+indifferent protection as compared with the German capital ships, and
+an interval of at least four minutes would elapse between each division
+coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further interval
+before the guns could be directed on to the ship selected and their
+fire become effective after so large a change of course.
+
+The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from the supposed
+position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van of the enemy would have
+a very considerable “overlap” if the deployment took place on the
+starboard wing division, whereas this would not be the case with
+deployment on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate a
+large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent the “T”
+being crossed, and each successive division coming into line would have
+to make this turn, in addition to the 8-point turn required to form
+the line. I therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port wing,
+division.
+
+The further knowledge which I gained of the actual state of affairs
+after the action confirmed my view that the course adopted was the best
+in the circumstances.
+
+The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division show that
+the range of the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at the moment of
+deployment was about 13,000 yards. The fleets were converging rapidly,
+with the High Sea Fleet holding a position of advantage such as would
+enable it to engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard
+division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as they formed up
+astern. It is to be observed that it would take some twenty minutes to
+complete the formation of the line of battle.
+
+The German gunnery was always good at the start, and their ships
+invariably found the range of a target with great rapidity, and
+it would have been very bad tactics to give them such an initial
+advantage, not only in regard to gunnery but also in respect of torpedo
+attack, both from ships and from destroyers.
+
+A subsequent study of the reports and the signals received has admitted
+of the accompanying plans being drawn up.
+
+The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and show clearly how
+great would have been the objections to deploying to starboard. It
+will be seen that the bearings of the enemy Battle Fleet, as given
+by the _Lion_ and the _Barham_ at 6.14 and 6.15 respectively, give a
+fair “cut,” and the bearing on which the _Marlborough_ opened fire
+enables the position of the Battle Fleet to be placed with considerable
+accuracy.
+
+Assuming that the German Battle Fleet was steaming at 17 knots on an
+easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31, it will be observed that at the
+latter time it bore 21 degrees before the starboard beam of the _Iron
+Duke_ at a range of 12,000 yards. The _Iron Duke_ actually engaged the
+leading battleship at this time on a bearing 20 degrees before the
+starboard beam at a range of 12,000 yards. The accuracy of the “plot”
+is therefore confirmed, so far as confirmation is possible. It appears
+certain that between about 6.0 P.M. and 6.16 P.M. the German battle
+cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and again turned
+16 points to their original course. This is borne out by observations
+on board the _Warrior_, which ship was being engaged by the _starboard_
+guns of enemy vessels. The German account also shows such a turn at
+this period.
+
+Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, had
+sighted the _Marlborough_ at 6.6 P.M. and the remainder of the 6th
+Division of the Battle Fleet a little later. Not seeing any other
+columns, he concluded that the _Marlborough_ was leading the whole
+line, and decided to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 P.M.,
+however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral Evan-Thomas
+realised that the Fleet was deploying to port, the 6th Division being
+the starboard wing column. He then determined to make a large turn of
+his squadron to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division,
+which by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle.
+During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships of the 5th
+Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy’s leading battleships, but
+the shooting was not good, and our vessels received little injury.
+
+Unfortunately, however, the helm of the _Warspite_ jammed, and that
+ship, continuing her turn through sixteen points came under a very
+heavy fire and received considerable injury. The disabled _Warrior_
+happened to be in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the
+_Warspite_ had the effect for the moment of diverting attention from
+the _Warrior_, so that the latter vessel got clear.
+
+The _Warspite_ was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts from
+an unpleasant position and was steered to the northward to make
+good damages, and eventually, in accordance with directions from
+Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, returned independently to Rosyth,
+considerably down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not
+much injured.
+
+By 6.38 P.M. the remaining ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were in
+station astern of the _Agincourt_ (1st Battle Squadron), the last ship
+of the line.
+
+At 6.33 P.M., as soon as the battle cruisers had passed clear, the
+speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 knots, and this speed
+was subsequently maintained. The reduction of speed to 14 knots during
+the deployment caused some “bunching” at the rear of the line as the
+signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, however, to be
+maintained until the battle cruisers had formed ahead.
+
+Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity for keeping a
+reserve of some three knots of speed in hand in the case of a long line
+of ships, in order to allow of station being kept in the line under
+conditions of action, when ships were making alterations of course to
+throw out enemy’s fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent
+action on the part of single ships, or of divisions of ships, became
+necessary, as well as to avoid excessive smoke from the funnels; for
+this reason the Fleet speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots.
+The experience of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at
+times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for this reserve.
+
+[Illustration: _Plan 8_
+
+_APPROXIMATE_ POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE GRAND FLEET AT 6.45. P.M. ON
+31st. MAY 1916.]
+
+At 6.14 P.M. the enemy’s salvoes were falling near ships of the 1st
+Battle Squadron, and the _Marlborough’s_ Division of the Battle
+Squadron became engaged with some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at
+6.17 P.M. immediately after turning for the deployment. At this time
+fire was opened by the _Marlborough_ on a ship stated to be of the
+“Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards and on a bearing 20° abaft
+the starboard beam; this knowledge enables us to deduce the position of
+the van of the German Battle Fleet at this time.
+
+Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s Fleet steering to
+the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, followed by the Battle Fleet
+in single line, the order being, four ships of the “König” class in the
+van, followed by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the
+rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached me at 4.48
+P.M. from the Commodore of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron indicated
+that ships of the “Kaiser” class were in the van of the Battle Fleet.
+The order of the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report,
+but there is no doubt that ships of the “König” class led during the
+Fleet action. The point is not, however, of importance.
+
+At about 6.38 P.M. the 6th Division was in line and our deployment was
+complete.
+
+Enemy shells had been falling close to the _Colossus_ and her 5th
+Division since 6.18 P.M., and these ships opened fire at 6.30 P.M.;
+but the conditions of visibility made it difficult to distinguish the
+enemy’s battleships.
+
+At 6.23 P.M. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed down the line,
+on the starboard, or engaged, side of our Fleet, apparently partly
+disabled. Her identity could not at the time he clearly established,
+but her German colours were flying and she was in a position for
+attacking the Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 P.M. the _Iron Duke_
+fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret guns by
+other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear of the line.
+
+At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult to
+distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an opinion
+on board the _Iron Duke_, in her position towards the centre of the
+line, as to the formation of the enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships
+in sight on the starboard beam was not even sufficiently clear for me
+to permit of fire being opened; but at 6.30 P.M. it became certain
+that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle Fleet and
+that the vessels then before the beam were battleships of the “König”
+class. The order was, therefore, given to open fire, and the _Iron
+Duke_ engaged what appeared to be the leading battleship at a range of
+12,000 yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other ships
+of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) opened fire
+at about the same time, and the van divisions (2nd Battle Squadron)
+very shortly afterwards; these latter ships reported engaging enemy
+battle cruisers as well as battleships. The fire of the _Iron Duke_,
+which came more directly under my personal observation, was seen to be
+immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes fired registering
+several palpable hits. It appeared as if all the enemy ships at that
+time in sight from the _Iron Duke_ (not more than three or four, owing
+to smoke and mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second
+battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, and settling
+by the stern. A large number of observers in the _Thunderer_, _Benbow_,
+_Barham_, _Marne_, _Morning Star_ and _Magic_ stated afterwards that
+they saw this ship blow up at 6.50 P.M.
+
+The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged about 12,000
+yards to the southward, though much less on other bearings, but ranges
+could not at times be obtained from the range-finders of the _Iron
+Duke_ at a greater distance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 P.M.,
+in a temporary clear channel through the mist, good ranges of 15,000
+yards were obtained of a battleship at which four salvoes were fired by
+the _Iron Duke_ before she was again hidden by smoke and mist. The very
+baffling light was caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly
+also by the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing
+Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-south-west with a
+force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel smoke to drift towards our line,
+thus further obscuring our view of his Fleet.
+
+The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently greater
+than in the centre at about 7 P.M., and the enemy’s fire, which was
+probably being concentrated on our rear ships, was more accurate at
+this period, but quite ineffective, only one ship, the _Colossus_,
+being hit by gunfire, although numerous projectiles were falling near
+the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons.
+
+Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the Battle Fleet
+could see only three or four enemy vessels at any one time, those in
+the ships of the rear division did occasionally see as many as eight,
+and were consequently better able to distinguish the formation and
+movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing
+to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and mist, to
+distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in the customary
+manner; the only course to adopt was for the captains to direct the
+fire of their guns on to any target which they could distinguish.
+
+The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east by east, as
+already stated, but the van had hauled on to south-east without signal
+shortly after deployment in order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 P.M.,
+as the range was apparently opening, the course was altered by signal
+to south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The _King George
+V._, leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had just anticipated this
+signal by turning to south. The alteration was made “by divisions”
+instead of “in succession” in order that the enemy should be closed
+more rapidly by the whole Battle Fleet.
+
+This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” involved some small
+amount of “blanketing” of the rear ships of one division by the leading
+ships of that next astern, and at one time the _Thunderer_ was firing
+over the bows of the _Iron Duke_, causing some slight inconvenience
+on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” however, was
+unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was inappreciable.
+
+At 6.45 P.M. one or two torpedoes crossed the track of the rear of
+our battle line, and the _Marlborough_ altered course to avoid one.
+They were apparently fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which
+were barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to those
+on board the _Iron Duke_. They might, however, have been fired by
+enemy battleships which were within torpedo range, or by a submarine,
+the _Revenge_ reporting that it was thought that one had been rammed
+by that ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by the
+observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very skilful handling of
+the ships by their captains.
+
+At 6.45 P.M., however, a heavy explosion occurred under the fore
+bridge of the _Marlborough_, abreast the starboard forward hydraulic
+engine-room. The ship took up a list of some seven degrees to
+starboard, but continued in action so effectively that she avoided
+three more torpedoes shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 P.M.,
+and at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König”
+class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen to turn out of line.
+
+The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to his flagship stated
+that the vessel had been struck by a “mine or torpedo.” It was assumed
+by me that a torpedo had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed
+over the same locality without injury from mine. This proved to be the
+case, the track of this torpedo not having been sufficiently visible to
+enable Captain Ross to avoid it.
+
+The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s torpedoes being
+visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to other
+officers. Reports had been prevalent that the Germans had succeeded
+in producing a torpedo which left little or no track on the surface.
+The information as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me
+until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one torpedo was
+reported by observers on board the destroyer _Oak_ to have passed close
+ahead of the _Iron Duke_ at about 7.35 P.M., finishing its run 2,000
+yards beyond that ship, and a second was observed by the _Benbow_ to
+pass apparently ahead of the _Iron Duke_ at 8.30 P.M., neither of them
+was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs specially
+stationed for the purpose.
+
+Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to south, a signal was
+made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead of the _Iron
+Duke_ and for the 1st Battle Squadron to form astern. This signal
+had, however, been already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the
+_Iron Duke_ in accordance with the general battle orders giving
+discretionary powers to the commanders of squadrons, and the line had
+been partly reformed before the signal was made.
+
+An incident occurred at about 6.47 P.M. which was an indication of the
+spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which it is impossible to speak too
+highly. The destroyer _Acasta_, which had been badly hit aft during
+her attack on enemy light cruisers in company with the _Shark_ and
+had her engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding
+officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled the condition of his
+ship to the _Iron Duke_ as that ship passed, leaving the _Acasta_ on
+her starboard or engaged side. The ship’s company was observed to be
+cheering each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that
+this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were subsequently brought
+into Aberdeen, being assisted by the _Nonsuch_.
+
+Shortly after 6.55 P.M. the _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of a ship
+with the bow and stern standing out of the water, the centre portion
+apparently resting on the bottom, with the destroyer _Badger_ picking
+up survivors. It was thought at first that this was the remains of
+a German light cruiser, but inquiry of the _Badger_ elicited the
+lamentable news that the wreck was that of the _Invincible_. It was
+assumed at the time that she had been sunk either by a mine or by
+a torpedo, and, in view of the safe passage of other ships in her
+vicinity, the latter appeared to be the more probable cause of her
+loss. Subsequent information, however, showed that she was destroyed by
+gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already recorded.
+
+At 7 P.M. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that the enemy was to
+the westward.
+
+Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, brought the enemy’s
+line into view once more, and between 7.0 and 7.30 P.M. the Battle
+Fleet was again in action with battleships and also battle cruisers,
+as they could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period was
+very baffling. The range varied from as much as 15,000 yards at the van
+to as little as 8,000 in the rear, this difference in range indicating
+that the enemy’s Fleet was turning to the westward, as shown in the
+accompanying plan facing page 358.
+
+In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of our
+battleships was very effective at this period. Some instances may be
+given. At 7.15 P.M. the _Iron Duke_, as already mentioned, engaged a
+hostile battleship at 15,000 yards’ range and on a bearing 74 degrees
+from right ahead. At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of
+“Lutzow” type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer smoke
+screen; at 7.17 P.M. the _King George V._ opened fire on a vessel,
+taken to be the leading ship in the enemy’s line at a range of about
+13,000 yards; the _Orion_ at a battleship[L]; the _St. Vincent_ was
+“holding her target (a battleship) effectively till 7.26 P.M., the
+range being between 10,000 and 9,500 yards”; the _Agincourt_ at 7.6
+P.M. opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that showed
+clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least four of her salvoes
+“straddled” the target; the _Revenge_ was engaging what were taken
+to be battle cruisers, obtaining distinct hits on two of them; the
+_Colossus_ from 7.12 to 7.20 P.M. was engaging a ship taken to be a
+battle cruiser, either the _Derfflinger_ or _Lutzow_, at ranges between
+10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct hits, two being
+on the water line; whilst the _Marlborough_, as already mentioned,
+“engaged a ship of the ‘König’ class.” Other vessels reported being in
+effective action during this period. The _Royal Oak_, the ship next
+astern of the _Iron Duke_, opened fire at 7.15 P.M. on the leading ship
+of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000
+yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and fire was shifted to the
+second ship which was lost to sight in the mist after a few rounds had
+been fired. It was difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on
+which fire was being directed, but one or more of the enemy’s battle
+cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 P.M., as a result of the
+heavy punishment they had received from our battle cruisers and the 5th
+Battle Squadron, and were engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet.
+
+    [L] The _Calliope_ reported at 7.1 P.M.: “Two enemy
+        battleships, ‘König’ class, engaged by _Orion’s_ division,
+        observed to be heavily on fire.”
+
+Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships of the 1st
+Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities for effective fire
+than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and the fullest use was made of
+the opportunities. This squadron, under the able command of Sir Cecil
+Burney, was known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof
+was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were needed, that his
+careful training had borne excellent results. The immunity of the ships
+of the squadron from the enemy’s fire, whilst they were inflicting on
+his vessels very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to
+the offensive powers of the squadron.
+
+[Illustration: APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE
+
+GRAND FLEET
+
+At 7. 15 P.M. 31st May 1916.
+
+_Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet, as evidenced
+by the positions of the ships engaged at the time, shown in Red._
+
+The Battle Cruisers and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, have crossed from
+the port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet.
+
+Note. Their battle station is between 5 and 6 miles slightly on the
+engaged bow of the Van of the Battle Fleet.
+
+The 2nd Battle Squadron is forming ahead of the Iron Duke.
+
+The 1st Battle Squadron is forming astern of the Iron Duke.
+
+The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron is getting into its battle-station on
+the Van of the Battle Fleet.
+
+The 4th and 11th Flotillas are moving towards their battle stations.
+
+The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron is coming up from the rear of the Battle
+Fleet to join the Battle Cruisers.
+
+The Minotaur and Cruisers are trying to get up to their battle stations
+ahead of the Battle Fleet.]
+
+At 7.5 P.M. the whole battle line was turned together three more points
+to starboard to close the range further; immediately afterwards two
+ships ahead of the _Iron Duke_ reported a submarine a little on the
+port bow; at 7.10 P.M. a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a
+cruiser, was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W. from the
+_Iron Duke_, and the Fleet was turned back to south in order to turn on
+to the submarine and bring the ships in line ahead ready, for any
+required manœuvre. A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges
+between 10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the destroyers
+turned and passed towards the rear of the line in a heavy smoke screen.
+One destroyer was seen by several observers to sink from the effects of
+the gunfire.
+
+At a sufficient interval before it was considered that the torpedoes
+fired by the destroyers would cross our line, a signal was made to the
+Battle Fleet to turn two points to port by subdivisions. Some minutes
+later a report was made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my
+Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with an instrument
+for giving the necessary information) that this turn was insufficient
+to clear the torpedoes, as I had held on until the last moment; a
+further turn of two points was then made for a short time. As a result
+of this attack and another that followed immediately, some twenty or
+more torpedoes were observed to cross the track of the Battle Fleet,
+in spite of our turn, the large majority of them passing the ships
+of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons at the rear of the line. It was
+fortunate that, owing to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were
+apparently near the end of their run, and were consequently not running
+at high speed. They were all avoided by the very skilful handling of
+the ships by their captains, to whom the highest credit is due, not
+only for their skill in avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in
+which the ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, prevented
+risk of collision and kept their station in the line. The captains were
+most ably assisted by the admirable look-out kept by the organisation
+that existed for dealing with this danger.
+
+The skill shown could not, however, have prevented several ships from
+being torpedoed had the range been less and the torpedoes consequently
+running at a higher speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow
+showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that would hit
+ships in a line when fired from destroyers at ranges up to 8,000 yards
+was comparatively high, even if the tracks were seen and the ships
+were manœuvred to avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes
+are always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the line of
+bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to judge the position
+of the torpedo from its track. Many ships experienced escapes from
+this and other attacks; thus the _Hercules_ reported that she “turned
+away six points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along the
+starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the other passed close
+under the stern”; the _Neptune_ reported that “the tracks of three
+torpedoes were seen from the fore-top, one of which passed very close
+and was avoided by the use of the helm”; in the _Agincourt’s_ report,
+a statement occurred that “at 7.8 P.M. a torpedo just missed astern,
+it having been reported from aloft and course altered”; and again,
+“at 7.38 P.M. tracks of two torpedoes running parallel were observed
+approaching; course altered to avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and
+at 8.25 P.M. torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed;
+torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard bow”; the
+_Revenge_ remarked, “at 7.35 P.M. altered course to port to avoid two
+torpedoes, one passed about ten yards ahead and the other about twenty
+yards astern, and at 7.43 P.M. altered course to avoid torpedoes, two
+passing astern”; the _Colossus_ stated, “at 7.35 P.M. turned to port
+to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side”; the _Barham_ at this
+period reported that “at least four torpedoes passed through the line
+close to the _Barham_”; the _Collingwood_ reported, “torpedo track was
+seen 20 degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; large
+helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close astern; at the same
+time another was seen to pass about thirty yards ahead.” The captain of
+the _Collingwood_, in remarking on the destroyer’s attack, added, “the
+great value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me, an
+outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action.”
+
+The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 P.M. and the Fleet was
+brought to a south by west course by 7.33 P.M. (that is, to a course
+one point to the westward of the course of the Fleet before the
+destroyer attack). The total amount by which the range was opened by
+the turns was about 1,750 yards.
+
+The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th Flotillas had been
+delayed in reaching their action station at the van until about 7.10
+P.M., owing to the turns to the westward made by the Battle Fleet to
+close the enemy. In accordance with arrangements made previously to
+counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out to engage
+the enemy destroyers, which, according to the report of the Commodore
+Le Mesurier, commanding the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering
+towards the head of the division led by the _King George V._, the van
+ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed for the first
+attack for the reason given above, they were in a very favourable
+position to counter the second destroyer attack, which took place at
+7.25 P.M. The enemy’s flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before
+the starboard beam of the _Iron Duke_ at a range of 9,000 yards and was
+heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, 1st, and 5th Battle
+Squadrons. During this attack three enemy destroyers were reported as
+sunk by the fire of the battleships, light cruisers and destroyers; one
+of them, bearing a Commodore’s pendant, being sunk at 7.50 P.M. by a
+division of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the _Obedient_, _Marvel_,
+_Mindful_ and _Onslaught_, which attacked them near the rear of our
+battle line. The _Southampton_ and _Dublin_, of the 2nd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, attacked and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least
+six torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the track
+of, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their attack on the German
+flotilla.
+
+The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring movement on the
+part of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, the movement being covered with the
+aid of a heavy smoke screen. Although this retirement was not visible
+from the _Iron Duke_ owing to the smoke and mist, and was, therefore,
+not known to me until after the action, it was clearly seen from the
+rear of our line, as is indicated by the following citations:
+
+    The Captain of the _Valiant_ stated in his report: “At 7.23 P.M.
+    enemy’s Battle Fleet now altered course together away from us
+    and broke off the action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which
+    effectually covered their retreat and obscured them from further
+    view.”
+
+    The Captain of the _Malaya_ reported, referring to this period:
+    “This was the last of the enemy seen in daylight, owing to their
+    Battle Fleet having turned away.”
+
+    Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period: “As the destroyer
+    attack developed, the enemy’s Battle Fleet in sight were observed
+    to turn at least eight points until their sterns were towards our
+    line. They ceased fire, declined further action, and disappeared
+    into the mist.”
+
+    The Captain of the _St. Vincent_ said: “The target was held
+    closely until 7.26 P.M. (32 minutes in all), when the enemy had
+    turned eight or ten points away, disappearing into the mist and
+    with a smoke screen made by destroyers to cover them as well.”
+
+    Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: “After joining the Battle
+    Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron conformed to the movements of the
+    Commander-in-Chief, engaging the rear ships of the enemy’s battle
+    line, until they turned away and went out of sight, all ships
+    apparently covering themselves with artificial smoke.”
+
+    The Captain of the _Revenge_ recorded: “A flotilla of destroyers
+    passed through the line and made a most efficient smoke screen. At
+    this period the enemy’s fleet turned eight points to starboard and
+    rapidly drew out of sight.”
+
+In the German account of the action at this stage, it is stated, in
+more than one passage, that the British Fleet during this action
+between the Battle Fleets was to the northward of the High Seas
+Fleet. This is correct of the earlier stages. The account refers to
+the attacks on our line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states
+finally that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the heavy
+ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the north-eastward.
+The accuracy of this statement is doubtful, since the destroyers were
+clearly in sight from our heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to
+state that “the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line to a
+southerly and south-westerly course _on which the enemy was last seen_,
+but he is no longer to be found.”
+
+This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships bore north and
+north-east from the enemy and then that the enemy turned to south and
+south-west, that is, _directly away from the British Fleet_. Thus the
+fact that the German Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans.
+
+No report of this movement of the German Fleet reached me, and at
+first it was thought that his temporary disappearance was due to
+the thickening mist, especially as firing could be heard from the
+battleships in rear, but at 7.41 P.M., the enemy Battle Fleet being no
+longer in sight from the _Iron Duke_, course was altered “by divisions”
+three points more to starboard (namely, to south-west) to close the
+enemy, and single line ahead was again formed on the _Iron Duke_ on
+that course.
+
+At this period the rear of our battle line was still in action at
+intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s fleet, which were
+probably some that had dropped astern partially disabled, but by 7.55
+P.M. fire had practically ceased.
+
+At about 7.40 P.M. I received a report from Sir David Beatty stating
+that the enemy bore north-west by west from the _Lion_, distant 10 to
+11 miles, and that the _Lion’s_ course was south-west. Although the
+battle cruisers were not in sight from the _Iron Duke_, I assumed the
+_Lion_ to be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet,
+but it appeared later from a report received in reply to directions
+signalled by me at 8.10 P.M. to the _King George V._ to follow the
+battle cruisers, that they were not in sight from that ship either.
+
+At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have become divided, for
+whilst Sir David Beatty reported the presence of battleships north-west
+by west from the _Lion_, other enemy battleships were observed to the
+westward (that is, on the starboard bow of the _Iron Duke_), and the
+course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions” to west in order
+to close the enemy; this alteration was made at 7.59 P.M.
+
+It will be observed that all the large alterations of course of the
+Battle Fleet during the engagement were made “by divisions” instead
+of “in succession from the van, or together.” The reason was that in
+this way the whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with far
+greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation, than if the movement
+had been carried out by the line “in succession.”
+
+The objection to altering by turning all ships together was the
+inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result of such a
+manœuvre carried out with a very large Fleet under action conditions in
+misty weather, particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of
+bearing for a long period.
+
+The battleships sighted at 7.59 P.M. opened fire on the ships of
+the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved out to starboard of
+the battle line to engage a flotilla of enemy destroyers which were
+steering to attack the Battle Fleet. The _Calliope_, the flagship of
+Commodore Le Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some
+damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a torpedo at
+the leading battleship at a range of 6,500 yards; an explosion was
+noticed on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class by the _Calliope_.[M] The
+ships sighted turned away and touch could not be regained, although
+sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 P.M., probably
+from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch with and engaged some
+of the enemy’s ships very effectively between 8.22 and 8.25 P.M. The
+_Falmouth_ was the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch
+with the enemy, at 8.38 P.M.; the ships then in sight turned eight
+points together away from the _Falmouth_.
+
+    [M] All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was
+        clearly concussion under water, and may have been caused by
+        the _Calliope’s_ torpedo obtaining a hit.
+
+At 8.30 P.M. the light was failing and the Fleet was turned “by
+divisions” to a south-west course, thus reforming single line again.
+
+During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described above, the battle
+cruisers were in action ahead as mentioned in Sir David Beatty’s report
+in the Appendix.
+
+At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the large alterations
+of course carried out by the High Sea Fleet, but it was regained at
+7.12 P.M., the battle cruisers opening fire at 7.14 P.M., though only
+for two and a half minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At
+this period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by south to
+south-west, and this course took them from the port to the starboard
+bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 P.M. The movements of our battle
+cruisers, which were at this time between four and five miles ahead of
+the van of the Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly,
+to the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers themselves,
+but even more to the funnel smoke from the numerous cruisers, light
+cruisers and destroyers which were attempting to gain their positions
+ahead of the van.
+
+The movements of the enemy’s fleet could not be distinguished from our
+Battle Fleet owing again to their own funnel and cordite smoke, and,
+also, to the smoke screens which ships and destroyers were making to
+conceal their movements.
+
+It will be realised that these conditions, which particularly affected
+the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the same extent to our ships ahead
+of our Battle Fleet. They had little but the smoke of the enemy’s
+leading ships to obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle
+Fleet had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that of the
+enemy’s long line of ships.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    H. M. S. “SUPERB” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+
+    H. M. S. “CANADA” ASTERN OF “SUPERB”]
+
+Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the Battle Fleet
+were very much accentuated in the Battle Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn
+Jerram, in his report, remarked on this point: “As leading ship, in
+addition to the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I imagine
+must have been cordite fumes from the battle cruisers after they had
+passed us, and from other cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel
+gases from small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense
+smoke from the _Duke of Edinburgh_, which was unable to draw clear.”
+
+The general position at 6.45 P.M. and again at 7.15 P.M. is shown in
+plans 8 and 9.
+
+At 7.10 P.M., according to remarks from the _Minotaur_, flagship of
+Rear-Admiral W. L. Heath, commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the
+position as seen from that ship was as follows: “The 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port side
+of the _King George V._, gaining on her slightly, but with all the
+destroyers and light craft between her and the _King George V._ The
+battle cruisers were about four miles distant on the starboard bow
+of the _Minotaur_; owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers
+rapidly increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some eight
+miles.”[N]
+
+    [N] Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here
+        described should be timed at about 6.50 to 7 P.M., and the
+        diagrams show this accordingly.
+
+At 7.5 P.M. according to a report from the _Shannon_, of the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron, the _Shannon’s_ course was S. 10 W., “the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron endeavouring to take station on the engaged bow of the Battle
+Fleet; the Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not engaged
+and turned slightly to port.” And again at 7.22 P.M. a report says:
+“The _Duke of Edinburgh_ had now taken station astern of the _Shannon_,
+the battle cruisers were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading
+ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross the bows
+of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard. Battle cruisers firing
+intermittently, light cruisers making their way through the destroyer
+flotillas to attack the enemy light cruisers.” Rear-Admiral Heath
+stated: “At 7.11 P.M. I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots to take
+up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was then engaged
+with the enemy.” He added: “One salvo fell short on the starboard bow
+of the _Minotaur_ and some others in close proximity”; and later says,
+“even when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell, no
+more than the flashes of the enemy’s guns could be seen.”
+
+Further remarks from the _Shannon_, at a later stage, were: “At 8 P.M.
+Battle Fleet altered course to starboard to close the enemy, and by
+8.15 was lost to sight, bearing about north by east.”
+
+“At 8.15 P.M. Battle Fleet, out of sight from _Shannon_, was heard to
+be in action.”
+
+“At 8.30 P.M. the visibility of grey ships was about 9,000 yards.” “At
+8.45 P.M. _King George V._ again sighted, bearing north-north-east.
+Visibility had again improved, and her range was estimated at about
+10,000 yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close enemy.”
+
+At 7.20 P.M. the ships engaged by our battle cruisers turned away and
+were lost to sight. They were located for a moment at 8.20 P.M. with
+the aid of the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they
+disappeared again at once, they were once more located and effectively
+engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 P.M. at about 10,000 yards range. They
+turned away once more and were finally lost to sight by the 3rd Light
+Cruiser Squadron (the last ships to keep in touch) at 8.38 P.M.,
+steaming to the westward.
+
+This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers had of putting
+the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s work. They had, under the
+very able and gallant leadership of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the
+splendid squadron so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone far to
+crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser Squadron.
+
+It will be seen from the above account that our battle cruisers
+experienced great difficulty in locating and holding the enemy after
+7.20 P.M., even when far ahead of the Battle Fleet, with its small
+craft, and therefore in a position of freedom from the smoke of our own
+vessels and the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 P.M., the battle
+cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The enemy turned away
+on each occasion when he was located and showed no disposition to fight.
+
+The visibility by this time had become very bad; the light was failing,
+and it became necessary to decide on the disposition for the night.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_)
+
+
+III.--THE NIGHT ACTION
+
+The situation, which had never been at all clear to me owing to the
+fact that I had not seen more than a few ships at a time, appeared to
+be as follows:
+
+We were between the enemy and his bases, whether he shaped a course
+to return via the Horn Reef, via Heligoland direct, or via the swept
+channel which he was known to use along the coast of the West Frisian
+Islands.
+
+I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward of us. He had been
+turning on _interior_ lines throughout. We had altered course gradually
+during the action from south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points,
+or 146 degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his
+ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it was possible
+that ships, which had fallen out owing to damage, might be to the
+northward.
+
+The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind,
+but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action
+between the heavy ships.
+
+It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it.
+
+In the first place, such a course must have inevitably led to our
+Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large destroyer
+force throughout the night. No senior officer would willingly court
+such an attack, even if our battleships were equipped with the
+best searchlights and the best arrangements for the control of the
+searchlights and the gunfire at night.
+
+It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights nor their
+control arrangements were at this time of the best type. The fitting
+of director-firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our
+battleships (a very important factor for firing at night) had also
+only just been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay was
+due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts
+I knew well that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not
+be obtained, and that we could place no dependence on beating off
+destroyer attacks by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch
+with the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no
+corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote
+at night, since, if they were disposed with this sole object in view,
+they would certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by
+our own ships.
+
+But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, the result
+of night actions between heavy ships must always be very largely a
+matter of _chance_, as there is little opportunity for skill on either
+side. Such an action must be fought at very close range, the decision
+depending on the course of events in the first few minutes. It is,
+therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general grounds. The
+greater efficiency of German searchlights at the time of the Jutland
+action, and the greater number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships,
+combined with his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the
+Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such
+an action.
+
+The question then remained as to the course to be steered. The first
+desideratum was to keep the British Fleet between the enemy and his
+bases, so as to be in a position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight
+was rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet for the
+night as quickly as possible to avoid visual signalling after dark; and
+it was also necessary to place our destroyers in a position where the
+chances of their coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a
+minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking the enemy’s
+capital ships during the night. The Grand Fleet was formed at the time
+in practically a single line, steering approximately west-south-west. I
+considered that a southerly course would meet the situation and would
+enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and, if I put the destroyers
+astern, they would fulfil three conditions: first, they would be in
+an excellent position for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also
+turn to the southward with a view to regaining its bases during the
+night (which seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy);
+secondly, they would also be in position to attack enemy destroyers
+should the latter search for our fleet with a view to a night attack
+on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships,
+and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error or of our
+battleships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum.
+
+Accordingly, at 9 P.M., I signalled to the Battle Fleet to alter
+course by divisions to _south_, informing the Flag officers of the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the
+officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that
+they should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle Fleet
+to assume the second organisation and to form divisions in line ahead
+disposed abeam to port, with the columns one mile apart. This had the
+effect of placing the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram:
+
+      1 mile     1 mile     1 mile
+   |<-------->|<-------->|<--------->
+   |          |          |
+   |          |          |          |
+   |          |          |          |
+   |          |          |          |
+  2nd        4th        1st        5th
+
+            Battle Squadrons.
+
+My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was to ensure that
+adjacent columns should not lose sight of each other during the night,
+and that therefore they would not mistake our own ships for those of
+the enemy.
+
+As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course the
+destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of
+the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 P.M. a signal was made to the mine-laying
+flotilla leader _Abdiel_ (Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay
+a mine-field in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship,
+over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would pass if the ships
+attempted to regain their ports during the night viâ the Horn Reef. The
+_Abdiel_ carried out this operation unobserved in the same successful
+manner as numerous other similar operations had been undertaken by this
+most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one of our submarines,
+stationed near the Horn Reef, which reported on return to her base
+having heard several underwater explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 A.M.
+on June 1st, it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines.
+
+At 10 P.M. the position of the _Iron Duke_ was Lat. 56.22 N., Long.
+5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, and the order of the Fleet from
+west to east was:
+
+    Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron); Cruiser
+    Squadrons;
+
+    Battle Fleet;
+
+    2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squadron;
+
+    4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet;
+
+    11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from west to
+    east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet.
+
+Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward for the night a
+destroyer attack took place on the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron at the
+rear of our Battle line. This was reported to me shortly after 9 P.M.,
+but immediately afterwards a further report stated that the enemy had
+been driven off to the north-west.
+
+At 10.4 P.M. Commodore Hawkesley, in the _Castor_, commanding the
+destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern, sighted three or more
+vessels at a range of 2,000 yards which he took to be enemy battle
+cruisers. If the German report is to be believed, the ships were light
+cruisers and included the _Hamburg_ and _Elbing_. The enemy at once
+opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the _Castor_ was hit, and her
+bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, making it impossible to
+signal to the 11th Flotilla, which the _Castor_ was leading. The damage
+to the _Castor_ was slight. The _Castor_, _Magic_, and _Marne_ fired
+torpedoes at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla
+refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity of the
+vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a violent detonation,
+following on the discharge of the torpedoes, had been felt in the
+engine-rooms of the destroyers near the _Castor_.
+
+At 0.15 A.M. the _Castor_ sighted a German destroyer on her starboard
+bow and opened fire with all guns at point-blank range. She was not
+seen again.
+
+At 10.20 P.M. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and engaged five
+enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with four light cruisers, probably
+of the 4th Scouting Group. The enemy again opened fire with great
+rapidity and accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading
+ships, the _Southampton_ and _Dublin_, at very short range. Both
+vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15 minutes’ engagement
+and there were fairly heavy casualties; three fires which broke out on
+board the _Southampton_ were promptly extinguished by fine work on the
+part of the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had
+been much cut up by shell fire.
+
+The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but fierce engagement,
+and it is probable that the German light cruiser _Frauenlob_, whose
+loss was admitted by the enemy, was sunk during this action, which took
+place in that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and the
+German 4th Scouting Group.
+
+At 11.30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy cruisers
+steering a south-easterly course. Again the vessels sighted opened fire
+immediately, and the flotilla leader _Tipperary_, commanded by Captain
+Wintour, the leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire
+and set on fire forward; the _Broke_, leader of the 2nd half Flotilla,
+received injury to her steering-gear, rendering her temporarily
+unmanageable and causing her to ram the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, with
+the result that it became necessary to abandon the latter destroyer
+on the following morning after taking off her crew. The destroyer
+_Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Trelawny), next astern of the
+_Tipperary_, fired torpedoes at a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared
+to be hit and in a sinking condition, and the _Spitfire_ then collided
+with a German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried
+off some 29 feet of her skin plating.
+
+The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement, while
+steering to the south-eastward, came into contact at midnight with the
+enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron, and one ship (probably the _Pommern_)
+was torpedoed and sunk either by the _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander
+Marsden) or _Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Coles) or _Garland_
+(Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff). A heavy and accurate fire was opened
+by the enemy and the destroyer _Fortune_ (Lieutenant-Commander F. G.
+Terry) was sunk.
+
+The flotilla was again in action a little later with some enemy
+battleships, and the _Ardent_ attacked, and fired a torpedo, but the
+result could not be observed as a very heavy fire was concentrated
+on the _Ardent_, which sank with colours flying after a very gallant
+night’s work. It is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden and
+one man were the only survivors, being picked up by a destroyer on June
+1st after having been five hours in the water.
+
+The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of the 1st Battle
+Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was somewhat astern of the remainder
+of the Fleet during the night, owing to the _Marlborough_ not being
+able to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions for this
+speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also more than five miles
+astern of the main portion of the Battle Fleet. At 11.30 P.M. also this
+flotilla was obliged for some little time to steer a south-easterly
+course, owing to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard
+hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with certainty. The
+result was that the 12th Flotilla was probably some ten miles to the
+north-eastward of the 1st Battle Squadron by midnight. The incident was
+a fortunate one since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of
+the enemy’s battle squadrons.
+
+At 1.45 A.M. Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in the _Faulknor_,
+sighted on the starboard bow this battle squadron, consisting of six
+ships steering south-east. The leading ships were thought to belong to
+the “Kaiser” class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel
+to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots to draw ahead,
+with the intention of turning to attack on a north-westerly course (the
+reverse of the enemy’s course), in order to give an opportunity of
+getting into close range. This attack was carried out at 2 A.M. at a
+range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their torpedoes at
+the second and third ships in the line. Some took effect on the third
+battleship in the line, the explosion being so violent and the flame
+reaching to such a height that it appeared to those in our destroyers
+that the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the magazine
+and destroyed the ship.
+
+Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the enemy light
+cruisers, which were in company with the battle squadron. The destroyer
+_Mænad_ (Commander J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the
+north-westward with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had been
+anticipated that the attack would have been made with torpedo tubes
+bearing to starboard, and her tubes were not ready to fire to port.
+Commander Champion held on the south-easterly course and, turning later
+than the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned again
+to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at 2.25 A.M. fired
+two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth ship in the line at a range
+between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, one of which took effect. In this case,
+too, the flame of the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was
+not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her were visible.
+
+It is of interest to note that at the time of the first attack on this
+squadron six battleships were visible. After the first attack only five
+were seen by Captain Stirling, and twenty-five minutes later five were
+sighted by the _Mænad_, and after the _Mænad’s_ attack only four were
+visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships was sunk was
+considered at the time to be very strong, particularly as the reports
+from the _Mænad_ and from Captain Stirling were sent to me quite
+independently, and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that
+Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original number in the
+battle squadron, and five as the number remaining after his attack.
+
+When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle squadron he
+reported the fact by wireless, but the signal was, unfortunately, not
+received by any ship, owing, presumably, to the strong interference
+caused by German wireless signalling at the time.
+
+The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas took station astern
+the Battle Fleet in company with the _Champion_ (Captain Farie), leader
+of the 13th Flotilla; the _Fearless_, leader of the 9th Flotilla,
+had not been able to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the
+destroyers of these flotillas lost touch with the _Champion_ during the
+night, and the flotillas became somewhat scattered.
+
+At 12.30 A.M. a large vessel, taken at first for one of our own ships,
+crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed, passing close to the
+_Petard_ and _Turbulent_. She rammed the _Turbulent_ and opened a heavy
+fire on both the _Turbulent_ and _Petard_; the _Turbulent_ sank and the
+_Petard_ was damaged.
+
+At 2.35 A.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, of the 13th Flotilla, sighted
+four battleships of the “Deutschland” class, and attacked, firing one
+torpedo; an explosion was subsequently heard.
+
+It was impossible to state with certainty which of our destroyers
+were actually successful in their attacks. The enemy, of course,
+denied that any marked success was obtained by our attacks, but
+information obtained after the action made it certain that at least
+four battleships of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes,
+in addition to the pre-Dreadnought battleship _Pommern_, which was
+admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the light cruiser
+_Rostock_.
+
+Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot be attributed
+to particular destroyers, the work of the flotillas as a whole, and
+particularly of the 4th and 12th Flotillas, was characterised by the
+splendid dash, skill and gallantry for which our destroyers had been
+conspicuous throughout the War. They were most ably led and achieved
+magnificent work under very difficult conditions.
+
+There is no doubt at all that the German organisation for night action
+was of a remarkably high standard. In the first place, the use of star
+shell, at that time unfamiliar to us, was of the greatest use to them
+in locating our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and,
+secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful (much more so
+than ours), but their method of controlling them and bringing guns and
+searchlights rapidly on to any vessel sighted was excellent. It also
+appeared that some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of
+their secondary armament.
+
+The increased offensive power given by these devices did not, however,
+prevent our destroyers from inflicting great damage on the enemy during
+their night attacks, although they led to the loss of some valuable
+destroyers and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader
+of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of destroyer work
+and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and other splendid officers
+perished with their gallant crews. Our destroyer service has, indeed,
+every reason to be exceedingly proud of the achievements of the
+flotillas, both during the day action of May 31st and during the night
+following that action.
+
+Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals during the
+night, and, curiously enough, the under-water explosions, four or five
+in number, were quite clearly recorded on a barograph in the _Malaya_,
+a ship well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There is
+little doubt that these records showed the explosion of our torpedoes
+against enemy ships.
+
+From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark that our
+destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired with great frequency
+by the enemy, and they produced a very brilliant illumination, leaving
+the enemy ships in complete darkness and not revealing their positions.
+
+At 11 P.M. the light cruiser _Active_, astern of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, and shortly afterwards
+saw searchlights switched on and a heavy fire opened against this
+vessel by a ship, or ships, on her starboard quarter. She appeared to
+be heavily hit and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been
+the _Black Prince_, which had apparently lost touch with our fleet
+during the day action.
+
+Shortly after this incident the _Active_ passed over some submerged
+object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent examination showed
+that some 15 feet of her bilge keel had been torn away. It was not
+conceivable that the object struck could have been submerged wreckage
+from any ship which had taken part in the action, no fighting having
+taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed possible that the _Active_
+had struck an enemy submarine. At 11.30 P.M. the _Colossus_ also passed
+over some submerged object which was felt to scrape along the bottom
+of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to both starboard
+propeller blades. Again there is doubt as to what the obstruction could
+have been; it was certainly not wreckage from any ship that had been in
+action.
+
+At 2 A.M. on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney informed me that
+the _Marlborough_ could not maintain the Fleet speed of 17 knots any
+longer, on account of the stress on the bulkheads, and that she had
+been obliged to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship
+to proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the German mined
+area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light cruiser _Fearless_ alongside
+the _Marlborough_, and was transferred in her, with his Staff, to
+the _Revenge_, the _Fearless_ being then detached to escort the
+_Marlborough_.
+
+Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements which
+constituted the Battle of Jutland will be gathered from a consideration
+of the distances steamed by our ships during the operations.
+
+The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 3.48 P.M., the time
+of opening fire, and 6.17 P.M. the time that the Battle Fleet commenced
+action, and a further distance of some 57 miles to 9 P.M., when the
+Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle Fleet steamed
+some 47 miles between the commencement of their engagement with the
+High Sea Fleet and the turn to the southward at 9 P.M.
+
+The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the period covered by the
+night action--9 P.M. to 2 A.M.
+
+At 2.47 A.M., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered course to north
+and formed single line ahead in the order--2nd Battle Squadron, 4th
+Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th
+Battle Squadron rejoined at 3.30 A.M. and took station ahead of the 2nd
+Battle Squadron.
+
+The weather was misty and the visibility even less than on May 31st,
+being only some three or four miles, and I considered it desirable
+under these conditions, and in view of the fact that I was not in
+touch with either my cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger
+of submarine attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th Division of the
+Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, having dropped astern during
+the night owing to the reduction in speed of the _Marlborough_ and
+the change of flag from the _Marlborough_ to the _Revenge_. Partly on
+account of the low visibility, and partly because of the inevitable
+difference in dead reckoning between ships, due to their many movements
+during the action and during the night, considerable difficulty was
+experienced in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to
+the destroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and whose
+facilities for computing their positions under these conditions
+were only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all
+classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause me any
+surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 A.M., the destroyers
+did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 A.M., and the 6th Division of the
+Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Squadron, was not
+in company until the evening.
+
+The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particularly
+the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for
+the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my
+intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night.
+It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the
+destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was
+effected it had become apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for
+the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields
+in the early morning on the way to their ports. The presence of a
+Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 A.M., made it certain that our position at
+that time would be known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the
+information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the
+early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must have passed
+the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly after daylight.
+
+At 3 A.M. the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, which was lying disabled in Lat.
+55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted a German light cruiser two miles to
+the eastward, steaming slowly to the northward. After being in sight
+for about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, bows
+first. The _Sparrowhawk_ was subsequently sighted by the _Marksman_ and
+others of our destroyers, and, being too seriously damaged for towing
+back to a base, was sunk by the _Marksman_.
+
+Shortly after 3.30 A.M. the report of gunfire to the westward was
+audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier,
+commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was
+engaging a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle Fleet.
+Course was altered “by divisions” to west at 3.44 A.M., as it seemed
+that the presence of the airship might possibly indicate the presence
+also of the High Sea Fleet. At 3.50 A.M. a Zeppelin was in sight from
+the Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back again to
+north and fire opened on the airship, which, however, was too high for
+the fire to be effective. She disappeared to the eastward. She was
+sighted subsequently at intervals.
+
+At 4.10 A.M. the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions in line ahead,
+disposed abeam to starboard, in order to widen the front and to reduce
+the risk of submarine attack. At 4.25 A.M. the cruiser _Dublin_
+reported by wireless that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two
+destroyers, and she gave her position.
+
+At 5.15 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle Fleet in
+accordance with orders signalled, and was directed to locate the
+cruiser reported by the _Dublin_, whilst the Battle Fleet searched to
+the south-eastward for one of the enemy’s battle cruisers which was
+thought to be in a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still
+making for a German port. At 4.45 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat.
+55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 A.M. the Commodore of the flotillas
+(Commodore Hawkesley), with destroyers, reported himself as being in
+Lat. 55.48 N., Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was
+in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at 18 knots, and
+at 6.15 A.M. altered course to south. At 6 A.M., not having met the
+destroyers, the Battle Fleet altered course to south-east, with the
+cruisers in company, steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course
+until 7.15 A.M., at which time course was altered to north, the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 A.M. and to north at 8 A.M.
+
+The _Dublin_ was sighted at 7.55 A.M. and reported having lost sight in
+a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32 E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat
+destroyers she had reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated
+that the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming fast.
+
+At 8.15 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 6.10 E.,
+steering north at 17 knots, turning at 8.52 A.M. to a south-west course.
+
+Between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. a considerable amount of wreckage was passed,
+and the bodies of dead German bluejackets were seen in the water. The
+wreckage of the destroyer _Ardent_ was also passed. Drifting mines in
+considerable numbers were seen during the whole forenoon of the 1st
+June, and there were one or two reports of submarines being sighted.
+At 10 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the
+Battle Fleet, and course was altered to north by west, the destroyers,
+which had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine screen.
+
+At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 5.25 E.,
+and at 12.30 P.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long.
+6.11 E.
+
+It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had either sunk or had
+passed inside the mine-fields _en route_ to their bases. It had been
+evident since the early morning, from the definite information obtained
+by our directional stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to
+port. All our own injured vessels were also _en route_ for their bases,
+and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, and gave the necessary
+instructions to the Rosyth force to return independently. Diagram 4
+shows the movement of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the
+forenoon of June 1st.
+
+The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had been kept in port by
+Admiralty orders on May 31st, and was despatched to sea on the morning
+of June 1st, when I was informed that it was being sent out to join me
+and to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 A.M. I instructed Commodore
+Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to screen the _Marlborough_
+to her base; he informed me at 2.30 P.M. that he had sighted the
+_Marlborough_. At 10.40 A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I
+did not require the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt to
+strengthen the _Marlborough’s_ escort and told him that I did not need
+his ships. They would have been of great use at daylight in June 1st
+had they been on the scene at that time, and it is needless to add how
+much I should have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in
+the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew well the extreme
+efficiency and the fine fighting spirit of this force which, under its
+gallant and distinguished commodore, had rendered such splendid service
+throughout the War.
+
+The _Marlborough_ reported at 11 A.M. that a torpedo had been fired at
+her and had missed. Some anxiety was felt about the ship on the morning
+of June 2nd, as bad weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs
+were ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber at 8 A.M.
+
+The _Warrior_, which had been taken in tow by the sea-plane carrier
+_Engadine_, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 3.54 E. at 8 A.M. on the
+1st June, but the crew was taken off by the _Engadine_ and the ship
+abandoned later in the day, as the weather had become bad and it
+was evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of rescue
+was very smartly carried out, the _Engadine_ being skilfully placed
+alongside the _Warrior_ in a considerable sea way by her Captain,
+Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson, and the large number of wounded
+transferred to her. The reports as to the condition of the _Warrior_
+were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain afloat, and
+later fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore I detached the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron, and subsequently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+to search for her. The search continued until the evening of June
+23rd, no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a report
+received subsequently from the Captain of the _Warrior_ that her
+condition was such that she must have sunk shortly after having been
+abandoned. During the search for the _Warrior_, one of the cruisers of
+the 2nd Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at dusk,
+opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported quite definitely that
+the submarine had been sunk. Later evidence showed, however, that the
+submarine was one of our own vessels of this class, that she had a
+very narrow escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This was
+one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines being mistaken for
+an enemy, attacked by our own ships, and considered to be sunk. The
+difficulty of ascertaining definitely the result of an engagement with
+a submarine was thereby exemplified, and was one of the weighty reasons
+which led the Admiralty during the War to refrain from publishing any
+figures giving the results of engagements with submarines.
+
+Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the destroyer _Broke_,
+and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was directed to search for that vessel
+also, assisted by two light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely
+in the Tyne, having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or
+partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach port were
+the _Acasta_, towed by the _Nonsuch_, and the _Onslow_, towed by the
+_Defender_.
+
+The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, and was reported
+ready for sea at four hours’ notice at 9.45 P.M. on that date.
+
+_Note._--In the diagrams embodied in this chapter there are some slight
+departures from those which accompanied my original despatch to the
+Admiralty.
+
+That despatch was sent in under constant pressure for its early receipt
+and at a time when I, in common with my Staff, was very fully occupied
+with the arrangements connected with the repair of damaged ships, the
+constructive alterations which the action had shown to be necessary
+in our ships, and the various committees which I had formed to report
+on different subjects in the light of our experience. I was not,
+therefore, able to give the personal attention to the reports which
+later opportunities have afforded me, and such slight modifications
+as I have made are due to a closer study of these reports, and of the
+signals received during May 31st.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to send to the King
+on the morning of June 3rd a message of humble duty, respectful and
+heartfelt wishes on His Majesty’s birthday.
+
+The following reply was received from His Majesty, and communicated to
+the Fleet:
+
+    “I am deeply touched by the message which you have sent me on
+    behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow of a battle
+    which has once more displayed the splendid gallantry of the
+    officers and men under your command. I mourn the loss of brave men,
+    many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their
+    country’s cause. Yet even more do I regret that the German High Sea
+    Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by the misty weather
+    to evade the full consequences of an encounter they have always
+    professed to desire, but for which when the opportunity arrived
+    they showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the enemy
+    immediately after the opening of the general engagement robbed
+    us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events
+    of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valour and
+    efficiency of the fleets under your command.
+
+                                                          “GEORGE R. I.”
+
+The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious message, and
+I added in my telegram to His Majesty that it was “a matter of the
+greatest gratification to all ranks to receive such an expression
+of Your Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our gallant
+comrades.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+
+
+There has been some discussion on the tactics of the Jutland Battle,
+and no doubt there will be more. I have endeavoured to give the facts,
+so that future discussions may take place with adequate knowledge.
+
+It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have seen
+expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with the object of enticing
+the enemy out to attack the weaker portion in order to provide the
+opportunity for a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May
+31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the southward of the
+Battle Fleet in pursuance of the policy which had been frequently
+carried out on previous occasions.
+
+Many surmises have been made as to the object with which the High Sea
+Fleet put to sea on this occasion. The view which I have always held
+is that the frequent light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down
+the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the Skagerrak during the
+spring of 1916, may have induced the German Commander-in-Chief to send
+out a force with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged
+in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle Fleet to sea
+in support of this force. There is no doubt that he did not expect to
+meet the whole Grand Fleet. If confirmation of this were needed it is
+supplied in the German account of the battle, in which it is stated
+that “there was no reason for supposing that any enemy forces were
+about, much less the entire British Fleet.”
+
+Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of the whole
+strategy and tactics of the War, leads naturally to the fresh problems
+which the advent of new weapons had introduced. When I took command
+of the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that of how to counter a
+destroyer attack in a day action. It had excited more attention in the
+two or three years before the War than any other question of tactics,
+much attention was devoted to it during the War, and for that reason it
+is desirable to discuss it fully.
+
+It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what were then
+known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions between Battle Fleets as
+an exercise), that destroyer attacks were actually carried out in the
+British Navy on a large scale.
+
+During that year manœuvres took place between the 3rd and 4th Divisions
+of the Home Fleets, commanded by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven,
+and the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase of the
+manœuvres of that year included some Battle Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,”
+during which attacks by considerable forces of destroyers were carried
+out. Before this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the
+fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place without
+destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented the matter from being
+made the subject of thorough practical experiment on such a scale as to
+give reliable guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into
+greater prominence.
+
+The Fleet manœuvres of 1912 did not throw further light on the
+question, as no Fleet action took place in which destroyers were
+engaged; and the subsequent Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as
+I recollect, include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged.
+During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 manœuvres most of the
+destroyer attacks on the “Red” Fleet were made from towards the rear of
+the “Blue” battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge from
+them.
+
+To turn from manœuvre experience; during the years 1911–14, covering
+the period of Sir George Callaghan’s command of the Home Fleets,
+destroyer attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that
+were constantly being carried out, and officers were impressed with the
+supreme importance of the whole matter.
+
+This was the position when I took over the command of the Grand
+Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the matter immediately engaged my
+attention. The “counter” which had usually been favoured by flag
+officers commanding Fleets up to the date named, had been the obvious
+one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ torpedo craft on those
+of the enemy, as the latter advanced to attack. It was difficult to
+forecast how far such a “counter” would be successful in preventing the
+destroyers from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the distance
+the torpedo could be relied upon to run with accuracy, and on its
+speed, both constantly increasing figures.
+
+The great number of destroyers possessed by the enemy, the largely
+increased range of torpedoes, the difficulty which our light cruisers
+and flotillas might experience in reaching a favourable position
+for meeting and disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter
+could discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger attendant
+on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low visibility, when a
+destroyer attack could be instantly and effectively launched before
+such a “counter” could take place, made it essential to consider other
+means for dealing with the situation.
+
+Some German documents which came into our possession early in the War
+proved the importance which the enemy attached to this form of attack,
+and emphasised the gravity of the question.
+
+It was, of course, fully realised that the question had two sides, and
+that if our own Battle Fleet was open to this form of attack, that of
+the enemy was equally so, but as against this there were important
+considerations to which it was necessary to devote attention.
+
+The first was that the element of chance enters very largely into
+torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla of destroyers attacking
+a Battle Fleet at long range does so with the idea that a certain
+percentage of the torpedoes fired will take effect on the ships, the
+remainder passing between the ships.
+
+Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards having a speed of
+30 knots an hour, or, in other words, of 50 feet per second, is not
+comparable to a projectile from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000
+yards of say 2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly
+straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course of the target
+have been determined with considerable accuracy, the torpedo will not
+hit. Let us assume that the target ship X at position A is steaming at
+15 knots, and that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on
+the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is discharged
+on a line at right angles to the course of the target at a distance of
+8,000 yards (_see_ diagram). The target ship will advance 4,000 yards
+along the line A B whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the
+line C D. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes.
+
+It will be seen that if the course of the target ship has been
+misjudged very slightly, or had been altered during the passage from
+A to B, the torpedo will pass ahead or astern of it. In that case it
+might hit instead a ship Z ahead or one Y astern of X.
+
+There are no means available on board a destroyer for determining
+with any real accuracy either the speed or the course of a ship at a
+distance of four or five miles. Hence the difficulty, and the reason
+why torpedoes are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in
+expectation that _one_ of the ships in the line will be hit.
+
+[Illustration]
+
+The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the enemy, and the chances
+of achieving this object are naturally proportional to the target
+presented by a ship as compared with the space between adjacent ships.
+
+In the case of a British line of eight battleships attacked “beam on,”
+the chances of a hit for torpedoes which reach the British line may be
+assessed roughly at seven to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600
+feet, and the distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next
+astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus giving a
+total length of _ships_ of 4,800 feet, and the total of the _interval_
+between them as 6,300 feet.
+
+A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes, and at long ranges
+one may calculate the chances of hits _on the above reasoning_ at
+between three and four per destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are
+correctly fired at such a range as to ensure that they reach the
+British battle line, and provided that the British ships can take no
+effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.[O]
+
+    [O] Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up
+        to the year 1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun
+        armament than their enemies.
+
+It has been said that the element of chance is a large factor in
+torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed. By this it is meant
+that skill is not a factor that can produce a decisive effect when
+dealing with torpedoes, as in the case of guns dealing with guns. It
+is true that skilful manœuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo,
+if sufficient warning of its approach is given, and if its position
+with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly judged. When
+experience at the Jutland Battle showed that under favourable weather
+conditions the track of German torpedoes was visible for some distance,
+great care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dispatches so
+that future use could be made of the fact.
+
+Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that our enemy was
+almost certain to possess a very considerable superiority over us in
+the number of destroyers likely to be present during a Fleet action.
+This was a question which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the
+then First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had discussed it on
+more than one occasion when the destroyer building programme was being
+considered.
+
+Our fears were realised, particularly during the first two years of the
+War.
+
+The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect at different
+periods is shown in the following table, so far as it is known to me:--
+
+  ------------------+--------------+-------------+-----------------------
+                    | British      | German      | Additional German
+                    | destroyers   | destroyers  | destroyers, less than
+                    | with the     | probably    | 12 years old, that
+         Date       | Grand Fleet, | attached to | could join the High
+                    | including    | the High    | Sea Fleet at Germany’s
+                    | Flotilla     | Sea Fleet   | selected moment.
+                    | Leaders[P]   |             |
+  ------------------+--------------+-------------+-----------------------
+  August 4th, 1914  |      42      |      88     |          20
+  October 1st, 1914 |      42      |      88     |          20
+  January 1st, 1915 |      42      |      88     |          30
+  April 1st, 1915   |      58      |      88     |          --
+  July 1st, 1915    |      65      |      88     |          --
+  October 1st, 1915 |      65      |      88     |          --
+  January 1st, 1916 |      66      |      88     |          50
+  April 1st, 1916   |      74      |      88     |          --
+  May 31st, 1916    |      80      |      88     |          70[Q]
+  ------------------+--------------+-------------+------------------------
+
+    [P] The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the
+        figures in column 2, since I never expected that it would
+        be able to concentrate with the Grand Fleet.
+
+    [Q] No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in
+        destroyers.
+
+Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at the end of May,
+1916, 70 were available to go to sea on May 30th (an unusually large
+proportion). There happened, also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight
+destroyers belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied the
+battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which 47 were with
+the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with the Battle Cruiser Fleet,
+including the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had
+88, a far larger proportion to each ship.
+
+This superiority in numbers on the part of the Germans arose from three
+causes:
+
+  (_a_) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and destroyer force
+    at Harwich, the presence of which force during a Fleet action was
+    very improbable, owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if
+    it took place, probably do so at Germany’s selected moment and
+    not at ours, and to the difficulty of concentration under such
+    circumstances.
+
+  (_b_) The necessity of utilising a large number of our destroyers for
+    patrol purposes in the Straits of Dover and elsewhere.
+
+  (_c_) We had not built an adequate number of destroyers in the
+    years before the War to meet the many needs that only this class
+    of vessel could fulfil, particularly as the enemy developed his
+    submarine warfare against merchant-ships.
+
+The shipbuilding programmes of 1908–09, and following years up to
+1912–13, included provision for twenty destroyers each year. Subsequent
+to the latter date, the programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in
+order to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we were
+woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in the Estimates,
+there was never sufficient money to meet all the Admiralty’s needs. It
+was intimated that one or other of the requirements had to give way at
+a time when the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and as
+the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary than the
+destroyers, the number of the latter class of vessel was reduced.
+
+Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme initiated by
+Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage of destroyers was most
+seriously felt throughout the whole War, the conditions would probably
+have been even worse had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been
+sacrificed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard desired
+by the Admiralty.
+
+A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity
+for _not leaving anything to chance in a Fleet action, because our
+Fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of
+the Empire_, as indeed to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside
+the Battle Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster
+befall it or even should its margin of superiority over the enemy be
+eliminated.
+
+The situation was in many respects different from that with which our
+Navy was faced in the time of the old wars. In those days disaster
+could only come about by reason of bad strategy or tactics owing to our
+enemy being in overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force
+better, and, apart from manœuvring, the action was invariably decided
+by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried weapon.
+
+During the recent War two entirely new features of the greatest
+importance were introduced. First, the torpedo could be fired at very
+long range, up to 15,000 yards, either from large ships or destroyers,
+and at shorter range from submarines, and the mine had been developed;
+the invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be known
+when they were being employed.
+
+The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious when dealing
+with the attack of under-water weapons than with gun attack are the
+greater damage which one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may
+well be fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to
+reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it is usually
+different; a ship which is being heavily hit can--if her own offensive
+powers will not save her by crushing the fire of the enemy--so manœuvre
+as to derange temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein lies
+the whole necessity for the exercise of care when dealing with the
+underwater weapon.
+
+These considerations led me to introduce measures for dealing with
+destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet other than the counter of attack
+by our light craft on the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a
+turn on the part of the ships, either _towards_ the torpedoes or _away_
+from them.
+
+In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so that they would
+present as small a target as possible to the torpedo, and incidentally
+that the space between the ships should be correspondingly large. The
+matter is very technical, and presents many interesting features, one
+of which may be illustrated by an example:
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships to steer direct
+for the attacking destroyers _if the moment at which the torpedoes are
+fired can be ascertained_.
+
+This course, although applicable to one attack, leads to difficulties
+in the case of successive attacks, since further turns towards will
+bring the battle line within effective range of torpedoes fired from
+the enemy’s battleships; occasions will arise when this risk must be
+accepted.
+
+The accompanying diagram shows that the van and centre squadrons are
+not so well safeguarded by a turn towards the attacking destroyers
+as is the rear squadron, for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire
+torpedoes from C (a threatening position to the van) and the van
+squadron turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will
+steer along the line A B.
+
+If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron instead of the
+van squadron as supposed, and their objective is the twentieth ship
+in the line, they will run along the line C D, i.e., directly at the
+fourth ship in the line.
+
+The target presented is, however, small, and the chances of a flotilla
+attacking the rear squadron when in a favourable position for attacking
+the van are not great.
+
+The important point in the case of a turn towards is, however, the
+necessity for ascertaining the moment of discharge of the torpedoes.
+
+In the second case, that of turning away, the object is to place
+the ships at such a distance from the attacking destroyers that the
+torpedoes will not cross their tracks, but if this object is not
+achieved the ships are in a good position for avoiding the torpedoes if
+their tracks are visible; the objection to this manœuvre is that the
+range of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened.
+
+It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or other of the
+manœuvres should destroyer attacks take place under conditions which
+prevented an effective “counter” by our own light craft; both manœuvres
+were arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn by
+divisions of four ships would delay the completion of the manœuvre to
+too great an extent.
+
+The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great deal in the way of
+discussion and instructions on the subject of torpedo attack in a Fleet
+action. The duties of light cruisers and destroyers in this connection
+were dealt with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the
+supreme importance both of making early torpedo attacks on the enemy’s
+line and of immediately countering such attacks, and it was pointed
+out that an early attack by our own destroyers would not only tend to
+stop an enemy attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best
+position to meet a hostile attack.
+
+The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroyers were so fixed
+that they should be in the best positions to effect these two objects,
+such positions being obviously in the van of the Fleet; in order to
+provide against a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment
+in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two flotillas,
+according to the numbers available, and a light cruiser squadron, were
+also stationed in the rear.
+
+The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been a matter of almost
+daily consideration, and all our experience and thought led to the same
+conclusion, namely, that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer
+attacks, would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for this
+belief, and some of them were as follows:
+
+    1. On each occasion when German vessels were met, they had
+    immediately retired towards their bases.
+
+    2. The tactical advantages of such a move were obvious. They might
+    be enumerated thus:
+
+      (_a_) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of advantage
+        in regard to torpedo attack on the following fleet. The
+        retiring fleet also eliminates, to a large extent, danger of
+        torpedo attack by the following fleet.
+
+      (_b_) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of drawing its
+        opponent over a mine or submarine trap.
+
+      (_c_) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere with
+        the observation of gunfire by the following fleet.
+
+      (_d_) Considerations of moral effect will force the stronger
+        fleet to follow the weaker, and play into the hands of the
+        enemy.
+
+We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these tactics that in
+all the many exercises carried out by the Fleet during the War, it was
+the invariable rule to indicate beforehand an _assumed_ position of
+Heligoland, and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-Chief
+of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always deployed his Fleet
+in the direction of Heligoland and adopted retiring tactics. The
+difficulties resulting from the employment of these retiring tactics
+and the best method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore,
+the subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the senior
+officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very frequently discussed
+and worked out on the tactical board.
+
+The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if retiring tactics
+are employed in conjunction with a free and skilful use of under-water
+weapons.
+
+When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st, 1916, these thoughts
+were in my mind, and were no doubt present in the minds of all
+Flag officers in the British Fleet. It has been mentioned that the
+circumstances of the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with
+any degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle Fleet,
+and the deployment of our own Fleet took place under these conditions.
+Even so, however, the course on deployment (that is, south-east by
+east) was to a certain extent governed by the idea of getting between
+the enemy and his base on the supposition that he would be making
+towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef Channel.
+
+The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a commanding position
+on the bow of the enemy caused the enemy to make a large turn to
+starboard, largely because this squadron--Rear-Admiral Hood’s--was
+mistaken for the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have
+already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that at
+about 5.45 P.M. “dim shapes of enemy battleships are discerned in a
+north-easterly direction.” These shapes were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron. The German account states that their battle cruisers
+turned away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Battle Fleet
+the chance of placing itself between the enemy and his base. Advantage
+was taken of this opportunity, and the enemy was then forced to pursue
+his retiring tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns
+required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed in a position
+of tactical disadvantage owing to the British Fleet working round on a
+wide circle outside the enemy.
+
+A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets will show this at
+once.[R] The course of the British Fleet on deployment was south-east
+by east. Successive turns to starboard brought the course through south
+by west to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13
+points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards apart, the
+German Fleet moving on the inner of these two circles.
+
+    [R] _Cf._ diagram in the pocket at the end.
+
+The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans erroneously
+thought was in favour of the British Battle Fleet, but which was always
+with the enemy, was accentuated, and the Grand Fleet was gradually
+brought farther and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet,
+placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in regard to
+torpedo attack. This advantage was increased by the low visibility,
+which rendered it difficult to see flotillas approaching to attack
+until they were at fairly short range.
+
+When the first attack by German destroyers took place and the first
+of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be approaching on a bearing 30
+degrees before the beam of the _Iron Duke_, and had reached a distance
+of 9,000 yards or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was
+essential. Our own flotillas had been using every endeavour to get to
+the van, but the frequent turns to starboard and the movement of our
+battle cruisers across the bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their
+movement, and it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers
+could prevent the attack from developing.
+
+The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be determined with
+sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards” and therefore the Battle Fleet
+was “turned away,” in subdivisions.
+
+Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, coincidentally
+with the destroyer attack the enemy made a very large turn-away from
+our Fleet, and thus opened the range much farther, disappearing
+entirely from view even from our rear; this process was repeated on
+each occasion of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was,
+therefore, continually refusing action.
+
+It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the whole line of
+battle away for this attack, or whether the leading squadron could not
+have held the original course. Such a movement was provided for in the
+Battle Orders, but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000
+yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the _Iron Duke_, the
+leading ship of the centre battle squadron, and therefore the leading
+Battle Squadron was as open to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or
+rear squadron; indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to
+attack the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle Squadron was
+also not at the time clear of the van of the centre squadron, as the
+turns that had been made had prevented line ahead being re-formed, and
+the _Iron Duke’s_ Division could not turn unless the division ahead
+also turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led me to make
+the signal general to the Battle Fleet.
+
+According to the reports of the captains of the ships of the Battle
+Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed the line of our Battle
+Fleet during the 7.10 P.M. destroyer attack alone, in spite of the
+turn. The large majority of these were observed by the ships of the 1st
+and 5th Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have crossed the
+line _ahead_ of the _Iron Duke_, and at least six crossed the track
+of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was moving out to attack the
+enemy’s flotilla.
+
+In the case of a long line of ships there is always danger of the
+torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being forgotten or minimised by
+ships that are in the van, owing to failure to realise how dangerous
+the torpedo fire of ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to
+vessels a long way in rear, although they themselves are quite immune
+from this danger.
+
+The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable
+decentralisation of command, and great stress was laid on this point in
+the general instructions for “Battle Tactics.” The opening paragraphs
+of this section of the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It
+was pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would control the
+movements of the whole Battle Fleet before and on deployment (except
+in the extreme case of very low visibility rendering it necessary for
+the Flag officer of a wing division to take immediate action), he could
+not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel and other
+smoke made both vision and communication difficult. The necessity for
+wide decentralisation of command was then pointed out, combined with a
+close watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which Flag
+officers should generally conform.
+
+The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since Trafalgar if
+we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese War, and advantage was
+naturally taken of the experience to make some changes in the Battle
+Orders; but there were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and,
+therefore, no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief of the
+Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet engagement, “This is all
+going according to expectation.” We did, however, obtain confirmation
+of our views as to the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted
+by the German fleet.
+
+The principal changes that were made in the Battle Orders were in the
+direction of laying still further emphasis on the discretionary power
+which was vested in Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the
+difficulty, always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jutland, which
+the Commander-in-Chief would experience in controlling the movements of
+the whole Fleet in the heat of action; also in defining still further
+the different movements that might be adopted to deal with torpedo
+attacks, whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships or from
+destroyers.
+
+A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo attacks in
+action had been prepared by my Staff during the spring of 1916, and
+a memorandum, with diagrams, had been written showing the various
+situations that might arise and the effect of the different
+counter-movements in each case. It is of interest to note that this
+memorandum was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was
+fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not actually been
+issued.
+
+The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in the memorandum before
+it was finally issued to the Fleet.
+
+The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and the “counter”
+measures adopted have been dealt with at considerable length, since
+this form of attack and its “counter” have been much discussed in the
+Service since 1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely
+to continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject of much
+future experiment.
+
+The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any great effect, and
+their importance should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British
+Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, but _it was not this
+turn which led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy_. That
+difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet made a very large
+turn to the westward under cover of a smoke screen at the moment of
+launching the earliest destroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers
+in the van which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary
+in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain touch until
+8.20 P.M. because of the retirement of the enemy.
+
+The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, in
+regard to the ranges at which the opening phases of the action should
+be fought, remained unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the
+policy of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside
+torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line _in ordinary circumstances_.
+
+As is very frequently the case when naval actions do not result in
+overwhelming material losses by one side or the other, or the capture
+or destruction of a large part of the opposing Fleet, both sides at
+the time claimed a victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped
+to support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, besides
+influencing neutral, and probably in particular American, opinion.
+
+The Germans apparently based their claim on two grounds, the first
+being that of having inflicted heavier losses than they received. In
+order to make good this contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk
+one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and five
+destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British side; and they
+concealed, until further concealment was impossible, the sinking of
+the battle cruiser _Lutzow_ and the light cruiser _Rostock_, besides
+omitting to mention that the _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to prevent
+her sinking, thereby slurring over the point that the _Seydlitz_ would
+undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own _Warrior_ did, had the
+action been fought as far from German bases as it was from British
+bases. They also said nothing of at least four German battleships being
+torpedoed, and of several battleships and all their battle cruisers
+being so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further
+fighting for several months. The case was very different with the
+British ships, as has been already stated. If these points are borne in
+mind, the original German claim to victory falls to the ground, even on
+the material side. After the surrender of the German ships in November,
+1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed writer on naval
+matters, stated in the _Berliner Tageblatt_ of November 18th that “our
+Fleet’s losses were severe,” adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was
+clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be,
+the last one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so openly.”
+
+But a victory is judged not merely by material losses and damage, but
+by its results. It is profitable to examine the results of the Jutland
+Battle. With the single exception of a cruise towards the English
+coast on August 19th, 1916--undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the
+High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show that it was still
+capable of going to sea--the High Sea Fleet never again, up to the end
+of 1917, ventured much outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even
+on August 19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately for
+home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts of the approach
+of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the method of procedure that would
+be adopted by a Fleet flushed with victory and belonging to a country
+which was being strangled by the sea blockade.
+
+Again, in the German account of the “victory” it is remarked that “as
+the dawn coloured the eastern sky on the historic 1st of June, everyone
+expected that the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed
+in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation was not realised. As
+far as the eye could reach the horizon was clear. Not until the late
+morning did our airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce
+that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was approaching from
+the southern part of the North Sea at full speed on a northerly course.
+To the great regret of all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to
+overtake and attack theirs.”
+
+What are the facts? We know now that as the sun rose, the High Sea
+Fleet (except such portions as were escaping via the Skaw) was close
+to the Horn Reef, steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for
+home behind the shelter of the German minefields. And the Grand Fleet
+was waiting for them to appear and searching the waters to the westward
+and northward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained
+the search during the forenoon of June 1st, and the airship, far from
+sighting the Fleet _late in the morning_, as stated, did so, first at
+3.30 A.M., and on several occasions subsequently during the forenoon.
+And if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what an
+opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate them! One
+is forced to the conclusion that this victorious fleet did not consider
+itself capable of engaging only twelve British battleships.
+
+I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland Battle without
+mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. From the second in command, Sir
+Cecil Burney, to the youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell
+in the _Chester_, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit and
+determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and trusted friend, a
+fine seaman who always handled his squadron--or, in my absence, the
+Fleet--with marked skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a
+high reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton Sturdee, the
+victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer who had made a special study
+of tactics; Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders,
+including my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir Robert
+Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose deaths the nation and Fleet
+lost of their best--were all officers of proved ability, in whom not
+myself only, but the Fleet, had absolute confidence.
+
+In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed a leader who
+throughout his Service career had shown fighting qualities of the
+highest order, and he had imbued his force with his own indomitable
+spirit.
+
+The Flag officers second in command of squadrons had all led divisions
+for a considerable period, and I was confident that they would handle
+their divisions as well in action as they did during exercises, as
+proved to be the case.
+
+The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyer flotillas
+had invariably fulfilled every expectation that I had formed of them. I
+had always admired the manner in which the personnel of these vessels
+had endured the conditions under which their work was so frequently
+performed.
+
+Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-Admiral Sir Charles
+Madden (my righthand man throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its
+chief members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag officers, and
+with captains who had on countless occasions shown their skill, I was
+indeed in a fortunate position.
+
+To the above advantages I must add those obtained by the magnificence
+of the personnel of the lower ranks. The officers and ships’ companies
+were as keen as any Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait
+had never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Officers and
+men were day after day striving to perfect the fighting efficiency of
+their ships, and well had they succeeded. The engine room staffs had
+demonstrated early in the War that they would respond magnificently
+to any demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it on the
+occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and moral of the Fleet never
+stood higher than at the time of the Battle of Jutland, and because
+of that spirit I knew that the Fleet under my command was the most
+formidable fighting machine in the world.
+
+Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with proper restraint.
+Whenever and wherever there was opportunity, officers and men displayed
+courage and self-sacrifice of the highest order. There were innumerable
+instances which proved that the personnel of the present Navy has
+nothing to learn in this respect from its forefathers. The dead
+died heroic deaths; the wounded behaved with marvellous fortitude.
+Forty-four years passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith
+in, and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket, but they
+surpassed all my expectations, and so long as that spirit endures, this
+country will be fortunate, and with adequate forces will be safe.
+
+It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum issued to the Fleet
+after the Jutland Battle:
+
+                                                   _Iron Duke_,
+                                                         June 4th, 1916.
+
+    H.F. 0022 349.
+
+    MEMORANDUM.
+
+    I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains, Officers and
+    Men of the Grand Fleet my very high appreciation of the manner in
+    which the ships were fought during the action on May 31st, 1916.
+
+    2. At this stage, when full information is not available, it is not
+    possible to enter into details, but quite sufficient is already
+    known to enable me to state definitely that the glorious traditions
+    handed down to us by generations of gallant seamen were most
+    worthily upheld.
+
+    3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable nature robbed the
+    Fleet of that complete victory which I know was expected by all
+    ranks, which is necessary for the safety of the Empire and which
+    will yet be ours.
+
+    4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most gallant comrades,
+    but, although it is very difficult to obtain accurate information
+    as to the enemy losses, I have no doubt that we shall find that
+    they are certainly not less than our own. Sufficient information
+    has already been received for me to make that statement with
+    confidence.
+
+    I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information on this
+    point at an early date, but do not wish to delay the issue of this
+    expression of my keen appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my
+    confidence in future complete victory.
+
+    5. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful spirit and
+    fortitude of the wounded has filled me with the greatest admiration.
+
+    I am more proud than ever to have the honour of commanding a fleet
+    manned by such officers and men.
+
+                                                   J. R. JELLICOE.
+                                                         Admiral,
+                                                     Commander-in-Chief.
+
+  The Flag Officers, Commodores and
+    Officers in command of H.M. ships
+    of the Grand Fleet.
+
+My official despatch on the battle to the Board of Admiralty was
+forwarded on June 19th, and the following letter was afterwards
+promulgated to the Grand Fleet:--
+
+                                                     ADMIRALTY,
+                                                         July 4th, 1916.
+
+    SIR,--My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered
+    your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand
+    Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on the 31st
+    May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the
+    Battle Cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and
+    Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.
+
+    2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines
+    of the Grand Fleet on this, the first Fleet action which has
+    occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the
+    enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of
+    the 31st May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry and
+    devotion which characterised all who took part in the battle; the
+    ships of every class were handled with skill and determination;
+    their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid
+    testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff;
+    while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally
+    conspicuous.
+
+    3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of
+    the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems
+    with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to
+    account. The expectations of the country were high; they have been
+    well fulfilled.
+
+    4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your
+    proceedings on this occasion.
+
+                                   I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
+                                                       W. GRAHAM GREENE.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL
+
+
+The ships which had received damage in the Jutland Battle had to
+be repaired without delay. The great majority of the repairs were
+completed during June or by the first week in July, and, whilst under
+repair, the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations
+which experience gained in the action had shown to be desirable.
+The _Marlborough_ was the only large ship whose repairs occupied
+any considerable length of time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in
+August, although the work upon her was handicapped to some extent by
+being carried out in a floating dock moored in a somewhat inconvenient
+position. The light cruiser _Chester_ was also detained at Hull until
+July 29th, as her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a
+great many alterations were carried out. The principal points affecting
+_matériel_ to which attention was directed were:
+
+  (_a_) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent the flash of
+    cordite charges, ignited by the explosion of a shell in a turret
+    or in positions between the turret and the magazine, being
+    communicated to the magazine itself. It was probable that the loss
+    of one, if not two, of our battle cruisers was due to this cause,
+    after the armour had been pierced.
+
+  (_b_) Better measures were required to prevent the charges of small
+    guns from being ignited by bursting shell, and to localise any
+    fires due to this cause, in the case of guns of the secondary
+    battery in large ships, and the main armament in small ships.
+
+  (_c_) Increased deck armour protection in large ships had been shown
+    to be desirable in order that shell or fragments of shell might not
+    reach the magazines. This need was particularly felt in all our
+    earlier ships of the Dreadnought type, since their side armour was
+    not carried to the upper deck level. The long range at which most
+    modern sea actions are fought, and the consequent large angle of
+    descent of the projectiles made our ships very vulnerable in this
+    respect.
+
+  (_d_) The pressing need for a better armour-piercing projectile with
+    an improved fuze was also revealed.
+
+  (_e_) Improved arrangements for flooding magazines and drenching
+    exposed cartridges had to be made.
+
+Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet to deal with all
+questions of this nature, as well as the important matter of possible
+developments in the fire-control system with a view to improving the
+methods of correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled”
+with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great gunnery
+knowledge and experience of Captain F. C. Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were
+of immense assistance, and he was most ably seconded by the numerous
+highly skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers and
+in the ships of the fleet.
+
+The action taken in connection with these matters was prompt, with
+the gratifying result that before I relinquished the command of the
+Fleet, the great majority of the heavy ships had been provided with
+additional deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings
+for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work was carried out
+while the ships were at their usual notice for steam, much of it being
+actually done at Scapa Flow by the dockyard artificers berthed there on
+board the _Victorious_: the work carried out by these artificers and by
+the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with most commendable
+rapidity.
+
+Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty, as First Sea Lord,
+and under the immediate direction of Captain Dreyer, then Director of
+Naval Ordnance, a new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new
+type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for guns of 12-inch
+calibre and above, which certainly doubled their offensive power.
+
+The investigation into the possibility of further development in
+fire-correction methods, a subject to which constant attention had been
+given throughout the War, was at first carried out by two independent
+committees. Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee,
+composed of the most experienced and most successful gunnery officers
+in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as the result, drawn up and
+passed for adoption in the Fleet; these had already produced a most
+convincing and most satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of
+fire before I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no exaggeration
+to say that the average time taken to find the gun range of the enemy
+with these new methods was about one half of that previously required.
+
+Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders. The majority
+had been installed in the Fleet before the great increases in the
+range of opening effective fire had come about, as the result of
+experience during the War. Our most modern ships at Jutland were
+provided with range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of
+the ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet long.
+During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply range-finders up to
+25 and 30 feet in length; a series of experiments with stereoscopic
+range-finders was also instituted in the same year. It had become known
+that the Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be stated,
+in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that the developments
+introduced in the fire-control arrangements of the Grand Fleet after
+the Battle of Jutland did not affect the _instruments_ already in use,
+which fully met our requirements, but the _methods_ of using those
+instruments and particularly the system of correction of fire.
+
+On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and Cruiser Squadrons were
+re-organised as follows:--
+
+  BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON
+
+  _Lion_ (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet).
+
+  _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+  _Princess Royal_ (Flag), _New Zealand_, _Tiger_.
+
+  _2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
+  _Australia_ (Flag), _Indomitable_, _Inflexible_.
+
+  CRUISER SQUADRONS
+
+  _2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
+  _Minotaur_ (Flag), _Duke of Edinburgh_, _Cochrane_, _Shannon_,
+  _Achilles_, _Donegal_.
+
+  _3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
+  _Antrim_, _Roxburgh_, _Devonshire_.
+
+On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived at Scapa _en route_
+to Archangel. In the morning he crossed from Thurso in the _Oak_, and
+came on board the _Iron Duke_ on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me,
+and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him. Before lunch
+we went round the ship. The officers and men naturally greeted him
+with much respect, and he can have had no doubt of the admiration in
+which he was held. During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming
+trip, and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it as a
+real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he confessed, had been
+very great, adding that he had felt that he could not have gone on
+without this break, which he welcomed very much. He was not, however,
+very sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He mentioned the
+difficulty which he experienced in dealing with questions discussed
+in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by most soldiers and sailors, whose
+training does not fit them to state or to argue a case, and who
+frequently find great difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule,
+accustomed to carry out their ideas without having first to bring
+conviction to the minds of men who, although possessing great general
+knowledge and administrative experience, have naturally but little
+acquaintance with naval and military affairs which in themselves form a
+lifelong study.
+
+After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland action, and Lord
+Kitchener evinced much interest in the tactics and the general story of
+the action.
+
+Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the idea that he was working
+to a time-table, and that he felt that he had not a day to lose. He
+mentioned three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed
+astonishment at the programme which he had planned to carry out in the
+restricted period. He was most anxious not to lose a moment on the sea
+trip and asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest time
+in which the passage could be made.
+
+During the day the weather at Scapa, which had been bad in the
+morning, gradually became worse, and by the afternoon it was blowing
+a gale from the north-eastward. It had been originally intended that
+the _Hampshire_ should take the route which passed up the eastern
+side of the Orkneys, following the channel ordinarily searched by
+mine-sweeping vessels as a routine measure; but as the north-easterly
+gale was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweeping was out of
+the question, and it was also obvious that the escorting destroyers
+could not face the sea at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which
+route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest, and finally
+decided that the _Hampshire_ should pass close in shore, and not take
+the alternative route passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry
+Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this decision were:--
+
+  (_a_) With a north-easterly wind there would be less sea and,
+    therefore, more chance of the destroyers being able to keep up with
+    the _Hampshire_.
+
+  (_b_) It was practically impossible that this route could have
+    been mined by any surface mine-layer owing to the dark period in
+    Northern latitudes being confined to a couple of hours, during
+    which no ship could expect to approach the shore for mine-laying
+    without having first been sighted.
+
+  (_c_) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries, and was,
+    therefore, under frequent observation.
+
+At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines had been confined
+to water well to the southward of the Firth of Forth, presumably
+because of their small radius of action. Danger from this source was,
+therefore, considered to be very remote.
+
+Finally the weather itself was a protection against submarine attack
+which was at that time more to be feared than the danger from submarine
+laid mines. Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not been
+practicable for three or four days owing to the weather conditions.
+
+At about 4 P.M. Lord Kitchener proceeded on board the _Hampshire_,
+accompanied by his Staff comprising Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F.
+Donaldson, Colonel FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr.
+Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-Lieutenant McPherson,
+Cameron Highlanders. The _Hampshire_ sailed at 5.30 P.M. escorted by
+two destroyers. Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16
+knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers back if
+they could not maintain the _Hampshire’s_ speed. Experience had proved
+that high speed was a valuable protection against submarines.
+
+At about 7 P.M. Captain Savill, commanding the _Hampshire_, ordered the
+two destroyers back to Scapa, as they were unable to face the heavy
+seas at the speed of the _Hampshire_. Between 7.30 and 7.45 P.M. the
+_Hampshire_ struck a mine about 1½ miles off shore, between the Brough
+of Birsay and Marwick Head; she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The
+incident was witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone message
+was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands that the
+cruiser was in difficulties. He at once ordered out patrol vessels and
+informed me, with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene
+immediately.
+
+The evidence of the few survivors of the _Hampshire_ showed that Lord
+Kitchener was below when the ship was mined, and that an officer
+escorted him on deck. Captain Savill was heard to give directions from
+the bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and his Staff,
+and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently on deck, but was not seen
+after the ship sank. The weather conditions prevented any boats being
+hoisted out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the ship
+sank.
+
+The scene of the disaster was searched during the night by destroyers
+and patrol craft, but the only survivors were twelve men who drifted
+ashore on a Carley raft, although many bodies were picked up by the
+searching vessels, and many drifted ashore.
+
+The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.
+
+At the time of the disaster the _Hampshire_ was steaming at 13½ knots,
+the wind being north-north-west, with a force of 50 miles an hour.
+The cold water and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest
+swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which was north-east at 4
+P.M. at Scapa, had become north-north-west by the time the _Hampshire_
+was outside, and there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the
+Orkneys, as had been anticipated.
+
+The hours that passed after the receipt of the report of the
+_Hampshire_ being in difficulties were most anxious ones. In spite
+of the fact that the destroyers had been sent back, it seemed almost
+incredible that the wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as
+was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow were not so bad
+as to indicate so extremely heavy a sea off the Brough of Birsay; and
+even when it was reported that the _Hampshire_ had sunk (a report which
+took some time to come through), there was hope that, at any rate, Lord
+Kitchener and his mission would be saved by boat. As the hours passed
+and no news was received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety
+became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the certainty that
+this great man, who had served his country so faithfully and well in
+its greatest emergency, had met his death when under the care of the
+Navy, the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord Kitchener had
+inspired the Service with confidence and trust. The Navy had frequently
+worked under him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been one of
+the outstanding figures in the European War on the side of the Entente.
+Everyone in the Grand Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had
+fallen upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the feelings
+of the Fleet generally were intensified in me, on whom lay the main
+responsibility for his safe passage to Archangel, so far as such safety
+could be ensured.
+
+I have often wondered since that fatal day whether anything could have
+been done that was not done, but short of postponing the departure of
+the _Hampshire_ altogether, until weather conditions admitted of a
+channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could have been done. Such a
+decision would have resulted in two or three days’ delay in starting,
+and would never have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover,
+with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy mine-laying
+possibilities, I did not consider the delay necessary as I should
+not have hesitated, if need had arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to
+sea on the same night and by the same route as that traversed by the
+_Hampshire_.
+
+My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming. There was, at first,
+doubt in the minds of some people as to whether the loss of the
+_Hampshire_ was due to a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were
+set at rest by the sweeping operations which were undertaken as soon as
+the weather admitted. They resulted in the discovery of moored mines of
+the type laid in southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines being
+easily distinguishable from those laid by surface vessels.
+
+During the month of June cruisers were kept constantly patrolling the
+route to Archangel to protect shipping against possible enemy raiders,
+as the traffic was very heavy at this period. The _Donegal_, _Antrim_,
+_Devonshire_ and _Roxburgh_ were the vessels employed. They visited the
+Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Stadlandet, _en route_ to and from
+patrol, with a view to intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick.
+
+The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla were employed in watching
+the waters in the Kattegat and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the
+Norwegian coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft. A
+regular submarine patrol was also begun off the Horn Reef, and was
+continued up to the time of my relinquishing command of the Fleet. At
+first two, and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol,
+which was of great utility in giving information of the movements of
+the few enemy surface vessels that ever ventured so far from their
+base, and also proved of use for attacking enemy submarines. At
+the commencement, the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and
+look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with that of the German
+submarines, by reason of their bad wireless equipment, which admitted
+of a range of some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were attached
+to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly the absolute necessity of
+effecting an improvement in this particular, stating that I was quite
+prepared to sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this be
+necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install efficient wireless
+apparatus in the only class of vessel that could carry out a watching
+patrol in the vicinity of German bases. Eventually arrangements were
+made to provide them with a wireless installation which gave a range of
+300 to 400 miles.
+
+When our submarines had been equipped in this way we were at once
+able to establish an efficient chain of outposts off the Horn
+Reef by the Grand Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the
+northward the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the result that
+in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult for the enemy to put
+to sea unobserved and unreported. The comparative inefficiency of the
+wireless installation in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our
+destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had to face during
+the first two years of War. It should be added that while patrolling
+in the Kattegat, submarine G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside
+territorial waters, the German steamship _Ems_, on passage from
+Christiania to Lübeck with oil, zinc and copper. The crew were rescued.
+
+The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the month, other than
+the usual patrols, were as follows:--
+
+The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth on the
+14th for the Naze, thence steered up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and
+returned to Rosyth.
+
+The _Comus_ and _Constance_ left Scapa on the 25th, swept down the
+Norwegian coast and returned on the 27th.
+
+The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers carried out a similar
+sweep from Rosyth between the 29th June and July 1st.
+
+On June 22nd the first mines from a British submarine mine-layer were
+laid by E 41 in the German Bight.
+
+His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with a visit on the
+14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in the _Oak_, at 5 P.M., being
+escorted by the destroyers of the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round
+the Fleet in the _Oak_, His Majesty proceeded on board the _Iron Duke_,
+where he spent the night. On the following day the King visited all
+the flagships, on board of which a large percentage of officers and
+men from the various squadrons were assembled, and left for Thurso in
+the _Oak_ at 5 P.M., proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth,
+honouring the squadrons at each of these bases with a visit.
+
+His Majesty addressed a representative gathering of officers and men
+from the ships at Scapa, who had been assembled on board the _Iron
+Duke_ on the morning of the 15th in the following terms:--
+
+“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand Fleet, you have
+waited for nearly two years with most exemplary patience for the
+opportunity of meeting and engaging the enemy’s fleet.
+
+“I can well understand how trying has been this period, and how great
+must have been the relief when you knew on May 31st that the enemy had
+been sighted.
+
+“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching darkness prevented
+that complete result which you all expected, but you did all that was
+possible in the circumstances. You drove the enemy into his harbours,
+and inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet another page
+to the glorious traditions of the British Navy.
+
+“You could not do more, and for your splendid work I thank you.”
+
+The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during June,
+gave as the figures:--
+
+No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No. sent in, 20; No. on
+patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to a given patrol, 8; No.
+on special service, 1.
+
+A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during the
+month--especially in the latter half--and this interfered somewhat with
+the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. A very dense fog prevailed in
+the Pentland Firth on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally
+from the northward, were prevalent during the first portion of the
+month, and a northerly gale occurred on the 5th.
+
+No large Fleet movements took place during June, as it was known that
+the greater part of the High Sea Fleet was under repair as the result
+of the Jutland action.
+
+During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only engaged in one cruise,
+namely, from the 17th to the 20th. The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle
+Squadrons, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
+the _Campania_, with sea-planes, and destroyer flotillas left Scapa
+between noon and 1.30 P.M. on the 17th, and proceeded to the northward
+and eastward of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of carrying
+out a series of battle exercises on the 18th and 19th; they were based
+on the experience gained of enemy tactics during the Jutland action.
+Some of the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise,
+and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during the forenoon of
+the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships approached the Pentland Firth,
+making entry somewhat difficult.
+
+Cruiser movements during the month comprised:--
+
+  (_a_) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by Grand Fleet Cruisers
+    to protect trade against raiders.
+
+  (_b_) The establishment on the 7th of a regular patrol of two
+    cruisers and two destroyers in an area well to the northward of the
+    Shetlands, this patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and
+    armed boarding-steamer which had been previously placed there.
+
+  (_c_) Extensive dispositions were made on the 9th to intercept a
+    German raider reported from neutral quarters, as about to leave
+    for the Atlantic. These dispositions included a close patrol by
+    two light cruiser squadrons and eight destroyers from Rosyth of an
+    area 80 to 100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which it was
+    expected the enemy would pass; a further patrol by the 4th Light
+    Cruiser Squadron and six destroyers was established farther north
+    to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; two cruisers
+    were ordered to patrol north of the Shetlands, local patrol
+    vessels being between these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half
+    flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island Channel.[S]
+
+  (_d_) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left Rosyth on the 12th
+    and swept up the Norwegian coast and back, returning on the 15th.
+
+  (_e_) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six destroyers repeated
+    the sweep, returning on the 20th.
+
+  (_f_) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth
+    and swept to the southward in the direction of the Horn Reef from a
+    position near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having sighted
+    anything.
+
+  (_g_) Two light cruisers and four destroyers repeated the sweep of
+    the Norwegian coast on the 24th.
+
+  (_h_) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left
+    Rosyth on the 26th, and proceeded to a position to the westward of
+    the Little Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to the Naze
+    on the look out for enemy raiders or Zeppelins, reports having
+    been received of the frequent presence of Zeppelins on this line;
+    the force turned to the northward from the Naze and swept along
+    the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceeding thence to Scapa. The
+    sweep was again uneventful.
+
+    [S] The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy
+        vessels being sighted; the report was probably incorrect.
+
+The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla were active during
+the month in the Kattegat and patrolling off the Horn Reef. They
+reported on the 20th that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft
+were visible.
+
+The attacks by enemy submarines on warships reported during the month
+were:
+
+The mine-sweeping sloop _Rosemary_ of the Southern Force was torpedoed
+on the 4th, but was towed into the Humber.
+
+The light cruiser _Galatea_ was missed by a torpedo on the 12th, in
+Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E.
+
+The armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Cornwall_ was missed by two
+torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged in boarding a ship south-east of
+the Pentland Skerries.
+
+The light cruiser _Yarmouth_ was missed by a torpedo on the 26th.
+
+Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were sunk by the gunfire
+of four enemy submarines, on the 11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11
+E., their guns being entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which
+the submarines are armed. This combined attack on the trawlers of the
+Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the regrettable loss of the
+three trawlers, was a great and well deserved tribute paid by the enemy
+to the work of that patrol which had been uniformly successful, and had
+proved a great annoyance to the German submarines.
+
+Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy submarines on the 7th,
+to the eastward of the Pentland Firth; on the 12th, two divisions
+of destroyers were sent from Scapa to attack the submarine that had
+fired at the _Duke of Cornwall_, the _Musketeer_ dropping a depth
+charge close to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought
+considerably damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-planes from
+Scapa were sent after a submarine reported by the armed boarding
+steamer _Dundee_ as sighted 10 miles east-south-east of the Pentland
+Skerries, but she was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of
+destroyers again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity, but
+failed to do so.
+
+Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered by the sweeping
+trawlers in the southern channel in the Moray Firth on the 26th, and
+were swept up by trawlers and fleet sweepers before any damage was done.
+
+The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed:
+
+No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No. sent in, 23; No. on
+patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 10;
+No. on special service, 0.
+
+The armed merchant-steamer _Arlanza_, after temporary repairs at
+Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July for refit.
+
+The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist being experienced
+at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd,
+24th and 25th.
+
+During the month of August the principal cruiser movements, apart from
+those in connection with the Battle Fleet, were as follows:
+
+  (_a_) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an area well
+    to the northward of the Shetlands was continued.
+
+  (_b_) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-patrol seaward of the
+    Fleet bases was maintained.
+
+  (_c_) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route was continued.
+
+  (_d_) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as follows:
+
+On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a
+sweep down the Norwegian coast, returning on the 3rd, having sighted
+nothing of interest; on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers
+from Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30 N., Long.
+5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th, without result. On the
+12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Scapa
+and proceeded towards Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of 10
+British merchant-ships which had been brought out of the Baltic. These
+vessels were escorted across the North Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy
+arrived safely on the 14th.
+
+On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers _Dundee_ and
+_King Orry_, which had been disguised as merchant-ships, left Scapa
+for operations off the Norwegian coast. It was hoped that they would
+be able to close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband without
+exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better chance of
+capturing them than any vessel having the appearance of a warship. The
+_Dundee_ operated between Udsire and Lister, and the _King Orry_ off
+Stadlandet, both being localities in which ships were in the habit
+of leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser _Constance_ and two
+destroyers were sent to support the _Dundee_, keeping well to seaward
+of her, as that ship was operating in waters in which enemy warships
+might be found. The operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying
+a cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being sent in.
+
+On the 30th the _Abdiel_ left Scapa to lay mines in the vicinity of
+the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation successfully, and without
+being observed, on the night of the 31st–1st.
+
+The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kattegat and in the
+vicinity of the Horn Reef continued. The submarines, returning on the
+17th, reported having been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the
+Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to operate against this
+vessel, but met with no success.
+
+Casualties to war-vessels during the month included: The light cruiser
+_Cleopatra_, of the Harwich force, which was mined on the 4th near
+the Thornton Ridge off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be
+repaired; the destroyer _Lassoo_, also of the Harwich force, was sunk
+by mine or submarine near the Maas Lightship off the Dutch coast on
+the 13th; the armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Albany_ was sunk by
+a submarine on the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland
+Skerries, with considerable loss of life, including Commander G. N.
+Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-planes, and an airship were
+sent out from Scapa at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of
+her, although the armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Clarence_ which had
+stood by the _Duke of Albany_ and rescued the survivors reported that
+she had passed over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser
+_Blonde_ went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland Firth, in thick
+weather on the 10th, but was lightened and towed off on the 11th,
+having sustained considerable injuries; the battleships _Warspite_ and
+_Valiant_ collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the 24th, whilst,
+respectively, returning from and proceeding to the night firing area,
+both ships being considerably damaged, with the result that they had to
+be docked.
+
+On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by an enemy submarine,
+and the departure of the _Marlborough_ from the Tyne was thereby
+delayed; the coincidence that mines were frequently laid in this
+neighbourhood when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs,
+led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that locality. On
+the 4th or 5th August a considerable number of mines of the submarine
+type were also laid in the War channel in the White Sea by enemy
+vessels.
+
+On August 3rd four “C” class submarines left the Nore in tow of tugs
+for Archangel, _en route_ by the canal system for service in the
+Baltic. These submarines performed very useful work in those waters
+during the year 1917.
+
+The increase in mine-laying by German submarines gave rise to anxiety
+that the movements of the Grand Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields
+near the bases at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new
+mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was strengthened
+during July by withdrawing a certain number of trawlers from patrol
+duty in order to form a mine-sweeping flotilla; during the latter
+half of 1916 the Grand Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty
+comprised two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as well as two
+flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in addition one flotilla of
+paddle mine-sweepers was based on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These
+flotillas were all additional to the small local sweeping force of
+trawlers at the various fleet bases.
+
+On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for a sweep in southern
+waters. The presence of an unusually large number of submarines in the
+North Sea--a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before the
+Jutland Battle--had suggested the possibility of movement on the part
+of the enemy and a sweep appeared desirable. The _Iron Duke_, after
+leaving Scapa Flow, proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle
+Fleet screened by two destroyers to communicate with the _Royalist_,
+and at 7.55 P.M., as the ships were about to communicate, a submarine
+on the starboard bow, about 250 yards off, fired a torpedo, which
+passed close astern of the screening destroyer _Onslaught_ on that
+bow. Only one torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the
+attack, and did not get into the position intended for attacking the
+_Iron Duke_, which was proceeding at high speed, and zigzagging, and,
+therefore, fired at the _Onslaught_ instead. Communication between the
+_Iron Duke_ and _Royalist_ was deferred until after dark in consequence
+of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal.
+
+The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid the submarine, and
+passed her without further incident, and the Battle Fleet and cruisers
+concentrated at daylight on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long
+Forties,” steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 knots.
+The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a position 30 miles
+ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 A.M. on the 19th the _Nottingham_,
+one of the light cruiser screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst
+zigzagging at 20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34
+N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the torpedoes struck
+the port side almost simultaneously. The first report indicated that
+she had been hit by mines _or_ torpedoes, and, until it was clear that
+a mine-field did not exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this
+locality, and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascertained
+that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this became clear the
+southward course of the Fleet was shaped to pass to the eastward of the
+submarine. Meanwhile the _Dublin_ cruised at high speed in the vicinity
+of the _Nottingham_ for the purpose of keeping the submarine down
+so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26 A.M. the _Nottingham_
+was hit by a third torpedo, and it became evident that she could not
+float much longer. Her boats were lowered, and the majority of the
+ship’s company placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 A.M., just as the
+destroyers _Penn_ and _Oracle_, which had been sent to her assistance,
+arrived on the scene. These two destroyers picked up all the survivors,
+except Captain Miller, one officer, and several men who remained on
+board until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter from the
+_Dublin_. Several torpedoes were fired at the _Dublin_ and the two
+destroyers during their work of rescue, but all fortunately missed.
+
+From 8.24 A.M. onwards Zeppelins were frequently in sight from both
+the Battle Fleet, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at,
+but they kept at too long a range for our fire to be effective. The
+_Galatea_ sighted the first airship at 8.24 A.M., and the second was
+seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 A.M.; at 10 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt,
+who was at sea with the Harwich force, reported himself in position
+Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E., and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He
+stated later that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole
+period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received from the
+patrol trawler _Ramexo_ that she had two Zeppelins in sight in Lat. 57
+N., Long. 1 E. It was evident that a very large force of airships was
+out. A total of at least ten was identified by our directional wireless
+stations and they appeared to stretch right across the North Sea.
+
+At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine E 23, on patrol
+in the Heligoland Bight, that she had sighted ships of the High Sea
+Fleet steering west at 9.19 A.M.; the position as received in the
+signal appeared incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20
+N., Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional
+wireless stations also led me to consider that a ship of the High Sea
+Fleet was in the position named at 5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 A.M.
+On the return of E 23 to Harwich, her captain reported that he had
+attacked the battle cruiser _Derfflinger_ unsuccessfully at 3.13 A.M.
+on the 20th. At 5 A.M., in spite of the strong enemy destroyer screen,
+he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship of the first Battle
+Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau” type. This ship turned for home on
+being torpedoed, and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but
+at 7.20 A.M. E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, and the captain
+of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was sunk. Subsequent information,
+however, showed that she reached port in a damaged condition; the
+persistent action of the captain of E 23 in the face of great
+opposition, was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our
+submarine service.
+
+On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our directional wireless
+stations, speed was increased, and course shaped to a position at
+which it was hoped the High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective
+of that fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in the
+neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention was to make for a
+position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 E., where the Fleet would be
+favourably placed either to engage the enemy before he closed the coast
+or to cut him off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience
+of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his objective
+the bombardment would be carried out either shortly before dusk, or
+at daylight, in order to facilitate escape afterwards, or approach
+before, unobserved. In the possible alternative of the movement being
+designed to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably placed
+to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle Fleet was in position
+Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering south-south-east. Submarines
+were sighted by the cruiser _Minotaur_ at 1.23 P.M., and by the light
+cruiser _Boadicea_ at 1.38 P.M.; both these ships were in the vicinity
+of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary to avoid the
+submarines; this caused some slight delay in the southward movement.
+
+The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea in readiness to
+meet the Fleet, if required, and during the forenoon of the 19th, was
+directed to spread on a line running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0,
+where the submarines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a
+position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed towards our
+coast north of Flamborough Head; in such an event the enemy would be
+between the Fleet and the submarines.
+
+The _Active_, with nine destroyers of the newly formed 4th Flotilla
+in the Humber, which was also at sea, was directed to join the Battle
+Fleet.
+
+At 1.45 P.M. I received information by wireless that directional
+wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 P.M. in a position
+approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. 1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45
+P.M. was in Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+was well ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the same course
+after 12.30 P.M. as it had steered between 5.30 A.M. and 12.30 P.M.,
+which would take them to Hartlepool, it was evident that it might
+be sighted at any moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance
+between the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal was
+therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High Sea Fleet might be
+encountered at any moment. The meeting appeared to be so certain that
+I arranged the distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the
+assumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on meeting us,
+I directed a concentration of fire of ships that would be ahead of
+the _Iron Duke_ on deployment, of two ships on one, leaving the _Iron
+Duke_ to deal with one ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate
+firing at Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to us. The
+weather was clear. There seemed to be a very good prospect that we
+might, on gaining touch with the enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was
+in a position to cut off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was
+probable that we should be to the eastward, although farther north.
+Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy elect to make
+for our coast and try to escape to the northward, where he would have
+found himself between the Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time
+passed, however, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came in
+from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High Sea Fleet had
+turned back, probably owing to the fact that the Zeppelins had warned
+the German Commander-in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this
+assumption, at 2.35 P.M. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to steer for a
+position to the north-westward of Terschelling, so that he might be
+ready to deliver a night attack on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich
+force.
+
+It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would leave a trap behind
+him in the shape of mines or submarines, or both; and, indeed, the
+numerous submarines already sighted made it probable that the trap was
+extensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters which he had
+occupied unless there was a prospect of bringing the High Sea Fleet to
+action.
+
+It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight by 4 P.M., and if
+he had turned for home, it would be impossible to bring him to action;
+I therefore passed a visual signal out at 3.5 P.M. to Sir David Beatty
+to the effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was in
+sight by 4 P.M.
+
+At 3.20 P.M., however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 3rd Light
+Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine in sight, and I signalled to Sir
+David Beatty to turn at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to
+the submarines was correct.
+
+At 3.40 P.M. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and the cruisers ahead
+to turn. At this time I received information from our directional
+wireless stations that enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0
+E., at 2.45 P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning to
+his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore turned the Battle
+Fleet at 3.56 P.M., when in Lat. 54.40 N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the
+course to pass up the searched channel so as to avoid mines.
+
+At 4.52 P.M. the _Falmouth_ of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in Lat.
+54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by two torpedoes, one right forward,
+and one right aft. The ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the
+time, and the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the
+torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard bow after
+she had been hit. The _Chester_, stationed astern of the _Falmouth_,
+proceeded at full speed to zigzag in the vicinity with the object of
+keeping the submarine submerged and preventing further attack. Another
+torpedo was fired at the _Falmouth_ at 5.14 P.M., but missed.
+
+At 5.20 P.M. the destroyers _Pasley_, _Pelican_, and _Negro_, detached
+to assist the _Falmouth_, arrived on the scene and the _Falmouth_,
+under their escort, proceeded towards the coast under her own steam,
+the _Chester_ then leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward.
+
+At 6.55 P.M. the _Pelican_ sighted a periscope, tried to ram the
+submarine, but missed. She then dropped six depth charges and reported
+that the submarine came to the surface almost immediately, and then
+appeared to sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled, and
+four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen the _Falmouth_,
+which was proceeding at five knots. The ship eventually reached the
+vicinity of Flamborough Head safely, and was there again hit by two
+more torpedoes fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat, and
+was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine destroyers until 8 P.M. on
+the 20th, when she sank in Lat. 54 N., Long. 0.2 W.
+
+At 2.30 P.M. on the 20th, the destroyer _Porpoise_ reported having
+rammed a submarine that had attacked the _Falmouth_.
+
+To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th. From 3.10 P.M.
+onwards frequent reports were received of submarines being sighted. The
+_Phaeton_, _Dublin_ (twice), and _Southampton_ all reported submarines
+in sight between 3.10 and 4.52 P.M., the time at which the _Falmouth_
+was torpedoed. At 6 P.M. Sir David Beatty reported that there was a
+German submarine screen of several boats extending north-east for
+some 25 miles from Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 P.M. Commodore
+Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s force of heavy ships
+steering east, accompanied by two Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving
+the position of the Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved
+to be unfavourable, and at 7.30 P.M. the Commodore reported that he had
+abandoned the pursuit; he returned with his force to Harwich. At 6.20
+P.M. reports received from our directional stations showed that enemy
+ships were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 P.M., giving clear
+evidence that the enemy was returning to his base.
+
+During the passage up the searched channel a number of submarines
+were sighted and frequent, and in some cases, large alterations of
+course were necessary to avoid them; if all the reports were correct,
+the locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines. Reports
+of submarines being seen were received between 4 P.M. and dark,
+from the _Galatea_, _Phaeton_, _Bellona_, _Dublin_, _Southampton_,
+_Lion_, _Royal Sovereign_ (two submarines), _Queen Elizabeth_, and
+_Inflexible_, the last ship reporting that two torpedoes had been fired
+at her at 7.50 P.M., and that both had passed close astern; at this
+time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in company.
+
+Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by the _Chatham_,
+_Galatea_, and _Lion_, and the trawlers _Sea Ranger_ and _Ramexo_; the
+last-named reported having sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and
+having scored two hits and caused a fire in the forward car.
+
+During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was detached to Rosyth,
+and the Battle Fleet continued to the northward. Reports of submarines
+being sighted to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at
+5 A.M. and 3.30 P.M. on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was therefore
+taken well to the northward to avoid them, and approached the Pentland
+Firth from a north-easterly direction, arriving without incident
+between 6.30 and 8 P.M.
+
+The experience of August 19th showed that light cruisers, proceeding
+at even the highest speed unscreened by destroyers, ran considerable
+danger from enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders were no
+doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks, which we could afford to run
+earlier in the War, were now unjustifiable. Representations were made
+to the Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in future
+light cruisers should be screened by at least one destroyer per ship;
+the number of destroyers available for the Grand Fleet did not at the
+time admit of this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number
+intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached, destroyers
+could be allotted to most of the light cruisers in the advanced line,
+provided there were not many absent from the Fleet carrying out
+extraneous services.
+
+The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the Fleet
+had been demonstrated on the 19th of August; what had constantly
+puzzled me was that this had not been done very frequently at an
+earlier stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted
+and with some success, there seemed to be every reason to expect a
+repetition of the operation, and it was clear that it was unwise to
+take the Fleet far into southern waters unless an adequate destroyer
+force was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. If the
+circumstances were exceptional and the need very pressing, it would be
+necessary to accept the risk. There was general agreement on this point
+between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the Admiralty.
+
+During the month of August the weekly average of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron showed:
+
+No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112; No. sent in, 35; No.
+on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrols,
+10; No. on special service, 0.
+
+The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was foggy and misty
+during a great part of the month. Much mist or fog was experienced from
+the 1st to the 6th, the 10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th.
+
+During the month Grand Fleet submarines were exercised at Scapa Flow in
+carrying out attacks on ships under way, and the destroyer flotillas
+were similarly practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet
+divisions being exercised in countering such attacks by turning
+movements. These exercises were continued for the remainder of the
+year, and much experience was obtained from them as to the different
+methods of dealing with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet
+action.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY
+
+
+Events were to prove that my period of command of the Grand Fleet was
+drawing to a close, my transfer to the Admiralty occurring at the end
+of November, 1917.
+
+But before coming to that development something must be said in
+continuation of the narrative of the work of the Grand Fleet.
+
+During the month of September, 1916, there was not much movement by
+the Fleet as a whole. On the 4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and
+2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, swept
+towards the Naze, then down to the southward of the Little Fisher Bank,
+and back to Rosyth. On the same day three divisions of destroyers from
+Scapa endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported by
+the _Talisman_ to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries. On the 7th a
+further unsuccessful search for a submarine was carried out in the same
+locality.
+
+On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons left Rosyth and
+Scapa respectively to exchange bases, carrying out a search of the
+North Sea _en route_, and on the 20th two light cruisers and four
+destroyers left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on the
+4th.
+
+On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the eastward made
+it necessary to move the patrol line of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+temporarily farther west.
+
+On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron, _Campania_, and the destroyer flotillas left
+Scapa for a cruise between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the
+Norwegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light cruisers,
+and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. Battle exercises were
+carried out during the cruise. A submarine was reported on the intended
+track of the fleet on return, and the base was, therefore, approached
+by another route, the available local patrol vessels being employed to
+keep the submarine submerged during the entry of the fleet to Scapa.
+
+Submarines were again active during the latter part of the month in
+the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the
+position of the squadron being shifted for that reason.
+
+On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth to
+search the waters to the southward of the German North Sea mine-field,
+returning on the 28th.
+
+On the same date the yacht _Conqueror II._, the patrol trawler _Sarah
+Alice_, and two British steamers were torpedoed in the Fair Island
+Channel by enemy submarines. On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow,
+destroyers were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate
+against the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these waters.
+
+Early on the 30th the _Lion_, with the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser
+Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and accompanied by a
+destroyer escort, left Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze,
+then turned to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.
+
+During September the cruiser patrols were continuously maintained to
+the northward of the Shetlands and on the Archangel routes, each patrol
+consisting of a cruiser and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine
+patrol, consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the Horn
+Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols inconvenient, and
+German destroyers on several occasions during the month cruised at
+night in the area patrolled with a view to interrupting our submarines
+when recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent change of
+position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning from patrol on the
+29th, sighted an enemy submarine on the surface, and, being unable to
+get into position to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did
+not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.
+
+The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla (the 10th
+Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the month, the base being the
+River Tees, and the parent ship the _Lucia_, with two attendant
+destroyers. The formation of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also
+commenced, this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be
+formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers to 100.
+
+On the 21st the new battle cruiser _Repulse_, heavily armed and of high
+speed, but with inadequate protection for a battle cruiser, joined the
+Fleet at Scapa to work up gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour
+protection of this ship was about equal to that of the _Australia_
+and _New Zealand_, and she was greatly inferior in this respect to
+the _Lion_, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, experience
+during the War had demonstrated very clearly that our battle cruisers
+were at a marked disadvantage in engaging German vessels of the same
+class, unless they were provided with better protection than that given
+to the _Australia_ and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore,
+forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably to the deck
+protection of both the _Repulse_ and her sister ship, the _Renown_.
+These proposals were approved and the work carried out at the Fleet
+bases. Although the ships were much improved by the alteration, they
+were still far inferior in protection to the German battle cruisers.
+
+On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built on the Tyne, for
+light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at Invergordon, and was a very
+useful addition to that most valuable refitting base.
+
+The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser Squadron during
+September were:
+
+No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on patrol, 15; No.
+absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; No. on special
+service, 0.
+
+The favourable weather and short nights, combined with the large number
+of vessels maintained on patrol were responsible for the increase in
+the number of ships intercepted.
+
+The weather as a whole was good during the month. Fog or mist was
+prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th and 27th, and a gale occurred on
+the 18th. Otherwise the conditions were favourable.
+
+In the early part of October, the activities of the enemy’s submarines
+in the White Sea, which had been considerable during the month of
+September, became more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three
+Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, and a British
+vessel and Russian steamer fell victims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N.,
+Long. 35.3 E. Some submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in
+Lat. 69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack
+was successful. The _Fearless_, now a submarine parent ship, and
+three submarines started for the White Sea on October 13th from Scapa
+to operate from Alexandrovsk against the hostile submarines. They
+arrived on the 20th and began operations at once. During their stay in
+the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any enemy submarines,
+but there was a marked decrease in enemy operations, possibly due to
+the cramping effect of the presence of our vessels in those waters.
+The _Fearless_, with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return
+passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these waters before
+the ice began to form.
+
+On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships of the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to
+the eastward, returning on the 4th.
+
+On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and swept towards the
+Naze, thence proceeding to a position to the south-westward of the
+Little Fisher Bank, in which our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef
+patrol had reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting
+suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours were found there
+by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; three were selected and sent in for
+examination, but were found to be in order.
+
+On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left Scapa to meet at sea
+the airships stationed at Longside, near Peterhead, with a view to
+gaining experience in airships and light cruisers working together.
+The programme arranged could not be completed owing to bad weather,
+but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, and some useful hints
+were gained. This work was undertaken as a preliminary to the airships
+being detailed to accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south,
+as the number of these craft completing in the near future justified
+such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of the Zeppelin
+type, it was felt that those of the smaller class might be able to
+carry out useful reconnaissance work ahead of the Fleet if moving south
+on the western side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable
+experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German High Sea Fleet in
+this respect. That experience had fully confirmed the views put forward
+in 1913 on this subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval
+Air Service came under my supervision. These views were expressed on
+an occasion when the building of a fleet of Zeppelins was being urged
+on behalf of the Navy. It was then pointed out with emphasis how
+great would be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in
+connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual conflict was
+proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin and heavier-than-air
+craft, but the views expressed were that whatever future there might
+be for the latter as development proceeded, there was no likelihood
+of their having the radius of action necessary for scouting work in a
+fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already possessed it. My
+apology for making mention of this fact is that it controverts the
+assertion so constantly made that the senior officers in the Navy were
+not alive to the value of air-craft before the War.
+
+On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some cruisers of the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left
+Scapa to cruise to the eastward, returning on the 10th.
+
+On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers left for a sweep,
+but were recalled on the 16th owing to bad weather.
+
+On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth
+for a position to the westward of Ekersund, and thence swept down to
+the Little Fisher Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of
+interest.
+
+On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers left
+the northern bases to spread on a line between Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1
+E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags,
+on a course approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order to
+search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was repeated during
+daylight hours on two successive days; no enemy vessels were sighted.
+
+On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and the 14th and 15th
+Flotillas left Scapa for a watching and exercise cruise to the
+eastward, returning on the 24th.
+
+During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried out during the
+month of October, the Flag officers were directed to carry out battle
+exercises based on the tactics employed by the enemy during the Jutland
+action, with a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet
+these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from all Flag
+officers.
+
+On October 24th a division of destroyers, together with sea-planes, was
+sent to the Fair Island Channel to operate against enemy submarines
+reported to be using this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during
+the patrol.
+
+On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak to operate against
+an enemy decoy vessel reported in those waters. On the same day the
+_Kildonan Castle_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a
+submarine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., Long. 18.30
+W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol line was consequently moved
+temporarily to the westward, and trawlers were despatched to the
+neighbourhood.
+
+On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth
+to carry out a reconnaissance of the waters south of the German North
+Sea mine-field. They returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy
+vessels.
+
+On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th Flotilla left Rosyth
+for an observation and exercise cruise in the central and northern
+positions of the North Sea, and returned without incident on November
+3rd.
+
+During the month the Northern patrol north of the Shetlands by one
+cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was continued, as were the
+patrol on the Archangel route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn
+Reef.
+
+The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following
+figures:--
+
+No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on patrol, 12; No.
+absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 12; No. on special
+service, 0.
+
+Bad weather during the month interfered with the operations of the
+squadron; gales were experienced on the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th.
+There was little fog or mist.
+
+On November 1st I left the _Iron Duke_ at Cromarty and proceeded to the
+Admiralty at the request of the First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was
+the result of letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing
+danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity
+for the adoption of most energetic measures to deal with this danger.
+It had been for some time my opinion that unless the Navy could devise
+effective means, first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly,
+to protect our communications more successfully until the submarines
+could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of our being forced into
+making an unsatisfactory peace. From information furnished to me it
+was evident that the Germans were making special efforts to increase
+the number of their submarines very largely, and there did not seem
+to be much prospect, with the methods we were at the time employing,
+of destroying submarines at a rate at all approaching that of their
+construction.
+
+So far as I was aware there was an insufficient reserve of food in
+the country to provide against the consequences of successful action
+by enemy submarines; and the construction of merchant-ships on an
+adequate scale to replace those lost had not been taken in hand, this
+being obviously an essential measure. I had written semi-officially for
+eighteen months before on the matter.[T] It seemed to me questionable
+whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently
+numerous and important staff, having as its sole business the work of
+dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem which was assuming
+such very serious proportions. It did not appear that new proposals
+and inventions for dealing with the submarine campaign were being
+pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly because of the
+absence of such an organisation, of difficulties connected with labour
+and _matériel_; and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers
+confronting us would be successfully combated.
+
+    [T] The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food
+        supplies or, at that time, for merchant-ship building.
+
+I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was alive to the
+danger, and that it caused him much anxiety. We had corresponded very
+freely on all subjects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty,
+and I was aware of his views on matters connected with the War, on
+which we had always been in complete agreement. His direction and
+assistance in connection with matters concerning the development
+and employment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, and
+invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that in putting forward my
+views as to the new and serious danger confronting us, and the possible
+methods of dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance in
+combating the menace. One of my suggestions was the formation of a
+committee, or department, at the Admiralty under a senior officer,
+and composed of some of the clever and younger officers who had
+shown marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole object would
+be the development of arrangements for dealing with the submarine
+warfare against merchant shipping, and the production of the necessary
+material. I pointed out that our existing methods were not meeting with
+the success attained at an earlier period, and gave the reasons which,
+in my opinion, were responsible for this result.
+
+I had also formed and expressed the opinion that the High Sea Fleet
+would not be risked again in a Fleet action, at any rate, until the
+submarine campaign against merchant shipping had been fully tried and
+had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I suggested to the
+Admiralty the desirability of reducing the number of destroyers in the
+Grand Fleet by one flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines
+in waters where such action had some chance of success. I pointed
+out, once again, that offensive action against submarines in the
+northern part of the North Sea (the only waters in which Grand Fleet
+destroyers could be used, and yet be available for work with the
+Fleet in an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results,
+as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water open to them,
+always dive and escape. The areas in which destroyers _could_ act more
+effectively against submarines were comparatively narrow and deep
+waters; in restricted localities, such as some parts of the English
+Channel, where the depth did not allow of their resting on the bottom,
+if hunted. My contention was that it was probably wise to reduce the
+number of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen
+the force required to deal with the submarine danger, even if this
+reduction necessitated sending the Grand Fleet to sea short of one
+battle squadron, should it have to deal with a grave emergency, such
+as attempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt _we could not
+face_, was to run the graver risk of serious disaster from successful
+submarine warfare on merchant shipping.
+
+It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would _not_ risk a fleet
+action for some time, and even if this Fleet undertook an operation
+having as its objective some military advantage, I considered that
+with the 1st, 2nd and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had
+been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be engaged with
+every prospect of success, provided always that it was well screened
+from submarine attack and carefully handled. The only direction, apart
+from an attack on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet
+could inflict any material damage on us and which the Grand Fleet could
+expect to be in a position to prevent, lay in attempted invasion. The
+bombardment of coast towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could
+not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened to be at sea
+and in the right position at the right moment.
+
+The objection which might be raised to this policy, which was otherwise
+to my mind correct, was the effect on the public mind of the High Sea
+Fleet being at sea without being brought to action, even if it could
+achieve no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised very
+fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility involved
+in disregarding it. On the other hand, the submarine danger to our
+shipping was most pressing and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with
+at all costs, and without delay, since the existence of the armies as
+well as that of the civil population depended on merchant shipping.
+
+I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty on November 5th.
+
+On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
+and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa to cruise eastward of the
+Shetland Islands, returning on November 4th.
+
+On the 3rd the _Botha_, with four destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, left
+Scapa for a sweep northward along the Norwegian coast from a position
+near Udsire Lighthouse on the probable track of enemy submarines
+returning to their bases. On the same day the _Faulknor_ and six
+destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried out a similar
+sweep to the northward, starting from the vicinity of the Little Fisher
+Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th
+Flotilla from Rosyth supported both forces.
+
+At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on patrol off the Horn
+Reef, sighted four enemy battleships of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6
+N., Long. 6.53 E. A considerable sea was running, making it difficult
+to prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had a strong
+destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack were very difficult.
+But Commander Lawrence succeeded, in spite of these difficulties, in
+firing his four bow torpedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them
+took effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned to the
+southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable period, but
+unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently that the two damaged ships
+managed to reach port, but this fact does not detract from the great
+credit attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack under
+exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident showed, as in previous
+cases, the efficiency of the German system of underwater protection in
+their capital ships.
+
+On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against enemy submarines on
+their expected tracks.
+
+From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was experienced in
+northern waters; several merchant ships were disabled and assistance
+was rendered to them by the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by
+tugs from Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 17th.
+
+On the 18th the _Otway_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, intercepted the
+Norwegian steamship _Older_, which was found to be in charge of a prize
+crew from a German submarine. She had on board, in addition, survivors
+of an Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine.
+The _Otway_ recaptured her, but was not in time to prevent the Germans
+from exploding several bombs in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did
+not, however, succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.
+
+During the period up to November 19th, the weekly average of work of
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:--
+
+No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on patrol, 13; No.
+absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.
+
+The weather throughout the period to the 19th November was very bad,
+and the figures showed a corresponding reduction in the number of ships
+intercepted.
+
+Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 16th, 17th and 18th.
+
+On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 1st and 2nd
+Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers proceeded
+to sea for a cruise in northern waters, during which battle exercises
+were carried out.
+
+Shortly before the _Iron Duke_ slipped from her buoy, and whilst the
+remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its way out of harbour, I received
+a telegram from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post
+of First Sea Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I
+consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and he stated his
+opinion that I ought to accept the post in order to be in a position
+to put into practice the views I held as to the steps required to deal
+with the submarine menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to
+leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since the outbreak
+of the War, for a position which I knew was the most difficult that a
+sailor could be called upon to fill in war time.
+
+I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to do whatever was
+considered best for the Service, and in accordance with the wish
+expressed in his telegram, agreed to meet him at Rosyth.
+
+I then followed the Fleet to sea in the _Iron Duke_, and having
+completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned over the Command of the
+Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (second in command), with directions
+that the ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded in the
+_Iron Duke_ to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning of the 27th.
+
+I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 27th, on the question
+of taking up the work at the Admiralty, and accepted the appointment.
+He intimated to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir
+David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the Grand Fleet, and
+informed me also of the other changes in Flag appointments that would
+be effected. I made suggestions on some of these matters.
+
+Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started my preparations
+for the change of duties and the transfer of command. I was under
+no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The attacks
+already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses
+due to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids on our
+coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with the means existing,
+fully prepared me for what was to come.
+
+I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the production of fresh
+material, could become effective for a period of at least six to twelve
+months. Indeed, I was so certain of the course that events would take,
+that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of the _Iron Duke_
+(a very difficult task in view of the intense regret that I felt at
+leaving them), I said that they must expect to see me the object of the
+same attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry
+Jackson, had been exposed. I was not wrong in this surmise. I left the
+_Iron Duke_ with a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot
+close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet during my twenty-eight
+months’ service as Commander-in-Chief better than by quoting my
+farewell memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so well.
+
+“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, officers and
+men of the Fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the
+commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all
+ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have
+tried their patience to the breaking-point.
+
+“The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southern
+movements of the Fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to
+staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to maintain the
+highest state of efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for
+testing the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.
+
+“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say,
+with absolute confidence, that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm
+has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the Fleet gains in
+efficiency from day to day. We have benefited by experience, and we
+have turned that experience to good account.
+
+“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so
+with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with that spirit
+which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages,
+whenever and wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and
+whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am
+perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than
+their match, ship for ship in all classes, and that the result will
+never be for one moment in doubt.
+
+“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in
+a just and lasting peace!
+
+                                                      “J. R. JELLICOE,
+                                                              “Admiral.”
+
+
+
+
+Appendix I
+
+BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH
+
+
+                                                     _Iron Duke,
+                                                       18th June, 1916._
+
+  No. 1395 H.F. 0022.
+  The Secretary
+          of the ADMIRALTY,
+
+    SIR,--
+
+    Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that
+    the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, 1916, to
+    the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.
+
+    2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the
+    general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left
+    its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions
+    issued by me.
+
+    3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were as
+    follows:
+
+        (_a_) Those in company with me:
+
+  _Iron Duke_--Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).
+
+  _Marlborough_--Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of
+        Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E.
+        Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).
+
+  _Colossus_--Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of
+        Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).
+
+  _Hercules_--Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.
+
+  _Neptune_--Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.
+
+  _Collingwood_--Captain James C. Ley.
+
+  _Revenge_--Captain Edward B. Kiddle.
+
+  _Agincourt_--Captain Henry M. Doughty.
+
+  _St. Vincent_--Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.
+
+  _Bellona_--Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.
+
+  _King George V._--Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of
+        Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).
+
+  _Orion_--Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of
+        Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).
+
+  _Centurion_--Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.
+
+  _Conqueror_--Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.
+
+  _Erin_--Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.
+
+  _Thunderer_--Captain James A. Fergusson.
+
+  _Monarch_--Captain George H. Borrett.
+
+  _Ajax_--Captain George H. Baird.
+
+  _Boadicea_--Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.
+
+  _Benbow_--Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral
+        Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).
+
+  _Superb_--Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+        Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).
+
+  _Canada_--Captain William C. M. Nicholson.
+
+  _Bellerophon_--Captain Edward F. Bruen.
+
+  _Temeraire_--Captain Edwin V. Underhill.
+
+  _Vanguard_--Captain James D. Dick.
+
+  _Royal Oak_--Captain Crawford Maclachlan.
+
+  _Blanche_--Captain John M. Casement.
+
+  _Minotaur_--Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of
+        Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).
+
+  _Hampshire_--Captain Herbert J. Savill.
+
+  _Cochrane_--Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.
+
+  _Shannon_--Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.
+
+  _Defence_--Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+        Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).
+
+  _Duke of Edinburgh_--Captain Henry Blackett.
+
+  _Black Prince_--Captain Thomas P. Bonham.
+
+  _Warrior_--Captain Vincent B. Molteno.
+
+  _Invincible_--Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+        The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).
+
+  _Indomitable_--Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
+
+  _Inflexible_--Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.
+
+  _Calliope_--Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.
+
+  _Caroline_--Captain H. Ralph Crooke.
+
+  _Comus_--Captain Alan G. Hotham.
+
+  _Constance_--Captain Cyril S. Townsend.
+
+  _Royalist_--Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.
+
+  _Canterbury_--Captain Percy M. R. Royds.
+
+  _Chester_--Captain Robert N. Lawson.
+
+  _Active_--Captain Percy Withers.
+
+  _Castor_--Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.
+
+  _Tipperary_--Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.
+
+  _Broke_--Commander Walter L. Allen.
+
+  _Shark_--Commander Loftus W. Jones.
+
+  _Acasta_--Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.
+
+  _Spitfire_--Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.
+
+  _Sparrowhawk_--Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.
+
+  _Achates_--Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.
+
+  _Ambuscade_--Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.
+
+  _Ardent_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.
+
+  _Fortune_--Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.
+
+  _Porpoise_--Commander Hugh D. Colville.
+
+  _Unity_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.
+
+  _Garland_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.
+
+  _Christopher_--Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.
+
+  _Contest_--Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.
+
+  _Owl_--Commander Robert G. Hamond.
+
+  _Hardy_--Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.
+
+  _Midge_--Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.
+
+  _Ophelia_--Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.
+
+  _Kempenfelt_--Commander Harold E. Sulivan.
+
+  _Ossory_--Commander Harold V. Dundas.
+
+  _Martial_--Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.
+
+  _Magic_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.
+
+  _Minion_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.
+
+  _Mystic_--Commander Claude F. Allsup.
+
+  _Mons_--Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.
+
+  _Mandate_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.
+
+  _Michael_--Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.
+
+  _Marne_--Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.
+
+  _Milbrook_--Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.
+
+  _Manners_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.
+
+  _Moon_--Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.
+
+  _Mounsey_--Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.
+
+  _Morning Star_--Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.
+
+  _Faulknor_--Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.
+
+  _Marksman_--Commander Norton A. Sulivan.
+
+  _Obedient_--Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.
+
+  _Mindful_--Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.
+
+  _Marvel_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.
+
+  _Onslaught_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.
+
+  _Mænad_--Commander John P. Champion.
+
+  _Narwhal_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.
+
+  _Nessus_--Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.
+
+  _Noble_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.
+
+  _Opal_--Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.
+
+  _Nonsuch_--Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.
+
+  _Menace_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.
+
+  _Munster_--Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.
+
+  _Mary Rose_--Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.
+
+  _Mischief_--Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.
+
+  _Oak_--Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.
+
+  _Abdiel_--Commander Berwick Curtis.
+
+        (_b_) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:
+
+  _Lion_--Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of
+        Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); Captain
+        Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.
+
+  _Princess Royal_--Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying the
+        Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).
+
+  _Tiger_--Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.
+
+  _Queen Mary_--Captain Cecil I. Prowse.
+
+  _New Zealand_--Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of
+        Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).
+
+  _Indefatigable_--Captain Charles F. Sowerby.
+
+  _Southampton_--Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.
+
+  _Nottingham_--Captain Charles B. Miller.
+
+  _Birmingham_--Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.
+
+  _Dublin_--Captain Albert C. Scott.
+
+  _Galatea_--Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.
+
+  _Inconstant_--Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.
+
+  _Phaeton_--Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.
+
+  _Cordelia_--Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.
+
+  _Falmouth_--Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+        Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).
+
+  _Birkenhead_--Captain Edward Reeves.
+
+  _Gloucester_--Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.
+
+  _Yarmouth_--Captain Thomas D. Pratt.
+
+  “_Barham_”--Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+        Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).
+
+  _Warspite_--Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.
+
+  _Valiant_--Captain Maurice Woollcombe.
+
+  _Malaya_--Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.
+
+  _Champion_--Captain (D.) James U. Farie.
+
+  _Nestor_--Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.
+
+  _Nomad_--Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.
+
+  _Narborough_--Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.
+
+  _Obdurate_--Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.
+
+  _Petard_--Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.
+
+  _Pelican_--Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.
+
+  _Nerissa_--Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.
+
+  _Onslow_--Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.
+
+  _Moresby_--Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.
+
+  _Nicator_--Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.
+
+  _Fearless_--Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.
+
+  _Acheron_--Commander Charles G. Ramsey.
+
+  _Ariel_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.
+
+  _Attack_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.
+
+  _Hydra_--Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.
+
+  _Badger_--Commander G. A. Fremantle.
+
+  _Goshawk_--Commander Dashwood F. Moir.
+
+  _Defender_--Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.
+
+  _Lizard_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.
+
+  _Lapwing_--Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.
+
+  _Lydiard_--Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.
+
+  _Liberty_--Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.
+
+  _Landrail_--Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.
+
+  _Laurel_--Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.
+
+  _Moorsom_--Commander John C. Hodgson.
+
+  _Morris_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.
+
+  _Turbulent_--Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.
+
+  _Termagent_--Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.
+
+  _Engadine_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.
+
+    4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and
+    2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser
+    Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas,
+    supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my
+    directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which
+    was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd
+    Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th
+    Flotillas.
+
+    5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after
+    the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly
+    course steered by the latter during the first hour of their action
+    with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable,
+    as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward
+    the main fleets would never have been in contact.
+
+    The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and
+    admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron
+    under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times,
+    disadvantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with
+    the best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable
+    advantage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the
+    German Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and
+    German battle cruisers in the matter of protection must not be
+    forgotten. The German vessels are in this respect equal to powerful
+    battleships, whereas our battle cruisers, particularly those of the
+    2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, are very lightly protected.
+    The main difficulty with which our ships had to contend was the bad
+    light. All reports mention the difficulty experienced in seeing the
+    enemy vessels to the eastward, whilst remarking on the clearness of
+    the western horizon. A photograph taken from _Malaya_ during the
+    action indicates this fact very clearly.
+
+    During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged with
+    the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the
+    advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and
+    the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting
+    qualities of the personnel.
+
+    6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir David
+    Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon
+    the scene:
+
+    “At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from _Galatea_ indicating
+    the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was
+    immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to
+    place my force between the enemy and his base.
+
+    “At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
+    eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward
+    and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the
+    Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly
+    altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at
+    3.31 P.M. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.
+
+    “After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser
+    Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders
+    spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the
+    battle cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we
+    had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light
+    cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser
+    Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station
+    ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the
+    course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the
+    work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great
+    value.
+
+    “From a report from _Galatea_ at 2.25 P.M. it was evident that
+    the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit
+    of light cruisers, so at 2.45 P.M. I ordered _Engadine_ to send
+    up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out
+    very quickly, and by 3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant
+    F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin,
+    R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the
+    enemy were received in _Engadine_ about 3.30 P.M. Owing to clouds
+    it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four
+    enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900
+    feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire
+    on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered
+    with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant
+    Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated
+    on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such
+    circumstances are of distinct value.
+
+    “At 3.30 P.M. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of
+    Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the
+    1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th
+    Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly
+    converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards,
+    and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The
+    5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now
+    bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was
+    good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy
+    and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically
+    good.
+
+    “At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both
+    forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered
+    to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E.,
+    the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500
+    yards.
+
+    “Shortly after 4 P.M. _Indefatigable_, after a violent explosion,
+    fell out of the line, turned over and sank.
+
+    “At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened
+    fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to
+    slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through
+    a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer _Landrail_ of 9th
+    Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead,
+    sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though
+    causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of
+    _Lydiard_ and _Landrail_ undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers
+    from closer submarine attack. _Nottingham_ also reported a
+    submarine on the starboard beam.
+
+    “Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, _Nestor_, _Nomad_,
+    _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, _Obdurate_,
+    _Nerissa_, with _Moorsom_ and _Morris_ of 10th Flotilla,
+    _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ of the 9th Flotilla, having been
+    ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity
+    offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar
+    movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out
+    in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before
+    arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they
+    intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15
+    destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with
+    the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle
+    cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their
+    torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in
+    this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was
+    rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having
+    dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore
+    unfavourable for torpedo attack.
+
+    “_Nestor_, _Nomad_ and _Nicator_, gallantly led by Commander
+    the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of _Nestor_, pressed home their
+    attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them
+    at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy
+    fire from the enemy’s secondary armament. _Nomad_ was badly hit
+    and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently
+    _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ altered course to the S.E., and in a short
+    time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found
+    themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships.
+    Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and
+    their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo
+    at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards.
+    Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, _Nestor_ was badly hit
+    and swung to starboard, _Nicator_ altering course inside her to
+    avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last
+    torpedo. _Nicator_ made good her escape and subsequently rejoined
+    the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. _Nestor_ remained stopped, but was
+    afloat when last seen. _Moorsom_ also carried out an attack on the
+    enemy’s battle fleet.
+
+    “_Petard_, _Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ also pressed home
+    their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after
+    the engagement with enemy destroyers. _Petard_ reports that all
+    her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while _Nerissa_
+    states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These
+    destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His
+    Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions.
+
+    “From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing battle
+    cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th
+    Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately
+    at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and
+    rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18
+    P.M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to
+    the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline
+    of the ships very indistinct.
+
+    “At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in _Queen Mary_; she
+    was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of
+    her officers and men were subsequently picked up by _Laurel_.
+
+    “At 4.38 P.M. _Southampton_ reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet
+    ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy’s
+    Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in
+    succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course
+    to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers
+    altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued.
+    _Southampton_ with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the
+    southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the
+    enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective
+    fire. _Southampton’s_ reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle
+    Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the
+    enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy
+    battle fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter
+    course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in
+    _Barham_, this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.
+
+    “At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and
+    came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet.
+    _Fearless_ with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle
+    cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. _Champion_
+    with 13th Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At
+    5 P.M. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been
+    following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard
+    bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.
+
+    “The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being
+    silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the
+    enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up
+    clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had
+    turned their van at about 6 P.M. Between 5 and 6 P.M. the action
+    continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000
+    yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment,
+    and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in
+    a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal
+    observation and was corroborated by _Princess Royal_ and _Tiger_.
+    Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5
+    P.M. _Onslow_ and _Moresby_, who had been detached to assist
+    _Engadine_ with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons
+    and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of _Lion_. At 5.10
+    P.M. _Moresby_, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy
+    ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later
+    she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th
+    ship in the line. _Moresby_ then passed between the lines to clear
+    the range of smoke, and rejoined _Champion_. In corroboration of
+    this, _Fearless_ reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily
+    on fire at about 5.10 P.M., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of
+    smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of
+    _Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_.
+
+    “At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position
+    of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the
+    north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He
+    was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment
+    at the head of his line, and probably acting on information
+    received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged
+    with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide _Indomitable’s_
+    report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 P.M. British
+    cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 P.M. the leading
+    battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon
+    altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought
+    the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the
+    Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east.
+    At this time only three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible,
+    closely followed by battleships of the ”König“ class.
+
+    “At about 6.5 P.M. _Onslow_, being on the engaged bow of _Lion_,
+    sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from
+    us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. _Onslow_ at
+    once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from
+    4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. _Onslow_ then
+    closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all
+    torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by
+    a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired.
+    Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer
+    proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had
+    three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and
+    torpedoed her. The enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the
+    remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly,
+    they must have crossed the enemy’s track. Damage then caused
+    _Onslow_ to stop.
+
+    “At 7.15 P.M. _Defender_, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots,
+    while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell
+    which damaged her foremost boiler, closed _Onslow_ and took her
+    in tow. Shell were falling all round them during this operation,
+    which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy
+    weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was
+    re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1. P.M. 1st June,
+    when _Onslow_ was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances
+    of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am
+    recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of _Onslow_, and
+    Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of _Defender_, for special recognition.
+    _Onslow_ was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral
+    Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, as follows:
+
+    “‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a
+    destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled
+    condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle
+    ahead again, and made straight for the _Derfflinger_ to attack her.
+    The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to
+    investigate it further.’”
+
+
+    PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET
+
+    7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted,
+    the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and
+    Destroyer Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course
+    to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that
+    elapsed before the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the
+    steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested.
+    Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner
+    in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet
+    maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the
+    older vessels.
+
+    The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the
+    Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet,
+    was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in
+    reckoning between _Lion_ and the _Iron Duke_, which was inevitable
+    under the circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third
+    Battle Cruiser Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward,
+    and it was not until 5.30 P.M. that this squadron observed flashes
+    of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward.
+    Rear-Admiral Hood sent the _Chester_ (Captain Robert N. Lawson)
+    to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light
+    cruisers at about 5.45 P.M. The engagement lasted for about twenty
+    minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with
+    great skill against heavy odds, and although the ship suffered
+    considerably in casualties her fighting and steaming qualities were
+    unimpaired, and at about 6.5 P.M. she rejoined the Third Battle
+    Cruiser Squadron.
+
+    The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward,
+    and at 6.10 P.M. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking
+    station ahead of the _Lion_ at 6.21 P.M. in accordance with the
+    orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He
+    reports as follows:
+
+    “I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out
+    magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action
+    ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval
+    ancestors. At 6.25 P.M. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support
+    of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only
+    8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot
+    fire into her, and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At
+    the same time I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of
+    the bearing and distance of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 P.M.
+    _Invincible_ blew up.
+
+    “After the loss of _Invincible_, the squadron was led by
+    _Inflexible_ until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were
+    clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3
+    miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong
+    the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this
+    time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy
+    ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note
+    that after 6 P.M., although the visibility became reduced, it was
+    undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals
+    their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very
+    severely and establish a definite superiority over them. The damage
+    received by our ships during this period, excepting the destruction
+    of _Invincible_, was slight. From the reports of other ships and
+    my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered severely,
+    battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was
+    crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our
+    battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron were
+    also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas
+    shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely
+    said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.
+
+    “From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third
+    Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our
+    starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 P.M. attacked with
+    the torpedo. _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ both fired torpedoes at the
+    leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo
+    hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light
+    Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with
+    gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that
+    the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired.
+    Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and
+    effective attack. _Indomitable_ reports that about this time one of
+    the _Derfflinger_ class fell out of the enemy’s line.”
+
+    8. Meanwhile, at 6 P.M., _Canterbury_ (Captain Percy M. R. Royds)
+    had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on
+    the torpedo-boat destroyer _Shark_ (Commander Loftus W. Jones),
+    _Acasta_ (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and _Christopher_
+    (Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this
+    engagement the _Shark_ was sunk.
+
+    9. At 5.45 P.M. the report of guns had become audible to me, and at
+    5.55 P.M. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard
+    beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the
+    position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The
+    difference in reckoning between _Iron Duke_ and _Lion_ mentioned in
+    paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation.
+
+    10. Shortly after 5.55 P.M. some of the cruisers ahead, under
+    Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were seen
+    to be in action, and reports received show that _Defence_, Flagship
+    (Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and _Warrior_ (Captain Vincent B.
+    Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light
+    cruiser at this time, which subsequently sank.
+
+    11. At 6 P.M. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers,
+    were sighted by _Marlborough_ bearing before the starboard beam of
+    the battle fleet.
+
+    At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet,
+    reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at
+    6.14 P.M. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.
+
+    At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle
+    cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to
+    ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.
+
+    12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir
+    David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became
+    engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers
+    ahead of the battle fleet.
+
+    The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:
+
+        The Commander-in-Chief,
+        Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
+        Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram,
+        Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee,
+        Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff,
+        Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson,
+        Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt.
+
+    13. At 6.16 P.M. _Defence_ and _Warrior_ were observed passing down
+    between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy
+    fire. _Defence_ was seen to blow up and _Warrior_ passed to the
+    rear disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during
+    his engagement with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to
+    complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the
+    enemy’s heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in
+    close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his
+    ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not
+    known when _Black Prince_ (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same
+    squadron, was sunk, but as a wireless signal was received from her
+    between 8 and 9 P.M. reporting the position of a submarine, it is
+    possible that her loss was the result of a torpedo attack. There
+    is much strong evidence of the presence of a large number of enemy
+    submarines in the vicinity of the scene of the action.
+
+    14. The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deployment,
+    became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire
+    at 6.17 P.M. on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre
+    squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light
+    cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König”
+    class, and the van squadron commenced immediately afterwards.
+
+    At 6.6 P.M. the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron,
+    then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard
+    wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of _Barham_,
+    and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form
+    ahead of the remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the
+    direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre
+    which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from
+    the enemy battle fleet. An accident to _Warspite’s_ steering gear
+    caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship
+    in the direction of the enemy’s line, during which time she was
+    hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Phillpotts to
+    extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.
+
+    Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was
+    possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle
+    line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever
+    visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but
+    never more than eight to twelve.
+
+    The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from
+    6.17 P.M. to 8.20 P.M. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards,
+    during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from
+    S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly
+    turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks
+    and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and
+    the alterations, of course, had the effect of bringing the British
+    Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on
+    the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle
+    line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his
+    bases.
+
+    At 6.55 P.M. _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of _Invincible_ with
+    _Badger_ standing by. I was not aware of the loss of _Queen Mary_
+    and _Indefatigable_ until the following day.
+
+    15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High
+    Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective
+    fire kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand
+    Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were
+    seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the
+    line, and at least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this
+    period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was
+    insignificant.
+
+
+    THE BATTLE CRUISERS IN THE VAN
+
+    16. Sir David Beatty reports:
+
+    “Between 7 and 7.12 P.M. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to
+    regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 P.M. again sighted them
+    at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time
+    were two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the
+    ‘König’ class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward,
+    but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved
+    considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged
+    at 7.17 P.M. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 P.M. my
+    course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship
+    bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed
+    signs of punishment, one ship being on fire while another appeared
+    to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s
+    line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as
+    with a pall, under cover of which they undoubtedly turned away, and
+    at 7.45 P.M. we lost sight of them.
+
+    “At 7.58 P.M. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
+    to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s line,
+    and at 8.20 P.M. we altered course to west in support. We soon
+    located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily
+    engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship
+    was hit repeatedly by _Lion_ and turned away 8 points, emitting
+    very high flames and with a heavy list to port. _Princess Royal_
+    set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; _New Zealand_ and
+    _Indomitable_ report that the third ship, which they both engaged,
+    hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which
+    now came down enveloped them, and _Falmouth_ reported they were
+    last seen at 8.38 P.M. steaming to the westward.
+
+    “At 8.40 P.M. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if
+    struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As,
+    however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an
+    occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a
+    great vessel. This seems a very probable explanation in view of the
+    condition in which the enemy was last seen.”
+
+    17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much
+    on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and
+    by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following” or
+    “chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired,
+    but only one took effect (on _Marlborough_), and even in this case
+    the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action.
+    The menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, in
+    weather conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to
+    the difficulty of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy.
+    Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.
+
+
+    DETAILS OF BATTLE FLEET ACTION
+
+    18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
+    came into action at 6.15 P.M. with the enemy’s Third Battle
+    Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe
+    punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and
+    light cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of _Marlborough_
+    (Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This
+    ship commenced at 6.17 P.M. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of
+    the “Kaiser” class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship,
+    and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable
+    list to starboard, but re-opened at 7.3 P.M. at a cruiser and at
+    7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König”
+    class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The
+    manner in which this effective fire was kept up, in spite of the
+    disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo, was most
+    creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.
+
+    The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards.
+    The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s return fire
+    than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of
+    the Fifth Battle Squadron. _Colossus_ was hit but not seriously
+    damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.
+
+    In the Fourth Battle Squadron--in which squadron my Flagship _Iron
+    Duke_ was placed--Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading one
+    of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and
+    some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and
+    light cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter,
+    but the fire of the squadron was effective. _Iron Duke_, having
+    previously fired at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire
+    at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König” class at a range of
+    12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting
+    commenced at the second salvo, and only ceased when the target
+    ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established
+    was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the
+    flagship so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C.
+    Dreyer.
+
+    The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed
+    at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the
+    mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.
+
+    The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir
+    Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser” or
+    “König” classes between 6.30 and 7.20 P.M., and fired also at an
+    enemy battle cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely
+    damaged.
+
+    19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser
+    Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with
+    the addition of _Duke of Edinburgh_ of the First Cruiser Squadron,
+    occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a
+    connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser
+    fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not
+    have an opportunity of coming into action.
+
+    The attached cruisers _Boadicea_, _Active_, _Blanche_, and
+    _Bellona_ carried out their duties as repeating ships with
+    remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.
+
+    The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E.
+    Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to
+    attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 P.M. and again at 8.18 P.M. when
+    they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under
+    Commodore James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the
+    Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore
+    Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their
+    object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack,
+    when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet
+    at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The _Calliope_ was hit several
+    times but did not sustain serious damage, although, I regret to
+    say, she had several casualties. The light cruisers attacked the
+    enemy’s battleships with torpedoes at this time, but were not able
+    to observe the result; an explosion on board a ship of the “Kaiser”
+    class was seen, however, at 8.38 P.M.
+
+    During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers
+    were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and
+    destroyers.
+
+
+    NIGHT DISPOSITIONS
+
+    20. At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat
+    of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching
+    darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the
+    night with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing
+    for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to
+    remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a
+    position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from
+    destroyer attack and at the same time be favourably situated for
+    attacking the enemy’s heavy ships.
+
+
+    NIGHT ATTACKS BY FLOTILLAS
+
+    21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked,
+    but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore
+    Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of
+    very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy
+    losses.
+
+    22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth
+    Flotilla occurred, including that of _Tipperary_ with the gallant
+    leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his
+    flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering
+    severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels
+    was taken and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.
+
+    Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels as
+    the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from
+    _Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the
+    other from either _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden),
+    _Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or _Garland_
+    (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).
+
+    23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan
+    J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked,
+    which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers,
+    comprised vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely
+    surprised. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at
+    the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third
+    ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack
+    made twenty minutes later by _Mænad_ (Commander John T. Champion)
+    on the five vessels still remaining resulted in the second ship in
+    the line being also hit and blown up.
+
+    The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on
+    reaching the rear of the line, but _Onslaught_ was the only vessel
+    which received any material injuries. In _Onslaught_ Sub-lieutenant
+    Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot,
+    R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship
+    successfully out of action and reached Rosyth.
+
+    24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla,
+    _Castor_ (Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla
+    engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank
+    range.
+
+    The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in
+    _Champion_ took station astern of the battle fleet for the night.
+    At 0.30 A.M. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear
+    of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the _Petard_
+    and _Turbulent_, switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire
+    which severely damaged _Petard_ and disabled _Turbulent_. At 3.30
+    A.M. _Champion_ was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy
+    destroyers. _Moresby_ reports four ships of “Deutschland” class
+    sighted at 2.35 A.M. at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes
+    later an explosion was felt by _Moresby_ and _Obdurate_.
+
+    _Abdiel_, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out
+    her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.
+
+    There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas;
+    they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of
+    them.
+
+    Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light
+    Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close
+    action for about fifteen minutes at 10.20 P.M. with a squadron
+    comprising one enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which
+    period _Southampton_ and _Dublin_ suffered rather heavy casualties,
+    although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired.
+    It is reasonable to suppose that they inflicted considerable damage
+    on their opponents.
+
+
+    PROCEEDINGS ON 1ST JUNE
+
+    25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the
+    southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in
+    search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own
+    cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 A.M. Vice-Admiral Sir
+    Cecil Burney transferred his flag from _Marlborough_ to _Revenge_,
+    as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed
+    of the squadron. _Marlborough_ was detached by my direction to a
+    base, being unsuccessfully attacked _en route_ by enemy submarines.
+    The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less
+    than on 31st May, and difficulty was experienced in meeting all
+    ships, the torpedo-boat destroyers not rejoining until 9 A.M.
+    The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of
+    the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the
+    destroyers _Ardent_, _Fortune_, and _Tipperary_ were picked up, and
+    the _Sparrowhawk_, which had been in collision and was no longer
+    seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large
+    amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 P.M.,
+    it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning
+    to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached
+    without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron
+    was detached to search for _Warrior_, which vessel had been
+    abandoned whilst in tow of _Engadine_ on her way to the base owing
+    to bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but
+    no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by
+    a light cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident
+    that she foundered.
+
+    26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30
+    P.M. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.
+
+
+    LOSSES
+
+    27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action
+    took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by
+    the enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the
+    difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted,
+    or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most
+    careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified
+    to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews
+    with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that
+    the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to
+    numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards
+    the particular class of vessel, particularly those which were sunk
+    during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk it is
+    unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by
+    gunfire and by torpedo attack.
+
+    28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him,
+    and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the water.
+    I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled
+    German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly
+    after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the
+    only gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British
+    Battle Fleet, there appeared to be no desire on the part of the
+    High Sea Fleet to continue the engagement. The battleships turned
+    away on each occasion of being sighted soon after fire was opened,
+    and although the British Fleet remained in the proximity of the
+    battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11
+    A.M. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances
+    from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to
+    enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft, the enemy made no
+    sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the
+    High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved
+    this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been
+    known to the enemy, as at 2.50 A.M. the fleet engaged a Zeppelin
+    for quite five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity
+    to note and subsequently report the position and course of the
+    British Fleet.
+
+    29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned in
+    this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss
+    of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as
+    Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon.
+    Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse,
+    Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles
+    J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished
+    with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They
+    led officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is
+    mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their
+    duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.
+
+
+    THE PERSONNEL OF THE FLEET
+
+    30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night
+    actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do
+    them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious
+    traditions of the past were most worthily upheld--whether in heavy
+    ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers--the same admirable
+    spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with
+    a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The
+    heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.
+
+    I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the
+    Fleet filled me.
+
+    31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships
+    during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the
+    prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department,
+    and that during action the officers and men of that department
+    perform their most important duties without the incentive which a
+    knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The
+    qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under
+    these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained
+    throughout the operations under review. Many ships attained speeds
+    that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly
+    their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were
+    conspicuous by their absence, and many instances are reported of
+    magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of
+    injured ships.
+
+    32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out
+    very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely
+    admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials
+    for performing critical operations and with their staff seriously
+    depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the
+    greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.
+
+    33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot
+    of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the
+    flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the
+    squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels
+    composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also
+    the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd
+    Cruiser Squadron.
+
+    34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Commanding
+    Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place
+    on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels
+    were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill
+    and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous
+    throughout the day.
+
+    I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by
+    Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand
+    Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton
+    Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander
+    L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest
+    F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet.
+    They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s
+    squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy
+    battle fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has
+    rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the
+    squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by
+    Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir
+    David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action
+    in rear of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the
+    evening.
+
+    Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant
+    leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He
+    appreciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s
+    lighter forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle
+    fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening
+    mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for
+    which he had manœuvred and for which the vessels in company with
+    him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on
+    this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest
+    value.
+
+    Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded
+    him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in
+    which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into
+    action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William
+    C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good
+    work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command
+    respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore
+    William E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He
+    states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes
+    and used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully
+    endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract
+    from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his
+    staff:
+
+        “I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I
+        received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief
+        of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment
+        was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My
+        Flag-Commander, The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most
+        valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling
+        me to take advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary,
+        Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as
+        they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping
+        the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander
+        Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under
+        the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his
+        signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these
+        officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the
+        manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the
+        enemy’s fire.”
+
+    35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant
+    work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden,
+    K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war
+    his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment,
+    his long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and
+    his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest
+    assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety
+    inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the
+    stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the
+    action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment never at
+    fault. I owe him more than I can say.
+
+    My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G.,
+    the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance in
+    the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation
+    is largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and
+    replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much
+    assistance to me during the action.
+
+    Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander Roger
+    M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the two fleets
+    with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander
+    the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as observer
+    aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These
+    officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action.
+
+    The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander
+    Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers, and
+    all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. My
+    Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also
+    of much service to me throughout the action.
+
+    The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet
+    and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and
+    after the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work
+    carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have
+    been invaluable throughout the war.
+
+    A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all
+    ships.
+
+    My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and Victor
+    H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the
+    action. Their records have been of much assistance.
+
+    To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am
+    indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning
+    throughout the operations.
+
+    36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of
+    their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not
+    come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of
+    specially distinguishing themselves.
+
+                                  I am, Sir,
+                                    Your obedient Servant,
+                                          (_Signed_) J. R. JELLICOE,
+                                        _Admiral_, _Commander-in-Chief_.
+
+
+Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated 18th June,
+1916.
+
+
+LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK, 31st May–1st June, 1916.
+
+
+_Battleships or Battle Cruisers._
+
+  2 Battleships, “Dreadnought” type     Certain.
+  1 Battleship, “Deutschland” type      Certain.
+
+  1 Battleship or Battle Cruiser        Probable.
+  1 Battleship, “Dreadnought” type      Probable.
+
+
+_Light Cruisers._
+
+  4 Light Cruisers                      Certain.
+  1 Heavy ship or Light Cruiser         Certain.
+
+
+_Torpedo-boat Destroyers._
+
+  6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers             Certain.
+  3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers             Probable.
+
+
+_Submarines._
+
+  1 Submarine                           Certain.
+  3 Submarines                          Possible.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix II
+
+ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY, 24th JANUARY, 1915
+
+
+                                                ADMIRALTY,
+                                                      _3rd March, 1915_.
+
+The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David
+Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of
+January, 1915:--
+
+                                        _H.M.S. Princess Royal,
+                                                    2nd February, 1915._
+
+    SIR,--I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January,
+    1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:
+
+    The Battle Cruisers _Lion_, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield,
+    C.V.O., flying my flag; _Princess Royal_, Captain Osmond de B.
+    Brock, Aide-de-Camp; _Tiger_, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; _New
+    Zealand_, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the
+    flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and
+    _Indomitable_, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
+
+    The Light Cruisers _Southampton_, flying the broad pendant of
+    Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; _Nottingham_, Captain
+    Charles B. Miller; _Birmingham_, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and
+    _Lowestoft_, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my
+    port beam.
+
+    Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in _Arethusa_, _Aurora_,
+    Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, _Undaunted_, Captain Francis G. St.
+    John, M.V.O., _Arethusa_, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.
+
+    At 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly
+    afterwards a report reached me from _Aurora_ that she was engaged
+    with enemy’s ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E.,
+    increased to 22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas
+    to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy.
+
+    This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my wishes
+    had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers, and
+    reports almost immediately followed from _Southampton_, _Arethusa_,
+    and _Aurora_ as to the position and composition of the enemy, which
+    consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and _Blücher_, 6 Light Cruisers, and
+    a number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course
+    to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with
+    the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.
+
+    The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the
+    southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme
+    visibility. At 7.30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow
+    steaming fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.
+
+    Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our
+    position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to
+    S.E. parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase,
+    gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots.
+    Great credit is due to the Engineer Staffs of _New Zealand_ and
+    _Indomitable_--these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.
+
+    At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear
+    ship, the Battle Cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so
+    that guns would bear, and _Lion_ fired a single shot, which fell
+    short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light
+    Cruisers ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard
+    beam.
+
+    Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9
+    A.M. _Lion_ made her first hit on the _Blücher_, No. 4 in the line.
+    The _Tiger_ opened fire at 9.20 A.M. on the rear ship, the _Lion_
+    shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being
+    hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 A.M.
+    _Princess Royal_, on coming into range, opened fire on _Blücher_,
+    the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards at 9.35 A.M. _New
+    Zealand_ was within range of _Blücher_, which had dropped somewhat
+    astern, and opened fire on her. _Princess Royal_ shifted to the
+    third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.
+
+    Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a
+    position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul
+    our range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening
+    attack, the _Meteor_ and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain
+    the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous
+    ability.
+
+    About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows: _Blücher_, the fourth
+    in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely
+    from gunfire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire.
+    _Lion_ was engaging No. 1, _Princess Royal_ No. 3, _New Zealand_
+    No. 4, while the _Tiger_, who was second in our line, fired first
+    at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.
+
+    The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen
+    their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now
+    appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their
+    distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port
+    quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our
+    line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line
+    of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed.
+
+    Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack.
+    _Lion_ and _Tiger_ opened fire on them, and caused them to retire
+    and resume their original course.
+
+    The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port
+    quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep
+    touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.
+
+    At 10.48 A.M. the _Blücher_, which had dropped considerably
+    astern of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with
+    a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition.
+    I consequently ordered _Indomitable_ to attack enemy breaking
+    northward.
+
+    At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and
+    I personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our
+    starboard bow. Immediately turned to port.
+
+    At 11.3 A.M. an injury to the _Lion_ being reported as incapable
+    of immediate repair, I directed _Lion_ to shape course N.W. At
+    11.20 A.M. I called the _Attack_ alongside, shifting my flag to
+    her at about 11.35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the
+    Squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.
+
+    I boarded and hoisted my flag in _Princess Royal_ at about 12.20
+    P.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since
+    the _Lion_ fell out of the line, namely, that _Blücher_ had been
+    sunk and that the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course
+    to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also
+    informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop
+    bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of
+    _Blücher_.
+
+    The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S.
+    _Attack_, in placing his vessel alongside the _Lion_ and
+    subsequently the _Princess Royal_, enabled the transfer of flag to
+    be made in the shortest possible time.
+
+    At 2 P.M. I closed _Lion_ and received a report that her starboard
+    engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 P.M. I
+    ordered _Indomitable_ to take her in tow, which was accomplished by
+    5 P.M.
+
+    The greatest credit is due to the Captains of _Indomitable_ and
+    _Lion_ for the seamanlike manner in which the _Lion_ was taken in
+    tow under difficult circumstances.
+
+    The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a
+    conspicuous feature.
+
+    I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men
+    who specially distinguished themselves.
+
+    Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men
+    for special mention, and as _Lion_ and _Tiger_ were the only ships
+    hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those
+    ships.
+
+                                  I have the honour to be, Sir,
+                                           Your obedient Servant,
+                                            (_Signed_) DAVID BEATTY,
+                                                           Vice-Admiral.
+
+
+
+
+    INDEX
+
+
+  _Abdiel_, 289, 373, 433, 465, 484
+
+  Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed and sunk off, 209
+
+  _Aboukir_, loss of, 15, 37, 105, 132
+
+  _Acacia_, 233
+
+  _Acasta_, 9, 176, 464
+    in Jutland battle, 332, 333, 356, 387, 476
+
+  _Achates_, 9, 464
+
+  _Acheron_, 466
+
+  _Achilles_, 8, 88, 212, 419
+    accident on, 163
+    sinks a German raider, 276
+
+  _Acorn_, 9
+
+  _Active_, 9, 134, 144, 145, 318, 380, 381, 439, 464, 482
+
+  Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main Fleet Base, 15
+    Intelligence Division of, 187
+    naval policy of, 34, 302
+    vigorous mine-laying policy adopted by, 249
+
+  Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, 303
+
+  Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 165
+
+  Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, 95
+    substituted for seaplanes, 222, 283
+
+  _Africa_, 8, 266
+
+  Agadir crisis, 91
+
+  _Agamemnon_, 10
+
+  _Agincourt_, 108, 152, 241, 308, 318, 463
+    in Jutland battle, 357, 360
+    joins 4th Battle Squadron, 121
+
+  Aircraft carriers, development of, 72
+    in warfare, 70, 153
+
+  Airships as scouts, 37, 450
+
+  _Ajax_, 8, 93, 98, 107, 135, 152, 241, 290, 318, 463
+
+  _Alarm_, 9, 142
+
+  _Albemarle_, 10, 93, 98, 212, 237, 249, 266
+
+  _Alcantara_, 272, 273
+    sinking of, 273
+
+  Alderson, Captain, 207
+
+  Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S., 203, 320, 466, 489
+
+  Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., 466
+
+  Allen, Commander Walter L., 464
+
+  Allsup, Commander Claude F., 464
+
+  _Alsatian_, 73, 105, 107, 109, 127, 131, 135, 169
+    captures concealed Germans, 138
+
+  _Ambuscade_, 9, 176, 286, 464
+    in Jutland battle, 376, 483
+
+  America enters the War, 303
+
+  American battleships join Grand Fleet, 303
+
+  _Amethyst_, 10
+
+  Ammunition, for Army use, 114
+    ships, 84
+
+  _Amphion_, 10
+
+  _Amsterdam_, 217
+
+  _Andes_, 272, 273
+    rescues German survivors, 274
+
+  _Andromache_, 11
+
+  _Anglia_, 104
+
+  Anti-submarine defences, German, 30
+    obstructions, 144, 146
+    obstructions damaged by gales, 247, 267
+    operations, British, 146, 218 _et seq._, 282
+
+  _Antrim_, 8, 89, 138, 159, 211, 419, 424
+
+  _Apollo_, 11
+
+  _Arabis_, sinking of, 269
+
+  Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, 8, 191, 334, 342, 410, 463, 477
+    death of, 335, 410, 487
+
+  _Ardent_, 9, 483
+    in collision, 250, 286
+    loss of, 376, 385, 485
+
+  _Arethusa_, 111
+    in action, 493, 494
+
+  _Argyll_, 8, 89, 223
+    aground off Scottish coast, 252
+
+  _Ariel_, 209, 466
+    sinks a submarine, 214
+
+  _Arlanza_, 253, 431
+
+  _Arley_, 233
+
+  Armour piercing shells, a new type of, 69, 417
+    Committees’ investigations on, 69
+    limitations of British, 306
+
+  Armour protection, improved, 417
+    question of, 394 _et seq._, 468
+
+  Arnot, Midshipman R. G., 484
+
+  Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the Fleet, 237, 241
+
+  _Assistance_, 8, 80, 83, 105, 114, 116, 138, 143, 186, 197
+
+  Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., 239, 240
+
+  Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, 24, 157, 161
+
+  _Attack_, 466, 496
+
+  _Attila_, capture of, 108
+
+  _Audacious_, 8, 135, 149, 150, 151
+    loss of, 148 _et seq._
+
+  _Aurora_, 194, 493, 494
+
+  _Australia_, 24, 203, 204, 210, 290, 418
+    in collision, 285
+
+  Austrian steamer captured, 108
+
+
+  Back, Captain Eric, 260
+
+  Backhouse, Captain Oliver, 463
+
+  Backhouse, Commander Roger, 7
+
+  Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, 154
+
+  _Badger_, 467
+    rescues survivors, 338, 356, 479
+
+  Baird, Captain George H., 463
+
+  Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes First Lord, 453
+    offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First Sea Lord, 458
+
+  Baltic, the, British submarines in, 434
+    proposed operations in, 129
+
+  _Barham_, 249, 320, 325, 328, 345, 348, 352, 360, 463, 472, 478
+    in collision, 258
+
+  Barron, Commander J. O., 333, 356, 464, 476
+
+  Bashmakoff, M., 275
+
+  Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., 465
+
+  Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, 71
+    Instructions to, 53
+    organisation of, 203
+    title altered, 204
+
+  Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._
+
+  Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation of, 418
+
+  Battle cruisers, function of, 304
+    question of armour, protection of, 305, 306
+
+  Battle Fleet, composition of, 7
+    aircraft provided for, 71
+
+  Battleships, “all-big-gun” type of, 34
+    and Battle Cruisers, British and German, 307 _et seq._
+
+  Battleships, British and German, 31
+    dummy, 171
+
+  _Bayano_ sunk by submarine, 210
+
+  Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, commands 1st Battle Squadron, 7, 85,
+        149
+    discusses question of blocking Zeebrugge, 154
+    exchange of command, 180, 182
+
+  Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., 466
+
+  Bear Island, reported enemy base and wireless station at, 233
+
+  Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., 466
+
+  Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, 8, 111, 177, 178, 203, 285, 322, 466,
+        477, 494
+
+  Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and Jutland battle, 320, 321, 325,
+        341, 345, 369, 440, 442, 468, 480
+    despatch on North Sea battle, 493 _et seq._
+    tribute to, 411, 489
+
+  Belgian coast, sweeping the, 170
+
+  Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., 7, 359, 490
+
+  _Bellerophon_, 8, 110, 318, 463
+
+  _Bellona_, 7, 88, 94, 97, 98, 173, 202, 318, 442, 463, 482
+    in collision, 180
+
+  _Benbow_, 169, 173, 186, 318, 352, 355, 463
+
+  Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., 2, 7, 41, 465
+    tribute to, 489
+
+  Beresford, Lord, 35
+
+  _Berliner Tageblatt_, Captain Persius’ admissions in, 408
+
+  Bernard, Captain V. H. G., 463
+
+  Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., 7, 490
+
+  Betty, Captain, 185
+
+  _Biarritz_, 292
+
+  Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S., 324, 463, 470
+    awarded V. C., 325
+
+  Bircham, Lieutenant, 77
+
+  _Birkenhead_, 246, 251, 255, 319, 466
+
+  _Birmingham_, 8, 88, 178, 182, 203, 223, 319, 466, 493
+    sinks a submarine, 93, 119
+
+  _Black Prince_, 171, 187, 244, 290, 318, 336, 380, 463
+    uncertainty of her end, 336, 337, 478
+
+  Blackett, Captain Henry, 463
+
+  Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., 467
+
+  _Blanche_, 8, 88, 175, 202, 207, 272, 273, 318, 463, 482
+
+  Blockade, Ministry of, 76
+    work of the Fleet, 73 _et seq._, 96, 97, 189
+    [_see also_, Cruiser Squadron (10th)]
+
+  Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow entrances, 167
+
+  _Blonde_, 8, 88, 202, 290
+    goes ashore, 433
+
+  _Blūcher_, 152, 494, 495
+    sinking of, 195, 197, 496
+
+  Blunt, Captain W. F., 10, 466
+
+  _Boadicea_, 4, 8, 88, 202, 318, 438, 463, 482
+    damaged by heavy seas, 175
+
+  Boarding steamers, increased force of, 171
+
+  Bonham, Captain Thomas P., 463, 478
+    death of, 487
+
+  Borrett, Captain George H., 463
+
+  _Botha_, 225, 267, 457
+
+  Boxer campaign, 62, 63
+
+  Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., 465
+
+  Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. H., 466
+
+  Bradford, Vice-Admiral E. E., 8, 48, 108, 176, 179, 208
+    and Dogger Bank action, 196
+
+  _Brandenburg_, 132
+    interned by Norwegian Government, 133
+
+  _Brisk_, 9
+
+  _Britannia_, 8, 199
+    aground in Firth of Forth, 198
+
+  British Expeditionary Force, transport of, 22, 23, 37
+
+  British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, 28, 31
+
+  British Navy (_see_ Navy)
+
+  “Broad Fourteens,” patrolling the, 37, 127, 132
+
+  Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., 203, 319, 465, 489, 493, 496
+
+  _Broke_, 180, 293, 375, 387, 464
+
+  Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, 467
+
+  Browning, Rear-Admiral M. E., 8
+
+  Bruen, Captain Edward F., 463
+
+  Bryce, Lord, 2
+
+  Bullen, Lieut.-Commander, 278
+
+  _Bulwark_, 10
+
+  Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, 60
+    clever device by, 61
+
+  Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, 10, 16, 36, 207, 358, 459, 462, 477,
+        480
+    and Heligoland, 129
+    and Jutland battle, 319, 342, 343, 362, 381
+    exchange of command, 180, 181
+    flagship damaged, 355, 485
+    illness of, 182
+    joins Grand Fleet, 36
+    resumes command of 1st Battle Squadron, 185
+    tribute to, 410, 488
+
+
+  _Caldaff_, mining of, 150
+
+  Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, 55
+    gives up the command, 5
+    his Service record, 1
+    improvises defences at Scapa, 27
+    strikes his flag, 6
+
+  Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, 496
+
+  _Calliope_, 227, 272, 277, 365, 464, 482
+
+  _Cambria_, 104, 114, 148
+
+  _Cameleon_, 9
+
+  Cameron, Captain John E., 466
+
+  _Campania_, 71, 221, 222, 229, 230, 231, 238, 282, 283, 428, 446
+
+  Campbell, Commander G. W. McC., 465
+
+  _Canada_, 308, 318, 463
+    joins Grand Fleet, 250
+
+  Canadian troops, a convoy for, 134, 136
+
+  _Canterbury_, 317, 318, 330, 332, 339, 464, 476
+
+  Cantlie, Lieutenant, 232
+
+  _Caribbean_, 211, 246
+    sinking of, 246
+
+  _Carnarvon_, 10
+
+  _Caroline_, 203, 464
+
+  Carpenter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. F. B., 2
+
+  Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., 465
+
+  Casement, Captain John M., 463
+
+  _Castor_, 374, 464
+
+  Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J. R. C., 464
+
+  Cay, Captain Arthur L., 337, 338, 463
+    death of, 487
+
+  _Centurion_, 2, 8, 95, 140, 198, 318, 463
+
+  _Champion_, 319, 329, 378, 463, 472, 484
+
+  Champion, Commander J. P., 377, 465, 484
+
+  Channel Fleet, 15, 16, 36
+    change in command of, 182
+    squadrons manned with nucleus crews, 36
+    strengthened, 155
+
+  Chatfield, Captain A. E. M., 465, 493
+
+  _Chatham_, 443
+
+  _Cheerful_, 135
+
+  _Chester_, 317, 318, 330, 339, 415, 441, 464, 475
+    her boy hero, Jack Cornwell, 332, 410
+    in action, 330 _et seq._
+
+  China, conference of Allied naval officers in, 63
+
+  Christian, Rear-Admiral, 101, 105
+    his command, 105
+
+  _Christopher_, 9, 236, 245, 331, 332, 464, 476
+
+  Chukovsky, M., 275
+
+  Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 3, 35
+    and Heligoland, 128
+    and position of Commander-in-Chief, 3
+    attends conference at Loch Ewe, 127
+    interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, 3
+
+  _Circe_, 9
+
+  _City of Oxford_, 171
+
+  _Clan McNaughton_, loss of, 205
+
+  _Cleopatra_, 279, 433
+
+  Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, 462
+
+  Coaling the Fleet, 83, 92, 104, 108, 109
+
+  Coal strike, a Welsh, 229, 230, 235
+
+  Coast lights, extinction of, 121, 136
+
+  Coast towns, enemy bombardment of, 25, 287, 456
+
+  Cobbe, Captain M. H., 11
+
+  _Cochrane_, 8, 88, 318, 419, 463
+
+  _Cockatrice_, 9, 173
+
+  Cole, Commander John F. H., 242
+
+  Coles, Lieut.-Commander G. A., 376, 464, 483
+
+  Colliers at the Fleet Base, 83
+    insufficient number of, 84, 92, 98
+
+  _Collingwood_, 7, 319, 361, 462
+
+  _Colossus_, 7, 38 (_note_), 60, 318, 319
+    and battle of Jutland, 351, 353, 357, 360, 381, 462, 481
+
+  _Columbella_, 233, 272
+
+  Colville, Commander Hugh D., 464
+
+  Colville, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, 81, 82, 122, 143, 159, 166, 231,
+        234, 243
+    assumes temporary command of 1st Battle Squadron, 182
+
+  _Comet_, 9, 107, 217
+
+  _Commonwealth_, 8, 186, 199
+
+  _Comus_, 272, 273, 277, 278, 342, 426, 464
+
+  _Conqueror_, 8, 31 (_note_), 152, 184, 193, 199, 318, 463
+
+  _Conqueror II._ torpedoed, 446
+
+  _Constance_, 426, 432, 464
+
+  _Contest_, 9, 464
+
+  _Cordelia_, 203, 319, 320, 466
+
+  Corlett, Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey, 466
+
+  _Cornwallis_, 10
+
+  Cornwell, Jack, of _Chester_, heroism of, 332, 410
+
+  Cowan, Captain Walter H., 465
+
+  Crabbe, Commander L. G. E., 464
+
+  Craig, Captain Arthur W., 466
+
+  _Crescent_, 11, 205, 255, 277
+
+  _Cressy_, loss of, 15, 37, 105
+
+  Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, 64, 65
+    a floating dock transferred to, 79, 80, 106, 122
+    and submarine menace, 64
+    Naval Base at, 28
+    Rear-Admiral Pears in charge of Base at, 97
+    rendered secure from submarine attacks, 77, 146
+
+  Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, 464
+
+  Cruiser Squadron (3rd), disbandment of, 245
+
+  Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, 210
+
+  Cruiser Squadron (10th) augmented, 181
+    blockade work of, 73, 158, 193, 201, 205, 214, 220, 228, 233, 243,
+        247, 253, 257, 261, 268, 275, 281, 288, 294, 427, 431, 444,
+        448, 452, 458
+    paid off, 163
+    patrol areas of, 96, 98, 103, 137, 145, 181, 192, 206, 213, 272, 283
+
+  Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of, 418, 419
+
+  Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, 463
+
+  _Cumberland_, 198
+
+  Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, 10
+
+  Curtis, Commander Berwick, 373, 465, 484
+
+  Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, 97
+
+  _Cyclops_, 7, 80, 83, 98, 117, 143
+
+
+  D’Aeth, Captain Arthur C. S. H., 464
+
+  _Dahlia_ strikes a mine, 245
+
+  Dampier, Captain, 149
+
+  Danehenko, M., 275
+
+  Dannreuther, Commander, 337
+
+  Dardanelles operations, kite balloons in, 71
+
+  “Dark night” patrols, 261, 264, 432
+
+  _Dartmouth_, 185
+
+  Day, Commander Selwyn, 276
+
+  De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, 11, 73, 96, 169
+
+  Decoy ships (Q-ships), 262
+
+  _Defence_, 191, 318, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 463
+    loss of, 306, 336, 477
+
+  _Defender_, 340, 387, 467, 474
+
+  _Derfflinger_, 197, 357, 437, 474
+
+  Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of, 447
+
+  Destroyer flotillas, 9, 118
+    detailed orders for, 52
+    fine work in Jutland battle, 378
+
+  Destroyers, Battle Orders for, 52, 54
+    German, 29, 50, 62
+    German superiority in number of, 396–7
+    German _v._ British, 29
+    importance attached by Germany to attack by, 393
+    in action, 176, 323–5, 339, 340
+    inadequate number of British, 17, 18, 29, 175, 179, 200, 201, 397
+    in collision, 245, 246, 280, 286
+    used for mine-sweeping, 244
+    welcome additions to force of, 204
+    work of, 215
+
+  _Devonshire_, 8, 90, 135, 180, 282, 419, 424
+
+  Dick, Captain James D., 463
+
+  _Digby_, 233
+
+  Director-firing, system of, 66
+
+  Displacement, question of, 307
+
+  Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, 232
+
+  Dock accommodation, absence of, 315, 316
+    the Kaiser’s comments on, 315
+
+  Dockyard men, fine work by, 129, 417
+
+  Dogger Bank action, 187 _et seq._
+   Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493 _et seq._
+    battle cruiser fleet, composition of, 203
+    battle fleet engaged in, 199
+    (_See also_ North Sea Battle)
+
+  _Dominion_, 8, 108, 119, 217
+
+  Donaldson, Sir F., 421
+
+  _Donegal_, 198, 255, 256, 290, 292, 419, 424, 458
+
+  Doughty, Captain Henry M., 463
+
+  Dover, Straits of, mining the, 249
+
+  _Drake_, 10, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 108, 116, 131, 134, 159, 164, 198
+
+  _Dreadnought_, 8, 34, 93, 207, 208, 290, 308
+    rams a submarine, 207
+
+  Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in conference, 114
+
+  Dreyer, Captain, 7 (_note_), 342, 416, 417, 462, 481
+    tribute to, 416, 481
+
+  _Dryad_, 166
+
+  _Dublin_, 319, 362, 375, 384, 436, 442, 466, 485
+
+  Duff, Captain A. A. M., 93, 466, 493
+
+  Duff, Rear-Admiral A. L., 60, 61, 62, 169, 318, 463, 477, 488
+    tribute to, 488
+
+  _Duke of Albany_, 223, 433
+
+  _Duke of Clarence_, 270, 433
+
+  _Duke of Cornwall_, 430
+
+  _Duke of Edinburgh_, 171, 318, 336, 368, 419, 463, 482
+
+  Dumaresq, Captain John S., 463
+
+  _Duncan_, 10
+
+  _Duncombe_, 262
+
+  Dundas, Commander Harold V., 464
+
+  _Dundee_, 270, 276, 432, 433
+
+  Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore at, 266
+
+  Dutton, Captain Arthur B. S., 463
+
+
+  East Coast, bombardment of undefended towns on, 25
+    raids on, 156
+
+  _Ebro_, 267
+
+  _Edgar_, 11, 141
+
+  Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, 282
+
+  Edwards, Captain John D., 466
+
+  _Elbing_, 374
+
+  Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, 421
+
+  Ellis, Captain Stanley V., 463, 477
+    death of, 487
+
+  _Emperor of India_, 169, 173, 186
+
+  _Ems_ sunk by submarine, 426
+
+  _Endymion_, 11
+
+  _Engadine_, 71, 289, 320, 321, 386, 467, 469, 472, 485
+
+  England, possibility of invasion of, 23, 456
+    raids on south-east coast of, 287
+
+  English Channel, destroyers in, 455
+
+  _Erin_, 129, 152, 308, 318, 463
+
+  _Erne_, wreck of, 205
+
+  Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, 131
+
+  Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., 7, 320, 466
+    and Jutland battle, 326, 345, 349, 363, 369, 410, 467, 472, 476, 478
+    new command for, 243
+    tribute to, 488, 489
+
+  Everett, Commodore A. F., 7, 219
+
+  _Exmouth_, 10, 93, 135, 148, 150
+
+  Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., 465
+
+
+  Falkland Islands battle, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205
+
+  _Falmouth_, 10, 16, 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104, 115, 134, 185, 319, 338,
+        466
+    and Jutland battle, 366, 441, 476, 479
+    sinking of, 441
+
+  Farie, Captain (D.) James U., 378, 466, 484
+
+  Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases in, 96, 97
+
+  Farrington, Captain, 262
+
+  _Faulknor_, 208, 377, 457, 465
+
+  Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, 465
+
+  Fawckner, Rear-Admiral W. B., 228
+
+  _Fearless_, 10, 111, 132, 204, 245, 319, 449, 466
+    and Jutland battle, 328, 378, 381, 472, 473
+
+  Fergusson, Captain James A., 463
+
+  Field, Captain Frederick L., 463
+
+  Filleul, C., awarded D. S. M., 334
+
+  Fire control instruments, 68
+
+  Fire correction methods, improved, 417
+
+  _Firedrake_, 112
+
+  Fisher, Captain William W., 463
+
+  Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, 242
+
+  Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord, 34, 155
+    destroyer programme of, 408
+    energy as First Sea Lord, 187
+    improvements in Fleet organisation by, 35
+    Mr. Schwab’s visit to, 151
+    naval policy of, 34
+    supports Director System, 67
+
+  Fishermen’s bladders as “floating mines,” 126
+
+  Fishing areas, question of restriction of, 121, 136
+
+  Fishing vessels attacked by submarines, 228
+
+  FitzGerald, Colonel, 421
+
+  Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert, 2, 490
+
+  Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, 110
+
+  Fleet, the, a vital factor to existence of the Empire, 308
+    concentration of, at outbreak of War, 38
+    disposition of, 15
+    (_See also_ Grand Fleet, Navy)
+
+  Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H. U., 465
+
+  Floating storage, advantages of, 84
+
+  Flotta, Island of, 81
+
+  _Flying Condor_, 148
+
+  Food question, the, 453
+
+  Forbes, Commander Charles M., 7 (_note_), 490
+
+  _Formidable_, 10
+
+  Forth, Firth of, obstructions against submarines in, 78
+    submarine activity in, 185
+
+  _Fortune_, 9, 267, 464, 485
+    in collision, 250
+    loss of, 376
+
+  _Forward_, 9
+
+  Foula Islands, 105
+
+  Fox, Captain C. H., 10
+
+  _Frauenlob_, loss of, 375
+
+  Fremantle, Commander G. A., 467
+
+  Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., 254
+
+  _Fury_, 9, 150, 233
+
+
+  _Galatea_, 203, 290, 319, 430, 466
+    and Jutland battle, 319, 436, 443, 468, 469
+
+  Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, 8, 205
+
+  _Garland_, 9, 286, 376, 464, 483
+
+  _Garry_ engages a submarine, 169
+
+  Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., 61, 319, 462, 477, 488
+    relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, 243
+    tribute to, 488
+
+  General Cruiser Instructions, the, 53
+
+  _Gentian_, 293
+
+  George V., King, messages to the Fleet, 89, 234, 288
+    visits the Fleet, 204, 234, 426
+
+  German account of Jutland battle, 363
+    bombardment of East Coast, 25
+    breach of international law, 18
+    disguised raiders, 273, 274
+    fleet (_see_ High Sea Fleet) gunnery, efficiency of, 348
+    merchant steamer intercepted and sunk, 291
+    mines and submarines, 221 _et seq._ (and _passim_)
+    submarine menace, 13, 16, 28, 37, 100, 113, 115 _et seq._
+
+  German Bight, British submarine lays mines in, 426
+
+  Germans fire on British rescuers, 112
+    proclaim British waters unsafe for shipping, 201
+    rescue British crews, 325, 486
+    thoroughness of defences of their naval bases, 30
+
+  Germany, destroyer force of, 392, 396, 397
+    mutinies in Navy of, 39
+    naval strength of, in early days of War, 32, 33
+
+  _Ghourko_, 86
+
+  _Gibraltar_, 11
+
+  _Glen Isla_, 262
+
+  Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., 467
+
+  _Gloucester_, 185, 203, 290, 320, 466
+
+  Goff, Lieut.-Commander R. S., 376, 464, 483
+
+  _Goldfinch_, 9
+    loss of, 205
+
+  Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L., 467
+
+  Goodenough, Commodore W. E., 8, 95, 112, 194, 203, 320, 326, 341,
+        344, 466, 489, 493
+    and Dogger Bank battle, 195
+    engages the enemy, 178
+
+  _Good Hope_, 10
+    loss of, 307
+
+  Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted at, 157
+
+  _Goshawk_, 467
+
+  _Gossamer_, 9
+
+  Gough-Calthorpe, Rear-Admiral the Hon. S., 8
+
+  _Grafton_, 11
+
+  Graham, Lieut.-Commander E. S., 467
+
+  Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, 152
+    a watching policy decided upon, 14
+    all-round improvement in fighting efficiency of, 70
+    and its bases, 26, 28, 34 _et seq._, 76 _et seq._, 144
+    arrival of additional seamen ratings for, 109
+    at end of November, 1914, 168
+    at end of 1914, 185
+    attempts to entice enemy to action, 264 _et seq._
+    bases: conditions for leaving and returning to, 295 _et seq._
+    battle exercises, 258
+    Battle Orders, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408
+    battle tactics exercises, 47
+    blockade work [_see_ Blockade, Cruiser Squadron (10th)]
+    compared with High Sea Fleet, 31
+    composition of, 7 _et seq._
+    condenser and boiler troubles of, 103, 108, 121, 129, 139, 152,
+        156, 159, 167, 172, 174, 185, 187, 190
+    constitution of, in May, 1916, and a parallel, 300 _et seq._
+    countering retiring battle tactics, 50
+    cruising formation and deployment, 47, 271
+    destroyer force of, 396
+    development of, 36
+    disposition and movements of, after declaration of war, 90 _et seq._
+    efficiency of engine-room departments of, 140, 387
+    Fleet movements: a month’s work, 216
+    gunnery practice of, 64 _et seq._
+    inception of, 34
+    kite balloons provided for, 71, 72
+    lectures, system of, 86
+    measures against invasion and raids, 23, 24
+    messages from the King to, 89, 234, 388
+    naval instruction and education problem, 188
+    new Submarine Flotilla, 447
+    peace and war conditions compared, 55
+    personnel and welfare of, 85 _et seq._, 410, 487
+    pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, 47, 48
+    problem of tactics in Fleet actions, 391
+    Royal visits to, 204, 233, 426
+    Russian gentlemen’s visit to, 275
+    sea-plane reconnaissances of, 221
+    ships fitted with Director-firing system, 67
+    signalling by, and why reduced, 56 _et seq._
+    spirit of comradeship in, 87
+    sports, 86
+    submarines attached to, 303
+    tables showing armament, protection and displacement of capital
+        ships in, 308–310
+    the Staff Organisation, 39 _et seq._
+    training of, 55 _et seq._
+    work of medical officers, 488
+
+  Grant, Captain E. P. F. G., 462
+
+  Grant, Rear-Admiral W. L., 10, 96, 97
+    in command of 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 210
+
+  Great War, declaration of, 88
+    first reports of enemy movements, 90
+    naval strategy in home waters, 12 _et seq._
+    opening of, 1 _et seq._
+
+  Green, Captain J. F. E., 466
+
+  Greene, W. Graham, 414
+
+  _Grief_, 274
+
+  Griffin, W. C. R., a D. S. M. for, 334
+
+  Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W., 465
+
+  Gun power, question of, 306
+
+  Gun, range of, 38 (and _note_)
+
+  Gunfire, correction of, 68
+
+  Gunnery efficiency: a new departure, 235
+    work of German High Sea Fleet, 62, 64
+
+  Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., 467
+
+
+  Haddock, Commodore, 149, 171, 172
+
+  Haldane, Lord, 2
+
+  Halsey, Commodore Lionel, 7 (_note_), 219, 411
+
+  _Hamburg_, 374
+
+  Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick, becomes Second Sea Lord, 3
+
+  Hamond, Commander Robert G., 464
+
+  _Hampshire_, 198, 230, 257, 259, 420, 463
+    Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel in, 421
+    strikes a mine and sinks, 422
+    survivors of, 422
+
+  _Hannibal_, 93, 95, 205
+
+  Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., 2
+
+  _Hardy_, 9, 176, 464
+
+  Harris, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald N. A., 82
+
+  Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G. C., 465
+
+  Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, 464
+
+  Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G. B., 465
+
+  Harwich, mined areas near, 110
+
+  Harwich Force, 9, 385
+    provided with aircraft, 71
+
+  _Hawk_ sinks a submarine, 225
+
+  _Hawke_, 11
+    loss of, 21, 141
+
+  Hawksley, Commodore J. R. P., 9, 374, 384, 463, 477, 482
+
+  Heath, Rear-Admiral H. L., 334, 367, 368, 463, 477, 482
+
+  Heaton-Ellis, Captain E. H. F., 464
+
+  Heligoland, a comprehensive mining policy urged, 248
+    fortifications of, 128
+    proposals for bombardment and capture of, 128
+
+  Heligoland Bight, British submarines followed by German trawlers, 105
+    dispositions for sweeping, 123
+    enemy light forces in action, 111
+    mining policy in, 248, 249, 264
+    projected operations in, 109
+
+  _Hercules_, 7, 281, 318, 360, 462
+
+  _Hibernia_, 8, 127, 254
+
+  High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand Fleet, 31, 302
+    changes in commands of, 200
+    defensive rôle of, 39
+    destroyer force of, 396
+    efficiency of, ix, 62, 63
+    position of, in Jutland battle, 341
+    probable tactics of, correctly anticipated, 401
+    superiority of protection in, 307
+    surrender of, ix, 39, 70
+    tables showing armament, protection and displacement of, 308–310
+    under repair, 428
+
+  _Hindustan_, 8
+
+  Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F. E. H. G., 467
+
+  Hodgson, Commander John C., 467
+
+  _Hogue_, sinking of, 15, 37, 105, 132
+
+  _Hollyhock_, 236, 242
+
+  Holtzendorff, Admiral von, 63
+
+  Homan, Lieut.-Commander Edwin A., 465
+
+  Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace, 219, 327, 330, 332, 337, 410,
+        463, 474, 475, 489
+    goes down with _Invincible_, 338, 487
+
+  _Hope_, 9, 184
+
+  Hope, C. C., awarded D. S. M., 334
+
+  Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, 464
+
+  Hotham, Captain Alan G., 273, 342, 464
+
+  Howell, T. O. G., awarded D. S. M., 334
+
+  Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H. V., 465
+
+  Hutchinson, Commander Reginald B. C., 464
+
+  _Hydra_, 467
+
+
+  _Illustrious_, 114, 146, 157
+
+  _Iltis_ and her commander, 63
+
+  _Impérieuse_, 83
+
+  _Implacable_, 10
+
+  _Inconstant_, 203, 319, 466
+
+  _Indefatigable_, 203, 204, 466
+    loss of, 306, 323, 326, 370
+
+  _India_ torpedoed and sunk, 241
+
+  _Indomitable_, 24, 191, 199, 203, 330, 332, 338, 418, 464, 476, 480,
+        493, 494, 495, 496
+    and Jutland battle, 330, 332, 338
+    joins Grand Fleet, 183
+    takes _Lion_ in tow, 196
+
+  _Inflexible_, 24, 119, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 157, 203, 228,
+        330, 418, 442, 464
+    and Jutland battle, 332, 338, 339, 475
+    joins the Fleet, 228
+    mined in Dardanelles, 314
+    loss of, 306
+
+  Ingenohl, Admiral von, 63, 200
+
+  International law, German disregard of, 18
+
+  _Intrepid_, 11
+
+  Invergordon as repairing base, 80
+    exercise and recreation at, 200
+    floating docks at, 79, 80, 448
+
+  _Invincible_, 24, 105, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 157, 191, 203,
+        204, 213, 219, 290, 330, 332, 463
+    loss of, 306, 337–338, 475
+    survivors rescued by _Badger_, 356
+
+  _Iphigenia_, 11
+
+  Irish mail packets as armed boarding steamers, 171
+
+  Irish Sea, submarine activity in, 198, 209
+
+  _Iron Duke_, 5, 6, 7, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100, 101, 106, 108, 122, 132,
+        143, 144, 146, 152, 164, 168, 174, 187, 194, 197, 212, 219,
+        220, 267, 317, 318, 345, 357, 373, 462, 479
+    Confirmation by Archbishop of York on, 228
+    disconcerting discovery on, 139
+    in action, 349, 352, 353, 357, 481
+    refitting at Invergordon, 200, 252
+    Staff of, 39 _et seq._
+    the King’s speech to Fleet, 426, 427
+
+  _Irresistible_, 10
+
+  Irvin, Commander (Acting) W. D., 465
+
+  Italy enters Great War, 219
+
+
+  Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, 78, 460
+    and the submarine menace, 454
+    becomes First Sea Lord, 219, 249
+
+  James, Lieut.-Commander C. H. N., 466
+
+  _Jason_, 9
+
+  Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J. R. (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), 318, 462
+    accepts command of Home Fleets, 1
+    and Kaiser’s criticism of dock accommodation, 315
+    and raids on unfortified towns, 287, 288
+    and the value of aircraft in war, 450
+    appointed Commander-in-Chief of Grand Fleet, 5
+    as First Sea Lord, 417, 459
+    Battle Orders of, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408
+    bids farewell to Fleet, 460
+    Birthday message to the King, 388
+    confers with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, 219
+    confers with Premier and Chancellor of Exchequer, 241
+    despatches on Jutland battle, 304, 388, 462
+    embarrassing interview with Sir G. Callaghan, 4
+    entertains Lord Kitchener, 419
+    extensive mining policy of, 249
+    memorandum to Fleet from, 412, 460
+    objections to change of Command, 3, 4
+    proposals for handling Fleet in action approved by Admiralty, 302
+    proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, 154
+    reorganises his Staff, 39 _et seq._
+    selects his Staff, 2
+    suggested scheme of submarine obstructions by, 78
+    tribute to personnel of Fleet, 410, 411, 487
+    visits the Admiralty, 453
+    wounded in China, 63
+
+  Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. Martyn, 316, 318, 367, 410, 463,
+        477, 482
+    relieves Admiral Warrender, 261
+    tribute to, 488
+
+  Jones, Commander Loftus W., 464, 476
+    gallantry of, 333
+    posthumous award of V. C. to, 332, 333
+
+  Jutland, Battle of, 304 _et seq._
+    Admiral Jellicoe’s memorandum to Fleet, 412
+    area covered by different engagements, 381
+    battle cruiser fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._, 479
+    battle fleet in action, 341 _et seq._, 474, 480
+    battle opens, 322
+    despatches on, 304, 388, 462
+    Director System in use at, 67
+    disposition of Fleet, 318 _et seq._
+    enemy losses, 486, 492
+    enemy sighted, 320, 342, 374
+    German version of, 363, 408, 409
+    Grand Fleet congratulated by Admiralty, 414
+    inferiority of British armour-piercing shell in, 69
+    night attacks by flotillas, 483
+    night dispositions, 483
+    proceedings on 1st June, 485
+    reflections on, 390 _et seq._
+    repairing and altering ships damaged in, 415
+    results of, 409
+    retiring tactics of enemy, 362, 407, 408
+    the night action, 370 _et seq._
+
+
+  _Kaiser_, 310
+
+  Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A., 484
+
+  _Kempenfelt_, 265, 266, 464
+
+  Kennedy, Captain Francis W., 464, 493
+
+  Kennedy, Captain Theobald W. B., 493
+
+  Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M., 464, 476
+
+  Keyes, Commodore, 105, 196
+    rescues enemy crews, 112
+
+  Kiddle, Captain E. B., 462
+
+  Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron’s visit to, 91
+
+  Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, 64
+
+  _Kildonan Castle_, 452
+
+  King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W. S., 467
+
+  _King Alfred_, 10, 106, 109, 159
+
+  _King Edward VII._, 8, 107, 108, 119
+    mined and sunk, 264, 265
+
+  _King George V._, 8, 167, 168, 173, 185, 190, 318, 463
+    and battle of Jutland, 345, 354, 357, 368
+
+  _King Orry_, 246, 432
+
+  _King Stephen_ sights sinking Zeppelin, 269
+
+  Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, 2, 3
+    at Scapa, 419
+    death of, 422
+    sails on _Hampshire_, 421
+
+  Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, 72
+
+  Kite balloons, 71, 283
+
+  Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitän von, 240
+
+  _Köningen Luise_, 99
+
+  _Kristianiafiord_ intercepted by _Teutonic_, 255
+
+  _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, 90
+
+  Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer sunk off, 291
+
+
+  Lamlash, as pre-War practice base, 147
+
+  _Lancaster_, 210
+
+  _Landrail_, 467, 470
+
+  Lans, Vice-Admiral von, 63
+
+  _Lapwing_, 467
+
+  _Larne_, 9
+
+  _Lassoo_, 278
+    sinking of, 433
+
+  _Latona_, 11
+
+  _Laurel_, 467, 471
+
+  _Laverock_, 27
+
+  Lawrence, Commander, 457
+
+  Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W., 464
+
+  Lawson, Captain R. N., 7, 331, 464, 475
+
+  Leake, Captain F. M., 276
+
+  Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., 463
+
+  Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A. M., 464
+
+  _Leda_, 9, 143
+
+  Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C. B., 466
+
+  Leggett, Captain Oliver E., 491
+
+  Leith, Zeppelin attack on, 282
+
+  Le Mesurier, Commodore, 227, 268, 361, 365, 464, 482
+
+  Lerwick, coaling base at, 105
+
+  Leveson, Rear-Admiral A. C., 60, 61, 62, 191, 318, 463, 477, 488
+    tribute to, 488
+
+  _Leviathan_, 10, 159, 169, 171, 191, 198, 210
+
+  Ley, Captain J. C., 462
+
+  _Liberty_, 467
+
+  Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, 184, 226
+
+  Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, 396
+
+  _Lilac_ strikes a mine, 242
+
+  Lion, 8, 24, 195, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 213, 242, 245, 250, 254,
+        319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 327, 329, 418, 442, 443, 446, 465,
+        472, 474, 475, 480, 493, 494, 495, 496
+    and Jutland battle, 322, 323, 329, 480, 495
+    taken in tow by _Indomitable_, 496
+
+  _Liverpool_, 10, 16, 88, 94, 97, 98, 104, 113, 138, 148, 150, 165,
+        168, 174, 200, 203, 228, 251, 255
+
+  _Lizard_, 467
+
+  Loch Ewe, a conference at, 128
+    as coaling base, 96
+    submarine activity at, 138
+
+  Loch-na-Keal, base at, 144
+    base abandoned, 57
+    improvised obstructions at, 77
+
+  _London_, 10
+
+  “Long Forties,” the, 275
+
+  Long Hope, anchorage at, 81
+
+  _Lord Nelson_, 10
+
+  Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstructions at, 146
+    base at, 144
+    Battle Squadrons at, 146
+    diversion at, 147
+    improvised obstructions at, 77, 146
+
+  _Louise_ (Danish steamer), 263
+
+  _Lowestoft_, 8, 90, 203, 493
+
+  Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, 286
+
+  Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, 77, 208, 219
+
+  _Lucia_, 447
+
+  _Lutzow_, 310 (_note_), 357
+    loss of, 314, 408
+
+  Lyddite shell, suspected, 163
+
+  _Lydiard_, 467, 470
+
+  _Lynx_, 9, 176
+    sunk by a mine, 238
+
+  Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H. I. N., 465
+
+  _Lyra_, 9
+
+
+  Maclachlan, Captain, 265, 266, 463
+
+  Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., 7, 40, 128, 411, 459, 490
+
+  _Mænad_, 376, 377, 465, 484
+
+  _Mafeking_, 232
+
+  _Magic_, 274, 353, 374, 464
+
+  _Magnificent_, 93, 95, 205
+
+  Mahan, Admiral, vii, 12, 302
+
+  _Mainz_ disabled in action, 111
+    her survivors rescued, 112
+
+  _Majestic_, 136
+
+  Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, 464
+
+  _Malaya_, 270, 328, 362, 380, 466, 468
+
+  _Manchester Commerce_, sinking of, 150
+
+  _Mandate_, 250, 464
+
+  _Manners_, 465
+
+  _Mantua_, 73, 109, 127, 131, 135
+
+  _Marksman_, 383, 465
+
+  Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W. P., 263
+
+  _Marlborough_, 7, 180, 181, 207, 318, 319, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348,
+        349, 351, 354, 358, 376, 381, 382, 386, 415, 434, 462, 477,
+        480, 481, 485
+    in action at Jutland battle, 351, 354, 358
+    torpedoed, 316, 355
+
+  _Marne_, 266, 353, 374, 465
+
+  Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, 376, 464, 483
+
+  _Martial_, 464
+
+  _Martin_, 9
+
+  _Marvel_, 362, 465
+
+  _Mary Rose_, 465
+
+  Master, Lieut.-Commander E. G. H., 464
+
+  _Matchless_ strikes a mine, 255
+
+  McKenna, Mr., as First Lord, 35
+    visits the Fleet, 237, 241
+
+  McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, 421
+
+  Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, 464, 495
+
+  Mediterranean, ships in the, 300
+
+  _Medusa_ rammed and sunk, 278
+
+  _Melita_, 265
+
+  _Menace_, 465
+
+  _Menelaus_ (kite balloon ship), 71
+
+  Merchant-ships attacked by submarines, 237, 241
+    camouflaged, 171
+    commissioned for blockade work, 73
+    convoying, 46, 433
+    instructions for safety of, 47
+    serious loss of, 201, 210
+    squadron disbanded, 172
+    submarine peril to, 446 _et seq._
+
+  _Meteor_, 495
+    damaged in Dogger Bank battle, 197
+
+  _Meteor_ (German mine-layer) abandoned and sunk, 239
+    number of mines laid by, 247
+
+  _Michael_, 280, 465
+
+  _Michigan_, 171
+
+  _Midge_, 9, 237, 464
+
+  Milford Haven, Marquis of, 3, 391
+    succeeded by Lord Fisher, 155
+
+  _Millbrook_, 465
+
+  Miller, Captain Charles B., 436, 466, 493
+
+  Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., 80, 81, 95, 117, 122
+
+  Minches, the, submarines reported in, 145
+
+  _Mindful_, 362, 465
+
+  “Mine Bumping Squadron,” the, 100
+
+  Minelayer Squadron, 11
+
+  Mine-layers, increased activity of British, 248
+    Instructions to, 54
+
+  Mines, British, defective pattern of, 248
+    experiments to counter, 60
+    German, 18, 38, 96, 99, 113, 120, 150, 192, 214, 221 _et seq._
+    success of new type of, 249
+    the Northern Barrage, 249
+
+  Minesweepers, 9, 19, 60, 118, 202, 223, 266
+    chase submarine, 161
+    in collision, 218
+    inadequacy of force of, 19, 170
+    maximum speed of, 19
+    withdrawn for service abroad, 209, 434
+
+  Mine-sweeping force strengthened, 434
+
+  Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine, 165
+
+  _Minion_, 464
+
+  Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, 76
+
+  _Minotaur_, 198, 257, 272, 318, 334, 367, 419, 438, 463
+
+  _Minstrel_, 9
+
+  _Mischief_, 465
+
+  Mocatta, Lieutenant Jack E. A., 466
+
+  _Moewe_ lays extensive minefield off Scottish coast, 265
+
+  Moir, Commander Dashwood F., 467
+
+  Molteno, Captain, 335, 463, 477
+
+  _Moltke_, 310
+
+  _Monarch_, 8, 31 (_note_), 93, 148, 184, 193, 310, 318, 463
+
+  Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, 128
+
+  _Monmouth_, loss of, 306
+
+  _Mons_, 464
+
+  _Moon_, 465
+
+  Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, 169, 171, 191, 493
+    and Dogger Bank battle, 193
+    succeeded by Rear-Admiral Pakenham, 210
+
+  _Moorsom_, 324, 325, 467, 470
+
+  Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, 209
+    gunnery practice in, 65
+
+  _Moresby_, 329, 379, 466, 472, 474
+
+  Morley, Lord, dinner party at United Services Club, 2
+
+  _Morning Star_, 259, 353, 465
+
+  _Morris_, 324, 467, 470
+
+  Morton, Lieutenant, 232
+
+  _Mounsey_, 465
+
+  Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, 166
+
+  Munro, Captain Donald S., 127
+    devises system of submarine obstruction, 77, 146
+
+  _Munster_, 465
+    rescues crew of _Alcantara_, 273
+
+  _Musketeer_, 266, 431
+
+  _Mystic_, 464
+
+
+  Nabakoff, Vladimir, 275
+
+  _Naiad_, 11
+
+  Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, 185, 203, 338, 383, 466, 476, 489
+    engages a Zeppelin, 382
+
+  Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, 13
+
+  _Narborough_, 324, 366, 370
+
+  Narvik, iron ore trade of, 276, 292
+
+  _Narwhal_, 465
+
+  _Natal_, 8, 88, 199
+    blown up in Cromarty harbour, 260
+    court-martial on loss of, 260
+
+  Naval instructors, reduced number of, 189
+
+  Naval manœuvres of 1912, 392
+
+  Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix.
+
+  Naval situation in May, 1916, 300 _et seq._
+
+  Navigation lights, extinction of, 121, 136
+
+  Navy Acts, German, 35
+
+  Navy League, the, formation of, 12
+
+  Navy, the, a lesson for the future, 33
+    composition of, at opening of Great War, 7 _et seq._
+    disposition of, in early days of Great War, 19 _et seq._
+    grief of, at Kitchener’s fate, 424
+    partition of, 36
+    use and purpose of, 12
+
+  Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., 465
+
+  _Negro_, 441
+
+  _Nemesis_, 9, 206, 217
+
+  _Neptune_, 7, 168, 207, 211, 318, 360, 462
+    in collision, 286
+
+  _Nerissa_, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471
+
+  _Nessus_, 266, 465
+
+  _Nestor_, 323, 324, 466, 470, 471
+
+  Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, 75
+
+  _New Zealand_, 8, 24, 101, 105, 126, 152, 169, 191, 203, 285, 290,
+        319, 339, 418, 466, 493, 494
+    and Jutland battle, 480
+    and North Sea action, 495
+
+  _Nicator_, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471
+
+  Nicholson, Captain William C. M., 463
+
+  Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., 493
+
+  Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R. L., 2, 491
+    organises wireless school, 188
+    signalling system of, 58
+    tribute to, 59, 491
+
+  Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, 10
+
+  _Noble_, 465
+
+  _Nomad_, 323, 324, 466, 470
+
+  _Nonsuch_, 356, 387, 465
+
+  North American Squadron joined by _Princess Royal_, 161
+
+  North east coast, Zeppelins on, 290
+
+  North Rona Island, a reported enemy base on, 107
+
+  North Sea, area of, 14
+    controlling the, 249 _et seq._
+    cruiser patrol areas in, 20
+    drifting German mines in, 199
+    Fleet in, 15
+    northern and central areas of, 102, 103
+    proclaimed a dangerous area, 157
+    reported mooring of oil drums in, 208
+    submarine and mine menace in, 17, 96, 116 _et seq._, 209 _et passim_
+    sweeps, 15, 88–9, 99, 116 _et seq._, 127, 158, 163, 171, 175, 194,
+        201 _et seq._, 211, 217, 219, 221, 223, 241, 246, 249 _et
+        seq._, 264, 267 _et seq._, 435, 445 _et seq._, 462 _et seq._
+    the Northern Barrage mine-field, 249
+
+  North Sea battle, 187 _et seq._
+    Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493
+    (_cf._ Dogger Bank)
+
+  Norway, German Fleet’s peace-time visits to, 91
+
+  Norwegian coast, British patrol of, 193
+    British submarines’ operations against enemy on, 258
+    reported German bases on, 91, 95, 107
+    steamers sunk, 449
+    sweeping, 277, 429, 432
+
+  _Nottingham_, 8, 88, 134, 203, 223, 224, 319, 435, 466, 470, 493
+    torpedoed and sunk, 437
+
+  Nugent, Captain R. A., 254
+
+  _Nymphe_, 9
+    in collision, 206
+    rams a submarine, 142
+
+
+  _Oak_, 7, 90, 113, 233, 355, 419, 465
+    King George V. on, 426
+
+  _Obdurate_, 325, 466, 470, 485
+
+  _Obedient_, 361, 465
+
+  O’Beirne, Mr., 421
+
+  Observation mine-fields, 228
+
+  _Oceanic_, 110
+    loss of, 73, 127
+
+  _Older_, German crew on, 458
+
+  Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., 186
+
+  _Olympic_, 149, 151
+
+  _Onslaught_, 362, 436, 464, 484
+
+  _Onslow_, 340, 387, 472
+    heroism of captain and crew of, 340, 473, 474
+
+  Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A. G., 465
+
+  _Opal_, 465
+
+  _Ophelia_, 330, 332, 364
+
+  _Oracle_, 336
+
+  _Orcoma_, 253, 256
+
+  _Orion_, 8, 93, 103, 105, 119, 121, 152, 191, 318, 357, 463
+
+  Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, 81, 82, 122
+    submarine activity in, 166
+    wireless stations in, 110
+
+  _Oropesa_ in collision, 244
+
+  _Orotava_, 206
+
+  _Orvieto_, 217
+
+  _Oscar II._, loss of, 233
+
+  _Ossory_, 464
+
+  _Otway_, 458
+
+  _Owl_, 9, 464
+
+
+  Pakenham, Rear-Admiral, W. C., 8, 203, 319, 466, 489
+    succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, 210
+
+  Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, 340, 467, 474
+
+  _Paragon_, 9
+
+  Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, 463
+
+  Parker, Captain Henry Wise, 463
+
+  Parsons, Lieutenant G., 245
+
+  _Pasley_, 441
+
+  Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West Indies, 210
+
+  _Patia_, 245, 271
+
+  _Patrol_ engaged by battle cruisers, 177
+
+  _Patuca_, 233
+
+  Peace manœuvres, unreality of, 37
+
+  Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R., 80, 97, 127
+
+  Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, 63
+
+  _Pelican_, 324, 441, 466, 470
+
+  Pelly, Captain Henry B., 465, 493
+
+  _Penn_, 436
+
+  _Penshurst_, 262
+
+  Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled, 110, 252
+    gunnery practice in, 65, 281
+
+  Persius, Captain, an admission by, 409
+
+  _Petard_, 324, 325, 378, 470, 471, 484
+
+  Peterhead, good work of patrol at, 225
+    patrol sinks a submarine, 293
+    trawlers sunk by enemy, 430
+
+  _Phaeton_, 217, 320, 442, 466
+    attacks a Zeppelin, 290
+
+  Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., 350, 466, 478
+
+  Phipps, Lieutenant W. D., 7
+
+  Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, 207
+
+  Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, 82
+
+  _Plover_, 147
+
+  Plowden, Commander Richard A. A., 464
+
+  Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon. Reginald A. R., 489
+
+  Pohl, Admiral von, 63, 200
+
+  Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C. A., 465
+
+  Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C. F., 7
+
+  _Pommern_, loss of, 314, 376, 379
+
+  _Porpoise_, 9, 259, 464
+    rams a submarine, 442
+
+  Portrush, German wreckage ashore at, 191
+
+  Pound, Captain A. D. P. R., 462
+
+  Pratt, Captain Thomas D., 466
+
+  Preston, Commander L. G., 9, 242, 251
+
+  _Prince Charles_, 262, 263
+    sinks a U-boat, 263
+
+  _Prince of Wales_, 10
+
+  _Princess Louise_, 232
+    attacked by submarine, 232
+
+  _Princess Margaret_, 255, 289
+
+  _Princess Royal_, 8, 135, 186, 190, 195, 198, 418, 473
+    convoys Canadian troops, 134, 136, 137
+    in Dogger Bank battle, 203, 493, 494, 495, 496
+    in Jutland battle, 320, 322, 466, 480
+    joins North American Squadron, 161, 168
+
+  _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_, 134
+
+  Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, 240
+
+  Prowse, Captain Cecil I., 465
+    death of, 487
+
+  _Prudentia_, loss of, 267
+
+  Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P. F., 96
+
+  “P. Z. Exercises,” 391
+
+
+  “Q” ships (_see_ Decoy ships)
+
+  _Queen_, 10
+
+  _Queen Elizabeth_, 219, 442
+
+  _Queen Mary_, 8, 24, 194, 198, 203, 310, 465 loss of, 306, 325, 471
+
+
+  Ramage, Commander G. N., 434
+
+  _Ramexo_, 437, 443
+
+  Ramsey, Commander Charles G., 466
+
+  _Ramsey_ sunk by disguised mine-layer, 239
+
+  Range of gun and torpedo, 38
+
+  Range-finders, improved, 418
+
+  Range-finding experiments, 68
+
+  _Rattler_, 185
+
+  Rawlings, Lieut.-Commander H. C., 464
+
+  _Redpole_, 9, 184
+
+  Reeves, Captain Edward, 466
+
+  _Rena_, 273
+
+  _Renown_, her deck protection improved, 448
+
+  _Repulse_, her deck protection improved, 448
+    joins the Fleet, 447
+
+  Retiring tactics, advantages of, 401
+
+  _Revenge_, 318, 354, 357, 360, 363, 381, 462, 486
+
+  Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J. C., 465
+
+  _Rifleman_, 9, 107, 218
+
+  Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J. W., 68
+
+  Robertson, Mr., 421
+
+  Robinson, Lieut.-Commander Charles G., 385, 467
+
+  _Rohilla_, wreck of, 153
+
+  Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D., 466
+
+  Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a merchant-ship at, 237
+
+  _Rosemary_ torpedoed, 430
+
+  Ross, Captain George P., 355, 462, 481
+
+  _Rostock_, 379, 409
+
+  Rosyth, a conference at, 78
+    base at, 28
+    conditions for leaving and returning to base at, 299
+    development of base at, 79
+    German prisoners landed at, 113
+    interview with Mr. Balfour at, 459
+    submarine obstructions for, 77
+    the coal difficulty at, 84
+    3rd Battle Squadron at, 24, 156
+
+  _Roxburgh_, 8, 88, 199, 223, 277, 282, 420, 425
+    hit by torpedo, 224
+
+  _Royal Arthur_, 11, 205
+
+  Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work of, 72
+
+  _Royal Oak_, 318, 358, 463
+
+  _Royal Sovereign_, 442
+
+  _Royalist_, 217, 435, 464
+
+  Royds, Captain Percy M. R., 464, 476
+
+  _Ruby_, 9, 184
+
+  _Russell_, 10, 93, 237
+
+  Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F., 465
+
+  Russian steamer sunk, 449
+
+  Russians relay their mine-fields, 284
+    visit Grand Fleet, 275
+
+  Russo-Japanese War, advances in technique in, viii
+
+  Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F. S., 321, 469
+
+
+  _St. Clair_, 110
+
+  St. John, Captain F. G., 493
+
+  _St. Vincent_, 7, 318, 357, 362, 463
+
+  Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J. S., 7
+
+  Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H. H., 466
+
+  _Sapphire_, 105
+
+  _Sappho_, 7, 107, 122, 136, 137, 171, 181, 193, 217, 218, 251, 258
+
+  _Sarah Alice_ torpedoed, 446
+
+  Savill, Captain, 422, 463
+
+  Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, 80
+    a wireless school established at, 59, 188
+    adopted as main Fleet Base, 15, 26
+    arrival of _Campania_ at, 71
+    arrival of air- and sea-planes at, 100
+    blocking the channels, 77, 167
+    defenceless nature of base at, 92, 114, 143
+    entrances to, 26, 28, 159, 298
+    gunnery and torpedo practice at, 65, 70, 160
+    recreation and occupation at, 85–7
+    reinforcing gun defences of, 82
+    situation of, 27
+    submarine menace, 139
+    submarine obstruction pierced, 181
+    submarine obstructions at, 144, 170
+
+  Scarborough, bombardment of, 176
+
+  Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe, 151
+
+  Schwann, Captain O., 283
+
+  Scott, Captain Albert C., 466
+
+  Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing system, 66, 67
+
+  Scottish coast, _Moewe_ lays minefield on, 265
+    submarines on, 153
+
+  _Seagull_, 9
+
+  Sea-plane carriers, orders to, 54
+    sheds wrecked by gale, 160
+
+  Seaplanes as scouts, 469
+    difficulties of, 71, 221, 222, 282–3, 290
+    first reconnaissance work with Fleet, 321
+    replaced by aeroplanes, 222, 283
+
+  _Sea Ranger_, 443
+
+  Searchlights, 162
+    excellence of German, 379
+    signalling by, 57
+
+  Second Fleet, 10
+
+  Selborne, Earl of, 34
+
+  Seven Years’ War, 39
+
+  _Seydlitz_, 197, 310, 409
+
+  Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, 1, 63
+
+  Seymour, Lieut.-Commander Ralph W., 489
+
+  _Shamrock_, 241
+
+  Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, 63
+
+  _Shannon_, 8, 88, 168, 318, 368, 419, 463
+
+  Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., 2, 491
+
+  _Shark_, 9, 176, 330, 368, 419, 463
+    heroism of captain and crew, 333
+    loss of, 332, 476
+    survivors awarded D. S. M., 334
+
+  _Sheldrake_, 9
+
+  Shetland Patrol Force, 9
+
+  Signalling by searchlight, 57
+
+  _Skipjack_, 9, 166
+
+  Smith, C. H., awarded D. S. M., 334
+
+  Smoke screens, 69, 325, 357, 359, 362, 363, 366, 408, 479
+
+  _Soudan_, 148
+
+  South Atlantic, von Spee’s Squadron in, 24, 157, 161, 204
+
+  _Southampton_, 8, 88, 95, 178, 182, 203, 290, 319, 320, 326, 442,
+        466, 493, 494
+    and Jutland battle, 362, 375, 471, 472, 485
+
+  South-east coast, raids on, 287
+
+  Sowerby, Captain Charles F., 466
+    death of, 487
+
+  _Sparrowhawk_, 9, 205, 464
+    rammed, 375
+    sinking of, 383, 485
+
+  “Special Service Squadron,” the, 171
+
+  Spee, Admiral von, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205
+
+  _Speedwell_, 9
+
+  _Speedy_, loss of, 120
+
+  Spickernell, Frank T., 489
+
+  _Spitfire_, 9, 176, 375, 464, 483
+
+  Spithead, Naval Review at, 3
+
+  Spitzbergen, reported German submarine base and wireless station at,
+        233
+
+  Stadlandet, patrols off, 276, 292
+
+  _Stag_, 135
+
+  Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D. C., 467
+
+  Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., 463
+
+  Star shells, 378, 379
+
+  _Staunch_, 9, 233
+
+  Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, 290
+
+  Stileman, Rear-Admiral H. H., 73
+
+  Stirling, Captain A. J. B., 377, 378, 465, 483
+
+  Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A. P., 10
+
+  Stuart, Lieut.-Commander Dudley, 467
+
+  Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, 207, 318, 410, 463, 477, 488
+    destroys von Spee’s squadron, 204
+    in Jutland battle, 482
+    kite balloon experiments of, 71
+    succeeds Sir D. Gamble, 205
+    tribute to, 488
+
+  Submarine activity in White Sea, 449
+    attack under difficulties, 457
+    C 27 sinks a German U-boat, 232
+    flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand Fleet, 294
+    flotillas, Instructions to, 54
+    menace, 76, 115, 434, 445, 453 _et passim_
+    obstructions (system of), 28, 77, 159, 170, 220, 225
+    patrols, 225, 426
+    peril to merchant shipping, 445 _et seq._
+    screens, question of, 45
+    sinks German steamship, 426
+    surrender of a German, 166
+
+  Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of, 447
+
+  Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet, 54, 425
+    comparative strength of British and German, 11, 17
+    defences against, at Scapa Flow, 27
+    German, 17
+    in collision, 289 (_note_)
+    reason for suppressing news of engagements with, 387
+    sunk by Navy, 93, 165, 166, 207, 214, 225, 226, 246, 263
+
+  Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, 152
+
+  Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, 182
+
+  Sulivan, Commander Harold E., 464
+
+  Sulivan, Commander Norton A., 465
+
+  Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G. C., 150, 465
+
+  _Superb_, 7, 192, 199, 244, 318, 463
+
+  Swan, T. W., awarded D. S. M., 334
+
+  Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, 73, 162, 220
+    defences of, 232
+    evacuation of, 162
+
+  _Swift_, 9, 141, 142
+
+  Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy destroyer, 280
+
+
+  Taku forts, capture of, 63
+
+  _Talisman_, 267, 294, 445
+
+  _Taranaki_, 232
+
+  Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, 291
+
+  Tay, River, submarines off entrance to, 187
+
+  Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed in action, 197
+
+  Telephonic communications, establishment of, 214
+
+  _Temeraire_, 8, 318, 463
+
+  _Termagant_, 324, 325, 467, 470, 471
+
+  Terry, Lieut.-Commander F. G., 375, 464
+
+  _Teutonic_, 131, 137
+    intercepts a Norwegian-American liner, 255
+
+  _Theseus_, 11, 21, 135, 141, 277
+
+  Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., 466
+
+  _Thetis_, 11, 120
+
+  Third Fleet, 11
+
+  Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E. C. O., 466
+
+  _Thornhill_, 148, 149
+
+  _Thunderer_, 8, 172, 175, 318, 352, 354, 463
+
+  _Tiger_, 24, 174, 199, 203, 204, 308, 420, 467
+    in Dogger Bank battle, 196, 493, 494, 495
+    in Jutland action, 322, 325, 472
+    joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 158
+
+  _Tipperary_, 376, 463, 485
+    loss of, 483
+
+  Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G., 466
+
+  Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, 63
+
+  _Titania_, 294
+
+  Tolstoy, Count Alexis, 275
+
+  Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, 278, 289
+
+  Torpedo attacks:
+    caution required in, 399
+    practices at Scapa Flow, 70
+    range of, 38
+    warfare:
+      element of chance in, 393, 395
+      importance attached by Germany to, 393
+      measures for combating, 359, 399
+    work of German Navy, 62
+
+  Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, 51
+    reports on, at battle of Jutland, 360
+
+  Tothill, Captain Hugh H. D., 463
+
+  Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds Rear-Admiral Waymouth, 213
+
+  Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J. C., 340, 467, 475
+    heroism of and tribute to, 340, 374–5
+
+  Townsend, Captain Cyril S., 464
+
+  Trafalgar, Battle of, 302
+
+  Trawlers, German, engaged and destroyed, 278
+    support marine obstructions at Scapa Flow, 82
+    suspicious, 106, 124, 224
+
+  Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C. W. E., 375, 465, 483
+
+  Trewin, Assistant-Paymaster G. S., 321, 469
+
+  _Trident_, 294
+
+  Trondhjem, _Brandenburg_ at, 132
+
+  _Turbulent_, 325, 326, 379, 467, 470, 471, 484
+    rammed and sunk, 378–80
+
+  Turkish battleships, purchase of, 108, 129
+
+  Tynemouth, minefields off, 110
+
+  Tyrwhitt, Commodore R. Y., 10, 191, 198, 229, 239, 249, 251, 259,
+        271, 278, 279, 286, 385, 386, 436, 440, 442, 493
+    a successful haul of German trawlers, 249
+    chases a destroyer, 111
+    orders sinking of _Medusa_, 278
+
+
+  U-boat losses, 93, 164, 165, 207, 214, 225, 226, 246, 262
+
+  _Undaunted_, 157, 279, 280, 493
+
+  Underhill, Captain Edwin V., 463
+
+  United Services Club, dinner party at, 2
+
+  United States enters the War, 303
+
+  _Unity_, 9, 176, 464
+
+  Usborne, Commander Cecil V., 60, 61
+
+  Usedom, Admiral von, 63
+
+  Utvoer Lighthouse, 133, 270
+
+
+  _Vala_, 262
+
+  _Valiant_, 275, 328, 362, 466
+    in collision, 434
+
+  _Vanguard_, 7, 115, 318, 463
+
+  _Venerable_, 10
+
+  _Vengeance_, 10
+
+  _Victor_, 9
+
+  Victoria Cross awards, 325, 332
+
+  _Victorious_, 83, 417
+
+  _Viknor_, 192
+    loss of, 193
+
+  _Vindex_, 71, 289
+
+  Visual signalling, 57
+
+  _Von der Tann_, 310
+
+
+  Wales, Prince of, visits Scapa, 243
+
+  Walney Island, submarine attack on, 198
+
+  Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C. A., 465
+
+  Wardle, Captain T. E., 272
+
+  Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in command of 2nd Battle
+        Squadron, 7, 41, 91, 94, 148, 177, 178, 179
+    terminates his command, 261
+
+  _Warrior_, 171, 290, 318, 334, 335, 336, 463
+    abandoned and sunk, 306, 386, 387, 485
+    in Jutland battle, 385, 477
+
+  _Warspite_, 213, 256, 336, 466
+    in collision, 258, 434
+    in Jutland battle, 328, 349, 350, 478
+
+  Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W., 198
+    breakdown in health, 213
+
+  Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., 7 (_note_), 491
+
+  Welsh coal-fields, strike in, 229, 235
+
+  White Sea, enemy submarines in, 448, 449
+    protecting the trade route, 256, 257
+
+  Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, 466
+
+  _Wiesbaden_ badly crippled, 335, 340
+
+  William II., Emperor, criticises British dock accommodation, 315
+
+  Wilson, Commander W. W., 169
+
+  Wintour, Captain Charles J., 9, 376, 464
+    death of, 380, 483, 487
+    unpleasant experience of, 142
+
+  Wireless school at Scapa, 59, 188
+
+  Wireless signalling, and why restricted, 56, 57
+
+  Wireless telegraphy, 38, 56 _et seq._, 110
+    improved system of, 58, 59, 188
+
+  Withers, Captain Percy, 464
+
+  _Wolf_ intercepted and sunk, 276
+
+  Woods, Commander A. E., 188
+
+  Woods, Commander Alexander R. W., 7, 490
+
+  Woollcombe, Captain Louis C. S., 463
+
+  Woollcombe, Captain Maurice, 466
+
+  Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C., 464
+
+
+  _Yarmouth_, 185, 203, 320, 430, 466
+    in Jutland battle, 338, 476
+
+  Yegoroff, M., 275
+
+  _Yorck_, sinking of, 157
+
+  York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, 228
+
+  Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, 180
+
+  Young, Captain G. B., 272
+
+  Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage Association, 187
+
+
+  _Zaza_, 231
+
+  _Zealandia_, 8, 254, 255
+
+  Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and considered impracticable, 154
+
+  Zeppelin activity, 436, 437, 442, 443
+    bombs rescuers, 496
+    engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle, 486
+    shed, Tondern, attack on, 278, 289
+
+  Zeppelins as scouts, 32, 451
+    destruction of, 169, 290
+    raids by, 282
+
+  Zigzagging, procedure of, 46
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration:
+
+                                                            _Diagram I._
+
+                                PLAN OF
+                             JUTLAND BATTLE
+                      BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT
+
+The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6.0. P.M. is fixed by a report
+from the Marlborough and confirmed at 6.4. P.M. by a report from the
+Rear-Admiral 1st Battle Squadron in the Colossus.
+
+The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by a report from the
+Marlborough at 6.5. P.M. taken in conjunction with the reports of the
+Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron.
+
+The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from the report of the
+Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet and from the Lion and Indomitable.
+
+The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6.7. P.M. is fixed by a
+report from the Lion received at 6.6. P.M.; this gave the bearing; the
+distance is obtained by a consideration of the ranges at which the Lion
+was firing.
+
+The position of the Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed at 6.14. P.M. from the
+Lion and at 6.15. P.M. from the Barham; the latter being signalled
+by wireless, an interval of four minutes being allowed between
+transmission and receipt.
+
+Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers are fixed by the
+bearings on which our Battle Cruisers were firing and the ranges given,
+and by a consideration of the German reports which show a 32 point turn
+between 6.6. and 6.15. P.M.
+
+Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are fixed by bearings
+and ranges given by the Marlborough at 6.17. P.M., Iron Duke at 6.31.
+P.M. and Monarch at 6.33. P.M.
+
+The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are fixed by reports
+and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral
+5th Battle Squadron.
+
+  _Note._--In studying this diagram it should be borne in mind that
+      only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due to the
+      smoke and mist.]
+
+
+[Illustration:
+
+                                                           _Diagram II._
+
+             DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT
+              HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON
+                       THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN.
+
+It should be borne in mind that no information as to the position of
+the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until 6.14. P.M., and that the
+only reports received had been one at 6.6. P.M., giving a bearing of
+the Enemy Battle Cruisers from the “Lion”, and a report at 5.50. P.M.
+from the “Southampton” to the effect that the Enemy Battle Fleet bore
+north-east from his Battle Cruisers (and were therefore presumably
+ahead of them and right ahead of our Battle Fleet.)
+
+There had therefore been no sufficient information on which to
+re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment on the starboard wing
+column to meet an enemy before the starboard beam would necessarily be
+an awkward manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration of
+the starboard wing column to port and a very large alteration of course
+of the remaining columns when coming into line astern of it.
+
+A torpedo attack during deployment would under these conditions throw
+the British Battle Fleet into great confusion and a concentration of
+gunfire on the turning point would be very effective; our own gunfire,
+owing to the large alterations of course and the consequent difficulty
+of obtaining correct fire control data would be correspondingly
+ineffective: our own destroyers had been spread ahead of the Battle
+Fleet as a submarine screen until 6.8 P.M. and were moving across the
+front in an unformed condition to the two flanks.
+
+The movements that would probably have resulted and the number of ships
+on each side in action are shown in the diagram for each 3-minute
+interval from 6.16 to 6.28 P.M.
+
+The three ships of the 5th. Battle Squadron would eventually have come
+into line ahead of the 6th. division, but would possibly have masked
+the fire of that division during the movement.]
+
+
+[Illustration:
+
+                                                          _Diagram III._
+
+                            DIAGRAM SHOWING
+                        ORDER OF THE BATTLEFLEET
+
+                           BATTLE OF JUTLAND
+
+                           31^{st.} MAY 1916
+
+    _“Minotaur’s” track chart records that at 8 p.m. “King George V”
+    bore N 10 E (true) from her, distant about 5 miles.
+
+    It also records that “Lion” bore W by S (true) from her, distant
+    about 5 miles.
+
+    If these records are reliable “Lion’s” 8 p.m. position would be
+    at X, and her track between 7.20 and 8 p.m., presumably as shewn
+    thus:----
+
+    “Minotaur’s” records however, do not profess to give exact
+    distances._]
+
+
+[Illustration:
+
+                                                           _Diagram IV._
+
+                           TRACK OF SQUADRONS
+                            DURING NIGHT OF
+                       May 31st. to June 1st. and
+                      Forenoon of June 1st. 1916.
+
+
+BATTLE FLEET.
+
+        During night, Battle Fleet in 3 columns, 1 mile apart, disposed
+        abeam.
+
+        From 2.45 A. M. to 3.30 A. M., in single line.
+
+        From 3.30 A. M. onward, in 6 columns, 1 mile apart, disposed
+        abeam.
+
+
+POSITIONS OF CRUISERS ETC.
+
+        Dublin at 4.30 A. M. in Lat. 55° 30′ N., Long. 6° 36′ E.
+        Commodore of Flotillas at 5.0 A. M. in Lat. 55° 48′ N., Long.
+        6° 22′ E.
+
+        Vice Admiral 1st Battle Squadron with 6th Division at 6.40
+        A. M. in Lat. 55° 55′ N., Long. 5° 15′ E. steering S. SE. 19
+        knots.
+
+        3 Submarines off Vyl Light Ship on bearing 270°, 4 miles, 12
+        miles and 20 miles respectively from Lightship.]
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
+were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
+marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
+unbalanced.
+
+Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs
+and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support
+hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to
+the corresponding illustrations.
+
+Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them,
+have been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed at the end of
+the book.
+
+The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
+references.
+
+Original text uses two forms of the following words; both retained here:
+
+    “moral” and “morale”
+
+    “underwater” and “under-water”
+
+    “minefield” and “mine-field”
+
+    “seaplanes” and “sea-planes”
+
+Redundant book title on page 1 has been removed by Transcriber.
+
+Page 316: The times in the illustration's heading use a mix of Roman
+and Arabic numerals.
+
+Page 360: The time shown as “7.8” was printed that way. It may mean “8
+minutes after 7”. Similar times appear on other pages.
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 ***
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+</head>
+
+<body>
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 ***</div>
+
+<div class="transnote section">
+<p class="center larger">Transcriber’s Note</p>
+
+<p>Larger versions of most illustrations may be seen by right-clicking them
+and selecting an option to view them separately, or by double-tapping and/or
+stretching them. Larger, higher-resolution versions of the maps and
+diagrams may be seen by clicking or right-clicking “(<i>High-res</i>)” below
+them.</p>
+
+<p class="covernote">New original cover art included with this eBook is granted
+to the public domain. It includes an illustration taken
+from the original book.</p>
+
+<p><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Additional notes</a> will be found near the end of this ebook.</p>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="chapter section">
+<figure id="i_2" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 27em;">
+  <img src="images/i_002.jpg" width="1297" height="1910" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption left">ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="chapter section center wspace">
+<h1>THE GRAND FLEET<br>
+<span class="small">1914–1916</span></h1>
+
+<p class="p1 larger">ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK</p>
+
+<p class="p2 larger"><span class="smaller">BY</span><br>
+ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE<br>
+<span class="smaller">OF SCAPA<br>
+G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.</span></p>
+
+<p class="p4 b4">WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS</p>
+
+<figure id="i_3" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 5em;">
+  <img src="images/i_003.jpg" width="221" height="220" alt="">
+</figure>
+
+<p class="p0 larger" style="margin-top: -2.75em;"> NEW<span class="in4">  YORK</span><br>
+GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+</p>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter section center wspace">
+<p class="p4 vspace small">COPYRIGHT, 1919,<br>
+BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
+</p>
+
+<p class="p4"><span class="small">PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</span></p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="chapter section center wspace">
+<p class="larger vspace">
+TO MY COMRADES<br>
+OF THE GRAND FLEET
+</p>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from
+the outbreak of war until the end of November, 1916,
+is described.</p>
+
+<p>The writing of this record of the work of the Grand
+Fleet, of which little has been heard by the nation
+hitherto, has helped to fill in days of leisure. The manuscript
+was finished by the autumn of 1918, but publication
+was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice
+had been signed and the German Navy had, for all practical
+purposes, ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book.
+The final revision has been done hastily owing to my early
+departure for the Dominions, and in the circumstances I
+hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if any clerical
+errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances
+of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the
+proofs, and I am much indebted to him.</p>
+
+<p>The narrative necessarily includes an account of the
+gradual organisation and development of the Grand Fleet,
+and its bases, by successive steps, after the hoisting of my
+flag on the outbreak of hostilities; and the manner in
+which the changing conditions of naval warfare were met
+is also dealt with.</p>
+
+<p>Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that
+whilst the <em>principles</em> of naval strategy are unchangeable,
+experience in war and changes in the weapons with which
+war is waged may profoundly affect the <em>application</em> of
+those principles.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">viii</span></p>
+
+<p>The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo-Japanese
+war; in the short interval between 1904 and 1914
+further great advances took place in the technique of
+warfare; these produced a striking influence on strategy
+and tactics during the late war.</p>
+
+<p>The reasons which made it necessary, during the war,
+to hide from public view the work of the Grand Fleet
+no longer exist, and it will no doubt be of interest to the
+nation to learn something of its operations, especially as,
+for various justifiable reasons, few despatches were issued
+dealing with its activities. So far as the Battle Fleet
+was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one
+exception, and that despatch was written and published
+when it was necessary to conceal a good deal from the
+enemy.</p>
+
+<p>As is inevitable, much of the information in this
+volume is of a technical character and, though interesting
+to seamen, may prove less so to the general reader. Those
+who take this view may decide that Chapters IV to X,
+inclusive, require only to be glanced at. Confidential
+matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has
+been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the
+light in later years.</p>
+
+<p>The main portion of the book is written in narrative
+form, but where it is thought that an explanation may
+be useful, as to the reasons which governed any particular
+movement or decision, such reason is given in order that
+opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding
+the purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped
+to achieve it.</p>
+
+<p>In some parts of the book reference is made to the
+Germans being superior to us in <i lang="fr">matériel</i>. There were
+many directions, however, in which war experience
+showed the correctness of our views and the wisdom of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">ix</span>
+our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of
+safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital
+ship, and we did gain advantage from the heavier calibre
+of our guns. Naval policy is pursued in peace conditions
+under inevitable disadvantages in a democratic country,
+because there are many claims on the Exchequer. Reviewing
+our pre-war programmes of ship construction and
+equipment, and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of
+the nation generally as to the imminence of war, it is
+matter for satisfaction that the Boards of Admiralty
+from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so
+much, and that when at last war became inevitable the
+nation had in control of its destinies at Whitehall a First
+Lord and a First Sea Lord who, accepting their responsibility,
+mobilised the Fleet before war was actually
+declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as,
+I hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand
+Fleet. The years of strenuous work and training carried
+out by the officers and men of the Fleet, which should
+never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent fighting
+machine, and bore ample fruit during the war.</p>
+
+<p>The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed
+generally the British lead. In this book reference is made
+to the general efficiency of the German Navy and of the
+good design and fine equipment of their ships. These
+points were never questioned by British naval officers,
+and the shameful surrender of the host of the German
+ships in 1918 did not alter the opinions previously formed.
+That surrender was the result of broken moral.</p>
+
+<p>More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafalgar,
+and after a century of controversy, the Admiralty
+considered it desirable to appoint a committee to decide
+whether that action was fought in accordance with the
+original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as embodied<span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">x</span>
+in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that
+the facts recorded in this book, and the comments
+accompanying them, constitute a clear statement of
+the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which
+it endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its
+mission.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">xi</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<table id="toc">
+<tr class="xsmall">
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">CHAPTER</td>
+  <td class="tdr">PAGE</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">I</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Opening of the War</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_1">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">II</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">General Naval Strategy in Home Waters</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_12">12</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">III</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Grand Fleet and Its Bases</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_34">34</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">IV</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Declaration of War</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_88">88</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">V</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Submarine and Mine Menace in the North Sea</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_115">115</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">VI</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Incidents at Sea—November 1 to December 31, 1914</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_155">155</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">VII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Dogger Bank Action</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_187">187</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">VIII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">German Mines and Submarines</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_221">221</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">IX</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Controlling the North Sea</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_249">249</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">X</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Attempts to Entice the Enemy to Action</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_264">264</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XI</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Naval Situation in May, 1916</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_300">300</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_304">304</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XIII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland</span> (<i>continued</i>)</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_341">341</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XIV</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland</span> (<i>continued</i>)</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_370">370</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XV</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Reflections on the Battle of Jutland</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_390">390</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XVI</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Lessons of Experience; Lord Kitchener’s Farewell</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_415">415</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">XVII</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Submarine Peril to Merchant Shipping; Recall to the Admiralty</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_445">445</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Appendix I</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_463">463</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Appendix II</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_490">490</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">xiii</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="ILLUSTRATIONS">ILLUSTRATIONS</h2>
+</div>
+
+<table id="loi">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl norpad"><span class="smcap">Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, of Scapa, G.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;B., O.&nbsp;M., G.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;V.&nbsp;O.</span>
+<span class="fright"><a href="#i_2"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></span></td>
+  <td> </td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="xsmall">
+  <td class="tdr" colspan="2">FACING PAGE</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Destroyers Raising Steam on the First Occasion of a Submarine Being Reported Inside Scapa Flow</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_28">28</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The First Obstruction at Scapa Flow</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_28b">28</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Smoke Screen Made by Destroyers</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_68">68</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Dummy Battleship, March, 1915</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_68b">68</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Commander-in-Chief, Captain of the Fleet (Commodore Lionel Halsey), and the Flag Lieutenant (Lieut.-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert) on Board H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i></span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_96">96</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland as Depicted by a German Artist</span> (<i>colour</i>)</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_336">336</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i> and 3rd Division of the Battle Fleet Deploying at the Battle of Jutland</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_342">342</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i> Opening Fire at the Battle of Jutland</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_346">346</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">H.M.S. <i>Superb</i> Opening Fire at the Battle of Jutland</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_366">366</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiv">xiv</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="PLANS_AND_DIAGRAMS">PLANS AND DIAGRAMS</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="b1 bold center larger">PLANS</p>
+
+<table class="plans">
+<tr class="xsmall">
+  <td class="tdc">PLAN</td>
+  <td class="tdr" colspan="2">FACING PAGE</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_48">1</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Scapa Flow and the Orkneys</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_48">48</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_74">2</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Area of Operations of 10th Cruiser Squadron</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_74">74</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_128">3</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Typical Sweep, September 8th–11th, 1914</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_128">128</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_138">4</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Approximate Dispositions, October 3rd–11th, 1914, Whilst Canadian Convoy Was Crossing</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_138">138</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_196">5</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Movements of Fleet, January 23rd–25th, 1915</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_196">196</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_290">6</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Operations off Horn Reef, May 2nd–5th, 1916</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_290">290</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_316">7</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Operations of Battle Cruiser Fleet, 2 p.&nbsp;m. to 6.15 p.&nbsp;m., May 31st, 1916</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_316">316</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_350">8</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Approximate Position of Ships of Grand Fleet, 6.45 p.&nbsp;m., May 31st, 1916</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_350">350</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_358">9</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Approximate Position of Ships of Grand Fleet, 7.15 p.&nbsp;m., May 31st, 1916</span></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_358">358</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="p2 center bold larger">DIAGRAMS</p>
+
+<table class="plans">
+<tr class="xsmall">
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">DIAGRAM</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_511">1</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Before and After Deployment of the Battle Fleet, May 31st, 1916.</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_512">2</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Showing an Imaginary Deployment on the Starboard Wing Column.</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_513">3</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Battle of Jutland, Movements of Battle Fleet and Battle Cruisers.</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_514">4</a>.</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Operations During the Night of May 31st–June 1st, and on June 1st, 1916.</span></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="THE_GRAND_FLEET_19141916"><span class="larger">THE GRAND FLEET, 1914–1916</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I"><span id="toclink_1"></span>CHAPTER I<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE OPENING OF THE WAR</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Early</span> in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second
+Sea Lord, I had been offered and had accepted the command
+of the Home Fleets, which in the ordinary course
+would have become vacant in the following December on
+the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term
+of command, and public announcement was made of the
+intended appointment.</p>
+
+<p>Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years,
+and he and I had served together in China fourteen years
+before, when I was Flag Captain to Admiral—afterwards
+Admiral of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour. He had
+since had what is probably a unique period of sea service,
+passing from one appointment to another without an
+interval of half pay. Soon after his promotion to flag
+rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old Channel
+Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron
+in 1907; two years later he became second in command
+in the Mediterranean, and on the expiration of his term
+there, in 1910, he returned to take up the appointment
+of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of the
+Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander-in-Chief
+in 1910. The usual period for which the Commander-in-Chief
+of the Home Fleet was supposed to fly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">2</span>
+his flag was two years, but in 1913 the Admiralty,
+accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service,
+extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it
+was the approaching termination of this further period of
+command—to the regret of the Admiralty, for which I
+can speak from personal knowledge, and to the regret
+also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets—which
+led to my nomination in the spring of that year.</p>
+
+<p>In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe
+had assumed a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First
+Lord, informed me that in the event of hostilities occurring
+involving this country, it was considered necessary
+that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets should
+have the assistance of a second in command, and he added
+that I had been selected for the appointment, and it was
+desired that I should arrange with Sir George as to the
+ship in which I should fly my flag.</p>
+
+<p>Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very
+shortly afterwards, and it was decided between us that
+the battleship <i>Centurion</i> should be my flagship. We
+discussed the slight reorganisation that this would involve
+in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised:
+Captain R.&nbsp;W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H.
+Fitzherbert as Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E.
+Hardman Jones as Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander
+R.&nbsp;L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander
+(N.) A.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet
+Paymaster H.&nbsp;H. Share as Secretary.</p>
+
+<p>On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events,
+I was present at a dinner party given by Lord Morley at
+the United Services Club. The party was interesting,
+as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, Mr.
+Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who
+figured later prominently in the War.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span></p>
+
+<p>During the two following days conferences took
+place at the Admiralty as to the disposition of the Fleet,
+etc., and, in view of the threatening political situation,
+the work of demobilisation after the King’s inspection
+at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises were
+suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord
+Kitchener, who was about to return to Egypt, on one or
+two occasions at the Admiralty during these days.</p>
+
+<p>On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second
+Sea Lord, which I had discharged since December, 1912,
+to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, K.C.B., and
+made my final preparations for joining the Fleet as second
+in command.</p>
+
+<p>I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following
+day, and during a conversation with Mr. Churchill and
+the Marquis of Milford Haven, the then First Sea Lord,
+it was intimated to me that, in certain circumstances, I
+might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to
+Sir George Callaghan.</p>
+
+<p>This intimation came upon me as a great surprise,
+and I protested against such an appointment being made
+on what might possibly be on the very eve of war.
+Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, with the
+impression that the change was not one that had been
+finally decided upon, but that it might take place. I
+left London the same night by the mail train for Wick,
+the Commander-in-Chief having informed me that he
+would send a vessel to meet me there.</p>
+
+<p>The idea that the change might be made occupied
+my thoughts during the journey to the North. As I
+thought over the possibility of a transfer of command at
+such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections.
+During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several
+telegrams to both the First Lord and the First Sea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">4</span>
+Lord on the subject. I dwelt strongly upon the danger
+of substituting, at such a juncture and at such short notice,
+an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet, for
+a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Command.
+I mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admiration
+and loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief that existed,
+and suggested as an alternative that I should act as his
+assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind
+that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his
+Chief of the Staff. In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated
+opinion, my views remained unaltered, although it
+did not occur to me that some anxiety might be felt
+that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand
+the strain of commanding the Fleet in the event of
+war. That, however, was a matter on which the Admiralty
+would be better informed than myself, and I had no hesitation
+in urging the opinions expressed in my successive
+telegrams.</p>
+
+<p>A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the <i>Boadicea</i>, the
+ship in which I made the passage to Scapa Flow, was
+not able to leave until late in the forenoon of August 2nd,
+and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon.</p>
+
+<p>When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief,
+the knowledge of the event which was apparently
+impending made the interview both embarrassing and
+painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of the
+possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could
+not tell him.</p>
+
+<p>We discussed various arrangements, including the
+question of the defence of Scapa Flow, for which temporary
+but naturally inadequate measures were being
+energetically taken with the limited resources at the disposal
+of the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>At about 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 4th, I received Admiralty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span>
+orders to open a secret envelope which had been handed
+to me in the train as I was leaving London, by an officer
+from the Admiralty. This envelope contained my
+appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
+Fleet”—a new designation which must be explained
+later.</p>
+
+<p>On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded
+on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> and found that the Commander-in-Chief
+had received orders to turn over the command
+to me.</p>
+
+<p>Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-Chief
+during my command of the 2nd Battle Squadron.
+He was, in addition, a personal friend, and I, like all those
+with whom he had been in contact, had the most profound
+respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over
+his command at <em>the</em> moment of his life naturally caused
+me feelings of the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was
+impossible to dismiss the fear that the Fleet might conclude
+that I had been in some measure responsible for
+the change. This possibility had, of course, been present
+in my mind from the moment I left London, and it
+appeared to add to the objections to a change of command
+at such a juncture, since any idea of this nature
+prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling of loyalty
+to me as the new Commander-in-Chief.</p>
+
+<p>It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot
+close this portion of my narrative without paying a warm
+tribute to the manner in which Sir George accepted the
+Admiralty decision, which obviously came as a great
+shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant
+officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make
+the position easy for me, in entire disregard of his own
+feelings.</p>
+
+<p>It was decided that I should take over the Command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span>
+on the following day, but a telegram having been received
+from the Admiralty ordering the Fleet to proceed to sea
+at once, I returned to the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and Sir George
+Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the <i>Sappho</i>
+before its departure at 8.30 in the morning.</p>
+
+<p>At that hour I took over the Command from Sir
+George Callaghan, who then struck his flag.</p>
+
+<p>The following ten or fourteen days were a period of
+great strain and anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsibility
+as the command of the Grand Fleet at such short
+notice on the eve of war was in itself a matter not to be
+taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together
+the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the
+dispositions already made and those immediately required,
+and the whole problem was largely complicated by the
+fact that the port on which the Fleet was based was open
+to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only
+obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties
+of the Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were
+by no means insuperable.</p>
+
+<p>Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at superseding
+a valued chief and friend at such a moment. The
+one thing that helped me through this period was the
+great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by the
+staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their
+intense personal regret at his departure, gave me their
+very warm support, and concealed from me any trace of
+the feelings which they must have experienced at my
+presence amongst them under such exceptional and trying
+conditions. They behaved as naval officers always
+behave—in a true spirit of comradeship. The same may
+be said of the flag officers and captains in the Fleet, and
+indeed of every officer and man.</p>
+
+<p>Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span>
+the exception of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied
+him to London. This staff included: Commodore A.&nbsp;F.
+Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain R.&nbsp;N.
+Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse,
+C.B., Flag Commander; Fleet Paymaster C.&nbsp;F. Pollard,
+C.B., Secretary; Commander the Hon. Matthew Best,
+War Staff Officer; Commander R.&nbsp;W. Woods, Signal
+Officer; Lieut.-Commander J.&nbsp;S. Salmond, Wireless
+Officer; Lieut.-Commander R.&nbsp;M. Bellairs, War Staff
+Officer; Lieut. W.&nbsp;D. Phipps, Signal Officer.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">A</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">A</a> Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the Fleet, Captain
+F.&nbsp;C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Commander C.&nbsp;M. Forbes, Flag-Commander,
+and Fleet-Paymaster V.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;T. Weekes, Additional Secretary.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>When it became certain that I was to take command
+of the Fleet, I asked the Admiralty to appoint Rear-Admiral
+Charles Madden as Chief of the Staff; and I
+was thus able to transfer Captain R.&nbsp;W. Bentinck to
+act as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George
+Warrender, the next senior flag officer in the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The composition of the Grand Fleet was:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hangw">
+
+<div class="center">
+<p>Fleet-Flagship—H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p1">Attached Ships—H.M.S. <i>Sappho</i>, H.M.S. <i>Oak</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p1 larger wspace">BATTLE FLEET</p>
+
+<p class="p1"><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="center">Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="center">Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Battleships <i>Marlborough</i> (Flag), <i>St. Vincent</i> (Rear Flag), <i>Colossus</i>,
+<i>Hercules</i>, <i>Neptune</i>, <i>Vanguard</i>, <i>Collingwood</i>, <i>Superb</i>, <i>Bellona</i>
+(attached Light Cruiser), <i>Cyclops</i> (repair ship)</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B.
+(in command).</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span></p>
+<p class="center">Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in
+command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Battleships <i>King George V.</i> (Flag), <i>Orion</i> (Rear Flag), <i>Ajax</i>, <i>Audacious</i>,
+<i>Centurion</i>, <i>Conqueror</i>, <i>Monarch</i>, <i>Thunderer</i>, <i>Boadicea</i>
+(attached Light Cruiser), <i>Assistance</i> (repair ship).</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O.
+(in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Battleships <i>Dreadnought</i> (Flag), <i>Temeraire</i>, <i>Bellerophon</i>, <i>Blonde</i>
+(attached Light Cruiser).</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Vice-Admiral E.&nbsp;E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="center">Rear-Admiral M.&nbsp;E. Browning (2nd in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Battleships <i>King Edward VII.</i> (Flag), <i>Hibernia</i> (Rear Flag),
+<i>Commonwealth</i>, <i>Zealandia</i>, <i>Dominion</i>, <i>Africa</i>, <i>Britannia</i>, <i>Hindustan</i>,
+<i>Blanche</i> (attached Light Cruiser).</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Battleships <i>Lion</i> (Flag), <i>Princess Royal</i>, <i>Queen Mary</i>, New <i>Zealand</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-Calthorpe
+(in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Cruisers <i>Shannon</i> (Flag), <i>Achilles</i>, <i>Cochrane</i>, <i>Natal</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Cruisers <i>Antrim</i> (Flag), <i>Argyll</i>, <i>Devonshire</i>, <i>Roxburgh</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Commodore W.&nbsp;E. Goodenough (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Light Cruisers <i>Southampton</i> (Flag), <i>Birmingham</i>, <i>Lowestoft</i>, <i>Nottingham</i>.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><span class="smcap">Destroyer Flotillas</span></p>
+
+<p class="p1 center"><i>Second Flotilla</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Captain J.&nbsp;R.&nbsp;P. Hawkesley (in command in <i>Active</i>).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Destroyers <i>Acorn</i>, <i>Alarm</i>, <i>Brisk</i>, <i>Cameleon</i>, <i>Comet</i>, <i>Fury</i>, <i>Goldfinch</i>,
+<i>Hope</i>, <i>Larne</i>, <i>Lyra</i>, <i>Martin</i>, <i>Minstrel</i>, <i>Nemesis</i>, <i>Nereide</i>,
+<i>Nymphe</i>, <i>Redpole</i>, <i>Rifleman</i>, <i>Ruby</i>, <i>Sheldrake</i>, <i>Staunch</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>Fourth Flotilla</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Captain C.&nbsp;J. Wintour (in command in <i>Swift</i>).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Destroyers <i>Acasta</i>, <i>Achates</i>, <i>Ambuscade</i>, <i>Ardent</i>, <i>Christopher</i>, <i>Cockatrice</i>,
+<i>Contest</i>, <i>Fortune</i>, <i>Garland</i>, <i>Hardy</i>, <i>Lynx</i>, <i>Midge</i>, <i>Owl</i>,
+<i>Paragon</i>, <i>Porpoise</i>, <i>Shark</i>, <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, <i>Spitfire</i>, <i>Unity</i>,
+<i>Victor</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>Mine-Sweeping Gunboats</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Commander L.&nbsp;G. Preston (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">H.M. Ships <i>Skipjack</i> (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), <i>Circe</i>, <i>Gossamer</i>,
+<i>Leda</i>, <i>Speedwell</i>, <i>Jason</i>, <i>Seagull</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Shetland Patrol Force: <i>Forward</i> (Scout) and four destroyers of the
+River class.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The above vessels formed the Fleet under the immediate
+command of the Commander-in-Chief at the
+outbreak of hostilities. In addition, there were in
+southern waters, and also under the command of the
+Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels:</p>
+
+<h3>THE HARWICH FORCE</h3>
+
+<p>This force, although an integral portion of the Grand
+Fleet, was based on Harwich. It was intended that it
+should join the Grand Fleet at sea, if possible, in the
+event of a fleet action being imminent, and for this
+reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet
+for battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span>
+join the Fleet, nor did I expect that it would be able
+to do so. At the outbreak of war it was commanded
+by Commodore R.&nbsp;Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. <i>Amethyst</i>
+and comprised:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hangw">
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>1st Flotilla</i></p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in <i>Fearless</i> with
+20 destroyers.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>3rd Flotilla</i></p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Commanded by Captain C.&nbsp;H. Fox in <i>Amphion</i> with
+15 destroyers.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets,
+which Sir George Callaghan had commanded-in-chief,
+were the Second and Third Fleets:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hangw">
+
+<p class="p2 center larger">SECOND FLEET</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">(under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B.,
+K.C.M.G.).</p>
+
+<p class="hang">Fleet-Flagship <i>Lord Nelson</i>, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and
+Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons).</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>5th Battle Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><i>Prince of Wales</i> (Flag), <i>Agamemnon</i>, <i>Bulwark</i>, <i>Formidable</i>, <i>Implacable</i>,
+<i>Irresistible</i>, <i>London</i>, <i>Queen</i>, <i>Venerable</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>6th Battle Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><i>Russell</i> (Flag), <i>Cornwallis</i>, <i>Albemarle</i>, <i>Duncan</i>, <i>Exmouth</i>, <i>Vengeance</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>5th Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;P. Stoddart (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>Carnarvon</i> (Flag), <i>Falmouth</i>, <i>Liverpool</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;L. Grant (in command).</p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>Drake</i>, <i>Good Hope</i>, <i>King Alfred</i>, <i>Leviathan</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span></p>
+
+<p>(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however,
+broken up immediately, and the ships transferred to other
+duties.)</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hangw">
+
+<p class="p2 center"><i>Minelayer Squadron</i>, commanded by Captain M.&nbsp;H. Cobbe.</p>
+
+<p class="hang">H.M. Ships <i>Naiad</i> (S.O.’s ship), <i>Andromache</i>, <i>Apollo</i>, <i>Intrepid</i>,
+<i>Iphigenia</i>, <i>Latona</i>, <i>Thetis</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h3>THIRD FLEET</h3>
+
+<p>This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle
+Squadrons, consisting of our oldest battleships, and the
+7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser Squadrons, comprising
+our oldest cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever
+associated with the Grand Fleet were the ships of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under the command of
+Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet
+shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being
+employed mainly on blockading duties. It was composed
+as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hangw">
+
+<p class="hang"><i>Crescent</i> (Flag), <i>Edgar</i>, <i>Endymion</i>, <i>Gibraltar</i>, <i>Grafton</i>, <i>Hawke</i>,
+<i>Royal Arthur</i>, <i>Theseus</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>All submarines, except those of the B and C classes
+which were detached for the protection of our coast and
+ports from Rosyth southwards, were worked, in accordance
+with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were not,
+therefore, under my command. The C class submarines
+were unfit for oversea work, and our operations in enemy
+waters were therefore confined to boats of the D and E
+classes, of which we possessed a total of 8 D’s and 9 E’s,
+as against the German total of 28 boats of the U class.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II"><span id="toclink_12"></span>CHAPTER II<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">It</span> is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the
+Navy had somewhat faded from public interest during
+the century that had elapsed since the Napoleonic Wars,
+the last occasion on which the inhabitants of this country
+had felt that their safety depended on maritime power.
+Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in
+a foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this
+matter, and to point out the all-important influence which
+Sea Power had exerted, and would exert, on history.</p>
+
+<p>Associations such as the Navy League had been
+formed, having as their object the enlightenment of our
+countrymen, and although a great work was done in this
+direction, the mere necessity for such work is an indication
+of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons
+of the past.</p>
+
+<p>I therefore offer no apology for making some reference
+to the use and purpose of the British Navy.</p>
+
+<p>The main objects for which our Navy exists may be
+shortly summed up under four heads:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang2">
+
+<p>1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use
+of the sea, this being vital to the existence of
+an island nation, particularly one which is
+not self-supporting in regard to food.</p>
+
+<p>2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic
+pressure to bear on our adversary by denying<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span>
+to him the use of the sea, thus compelling
+him to accept peace.</p>
+
+<p>3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the
+passage and assist any army sent overseas,
+and to protect its communications and supplies.</p>
+
+<p>4. To prevent invasion of this country and its
+overseas Dominions by enemy forces.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The above objects are achieved in the quickest and
+surest manner by destroying the enemy’s armed naval
+forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet.
+The Fleet exists to achieve victory.</p>
+
+<p>But history has always shown that it is a very difficult
+matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary,
+and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroying
+his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main
+body of those forces—the Battle Fleet—in positions of
+safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant
+threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval
+Power, and force upon that Power a watching policy so
+that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to sea,
+before he is able to gain any advantage.</p>
+
+<p>The watching policy in the great wars of the
+Napoleonic era was carried out by keeping our squadrons,
+through fair or foul weather, in the vicinity of those ports
+of the enemy in which his fleet lay. Occasionally our
+ships were driven off by stress of weather, but they
+regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted.
+During this war, however, the advent of the submarine
+and destroyer, and, to a lesser extent, the use of the
+mine rendered such dispositions impossible.</p>
+
+<p>No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity
+of enemy bases without the certainty that she would fall
+an early victim to the attacks of submarines. Destroyers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span>
+could, it is true, afford some measure of protection, but
+destroyers have a very limited range of action, and could
+not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even in
+good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical
+relief of the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the
+great numbers that would be required for this purpose.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be overcome,
+the heavy ships would be so open to attack by
+enemy destroyers at night, if cruising anywhere near
+enemy bases, that they would certainly be injured, if not
+sunk, before many days had passed.</p>
+
+<p>These facts had been recognised before the War and
+a watching policy from a distance decided upon, the watch
+being instituted for the purpose of preventing enemy
+vessels from gaining the open sea, where they would constitute
+a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch
+maintained at a distance from the port under observation
+is necessarily only partial, except in circumstances where
+the enemy has to pass through narrow straits before gaining
+open water.</p>
+
+<p>The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend
+entirely on the number of watching vessels and the distance
+that those on board them can see. At night this
+distance is very short—on a dark night not more than
+a quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the
+average conditions of visibility obtaining in the North Sea,
+it is not more than six to eight miles.</p>
+
+<p>The North Sea, though small in contrast with the
+Atlantic, is a big water area of about 120,000 square miles
+in extent. The width across it, between the Shetland
+Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is 160 miles,
+and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel)
+would need to be watched also if a patrol were established
+along this line.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span></p>
+
+<p>A consideration of all the circumstances had led to
+the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the
+Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had
+determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in
+the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that
+the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that
+the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus,
+in combination, holding the enemy’s main force.</p>
+
+<p>To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main
+Battle Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a
+strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in
+support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the
+southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be
+favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to
+action should it put to sea.</p>
+
+<p>This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the
+result of experience in the various naval manœuvres
+carried out in previous years in the North Sea. These
+had demonstrated quite clearly that the alternative
+policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North
+Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an
+impracticable one, it having been shown on many occasions
+that evasion of a single patrol line during the hours
+of darkness, or even daylight, under the conditions of
+visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is a very
+simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying
+regular patrol positions is always in peril of successful
+submarine attack; the loss of the cruisers <i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i>
+and <i>Aboukir</i> showed this. It is also open to a concentrated
+attack by surface vessels.</p>
+
+<p>The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief
+of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general
+idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in compliance
+with Admiralty orders at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span>
+the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out
+this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command
+of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in
+the Channel in accordance with the general strategic
+dispositions.</p>
+
+<p>The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand
+Fleet comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+with their attached cruisers; the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, strengthened
+by the addition of the <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>; the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These
+dispositions continued in force for some three weeks,
+when the strong influence of the submarine on naval
+strategy began to make itself apparent.</p>
+
+<p>The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities
+of submarines were found, after a short experience of
+war, to need modification. In the first place, it became
+quickly apparent that the German submarines possessed
+a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably
+greater than those of our own submarines. It had been,
+for instance, looked upon as a considerable achievement
+for our submarines to keep the sea for a period of five to
+seven days, and they had not operated at any great distance
+from the coast. It is true that submarines had on
+occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but
+they were then usually escorted, or even towed, and the
+number of days from port to port did not approach the
+length of time for which German submarines remained
+at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans possessed
+a considerable superiority in the number of submarines
+which were capable of operating overseas, and
+the frequent sighting of enemy submarines as far north
+as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War,
+combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span>
+had established a regular submarine patrol in the centre
+of the North Sea, made it evident that the German submarines
+would constitute a very serious menace to our
+heavy ships.</p>
+
+<p>The comparative strength in submarines in Home
+Waters at the outbreak of war was as follows:</p>
+
+<table id="t17" class="section">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="5"><i>German</i>—</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl" style="width: 3em;">U Boats</td>
+  <td class="tdr top">28</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea work, but were as good as our D class.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl p1" colspan="5"><i>British</i>—</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl mid">D Class</td>
+  <td class="tdr mid">8</td>
+  <td class="tdc mid">{</td>
+  <td class="tdl">of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining units of the D class were not equal to the U boats.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">E Class</td>
+  <td class="tdr top">9</td>
+  <td></td>
+  <td></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">C Class</td>
+  <td class="tdr top">34</td>
+  <td class="tdc mid" rowspan="2">}</td>
+  <td class="tdl mid" rowspan="2">Unfit for oversea work and used only for local defence of the coast or in the Channel.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">B Class</td>
+  <td class="tdr top">3</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under
+construction, whilst we were building 19, apart from two
+experimental vessels of which nothing resulted.</p>
+
+<p>Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in
+pursuance of a policy introduced by the Admiralty in
+1913–14 of widening the area of supply of these vessels.
+This policy had far-reaching and beneficial results on the
+subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it enabled us
+to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would
+otherwise have been the case.</p>
+
+<p>A change in previous naval practice was considered
+necessary at an early period, because vessels moving at
+anything but high speed, particularly in the case of a
+number of ships in company, ran very considerable risks
+in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to be
+operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers.
+This conclusion affected the movements and operations
+of the Battle Fleet, since the number of destroyers we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span>
+possessed was quite inadequate to form a screen for a
+Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which constantly
+kept the sea. The number required, for such a
+screen to be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle
+Fleet alone as then constituted, and that number, 40, was
+all that we had stationed at the Northern Base. The fuel
+capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for them to
+remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days
+and nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for
+three or four times that period. Moreover, the destroyers
+could not be kept nearly so constantly at sea as the large
+ships owing to their requirements in the way of boiler-cleaning
+and the refit and adjustment of their more
+delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only
+the machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. The
+heavy ships, then, had two alternatives, either to remain
+at sea without a destroyer screen or to return to harbour
+with the destroyers. In the early days the first alternative
+was adopted, the risk being accepted, but minimised as
+far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part
+of the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>A further danger soon made itself apparent. It
+became evident at an early period, as many naval
+officers had expected, in view of German language at the
+Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw
+overboard the doctrines of international law when he could
+gain any advantage by doing so. He accordingly proceeded
+at once to lay mines in positions where he thought
+they would be advantageous to his operations, in utter disregard
+of the safety, not only of British, but also of neutral
+merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very probable
+that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the
+North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might
+prove effective against the Grand Fleet, and that he would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span>
+do this without issuing any warning to neutral countries.
+Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet were kept moving
+continuously in the central and southern waters of the
+North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay
+mines with little danger of his operations being witnessed
+(as he could carry them out under cover of darkness),
+it was evident that considerable risks might be incurred
+without our being aware of the fact. The policy
+of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried
+out with such success as to produce equality, or even
+inferiority, on the part of the British Fleet as compared
+with the German, in a comparatively short space of time.
+The only safeguard against such action which we could
+take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working
+ahead of the Battle Fleet. But the number of mine-sweepers
+that we possessed was wholly inadequate for
+such a task; and even if this had not been so, to carry out
+such an operation would have necessitated the speed of
+the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the
+maximum sweeping speed of mine-sweepers, and it would
+have been forced also to steer a steady course without
+zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships exceedingly
+vulnerable to submarine attack.</p>
+
+<p>The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace,
+combined with possible German action in regard to mine-laying,
+was to cause the Battle Fleet to confine its movements
+<em>under ordinary conditions</em> to the more northern
+waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be taken
+of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers,
+and where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water
+and the distance from enemy bases, that the Germans
+would be able to lay mines without discovery.</p>
+
+<p>The fact that this course of action would be forced
+upon us as the submarine and destroyer menace grew had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span>
+often been present in my mind in pre-War days, when I
+had expressed the view that the beginning of a naval war
+would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the
+larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have
+no doubt that this opinion was very generally held by
+officers of experience.</p>
+
+<p>The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was
+combined with the establishment of certain cruiser patrol
+<em>areas</em> in the North Sea. These areas, which were purposely
+made large, were watched on a regular, organised
+plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high
+speed in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk
+to the cruisers to a minimum, whist at the same time they
+kept as effective a watch as possible, first, to intercept
+German war vessels that might be covering a raid on our
+coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to
+operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all
+merchant ships entering or leaving the North Sea should
+be closely examined in order to enforce the blockade.</p>
+
+<p>This patrol policy was associated with periodical
+sweeps of cruisers, supported by the Battle Fleet, down
+into the southern waters of the North Sea, the object
+being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if possible, and
+in any case, owing to our movements being probably reported
+to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to
+make them feel that they could never move a force to
+sea without the possibility of encountering our Fleet
+engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which we carried
+out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illustrated
+in accompanying plans. On these occasions the
+Battle Fleet was kept strictly concentrated during the
+southern movement, and was screened as far as possible
+by destroyers against submarine attack; and at times
+mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">21</span>
+Fleet. When this was not possible, owing to the small
+number of mine-sweepers available or the state of the
+weather, some of the older battleships of the 6th Battle
+Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed
+ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a
+minefield be encountered, these older ships would be the
+first to strike the mines, thus giving sufficient warning
+to enable me to manœuvre the more valuable ships clear
+of the field.</p>
+
+<p>This general policy was continued until the attack on
+the <i>Theseus</i> and loss of the <i>Hawke</i>, belonging to the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, by submarine attack on
+October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the dispositions
+then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked
+to too great an extent when working without destroyers
+in the central part of the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the
+cruiser patrols to a safer position farther to the northward
+and eastward of the Shetland Islands, this being combined
+with a watch by the smaller craft on the Fair Island
+Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the
+North Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet
+was often kept either in a position westward of the
+Orkneys, where it was in support of the cruisers and at
+the same time formed a second blockade line, or it cruised
+to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser
+patrols working farther south.</p>
+
+<p>In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on
+the northern entrance to the North Sea, the principle
+kept in mind was the necessity for such an organisation
+of the patrols as to have, in so far as numbers permitted,
+two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were
+at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out
+of the North Sea were forced, so far as all human foresight<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span>
+could provide, to pass through the waters occupied
+by one of the two groups of ships during daylight hours;
+the distances apart were regulated according to the length
+of the night at the different seasons of the year.</p>
+
+<p>As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward
+and westward, it became possible to make use of the
+heavy ships to assist in blockade work without running
+undue risks from submarines, and the blockade increased
+correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, however,
+the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number
+of armed merchant cruisers enabled us to establish an
+effective blockade line by the use of these vessels alone,
+backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such were available.
+The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern
+and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base
+was shifted temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly.
+When this occurred, it did not affect the policy of frequent
+cruiser sweeps into the southern portion of the
+North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still
+continued.</p>
+
+<p>The dispositions that have been described took account
+naturally of two other very important factors.</p>
+
+<p>The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force
+to France. It was highly probable that the enemy would
+endeavour to interfere with this movement, and in the
+early days of the War it would not have been a difficult
+matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make
+at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of
+enterprise which surprised me, as I think it surprised most
+naval officers.</p>
+
+<p>The conditions for him were distinctly favourable.
+Our main Fleet was based, as he must have been aware,
+far away to the northward, and if he had timed an attack
+on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during which he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span>
+reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers,
+were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a
+good chance of making the attack and returning to his
+base before that Fleet could intervene. Consequently, he
+would only have had to deal with the comparatively light
+forces based in southern waters. On the other hand,
+if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the
+Germans would have possessed no mean advantage.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy was provided with a large number of
+modern destroyers, and some of them would have been
+well expended over a Channel dash, which would in all
+probability have met with some success. During the
+transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of
+the Grand Fleet kept the sea as far as possible in order
+to cover the movement, but the destroyers were constantly
+returning to the base to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>The second factor which had considerable influence on
+Fleet dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a
+raid or invasion by the enemy. Such a move was not
+very likely in the earliest days of the War, when the
+nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary
+Force had not left the country. It is also probable that
+the enemy had few troops to spare for the purpose. But
+the chances became greater as we denuded the country of
+men, and the conditions in other respects became more
+favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and
+expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted,
+landings would probably be effected in the rivers on the
+East Coast, the entrances to which were either unprotected
+or inadequately protected. A beach landing on
+our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather,
+and the chances of encountering favourable conditions on
+arrival off the coast are not great, and I always doubted
+the attempt being made. In our rivers the opportunities<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span>
+are greater, and are not so dependent on fine weather,
+and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive
+in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready
+to be sunk across the channels (which are narrow and
+shallow), the ships being fitted with explosive charges
+below ready to blow out the bottoms in case of necessity.
+I mentioned the names of certain retired naval officers
+who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary preparations
+in a very few days. I believe that my proposals
+were carried out.</p>
+
+<p>The danger of raids, however, and the consequent
+responsibility thrown upon the Admiralty for their prevention,
+during a period when we had very little military
+force in the country, led to a division of the Fleet by
+Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had certain
+disadvantages from a strategic point of view.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of
+the “King Edward VII.” class, and the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron of four ships of the “County” class, were ordered
+to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers
+for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then
+to be faced was that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet
+having to engage the High Sea Fleet, since concentration
+with the 3rd Battle Squadron could probably not be
+effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of
+engaging.</p>
+
+<p>At this time the battle cruisers <i>Princess Royal</i>, <i>Invincible</i>,
+and <i>Inflexible</i> were in the Atlantic operating
+against Von Spee’s squadron; and the <i>Australia</i>, <i>Indomitable</i>
+had not joined the Grand Fleet. The <i>Tiger</i> was not
+yet ready, so that at times our battle cruiser force consisted
+of only three ships, the <i>Lion</i>, <i>Queen Mary</i>, and
+<i>New Zealand</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span>
+for the prevention of raids or invasion was a factor which
+had a considerable influence on naval strategy.</p>
+
+<p>If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in
+the North Sea, or if it was at sea for a cruise having
+exercises for its main object, there was bound to be
+present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief the chance
+that he might be required suddenly to move south to engage
+the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a
+landing. If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a
+moment very serious consequences might ensue, and
+therefore all cruiser sweeps or other operations had to be
+curtailed to prevent such a situation arising.</p>
+
+<p>One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our
+naval strategy throughout the War, namely, the bombardment
+of our undefended towns on the East Coast.
+Such bombardments were of no immediate military value
+to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority
+of the Press, and the public, realised that the Navy should
+not be led into false strategy because of these bombardments,
+it was difficult for the Fleet to ignore them, and
+I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this fact.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was
+quite impossible to ensure that the enemy would be
+brought to action after such an operation, since to attain
+this end it would have been necessary for the Fleet, or
+a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the southern
+portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even
+had it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keeping
+destroyers with the heavier ships, and in any case it
+was false strategy to divide the Battle Fleet, as such a
+course might well have resulted in disaster.</p>
+
+<p>The usual course adopted was to base the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet on Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise
+from that neighbourhood. The speed of the battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span>
+cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly
+superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but
+there was always some risk in this case of a ship being
+disabled; the flag officer in command would then have
+been faced with the unpleasant alternative of abandoning
+her or of risking his whole force to cover her retreat.</p>
+
+<p>Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the
+enemy ports, so as to obtain warning of their ships leaving,
+the difficulty would not have been so great, but our
+submarines in those days (the only class of vessel which
+could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted
+with wireless installations with which they could signal
+from the required positions, or indeed from positions anywhere
+near the enemy’s coast, and, in any case, it must be
+borne in mind that at night the exit of enemy vessels unobserved,
+even under the conditions of a close submarine
+look-out, is a comparatively easy matter.</p>
+
+<p>At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the condition
+of British naval bases. As is well known, the
+Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow during the latter
+days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition of the
+Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack,
+was brought very strongly into prominence by the presence
+of so valuable a Fleet at this Base.</p>
+
+<p>The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main
+entrances navigable by all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha,
+and Hoy Channels, and, in addition, has some more
+narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern
+side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of
+providing gun defences for this Base, which the Admiralty
+had decided a year or two before the War was
+to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on more
+than one occasion, after examination by a committee of
+officers on the spot; but, since finance governs defence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span>
+and the Admiralty from year to year had insufficient
+money for even more urgent needs, no action had been
+taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the German
+naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by
+enemy’s destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by submarines.
+Its main, indeed its only, safety against such
+attacks by submarines lay in the navigational difficulties
+attendant upon entry into the harbour, combined, as regards
+destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an enemy’s
+force being intercepted on its outward or homeward
+passage, or of its being successfully engaged in the
+vicinity of the base. The sailing directions laid great
+stress upon the difficulties of navigations in the approaches
+to this Base, due to the very strong and varying currents,
+but the Germans were well acquainted with
+the Orkney and Shetland Islands. They had indeed
+made it a practice to send ships to visit these islands fairly
+frequently before the War, and they were, therefore, as
+well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into Scapa
+Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main
+Fleet Base, they could deduce the fact, if they did not
+know it already, that the difficulties of entry were not
+insuperable.</p>
+
+<p>Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the
+arrival of the Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July,
+took immediate steps, with the resources at his disposal
+in the Fleet, to improvise defences for the Base against
+destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land some
+12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount
+them at the entrances. No searchlights could, however,
+be provided, so that the guns were not of much value at
+night. Arrangements were also made for placing light
+cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to assist
+these defences. The further step, of course, was taken<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span>
+when the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols
+to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in
+the Fleet, however, that these measures gave much
+security even against destroyer attack on a dark night, and,
+it gave no security whatever against submarine attack.
+Nothing but <em>obstructions</em> of some kind could give that
+security. The matter was frequently discussed. Although
+many brains had been at work, no satisfactory anti-submarine
+obstruction had been devised. Under the urgent
+pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion
+generally held by experienced submarine officers was that,
+whilst the least important entrances, such as the Hoy,
+the Switha and the Holm Sound Channels, would be extremely
+difficult for the passage of a submarine, entry by
+the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a determined
+submarine officer. So much for the Base at
+Scapa Flow.</p>
+
+<p>At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better.
+The only entrance to this Base is comparatively narrow,
+and was defended against the entry of destroyers and
+larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted by the
+Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however,
+no boom protection against the entry of destroyers, and
+the conditions in regard to submarine attack were the
+same as at Scapa Flow, there being no obstructions.</p>
+
+<p>At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at
+Cromarty, namely, the harbour was defended by guns
+only against attack by destroyers. In this case, the guns
+were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at
+Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to submarine
+attack.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_28" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <img src="images/i_028.jpg" width="1302" height="884" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot short">
+
+<p>DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A
+SUBMARINE BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<figure id="i_28b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <img src="images/i_028b.jpg" width="1295" height="866" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot short">
+
+<p>THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of
+Fleets or Squadrons at anchor in any of the Bases used
+by the Grand Fleet was immense. For my part, I was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span>
+always far more concerned for the safety of the Fleet
+when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceedingly
+brief periods which were spent there for coaling in
+the early days of the War, than I was when the Fleet
+was at sea, and this anxiety was reflected in the very short
+time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It was also the
+cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more
+than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a
+submarine in the anchorage, and considerable risks were
+accepted in getting the Fleet to sea in very thick weather
+at night on at least one of these occasions.</p>
+
+<p>I have often wondered why the Germans did not
+make greater efforts to reduce our strength in capital ships
+by destroyer or submarine attacks on our bases in those
+early days. They possessed, in comparison with the uses
+for which they were required, almost a superfluity of
+destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with ourselves,
+and they could not have put them to a better use
+than in an attack on Scapa Flow during the early months
+of the 1914–1915 winter.</p>
+
+<p>In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home
+waters fit for such an operation, all with a speed of, or
+exceeding, 30 knots, this number being in addition to a
+total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and with speeds
+varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for
+work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in
+the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>This country had in home waters at the same period
+only 76 destroyers that could be compared with the German
+vessels in view of modern requirements, and 33 of
+these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76 destroyers,
+40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining
+36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large
+and fast destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span>
+their small fuel capacity, were only of use in southern
+waters and were appropriated to Dover. And we possessed
+25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a nominal
+speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot destroyer;
+the latter class was only fit for patrol work in
+the vicinity of the coast.</p>
+
+<p>It may be said that similar reflections to those I have
+mentioned might be made by the Germans as regards our
+own movements, and that they were surprised that we
+did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer is
+obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very
+short of destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware
+of the thoroughness of the defences of the German naval
+bases. We knew that they not only possessed the most
+powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew also
+that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and
+we were justified in assuming that they had protected their
+naval bases by extensive minefields. We, on the other
+hand, were entirely unprovided with this particular form
+of defence.</p>
+
+<p>In view of the known quality of German artillery and
+mine defences and the thorough nature of their organisation,
+my own view was that they also possessed, in all
+probability, anti-submarine defences. For these reasons,
+together with the important fact that the German rivers
+are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them
+in a submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack
+on their ships in harbour would meet with no success,
+and that we could not afford to expend any of our exceedingly
+limited number of destroyers, or submarines, in
+making an attack which would, in all human probability,
+be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the
+German defences proved the correctness of this view.
+I can only imagine that the Germans credited us, also,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span>
+with possessing harbour defences and obstructions which
+in our case were non-existent, although we did our
+best in the Fleet to give the impression that we had obstructed
+the entrances, for, pending the provision of proper
+obstructions, we improvised various contrivances. It
+may have seemed impossible to the German mind that we
+should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for
+its very existence, in a position where it was open to submarine
+or destroyer attack.</p>
+
+<p>This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those
+responsible for the safety of our Fleet from the gravest
+anxiety whenever the more valuable ships were in the undefended
+harbours.</p>
+
+<p>A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet
+and the High Sea Fleet in the early part of the War shows
+the following figures. Only ships that had completed
+their training and were fit to fight in the line are included:</p>
+
+<h3 class="section">BATTLESHIPS</h3>
+
+<p class="p1 center">(B., British; G., German)</p>
+
+<table id="t31b" class="bl">
+<tr class="bt bb">
+  <td class="tdc" style="width: 8em;"> Date</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Dreadnoughts</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Pre-Dreadnoughts</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Battle cruisers</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Light cruisers</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Destroyers</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Airships</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Cruisers</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc">August 4th, 1914</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> B</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 42</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> G</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 13</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 16</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 15</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc">October 1st, 1914</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> B</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 42</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> G</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 15</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 16</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc">January 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> B</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">B</a></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 44</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> G</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 16</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 16</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc">April 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> B</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 23</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 18</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 54</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> G</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 16</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc">October 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc"> B</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 66</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 15</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdc"> G</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 16</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 15</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="footnote"><br>
+
+<a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">B</a> 21 completed, but two of these (<i>Monarch</i> and <i>Conqueror</i>) were seriously damaged
+and one other battleship was refitting.
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span></p>
+
+<p>The above list gives the vessels nominally available.</p>
+
+<p>In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s <em>selected</em>
+and our <em>average</em> moment, the following facts should be remembered,
+and were necessarily taken into account by me
+at the time:</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two
+light cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and perhaps
+one battle cruiser under refit, in addition to any other
+vessels that might be temporarily disabled.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was
+refitting when planning an operation, and she could reinforce
+her Fleet by several light cruisers and two or more
+flotillas of destroyers from the Baltic.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important
+factor on either side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in
+the case of our ships, the comparatively short range of
+their guns, due to the small amount of elevation of which
+their mountings admitted.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers increased,
+were of great assistance to the enemy for scouting,
+each one being, in <em>favourable weather</em>, equal to at least two
+light cruisers for such a purpose.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>e</i>) Account is not taken in the British figures of the
+Harwich force, as this force could not be counted upon to
+effect concentration with the remainder of the Grand Fleet
+at the German selected moment.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>f</i>) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked
+the speed necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were
+very slightly faster than the battleships of the “Dreadnought”
+type, and, owing to their lack of speed, they
+were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an
+enemy Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On
+the other hand, they were very superior in fighting
+qualities to the German light cruisers.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span></p>
+
+<p>It will be seen from the above statements that the
+enemy had by far his best opportunity from the naval
+point of view in the early months of the War, as he was
+then much nearer equality of strength with the Grand
+Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap,
+which included minefields and submarines, with the High
+Sea Fleet as a bait, might have been very effective at
+any period of the War in inflicting considerable losses on
+us. The Germans had their best opportunities between
+November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915,
+the situation got steadily worse for the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this
+review of relative naval strength, is that if this country
+in the future decides to rely for safety against raids or
+invasion on the Fleet alone, it is essential that we should
+possess a considerably greater margin of superiority over
+a possible enemy <em>in all classes of vessels</em> than we did in
+August, 1914.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III"><span id="toclink_34"></span>CHAPTER III<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being
+only at the outbreak of the War, when it was so christened.
+As with the name, so with the organisation.</p>
+
+<p>The great majority of the really effective ships in the
+Grand Fleet were the outcome of the policy initiated by
+Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone when
+he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord in 1904
+in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of
+Lord Fisher’s first acts—and he carried through a number
+of other changes which reacted favourably on the
+efficiency of the Fleet for war—was the introduction of
+the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the <i>Dreadnought</i>,
+laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905,
+was the earliest example. She was closely followed
+by the three “all-big-gun” battle-cruisers of the “Invincible”
+class, which were of the same programme—1905–6.
+Much criticism was levelled at the
+<i>Dreadnought</i>, but even more at the principle embodied
+in the battle-cruisers—ships with the speed of
+cruisers, but the same calibre armament as battleships.
+The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s
+conception.</p>
+
+<p>Our superiority <em>in capital ships</em> at the outbreak of
+war was due to the efforts of the Boards presided over by
+Lord Selborne and his successors from 1904 onwards, and
+Lord Fisher held the post of First Sea Lord for five and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span>
+a half years of that period. At the beginning of 1909,
+during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord,
+great efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance
+of a sufficient standard of superiority in capital ships over
+Germany, and to make good our deficiencies in destroyers.
+The nation has good reason for the most profound
+gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude
+he assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to
+the table on <a href="#Page_31">page 31</a> will show the position that would
+have arisen if the four additional “Dreadnoughts” had
+not been included in the 1909–10 building programme.
+In the later Administration, presided over by Mr.
+Churchill, continued efforts were necessary, and were
+made, and steps were also taken with a view to meeting
+the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord
+Beresford had for some years been pointing out how
+essential it was to add largely to our programmes of light
+cruisers and destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>So much for construction in pre-War days when the
+Germans were carrying out their Navy Acts, one following
+the other in rapid succession.</p>
+
+<p>It is also of interest to note the part which Lord
+Fisher took in building up the Fleet organisation that
+existed in 1914. He introduced the system of manning
+the older ships, not in the first line, with nucleus crews
+composed of the principal officers and ratings. These
+ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very
+short time, into a condition in which they were fit to
+fight. This system superseded the old arrangement, by
+which ships not in full commission were not manned at
+all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the total
+number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was
+minimised by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably
+accepted now that in the circumstances existing at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span>
+time the nucleus crew system is far preferable; it raised
+the general standard of the whole Navy in British waters,
+and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Reserves
+on the outbreak of war.</p>
+
+<h3>I.—<span class="smcap">The Development of the Grand Fleet</span></h3>
+
+<p>In the organisation existing before the War, the
+Home Fleets comprised the First, Second and Third
+Fleets—in fact, practically all ships in home waters which
+it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war.</p>
+
+<p>The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home
+Fleets into two parts.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>First</i>, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet,
+comprising the latest-built ships; the force stationed at
+Harwich; four ships of the 6th Battle Squadron; the 6th
+and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second and Third
+Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from
+the Second Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Second</i>, or Channel Fleet, included the older
+battleships, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons,
+the 5th and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, and a sweeping
+flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was commanded
+by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914,
+when he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of
+the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th
+Battle Squadrons and the 5th Cruiser Squadron were
+manned before mobilisation with nucleus crews, and were
+consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at
+Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle
+Squadrons and 7th Cruiser Squadron were not manned
+until mobilisation, and the crews consequently required
+training. This training was carried out near Plymouth,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span>
+and the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command
+on September 3rd, 1914.</p>
+
+<p>The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed
+as a look-out force in the Straits of Dover during the time
+that the Channel Battle Fleet was patrolling to guard the
+passage of the Expeditionary Force. They were subsequently
+ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and
+three of them, the <i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i> and <i>Aboukir</i>, were sunk
+whilst patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast.</p>
+
+<p>These, then, were the conditions when War opened.
+It was only natural that war experience should show
+very quickly the many directions in which we had to recast,
+or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to introduce new arrangements.</p>
+
+<p>Peace manœuvres, however useful, can never be a
+substitute for war experience. They are many factors
+which render peace manœuvres unreal. In the first place,
+the available ships have to be divided so as to form the
+opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far
+greater moment, the manœuvres occupy much too short
+a period, and many of the difficulties affecting both
+<i lang="fr">matériel</i> and personnel are not experienced; thirdly, the
+conditions of war cannot be reproduced without serious
+inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships; finally,
+in our own manœuvres there was a tendency in the rules
+to give the torpedo less than its proper value as a fighting
+weapon.</p>
+
+<p>But, more than all, it was the conditions under which
+war broke out that made it necessary for us in the Grand
+Fleet to build up what was almost a new organisation.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The submarine had just become a most formidable
+weapon; its development during the War was extraordinarily
+rapid.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span>
+start, but it also developed with great rapidity, as did the
+heavier-than-air machines.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly developed
+by the enemy, both defensively and offensively.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) The effective range both of the gun and of the
+torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater than had
+been considered possible before the War.<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">C</a></p>
+
+<p>(<i>e</i>) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity,
+and was put to many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">C</a> In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out at a maximum
+range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one occasion, when the <i>Colossus</i> fired
+at a target at 14,000 yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having
+the Fleet concentrated at the outbreak of war. People
+had often pictured war with Germany coming as a bolt
+from the blue, and even naval officers feared that when
+the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously
+been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might
+lead the Government to delay concentration with the result
+that our squadrons would be separated when war was
+actually declared. Fortunately, the Admiralty in the last
+days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong strategic
+position. For this action the nation should be grateful
+to the First Lord and First Sea Lord.</p>
+
+<p>It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history,
+there was general expectation that a great Fleet action
+would at once be fought. No doubt this arose, partly,
+from the boastings of German naval officers in pre-War
+days, and partly from a knowledge of the great sacrifices
+the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively
+our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult
+to imagine that the High Sea Fleet (built at vast
+expense, and rightly considered by the enemy to be an
+efficient weapon of war) would adopt from the outset a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span>
+purely passive rôle, with the inevitable result that German
+trade would be swept from the seas. But there
+were two factors tending to make the High Command
+adopt this course. First, there was the fear that action
+with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High Sea
+Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into
+Allied hands, with a consequent landing of Russian
+troops on German soil as the result. This fear had been
+present in the German mind ever since the days of Frederick
+the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during
+the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt,
+was that the German High Command realised that, if
+Germany adopted a defensive rôle with her Fleet, it
+created, by far, the most difficult situation for us. Repugnant
+as this might be to high-spirited German naval officers,
+it was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for,
+whilst the German High Sea Fleet remained “in being”
+as a fighting force, we could not afford to undertake
+operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particularly
+in the earlier period of the War when our margin
+of superiority at Germany’s “selected moment” was not
+great. The main disadvantage to the Germans, <em>apart from
+their loss of trade</em>, lay in the inevitable gradual weakening
+of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it is
+highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end
+responsible for the series of mutinies which broke out in
+the High Sea Fleet during 1917 and 1918, culminating
+in the final catastrophe in November, 1918. In my view,
+the passive rôle was carried much too far.</p>
+
+<h3>II.—<span class="smcap">The Staff Organisation</span></h3>
+
+<p>To pass to the development of the organisation.</p>
+
+<p>Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff
+work. In the days before the War, the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span>
+of the Home Fleets consisted of the following
+officers:</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander,
+Flag-Lieutenant, and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was
+also, in a sense, on the Personal Staff.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the
+Fleet with his Secretary, a Wireless officer, a Signal officer,
+and the clerical staff of the Secretary.</p>
+
+<p>In addition, the organisation provided for the appointment
+of two War Staff officers, on mobilisation for war.</p>
+
+<p>This was the Staff which, together with an additional
+Signal officer, I found in the <i>Iron Duke</i>, on assuming command
+of the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir
+George Callaghan in December, 1914 (as was originally
+arranged before the War broke out, as I have explained),
+to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational side
+of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only
+for the Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my
+opinion, sufficient work and responsibility to occupy his
+whole time; and I had prepared an organisation of the
+Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with which the
+work should be divided into two distinct branches, the
+operations and the <i lang="fr">matériel</i> side, each with a secretariat.
+I had communicated my views to the officers selected for
+the Staff. This, in my judgment, was the correct line for
+any Naval Staff organisation, and it was later introduced
+by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff.</p>
+
+<p>When informed, just prior to the declaration of War,
+that I might be required to take over the command of the
+Fleet, I decided to ask, as the first step, for the services
+of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as Chief of the Staff.</p>
+
+<p>I had brought with me from London on my own Staff,
+as Second in Command of the Grand Fleet, a Captain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span>
+(Captain Bentinck), with the title of Captain on the
+Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a
+Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and
+a Signal Boatswain. These, with the exception of Captain
+Bentinck (who joined Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender’s
+Staff), I took to the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and my Staff
+then comprised:</p>
+
+<ul>
+<li>A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff.</li>
+<li>A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet.</li>
+<li>Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff.</li>
+<li>A Flag-Lieutenant.</li>
+<li>Three Signal officers.</li>
+<li>Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two).</li>
+<li>Three War Staff officers.</li>
+<li>Two Signal Boatswains.</li>
+<li>A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<p>The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat
+with a suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this
+difficulty was somewhat serious when I doubled the staff
+on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>. However, it was successfully
+overcome. The Staff was organised into two branches—Operations
+and <i>Matériel</i>—the former directly under the
+Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Captain
+of the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the
+work of the Captain of the Fleet became, of necessity,
+very largely reduced, and he joined the operational side,
+arrangements being made by which either he or the Chief
+of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as
+we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on
+the advent of the submarine as an important factor in
+naval warfare, that it was essential that an officer should
+be constantly on the bridge who could take immediate
+action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as might
+be required.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span></p>
+
+<p>Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief
+was so frequently required, at a moment’s notice, owing
+to the swiftness with which a modern fleet moves, that I
+never left my sea cabin, which was under the bridge,
+to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was
+at sea.</p>
+
+<p>The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as
+already stated, under two headings. This division, as is
+clear from the above remarks, affected their duties in
+harbour more than when at sea. In the latter case the
+two branches combined, and the whole staff became “operational.”</p>
+
+<p>The Staff work under these conditions was carried out
+in the war-room, situated under protection, below the conning
+tower. Here the movements of our own ships were
+recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we were
+nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the
+bridge to this centre by the Signal officers, and the situation
+at any moment could be seen by a glance at the charts
+kept by the War Staff officer on duty.</p>
+
+<p>When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters,
+the work was shifted from the war-room to the Admiral’s
+shelter on the bridge, so that the situation could
+be seen by me more readily; and finally, when, as on
+May 31st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were
+nearing touch with one another, the “plot” of the movements
+as reported was continually under my observation.</p>
+
+<p>At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers engaged
+on the operational side were following the movements
+of such enemy vessels (chiefly, of course, submarines)
+as were known to be at sea, as well as those
+of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to
+ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span>
+each other at night—when risk of collision would be incurred
+owing to ships not carrying lights, or in thick
+weather.) They put into execution the orders given by
+myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged
+in elaborating plans of future movements and drawing
+up the necessary orders for such movements as I had in
+contemplation. They were also engaged in arranging all
+gunnery, torpedo and other practices and exercises, and
+in the constant work of the production, revision and issue
+of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>On the <i lang="fr">matériel</i> side, the Staff work comprised that of
+storing, provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions
+of instruction, training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits
+and repairs, etc.</p>
+
+<p>In action each member of the Staff had his own
+particular duty allotted to him. The secretaries took
+notes and recorded proceedings; certain officers had as
+their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me every
+movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to
+attend solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy,
+keeping me informed of their progress and of their possibilities;
+another dealt with all questions relating to concentration
+or distribution of fire, bringing to my notice
+any signals required to give effect to our preconceived
+arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty,
+one being responsible that all signals for tactical movements
+made visually were also made by “short distance”
+wireless telegraphy. One wireless officer worked in the
+main office and one in the auxiliary office. The Staff
+was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief
+free to take a comprehensive survey of the whole position,
+whilst ensuring that nothing that should be done was
+left undone. It must, however, be realised that the rapidity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span>
+of movement of fleets is so great that, at critical
+moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the Flag
+Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make
+instant decisions; there is no time for consultation or for
+advice.</p>
+
+<h3>III.—<span class="smcap">Preparation of Cruising Orders</span></h3>
+
+<p>One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand
+Fleet after the declaration of War was to lay down definitely
+the various cruising orders for the Battle Fleet
+and its “look-out” screen of battle-cruisers, cruisers and
+light cruisers. There had been much discussion for some
+years before the War as to the best disposition of cruisers
+ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that
+had been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but
+war experience led to a series of diagrams being drawn
+up giving the cruising stations of all the various classes
+of cruisers and other light craft under the different conditions
+that might exist. These included diagrams showing
+the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards
+enemy waters, under conditions of ordinary visibility,
+by day, or in low visibility by day, both with the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet in company and without it; a similar diagram
+when moving away from enemy water by day (this
+being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack
+by destroyers as the fleet steered away from enemy
+waters); diagrams were got out for steering towards or
+away from enemy waters at night; and, finally, diagrams
+were prepared, both for day and night, for the
+dispositions of the cruisers and other light forces after an
+action.</p>
+
+<p>Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle
+Fleet itself, both by day and at night, were similarly
+drawn up. Some of these were specially designed to give<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span>
+such safety from submarine attack as was possible to the
+main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of
+destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of
+fuel, or other causes. The dispositions for use at night
+provided for the use of destroyer attack, and were designed
+to give safety from collision, due to squadrons
+inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when
+showing no lights; this was a very possible event during
+the course of a long night when a very slight error in
+steering, or a slight difference in compasses, will rapidly
+bring two squadrons together that started the night five
+miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons separated,
+as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful
+submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons
+gave greater freedom of movement in the case of destroyer
+attack. At the same time it was necessary to
+provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at daylight.</p>
+
+<p>The question of submarine screens was taken up
+at the commencement of war. This matter had
+naturally been considered before the War, but was in
+its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition
+of a screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter
+when there is no lack of destroyers, the case is different
+when a fleet is very short of the requisite number, as was
+our experience, and one destroyer had often to be disposed
+to endeavour to do the work of two.</p>
+
+<p>Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore,
+drawn up to meet the different conditions resulting from
+the presence of varying numbers of destroyers, or a decreased
+number of ships requiring to be screened, and
+also providing for the ships being in various formations.
+In November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was
+seventeen.</p>
+
+<p>Early in the War the danger of successful submarine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span>
+attack on warships at sea, whether in company or proceeding
+singly, had impressed on us the necessity of
+taking every precaution for safety, and the practice of the
+fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally
+adopted in accordance with my directions. In the case
+of a fleet or squadron, the usual practice was to carry out
+the alterations of course by turning the ships together;
+occasionally the turn was made “in succession,” but this
+was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns were occasionally
+made at fixed time intervals without signal.</p>
+
+<p>Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner
+in which officers of watches kept station in a fleet, since
+there is no better practice than keeping station on a line of
+bearing, a far more difficult matter to the novice than
+keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute the
+excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915
+and 1916 very largely to this early experience. Much
+theoretical investigation was instituted to determine the
+method of zigzagging, both in a fleet and in a single ship,
+which gave the greatest protection against submarine attack,
+and actual experiments took place with our own
+submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions;
+the flag officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance
+in this as in all other matters.</p>
+
+<p>The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the
+instructions subsequently issued to merchant ships, and
+the value of zigzagging in reducing the danger of submarine
+attack was clearly shown during the year 1917 by
+the comparative immunity of merchant ships that complied
+with the orders as compared with those that did not
+do so. Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship
+into danger, but this was exceptional as compared with
+the general immunity given.</p>
+
+<p>When the convoying of merchant ships through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span>
+the submarine zone was instituted in 1917, after I had
+returned to the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet experience
+was again of value in the preparation of instructions.</p>
+
+<p>The supremely important question of how best to
+handle in action the large and increasing Fleet engaged
+my attention from the commencement. In
+drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of
+the Fleet, both when cruising and in action, I availed
+myself of the advice and assistance of the experienced
+flag officers commanding the various Squadrons. Much
+discussion took place on these matters, and many of the
+dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual experiment
+at sea before being incorporated in the
+orders.</p>
+
+<p>The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle
+Fleet from its cruising formation was a matter of the
+greatest importance, and constant practice in carrying out
+this manœuvre under every varying condition was given
+to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were
+introduced having as their object the simplification and
+shortening of the manœuvre, with a view to bringing
+the heaviest possible fire to bear on the enemy’s fleet as
+quickly as possible. Orders were drawn up to meet
+cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy
+might be sighted at short range, and immediate independent
+action by a divisional Flag Officer would be
+necessary.</p>
+
+<p>In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of
+the Fleet for action was complicated by the presence of
+the 3rd Battle Squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts—the vessels
+of the “King Edward VII.” class—as the speed
+of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less
+than that of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured
+to solve this problem by practical experience. Much<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span>
+depended on the tactics likely to be adopted by the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty lay in the
+fact that if the 3rd Battle Squadron was placed on one
+flank of the Battle Fleet when in cruising order and deployment
+towards that flank became necessary in conformity
+with an enemy movement, thus placing the slow
+3rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the
+whole Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14
+knots, in order to have the necessary reserve of speed in
+hand. If, on the other hand, the 3rd Battle Squadron
+was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet speed
+was again reduced to that attainable by this squadron.
+It was desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle
+Fleet which would admit of the 3rd Battle Squadron being
+in the rear after deployment, in whichever direction
+deployment took place. There was still the objection,
+which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced
+upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the
+van.</p>
+
+<p>The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre-Dreadnought
+Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought
+Squadrons, with a view to the slow squadron turning in
+the opposite direction to the remainder on deployment,
+and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought
+Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the
+3rd Battle Squadron into effective action.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_48" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+<div class="right"><p>Plan N<sup>o.</sup> 1</p></div>
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_048.jpg" width="1235" height="1186" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_048-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The question was not one of importance subsequent
+to April, 1915, from which date our superiority in battleships
+of the Dreadnought type was sufficient to give me
+confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under suitable
+conditions, could be crushed in action without the
+aid of the 3rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter
+of 1914–15, when our superiority in Dreadnoughts was
+frequently very slight, and the enemy possessed two
+pre-Dreadnought<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> Battle Squadrons, our 3rd Battle Squadron
+was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Orders indicated the position to be
+occupied by our battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers
+and destroyers on deployment, as well as that of the
+fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the
+“Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the
+Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued
+shortly after war commenced were modelled on a Battle
+memorandum which I had prepared when in command,
+first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron. But the changing situation soon made alterations
+and additions necessary, and the Orders were under
+constant revision.</p>
+
+<p>The tactics to be pursued by the different units of
+the Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were
+provided for as far as possible.</p>
+
+<p>Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that
+the Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after
+deployment control the movements of all the squadrons
+comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern
+action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the great
+length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events,
+and increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity
+for wide decentralisation of command, <em>after the deployment</em>
+of the fleet for action, was emphasised.</p>
+
+<p>As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid
+on this point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were,
+of course, kept fully acquainted with the general ideas
+under which the Fleet would act, so that they might be
+able to interpret my wishes when acting independently.
+Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close watch
+on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that
+squadrons could conform to his movements. The general<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span>
+lines on which I intended to engage were defined. These
+included the range at which it was intended to open the
+engagement, the range below which it was not intended to
+close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks
+to be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to
+this rule which might become necessary. Emphasis was
+laid on the supreme necessity for a free use of our own
+torpedoes when opportunity occurred.</p>
+
+<p>After the experience of the engagement on January
+24th, 1915, between the battle-cruisers, and especially as
+our superiority increased and the High Sea Fleet gave no
+sign of a desire to engage, the conviction became stronger
+than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy would
+fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of
+tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines
+and torpedoes, <em>since a retiring fleet is in a position of
+great tactical advantage in the employment of these
+weapons</em>. The Tactical Board was in constant use for
+a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the
+other flag officers.</p>
+
+<p>In the earliest stages of the War, when the German
+submarine strength was not great, one of the main problems
+to be considered in regard to a fleet action was the
+employment of our destroyers and light cruisers to
+attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to
+counter his similar attacks, which, owing to his great superiority
+in destroyers, was a matter of supreme importance.
+The knowledge, too, that his light cruisers and
+destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships,
+were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with
+us) made it necessary to take into account the probability
+that he would use this form of attack at the commencement
+of a general action, or during the stages leading
+up to it. Later, when his submarines increased in number,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span>
+the method of countering the use of such vessels by
+the enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action,
+had also to be considered, particularly as it was not
+until 1916 that the Grand Fleet was provided with any
+submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that submarines
+which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea became
+part of the organisation.</p>
+
+<p>The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo attack
+by the enemy, if the fleets were approximately abeam
+of one another, and the risks run by the centre and rear
+were pointed out, as were the different conditions produced
+in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had
+a position of torpedo advantage.</p>
+
+<p>The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater
+as the War progressed, owing to the advance made in
+the technique of these weapons. Before the opening of
+hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had a maximum range of
+about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements
+in our torpedoes as the War progressed, including
+a great increase in range, and we had every reason to
+believe that the Germans were making similar progress,
+and that the range of their torpedoes was as much in excess
+of the pre-War range as was that of our own
+weapons.</p>
+
+<p>The threat of successful torpedo attack even from
+battleships in the line was, therefore, an important factor
+to be taken into account, with the ships of the opposing
+fleets formed in single line at the close intervals which are
+necessary for successful co-operation and the concentration
+of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation
+into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet
+action was constantly proceeding, but the single line, or
+a modification of it, was, under most conditions, the best
+that could be devised.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span></p>
+
+<p>It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be
+manœuvred for advantage in gunnery position, it might
+be necessary to engage under unfavourable gunnery conditions
+in order to prevent the enemy reaching his own
+waters.</p>
+
+<p>Several new manœuvres were introduced and practised
+by the Fleet with a view to countering possible tactics
+on the part of the enemy. These included a
+“turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious
+attack by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the
+course of the Fleet without impairing its organisation
+to meet enemy tactics necessitating such a move;
+rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other new
+tactical methods were introduced as time progressed
+to meet the changing conditions of modern warfare.</p>
+
+<p>Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the conduct
+of the Fleet after an action, so far as it was possible
+to foresee the conditions that might arise. The object
+was to arrange to continue the attack by light craft,
+whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter-attack
+by light forces.</p>
+
+<p>In the orders which were issued for the guidance of
+the destroyers both before, during, and after an action, endeavour
+was made to provide for all these contingencies.
+The stations of the flotillas, including the Harwich
+flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each
+had its particular duties assigned to it. General directions
+were given for the employment of the destroyers,
+wide latitude being reserved to the officers commanding
+flotillas.</p>
+
+<p>The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for.</p>
+
+<p>The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser,
+cruiser and light cruiser when in cruising order, or in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span>
+action, or after an action, were defined, particular emphasis
+being laid on the necessity for ships in the van,
+when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advantage
+in regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the
+same time engaging enemy vessels of a similar class and
+preventing torpedo attacks on our own Battle Fleet from
+developing.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the
+General Cruiser Instructions, that after gaining touch
+with the enemy the first essential was to maintain that
+touch. Instructions were also given that in the event of
+the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our
+Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were
+to push on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet.
+It will be seen later that this situation arose during the
+Jutland battle.</p>
+
+<p>The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the principle
+that <em>in action</em> their primary function was the destruction
+of the similar enemy vessels if present, and, after
+their destruction or in their absence, to attack the van
+of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their duty
+was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet, whilst denying similar information to the enemy.
+The Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle-Cruiser
+Fleet was given a free hand to carry out these general
+instructions.</p>
+
+<p>The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the
+ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to
+provide for the battle-cruisers being either absent or
+present. In the former event, this squadron took the
+place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our
+battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle
+Squadron was ordered to take station ahead of the remainder
+of the Battle Fleet in the case of a deployment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span>
+towards Heligoland, and in rear of the Battle Fleet in the
+case of deployment <em>away from</em> Heligoland. The object of
+this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet
+at a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after
+deployment. In order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron
+to carry out its functions in action, it was stationed between
+the Cruiser Line and the main Battle Fleet when
+in cruising order.</p>
+
+<p>The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their
+duties in action as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers
+and torpedo craft, to support our destroyers, and to attack
+the enemy’s battle line with torpedoes. For this
+purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were required
+to be in the van on deployment.</p>
+
+<p>The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the
+fact that they should carry out an early attack on the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet, commencing their attacks in clear
+weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet were engaged. Under
+conditions of low visibility, they were instructed to
+attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be engaged.
+It was pointed out that destroyers closing the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet for the purpose of an attack were
+also in the best position for preventing successful attacks
+on our own fleets.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the
+Grand Fleet, in 1916, instructions for their conduct before,
+during, and after action were drawn up. Instructions
+for two other classes of vessel, namely, mine-layers
+and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of
+the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having
+been attached to the Fleet from the commencement of
+War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing, however, but slow
+speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during
+1915.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p>
+
+<h3>IV.—<span class="smcap">The Training of the Fleet</span></h3>
+
+<p>Inseparable from the question of the management of
+the Fleet before and during action was that of the working
+together of its units at sea by day and at night. This
+matter was, of course, one to which great attention had
+been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he
+handed over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine
+trained to a very high pitch of perfection by an officer
+who was a past master in fleet training.</p>
+
+<p>But it was inevitable that war conditions should make
+even greater demands on the skill of the personnel than
+had previously been necessary, and in no direction was
+this more necessary than at night, the number of ships
+in company being far greater than had previously been
+usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling
+added to the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions,
+fleets cruising on dark, stormy nights without showing any
+lights, did so for comparatively short periods, during
+which the more experienced officers could, to a certain
+extent, remain on deck.</p>
+
+<p>Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed
+more than a very dim light at the stern, and frequently
+not even that, adding greatly to difficulties of fleet cruising.
+Consequently provision had to be made for ensuring
+safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and considerable
+foresight and great skill on the part of officers
+was necessary.</p>
+
+<p>Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility
+pass close to one another during hours of darkness
+were warned beforehand of the danger, and arrangements
+made so that they should be aware of each other’s
+positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions
+so as to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span>
+otherwise might open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all
+sorts were similarly warned so far as this was possible,
+but in their case the conditions, owing to difficulties of
+communication, were frequently much more embarrassing.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night
+had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the necessity
+for signals, whilst giving freedom of action in an emergency.
+What applied to conditions of darkness applied
+equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring
+safety in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren,
+could not as a rule be employed, since the blasts might
+give warning to the enemy and place the Fleet open
+to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the
+other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in
+close company with the larger ships for screening purposes
+against submarines led, in the case of sudden fog, to a
+difficult situation, as, before the Fleet could safely carry
+out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the destroyers
+clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by
+the large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued
+to meet all these conditions, and the best testimony to
+the training of the Fleet prior to the War was the remarkable
+freedom from accident during the early months after
+the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly
+commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by
+no means handy vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation,
+was also a source of great gratification to me, and
+must have been most satisfactory to the officers and men
+concerned.</p>
+
+<p>The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly
+in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its
+units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by
+wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span>
+presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate attention
+on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements.
+Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to
+be stopped, because by means of <em>directional</em> wireless stations
+the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could
+be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt
+that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and
+in some cases even the <em>name</em> of the ship so signalling.
+This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made
+progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet
+being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if
+much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally
+concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of
+our squadrons using the same means of communication.
+That was an inevitable inference.</p>
+
+<p>The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in
+the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled
+and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of signalling
+that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet
+had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the
+Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions
+that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders
+somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the
+object was achieved.</p>
+
+<p>Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea
+in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in
+and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet
+Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the
+enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time
+occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet
+manœuvring when much to the southward of the latitude
+of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was
+also carried out by visual signalling.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span>
+Fleet to enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not possible
+to use visual signalling at night, except with carefully
+shaded lamps which were only visible at a distance of
+about a quarter of a mile, and then only by the ship
+addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at
+night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort
+had then to be made to wireless, but by signalling before
+dark all expected movements during the night, and by
+arranging the course of the Fleet so that few alterations
+were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost absolute
+wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when important
+information from the Admiralty and elsewhere
+was to be transmitted to the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior
+officers of squadrons, or to single ships when at sea engaged
+in operations, etc., and early in the War we had
+to devise a method by which this could be done without
+calling up the ships in question by wireless, thus necessitating
+a reply from them, and thus possibly acquainting
+the enemy of their position.</p>
+
+<p>After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of
+communicating the required information without causing
+the ship herself to divulge her position was devised by
+the Fleet Wireless officer, Lieutenant-Commander R.&nbsp;L.
+Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and gradually
+was greatly extended during the later stages of the War.</p>
+
+<p>It must not be thought that, because wireless signalling
+at sea was restricted, it was not intended to make
+full use of it when necessary and when silence was no
+longer required, such as when the fleets were within
+sight of one another. On the contrary, a great advance
+was made during the War in the use of wireless telegraphy
+for manœuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in
+every other direction. So proficient did the ships become
+under the organisation introduced by Lieutenant-Commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span>
+Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very
+efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in
+1916 I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as
+much ease and rapidity as by visual signals. At the beginning
+of the War ten minutes to a quarter of an hour would
+elapse before I could be sure that all ships had received
+a manœuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole
+Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to
+three minutes. This great improvement was due to new
+methods introduced, as well as to incessant practice in
+harbour.</p>
+
+<p>Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was
+very considerable indeed, and I owed a great debt of
+gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, the other
+wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and the wireless
+officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress
+was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme shortage
+of wireless personnel for the expanding Fleet and
+the large number of auxiliary vessels commissioned, we
+were forced to discharge many of the best operators in
+the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by
+boys trained in the Wireless School established by the
+Fleet at Scapa Flow.</p>
+
+<p>A point which war experience brought into considerable
+prominence was the difficulty of distinguishing,
+with sufficient rapidity, enemy vessels from our own
+ships both before, and, more particularly during, action.
+The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but was
+greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines.
+Steps were taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrangements
+made for certain distinguishing marks visible at
+long distances to be worn during daylight by our own
+surface vessels. The question of identification at night
+was more difficult, and although we effected improvement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span>
+in this respect also, the results were not so satisfactory.</p>
+
+<p>Of the original experimental work carried out by the
+Fleet at Scapa Flow none was more important than that
+connected with the safety of ships from mines. Early
+in the War it had become obvious that there was danger
+of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful
+mine attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work
+of the mine-sweepers; these vessels could not work far
+afield, and in bad weather could not work even close to
+their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to proceed
+to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable.</p>
+
+<p>A solution of this difficulty was required. Commander
+Cecil V. Usborne, of the <i>Colossus</i>, in these
+circumstances proposed to me the trial of an apparatus
+which he suggested should be towed from the bows of
+ships; it was intended to fend off any mine encountered,
+provided the ship did not strike it absolutely “end on.”
+I ordered immediate trials; all the necessary <i lang="fr">matériel</i> was
+provided with Fleet labour and appliances, and starting
+with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until a
+series of experiments commenced in large ships, battleships
+and cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A.&nbsp;L. Duff
+and A.&nbsp;C. Leveson in charge of the experiments and
+great progress was made, although absolute success was
+not obtained.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir
+Cecil Burney, visited the base at this juncture, and,
+knowing his inventive turn of mind, I discussed the
+matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant
+Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for
+effecting the required object. His idea was to utilise
+apparatus which he had devised earlier for other purposes.
+His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span>
+devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the
+manufacture of appliances by outside manufacturers. I
+urged the Admiralty to take up the question at once;
+this was done, and the experiments, started at Portsmouth,
+were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as preliminary
+success had been obtained.</p>
+
+<p>The two devices were then tried over a considerable
+period at Scapa Flow, still under the immediate direction
+of Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson, who threw themselves
+wholeheartedly into the task, Rear-Admiral
+E.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional
+absence. After many disappointments the Burney
+system was proved to be successful, and I at once requested
+that manufacture on a large scale should be
+proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate character,
+and many persons at first were sceptical as to its
+value, owing partly to early difficulties in manipulation.
+But Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson rendered the
+greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and gradually
+it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had
+become possessed of a most valuable safeguard. By
+the time I relinquished the Command a very large number
+of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and some
+light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working
+well. Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improvement
+was constantly being effected, with the result that
+during 1917 the fitting was universal. During that year
+it was instrumental in saving several warships from damage
+by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was
+also considerable.</p>
+
+<p>The initial idea was that of Commander Usborne,
+and both he and Lieutenant Burney displayed much
+energy in working out their respective devices. But it
+was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span>
+success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson
+eventually brought the appliance to perfection, with the
+result that it was generally adopted. A modified arrangement
+of the same nature was fitted to merchant ships
+during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value.</p>
+
+<p>As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early
+stage of my Command to the necessity for constant
+improvement in the fighting efficiency of the Grand
+Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was
+considerable, left me under no delusions as to its
+character. I had made it my business to keep myself
+very fully acquainted with German progress. I had
+first been brought into close touch with the modern
+German Navy during service in China from 1899 to
+1902, which included the Boxer campaign, when I
+saw a great deal of its officers and men. I had then
+formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent
+touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had
+convinced me that in <i lang="fr">matériel</i> the Germans were ahead
+of us, and that the personnel, though lacking the
+initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the
+British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and
+trained. I knew also that the German Fleet was in no
+way short of officers; this was the case with us owing to the
+constant political pressure in the years before the War,
+and I expected that this shortage of officers would be a
+great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch
+of the German Navy from which I expected very good
+work was the destroyer service. I had seen German destroyers
+manœuvring.</p>
+
+<p>Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our
+officers, how efficient was the gunnery and torpedo work
+of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid had been its advance
+in the year or two before the War. A great increase<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span>
+had been made in the allowance of ammunition for
+practice. Before the War this was much higher than our
+own, and there was no doubt in my mind that the German
+allowance would be well expended. Indeed, we had obtained
+information which placed this beyond question.</p>
+
+<p>I was well acquainted personally with many of the
+flag officers and captains in the German Navy and had
+some idea of their views on naval warfare. Amongst
+those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl,
+the then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet,
+Vice-Admiral von Lans, commanding a Battle Squadron,
+Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval Staff, who
+later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral
+von Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Commander-in-Chief
+of the High Sea Fleet, who succeeded
+Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval Staff, and Admiral
+von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore
+batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowledge
+of these officers led me to expect good work in the
+High Command, and I also expected that they would be
+well supported.</p>
+
+<p>It is interesting to record that I took part in a Conference
+of Allied naval officers in a pagoda at the end
+of the Great Wall of China in company with Admiral
+von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain in
+China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts,
+in 1900, and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me
+as Chief of the Staff to Admiral—afterwards Admiral
+of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour, when I was wounded
+during the international expedition for the relief of the
+Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on several
+subsequent occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans,
+who was in command of the <i>Iltis</i> at the capture of the
+Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer campaign.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span></p>
+
+<p>My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong reason,
+had no others existed, for making me desirous of
+doing all that was possible to increase our own gunnery
+and torpedo efficiency.</p>
+
+<p>The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground
+in Kiel Bay, with every appliance for carrying out gunnery
+exercises, and I felt sure that they had rendered it
+safe from any hostile attack, and that the German Fleet
+would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as
+time progressed.</p>
+
+<p>We were not in so fortunate a position. There had
+been no recent opportunity for carrying out gunnery and
+torpedo exercises and practices; Scapa Flow had not been
+used as a base for such work in peace time, except for
+destroyers, and consequently no facilities existed there,
+although the proximity of Cromarty, which <em>had</em> been a
+Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a
+certain extent at a later period. But there was no protected
+area outside the harbour where practices could be
+carried out in safety, and the harbour itself was not at
+first secure against submarine attack. Much use, however,
+was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty
+later when submarine obstructions had been provided,
+and the Germans had obligingly laid a mine-field which
+protected the practice area from seaward. At the
+commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to
+depend on fleet resources for the provision of targets for
+gunnery practices, and the practices themselves were carried
+out under conditions which laid the ships open to
+submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the
+work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity
+provided by constant sea work in the first months of the
+War was, however, utilised to carry out such gunnery
+practices as the conditions admitted.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span></p>
+
+<p>At first the custom was for the Fleet to use small
+targets which the ships carried with them. These were
+unsuitable; their small size rendered them frequently
+invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea, and I felt
+that the Fleet could not make progress under such conditions.</p>
+
+<p>Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted
+to, but no really suitable rocks existed, and, in any
+case, practice at them eventually involved too much risk
+of submarine attack, as the German submarines began
+to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards
+the end of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase
+in the number of destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to
+the provision of submarine obstructions at Cromarty, to
+carry out gunnery practices at long ranges at targets in
+the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that
+period.</p>
+
+<p>Later still, battle practice targets were brought to
+Scapa Flow, and the long-range firing was carried
+out in the Pentland Firth, a still more convenient
+place.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for
+all the preliminary gunnery practices which could be
+carried out with guns up to 6-inch in calibre, and also
+for night firing and for torpedo work. The fine stretch
+of water was secure from submarine attack after the
+obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise
+by day and night without danger of attack. The Flow
+was simply invaluable for this purpose. Ships were
+firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control exercises,
+carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing
+with attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight
+until dark.</p>
+
+<p>After dark, night firing was frequently carried out,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span>
+and occasionally a division of battleships was exercised
+in steaming in company, without lights, in order to give
+the officers of watches practice. When the constant sea
+work of the earlier months of the War gave place to occasional
+cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of
+the Fleet was maintained at a remarkably high standard
+as a result of the work in Scapa Flow.</p>
+
+<p>During the period 1914–16 a marked advance was
+undoubtedly made in gunnery efficiency. At an early
+period of the War a memorandum was issued pointing
+out the necessity for increased attention to drill and
+organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon,
+and it was obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers
+and men. I knew that we had to deal with an enemy
+who would be as perfect as constant drill could
+ensure.</p>
+
+<p>A great extension of the system of Director Firing,
+by which one officer or man could lay and fire all the guns,
+was made. The situation in this respect before the War
+was that a few ships had been fitted for the system, which
+had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a
+very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value
+compared with the alternative system; there was considerable
+opposition to it, and the great majority of the ships
+were not fitted. In some cases the system was not favoured
+even in the ships provided with it.</p>
+
+<p>It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out competitive
+trials of the Director System and the alternative
+system already in use, and the results of these trials
+had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion of the
+great value of the Director System. I was able to press
+these views on my return to the Admiralty at the end
+of 1912 as Second Sea Lord, and it was then decided to
+provide all the later ships with the arrangement. Little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span>
+progress had, however, been made when the War broke
+out, only eight battleships having been fitted.</p>
+
+<p>Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the assistance
+of Sir Percy Scott and the warm support of
+Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by which the battleships
+and battle-cruisers were supplied with this system,
+without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard
+for the purpose. The necessary instruments were manufactured
+at various contractors’ shops, and the very laborious
+task of fitting them, and the heavy electric cables,
+on board the ships was carried out by electricians sent
+to the various bases. The complicated work naturally
+took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays occurred;
+but gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy
+Scott rendering invaluable assistance at headquarters.</p>
+
+<p>As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy
+guns mounted in turrets, and by the date of the Battle
+of Jutland there were few ships that were not supplied
+with the system, although six of those last fitted had not
+had much experience with it.</p>
+
+<p>The conditions under which that action was fought
+converted any waverers at once to a firm belief in the
+Director System, and there was never afterwards any
+doubt expressed as to its great value.</p>
+
+<p>Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work,
+and the system was extended to smaller vessels. This
+had been the intention even before the action, but there
+were then still many who were unconvinced. However,
+during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was
+pressed forward, and the system became universal for all
+guns and in all classes of ships.</p>
+
+<p>The improvement in what may be termed the application
+of existing methods of fire control may now be mentioned.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span>
+Throughout the War we had gradually, as the
+result of practice, increased greatly the effective range
+at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid
+on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the
+target in order to obtain early hits. Improvement was
+perhaps most rapid in the five or six months following
+the Jutland action. In this action the Fire Control Instruments,
+as adopted in the Service, which were the outcome
+of the work of naval officers, were found to meet
+the gunnery requirements most successfully. The only
+important improvement that was made was the provision
+of additional means for keeping the observation of
+Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Various
+committees were formed immediately after the battle
+in order that full advantage might be taken at once of
+our experience. The result was the introduction of new
+rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition to greatly
+increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered
+it difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment
+by dodging tactics.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_68" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <img src="images/i_068.jpg" width="1307" height="853" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<figure id="i_68b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <img src="images/i_068b.jpg" width="1301" height="908" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>In order to cope more successfully with the latter development,
+more experiments were ordered, having as
+their object the determination of the inclination of the
+enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and various
+methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended
+to the Fleet. The most promising at the time that I
+relinquished command of the Fleet was that proposed
+by Lieutenant J.&nbsp;W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N., the range-finding
+expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this
+inclination problem for some years. A great increase
+in the rapidity with which the fall of shot were “spotted
+on” to a target resulted from all this work. It is not
+too much to say that the interval between opening fire
+and the moment at which the salvoes began to “straddle”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span>
+the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of
+fire when the enemy was “straddled” was very greatly
+increased. The new firing rules, by standardising the
+system of correcting fire, produced a marked increase
+in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two
+ships was concentrated on to one target and generally
+paved the way for the solution of many gunnery
+problems which the Fleet had previously been unable
+to solve completely.</p>
+
+<p>The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as
+a result of our experience of the German use of this device.
+Prolonged experiments were carried out at Scapa
+Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best method
+of using smoke screens, and they were also used during
+battle tactics and during range-finder exercises. The
+trials included the use of smoke shell as well as funnel
+and artificial smoke.</p>
+
+<p>In another direction efforts were made to increase
+efficiency. The Jutland battle convinced us that our armour-piercing
+shell was inferior in its penetrative power
+to that used by the Germans, and immediately
+after the action I represented this with a view to immediate
+investigation. A Committee sat to consider the
+matter. In 1917, as First Sea Lord, I appointed a second
+Committee.</p>
+
+<p>With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of
+a particular calibre as used at Jutland the shell would,
+with oblique impact at battle range, <em>break up whilst holing
+a certain thickness of plate</em>, and the shell could not,
+therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s ships. A shell
+of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee, of
+the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and
+range <em>pass whole through a plate of double the thickness</em>
+before exploding and could therefore with delay action<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span>
+fuse penetrate to the magazines of a capital ship. Had
+our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing shell
+at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being
+only damaged, would probably not have been able to
+reach port. The manufacture of these new type shells
+for the Fleet was well advanced before the end of 1917.</p>
+
+<p>The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in
+action, from ships, from destroyers, and from submarines,
+was also greatly increased. The torpedo practices at
+Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, were of
+the greatest possible use.</p>
+
+<p>The real cause underlying the improvement was the
+great keenness displayed by officers and men. Their one
+idea was to strive for the highest efficiency, and
+there was never apparent the least sign of weariness or
+staleness in repeating time after time exercises and practices
+with which they were so familiar. No tribute
+that I can pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in
+this connection could be sufficiently high. I know that
+under my successor the improvement in fighting efficiency
+continued.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel
+of the German Navy, culminating in the surrender for
+internment of the majority of their capital ships, the
+Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in action
+the methods adopted as a result of our experience
+during the first two years of war, and perfected by two
+years’ further training. Had the German fleet come out
+to battle a terrible punishment awaited it!</p>
+
+<p>Mention has been made of the development of aircraft
+during the War. The possibilities resulting from the use
+of the air for reconnaissance work, for assisting in the direction
+of gunfire, and, finally, for offensive operations,
+were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but for a considerable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span>
+period the lack of suitable machines hindered
+development. The first decisive step taken was the fitting
+out of the <i>Campania</i>, a passenger ship of the Cunard
+Line, as a sea-plane carrier to be attached to the Battle
+Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force and, later, the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller vessels,
+the <i>Vindex</i> and <i>Engadine</i>, carrying a few sea-planes.
+They had been used in operations in the Heligoland
+Bight, but without much success, owing to the difficulty
+experienced in getting sea-planes to rise from the water
+except in the finest weather.</p>
+
+<p>With the arrival of the <i>Campania</i> at Scapa, we were
+able to investigate the difficulties attending the use of aircraft
+from ships as then fitted and to indicate the direction
+in which improvement was desirable and possible. It
+was apparent that little improvement could be expected
+so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from
+the water. The first step, therefore, was to improve the
+arrangements for flying off from the deck of the
+<i>Campania</i>. The ship returned to Liverpool at the end
+of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations
+might be effected; these were not completed until
+the late spring of 1916; during the alterations, the
+<i>Campania</i> was also, at my request, fitted to carry a kite
+balloon.</p>
+
+<p>The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite
+balloons had been demonstrated during the Dardanelles
+operations, and the <i>Menelaus</i>, kite balloon ship, was sent
+to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon obvious that we
+could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a fleet
+action unless they were flown from the ships themselves,
+and experiments were carried out, under the direction of
+Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the
+4th Battle Squadron, having as their object the best<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span>
+method of fitting and using kite balloons from warships.
+Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one
+being that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand
+the tension of the balloon during strong winds. The Kite
+Balloon Section at Roehampton gradually solved the
+difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority of the
+flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided
+with kite balloons, and were experiencing their utility.
+From this beginning, great developments took place in
+providing vessels of all classes, including light cruisers,
+destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite balloons; the
+balloon was used in the case of the smaller vessels
+for anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the
+heavy ships it was used for observation and correction
+of fire.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier
+had proceeded, but not with the same rapidity. It was
+evident to me in 1916 that for anti-Zeppelin work we
+should look towards the aeroplane flying from the deck,
+rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise
+from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe
+for the step, owing to the landing difficulty, and the first
+efforts of the Royal Naval Air Service lay in the direction
+of providing a type of sea-plane that would fly well off
+the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were fairly
+successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air
+craft machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until
+the aeroplane was adopted for the work; and this took
+place in 1917, when progress became rapid, and continued
+until the end of the War.</p>
+
+<p>There remains the question of the airship, which was
+also being developed during the period 1914–16, but as
+this matter was not within the province of the Fleet, it
+is unnecessary to touch upon it here.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span></p>
+
+<h3>V.—<span class="smcap">The Blockade</span></h3>
+
+<p>The story of the development of the Grand Fleet
+would be incomplete without reference to the Blockade,
+and, in particular, to the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
+In the early days of the War, the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class—vessels
+at least twenty years old; and during August,
+1914, the Admiralty commissioned three armed merchant
+ships, the <i>Mantua</i>, <i>Alsatian</i> and <i>Oceanic</i>, to strengthen
+the squadron for blockade work; the latter ship was lost
+by shipwreck in September of that year.</p>
+
+<p>The Blockade in those early days was carried out by
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron and by the other cruiser squadrons
+attached to the Grand Fleet. During November,
+1914, the ships of the “Edgar” class were withdrawn
+owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the
+ships’ companies utilised to commission a number of additional
+armed merchant cruisers. By the end of December,
+1914, the squadron consisted of eighteen ships,
+being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships. A
+very large proportion of the officers and men of the reconstituted
+10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mercantile
+Marine.</p>
+
+<p>The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels
+called for a considerable organisation for their maintenance;
+they were based on Liverpool for all the heavy
+work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced base at
+Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland
+Islands, was gradually developed, and obstructed against
+submarine attack. The work of organisation was carried
+out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded the
+squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H.&nbsp;H. Stileman,
+the Senior Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span>
+we were much indebted for hearty co-operation and efficient
+organisation at the base.</p>
+
+<p>The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting
+and boarding all vessels bound into or out of the northern
+entrance to the North Sea, and this work could obviously
+not be carried out in the face of the German submarines
+without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was
+greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examining
+vessel was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat.
+As the number of German submarines increased, the
+squadron was necessarily withdrawn to positions further
+removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the Blockade
+line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from
+the Orkneys and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to
+Iceland, and when freedom from ice rendered passage
+round the north of Iceland possible, ships operated in that
+neighbourhood.</p>
+
+<p>A careful organisation of the movements of the ships
+was necessary to cover such an immense area of the sea,
+and to provide that all ships should, as far as possible, be
+intercepted. Even in the case of ships of such large coal
+endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not
+possible to keep much more than one-half the number in
+commission on an average on the patrol line at the same
+time. The remainder were either in port refitting and
+refueling, or were <i lang="fr">en route</i> to and from the bases. The
+distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool
+was some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in
+the passage each way.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_74" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="right"><p><i>Plan N<sup>o.</sup> 2.</i></p></div>
+
+  <img src="images/i_074.jpg" width="993" height="618" alt="">
+
+<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_074-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot short">
+
+<p>Chart showing in pecked lines the area in which
+the ships of the 10<sup>th.</sup> Cruiser Squadron usually worked
+after about the middle of the year 1915; the positions
+of the ships being constantly changed.</p>
+
+<p>Prior to this the areas were in the vicinity of A.B.C.D.G.</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run
+the gauntlet of enemy submarines, which were passing
+down the west coast of the Hebrides and Ireland, and
+as no destroyers were available with which to screen them
+against attack, the risk was considerable. They had also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span>
+to face the constant danger of mine-fields. Several ships
+of the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with
+a resultant heavy loss of life.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the boarding
+parties was very arduous. The preliminary examination
+could not be carried out without boarding,
+and the manner in which the boats of the squadron were
+handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in
+northern latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship
+of the officers and men. In this boarding work the fishermen
+of the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, hardy
+and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous
+service.</p>
+
+<p>The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually
+from its inception, as is well known, and after a time the
+percentage of vessels that evaded the ships of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron became so low as to be almost negligible.
+The procedure adopted was to send all ships,
+preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any
+suspicion, into Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where regular
+examination services were instituted. The ships were
+taken in under the supervision of an armed guard, sent
+on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards underwent
+many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their
+lives in ships which were torpedoed by German submarines,
+and in many cases, particularly in badly found sailing
+ships, they underwent great hardships. The guards
+were also the means of saving more than one such ship
+from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew
+refused to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact
+and discretion on the part of the officer in charge, usually
+a junior officer of the Royal Naval Reserve, were necessary
+in his dealings with the neutral captains. The whole
+question of the efficiency of the Blockade—as shown by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span>
+the returns furnished to me from Headquarters—was constantly
+under review by my Staff and myself.</p>
+
+<p>The fate of the detained ship was decided in London
+on receipt of the report of examination. As was perhaps
+natural, the sentence on many ships’ cargoes pronounced
+in London was not accepted without question from the
+Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with
+reference to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were naturally
+very critical of any suspicion of laxity in passing,
+into neutral countries bordering on Germany, articles
+which we suspected might find their way into Germany,
+and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the
+Admiralty, and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when
+that Ministry was established. The difficulties with which
+the Foreign Office was faced in regard to neutral susceptibilities
+were naturally not so apparent in the Fleet
+as to the authorities in London, and though many of our
+criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some
+possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were
+of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giving
+the naval point of view. The decisive effect of the
+Blockade did not become apparent until the end, when
+the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an
+influence on the result of the War this powerful weapon
+had exercised. Even those who during the War had
+been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised at the
+last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result
+of the silent pressure of Sea Power.</p>
+
+<h3>VI.—<span class="smcap">The Grand Fleet Bases</span></h3>
+
+<p>Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected
+state of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack
+in the early part of the War. The matter was one of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span>
+supreme importance, and formed the subject of very
+urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains
+were at work on the problem at the Admiralty, at the
+bases, and in the Fleet itself.</p>
+
+<p>The first step was that taken under the direction of
+Captain Donald S. Munro, the King’s Harbour Master
+at Cromarty, who devised a system of submarine
+obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep-water
+obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing
+to his energy and driving power, the entrance to
+Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by October 26th,
+1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for
+Cromarty another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R.,
+under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Lowry,
+the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of Scotland,
+suggested a method for providing an obstruction for
+the Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by
+the end of October, 1914, and was also entirely successful.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I requested
+that obstructions on similar lines should be
+fitted to the three main entrances to Scapa Flow, the
+Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to be attempted)
+being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the
+supply of the necessary material were experienced,
+and the first line of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance
+was not completed until December 29th, 1914, the first
+line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and that
+in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile officers
+and men of the Fleet had improvised obstructions,
+first at Lough Swilly and Loch na Keal, and later at
+Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough security
+against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychological
+value. These obstructions, which were kept in existence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span>
+even after the completion of the more efficient methods
+of dealing with the problem, involved much labour.</p>
+
+<p>Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disadvantages
+attendant on basing the Fleet so far north as
+Scapa Flow, were discussed between Sir Henry Jackson
+(then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that,
+with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of
+intercepting the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and
+of dealing with landing raids covered by the High Sea
+Fleet, were so considerable as to make it eminently desirable
+to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this were
+feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the
+result I suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions
+across the Firth of Forth, which would admit not only
+of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that anchorage, but
+would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being
+carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the
+Forth, so that the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its
+fighting efficiency. Many senior officers in the Grand
+Fleet were not in favour of the idea, for two reasons:
+first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy
+with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at
+Scapa; and, secondly, that practices could not be so efficiently
+carried out in the Forth. There was much weight
+in both these objections, although the difficulties of carrying
+out practices in the Forth were exaggerated; but the
+strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and
+the scheme was proceeded with as proposed.</p>
+
+<p>That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe
+carrying out of practices was completed by December,
+1916, and the whole of the new obstructions were in place
+by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is true, than the
+anticipated date. The result certainly justified the conclusion
+arrived at. When the conditions made it at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span>
+all probable that the High Sea Fleet might put to
+sea for an operation in southern waters, the Grand
+Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the undoubted
+disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by
+skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers responsible.</p>
+
+<p>The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine
+attack was only one of the many factors necessary
+for their development. In pre-War days, although it
+had been decided that the use of northern bases would
+be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the
+bases had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It
+is, perhaps, desirable to remove any misunderstanding as
+to the causes of this failure.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The decision had not long been taken, and</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) The necessary financial provision was lacking.</p>
+
+<p>Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa
+Flow was affected, and, under the second, that at Rosyth,
+where for some time progress in the development of the
+base had been arrested.</p>
+
+<p>The Admiralty had taken steps to make some preparations
+at Cromarty, in so far as the provision of gun
+defences against attack by surface vessels was concerned,
+but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a fleet beyond
+a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one
+of the floating docks at southern yards.</p>
+
+<p>In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted
+our Fleet to the north, all the conveniences for the maintenance
+of that fleet were still in the Channel ports. The
+first step was the transference of the large floating dock
+from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth,
+together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were
+housed in a merchant ship captured from the Germans.
+Workshops were fitted up on shore under the energetic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span>
+superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund R. Pears and
+his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with
+great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invaluable
+to the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Invergordon gradually developed into a great repairing
+base. A second and smaller floating dock was purchased
+early in 1916 at my request and placed there, and
+by the middle of that year the base had attained large
+proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapidity
+and success, including the repairs of battleships
+after the Jutland battle, and the great extension in
+armoured-deck protection fitted to ships after the same
+action.</p>
+
+<p>Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at
+Invergordon since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow
+the same possibilities as a repairing base did not exist,
+although a floating dock for destroyers, for which many
+requests had been made, was eventually obtained and
+placed there.</p>
+
+<p>But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all
+knowledge in other directions. In August, 1914, the
+base organisation consisted only of the seagoing Fleet repair
+ships <i>Cyclops</i> and <i>Assistance</i>. At an early stage the
+<i>Cyclops</i> was connected to a shore telegraph cable off the
+village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a
+floating post office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a
+few drifters) which were first requisitioned. Rear-Admiral
+Francis S. Miller was appointed to her as the Senior
+Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which the great
+demands on her accommodation were met was a standing
+wonder to me. In the early part of the War, officers on
+Admiral Miller’s staff and others were obliged to make
+their sleeping berths, as best they could, on the deck or
+on top of their writing-tables, and it was surprising that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span>
+the overcrowding in all directions did not affect health.
+But the work went on very successfully in the most inconvenient
+circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing
+to the weather conditions, to move the base organisations
+from the north to the south-west side of Scapa Flow.
+The anchorage at Long Hope was selected, whilst the
+Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta,
+and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store
+ships, and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope
+and Hoy Sound. Prior to this, the importance of the
+organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands had increased
+to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment
+of a Senior Flag Officer in general command
+of the whole district, and of the defences in particular.</p>
+
+<p>So much of my time was being occupied in deciding
+and pressing forward the work of organisation of the base
+and its obstructions and defences, in dealing with the
+numerous questions relating to the patrol of the coast by
+coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant
+ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding such
+vessels, in considering questions affecting the occupation
+of land for the erection of defences, in the requisitioning
+of trawlers and drifters, etc., that it was becoming
+difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet work
+proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who suggested
+that he should waive his seniority in order to serve
+as my junior officer, was appointed Vice-Admiral Commanding
+the Orkneys and Shetlands. This left Rear-Admiral
+Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly
+heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of
+a mass of work outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest
+possible benefit in every way. Under Sir Stanley Colville’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span>
+most able direction, the completion of the organisation
+for the general defences of the Islands, the work
+of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of
+submarine obstructions was effected, and the work pushed
+forward. Captain Stanley Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of
+very wide experience, was appointed to superintend the
+work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under
+his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties
+due to bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to
+Scapa Flow were either blocked by sunken ships or obstructed
+by nets, mines, and other devices.</p>
+
+<p>The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning
+of the War consisted of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns
+landed from the Fleet, were gradually reinforced by four-inch
+and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the whole
+being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.-Colonel
+Gerald N.&nbsp;A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was
+housed in huts, erected temporarily for the purpose,
+and although with the handiness which characterises
+a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the
+officers and men eventually made themselves comfortable
+even under such weather conditions as are experienced at
+Scapa Flow, they endured a very considerable amount of
+hardship in the early days with their accustomed cheerfulness.</p>
+
+<p>And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and
+staying qualities of the crews of the trawlers that supported
+the submarine obstructions, particularly those at
+Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in positions in
+which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly
+and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a
+few yards of a rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them
+and bringing on board tons of water. The skippers knew
+that they had to stick it out for the sake of the safety of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span>
+the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and
+under these conditions they did their duty in a manner
+which calls for the highest praise.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile the development of the base proper proceeded
+apace. One of the earlier arrivals was the old
+cruiser <i>Impérieuse</i>, which was used as a post office, depot,
+and general overflow ship to the <i>Cyclops</i>. The number of
+trawlers and drifters, which had their home at
+Scapa Flow and which were engaged on patrol or mine-sweeping
+work, attendance on the Fleet, garrison, or on
+the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased with great rapidity
+during the winter of 1914–15; on September 1st, 1914,
+the number was <i lang="la">nil</i>, and it reached a total of some four
+yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by
+the summer of 1915. These vessels all looked to the
+<i>Cyclops</i>, <i>Assistance</i> and <i>Impérieuse</i> for refit, pay, food,
+and for every conceivable want. Gradually the number of
+base ships was increased, culminating in the arrival of
+the old battleship <i>Victorious</i> about March 6, 1916, as the
+“home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the
+Fleet, fitting the Director System, increasing the protection
+to decks and magazines, carrying out minor
+repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent
+tasks.</p>
+
+<p>Mention has been made of the large number of colliers,
+oilers, store ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used
+by the Fleet. At one time this caused some criticism,
+based principally on the time spent by the colliers at the
+Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the
+necessity for this. There were no facilities at the base
+for the storage of coal, either in lighters or on shore.
+Consequently, the whole of the coal required at the base
+was necessarily kept on board the colliers. The actual
+number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span>
+at the base during the first two years of war was
+determined by the necessity for coaling the Fleet and
+getting it to sea again with the utmost possible rapidity.
+We could not contemplate such a situation as the Fleet
+arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing
+owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of information
+being received simultaneously that the High
+Sea Fleet was at sea and covering a landing raid on our
+coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital importance to
+the Empire.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I
+gave the number necessary to enable almost the whole
+Fleet to be fuelled simultaneously; in other words,
+the number of colliers was dependent on the number of
+coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction
+was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some
+ships requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of
+two such ships using one collier in succession; but,
+broadly speaking, the requirements were as stated.
+When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum,
+they return to Cardiff to refill to economise tonnage.</p>
+
+<p>At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of
+coal by rail to Grangemouth and its transshipment to
+colliers there. As we needed colliers as coal-storing ships,
+so also we required ammunition ships to carry a proportion
+of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There
+were no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on
+shore. The number of ships required for this service was,
+however, much smaller.</p>
+
+<p>Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great advantage
+over shore storage; should strategic conditions
+necessitate a change of base, the coal, ammunition and
+other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span>
+same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating
+docks.</p>
+
+<p>A consideration of all these facts connected with the
+development of fleet bases will show that this question
+necessarily required a good deal of attention on the part
+of my Staff and myself, and was incidental to the development
+of the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<h3>VII.—<span class="smcap">The Personnel and its Welfare</span></h3>
+
+<p>Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by
+no means the least important, was that of the moral and
+spirit of the personnel. It is, of course, impossible to
+exaggerate the importance of this question as an element
+in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of
+war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours
+spent in harbour were fully occupied in coaling and storing
+the ships; but these conditions could not be continued
+indefinitely. As the months passed with no sign of enemy
+vessels at sea and time in harbour increased as compared
+to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find
+some diversion for the minds of the officers and men.</p>
+
+<p>The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out
+under the superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis
+Bayly, then commanding the 1st Battle Squadron.
+Always alive to the necessity for providing occupation,
+recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started
+considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a
+divergent nature as batteries for the defence of the submarine
+obstructions then in progress, football grounds
+for the men, a golf course for the officers, and landing
+piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventually
+divided out amongst the various squadrons. A rifle
+and pistol range were also constructed, and several piers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span>
+built. The whole of the work was carried out, I may
+add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen” ship,
+the s.s. <i>Ghourko</i>, was fitted up by the Junior Army and
+Navy Stores, and this vessel played an important part
+in the harbour life of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores
+and provisions of all sorts, available for use by all ships,
+but particularly of the smaller vessels which could not
+send their mess stewards far afield in search of a change
+of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical
+and cinema entertainments took place on board frequently.
+She was also fitted with a boxing ring, and
+squadron boxing competitions were held on board with
+great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures
+of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catholics
+and Nonconformists.</p>
+
+<p>The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost.
+Officers lectured on board their ships to the ships’ companies
+on every subject, the War included, and much
+good resulted.</p>
+
+<p>Education was freely developed. The Admiralty
+provided, at my request, schoolmasters in large numbers,
+and classes for the boys and voluntary classes for the men
+in the evenings in harbour were very well attended.</p>
+
+<p>And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to
+the utmost extent possible. This took the form principally
+of football, rowing regattas, athletic sports and boxing.
+The keenness displayed in all these sports was a
+certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign
+of staleness.</p>
+
+<p>The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over
+periods of tedium and weariness, which are most calculated
+to undermine discipline. Occupation and interest
+are the surest antidotes to discontent and unrest, and
+never during the first two and a half years did I see signs<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span>
+of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thoroughly
+happy and contented, treated the War as being
+in the day’s work, and looked forward eagerly to the day
+on which their enemy would give them the opportunity
+for which they were waiting, and for which they kept
+themselves thoroughly efficient and fit.</p>
+
+<p>In those days the officers got to know the men even
+better than they had done before, and the spirit of comradeship
+between all ranks became correspondingly closer.
+Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have desired
+to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than
+that which animated the officers and men of the Grand
+Fleet.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV"><span id="toclink_88"></span>CHAPTER IV<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">DECLARATION OF WAR</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">At</span> 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet proceeded
+to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders. The
+ships accompanying the Fleet-Flagship <i>Iron Duke</i> were
+the vessels of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+the light cruisers <i>Southampton</i>, <i>Birmingham</i>, <i>Boadicea</i>,
+<i>Blonde</i> and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla; the cruisers
+<i>Shannon</i>, <i>Natal</i> and <i>Roxburgh</i>, and the light cruisers
+<i>Nottingham</i>, <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>, which were at
+Rosyth with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to
+meet the Fleet at a rendezvous in Lat. 58.40 N., Long.
+1.30 E. The light cruisers <i>Bellona</i> and <i>Blanche</i> were left
+behind to coal.</p>
+
+<p>A report received from the Admiralty that three German
+transports had passed the Great Belt on the evening
+of August 1st had led to the 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
+with the cruisers <i>Cochrane</i> and <i>Achilles</i>, and the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the
+evening of August 3d to cruise to the southward of the
+Fair Island Channel during the night.</p>
+
+<p>The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep
+east as far as Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers
+to carry out a wide sweep to the southward and south-westward.
+These orders were in conformity with the
+general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for
+the Grand Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at
+establishing a blockade; at preventing the enemy forces
+from getting into the Atlantic to interfere with the operations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span>
+of our cruisers engaged in protecting our own trade
+as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and
+at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to
+the enemy. Pursuant to these orders, the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed
+to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61 N., working
+eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriving
+there at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, thence to sweep to the S.E. until
+5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 5th, when they were on a line drawn
+S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat. 59.25 N. with the
+eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The <i>Antrim</i> and
+<i>Argyll</i>, being short of fuel, were detached during the
+evening of August 4th to coal at Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the
+cruisers and light cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla
+was detached to Rosyth to fuel. This first sweep was
+begun in northern waters because the North Sea is
+narrower at this point, and also because it afforded opportunity
+of intercepting vessels which might have left
+German ports two days previously in anticipation of
+hostilities. The cruiser sweep was supported by the
+Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E., turning
+at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 5th to the westward.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled
+to leave Scapa 30 per cent. short of fuel owing to the
+paucity of colliers, was detached to that base at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+on the 4th, to complete with coal.</p>
+
+<p>During the night information was received by wireless
+telegraphy that war had been declared against Germany
+at midnight, 4th–5th August, and the following gracious
+message was received from His Majesty the King and was
+communicated to the Fleet:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span></p><div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“At this grave moment in our National History, I
+send to you and through you to the officers and men of
+the Fleet of which you have assumed command, the
+assurance of my confidence that under your direction they
+will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy,
+and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her
+Empire in the hour of trial.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised
+to the northward of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with
+Admiralty telegraphic orders; the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as four
+light cruisers and the <i>Lowestoft</i>, and the 4th Flotilla was
+sent to Invergordon for a similar purpose. In the afternoon,
+the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the cruiser <i>Devonshire</i>,
+as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, were
+detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet
+turned to the southward at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 6th to meet the
+3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat.
+59 N., Long. 1.0 E.</p>
+
+<p>During August 6th the following reports were received:</p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) Two German cruisers were reported passing
+Trondhjem going north. (This came from the Admiralty.)</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north-west
+end of the Shetlands going north. (This was a local
+report.)</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) The German liner <i>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</i> was
+stated to have passed through the Stronsay Firth, Orkneys,
+bound east, during the night of the 5th–6th. (Local
+report.)</p>
+
+<p>The destroyer <i>Oak</i> was despatched to search the
+vicinity of the Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained
+no confirmation of the report.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) It was reported that the Germans had established<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span>
+a base in Lat. 62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact
+position unknown).</p>
+
+<p>A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in
+confirmation of the last report, but a British trawler
+reported that a large number of German merchant ships
+had assembled in the West Fiord and in the harbours of
+the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Norway. Reports
+as to the Germans having established a base on the Norwegian
+coast were very persistent during the early days
+of the War. These reports were probably to some extent
+due to the ideas prevailing before the War as to German
+intentions in this respect, these views being naturally
+coloured by the frequent visits of the German High Sea
+Fleet in peace time to Norwegian waters, particularly
+to the vicinity of Trondhjem.</p>
+
+<p>In 1911, when I commanded the Atlantic Fleet, arrangements
+had been made for me to visit Norwegian
+ports at the same time as the High Sea Fleet, in order
+to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with,
+it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis
+intervened, and the visit was postponed. The meeting
+took place in 1914, when a portion of the 2nd Battle
+Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir
+George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week,
+very shortly before the outbreak of war.</p>
+
+<p>During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet cruised between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and
+Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the eastward between
+Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward along
+the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa
+Flow, the 3rd Battle Squadron being detached to the
+N.E. to cover them. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after refuelling; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span>
+2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the
+north-eastward; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with
+orders to search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for submarines
+prior to the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at
+6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 7th to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron arrived at 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and
+during the day the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd
+Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian
+coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+and 3rd Battle Squadron. No sign of a German base
+could be discovered, and the force was ordered back to
+Scapa to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed,
+owing to the inadequate number of colliers, many of those
+present being also unsuitable for the work of rapid coaling.
+The lack of lubricating oil for the 3rd Battle
+Squadron also caused trouble, but these early difficulties,
+although a source of considerable anxiety at the commencement
+of hostilities, were overcome later.</p>
+
+<p>The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was
+the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was
+open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the
+Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be
+afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off
+the various entrances and to patrol outside the main
+entrance; but these measures were no real defence
+against submarines, and the position was such that it was
+deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour
+longer than was absolutely necessary for fuelling purposes.
+Accordingly, at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the same day, the
+Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened
+through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark
+by the 4th Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span>
+round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to
+provide some protection against destroyer attack, a request
+was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two
+of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the
+main entrances. This measure was approved and a reply
+was received that the <i>Hannibal</i> and <i>Magnificent</i> were
+being despatched.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Russell</i>, <i>Albemarle</i> and <i>Exmouth</i>, of the 6th
+Battle Squadron, belonging originally to the Channel
+Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the Grand Fleet on the
+night of the 7th–8th.</p>
+
+<p>At 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 8th the battleships <i>Orion</i>, <i>Monarch</i>
+and <i>Ajax</i> were detached to carry out target practice, and
+the remainder of the Fleet proceeded to the south-eastward
+from Fair Island, carrying out Fire Control Exercises;
+but, on receipt of a report from the <i>Monarch</i> that
+a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the practice
+was stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the
+2nd Flotilla being directed to search for the submarine.
+At 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the officer of the watch on board the <i>Iron
+Duke</i> sighted a periscope and altered course to ram; the
+same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the
+<i>Dreadnought</i>, but was not seen again.</p>
+
+<p>At 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N.,
+Long. 1.9 E.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly afterwards the <i>Orion</i> reported a strong smell
+of oil, and bubbles were seen on the surface, and the
+<i>Birmingham</i>, commanded by Captain A.&nbsp;M. Duff, of
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screening
+ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron,
+claimed to have rammed and sunk the German submarine
+U 15, which she had sighted on the surface. This initial
+success was hailed with great satisfaction in the Fleet.
+Subsequent information showed that the <i>Birmingham</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span>
+had been handled with great promptitude. During daylight
+of August 9th, the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron were cruising in company, the noon position
+being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and as the presence
+of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was constantly
+zigzagging, the ships altering course by “Blue
+Pendant” turns, that is, turning together by signal.</p>
+
+<p>At midnight, 9th–10th, the position of the <i>Iron Duke</i>
+was Lat. 57.51 N., Long. 1.2 E.</p>
+
+<p>On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty
+requesting that the movements of the Commodore (T)
+and Commodore (S) might be directed from the Admiralty,
+whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet
+remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be
+sufficiently conversant with the conditions in the south for
+the Commander-in-Chief to control these movements.
+This plan was adopted and continued throughout the War.</p>
+
+<p>On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as
+follows:</p>
+
+<p>At 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> parted company from the
+Fleet and proceeded to Scapa in order that the Commander-in-Chief
+might communicate by land wire with
+the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the
+work at the fleet bases. The <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron, and the <i>Falmouth</i>, <i>Liverpool</i> and
+<i>Bellona</i>, arrived at Scapa at 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the 2nd Flotilla
+forming a submarine screen through the Pentland Firth.</p>
+
+<p>The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north
+under the command of Sir George Warrender to a position
+to the westward of the Shetlands, in accordance with
+telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty, where
+it was considered that the submarine danger in the
+North Sea was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron was detached to sweep a wide area to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span>
+northward and westward in advance of the Battle Fleet,
+which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north as
+Lat. 60 N.; this flotilla was then detached for operations
+on the Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
+The latter force was directed to search for a suspected
+German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavanger Fiord.
+The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the
+operation of endeavouring to locate this base—if it
+existed—with due regard to the susceptibilities of the
+Norwegians. Commodore W.&nbsp;E. Goodenough, commanding
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stavanger
+in the <i>Southampton</i> and was assured by the
+Norwegian authorities that no base had been formed in
+that vicinity by the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the <i>Falmouth</i> left
+Scapa at 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron, the <i>Hannibal</i> and <i>Magnificent</i> having
+arrived at Scapa at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> These two battleships were
+stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to Scapa
+Flow against attack by destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>Rear-Admiral Miller, who arrived in the <i>Hannibal</i>,
+was placed in administrative charge of the base and of the
+local defences, and arrangements were made for the local
+Territorial Force and other inhabitants of the Orkneys
+and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch the harbours.
+Telephonic communication round the coast was established
+by degrees.</p>
+
+<p>Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen
+over the Orkneys on the evening of the 10th, and the
+<i>Centurion</i> reported having sighted an airship north of the
+Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence was attached
+to these reports, which in the early days of the War
+were very frequently received.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span></p>
+
+<p><i>August 11th.</i>—The <i>Iron Duke</i> left Scapa and rejoined
+the Battle Fleet at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in Lat. 60.8 N., Long.
+3.28 W. The Battle Fleet was then exercised in forming
+line of battle, and also carried out sub-calibre gun practice.
+The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after completing
+its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa
+to fuel at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Flotilla, having completed
+their examination of the Norwegian coast, returned, some
+to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30
+miles from Kinnaird Head. The <i>Drake</i>, flying the Flag
+of Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;L. Grant, which had joined the
+Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the
+Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old
+cruisers of the “Edgar” class, had by this time been
+established on a northern patrol area between the Shetlands
+and the Norwegian coast, under the command of
+Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair.</p>
+
+<p>On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe,
+on the north-west coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling
+base for the Fleet, and Rear-Admiral Richard P.&nbsp;F.
+Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the base.</p>
+
+<p>A week of war had now elapsed without any move
+whatever being made on the part of the High Sea Fleet;
+the only German naval activities had been mine-laying in
+southern waters during the first two days of the War,
+together with some submarine activity in the North Sea.
+The British Fleet during the week had been largely occupied
+in boarding all merchant vessels sighted, and in instituting
+as strict a blockade as was possible.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_96" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 26em;">
+  <img src="images/i_096.jpg" width="1220" height="1933" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL HALSEY),
+AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT),
+ON BOARD H.&nbsp;M.&nbsp;S. “IRON DUKE”</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><i>August 12th.</i>—The Battle Fleet to the westward of the
+Orkneys (noon position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.)<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span>
+was exercised during the forenoon and afternoon at
+battle tactics and carried out gunnery practices between 4
+and 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to fuel,
+arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the
+3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal,
+and to test the suitability of this base and its capability
+for defence against submarine attack.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been
+fuelling at Scapa, left before dark on the 12th to cruise
+west of the Orkneys with orders to economise fuel in
+view of a projected operation to the southward.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the <i>Falmouth</i> swept
+100 miles to the south-eastward from Kinnaird Head
+during the day, and then returned to Cromarty to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Bellona</i> and <i>Liverpool</i> swept to the south-eastward
+of the Pentland Firth during the day and night of
+the 12th, together with one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as
+a guard against destroyer attack on the Fleet whilst coaling.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern
+patrol. A report was received from Rear-Admiral Grant,
+in the <i>Drake</i>, that the position in the Faroe Islands was
+quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed. The <i>Drake</i>
+remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe
+Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
+sent to assist her in her work of blockade.</p>
+
+<p>Rear-Admiral E.&nbsp;R. Pears was on this date appointed
+in charge of the Fleet Base at Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer
+from Hamburg had arrived in England and reported that
+there were fourteen enemy battleships at Cuxhaven on
+the 9th inst., together with several mine-layers; that
+there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and Heligoland,
+and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">98</span>
+entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite
+news of the enemy’s main fleet.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 13th.</i>—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was
+coaling at Scapa during the day, and the 3rd Battle
+Squadron coaling and storing at Loch Ewe. My object
+in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry
+into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with
+a second base in the event of Scapa Flow becoming
+untenable by submarine attack.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Albemarle</i> relieved the <i>Liverpool</i> and <i>Bellona</i> on
+patrol to the eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these
+two ships returning to Scapa to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of
+the Orkneys; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coaling;
+the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at sea sweeping to the
+south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The <i>Falmouth</i>
+was now attached to this squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the <i>Drake</i> were on
+the northern and Faroe patrols. During the day the
+Commander-in-Chief held a conference with the Flag
+officers of the Fleet and explained the operations contemplated
+on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the
+Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the westward,
+except two ships which had not finished coaling,
+the operation having been again delayed owing to an
+insufficient number of colliers being provided. They followed
+later.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Ajax</i> reported a turret defective, and was sent
+back to effect repairs with the aid of the <i>Cyclops</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 14th.</i>—During the forenoon the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet and battle cruisers were carrying out target
+practice. Noon position of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, Lat. 59.11 N.,
+Long. 4.27 W.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span></p>
+
+<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd
+Battle Squadron from Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squadron,
+rejoined the Flag, and battle exercises, including deployments,
+were carried out till 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair
+Island Channel on its way to carry out a sweep in the
+North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>During the night of the 14th–15th all squadrons were
+moving towards a concentration rendezvous in the North
+Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons being
+Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the
+15th; the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was
+Lat. 59.7 N., Long. 0.40 W., at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the 15th; for the
+mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 3.45 E., at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron from
+the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 15th.</p>
+
+<p>Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a
+usually reliable source had been received at the Admiralty
+indicating that the Germans intended carrying out a very
+extensive mine-laying policy in British waters in the event
+of war between the two countries. The actual positions of
+many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it was
+apparent, provided the information were correct, that
+the enemy intended to lay mines regardless of their effect
+on mercantile traffic, whether British, Allied, or neutral.</p>
+
+<p>The proceedings of the mine-layer <i>Köningen Louise</i>
+in the first days of war tended to confirm this view, and
+consequently it was thought to be quite probable that
+mine-fields of an extensive character might be laid in the
+North Sea, in positions where they might be expected
+to be effective against any movement of our Fleet, particularly
+any southward movement.</p>
+
+<p>The small margin of superiority which we possessed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span>
+over the German fleet, as compared with the immense
+difference in our naval responsibilities, made it very necessary
+that precautions should be taken to safeguard the
+most valuable of our ships from such a menace when operating
+in waters that might be mined.</p>
+
+<p>It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers
+accompanied the Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, although
+the speed of the Fleet was necessarily reduced by
+their presence in order to admit of sweeping operations,
+and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased,
+and although the sweeping operations could only be carried
+out in an exploratory fashion, there <em>was</em> the chance
+that the danger incurred by taking the whole Fleet over
+possible mine-fields might be much reduced.</p>
+
+<p>Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers
+to sea as their presence was more necessary in the vicinity
+of the bases, the practice was introduced of placing one of
+the older battleships of the 6th Battle Squadron ahead of
+each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in order that
+these less valuable ships might first discover the mines
+instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and
+men of the 6th Battle Squadron named their Squadron
+the “Mine Bumping Squadron” on this account.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 15th.</i>—At noon the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position was
+Lat. 58.16 N., Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in
+company in cruising order and steering to the eastward,
+preparatory to turning south. The plan of operations
+included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by
+cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, together
+with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two
+of our submarines had been ordered to be off the Ems
+and two off the Jade by 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 16th.</p>
+
+<p>During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes
+arrived at Scapa for reconnaissance work from the base.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span></p>
+
+<p><i>August 16th.</i>—At 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> was in Lat.
+56.43 N., Long. 4.5 E. At 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, no report having been
+received of the sighting of any German vessels, the
+Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to continue the
+sweep until 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> At this time the Fleet-flagship
+<i>Iron Duke’s</i> position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E.,
+the battle cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of
+the Battle Fleet. The only enemy vessel seen was one
+submarine by the <i>New Zealand</i> at 10.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> in Lat.
+55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E.</p>
+
+<p>The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at
+9.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the cruisers being then well to the southward
+of the latitude of the Horn Reef, the whole Fleet turned
+to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a north by west
+course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging.</p>
+
+<p>Rear-Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron,
+reported that the sweep of the southern force had been
+unproductive.</p>
+
+<p>The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for
+a northerly sweep, spreading from the Norwegian coast,
+for a distance of 150 miles, to the westward, with the
+Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron
+swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along
+that coast as far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird
+Head, with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron prolonging
+and supporting. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron extended the
+front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle
+Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of
+the Battle Fleet until dusk, and then was stationed 12
+miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, spread 10 miles
+apart, covered the area between the Battle Fleet and the
+2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas remained
+with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span>
+screen by day, and keeping in rear of the Fleet at night.</p>
+
+<p>The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the
+Battle Fleet when on the southerly course, acted as a
+submarine screen during the passage to the northward.
+During the night of the 16th–17th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron to Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern
+patrol, and the 6th Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla
+mine-sweepers and 3rd Battle Squadron proceeded to
+Scapa to fuel.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 17th.</i>—At 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet altered course to pass through the Fair Island
+Channel, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined.
+The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed astern during
+the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at daylight.
+The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout
+daylight.</p>
+
+<p>At noon the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position was Lat. 58.59
+N., Long. 1.35 E. At midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long.
+2.25 W., and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the 18th, Lat. 58.44 N., Long.
+4.47 W.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep
+sighted only neutral vessels and proceeded to work in an
+area designated as No. 5 (eastward from Kinnaird Head).
+Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E.</p>
+
+<p>This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach
+to the Pentland Firth, both for blockade purposes and as
+an outpost position for the Fleet at Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>At this time, the northern and central parts of the
+North Sea were divided into certain numbered areas in
+which cruisers could be directed by wireless to work without
+the necessity of making a long signal.</p>
+
+<p>The various areas were approximately placed as
+follows:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang6">
+
+<p>Area No. 1.—Covering the route round the north end of the Shetland
+Islands from the southward and eastward.</p>
+
+<p>Area No. 2.—Covering the Fair Island Channel to south-eastward,
+working down to the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire.</p>
+
+<p>Area No. 3.—South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys to
+Lat. of Kinnaird Head, with a width of about 50 miles
+from the line Noss Head—Kinnaird Head.</p>
+
+<p>Area No. 4.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire
+Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from
+Kinnaird Head.</p>
+
+<p>Area No. 5.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire
+Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian
+territorial waters.</p>
+
+<p>Area No. 6.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire
+Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from
+Kinnaird Head.</p>
+
+<p>Area No. 7.—Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between 50 and
+150 miles from the English coast.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to
+resume the northern patrol; the <i>Drake</i>, and the two ships
+acting with her, were ordered to return to Scapa to coal,
+and directions were given for the other two ships to rejoin
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the
+day the <i>Orion</i> developed serious condenser defects, necessitating
+retubing her condensers. A telegram was sent
+to the Admiralty requesting that new condenser tubes
+might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with dockyard
+workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile
+arrangements were made for giving fleet assistance to the
+<i>Orion</i>, and for all suitable spare condenser tubes from
+the fleet to be sent to her on arrival.</p>
+
+<p>The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet
+had by this time become very serious, and was causing
+me much anxiety; in reply to strong representations to
+the Admiralty, a telegram was received explaining the
+position and the efforts being made to rectify matters.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span></p>
+
+<p>The Admiralty also informed me of the great importance
+that was attached to the efficiency of the northern
+patrol, and stated that four armed merchant ships were
+being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The constant sea work had by this time shown the
+inadequacy of the engine-room implements of all ships
+for war conditions, and, in consequence of representations
+to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen were sent to
+Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The
+benefit derived from this measure was very considerable.</p>
+
+<p>Two Fleet messenger vessels, the <i>Cambria</i> and <i>Anglia</i>,
+arrived at Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for
+communication between the bases, for carrying mails and
+despatches, and for boarding duties.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 18th.</i>—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet
+arrived at Loch Ewe to fuel early in the afternoon; it was
+accompanied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron which was
+without the <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>. The attached
+cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending
+the entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were
+capable of doing it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet
+patrolled the entrance.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached
+to Scapa at daylight to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron had been by this time established at
+Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the ships
+when proceeding to fuel. The <i>Alsatian</i>, an armed merchant
+ship, joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Assistance</i> arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair
+ship, and was connected to the shore telegraph system.</p>
+
+<p>Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west
+of the Shetlands, during the night of the 18th–19th. Enquiry
+showed this rumour to be false.</p>
+
+<p>The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear-Admiral<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span>
+Arthur Christian, with his Flag in the <i>Sapphire</i>,
+had been placed in command of all forces in the southern
+portion of the North Sea, namely, Cruiser force C, the
+destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained,
+these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and
+were independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag.</p>
+
+<p>This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss
+of the <i>Cressy</i>, <i>Aboukir</i> and <i>Hogue</i>, Cruiser force C being
+abolished, and the command of the destroyer and submarine
+forces reverting to their own senior officers.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 19th, 21st, 22nd.</i>—The Battle Fleet and 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron remained in harbour during the
+19th, coaling, storing, cleaning boilers, and taking in additional
+ammunition up to a maximum storage. With the
+exception of the <i>Orion</i>, these ships left on the 20th at 6.30
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and
+Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the
+21st. The battle cruiser <i>New Zealand</i> was ordered to the
+Humber to join the <i>Invincible</i>.</p>
+
+<p>As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our
+submarines in the Heligoland Bight were being followed
+and watched by German trawlers fitted with wireless, I
+informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat such
+vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and
+3rd Cruiser Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol
+Area 1 alternately, and to carry out target practice in the
+Cromarty Firth, <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the patrol area.</p>
+
+<p>The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was interfered
+with by fog and the Fleet did not form up until late
+at night, and passed through the Fair Island Channel into
+the North Sea during the early morning of the 22nd.
+The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics
+during the day, and in the afternoon was joined by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span>
+2nd Flotilla as a submarine screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long.
+1.30 E. The position of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at midnight,
+22nd–23rd, was Lat. 59.34 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to
+southward.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been
+detained at Scapa by fog during the 21st, carried out
+target practice to the westward of the Orkneys on the
+22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15 N.,
+Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now
+comprising the <i>Drake</i> and <i>King Alfred</i>, which were
+ordered to work between Scotland and Norway in areas
+to the southward of the position named.</p>
+
+<p>There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted
+except one submarine in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E.,
+on August 20th. The Admiralty informed me on this
+date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for
+Cromarty northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided
+on before the War. It was, therefore, suggested that one
+of the boy artificers’ floating workshops should be sent
+north to work in conjunction with the dock. Steps were
+taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost
+on passage in bad weather near Portland.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 23rd.</i>—The Battle Fleet remained cruising in
+the North Sea in support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the
+weather being misty, with rain. The 3rd Battle Squadron
+was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at daylight, the
+24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron, were sweeping to the southward as far south as
+Lat. 56 N.; the <i>Alsatian</i> was sent with the 6th Cruiser
+Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point, on the southern
+coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships,
+trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span>
+waters at this point, and, if so, to capture them. One-half
+of the 2nd Flotilla was screening the Battle Fleet,
+the second half searching for a submarine reported east
+of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the <i>Ruby</i>
+of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and
+course altered to avoid her.</p>
+
+<p>The destroyers <i>Rifleman</i> and <i>Comet</i> collided in a fog,
+the latter being considerably damaged.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Sappho</i> was sent to search North Rona Island, a
+statement having been received indicating that it might
+possibly have been used by the enemy as a base for aircraft.
+She reported, after examination, that the island
+was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Ajax</i> reported having burnt out a boiler, and the
+Admiralty was asked to instruct the contractors to send
+to Scapa men and tubes for retubing it.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>King Edward VII.</i> reported cracks in the inner
+A tubes of two of her 12-inch guns.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 24th.</i>—The Battle Fleet cruised between the
+Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, and carried out battle
+tactics during the forenoon, the weather becoming too
+thick in the afternoon.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to
+fuel, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter
+being relieved by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. The remainder
+of the cruisers continued their sweeping operations
+as on the 23rd.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 25th.</i>—The 3rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to
+relieve the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate support
+of the cruisers at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and while <i lang="fr">en route</i> to its
+position captured an Austrian steamer, the <i>Attila</i>. The
+remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground,
+arriving at Scapa at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 26th, with the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron to fuel. The <i>Agincourt</i>, a new<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span>
+battleship which was bought from Turkey when still in
+an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head and entered
+with the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a submarine was sighted from the bridge
+of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and the Fleet manœuvred clear of the
+position. One-half of the 4th Flotilla, which had screened
+the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea, joined the Commander-in-Chief
+at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and was ordered to search for this
+submarine, but without result. The <i>Drake</i>, of the 6th
+Cruiser Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at
+4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the 25th, owing to condenser trouble.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Dominion</i> reported two of her 12-inch guns
+cracked. The <i>King Edward VII</i>. left Scapa for Devonport
+to change her two guns, which had also cracked,
+Vice-Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship
+<i>Dominion</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The weather was thick during the night of the 25th–26th,
+but the fog lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet
+to enter Scapa.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 26th.</i>—The <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 2nd and 4th Battle
+Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla,
+were at Scapa fuelling.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th
+Flotilla, left to join the 3rd Battle Squadron at sea, their
+departure having been delayed for some hours by thick fog.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> for
+Rosyth to coal.</p>
+
+<p>The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to coal,
+the <i>King Alfred</i> at Scapa, and the <i>Alsatian</i> at Liverpool;
+the arrangements in the large merchant-ships were such
+as to render coaling from colliers a difficult and slow
+progress.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the <i>Mantua</i>, left
+the northern patrol to coal at Scapa.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span></p>
+
+<p>During the day the Admiralty informed me of some
+operations which the southern forces were intended to
+carry out in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th, and directed
+that the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron should join in
+the operations. I made urgent representations as to the
+necessity of supporting the force with battle cruisers, and
+informed the Admiralty that I was sending the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron to take part. I requested that the
+Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Commodore,
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed
+direct by the Admiralty of the positions which the other
+ships would occupy, and that the senior officers of the
+southern force taking part should also be informed of
+the presence of the battle cruisers and 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived
+to join the Fleet, experience having shown that the number
+of deck complements, as well as the engine-room
+complements, required increasing, principally owing to
+the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so constantly
+manned at sea—by day against submarine attack,
+and by night against destroyer attack.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 27th.</i>—On this date I wired to the Admiralty
+proposing the erection of two wireless stations in the
+Orkneys for local communication, and a directional station
+to assist in locating the positions of German ships
+using wireless. The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded
+to sea at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to join the 1st and 3rd Battle
+Squadrons at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 28th to the south-eastward of
+the Orkneys in Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd
+Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as a submarine screen.</p>
+
+<p>On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the
+Pentland Firth was inaugurated by the Mine-laying
+Squadron which was not required at the time for mine-laying<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span>
+operations, with the object of ensuring a closer
+watch on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland
+Firth, and the <i>Oceanic</i>, an armed merchant cruiser, which
+had joined the Fleet, was detached to carry out a patrol to
+the westward of the Fair Island Channel in order to control
+the traffic at this point.</p>
+
+<p>Information was received from the Admiralty of the
+existence of mined areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head
+and Tynemouth. The positions of the two latter minefields
+appeared to corroborate the information obtained
+prior to the outbreak of war.</p>
+
+<p>A collision occurred at 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> between the <i>Bellerophon</i>
+and the s.s. <i>St. Clair</i>, which was passing through
+the Fleet. The <i>St. Clair</i> was damaged, but the damage
+to the <i>Bellerophon</i> was not serious.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 28th.</i>—The weather was misty with a visibility
+of 4 to 6 miles until the evening, when it cleared slightly.
+The Battle Fleet during the day proceeded to the southward,
+the noon position being Lat. 58.19 N., Long. 0.21
+E., with cruisers in advance.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tactics.
+The sweep of light forces into the Heligoland Bight
+which took place at dawn was successful in bringing enemy
+light forces to action. The official despatches relating to
+this operation are given in an Appendix. The events may
+be shortly described here. At 6.53 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore
+Tyrwhitt, commanding the Harwich force, which had
+swept into the Heligoland Bight during the night to cut
+off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and chased her.
+From 7.20 to 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Arethusa</i> and the 3rd Flotilla
+were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making
+for Heligoland, sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the
+<i>Arethusa</i>, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flagship, which had
+been in commission only a few days, sighted two enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span>
+light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later
+by the light cruiser <i>Fearless</i>. At 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a hit from the
+<i>Arethusa</i> wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy
+ships, and they both steamed at once for Heligoland,
+which was then sighted, and our ships turned to the westward.
+The <i>Arethusa</i> had been considerably damaged
+during the action and had suffered several casualties.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> another German light cruiser was
+sighted by the <i>Arethusa</i>, and on being attacked by the
+<i>Fearless</i> and destroyers turned away; she reappeared at
+11.5 and engaged the <i>Arethusa</i> and <i>Fearless</i> and was
+attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again turned
+away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed
+Sir David Beatty of the position, and that officer proceeded
+at full speed to his support. The light cruiser
+<i>Mainz</i> had been attacking the somewhat disabled <i>Arethusa</i>
+and the <i>Fearless</i> at about 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and had suffered very
+severely in the action, being practically disabled. The
+arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore
+Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured
+her destruction.</p>
+
+<p>Between 12.37 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron engaged
+two other German light cruisers, one of which was
+sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in
+a sinking condition.</p>
+
+<p>Even thus early in the War the difference between
+the behaviour of British and German seamen was noticeable.
+On the British side, in addition to other assistance
+rendered to the survivors of the <i>Mainz</i> (which had been
+sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer <i>Firedrake</i>,
+proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of
+them being wounded. A German light cruiser opened
+fire on the British destroyers engaged in picking up survivors<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span>
+from the German destroyer V187 when that vessel
+was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for
+the destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the
+rescue work. The British submarine E4 afterwards took
+our officers and men out of these boats and left some unwounded
+Germans to take the other boats, which contained
+German wounded, to Heligoland.</p>
+
+<p>In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron was directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving
+the armed merchant cruisers farther to the northward. The
+object was to give a better chance of intercepting enemy
+vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war by
+establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance
+courses, one of which would in all probability be crossed
+of necessity during daylight hours, even if the second were
+passed through at night.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 29th.</i>—This was a bright, fine day, with high
+visibility. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at
+sea with three divisions of the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and
+carrying out battle tactics and other exercises.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to
+fuel at 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, in company with the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron, the <i>Liverpool</i> being detached to Rosyth to land
+the German prisoners captured in the Heligoland Bight
+on the 28th.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Area No. 5,
+which the 3rd Cruiser Squadron left during the day for
+Cromarty to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron
+were in Area No. 6; the mine-layers were in Area No. 3.</p>
+
+<p>During the day the <i>Oak</i> arrived from Scapa with telegrams
+and despatches for me and returned with similar
+correspondence for the Admiralty. The <i>Oak</i> was usually
+employed on this duty while the <i>Iron Duke</i> was at sea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span>
+during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent
+visits to a base rendering this essential.</p>
+
+<p>Some risk from submarine attack was naturally involved
+during the time that the <i>Iron Duke</i>, or any other
+heavy ship, was stopped to communicate. The risk was
+recognised, and, as the number of enemy submarines increased,
+it became undesirable to incur it, and the practice
+of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was
+abandoned; the longer time spent in harbour tended to
+reduce the necessity for the practice to some extent, but
+during the early part of the War this was the only means
+of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was constantly
+at sea.</p>
+
+<p>The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our
+eastern coasts caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at
+this time the desirability of the patrol flotillas working
+somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for an increase as
+soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to work
+off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to
+work in the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also
+forwarded.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet messenger <i>Cambria</i> was brought out to work
+with the Battle Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant
+ships owing to the shortage of light cruisers for this work.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 30th.</i>—In the afternoon the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet shaped course for Scapa, and arrived at 7
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 31st to fuel, the 3rd Battle Squadron being
+ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to support the
+2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern
+portion of Area 5.</p>
+
+<p>The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was
+continued as usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the
+Area at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 31st to fuel at Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>During the day the <i>Assistance</i> returned to Scapa from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span>
+Loch Ewe as base ship, and the <i>Illustrious</i> arrived there
+as defence ship for the entrance. I had decided her position
+during my previous visit.</p>
+
+<p>As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I was informed
+that trawlers were being taken up and armed for
+patrol duties as rapidly as possible, and that arrangements
+for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the subject
+of correspondence between the Admiralty and myself, had
+been approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields
+at the entrances.</p>
+
+<p><i>August 31st.</i>—A sweep towards the Scottish coast
+of all vessels at sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in
+consequence of information having been received pointing
+to the possibility of mine-laying by the enemy in the
+vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the
+night of August 31st–September 1st; the sweep was
+arranged to intercept the enemy mine-layers on their
+return trip. But it was unproductive, no mine-laying
+having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep
+were the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squadron,
+3rd Cruiser Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>In consequence of urgent representations as to the
+insufficiency of .303 rifle ammunition for the Army, all
+ships disembarked 50 per cent. of their ammunition of
+this calibre at the end of August for conveyance to
+Woolwich.</p>
+
+<p>Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but
+a very small number of rifles, as well as many machine-guns,
+were landed from the Fleet for use by the Army.</p>
+
+<p>A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battleships
+was held on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> on August 31st in
+order to discuss with them the subject of tactics in action.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V"><span id="toclink_115"></span>CHAPTER V<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">On</span> September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron
+and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, cleaning
+boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition, etc. The
+Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier, on the
+north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with
+torpedo nets had them out, as was customary, unless colliers
+or store-ships were alongside.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Falmouth</i>, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was
+anchored to the westward of Holm Sound, and the remainder
+of this squadron formed the outer or southward
+line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam. The
+weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at
+times.</p>
+
+<p>At 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Falmouth</i> reported the periscope of a
+submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately
+opened fire, four rounds being fired by this ship; she
+reported having probably hit the submarine. Directly
+afterwards the <i>Vanguard</i>, one of the outer line of battleships,
+also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope,
+as did one of the E class destroyers, which was patrolling
+between the Fleet and the Hoxa entrance.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh
+immediately steam was ready, which was at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and
+to endeavour to locate the submarine and keep her under.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span>
+was also instructed to weigh at once and search for the
+submarine. The whole of the ships present were ordered
+to raise steam with all despatch, and to prepare for torpedo
+attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, steamboats,
+motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready
+and which could be collected, were at once organised in
+detachments to steam up and down the lines at high speed
+and outside the Fleet, with the object of confusing the
+submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted. Colliers
+and store-ships which had steam ready were directed
+to weigh and to go alongside the battleships that were
+not fitted with torpedo nets, in order to act as a form of
+protection against torpedoes fired at these valuable vessels.
+All ships in the outer lines were directed to burn
+searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine.</p>
+
+<p>At about 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Drake</i> reported a submarine
+in sight from that ship, thus confirming the earlier reports.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon
+as steam was ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the
+weather was exceedingly thick inside the harbour and considerable
+difficulty was experienced in getting the Fleet
+out, as at this time there were no navigational facilities
+of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick
+weather; but by 11 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> all the ships had left the harbour
+without accident, and, although there was a dense fog
+outside, the Fleet cleared the Pentland Firth successfully.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Assistance</i> was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left
+after the Fleet, reporting having sighted a submarine in
+the entrance whilst going out. The 2nd Flotilla was left
+behind to locate and, if possible, destroy the submarine,
+and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa and
+Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet
+the Fleet at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct
+from destroyers, remaining in the harbour was the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span>
+<i>Cyclops</i>, lying off Scapa with the telegraph and telephone
+cables on board, and directions were given to Rear-Admiral
+Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the mine-sweeping
+gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the
+<i>Falmouth</i>.</p>
+
+<p>No trace of a submarine was discovered, and subsequent
+investigation showed that the alarm <em>may</em> have
+been false, the evidence not being conclusive either way.
+The incident, however, made it clear that protection
+against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as
+the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open
+to this form of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible
+action, in the event of an alarm being given of the
+presence of a submarine, was to take the Fleet to sea,
+and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from
+a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity
+was created, which would be bad for moral, and
+the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning
+boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which experience was
+showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the
+Fleet was to be maintained.</p>
+
+<p>The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty
+and proposals were made for blocking all the entrances
+to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, by
+sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending
+the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance,
+Rear-Admiral Miller was directed to requisition a large
+number of net-drifters. The plan was to lay drift
+nets in the entrance to be watched by the drifters, the
+nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating
+on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might
+be indicated by the buoy moving with the net.</p>
+
+<p>The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances
+were, meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span>
+submarines through them, but it was realised that these
+were considerable. The opinion was formed, however,
+that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable
+difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine
+commander.</p>
+
+<p>By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers
+consisted of vessels of the E class. A request was made
+for basing a hunting flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall,
+these vessels being intended to guard the approaches to
+the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine hunters
+generally. It was also suggested that a monetary
+reward should be offered to the personnel of any trawler
+through whose agency a submarine was captured or destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had been
+strengthened by the addition of a flotilla of trawlers, and
+the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers were continuously
+employed in keeping certain fixed channels of
+approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines.
+These vessels were, therefore, not available for anti-submarine
+work, except to the detriment of their mine-sweeping
+duties.</p>
+
+<p>On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were
+employed in Area No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle
+Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>From September 1st to September 5th the Battle
+Fleet remained at sea, cruising in the area between the
+north-east coast of Scotland and the coast of Norway, in
+support of the cruiser squadrons working to the southward,
+and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises
+of the Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional
+gunnery practice. The <i>Orion</i>, of the 2nd Battle Squadron,
+was still absent from the Fleet, retubing condensers; the
+<i>King Edward VII.</i> rejoined on the 2nd, after exchanging<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span>
+defective guns; and the <i>Dominion</i> was then detached to
+Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strengthened
+by the arrival of the <i>Inflexible</i> from the Mediterranean,
+and was employed during this period in support
+of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the Battle
+Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises.</p>
+
+<p>During the period under review reports from time to
+time of the sighting of enemy submarines appeared to
+indicate that they were working on a line Ekersund-Pentland
+Firth, the line which they were apparently
+occupying during the first few days of the War, when
+U 15 was sunk by the <i>Birmingham</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Information received on September 3d suggested that
+enemy cruisers might have passed, or might be intending
+to pass, into the North Sea via the Skagerrak. The
+2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were,
+therefore, directed to sweep to the entrance to the
+Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th,
+starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E.,
+at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadrons were to make a detour to the south-westward
+with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the latter
+proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons
+to Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with the 2nd Flotilla, was directed to sweep on a wide
+front towards the Pentland Firth on the Ekersund-Pentland
+line in search of enemy submarines, which it
+was hoped might be caught on the surface at night.
+Thence the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was to proceed
+to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla to the westward of
+the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span>
+Longhope at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla,
+which had been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at
+the same time to sweep the western portion of the Ekersund-Pentland
+line for submarines, and then to return
+to Longhope.</p>
+
+<p>These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels
+of any sort were sighted, except that at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the
+5th the <i>Thetis</i>, mine-layer, working south-eastward
+of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel, thought
+to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser
+Squadrons and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on
+the position, but the ship was eventually identified as one
+of our own vessels.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe
+at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 5th to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats
+having been previously detached to that base to search
+the entrance for mines.</p>
+
+<p>During the early days of September frequent reports
+were received of enemy mines having been discovered on
+the east coast, and several vessels were sunk, as a consequence,
+including the gunboat <i>Speedy</i>. It appeared that
+the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels
+flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well
+as from regular mine-laying ships. The large number
+of vessels trading on the east coast and of fishing craft
+at sea, both British and neutral, greatly increased the
+difficulty of preventing these operations. The task of
+boarding and examining even a considerable percentage
+of these vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser
+sweeps were showing this daily. The Admiralty’s attention
+was drawn to the matter, and the question was raised
+of establishing some restrictions, particularly as regards
+the areas in which fishing should be permitted.</p>
+
+<p>The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span>
+was also proposed, the burning of which enabled the
+enemy to fix his position accurately when engaged in
+mine-laying operations. This policy of the extinction of
+lights, thus started, gradually became general, and
+eventually only the most important lights were exhibited
+at night, and the large majority of these were only shown
+when requests were made by men-of-war who required
+them for entering port, the time of their exhibition being
+thus reduced to a minimum.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe
+until 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on September 7th, and then proceeded to
+sea. The <i>Orion</i> was left behind to complete work on her
+condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on September
+9th, having been absent for twenty-one days.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Agincourt</i>, the new battleship which since commissioning
+had been engaged in gunnery and torpedo
+practices either at Scapa or to the westward of the
+Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea on September
+7th in order to give her officers experience in
+working with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty
+in carrying out her practices because she had not been
+supplied with “sub-calibre” guns, and this deficiency
+could not be made good for some months; this caused
+much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However,
+she was manned with officers and a ship’s company of
+a very high standard and, in spite of all disadvantages,
+the early gunnery practices carried out by her in company
+with the Fleet showed that she would eventually
+prove to be a most valuable addition to the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Representations had been made by me to the Admiralty
+that the presence of a senior Flag officer in
+general command of the Orkneys and Shetlands, who
+would be responsible for the defences of these islands and
+the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span>
+administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient
+fully to occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller.</p>
+
+<p>Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted
+the post, and as it was very desirable that the officer
+holding this position should be junior to the Commander-in-Chief
+of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the compliment
+of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to
+myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities.</p>
+
+<p>He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch
+Ewe on September 6th, to confer with me before taking
+up his appointment. He accompanied me to sea in the
+<i>Iron Duke</i> on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was
+embarked on board the <i>Oak</i> to the westward of the
+Orkneys, and took up his command on arrival. The
+result was immediately most beneficial. He was able to
+devote his whole time to the questions of defence and
+organisation and relieved me of all these matters which
+had, as was inevitable under the previous arrangement,
+occupied so much of my time in harbour and so much
+of my thoughts at sea.</p>
+
+<p>On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock arrived
+safely at Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
+proceeded northward from Loch Ewe <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the
+North Sea, and passed through the Fair Island Channel
+at 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, being joined at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> by the 3rd Battle
+Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth
+after dark on this date and proceeded to the north-eastward,
+being joined at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 8th by the <i>Sappho</i>
+and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla. These smaller
+vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in order
+to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine
+attack, consequent on stopping for this purpose. The
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron swept to the south-eastward<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span>
+of Area 6 during daylight on the 8th, and during the
+night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was on a patrol
+area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and
+Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of intercepting
+possible enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet
+carried out gunnery practices and exercised battle tactics
+during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at dark proceeded
+to the southward to support an extensive sweep
+into the Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to
+carry out on September 10th. The dispositions for this
+sweep were generally as follows:</p>
+
+<p>The 1st and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported
+by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron to the northward, and the 7th Cruiser Squadron
+to the westward, swept out the Heligoland Bight from
+east to west, commencing from a position some ten to
+twelve miles from Heligoland, which position was to be
+reached one hour before dawn. The Battle Fleet, with
+the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread 20 miles
+ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E.
+at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12
+knots speed of advance.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadrons to the southward, cruised to the north-westward
+of Heligoland until 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 10th, by which
+time it was clear that the sweep had been unproductive.
+No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one
+seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd
+Flotilla was stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine
+screen, and to assist the attached cruisers in boarding
+duties during the day, and the 4th Flotilla, which had been
+working with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, principally
+for boarding duties, was also directed to join the
+Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span>
+of the thick weather did not do so until 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Owing
+to the large number of trawlers that were met with,
+nearly all of which were flying neutral colours, the boarding
+duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion
+attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken
+wireless signals were noticed to be very strong after the
+Fleet had passed these vessels; but close examination
+failed to reveal anything suspicious in those that were
+boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any
+of them.</p>
+
+<p>The conditions on September 10th were very unfavourable
+for the sweep into the Bight. Thick weather prevailed
+both before and after daylight, and the visibility
+varied from between two and five miles. The mist prevented
+the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle
+Fleet for eight hours, a circumstance which would have
+had awkward consequences had the High Sea Fleet been
+encountered with its full complement of 80 to 100 destroyers,
+as might have been the case in such close proximity
+to German ports.</p>
+
+<p>It was noted at the time that the conditions were very
+unfavourable for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility
+combined with the glare produced by the occasional sunshine
+and absence of wind. A passage in the notes made
+on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows:</p>
+
+<p>“The weather conditions ... were very unfavourable
+for a general action owing to the low visibility and
+the glare caused by brilliant sunlight and absence of
+wind.... The conditions make it impossible for
+the Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to
+know what is going on in the van and rear ... besides
+being entirely favourable to tactics largely based on the
+employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers.</p>
+
+<p>“In addition there are great difficulties in concentrating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span>
+detached ships and flotillas and in forming the
+Fleet prior to battle, also in the recognition of ships and
+destroyers.”</p>
+
+<p>This passage is of interest because of its bearing on
+the Jutland battle some two years later when somewhat
+similar conditions prevailed.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much
+impression on my mind that special daylight recognition
+devices which could be seen at a considerable distance were
+subsequently devised and used by our own light cruisers
+and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>When it became evident that there were no enemy
+vessels to engage, I organised a sweep to the northward
+on a large scale, with a view to intercepting any enemy
+ships that might be at sea and of closely examining all
+merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with.</p>
+
+<p>The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N.,
+Long. 4.0 E., the dispositions being:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>The <i>Invincible</i> (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers)
+and the <i>Inflexible</i>, to sweep towards Dundee.</p>
+
+<p>3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of
+advance.</p>
+
+<p>1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11
+knots speed of advance.</p>
+
+<p>2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed
+of advance.</p>
+
+<p>All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more included
+the <i>New Zealand</i>) to be in general support.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to extend
+the sweep to the eastward.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2.</p>
+
+<p>At 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn
+to N. 16 E., and, later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was
+stationed in a new area, No. 7, between Lat. 55.20 N.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span>
+and 57.30 N., between 50 and 150 miles from the coast.
+The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal;
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet, and the <i>Invincible</i>
+and <i>Inflexible</i> were sent to Scapa to coal, as well as the
+3rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of destroyers screening
+these vessels into the base.</p>
+
+<p>During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron carried out battle tactics and
+gunnery exercises, and the Battle Fleet then proceeded to
+Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>During the passage south and north numerous reports
+of floating mines were received. The majority proved to
+be fishermen’s bladders which at this time were being
+frequently reported by merchant ships as floating mines.</p>
+
+<p>The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the
+3rd meridian of East Long. between the parallels of
+55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been established by the 1st
+and 3rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight destroyers
+and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the
+“Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy
+mine-layers. I was also informed that a patrol of the
+“Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch coast, was being
+maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames
+approaches.</p>
+
+<p>On September 11th the <i>Hibernia</i> reported a 12-inch
+gun cracked, the fifth since the outbreak of war!</p>
+
+<p>On the same day salvage operations on the armed
+merchant-cruiser <i>Oceanic</i>, which had gone ashore in
+a fog on Foula Island on September 8th, were
+abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke
+up eventually.</p>
+
+<p>Rear-Admiral E.&nbsp;R. Pears reported that the Portsmouth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span>
+floating dock would be ready for work on September
+21st, a very smart piece of mooring work
+having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the
+King’s Harbour Master.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch
+Ewe coaling, storing and cleaning boilers, etc., from
+5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on September 13th until 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on September 17th,
+and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the <i>Inflexible</i>
+and <i>Invincible</i>, remained at Scapa until September
+18th. Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the
+North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and 7 were carried out by the 2nd,
+3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and the Mine-layer
+Squadron, supported by the <i>Invincible</i>, <i>Inflexible</i> and
+3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning
+of September 14th for the purpose. The armed merchant-cruisers
+<i>Alsatian</i> and <i>Mantua</i> were patrolling eastward of
+the Shetlands.</p>
+
+<p>Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to
+make general arrangements with the Admiralty for the
+defence of that base, and on September 17th the First
+Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War Staff,
+the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S)
+and (T) arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The
+bombardment and capture of Heligoland was also discussed.
+The proposals had been previously forwarded to
+me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined by
+myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of
+Staff, and by the Flag officers commanding the Battle
+Squadrons. The opinions of these officers against the
+operation were unanimous. It had not been suggested
+that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation,
+except as a supporting force; the older battleships were
+intended for this purpose. But the arguments against
+the operation were overwhelmingly strong. It was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span>
+pointed out that ships were no match for heavy fortifications
+such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that
+direct fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory
+would be ineffective against well-placed, heavily protected
+and well-concealed land guns; that, even if a storming
+party were able to land and to capture the
+island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated
+as it was close to German naval bases, for if we could take
+it in a fortified condition, it would be far easier for the
+Germans to recapture it with the fortifications demolished;
+that it would be under continuous attack by sea
+and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured,
+would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly in
+southern waters, which, owing to the number of small
+craft then available, was an impossibility. Aircraft
+spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct, was at that
+time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited
+for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors
+which, later on, carried out such useful work on the
+Belgian coast. After a conference, at which the Flag
+officers were present, I thought that the idea would be
+abandoned.</p>
+
+<p>This was not the case, however, and the matter was
+taken up later at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir
+Cecil Burney, commanding the Channel Fleet. His view
+coincided with those expressed by the Flag officers at the
+Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared
+to carry out any orders that might be given him. The
+idea was not finally abandoned for some time. The
+opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and myself were identical,
+as indeed were those of every Flag officer with whom I
+discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior
+Flag officer.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_128" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption sans"><span class="smcap">SWEEP of SEP<sup>T.</sup> 8<sup>TH.</sup> to 11<sup>TH.</sup> 1914.</span>
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_128.jpg" width="964" height="657" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_128-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span>
+visit was that of operations in the Baltic, but as no large
+operations of this nature could be attempted without the
+assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain
+supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no
+steps were taken.</p>
+
+<p>By this date a regular programme of dockings and
+refits for all ships was recognised as necessary, and
+battleships were now being detached one at a time for
+this purpose. For some months after the commencement
+of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than
+four days for docking and for the execution of the most
+urgent work, except in cases of accident or very serious
+defects, as our margin of superiority was none too large,
+and we were already experiencing a good deal of trouble
+with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up
+for the work of retubing; but the work achieved in the
+four days was a very fine tribute to the dockyard organisation
+and to the industry of the dockyard men.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of
+September 17th, the <i>Erin</i>, a new battleship bought, incomplete,
+from Turkey, being in company for the first
+time in order to accustom her officers to working the ship
+with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to the
+westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the
+18th, but was interfered with by bad weather—a frequent
+experience. The Battle Fleet then proceeded into the
+North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel, the position at
+midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.13 W., and
+course south. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa
+with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of
+the 19th, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at
+the same time, all for the southward for a sweep into
+the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet, in
+search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span>
+thorough examination of trawlers suspected of acting as
+look-out vessels for the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>While on passage south during the 19th the Battle
+Fleet was exercised at battle tactics. At midnight on
+the 19th the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 58.3 N.,
+Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 20th, in Lat. 57.8 N.,
+Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
+The 2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa
+in time to meet the Battle Fleet at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 21st,
+but, owing to bad weather, the orders were cancelled
+and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the 4th Flotilla,
+which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers.
+During daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised towards
+the Norwegian coast to the northward of Lat.
+57 N., in support of the battle cruisers engaged in examining
+trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher
+Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to rendezvous,
+at 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with
+the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been coaling at
+Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the Commander-in-Chief.</p>
+
+<p>At 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position
+Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of
+the battle cruisers having reported at 6.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> from a
+position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52 E., that the weather
+was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers being
+carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned
+and the Fleet turned to the northward, as it was considered
+that an incomplete examination would do more
+harm than good.</p>
+
+<p>During this period the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was
+working in Area 7, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in
+Area 6, as usual; the <i>Alsatian</i> and <i>Mantua</i>, with the
+<i>Drake</i>, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping down<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span>
+the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their
+patrol east of the Shetlands, where they were joined by
+the armed merchant ship <i>Teutonic</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and
+joined the Battle Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron
+respectively on the 21st.</p>
+
+<p>All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped
+between 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th and 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 21st, in
+order that the enemy should not become aware of the
+movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might prevent
+the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly
+deprive us of our opportunity of catching it.</p>
+
+<p>During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an
+extensive sweep was carried out during daylight of the
+21st. The Battle Fleet covered a front of 40 miles, and
+battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front to the
+eastward and westward.</p>
+
+<p>On the evening of the 21st I was informed by
+wireless telegraphy from the Admiralty of a report
+that a German force of two light cruisers, with
+destroyers and submarines in company, had been
+sighted from Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the
+northward. The whole Fleet was turned to the southward
+at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to cover a
+front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward,
+sweeping to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the
+enemy vessels if they had continued a course to the northward.
+The sweep to the northward was continued until
+10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The <i>Iron Duke</i> was in position Lat. 59 N.,
+Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel
+towards the Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W.
+During the 22nd, visibility was very good, but no enemy
+vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
+and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span>
+during the night, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle
+Squadron being detached to support the cruisers searching
+in the North Sea areas.</p>
+
+<p>At 7.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals
+from the <i>Cressy</i> were intercepted indicating that the
+<i>Aboukir</i> and <i>Hogue</i> had been sunk by submarines in
+Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 3.41 E. These vessels were
+patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast,
+under Admiralty orders. No further details were received,
+beyond a wireless signal from Commodore (S), at
+11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, that he was proceeding in the <i>Fearless</i> with
+seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to intercept
+the enemy submarines on their way back. The
+Commander-in-Chief, thereupon, ordered the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron (from the southern position of Area 7) to proceed
+at once to support the Commodore (S). By directions,
+however, given by the Admiralty these orders were
+cancelled, and the forces returned.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers
+to proceed at once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report
+had been received that the German liner <i>Brandenburg</i>,
+lying at that port, was likely to sail. Constant reports
+to this effect were received for several days, and the
+<i>Brandenburg</i> was heard using her wireless telegraphy on
+September 25th. The patrol was maintained until September
+28th, when contradictory reports were to hand—one
+that she had been seen at sea on the 27th, and the
+other that she was being interned by the Norwegian
+Government. The latter report proved to be correct.
+The patrol was then moved to a position off the Utvoer
+Lighthouse, Lat. 61.3 N., Long. 4.30 E., to intercept
+the German destroyer <i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>, said to
+be leaving a Norwegian port.</p>
+
+<p>During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span>
+battle cruisers attempted to carry out gunnery practices,
+but thick weather interfered. The force returned to
+Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd Battle
+Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron proceeded
+from Area 7 to sweep up the Norwegian coast,
+thence going to Cromarty to coal. The squadron arrived
+there on the evening of the 25th.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa
+until the evening of the 25th, when it proceeded out to
+the westward of the Orkneys; on the 26th bad weather
+again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale
+being experienced. This moderated on the morning of
+the 27th, when the Battle Fleet was to the eastward of
+the Shetlands, but increased again to a very strong gale
+during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles per hour
+and a very heavy confused sea.</p>
+
+<p>A considerable amount of damage was done to wireless
+masts, topmasts, etc., and several ships had boats
+damaged or washed away. The ships of the “Iron
+Duke” class took in large quantities of water through
+their 6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted
+at such a low level. The gale continued during the 28th,
+veering to the northward, and moderated on the 29th, on
+which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved to the
+southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met
+and screened by destroyers which had not been able to
+join the Fleet at sea owing to the bad weather.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the
+morning of the 26th, and proceeded to the Norwegian
+coast, sweeping down as far as the Naze in search of
+enemy ships, particularly the s.s. <i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>,
+reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also
+to support the <i>Drake</i>, <i>Nottingham</i>, <i>Falmouth</i>, and two<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span>
+destroyers, which had been sent to the vicinity of the
+Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The latter vessels
+had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for
+enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers
+experienced very heavy weather on their return across the
+North Sea, and some anxiety was felt for their safety.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the
+26th, and on the 29th was sent to watch off the entrances
+to Bergen in Norway for the German s.s. <i>Prinz
+Friedrich Wilhelm</i>. The squadron returned to Cromarty
+on October 1st. On the 28th the <i>Princess Royal</i> left the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to
+fuel, <i lang="fr">en route</i>) to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian
+troops about to leave the Dominion for the United
+Kingdom. The <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i>, which had
+been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the purpose
+of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the
+3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from
+Scapa on the arrival of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet.
+Additional precautions against attack by submarines
+were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on this
+occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a considerably
+increased number in the North Sea. These precautions
+included more numerous patrols by destroyers of the
+2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the entrances to Scapa, and
+necessarily involved a greatly increased strain on the destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>Further precautions against submarine attack were
+also found necessary in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival
+of light cruisers at Leith for refit were temporarily suspended
+by Admiralty orders owing to the presence of
+submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at
+the destroyer <i>Stag</i>, and another at a torpedo boat off May<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span>
+Island on the 25th. The destroyer <i>Cheerful</i> was also
+fired at on the 26th.</p>
+
+<p>The month of October, 1914, opened with the
+Dreadnought Battle Fleet at Scapa, with the exception
+of the <i>Ajax</i>, which was <i lang="fr">en route</i> to Devonport to refit,
+and the <i>Audacious</i>, which was on passage from Devonport
+after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were
+at sea supporting the cruisers, except the <i>Exmouth</i>, of
+the 6th Battle Squadron, which was at Devonport
+refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the <i>Invincible</i>,
+and the <i>Inflexible</i>, were at Scapa; the <i>Princess
+Royal</i> was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to
+Halifax.</p>
+
+<p>Of the cruisers, the <i>Devonshire</i>, of the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron, was refitting at Cromarty; the <i>Theseus</i>, of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, was returning from the White
+Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian officers;
+the <i>Mantua</i> and <i>Alsatian</i>, armed merchant-cruisers, were
+at Liverpool, coaling and making good defects.</p>
+
+<p>Of the destroyer flotillas, the <i>Active</i> and five destroyers
+of the 2nd Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla,
+were absent refitting.</p>
+
+<p>On October 1st regulations were brought into force
+under which a large number of coastal navigational lights
+were extinguished, as also were regulations closing the
+east coast ports to neutral fishing craft; other regulations
+were issued to control the movements of fishing vessels
+in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under
+which additional coastal navigation lights were extinguished
+(principally in the North of Scotland), became
+effective.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa
+until 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 2nd, and then proceeded into the
+North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron sailed at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span>
+daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted 2nd
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the <i>Invincible</i> and
+<i>Inflexible</i>, with the <i>Sappho</i> and three mine-layers, left at
+2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 3rd.</p>
+
+<p>On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took
+up pre-arranged positions designed to secure a close watch
+over the northern portion of the North Sea, partly with
+a view to an interception of all traffic, and partly to
+ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the North Sea
+during the ensuing week. The main object was the protection
+of an important convoy of Canadian troops, which
+was crossing from Halifax, and which the battle cruiser
+<i>Princess Royal</i> and the battleship <i>Majestic</i> had been
+sent to meet and to protect. The <i>Princess Royal</i>
+arrived at the rendezvous at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 7th,
+and waited for the convoy, which was two and a half
+days late.</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during
+the period Oct. 3rd–11th approximately as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island
+Channel from the western side.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruisers,
+the <i>Sappho</i> and three mine-layers, was stationed to the northward
+and eastward of the Shetland Islands.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion
+of Area No. 4.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5.</p>
+
+<p>The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island
+Channel.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread,
+worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle
+Squadron to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle
+Squadron was utilised to watch the waters between the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet and Norwegian territorial waters.</p>
+
+<p>The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern approaches<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span>
+of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian
+coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle
+Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to
+the bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and
+for shelter when the weather necessitated this.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Princess Royal</i> met the Canadian convoy in Lat.
+49.45 N., Long. 27.5 W., at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 10th.
+On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet passed to the
+westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until daylight
+on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, with the <i>Teutonic</i>, being withdrawn
+from the patrol north of the Shetlands to a patrol line
+north-west from Sule Skerry lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N.,
+Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th and remaining
+there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for
+Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged
+in this operation returned to their bases for fuel, except
+the 3rd Battle Squadron (the ships of which had coaled
+two at a time during the operation) and the cruiser squadrons,
+which had been relieved as necessary to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the
+following incidents occurred. On October 2nd the
+<i>Alsatian</i> took six concealed Germans off a Danish
+steamer. At 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on October 7th a submarine was
+reported inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and
+by the <i>Assistance</i>; she was fired at by the latter ship, in
+misty weather. On receipt of the report I ordered all
+vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a division
+of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the submarine.
+Later investigation indicated that the report
+was well founded.</p>
+
+<p>On October 9th the <i>Alsatian</i> sighted an enemy submarine
+in Lat. 61.42 N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span>
+day at 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Antrim</i>, flagship of the 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was missed
+by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the
+<i>Antrim</i> just failed to ram after the attack; numerous
+reports of enemy aircraft having been sighted on the East
+and West coasts of Scotland were also received.</p>
+
+<p>On October 10th the <i>Liverpool</i> and one-half of the 4th
+Flotilla were sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the
+islands in the vicinity of Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N.,
+Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they were not being used
+as German submarine bases, in view of the attack on the
+<i>Antrim</i> in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour
+to this idea.</p>
+
+<p>Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the northward,
+two or three at a time, during the operations, to
+carry out gunnery practices by day and by night. Thick
+fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and ships
+detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable
+difficulty in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly
+resulted in a serious collision between a battleship of the
+6th Battle Squadron and one of the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of each other
+on opposite courses.</p>
+
+<p>On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the
+morning of October 12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville
+reported that a partial submarine obstruction was in place
+across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even a
+partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine
+attack on the Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had
+given me much anxiety since the beginning of hostilities.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_138" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption sans"><p>APPROXIMATE</p>
+
+<p>DISPOSITIONS OCT<sup>R.</sup> 3<sup>RD.</sup> <span class="allsmcap">TO</span> 11<sup>TH.</sup> 1914.</p>
+
+<p>WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING.</p>
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_138.jpg" width="812" height="607" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_138-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p>On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser
+tubes of the <i>Iron Duke</i> were in a bad condition, although
+the ship was quite new, and that the condensers would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span>
+need either complete, or partial, retubing. The discovery
+was very disconcerting when taken in conjunction with
+the case of the <i>Orion</i>, the condensers of which ship had
+been retubed during September; it naturally led to suspicion
+being directed to the condenser tubes generally
+of other ships, from which reports of cases of tubes occasionally
+giving out were being received.</p>
+
+<p>The whole question was taken up with the Admiralty,
+requests being made that all available spare tubes should
+be sent at once to the Northern bases, together with some
+dockyard fitters who could assist the artificers of the
+Fleet in the work of retubing. Representations were also
+made as to the urgent necessity of increasing the
+stock of reserve tubes in case the defects became
+general in the Fleet owing to the ships being so constantly
+under steam at sea. The task of replacing the defective
+tubes in the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> condensers was begun at once,
+with the help of the artificers of the Fleet, and the
+<i>Centurion</i> was detailed as the spare Fleet-Flagship in
+case of emergency. But at this time the <i>Iron Duke</i> was
+not kept specially in harbour for retubing work, this being
+carried out as opportunity occurred, although under considerable
+difficulties, since the labour of suddenly preparing
+for sea, with a condenser undergoing retubing, was
+very appreciable. The manner in which this heavy work
+was taken in hand and rapidly completed in several ships,
+largely by Fleet labour, demonstrated the extreme
+efficiency and very fine spirit of the engine-room departments
+of the ships of the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>From the 12th to the 16th October the 1st and 4th
+Battle Squadrons remained at Scapa, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the
+16th they left to carry out target practice to the westward
+of the Orkneys. The 2nd Battle Squadron left Scapa
+on the evening of the 13th to support the cruisers in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span>
+North Sea; it joined the 3rd Battle Squadron already
+there, the ships of which were being detached to Scapa
+two at a time to fuel and to overhaul their machinery.
+It was found necessary to give these ships, with reciprocating
+engines, five days off duty periodically in order to
+carry out necessary adjustments.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron and two divisions of destroyers, left
+Scapa at 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 12th, to carry out a sweep of
+the southern part of the North Sea. This force swept on
+the 13th on a broad front down to the Dogger Bank,
+thence to the Norwegian coast, and to the northward
+on the 14th in conjunction with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron
+(which was then prolonging the sweeping line), without
+sighting any enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and light
+cruisers took up a position on the 15th to support the
+cruiser squadrons on patrol, the destroyers proceeding
+to Lerwick to fuel.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron remained at Scapa.
+The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was working the N.E. corner
+of Area 6, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron at this period
+was working the south-western portion of Area No. 6.
+At 1.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 15th the <i>Theseus</i> reported that
+a torpedo, which had missed, had been fired at her in
+Lat. 57.50 N., Long. 0.33 E.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of this report orders were given that the
+ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, on patrol, were to be
+withdrawn to the northern corner of the area, and later,
+at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, orders were sent that they were to join the
+2nd Battle Squadron still farther north, and to be used
+by the battleships (which were spread for the purpose of
+intercepting trade or enemy’s ships) for boarding purposes.
+Meanwhile the senior officer of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron ships operating in Area 6 (H.M.S. <i>Edgar</i>) reported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span>
+that he could get no reply to wireless signals from
+the <i>Hawke</i>. The <i>Swift</i>, with a division of destroyers,
+was ordered to proceed from Scapa at high speed to the
+last reported position of the <i>Hawke</i> in Lat. 57.47 N.,
+Long. 0.12 E., to search for the ship. Two other
+divisions of destroyers were sent, later on, to assist the
+<i>Swift</i>. It is to be noted that a submarine had been
+reported off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast at 8.30
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 14th, but this report did not reach the <i>Iron
+Duke</i> until the afternoon of the 15th.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Swift</i> reported on the 16th having picked up a
+raft with an officer and 20 men, survivors of the <i>Hawke</i>,
+which had been sunk by a submarine in Lat. 57.40 N.,
+Long. 0.13 W., on the 15th. Shortly after sighting the
+raft, the <i>Swift</i> was attacked by the same or another submarine
+(it was thought by more than one) whilst engaged
+in her work of rescue, and torpedoes were fired at her.
+Captain Wintour subsequently stated that he was only
+able to effect the rescue by manœuvring at high speed in
+the midst of the wreckage, etc., using the destroyers with
+him to screen his movements. His experience was an
+unpleasant one, as he naturally desired to remain on
+the spot until he had ascertained with certainty that he
+had picked up all the survivors, and this he proceeded to
+do with praiseworthy persistence, bringing them to
+Scapa. On the 16th reports were also received that
+the destroyers <i>Alarm</i> and <i>Nymphe</i> had been attacked by
+submarines to the eastward of the Pentland Firth, and
+that the <i>Nymphe</i> had rammed the submarine that had
+attacked her. Later examination of the <i>Nymphe’s</i>
+bottom by divers showed that her starboard propeller was
+damaged.</p>
+
+<p>At 4.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the same day, the 16th, it was
+reported from one of the shore batteries that a submarine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span>
+was close into the Switha entrance to Scapa Flow. The
+ships inside were immediately ordered to raise steam with
+all despatch, and the usual precautions were taken of
+patrolling the harbour with every available small craft,
+including destroyers, tugs, trawlers, drifters and picket-boats;
+and colliers and store-ships were as usual sent
+alongside the battleships, which were not fitted with
+torpedo nets, as a precaution.</p>
+
+<p>The scene in the harbour on such occasions was a busy
+one. Small craft of every nature were patrolling at
+the sight of a periscope; all guns were manned; torpedo
+nets, where fitted, were placed in position; and every
+effort was made to ensure that the Fleet was as adequately
+guarded by the available patrol craft as circumstances
+admitted. All large ships except the repair ships <i>Cyclops</i>
+and <i>Assistance</i> left harbour during the night, the <i>Iron
+Duke</i> joining the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons west of
+the Orkneys.</p>
+
+<p>At noon on the 17th Sir Stanley Colville, who had
+been requested to organise a careful search for the reported
+submarine, signalled that a submarine was believed
+to be inside Scapa Flow and had been hunted, but not
+actually located. Reports had been received that officers
+and men on board several of the destroyers, and the gunboat
+<i>Leda</i>, had seen the periscope of the submarine, and
+that a torpedo had actually been fired at one of the hunting
+vessels. It was, however, ascertained subsequently
+that this torpedo was one which had been accidentally
+discharged by one of our own destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>The accuracy or otherwise of these reports has never
+yet been determined with certainty, but many of the
+officers engaged in the search were convinced at the time
+that a submarine was actually inside, and that they had
+seen her. Indeed, a good many rounds were fired during<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span>
+the day at objects which were thought at the time to be
+a periscope.</p>
+
+<p>The reports signalled to me convinced me that, until
+the matter was cleared up with certainty, and until some
+more absolute security against submarine attack on the
+Fleet at anchor could be provided, it was courting disaster
+to base battleships or battle cruisers at Scapa Flow. We
+had seen in the loss of the <i>Hawke</i> that enemy submarines
+could quite well operate in northern waters, and it was
+thought to be only a matter of time before they would
+attempt an attack on the Fleet in Scapa Flow, if indeed
+the attempt had not already been made.</p>
+
+<p>I decided, therefore, that it was necessary to seek for
+a temporary base which could be used with safety whilst
+the submarine obstructions at Scapa were being perfected.
+The incident that had already occurred at Loch
+Ewe cast doubt on the safety of that base, since it was
+unprovided with any obstructions at all and the depth of
+water made it impossible to improvise them with Fleet
+resources.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly I looked for other and more easily obstructed
+ports, and eventually decided on Lough Swilly
+for the main part of the Fleet, and Loch-na-Keal in the
+Island of Mull for the ships for which berthing-space
+could not be found at Lough Swilly. Both ports possessed
+comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly
+the water was so shallow as to make it difficult for a submarine
+to enter submerged. It was also a “defended port”
+and therefore possessed an organisation which would be
+useful for regulating the entry of ships.</p>
+
+<p>The extensive dispositions necessitated by the temporary
+change of base were at once ordered. Colliers,
+store-ships, and auxiliaries of one kind and another, which
+were either <i lang="fr">en route</i> to, or at, Scapa Flow, were diverted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span>
+to the new bases; the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron were ordered to Loch-na-Keal to fuel
+and to improvise anti-submarine obstructions at the
+entrance; and the <i>Illustrious</i> was ordered there from Loch
+Ewe to act as guard ship; the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons
+and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron were detached to
+cruise to the north-westward of the Hebrides for blockading
+purposes, and to carry out practices; and the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 3rd
+and 6th Battle Squadrons were sent to Lough Swilly to
+coal. The cruiser blockade and look-out line was withdrawn
+farther to the northward owing to the danger from
+submarines incurred in operating in the central or
+southern portions of the North Sea on a regular patrol,
+and the impossibility of providing destroyers as a screen
+for the ships. The new line was to the northward of the
+Shetland Islands, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons
+and armed merchant-cruisers carried out the patrol. There
+were, therefore, two lines of blockade, one formed by the
+heavy ships north-westward of the Hebrides, the second
+to the northward of the Shetland Islands. The organisation
+was such that it was probable that vessels attempting
+to evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines
+during daylight hours. In making these new dispositions
+it was still intended to keep the North Sea itself under
+observation by frequent cruiser sweeps.</p>
+
+<p>Numerous reports of submarines in the Minch at this
+time led to the <i>Active</i> and two divisions of destroyers
+being sent there to search for them, and the remainder of
+the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were divided between blockade
+duty in the Pentland Firth, work at Scapa Flow, and in
+the vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands, and with the
+ships at Loch-na-Keal and Lough Swilly.</p>
+
+<p>On October 21st the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span>
+arrived at Cromarty to coal. Owing to the receipt of information
+from the Admiralty early that day, that it was
+reported that some German cruisers, destroyers and submarines
+had left Danzig on October 17th for the North
+Sea, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron were ordered to leave their bases that
+morning, proceed into the North Sea, and sweep down
+on a broad front to the Skagerrak, screened by the 4th
+Flotilla of destroyers. The latter had to be sent back to
+their base on October 22nd owing to heavy weather. The
+remainder of the force swept up to the Skaw without
+sighting any enemy vessels, then north along the Norwegian
+coast, and proceeded, the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron to Cromarty and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
+to Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>On October 21st a submarine was reported just outside
+Cromarty by an armed trawler, and another report
+was received of one having been sighted by the destroyer
+<i>Lynx</i>. The submarine obstruction at Cromarty, designed
+by Captain Munro, had now been completed, and the base
+was considered secure. It would, however, only accommodate
+a small portion of the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The dispositions given above were maintained until
+October 22nd, when the <i>Iron Duke</i>, 1st and 4th Battle
+Squadrons, the <i>Active</i> and two divisions of destroyers
+of the 2nd Flotilla, arrived at Lough Swilly. The 3rd and
+6th Battle Squadrons and 2nd Cruiser Squadron took
+their place to the north-westward of the Hebrides as an
+outer blockade line and support for the cruiser squadrons.
+The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and four
+destroyers were detached to the southern part of the
+North Sea on the 23rd to support the Commodore (T) in
+carrying out aerial operations in the Heligoland Bight.
+The operations failed owing to the difficulty the sea-planes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span>
+experienced in rising off the water, and the 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron returned to Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>On arrival of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons at
+Lough Swilly, steps were immediately taken to lay an
+anti-submarine obstruction at the entrance, and this was
+very smartly completed with the limited resources of the
+squadrons by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 23rd, and for the first time
+since the declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure
+base. Wire hawsers provided by the ships of the Fleet
+were suspended at varying depths between six colliers
+which were anchored across the entrance, with target rafts
+as intermediate supports.</p>
+
+<p>It was a fairly effective obstruction, and armed steamboats
+from the fleet patrolled near it with destroyers as
+a support.</p>
+
+<p>The relief to those responsible for the safety of the
+Fleet was immense, and attention was at once turned to
+the well-being of the personnel, which had been pressed
+very hard, and to improving the efficiency of the ships in
+gunnery and torpedo work. Battle practice targets were
+ordered over from Lamlash, in the Island of Arran, a
+pre-War practice base, with the intention of carrying out
+practice in the waters north-west of Ireland. The work
+of retubing the condensers of the <i>Iron Duke</i> was once
+more taken in hand, and ships were given the opportunity
+of overhauling and adjusting machinery, steam being
+put back to longer notice than had previously been
+possible. The anti-submarine defence was continually
+strengthened and improved during the stay of the Fleet,
+and the colliers supporting it were gradually replaced by
+trawlers and drifters.</p>
+
+<p>In order to give the men some much-needed diversion
+and exercise a pulling regatta was organised and held on
+October 26th, and the men were landed for route marches<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span>
+as frequently as possible during the stay of the ships at
+Lough Swilly.</p>
+
+<p>On the 26th a submarine was reported inside
+Cromarty harbour, but Sir David Beatty, who was there
+with the battle cruisers, stated, after investigation, that
+he did not consider the report was true.</p>
+
+<p>Discussions took place with the Admiralty during the
+stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly on the subject of
+trawlers for the patrol of the Minches and vicinity, and
+the requirements were given as thirty-six trawlers for this
+service, which was considered next in importance to the
+provision of an adequate patrol force of this nature for
+the waters in the vicinity of the bases at Scapa Flow
+and Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>The stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly was rendered
+memorable by the unfortunate loss of the <i>Audacious</i>,
+then one of our most modern battleships.</p>
+
+<p>Orders had been given to the 2nd Battle Squadron to
+carry out target practice against the two battle practice
+targets obtained from Lamlash, and the squadron left
+Loch-na-Keal on the evening of October 26th for a
+rendezvous in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 8.30 W., at daylight
+on the 27th, where the targets which had left Lough
+Swilly in tow of two tugs, the <i>Plover</i> and <i>Flying Condor</i>,
+escorted by the light cruiser <i>Liverpool</i>, were to be met.</p>
+
+<p>The squadron was in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 8.30 W.
+at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 27th, preparing for the practice, when
+at that hour the <i>Audacious</i> struck a mine whilst turning.
+The explosion resulted in the flooding of the port
+engine-room and partly flooding the centre engine-room.
+It was not clear at the time whether the ship had been
+mined or torpedoed. The <i>Monarch</i> having reported sighting
+a submarine at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, a precautionary signal was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span>
+made to Sir George Warrender to keep the squadron
+clear of the <i>Audacious</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers and
+other small craft were sent from Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal
+to assist the <i>Audacious</i> and to prevent the submarine
+(if one were present) from doing further damage;
+and the armed boarding steamer <i>Cambria</i> escorted the
+collier <i>Thornhill</i> (provided with towing hawsers) to the
+scene. The hospital-ship <i>Soudan</i> was ordered out to give
+help to survivors in case the <i>Audacious</i> sank or to the
+injured, and the <i>Liverpool</i> was directed to stand by her,
+but to keep moving at high speed. The battleship
+<i>Exmouth</i> was put at “short notice” ready to tow the
+<i>Audacious</i> in if necessary. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis
+Bayly, commanding the 1st Battle Squadron, came on
+board the <i>Iron Duke</i> to suggest that he should proceed to
+the scene to render any assistance, an offer of which I
+very gladly availed myself, as Sir George Warrender, in
+the 2nd Battle Squadron, could not close the ship whilst
+the danger of submarine attack existed.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after the <i>Audacious</i> struck the mine, the
+s.s. <i>Olympic</i>, on passage from the United States to Liverpool,
+closed the ship on learning of the disaster, and
+Captain Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., who was in command,
+at once volunteered to help in any way possible. Captain
+Dampier, of the <i>Audacious</i>, asked that his ship might be
+taken in tow and brought into Lough Swilly, and Captain
+Haddock, disregarding the danger of submarine attack or
+of being mined, took immediate steps to carry out this
+request. Unfortunately a considerable sea was running,
+which increased during the day. In spite of the most magnificent
+and seamanlike handling of the <i>Olympic</i> by
+Captain Haddock, and later in the day excellent work on
+the part of the master of the <i>Thornhill</i>, the hawsers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span>
+constantly parted, owing to the state of the sea and the
+weight of the <i>Audacious</i>, the stern of that ship being
+almost awash by the afternoon. The two ships were
+worked in a manner which Sir Lewis Bayly reported as
+beyond praise. The attempts to tow the injured ship had
+to be abandoned before dark, and Sir Lewis Bayly,
+Captain Dampier and the few officers and men who had
+remained on board to work the hawsers, etc., were taken
+off the <i>Audacious</i> by 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The remainder of the
+ship’s company had been removed without accident, in
+spite of the heavy sea, in the course of the day by destroyers,
+trawlers, and other small craft, and in the boats
+of the <i>Audacious</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The work of the destroyers on this occasion was, as
+usual, of the greatest value, and the exceedingly seamanlike
+handling of the <i>Fury</i> by Lieutenant-Commander
+Sumner, who, in the teeth of the greatest difficulties, took
+heavy wire towing hawsers between the <i>Audacious</i> and
+the towing ships on several occasions, elicited from
+Sir Lewis Bayly expressions of warm admiration.
+Arrangements were made for the <i>Liverpool</i> to stand by
+the <i>Audacious</i> during the night, but at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> she suddenly
+blew up with great violence and sank. The cause
+of this explosion was never ascertained with certainty.
+At the time the ship blew up the <i>Liverpool</i> was not far
+distant, and a good deal of <i lang="fr">débris</i> fell on the deck of that
+ship, killing one petty officer. This was the only casualty
+due to the loss of the <i>Audacious</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, at 1.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, information reached me from
+Kingstown that the s.s. <i>Manchester Commerce</i> had been
+sunk on the night of the 26th by a mine in the vicinity of
+the disaster to the <i>Audacious</i>, and at 4.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a report
+came from Malin Head that a four-masted sailing vessel,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span>
+the <i>Caldaff</i>, had also struck a mine in the neighbourhood
+on the previous night.</p>
+
+<p>These unfortunately belated reports disposed at once
+of any idea that submarines had attacked the <i>Audacious</i>,
+and at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Exmouth</i> sailed from Lough Swilly to
+attempt to tow her in. Steps had already been taken to
+warn outward and homeward bound vessels of the existence
+of the mine-field and to divert all traffic clear of it;
+and all mine-sweeping gunboats were ordered to Lough
+Swilly to locate the exact limits of the mine-field and to
+sweep a clear passage along the north coast of Ireland.</p>
+
+<p>On the arrival of the s.s. <i>Olympic</i> at Lough Swilly,
+orders were given that no communication between the
+ship and the shore was to take place. I wired to the
+Admiralty suggesting that the loss of the <i>Audacious</i>
+should be kept secret for as long as possible, so that the
+enemy should not learn of it, as the fact would afford
+him encouragement at a time when the military situation
+was extremely critical for the Allies, and also because, as
+a general policy, it was desirable to conceal from the
+enemy any serious losses of which he could otherwise have
+no immediate knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>This procedure was approved for the time, because of
+the military situation, and the <i>Olympic</i> was kept at Lough
+Swilly for several days. This was necessary as she had
+on board a considerable number of United States passengers,
+and it was known that they had taken photographs
+of the <i>Audacious</i> in a sinking condition.</p>
+
+<p>Amongst these passengers was Mr. Schwab, of the
+Bethlehem Steel Company, and it was made known to me
+after a day or two that he had come over on very important
+business connected with War Office contracts, and
+wished to proceed to London. After an interview with
+him, this was agreed to, and I asked him to call on Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span>
+Fisher of the Admiralty in connection with the construction
+of some submarines which I ascertained from him
+that his firm was in a position to build very rapidly and
+which would be of the greatest value to us. He did this,
+and with the most satisfactory results, as ten submarines
+were constructed—as he promised—in the extraordinarily
+short space of five months. These vessels were most useful
+to us later.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough
+Swilly during the remainder of October; the 2nd Battle
+Squadron proceeded to Lamlash on the 29th to coal, and
+to Lough Swilly on November 1st; the 3rd Battle Squadron
+went to Scapa on the 27th; and the 6th Battle Squadron
+to Lough Swilly.</p>
+
+<p>On October 27th a trawler reported very suspicious
+movements on the part of a large steamer to the westward
+of the island of Sule Skerry (west of the Orkneys). It
+appeared possible that the ship might be a German mine-layer,
+and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa was
+sent to a position 120 miles from Fair Island on the Fair
+Island—Heligoland line, to intercept her on returning,
+with orders that, at daylight on the 29th, she should
+spread widely and sweep towards Fair Island, then
+sweeping over to the Norwegian coast near Jaederen’s
+Point, spreading at daylight on the 30th and sweeping
+up a line approximately N. 15 W. from Heligoland,
+before returning to Scapa. Destroyers of the 4th
+Flotilla were also sent out from Scapa on the 28th in
+search of the suspected vessel, and the 3rd and 10th
+Cruiser Squadrons were disposed so as to cut her off if
+she passed to the north of the Shetlands. The ship was
+not sighted, and no mines had been laid.</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet was considerably weakened at this
+time apart from the loss of the <i>Audacious</i>. The <i>Ajax</i> had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span>
+developed condenser defects; the <i>Iron Duke</i> had similar
+troubles; the <i>Orion</i> had to be sent to Greenock for
+examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to
+be defective; the <i>Conqueror</i> was at Devonport refitting,
+and the <i>New Zealand</i> was in dock at Cromarty. The
+<i>Erin</i> and <i>Agincourt</i>, having been newly commissioned,
+could not yet be regarded as efficient, so that the Dreadnought
+Fleet only consisted of 17 effective battleships
+and 5 battle cruisers; the German Dreadnought Fleet
+at the time comprised 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers,
+with the <i>Blücher</i> in addition. The margin of superiority
+was, therefore, unpleasantly small in view of the fact
+that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and the
+Grand Fleet only 42.</p>
+
+<p>During the stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly numerous
+reports of the presence of submarines on the west
+coast of Scotland were received, a large number of the
+reports coming from the coast watchers. Destroyers were
+sent on many occasions to search the localities from which
+the reports emanated, and the various harbours that
+could be used by submarines as a base were frequently
+examined. At this period it was considered possible
+that enemy submarines, acting so far from their home
+ports as the west coast of Scotland, would be working
+from a short or from a floating base. It was not thought—from
+experience with our own submarines—that they
+would be self-supporting at this distance, and the best
+method of limiting their activities, if not destroying the
+submarines, was to find their base. Later experience,
+and a closer knowledge of German submarines, however,
+showed that they were independent of such bases.</p>
+
+<p>It is very doubtful whether any enemy submarines
+passed to the westward of Scotland during October. We,
+at any rate, found no certain evidence that they were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span>
+present, in spite of the very numerous reports of their
+being sighted. Similarly, reports were constantly being
+received of air-craft (both Zeppelins and aeroplanes)
+being seen in the north of Scotland; many of the rumours
+were of the most circumstantial nature, some coming
+even from warships. It is quite certain that these reports
+were founded on optical illusions, and it may be said that
+little credence was attached to them at the time.</p>
+
+<p>But the currency of many rumours in those early days
+of the War, sometimes supported by statements of the
+most plausible character, were not only embarrassing, but
+frequently involved a great deal of unproductive cruising,
+for it was impossible to ignore anything which would
+enable us to find out the enemy’s movements or intentions.</p>
+
+<p>At the end of October, news came of the unfortunate
+wreck of the hospital ship <i>Rohilla</i> off Whitby, with considerable
+loss of life.</p>
+
+<p>About this time the German land forces occupied
+the Belgian coast. The effect of this occupation on naval
+strategy was considered in the Grand Fleet, and Sir Lewis
+Bayly and I discussed the blocking of Zeebrugge by sinking
+ships across the channel. Sir Lewis Bayly considered
+the scheme feasible, and wrote to me on the subject. I
+then suggested to the Admiralty that such an operation
+should be carried out. It was not considered practicable
+by the Admiralty at the time. It is perhaps of interest
+to note that the subject was discussed as early as 1914.</p>
+
+<p>Some two years later I caused the question to be reconsidered
+after taking up the appointment of First Sea
+Lord at the Admiralty (it had been under consideration
+between 1914 and 1917). More than one plan was discussed
+between Admiral Bacon (commanding the Dover
+patrol) and myself; one idea, which I favoured, was to
+utilise ships of the “Apollo” class, cutting down their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span>
+upper works to render them less visible during approach.
+Meanwhile, other schemes for driving the enemy
+from the Belgian coast were in operation, so the question of
+blocking was deferred. In September, 1917, when it became
+clear that the object in view would not be effected
+by military operations during that year, I gave directions
+to the Plans Division of the Naval Staff, of which Rear-Admiral
+Roger Keyes had recently become the head, that
+plans for blocking Zeebrugge were to be prepared; later,
+after considering an independent proposal by Sir Reginald
+Bacon for attacking the mole by landing parties
+from monitors run alongside it, I decided that the operation
+was to be combined with the landing on the Zeebrugge
+mole. The main objective for the landing was
+the destruction of enemy destroyers known to be lying
+alongside the mole, and I considered that this landing
+would also be very useful in creating a diversion to facilitate
+the approach of the block ships. The scheme was
+eventually approved by me in November, 1917, and the
+training of the storming party and selection of the block
+ships were taken in hand.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI"><span id="toclink_155"></span>CHAPTER VI<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">INCIDENTS AT SEA—NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">On</span> November 1st I left Lough Swilly to confer at the
+Admiralty with the First Lord and the First Sea Lord,
+Lord Fisher, who had relieved the Marquis of Milford
+Haven in this post. During this conference, held on
+November 2nd, the requirements of trawlers, drifters,
+etc., for the patrol of the vicinity of the various fleet
+bases, the Minches, and the waters surrounding the
+Orkneys and Shetlands were discussed at length and
+decisions reached. The defence of the bases was also considered.
+I stated that the requirements of patrol vessels
+for the Orkney and Shetland areas were a total of 72,
+and for the Minches of 36.</p>
+
+<p>The future general naval policy was also discussed,
+one of the main questions being that of the 3rd and
+6th Battle Squadrons joining the Channel Fleet. It
+was determined that this step should be taken and the
+necessary orders were given. I agreed to it with some
+reluctance, as there was obviously no prospect of the 3rd
+Battle Squadron being able to join the Dreadnought
+Fleet before a Fleet action if stationed in southern waters,
+and a dispersion of the Fleet, which resulted in the main
+Battle Fleet having but a slender preponderance of
+strength over the High Sea Fleet, was a measure which
+was open to considerable objection. The increasing
+necessity for refitting our ships, which involved sending
+them as far away as Portsmouth or Devonport, combined
+with the failures in condenser tubes that were occurring,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span>
+led to two, or three, or even more battleships being absent
+at a time, on passage, laid up, or refitting. At the
+German selected moment, our main Battle Fleet might
+well at this period have been reduced to 18 ships (all
+Dreadnoughts), whilst the High Sea Fleet was just
+rising to a strength of 16 Dreadnoughts and 16 pre-Dreadnoughts.</p>
+
+<p>Later, however, after the raid on East Coast towns,
+the 3rd Battle Squadron was again detached from the
+Channel Fleet and based on Rosyth, with the 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron; the two squadrons arrived there on
+November 20th after passing west of Ireland and coaling
+at Scapa. The 6th Battle Squadron remained in southern
+waters. The object which it was desired to attain by this
+last distribution, which was ordered from the Admiralty,
+was to have a naval force based farther south than Scapa,
+to be more immediately available in the case of an attempt
+by the enemy to land a hostile force on our east
+coast.</p>
+
+<p>I returned to Lough Swilly at noon, November 3rd,
+and found the Fleet under orders from the Admiralty to
+proceed to Scapa at once. These orders were cancelled
+after my arrival, and the movements of the Battle Fleet
+left to my discretion. I proceeded to sea with the 1st,
+2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons at 3.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and, passing
+south of Tory Island, made for the vicinity of the Bills
+Rocks on the coast of Galway, for target practice, which
+was carried out on the 4th, the Fleet then proceeding to
+the northward.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet was screened out of Lough Swilly
+by the 2nd Flotilla, which then left for Scapa. This
+flotilla had been employed during the stay at Lough Swilly
+in providing patrols off the entrance and in hunting for
+submarines, reports of which were very frequent.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p>
+
+<p>Prior to leaving Lough Swilly, news arrived from the
+Admiralty that the light cruiser <i>Undaunted</i>, of the
+Harwich force, was being chased by several German
+vessels in southern waters, and that hostile battle cruisers
+had been sighted off Gorleston. These occurrences had,
+presumably, led to the ordering of the Fleet to Scapa.
+As it was thought that the operations of the German
+battle cruisers might be part of a general movement,
+orders were sent to the 3rd Battle Squadron to join the
+Commander-in-Chief at Scapa, the 1st and 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadrons being directed to proceed with all
+dispatch towards Heligoland, with the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons were ordered
+to Scapa to coal, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+to the Shetlands for the same purpose, ready for eventualities.
+These orders were cancelled when it became
+apparent that the German movement was local, and that
+our ships would be too late to intercept the enemy. On
+this occasion, the German cruiser <i>Yorck</i>, when returning
+to port, struck a German mine and sank.</p>
+
+<p>The base at Loch-na-Keal was abandoned when the
+Fleet left Lough Swilly, and the obstructions removed
+by the battleship <i>Illustrious</i>.</p>
+
+<p>On November 3rd the Admiralty issued a general notice
+proclaiming the North Sea as an area in which hostile
+operations were being carried out, and pointing out the
+danger incurred by neutral vessels which entered the North
+Sea without first ascertaining the steps necessary for
+safety.</p>
+
+<p>On November 5th the <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i> left
+Cromarty for Devonport by Admiralty orders, prior to
+proceeding to search for Admiral von Spee’s squadron
+in the South Atlantic. This order, the necessity for
+which was apparent, and the subsequent results of which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span>
+were undoubtedly of high value, had, however, the effect
+of still further weakening the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle
+Squadrons cruised between the Hebrides, Faroe Islands
+and Shetlands after November 4th, and carried out gunnery
+practices and battle exercises as opportunity occurred.
+The 1st Battle Squadron was sent to Scapa to
+coal on the 7th, the 2nd Battle Squadron on the 8th, and
+the <i>Iron Duke</i> and 4th Battle Squadron arrived there on
+the 9th.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were engaged
+on blockade work during this period.</p>
+
+<p>On November 6th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and one-half of the
+4th Flotilla, was sent from Cromarty to carry out a sweep
+of the North Sea, passing through the following positions,
+namely:</p>
+
+<table id="t158" class="narrow section">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr">1.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lat. 56.0</td>
+  <td class="tdl">N.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">Long. 1.30</td>
+  <td class="tdl">E.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr">2.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lat. 57.50</td>
+  <td class="tdl">N.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">Long. 5.0</td>
+  <td class="tdl">E.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr">3.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lat. 60.10</td>
+  <td class="tdl">N.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">Long. 3.15</td>
+  <td class="tdl">E.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr">4.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lat. 61.20</td>
+  <td class="tdl">N.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">Long. 3.0</td>
+  <td class="tdl">E.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr">5.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lat. 61.0</td>
+  <td class="tdl">N.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">Long. 1.0</td>
+  <td class="tdl">E.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr">6.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lat. 58.50</td>
+  <td class="tdl">N.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr"> </td>
+  <td class="tdl">Long. 0.0</td>
+  <td class="tdl">.</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="in0">thence the Battle Cruiser Squadron and destroyers were
+to go to Cromarty and the light cruisers to Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>The new battle cruiser <i>Tiger</i>, which had been working
+up gunnery and torpedo practices at Bantry Bay in
+the south of Ireland, arrived at Scapa on November 6th to
+continue her practices and to join the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron. It was felt that she would prove a very welcome
+reinforcement when efficient, since the departure
+of the <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i> had left us in a questionable
+position with regard to battle cruisers as compared
+with the Germans.</p>
+
+<p>After the Battle Fleet left Lough Swilly, and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span>
+consequence of information sent to me by Admiral Colville
+as to the slow progress being made with the submarine
+obstructions, orders were given to the various ships to
+prepare sections of rope net submarine detectors for use
+in the entrances to Scapa Flow, and these were rapidly
+placed in position by the Fleet in Hoxa, Switha and Hoy
+Sounds when the ships arrived at Scapa, armed trawlers
+being detailed to watch each section. It was very disappointing
+to find on returning to the base that so little
+headway had been made with the supply of material for
+the permanent submarine wire net obstruction, and that
+the Fleet was still, therefore, open to submarine attack.
+The increase in the number of patrol trawlers, however,
+for service in the vicinity of the base gave some protection
+to the entrances, and relieved the hard-pressed destroyers
+to a welcome extent.</p>
+
+<p>At this time the watching and blockading cruisers
+were disposed in areas between the Shetland Islands,
+Faroe Islands, and Iceland and to the north-westward of
+the Hebrides, but the whole of the cruisers were beginning
+to show signs of overwork.</p>
+
+<p>The Rear-Admiral commanding the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron reported that all his ships, which were very old,
+were showing increasing signs of needing thorough repair
+at a dockyard, and arrangements were put in hand for
+sending them, three at a time, to the Clyde. In addition,
+the <i>Antrim</i>, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, reported condenser
+defects; the <i>Drake</i>, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron,
+was at Scapa making good defects, which were constantly
+developing, and the <i>King Alfred</i> and <i>Leviathan</i>,
+of the same squadron, were refitting at dockyard ports.
+In spite of these incidents, however, large numbers of
+steamers were being intercepted daily by cruisers, battleships
+and destroyers, and sent into Kirkwall for examination.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span>
+About this time the increase in the number of
+patrol craft at Scapa made it necessary to add considerably
+to the administrative organisation at that base, and
+requests were sent to the Admiralty to provide depôt ships
+for the local defence destroyers, the patrol trawlers, and
+the other small craft, as well as adequate administrative
+staffs.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa
+until November 17th with steam ready at from two to
+three hours’ notice, and on that date the 2nd Battle
+Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron, and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a half
+flotilla as a screen, left their bases to take up positions for
+preventing a suspected attempt on the part of the enemy
+to send some ships into the Atlantic. The 2nd Battle
+Squadron worked to the westward, and the remaining
+vessels to the eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
+returned to Scapa on the 20th and the 2nd Battle Squadron
+and 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the 21st.</p>
+
+<p>A heavy gale was experienced in the northern part of
+the North Sea and in the waters surrounding the Orkneys
+and Shetlands from November 11th to November 13th,
+and all work in the harbour had to be suspended, ships
+lying with steam up, whilst at sea most of the cruisers
+were obliged to lay to. At Scapa all the sea-plane sheds
+were wrecked by the gale, and the sea-planes damaged.</p>
+
+<p>During this stay of the Battle Fleet at Scapa the
+routine was introduced of carrying out gunnery and torpedo
+practices inside the harbour, two or three ships being
+under way at a time for the purpose. This routine was
+subsequently carried out whenever the Fleet, or any portion
+of it, was at Scapa and the greatest possible benefit
+was derived from it. It was found possible to carry out<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span>
+practice from all guns, up to and including 6-inch, inside
+the harbour by day and night, besides the ordinary sub-calibre
+firing and torpedo practices by ships, and by destroyers
+attacking ships, or divisions of ships.</p>
+
+<p>On November 11th, the battle cruiser <i>Princess Royal</i>
+sailed for Halifax, by Admiralty orders, for the purpose
+of strengthening the North American Squadron in operations
+against Admiral von Spee’s squadron, should it
+appear in northern waters. I protested, as Commander-in-Chief,
+against sending so powerful a ship as the <i>Princess
+Royal</i>, armed with 13.5-inch guns, since her absence left
+our Battle Cruiser Squadron inferior in strength to the
+German battle cruiser force. I suggested that the <i>New
+Zealand</i>, carrying 12-inch guns, was, owing to her economical
+coal consumption, more suited to the work required
+and strong enough for the purpose. However, the
+<i>Princess Royal</i> sailed and remained absent from the North
+Sea until the beginning of January, 1915.</p>
+
+<p>At this period, reports of enemy submarines being
+sighted, more particularly by shore observers in the
+Hebrides, Orkneys and Shetlands, were very numerous,
+and destroyers and patrol craft were frequently being sent
+to search suspected bases or sheltered bays in which submarines
+might be taking refuge. All such searches were,
+however, fruitless, although in many cases the reports
+were very circumstantial and convincing.</p>
+
+<p>On November 18th the mine-sweeping gunboats,
+whilst searching the Fair Island Channel, sighted a
+submarine on the surface and chased her at a speed of 18
+knots, but could not overhaul her. The submarine subsequently
+dived. This incident was the first practical
+proof of the high surface speed possessed by German
+submarines.</p>
+
+<p>Destroyers were sent out immediately from Scapa to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span>
+assist in the search, with orders to use their searchlights
+after dark in order to force the submarine to keep under
+water and so exhaust her batteries. The search, however,
+proved abortive, although continued for 24 hours. The
+use of searchlights for this purpose, begun on this occasion,
+became common later on.</p>
+
+<p>A submarine was sighted by the 2nd Battle Squadron
+at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 19th, well to the westward of the
+Orkneys, and this may have been the vessel chased by
+the mine-sweepers.</p>
+
+<p>During the gale on November 12th, the ships of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron—the old “Edgar” class of cruisers—which
+were on patrol between the Shetlands and Faroe
+Islands had suffered much damage, many of them showing
+signs of leaking and straining; boats and ventilators
+were washed away; and water in large quantities found
+its way below. It became evident that these old ships were
+not sufficiently seaworthy to withstand the winter gales
+of northern latitudes without first undergoing a thorough
+repair, and arrangements were made to send them, three
+at a time, to the Clyde for survey and refit. The survey
+of the first three, however, revealed that some months’
+work would be required to make them efficient for winter
+blockade duty, and it was then decided by the Admiralty
+to pay off the whole squadron, and to utilise the crews to
+commission armed merchant ships, which would be far
+more suitable, as they could keep the sea for much longer
+periods.</p>
+
+<p>The ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been
+using Swarbachs Minn, a harbour in the Shetland Islands,
+as an occasional coaling base. This was evacuated on
+November 20th in consequence of the receipt of a report
+that a submarine attack on the harbours in the Shetland
+Islands was probable, all of these harbours being, at that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span>
+time, defenceless against such attack. On leaving the
+base, the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, not already
+at a refitting port, were ordered to dockyard ports to pay
+off.</p>
+
+<p>On November 20th, during practice, a lyddite common
+shell detonated in one of the 9.2-inch guns of the <i>Achilles</i>,
+and the muzzle of the gun was blown off, eleven of the
+gun’s crew being injured. This occurrence cast doubt on
+the safety of the whole of the lyddite shell afloat, and
+restrictions on their use were issued, but were eventually
+removed, after the withdrawal of all suspected shell of
+this nature.</p>
+
+<p>At dusk on November 22nd the Grand Fleet left its
+bases for the purpose of carrying out a sweep of the
+North Sea, and to support an aerial operation in the
+Heligoland Bight. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were included in this
+movement, and met the remainder of the Fleet at sea at
+9.30 <i>A.M.</i> on November 23rd in Lat. 57.40 N., Long.
+2.30 E.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+2nd Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 6th Cruiser
+Squadron, and 2nd and 4th Flotillas, took part in the
+operation, the Fleet proceeding south in cruising order,
+with destroyers screening the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron against submarine attack by day. The
+channel eastward of the Pentland Firth was, as usual,
+searched by the mine-sweeping gunboats prior to the departure
+of the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The Commodore (T) from Harwich, with three Light
+Cruisers and eight destroyers, was directed to co-operate
+in the aerial operations. During daylight on the 23rd
+opportunity was taken to carry out two tactical exercises.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span>
+The <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position at midnight was Lat. 56.55 N.,
+Long. 4.11 E. Ships were ordered to be at action stations
+by dawn on the 24th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and a division of
+destroyers, was detached in the afternoon of the 23rd with
+directions to be in Lat. 55.10 N., Long. 6.20 E. by 5.30
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 24th.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Drake</i> reported her port engine disabled at 1
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 23rd, and had consequently to be sent back
+to Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>During the night the Admiralty informed me that the
+aerial operations had been abandoned, as it was thought
+that the enemy had a force present in the Bight, which
+would be too strong for our detached vessels. I then
+directed the Commodore (T) to meet the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron at its daylight position in Lat. 54.50 N., Long.
+7.6 E., and thence to proceed towards Heligoland and
+endeavour to draw any enemy forces that might be encountered
+towards our Fleet. The 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed
+also to proceed to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to give any
+necessary support.</p>
+
+<p>The weather on the 24th was fine and bright with
+high visibility. The Commodore (T) reconnoitred Heligoland
+and reported at 10.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that there was smoke
+behind the island, and ships steaming to the southward;
+and that he had sighted a submarine. The Rear-Admiral
+of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that he
+had only sighted destroyers, and that he could not draw
+the enemy towards him, and so was returning to the
+northward with Commodore (T). The Vice-Admiral of
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, who was supporting,
+turned to the northward shortly afterwards, his noon position
+being Lat. 54.47 N., Long. 6.35 E. The 2nd Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span>
+Squadron was attacked at 12.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> by an aeroplane,
+which dropped five bombs near the <i>Liverpool</i>, which was
+in company.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet cruised in support, the 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> position
+of the <i>Iron Duke</i> being Lat. 55.23 N., Long. 5.30
+E. At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Fleet turned to the north-westward,
+sighting the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron astern at
+3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The battle cruisers and light cruisers were
+stationed 15 miles to the eastward of the Battle Fleet
+during the night, and the necessary dispositions were taken
+to provide against a destroyer attack during the night.</p>
+
+<p>On November 25th two more tactical exercises were
+carried out. During the afternoon the wind increased,
+and thick weather set in, and by daylight on the 26th a
+heavy southerly gale was blowing, so the attached cruisers
+were sent to the bases for shelter. The 1st Battle Squadron,
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, and the destroyers, had been detached
+at midnight on the 25th for Scapa, Rosyth and Invergordon
+respectively. The original intention was to take
+the remainder of the Fleet farther north for target practice,
+but it was abandoned owing to the bad weather,
+and the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons
+and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa on the
+27th.</p>
+
+<p>During the absence of the Fleet, the German submarine
+U 18 was rammed at 12.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> November 24th
+by mine-sweeping trawler No. 96, one mile off the Hoxa
+entrance to Scapa. U 18 was damaged in the collision,
+dived, hit the bottom and received further damage. All
+the available patrol craft were ordered to the spot most
+promptly by the Vice-Admiral commanding the Orkneys
+and Shetlands and hunted her. She finally came to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span>
+surface and surrendered off Muckle Skerry in the Pentland
+Firth. The submarine sank as the crew came on
+deck, the sea cocks, probably, having been previously
+opened. The commanding officer of the submarine, who
+had apparently intended to try to enter Scapa Flow,
+expressed great surprise to Admiral Colville at the absence
+of the Fleet. It seemed possible that he had been
+deterred from his attempt by the sight of the buoys across
+the entrance, probably suspecting the presence of an obstruction
+which, however, was <em>not</em> there. The sinking
+of the submarine caused the greatest gratification to the
+local defence forces at Scapa and acted as an incentive
+to further efforts. It was also, probably, a deterrent
+to further attacks on the Fleet at Scapa, as the circumstances
+in which U 18 was sunk were kept most secret in
+order that the enemy might be led to think that her destruction
+was due to nets or mines. Indeed, it is very likely that
+this incident and the secrecy observed had important results
+in preventing the loss of ships of the Grand Fleet when
+at anchor in Scapa Flow.</p>
+
+<p>Great submarine activity occurred at this time in the
+vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands. The <i>Dryad</i>
+sighted a submarine on the 24th in Lat. 58.35 N., Long.
+1.45 W.; a second was sighted by an armed trawler off
+Copinsay on the same day; and a third was sighted from
+the shore, proceeding to the eastward through the Pentland
+Firth. On the 25th U 16 was sighted by a collier
+and trawler in Lat. 58.46 N., Long. 2.15 W., and later
+by the mine-sweeping gunboat <i>Skipjack</i> not far from this
+position.</p>
+
+<p>On the return of the Fleet arrangements were made
+for constructing, with Fleet resources, net obstructions
+across the Hoy entrance to Scapa Flow, and, in view of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span>
+the attempt of U 18, all patrols were stiffened to the utmost
+extent possible.</p>
+
+<p>During November 27th and 28th the strong gale continued,
+interfering considerably with the work on the
+submarine obstructions. Several reports of the sighting
+of submarines in harbours in the north of Scotland, the
+Orkneys and Shetlands were received during the last days
+of November, and destroyers and patrol craft were kept
+very busy in searching the various bays and harbours.
+In many cases charges were exploded on the bottom in
+bays in which it was considered that a submarine might
+be lying, in the hope of forcing her to the surface. No
+known result, however, was obtained.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet remained in the various bases until the end
+of the month, the ships in Scapa Flow carrying out gunnery
+and torpedo practices and working at the obstructions.
+The <i>King George V.</i>, which had just returned
+from refit at a dockyard, developed condenser defects
+necessitating partial retubing; she was the fourth battleship
+in which this defect had occurred since the War
+started, a period of only four months, and it will be realised
+that such wholesale breakdowns caused me uneasiness.</p>
+
+<p>During November the work of sinking block-ships in
+all the entrance channels to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa
+and Hoy entrances, was carried out. Unfortunately the
+block-ships had been sent up in a light condition without
+cement ballast which, I was informed, could not be supplied,
+and they began in many cases to break up or to
+shift their position during the winter gales. This fact,
+combined with the great difficulty experienced in sinking
+them in the exact positions required owing to the strong
+tides prevailing (up to at least eight knots in strength),
+and the very short periods of slack water, rendered the
+work of blocking only partially effective.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span></p>
+
+<p>At the end of November the effective state of the
+Grand Fleet was as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang3">
+<p class="center b1">Fleet-Flagship: the <i>Iron Duke</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+7 ships, the <i>Neptune</i> being away refitting.</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+7 ships, of which one, the <i>King George V.</i>, was disabled, retubing
+condensers.</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i> (Pre-Dreadnoughts):<br>
+7 ships, one ship refitting at twelve hours’ notice for steam,
+and the 8th ship returning from a dockyard refit.</p>
+
+<p><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+5 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (the <i>Princess Royal</i> having been detached to North
+America).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+3 ships. The <i>Shannon</i> was refitting.</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+5 ships. The <i>Liverpool</i> was refitting.</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Flotilla</i>:<br>
+15 destroyers (5 refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>4th Flotilla</i>:<br>
+15 destroyers (5 refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>10th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Nil</i> (paid off).</p>
+
+<p><i>Armed Merchant-Cruisers</i>:<br>
+2 (2 were coaling at Liverpool).</p>
+
+<p><i>Mine-sweeping Gunboats</i>:<br>
+5 (3 were refitting).</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The two new battleships, the <i>Emperor of India</i> and
+<i>Benbow</i>, the former flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A.
+L. Duff, C.B., had arrived at Berehaven in the south of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span>
+Ireland on December 1st to “work up” after commissioning.
+On the same date the <i>Leviathan</i> arrived at
+Cromarty to act as flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron
+under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir A.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;W. Moore.
+His flag was transferred to her from the <i>New Zealand</i> on
+December 2nd.</p>
+
+<p>On the night of December 2nd a very violent gale
+sprang up at Scapa Flow, during which several ships
+dragged their anchors, in spite of two anchors being down
+and steam up; the gale lasted until the morning of the
+4th. All communication between ships in Scapa Flow,
+even by drifter, was suspended, and the light cruisers at
+sea on patrol were forced to lie to. An officer and one
+man were washed overboard from a picket-boat sheltering
+under the stern of a store-ship and drowned.</p>
+
+<p>On December 3rd Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair,
+lately in command of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, hoisted
+his flag in the armed merchant ship <i>Alsatian</i> to command
+the merchant cruisers attached to the Grand Fleet, which
+were now constituted as the new 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>At 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on December 3rd the destroyer <i>Garry</i>,
+Commander W.&nbsp;W. Wilson, of the local defence force,
+reported that she was engaging a submarine at the Holm
+Sound entrance to Scapa Flow. This submarine was
+possibly sheltering there from the bad weather. Destroyers
+and trawlers were at once sent out to assist,
+and the submarine was last reported diving to seaward.
+Several rounds from her 12-pounder gun were fired by
+the <i>Garry</i> at the submarine’s conning tower, but apparently
+without effect, and an attempt to ram her also
+failed owing to the heavy sea and very strong tides. The
+submarine and the <i>Garry</i> fired torpedoes at one another,
+the submarine’s torpedo passing under the stern of the
+<i>Garry</i>. All ships were directed to raise steam for leaving<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span>
+harbour on receipt of the first report from the Garry,
+from which it was not clear whether the submarine had
+passed through Holm Sound into the harbour, but this
+order was cancelled when it was ascertained that she was
+outside.</p>
+
+<p>On December 4th all the mine-sweeping gunboats
+attached to the Grand Fleet were sent to Sheerness by
+Admiralty direction for the purpose of carrying out
+sweeping operations off the coast of Belgium; trawlers
+were then the only sweeping vessels left with the Grand
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>On December 5th another heavy gale was experienced,
+lasting until the following morning, and all small craft at
+sea were forced to shelter.</p>
+
+<p>In consequence of representations made to the Admiralty
+of the inadequacy of the mine-sweeping force at
+this time attached to the Grand Fleet, owing to the
+withdrawal of the gunboats, steps were taken to fit out
+eight small steamers for the purpose, and I was informed
+that they would arrive on various dates during the month
+of December. These vessels did not prove very satisfactory
+as mine-sweepers in northern waters, and were
+withdrawn later for use in the Mediterranean.</p>
+
+<p>During the stay of the Fleet in Scapa Flow work on
+the improvised submarine obstructions was continued by
+naval parties with all possible speed, and, meanwhile,
+work on the permanent obstructions was in hand, though
+progressing but slowly, owing to the difficulty experienced
+in fitting out the trawlers at Inverness with the necessary
+winches and providing the required moorings.</p>
+
+<p>On December 6th bad weather was again experienced.
+Orders were issued on this date for a sweep down the
+North Sea, but were cancelled on receipt of information
+from the Admiralty that the recent bad weather had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span>
+caused a very large number of mines to break adrift in
+the southern portion of the North Sea. On the same day
+the light cruiser <i>Sappho</i> and three armed boarding
+steamers were sent to Loch Ewe and based there with
+orders to work north-west of the Hebrides for the interception
+of trade; the force of armed boarding steamers
+was increased later. These vessels were mostly Irish mail
+packets. Rather extensive alterations were necessary,
+after they had been sent up, before they were fit for their
+duties.</p>
+
+<p>During the early part of December the ships of the
+2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron were mainly engaged in Areas 3, 4 and 6; the
+3rd Cruiser Squadron was at Rosyth and working to the
+eastward from that base.</p>
+
+<p>On December 7th Rear-Admiral Sir A.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;W.
+Moore, K.C.B., assumed command of the newly constituted
+1st Cruiser Squadron, and the <i>Leviathan</i> and
+<i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> arrived at Scapa on that date; the
+<i>Warrior</i> and <i>Black Prince</i>, with the above ships, comprised
+the squadron. On December 7th, two merchant
+ships, the s.s. <i>Michigan</i> and <i>City of Oxford</i>, disguised as
+men-of-war, arrived at Scapa. These vessels, with
+several others, had been fitted out at Belfast by Admiralty
+orders with dummy turrets and guns, and altered with a
+view to representing certain British battleships and battle
+cruisers. The whole of these were formed into a squadron
+under the command of Commodore Haddock, C.B.,
+R.N.R., of <i>Olympic</i> fame, and termed the Special Service
+Squadron. The disguise of the ships was carried out
+very cleverly, though presumably at considerable expense.
+They would have been of value had it been possible to
+select vessels of a suitable speed, but the highest speed
+attainable by any vessel in the squadron was not more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span>
+than nine to ten knots, whilst the speed of the squadron
+as a whole did not exceed seven knots. The ships
+could not under these conditions accompany the Fleet
+to sea, and it was very difficult to find a use for them
+in home waters. Commodore Haddock was, later, detached
+with the squadron to Loch Ewe, where the ships
+were worked up to carry out fleet movements. This he
+did most successfully, so that, had the ships possessed
+the requisite speed, use might have been made of them
+as a squadron for various decoy purposes. But, under
+the conditions existing, this was impossible, and eventually
+the squadron was disbanded with the exception of
+one vessel; the experiment was tried of sending her to
+sea disguised as a disabled man-of-war with a considerable
+heel to one side, and with patrol craft accompanying
+her as if for protection, in the hope that a submarine
+might be induced to attack her and so afford the patrols
+an opportunity of sinking the submarine.</p>
+
+<p>This scheme, however, met with no success. All the
+vessels were restored to their original conditions for trading
+purposes, with the exception of some which were sent
+to the Mediterranean and to North America, where it was
+reported that they were of some use.</p>
+
+<p>On December 8th another gale was experienced. The
+<i>Thunderer</i>, which had developed condenser defects, left
+for Devonport on the 8th for refit and for retubing condensers;
+yet another case of this defect!</p>
+
+<p>On December 9th the 1st Battle Squadron proceeded
+to sea to cruise to the north-westward of the Shetland
+Islands and to carry out gunnery practices as convenient.
+In consequence of bad weather the Vice-Admiral sent the
+attached cruiser <i>Bellona</i> back to Scapa for shelter.</p>
+
+<p>On December 10th the new battleships <i>Benbow</i> and
+<i>Emperor of India</i> arrived from Berehaven to strengthen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span>
+the 4th Battle Squadron, and proved very welcome additions
+to the Fleet. They, as well as all other new ships
+joining, necessarily spent several weeks in practices before
+becoming efficient to join the Fleet at sea, or to take part
+in action. Owing to the hurried completion of these two
+ships, a great deal of fitting work was also required before
+they were in a proper condition, and this delayed their
+practices considerably. On the 11th another gale was
+experienced which lasted until the 14th. The weather
+during this period was very bad, and ships at sea (including
+the 1st Battle Squadron which returned to Scapa
+on the 12th) met with very bad weather. Destroyers on
+patrol were unable to maintain their stations and were
+forced to run for shelter, and one of them, the <i>Cockatrice</i>,
+suffered some damage.</p>
+
+<p>On the 12th the work of retubing the port condenser
+of the <i>King George V.</i> was completed; the starboard condenser
+was not taken in hand owing to the small margin
+of superiority of the Battle Fleet over the High Sea Fleet
+at this time.</p>
+
+<p>During this stay of the Battle Fleet some very necessary
+work in the ships of the “Iron Duke” class was
+partially carried out. These ships were the first modern
+battleships fitted with 6-inch guns for their secondary
+armament, and the gunports were very low. Early in the
+War it was found necessary to unship the ports altogether,
+as the sea washed them away constantly. Water then
+had free access to the inside of the ship through the opening
+between the revolving shield and the ship’s side, and,
+except in fine weather, water entered freely. In bad
+weather the water, as deep as three to four inches, was
+continually washing about the living decks and finding its
+way below through the open hatches, to the great discomfort
+of the ship’s company, who were continually wet, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span>
+to the detriment of efficiency. Arrangements were devised
+on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> to overcome this trouble,
+and steps taken to have all the necessary fittings made
+at various contractors’ yards. A partial bulkhead was
+fitted in rear of the guns to confine the water which entered
+the ship, and watertight indiarubber joints provided
+between the gun shields and the ship’s side. The
+result was satisfactory, and similar changes were made
+in the ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class and in the
+<i>Tiger</i>. The two after 6-inch guns, which were on the
+main deck level, were removed altogether at the first
+opportunity, and the ship’s side and armour completed in
+the after embrasure in all these ships, as it was apparent
+that these guns could never be worked at sea, being only
+a few feet above the water line. The guns themselves
+were mounted in new unarmoured casemates on the
+superstructure deck level. The work connected with the
+forward 6-inch guns was entirely carried out at Scapa,
+with the ships at short notice for steam, and in some
+cases the workmen remained in the ships and continued
+the work at sea.</p>
+
+<p>On December 12th serious defects in the boilers of
+the <i>Liverpool</i> became apparent and the speed of the ship
+was limited to 17 knots. This defect, which first showed
+itself in this ship, gradually affected the boilers of the
+same type in all ships so fitted, as they experienced a certain
+degree of wear, and from this time onwards there was
+usually one, and occasionally two, light cruisers paid off
+for the purpose of carrying out the necessary repairs
+which occupied a period of two or three months. This
+reduction in the number of efficient light cruisers was
+serious, at a time when our numbers compared badly with
+those possessed by the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>On December 14th directions were given to the 2nd<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span>
+Battle Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at
+Scapa, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty and
+all the available destroyers which were at that base,
+and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, to proceed
+to sea to meet at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.20 N., Long.
+0.10 W., at 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on December 15th, the force then
+to proceed to the southward with a view to sweeping
+the western portion of the North Sea. The 2nd Battle
+Squadron—without the <i>Thunderer</i>, which was refitting,
+and, therefore, comprising only six ships—left Scapa early
+on the 15th, but in passing through the Pentland Firth
+the attached cruisers <i>Blanche</i> and <i>Boadicea</i> were seriously
+damaged by the heavy sea running as the result of the late
+exceptional gales, and were forced to return. The
+<i>Boadicea</i> had her bridge washed away and lost several
+men swept overboard and drowned. This ship was sent
+to the Clyde for repairs; the damage to the <i>Blanche</i> being
+less was made good at Scapa. The number of destroyers
+accompanying the force was, unfortunately, very inadequate,
+the 2nd Battle Squadron being unprovided with
+any vessels of this class, as the weather conditions in the
+Pentland Firth made it out of the question for destroyers
+to go to sea from Scapa. It was decided not to postpone
+the sweep on this account. I ordered all available
+destroyers out from Cromarty in the hope that the weather
+conditions in the Moray Firth might be better than at
+Scapa; only seven were available, however, and I therefore
+asked the Admiralty to direct the Commodore (T),
+with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, to meet the
+northern force at a southern rendezvous at daylight on
+December 16th. This proposal was not carried out, however,
+the Harwich force, which was at sea, remaining a
+considerable distance to the southward.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the force was on passage to the southward, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span>
+destroyers <i>Lynx</i>, <i>Ambuscade</i>, <i>Unity</i>, <i>Hardy</i>, <i>Shark</i>,
+<i>Acasta</i> and <i>Spitfire</i>—which had left Cromarty with the
+battle cruisers and on reaching the rendezvous were stationed
+10 miles ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron—sighted
+and became engaged before daylight on December
+16th with a strong force of enemy destroyers, and,
+later, with one enemy cruiser and three light cruisers.
+The destroyers appeared to be screening ahead of the other
+vessels and both destroyers and cruisers were engaged by
+our small destroyer force. It was difficult to ascertain
+the result of the engagement so far as the German vessels
+were concerned, although the <i>Hardy</i> claimed to have hit
+a light cruiser at close range; the <i>Hardy’s</i> steering-gear
+was disabled by enemy fire, two men killed and one officer
+and 14 men wounded. The <i>Ambuscade</i> and <i>Lynx</i> were
+also holed, the <i>Lynx</i> having one man wounded. The
+<i>Hardy</i> finally withdrew under escort of the <i>Lynx</i>. The
+engagement caused our own destroyers to become scattered
+and separated from the Battle Squadron, and in
+the course of the day they proceeded to various east coast
+ports to repair and refuel, the <i>Hardy</i> being escorted to
+the Humber by the <i>Spitfire</i>. No report of this engagement
+reached me at the time. My first information of
+the presence of enemy forces in the vicinity of our coast
+was obtained by intercepting at 8.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a wireless message
+from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral commanding
+the 2nd Battle Squadron, timed 8.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, stating that
+Scarborough was being shelled. The Grand Fleet was at
+once ordered to raise steam, and left at 12.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, steering
+for a position Lat. 57 N., Long. 2.30 E. The weather
+had now moderated sufficiently to allow of destroyers accompanying
+the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile Sir George Warrender, who was in command
+of the 2nd Battle Squadron and was the senior<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span>
+officer of the forces at sea, on receipt of the Admiralty
+telegram had turned to the northward to endeavour to
+intercept the enemy forces on their return passage.
+Wireless signals were intercepted in the <i>Iron Duke</i> indicating
+that the scout <i>Patrol</i> was being engaged by two
+enemy battle cruisers and that battleships or battle
+cruisers were off Scarborough and light cruisers off
+Hartlepool. I knew that a gap between two mine-fields
+laid by the enemy off our coast existed between Lat.
+54.20 N. and 54.40 N. and concluded that any enemy
+forces operating off our coasts would pass through this
+gap. At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, therefore, after intercepting the various
+messages mentioned above, I reminded the Vice-Admiral
+of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the Vice-Admiral of the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by wireless that this gap
+existed, and that the enemy would probably emerge there,
+and Sir George Warrender at 10.26 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> directed Sir
+David Beatty to pass through the gap towards our coast.
+The Admiralty at 10.30 signalled, however, to the Vice-Admiral
+of the 2nd Battle Squadron that the enemy was
+probably returning towards Heligoland, and that he
+should keep outside the mine-fields and steer to cut off
+the enemy. Sir George Warrender then directed Sir
+David Beatty to obey this latter order.</p>
+
+<p>I had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea from
+Rosyth immediately on receipt of the first news of the
+enemy, and Vice-Admiral Bradford, whose squadron was
+at short notice for steam, left at 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> with directions
+from me to proceed to lat. 55.50 N., Long. 1.10 W.,
+my object being for this force to intercept the enemy
+should he pass out to the northward of the German minefields
+instead of through the gap between them.</p>
+
+<p>Sir George Warrender, with the 2nd Battle Squadron,
+the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being in company, was informed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span>
+of these dispositions by me. At 11.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> he signalled
+that at 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he would be in Lat. 54.24 N., Long.
+2.0 E. Sir David Beatty, with the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was to the
+north-westward of the Battle Squadron, and the Commodore
+(T) some 60 miles to the southward, having been
+ordered by the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron,
+at 10.28 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, to steer for a position in Lat. 54.20 N.,
+Long. 1.30 E. The weather throughout the whole morning
+had been very misty, with a visibility of about five
+miles, and sufficient sea to cause a great deal of spray
+when ships were steaming at high speed.</p>
+
+<p>At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, in the
+<i>Southampton</i> (1st Light Cruiser Squadron), sighted an
+enemy light cruiser and destroyers steering to the southward,
+gave chase with the <i>Birmingham</i> and engaged them;
+owing to the spray washing over the ship, and to the mist,
+no result was visible. Three other enemy light cruisers,
+or cruisers, were sighted to the south-westward shortly
+before 11.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, at about which time touch with these
+vessels was lost.</p>
+
+<p>At 12.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, German cruisers and destroyers were
+sighted in Lat. 54.23 N., Long. 2.14 E. by the 2nd
+Battle Squadron distant about five miles on a bearing
+north by west, steering to the eastward, having evidently
+come out through the gap in the mine-fields as was anticipated;
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at this time
+was some 15 miles north of the Battle Squadron. It
+seems probable that the German force passed either
+between our 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, or ahead of the former and astern of
+the latter. On sighting our Battle Squadron, which turned
+to close, the enemy steered to the northward and disappeared
+shortly afterwards in the mist, steaming at high<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span>
+speed, and without being engaged by the 2nd Battle
+Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron did not sight
+any enemy forces.</p>
+
+<p>The escape of the enemy’s force was most disappointing,
+seeing that our own squadrons were in a very favourable
+position for intercepting the raiders. Low visibility
+was the main reason for their escape, but the absence
+from the Battle Squadron (through the bad weather in
+the Pentland Firth) of its attached cruisers and of a
+sufficient force of destroyers was a contributory cause, as
+well as the fact of our light cruisers having lost touch with
+the enemy at 11.50.</p>
+
+<p>At 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron
+informed me of the main features of the position, and
+stated that he was in Lat. 54.43 N., Long. 1.55 E., steering
+to the northward, with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, adding
+that he had ordered the battle cruisers and light cruisers
+to rejoin him.</p>
+
+<p>At about 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Admiralty informed me that it
+was thought, from the information given by our directional
+stations, that other ships of the High Sea Fleet
+were probably at sea, and at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I gave all our forces
+a rendezvous at which to meet at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 17th.</p>
+
+<p>The force from Scapa, consisting of the 1st and 4th
+Battle Squadrons, with the 2nd Flotilla, and the 1st, 2nd
+and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, met at this time the force
+under Sir George Warrender, the 3rd Battle Squadron
+under Vice-Admiral E.&nbsp;E. Bradford, and the Commodore
+(T) with three light cruisers, and proceeded to the southward.
+During the afternoon of the 17th the Admiralty
+was able to ascertain (by directional wireless telegraphy)
+and to inform me that the ships of the High Sea Fleet,
+previously reported, were now in harbour.</p>
+
+<p>Opportunity was then taken of the whole Fleet being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span>
+in company with the Commodore (T) to carry out a battle
+exercise. At dusk the Commodore (T) was detached to
+Harwich, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron to Rosyth, the 2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd
+Flotilla to Scapa, and the <i>Marlborough</i> to Rosyth, for the
+purpose of allowing Sir Lewis Bayly and Sir Cecil Burney
+to exchange commands in accordance with orders received
+from the Admiralty by wireless telegraphy when at sea.</p>
+
+<p>The light cruiser <i>Bellona</i> and the flotilla leader <i>Broke</i>
+collided during the battle exercises, and were seriously
+damaged, being sent to Rosyth under the escort of the
+<i>Devonshire</i>.</p>
+
+<p>During the 17th wireless messages intercepted in the
+<i>Iron Duke</i> showed that the enemy raiding force had laid
+a large number of mines off the Yorkshire coast and that
+some British and neutral merchant ships had been sunk
+as a result.</p>
+
+<p>During December 18th the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron remained at sea to the eastward of the
+Orkneys, and in the evening the battleships shaped course
+for Scapa, arriving on the 19th, the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reaching
+Cromarty on the same day. The 1st and 2nd Cruiser
+Squadrons also proceeded to Cromarty, and the 6th
+Cruiser Squadron remained out on patrol.</p>
+
+<p>During the 18th a submarine was reported inside
+Scapa Flow, and the 2nd Battle Squadron raised steam;
+but investigation showed that the report was not well
+founded.</p>
+
+<p>The strength of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now
+risen to 18 ships, and directions were given by me to
+the Rear-Admiral commanding to establish patrols as
+follows:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Patrol A.—North of the Faroes and to westward of Long.
+5.30 W.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol B.—North of the Shetlands and to westward of Long.
+1.0 W.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol C.—South of the Faroes and to westward of a line
+joining Sydero and Sule Skerry lighthouses.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol D.—West of the Hebrides and a line N.½W. from
+St. Kilda.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The <i>Sappho</i> and the seven armed boarding-steamers,
+now available, were based on Loch Ewe, and completed
+the blockade line between Patrol D and the Hebrides.
+They were, however, shifted later on to Scapa, where
+they were employed on patrol and boarding duties in
+the approaches to the Pentland Firth, or at sea with
+cruiser squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>On December 20th a report was received that the
+submarine obstruction in Hoxa Sound had been found to
+be pierced; this led to steam being raised by all ships at
+Scapa, and the usual search by small craft was ordered;
+boats were also sent to explode charges on the bottom in
+the vicinity of the damaged portion of the submarine
+obstruction, where it was thought a submarine might
+have been entangled. Another alarm took place later,
+due to some trawlers inside Scapa Flow mistaking the
+concussion due to the explosion of these charges for torpedoes
+and firing warning signals in consequence. The
+precautions were kept in force until after daylight on the
+21st. On that date Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney
+arrived at Scapa in the <i>Marlborough</i> and assumed command
+of the 1st Battle Squadron, Sir Lewis Bayly taking
+over the command of the Channel Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>On the 21st the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty for Rosyth in obedience
+to directions from the Admiralty that the battle cruisers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span>
+and light cruisers were to be based on the latter port.
+This change was one result of the Scarborough raid.</p>
+
+<p>The mine-sweeping gunboats rejoined the Grand Fleet
+on this date.</p>
+
+<p>On December 23rd the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+with the <i>Iron Duke</i>, proceeded to sea to the westward of
+the Orkneys, and carried out target practice at the Sulis-Ker
+Rock, north of the Hebrides, on the 24th, passed
+through the Pentland Firth at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on that date, and
+proceeded into the North Sea for a sweep into southern
+waters.</p>
+
+<p>During daylight of the 25th the 1st Battle Squadron,
+the 2nd Flotilla and the 6th Cruiser Squadron from Scapa,
+the 3rd Battle Squadron, the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron from Rosyth, and the 1st and 2nd Cruiser
+Squadrons and 4th Flotilla from Cromarty met the <i>Iron
+Duke</i>, and the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons at given
+rendezvous between Lat. 56.45 N., Long. 1.30., and Lat.
+56.14 N., Long. 3.20 E.</p>
+
+<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney was under treatment
+on board a hospital ship and too unwell to take his
+squadron to sea. Admiral Sir Stanley Colville was,
+therefore, directed to hoist his flag on board the <i>Marlborough</i>
+and to assume temporary command of the 1st
+Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The whole Fleet was together by 1.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the
+25th, steering south-south-east at 15 knots. At 1.40
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Birmingham</i> and <i>Southampton</i>, of the 1st Light
+Cruiser Squadron, both sighted submarines about 15 miles
+to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet was then gradually turned from the
+south-south-eastward course to north-north-eastward until
+3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, being then in position Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 3.43<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span>
+E. Course was altered to north-north-west at 3.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+and speed reduced. At 9.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Fleet again turned
+to the southward, speed having to be reduced owing to
+the sea becoming too heavy for the destroyers. By
+midnight a south-westerly gale was blowing.</p>
+
+<p>At 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on December 26th the Battle Fleet was in
+Lat. 55.58 N., Long. 2.16 E., with the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron 40 miles
+to the southward; a speed of 11 knots was the most that
+the destroyers could keep up without risk of serious damage,
+and, as the weather was getting rapidly worse, they
+were detached at 8.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> to their bases.</p>
+
+<p>By 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a whole gale was blowing from the south-eastward.
+The sweep was abandoned and course altered
+to the northward. At 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Rosyth and Cromarty
+squadrons were ordered to proceed to their bases, the
+<i>Indomitable</i>, which had joined the Fleet at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> from
+the Mediterranean, being ordered to Rosyth, there to join
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. The destroyers and
+light cruisers suffered somewhat from the gale, the 2nd
+Flotilla unfortunately losing three men, and from the
+light cruiser <i>Caroline</i> one man was washed overboard.</p>
+
+<p>Bad weather continued during the passage north with
+a very rough sea, and on nearing the Pentland Firth the
+Dreadnought Battle Fleet found the conditions to be
+exceptionally severe, with a following wind which caused
+the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead of the ships.
+The ships were directed to enter Scapa Flow in the following
+order: 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron,
+4th Battle Squadron; the 2nd Battle Squadron was timed
+to enter at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>—some time, of course, before daylight,
+which, at this period of the year at Scapa Flow, is about
+8.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>As the rear subdivision of the 2nd Battle Squadron<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span>
+approached the entrance, the ships as usual having no
+lights showing, the <i>Monarch</i> altered course and stopped
+to avoid a patrol trawler which she suddenly sighted close
+under her bows. The <i>Conqueror</i>, astern of her, was
+unable to avoid the <i>Monarch</i> and the two ships collided;
+the stern of the <i>Monarch</i> and the starboard bow of the
+<i>Conqueror</i> were very seriously damaged, rendering both
+ships unseaworthy. They were brought into the harbour
+and safely berthed.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, the 1st Battle Squadron, following astern
+of the 2nd Battle Squadron, entered safely. The <i>Iron
+Duke</i> was leading the 4th Battle Squadron, and, on intercepting
+the wireless messages indicating that something
+was wrong, I stood through the Pentland Firth to the
+westward with the 4th Battle Squadron until the situation
+had become clearer. The dawn was very late and a
+furious gale was blowing, with a very heavy sea and strong
+tide in the Firth. These conditions made the handling
+of the battleships very difficult when they turned through
+16 points to return to the eastward.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i> and 4th Battle Squadron entered at
+10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The whole Fleet remained with two anchors
+down and steam up on account of the weather until 1
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when the wind and sea moderated, and by the morning
+of the 28th normal conditions were resumed. As a
+result of the gale, it was necessary to send the destroyers
+<i>Hope</i>, <i>Redpole</i> and <i>Ruby</i> to dockyards for repairs.</p>
+
+<p>On the 28th a new Light Cruiser Squadron, termed
+the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was formed, consisting
+of the <i>Falmouth</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan
+Napier), <i>Gloucester</i>, <i>Yarmouth</i> and <i>Dartmouth</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney now resumed command
+of the 1st Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>Enemy submarines were active at the entrance to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span>
+Firth of Forth at this time; a torpedo was fired at T.B.
+No. 33 and another at T.B. No. 31 on the 25th, and two
+submarines were sighted during the 28th off the entrance
+to the Tay.</p>
+
+<p>Temporary repairs to the <i>Monarch</i> and <i>Conqueror</i>
+were begun as soon as the weather permitted, and the
+former ship was able to leave Scapa for Devonport for
+thorough repair on December 29th. It was found necessary
+to obtain salvage plant and assistance in the case of
+the <i>Conqueror</i>, which had sustained very extensive underwater
+injury over a considerable length, and Captain
+Young, of the Liverpool Salvage Association, for whose
+services I applied at once, was sent up with the salvage
+ship <i>Rattler</i>, arriving on December 31st. The <i>Conqueror</i>
+was taken into Switha Sound and the repair ship
+<i>Assistance</i> secured alongside her, and excellent temporary
+repairs were effected by the 18th January, by
+the staff of the <i>Assistance</i>, Captain Betty, R.N., and by
+the salvage artificers under Captain Young.</p>
+
+<p>The second condenser of the <i>King George V.</i> was
+taken in hand for retubing at this time.</p>
+
+<p>At the end of 1914 the condition of the Fleet was:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang3">
+<p>
+Fleet-Flagship: <i>Iron Duke</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+8 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (the <i>Conqueror</i> and <i>Monarch</i> being disabled and the
+<i>King George V.</i> retubing her second condenser).</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+7 ships (<i>Commonwealth</i> refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+7 ships (complete) but two new ships, the <i>Benbow</i> and <i>Emperor
+of India</i>, not yet efficient.</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+5 ships (<i>Princess Royal</i> was away).<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span></p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+3 ships (<i>Black Prince</i> refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+2 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+2 ships (2 not joined).</p>
+
+<p><i>10th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+14 ships (4 coaling and refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Flotilla</i>:<br>
+16 destroyers (4 refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>4th Flotilla</i>:<br>
+17 destroyers (3 refitting).</p>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII"><span id="toclink_187"></span>CHAPTER VII<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE DOGGER BANK ACTION</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Developments</span> in the intelligence system at the
+Admiralty, initiated at the outbreak of war by Rear-Admiral
+Henry F. Oliver, the Director of the Intelligence
+Division, and an improvement in the efficiency
+of our directional wireless stations and of wireless telegraphy
+generally, led to our being able to obtain more
+reliable knowledge of the movements of enemy vessels.
+The result was that it had become unnecessary towards
+the end of 1914 to keep the Fleet so constantly at sea
+in anticipation of enemy movements. It was very desirable
+to spare the ships to some extent since it was increasingly
+evident that the War would be prolonged, and
+we had already had several warnings that the strain of
+constant sea work was telling on the efficiency of the
+machinery. Two very disquieting examples of this were
+the failure of condenser tubes on a large scale, particularly
+in the battleships, and the trouble developing in the boilers
+of a very considerable number of light cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>The problem of training personnel was also beginning
+to prove serious. In order to commission the large
+number of new ships which had been laid down since Lord
+Fisher, full of energy and ideas, had taken up the office
+of First Sea Lord (the number, of all sorts, building and
+projected, being more than 600), it became evident that
+it would be necessary to remove trained men from the
+Grand Fleet and to replace them with boys or untrained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span>
+landsmen. Under these conditions the individual
+efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work, as
+well as in such matters as signalling (visual and wireless)
+and the other factors which are essential in a fighting
+ship, could only be maintained if we could spend sufficient
+time in harbour, during which regular instruction
+could be given; this instruction to be followed by frequent
+practices under way, in conditions where the ships would
+not be liable to attack by enemy submarines, and need
+not, therefore, be screened by the overworked destroyers.
+The organisation for carrying out this work at Scapa Flow
+was, therefore, greatly elaborated.</p>
+
+<p>Steps were taken to start a school for training young
+wireless operators at Scapa, first on board each ship, and,
+later, in a specially fitted merchant ship. The want of
+wireless operators had been most seriously felt since the
+War began. In addition to the needs of new warships
+of all classes in this respect, the requirements for merchant
+ships, trawlers and other patrol craft were immense and
+could not be met. In this branch of instruction Lieut.-Commander
+R.&nbsp;L. Nicholson, the Fleet wireless officer
+on my staff, carried out invaluable work in organising
+and starting the school. The training of young ratings in
+visual signal duties was also taken in hand vigorously
+under Commander A.&nbsp;E. Wood and the signal officers of
+the Fleet. The Grand Fleet became, in effect, a great
+school for turning out trained personnel for the Navy as
+a whole, whilst still keeping watch over the High Sea
+Fleet, and controlling the North Sea and its northern exit,
+thus carrying out its rôle as the centre and pivot of the
+whole naval side of the War.</p>
+
+<p>Early in 1915 the subject of the instruction and education
+of the midshipmen also exercised my attention. On
+mobilisation all the cadets had been removed from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span>
+Dartmouth and sent to sea, with their training, of course,
+very incomplete. During the first months of the War,
+when the ships were either at sea or, if in harbour, were
+coaling, it was impossible to give these young officers
+any regular instruction, and, whilst they were learning
+much that would be invaluable to them in the future,
+it was evidently highly desirable that their systematic
+education should be continued as far as was possible during
+a war.</p>
+
+<p>Steps were accordingly taken in this direction. The
+first essential was to obtain naval instructors for the ships
+carrying midshipmen. The policy of the Admiralty, for
+some years before the War, had been to reduce gradually
+the number of naval instructors afloat, the idea being that
+the training at the Colleges and on board the training
+cruisers rendered the presence of instructors at sea
+unnecessary. I never held this view personally, but, in
+any case, it was clear that, as the cadets had gone to sea
+with less than half their course completed, further instruction
+at sea was necessary. The specialist officers
+afloat could not undertake this work under war conditions
+and strong representations were, therefore, made to the
+Admiralty on the subject. Eventually a number of
+gentlemen were entered specially for this instructional
+work and, after a short course of training in navigation
+at Greenwich, were sent to the Fleet, where their work
+proved to be of great value to the rising generation of
+officers.</p>
+
+<p>The blockade was becoming daily more effective,
+although the blockading cruisers worked at so great a
+distance from the German coast. The only interference
+ever attempted by the enemy was by submarine attack
+or by mines, and during the year 1915 no great success
+was achieved by them in this respect when the conditions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span>
+are considered. The regular blockading squadron, the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, was assisted in its work by the
+sweeps of our cruisers and light cruisers, accompanied
+occasionally by the Battle Fleet. In addition to the
+discharge of these duties, the Battle Fleet engaged in
+periodical cruises, during which battle exercises were
+carried out for the purpose of maintaining efficiency in
+the handling of the ships and squadrons and of giving the
+fresh officers, who were frequently joining the Fleet, to
+replace others required for the new ships, experience in
+the work of the Grand Fleet under the novel war
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>Pursuant to this general policy, the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet remained in harbour until January 10th, and
+then left for a cruise to the westward of the Orkneys and
+Shetlands. Gunnery practices were carried out by day
+and at night, as well as battle exercises, and the Fleet
+returned to Scapa during the day and the night of the
+13th. The 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth on the 12th
+for a cruise in the North Sea, and on the night of the 13th–14th
+passed to the westward of the Orkneys for gunnery
+practice, returning to Rosyth on the 15th.</p>
+
+<p>Other events of interest during the first fortnight of
+January were the return of the <i>Princess Royal</i> from
+North American waters on the 1st; a short cruise in the
+centre of the North Sea by the 1st Battle Cruiser
+Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron between
+the 3rd and the 5th, and by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+between the 6th and the 8th; a cruise by the 1st Cruiser
+Squadron to the westward of the Orkneys between the 4th
+and 6th, and by the 6th Cruiser Squadron between the
+6th and the 9th, and the 10th and 14th. On January 4th
+the <i>King George V.</i> completed the work of retubing her
+condenser.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span></p>
+
+<p>On the 9th all ships at Scapa raised steam ready for
+leaving, in consequence of a report of a submarine being
+sighted in Hoy Sound, and available destroyers and
+trawlers were sent to patrol in the vicinity of the Hoy
+anti-submarine Fleet obstructions until the Battle Fleet
+left harbour on the 10th.</p>
+
+<p>Gales were experienced at Scapa on the 1st, 13th, 16th
+and 19th of January.</p>
+
+<p>On January 15th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+was reconstituted, under Vice-Admiral Sir A.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;W.
+Moore, K.C.B., whose flag was transferred from the
+<i>Leviathan</i>, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, to the <i>New
+Zealand</i>; the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron then comprised
+the <i>New Zealand</i>, <i>Indomitable</i> and <i>Invincible</i> (the last
+not having yet arrived). Rear-Admiral Sir Robert
+Arbuthnot, Bart., took command of the 1st Cruiser
+Squadron in place of Sir Gordon Moore, flying his flag
+in the <i>Defence</i>, which took the place of the <i>Leviathan</i>;
+the latter vessel was transferred to the 6th Cruiser
+Squadron. Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;C. Leveson, C.B., relieved
+Sir Robert Arbuthnot as Rear-Admiral in the 2nd Battle
+Squadron, flying his flag in the <i>Orion</i>.</p>
+
+<p>On the 17th the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser
+Squadrons and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth
+for a cruise in the centre and southern portions of the
+North Sea, and on the 19th, at dawn, arrived in position
+Lat. 55 N., Long. 5.30 E. to support Commodore Tyrwhitt
+in carrying out a reconnaissance in Heligoland
+Bight. Nothing was sighted beyond an airship and a sea-plane,
+and the force was ordered to return to its bases
+and arrived during the night of the 20th–21st.</p>
+
+<p>On the 18th the Admiral commanding at Queenstown
+reported that a German mine had been washed ashore
+at Portrush, as well as bodies and wreckage, apparently<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span>
+belonging to the <i>Viknor</i>, an armed merchant cruiser of
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Anxiety had been felt as
+to the safety of the <i>Viknor</i> for two or three days owing
+to no reply to wireless signals being received from her,
+and the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been
+directed to search for her. The report from Portrush
+pointed to the probability that she had struck a mine off
+the north coast of Ireland, either in the <i>Audacious</i> minefield
+or a field further to the southward, and had been lost
+with all hands in the very heavy weather prevailing at the
+time in this vicinity. All traffic round the north of
+Ireland was stopped until sweepers were able to examine
+the whole area.</p>
+
+<p>At this time a large number of German mines were
+being constantly reported both in the North Sea and on
+the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland, having evidently
+broken adrift from their moorings in the heavy weather
+which had been generally prevalent. These mines, which
+were not safe when adrift, as provided for under The
+Hague Convention, were a source of some danger to
+ships, particularly at night. On the 18th the battleship
+<i>Superb</i>, having developed defects in one of her turbines,
+was sent to Portsmouth. She was absent from the Fleet
+until March 11th.</p>
+
+<p>On January 19th, the orders for the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron (blockading squadron) were somewhat modified
+by me; the new centre lines of patrol positions being:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Patrol A.—A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 62.20 N.,
+Long. 10.0 W.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol B.—A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 61.10 N.,
+Long. 1.15 E.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol C.—A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 59.40 N.,
+Long. 9.0 W.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol D.—Eastern line of patrol to be 80 miles in the direction
+335° from St. Kilda.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span></p>
+
+<p>The ships were ordered to patrol on east and west
+courses on each side of the centre line at a speed of at
+least 13 knots by day, zigzagging.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time four ships were directed to carry
+out a special patrol of the Norwegian coast between the
+parallels of 62 N. and 62.20 N. This patrol was maintained
+until the 22nd. As indicating the growing work
+of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the
+efficiency of the blockade, the Rear-Admiral of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron reported on January 18th that 80 ships
+had been intercepted by his squadron since December
+26th, 52 of which were eastward-bound. The strength
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 21 ships,
+exclusive of the <i>Viknor</i>, the loss of which ship with her
+fine ship’s company was deeply regretted.</p>
+
+<p>A patrol to the eastward of the Pentland Firth was
+at this period being worked by the <i>Sappho</i> and five armed
+boarding-steamers, which were supported at night by one
+or two cruisers or light cruisers as necessary.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Monarch</i> returned from being repaired at Devonport
+on the 20th. Temporary repairs to the <i>Conqueror</i>
+had been completed about January 18th, but the ship was
+detained pending more favourable weather conditions;
+on the 21st she left for a southern dockyard, escorted
+by four destroyers. On clearing the Pentland Firth,
+however, she found that the sea was too heavy for the
+passage to be made with safety in her damaged condition,
+and the ship returned to Scapa, where further work was
+taken in hand and it was decided that it would be necessary
+to dock her in the floating-dock at Invergordon to
+effect more permanent repairs for the passage south than
+could be carried out by divers at Scapa. She reached
+Invergordon on January 24th.</p>
+
+<p>On January 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span>
+Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth
+left for a sweep in the southern portion of the North Sea,
+in conjunction with the Harwich force. The remainder
+of the Grand Fleet acted in support. The 1st and 2nd
+Battle Cruiser Squadrons (except the <i>Queen Mary</i>, which
+was absent refitting) and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
+were directed to a rendezvous, where the Commodore (T),
+with available destroyers and light cruisers, was ordered
+to meet them.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+were ordered to the vicinity of the battle cruisers’
+rendezvous.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+the 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the
+2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, available destroyers of 2nd
+and 4th Flotilla (a total of 28 destroyers) left Scapa
+during the evening of the 23rd and proceeded towards the
+same rendezvous.</p>
+
+<p>At 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Aurora</i>, of the Harwich force,
+reported that she was in action with enemy vessels; at
+7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Sir David Beatty reported enemy battle cruisers
+and cruisers in sight in Lat. 54.53 N., Long. 3.32 E.,
+steering east. At 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough,
+commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported
+his position as Lat. 55.10 N., Long. 3.32 E., and enemy
+vessels in sight, consisting of battle cruisers, light cruisers
+and destroyers, steering between south-east and south.
+On receipt of these reports the Battle Fleet increased to
+19 knots speed, and steered to support the battle cruisers,
+and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
+which were further to the southward, were ordered to
+steer for Heligoland at full speed, to act in immediate
+support. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was also sent
+on ahead at full speed to join the other forces.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span></p>
+
+<p>The proceedings of the force under Sir David Beatty
+are best described in his report given in an Appendix.</p>
+
+<p>During the early part of the engagement Sir David
+Beatty kept me informed of his position and proceedings,
+but at 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a report was received from Sir Gordon
+Moore that he was heavily engaged with the enemy battle
+cruisers in Lat. 54.21 N., Long. 5.4 E. The fact that
+this report was made by this officer caused me some uneasiness
+at first, as it implied that the <i>Lion</i> could not
+signal, but as the Rear-Admiral made no mention of
+any casualty to the <i>Lion</i>, I concluded the cause was some
+breakdown in her wireless arrangements and that all was
+well.</p>
+
+<p>At 11.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, commanding
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported the enemy
+steering south-east at 25 knots, and at noon that he had
+lost touch with them; at 12.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Rear Admiral Sir
+Gordon Moore reported that he was retiring north-west,
+and, later, north-north-west, that the <i>Blücher</i> was out of
+action, and that the remaining enemy battle cruisers were
+out of sight; he added that the <i>Lion</i> had hauled out of
+action. He gave his position as Lat. 54.19 N., Long.
+5.22 E.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet’s position at noon was
+Lat. 56.29 N., Long. 3.22 E., with the cruisers 15
+miles ahead and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron ahead
+of the cruisers. At 1.15 Rear-Admiral Moore reported
+in reply to my enquiry that Sir David Beatty was on
+board the <i>Princess Royal</i>, that the <i>Lion</i> was damaged and
+detached; Sir David Beatty then reported that the <i>Lion’s</i>
+speed was reduced to 12 knots, that the <i>Blücher</i> had
+been sunk, and two other enemy battle cruisers seriously
+damaged, and that he was covering the retirement of the
+<i>Lion</i>, which was steaming with her starboard engine only.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">196</span></p>
+
+<p>The hit which disabled the <i>Lion</i> was a piece of luck
+for the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Vice-Admiral Bradford, commanding the
+3rd Battle Squadron, reported that he was turning to the
+northward, having all the battle cruisers in sight. The
+3rd Battle Squadron was sighted from the <i>Iron Duke</i> at
+3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and stationed on the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile directed the
+<i>Indomitable</i> at 3.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to take the <i>Lion</i> in tow, and
+this operation was effected by 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> At 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron
+Duke’s</i> position was Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 4.7 E., and
+at 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the battle cruisers were in sight from the
+<i>Iron Duke</i>. The Battle Fleet then turned to the northward,
+keeping in company with the battle cruisers until
+dark.</p>
+
+<p>At 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Lion’s</i> starboard engine became disabled
+and the speed was still further reduced.</p>
+
+<p>At dusk the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and
+all destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with the Battle
+Fleet, except those vessels which were short of fuel, had
+been detached to assist the remaining destroyers in screening
+the <i>Lion</i> and her escort against destroyer and submarine
+attack. The heavy ships, battleships and battle
+cruisers, stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo
+attack. The night passed without incident, the 1st and
+2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the battle cruisers
+during the darkness. Wireless messages were sent on the
+24th to the Senior Naval Officer, Tyne, to send out tugs
+to meet the <i>Lion</i>, and this was done.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the battle cruisers
+remained cruising in the North Sea during daylight on
+the 25th, except the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
+Cruiser Squadron, which were detached to Rosyth at
+8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span></p>
+
+<figure id="i_196" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption sans">MOVEMENTS <span class="allsmcap">FROM</span> JAN<sup>Y</sup>. 23<sup>RD</sup>. <span class="allsmcap">TO</span> 25<sup>TH</sup>. 1915.
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_196.jpg" width="844" height="849" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_196-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p>During these operations many floating mines were
+sighted and sunk.</p>
+
+<p>The battle cruisers proceeded to Rosyth at dusk, and
+the Battle Fleet to Scapa, except the <i>Iron Duke</i> and
+<i>Centurion</i>, which were sent to Cromarty, the <i>Iron Duke</i>
+to dock and refit and the <i>Centurion</i> to act as “stand by”
+Fleet-Flagship during the refit. The <i>Lion</i> arrived at
+Rosyth at 6.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 26th in a dense fog and was
+taken up harbour for temporary repairs, the <i>Assistance</i>
+being sent from Scapa to Rosyth to help in the work.
+The main injury to the <i>Lion</i> was caused by two hits under
+water, which pierced the feed tank and displaced an
+armour plate; the permanent repairs were completed on
+the Tyne, the work being carried out by the aid of coffer
+dams, there being no dock there capable of taking the
+ship. Her casualties consisted of 11 men wounded. The
+only other battle cruiser that received injury was the
+<i>Tiger</i>, in which ship Engineer Captain Taylor, a most
+valuable officer, and five men were killed, 11 being
+wounded; the material damage to the ship was slight.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy, as the result of this action, suffered the
+total loss of the <i>Blücher</i>; and two battle cruisers, the
+<i>Derfflinger</i> and <i>Seydlitz</i>, sustained severe injuries, a
+serious fire or explosion occurring in one of the after
+turrets of one ship, which put that, or possibly both after
+turrets, out of action and caused a large number of
+casualties amongst the crew. It was ascertained at a
+later date from German prisoners that the condition of
+one, if not of both ships on return to harbour was very
+serious; the casualties, as well as the material injury, were
+heavy. It was stated subsequently that the <i>Derfflinger</i>
+had 60 killed and 250 wounded, and the <i>Seydlitz</i> about
+100 killed.</p>
+
+<p>One of our destroyers, the <i>Meteor</i>, was damaged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span>
+in the action, but was towed back to port and
+repaired.</p>
+
+<p>On the 26th the 6th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted
+and composed of the <i>Drake</i>, <i>Leviathan</i> and
+<i>Cumberland</i>, and a 7th Cruiser Squadron was formed
+under the command of Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;W. Waymouth,
+consisting of the <i>Minotaur</i> (flagship), <i>Hampshire</i> and
+<i>Donegal</i>. The 1st and 6th Cruiser Squadrons were sent
+to Scapa, and the 2nd and 7th to Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Britannia</i>, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, grounded
+in the Firth of Forth in the fog on her way back to
+Rosyth, was ashore for 36 hours, and suffered considerable
+damage, necessitating repairs at a dockyard.</p>
+
+<p>On the 27th January the 1st Cruiser Squadron and a
+division of destroyers sailed to cruise in the centre portion
+of the North Sea and returned on the 30th, being relieved
+by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. On January 28th
+the battle cruisers <i>Princess Royal</i> and <i>Queen Mary</i>, with
+the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, left Rosyth to support
+operations being carried out in the Heligoland Bight by
+Commodore Tyrwhitt and Commodore Keyes on January
+30th and 31st. Owing to fog the operations could not
+be carried out, and the force returned to its bases on the
+30th.</p>
+
+<p>A report of a submarine inside Cromarty Harbour on
+the 29th caused ships to raise steam preparatory to
+leaving, and all small craft to search for the submarine,
+but on investigation it was considered that the report was
+unreliable.</p>
+
+<p>On January 30th enemy submarines appeared in the
+Irish Sea, one of them opening fire on Walney Island,
+where the works of Messrs. Vickers, Limited, are situated.
+At about this date, owing to marked enemy submarine
+activity in the Irish Sea, the ships of the 10th Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">199</span>
+Squadron were directed to coal temporarily at Loch
+Ewe instead of at Liverpool, and two divisions of Grand
+Fleet destroyers were detached to the Irish Sea to assist
+in hunting the submarines.</p>
+
+<p>During January the number of drifting German mines
+in the North Sea was very considerable. Many were
+sighted and sunk by the Fleet when at sea; the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron alone, when on patrol on the 30th and
+31st January sinking 12 mines.</p>
+
+<p>At the end of January the condition of the Grand
+Fleet was as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang3">
+<p class="center larger b1">BATTLE FLEET</p>
+
+<p class="center b1"><i>Iron Duke</i>, Fleet-Flagship, refitting.</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+7 ships (<i>Superb</i> was away).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+6 ships (<i>Conqueror</i> was unserviceable).</p>
+
+<p><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+7 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i>:<br>
+6 ships (<i>Commonwealth</i> and <i>Britannia</i>, refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+2 ships (<i>Lion</i> was effecting temporary repairs; the <i>Tiger</i> refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+1 ship (<i>Indomitable</i> refitting after a fire, due to defective electric
+circuits).</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+3 ships (<i>Natal</i> refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+3 ships (<i>Roxburgh</i> refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+3 ships (complete).<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">200</span></p>
+
+<p><i>7th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+3 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (complete).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+4 ships (<i>Liverpool</i> refitting).</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Flotilla</i>:<br>
+11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).</p>
+
+<p><i>4th Flotilla</i>:<br>
+11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The shortage of destroyers at this period was exceedingly
+marked.</p>
+
+<p>During February the Battle Fleet remained in harbour.
+No enemy movements took place or were expected
+as several changes were being made in the High Sea
+Fleet commands; the principal of these was the relief of
+Admiral von Inghenol by Admiral von Pohl as Commander-in-Chief.
+It was anticipated that the new
+Flag officers would exercise their squadrons in order
+to become familiar with them before attempting any
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>The opportunity was taken of refitting the <i>Iron
+Duke</i>, and the ship remained at Invergordon, in the
+Cromarty Firth, until February 23rd. It was becoming
+desirable to give the officers and men of the Battle Fleet
+some change from Scapa Flow, where there were no
+opportunities for landing for exercise or recreation, and
+arrangements were made by which battle, as well as
+cruiser squadrons should visit Invergordon periodically
+for this purpose. The 2nd Battle Squadron accordingly
+arrived at this base on February 24th.</p>
+
+<p>During the first half of February, 1915, eight destroyers
+were absent from the Grand Fleet flotillas,
+working in the Irish Channel against submarines, leaving
+only a total of 20 to 22 available for the Fleet; an insufficient<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span>
+number for screening purposes. This deficiency
+made it desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour,
+except in an emergency.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy’s submarine activity became much more
+marked during February. Early in the month the German
+Admiralty proclaimed that after February 18th all
+the waters round the British Isles would be declared
+unsafe for merchant-ships of all nationalities, and intimated
+that Allied merchant-ships would be destroyed in
+these waters and that neutral merchant-ships ran similar
+risks. Enemy submarines began to operate in increasing
+numbers in the English Channel, to the westward of the
+English Channel, in the Irish Sea and off the west coast
+of Ireland, as well as on the east coast of England, and the
+losses of merchant-ships from submarine attack became
+serious. The destroyers of the Grand Fleet that remained
+at the northern bases were kept fully employed in searching
+for and hunting reported submarines.</p>
+
+<p>In addition to the maintenance of the blockade by the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, cruiser and light cruiser squadrons
+carried out various patrol and search operations
+during the month. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron cruised in
+the centre portion of the North Sea from February 1st
+to 3rd; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron cruised off the Shetland
+Islands from the 11th–13th, then swept down
+the Norwegian coast and returned to Cromarty on the
+15th; the new 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out
+a sweep in the southern portion of the North Sea between
+the 16th and 20th with destroyers in company;
+the new 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron cruised to the westward
+of the Shetlands for exercise between the 15th and
+18th, then passed into the North Sea and swept to the
+southward, returning to Scapa on the 20th; the 1st
+Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 17th for the vicinity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">202</span>
+of the Norwegian coast, swept down towards the Naze and
+then returned to patrol north of the Shetlands until the
+21st, when the squadron arrived at Scapa; the four light
+cruisers attached to the Battle Fleet, <i>Bellona</i>, <i>Blanche</i>,
+<i>Boadicea</i>, and <i>Blonde</i>, with four destroyers, left Scapa on
+the 18th for a line N. 37 E. 60 miles long from Lat. 57.30
+N., Long. 0.30 W., with directions to sweep towards the
+Naze by day and patrol the line at night; they remained
+on this duty until the 21st. The 7th Cruiser Squadron
+cruised to the westward of the Fair Island Channel from
+the 19th to the 22nd, and available destroyers of the 2nd
+and 4th Flotillas were patrolling to the eastward of the
+Fair Island Channel and the Moray Firth respectively
+during the same period.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left
+Rosyth on the 23rd to cover the Fleet mine-sweepers
+whilst searching for mines along a projected Fleet track
+in the North Sea, but, the sea being too heavy for mine-sweeping,
+the squadron carried out a patrol instead until
+the 25th, when the mine-sweeping operations took place,
+lasting until the 27th, when the squadron returned to
+Rosyth.</p>
+
+<p>This searching mine-sweep was carried out because of
+the increasing probability of the enemy laying mines
+intended to catch our heavy ships when proceeding towards
+the southern portion of the North Sea, and the
+consequent necessity for a periodical examination of a
+route which the Fleet could traverse with some safety.
+This policy was maintained throughout the period of
+my command, alternative routes being periodically
+examined; although it was obviously impossible to carry
+out this examination frequently, it did afford some chance
+of a mine-field being discovered before serious losses were
+sustained by the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">203</span></p>
+
+<p>During the month of February a reorganisation of
+the battle cruiser and light cruiser squadrons was carried
+out by Admiralty orders, and a “Battle Cruiser Fleet”
+instituted under the command of Sir David Beatty, with
+the title Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The organisation was as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang3">
+<p class="center b1">
+<i>Lion</i>, Fleet-Flagship.</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Princess Royal</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), <i>Queen
+Mary</i>, <i>Tiger</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Australia</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;C. Pakenham), <i>New
+Zealand</i>, <i>Indefatigable</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Invincible</i> (to be Flag), <i>Inflexible</i>,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">D</a> <i>Indomitable</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Galatea</i> (Broad pennant of Commodore E.&nbsp;S. Alexander-Sinclair),
+<i>Cordelia</i>, <i>Caroline</i>, <i>Inconstant</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Southampton</i> (Broad pennant of Commodore W.&nbsp;E. Goodenough),
+<i>Nottingham</i>, <i>Birmingham</i>, <i>Lowestoft</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>3rd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Falmouth</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), <i>Yarmouth</i>,
+<i>Gloucester</i>, <i>Liverpool</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">D</a> The <i>Inflexible</i> had not yet joined by the end of February.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an integral portion
+of the Grand Fleet. In some respects the term “Fleet”
+was an unfortunate selection, as it implied, incorrectly,
+an independent organisation. On my taking office
+as First Sea Lord at the end of 1916, the title was altered
+to the more appropriate one of Battle Cruiser Force.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Australia</i> joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet at
+Rosyth on February 17th, and the <i>Invincible</i>, having
+concluded the very successful operations in the South<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span>
+Atlantic under Sir Doveton Sturdee, which culminated
+in the destruction of Admiral von Spee’s Squadron of
+cruisers and light cruisers, arrived at Scapa for gunnery
+practices during the latter part of February, and joined
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth early in March;
+the <i>Indefatigable</i> also arrived on the 24th from the Mediterranean.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Tiger</i> arrived in the Tyne on February 1st for
+refit, and left again on the 8th. The <i>Lion</i> reached
+the Tyne for repairs on February 9th, remaining there
+for the remainder of the month. The strength of the
+destroyer force working with the Grand Fleet was
+increased on February 19th by the addition of the light
+cruiser <i>Fearless</i> and two divisions of destroyers from the
+1st Flotilla. These vessels had been relieved at Harwich
+by new destroyers of the “M” class. This addition
+brought the destroyer force actually with the Grand Fleet
+up to a total of 48, and further additions were now
+gradually made from the 1st Flotilla at Harwich as new
+destroyers were completed to relieve them.</p>
+
+<p>His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet on
+February 27th by visiting the ships based on Rosyth.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of February the destroyers of the
+“River” or “E” class, based at Scapa for local defence,
+were replaced, by Admiralty directions, by destroyers of
+the “C” class (old 30-knot type). This change, although
+dictated by the general naval situation, limited considerably
+the range of activity of the local defence vessels,
+owing to the poorer sea-going qualities of the destroyers
+of the “C” class.</p>
+
+<p>During the month the destroyer <i>Erne</i> was wrecked
+off Rattray Head on the Aberdeen coast, and became a
+total loss; the <i>Goldfinch</i> went ashore in a fog in the north
+of the Orkneys and was also lost; the <i>Sparrowhawk</i> also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">205</span>
+went ashore, but was got off, though considerably
+damaged. The armed merchant-cruiser <i>Clan McNaughton</i>,
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was lost with all hands
+during the month, the supposition being that she
+foundered in one of the numerous heavy gales. Although
+a prolonged search was carried out, only a certain amount
+of wreckage was found. The loss of this ship and her
+efficient ship’s company brought once more into prominence
+the excellent work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and
+the risks to which the ships were subjected.</p>
+
+<p>The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were daily
+increasing, and the number of ships passing the blockade
+line unexamined was becoming very small. During one
+week in February sixty-seven vessels were intercepted
+and eighteen of them sent in with prize crews on board.</p>
+
+<p>During February the old battleships <i>Hannibal</i> and
+<i>Magnificent</i> were relieved as guard-ships by the old
+cruisers <i>Crescent</i> and <i>Royal Arthur</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral
+Sir Douglas Gamble in the command of the
+4th Battle Squadron during the month; Admiral
+Gamble’s period of command had expired. Sir Doveton
+Sturdee, who had served as Chief of the Naval Staff early
+in the War, came to the Fleet fresh from his Falkland
+Islands victory.</p>
+
+<p>The weather at the northern bases during February
+was less boisterous than usual. There was a good deal of
+misty and foggy weather in the early part of the month,
+and a considerable amount of snow towards the end.</p>
+
+<p>During March the principal movements of the Fleet
+were as follows:</p>
+
+<p>From the 4th to the 10th, the 6th Cruiser Squadron
+was, with the <i>Orotava</i> of the 10th Cruiser Squadron,
+cruising off the Norwegian Coast.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">206</span></p>
+
+<p>From the 7th to the 10th the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet was cruising in the northern portion of the North
+Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser
+Squadrons and the 4th Flotilla; and the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet was also cruising during the same period in the
+central part of the North Sea. The opportunity was
+taken of carrying out various battle exercises. The 2nd
+Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser Squadron did not return
+with the remainder of the Battle Fleet on the 10th, but
+remained at sea until the 11th. The 4th Flotilla was
+forced to shelter at Lerwick from the 7th to the 9th owing
+to bad weather. From March 10th to the 13th the 3rd
+Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were cruising
+in the centre portion of the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>From the 16th to the 19th the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet again cruised in the northern and central parts of
+the North Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th
+Cruiser Squadrons, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, and
+the 2nd Flotilla. The 2nd Flotilla, however, could not
+remain at sea on the 17th owing to bad weather and was
+sent back to Scapa. A collision occurred between the
+<i>Nemesis</i> and <i>Nymphe</i>, which necessitated the docking of
+both vessels for repairs. The flotilla was ordered out
+again from Scapa early on the 18th, but only seven
+destroyers were available, and they reached the Fleet at
+2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on that date.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Fleet and cruisers carried out a strategical
+exercise in the early morning of the 18th, and then
+steered for the bases, a projected second exercise being
+abandoned as the Fleet was by this time in an area which
+was not considered safe from submarine attack; the
+visibility was also very high, and it was suspected that
+at least one enemy submarine might be in the neighbourhood.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span></p>
+
+<p>At noon the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 58.21 N., Long.
+1.12 E., zigzagging at a speed of 15 knots, and the 4th
+Battle Squadron had just been detached to proceed to
+Cromarty, when at 12.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil
+Burney commanding the 1st Battle Squadron signalled
+that a submarine’s periscope had been sighted from the
+<i>Marlborough</i>, the leading ship of the port wing column,
+and that a torpedo fired by the submarine had passed just
+astern of the <i>Neptune</i>, the rear ship of the column. The
+Fleet was at once turned away from the submarine 12
+points to starboard (ships turning together) and speed
+was increased to 17 knots.</p>
+
+<p>At 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing
+under the stern of the remainder of the Battle Fleet and
+signals were being made to Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton
+Sturdee to steer clear of the position in which the submarine
+was sighted, but before any movement was
+effected the officer of the watch, Lieutenant-Commander
+Piercy, of the <i>Dreadnought</i> of that Squadron, sighted a
+periscope close to, one point on the port bow, the submarine
+apparently steering a southerly course and
+zigzagging. Captain Alderson, commanding the <i>Dreadnought</i>,
+at once altered course direct for the submarine,
+increased speed, followed, and rammed her. The bow
+of the submarine came out of the water and her number,
+U 29, was plainly visible. She sank immediately. The
+<i>Blanche</i>, which passed close to the spot, reported a large
+quantity of wreckage, one article of clothing and much oil
+and bubbles on the surface, but no survivors.</p>
+
+<p>It seems probable that the captain of the submarine,
+after firing at the 1st Battle Squadron, was confused by
+the movements of the 4th Battle Squadron crossing astern
+of the remainder of the zigzagging Fleet, at high speed,
+and in trying to get clear failed to observe the <i>Dreadnought</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span>
+until too late. The <i>Dreadnought</i> was admirably
+handled.</p>
+
+<p>On arrival of the Fleet in harbour I wired to the
+Admiralty urging that the fate of U 29 should be kept
+secret. The secrecy regarding the loss of this submarine,
+commanded by Commander Weddingen, was much
+resented in Germany, and many accusations of treacherous
+conduct levelled at the British, probably in the hope
+that we might give information as to her fate. The policy
+of secrecy was certainly correct, as it left the enemy
+entirely ignorant of our methods, and possibly had some
+effect of the moral of the submarine crews.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet steered to the eastward until well clear of
+the area in case other submarines were present, and then
+shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 19th.</p>
+
+<p>On March 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases with the
+intention of carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, but
+the plan was abandoned and the Fleet returned to its
+bases on the following day.</p>
+
+<p>The principal movements of destroyers during March,
+additional to the regular patrols and fleet movements,
+were as follows:</p>
+
+<p>From March 2nd to March 5th search was made by
+a half flotilla for a number of oil drums reported as
+moored in certain areas in the North Sea. The report
+indicated that the enemy might be refuelling submarines
+in this manner; the search disposed of the supposition.</p>
+
+<p>From March 8th to March 10th the Commander-in-Chief
+Coast of Scotland, Sir Robert Lowry, in conjunction
+with Vice-Admiral Bradford, who was the Senior
+Flag Officer of Grand Fleet ships at Rosyth, and was,
+therefore, responsible for all movements of these ships
+from the Rosyth base, organised a search on a large<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span>
+scale for a submarine reported to be operating off the
+Aberdeenshire coast. The vessels employed in this operation
+comprised trawler patrols and destroyers of the 1st
+Flotilla, and they were rewarded on March 10th by
+forcing the submarine—U 12—to the surface, when
+H.M.S. <i>Ariel</i>, very skilfully handled, succeeded in ramming
+and sinking her. Ten of her crew of twenty-eight
+were rescued. The <i>Ariel</i> was considerably damaged, and
+was docked at Leith for repairs.</p>
+
+<p>On March 20th and 21st a division of destroyers hunted
+a submarine in the Moray Firth without success.</p>
+
+<p>On March 12th the <i>Faulknor</i> and six destroyers
+were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate
+against submarines in the Irish Sea.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of the month the small steamers,
+specially fitted as mine-sweepers for the Grand Fleet, were
+withdrawn for service abroad. The increasing number of
+mines in the North Sea and the paucity of mine-sweepers
+led me to decide on March 22nd to fit eight destroyers each
+from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with light mine-sweeps, and
+the work was taken in hand. These vessels were intended
+to augment the regular force of mine-sweepers in an
+emergency, as it was felt that a movement of the High
+Sea Fleet for an important naval operation would in all
+probability be preceded by extensive mine-laying outside
+the Fleet bases, and a much stronger sweeping force than
+we possessed was required to enable a passage for the
+Fleet to be rapidly cleared.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Conqueror</i> rejoined the Fleet on March 6th
+after effecting repairs which had been carried out by
+Messrs. Cammell Laird at Liverpool with most commendable
+rapidity.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron experienced a further loss<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span>
+during March, the <i>Bayano</i> being sunk by a submarine off
+Corsewall Point, Galloway, on March 11th, with considerable
+loss of life.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of this month Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;L.
+Grant succeeded Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;C. Pakenham in
+command of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the latter succeeding
+Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon Moore in command of the
+2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron; Vice-Admiral Patey
+transferred his flag from the <i>Australia</i> to the <i>Leviathan</i>
+to proceed to the West Indies as Commander-in-Chief,
+and the 6th Cruiser Squadron was broken up, the ships
+being transferred to service abroad.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy submarines were very active against merchant
+shipping during March, and our losses were considerable,
+both from this cause and from mines.</p>
+
+<p>During March the weather at the northern bases was
+not very boisterous, but a great deal of mist and fog was
+prevalent during the first fortnight, and during the last
+fortnight snow fell on at least seven days. An average
+of fifty-six ships per week was intercepted by the ships of
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month.</p>
+
+<p>During April, 1915, intended Fleet movements were
+prevented on several occasions by bad weather, and the
+10th Cruiser Squadron and other ships at sea experienced
+exceptional gales; the principal movements carried out
+were as follows:</p>
+
+<p>From the 5th to the 8th the 3rd Battle Squadron,
+3rd Cruiser Squadron and five destroyers of the 1st
+Flotilla cruised in the North Sea (central portion), and
+from the 5th to the 9th the Battle Cruiser Fleet with
+eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the northern
+portion of the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>On April 8th the <i>Lancaster</i>, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron,
+and the <i>Caribbean</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span>
+were detached to watch the Norwegian coast between
+Lat. 62 and 64 N.</p>
+
+<p>On April 11th the whole Grand Fleet proceeded to
+sea; the Battle Fleet met the Battle Cruiser Fleet
+and 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth, and cruised in the
+centre portion of the North Sea during the 12th and
+13th, returning to the various bases on the 14th to fuel.
+The opportunity was taken of carrying out battle
+exercises.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was passing
+down east of the Orkneys at 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and was
+being met by the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, which had come
+out to screen the ships in, the <i>Neptune</i> reported having
+sighted a submarine’s periscope, but as the Fleet was
+steaming at 18 knots and the destroyers were taking up
+screening stations it was not considered that successful
+attack was probable, and the Fleet held its course for
+Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>Submarines were also sighted during the day by the
+<i>Antrim</i> in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 1.2 E., and by the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.40 E.,
+but no successful attack resulted.</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea again for a sweep
+in southern waters on the 17th, and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the
+18th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 1st, 2nd,
+and 7th Cruiser Squadrons looking out ahead and the 2nd
+and 4th Flotillas screening, was in Lat. 57.25 N., Long.
+1.4 E., steering at 18 knots’ speed for a position in
+Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 3.30 E., where it was intended to
+meet the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron
+from Rosyth.</p>
+
+<p>The junction took place at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet, which had been ordered to a position a little farther
+south, arriving there at this time. No enemy vessels<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span>
+having been sighted, the whole Fleet was turned to the
+northward shortly before dusk, when in the vicinity of
+the Little Fisher Bank, to the westward of Northern Denmark.
+During the night the 3rd Battle Squadron and
+3rd Cruiser Squadron were detached to return to Rosyth,
+and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas to Scapa; the Vice-Admiral,
+Battle Cruiser Fleet, was directed to cruise independently
+on the 19th; and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with
+the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, proceeded to the
+eastward of the Shetlands; target practice was carried
+out during daylight of the 19th and the night of the 19th–20th,
+and the Battle Fleet returned to its bases at Scapa
+and Cromarty during the night of the 20th–21st and
+fuelled. During the cruise the <i>Achilles</i>, of the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron, reported sighting a submarine at 2.40
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 18th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 19th the <i>Albemarle</i> and <i>Russell</i>, of the 6th
+Battle Squadron, which had rejoined the 3rd Battle
+Squadron from the Channel ports, were detached from
+Rosyth to Scapa for practices.</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet again proceeded to sea on the night
+of the 21st for another sweep towards the Danish coast,
+and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 22nd the forces from Scapa and
+Cromarty, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+<i>Russell</i> and <i>Albemarle</i>, 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser
+Squadrons, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, were in position
+Lat. 58.4 N., Long. 0.27 E.</p>
+
+<p>At 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
+Squadron joined the Commander-in-Chief, and the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet took station ahead of the cruiser screen.
+At dusk no enemy ships had been sighted and the Fleet
+turned to the northward again, the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position
+being Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 4.53 E.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">213</span>
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet were detached to return to Rosyth
+during the night, and the remainder of the Fleet arrived
+at the Scapa and Cromarty bases on the 23rd.</p>
+
+<p>During these two southerly sweeps the Fleet sighted
+a large number of neutral steamers and trawlers which
+were closely examined, but nothing suspicious was found,
+although the interception of German wireless messages,
+when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the trawlers, raised
+suspicions that they were acting as look-out vessels; this
+suspicion was strengthened by carrier pigeons being
+sighted from various ships.</p>
+
+<p>One Norwegian steamer which was found to be carrying
+magnetic ore to Rotterdam was sent to the Firth of
+Forth.</p>
+
+<p>Movements of interest of individual ships during
+April included the arrival of the <i>Lion</i> at Rosyth on the 7th
+after completion of all repairs, the arrival of the new
+Battleship <i>Warspite</i>, of the “Queen Elizabeth” class,
+at Scapa on the 13th, and the commissioning on the 26th
+of four more mercantile vessels to join the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Invincible</i> was sent to the Tyne to change some
+of her 12-inch guns, which had become worn during the
+Falkland Island engagement.</p>
+
+<p>On April 10th Rear-Admiral Tottenham succeeded
+Rear-Admiral Waymouth in command of the 7th Cruiser
+Squadron, the latter officer’s health having unfortunately
+broken down.</p>
+
+<p>On April 7th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron were rearranged somewhat in view of the
+lengthening of the days:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang7">
+<p>Patrol Area A was north of the Faroes, the centre line being occasionally shifted.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span></p>
+
+<p>Patrol Area C had as its centre a line from Cape Sydero in the Faroe Islands to Lat. 58.30 N., Long. 8.0 W.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol Area E was north of Iceland.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol Area F was south of Iceland.</p>
+
+<p>Patrol Area G had as its centre the meridian of 3° E. Long. between Lat. 62 N. and 63½ N. A cruiser was sent to strengthen the patrol in this area.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>During the month the average number of vessels
+intercepted weekly by the ships of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron was 68, of which an average number of 23 was
+sent in weekly for examination.</p>
+
+<p>Enemy submarines were very active in April, and
+destroyers were sent out frequently from the Fleet
+bases to endeavour to destroy craft reported in the
+vicinity—particularly in the neighbourhood of the Fair
+Island Channel—but no success was achieved, except
+in the case of the <i>Ariel</i> and U 12. The look-out and
+navigational arrangements for the Pentland Firth were
+improved during April by the establishment of telephonic
+communications between Scapa and the Island of Swona.
+Arrangements were also gradually perfected for obtaining
+the exhibition of all navigational lights and fog signals
+in the Pentland Firth on demand by our ships at all
+times. The weather at Scapa during April was bad.</p>
+
+<p>Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th,
+9th and 10th. There was a great deal of mist and fog
+during the latter part of the month as well as a moderate
+amount of snow.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy laid a large mine-field in the middle of
+the southern portion of the North Sea during April, thus
+pursuing the policy which it was expected he would
+adopt, regardless of the interests of neutrals. Fortunately,
+information as to its existence was obtained in
+time to prevent any of our ships from falling victims<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span>
+to the mines. But the mine-field was undoubtedly well
+placed strategically so as to interfere with the freedom of
+movement of our Fleet in southern waters if it were
+endeavouring to bring the High Sea Fleet to action, since
+it necessitated our ships making a wide detour to the
+eastward or westward to reach the waters to the southward
+of the mine-field; it was doubtless laid with this
+object in view.</p>
+
+<p>In May the Grand Fleet flotillas were much occupied
+in endeavouring to locate and destroy enemy submarines,
+and the movements of the heavy ships were curtailed
+during the month owing to the absence of destroyers for
+the purpose of acting as a submarine screen.</p>
+
+<p>The principal work of the destroyers in this connection—officers
+and men showing a fine spirit in carrying
+out what were frequently fruitless searches—was as
+follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>May 1st–3rd.</i>—The 2nd Flotilla was engaged in operations
+against enemy submarines reported, first, in the Fair Island
+Channel and, then, to the eastward and south-eastward of the
+Pentland Firth. The flotilla did not succeed in gaining touch
+with the submarines.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 5th–7th.</i>—One half of the 1st Flotilla was searching for
+a submarine off the Aberdeenshire coast, without result.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 7th.</i>—One division of the 2nd Flotilla was acting against
+a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel, and then
+proceeded to work down the shipping route west of the Hebrides
+and Ireland in the hope of catching a submarine attacking
+trade.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 8th.</i>—Half the 4th Flotilla was searching for submarines
+off the east coast of the Orkneys.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 10th–11th.</i>—A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching
+for a submarine reported to be off North Ronaldshay; later,
+this division was reinforced by all available destroyers from
+Scapa, with orders that the force was to continue the search
+during the night, burning searchlights to assist the work and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span>
+cause the submarine to submerge, thus exhausting her battery
+power.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 13th.</i>—Six destroyers were searching for a submarine
+reported west of Thurso.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 15th.</i>—A division of the 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to
+operate against a submarine off Aberdeen.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 16th.</i>—A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching for
+a submarine reported approaching the Fair Island Channel.</p>
+
+<p><i>May 19th–20th.</i>—A division of the 4th Flotilla was acting
+against a submarine reported west of the Orkneys.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The principal Fleet movements during the month
+were:</p>
+
+<p><i>May 2nd to May 5th.</i>—Two forces, each consisting
+of two light cruisers and eight destroyers, were engaged
+in carrying out a thorough examination of all vessels,
+especially fishing craft, found in the areas usually traversed
+by the Fleet during southerly sweeps in order to
+ascertain whether any were acting as German look-out
+ships under neutral colours. A considerable number of
+vessels were examined, especially trawlers, and some were
+sent in for more detailed examination at the bases, but
+nothing incriminating was discovered.</p>
+
+<p>Between May 5th and 10th the 3rd Battle Squadron
+and 3rd Cruiser Squadron cruised in the northern portion
+of the North Sea, being screened out from Rosyth by a
+half flotilla. On the return towards Rosyth in Lat. 56.49
+N., Long. 0.39 E., and before being met by the screening
+destroyers, the 3rd Battle Squadron, two torpedoes
+were fired by a submarine; they were aimed apparently
+at the <i>Dominion</i>, but both missed. The squadron was in
+division in line ahead, steaming at 15 knots, and was zigzagging
+at the time.</p>
+
+<p>On May 6th the mine-layer <i>Orvieto</i> and eight destroyers
+left Scapa to carry out a mine-laying operation
+in the Heligoland Bight. The force ran into a dense fog,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span>
+and a collision occurred between the destroyers <i>Comet</i>
+and <i>Nemesis</i>, the latter being seriously damaged. The
+force was directed to return and left Scapa again on the
+8th, carrying out the operation successfully during the
+night of the 10th–11th; it returned on the 12th.</p>
+
+<p>The light cruisers <i>Phaeton</i> and <i>Royalist</i> left Scapa on
+May 12th for a position north of the Shetlands, in order
+to intercept a neutral steamer reported to have left
+Bremerhaven on May 11th with wireless installations on
+board. The C Patrol of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was
+also moved to a position to intercept this vessel, and the
+light cruiser <i>Sappho</i> and armed boarding steamer <i>Amsterdam</i>
+were placed on the western side of the Fair Island
+Channel. The force returned on the 14th, the report
+proving to be incorrect.</p>
+
+<p>The whole Grand Fleet carried out a sweep of the
+central part of the North Sea between May 17th and
+19th, the forces from Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth meeting
+at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 0.0 at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+on the 8th, and sweeping to the south-eastward at a speed
+of 16 knots until the afternoon, with the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet some thirty to fifty miles ahead of the Battle Fleet.
+The Fleet returned to its bases on the 19th, not having
+sighted any hostile vessels. Battle tactics were exercised
+during the passage north.</p>
+
+<p>On May 21st the Fleet mine-sweepers, which had been
+sent to Aberdeen beforehand in readiness, left with an
+escort of two light cruisers to examine the mine-field
+reported to have been laid in the centre of the southern
+portion of the North Sea. Two of the sweepers collided
+in a fog on leaving Aberdeen, and another went ashore;
+the remainder proceeded and located the north-east corner
+of the mine-field on the 22nd and 23rd; they returned to
+Aberdeen on the 24th, after examining <i lang="fr">en route</i> a position<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span>
+in which it was reported that paraffin barrels were moored.
+These were destroyed. It was thought that they might be
+intended for German submarines.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the Fleet sweepers located the north-east
+corner of the mine-field, paddle sweepers, under the escort
+of two light cruisers from Harwich, located the south-west
+corner. The search was subsequently continued under the
+same conditions, and the limits of the mine-field, which
+covered a large area south of Lat. 56 N. and east
+of Long. 2.30 E., were determined. The enemy made
+no attempt to interfere with the sweeping operations, if
+indeed he was aware of them.</p>
+
+<p>On the 21st the patrol, comprising the <i>Sappho</i> and
+armed boarding steamers, hitherto maintained in an area
+east and south-east of the Pentland Firth, was moved temporarily
+to the west of the Firth on account of submarine
+activity. Destroyers from the Grand Fleet replaced the
+original patrol at night, the interception of mercantile
+traffic being carried out by the armed boarding steamers
+to the westward. The destroyer <i>Rifleman</i> grounded in a
+fog on the 22nd, necessitating docking for repairs.</p>
+
+<p>A new form of anti-submarine operation was begun
+on May 23rd by the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland
+(Admiral Sir R. Lowry). This consisted of two
+C-class submarines operating with an armed trawler,
+the idea being that the trawler should invite attack by a
+submarine, thus giving our submarines an opportunity of
+sinking the enemy by torpedo attack.</p>
+
+<p>On May 24th the Admiralty telegraphed that Italy
+had entered the War on the side of the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>On the next day I proceeded in the <i>Iron Duke</i> to
+Rosyth to confer with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who
+had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. The conference
+took place on the 26th and was of an important<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span>
+nature. The general naval policy, so far as it concerned
+the Grand Fleet, was discussed, and arrangements made
+as to the procedure to be followed in future. Sir Henry
+Jackson asked that Commodore Everett might join him
+at the Admiralty as Naval Assistant, and, with the consent
+of Commodore Everett, this was arranged. His place as
+Captain of the Fleet was filled by Captain Lionel Halsey,
+C.M.G., of the <i>New Zealand</i>. It was with great regret
+that I parted with Commodore Everett; his long experience
+in the Fleet under Sir George Callaghan and his
+intimate knowledge of fleet work and unfailing tact had
+been of the greatest possible assistance. The <i>Iron Duke</i>
+returned to Scapa on the morning of the 28th. On the
+26th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, C.B., had
+hoisted his flag in the <i>Invincible</i> as Rear-Admiral commanding
+the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The battleship
+<i>Queen Elizabeth</i> arrived at Scapa from the Dardanelles
+on the same day.</p>
+
+<p>From May 29th to 31st the Grand Fleet carried out
+another sweep in the North Sea, the direction on this occasion
+being towards the Dogger Bank. The forces from
+Scapa and Cromarty concentrated in Lat. 57.35 N.,
+Long. 0.0 at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 30th, and steered to the
+southward at 17 knots’ speed. The Rosyth force steered
+for a point farther south and was in sight from the cruiser
+line at 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M</span>., being ordered to keep ahead of the Fleet.
+The sweep was continued until the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet was in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. No enemy
+vessel was sighted.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet then turned to the northward and, owing
+to a northerly swell, speed had to be reduced on account
+of the destroyers. During the night the Rosyth force was
+detached to its base. Speed was increased as the weather
+improved, and the Scapa and Cromarty forces arrived on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span>
+the morning of May 31st. The <i>Iron Duke</i> left Scapa for
+Cromarty during the afternoon of May 31st, and arrived
+that evening.</p>
+
+<p>During the month the procedure of moving squadrons
+between Scapa and Cromarty was continued. At this
+period a second line of submarine obstructions, which was
+designed to prevent the entry of destroyers, as well as
+submarines, into Scapa Flow, advanced considerably towards
+completion. Progress was also made with the
+laying of mine-fields at the entrance. The anchorage at
+Swarbachs Minn, in the Shetlands, had been selected as
+a secondary coaling base for the ships of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron, and steps were taken to prepare a submarine
+obstruction for the entrance, and to provide the necessary
+labour for coaling the ships from colliers.</p>
+
+<p>The blockade work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued
+actively during the month, the average number
+of ships intercepted per week being 62, and the average
+number sent into port for closer examination, 16.</p>
+
+<p>The weather at Scapa during the month was misty,
+fog being experienced on the 5th, 6th, 21st, 23rd, 24th,
+27th and 28th, and snow on the 11th and 12th. The wind
+during the month was not strong.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII"><span id="toclink_221"></span>CHAPTER VIII<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> the early summer of 1915 there was a vague impression
+in some quarters, unsupported, so far as I am aware, by
+any confirmatory evidence, that the enemy might exhibit
+greater activity at sea. But during June, so far as
+could be ascertained by our intelligence system and by
+our submarine patrols, the Germans made no attempt to
+move to sea, but concentrated attention on increased
+submarine activity. The Grand Fleet, for various reasons
+unconnected with this development, spent the greater
+part of the time in harbour, exercising in Scapa Flow,
+the ships from the Rosyth base being sent up in pairs to
+exercise and carry out gunnery and torpedo practices.
+The opportunity of this change of base was usually taken
+for a searching sweep whilst <i lang="fr">en route</i> between the
+bases, so that the North Sea was continually under observation.</p>
+
+<p>On June 11th, however, the Grand Fleet went to
+sea for a cruise in northern waters principally for gunnery
+practices and battle exercises, which were carried out on
+a large scale. On this occasion the sea-planes working
+from the <i>Campania</i> were utilised, so far as I am aware,
+for the first time in history in observing the movements
+of the squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large
+hostile fleet. From this beginning, there was a great
+development in the work of heavier-than-air craft operating
+with a fleet. The first step was the provision of a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span>
+flying-off deck in a ship for sea-planes, as the extreme
+difficulty experienced by sea-planes in rising from the
+water, except in very fine weather, rendered the provision
+of a flying-off deck essential; the next was the substitution
+of aeroplanes for sea-planes, working from special
+carriers; and, finally, the provision of flying-off platforms
+in fighting ships themselves, first in light cruisers, afterwards
+in battle cruisers, and, eventually, in battleships;
+these successive developments were rendered possible by
+the progressive improvement in aircraft. In this way,
+naval power was given the assistance which air power
+could give it, both in reconnaissance and in making its
+gunnery more effective.</p>
+
+<p>The Scapa force proceeded to the westward through
+the Pentland Firth on the 11th. It carried out target
+practice at special targets towed by colliers to the north-westward
+of the Shetlands on the 12th, being joined by
+the Cromarty force (the 1st Battle Squadron and 7th
+Cruiser Squadron) that evening; the fleet then separated
+for night-firing.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had also left Rosyth
+on the 11th, carried out night-firing on the 12th, and the
+whole Grand Fleet practised battle exercises on the 13th,
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet afterwards firing at the targets
+which were towed by colliers, and rejoining my flag at
+daylight on the 14th. On that day further battle exercises
+were carried out. The <i>Campania</i>, with her sea-planes,
+again took part in these exercises, and an improvement
+in the scouting work of the sea-planes was
+noticeable. The Fleet then returned to the various bases,
+the Scapa force passing westward of the Orkneys.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the main portion of the Grand Fleet was exercising
+in northern waters, the 3rd Battle Squadron and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">223</span>
+3rd Cruiser Squadron, with one-half of the 1st Flotilla,
+cruised in the central portion of the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>Other operations during the month included:</p>
+
+<p>From the 1st to the 3rd, and the 5th to the 7th, further
+mine-sweeping operations were carried out by the
+Fleet sweepers and paddle sweepers in connection with the
+German mine-field in the southern portion of the North
+Sea, the operation being covered by four light cruisers and
+a force of destroyers. The work of clearing that portion
+of the mine-field, which it was decided to sweep up, was
+completed on the 7th. On several days during the month
+a force from Harwich, comprising light cruisers and destroyers,
+was cruising off the Dutch coast with the object
+of intercepting and attacking zeppelins. The force did
+not, however, meet with any success.</p>
+
+<p>From the 4th to the 7th the 1st Cruiser Squadron,
+with three armed boarding-steamers and three destroyers,
+operated on the two trade routes, St. Abbs Head to the
+Skagerrak and Rotterdam to Norwegian ports, examining
+all vessels encountered; nothing of special interest
+occurred. But when returning during a thick fog to
+Scapa the armed boarding-steamer <i>Duke of Albany</i>
+grounded on the Lother Rock, Pentland Firth, at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+on the 7th, remained ashore for seven days, and was considerably
+damaged.</p>
+
+<p>From the 18th to the 21st the 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
+with the light cruisers <i>Nottingham</i> and <i>Birmingham</i>, of
+the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied by four
+destroyers, swept across the North Sea, steering to the
+eastward from Rosyth to the entrance to the Skagerrak,
+thence to the coast of Norway and back to Rosyth. This
+force was attacked by at least three submarines during
+the sweep, and torpedoes were fired at the <i>Birmingham</i>
+on the 19th, and at the <i>Argyll</i>, the <i>Roxburgh</i> (on two<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">224</span>
+occasions), and the <i>Nottingham</i> on the 20th. Two torpedoes
+were fired at the <i>Nottingham</i>. These ships were proceeding
+at high speed and all the attacks failed, except
+the second attack on the <i>Roxburgh</i> (Captain C.&nbsp;R. de C.
+Foot), which was hit in the bows by a torpedo at 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on
+the 20th in Lat. 56.47 N., Long. 0.38 E. Fortunately,
+the damage was well forward, and the <i>Roxburgh</i> was able
+to maintain a speed of 14 knots during her return to
+Rosyth, all available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla being
+sent out to meet and screen her in. At the time of the
+attack the <i>Roxburgh</i> was proceeding at high speed and
+zigzagging, with one destroyer screening her. The ship
+was considerably damaged, and her repairs at a dockyard
+occupied a lengthened period.</p>
+
+<p>The incident furnished an example of the risks run
+by heavy ships cruising in the North Sea in waters frequented
+by submarines, unless accompanied by a much
+stronger screen of destroyers than it was possible to provide
+owing to the paucity of destroyers and the immense
+amount of work required of them. It was noted at the
+time, and considered to be suspicious, that a large fleet
+of trawlers flying neutral colours was fishing in the neighbourhood
+of these submarine attacks.</p>
+
+<p>As a result a force comprising three armed boarding-steamers
+and three destroyers was despatched from Scapa
+on June 26th to examine a fleet of neutral fishing vessels
+working to the south-eastward of the Pentland Firth and
+on the ordinary track of the Fleet when proceeding to sea.
+Six vessels were sent in for detailed examination, but
+nothing suspicious was found on board. The fishing fleet,
+however, shifted its ground to a position clear of the track
+of the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Operations against enemy submarines carried out by
+Grand Fleet forces during June included the following:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>June 1st to 2nd.</i>—A division of destroyers endeavoured, without
+success, to locate and attack a submarine 60 to 80 miles to
+the eastward of May Island.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 4th to 5th.</i>—Two destroyers and two sloops operated
+against a submarine, with a supposed tender, to the eastward
+of the Pentland Firth.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 5th.</i>—The armed trawler <i>Hawk</i>, of the Peterhead area,
+disabled submarine U 14 by gun fire and sank her by ramming
+at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> in Lat. 57.15 N., Long. 0.32 E. One officer and
+21 men were rescued. It was a fine exploit, typical of the consistently
+good work of the vessels of the Peterhead patrol; it
+was a success that was specially welcome at this time when submarines
+were very active in northern waters.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>There were many other engagements between auxiliary
+patrols and submarines during the month, but no
+other <em>certain</em> successes. It was believed that at least one
+submarine was sunk in a deep mine-field which had been
+laid at my request off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast.
+Appended are notes of further operations against the
+enemy’s under-water craft:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>June 18th and 19th.</i>—Anti-submarine operations by three destroyers
+and sloops were carried out in the Fair Island Channel.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 20th.</i>—Four destroyers were operating against submarines
+to the westward of the Orkneys.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 21st and 22nd.</i>—The <i>Botha</i> and eight destroyers of the
+1st Flotilla were operating against submarines in an area between
+Lat. 56.20 and 57.10 N. and Long. 1 E. to 1 W.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 21st.</i>—Four destroyers and six gunboats were operating
+to the east of the Pentland Firth against a submarine.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 23rd.</i>—Submarine U 40 was sunk 50 miles S.E. by S.
+of Girdle Ness at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> by submarine C 24, working in company
+with a trawler.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 23rd.</i>—A division of destroyers was sent to operate
+against a submarine to westward of the Fair Island Channel.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 24th–26th.</i>—Three sloops were engaged in searching for
+a submarine to the eastward of Orkneys and Shetlands.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">226</span></p>
+
+<p><i>June 26th.</i>—A large force, comprising 20 armed trawlers
+from Granton in the Firth of Forth, began to operate against
+submarines in an area round Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E., remaining
+out until July 7th. Two armed trawlers, with C class submarines
+in company, were also operating to the southward of this
+position.</p>
+
+<p><i>June 30th–July 1st.</i>—A force of eight destroyers was operating
+against submarines in the Fair Island Channel.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The anti-submarine operations by destroyers or sloops
+met with no success. The invariable difficulty was the
+provision of a sufficiently large number of vessels to keep
+the submarine down long enough to cause her to exhaust
+her battery power, a period of some 48 hours. When
+destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet were used for
+anti-submarine operations at any distance from the base,
+the disadvantage of their not being available to accompany
+the Fleet to sea in an emergency had to be accepted.
+This would have led to awkward results had the Fleet
+proceeded to sea with any considerable shortage of destroyers
+for screening purposes on passage south and for
+Fleet purposes during a Fleet action. The dilemma was
+one which faced me during the whole period of my command
+of the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>My experience convinced me that anti-submarine
+operations by destroyers in such open waters as existed
+near the northern bases had but little prospect of success
+unless undertaken by a considerably larger number of
+vessels than were usually available at Scapa for such
+operations; a contributory reason for the shortage of destroyers
+was that in addition to the operations carried out
+by the heavy ships, cruisers and light cruisers, for which
+the presence of destroyers was necessary, there was a
+constant call on these vessels for escort work during the
+movements of single ships or of squadrons between bases.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">227</span></p>
+
+<p>Other events of interest during this month included:</p>
+
+<p>The formation of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron of
+new light cruisers under the command of the late Commodore
+Le Mesurier, C.B., in the <i>Calliope</i>. This
+squadron was attached to the Battle Fleet, and in cruising
+order at sea was usually stationed from three to five miles
+ahead of the Battle Fleet to act as an advanced submarine
+screen forcing submarines to dive. From this position
+it could reach the van of the Fleet on deployment for
+action, and was stationed there for the purpose of attacking
+enemy destroyers with gunfire and the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet with torpedoes. It was a squadron on which, as
+Commander-in-Chief, I kept a hold so that I might be
+certain it would be at my disposal when action with the
+enemy was joined. Other light cruiser squadrons, which
+occupied an advanced position in the cruiser screen, could
+not be depended upon with the same certainty to occupy
+the van position to which they were allotted during a fleet
+action, since they might become engaged with enemy vessels
+of the same class.</p>
+
+<p>The battle cruiser <i>Inflexible</i> joined the Fleet from
+Gibraltar on June 19th.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Liverpool</i> left to pay off on the 26th for repair
+to boilers. Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;B. Fawckner took charge
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron base at Swarbachs Minn on
+the 18th.</p>
+
+<p>During the month observation mine-fields at the entrance
+to Cromarty and off Hoy Sound, Scapa Flow, were
+completed.</p>
+
+<p>A short visit was paid to the Fleet at Scapa Flow by
+the Archbishop of York on the 26th. He held a Fleet
+Confirmation in the <i>Iron Duke</i>, a great open-air service
+on Flotta Island, many thousands of officers and men attending;
+there was another service at Longhope, and, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">228</span>
+addition, he visited the majority of the ships. He was
+indeed indefatigable and left amidst the most sincere expressions
+of regret. To me personally his visit gave the
+greatest pleasure. From Scapa he passed to Invergordon,
+where, during a two days’ stay, he held a large open-air
+service, and visited most of the ships based there, moving
+on to Rosyth, where an impressive open-air service
+took place in one of the large graving-docks.</p>
+
+<p>The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued
+throughout the month, an average of 73 ships being intercepted
+weekly and 15 sent in for detailed examination.</p>
+
+<p>A serious attack was made by an enemy submarine
+on the fishing fleet some 50 miles to the eastward of
+the Shetlands on the night of the 23rd–24th June, about
+16 drifters being sunk by bombs and gunfire. This incident
+emphasised the necessity for better control over the
+movements of our fishing vessels in northern waters and
+of providing some form of protection for them. Steps
+were taken in both directions, although they naturally
+resulted in some unavoidable reduction in the operations
+of the fishing fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The weather at Scapa during June was very misty,
+fog or mist being experienced on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th,
+26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th.</p>
+
+<p>During July, 1915, fleet movements were kept to the
+lowest possible minimum owing to a threatened strike in
+the Welsh coal-fields, which eventually took place on the
+18th, and caused considerable anxiety as to its effect on
+Fleet movements.</p>
+
+<p>From the 11th to the 14th the Dreadnought Battle
+Fleet, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, and the
+<i>Campania</i> cruised in the vicinity of the Shetland Islands
+and carried out a series of battle exercises during the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span>
+cruise. The Battle Cruiser Fleet made a sweep between
+the 11th and 13th down to the Dogger Bank. Whilst
+the Battle Fleet was at sea the destroyer flotillas were
+sent into Balta Sound (Shetland Islands) to complete
+with fuel in case a move south on the part of the Battle
+Fleet became necessary.</p>
+
+<p>On the 28th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with
+two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd
+Light Cruiser Squadron, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
+and 14 destroyers of the 1st and 4th Flotillas from Rosyth
+and Scapa, together with Commodore Tyrwhitt and four
+light cruisers and 12 destroyers from Harwich, left their
+bases to carry out an operation in the Skagerrak, with the
+object of intercepting trade and searching for any enemy
+vessels. Only one German vessel (a trawler) was encountered,
+and she was sunk after removal of the crew. A
+Danish steamer was sent in to a British port with a guard
+on board and the force returned to their various bases on
+the 31st.</p>
+
+<p>As the threatened coal strike limited the movements
+of the coal-burning heavy ships, the oil-burning destroyers
+were used for anti-submarine work to a greater extent
+than would have been desirable if greater activity of the
+Fleet had been anticipated.</p>
+
+<p>Operations against enemy submarines included:</p>
+
+<p>On July 1st the <i>Hampshire</i> reported that a torpedo
+had been fired at her in the Moray Firth. Twelve destroyers
+and all available local patrol vessels were sent to
+endeavour to locate and sink the submarine. The steamboats
+from the ships at Cromarty were also despatched
+to operate in the various bays in the Moray Firth, where
+a submarine might elect to lie on the bottom. The boats
+exploded a large number of charges on the bottom in the
+hope of forcing any submarine to the surface. The operations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span>
+were abandoned on the evening of the 2nd, the submarine
+not having been located.</p>
+
+<p>On the 4th a division of the 2nd Flotilla hunted for
+another submarine reported in the Moray Firth.</p>
+
+<p>From the 5th to the 10th the sea-plane carrier <i>Campania</i>,
+with a flotilla leader, eight destroyers, four sloops
+and a large number of trawlers and net-drifters, operated
+against submarines that were reported to be passing
+through the Fair Island Channel, being based on Pierowall
+Harbour, in the north of the Orkneys. The destroyers,
+sloops and patrol vessels operated in conjunction
+with the sea-planes. No success was achieved, however,
+although these extensive operations covered a large area.</p>
+
+<p>On the night of the 16th a division of destroyers
+operated against a submarine reported to the southward
+of the Pentland Firth, off Duncansby Head, but again
+without result.</p>
+
+<p>From the 15th to the 19th six sloops and seven gunboats
+were despatched against submarines in the Fair
+Island Channel and north of the Shetlands, the <i>Campania’s</i>
+sea-planes again assisting from Pierowall Harbour.
+Destroyers were also helping during a portion of
+the period covered by the operations. On the 16th the
+gunboat <i>Speedwell</i> reported having sighted the periscope
+of a submarine, ramming her at a speed of 15 knots. The
+submarine was struck on her starboard quarter at an angle
+of 10 degrees, but there was, unfortunately, no evidence
+to show that she was sunk, although it was probable that
+she was considerably damaged. She was not seen again.
+On the same day a submarine was reported by the armed
+yacht <i>Zaza</i>, as being in a drift-net 12 miles east-north-east
+from Fair Island. Local patrol vessels, gunboats
+and four destroyers concentrated on the position and explosive
+charges were fired, but without certain result.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span>
+From the 25th to the 27th a sub-division of destroyers
+searched, fruitlessly, a large area to the northward of the
+Hebrides for submarines and a reported submarine base
+ship. They were assisted by four sloops operating in the
+area from the 26th to the 30th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 18th and 19th a division of destroyers was
+engaged in moving a neutral fishing fleet away from an
+area to the eastward of the Firth of Forth where they
+interfered with Fleet operations. Submarine C 27 had
+for some little time been operating against submarines in
+the North Sea from Scapa, in tow of a trawler, to which
+vessel she was connected by telephone. This idea, which
+had first been conceived at the Rosyth base, had also been
+put into operation at Scapa, the arrangements being
+made under the direction of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville.
+On July 20th the trawler <i>Princess Louise</i>, Lieutenant
+Morton, R.N.R., being in command, with Lieutenant
+Cantlie, R.N., a submarine officer, on board, was towing
+Submarine C 27 (Lieutenant-Commander Dobson) in a
+submerged condition when a German submarine, U 23,
+was sighted 1¼ miles off on the port bow. C 27 was informed
+by telephone, telephonic communication then
+breaking down. U 23 opened fire at a range of 2,000
+yards on the <i>Princess Louise</i>. Lieutenant Cantlie, being
+unable to communicate further with C 27, slipped the
+tow and proceeded to abandon the trawler with every
+appearance of haste. U 23 closed to within 600 yards
+and stopped. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Dobson,
+hearing nothing further by telephone, but noticing
+the splash and explosion of the projectiles in the water,
+got well clear of the trawler after slipping, and then
+brought his periscope to the surface for a look around.
+He sighted U 23 about 900 yards off, closed to a good
+position for attack within 500 yards, and fired his first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">232</span>
+torpedo, which missed. His second shot hit; there was a
+heavy explosion, and U 23 sank; four officers and six men
+were picked up out of a crew of 34. The whole attack
+was exceedingly well managed and a very well deserved
+success scored, which reflected much credit on all concerned
+in the operations.</p>
+
+<p>On the 26th a submarine was engaged about 120 miles
+east of Dundee by the armed trawler <i>Taranaki</i>, which
+claimed to have sunk her.</p>
+
+<p>On the 27th an engagement took place between the
+armed trawler No. 830 and a submarine to the southward
+of St. Kilda, the trawler reporting that the submarine was
+hit several times by gunfire and considered to have been
+badly damaged.</p>
+
+<p>Other events of interest during the month included
+an attempt by the <i>Digby</i> to tow the Norwegian steamer
+<i>Oscar II.</i>, damaged by collision with the <i>Patuca</i> on July
+1st, into Stornoway, the destroyers <i>Fury</i> and <i>Staunch</i>
+being detached from Scapa and local patrol vessels from
+Stornoway to assist. In spite of perseverance under very
+bad weather conditions, during which the ships and the
+destroyers were handled with great ability, the <i>Oscar II.</i>
+sank on the night of the 3rd.</p>
+
+<p>An expedition consisting of the armed merchant-ship
+<i>Columbella</i>, the sloop <i>Acacia</i> and the two trawlers <i>Arley</i>
+and <i>Mafeking</i>, left Scapa on July 29th for Bear Island
+and Spitzbergen to search for a reported German submarine
+base and wireless station. These vessels carried
+out as thorough a search as was possible, in face of the
+ice-fields in the neighbourhood of the islands; but no trace
+of a submarine base was discovered, nor could it have been
+possible for one to operate under such conditions.</p>
+
+<p>The average figures per week for the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron during the month were:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">233</span></p>
+
+<p>Number of ships intercepted, 62; number of ships
+sent in with armed guards, 10; number of ships on patrol,
+15; number of ships refitting, coaling or on passage to or
+from base, 9.</p>
+
+<p>German submarines were active in the vicinity of the
+ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, and
+the <i>Columbella</i> was unsuccessfully attacked on the 21st.</p>
+
+<p>Some armed boarding steamers were detailed to assist
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, being withdrawn
+from the patrol eastward of the Pentland Firth.</p>
+
+<p>The anti-submarine defence of the base at Swarbachs
+Minn was practically completed during the month.</p>
+
+<p>An event of great interest to the officers and men of
+the Fleet was a visit from His Majesty the King, who
+arrived at Scapa on July 7th, crossing from Thurso in the
+<i>Oak</i>, escorted by a portion of the 2nd Flotilla.
+During His Majesty’s visit he stayed with Admiral Sir
+Stanley Colville at Longhope and spent two very busy
+days with the Fleet. His Majesty visited all the flagships,
+and a large number of the officers and men of the ships
+of each division of the Battle Fleet and of each vessel in
+the cruiser squadrons were assembled on board the various
+flagships and passed before the King. His Majesty
+reviewed the officers and men of the smaller vessels, destroyers,
+sloops, etc., on the island of Flotta, visited hospital
+ships, and reviewed the great mass of auxiliary
+vessels anchored in Scapa Flow, being greeted with enthusiastic
+loyalty by the crews of these vessels: visited the
+various shore batteries, and inspected the anti-submarine
+defences and the boom vessels. The weather was bad, but
+the programme was carried out in spite of these conditions.
+The officers and men of the Fleet derived the utmost
+encouragement from His Majesty’s gracious visit.
+The King made the following signal to the Commander-in-Chief<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span>
+as the <i>Oak</i> left the Fleet, escorted by a portion of
+the 4th Flotilla:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long-cherished
+desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most interesting
+days spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and
+admiration for the splendid force which you command with the
+full confidence of myself and your fellow-countrymen.</p>
+
+<p>“I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the
+officers and men of the Fleet. I realise the patience and determined
+spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting
+and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links
+all ranks together.</p>
+
+<p>“Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever
+the day of battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its
+old glorious traditions.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In reply to His Majesty’s gracious message, I expressed
+the appreciation of the officers and men of the
+Grand Fleet, adding that it was “my conviction that the
+glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in the hands of
+those I have the honour to command.”</p>
+
+<p>During August the coal strike continued to influence
+Fleet movements to a certain extent.</p>
+
+<p>On August 2nd the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 2nd Battle Squadron
+and the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out target practice
+from Cromarty. This was a new departure, the
+practice hitherto having been limited to firing at a small
+target towed by other ships or by a collier to the northward
+or eastward of the Shetlands, or firing at a rock. Both
+were highly unsatisfactory methods, which did not enable
+the gunnery efficiency of ships to be either tested or
+greatly improved. Accordingly I decided to risk sending
+ships out from Cromarty to fire at a large target of the
+pattern used in peace practices; it was towed across the
+Moray Firth, the ships firing and the towing vessels being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span>
+protected from submarine attack by destroyers, sloops
+and gunboats. The system was an improvement,
+although very expensive in the employment of destroyers,
+etc. It was continued until practice in the Pentland
+Firth took its place. The usual procedure was for two
+ships, screened by destroyers, to be on the firing ground
+at a time, firing either independently or with concentrated
+fire, with two more vessels approaching the firing ground
+ready to fire when the first pair had finished. On completion
+of practice the first pair returned to harbour and
+were met at the entrance by the third pair, to which they
+turned over their destroyers. Careful organisation insured
+that ships did not have to wait at the entrance, nor was
+there delay for the target to be turned round for the
+return run. A large number of destroyers, sloops or gunboats,
+patrolled to seaward of the target to prevent submarines
+from approaching. The total number usually employed
+screening and patrolling during a day’s firing was
+from 22 to 28.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the 2nd Battle Squadron and
+the 1st Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to Scapa on completion
+of the practice, being relieved later by another
+battle squadron and cruiser squadron in accordance with
+the routine which had been established of changing bases
+periodically. The special service ship No. 6 left Scapa
+for Rosyth, with two destroyers, to endeavour to “draw”
+submarines to attack her and give the destroyers an opportunity
+of engaging them; but no attack took place.</p>
+
+<p>From August 5th to the 9th extensive anti-submarine
+operations were carried out to the westward of the
+Orkneys by a force consisting of nine destroyers, six
+sloops, five gunboats and a large number of patrol
+trawlers. The operations covered a very large area, the
+general idea being to compel any submarine intending<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span>
+to pass round the Shetland Islands or through the Fair
+Island Channel to submerge for a period that would exhaust
+her batteries and eventually bring her to the surface
+to recharge. The limited duration of darkness in
+northern latitudes assisted the operations of the hunting
+vessels. No <em>certain</em> success was attained. A submarine
+was sighted on the 6th at 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and a heavy explosion,
+under water, close to the sloop <i>Hollyhock</i> at 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on
+the same night might have been due to a submarine coming
+to grief, while another submarine was sighted at 10.30
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 7th. Examination of a sailing vessel found
+in the vicinity of this latter submarine was unproductive.</p>
+
+<p>The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on August
+6th to cruise off the Norwegian coast, and the battleships
+<i>Albemarle</i> and <i>Russell</i>, of the 6th Battle Squadron, arrived
+at Scapa for practices, having left the Channel
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>On August 7th I returned in the <i>Iron Duke</i> to
+Cromarty in order to meet the Prime Minister and Chancellor
+of the Exchequer who were about to visit Invergordon.
+At 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 8th a wireless report was received
+in the <i>Iron Duke</i> that a submarine was attacking
+a steamer off Rosehearty on the southern shore of the
+Moray Firth. The “duty” destroyer division was ordered
+to sea at once, and the remaining three available destroyers
+followed shortly afterwards. Meanwhile, the destroyer
+<i>Christopher</i>, already on patrol in the Moray Firth, reported
+herself in action at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> with the submarine,
+which had submerged, the report stating that the merchant-ship
+had been sunk. The second destroyer on
+patrol, the <i>Midge</i>, assisted in the search for the submarine,
+as did the remaining destroyers and patrol trawlers, without
+result. At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the trawler mine-sweepers, which
+had been carrying out the usual routine sweep on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span>
+southern shore of the Moray Firth, reported the discovery
+of a mine-field to the northward of Banff, and several
+reports were received during the day of drifting mines
+being sighted along the coast and in the Firth. All destroyers
+were ordered in at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, except the two on
+patrol and any others in touch with the submarine, and
+vessels remaining on patrol were given the limits of the
+mine-field as far as they had then been ascertained.</p>
+
+<p>Such investigation as could be hurriedly carried out
+during the day, by signal and wireless, revealed the fact
+that a yacht and a trawler on patrol on the night of the
+7th–8th had sighted strange lights, but without identifying
+the vessel carrying them, and it became apparent
+that a German surface mine-laying vessel had been at
+work. The night had been somewhat misty. Directions
+were at once sent by wireless to the 4th Light Cruiser
+Squadron, still at sea, to proceed at full speed towards the
+Horn Reef to endeavour to intercept the returning mine-layer,
+and the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, from
+Rosyth, were also sent out for the purpose; the Admiralty
+was also informed, and as a result the Harwich force was
+sent on the same mission.</p>
+
+<p>As the other squadrons proceeded, the 4th Light
+Cruiser Squadron was directed to the Skagerrak in case
+the mine-layer endeavoured to return by that route, whilst
+the remaining light cruiser squadrons made for the Horn
+Reef. All the mine-sweepers and the destroyers engaged
+in the anti-submarine operation mentioned earlier were
+recalled to fuel with all despatch, and sweeping by the
+Fleet mine-sweepers, trawlers and destroyers, organised
+on a large scale, was begun on the 9th and continued until
+clear routes for the ships at Cromarty and for merchant-ships,
+gradually extending to 10 miles in width, had been
+swept on both the northern and southern shores of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">238</span>
+Moray Firth. These sweeping operations were greatly
+delayed by persistent fog, although a clear channel sufficiently
+wide to admit of the exit of the squadrons at
+Cromarty was quickly swept. The <i>Campania</i> was sent
+to Cromarty, so that her sea-planes might assist to locate
+the mines, but in the rather thick waters of the Moray
+Firth they were of no use for this purpose.</p>
+
+<p>On the afternoon of the 9th news was received that
+the destroyer <i>Lynx</i> had been sunk by a mine at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+that morning in a position stated to be two miles to the
+northward of the mine-field as then located. It was very
+regrettable that only three officers and 21 men were saved
+out of her fine ship’s company; those lost included her
+captain, Commander John F.&nbsp;H. Cole, an officer of great
+promise. The loss of such a comparatively shallow draft
+vessel showed that some of the mines had been laid near
+the surface, and mine-sweeping operations were suspended
+near the time of low water.</p>
+
+<p>At 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich
+force, reported that the German mine-layer <i>Meteor</i>,
+which had been sighted by his vessels in the vicinity of
+the Horn Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her
+own crew and that he had subsequently rescued four
+officers and 39 men, survivors of the armed boarding-steamer
+<i>Ramsey</i>, who had been prisoners on board the
+<i>Meteor</i>. The <i>Ramsey</i> had been on patrol south-east of
+the Pentland Firth, and it was ascertained from the survivors
+later that she had sighted and closed the <i>Meteor</i>,
+which was disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, shortly
+after daylight on August 8th, with the intention of
+boarding her. On closing, however, the <i>Meteor</i> suddenly
+showed her true character; her powerful armament,
+hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the <i>Ramsey</i>,
+which was returned by the latter ship’s greatly inferior<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span>
+armament of 12-pounder guns. But the surprise was too
+complete and the odds too heavy, and the <i>Ramsey</i> was
+sunk very quickly with her colours flying, four officers
+and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by
+the <i>Meteor</i>. Acting-Lieut. P.&nbsp;S. Atkins, R.N.R., the
+senior surviving officer of the <i>Ramsey</i>, came north to report
+himself to me, and gave full details of his experiences.
+He stated that when the officers of the <i>Meteor</i> abandoned
+and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt’s
+force, the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board
+a neutral fishing vessel. Shortly afterwards the British
+light cruisers passed close to the fishing vessel, and Lieut.
+Atkins signalled to the Commodore, stating that they were
+survivors of the <i>Ramsey</i> and asked to be taken off. He
+added that the Commodore, who was at that time being
+attacked by both aircraft and submarines, replied, “Steer
+south-west; I will return and pick you up.”</p>
+
+<p>Lieut. Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the
+<i>Meteor</i> to steer south-west, but the Germans naturally
+enough objected, as they desired to make their own coast.
+However, in spite of the fact that the British were unarmed
+and numerically very inferior, their arguments
+prevailed and a south-west course was steered for a short
+time until another fishing vessel was sighted; the British
+suggested transferring to her; this was agreed to by the
+Germans. As the British were leaving, the German captain,
+Konstten-Kapitän von Knorr, asked Lieut. Atkins
+if he had any money, to which he replied, “How could I,
+seeing that you picked me up in pyjamas?” Captain von
+Knorr pressed money on him, but Lieut. Atkins said that
+he did not see that he would require it. However, he
+eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him an
+English £5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record
+so gentlemanly and courteous an act, which stands out<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span>
+in strong contrast to the usual behaviour of German naval
+officers during the War. The money was given to me, and
+I sent it to the Admiralty, asking that it might be repaid,
+with the thanks of the British for the courtesy shown to
+our prisoners of war.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons were
+ordered to return to their bases on receipt of the news
+of the sinking of the <i>Meteor</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The mine-sweeping operations in the Moray Firth on
+August 9th showed that the mine-field was larger than
+had been at first reported, and additional paddle mine-sweepers
+were sent from the Clyde to assist the other
+vessels.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were on board the
+<i>Iron Duke</i> from the 7th to the 9th, and various matters
+of importance were discussed. When questioned as to
+urgent requirements I pressed for the building of a large
+number of sloops, a class of vessel which had proved most
+useful, both as mine-sweepers and as patrol vessels, and
+which could supplement the numerous destroyers then
+building, which took much longer to complete.</p>
+
+<p>The persistence of the fog at this period is shown by
+the fact that the <i>Agincourt</i>, returning to Scapa from
+Portsmouth, was unable to enter the base for 36 hours
+after passing Cape Wrath, only 60 miles distant, and was
+forced to cruise to the westward, making repeated attempts
+at entry. The <i>Ajax</i> was similarly delayed in entry
+for 12 hours during the same period.</p>
+
+<p>On August 10th the armed merchant-ship <i>India</i>, of
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was torpedoed and sunk by
+an enemy submarine off the coast of Norway with considerable
+loss of life.</p>
+
+<p>Four destroyers were sent on August 13th to locate
+and engage a submarine that had attacked one of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span>
+Fleet mine-sweepers. They did not succeed in finding
+her, but on the following day an armed yacht engaged
+a submarine off the Aberdeen coast and claimed to have
+hit her by gunfire; and the trawler <i>Shamrock</i> claimed to
+have run over another submarine.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, and seven destroyers
+carried out a search between the 16th and 18th for enemy
+vessels in the northern and central portion of the North
+Sea, sweeping towards the Skagerrak, and covering a
+large area by wide zigzags.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i> returned to Scapa from Cromarty on
+the 16th.</p>
+
+<p>From the 18th to the 21st the <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+was cruising in the North Sea and carrying out
+exercises off the Shetland Islands, proceeding to Scapa
+for practices on the 21st, and returning to Rosyth on
+the 23rd.</p>
+
+<p>On August 18th the Fleet mine-sweeper <i>Lilac</i>, Lieut.-Commander
+Leslie Fisher, while at work on the Moray
+Firth mine-field, struck a mine. The whole fore part of
+the ship was destroyed and the wreck of it hung down
+from the after part, causing her to draw 30 feet of water
+forward, instead of the usual nine to ten feet. The
+weather was very bad and a heavy sea running, but by
+great persistence and good seamanship, aided by very
+gallant work on the part of her own crew and that of the
+<i>Hollyhock</i>, Captain Preston, senior officer of Fleet mine-sweepers,
+who was in command of the <i>Hollyhock</i>, succeeded
+in towing her to Peterhead. She was eventually
+reconstructed and rejoined the Fleet mine-sweeping flotillas.
+The value of this class of vessel was clearly shown
+by the incident.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span></p>
+
+<p>Eight destroyers from Scapa, with a flotilla leader,
+were carrying out on August 23rd and 24th anti-submarine
+operations in the Fair Island Channel, and a division
+was similarly employed east of May Island, in the
+Firth of Forth.</p>
+
+<p>Between August 24th and 26th the 3rd and 7th
+Cruiser Squadrons exchanged bases, between Scapa and
+Rosyth, carrying out a wide search of the North Sea <i lang="fr">en
+route</i>, destroyers screening the ships by day.</p>
+
+<p>On the 24th Rear-Admiral E.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;A. Gaunt, C.M.G.,
+relieved Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas in the 1st
+Battle Squadron, the latter officer being designated to
+take command of the new 5th Battle Squadron (five ships
+of the “Queen Elizabeth” class), as it was formed.</p>
+
+<p>On August 30th–31st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with destroyers, searched to the eastward of May Island
+for enemy vessels; and from August 31 to September
+1st the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied by four
+destroyers, was cruising between the Firth of Forth and
+the Dogger Bank for the same purpose.</p>
+
+<p>During the month the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons
+carried out target practice in the Moray Firth, and all
+battle squadrons and cruiser squadrons proceeded to sea
+for cruises, independently, from their bases, screened by
+destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visited Sir
+Stanley Colville at Longhope during the month, remaining
+for six days. He went on board many of the ships
+of the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron report for the month
+showed the average weekly results as follows: Ships intercepted,
+65; ships sent in, 13; number of vessels on patrol,
+14; number refitting, coaling or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from
+patrol, 9.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span></p>
+
+<p>The weather at Scapa was very misty. Fog or mist
+was experienced on the 3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th,
+14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 31st. There were no gales.</p>
+
+<p>On August 3rd the large floating-dock from the Medway,
+which had been towed to the Tyne, was reported as
+ready for use.</p>
+
+<p>On the 29th the old light cruiser <i>Brilliant</i> arrived at
+Lerwick to act as guard and depot ship at that base,
+which was being developed as a secondary examination
+base for vessels sent in by the 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>An extended patrol to the south-eastward of the Pentland
+Firth during the month was maintained by three
+armed boarding steamers and three destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>The principal events of September, 1915, may perhaps
+be given most conveniently and briefly in diary form:</p>
+
+<p>On September 1st eight destroyers, fitted for mine-sweeping,
+swept the waters to the westward of the Pentland
+Firth. This was the first occasion on which destroyers
+were used for this purpose.</p>
+
+<p>September 1st and 2nd.—The <i>Black Prince</i> and four
+light cruisers, with six destroyers, carried out a sweep to
+the eastward from Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>September 2nd–5th.—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet,
+the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, and the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron were cruising in northern waters.
+Destroyers screened the Fleet out and back, but did not
+remain with it during the cruise, being kept at the base,
+ready fuelled, in case it became necessary to move to the
+southward. Battle exercises and night-firing were carried
+out during the cruise, as opportunity offered. The
+battleship <i>Superb</i> reported sighting the periscope of a
+submarine.</p>
+
+<p>On September 2nd the Fleet was visited by five
+French gentlemen of eminence, and a representative of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span>
+the United States Press. This was the first visit paid to
+the Grand Fleet base by anyone not immediately connected
+with the Service, and we were flattered that the
+occasion should have brought to Scapa Flow representatives
+of our gallant Allies from across the Channel. The
+Fleet left immediately after the visit, and an opportunity
+was afforded our visitors of seeing the ships leave harbour.</p>
+
+<p>September 4th.—Another mine-sweeping sloop, the
+<i>Dahlia</i>, Lieutenant G. Parsons, R.N., struck a mine in
+the Moray Firth mine-field during sweeping operations.
+She was very badly damaged; Lieut. Parsons himself was
+severely injured. The ship reached Invergordon with the
+loss of three killed and one missing. She was subsequently
+repaired.</p>
+
+<p>September 7th.—The 3rd Cruiser Squadron left
+Scapa, with destroyers, swept down in the direction of
+the Horn Reef, and arrived at Rosyth on the 9th without
+sighting enemy vessels. Visibility was low during the
+sweep.</p>
+
+<p>September 8th.—The 7th Cruiser Squadron left
+Rosyth, with destroyers, swept out to the eastward, towards
+the Skagerrak, then turned to the northward and
+arrived at Scapa on the 10th.</p>
+
+<p>Two destroyers were damaged by collision with
+steamers in a fog on the 8th, necessitating repairs at a
+dockyard in both cases.</p>
+
+<p>September 10th–12th.—The <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st and
+3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadrons and 16 destroyers, was cruising in the
+North Sea to cover mine-laying operations carried out by
+our mine-layers in the Heligoland Bight, the remainder
+of the Grand Fleet being, as was usual on such occasions,
+at short notice for steam. The <i>Fearless</i> and a destroyer,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span>
+part of the force with the battle cruisers, collided while
+at sea, the former sustaining considerable damage.</p>
+
+<p>September 11th.—The <i>Patia</i> and <i>Oropesa</i>, of the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron, collided; the <i>Patia</i> was seriously damaged,
+and was brought into port under convoy of a destroyer
+and armed trawlers with considerable difficulty,
+being unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine <i lang="fr">en route</i>.</p>
+
+<p>September 12th.—Submarine E 16, attached to the
+Grand Fleet flotilla, was sent to the coast of Norway
+from Aberdeen to operate against an enemy submarine
+thought to be operating in those waters. On the 15th
+E 16 sighted a hostile submarine off the Norwegian coast
+and sank her with a torpedo. This success, one of the
+earliest achieved by one submarine operating against
+another, was very encouraging after the somewhat similar
+success of C 27 in July.</p>
+
+<p>September 17th.—The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with four destroyers, left Rosyth to sweep to the
+Skagerrak. They returned on the 19th, without having
+sighted any enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>September 23rd.—The destroyer <i>Christopher</i> was
+damaged in collision with the armed boarding-steamer
+<i>King Orry</i> in a fog.</p>
+
+<p>September 26th.—The s.s. <i>Caribbean</i>, which had
+been fitted out as a receiving-ship for dockyard workmen,
+encountered very heavy weather whilst <i lang="fr">en route</i> from her
+port to Scapa, and got into serious difficulties, taking in
+a great deal of water. Her wireless distress calls off Cape
+Wrath were answered by sending to her assistance the
+light cruiser <i>Birkenhead</i> from Scapa, together with tugs
+and yachts from Scapa and Stornoway. At 4.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on
+the 27th the <i>Birkenhead</i> and patrol vessels, which were
+then standing by, took off most of the crew of the <i>Caribbean</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span>
+which sank at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, unfortunately with the
+loss of 15 lives.</p>
+
+<p>During the month the battle and cruiser squadrons
+carried out independent cruises by day and at night from
+the Scapa and Rosyth bases, being screened by destroyers
+during the exercises. The squadrons of the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet, also, all visited Scapa for the purpose of
+carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices.</p>
+
+<p>A widely extended patrol by one or more light
+cruisers with destroyers, working to the south-eastward
+from Scapa, was maintained during the month, in order
+to guard against any attempt at mine-laying in the
+Pentland Firth by enemy vessels disguised as merchant-ships.
+Similar precautions were taken at Rosyth. This
+patrol was henceforth regularly established when the
+conditions of the moon rendered attempted mine-laying
+operations at night probable.</p>
+
+<p>The sweeping operations in the Moray Firth were
+continued on a large scale throughout the month, and
+clear channels on each shore were provided. Up to
+September 19th, 222 mines had been accounted for out of
+the 450 which survivors of the <i>Ramsey</i> stated had been
+laid by the <i>Meteor</i>. The Moray Firth mine-field, in the
+centre of the Firth, was purposely left undisturbed, as it
+formed an excellent anti-submarine defence in that position
+and reduced the area to be patrolled by our vessels.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Cruiser Squadron became non-existent during
+the month, two ships being detached by the Admiralty
+on special service, and the remaining two sent into port for
+somewhat extensive repairs.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s <em>weekly average</em> for the
+month worked out at:</p>
+
+<p>Ships intercepted, 64; sent in with armed guards, 11;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span>
+number of vessels on patrol, 13; number absent or <i lang="fr">en
+route</i> to or from patrols, 10.</p>
+
+<p>The weather at Scapa showed fog or mist on the 6th,
+8th, 9th, 10th, 14th, 18th, 23rd and 24th; a very heavy
+gale occurred between the 25th and 28th, during which
+great damage was done to the anti-submarine obstructions
+at Scapa, and a good deal of damage was suffered on the
+mainland in the north of Scotland, a portion of the Highland
+Railway being washed away.</p>
+
+<p>Between June and August, 1915, I had pressed upon
+the Admiralty my opinion that we should carry out a
+much more comprehensive mining policy in the Heligoland
+Bight. I had urged this early in the War, but the
+view taken at the Admiralty was that mining on any
+large scale would impede both our submarine operations
+and also any Fleet operations that might be undertaken
+in those waters. I felt that unless we adopted one of
+two policies—namely, either a close watch by surface
+ships on the exits from the German bases, or an
+extensive mining policy—we could never feel that we
+should receive sufficient warning of the exit of enemy
+forces as to prevent mischief being done. The close
+blockade by surface ships was not a feasible operation
+in view of the number of craft at our disposal and the
+submarine danger; our submarines were too few in number
+and had not the necessary means of communication to take
+the place of surface ships.</p>
+
+<p>I could see no alternatives to very extensive mining,
+limited only by the number of mines that could be produced.
+The mining proposed by me was intended to
+hamper the operations of both surface vessels and submarines.
+I pointed out that earlier in the War the view
+had been expressed to me by the Admiralty that we
+should not risk our cruisers too freely in the North Sea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">248</span>
+owing to the submarine danger, and that, if we adhered
+to this policy, it was impossible to insure that the exits
+to the Fleet bases would not be mined by surface mine-layers,
+as the <i>Meteor</i> incident had shown, and as was also
+indicated by the success of our own infrequent mining excursions
+to the Heligoland Bight.</p>
+
+<p>The correspondence resulted in increased activity on
+the part of our mine-layers, but the success of our work
+was unfortunately handicapped by defects in the pattern
+of mine in use at that time, especially as against
+submarines.</p>
+
+<p>In 1917, shortly after my return to the Admiralty,
+I undertook a very extensive mining policy. In the
+previous year, during Sir Henry Jackson’s period as First
+Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was designed,
+the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him.
+This was one of the replies to the submarine. One hundred
+thousand of these mines were ordered by me early in
+1917 to carry out various schemes for mining the Heligoland
+Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later in 1917, with
+the assistance of the United States, provision was made
+for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the
+Northern Barrage. It was not until the large supplies
+of mines became available in the autumn that really effective
+results against submarines by mining began to be
+achieved, although the operations of German surface vessels
+had previously been hampered to a very considerable
+extent.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX"><span id="toclink_249"></span>CHAPTER IX<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">During</span> the later months of 1915 the Grand Fleet continued
+to sweep and control the North Sea in spite of the
+enemy’s efforts to effect attrition by submarines and
+mines. On October 1st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with destroyers escorting, left Rosyth and proceeded
+towards the Little Fisher Bank; on reaching that locality
+the squadron turned to the north-westward and steered
+towards Scapa, arriving on the 3rd. The line thus swept
+was the possible course of enemy mine-laying or other
+vessels, proceeding towards, or returning from, the
+vicinity of Scapa and Cromarty. No enemy ships were
+sighted.</p>
+
+<p>On October 2nd the battleship <i>Barham</i>, Flagship of
+the new 5th Battle Squadron, arrived at Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser
+Squadron (now comprising six light cruisers) and nine
+destroyers, left Harwich on the 6th to sweep towards the
+Skagerrak in search of enemy vessels, particularly fishing
+trawlers, which were suspected of acting as outpost vessels.
+The operation on this occasion was fruitful in result; 14
+German trawlers were captured and sent in; one was also
+sunk. As usual during such operations when a supporting
+force was not actually at sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet was
+kept at short notice for steam, to be ready to put to sea
+if required.</p>
+
+<p>On October 10th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron left
+Scapa and swept down to the Little Fisher Bank, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span>
+thence to Rosyth with the same object in view as that of
+the Harwich force, being met at daylight on the 11th by
+destroyers from Rosyth, and arriving at that base on the
+12th. On this occasion the operation gave no result.</p>
+
+<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, comprising the 1st,
+2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th
+Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and
+the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, left Scapa on the 13th, and
+proceeded into the northern portion of the North Sea for
+a cruise. Owing to bad weather the destroyers were sent
+back on the 11th, one, the <i>Mandate</i>, being damaged by
+a heavy sea; the <i>Ardent</i> and <i>Fortune</i> collided, the former
+vessel being damaged. The fleet carried out battle exercises
+during the cruise, and returned to the bases at Scapa
+and Cromarty on the 15th, on which day the new battleship
+<i>Canada</i> joined the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>On October 18th the Harwich force, consisting of the
+5th Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, sailed to
+operate off the Danish coast, north of the Horn Reef,
+against any enemy vessels found there. The <i>Lion</i>, with
+the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, left
+Rosyth to support the Harwich force, which closed the
+Danish coast at daylight on the 19th, then steered to the
+north-westward, till dark, returning afterwards to Harwich.
+The search was unproductive, no enemy vessels
+being sighted. The <i>Lion</i> and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
+proceeded towards Cromarty, but were diverted to Scapa
+during the night of the 19th–20th, owing to a report of
+suspicious vessels, possibly mine-layers, being sighted off
+Noss Head. These vessels were subsequently identified
+as two of our own trawlers.</p>
+
+<p>On October 22nd three divisions of destroyers were
+sent from Scapa to hunt a submarine off Fair Island, but
+were forced to return owing to bad weather.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span></p>
+
+<p>On October 27th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with two
+armed boarding-steamers, left Scapa to search the
+northern portion of the North Sea, returning on the 30th.
+Nothing was sighted.</p>
+
+<p>On October 30th Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th
+Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, left Harwich for
+another sweep off the Danish coast. His force passed
+through a position some 70 miles north-west of Heligoland
+before daylight on the 21st, steered for the Little
+Fisher Bank, and thence to Harwich. A portion of the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet kept steam at short notice during the
+operation, which was unproductive, except for the interception
+of an ore-laden neutral steamer which was sent
+in to a British port.</p>
+
+<p>On October 30th the <i>Birkenhead</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>,
+newly commissioned light cruisers, left Scapa for a searching
+and exercise cruise in the northern portion of the
+North Sea, and returned to Scapa on November 1st.</p>
+
+<p>During October squadrons cruised independently in
+the North Sea from Scapa, as in previous months, by day
+and at night. The ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, as
+well as the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth and squadrons
+from Scapa, proceeded to Cromarty, in turn, in
+order to carry out long-range firing at towed targets in
+the Moray Firth, being screened from submarine attack
+by destroyers. Squadrons from Rosyth proceeded also
+to Scapa to carry out practices.</p>
+
+<p>A patrol, comprising the <i>Sappho</i> and eight armed
+whalers, based on Peterhead, was instituted as a guard
+against further attempted mine-laying in the Moray
+Firth. The Peterhead and Cromarty mine-sweeping
+vessels, which had been working under the Senior
+Officer of Fleet mine-sweepers (Captain Preston) for the
+clearance of the Moray Firth mine-field, reverted to their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">252</span>
+proper commands, and arrangements were made for a
+constant sweep by mine-sweeping trawlers of the channel
+along the south shore of the Moray Firth, which was that
+used by ships based on Cromarty when concentrating with
+the remainder of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. It
+was essential to ensure that this channel was kept clear
+of mines so long as any portion of the Grand Fleet was
+based on Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>It may not be out of place here to state the patrol
+arrangements existing in the vicinity of the Pentland
+Firth at this time. Usually three armed boarding-steamers
+and three destroyers were patrolling to the eastward
+of the Firth. They moved to the northward during
+daylight and worked for a considerable distance to the
+south-eastward of the Firth at night. An extended patrol,
+usually consisting of a light cruiser and a destroyer, also
+worked from Peterhead. A patrol of one or two
+destroyers was maintained at night off Noss Head on the
+north shore of the Moray Firth. Destroyers were kept
+off the entrance to Hoy Sound and Holm Sound, and
+a large number of trawlers near the Hoxa Sound
+entrance. In bad weather the eastern destroyer patrol
+was withdrawn to work between Swona Island and
+the land to the eastward and to the north-westward. The
+old local defence destroyers also carried out patrol work
+off the entrance, and off Kirkwall. These particulars
+are of interest as conveying some idea of the sea work
+in a restricted area which had to be carried out in all
+weathers.</p>
+
+<p>From October 1st to October 11th the Fleet Flagship
+<i>Iron Duke</i> was refitting at Invergordon.</p>
+
+<p>On October 28th the <i>Argyll</i>, <i lang="fr">en route</i> from Devonport
+to Rosyth to rejoin the 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
+grounded on the Bell Rock, near Dundee, early in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">253</span>
+morning in thick weather, and became a total wreck; all
+hands were taken off in a heavy sea by destroyers from
+Rosyth. The destroyers were exceedingly well handled
+under very difficult conditions. On the following day the
+<i>Arlanza</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which had been
+sent to the White Sea, struck a mine and was seriously
+damaged, but succeeded in reaching the Yakanski anchorage,
+in the neighbourhood. Repairs were impossible during
+the winter and the greater part of her crew was, therefore,
+brought home in the <i>Orcoma</i>, of the same squadron
+which had been sent north for the purpose.</p>
+
+<p>From October 29th to October 30th a heavy gale was
+experienced at Scapa, and considerable damage was done
+to the anti-submarine defences and to the block-ships at
+the entrances. Fog or mist was experienced on October
+3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th, 16th and 30th.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s work showed as a weekly
+average the following figures: Ships intercepted, 56; sent
+in, 16; number on patrol, 14; number absent, 8. The
+bad weather experienced interfered with the work of the
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>On November 2nd the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle
+Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the
+1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyers of the 4th
+and 11th (old 2nd) Flotilla left for a cruise to the westward
+of the Orkneys. The destroyers were sent back on
+the 3rd owing to bad weather. Battle exercises and sub-calibre
+firing took place during the cruise, which was
+otherwise uneventful; the Fleet arrived at Scapa and
+Cromarty on November 5th, being screened in by the
+destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>On November 6th the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser
+Squadrons, with destroyers, left Scapa and Rosyth respectively,
+to carry out an operation in the Skagerrak.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span>
+The force was timed to arrive at the eastern end of the
+Skagerrak at dawn on the 7th, and to sweep westward
+during daylight in order that our ships should be between
+the enemy and his Baltic base if enemy ships were
+sighted. The <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st and 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadrons and destroyers, left Rosyth in time to be in
+a supporting position by daylight on the 7th. A large
+number of vessels were boarded by the destroyers, but
+nothing suspicious was encountered, and the forces returned
+to the bases on November 8th.</p>
+
+<p>During the night of November 6th–7th the battleship
+<i>Hibernia</i>, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral S. Fremantle,
+with the <i>Zealandia</i> and <i>Albemarle</i>, passed through the
+Pentland Firth to the westward <i lang="fr">en route</i> for southern
+ports and the Mediterranean. A strong wind was
+blowing against the spring tides, and a very heavy sea
+was running in the Firth, as was not unusual. Whilst
+passing through the Firth the <i>Albemarle</i>, Captain R.&nbsp;A.
+Nugent, shipped two heavy seas which washed away her
+fore bridge, with everyone on it, and even displaced the
+roof of the conning tower; hundreds of tons of water
+flooded the decks and poured down below. An officer
+and one man were washed overboard and drowned,
+and several men injured; Captain Nugent found himself
+on the upper deck amidst the wreckage of the
+bridge. The <i>Hibernia</i>, which was ahead, turned to assist
+the <i>Albemarle</i>, and an urgent signal for assistance
+was received on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>. One of the
+emergency cruisers at Scapa was directed to raise steam
+with all despatch; the <i>Hibernia</i> arrived in with the <i>Albemarle</i>
+at daylight. The ship presented an extraordinary
+sight, the sea having made a clean sweep of her bridge
+and everything on it. In all our experience of the Pentland
+Firth, we had never witnessed such havoc before. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span>
+<i>Zealandia</i> was also obliged to turn back to repair her
+gunports, damaged by the sea in the Firth.</p>
+
+<p>The next few days were marked only by comparatively
+trifling incidents. On November 6th the
+<i>Birkenhead</i>, which had recently been commissioned, completed
+her practices at Scapa and joined the 3rd Light
+Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth. Two days later the <i>Princess
+Margaret</i> laid mines successfully in the Heligoland
+Bight; on the 9th the <i>Crescent</i>, harbour-defence vessel at
+Hoy Sound, was withdrawn and left to pay off; and
+the <i>Matchless</i>, of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, struck a
+drifting mine in southern waters, her stern being blown
+off.</p>
+
+<p>On the 12th Submarine E 17 was sent into the Kattegat
+to reconnoitre and ascertain whether any German
+trawlers or other vessels were working there. She returned
+on the 19th and reported in the negative. On the night of
+the 15th–16th the s.s. <i>Kristianiafiord</i>, of the Norwegian-American
+line, a ship which had been endeavouring on
+other occasions to evade the blockading squadron, was
+intercepted by the <i>Teutonic</i> in high latitudes; she was
+steaming fast without lights, and was sent to Kirkwall for
+examination. In this and in other similar cases the ships
+ran great risk of being mistaken for enemy vessels and
+sunk, since the methods employed by the Germans made
+it very difficult to abstain from opening fire on vessels
+without running the serious danger of our own ships
+being sunk by surprise attack. In the case of a ship carrying
+a large number of passengers, like the <i>Kristianiafiord</i>,
+the risk taken was very great and could not be
+justified.</p>
+
+<p>On November 16th the 7th Cruiser Squadron, without
+the <i>Donegal</i>, but accompanied by the <i>Liverpool</i> and one
+armed boarding-steamer, left Scapa to patrol an area<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span>
+north of the Shetlands and Faroe Islands, with a view to
+intercepting possible raiders or other vessels.</p>
+
+<p>At noon on the 18th a report reached me that an
+enemy three-funnelled cruiser had been seen on the 17th
+to pass through the Danish Sound going north. The
+possible objectives of this vessel, if the report were true,
+appeared to be either mine-laying off our bases or an attempt
+to interfere with the White Sea traffic, the Admiralty
+having informed me on the 16th that large consignments
+of arms and ammunition would be passing from
+France to the White Sea during November and December.
+In view of the fact that the news had reached me too
+late to intercept this vessel in southern waters, the dispositions
+made were as follows:</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Donegal</i>, which had left Scapa on the 17th to
+cruise along the trade route to the White Sea, was directed
+to rendezvous with the <i>Orcoma</i> (a ship of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron on patrol off the Norwegian coast), and to
+patrol the parallel of Lat. 66 N. between the meridians
+of 5.30 E. and 7.30 E.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa for
+a position Lat. 63 N., Long. 4 E., there to meet the 7th
+Cruiser Squadron, already at sea. Both squadrons, widely
+spread, were to sweep to the northward along the Norwegian
+coast, as far as the Rost Islands, and to cruise
+to the westward of the Lofoten Islands during daylight
+of the 20th, then returning to their base. The 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron also left Scapa and proceeded north, the ships
+spread to cover a wide area to the westward of the 7th
+Cruiser Squadron, in order to protect the Archangel trade.
+The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa on the
+18th to sweep to the eastward, with orders to return to
+Cromarty on the 19th.</p>
+
+<p>Strong destroyer patrols were despatched from Scapa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">257</span>
+and Rosyth to prevent mine-laying off the bases, and one
+Battle Cruiser Squadron was put at short notice for steam.
+No enemy vessels were sighted, and the <i>Donegal</i> eventually
+proceeded to the White Sea, being accompanied
+by the <i>Minotaur</i> as far as the North Cape.</p>
+
+<p>On November 19th three submarines proceeded from
+Harwich to the Kattegat to obtain information relative
+to the presence of any enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>On November 23rd the <i>Warspite</i> rejoined the 5th
+Battle Squadron, after having been for some weeks under
+repair in the Tyne, owing to injuries sustained through
+grounding in the Firth of Forth.</p>
+
+<p>On November 28th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left
+Rosyth for a cruise in the northern portion of the North
+Sea, during which cruiser exercises and gunnery practices
+were carried out; the squadron returned to Rosyth on
+December 2nd.</p>
+
+<p>From November 22nd to December 7th, the <i>Donegal</i>
+and <i>Hampshire</i> were protecting the White Sea trade,
+working on the trade route and coaling at Alexandrovsk.</p>
+
+<p>During the month independent squadron exercise
+cruises from the bases were continued, as was target practice
+from Cromarty.</p>
+
+<p>The figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron gave as a
+weekly average: Ships intercepted, 30; sent in, 9; number
+on patrol, 10; absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i>, 9; on
+special service, 3. The bad weather experienced during
+the month interfered considerably with the boarding
+operations of the squadron and also hampered Fleet
+movements.</p>
+
+<p>On December 1st the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle
+Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron, and the <i>Minotaur</i> of the 7th
+Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to the westward for a cruise.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span>
+Battle exercises were carried out on the 2nd and 3rd, and
+the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty on December
+4th. The exercises were specially intended to represent
+the conditions that might arise if the High Sea Fleet tried
+to draw the Grand Fleet over areas in which mines had
+been laid or in which submarines were operating. During
+the exercises the <i>Barham</i> and <i>Warspite</i> of the 5th Battle
+Squadron collided, both being considerably damaged.
+They were escorted to Scapa for temporary repairs and
+left later, the <i>Barham</i> for Invergordon and the <i>Warspite</i>
+for Devonport.</p>
+
+<p>On December 8th the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
+left Rosyth, swept to the eastward to the Little Fisher
+Bank, and returned on the 10th.</p>
+
+<p>From the 11th to the 13th two ships of the 4th Light
+Cruiser Squadron were cruising to the eastward of the
+Fair Island Channel.</p>
+
+<p>On December 12th Submarines D 7 and D 8, which
+were based temporarily on Blyth, were directed to leave
+for the Norwegian coast to operate against enemy trade
+and against enemy submarines. D 7 was directed to make
+the Ryvingen Light during the dark hours and then to
+cruise to intercept trade between Ryvingen and Arendal,
+and between Ryvingen and the west coast of Denmark.
+It was anticipated that this might draw enemy
+submarines to the northward from German ports to try to
+sink D 7, and D 7 was directed to be back at Ryvingen 36
+hours after she expected that the first vessel she examined
+had reached port, so that she might be ready to attack
+enemy submarines sent after her. D 8 was directed to
+cruise on a bearing 270° from the Hantsholm Light (coast
+of Denmark) in order to intercept enemy submarines sent
+after D 7. Bad weather prevented D 7 leaving before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span>
+December 15th. The enemy was apparently not drawn,
+and no success was obtained.</p>
+
+<p>On December 15th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left
+Scapa for a sweep to the south-eastward, and returned
+on the 17th.</p>
+
+<p>Two neutral ships, steaming at high speed at night
+without lights on the 15th and 16th, evidently intending to
+evade the blockade, were intercepted by the 10th Cruiser
+squadron and sent into Kirkwall.</p>
+
+<p>On December 20th Commodore Tyrwhitt left Harwich
+with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, to sweep to the
+Danish coast, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was kept at
+the usual short notice for steam during the time that he
+was absent until the 23rd.</p>
+
+<p>On December 24th the 1st Cruiser Squadron left
+Scapa to search the central portion of the North Sea.
+During the day anxiety was felt as to the safety of the
+destroyers <i>Porpoise</i> and <i>Morning Star</i>, which had been
+escorting a Russian ice-breaker to the northward and
+which had hove to near the Fair Island Channel in a heavy
+gale during the 23rd. The 1st Cruiser Squadron was
+directed to spread and search for them, and the <i>Hampshire</i>
+and <i>Donegal</i> were also sent from Scapa to endeavour
+to gain touch. Both the destroyers, however, reached
+Cromarty in safety, the <i>Porpoise</i> on the 25th, and the
+<i>Morning Star</i> on the 26th, after having experienced very
+heavy weather. Many compartments were flooded, and
+very considerable damage was done. They had been
+handled with great ability during the exceptionally heavy
+weather. The 1st Cruiser Squadron, with the <i>Hampshire</i>
+and <i>Donegal</i>, returned to Scapa on the 26th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 24th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron also proceeded
+from Rosyth to search the North Sea, down to
+the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, thence towards the Little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">260</span>
+Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. No enemy vessels were
+sighted. The weather in the North Sea at this period
+was very severe, and the <i>Sappho</i>, which was supporting
+the armed trawler patrol to the north-eastward of Peterhead,
+lost her rudder in a heavy sea.</p>
+
+<p>On the 30th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth and
+carried out a sweep to the south-eastward, returning on
+the 31st.</p>
+
+<p>On the same day, a lamentable disaster occurred, the
+cruiser <i>Natal</i> (Captain Eric Back) being blown up in
+Cromarty harbour with great loss of life. Captain Back
+was amongst those who lost their lives. It was reported
+by adjacent vessels at 3.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the ship was on fire,
+and at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, before any action could be taken, the
+ship blew up and sank, the explosion taking place in her
+after magazines. Steps were taken to deal with the situation
+in case the explosion had been caused by an enemy
+submarine having entered the harbour, but it soon became
+evident that this was not the case. Examination of the
+wreck by divers later showed no signs of any external
+explosion. A court-martial was subsequently held at
+Chatham to investigate the causes of the disaster, but the
+conclusions were not made public.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of December independent exercises
+from the Fleet bases were continued, as well as target
+practice from Cromarty. As to the latter, an interesting
+practice was carried out by the <i>Iron Duke</i> at the range,
+and under the conditions of battle practice before the
+War, in order to ascertain, by examining the actual hits
+made on the canvas of the target, whether the pre-War
+standard of shooting was being maintained. Some uncertainty
+existed owing to the great increase in the ranges
+at which practices were carried out during the War,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span>
+namely, 16,000 to 19,000 yards, as compared with the
+9,500 yards, which was the maximum peace range. The
+result was very satisfactory and indicated a most decided
+advance on pre-War accuracy of fire.</p>
+
+<p>On December 13th the first target practice was carried
+out in the Pentland Firth. This was in the nature
+of an experiment and, being successful, practice in this
+locality was later substituted for practice in the Moray
+Firth; it was far more convenient for the main Fleet base
+and much less extravagant in the use of screening and
+protecting destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>On December 16th Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram,
+K.C.B., relieved Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender,
+Bart., in command of the 2nd Battle Squadron, on the
+termination of the latter officer’s three years’ command.</p>
+
+<p>During December patrols seaward of the bases were
+strengthened and considerably extended during the first
+and fourth quarters of the moon in order to frustrate any
+attempted mine-laying on the part of the enemy. This
+“dark night” patrol subsequently became a matter of
+routine.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average showed:
+Ships intercepted, 35; sent in, 14; number of ships on
+patrol, 12; number at bases or <i lang="fr">en route</i>, 7; number on
+special service, 2.</p>
+
+<p>The long nights and bad weather were responsible
+for the reduction in the number of vessels intercepted.
+During December fog or mist were experienced at
+Scapa on the 15th, 22nd, 25th and 26th; gales on the
+6th, 8th and 23rd; and snow on the 3rd, 4th, 8th and
+12th. Although the weather at Scapa Flow was fairly
+good, gales in the North Sea and to the westward of the
+Orkneys were frequent and violent during the month.</p>
+
+<p>Before turning to the events of 1916 it is of interest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span>
+to notice the work of the “decoy ships,” known later by
+the name of “Q” ships, fitted out at Scapa during the
+year 1915. These vessels, five in number, were designed
+to sink enemy submarines by inducing the latter to close
+them for the purpose of attack by gun fire or by torpedo.
+The same system was employed in southern waters, and
+was developed greatly during the year 1917. At Scapa
+in 1915 and 1916 the ships were manned principally by
+volunteers from the Grand Fleet, or from the depôt ships
+at the base. Colliers or store-ships were selected for their
+size and general suitability for the work, and they were
+fitted with a very carefully concealed armament, which was
+kept hidden until the submarine was within point-blank
+range, so that fire opened on her must be immediately
+effective; unless the submarine was holed in less than a
+minute after fire was opened on her she could submerge
+and escape, and probably torpedo the decoy ship as well.
+The five ships, the <i>Prince Charles</i>, <i>Vala</i>, <i>Duncombe</i>,
+<i>Penshurst</i> and <i>Glen Isla</i>, were fitted up by Captain Farrington
+of the <i>Cyclops</i>, under the direction of Admiral
+Sir Stanley Colville and were marvels of ingenuity. Their
+usual cruising-ground was in the vicinity of the Orkneys,
+Shetlands, or Hebrides, or towards the Norwegian coast,
+or the White Sea, or down the east coast of Scotland.
+They worked on a route that was freely used by merchant-ships
+and altered their appearance according to their route
+so as to give them the look of vessels usually trading on
+that route.</p>
+
+<p>Many stories of the “Q” ships have been told in the
+Press and need not be repeated here, but a high tribute
+must be paid to the extreme gallantry and splendid
+discipline of the officers and men who manned these vessels.
+I had personal knowledge of the work of the
+vessels operating from Scapa. Their opportunities for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span>
+engaging submarines successfully were rare, and the work
+in the small ships in the heavy seas encountered in northern
+latitudes was very arduous; there was never any lack of
+volunteers for the duty, the difficulty always being that
+of selection from the large number of officers and men
+anxious to serve. It is satisfactory to record that the first
+submarine sunk by a decoy ship fell a victim to a vessel
+working from Scapa Flow.</p>
+
+<p>On July 25th, 1915, the <i>Prince Charles</i> (Lieutenant
+W.&nbsp;P. Mark-Wardlaw—of Admiral Colville’s staff—in
+command) sighted, near North Rona Island, the Danish
+steamer <i>Louise</i>, stopped and with a submarine close to.
+When the submarine sighted the <i>Prince Charles</i> she proceeded
+at full speed towards her and opened fire at 5,000
+yards’ range. Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw stopped his
+engines and went through the usual process of lowering
+boats in a great hurry. The submarine, which was the
+U 36, closed to within 500 yards, still on the surface, and
+at that range the <i>Prince Charles</i> revealed her true character,
+unmasked her guns, and opened a most accurate
+fire with her two 6-pounders and two 3-pounders. The
+U 36 was immediately holed, and two men killed in the
+conning tower. She was unable to dive and sank stern
+first; 4 commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 9
+men were saved by the <i>Prince Charles</i>.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_X"><span id="toclink_264"></span>CHAPTER X<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> year 1916 opened and still no general action had
+been fought in the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet
+continued to dominate, paying its price—though not so
+heavy as might have been expected—for the influence it
+exerted on all the operations—naval, military and economic—to
+which the country had by that time been committed
+in face of the active operations pursued by enemy
+submarines and mine-laving craft.</p>
+
+<p>On January 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth
+to cruise in the northern part of the North Sea, and returned
+during the night of the 8th–9th.</p>
+
+<p>The facility with which enemy mines could be laid
+in the vicinity of naval bases during the long winter
+nights, when there was little or no moon (as shown, <i lang="la">inter
+alia</i>, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland Bight,
+which, though not very frequent in 1916, became constant
+in 1917), led me to extend still further the patrols
+from the bases at such times; from January 2nd to
+January 10th inclusive, the patrol vessels (two light
+cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about 140
+miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the
+Pentland Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+each day. Similar patrols were ordered to be instituted
+from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however, instead of
+mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected
+the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span>
+purpose, possibly because of the considerable mercantile
+traffic using this route. The patrols in this direction did
+not extend so far from the base, the sea being very frequently
+too heavy in the winter months; the practice was to
+search the route periodically for mines.</p>
+
+<p>The weather early in January had been very bad, and
+both sweeping and patrol work were impracticable. In
+these circumstances the enemy raider <i>Moewe</i>, disguised
+as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably passed up
+the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland
+Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field
+between Cape Wrath and a position about north from
+Strathie Point, on the Scottish coast, on the night of
+January 1st or 2nd. The work of the <i>Moewe</i> was facilitated
+by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and
+Sule Skerry Island were necessarily exhibited at night
+for the sake of the large mercantile traffic using the
+Pentland Firth and the Minches.</p>
+
+<p>On January 6th, at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the pre-Dreadnought
+battleship <i>King Edward VII.</i>, of the 3rd Battle Squadron,
+left Scapa for Belfast to refit, and at 10.47 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>,
+when in Lat. 58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent explosion
+occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain
+Maclachlan first reported that the ship had been torpedoed,
+but later came to the conclusion that she had been
+mined, as was eventually found to be, undoubtedly, the
+case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both engine-rooms
+filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing
+at the time with a rising sea.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as the report was received at Scapa the
+flotilla leader <i>Kempenfelt</i> and 12 destroyers were sent out
+to assist and to keep the submarine under, if one were
+present. Tugs were also despatched. Meanwhile the
+collier <i>Melita</i>, which had arrived on the scene, proceeded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span>
+to take the <i>King Edward VII.</i> in tow, assisted by the
+<i>Kempenfelt</i>; but the ship was very low in the water and
+unmanageable, and the tow parted. At 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the battleship
+having by this time a heavy list, Captain Maclachlan
+decided to abandon her for the night, and the
+destroyers <i>Musketeer</i>, <i>Marne</i>, <i>Fortune</i> and <i>Nessus</i> were
+taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they
+embarked all hands without loss of life, although the
+destroyer <i>Musketeer</i> received considerable injury from
+projections on the side of the battleship. The destroyer
+<i>Nessus</i> and a tug stood by the <i>King Edward VII.</i> until
+8.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> when she turned over and sank. The <i>Africa</i>,
+also of the 3rd Battle Squadron, <i lang="fr">en route</i> from Belfast
+to Scapa, passed safely through the mined area a few
+hours before the <i>King Edward VII.</i> was mined—a very
+fortunate escape!</p>
+
+<p>Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing
+between Cape Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large
+force of mine-sweepers was detached to ascertain the
+limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear a passage along
+the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch
+Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape
+Wrath, and some on Scapa, but continuous bad weather
+interfered with the sweeping operations to such an extent
+that, between January 7th and January 21st, no sweeping
+was possible except close in shore in sheltered water. On
+January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet
+Bay, near Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the
+loss of the <i>King Edward VII.</i> was thereby removed.</p>
+
+<p>On January 7th the battleship <i>Albemarle</i> left Scapa
+for Archangel, and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth
+to operate in the Skagerrak; she returned on the 16th,
+having met with no success.</p>
+
+<p>On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span>
+experienced at Scapa. The oiler <i>Prudentia</i> drifted across
+the bows of the <i>Iron Duke</i> during the night and sank, and
+one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier, a tug and three
+trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an
+hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The <i>Iron
+Duke</i> was undamaged.</p>
+
+<p>Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron on patrol suffered considerable
+damage from the heavy seas. The month of January,
+as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally
+bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over
+the whole North Sea. Great injury was done to all the
+anti-submarine obstructions at Scapa, many of them being
+entirely destroyed. In order to make the base temporarily
+as secure as possible from submarine attack, the
+Fleet was directed to make and lay improvised net obstructions.</p>
+
+<p>On January 24 the destroyer <i>Talisman</i> reported that
+a torpedo had been fired at her off Blyth. The <i>Botha</i> and
+10 destroyers were sent out from Rosyth to locate and
+destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing of her.</p>
+
+<p>On January 25th the <i>Ebro</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron,
+picked up a dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and
+towed her to Lerwick, arriving on the 28th.</p>
+
+<p>On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with six destroyers, and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron,
+with five destroyers, left Rosyth for operations in
+the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers,
+during daylight on the 27th, swept through the
+Skagerrak to the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+being in support. The ships then moved to the northward;
+at daylight on the 28th, the whole force, joined by
+the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from
+Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span>
+again swept into the Skagerrak. The squadrons then
+returned to their respective bases. During the operations
+the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was at short
+notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted outside
+territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of
+the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of
+small vessels passing along the Norwegian coast inside
+territorial waters.</p>
+
+<p>On January 28th the senior officer of the mine-sweepers
+reported that he had swept a clear channel along
+the north coast of Scotland from Cape Wrath to Scapa,
+between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field laid
+by the <i>Moewe</i>. This channel was instituted for warships
+only for use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were directed
+to steer to the northward from Cape Wrath, thence
+to make Noup Head, on the north-west coast of the Orkneys,
+passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa;
+all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair
+Island Channel to their destination.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of January gunnery practices were
+carried out, both in the Moray Firth and in the Pentland
+Firth.</p>
+
+<p>The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
+much restricted by the bad weather experienced, the
+weekly average showing:</p>
+
+<p>Number of ships intercepted, 21; number sent in, 8;
+number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports or
+<i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 10; number on special
+service, 2.</p>
+
+<p>Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbourhood
+on January 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th,
+15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 30th. The weather
+during the month both at Scapa and in the whole northern
+area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span>
+the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements
+of all small craft.</p>
+
+<p>Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by
+night from the various bases were continued in January,
+as was the change of base of the Rosyth squadrons to
+Scapa and Cromarty for practices.</p>
+
+<p>At 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron
+and four destroyers left Scapa, steering towards the little
+Fisher Bank, whence the destroyers returned to Scapa,
+and the squadron proceeded to sweep up the Norwegian
+coast during daylight hours and thence to Scapa. These
+sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was considered
+probable that enemy raiders, attempting to pass
+out of the North Sea, would hug the coast on passage.</p>
+
+<p>On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron,
+from Harwich, was at sea endeavouring to intercept zeppelins
+returning from raiding our east coast. The fishing
+trawler <i>King Stephen</i> on this day sighted Zeppelin L 19
+in a sinking condition in the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate
+off the Norwegian coast. She returned on the 13th.</p>
+
+<p>On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded
+to a position about 150 miles to the south-eastward from
+Scapa for patrol during the night and returned on the
+8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out
+a similar patrol, returning on the 9th.</p>
+
+<p>On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla,
+operating from the Humber under the orders of the Rear-Admiral
+of the East Coast, was attacked by enemy torpedo
+craft in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, and the
+<i>Arabis</i> was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending
+further information as to the strength of enemy forces at
+sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night
+of the 10th–11th, and proceeded to the southward; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">270</span>
+5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Harwich; and
+the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at Scapa,
+Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and
+move to the southward. The situation became clear during
+the 11th, when it was evident that the enemy’s force,
+which had consisted only of destroyers, had returned to
+its base.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat.
+57.57 N., Long. 0.20 E.) orders were given for the Grand
+Fleet to return to its bases, and the squadrons arrived on
+the 12th.</p>
+
+<p>From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
+with the armed boarding-steamers <i>Dundee</i> and <i>Duke of
+Clarence</i>, from Scapa, swept from that base to the Utvoer
+Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N., Long. 40.31 E.), thence down
+the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed boarding-steamers
+returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted
+were two enemy submarines off the coast of Norway.</p>
+
+<p>On February 18th the new battleship <i>Malaya</i>, the gift
+of the Federated Malay States, arrived at Scapa and
+joined the 5th Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were
+sent to the Skagerrak to examine and board merchant-vessels
+with a view to stopping the iron ore trade from
+Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the
+submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part
+of their cruise, to operate against two enemy submarines
+reported off the Norwegian coast. They returned on
+February 28th, not having met, outside territorial waters,
+the submarines or with any vessels which were engaged
+in the iron ore trade.</p>
+
+<p>On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were
+sent without result to operate against a submarine reported
+in the Fair Island Channel.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span></p>
+
+<p>On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with
+the 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser
+Squadron and flotillas, left Scapa before daylight for a
+watching and exercise cruise in the northern part of the
+North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight, in conjunction
+with the Harwich force, had been intended, but
+was abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore
+Tyrwhitt that the weather and other conditions were unsuitable
+for his operations. Battle exercises took place
+during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
+left Rosyth at 1.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 26th, joined the Battle
+Fleet at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> next day. During that day further battle
+exercises were carried out, including deployments of the
+whole Grand Fleet from its cruising order, so that the
+battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers might
+become accustomed to taking up the stations assigned to
+them on deployment under certain conditions. The exercises
+were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned
+to its bases on the 28th.</p>
+
+<p>During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine-sweeping
+sloops patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys
+to prevent mine-laying in the approaches to the base.</p>
+
+<p>On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept
+any enemy vessel that might be attempting to pass out into
+the North Sea. Information from neutral sources had
+led to a belief in the possibility of such an attempt being
+made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the
+information was received after the event, that is, it was
+reported that the vessel in question had already left German
+waters. The dispositions were made, therefore, on
+this assumption, and in making them it was necessary to
+place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be expected
+to pass through in daylight.</p>
+
+<p>The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">272</span>
+whether her mission were mine-laying near our bases, or
+an attempt to pass out into the Atlantic. The <i>Patia</i> and
+<i>Columbella</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were directed
+to patrol a line running north-east from Lat. 61.45 N.,
+Long. 0.50 E., and ships of the same squadron on the
+C Patrol line were directed to extend this line to the
+north-eastward. The <i>Alcantara</i> and <i>Andes</i>, of the same
+squadron, already on a special patrol line, were ordered
+to remain in their position till further orders. Two
+ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers
+left Rosyth at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 28th to patrol the
+area covering the Farn Island—Skaw and the May
+Island—Skaw trade routes, working to the eastward.
+Early on the 29th the <i>Comus</i> and the <i>Calliope</i>, of the
+4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the
+28th with two destroyers for areas in the vicinity of Lat.
+58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E., and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 3.0 E.
+respectively, were directed to patrol lines 40 miles long,
+running 50° to 230° respectively from a position in Lat.
+61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The <i>Blanche</i>, which had also sailed,
+was ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The
+<i>Minotaur</i> and a destroyer were sent to patrol the Fair
+Island passage during daylight on the 29th. Steps were
+also taken to cover the approaches to the Pentland Firth
+against mine-laying.</p>
+
+<p>At 8.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 29th the <i>Andes</i>, Captain G.&nbsp;B.
+Young, R.N., reported by wireless that an enemy vessel
+was in sight in Lat. 61.58 N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave
+her course, speed and description; her enemy character
+was assumed owing to her movements. The <i>Alcantara</i>,
+Captain T.&nbsp;E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight
+of the Andes, but sighted her at 9.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> chasing a
+strange vessel, joined in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>,
+being then about 6,000 yards from her, ordered her to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">273</span>
+stop. She complied and informed the <i>Alcantara</i> that
+she was the Norwegian s.s. <i>Rena</i> from Rio to Trondjhem.
+She was flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted
+on her sides. At 9.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Alcantara</i>, then about
+2,500 yards on the quarter of the stranger, began to
+hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding. At this
+moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her
+hitherto concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian
+ensign and staff overboard and hoisting a German ensign
+at the main. But she still showed the Norwegian flag on
+her sides, where it was displayed throughout the action.
+At the close range at which fire was opened hitting commenced
+immediately, and as the first hits on the <i>Alcantara</i>
+cut all her communications, Captain Wardle experienced
+great difficulty in passing orders to the guns. But the
+enemy’s fire was returned quickly and with effect, in spite
+of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went ahead
+and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of
+which hit the <i>Alcantara</i> between the boiler-rooms at about
+10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, causing them gradually to fill.</p>
+
+<p>By 10.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the enemy was badly on fire and stopped.
+A few minutes later, at 10.22 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, boats were observed
+to be leaving her and the <i>Alcantara</i> ceased firing. The
+latter ship was by this time listing heavily and was abandoned
+shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The <i>Andes</i>,
+which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range
+than the <i>Alcantara</i>, rendered assistance to the boats of
+the two ships.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the first signal from the <i>Andes</i>, the
+<i>Calliope</i>, <i>Comus</i> and <i>Blanche</i> had been ordered to the
+scene at full speed. The <i>Comus</i>, Captain Alan G. Hotham,
+R.N., the nearest vessel, with the destroyer <i>Munster</i>,
+arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E., as
+the <i>Alcantara</i> was sinking. The <i>Munster</i> picked up the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">274</span>
+crew of the <i>Alcantara</i>, and as the enemy raider still had
+colours flying the <i>Comus</i> proceeded to sink her by gunfire
+and to pick up the survivors in her boats. The <i>Calliope</i>
+and <i>Magic</i> arrived at 1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but, not being required,
+returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned
+out to be the disguised raider <i>Grief</i>, armed with four
+5.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes; she had a complement
+of 306, of whom 209, including many wounded, were
+rescued by the <i>Comus</i> and <i>Andes</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying
+out blockade work under modern conditions when dealing
+with an unscrupulous enemy. A raider disguised as
+a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most difficult
+customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had
+perforce to be treated as “suspect” after an incident of
+this nature. It is not possible to examine a vessel without
+boarding her, and, except in very fine weather, it is necessary
+for the boarding ship to be close to the suspected ship
+before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously cannot
+pull long distances. The experience of the <i>Alcantara</i>
+showed the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An
+attempt to solve the problem was made by informing all
+neutrals that, when any of our vessels displayed a certain
+signal, the ship to be boarded should steam towards the
+boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away.
+But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously
+dependent to a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals,
+which was not always in evidence.</p>
+
+<p>Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties
+which did not exist in the days of our forefathers,
+not the least being the advent of the torpedo and the submarine.
+The German method of solving such difficulties
+was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did not, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">275</span>
+never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of
+any seaman belonging to the Allied nations.</p>
+
+<p>During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights,
+combined with more favourable weather, gave the 10th
+Cruiser Squadron better opportunities for the blockade,
+and the average weekly results were: Number of ships
+intercepted, 39; number sent in, 111; number of ships on
+patrol, 12; number absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from
+patrol, 9; number detached on special service, 1.</p>
+
+<p>Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood
+on February 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual
+exchange of bases for practices and the independent
+squadron exercises at sea from the bases were carried out
+during the month.</p>
+
+<p>On March 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentlemen
+visited the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in
+the evening. The party included M. Danchenko, Count
+Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir Nabakoff, M. Bashmakoff,
+M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky.</p>
+
+<p>On March 2nd the new battleship <i>Valiant</i>, a vessel
+of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, arrived at Scapa and
+joined the 5th Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the
+Kattegat to intercept trade and to ascertain the situation
+there on the chance of any enemy vessels being found.
+She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day
+the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and
+exercise cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea.
+On the 6th the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded
+into the North Sea for a southerly sweep, concentration
+being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the “Long
+Forties,” the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on
+the meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became
+very unfavourable for destroyers, and speed had eventually<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">276</span>
+to be reduced to such an extent that the sweep was
+abandoned, and the Fleet returned to its bases on the 7th.</p>
+
+<p>On March 9th a patrol consisting of one cruiser and
+one armed boarding-steamer was instituted in an area
+north of the Shetlands. It was designed to cover the
+track of vessels <i lang="fr">en route</i> between the north of Iceland
+and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of
+Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was
+considered probable that this route might be taken by
+enemy raiders as well as by vessels attempting to evade
+the blockade. The patrol was continued throughout the
+year, although occasionally modified in details and frequently
+doubled in strength. It was eventually successful
+in intercepting and sinking the German raider <i>Wolf</i>,
+in the spring of 1917, the <i>Achilles</i> (Captain F.&nbsp;M. Leake,
+R.N.) and the armed boarding-steamer <i>Dundee</i> (Commander
+Selwyn Day, R.N.R.) being the vessels engaged
+in this operation. This patrol was also of use for blockade
+work.</p>
+
+<p>On March 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with
+a division of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth
+at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> for operations off the Norwegian coast, the
+objective being the capture of any enemy merchant-ships
+found outside territorial waters between Ekersund and
+the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German
+merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian
+ports, and especially Narvik, occasionally ventured outside
+territorial waters in this locality. It was the only locality,
+besides the vicinity of Stadlandet, in which they did so
+venture, and in which, therefore, there was a chance of
+capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the southward
+of the Naze for supporting purposes. It was also
+intended that the remainder of the Grand Fleet should<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">277</span>
+be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly gale
+sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accompanying
+the Battle Fleet, and this portion of the programme
+was cancelled; Sir David Beatty was informed
+that, if the weather conditions farther south prevented
+his destroyers from screening the battle cruisers, the latter
+should return to their base and a light cruiser squadron
+be left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The
+conditions being unfavourable for destroyers, this course
+was adopted. The weather eventually became too bad
+for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain their speed,
+and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed.</p>
+
+<p>Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on
+March 14th to intercept contraband trade and for reconnoitring
+purposes. She did not sight any enemy vessels,
+but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying
+contraband.</p>
+
+<p>The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was
+at sea on March 14th and 15th, and the <i>Roxburgh</i> and
+two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th for another sweep
+on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the
+Naze. This was again unproductive.</p>
+
+<p>The cruiser <i>Theseus</i> left Barry on the 15th for Alexandrovsk
+in the White Sea. On the same date the cruiser
+<i>Crescent</i>, <i lang="fr">en route</i> from Scapa to the south, was fired at
+and missed by a submarine south of the Hebrides.</p>
+
+<p>On the 19th the light cruiser <i>Calliope</i>, with two destroyers,
+left the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with
+orders to proceed to the Naze and sweep <em>up</em> the Norwegian
+coast to Udsire; and the <i>Comus</i> and two destroyers
+left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep <em>down</em> the Norwegian
+coast to the Naze, the object being again the capture
+of any German merchant-ships found outside territorial
+waters in this locality. The <i>Calliope</i> was forced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">278</span>
+to put in to Rosyth owing to a serious fire occurring in
+her after boiler-room. The <i>Comus</i> completed her sweep
+in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out
+aerial operations off the Danish coast, involving an attack
+on the enemy’s zeppelin shed at Tondern, and the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet left early that day to cover the operation.
+In the course of the operations the destroyers of the
+Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up returning
+sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the
+southward of the Horn Reef for this purpose. Some
+German outpost trawlers were encountered here by the
+destroyers; they were engaged and destroyed. But during
+the engagement the destroyer <i>Medusa</i> was rammed by
+the destroyer <i>Laverock</i>, being very seriously damaged.
+The <i>Medusa</i> was taken in tow, but, the weather becoming
+very bad, the towing hawser parted, and all attempts to
+get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels were
+in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident
+that the enemy would be aware of the incident by means
+of his directional wireless system, since a good deal of
+wireless signalling on the part of our ships had been necessary.
+It was expected, therefore, that he would send
+out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark
+hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in
+view of the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt
+rightly judged it expedient to abandon and sink the
+<i>Medusa</i>, and gave orders to this effect. The ship’s company
+of the <i>Medusa</i> was taken off in a most seamanlike
+manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the <i>Lassoo</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was
+difficult for Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact
+conditions, but during the night of the 25th, having sent
+his destroyers ahead, he steered with his light cruisers in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">279</span>
+order to pass to the northward of the enemy’s North
+Sea mine-field. At about 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> two enemy destroyers
+were sighted on the port bow of the <i>Cleopatra</i> (flying
+Commodore Tyrwhitt’s broad pennant) at a distance of
+about 800 yards. Their presence was betrayed by the
+flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of
+the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the
+enemy. The <i>Cleopatra</i> at once opened fire and headed
+for the destroyers, and when it was seen that they were
+crossing from port to starboard, Captain Loder Symonds
+of the <i>Cleopatra</i> ported his helm and rammed the second
+destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically
+in half. There was a tremendous crash, followed by
+what seemed to be two explosions, one possibly a boiler
+explosion, and the second due to either a mine or depth-charge,
+causing considerable damage to the stem piece
+of the <i>Cleopatra</i>. The injury was subsequently found to
+be far too great to have been caused by the impact alone.
+The sudden alterations of course by the <i>Cleopatra</i>, combined
+with the gunfire and explosions, had thrown the
+squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and
+navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the
+<i>Cleopatra</i>, in separating from the sinking destroyer, found
+herself across the <i>Undaunted’s</i> stem; the latter was
+somewhat seriously damaged, and reported subsequently
+that she could only steam at slow speed. The Commodore,
+therefore, remained near the <i>Undaunted</i> for the night.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left
+Rosyth on the 24th to cover the operations, was in the
+vicinity of the Harwich force, and, on the morning of
+the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the
+<i>Undaunted</i>, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force
+swept back towards her position, not sighting any enemy
+vessels. Three of the light cruisers covered the <i>Undaunted</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">280</span>
+during her passage to the Tyne, where she was
+sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced
+in locating the <i>Undaunted</i>, owing to a difference in “dead
+reckoning” between the various ships. In order to be
+prepared for eventualities the remainder of the Grand
+Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of the 25th–26th,
+heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa
+and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility
+was also very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang
+up when the snow ceased. During the early afternoon
+of the 26th the wireless reports from the Vice-Admiral
+of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and
+the <i>Undaunted</i> cleared up the situation, the latter
+ship reporting herself as hove to until the weather
+moderated.</p>
+
+<p>By 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when the Fleet was in the vicinity of
+the “Long Forties,” the sea had become so heavy and
+steep that destroyers with the Battle Fleet could not
+safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the
+whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern
+waters, and the <i>Undaunted</i> was approaching a safe area,
+the 5th Battle Squadron was detached at high speed,
+without destroyers, to assist in covering her passage back
+to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet and
+cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and
+Cromarty. The <i>Iron Duke</i> convoyed the destroyer
+flotillas in order that they could be given their position,
+as the coast was approached. The weather moderated
+during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the
+27th. Two destroyers collided off Noss Head just before
+daylight on the 27th, one, the <i>Michael</i>, being somewhat
+seriously damaged.</p>
+
+<p>By 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 27th the <i>Undaunted</i> was in Lat.
+56.35 N., Long. 2 E., and the 5th Battle Squadron returned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">281</span>
+to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser Fleet arriving at
+Rosyth on the 27th.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st
+and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
+and flotillas again proceeded to sea on March 29th,
+for a watching and exercise cruise in the northern part
+of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on
+the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st,
+the destroyers having to return independently as they
+were unable to maintain Fleet speed through bad weather
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>During March the system of carrying out target practice
+in the Pentland Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of
+in the Moray Firth was regularly instituted, and no further
+practices took place in the Moray Firth during the year
+1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory
+in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that
+of towing the target in the strong tides of the Pentland
+Firth.</p>
+
+<p>On March 19th the battleship <i>Hercules</i>, which had
+been laid up at Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly
+six weeks, completed her repairs. These were carried out
+with the assistance of artisans from the engine contractors.</p>
+
+<p>The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth
+for the purpose of practices continued.</p>
+
+<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average for
+March showed: Number of ships intercepted, 43; number
+sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number absent at
+bases, or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 9; number on special
+service, 1.</p>
+
+<p>A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced
+during the month, and the weather generally in northern
+waters was bad, gales occurring on the 6th, 11th, 12th,
+25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">282</span></p>
+
+<p>On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth
+and attacked Leith and Edinburgh, but did not make
+any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of intercepting
+some of them during their return passage, but
+saw nothing of them.</p>
+
+<p>On April 3rd the <i>Devonshire</i> and two destroyers left
+Rosyth and proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the
+vicinity of Udsire lighthouse, and swept thence to the
+Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or neutrals
+with contraband which might be found outside territorial
+waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic
+in territorial waters was reported.</p>
+
+<p>On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate
+against enemy submarines on the route which it was
+thought was taken by them between the Shetlands and
+Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about
+30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not,
+however, sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine
+operations of this nature by the submarines attached to
+the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent intervals
+during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever any craft
+were available for this purpose; the plan of operations
+was constantly varied. The general scheme was to place
+our craft in positions through which hostile submarines
+were expected to pass, or along the routes which they
+usually took.</p>
+
+<p>On April 6th the <i>Roxburgh</i> left Rosyth with two destroyers,
+to repeat once again the operation of sweeping
+down the Norwegian coast from Udsire to the Naze. The
+search was again unproductive.</p>
+
+<p>On April 12th the armed liner <i>Campania</i> returned
+from a lengthy refit at Liverpool, during which the ship
+had, at my request, been provided with a “flying-off”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">283</span>
+deck for her sea-planes, as experience throughout the War
+had shown conclusively that it was of little use to depend
+on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the
+most advantageous conditions, and that the only system
+which would give reasonable certainty of the machines
+being able to get into the air when required was to fly
+them from the ship. At the same time I formed the conclusion,
+after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of
+the <i>Campania</i>, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service,
+that the sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown
+from ships, since the weight of the floats of sea-planes
+greatly limited their climbing powers, their radius of action
+and their speed. This alteration to the <i>Campania</i>
+was the commencement of the system, gradually introduced,
+of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships
+with scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from
+the ship under practically all conditions. I make no apology
+for referring again to this subject in view of its importance.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Campania</i> had also been fitted to carry a kite
+balloon aft, for use for spotting the fall of shot and for
+reconnaissance purposes. This fitting was the beginning
+of the arrangement, gradually introduced during 1916, of
+carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success in
+large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being
+also provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small
+craft, an arrangement which proved to be of great use
+for anti-submarine and convoy work.</p>
+
+<p>On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron were modified; “A” and “C” patrols took up
+a line running from Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 11.30 W. to
+Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles apart
+and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed
+to the northward of Iceland.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">284</span></p>
+
+<p>On April 20th a force left to carry out an extensive
+sweep into the Kattegat, designed (1) to intercept
+and examine all mercantile traffic, (2) to operate against
+enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any enemy
+vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the movements
+in the Kattegat of the light forces, which it was
+intended should be sighted from neutral shores in the
+expectation that they might be reported to the enemy
+by his agents.</p>
+
+<p>The force included three submarines, which were ordered
+to positions commanding the northern entrance to
+the Sound, and the Great and Little Belts, so that enemy
+forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might
+be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was
+decided to move south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef
+with the whole Grand Fleet, the object being to induce
+the enemy to keep the ships of the High Sea Fleet in
+North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic,
+where they might cause interference with the relaying the
+Russian mine-fields, an operation which became necessary
+at this season of the year after the ice had broken up.
+It was thought that the appearance of the Grand Fleet
+in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would probably
+effect this object better than the operation in the Kattegat.
+Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the
+21st, with orders for the battle and cruiser squadrons to
+concentrate on the morning of the 22nd in a given position
+to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” whilst the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead
+of the Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd
+Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth,
+were ordered to an area from which they could concentrate
+later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if required.</p>
+
+<p>At 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">285</span>
+Squadron was detached, with three destroyers, to proceed
+to the Skagerrak, with directions to arrive in the
+vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to
+sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet
+was ordered to push ahead, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> of the 22nd
+was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26 E., cruising in an area
+north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight, when it was
+intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather,
+which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Battle
+Fleet, with cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered
+to the eastward from Scapa until shortly before dark, and
+then altered course to South 18 East for the Horn Reef,
+to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the 23rd.</p>
+
+<p>The weather had been gradually thickening since 3
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Sir David Beatty reported that the
+<i>Australia</i> and <i>New Zealand</i> had collided in a fog and
+had received damage necessitating both ships returning to
+their base. By 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Fleet and cruisers were
+also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night.
+It was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such
+conditions with so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers
+and destroyers, when to the westward of the Little Fisher
+Bank, were accordingly turned to the northward, the order
+of turning being rear squadrons first and thence to the
+van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special signals
+had been introduced to provide for such circumstances,
+and were of great use on this occasion.</p>
+
+<p>In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty
+was experienced in carrying out the turn in the dense
+fog that prevailed, especially amongst the destroyers,
+and three of them, namely, the <i>Garland</i>, <i>Ardent</i> and
+<i>Ambuscade</i>, were in collision; the <i>Ardent</i> was so seriously
+damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her
+back to a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">286</span>
+neutral steamer, in passing through the Fleet in the fog,
+collided with the battleship <i>Neptune</i>, doing considerable
+injury to that ship.</p>
+
+<p>The weather cleared somewhat during the morning,
+and the Fleet cruised to the westward of the Little Fisher
+Bank until it was certain that the damaged destroyers
+were safely on their way to their bases. The operations
+were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable,
+and the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the
+Fleet remaining out for a further twenty-four hours, so
+as to repeat the sweep to the Horn Reef on the following
+day.</p>
+
+<p>The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th,
+fuelled, and again proceeded to sea for another movement
+south during the evening of that day, the 5th Battle
+Squadron being sent on in advance of the remainder of
+the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and strengthen
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of
+the <i>Australia</i> and <i>New Zealand</i>, damaged in collision.</p>
+
+<p>At 4.6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 25th, however, whilst steering to
+the southward, a report was received from Commodore
+Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, that
+he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light cruisers
+in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once influenced
+the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet
+increased to full speed, and shaped a course to pass down
+the searched channel to the westward of the German mine-field
+to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th
+Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course
+designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during
+their expected return passage to their ports. At 4.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+the Admiralty informed me that the enemy was bombarding
+Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron
+was in touch with the enemy’s ships; and at 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">287</span></span>
+the Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle
+cruisers in sight steaming to the eastward.</p>
+
+<p>At 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the Dreadnought
+Battle Fleet, was in Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd
+Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were about
+35 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70 miles to
+the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the
+south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as
+appeared later, having evidently only just barely missed
+cutting the enemy off from his base. The Battle Fleet
+stood on to the south-eastward until the afternoon, when
+it became evident that the Germans had escaped to their
+bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and
+shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 26th.</p>
+
+<p>On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty
+as to the steps which could be taken to minimise the
+danger of a recurrence of such raids on unfortified towns
+on the south-east coast as that of the 25th. Although
+they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly
+a great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants,
+and might result in much loss of life. I suggested that
+the placing of the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Humber
+or in the Thames might act as a deterrent, and in any case
+would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy
+ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting
+injury by submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet,
+if, by good fortune, we happened to be cruising sufficiently
+far to the southward at the time. The presence of the
+squadron in southern waters would be useful, also, in the
+unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good
+backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of
+movement, due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy submarines
+in southern waters, were considerable. I pointed
+out that since the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">288</span>
+the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was no
+longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships
+of the “Revenge” class were also approaching completion.
+The proposal was adopted, and the 3rd Battle
+Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed for the Humber
+on the 29th, <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the Medway. On that port
+the 3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the
+ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being gradually withdrawn
+for service in foreign waters. The Admiralty also
+stationed some of the monitors in the more important undefended
+ports.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of April a policy, suggested by
+me, of placing the Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead
+of in light cruisers, was adopted. This was made possible
+by the completion of several vessels of the class. The
+object was to add the light cruisers thus released to our
+all too slender light cruiser force.</p>
+
+<p>The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+during April were:</p>
+
+<p>Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10;
+number of ships on patrol, 12; number absent at ports
+or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 9; number on special
+service, 1.</p>
+
+<p>A very considerable amount of mist and fog was experienced
+during the month, and gales on the 8th, 16th
+and 24th.</p>
+
+<p>On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the
+vicinity of the Horn Reef. The operation was covered
+by the Grand Fleet. One of its objects was, as before,
+to attract the attention of the enemy’s naval forces to
+the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually
+drawn out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand
+Fleet in southern waters would soon become known to
+the enemy from neutral sources, with the result that vessels<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">289</span>
+of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations in the
+Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North
+Sea ports. From information obtained subsequently from
+reliable sources, it appeared that the operation produced
+the intended result. Between the afternoon of May 2nd
+and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers
+convoying the sea-plane-carriers <i>Vindex</i> and <i>Engadine</i>,
+proceeded to a position just north of the Horn Reef, arriving
+at dawn on May 4th; the objective of the sea-planes
+was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer <i>Abdiel</i>
+proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd–4th to the
+southward of the Vyl Lightship on the expected track
+of enemy vessels <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the North Sea via the Horn
+Reef. The mine-layer <i>Princess Margaret</i> was directed
+to lay mines on the same night across the expected route
+taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route
+passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were
+completed without any interference on the part of the
+enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn
+Reef, three to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three
+to positions off Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of
+the 3rd.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">E</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">E</a> Two of our submarines collided while submerged off the Horn Reef, one
+being slightly damaged.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet and destroyers proceeded to
+a position for supporting the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+near the Horn Reef, with directions to arrive at daylight
+on the 4th, and the Battle Fleet, with its cruiser squadrons,
+the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyer
+flotillas, to a supporting position to the northward of the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet. The list of ships absent from the
+Fleet on this occasion, owing to refit, repair, or to being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">290</span>
+engaged on other operations, is given below; it is useful
+as showing the reduction that takes place in the nominal
+numbers comprising a watching fleet at any given moment:
+Battleships, <i>Ajax</i> and <i>Dreadnought</i>; battle
+cruisers, <i>New Zealand</i>, <i>Australia</i>, <i>Invincible</i>; cruisers,
+<i>Black Prince</i>, <i>Warrior</i>, <i>Donegal</i>; light cruisers, <i>Southampton</i>,
+<i>Gloucester</i>, <i>Blonde</i>; destroyers, 3 from the 1st
+Flotilla, 6 from the 2nd Flotilla, 3 from the 11th Flotilla.
+During the passage south, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
+was detached to endeavour to locate a zeppelin reported
+by directional wireless to be in the centre of the
+North Sea (zeppelins had been seen off the north-east
+coast on the night of the 2nd). The search was unsuccessful,
+but the zeppelin descended off Stavanger later
+and was destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea-planes
+seemed from the Battle Fleet to be ideal, but,
+once more, the difficulty of getting these machines to rise
+from the water was experienced, a slight sea being sufficient
+to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the
+attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped
+bombs on the objective. The remainder were damaged
+by the sea.</p>
+
+<p>At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a zeppelin, L 7, was sighted by the 1st
+Light Cruiser Squadron and attacked by gunfire by the
+<i>Galatea</i> and <i>Phaeton</i>. She was damaged sufficiently to
+cause her to descend near submarine E 31 in the vicinity
+of the Vyl Lightship. E 31 completed her destruction
+and rescued seven survivors.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_290" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption sans"><span class="smcap">OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF MAY 2<sup>ND.</sup> to 5<sup>TH.</sup> 1916.</span>
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_290.jpg" width="827" height="838" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_290-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Horn Reef
+during May 4th, no enemy vessels being sighted, and then
+returned to its various bases. A thick fog was experienced
+during the return passage, which was made without incident;
+the Cromarty force was, however, taken to Scapa,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">291</span>
+as a submarine had been reported off Tarbet Ness in the
+Moray Firth.</p>
+
+<p>On May 9th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left
+Scapa to carry out another sweep on the Norwegian coast
+between the Naze and Udsire Lighthouse. The squadron
+was divided, two ships proceeding to the Naze and two
+to Udsire, arriving in position at daylight on the 10th
+and then sweeping towards each other. One neutral
+steamer, carrying iron ore for Lübeck, was intercepted
+outside territorial waters and sent in. On the same day
+the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for Scapa,
+searching the central portion of the North Sea <i lang="fr">en route</i>.</p>
+
+<p>On the 9th, 11th and 13th the ships on the northern
+patrol off the Shetlands moved in to Stadlandet for a
+short period, on the chance of intercepting ships outside
+territorial waters.</p>
+
+<p>On the 14th an unsuccessful search for a reported submarine
+was carried out to the south-east of the Pentland
+Firth.</p>
+
+<p>On the 15th Submarines D 7 and E 30 left for the
+Kattegat to operate at the northern end of the Sound and
+off Anholt Island. One German merchant-steamer was
+intercepted and sunk outside territorial waters off the
+Kullen on the 22nd by E 30. On the 18th another submarine
+was sent to operate off Goteberg in Sweden. She
+returned on the 25th, not having sighted any enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>On the same day a reliable report was received that
+an exceptionally large force of enemy submarines was now
+operating in the North Sea, and additional precautions
+were taken at all the bases to strengthen the patrols and
+to protect inward- and outward-bound vessels. The Vice-Admiral
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was warned to
+be ready to move all his patrol lines to given alternative
+positions, and on the 19th was directed to move his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">292</span>
+ships to the most western of these lines. Precautions
+against mine-laying by submarines were also taken, and
+the waters to the eastward of the “Long Forties,”
+through which the Fleet usually passed when on passage
+south, were examined by the Fleet mine-sweepers, protected
+by destroyers, on the 21st and subsequent days.
+These vessels searched without result on the 22nd for a
+submarine which was being chased by a patrol vessel in
+this neighbourhood.</p>
+
+<p>On the 21st the <i>Donegal</i> and two destroyers were sent
+to the vicinity of the entrance to Bergen to intercept a
+steamer which, it was thought, had passed through the
+10th Cruiser Squadron blockade during a fog. The ship
+however, called later at Kirkwall, and the force was recalled.</p>
+
+<p>On the 23rd the first of a series of deep mine-fields
+in the Moray Firth, which I had requested might be laid
+with the object of catching enemy submarines, was placed
+in position by the mine-layer <i>Biarritz</i>.</p>
+
+<p>On the 24th the <i>Donegal</i> and an armed boarding-steamer
+were sent to patrol off Stadlandet with a view to
+intercepting ships engaged in the iron ore trade from
+Narvik. This, as before stated, was one of the few positions
+at which ships were obliged for navigational reasons
+to leave territorial waters.</p>
+
+<p>On the 24th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with
+destroyers, which had been at Rosyth, left for another
+search off the Norwegian coast from the Naze to Udsire,
+and thence to Scapa. The search was unproductive.</p>
+
+<p>On the 26th two submarines were despatched to
+operate against enemy submarines off the Norwegian
+coast, and, on the same date, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with six destroyers, left, via the searched channel,
+to carry out a reconnaissance to the southward of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">293</span>
+German North Sea mine-field. The squadron proceeded
+as far east as Long. 6 E., but, unfortunately, sighted
+nothing.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Broke</i> and 12 destroyers left on the 27th to search
+for a submarine reported to have been sighted to the eastward
+of the Pentland Firth, and returned on the 28th,
+not having seen her; but on the 27th Trawler Unit No. 42,
+working from Peterhead, reported having engaged and
+sunk a submarine at 12.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in Lat. 57.10 N., Long.
+1.20 E., thus adding one more success to the record of
+this patrol. On the 30th Fleet-sweeper <i>Gentian</i> was
+missed, in a position about 40 miles due east of the Pentland
+Firth, by a torpedo fired evidently by the submarine
+that had been hunted on the 28th. A half flotilla and
+sea-planes were sent out to search, and a submarine was
+sighted at 3.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> near the position given, but she dived
+and got clear away.</p>
+
+<p>The movements of the Fleet between the time of leaving
+and returning to the bases in connection with the
+Battle of Jutland are given in Chapter XI., but some
+mention may be made of an incident which occurred on
+the night of May 31st. A report was received at Scapa
+that an enemy raider might be attempting to escape into
+the Atlantic. The Vice-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron was directed to assume a patrol north of the
+Shetlands in accordance with a plan which had been pre-arranged
+to meet such a case. On June 3rd, after the
+return of the Fleet to its bases, light cruisers were sent
+out to patrol to the north-westward of the Orkneys, and
+the 10th Cruiser Squadron was then directed to fall back
+to a position farther west to form a second patrol line.
+Nothing came of the matter.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of May the weekly average results
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed: Number of vessels<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">294</span>
+intercepted, 55, besides 17 trawlers; number sent in, 18;
+number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports
+or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 9; number on special
+service, 2.</p>
+
+<p>A good deal of fog and mist was experienced during
+the month, the worst periods being from the 17th to the
+20th, 24th, 26th, and the 28th to 30th.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of May the firing exercises in the
+Pentland Firth continued, as did the usual exchange of
+bases between squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>During the months of March, April and May, a
+flotilla of submarines had been gradually organised as a
+unit of the Grand Fleet. It was named the 11th Submarine
+Flotilla, was based on Blyth, with the <i>Titania</i> as
+parent ship and the <i>Talisman</i> and <i>Trident</i> as attendant
+destroyers. Separate spheres of activity for the Grand
+Fleet submarine flotillas and for the submarine flotillas
+based on Harwich and Yarmouth were also arranged, the
+dividing line running from a position a little to the southward
+of the Horn Reef to Flamborough Head. The line
+was subsequently slightly altered once or twice as the
+strength of the Grand Fleet submarine flotillas increased,
+but the general principle was that the Grand Fleet submarines
+worked to the northward of such a line and the
+remaining submarines to the southward.</p>
+
+<p>It may not be out of place here to mention the
+organisation for getting the Grand Fleet to sea from its
+bases to any desired point of concentration with rapidity
+and safety, and of bringing the Fleet back into the bases
+in face of probable submarine or mine attack.</p>
+
+<p>As the Grand Fleet increased in size, and the danger
+from mine and submarine grew, so the problem of leaving
+Scapa Flow and re-entering that base with safety
+became more complicated. The necessity for the Fleet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">295</span>
+leaving harbour in the shortest possible time and with the
+fewest possible number of signals was obvious. Similarly
+on returning the various squadrons had to enter the base
+with the least practicable delay in order to avoid giving
+submarines engaged in watching the approaches an opportunity
+for getting into positions for attacking the squadrons
+in rear, after having sighted those in the van. The
+operations, both of departure and entry, were rendered all
+the more difficult owing to the very strong and erratic tides
+experienced in the Pentland Firth, while all ships navigating
+at night had to be navigated without showing lights.</p>
+
+<p>The usual method of departure from Scapa was as
+follows: A “Preparatory Signal for leaving Scapa” consisting
+of one word was made as soon as I decided to take
+the Fleet to sea. On receipt of this “Preparatory Signal”
+all ships raised steam for 18 knots at two hours’ notice.
+Patrol destroyers were recalled by the Commodore (F)
+for refuelling. All officers and men absent on patrol
+duty in drifters were also recalled, and every preparation
+was made for leaving harbour. The Admiral Commanding
+the Orkneys and Shetlands warned the outer patrols
+that the Fleet might be leaving shortly.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the Fleet was raising steam in readiness to be
+off at two hours’ notice a signal was made which indicated
+the time at which the first squadron to leave was to move
+ahead from the anchorage, together with the speed to be
+maintained after passing the submarine obstructions. No
+further signals were necessary. The organisation provided
+for the order in which squadrons were to leave, as
+well as the interval between squadrons or divisions, which
+in daylight was usually one mile from the rear ship of
+one squadron, or division of four ships, to the leading ship
+of that following, or two miles at night. The organisation
+also provided for successive squadrons or divisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">296</span>
+being taken alternately north or south of the Pentland
+Skerries if the Fleet proceeded to the eastward, in order
+that the interval between those following the same course
+might be increased.</p>
+
+<p>In the strong tides, particularly at night, some such
+procedure had to be adopted, because the tide was not
+felt until the ships were clear of Swona Island, and then
+the effect of it, if running to the westward, and particularly
+at the period of spring tides, when it has a speed of
+10 knots, was to bring a leading squadron or division
+back on top of that in rear of it. Frequently also a ship,
+emerging from slack water into the strength of the tide,
+would be caught by the tide on the bow, and, unless
+the greatest possible care was taken to watch the steering
+(and even sometimes in spite of every care), the ship
+would be turned round through 8, 12 or even 16 points,<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">F</a>
+becoming a danger to those astern of her, as she would
+be almost unmanageable for a time. Such a situation on
+a dark night, with a large fleet showing no lights, was not
+pleasant, and it speaks well for the skill shown in handling
+the ships that no accident occurred from this cause.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">F</a> 8 points = 90 degrees.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The practice in regard to the destroyers, when they
+accompanied the Fleet (as was necessary after the
+first twelve months of war), was for the various groups
+which were detailed by the Commodore (F) to screen the
+squadrons or divisions of the heavy ships, to meet them
+just outside the submarine obstruction and screen them
+from there in daylight, or on moonlight nights, and
+to form astern on dark nights, in readiness to re-establish
+the screen at daylight. In the early days of the War, and
+indeed for the first eighteen months, the practice was for
+the destroyer flotillas to be stationed some 10 miles from
+the Battle Fleet at night in order to avoid any chance of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">297</span>
+their being sighted and mistaken for enemy destroyers;
+but this procedure caused considerable delay in forming
+the submarine screen at daylight, and in thick weather
+the destroyers frequently experienced difficulty in finding
+the Battle Fleet. Consequently, it became the practice
+to keep the destroyers actually in company at night, and
+this procedure was undoubtedly preferable.</p>
+
+<p>After the various squadrons had passed the Pentland
+Skerries, the organisation provided for their taking certain
+defined routes; the usual practice was to use three
+routes with the squadrons divided between them, the
+routes being about seven miles apart.</p>
+
+<p>A concentration point, which the squadrons would
+reach at the ordered speed shortly after daylight, was
+given in the departure signal, and the squadrons closed
+in on this point at the appointed time, so that the whole
+Battle Fleet, including detachments coming from Cromarty,
+was concentrated shortly after daylight, with the
+cruisers in their assigned positions scouting ahead.</p>
+
+<p>The organisation of the Battle Fleet provided for the
+strongest squadron being on the eastern flank, because
+it was considered that the enemy would invariably make
+towards his bases if touch was gained, and it was desired
+to have our strongest squadron in the van.</p>
+
+<p>The “departure” organisation was carefully worked
+out by my Staff and very minutely described in the Grand
+Fleet orders. It was most useful, the whole Fleet,
+comprising frequently 50 or more battleships, cruisers
+and light cruisers, and as many as 50 destroyers, being
+in daylight under weigh in one hour, and clear of the
+harbour in an hour and a half after the signal was made
+to proceed; on dark nights this time was lengthened by
+half an hour.</p>
+
+<p>When returning to Scapa Flow, the usual practice<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">298</span>
+was for the time of entry to be arranged so that the leading
+squadrons passed the Pentland Skerries shortly before
+dawn, in order to minimise the danger from submarine
+attack; but it was not, of course, always possible to
+arrange the time of entry in this manner. In returning
+to Scapa, when the arrival was thus timed for dawn,
+the different squadrons were disposed, as a rule, in two
+separate lines, the lines being some five miles apart and
+the squadrons in each line having an interval of about
+three miles between them. One line would enter the
+Pentland Firth by passing north of the Pentland Skerries
+and the other by passing south of these rocks, the object
+being to confuse any enemy submarines that might be
+watching the approaches, and also to get the Fleet into
+the Firth as quickly as possible, as once in the tideway
+there was little to fear from submarine attack.</p>
+
+<p>If the Fleet entered Scapa Flow during darkness,
+the ships anchored in the centre of the Flow in certain
+specified berths, and waited for daylight before taking
+up their berths in the Fleet anchorage; towards the end
+of my period of command, however, coloured lights were
+arranged to be placed as leading-marks for the Fleet
+anchorage, so that ships could proceed to their final
+berths under all conditions.</p>
+
+<p>As regards mines, an exploratory search of the channel
+intended to be used was always carried out, if time
+permitted, before the Fleet left, and similarly before
+it returned. Three channels were used, each some 7
+to 10 miles in width—one passing up the east side of
+the Orkneys, one running to the eastward from the Pentland
+Skerries, and one passing down the Scottish coast
+for a short distance and then to the eastward. Usually
+the second of these channels was used.</p>
+
+<p>The principal difficulty with which we had to deal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">299</span>
+when leaving or returning was fog. In a really dense
+fog there was great risk in attempting to leave Scapa
+with a large fleet, owing to the strong tides to be encountered
+in the Pentland Firth, and nothing but the
+gravest emergency would have justified the attempt being
+made. If it became really necessary, an organisation
+had been provided to meet the case, and the attempt
+would have been made. The interval between the various
+squadrons would have been considerably greater, and the
+time occupied in leaving would have been correspondingly
+increased.</p>
+
+<p>The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases,
+Cromarty and Rosyth, were, of course, simpler, owing to
+the absence of the very strong cross-tides, but fog was
+even more prevalent at Rosyth than at Scapa, and the
+operation of leaving with a considerable number of ships
+was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed
+under difficulties on very numerous occasions and with
+remarkable freedom from accident during my period of
+command. The approach to the Firth of Forth in thick
+weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were
+experienced in making the land when the position of
+the ships had not been accurately ascertained by sights
+for some time before approaching the base. These
+approaches could have been mined by the enemy with
+great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently
+enterprising, and it was a standing wonder to me that
+the attempt was never made.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">300</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XI"><span id="toclink_300"></span>CHAPTER XI<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">It</span> may not be out of place here to touch upon the general
+naval situation in the spring of 1916—that is, on the eve of
+the Battle of Jutland. What were the strategical conditions?
+To what extent was it justifiable to take risks
+with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks the full consequences
+of which could not be foreseen owing to the new
+conditions of naval warfare?</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our
+available capital ships. There was very little in the way of
+reserve behind it. The battleships <em>not</em> included in the
+Grand Fleet were all of them pre-Dreadnoughts and
+therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted of seven
+ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, two ships of the
+“Lord Nelson” class, and four of the “Queen” class,
+all of these ships being in the Mediterranean except five of
+the “King Edward VII.” class. They were required
+there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the
+operations in the Ægean. Five of our light cruisers were
+also in the Mediterranean.</p>
+
+<p>The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in
+the Mediterranean, but, owing to political considerations
+and their duty in watching the Austrian Fleet, there
+was little prospect of their leaving that locality.</p>
+
+<p>It is interesting to compare this situation with that
+existing a century earlier. In September, 1805, the
+month before Trafalgar, the disposition of British ships<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">301</span>
+in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean is
+given in the following table:</p>
+
+<table id="t301" class="bl section">
+<tr class="bt bb">
+  <td class="tdc" style="width: 10em;">Station</td>
+  <td class="tdc" style="width: 8em;">Commander-<br>in-Chief</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Ships of<br>the Line</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Frigates</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Sloops and<br>small vessels</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Total</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">From Shetland to Beachy Head</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lord Keith</td>
+  <td class="tdc">10</td>
+  <td class="tdc">15</td>
+  <td class="tdc">155</td>
+  <td class="tdc">180</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Channel</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Port Admirals</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 51</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 52</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Guernsey and Jersey</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Sir J. Saumarez</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Off Ushant, etc.</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Admiral Cornwallis</td>
+  <td class="tdc">26</td>
+  <td class="tdc">15</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 61</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Irish</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lord Gardner</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc">10</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 24</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Mediterranean</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Lord Nelson</td>
+  <td class="tdc">26</td>
+  <td class="tdc">19</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 24</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 69</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdl">In port refitting and destined to reinforce Lords Nelson and Cornwallis</td>
+  <td class="tdl"></td>
+  <td class="tdc">11</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 35</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>In addition to Nelson’s force of 26 capital ships and
+19 frigates, the Navy had, therefore, in commission in
+home waters and the Mediterranean a yet more numerous
+force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates. The main portion
+of this force was with Cornwallis off Ushant, and
+was watching Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy
+Head we had 155 sloops and small vessels.</p>
+
+<p>In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital
+ships (including battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light
+cruisers, we had in commission in home waters and the
+Mediterranean only 13 capital ships (all of pre-Dreadnought
+types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light
+cruisers. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we
+had, exclusive of the Grand Fleet and Harwich force,
+about 60 destroyers (mostly of old type), 6 P boats, and
+33 old torpedo boats.</p>
+
+<p>In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the
+line in England, besides 10 under construction in Russia,
+and 36 frigates. In May, 1916, we had building five
+capital ships and about nine light cruisers.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">302</span></p>
+
+<p>A consideration of these figures will show that the
+situation at the two periods under review was very different,
+in that, in 1805, the force engaged at Trafalgar
+was only a relatively small portion of the available British
+Fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the large
+majority of the vessels upon which the country had to
+rely for safety.</p>
+
+<p>Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I
+had written to the Admiralty pointing out the dangers
+which an intelligent use of submarines, mines and torpedoes
+by the Germans, before and during a Fleet action,
+would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the
+tactics which I had intended to employ to meet the
+expected German movement in order to bring the enemy
+to action in the shortest practicable time and with the best
+chance of achieving such a victory as would be decisive.
+I stated that with new and untried methods of warfare
+new tactics must be devised to meet them.</p>
+
+<p>I received in reply an expression of approval of
+my views and of confidence in the manner in which I
+proposed to handle the Fleet in action.</p>
+
+<p>Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the
+margin of superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High
+Sea Fleet justify me in disregarding the enemy’s torpedo
+fire or meeting it otherwise than by definite movements
+deduced after most careful analysis of the problem at sea
+with the Fleet and on the tactical board.</p>
+
+<p>The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet
+were taken into account in making this decision. There
+was also a possibility that the Grand Fleet might later
+be called upon to confront a situation of much wider
+scope than that already existing.</p>
+
+<p>The position gradually improved after 1916. During
+the latter half of that year the remaining ships of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">303</span>
+“Royal Sovereign” class joined the Grand Fleet, and
+greatly increased the ratio of strength of the Fleet as
+compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it
+was also possible to withdraw the four battleships of the
+“Queen” class from the Adriatic. This greatly eased the
+manning situation. And in April, 1917, the culminating
+event was the entry of the United States of America into
+the War on the side of the Entente. In December, 1917,
+the United States sent a division of battleships to join
+the Grand Fleet, and it was apparent that we could count
+upon the whole battleship strength of the United States
+Navy, if required, to second our efforts.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light
+cruiser and destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet increased
+steadily after the Battle of Jutland, and to a very
+considerable extent reduced the danger of successful torpedo
+attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface craft.
+The inclusion of the K. class submarines—submarines of
+high speed—in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very
+probable that any losses suffered by us by submarine
+attack would be more than compensated by enemy losses
+from the same cause.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in
+regard to battle cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory,
+the general effect of all these considerations upon the
+tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be overwhelming.
+The position was assured, and we could have afforded to
+take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most
+unwise.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">304</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XII"><span id="toclink_304"></span>CHAPTER XII<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">On</span> May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea
+Fleet fought the action which has become known as the
+Battle of Jutland. The despatch<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">G</a> describing the battle,
+as published some weeks later, was not quite in its original
+form as written by me. After a conference held at the
+Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some
+of them because it was considered that certain passages
+might convey useful information to the enemy, and others
+because it was thought to be undesirable to draw attention
+to certain features of British design. Amongst the latter
+was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our
+earlier battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">G</a> See <a href="#Appendix_I">Appendix</a>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause
+our battle cruisers, with their attendant light cruisers, to
+occupy when at sea an advanced position, often at a considerable
+distance from the Battle Fleet. Battle cruisers
+were designed and built in order that they might keep
+in touch with the enemy and report his movements
+when he had been found; hence the heavy guns which
+they carried. They were intended to find the enemy for
+the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy’s strength in
+order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not
+been adopted the enemy’s battle cruisers could not have
+been brought to action on such occasions as the engagement
+of January 24th, 1915. And in the cases of raids<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">305</span>
+on our coast, the battle cruisers were always sent ahead
+at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle
+cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the
+middle of 1916 and the heavier armaments carried by our
+ships, the real risk involved in this policy was that of our
+battle cruisers being drawn on to the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled.
+Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would,
+owing to their higher speed, have no difficulty in clear
+weather in keeping out of range of the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still maintaining touch
+with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the added
+support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which
+had been grouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to
+the absence of the 3rd Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow,
+the tactical advantage of our ships was even stronger,
+provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an
+excess of speed over the fastest enemy’s Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch,
+I had felt it necessary on the highest grounds, as well as
+only just to the officers and men of our battle cruisers,
+to give some explanation of the heavy losses incurred by
+our ships in the early part of the action, when we were
+opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long
+range, by four battleships of the “Queen Elizabeth”
+class, comprising the 5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy
+battle cruisers, which were not then supported by the
+German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter showed
+that one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately
+protected by armour as compared with the
+German vessels of the battle cruiser type. It was considered
+undesirable to draw attention to this publicly
+while the war was in progress.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">306</span></p>
+
+<p>The relative values of protection and gun power had
+frequently engaged my serious attention. It was also a
+subject of much discussion amongst writers on naval
+matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting
+that all available weight should be put into gun power and
+that ships should be left practically without armour.
+Their views were based on the argument that “the best
+defense is a powerful offensive.” Although this argument
+is very true when applied to strategy, the War has
+shown its fallacy as applied to <i lang="fr">matériel</i>. The loss of the
+<i>Good Hope</i>, <i>Monmouth</i>, <i>Queen Mary</i>, <i>Indefatigable</i>,
+<i>Invincible</i>, <i>Defence</i>, and <i>Warrior</i>, and the considerations
+to which these losses gave rise, convinced naval officers
+afloat, even if they did not convince others less intimately
+associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships with
+inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those
+which possess them to a considerably greater degree,
+even if the former are superior in gun power. The conviction
+was strengthened by the knowledge we obtained,
+that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire,
+torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were
+yet taken safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive
+qualities, but, partly, to the limitations of our armour-piercing
+shell at that time.</p>
+
+<p>There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters,
+when comparing the relative strength of the British
+and German Fleets for the purpose of future provision
+of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make comparison
+only on the basis of the <em>gun power</em> of the vessels
+of the two Navies. Great superiority in fighting qualities
+on the part of the British Fleet was suggested by this
+blindness to other considerations. During my pre-War
+service at the Admiralty this question was often under
+discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">307</span>
+argument as being very misleading, and pointed out that
+the true comparison lay between the <em>displacement</em> of the
+ships of the various classes, because if we assumed, as
+War experience has since shown that we were justified
+in assuming that the German naval designers and
+constructors were not inferior in ability to our own,
+it was obvious that, taking ships of equal displacement
+and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if our
+vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans
+must possess superiority in some other direction. It was
+well known at the Admiralty that their superiority lay in
+greatly increased protection, combined with heavier torpedo
+armament.</p>
+
+<p>We were also aware that the German vessels were
+fitted with small tube boilers, which were very economical
+in weight for a given horse-power, and, consequently, the
+German vessels obtained thereby a further advantage,
+the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the
+ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted
+a different disposition of the weight available in each
+ship.</p>
+
+<p>The tables on pp. 308–11 give particulars of the
+armament, protection, and displacement of the capital
+ships of the two Navies engaged in the Battle of Jutland,
+so far as they are known to me.</p>
+
+<p>The main facts revealed by an examination of these
+tables are:</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center">BATTLESHIPS</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. The German ships of any particular period were of considerably
+greater displacement as compared with contemporary
+British ships.</p>
+
+<p>2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour
+than their British contemporaries.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">308</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 center section">TABLE I<br>
+BRITISH BATTLESHIPS</p>
+
+<table id="t308-1" class="bl">
+<tr class="bt">
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdc"> Ships</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Programme</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Speed</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="smaller">
+  <td></td>
+  <td class="tdc">Year</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Knots</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Royal Sovereign” Class (5)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1913–14</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25,750</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.5</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,400</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 15″   <br>14,   6″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 13″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 13″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Queen Elizabeth” Class (5)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1912–13</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 27,500</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,400</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 15″   <br>12,   6″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 13″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 13″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Iron Duke” Class (4)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,300</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>12,   6″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“King George V.” Class (3)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1910–11</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 23,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>12,   4″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Orion” Class (4)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1909–10</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 22,500</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,100</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>13,   4″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Canada</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Emergency War Programme</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 28,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 22.75</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 14″   <br>12,   6″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7″ and 4½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Erin</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 23,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>16,   6″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Agincourt</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 27,500</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 22.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14, 12″  <br>20,   6″  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 1½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Hercules” Class (3)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1909–10</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″  <br>12,   4″  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck only.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“St. Vincent” Class (2)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1907–8</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 19,250</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″  <br>13,   4″  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Bellerophon” Class (3)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1906–7</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 18,600</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,500</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″  <br>12,   4″  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top bb">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Dreadnought</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1905–6</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17,900</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="p2 center section">TABLE II<br>
+BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS</p>
+
+<table id="t309-2" class="bl">
+<tr class="bt">
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdc"> Ships</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Programme</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Speed</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="smaller">
+  <td></td>
+  <td class="tdc">Year</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Knots</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl"> <i>Tiger</i> (1)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 28,500</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 29.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 13″.5<br>12,   6″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Lion” Class (3)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1909–10</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 26,350</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 28.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,600</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 13″.5<br>15,   4″   </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“New Zealand” Class (3)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 18,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 26.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 12″<br>14,   4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top bb">
+  <td class="tdl">“Inflexible” Class (3)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1905–6</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 17,250</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 12″<br>12,   4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> nil</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 2½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">310</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 center section">TABLE III<br>
+GERMAN BATTLESHIPS</p>
+
+<table id="t310-1" class="bl">
+<tr class="bt">
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdc"> Ships</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Programme</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Speed</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="smaller">
+  <td></td>
+  <td class="tdc">Year</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Knots</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“König” Class (4)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 25,390</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 23.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,200</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″   <br>14,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 14″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2½″ to 3″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Kaiser” Class (5)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1909–11</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 24,410</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″   <br>14,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5</td>
+  <td class="tdc">13″.75</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc">11¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Ditto, but at after end side only armoured up to main deck.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Heligoland” Class (4)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1908–9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 22,440</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20.5</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,100</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12, 12″   <br>14,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6</td>
+  <td class="tdc">11″.75</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc">11¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 2¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck and secondary battery above that.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top bb">
+  <td class="tdl">“Nassau” Class (4)</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1907–8</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 18,600</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20.0</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2,800</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12, 11″   <br>12,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6</td>
+  <td class="tdc">11″.75</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6½″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2″ to 4¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="p2 center section">TABLE IV<br>
+GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS</p>
+
+<table id="t310-2" class="bl">
+<tr class="bt">
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdc"> Ships</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Programme</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Speed</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="smaller">
+  <td></td>
+  <td class="tdc">Year</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Knots</td>
+  <td class="tdc">Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl">“Derfflinger” Class<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">H</a></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 26,180</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 28.0  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5,600</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 12″   <br>14,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 12″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3.2″</td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck with secondary battery above that.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Seydlitz</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1910–11</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 24,610</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 26.75</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 11″   <br>12,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc">11¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3¼″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Moltke</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1908–9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 22,640</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 27.25</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,200</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10, 11″   <br>12,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 11″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> tapering</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 10″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> ? same as <i>Seydlitz</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="top bb">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Von der Tann</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 1907–8</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 19,100</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 26.0  </td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2,900</td>
+  <td class="tdc">   8, 11″   <br>10,   5″.9</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4</td>
+  <td class="tdc">9¾″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 9″</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> ? same as <i>Seydlitz</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck with secondary battery armoured to upper deck.</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">H</a> <i>Lutzow</i> was similar.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p class="p2 center section">TABLE V<br>
+Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships of the same date. N.&nbsp;B.—The German figures are approximate.</p>
+
+<table id="t310-3" class="bl">
+<tr class="bt bb">
+  <td class="tdl"></td>
+  <td class="tdl nobl"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Displacement</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Weight of<br>armour</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Weight of deck<br>protection</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Total</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Length<br>of ship</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> Beam</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Battleships</span>—</td>
+  <td class="tdc smaller"></td>
+  <td class="tdc smaller"> Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc smaller"> Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc smaller"> Tons</td>
+  <td class="tdc smaller"> Feet</td>
+  <td class="tdc smaller"> Feet</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Monarch</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl nobl"> British</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 22,500</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 4,560</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2,010</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6,570</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 545</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88½</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Kaiser</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl nobl"> German</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 24,410</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5,430</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,130</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 8,560</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 564</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 95   </td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Battle Cruisers</span>—</td>
+  <td class="tdl"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+  <td class="tdc"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Queen Mary</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl nobl"> British</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 27,000</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 3,900</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2,300</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 6,200</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 660</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 89   </td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Seydlitz</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl nobl"> German</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 24,610</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 5,200</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 2,400</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 7,600</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 656</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 93½</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p class="p0 smaller center"><i>Note.</i>—Similar comparisons between other ships of the same date would show similar results.
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">312</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour
+<em>to the upper deck</em>;, whilst nine of the earliest British
+Dreadnoughts were provided with armour protection to the
+<em>main deck only</em>, thus rendering them far more open to artillery
+attack. The “Orion” class of battleship and the “Lion” class
+of battle cruiser, designed during my service at the Admiralty
+as Controller, were the first of our Dreadnoughts armoured to
+the upper deck.</p>
+
+<p>4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships
+was in nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries,
+whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in <em>all cases</em>
+considerably greater in the German ships.</p>
+
+<p>5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually
+greater than in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision
+more complete.</p>
+
+<p>6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged
+torpedo tubes than the British vessels.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="p2 center">BATTLE CRUISERS</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater displacement
+than their British contemporaries.</p>
+
+<p>2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than
+their British contemporaries.</p>
+
+<p>3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection
+above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being
+provided with protection to the upper deck.</p>
+
+<p>4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions,
+including deck protection, as well as more complete watertight
+subdivisions.</p>
+
+<p>5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged
+torpedo tubes than the British ships.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As against the additional protection of the German
+ships our vessels of contemporary design were provided in
+all cases with heavier turret guns, whilst the German
+ships carried heavier secondary armaments.</p>
+
+<p>A point of considerable interest, which should also
+be mentioned because it was to prove important, was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">313</span>
+that the Germans possessed a delay-action fuse which,
+combined with a highly efficient armour-piercing projectile,
+ensured the burst of shell taking place <em>inside</em>
+the armour of British ships instead of <em>outside</em>, or whilst
+passing through the armour, which was the case with
+British shells of that date fired against the thick German
+armour.</p>
+
+<p>The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was
+not widely different, although the British ships, as a
+rule, were fitted to carry more fuel. Although I arranged,
+after the first few months of war, to reduce the amount
+of fuel carried by our ships very considerably—in fact,
+by more than 25 per cent.—I was unable to reduce it further
+in coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the
+protection afforded by the coal, since in our case it was
+necessary to be prepared to do a considerable amount of
+steaming at high speed, involving expenditure of coal,
+before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have
+been unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with
+coal below what I may call the “safety line.” On the
+other hand, it was well known that, as the Germans had
+no intention of fighting an action far from their bases,
+they had effected a very much greater reduction in the
+quantity of fuel carried with consequently a corresponding
+advantage in speed.</p>
+
+<p>There was yet one other matter of great importance,
+namely, the vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies
+in regard to under-water attack. Here the Germans possessed
+a very real advantage, which stood them in good
+stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes:</p>
+
+<p>1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside
+the ships, and in many cases its greater thickness.</p>
+
+<p>2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">314</span>
+skin of the ship and the consequent additional protection
+to under-water attack afforded thereby.</p>
+
+<p>In regard to the first point, the great majority of
+our ships only carried partial internal protection, that is,
+protection over a portion of the length of the ship. The
+protection was usually confined to the region of the
+magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran
+throughout the length of the vessel.</p>
+
+<p>As to the second point, it was possible to place the
+protective bulkhead farther “inboard” in the German
+ships without cramping machinery and magazine spaces,
+because the ships themselves were of much greater beam.
+Consequently the explosion of a mine or a torpedo against
+the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the protective
+bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of
+the ships than was the case with a British vessel. The
+result was that, although it is known that many German
+capital ships were mined and torpedoed during the war,
+including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans have
+not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought
+battleship <i>Pommern</i> and the battle cruiser
+<i>Lutzow</i>, whose injuries from shell fire were also very
+extensive.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or
+torpedoed, rarely survived. The recorded instances of
+escape are the <i>Inflexible</i> (mined in the Dardanelles) and
+the <i>Marlborough</i> (torpedoed at Jutland), and in the latter
+case, although the torpedo struck at about the most
+favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in
+reaching port.</p>
+
+<p>The question will be asked why it was that British
+ships were under this disadvantage. The reply is that the
+whole of our Dreadnought battleships, designed before
+the War, were hampered by the absence of proper dock<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">315</span>
+accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked
+to me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the
+mistake of building our ships before we had proper dock
+accommodation for them, whilst in Germany they had provided
+the dock accommodation first and had designed the
+ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since
+docks took a long time to construct, the German policy
+involved delay in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of
+a type, and hence our margin of superiority in 1914. As
+each successive type of Dreadnought was designed, our
+constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they
+went beyond a certain beam the number of docks available
+would be insufficient; and it was always a matter
+of great difficulty to obtain money with which to construct
+adequate docks. Docks make no appeal to the
+imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money.
+The result was that August, 1914, found us with a superiority
+in ships, but woefully lacking in dock accommodation;
+and for this reason alone a Fleet action early in
+the War, resulting in considerable damage to heavy ships,
+would have produced embarrassing results.</p>
+
+<p>It is only just to our very able constructive staff at
+the Admiralty to point this out; it was one of the reasons
+which led to the German ships being much better equipped
+to withstand under-water attack than were our own. It is
+devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in mind
+in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided
+for the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The matter is one of which I have considerable personal
+knowledge, since it came within my province as
+Controller in 1909–11 and was also given to me to examine
+whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless to say
+that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out
+with emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">316</span>
+will be shown, as an introduction in a consideration of the
+Battle of Jutland, if that action is to be rightly judged.</p>
+
+<p>In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential
+to bear in mind that the time of receipt of signals,
+especially of reports emanating from the bridge of a ship,
+is not a true indication of the time at which the officer
+making the report began his task. A varying but considerable
+interval is bound to elapse; this includes the
+time taken to write out the report, transmit it to the
+wireless office or signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode
+it on board the receiving ship, write it out and transmit
+it to the bridge. The interval is greater with wireless
+than with visual signals.</p>
+
+<h3>I.—<span class="smcap">The Battle Cruiser Fleet’s Action</span></h3>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose
+of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the
+North Sea. The orders from me under which the Fleet
+acted were as follows:</p>
+
+<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle
+Squadron from Cromarty, was directed to pass through
+a position in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.0 E., and to meet
+the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 31st
+at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.</p>
+
+<p>Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron, was directed
+to proceed to a position in Lat. 56.40 N., Long. 5 E.,
+economising fuel in the destroyers as much as possible;
+it was expected that he would be in that position by about
+2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand
+to the northward to get into visual touch with the Battle
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_316" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption sans">Operations of<br>
+
+<span class="larger">BATTLE CRUISER FLEET</span><br>
+
+II·00 p.m to VI·15 p.m. 31<sup>st</sup>. May.
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_316.jpg" width="730" height="623" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_316-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">317</span></p>
+
+<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i> and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons,
+together with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the
+newly commissioned light cruisers <i>Chester</i> and <i>Canterbury</i>,
+which had been carrying out gunnery and torpedo
+practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of
+May 30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat.
+57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E., having met the 2nd Battle
+Squadron <i lang="fr">en route</i> at 11.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> in Lat. 58.13 N.,
+Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed
+before sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards
+the Horn Reef from the position in Lat. 57.45 N.,
+Long. 4.15 E.</p>
+
+<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about
+18 miles to the north-westward of the position (A),
+being actually in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 3.45 E., in
+organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly delayed
+for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary practice
+of examining trawlers and other vessels met with <i lang="fr">en
+route</i> to be carried out without causing the examining
+vessels to expend unnecessary fuel in regaining station.
+We had to be on our guard against scouts. The divisions
+were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard
+in the order: 1st–6th Divisions (screened by the 4th,
+11th, and 12th Flotillas) with the 4th Light Cruiser
+Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet.
+The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were
+stationed 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six
+miles apart on a line of direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.;
+the cruisers being eight miles apart and their positions
+being in the order from east to west:</p>
+
+<div class="center"><div class="ilb">
+<pre>
+                       (F.)      (F.)
+<i>Cochrane</i>   <i>Shannon</i>   <i>Minotaur</i>   <i>Defence</i>   <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>   <i>Black Prince</i>
+                         .         .
+                         .         .
+                         .      <i>Warrior</i>
+                         .
+                         .
+                     <i>Hampshire</i> (linking ship 6 miles astern of the <i>Minotaur</i>)
+</pre>
+</div></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">318</span></p>
+
+<p>The attached cruisers, the <i>Active</i>, <i>Boadicea</i>, <i>Blanche</i>,
+and <i>Bellona</i>, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and
+the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers
+<i>Chester</i> and <i>Canterbury</i>, about 20 miles ahead, the whole
+steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the speed of <em>advance</em>
+being 14 knots.</p>
+
+<p>The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below:</p>
+
+<table id="t318" class="smaller section">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="6">Line of Advance.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc xxlarge" colspan="6">↑</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc">1st Div.</td>
+  <td class="tdc">2nd Div.</td>
+  <td class="tdc">3rd Div.</td>
+  <td class="tdc">4th Div.</td>
+  <td class="tdc">5th Div.</td>
+  <td class="tdc">6th Div.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>King George V.</i>(F.)</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Orion</i> (F.)</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Iron Duke</i> (F.F.)</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Benbow</i> (F.)</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Colossus</i> (F.)</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Marlborough</i> (F.)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Ajax</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Monarch</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Royal Oak</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Bellerophon</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Collingwood</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Revenge</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Centurion</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Conqueror</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Superb</i> (F.)</td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Temeraire</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Neptune</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Hercules</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Erin</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Thunderer</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Canada</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Vanguard</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>St. Vincent</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Agincourt</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="6">F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship.</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>It may be added in further explanation that the
+flagships of the Battle Fleet were:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang6">
+
+<p><i>Iron Duke</i>, Fleet-Flagship.—Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (Commander-in-Chief).</p>
+
+<p><i>King George V.</i>—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, Commanding
+2nd Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Orion.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in
+the 2nd Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Superb.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in
+the 4th Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Benbow.</i>—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Commanding
+the 4th Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Colossus.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral E.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral
+in the 1st Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Marlborough.</i>—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding
+1st Battle Squadron and second in command of
+the Grand Fleet.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron,
+with destroyers, were at 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in Lat. 56.46 N., Long.
+4.40 E., and had turned to the northward, steering N. by
+E., speed 19½ knots, in the order:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">319</span></p>
+
+<p>The <i>Lion</i> and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single
+line ahead, screened by the light cruiser <i>Champion</i> and
+10 destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead three miles E.N.E.
+of the <i>Lion</i>, screened by six destroyers.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">I</a> The 5th Battle
+Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W.
+of the <i>Lion</i>, being screened by the light cruiser <i>Fearless</i>
+and nine destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser
+Squadrons formed a screen eight miles S.S.E. from the
+<i>Lion</i>, ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and
+W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to east:</p>
+
+<table id="t319" class="section">
+<tr class="lrpad">
+  <td class="tdc">2nd Light Cruiser<br>Squadron</td>
+  <td class="tdc">3rd Light Cruiser<br>Squadron</td>
+  <td class="tdc">1st Light Cruiser<br>Squadron</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Southampton</i> (F.)<br><i>Nottingham</i><br><i>Birmingham</i><br><i>Dublin</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Falmouth</i> (F.)<br><i>Birkenhead</i><br><i>Gloucester</i></td>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Inconstant</i><br><i>Galatea</i> (F.)<br><i>Cordelia</i><br><i>Phaeton</i></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">I</a> These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but happened to be at
+Rosyth.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>It should be added that the flagships were:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang6">
+
+<p><i>Lion.</i>—Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David
+Beatty.</p>
+
+<p><i>Princess Royal.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, commanding
+1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>New Zealand.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, commanding
+2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Barham.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding
+5th Battle Squadron.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The <i>Engadine</i>, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between
+the light cruisers <i>Gloucester</i> and <i>Cordelia</i>, and the
+light cruiser <i>Yarmouth</i> acted as linking ship between
+the <i>Lion</i> and the light cruiser screen.</p>
+
+<p>The first report of enemy vessels was received from the
+<i>Galatea</i>, the flagship of Commodore E.&nbsp;S. Alexander-Sinclair,
+commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron,
+who, at 2.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, sighted two enemy vessels to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">320</span>
+E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a
+neutral steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possibilities
+of the situation, immediately turned his fleet to the
+S.S.E., the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get
+between the enemy and his base.</p>
+
+<p>At 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Galatea</i> reported a large amount of
+smoke “as from a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a
+report that the vessels were steering north. The course
+of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered to the eastward
+and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being
+sighted at 3.31 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and identified as five battle cruisers
+accompanied by destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons
+changed their direction, and, judging the situation
+accurately, spread to the east without waiting for orders,
+forming a screen in advance of the heavy ships. Our
+Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels of a
+similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, under Commodore W.&nbsp;E. Goodenough, with
+his broad pendant in the <i>Southampton</i>, came in at high
+speed towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of
+them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> sighted
+enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the <i>Galatea’s</i> report, Sir David Beatty
+ordered the <i>Engadine</i> to send up a sea-plane to scout to
+the N.N.E. This was the first time that sea-planes had
+been used for reconnaissance work with a fleet in an
+action, and the event is notable for that reason. The
+low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-plane,
+with Flight-Lieutenant F.&nbsp;S. Rutland, R.N., as
+pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G.&nbsp;S. Trewin, R.N., as
+observer, was able, by flying low under the clouds, to
+identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the report
+being received on board the <i>Lion</i> at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">321</span>
+sea-plane was under heavy fire from the light cruisers
+during the observation. By this time the line of battle
+was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with
+the destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station
+ahead. The course was E.S.E., slightly converging on
+the enemy, the speed 25 knots, and the range 23,000
+yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on a line of
+bearing in order to clear the smoke.</p>
+
+<p>The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the
+movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing
+N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the weather was favourable,
+the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E., and
+the visibility good.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile the wireless reports from the <i>Galatea</i> to the
+<i>Lion</i> had been intercepted on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and
+directions were at once given to the Battle Fleet to raise
+steam for full speed, the ships being at the time at short
+notice for full speed. The cruisers had been ordered to
+raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle
+Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+I directed Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships
+of the situation. The earliest reports from the <i>Galatea</i>
+had indicated the presence of light cruisers and destroyers
+only, and my first impression was that these vessels, on
+sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via
+the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels
+and were consequently not in so much danger of being
+cut off as if they turned to the southward. The 3rd
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well placed for cutting
+the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place,
+was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>,
+on the receipt of the information of the presence of enemy
+battle cruisers, it was directed to reinforce Sir David<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">322</span>
+Beatty. About 3.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received a report from Sir
+David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers and
+a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the
+same time.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was
+reported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close
+our battle cruisers, and speed increased as rapidly as
+possible. By 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the “Fleet Speed” was 20 knots,
+being higher than had previously been obtained. Zigzagging
+was abandoned on receipt of the <i>Galatea’s</i> first
+report. The battleships were also directed to keep clear
+of the wake of the next ahead in order to prevent loss of
+speed from the wash.</p>
+
+<p>At 3.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the action between the battle cruisers
+began at a range of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened
+by the two forces practically simultaneously. At the commencement
+the fire from the German vessels was rapid
+and accurate, the <i>Lion</i> being hit twice three minutes after
+fire was opened, and the <i>Lion</i>, <i>Tiger</i> and <i>Princess Royal</i>
+all receiving several hits by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; observers on board
+our own ships were also of opinion that our fire was
+effective at that stage.</p>
+
+<p>At about 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> it was evident by the accuracy of the
+enemy’s fire that he had obtained the range of our ships,
+which was then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore
+well abaft the beam, and course was altered slightly to
+the southward to confuse his fire control. Course was
+altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose.
+The German ships frequently zigzagged for the
+purpose of confusing our fire control.</p>
+
+<p>At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very
+rapid and accurate; the <i>Lion</i> received several hits, the roof
+of one of her turrets being blown off at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> At about
+4.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Indefatigable</i> was hit, approximately at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">323</span>
+outer edge of the upper deck level in line with the after
+turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an explosion
+followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell
+out of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit
+by another salvo forward, turned over and sank.</p>
+
+<p>About this time (4.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>) the 5th Battle Squadron
+came into action, opening fire at a range between 19,000
+and 20,000 yards. This slower squadron was some distance
+astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason partly of
+the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and
+partly of the light to the eastward having become less
+favourable, difficulty was experienced in seeing the
+targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time.
+At 4.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the range of the enemy’s battle cruisers
+from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was
+altered from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire
+had slackened owing to the increase in range.</p>
+
+<p>The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing
+the line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the
+periscopes of enemy submarines were also made by more
+than one ship.</p>
+
+<p>In accordance with the general directions given by
+Sir David Beatty to the destroyers to attack when a
+favourable opportunity occurred, the <i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i>,
+<i>Nicator</i>, <i>Narborough</i>, <i>Pelican</i>, <i>Petard</i>, <i>Obdurate</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>,
+<i>Moorsom</i>, <i>Morris</i>, <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Termagant</i> moved out
+at 4.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; at the same time a similar movement took
+place on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser
+and 15 destroyers. Both sides first steered to reach an
+advantageous position at the van of the opposing battle
+cruiser lines from which to deliver their attack, and then
+turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement
+at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the
+enemy lost two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">324</span>
+addition, his torpedo attack was partially frustrated; some
+torpedoes were fired by the enemy, two of which crossed
+the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been
+turned away to avoid the attack.</p>
+
+<p>During this action, which reflected the greatest credit
+on our destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing
+to their having dropped back towards the rear of our line,
+were not in a good position to attack the enemy’s battle
+cruisers with torpedoes. The <i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i>, and <i>Nicator</i>,
+most gallantly led by Commander the Hon. E.&nbsp;B.&nbsp;S. Bingham
+in the <i>Nestor</i>, were able to press home their attack,
+causing the enemy’s battle cruisers to turn away to avoid
+their torpedoes. The <i>Nomad</i> was damaged and forced
+to haul out of line before getting within torpedo range of
+the battle cruisers, but the <i>Nestor</i> and <i>Nicator</i> succeeded
+in firing torpedoes at the battle cruisers under a heavy
+fire from the German secondary armaments. The <i>Nestor</i>
+was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser,
+and remained stopped between the lines. She was sunk
+later by the German Battle Fleet when that force
+appeared on the scene, but not before she had fired her last
+torpedo at the approaching ships. The <i>Nomad</i> was also
+sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but this
+vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached.
+In both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying
+circumstances was shown by the officers and men. It
+is gratifying to record that a considerable proportion of
+the ship’s company of both destroyers was picked up by
+German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed
+the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle
+cruisers, the <i>Nicator</i> was able to rejoin her flotilla. The
+<i>Moorsom</i> also attacked the enemy’s Battle Fleet and
+returned. In the meantime, the <i>Petard</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, <i>Turbulent</i>
+and <i>Termagant</i> succeeded in firing torpedoes at long<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">325</span>
+range (7,000 yards) at the enemy’s battle cruisers. For
+his gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack
+Commander the Hon. E.&nbsp;B.&nbsp;S. Bingham, who was
+rescued from the <i>Nestor</i> and taken prisoner by the
+Germans, received the Victoria Cross.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships
+had become very fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle
+cruisers began to be noticeable, the third ship in the line
+being observed to be on fire at 4.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, whilst our ships
+of the 5th Battle Squadron were also inflicting and receiving
+some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of
+the fire from the enemy’s vessels was deteriorating at
+this period; our own ships were much handicapped by the
+decreasing visibility, due partly to the use by the enemy
+of smoke screens, under cover of which he altered course
+to throw out our fire.</p>
+
+<p>The flagship <i>Barham</i>, of the 5th Battle Squadron,
+received her first hit at 4.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>At about 4.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a second disaster befell the British
+battle cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy’s
+battle cruisers hit the <i>Queen Mary</i> abreast of “Q” turret
+and a terrific explosion resulted, evidently caused by a
+magazine blowing up. The <i>Tiger</i>, which was following
+close astern of the <i>Queen Mary</i>, passed through the dense
+cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal
+of material fell on her decks, but otherwise the <i>Queen
+Mary</i> had completely vanished. A few survivors from
+this ship and from the <i>Indefatigable</i> were afterwards
+rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine
+ships with their splendid ships’ companies was a heavy
+blow to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature
+of the disaster adding to its magnitude.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">J</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">326</span></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">J</a> I was not aware of the loss of the <i>Queen Mary</i> and <i>Indefatigable</i> until
+the morning of June 1st.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>At 4.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, in the <i>Southampton</i>,
+Flagship of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+which had been scouting ahead of the Battle Cruisers, reported
+that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight bearing
+S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position.
+Sir David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting
+the Battle Fleet at 4.42 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> turned the battle cruisers
+16 points in succession to starboard. This movement was
+followed by the enemy’s battle cruisers, and Sir David
+Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn
+his ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commodore
+Goodenough led the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
+to a favourable position from which to observe the
+movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, within 13,000
+yards’ range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very
+heavy fire, clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded
+several reports of their position and movements;
+the skilful manner in which the Commodore, aided by his
+captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly
+saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant
+manœuvring of the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
+during the engagement, the position of the <i>Southampton</i>,
+as obtained by reckoning, was somewhat inaccurate,
+as was to be expected. This fact detracted from the value
+of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by latitude
+and longitude, as reported from time to time to
+the <i>Iron Duke</i>, was consequently incorrect. This discrepancy
+added greatly to the difficulty experienced in
+ascertaining the correct moment at which to deploy the
+Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the direction
+of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however,
+inevitable under the conditions.</p>
+
+<p>The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the southward
+in their pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">327</span>
+in excess of that which the Battle Fleet could
+attain, resulted in opening the distance between the two
+forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty’s
+force to the northward, the <i>Iron Duke</i> and the <i>Lion</i> were
+over 50 miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles
+per hour.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as the position of the <i>Lion</i> was known after
+the receipt of the report of enemy battle cruisers being
+in sight, Rear-Admiral the Hon. H.&nbsp;S. Hood was directed
+to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir David Beatty’s
+force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to
+the Rear-Admiral. The latter officer reported his own
+position and gave his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots.
+At the same time the Battle Fleet was informed that our
+battle cruisers were in action with the enemy’s battle
+cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral
+Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company
+with Sir David Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being
+received, with a report that his squadron was in action.</p>
+
+<p>At this time I was confident that, under the determined
+leadership of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our
+best and fastest battleships and six battle cruisers, very
+serious injury would be inflicted on the five battle cruisers
+of the enemy if they could be kept within range.</p>
+
+<p>The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet,
+which was communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not
+cause me any uneasiness in respect of the safety of our
+own vessels, since our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron
+were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not, however,
+expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of
+24 knots; the information furnished to me at this time
+gave the designed speed of the fastest German battleships
+as 20.5 knots only. Even after making full allowance for
+the fact that our ships were probably carrying more fuel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">328</span>
+and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving
+the Germans credit for some excess over the designed
+speed, no doubt existed in my mind that both our battleships
+and our battle cruisers with Sir David Beatty could
+keep well out of range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if
+necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I learned
+later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron,
+<em>when going at its utmost speed</em>, found considerable
+difficulty in increasing its distance from the enemy’s 3rd
+Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the “König”
+class, and on return to Scapa I received a report from the
+Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron with a
+speed of <em>23 knots</em> for a short period, this being the first
+intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable
+by them.</p>
+
+<p>To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between
+the battle cruisers was renewed during the retirement of
+our ships to the northward, and the two leading ships of
+the 5th Battle Squadron, the <i>Barham</i> and <i>Valiant</i>, supported
+our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two rear
+ships of that force, the <i>Warspite</i> and <i>Malaya</i>, engaged
+the leading ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet as long as
+their guns would bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards.</p>
+
+<p>The light cruiser <i>Fearless</i>, with destroyers of the 1st
+Flotilla, were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers,
+and the light cruiser <i>Champion</i>, with destroyers of the
+13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle Squadron. The 1st and
+3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in the rear
+during the southerly course, now took up a position on the
+starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd
+Light Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During
+this northerly run the fire from our ships was very
+intermittent, owing to the weather thickening to the eastward,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">329</span>
+although the enemy was able at times to fire with
+some accuracy.</p>
+
+<p>From 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> until after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the light was very much
+in favour of the enemy, being far clearer to the westward
+than to the eastward. A photograph taken on board the
+<i>Malaya</i> at 5.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> towards the western horizon established
+this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted
+against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000
+yards distant.</p>
+
+<p>Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30
+minutes after 5.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> owing to the enemy’s ships being
+invisible, fire being reopened at about 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the
+enemy’s battle cruisers, three or four of which could be
+seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of some 14,000
+yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed
+to be effective, the <i>Lion</i> alone firing some 15 salvoes during
+this period.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the destroyer <i>Moresby</i>, which had rejoined
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet after assisting the <i>Engadine</i>
+with her sea-plane, fired a torpedo at the enemy’s
+line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000 yards from a
+favourable position—two points before the beam of the
+enemy’s leading battle cruiser.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Lion’s</i> course was gradually altered
+from N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled
+movements and resulting position of the British Battle
+Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also gradually hauled
+to the eastward, being probably influenced in this movement
+by reports received from their light cruisers, which
+were by this time in contact with the light cruiser <i>Chester</i>
+and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by
+Rear-Admiral Hood.</p>
+
+<p>The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.</p>
+
+<p>At 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, in accordance with my directions, the 3rd<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">330</span>
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood,
+proceeded at full speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At
+5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the squadron, comprising the <i>Invincible</i> (Flag),
+<i>Inflexible</i>, and <i>Indomitable</i>, in single line ahead in that
+order, with the destroyers <i>Shark</i>, <i>Christopher</i>, <i>Ophelia</i>,
+and <i>Acasta</i>, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had
+the light cruiser <i>Canterbury</i> five miles ahead and the light
+cruiser <i>Chester</i> bearing N. 70° W., and was steering S.
+by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing.
+According to the <i>Indomitable’s</i> report, objects could be
+distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings,
+and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then
+onwards, according to the same report, the visibility
+varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, although other
+reports place it higher at times.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the sound of gunfire was plainly heard
+to the south-westward, and the <i>Chester</i> turned in that
+direction to investigate, and, at 5.36 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, sighted a three-funnelled
+light cruiser on the starboard bow, with one or
+two destroyers in company. The <i>Chester</i> challenged and,
+receiving no reply, altered course to west to close, judging
+from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel
+was hostile.</p>
+
+<p>As the <i>Chester</i> closed, course was altered to about
+north in order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by
+the destroyer on a bearing favourable to the latter. This
+turn brought the enemy well abaft the port beam of the
+<i>Chester</i> and on an approximately parallel course. During
+the turn the <i>Chester</i> sighted two or more light cruisers
+astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser
+opened fire on the <i>Chester</i>, the latter replying immediately
+afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility
+at this time, judging by the distance at which the
+enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the <i>Chester</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">331</span>
+could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth
+salvo hit the <i>Chester</i>, put No. 1 gun port out of action,
+and killed and wounded a large proportion of the gun
+crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light cruisers
+sighted by the <i>Chester</i> undoubtedly belonged to one of
+the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the starboard
+bow of their battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>Captain Lawson of the <i>Chester</i>, in view of the superior
+force to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E.
+and towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing
+the enemy’s light cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid
+and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy vessels
+turned after the <i>Chester</i>, and during the unequal engagement,
+which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully
+manœuvred his ship with a view to impeding
+the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was in no
+condition to engage such superior forces successfully in
+her damaged state.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Chester</i> closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+and took station N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron at a later phase of the action. The
+ship suffered considerable casualties, having 31 killed and
+50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were
+disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above
+the water line. It was on board the <i>Chester</i> that the
+second Victoria Cross of the action was earned, posthumously,
+by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class, who was
+mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad,
+whose age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained
+standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly
+awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the guns’
+crew, dead and wounded, all round him.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd
+Battle Cruiser Squadron at 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and Rear-Admiral<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">332</span>
+Hood turned his ships to starboard and brought the
+enemy light cruisers, which were engaging the <i>Chester</i>,
+and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his port
+bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the
+3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port
+quarter of the squadron. As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood
+made out his position he led his squadron with the <i>Canterbury</i>
+between the enemy and the <i>Chester</i>, on a course
+about W.N.W., and at 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> opened an effective fire
+on the German light cruisers with his port guns, at a
+range of about 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The enemy vessels
+turned away from this attack and fired torpedoes at
+the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were seen
+later from the <i>Indomitable</i>. At about 6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Invincible</i>
+and <i>Indomitable</i> turned to starboard to avoid
+these torpedoes, three of which passed very close to the
+latter ship, and ran alongside within 20 yards of the vessel.
+The <i>Inflexible</i> turned to port.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted
+astern of the first group, and the four British destroyers,
+<i>Shark</i>, <i>Acasta</i>, <i>Ophelia</i> and <i>Christopher</i>, attacked them
+and the large destroyer force in company with them, and
+were received by a heavy fire which disabled the <i>Shark</i>
+and damaged the <i>Acasta</i>. On board the <i>Shark</i> the third
+V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain,
+Commander Loftus Jones, this award also being, I regret
+to say, posthumous.</p>
+
+<p>The attack of the British destroyers was carried out
+with great gallantry and determination, and having frustrated
+the enemy’s torpedo attack on the 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones turned his
+division to regain his position on our battle cruisers. At
+this moment three German vessels came into sight out
+of the mist and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">333</span>
+<i>Shark</i> and causing many casualties on board; Commander
+Loftus Jones was amongst those wounded. Lieut.-Commander
+J.&nbsp;O. Barron, commanding the <i>Acasta</i>, came
+to the assistance of the <i>Shark</i>, but Commander Loftus
+Jones refused to imperil a second destroyer, and directed
+the <i>Acasta</i> to leave him. The <i>Shark</i> then became the
+target for the German ships and destroyers. Commander
+Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged
+gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be
+placed in the tube and fired; but whilst this was being
+done the torpedo was hit by a shell and exploded, causing
+many casualties. Those gallant officers and men in the
+<i>Shark</i> who still survived, continued to fight the only gun
+left in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The
+captain was now wounded again, his right leg being
+taken off by a shell; but he still continued to direct the
+fire, until the condition of the <i>Shark</i> and the approach of
+German destroyers made it probable that the ship would
+fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders
+for her to be sunk, countermanding this order shortly
+afterwards on realising that her remaining gun could still
+be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit by two torpedoes,
+and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors
+were picked up the next morning by a Danish
+steamer. In recognition of the great gallantry displayed,
+the whole of the survivors were awarded the Distinguished
+Service Medal. Their names are: W.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;R. Griffin,
+Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C.&nbsp;C.
+Hope, A.B.; C.&nbsp;H. Smith, A.B.; T.&nbsp;O.&nbsp;G. Howell, A.B.;
+T.&nbsp;W. Swan, Stoker.</p>
+
+<p>At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of
+our advanced cruiser line, which at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> was about 16
+miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, the latter being at that
+time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E., steering S.E. by S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">334</span>
+at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to decreasing
+visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to
+be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard
+flank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was about 16
+miles due east of the advanced cruiser line, but was steering
+more to the southward on a converging course at a
+speed of about five knots faster.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line,
+and shortly afterwards ships were seen from the <i>Minotaur</i>
+to be emerging from the mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the
+senior officer of the cruiser line, had recalled the ships
+of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing and
+had ordered them to form single line ahead on the
+<i>Minotaur</i>. He then made the signal to engage the
+enemy, namely, the ships in sight ahead; but before fire
+was opened they replied to his challenge and were identified
+as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, engaged
+with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the
+westward.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.47 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Defence</i>, with the <i>Warrior</i> astern,
+sighted on a S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard
+bow) three or four enemy light cruisers, and course was
+altered three points to port, bringing them nearly on a
+beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in
+the <i>Defence</i>, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each
+ship fired three salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The
+salvoes fell short, and the <i>Defence</i> altered course to starboard,
+brought the enemy first ahead, and then to a
+bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention of
+closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers
+were falling in close proximity to the <i>Defence</i> and the
+<i>Warrior</i>. These ships opened fire with their port guns<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">335</span>
+at 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and shortly afterwards passed close across the
+bows of the <i>Lion</i> from port to starboard. One light
+cruiser, probably the <i>Wiesbaden</i>, was hit by the second
+salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and
+nearly stopped. Our ships continued to close her until
+within 5,500 yards. From about 6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> onwards they
+had come under fire of guns of heavy calibre from the
+enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as
+gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently
+bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on,
+probably not realising in the gathering smoke and mist
+that the enemy’s heavy ships were at fairly close range.
+At about 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Defence</i> was hit by two salvoes in
+quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up
+and the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an
+officer as Sir Robert Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s
+company as the officers and men of the <i>Defence</i> was a
+heavy blow. The <i>Warrior</i> was very badly damaged by
+shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain
+Molteno was able to bring his ship out of action, having
+first seen the <i>Defence</i> disappear. From diagrams made
+in the <i>Warrior</i> it appears that the German battle cruisers
+turned 16 points (possibly with a view either to close their
+Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled <i>Wiesbaden</i>),
+engaged the <i>Defence</i> and <i>Warrior</i>, and then
+turned back again. This supposition is confirmed by
+sketches taken on board the <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> at the
+same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, however,
+it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the
+observations on board the <i>Warrior</i> it is certain that the
+visibility was much greater in her direction from the
+enemy’s line, than it was in the direction of the enemy
+from the <i>Warrior</i>. Although the <i>Defence</i> and <i>Warrior</i>
+were being hit frequently, those on board the <i>Warrior</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">336</span>
+could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly,
+and it is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert
+Arbuthnot not realising that he was at comparatively short
+range from the German battle cruisers until he was already
+under an overwhelming fire.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Warrior</i> passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron
+at the period when the steering gear of the <i>Warspite</i> had
+become temporarily disabled.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">K</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">K</a> <i>Cf.</i> <a href="#Page_350">page 350</a>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, the ship next to the westward
+of the <i>Defence</i> and the <i>Warrior</i> in the cruiser
+screen, had turned to close these ships when they became
+engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in accordance
+with a signal from the <i>Defence</i>. The <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>
+joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on
+her starboard bow, did not follow the other ships across
+the bows of the battle cruisers, as to do so would have
+seriously incommoded these vessels; she turned to port to
+a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser
+Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Black Prince</i> was observed from the <i>Duke of
+Edinburgh</i> to turn some 12 points to port at the same
+time that the <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> turned, but her subsequent
+movements are not clear; the German accounts of
+the action stated that the <i>Black Prince</i> was sunk by gunfire
+at the same time as the <i>Defence</i>, but she was not seen
+to be in action at this time by any of our vessels, and,
+moreover, a wireless signal, reporting a submarine in sight
+and timed 8.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, was subsequently received from her.
+It is probable that the <i>Black Prince</i> passed to the rear
+of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and that during the
+night she found herself close to one of the German battle
+squadrons, and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In
+support of this theory, the German account mentions that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">337</span>
+a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk in that manner
+during the night. None of the ships of this class was
+present during the engagement, but the <i>Black Prince</i>
+might well have been mistaken for a ship of this type in
+the circumstances.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_336" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;">
+  <img src="images/i_336.jpg" width="2060" height="1239" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AS DEPICTED DY A GERMAN ARTIST, SHOWING THE “WIESBADEN” SINKING BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES</p>
+
+<p>The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about
+6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at the termination of their engagement with
+enemy light cruisers, turning to avoid torpedoes fired at
+them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood sighted
+the <i>Lion</i> and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at
+about 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> hoisted the signal to his squadron to form
+single line ahead, and turned to take station ahead of the
+<i>Lion</i> and to engage the hostile battle cruisers, which at
+6.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> were sighted at a range of 8,600 yards.</p>
+
+<p>A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and
+the fire of the squadron was judged by those on board
+the <i>Invincible</i> to be very effective. Rear-Admiral Hood,
+who was on the bridge of the <i>Invincible</i> with Captain
+Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer
+in the fore control, at about 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, saying, “Your firing
+is very good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every
+shot is telling.” At about 6.34 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Invincible</i>, which
+had already been hit more than once by heavy shell without
+appreciable damage, was struck in “Q” turret. The
+shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander
+Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion
+followed immediately, evidently caused by the
+magazine blowing up, and the ship broke in half and sank
+at once, only two officers, including Commander Dannreuther,
+and four men being subsequently picked up by
+the destroyer <i>Badger</i>. The British Navy sustained a most
+serious loss in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood,
+one of the most distinguished of our younger flag officers,
+and in Captain Cay and the officers and men of his flagship.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">338</span>
+The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships even at the
+close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact that
+the officers in the <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Indomitable</i> were under
+the impression that they were engaging battle cruisers,
+whilst officers in the <i>Inflexible</i>, stationed between these
+two ships in the line, reported that her fire was being directed
+at a battleship of the “Kaiser” or “König” class,
+and that only one ship could be seen.</p>
+
+<p>Just before the loss of the <i>Invincible</i>, the 3rd Light
+Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier,
+had carried out an effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s
+battle cruisers; both the light cruisers <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Yarmouth</i>
+fired torpedoes at the leading battle cruiser. It was
+thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark as a heavy
+under-water explosion was felt at this time.</p>
+
+<p>After the loss of the <i>Invincible</i>, the <i>Inflexible</i> was
+left as leader of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the
+<i>Invincible</i> had been passed, course was altered two points
+to starboard to close the enemy ships, which were disappearing
+in the mist. A further turn to starboard for
+the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>,
+the battle cruisers being clear of the leading battleships
+(which were bearing N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir
+David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the <i>Inflexible</i>
+and <i>Indomitable</i> took station astern of the <i>New Zealand</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The course of events can now be traced with accuracy.
+The <i>Chester</i> with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which
+by 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> had got ahead of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser
+screen, encountered some of the light cruisers composing
+the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing so,
+drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, which, with the <i>Canterbury</i> and destroyers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">339</span>
+turned to about W.N.W. to assist the <i>Chester</i>
+and to engage the enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was
+made by four British destroyers on the enemy’s light
+cruisers. This attack was apparently thought by the Germans
+to come from the flotillas with the Battle Fleet, as
+far as can be judged from their report of the action; the
+ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly
+mistaken by their vessels for the van of our Battle
+Fleet, since mention is made in the German report of the
+British Battle Fleet having been sighted at this time by
+the German light forces, steering in a westerly or north-westerly
+direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of
+the High Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.</p>
+
+<p>So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course
+at this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly
+course before, through, and immediately subsequent
+to deployment, gradually hauling round afterwards,
+first through south to south-west, and, then, to west, <em>but
+it was not until</em> 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <em>that a westerly course was being
+steered</em>.</p>
+
+<p>The only point that is not clear is the identity of the
+light cruiser engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd
+Battle Cruiser Squadron. The ship engaged by the <i>Defence</i>
+and <i>Warrior</i> was apparently the <i>Wiesbaden</i>. It
+seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron
+engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have
+been another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two
+engagements took place at almost the same time, the 3rd
+Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and
+the <i>Defence</i> and the <i>Warrior</i> (the 1st Cruiser Squadron)
+commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at
+about 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and continuing it with the port guns at
+6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> It is hardly possible, even in the conditions of low<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">340</span>
+visibility that prevailed, that the two squadrons could have
+been engaging the same vessel.</p>
+
+<p>Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer
+<i>Onslow</i>, commanded by Lieut.-Commander J.&nbsp;C.
+Tovey, which at 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> sighted an enemy’s light cruiser
+in a position on the bows of the <i>Lion</i> and favourable for
+torpedo attack on that ship. The <i>Onslow</i> closed and engaged
+the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between
+2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged
+by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German battle
+cruiser to attack with torpedoes; she was struck by a heavy
+shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieut.-Commander
+Tovey thought that his order to fire all torpedoes
+had been carried out, and finding that this was not
+the case, closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her,
+and then sighting the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes
+at battleships. The <i>Onslow’s</i> engines then stopped,
+but the damaged destroyer <i>Defender</i>, Lieut.-Commander
+Palmer, closed her at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and took her in tow under
+a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night
+and the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought
+her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to
+the care of a tug.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">341</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIII"><span id="toclink_341"></span>CHAPTER XIII<br>
+
+<span class="subhead"><span class="allsmcap">THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span>—(<i>Continued</i>)</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3>II.—<span class="smcap">The Battle Fleet in Action</span></h3>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> “plot” made on the reports received between 5 and
+6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> from Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron, and the report at 4.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> from Sir
+David Beatty in the <i>Lion</i> giving the position of the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet,
+might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and
+that the cruiser line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight
+the enemy nearly ahead of the centre. Obviously, however,
+great reliance could not be placed on the positions
+given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had
+been in action for two hours and frequently altering course.
+I realised this, but when contact actually took place it was
+found that the positions given were at least twelve miles
+in error when compared with the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> reckoning.
+The result was that the enemy’s Battle Fleet appeared
+on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had expected,
+and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated.
+There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning
+on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, as the movements of that ship
+could be “plotted” with accuracy after leaving Scapa
+Flow, there being no disturbing elements to deal with.</p>
+
+<p>The first accurate information regarding the position
+of affairs was contained in a signal from the <i>Black Prince</i>,
+of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (the starboard wing ship of
+the cruiser screen), which was timed 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but received<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">342</span>
+by me considerably later, and in which it was reported
+that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south,
+distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were
+our own vessels.</p>
+
+<p>Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility,
+I had directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause
+the range-finder operators to take ranges of ships on bearings
+in every direction and to report the direction in which
+the visibility appeared to be the greatest. My object was
+to ascertain the most favourable bearing in which to engage
+the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice
+being exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibility
+appeared to be best to the southward.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Comus</i> (Captain Hotham), of the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron, which was stationed three miles
+ahead of the Battle Fleet, reported heavy gunfire on a
+southerly bearing, i.e., three points from ahead, and shortly
+afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing south-south-west
+although no ships could be seen.</p>
+
+<p>At about 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received a wireless signal from
+Sir Robert Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting
+having sighted ships in action bearing south-south-west
+and steering north-east. There was, however, no clue
+as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind that
+they might be the opposing battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir
+Cecil Burney, leading the starboard wing division in the
+<i>Marlborough</i>, inquiring what he could see. The reply was:
+“Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the starboard bow.”
+This reply was received at about 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position
+of the enemy’s Battle Fleet and its formation caused me
+to continue in the Battle Fleet on the course south-east by
+south at a speed of 20 knots, in divisions line ahead disposed
+abeam to starboard, the <i>Iron Duke</i> at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> being
+in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_342" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;">
+  <img src="images/i_342.jpg" width="2110" height="1185" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot short">
+
+<p>H.&nbsp;M.&nbsp;S. “IRON DUKE” AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET
+DEPLOYING AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">343</span></p>
+
+<p>The information so far received had not even been
+sufficient to justify me in altering the bearing of the guides
+of columns from the <i>Iron Duke</i> preparatory to deployment,
+and they were still, therefore, on the beam. The
+destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening
+formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direction
+of deployment before stationing them for action.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.56 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported
+strange vessels in sight bearing south-south-west and steering
+east, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he reported them as British battle
+cruisers three to four miles distant, the <i>Lion</i> being the
+leading ship.</p>
+
+<p>This report was made by searchlight and consequently
+reached me shortly after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M</span>., but as showing the interval
+that elapses between the <em>intention to make a signal</em>
+and the actual receipt of it (even under conditions where
+the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid delay,
+and the signal staff is efficient), it is to be noted that whereas
+the report gave the bearing of our vessels as south-south-west,
+notes taken on board the <i>Colossus</i> placed our
+battle cruisers one point on the starboard bow of that ship,
+that is, on a south-south-east bearing and distant two miles
+at 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>Shortly after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we sighted strange vessels bearing
+south-west from the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a distance of about five
+miles. They were identified as our battle cruisers, steering
+east across the bows of the Battle Fleet. Owing to the
+mist it was not possible to make out the number of ships
+that were following the <i>Lion</i>.</p>
+
+<p>At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the
+position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire
+were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">344</span>
+the noise was heavy and continuous. Our cruisers ahead
+seemed to be hotly engaged, but the fact that they were not
+closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents
+could hardly be battleships.</p>
+
+<p>In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to
+clearing up the situation without altering the formation
+of the Battle Fleet, a signal had been made to the Battle
+Fleet at 6.2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to alter course leaders together, the remainder
+in succession, to south (a turn of three points).
+Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 knots to allow
+of the ships closing up into station. Immediately afterwards
+it became apparent by the sound of the heavy firing
+that enemy’s heavy ships must be in close proximity, and
+the <i>Lion</i>, which was sighted at this moment, signalled at
+6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-east.
+Meanwhile, at about 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, I had received a wireless
+report from Commodore Goodenough, commanding the
+2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, to the effect that the
+enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-west from their Battle
+Fleet; in other words, that his Battle Fleet bore north-east
+from his battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our
+battle cruisers were steering east, and observing that Sir
+David Beatty reported at 6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the enemy’s battle
+cruisers bore south-east, it appeared from Commodore
+Goodenough’s signal that the enemy’s Battle Fleet must
+be <em>ahead</em> of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it
+seemed to me almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could
+have passed the battle cruisers. The conflicting reports
+added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I
+determined to hold on until matters became clearer.</p>
+
+<p>The conviction was, however, forming in my mind
+that I should strike the enemy’s Battle Fleet on a bearing
+a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be prepared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">345</span>
+for deployment I turned the Fleet to a south-east course,
+leaders together and the remainder in succession, and the
+destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, to
+take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order
+disposed them as follows:</p>
+
+<figure id="i_345" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <img src="images/i_345.jpg" width="1194" height="399" alt="">
+</figure>
+
+<p>There was, however, a very short interval between this
+signal to the destroyers and the signal for deployment,
+and consequently the destroyers did not reach their positions
+before deployment. The subsequent alterations of
+course to the southward and westward added to their
+difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations
+at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The correct
+position for the two van flotillas on deployment was
+three miles ahead of the Fleet, but slightly on the engaged
+bow.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, immediately on sighting the <i>Lion</i>, a signal
+had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position
+of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at
+6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and at 6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he signalled: “Have sighted the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west”; this report
+gave me the first information on which I could take
+effective action for deployment.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in
+the <i>Barham</i>, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled
+by wireless that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in
+sight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was not reported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">346</span>
+in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I
+concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir
+Cecil Burney had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron
+at 6.7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> as in sight, bearing south-west from the
+<i>Marlborough</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The first definite information received on board the
+Fleet-Flagship of the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet
+did not, therefore, come in until 6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and the position
+given placed it thirty degrees before the starboard beam
+of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, or fifty-nine degrees before the starboard
+beam of the <i>Marlborough</i>, and apparently in close
+proximity. There was no time to lose, as there was evident
+danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle Fleet
+being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet before
+deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a signal
+was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the
+port wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being
+assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately
+the same as that of our battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to
+admit of our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle
+Fleet, as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet
+being blanketed by them.</p>
+
+<p>During the short interval, crowded with events, that
+had elapsed since the first flashes and sound of gunfire
+had been noted on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the question of
+most urgent importance before me had been the direction
+and manner of deployment.</p>
+
+<p>As the evidence accumulated that the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well
+before the beam of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the point for decision
+was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or on
+the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was
+to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">347</span>
+the Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, but
+it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of
+gunfire and the reports from the <i>Lion</i> and the <i>Barham</i>,
+that the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and
+on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in
+such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers
+would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that,
+owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers attacking
+from a commanding position in the van would be much
+facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet
+in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers
+during such a deployment, as such an event would throw
+the Fleet into confusion at a critical moment.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_346" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;">
+  <img src="images/i_346.jpg" width="2112" height="1197" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>
+H.&nbsp;M.&nbsp;S. “IRON DUKE” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND<br>
+
+H.&nbsp;M.&nbsp;S. “ROYAL OAK” AND “SUPERB” ASTERN, AND “THUNDERER” AHEAD</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The further points that occurred to me were, that if
+the German ships were as close as seemed probable, there
+was considerable danger of the 1st Battle Squadron, and
+especially the <i>Marlborough’s</i> Division, being severely
+handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet
+before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist.
+The 1st Battle Squadron was composed of many of our
+weakest ships, with only indifferent protection as compared
+with the German capital ships, and an interval of
+at least four minutes would elapse between each division
+coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further
+interval before the guns could be directed on to the ship
+selected and their fire become effective after so large a
+change of course.</p>
+
+<p>The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from
+the supposed position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van
+of the enemy would have a very considerable “overlap”
+if the deployment took place on the starboard wing division,
+whereas this would not be the case with deployment
+on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate
+a large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">348</span>
+the “T” being crossed, and each successive division
+coming into line would have to make this turn, in addition
+to the 8-point turn required to form the line. I therefore
+decided to deploy on the first, the port wing, division.</p>
+
+<p>The further knowledge which I gained of the actual
+state of affairs after the action confirmed my view that the
+course adopted was the best in the circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division
+show that the range of the van of the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet at the moment of deployment was about 13,000
+yards. The fleets were converging rapidly, with the High
+Sea Fleet holding a position of advantage such as would
+enable it to engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard
+division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as
+they formed up astern. It is to be observed that it would
+take some twenty minutes to complete the formation of
+the line of battle.</p>
+
+<p>The German gunnery was always good at the start,
+and their ships invariably found the range of a target with
+great rapidity, and it would have been very bad tactics
+to give them such an initial advantage, not only in regard
+to gunnery but also in respect of torpedo attack, both
+from ships and from destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>A subsequent study of the reports and the signals
+received has admitted of the accompanying plans being
+drawn up.</p>
+
+<p>The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and
+show clearly how great would have been the objections to
+deploying to starboard. It will be seen that the bearings
+of the enemy Battle Fleet, as given by the <i>Lion</i> and the
+<i>Barham</i> at 6.14 and 6.15 respectively, give a fair “cut,”
+and the bearing on which the <i>Marlborough</i> opened fire
+enables the position of the Battle Fleet to be placed with
+considerable accuracy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">349</span></p>
+
+<p>Assuming that the German Battle Fleet was steaming
+at 17 knots on an easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31,
+it will be observed that at the latter time it bore 21 degrees
+before the starboard beam of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a range
+of 12,000 yards. The <i>Iron Duke</i> actually engaged the
+leading battleship at this time on a bearing 20 degrees
+before the starboard beam at a range of 12,000 yards.
+The accuracy of the “plot” is therefore confirmed, so far
+as confirmation is possible. It appears certain that between
+about 6.0 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the German battle
+cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and
+again turned 16 points to their original course. This
+is borne out by observations on board the <i>Warrior</i>, which
+ship was being engaged by the <em>starboard</em> guns of enemy
+vessels. The German account also shows such a turn at
+this period.</p>
+
+<p>Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th
+Battle Squadron, had sighted the <i>Marlborough</i> at 6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+and the remainder of the 6th Division of the Battle Fleet
+a little later. Not seeing any other columns, he concluded
+that the <i>Marlborough</i> was leading the whole line, and decided
+to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>,
+however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral
+Evan-Thomas realised that the Fleet was deploying to
+port, the 6th Division being the starboard wing column.
+He then determined to make a large turn of his squadron
+to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division, which
+by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle.
+During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships
+of the 5th Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy’s
+leading battleships, but the shooting was not good, and
+our vessels received little injury.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, however, the helm of the <i>Warspite</i>
+jammed, and that ship, continuing her turn through sixteen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">350</span>
+points came under a very heavy fire and received considerable
+injury. The disabled <i>Warrior</i> happened to be
+in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the <i>Warspite</i>
+had the effect for the moment of diverting attention
+from the <i>Warrior</i>, so that the latter vessel got clear.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Warspite</i> was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts
+from an unpleasant position and was steered to the
+northward to make good damages, and eventually, in
+accordance with directions from Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas,
+returned independently to Rosyth, considerably
+down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not
+much injured.</p>
+
+<p>By 6.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the remaining ships of the 5th Battle
+Squadron were in station astern of the <i>Agincourt</i> (1st
+Battle Squadron), the last ship of the line.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.33 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as soon as the battle cruisers had passed
+clear, the speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17
+knots, and this speed was subsequently maintained. The
+reduction of speed to 14 knots during the deployment
+caused some “bunching” at the rear of the line as the
+signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had,
+however, to be maintained until the battle cruisers had
+formed ahead.</p>
+
+<p>Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity
+for keeping a reserve of some three knots of speed in
+hand in the case of a long line of ships, in order to allow
+of station being kept in the line under conditions of action,
+when ships were making alterations of course to throw
+out enemy’s fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent
+action on the part of single ships, or of divisions
+of ships, became necessary, as well as to avoid excessive
+smoke from the funnels; for this reason the Fleet speed
+during the action was fixed at 17 knots. The experience
+of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at
+times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for
+this reserve.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_350" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="right"><p><i>Plan 8</i></p></div>
+
+<p class="sans"><span class="uline">APPROXIMATE</span> POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE<br>
+GRAND FLEET AT 6.45. P.M. ON<br>
+31st. MAY 1916.</p>
+  </figcaption>
+  <img src="images/i_350.jpg" width="786" height="801" alt="">
+<div class="right"><a href="images/i_350-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">351</span></p>
+
+<p>At 6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the enemy’s salvoes were falling near
+ships of the 1st Battle Squadron, and the <i>Marlborough’s</i>
+Division of the Battle Squadron became engaged with
+some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+immediately after turning for the deployment. At this
+time fire was opened by the <i>Marlborough</i> on a ship stated
+to be of the “Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards
+and on a bearing 20° abaft the starboard beam; this
+knowledge enables us to deduce the position of the van
+of the German Battle Fleet at this time.</p>
+
+<p>Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s
+Fleet steering to the eastward, the battle cruisers leading,
+followed by the Battle Fleet in single line, the order
+being, four ships of the “König” class in the van, followed
+by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the
+rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached
+me at 4.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> from the Commodore of the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron indicated that ships of the “Kaiser”
+class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. The order of
+the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report,
+but there is no doubt that ships of the “König” class led
+during the Fleet action. The point is not, however, of
+importance.</p>
+
+<p>At about 6.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 6th Division was in line and
+our deployment was complete.</p>
+
+<p>Enemy shells had been falling close to the <i>Colossus</i> and
+her 5th Division since 6.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and these ships opened
+fire at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; but the conditions of visibility made it
+difficult to distinguish the enemy’s battleships.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed
+down the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our
+Fleet, apparently partly disabled. Her identity could not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">352</span>
+at the time he clearly established, but her German colours
+were flying and she was in a position for attacking the
+Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i>
+fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret
+guns by other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear
+of the line.</p>
+
+<p>At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult
+to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible
+to form an opinion on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, in her position
+towards the centre of the line, as to the formation of the
+enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships in sight on the starboard
+beam was not even sufficiently clear for me to permit
+of fire being opened; but at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> it became certain
+that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle
+Fleet and that the vessels then before the beam were battleships
+of the “König” class. The order was, therefore,
+given to open fire, and the <i>Iron Duke</i> engaged what appeared
+to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000
+yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other
+ships of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron)
+opened fire at about the same time, and the van divisions
+(2nd Battle Squadron) very shortly afterwards;
+these latter ships reported engaging enemy battle cruisers
+as well as battleships. The fire of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, which
+came more directly under my personal observation, was
+seen to be immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes
+fired registering several palpable hits. It appeared
+as if all the enemy ships at that time in sight from the <i>Iron
+Duke</i> (not more than three or four, owing to smoke and
+mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second
+battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire,
+and settling by the stern. A large number of observers
+in the <i>Thunderer</i>, <i>Benbow</i>, <i>Barham</i>, <i>Marne</i>, <i>Morning Star</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">353</span>
+and <i>Magic</i> stated afterwards that they saw this ship blow
+up at 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged
+about 12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on
+other bearings, but ranges could not at times be obtained
+from the range-finders of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a greater distance
+than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, in a temporary
+clear channel through the mist, good ranges of
+15,000 yards were obtained of a battleship at which four
+salvoes were fired by the <i>Iron Duke</i> before she was again
+hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was
+caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly also by
+the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing
+Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-south-west
+with a force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel
+smoke to drift towards our line, thus further obscuring our
+view of his Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently
+greater than in the centre at about 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and the
+enemy’s fire, which was probably being concentrated on
+our rear ships, was more accurate at this period, but quite
+ineffective, only one ship, the <i>Colossus</i>, being hit by gunfire,
+although numerous projectiles were falling near the
+ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the
+Battle Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at
+any one time, those in the ships of the rear division did
+occasionally see as many as eight, and were consequently
+better able to distinguish the formation and movements
+of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing
+to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and
+mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in
+the customary manner; the only course to adopt was for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">354</span>
+the captains to direct the fire of their guns on to any target
+which they could distinguish.</p>
+
+<p>The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east
+by east, as already stated, but the van had hauled on
+to south-east without signal shortly after deployment in
+order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as the range was
+apparently opening, the course was altered by signal to
+south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The
+<i>King George V.</i>, leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had
+just anticipated this signal by turning to south. The alteration
+was made “by divisions” instead of “in succession”
+in order that the enemy should be closed more rapidly by
+the whole Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” involved
+some small amount of “blanketing” of the rear
+ships of one division by the leading ships of that next
+astern, and at one time the <i>Thunderer</i> was firing over the
+bows of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, causing some slight inconvenience
+on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” however,
+was unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was inappreciable.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> one or two torpedoes crossed the track
+of the rear of our battle line, and the <i>Marlborough</i>
+altered course to avoid one. They were apparently
+fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which were
+barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to
+those on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>. They might, however,
+have been fired by enemy battleships which were within
+torpedo range, or by a submarine, the <i>Revenge</i> reporting
+that it was thought that one had been rammed by that
+ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by
+the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very
+skilful handling of the ships by their captains.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, however, a heavy explosion occurred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">355</span>
+under the fore bridge of the <i>Marlborough</i>, abreast the
+starboard forward hydraulic engine-room. The ship took
+up a list of some seven degrees to starboard, but continued
+in action so effectively that she avoided three more torpedoes
+shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and
+at 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the
+“König” class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen
+to turn out of line.</p>
+
+<p>The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to
+his flagship stated that the vessel had been struck by a
+“mine or torpedo.” It was assumed by me that a torpedo
+had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed over the
+same locality without injury from mine. This proved
+to be the case, the track of this torpedo not having been
+sufficiently visible to enable Captain Ross to avoid it.</p>
+
+<p>The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s torpedoes
+being visible was a matter of great surprise to me,
+and I think to other officers. Reports had been prevalent
+that the Germans had succeeded in producing a torpedo
+which left little or no track on the surface. The information
+as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me
+until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one
+torpedo was reported by observers on board the destroyer
+<i>Oak</i> to have passed close ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at about
+7.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, finishing its run 2,000 yards beyond that ship,
+and a second was observed by the <i>Benbow</i> to pass apparently
+ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, neither of them
+was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs
+specially stationed for the purpose.</p>
+
+<p>Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to
+south, a signal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to
+take station ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> and for the 1st Battle
+Squadron to form astern. This signal had, however, been
+already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">356</span>
+in accordance with the general battle orders giving discretionary
+powers to the commanders of squadrons, and
+the line had been partly reformed before the signal was
+made.</p>
+
+<p>An incident occurred at about 6.47 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> which was an
+indication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which
+it is impossible to speak too highly. The destroyer <i>Acasta</i>,
+which had been badly hit aft during her attack on enemy
+light cruisers in company with the <i>Shark</i> and had her
+engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding
+officer, Lieut.-Commander J.&nbsp;O. Barron, signalled
+the condition of his ship to the <i>Iron Duke</i> as that ship
+passed, leaving the <i>Acasta</i> on her starboard or engaged
+side. The ship’s company was observed to be cheering
+each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that
+this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were subsequently
+brought into Aberdeen, being assisted by the
+<i>Nonsuch</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after 6.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> passed the
+wreck of a ship with the bow and stern standing out of
+the water, the centre portion apparently resting on the
+bottom, with the destroyer <i>Badger</i> picking up survivors.
+It was thought at first that this was the remains of a
+German light cruiser, but inquiry of the <i>Badger</i> elicited
+the lamentable news that the wreck was that of the <i>Invincible</i>.
+It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk
+either by a mine or by a torpedo, and, in view of the safe
+passage of other ships in her vicinity, the latter appeared
+to be the more probable cause of her loss. Subsequent
+information, however, showed that she was destroyed by
+gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already
+recorded.</p>
+
+<p>At 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that
+the enemy was to the westward.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">357</span></p>
+
+<p>Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile,
+brought the enemy’s line into view once more, and between
+7.0 and 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was again in
+action with battleships and also battle cruisers, as they
+could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period
+was very baffling. The range varied from as much as
+15,000 yards at the van to as little as 8,000 in the rear,
+this difference in range indicating that the enemy’s Fleet
+was turning to the westward, as shown in the accompanying
+plan facing <a href="#Page_358">page 358</a>.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of
+our battleships was very effective at this period. Some
+instances may be given. At 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i>, as
+already mentioned, engaged a hostile battleship at 15,000
+yards’ range and on a bearing 74 degrees from right ahead.
+At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of “Lutzow”
+type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer
+smoke screen; at 7.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>King George V.</i> opened
+fire on a vessel, taken to be the leading ship in the enemy’s
+line at a range of about 13,000 yards; the <i>Orion</i> at a
+battleship<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">L</a>; the <i>St. Vincent</i> was “holding her target (a
+battleship) effectively till 7.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the range being between
+10,000 and 9,500 yards”; the <i>Agincourt</i> at 7.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that
+showed clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least
+four of her salvoes “straddled” the target; the <i>Revenge</i>
+was engaging what were taken to be battle cruisers, obtaining
+distinct hits on two of them; the <i>Colossus</i> from
+7.12 to 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> was engaging a ship taken to be a battle
+cruiser, either the <i>Derfflinger</i> or <i>Lutzow</i>, at ranges between
+10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct
+hits, two being on the water line; whilst the <i>Marlborough</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">358</span>
+as already mentioned, “engaged a ship of the ‘König’
+class.” Other vessels reported being in effective action
+during this period. The <i>Royal Oak</i>, the ship next astern
+of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, opened fire at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the leading
+ship of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range
+of 14,000 yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and
+fire was shifted to the second ship which was lost to sight
+in the mist after a few rounds had been fired. It was
+difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on which fire
+was being directed, but one or more of the enemy’s battle
+cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as a
+result of the heavy punishment they had received from our
+battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron, and were
+engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">L</a> The <i>Calliope</i> reported at 7.1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>: “Two enemy battleships, ‘König’ class,
+engaged by <i>Orion’s</i> division, observed to be heavily on fire.”</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships
+of the 1st Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities
+for effective fire than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and
+the fullest use was made of the opportunities. This squadron,
+under the able command of Sir Cecil Burney, was
+known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof
+was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were
+needed, that his careful training had borne excellent results.
+The immunity of the ships of the squadron from
+the enemy’s fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels
+very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to
+the offensive powers of the squadron.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_358" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p class="sans">APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE<br>
+<span class="large">GRAND FLEET</span><br>
+At 7. 15 P.M. 31st May 1916.</p>
+
+<p><i>Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet,
+as evidenced by the positions of the ships engaged at the time,
+shown in Red.</i></p>
+
+  <img src="images/i_358.jpg" width="696" height="585" alt="">
+<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_358-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot sans">
+<p>The Battle Cruisers and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron,
+have crossed from the port to the starboard bow of
+the Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Note. Their battle station is between 5 and 6 miles
+slightly on the engaged bow of the Van of the
+Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The 2nd Battle Squadron is forming ahead of the
+Iron Duke.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Battle Squadron is forming astern of the
+Iron Duke.</p>
+
+<p>The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron is getting into its
+battle-station on the Van of the Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The 4th and 11th Flotillas are moving towards their
+battle stations.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron is coming up from
+the rear of the Battle Fleet to join the Battle Cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>The Minotaur and Cruisers are trying to get up to
+their battle stations ahead of the Battle Fleet.</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>At 7.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the whole battle line was turned together
+three more points to starboard to close the range further;
+immediately afterwards two ships ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i>
+reported a submarine a little on the port bow; at 7.10
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a cruiser,
+was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W.
+from the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and the Fleet was turned back to
+south in order to turn on to the submarine and bring the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">359</span>
+ships in line ahead ready, for any required manœuvre.
+A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges between
+10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the
+destroyers turned and passed towards the rear of the line
+in a heavy smoke screen. One destroyer was seen by
+several observers to sink from the effects of the gunfire.</p>
+
+<p>At a sufficient interval before it was considered that
+the torpedoes fired by the destroyers would cross our line,
+a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to turn two points
+to port by subdivisions. Some minutes later a report was
+made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my
+Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with
+an instrument for giving the necessary information) that
+this turn was insufficient to clear the torpedoes, as I had
+held on until the last moment; a further turn of two
+points was then made for a short time. As a result of
+this attack and another that followed immediately, some
+twenty or more torpedoes were observed to cross the track
+of the Battle Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority
+of them passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons
+at the rear of the line. It was fortunate that, owing
+to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were apparently
+near the end of their run, and were consequently
+not running at high speed. They were all avoided by the
+very skilful handling of the ships by their captains, to
+whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in
+avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in which the
+ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, prevented
+risk of collision and kept their station in the line.
+The captains were most ably assisted by the admirable
+look-out kept by the organisation that existed for dealing
+with this danger.</p>
+
+<p>The skill shown could not, however, have prevented
+several ships from being torpedoed had the range been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">360</span>
+less and the torpedoes consequently running at a higher
+speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow
+showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that
+would hit ships in a line when fired from destroyers at
+ranges up to 8,000 yards was comparatively high, even
+if the tracks were seen and the ships were manœuvred to
+avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes are
+always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the
+line of bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to
+judge the position of the torpedo from its track. Many
+ships experienced escapes from this and other attacks;
+thus the <i>Hercules</i> reported that she “turned away six
+points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along
+the starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the
+other passed close under the stern”; the <i>Neptune</i> reported
+that “the tracks of three torpedoes were seen from the fore-top,
+one of which passed very close and was avoided by
+the use of the helm”; in the <i>Agincourt’s</i> report, a statement
+occurred that “at 7.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a torpedo just missed astern,
+it having been reported from aloft and course altered”;
+and again, “at 7.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> tracks of two torpedoes running
+parallel were observed approaching; course altered to
+avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and at 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed;
+torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard
+bow”; the <i>Revenge</i> remarked, “at 7.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> altered
+course to port to avoid two torpedoes, one passed about
+ten yards ahead and the other about twenty yards astern,
+and at 7.43 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> altered course to avoid torpedoes, two
+passing astern”; the <i>Colossus</i> stated, “at 7.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> turned
+to port to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side”;
+the <i>Barham</i> at this period reported that “at least four
+torpedoes passed through the line close to the <i>Barham</i>”;
+the <i>Collingwood</i> reported, “torpedo track was seen 20<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">361</span>
+degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship;
+large helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close
+astern; at the same time another was seen to pass about
+thirty yards ahead.” The captain of the <i>Collingwood</i>, in
+remarking on the destroyer’s attack, added, “the great
+value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me,
+an outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action.”</p>
+
+<p>The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and
+the Fleet was brought to a south by west course by
+7.33 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> (that is, to a course one point to the westward
+of the course of the Fleet before the destroyer attack).
+The total amount by which the range was opened by the
+turns was about 1,750 yards.</p>
+
+<p>The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th
+Flotillas had been delayed in reaching their action station
+at the van until about 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, owing to the turns to the
+westward made by the Battle Fleet to close the enemy.
+In accordance with arrangements made previously to
+counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out
+to engage the enemy destroyers, which, according to the
+report of the Commodore Le Mesurier, commanding the
+4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering towards the
+head of the division led by the <i>King George V.</i>, the van
+ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed
+for the first attack for the reason given above, they were
+in a very favourable position to counter the second destroyer
+attack, which took place at 7.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The enemy’s
+flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before the starboard
+beam of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a range of 9,000 yards and was
+heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, 1st, and
+5th Battle Squadrons. During this attack three enemy
+destroyers were reported as sunk by the fire of the battleships,
+light cruisers and destroyers; one of them, bearing
+a Commodore’s pendant, being sunk at 7.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> by a division<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">362</span>
+of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the <i>Obedient</i>,
+<i>Marvel</i>, <i>Mindful</i> and <i>Onslaught</i>, which attacked them
+near the rear of our battle line. The <i>Southampton</i>
+and <i>Dublin</i>, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, attacked
+and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least six
+torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the
+track of, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their
+attack on the German flotilla.</p>
+
+<p>The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring
+movement on the part of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, the
+movement being covered with the aid of a heavy smoke
+screen. Although this retirement was not visible from the
+<i>Iron Duke</i> owing to the smoke and mist, and was, therefore,
+not known to me until after the action, it was clearly
+seen from the rear of our line, as is indicated by the following
+citations:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>The Captain of the <i>Valiant</i> stated in his report:
+“At 7.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> enemy’s Battle Fleet now altered
+course together away from us and broke off the
+action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which
+effectually covered their retreat and obscured them
+from further view.”</p>
+
+<p>The Captain of the <i>Malaya</i> reported, referring to
+this period: “This was the last of the enemy seen in
+daylight, owing to their Battle Fleet having turned
+away.”</p>
+
+<p>Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period:
+“As the destroyer attack developed, the enemy’s
+Battle Fleet in sight were observed to turn at least
+eight points until their sterns were towards our line.
+They ceased fire, declined further action, and disappeared
+into the mist.”</p>
+
+<p>The Captain of the <i>St. Vincent</i> said: “The target<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">363</span>
+was held closely until 7.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> (32 minutes in
+all), when the enemy had turned eight or ten points
+away, disappearing into the mist and with a smoke
+screen made by destroyers to cover them as well.”</p>
+
+<p>Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: “After
+joining the Battle Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron
+conformed to the movements of the Commander-in-Chief,
+engaging the rear ships of the enemy’s battle
+line, until they turned away and went out of sight,
+all ships apparently covering themselves with artificial
+smoke.”</p>
+
+<p>The Captain of the <i>Revenge</i> recorded: “A flotilla
+of destroyers passed through the line and made a
+most efficient smoke screen. At this period the
+enemy’s fleet turned eight points to starboard and
+rapidly drew out of sight.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the German account of the action at this stage, it
+is stated, in more than one passage, that the British Fleet
+during this action between the Battle Fleets was to the
+northward of the High Seas Fleet. This is correct of the
+earlier stages. The account refers to the attacks on our
+line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states finally
+that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the
+heavy ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the
+north-eastward. The accuracy of this statement is doubtful,
+since the destroyers were clearly in sight from our
+heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to state that
+“the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line
+to a southerly and south-westerly course <em>on which the
+enemy was last seen</em>, but he is no longer to be found.”</p>
+
+<p>This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships
+bore north and north-east from the enemy and then that
+the enemy turned to south and south-west, that is, <i>directly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">364</span>
+away from the British Fleet</i>. Thus the fact that the German
+Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans.</p>
+
+<p>No report of this movement of the German Fleet
+reached me, and at first it was thought that his temporary
+disappearance was due to the thickening mist, especially
+as firing could be heard from the battleships in rear, but
+at 7.41 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the enemy Battle Fleet being no longer in
+sight from the <i>Iron Duke</i>, course was altered “by divisions”
+three points more to starboard (namely, to south-west)
+to close the enemy, and single line ahead was again
+formed on the <i>Iron Duke</i> on that course.</p>
+
+<p>At this period the rear of our battle line was still in
+action at intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s
+fleet, which were probably some that had dropped astern
+partially disabled, but by 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> fire had practically
+ceased.</p>
+
+<p>At about 7.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received a report from Sir David
+Beatty stating that the enemy bore north-west by west
+from the <i>Lion</i>, distant 10 to 11 miles, and that the <i>Lion’s</i>
+course was south-west. Although the battle cruisers were
+not in sight from the <i>Iron Duke</i>, I assumed the <i>Lion</i> to
+be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet,
+but it appeared later from a report received in reply to directions
+signalled by me at 8.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to the <i>King George V.</i>
+to follow the battle cruisers, that they were not in sight
+from that ship either.</p>
+
+<p>At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have
+become divided, for whilst Sir David Beatty reported the
+presence of battleships north-west by west from the <i>Lion</i>,
+other enemy battleships were observed to the westward
+(that is, on the starboard bow of the <i>Iron Duke</i>), and
+the course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions”
+to west in order to close the enemy; this alteration was
+made at 7.59 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">365</span></span></p>
+
+<p>It will be observed that all the large alterations of
+course of the Battle Fleet during the engagement were
+made “by divisions” instead of “in succession from the
+van, or together.” The reason was that in this way the
+whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with
+far greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation,
+than if the movement had been carried out by the line
+“in succession.”</p>
+
+<p>The objection to altering by turning all ships together
+was the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as
+the result of such a manœuvre carried out with a very
+large Fleet under action conditions in misty weather,
+particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of bearing
+for a long period.</p>
+
+<p>The battleships sighted at 7.59 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> opened fire on the
+ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved
+out to starboard of the battle line to engage a flotilla of
+enemy destroyers which were steering to attack the Battle
+Fleet. The <i>Calliope</i>, the flagship of Commodore Le
+Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some
+damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a
+torpedo at the leading battleship at a range of 6,500
+yards; an explosion was noticed on board a ship of the
+“Kaiser” class by the <i>Calliope</i>.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">M</a> The ships sighted
+turned away and touch could not be regained, although
+sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>,
+probably from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch
+with and engaged some of the enemy’s ships very effectively
+between 8.22 and 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The <i>Falmouth</i> was
+the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch
+with the enemy, at 8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; the ships then in sight
+turned eight points together away from the <i>Falmouth</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">M</a> All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was clearly concussion
+under water, and may have been caused by the <i>Calliope’s</i> torpedo obtaining
+a hit.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">366</span></p>
+
+<p>At 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the light was failing and the Fleet was
+turned “by divisions” to a south-west course, thus reforming
+single line again.</p>
+
+<p>During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described
+above, the battle cruisers were in action ahead as mentioned
+in Sir David Beatty’s report in the Appendix.</p>
+
+<p>At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the
+large alterations of course carried out by the High Sea
+Fleet, but it was regained at 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the battle cruisers
+opening fire at 7.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, though only for two and a half
+minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At this
+period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by
+south to south-west, and this course took them from the
+port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+The movements of our battle cruisers, which were at this
+time between four and five miles ahead of the van of the
+Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly, to
+the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers
+themselves, but even more to the funnel smoke from the
+numerous cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers which
+were attempting to gain their positions ahead of the van.</p>
+
+<p>The movements of the enemy’s fleet could not be distinguished
+from our Battle Fleet owing again to their own
+funnel and cordite smoke, and, also, to the smoke screens
+which ships and destroyers were making to conceal their
+movements.</p>
+
+<p>It will be realised that these conditions, which particularly
+affected the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the
+same extent to our ships ahead of our Battle Fleet. They
+had little but the smoke of the enemy’s leading ships to
+obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle Fleet
+had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that
+of the enemy’s long line of ships.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_366" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;">
+  <img src="images/i_366.jpg" width="2100" height="1226" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>H.&nbsp;M.&nbsp;S. “SUPERB” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</p>
+
+<p>H.&nbsp;M.&nbsp;S. “CANADA” ASTERN OF “SUPERB”</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">367</span>
+Battle Fleet were very much accentuated in the Battle
+Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, in his report,
+remarked on this point: “As leading ship, in addition to
+the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I
+imagine must have been cordite fumes from the battle
+cruisers after they had passed us, and from other
+cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel gases from
+small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense
+smoke from the <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, which was unable
+to draw clear.”</p>
+
+<p>The general position at 6.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and again at 7.15
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> is shown in plans 8 and 9.</p>
+
+<p>At 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, according to remarks from the <i>Minotaur</i>,
+flagship of Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;L. Heath, commanding
+the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the position as seen from
+that ship was as follows: “The 2nd Cruiser Squadron
+was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port
+side of the <i>King George V.</i>, gaining on her slightly, but
+with all the destroyers and light craft between her and
+the <i>King George V.</i> The battle cruisers were about four
+miles distant on the starboard bow of the <i>Minotaur</i>;
+owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers rapidly
+increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some
+eight miles.”<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">N</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">N</a> Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here described should
+be timed at about 6.50 to 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and the diagrams show this accordingly.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>At 7.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> according to a report from the <i>Shannon</i>,
+of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the <i>Shannon’s</i> course was
+S. 10 W., “the 2nd Cruiser Squadron endeavouring to
+take station on the engaged bow of the Battle Fleet; the
+Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not engaged
+and turned slightly to port.” And again at 7.22
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a report says: “The <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> had now
+taken station astern of the <i>Shannon</i>, the battle cruisers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">368</span>
+were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading
+ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross
+the bows of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard.
+Battle cruisers firing intermittently, light cruisers making
+their way through the destroyer flotillas to attack the
+enemy light cruisers.” Rear-Admiral Heath stated:
+“At 7.11 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots
+to take up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
+was then engaged with the enemy.” He added: “One
+salvo fell short on the starboard bow of the <i>Minotaur</i> and
+some others in close proximity”; and later says, “even
+when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell,
+no more than the flashes of the enemy’s guns could be
+seen.”</p>
+
+<p>Further remarks from the <i>Shannon</i>, at a later stage,
+were: “At 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Battle Fleet altered course to starboard
+to close the enemy, and by 8.15 was lost to sight, bearing
+about north by east.”</p>
+
+<p>“At 8.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Battle Fleet, out of sight from <i>Shannon</i>,
+was heard to be in action.”</p>
+
+<p>“At 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the visibility of grey ships was about
+9,000 yards.” “At 8.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>King George V.</i> again
+sighted, bearing north-north-east. Visibility had again improved,
+and her range was estimated at about 10,000
+yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close
+enemy.”</p>
+
+<p>At 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the ships engaged by our battle cruisers
+turned away and were lost to sight. They were located
+for a moment at 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> with the aid of the 1st and 3rd
+Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they disappeared
+again at once, they were once more located and effectively
+engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at about 10,000 yards
+range. They turned away once more and were finally lost
+to sight by the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (the last ships<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">369</span>
+to keep in touch) at 8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, steaming to the westward.</p>
+
+<p>This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers
+had of putting the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s
+work. They had, under the very able and gallant leadership
+of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the splendid squadron
+so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone
+far to crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser
+Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>It will be seen from the above account that our battle
+cruisers experienced great difficulty in locating and holding
+the enemy after 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, even when far ahead of the
+Battle Fleet, with its small craft, and therefore in a
+position of freedom from the smoke of our own vessels and
+the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the battle
+cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The
+enemy turned away on each occasion when he was located
+and showed no disposition to fight.</p>
+
+<p>The visibility by this time had become very bad; the
+light was failing, and it became necessary to decide on the
+disposition for the night.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">370</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIV"><span id="toclink_370"></span>CHAPTER XIV<br>
+
+<span class="subhead"><span class="allsmcap">THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span>—(<i>Continued</i>)</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3>III.—<span class="smcap">The Night Action</span></h3>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> situation, which had never been at all clear to me
+owing to the fact that I had not seen more than a few
+ships at a time, appeared to be as follows:</p>
+
+<p>We were between the enemy and his bases, whether
+he shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via
+Heligoland direct, or via the swept channel which he was
+known to use along the coast of the West Frisian Islands.</p>
+
+<p>I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward
+of us. He had been turning on <em>interior</em> lines throughout.
+We had altered course gradually during the action from
+south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, or 146
+degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his
+ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it
+was possible that ships, which had fallen out owing to
+damage, might be to the northward.</p>
+
+<p>The possibility of a night action was, of course,
+present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not
+my intention to seek such an action between the heavy
+ships.</p>
+
+<p>It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments
+against it.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, such a course must have inevitably
+led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a
+very large destroyer force throughout the night. No<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">371</span>
+senior officer would willingly court such an attack, even
+if our battleships were equipped with the best searchlights
+and the best arrangements for the control of the searchlights
+and the gunfire at night.</p>
+
+<p>It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights
+nor their control arrangements were at this time of
+the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the
+guns of the secondary armament of our battleships (a very
+important factor for firing at night) had also only just
+been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay
+was due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without
+these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of
+our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could
+place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by
+gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the
+heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with
+no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were
+no effective antidote at night, since, if they were disposed
+with this sole object in view, they would certainly be taken
+for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships.</p>
+
+<p>But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers,
+the result of night actions between heavy ships must
+always be very largely a matter of <em>chance</em>, as there is
+little opportunity for skill on either side. Such an action
+must be fought at very close range, the decision depending
+on the course of events in the first few minutes. It
+is, therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general
+grounds. The greater efficiency of German searchlights
+at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater number
+of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with
+his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the
+Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement
+of such an action.</p>
+
+<p>The question then remained as to the course to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">372</span>
+steered. The first desideratum was to keep the British
+Fleet between the enemy and his bases, so as to be in a
+position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight was
+rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet
+for the night as quickly as possible to avoid visual signalling
+after dark; and it was also necessary to place
+our destroyers in a position where the chances of their
+coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a
+minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking
+the enemy’s capital ships during the night. The Grand
+Fleet was formed at the time in practically a single line,
+steering approximately west-south-west. I considered
+that a southerly course would meet the situation and
+would enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and,
+if I put the destroyers astern, they would fulfil three
+conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position
+for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also turn to the
+southward with a view to regaining its bases during the
+night (which seemed a very probable movement on the
+part of the enemy); secondly, they would also be in
+position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter
+search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the
+heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships,
+and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error
+or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to
+a minimum.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, I signalled to the Battle
+Fleet to alter course by divisions to <em>south</em>, informing the
+Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and
+light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding destroyer
+flotillas, of my movements in order that they
+should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle
+Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form
+divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">373</span>
+columns one mile apart. This had the effect of placing
+the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram:</p>
+
+<div class="center"><div class="ilb">
+<pre>
+    1 mile     1 mile     1 mile
+ |&lt;————————&gt;|&lt;————————&gt;|&lt;————————&gt;
+ |          |          |
+ |          |          |          |
+ |          |          |          |
+ |          |          |          |
+2nd        4th        1st        5th
+
+          Battle Squadrons.
+</pre>
+</div></div>
+
+<p class="in0">My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was
+to ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of
+each other during the night, and that therefore they would
+not mistake our own ships for those of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly
+course the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station
+five miles astern of the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a
+signal was made to the mine-laying flotilla leader <i>Abdiel</i>
+(Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay a mine-field
+in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship,
+over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would
+pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during
+the night viâ the Horn Reef. The <i>Abdiel</i> carried out this
+operation unobserved in the same successful manner as
+numerous other similar operations had been undertaken
+by this most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one
+of our submarines, stationed near the Horn Reef, which
+reported on return to her base having heard several underwater
+explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on June 1st,
+it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines.</p>
+
+<p>At 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the position of the <i>Iron Duke</i> was Lat.
+56.22 N., Long. 5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots,
+and the order of the Fleet from west to east was:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron);
+Cruiser Squadrons;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">374</span></p>
+
+<p>Battle Fleet;</p>
+
+<p>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squadron;</p>
+
+<p>4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet;</p>
+
+<p>11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from
+west to east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward
+for the night a destroyer attack took place on the 2nd
+Light Cruiser Squadron at the rear of our Battle line.
+This was reported to me shortly after 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but immediately
+afterwards a further report stated that the enemy
+had been driven off to the north-west.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore Hawkesley, in the <i>Castor</i>,
+commanding the destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern,
+sighted three or more vessels at a range of 2,000 yards
+which he took to be enemy battle cruisers. If the German
+report is to be believed, the ships were light cruisers and
+included the <i>Hamburg</i> and <i>Elbing</i>. The enemy at once
+opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the <i>Castor</i> was hit,
+and her bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged,
+making it impossible to signal to the 11th Flotilla, which
+the <i>Castor</i> was leading. The damage to the <i>Castor</i> was
+slight. The <i>Castor</i>, <i>Magic</i>, and <i>Marne</i> fired torpedoes
+at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla
+refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity
+of the vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a
+violent detonation, following on the discharge of the torpedoes,
+had been felt in the engine-rooms of the destroyers
+near the <i>Castor</i>.</p>
+
+<p>At 0.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Castor</i> sighted a German destroyer
+on her starboard bow and opened fire with all guns at
+point-blank range. She was not seen again.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted
+and engaged five enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">375</span>
+four light cruisers, probably of the 4th Scouting Group.
+The enemy again opened fire with great rapidity and
+accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading
+ships, the <i>Southampton</i> and <i>Dublin</i>, at very short range.
+Both vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15
+minutes’ engagement and there were fairly heavy casualties;
+three fires which broke out on board the <i>Southampton</i>
+were promptly extinguished by fine work on the part of
+the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had
+been much cut up by shell fire.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but
+fierce engagement, and it is probable that the German
+light cruiser <i>Frauenlob</i>, whose loss was admitted by the
+enemy, was sunk during this action, which took place in
+that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
+and the German 4th Scouting Group.</p>
+
+<p>At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked
+enemy cruisers steering a south-easterly course. Again
+the vessels sighted opened fire immediately, and the flotilla
+leader <i>Tipperary</i>, commanded by Captain Wintour, the
+leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire
+and set on fire forward; the <i>Broke</i>, leader of the 2nd half
+Flotilla, received injury to her steering-gear, rendering
+her temporarily unmanageable and causing her to ram
+the destroyer <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, with the result that it became
+necessary to abandon the latter destroyer on the
+following morning after taking off her crew. The destroyer
+<i>Spitfire</i> (Lieutenant-Commander C.&nbsp;W. Trelawny),
+next astern of the <i>Tipperary</i>, fired torpedoes at
+a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared to be hit and in
+a sinking condition, and the <i>Spitfire</i> then collided with a
+German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried
+off some 29 feet of her skin plating.</p>
+
+<p>The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">376</span>
+while steering to the south-eastward, came into contact
+at midnight with the enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron,
+and one ship (probably the <i>Pommern</i>) was torpedoed and
+sunk either by the <i>Ardent</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Marsden)
+or <i>Ambuscade</i> (Lieutenant-Commander G.&nbsp;A.
+Coles) or <i>Garland</i> (Lieutenant-Commander R.&nbsp;S. Goff).
+A heavy and accurate fire was opened by the enemy and
+the destroyer <i>Fortune</i> (Lieutenant-Commander F.&nbsp;G.
+Terry) was sunk.</p>
+
+<p>The flotilla was again in action a little later with some
+enemy battleships, and the <i>Ardent</i> attacked, and fired a
+torpedo, but the result could not be observed as a very
+heavy fire was concentrated on the <i>Ardent</i>, which sank
+with colours flying after a very gallant night’s work. It
+is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden
+and one man were the only survivors, being picked up
+by a destroyer on June 1st after having been five hours in
+the water.</p>
+
+<p>The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of
+the 1st Battle Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was
+somewhat astern of the remainder of the Fleet during
+the night, owing to the <i>Marlborough</i> not being able
+to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions
+for this speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also
+more than five miles astern of the main portion of the
+Battle Fleet. At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> also this flotilla was obliged
+for some little time to steer a south-easterly course, owing
+to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard
+hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with
+certainty. The result was that the 12th Flotilla was probably
+some ten miles to the north-eastward of the 1st Battle
+Squadron by midnight. The incident was a fortunate one
+since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of the
+enemy’s battle squadrons.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">377</span></p>
+
+<p>At 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in
+the <i>Faulknor</i>, sighted on the starboard bow this battle
+squadron, consisting of six ships steering south-east. The
+leading ships were thought to belong to the “Kaiser”
+class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel
+to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots
+to draw ahead, with the intention of turning to attack
+on a north-westerly course (the reverse of the enemy’s
+course), in order to give an opportunity of getting into
+close range. This attack was carried out at 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> at a
+range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their
+torpedoes at the second and third ships in the line. Some
+took effect on the third battleship in the line, the explosion
+being so violent and the flame reaching to such a
+height that it appeared to those in our destroyers that
+the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the
+magazine and destroyed the ship.</p>
+
+<p>Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the
+enemy light cruisers, which were in company with the
+battle squadron. The destroyer <i>Mænad</i> (Commander
+J.&nbsp;P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the north-westward
+with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had
+been anticipated that the attack would have been made
+with torpedo tubes bearing to starboard, and her tubes
+were not ready to fire to port. Commander Champion
+held on the south-easterly course and, turning later than
+the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned
+again to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at
+2.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> fired two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth
+ship in the line at a range between 4,000 and 5,000 yards,
+one of which took effect. In this case, too, the flame of
+the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was
+not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her
+were visible.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">378</span></p>
+
+<p>It is of interest to note that at the time of the first
+attack on this squadron six battleships were visible. After
+the first attack only five were seen by Captain Stirling,
+and twenty-five minutes later five were sighted by the
+<i>Mænad</i>, and after the <i>Mænad’s</i> attack only four were
+visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships
+was sunk was considered at the time to be very strong,
+particularly as the reports from the <i>Mænad</i> and from
+Captain Stirling were sent to me quite independently,
+and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that
+Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original
+number in the battle squadron, and five as the number
+remaining after his attack.</p>
+
+<p>When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle
+squadron he reported the fact by wireless, but the signal
+was, unfortunately, not received by any ship, owing, presumably,
+to the strong interference caused by German
+wireless signalling at the time.</p>
+
+<p>The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas
+took station astern the Battle Fleet in company with the
+<i>Champion</i> (Captain Farie), leader of the 13th Flotilla;
+the <i>Fearless</i>, leader of the 9th Flotilla, had not been able
+to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the destroyers
+of these flotillas lost touch with the <i>Champion</i>
+during the night, and the flotillas became somewhat
+scattered.</p>
+
+<p>At 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a large vessel, taken at first for one of
+our own ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high
+speed, passing close to the <i>Petard</i> and <i>Turbulent</i>. She
+rammed the <i>Turbulent</i> and opened a heavy fire on both
+the <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Petard</i>; the <i>Turbulent</i> sank and the
+<i>Petard</i> was damaged.</p>
+
+<p>At 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the destroyer <i>Moresby</i>, of the 13th Flotilla,
+sighted four battleships of the “Deutschland” class,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">379</span>
+and attacked, firing one torpedo; an explosion was subsequently
+heard.</p>
+
+<p>It was impossible to state with certainty which of our
+destroyers were actually successful in their attacks. The
+enemy, of course, denied that any marked success was
+obtained by our attacks, but information obtained after
+the action made it certain that at least four battleships
+of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes, in addition
+to the pre-Dreadnought battleship <i>Pommern</i>, which
+was admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the
+light cruiser <i>Rostock</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot
+be attributed to particular destroyers, the work of the
+flotillas as a whole, and particularly of the 4th and 12th
+Flotillas, was characterised by the splendid dash, skill and
+gallantry for which our destroyers had been conspicuous
+throughout the War. They were most ably led and
+achieved magnificent work under very difficult conditions.</p>
+
+<p>There is no doubt at all that the German organisation
+for night action was of a remarkably high standard.
+In the first place, the use of star shell, at that time unfamiliar
+to us, was of the greatest use to them in locating
+our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and,
+secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful
+(much more so than ours), but their method of controlling
+them and bringing guns and searchlights rapidly on to
+any vessel sighted was excellent. It also appeared that
+some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of
+their secondary armament.</p>
+
+<p>The increased offensive power given by these devices
+did not, however, prevent our destroyers from inflicting
+great damage on the enemy during their night attacks,
+although they led to the loss of some valuable destroyers
+and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader<span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">380</span>
+of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of destroyer
+work and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and
+other splendid officers perished with their gallant crews.
+Our destroyer service has, indeed, every reason to be exceedingly
+proud of the achievements of the flotillas, both
+during the day action of May 31st and during the night
+following that action.</p>
+
+<p>Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals
+during the night, and, curiously enough, the under-water
+explosions, four or five in number, were quite
+clearly recorded on a barograph in the <i>Malaya</i>, a ship
+well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There
+is little doubt that these records showed the explosion of
+our torpedoes against enemy ships.</p>
+
+<p>From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark
+that our destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired
+with great frequency by the enemy, and they produced
+a very brilliant illumination, leaving the enemy ships in
+complete darkness and not revealing their positions.</p>
+
+<p>At 11 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the light cruiser <i>Active</i>, astern of the 2nd
+Battle Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern,
+and shortly afterwards saw searchlights switched on and
+a heavy fire opened against this vessel by a ship, or ships,
+on her starboard quarter. She appeared to be heavily hit
+and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been
+the <i>Black Prince</i>, which had apparently lost touch with
+our fleet during the day action.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after this incident the <i>Active</i> passed over some
+submerged object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent
+examination showed that some 15 feet of her bilge
+keel had been torn away. It was not conceivable that
+the object struck could have been submerged wreckage
+from any ship which had taken part in the action, no
+fighting having taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">381</span>
+possible that the <i>Active</i> had struck an enemy submarine.
+At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Colossus</i> also passed over some submerged
+object which was felt to scrape along the bottom
+of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to
+both starboard propeller blades. Again there is doubt
+as to what the obstruction could have been; it was certainly
+not wreckage from any ship that had been in action.</p>
+
+<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney
+informed me that the <i>Marlborough</i> could not maintain
+the Fleet speed of 17 knots any longer, on account of the
+stress on the bulkheads, and that she had been obliged
+to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship to
+proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the
+German mined area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light
+cruiser <i>Fearless</i> alongside the <i>Marlborough</i>, and was
+transferred in her, with his Staff, to the <i>Revenge</i>, the
+<i>Fearless</i> being then detached to escort the <i>Marlborough</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements
+which constituted the Battle of Jutland will be
+gathered from a consideration of the distances steamed
+by our ships during the operations.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between
+3.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the time of opening fire, and 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the
+time that the Battle Fleet commenced action, and a
+further distance of some 57 miles to 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when the
+Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle
+Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the commencement
+of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the
+turn to the southward at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the
+period covered by the night action—9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>At 2.47 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered
+course to north and formed single line ahead in the order—2nd
+Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">382</span>
+Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th Battle Squadron
+rejoined at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and took station ahead of the
+2nd Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The weather was misty and the visibility even less than
+on May 31st, being only some three or four miles, and
+I considered it desirable under these conditions, and in
+view of the fact that I was not in touch with either my
+cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger of submarine
+attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the
+enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th
+Division of the Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight,
+having dropped astern during the night owing to the
+reduction in speed of the <i>Marlborough</i> and the change
+of flag from the <i>Marlborough</i> to the <i>Revenge</i>. Partly on
+account of the low visibility, and partly because of the
+inevitable difference in dead reckoning between ships, due
+to their many movements during the action and during
+the night, considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting
+the Fleet. This applied particularly to the destroyer
+flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and
+whose facilities for computing their positions under these
+conditions were only slight; but the same difficulty was
+experienced with all classes of ships, and, although awkward,
+the fact did not cause me any surprise. The cruisers
+were not sighted until 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the destroyers did not join
+the Battle Fleet until 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and the 6th Division of the
+Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle
+Squadron, was not in company until the evening.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet
+(particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes,
+rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the
+Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when
+deciding to steer to the southward during the night.
+It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">383</span>
+Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By
+the time this concentration was effected it had become
+apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn
+Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields
+in the early morning on the way to their ports. The
+presence of a Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, made it
+certain that our position at that time would be known
+to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the information
+obtained from our wireless directional stations during the
+early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet
+must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course
+shortly after daylight.</p>
+
+<p>At 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the destroyer <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, which was
+lying disabled in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted
+a German light cruiser two miles to the eastward, steaming
+slowly to the northward. After being in sight for
+about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank,
+bows first. The <i>Sparrowhawk</i> was subsequently sighted
+by the <i>Marksman</i> and others of our destroyers, and, being
+too seriously damaged for towing back to a base, was
+sunk by the <i>Marksman</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the report of gunfire to the
+westward was audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38
+Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier, commanding the 3rd
+Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was engaging
+a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle
+Fleet. Course was altered “by divisions” to west at
+3.44 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as it seemed that the presence of the airship
+might possibly indicate the presence also of the High Sea
+Fleet. At 3.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a Zeppelin was in sight from the
+Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back
+again to north and fire opened on the airship, which,
+however, was too high for the fire to be effective. She<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">384</span>
+disappeared to the eastward. She was sighted subsequently
+at intervals.</p>
+
+<p>At 4.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions
+in line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order
+to widen the front and to reduce the risk of submarine attack.
+At 4.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the cruiser <i>Dublin</i> reported by wireless
+that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two destroyers,
+and she gave her position.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle
+Fleet in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed
+to locate the cruiser reported by the <i>Dublin</i>, whilst the
+Battle Fleet searched to the south-eastward for one of
+the enemy’s battle cruisers which was thought to be in
+a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still making
+for a German port. At 4.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was
+in Lat. 55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Commodore
+of the flotillas (Commodore Hawkesley), with destroyers,
+reported himself as being in Lat. 55.48 N.,
+Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser Fleet was
+in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at
+18 knots, and at 6.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> altered course to south. At
+6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, not having met the destroyers, the Battle Fleet
+altered course to south-east, with the cruisers in company,
+steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course until
+7.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, at which time course was altered to north, the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+and to north at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The <i>Dublin</i> was sighted at 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and reported
+having lost sight in a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32
+E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat destroyers she had
+reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated that
+the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming
+fast.</p>
+
+<p>At 8.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N.,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">385</span>
+Long. 6.10 E., steering north at 17 knots, turning at
+8.52 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> to a south-west course.</p>
+
+<p>Between 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a considerable amount of
+wreckage was passed, and the bodies of dead German
+bluejackets were seen in the water. The wreckage of the
+destroyer <i>Ardent</i> was also passed. Drifting mines in considerable
+numbers were seen during the whole forenoon
+of the 1st June, and there were one or two reports of submarines
+being sighted. At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle Fleet, and
+course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, which
+had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine
+screen.</p>
+
+<p>At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20
+N., Long. 5.25 E., and at 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser
+Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long. 6.11 E.</p>
+
+<p>It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had
+either sunk or had passed inside the mine-fields <i lang="fr">en route</i>
+to their bases. It had been evident since the early morning,
+from the definite information obtained by our directional
+stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to
+port. All our own injured vessels were also <i lang="fr">en route</i> for
+their bases, and I decided to return with the whole Fleet,
+and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth force
+to return independently. Diagram 4 shows the movement
+of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the
+forenoon of June 1st.</p>
+
+<p>The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had
+been kept in port by Admiralty orders on May 31st, and
+was despatched to sea on the morning of June 1st, when
+I was informed that it was being sent out to join me and
+to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> I instructed
+Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to
+screen the <i>Marlborough</i> to her base; he informed me at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">386</span>
+2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that he had sighted the <i>Marlborough</i>. At 10.40
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not require
+the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt
+to strengthen the <i>Marlborough’s</i> escort and told him that
+I did not need his ships. They would have been of great
+use at daylight in June 1st had they been on the scene
+at that time, and it is needless to add how much I should
+have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in
+the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew
+well the extreme efficiency and the fine fighting spirit
+of this force which, under its gallant and distinguished
+commodore, had rendered such splendid service throughout
+the War.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Marlborough</i> reported at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that a torpedo
+had been fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was
+felt about the ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad
+weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs were
+ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber
+at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The <i>Warrior</i>, which had been taken in tow by the
+sea-plane carrier <i>Engadine</i>, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long.
+3.54 E. at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 1st June, but the crew was
+taken off by the <i>Engadine</i> and the ship abandoned later
+in the day, as the weather had become bad and it was
+evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of
+rescue was very smartly carried out, the <i>Engadine</i> being
+skilfully placed alongside the <i>Warrior</i> in a considerable
+sea way by her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander C.&nbsp;G.
+Robinson, and the large number of wounded transferred
+to her. The reports as to the condition of the <i>Warrior</i>
+were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain
+afloat, and later fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore
+I detached the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and subsequently
+the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to search for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">387</span>
+her. The search continued until the evening of June 23rd,
+no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a
+report received subsequently from the Captain of the
+<i>Warrior</i> that her condition was such that she must have
+sunk shortly after having been abandoned. During the
+search for the <i>Warrior</i>, one of the cruisers of the 2nd
+Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at
+dusk, opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported
+quite definitely that the submarine had been sunk. Later
+evidence showed, however, that the submarine was one
+of our own vessels of this class, that she had a very narrow
+escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This
+was one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines
+being mistaken for an enemy, attacked by our own ships,
+and considered to be sunk. The difficulty of ascertaining
+definitely the result of an engagement with a submarine
+was thereby exemplified, and was one of the
+weighty reasons which led the Admiralty during the War
+to refrain from publishing any figures giving the results
+of engagements with submarines.</p>
+
+<p>Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the
+destroyer <i>Broke</i>, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was
+directed to search for that vessel also, assisted by two
+light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely in the Tyne,
+having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or
+partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach
+port were the <i>Acasta</i>, towed by the <i>Nonsuch</i>, and the
+<i>Onslow</i>, towed by the <i>Defender</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled,
+and was reported ready for sea at four hours’ notice at
+9.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on that date.</p>
+
+<p><i>Note.</i>—In the diagrams embodied in this chapter
+there are some slight departures from those which accompanied
+my original despatch to the Admiralty.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">388</span></p>
+
+<p>That despatch was sent in under constant pressure
+for its early receipt and at a time when I, in common
+with my Staff, was very fully occupied with the arrangements
+connected with the repair of damaged ships, the
+constructive alterations which the action had shown to
+be necessary in our ships, and the various committees
+which I had formed to report on different subjects in
+the light of our experience. I was not, therefore, able
+to give the personal attention to the reports which later
+opportunities have afforded me, and such slight
+modifications as I have made are due to a closer study
+of these reports, and of the signals received during May
+31st.</p>
+
+<div class="tb">* * * * *</div>
+
+<p>One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to
+send to the King on the morning of June 3rd a message
+of humble duty, respectful and heartfelt wishes on His
+Majesty’s birthday.</p>
+
+<p>The following reply was received from His Majesty,
+and communicated to the Fleet:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I am deeply touched by the message which you
+have sent me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It
+reaches me on the morrow of a battle which has once
+more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers
+and men under your command. I mourn the loss of
+brave men, many of them personal friends of my
+own, who have fallen in their country’s cause. Yet
+even more do I regret that the German High Sea
+Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by
+the misty weather to evade the full consequences of
+an encounter they have always professed to desire,
+but for which when the opportunity arrived they
+showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">389</span>
+enemy immediately after the opening of the general
+engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gaining
+a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday
+amply justify my confidence in the valour and efficiency
+of the fleets under your command.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+“<span class="smcap">George R.&nbsp;I.</span>”
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious
+message, and I added in my telegram to His
+Majesty that it was “a matter of the greatest gratification
+to all ranks to receive such an expression of Your
+Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our
+gallant comrades.”</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">390</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XV"><span id="toclink_390"></span>CHAPTER XV<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">There</span> has been some discussion on the tactics of the
+Jutland Battle, and no doubt there will be more. I have
+endeavoured to give the facts, so that future discussions
+may take place with adequate knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have
+seen expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with
+the object of enticing the enemy out to attack the
+weaker portion in order to provide the opportunity for
+a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May
+31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the
+southward of the Battle Fleet in pursuance of the policy
+which had been frequently carried out on previous
+occasions.</p>
+
+<p>Many surmises have been made as to the object with
+which the High Sea Fleet put to sea on this occasion.
+The view which I have always held is that the frequent
+light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down
+the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the
+Skagerrak during the spring of 1916, may have induced
+the German Commander-in-Chief to send out a force
+with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged
+in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle
+Fleet to sea in support of this force. There is no doubt
+that he did not expect to meet the whole Grand Fleet.
+If confirmation of this were needed it is supplied in the
+German account of the battle, in which it is stated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">391</span>
+that “there was no reason for supposing that any
+enemy forces were about, much less the entire British
+Fleet.”</p>
+
+<p>Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of
+the whole strategy and tactics of the War, leads naturally
+to the fresh problems which the advent of new
+weapons had introduced. When I took command of
+the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that
+of how to counter a destroyer attack in a day action.
+It had excited more attention in the two or three
+years before the War than any other question of
+tactics, much attention was devoted to it during the
+War, and for that reason it is desirable to discuss it
+fully.</p>
+
+<p>It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what
+were then known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions
+between Battle Fleets as an exercise), that destroyer attacks
+were actually carried out in the British Navy on
+a large scale.</p>
+
+<p>During that year manœuvres took place between the
+3rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleets, commanded
+by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven, and the Atlantic
+Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase
+of the manœuvres of that year included some Battle
+Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,” during which attacks by considerable
+forces of destroyers were carried out. Before
+this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the
+fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place
+without destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented
+the matter from being made the subject of thorough
+practical experiment on such a scale as to give reliable
+guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into
+greater prominence.</p>
+
+<p>The Fleet manœuvres of 1912 did not throw further<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">392</span>
+light on the question, as no Fleet action took place in
+which destroyers were engaged; and the subsequent
+Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as I recollect,
+include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged.
+During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 manœuvres
+most of the destroyer attacks on the “Red”
+Fleet were made from towards the rear of the “Blue”
+battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge
+from them.</p>
+
+<p>To turn from manœuvre experience; during the
+years 1911–14, covering the period of Sir George Callaghan’s
+command of the Home Fleets, destroyer
+attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that
+were constantly being carried out, and officers were
+impressed with the supreme importance of the whole
+matter.</p>
+
+<p>This was the position when I took over the command
+of the Grand Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the matter
+immediately engaged my attention. The “counter”
+which had usually been favoured by flag officers commanding
+Fleets up to the date named, had been the
+obvious one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ torpedo
+craft on those of the enemy, as the latter advanced
+to attack. It was difficult to forecast how far such a
+“counter” would be successful in preventing the destroyers
+from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the
+distance the torpedo could be relied upon to run with
+accuracy, and on its speed, both constantly increasing
+figures.</p>
+
+<p>The great number of destroyers possessed by the
+enemy, the largely increased range of torpedoes, the difficulty
+which our light cruisers and flotillas might experience
+in reaching a favourable position for meeting and
+disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">393</span>
+discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger attendant
+on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low
+visibility, when a destroyer attack could be instantly and
+effectively launched before such a “counter” could take
+place, made it essential to consider other means for dealing
+with the situation.</p>
+
+<p>Some German documents which came into our possession
+early in the War proved the importance which
+the enemy attached to this form of attack, and emphasised
+the gravity of the question.</p>
+
+<p>It was, of course, fully realised that the question had
+two sides, and that if our own Battle Fleet was open to
+this form of attack, that of the enemy was equally so,
+but as against this there were important considerations
+to which it was necessary to devote attention.</p>
+
+<p>The first was that the element of chance enters very
+largely into torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla
+of destroyers attacking a Battle Fleet at long range does
+so with the idea that a certain percentage of the torpedoes
+fired will take effect on the ships, the remainder
+passing between the ships.</p>
+
+<p>Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards
+having a speed of 30 knots an hour, or, in other words,
+of 50 feet per second, is not comparable to a projectile
+from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000 yards of say
+2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly
+straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course
+of the target have been determined with considerable accuracy,
+the torpedo will not hit. Let us assume that the
+target ship <span class="allsmcap">X</span> at position <span class="allsmcap">A</span> is steaming at 15 knots, and
+that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on
+the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is
+discharged on a line at right angles to the course of the
+target at a distance of 8,000 yards (<em>see</em> <a href="#i_394">diagram</a>). The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">394</span>
+target ship will advance 4,000 yards along the line <span class="allsmcap">A B</span>
+whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the line
+<span class="allsmcap">C D</span>. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes.</p>
+
+<p>It will be seen that if
+the course of the target
+ship has been misjudged
+very slightly, or had been
+altered during the passage
+from <span class="allsmcap">A</span> to <span class="allsmcap">B</span>, the torpedo
+will pass ahead or astern of
+it. In that case it might
+hit instead a ship <span class="allsmcap">Z</span> ahead or
+one <span class="allsmcap">Y</span> astern of <span class="allsmcap">X</span>.</p>
+
+<p>There are no means
+available on board a destroyer
+for determining
+with any real accuracy
+either the speed or the
+course of a ship at a distance
+of four or five miles.
+Hence the difficulty, and
+the reason why torpedoes
+are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in
+expectation that <em>one</em> of the ships in the line will be hit.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_394" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 14em;">
+  <img src="images/i_394.jpg" width="637" height="1055" alt="">
+</figure>
+
+<p>The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the
+enemy, and the chances of achieving this object are naturally
+proportional to the target presented by a ship as
+compared with the space between adjacent ships.</p>
+
+<p>In the case of a British line of eight battleships attacked
+“beam on,” the chances of a hit for torpedoes which
+reach the British line may be assessed roughly at seven
+to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600 feet, and the
+distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next
+astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">395</span>
+giving a total length of <em>ships</em> of 4,800 feet, and the total
+of the <em>interval</em> between them as 6,300 feet.</p>
+
+<p>A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes,
+and at long ranges one may calculate the chances of hits
+<em>on the above reasoning</em> at between three and four per
+destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are correctly fired
+at such a range as to ensure that they reach the British
+battle line, and provided that the British ships can take
+no effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">O</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">O</a> Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up to the year
+1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun armament than their enemies.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>It has been said that the element of chance is a large
+factor in torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed.
+By this it is meant that skill is not a factor that can produce
+a decisive effect when dealing with torpedoes, as in
+the case of guns dealing with guns. It is true that skilful
+manœuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo, if sufficient
+warning of its approach is given, and if its position
+with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly
+judged. When experience at the Jutland Battle showed
+that under favourable weather conditions the track of
+German torpedoes was visible for some distance, great
+care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dispatches
+so that future use could be made of the fact.</p>
+
+<p>Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that
+our enemy was almost certain to possess a very considerable
+superiority over us in the number of destroyers likely
+to be present during a Fleet action. This was a question
+which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the then
+First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had discussed
+it on more than one occasion when the destroyer
+building programme was being considered.</p>
+
+<p>Our fears were realised, particularly during the first
+two years of the War.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">396</span></p>
+
+<p>The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect
+at different periods is shown in the following table, so far
+as it is known to <span class="locked">me:—</span></p>
+
+<table id="t396" class="bl section">
+<tr class="bt bb">
+  <td class="tdc" style="width: 20%;">Date</td>
+  <td class="tdc" style="width: 25%;">British destroyers with the Grand Fleet, including Flotilla Leaders<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">P</a></td>
+  <td class="tdc" style="width: 25%;">German destroyers probably attached to the High Sea Fleet</td>
+  <td class="tdl flush" style="width: 30%;">Additional German destroyers, less than 12 years old, that could join the High Sea Fleet at Germany’s selected moment</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">August 4th, 1914</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 42</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">October 1st, 1914</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 42</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 20</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">January 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 42</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 30</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">April 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 58</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> —</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">July 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 65</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> —</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">October 1st, 1915</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 65</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> —</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">January 1st, 1916</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 66</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 50</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">April 1st, 1916</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 74</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> —</td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="bb">
+  <td class="tdl">May 31st, 1916</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 80</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> 88</td>
+  <td class="tdc">  70<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">Q</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">P</a> The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the figures in column 2,
+since I never expected that it would be able to concentrate with the Grand
+Fleet.</p>
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">Q</a> No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in destroyers.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at
+the end of May, 1916, 70 were available to go to sea on
+May 30th (an unusually large proportion). There happened,
+also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight destroyers
+belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied
+the battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which
+47 were with the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet, including the 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had 88, a far
+larger proportion to each ship.</p>
+
+<p>This superiority in numbers on the part of the Germans
+arose from three causes:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and destroyer
+force at Harwich, the presence of which
+force during a Fleet action was very improbable,
+owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">397</span>
+it took place, probably do so at Germany’s selected
+moment and not at ours, and to the difficulty
+of concentration under such circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) The necessity of utilising a large number of our
+destroyers for patrol purposes in the Straits of
+Dover and elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) We had not built an adequate number of destroyers
+in the years before the War to meet the
+many needs that only this class of vessel could fulfil,
+particularly as the enemy developed his submarine
+warfare against merchant-ships.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The shipbuilding programmes of 1908–09, and following
+years up to 1912–13, included provision for twenty
+destroyers each year. Subsequent to the latter date, the
+programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in order
+to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we
+were woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in
+the Estimates, there was never sufficient money to meet
+all the Admiralty’s needs. It was intimated that one or
+other of the requirements had to give way at a time when
+the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and
+as the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary
+than the destroyers, the number of the latter class
+of vessel was reduced.</p>
+
+<p>Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme
+initiated by Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage
+of destroyers was most seriously felt throughout the whole
+War, the conditions would probably have been even worse
+had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been sacrificed
+to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard
+desired by the Admiralty.</p>
+
+<p>A third consideration that was present in my mind
+was the necessity for <i>not leaving anything to chance in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">398</span>
+Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one and only factor
+that was vital to the existence of the Empire</i>, as indeed
+to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle
+Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster
+befall it or even should its margin of superiority over
+the enemy be eliminated.</p>
+
+<p>The situation was in many respects different from that
+with which our Navy was faced in the time of the old wars.
+In those days disaster could only come about by reason
+of bad strategy or tactics owing to our enemy being in
+overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force
+better, and, apart from manœuvring, the action was invariably
+decided by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried
+weapon.</p>
+
+<p>During the recent War two entirely new features of
+the greatest importance were introduced. First, the torpedo
+could be fired at very long range, up to 15,000 yards,
+either from large ships or destroyers, and at shorter range
+from submarines, and the mine had been developed; the
+invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be
+known when they were being employed.</p>
+
+<p>The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious
+when dealing with the attack of under-water weapons
+than with gun attack are the greater damage which
+one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may well be
+fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to
+reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it
+is usually different; a ship which is being heavily hit
+can—if her own offensive powers will not save her by
+crushing the fire of the enemy—so manœuvre as to derange
+temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein
+lies the whole necessity for the exercise of care when dealing
+with the underwater weapon.</p>
+
+<p>These considerations led me to introduce measures<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">399</span>
+for dealing with destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet
+other than the counter of attack by our light craft on
+the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a turn
+on the part of the ships, either <em>towards</em> the torpedoes or
+<em>away</em> from them.</p>
+
+<p>In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so
+that they would present as small a target as possible to
+the torpedo, and incidentally that the space between the
+ships should be correspondingly large. The matter is
+very technical, and presents many interesting features,
+one of which may be illustrated by an example:</p>
+
+<figure id="i_399" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 22em;">
+  <img src="images/i_399.jpg" width="1040" height="541" alt="">
+</figure>
+
+<p>Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships
+to steer direct for the attacking destroyers <em>if the moment
+at which the torpedoes are fired can be ascertained</em>.</p>
+
+<p>This course, although applicable to one attack, leads
+to difficulties in the case of successive attacks, since further
+turns towards will bring the battle line within effective
+range of torpedoes fired from the enemy’s battleships;
+occasions will arise when this risk must be accepted.</p>
+
+<p>The accompanying diagram shows that the van and
+centre squadrons are not so well safeguarded by a turn
+towards the attacking destroyers as is the rear squadron,
+for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire torpedoes from <span class="allsmcap">C</span>
+(a threatening position to the van) and the van squadron<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">400</span>
+turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will
+steer along the line <span class="allsmcap">A B</span>.</p>
+
+<p>If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron
+instead of the van squadron as supposed, and their objective
+is the twentieth ship in the line, they will run along
+the line <span class="allsmcap">C D</span>, i.e., directly at the fourth ship in the line.</p>
+
+<p>The target presented is, however, small, and the
+chances of a flotilla attacking the rear squadron when
+in a favourable position for attacking the van are not
+great.</p>
+
+<p>The important point in the case of a turn towards is,
+however, the necessity for ascertaining the moment of
+discharge of the torpedoes.</p>
+
+<p>In the second case, that of turning away, the object
+is to place the ships at such a distance from the attacking
+destroyers that the torpedoes will not cross their tracks,
+but if this object is not achieved the ships are in a good
+position for avoiding the torpedoes if their tracks are
+visible; the objection to this manœuvre is that the range
+of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened.</p>
+
+<p>It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or
+other of the manœuvres should destroyer attacks take
+place under conditions which prevented an effective
+“counter” by our own light craft; both manœuvres were
+arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn
+by divisions of four ships would delay the completion of
+the manœuvre to too great an extent.</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great
+deal in the way of discussion and instructions on the subject
+of torpedo attack in a Fleet action. The duties of
+light cruisers and destroyers in this connection were dealt
+with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the supreme
+importance both of making early torpedo attacks
+on the enemy’s line and of immediately countering such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">401</span>
+attacks, and it was pointed out that an early attack by
+our own destroyers would not only tend to stop an enemy
+attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best
+position to meet a hostile attack.</p>
+
+<p>The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroyers
+were so fixed that they should be in the best positions
+to effect these two objects, such positions being obviously
+in the van of the Fleet; in order to provide against
+a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment
+in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two
+flotillas, according to the numbers available, and a light
+cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear.</p>
+
+<p>The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been
+a matter of almost daily consideration, and all our experience
+and thought led to the same conclusion, namely,
+that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer attacks,
+would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for
+this belief, and some of them were as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. On each occasion when German vessels were met,
+they had immediately retired towards their bases.</p>
+
+<p>2. The tactical advantages of such a move were obvious.
+They might be enumerated thus:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang1">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of
+advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the following
+fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates,
+to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the
+following fleet.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of
+drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine
+trap.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">402</span>
+with the observation of gunfire by the following
+fleet.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) Considerations of moral effect will force the
+stronger fleet to follow the weaker, and play into
+the hands of the enemy.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<p>We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these
+tactics that in all the many exercises carried out by the
+Fleet during the War, it was the invariable rule to indicate
+beforehand an <em>assumed</em> position of Heligoland,
+and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-Chief
+of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always
+deployed his Fleet in the direction of Heligoland and
+adopted retiring tactics. The difficulties resulting from
+the employment of these retiring tactics and the best
+method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore, the
+subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the
+senior officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very frequently
+discussed and worked out on the tactical board.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if
+retiring tactics are employed in conjunction with a free
+and skilful use of under-water weapons.</p>
+
+<p>When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st,
+1916, these thoughts were in my mind, and were no doubt
+present in the minds of all Flag officers in the British
+Fleet. It has been mentioned that the circumstances of
+the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with any
+degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle
+Fleet, and the deployment of our own Fleet took place
+under these conditions. Even so, however, the course on
+deployment (that is, south-east by east) was to a certain
+extent governed by the idea of getting between the enemy
+and his base on the supposition that he would be making<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">403</span>
+towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef
+Channel.</p>
+
+<p>The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a
+commanding position on the bow of the enemy caused the
+enemy to make a large turn to starboard, largely because
+this squadron—Rear-Admiral Hood’s—was mistaken for
+the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have
+already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that
+at about 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> “dim shapes of enemy battleships are
+discerned in a north-easterly direction.” These shapes
+were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The
+German account states that their battle cruisers turned
+away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Battle
+Fleet the chance of placing itself between the enemy
+and his base. Advantage was taken of this opportunity,
+and the enemy was then forced to pursue his retiring
+tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns
+required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed
+in a position of tactical disadvantage owing to the British
+Fleet working round on a wide circle outside the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets
+will show this at once.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">R</a> The course of the British Fleet
+on deployment was south-east by east. Successive turns
+to starboard brought the course through south by west
+to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13
+points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards
+apart, the German Fleet moving on the inner of these two
+circles.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">R</a> <i>Cf.</i> diagram in the pocket at the end.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans
+erroneously thought was in favour of the British Battle
+Fleet, but which was always with the enemy, was accentuated,
+and the Grand Fleet was gradually brought farther
+and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">404</span>
+placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in
+regard to torpedo attack. This advantage was increased
+by the low visibility, which rendered it difficult to see
+flotillas approaching to attack until they were at fairly
+short range.</p>
+
+<p>When the first attack by German destroyers took
+place and the first of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be
+approaching on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of
+the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and had reached a distance of 9,000 yards
+or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was
+essential. Our own flotillas had been using every endeavour
+to get to the van, but the frequent turns to starboard
+and the movement of our battle cruisers across the
+bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their movement, and
+it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers could
+prevent the attack from developing.</p>
+
+<p>The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be determined
+with sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards”
+and therefore the Battle Fleet was “turned away,” in
+subdivisions.</p>
+
+<p>Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, coincidentally
+with the destroyer attack the enemy made a
+very large turn-away from our Fleet, and thus opened the
+range much farther, disappearing entirely from view even
+from our rear; this process was repeated on each occasion
+of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was,
+therefore, continually refusing action.</p>
+
+<p>It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the
+whole line of battle away for this attack, or whether the
+leading squadron could not have held the original course.
+Such a movement was provided for in the Battle Orders,
+but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000
+yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the
+<i>Iron Duke</i>, the leading ship of the centre battle squadron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">405</span>
+and therefore the leading Battle Squadron was as open
+to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or rear squadron;
+indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to attack
+the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle
+Squadron was also not at the time clear of the van of the
+centre squadron, as the turns that had been made had prevented
+line ahead being re-formed, and the <i>Iron Duke’s</i>
+Division could not turn unless the division ahead also
+turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led
+me to make the signal general to the Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>According to the reports of the captains of the ships
+of the Battle Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed
+the line of our Battle Fleet during the 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> destroyer
+attack alone, in spite of the turn. The large majority
+of these were observed by the ships of the 1st and 5th
+Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have
+crossed the line <em>ahead</em> of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and at least
+six crossed the track of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
+which was moving out to attack the enemy’s flotilla.</p>
+
+<p>In the case of a long line of ships there is always danger
+of the torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being
+forgotten or minimised by ships that are in the van, owing
+to failure to realise how dangerous the torpedo fire of
+ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to vessels a
+long way in rear, although they themselves are quite
+immune from this danger.</p>
+
+<p>The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable
+decentralisation of command, and great stress
+was laid on this point in the general instructions for “Battle
+Tactics.” The opening paragraphs of this section of
+the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It was
+pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would
+control the movements of the whole Battle Fleet before
+and on deployment (except in the extreme case of very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">406</span>
+low visibility rendering it necessary for the Flag officer
+of a wing division to take immediate action), he could
+not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel
+and other smoke made both vision and communication difficult.
+The necessity for wide decentralisation of command
+was then pointed out, combined with a close watch
+on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which
+Flag officers should generally conform.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since
+Trafalgar if we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese
+War, and advantage was naturally taken of the experience
+to make some changes in the Battle Orders; but there
+were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and, therefore,
+no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief
+of the Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet engagement,
+“This is all going according to expectation.”
+We did, however, obtain confirmation of our views as to
+the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted by
+the German fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The principal changes that were made in the Battle
+Orders were in the direction of laying still further emphasis
+on the discretionary power which was vested in
+Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the difficulty,
+always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jutland,
+which the Commander-in-Chief would experience in
+controlling the movements of the whole Fleet in the heat
+of action; also in defining still further the different movements
+that might be adopted to deal with torpedo attacks,
+whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships
+or from destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo
+attacks in action had been prepared by my Staff during
+the spring of 1916, and a memorandum, with diagrams,
+had been written showing the various situations that might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">407</span>
+arise and the effect of the different counter-movements in
+each case. It is of interest to note that this memorandum
+was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was
+fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not
+actually been issued.</p>
+
+<p>The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in
+the memorandum before it was finally issued to the Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and
+the “counter” measures adopted have been dealt with
+at considerable length, since this form of attack and its
+“counter” have been much discussed in the Service since
+1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely to
+continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject
+of much future experiment.</p>
+
+<p>The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any
+great effect, and their importance should not be exaggerated.
+The turn of the British Battle Fleet opened
+the range some 1,750 yards, but <em>it was not this turn which
+led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy</em>.
+That difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet
+made a very large turn to the westward under cover of a
+smoke screen at the moment of launching the earliest destroyer
+attacks. Neither our battle cruisers in the van
+which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary
+in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain
+touch until 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> because of the retirement of
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief,
+in regard to the ranges at which the
+opening phases of the action should be fought, remained
+unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the policy
+of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside
+torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line <em>in ordinary
+circumstances</em>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">408</span></p>
+
+<p>As is very frequently the case when naval actions
+do not result in overwhelming material losses by one side
+or the other, or the capture or destruction of a large part
+of the opposing Fleet, both sides at the time claimed a
+victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped to
+support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet,
+besides influencing neutral, and probably in particular
+American, opinion.</p>
+
+<p>The Germans apparently based their claim on two
+grounds, the first being that of having inflicted heavier
+losses than they received. In order to make good this
+contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk one battleship,
+one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and
+five destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British
+side; and they concealed, until further concealment
+was impossible, the sinking of the battle cruiser <i>Lutzow</i>
+and the light cruiser <i>Rostock</i>, besides omitting to mention
+that the <i>Seydlitz</i> had to be beached to prevent her sinking,
+thereby slurring over the point that the <i>Seydlitz</i> would
+undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own <i>Warrior</i>
+did, had the action been fought as far from German bases
+as it was from British bases. They also said nothing of
+at least four German battleships being torpedoed, and
+of several battleships and all their battle cruisers being
+so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further
+fighting for several months. The case was very different
+with the British ships, as has been already stated.
+If these points are borne in mind, the original German
+claim to victory falls to the ground, even on the material
+side. After the surrender of the German ships in November,
+1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed
+writer on naval matters, stated in the <i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>
+of November 18th that “our Fleet’s losses were severe,”
+adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was clear to every thinking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">409</span>
+person that this battle must, and would be, the last
+one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so
+openly.”</p>
+
+<p>But a victory is judged not merely by material losses
+and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to examine
+the results of the Jutland Battle. With the single
+exception of a cruise towards the English coast on August
+19th, 1916—undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the
+High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show
+that it was still capable of going to sea—the High Sea
+Fleet never again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much
+outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even on August
+19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately
+for home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts
+of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the
+method of procedure that would be adopted by a Fleet
+flushed with victory and belonging to a country which
+was being strangled by the sea blockade.</p>
+
+<p>Again, in the German account of the “victory” it
+is remarked that “as the dawn coloured the eastern sky
+on the historic 1st of June, everyone expected that
+the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed
+in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation
+was not realised. As far as the eye could reach the
+horizon was clear. Not until the late morning did our
+airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce
+that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was
+approaching from the southern part of the North Sea at
+full speed on a northerly course. To the great regret of
+all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to overtake
+and attack theirs.”</p>
+
+<p>What are the facts? We know now that as the sun
+rose, the High Sea Fleet (except such portions as were
+escaping via the Skaw) was close to the Horn Reef,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">410</span>
+steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for
+home behind the shelter of the German minefields.
+And the Grand Fleet was waiting for them to appear
+and searching the waters to the westward and northward
+of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained
+the search during the forenoon of June 1st,
+and the airship, far from sighting the Fleet <em>late in the
+morning</em>, as stated, did so, first at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and on several
+occasions subsequently during the forenoon. And
+if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what
+an opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate
+them! One is forced to the conclusion that this
+victorious fleet did not consider itself capable of engaging
+only twelve British battleships.</p>
+
+<p>I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland
+Battle without mentioning the personnel of the Fleet.
+From the second in command, Sir Cecil Burney, to the
+youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell in the
+<i>Chester</i>, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit
+and determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and
+trusted friend, a fine seaman who always handled his
+squadron—or, in my absence, the Fleet—with marked
+skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a high
+reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton
+Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer
+who had made a special study of tactics; Rear-Admiral
+Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, including
+my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir
+Robert Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose
+deaths the nation and Fleet lost of their best—were all
+officers of proved ability, in whom not myself only, but
+the Fleet, had absolute confidence.</p>
+
+<p>In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed
+a leader who throughout his Service career had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">411</span>
+shown fighting qualities of the highest order, and he had
+imbued his force with his own indomitable spirit.</p>
+
+<p>The Flag officers second in command of squadrons
+had all led divisions for a considerable period, and I was
+confident that they would handle their divisions as well
+in action as they did during exercises, as proved to be
+the case.</p>
+
+<p>The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons
+and destroyer flotillas had invariably fulfilled every expectation
+that I had formed of them. I had always admired
+the manner in which the personnel of these vessels
+had endured the conditions under which their work was
+so frequently performed.</p>
+
+<p>Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-Admiral
+Sir Charles Madden (my righthand man
+throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its chief
+members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag
+officers, and with captains who had on countless occasions
+shown their skill, I was indeed in a fortunate position.</p>
+
+<p>To the above advantages I must add those obtained
+by the magnificence of the personnel of the lower ranks.
+The officers and ships’ companies were as keen as any
+Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait had
+never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Officers
+and men were day after day striving to perfect the
+fighting efficiency of their ships, and well had they succeeded.
+The engine room staffs had demonstrated early
+in the War that they would respond magnificently to any
+demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it
+on the occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and
+moral of the Fleet never stood higher than at the time
+of the Battle of Jutland, and because of that spirit I
+knew that the Fleet under my command was the most
+formidable fighting machine in the world.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">412</span></p>
+
+<p>Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with
+proper restraint. Whenever and wherever there was opportunity,
+officers and men displayed courage and self-sacrifice
+of the highest order. There were innumerable
+instances which proved that the personnel of the present
+Navy has nothing to learn in this respect from its forefathers.
+The dead died heroic deaths; the wounded behaved
+with marvellous fortitude. Forty-four years
+passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith in,
+and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket,
+but they surpassed all my expectations, and so long as
+that spirit endures, this country will be fortunate, and
+with adequate forces will be safe.</p>
+
+<p>It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum
+issued to the Fleet after the Jutland Battle:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><i>Iron Duke</i>,</span><br>
+June 4th, 1916.
+</p>
+
+<p class="in0">H.F. 0022 349.</p>
+
+<p class="in0">MEMORANDUM.</p>
+
+<p>I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains,
+Officers and Men of the Grand Fleet my very high
+appreciation of the manner in which the ships were
+fought during the action on May 31st, 1916.</p>
+
+<p>2. At this stage, when full information is not available,
+it is not possible to enter into details, but quite
+sufficient is already known to enable me to state definitely
+that the glorious traditions handed down to us
+by generations of gallant seamen were most worthily
+upheld.</p>
+
+<p>3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable
+nature robbed the Fleet of that complete victory
+which I know was expected by all ranks, which is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">413</span>
+necessary for the safety of the Empire and which
+will yet be ours.</p>
+
+<p>4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most
+gallant comrades, but, although it is very difficult to
+obtain accurate information as to the enemy losses,
+I have no doubt that we shall find that they are certainly
+not less than our own. Sufficient information
+has already been received for me to make that statement
+with confidence.</p>
+
+<p>I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information
+on this point at an early date, but do not wish
+to delay the issue of this expression of my keen
+appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my confidence
+in future complete victory.</p>
+
+<p>5. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful
+spirit and fortitude of the wounded has filled me
+with the greatest admiration.</p>
+
+<p>I am more proud than ever to have the honour of
+commanding a fleet manned by such officers and men.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span class="larger" style="margin-right: 2em;">J.&nbsp;R. JELLICOE.</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 4em;">Admiral,</span><br>
+Commander-in-Chief.
+</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><span class="larger">The Flag Officers, Commodores<br>
+and Officers in command of<br>
+H.M. ships of the Grand Fleet.</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>My official despatch on the battle to the Board of
+Admiralty was forwarded on June 19th, and the
+following letter was afterwards promulgated to the
+Grand <span class="locked">Fleet:—</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">414</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><span class="smcap">Admiralty</span>,</span><br>
+July 4th, 1916.
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
+have considered your reports on the action off
+the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under
+your command and the German High Sea Fleet on
+the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral
+Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and
+those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding
+Officers of the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen,
+and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the
+first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak
+of the war, as a result of which the enemy,
+severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The
+events of the 31st May and 1st June gave ample
+proof of the gallantry and devotion which characterised
+all who took part in the battle; the ships of
+every class were handled with skill and determination;
+their steaming under battle conditions afforded
+a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the
+engineering staff; while individual initiative and tactical
+subordination were equally conspicuous.</p>
+
+<p>3. The results of the action prove that the officers
+and men of the Grand Fleet have known both
+how to study the new problems with which they are
+confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account.
+The expectations of the country were high;
+they have been well fulfilled.</p>
+
+<p>4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their
+full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,<br>
+<span style="margin-right: 3.5em;"><span class="smcap">W. Graham Greene</span>.</span>
+</p>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">415</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVI"><span id="toclink_415"></span>CHAPTER XVI<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S
+FAREWELL</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> ships which had received damage in the Jutland
+Battle had to be repaired without delay. The great
+majority of the repairs were completed during June
+or by the first week in July, and, whilst under repair,
+the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations
+which experience gained in the action had shown
+to be desirable. The <i>Marlborough</i> was the only large
+ship whose repairs occupied any considerable length of
+time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in August, although
+the work upon her was handicapped to some extent
+by being carried out in a floating dock moored in a
+somewhat inconvenient position. The light cruiser
+<i>Chester</i> was also detained at Hull until July 29th, as
+her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a
+great many alterations were carried out. The principal
+points affecting <i lang="fr">matériel</i> to which attention was directed
+were:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang1">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent
+the flash of cordite charges, ignited by the explosion
+of a shell in a turret or in positions between
+the turret and the magazine, being communicated
+to the magazine itself. It was probable
+that the loss of one, if not two, of our battle
+cruisers was due to this cause, after the armour
+had been pierced.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">416</span></p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Better measures were required to prevent the
+charges of small guns from being ignited by
+bursting shell, and to localise any fires due to this
+cause, in the case of guns of the secondary battery
+in large ships, and the main armament in
+small ships.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) Increased deck armour protection in large
+ships had been shown to be desirable in order
+that shell or fragments of shell might not reach
+the magazines. This need was particularly felt
+in all our earlier ships of the Dreadnought type,
+since their side armour was not carried to the
+upper deck level. The long range at which most
+modern sea actions are fought, and the consequent
+large angle of descent of the projectiles
+made our ships very vulnerable in this respect.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) The pressing need for a better armour-piercing
+projectile with an improved fuze was also
+revealed.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>e</i>) Improved arrangements for flooding magazines
+and drenching exposed cartridges had to
+be made.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet
+to deal with all questions of this nature, as well as the
+important matter of possible developments in the fire-control
+system with a view to improving the methods of
+correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled”
+with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great
+gunnery knowledge and experience of Captain F.&nbsp;C.
+Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were of immense assistance,
+and he was most ably seconded by the numerous highly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">417</span>
+skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers
+and in the ships of the fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The action taken in connection with these matters
+was prompt, with the gratifying result that before I relinquished
+the command of the Fleet, the great majority
+of the heavy ships had been provided with additional
+deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings
+for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work
+was carried out while the ships were at their usual notice
+for steam, much of it being actually done at Scapa Flow
+by the dockyard artificers berthed there on board the
+<i>Victorious</i>: the work carried out by these artificers and
+by the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with
+most commendable rapidity.</p>
+
+<p>Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty,
+as First Sea Lord, and under the immediate direction
+of Captain Dreyer, then Director of Naval Ordnance, a
+new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new
+type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for
+guns of 12-inch calibre and above, which certainly doubled
+their offensive power.</p>
+
+<p>The investigation into the possibility of further development
+in fire-correction methods, a subject to which
+constant attention had been given throughout the War,
+was at first carried out by two independent committees.
+Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee,
+composed of the most experienced and most successful
+gunnery officers in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as
+the result, drawn up and passed for adoption in the Fleet;
+these had already produced a most convincing and most
+satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of fire before
+I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no
+exaggeration to say that the average time taken to find<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">418</span>
+the gun range of the enemy with these new methods was
+about one half of that previously required.</p>
+
+<p>Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders.
+The majority had been installed in the Fleet before the
+great increases in the range of opening effective fire had
+come about, as the result of experience during the War.
+Our most modern ships at Jutland were provided with
+range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of the
+ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet
+long. During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply
+range-finders up to 25 and 30 feet in length; a series of
+experiments with stereoscopic range-finders was also instituted
+in the same year. It had become known that the
+Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be
+stated, in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that
+the developments introduced in the fire-control arrangements
+of the Grand Fleet after the Battle of Jutland
+did not affect the <em>instruments</em> already in use, which fully
+met our requirements, but the <em>methods</em> of using those
+instruments and particularly the system of correction of
+fire.</p>
+
+<p>On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and
+Cruiser Squadrons were re-organised as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hangw">
+<p class="center b1"><span class="smcap">Battle Cruiser Squadron</span></p>
+
+<p class="center"><i>Lion</i> (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet).</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Princess Royal</i> (Flag), <i>New Zealand</i>, <i>Tiger</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="hang"><i>2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Australia</i> (Flag), <i>Indomitable</i>, <i>Inflexible</i>.</p>
+
+<p class="p1 b1 center"><span class="smcap">Cruiser Squadrons</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Minotaur</i> (Flag), <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, <i>Cochrane</i>, <i>Shannon</i>, <i>Achilles</i>, <i>Donegal</i>.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">419</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang"><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br>
+<i>Antrim</i>, <i>Roxburgh</i>, <i>Devonshire</i>.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived
+at Scapa <i lang="fr">en route</i> to Archangel. In the morning he
+crossed from Thurso in the <i>Oak</i>, and came on board the
+<i>Iron Duke</i> on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me,
+and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him.
+Before lunch we went round the ship. The officers and
+men naturally greeted him with much respect, and he can
+have had no doubt of the admiration in which he was held.
+During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming trip,
+and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it
+as a real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he confessed,
+had been very great, adding that he had felt that
+he could not have gone on without this break, which he
+welcomed very much. He was not, however, very
+sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He mentioned
+the difficulty which he experienced in dealing with
+questions discussed in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by
+most soldiers and sailors, whose training does not fit them
+to state or to argue a case, and who frequently find great
+difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule, accustomed
+to carry out their ideas without having first to bring conviction
+to the minds of men who, although possessing
+great general knowledge and administrative experience,
+have naturally but little acquaintance with naval and
+military affairs which in themselves form a lifelong
+study.</p>
+
+<p>After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland
+action, and Lord Kitchener evinced much interest in
+the tactics and the general story of the action.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the
+idea that he was working to a time-table, and that
+he felt that he had not a day to lose. He mentioned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">420</span>
+three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed
+astonishment at the programme which he had planned
+to carry out in the restricted period. He was most
+anxious not to lose a moment on the sea trip and
+asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest
+time in which the passage could be made.</p>
+
+<p>During the day the weather at Scapa, which had
+been bad in the morning, gradually became worse,
+and by the afternoon it was blowing a gale from the
+north-eastward. It had been originally intended that
+the <i>Hampshire</i> should take the route which passed
+up the eastern side of the Orkneys, following the
+channel ordinarily searched by mine-sweeping vessels as
+a routine measure; but as the north-easterly gale
+was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweeping
+was out of the question, and it was also obvious
+that the escorting destroyers could not face the sea
+at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which
+route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest,
+and finally decided that the <i>Hampshire</i> should pass
+close in shore, and not take the alternative route
+passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry
+Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this decision
+<span class="locked">were:—</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang1">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) With a north-easterly wind there would be less
+sea and, therefore, more chance of the destroyers
+being able to keep up with the <i>Hampshire</i>.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) It was practically impossible that this route
+could have been mined by any surface mine-layer
+owing to the dark period in Northern
+latitudes being confined to a couple of hours,
+during which no ship could expect to approach
+the shore for mine-laying without having first
+been sighted.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">421</span></p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries,
+and was, therefore, under frequent observation.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines
+had been confined to water well to the southward of the
+Firth of Forth, presumably because of their small radius
+of action. Danger from this source was, therefore, considered
+to be very remote.</p>
+
+<p>Finally the weather itself was a protection against
+submarine attack which was at that time more to be
+feared than the danger from submarine laid mines.
+Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not
+been practicable for three or four days owing to the
+weather conditions.</p>
+
+<p>At about 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Lord Kitchener proceeded on board
+the <i>Hampshire</i>, accompanied by his Staff comprising
+Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F. Donaldson, Colonel
+FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr.
+Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-Lieutenant
+McPherson, Cameron Highlanders. The
+<i>Hampshire</i> sailed at 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> escorted by two destroyers.
+Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16
+knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers
+back if they could not maintain the <i>Hampshire’s</i> speed.
+Experience had proved that high speed was a valuable
+protection against submarines.</p>
+
+<p>At about 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Captain Savill, commanding the
+<i>Hampshire</i>, ordered the two destroyers back to Scapa,
+as they were unable to face the heavy seas at the
+speed of the <i>Hampshire</i>. Between 7.30 and 7.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+the <i>Hampshire</i> struck a mine about 1½ miles off shore,
+between the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head;
+she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The incident was
+witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone message<span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">422</span>
+was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys
+and Shetlands that the cruiser was in difficulties.
+He at once ordered out patrol vessels and informed me,
+with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene
+immediately.</p>
+
+<p>The evidence of the few survivors of the <i>Hampshire</i>
+showed that Lord Kitchener was below when the ship
+was mined, and that an officer escorted him on deck.
+Captain Savill was heard to give directions from the
+bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and
+his Staff, and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently
+on deck, but was not seen after the ship sank. The
+weather conditions prevented any boats being hoisted
+out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the
+ship sank.</p>
+
+<p>The scene of the disaster was searched during the night
+by destroyers and patrol craft, but the only survivors
+were twelve men who drifted ashore on a Carley raft, although
+many bodies were picked up by the searching
+vessels, and many drifted ashore.</p>
+
+<p>The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.</p>
+
+<p>At the time of the disaster the <i>Hampshire</i> was
+steaming at 13½ knots, the wind being north-north-west,
+with a force of 50 miles an hour. The cold water
+and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest
+swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which
+was north-east at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at Scapa, had become north-north-west
+by the time the <i>Hampshire</i> was outside, and
+there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the Orkneys,
+as had been anticipated.</p>
+
+<p>The hours that passed after the receipt of the report
+of the <i>Hampshire</i> being in difficulties were most anxious
+ones. In spite of the fact that the destroyers had
+been sent back, it seemed almost incredible that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">423</span>
+wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as
+was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow
+were not so bad as to indicate so extremely heavy a
+sea off the Brough of Birsay; and even when it was
+reported that the <i>Hampshire</i> had sunk (a report which
+took some time to come through), there was hope that,
+at any rate, Lord Kitchener and his mission would be
+saved by boat. As the hours passed and no news was
+received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety
+became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the
+certainty that this great man, who had served his
+country so faithfully and well in its greatest emergency,
+had met his death when under the care of the Navy,
+the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord
+Kitchener had inspired the Service with confidence
+and trust. The Navy had frequently worked under
+him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been
+one of the outstanding figures in the European War
+on the side of the Entente. Everyone in the Grand
+Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had fallen
+upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the
+feelings of the Fleet generally were intensified in me,
+on whom lay the main responsibility for his safe
+passage to Archangel, so far as such safety could be
+ensured.</p>
+
+<p>I have often wondered since that fatal day whether
+anything could have been done that was not done,
+but short of postponing the departure of the <i>Hampshire</i>
+altogether, until weather conditions admitted
+of a channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could
+have been done. Such a decision would have resulted
+in two or three days’ delay in starting, and would never
+have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover,
+with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">424</span>
+mine-laying possibilities, I did not consider the delay
+necessary as I should not have hesitated, if need had
+arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to sea on the same
+night and by the same route as that traversed by
+the <i>Hampshire</i>.</p>
+
+<p>My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming.
+There was, at first, doubt in the minds of some people
+as to whether the loss of the <i>Hampshire</i> was due to
+a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were set
+at rest by the sweeping operations which were undertaken
+as soon as the weather admitted. They resulted
+in the discovery of moored mines of the type laid in
+southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines
+being easily distinguishable from those laid by surface
+vessels.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of June cruisers were kept constantly
+patrolling the route to Archangel to protect
+shipping against possible enemy raiders, as the traffic
+was very heavy at this period. The <i>Donegal</i>, <i>Antrim</i>,
+<i>Devonshire</i> and <i>Roxburgh</i> were the vessels employed.
+They visited the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of
+Stadlandet, <i lang="fr">en route</i> to and from patrol, with a view to
+intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick.</p>
+
+<p>The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla
+were employed in watching the waters in the Kattegat
+and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the Norwegian
+coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft.
+A regular submarine patrol was also begun off the
+Horn Reef, and was continued up to the time of my
+relinquishing command of the Fleet. At first two,
+and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol,
+which was of great utility in giving information of the
+movements of the few enemy surface vessels that ever
+ventured so far from their base, and also proved of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">425</span>
+use for attacking enemy submarines. At the commencement,
+the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and
+look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with
+that of the German submarines, by reason of their bad
+wireless equipment, which admitted of a range of
+some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were
+attached to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly
+the absolute necessity of effecting an improvement in
+this particular, stating that I was quite prepared to
+sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this
+be necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install
+efficient wireless apparatus in the only class of vessel
+that could carry out a watching patrol in the vicinity
+of German bases. Eventually arrangements were made
+to provide them with a wireless installation which gave
+a range of 300 to 400 miles.</p>
+
+<p>When our submarines had been equipped in this
+way we were at once able to establish an efficient
+chain of outposts off the Horn Reef by the Grand
+Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the northward
+the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the
+result that in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult
+for the enemy to put to sea unobserved and unreported.
+The comparative inefficiency of the wireless installation
+in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our
+destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had
+to face during the first two years of War. It should be
+added that while patrolling in the Kattegat, submarine
+G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside territorial
+waters, the German steamship <i>Ems</i>, on passage from
+Christiania to Lübeck with oil, zinc and copper. The
+crew were rescued.</p>
+
+<p>The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the
+month, other than the usual patrols, were as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">426</span></p>
+
+<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers,
+left Rosyth on the 14th for the Naze, thence steered
+up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and returned to
+Rosyth.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Comus</i> and <i>Constance</i> left Scapa on the 25th,
+swept down the Norwegian coast and returned on
+the 27th.</p>
+
+<p>The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers carried
+out a similar sweep from Rosyth between the 29th
+June and July 1st.</p>
+
+<p>On June 22nd the first mines from a British submarine
+mine-layer were laid by E 41 in the German
+Bight.</p>
+
+<p>His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with
+a visit on the 14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in
+the <i>Oak</i>, at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, being escorted by the destroyers of
+the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round the Fleet in
+the <i>Oak</i>, His Majesty proceeded on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>,
+where he spent the night. On the following day the
+King visited all the flagships, on board of which a large
+percentage of officers and men from the various squadrons
+were assembled, and left for Thurso in the <i>Oak</i> at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>,
+proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth, honouring
+the squadrons at each of these bases with a
+visit.</p>
+
+<p>His Majesty addressed a representative gathering
+of officers and men from the ships at Scapa, who had
+been assembled on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> on the morning
+of the 15th in the following <span class="locked">terms:—</span></p>
+
+<p>“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand
+Fleet, you have waited for nearly two years with most
+exemplary patience for the opportunity of meeting and
+engaging the enemy’s fleet.</p>
+
+<p>“I can well understand how trying has been this period,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">427</span>
+and how great must have been the relief when you knew
+on May 31st that the enemy had been sighted.</p>
+
+<p>“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching
+darkness prevented that complete result which you all
+expected, but you did all that was possible in the circumstances.
+You drove the enemy into his harbours, and
+inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet
+another page to the glorious traditions of the British
+Navy.</p>
+
+<p>“You could not do more, and for your splendid work
+I thank you.”</p>
+
+<p>The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+during June, gave as the <span class="locked">figures:—</span></p>
+
+<p>No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No.
+sent in, 20; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports
+or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to a given patrol, 8; No. on special
+service, 1.</p>
+
+<p>A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during
+the month—especially in the latter half—and this interfered
+somewhat with the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
+A very dense fog prevailed in the Pentland Firth
+on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally from
+the northward, were prevalent during the first portion
+of the month, and a northerly gale occurred on the
+5th.</p>
+
+<p>No large Fleet movements took place during June,
+as it was known that the greater part of the High Sea
+Fleet was under repair as the result of the Jutland
+action.</p>
+
+<p>During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only engaged
+in one cruise, namely, from the 17th to the 20th.
+The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 2nd
+and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
+the <i>Campania</i>, with sea-planes, and destroyer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">428</span>
+flotillas left Scapa between noon and 1.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the
+17th, and proceeded to the northward and eastward
+of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of
+carrying out a series of battle exercises on the 18th
+and 19th; they were based on the experience gained
+of enemy tactics during the Jutland action. Some of
+the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise,
+and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during
+the forenoon of the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships
+approached the Pentland Firth, making entry somewhat
+difficult.</p>
+
+<p>Cruiser movements during the month <span class="locked">comprised:—</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang1">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by
+Grand Fleet Cruisers to protect trade against
+raiders.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) The establishment on the 7th of a regular
+patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an
+area well to the northward of the Shetlands, this
+patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and
+armed boarding-steamer which had been previously
+placed there.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) Extensive dispositions were made on the
+9th to intercept a German raider reported
+from neutral quarters, as about to leave for
+the Atlantic. These dispositions included a
+close patrol by two light cruiser squadrons and
+eight destroyers from Rosyth of an area 80 to
+100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which
+it was expected the enemy would pass; a further
+patrol by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
+and six destroyers was established farther north
+to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels;
+two cruisers were ordered to patrol north of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">429</span>
+the Shetlands, local patrol vessels being between
+these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half
+flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island
+Channel.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">S</a></p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left
+Rosyth on the 12th and swept up the Norwegian
+coast and back, returning on the 15th.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>e</i>) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six
+destroyers repeated the sweep, returning on the
+20th.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>f</i>) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroyers
+left Rosyth and swept to the southward in
+the direction of the Horn Reef from a position
+near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having
+sighted anything.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>g</i>) Two light cruisers and four destroyers repeated
+the sweep of the Norwegian coast on the
+24th.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>h</i>) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four
+destroyers, left Rosyth on the 26th, and proceeded
+to a position to the westward of the Little
+Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to
+the Naze on the look out for enemy raiders or
+Zeppelins, reports having been received of the frequent
+presence of Zeppelins on this line; the force
+turned to the northward from the Naze and swept
+along the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceeding
+thence to Scapa. The sweep was again uneventful.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">S</a> The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy vessels being
+sighted; the report was probably incorrect.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla
+were active during the month in the Kattegat and patrolling
+off the Horn Reef. They reported on the 20th<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">430</span>
+that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft were
+visible.</p>
+
+<p>The attacks by enemy submarines on warships reported
+during the month were:</p>
+
+<p>The mine-sweeping sloop <i>Rosemary</i> of the Southern
+Force was torpedoed on the 4th, but was towed into the
+Humber.</p>
+
+<p>The light cruiser <i>Galatea</i> was missed by a torpedo on
+the 12th, in Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E.</p>
+
+<p>The armed boarding-steamer <i>Duke of Cornwall</i> was
+missed by two torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged
+in boarding a ship south-east of the Pentland
+Skerries.</p>
+
+<p>The light cruiser <i>Yarmouth</i> was missed by a torpedo
+on the 26th.</p>
+
+<p>Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were
+sunk by the gunfire of four enemy submarines, on the
+11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11 E., their guns being
+entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which the submarines
+are armed. This combined attack on the trawlers
+of the Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the
+regrettable loss of the three trawlers, was a great and
+well deserved tribute paid by the enemy to the work
+of that patrol which had been uniformly successful,
+and had proved a great annoyance to the German submarines.</p>
+
+<p>Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy submarines
+on the 7th, to the eastward of the Pentland Firth;
+on the 12th, two divisions of destroyers were sent from
+Scapa to attack the submarine that had fired at the <i>Duke
+of Cornwall</i>, the <i>Musketeer</i> dropping a depth charge close
+to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought considerably
+damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-planes
+from Scapa were sent after a submarine reported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">431</span>
+by the armed boarding steamer <i>Dundee</i> as sighted 10
+miles east-south-east of the Pentland Skerries, but she
+was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of destroyers
+again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity,
+but failed to do so.</p>
+
+<p>Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered
+by the sweeping trawlers in the southern channel in the
+Moray Firth on the 26th, and were swept up by trawlers
+and fleet sweepers before any damage was done.</p>
+
+<p>The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+showed:</p>
+
+<p>No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No.
+sent in, 23; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or
+<i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 10; No. on special service, 0.</p>
+
+<p>The armed merchant-steamer <i>Arlanza</i>, after temporary
+repairs at Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July
+for refit.</p>
+
+<p>The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist
+being experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on
+the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd, 24th and 25th.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of August the principal cruiser
+movements, apart from those in connection with the Battle
+Fleet, were as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang1">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers
+in an area well to the northward of the Shetlands
+was continued.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-patrol
+seaward of the Fleet bases was maintained.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route
+was continued.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as follows:</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">432</span></p>
+
+<p>On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers
+left Rosyth for a sweep down the Norwegian coast, returning
+on the 3rd, having sighted nothing of interest;
+on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers from
+Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30
+N., Long. 5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th,
+without result. On the 12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
+with four destroyers, left Scapa and proceeded towards
+Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of
+10 British merchant-ships which had been brought out of
+the Baltic. These vessels were escorted across the North
+Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy arrived safely on
+the 14th.</p>
+
+<p>On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers
+<i>Dundee</i> and <i>King Orry</i>, which had been disguised as
+merchant-ships, left Scapa for operations off the Norwegian
+coast. It was hoped that they would be able to
+close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband without
+exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better
+chance of capturing them than any vessel having the
+appearance of a warship. The <i>Dundee</i> operated between
+Udsire and Lister, and the <i>King Orry</i> off Stadlandet,
+both being localities in which ships were in the habit of
+leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser <i>Constance</i>
+and two destroyers were sent to support the <i>Dundee</i>,
+keeping well to seaward of her, as that ship was operating
+in waters in which enemy warships might be found. The
+operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying a
+cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being
+sent in.</p>
+
+<p>On the 30th the <i>Abdiel</i> left Scapa to lay mines in the
+vicinity of the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation
+successfully, and without being observed, on the night of
+the 31st–1st.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">433</span></p>
+
+<p>The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kattegat
+and in the vicinity of the Horn Reef continued.
+The submarines, returning on the 17th, reported having
+been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the
+Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to
+operate against this vessel, but met with no success.</p>
+
+<p>Casualties to war-vessels during the month included:
+The light cruiser <i>Cleopatra</i>, of the Harwich force,
+which was mined on the 4th near the Thornton Ridge
+off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be
+repaired; the destroyer <i>Lassoo</i>, also of the Harwich force,
+was sunk by mine or submarine near the Maas Lightship
+off the Dutch coast on the 13th; the armed boarding-steamer
+<i>Duke of Albany</i> was sunk by a submarine on
+the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries,
+with considerable loss of life, including Commander
+G.&nbsp;N. Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-planes,
+and an airship were sent out from Scapa
+at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of
+her, although the armed boarding-steamer <i>Duke of
+Clarence</i> which had stood by the <i>Duke of Albany</i> and
+rescued the survivors reported that she had passed
+over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser
+<i>Blonde</i> went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland
+Firth, in thick weather on the 10th, but was lightened
+and towed off on the 11th, having sustained considerable
+injuries; the battleships <i>Warspite</i> and <i>Valiant</i>
+collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the
+24th, whilst, respectively, returning from and proceeding
+to the night firing area, both ships being considerably
+damaged, with the result that they had to
+be docked.</p>
+
+<p>On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_434">434</span>
+an enemy submarine, and the departure of the <i>Marlborough</i>
+from the Tyne was thereby delayed; the coincidence
+that mines were frequently laid in this neighbourhood
+when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs,
+led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that
+locality. On the 4th or 5th August a considerable number
+of mines of the submarine type were also laid in the War
+channel in the White Sea by enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>On August 3rd four “C” class submarines left the
+Nore in tow of tugs for Archangel, <i lang="fr">en route</i> by the canal
+system for service in the Baltic. These submarines performed
+very useful work in those waters during the year
+1917.</p>
+
+<p>The increase in mine-laying by German submarines
+gave rise to anxiety that the movements of the Grand
+Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields near the bases
+at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new
+mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was
+strengthened during July by withdrawing a certain number
+of trawlers from patrol duty in order to form a mine-sweeping
+flotilla; during the latter half of 1916 the Grand
+Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty comprised
+two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as
+well as two flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in
+addition one flotilla of paddle mine-sweepers was based
+on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These flotillas were
+all additional to the small local sweeping force of trawlers
+at the various fleet bases.</p>
+
+<p>On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea
+for a sweep in southern waters. The presence of an unusually
+large number of submarines in the North Sea—a
+phenomenon which had been observed shortly before
+the Jutland Battle—had suggested the possibility of
+movement on the part of the enemy and a sweep appeared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">435</span>
+desirable. The <i>Iron Duke</i>, after leaving Scapa Flow,
+proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet
+screened by two destroyers to communicate with the
+<i>Royalist</i>, and at 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as the ships were about to communicate,
+a submarine on the starboard bow, about 250
+yards off, fired a torpedo, which passed close astern of the
+screening destroyer <i>Onslaught</i> on that bow. Only one
+torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the
+attack, and did not get into the position intended for attacking
+the <i>Iron Duke</i>, which was proceeding at high
+speed, and zigzagging, and, therefore, fired at the <i>Onslaught</i>
+instead. Communication between the <i>Iron Duke</i>
+and <i>Royalist</i> was deferred until after dark in consequence
+of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal.</p>
+
+<p>The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid
+the submarine, and passed her without further incident,
+and the Battle Fleet and cruisers concentrated at daylight
+on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,”
+steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17
+knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a
+position 30 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+on the 19th the <i>Nottingham</i>, one of the light cruiser
+screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst zigzagging at
+20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34
+N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the
+torpedoes struck the port side almost simultaneously. The
+first report indicated that she had been hit by mines <em>or</em>
+torpedoes, and, until it was clear that a mine-field did not
+exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this locality,
+and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascertained
+that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this
+became clear the southward course of the Fleet was
+shaped to pass to the eastward of the submarine. Meanwhile
+the <i>Dublin</i> cruised at high speed in the vicinity of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">436</span>
+the <i>Nottingham</i> for the purpose of keeping the submarine
+down so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Nottingham</i> was hit by a third torpedo, and it
+became evident that she could not float much longer. Her
+boats were lowered, and the majority of the ship’s company
+placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, just
+as the destroyers <i>Penn</i> and <i>Oracle</i>, which had been sent
+to her assistance, arrived on the scene. These two destroyers
+picked up all the survivors, except Captain Miller,
+one officer, and several men who remained on board
+until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter
+from the <i>Dublin</i>. Several torpedoes were fired at the
+<i>Dublin</i> and the two destroyers during their work of rescue,
+but all fortunately missed.</p>
+
+<p>From 8.24 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> onwards Zeppelins were frequently
+in sight from both the Battle Fleet, and the Battle
+Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at, but they kept at too
+long a range for our fire to be effective. The <i>Galatea</i>
+sighted the first airship at 8.24 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and the second was
+seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; at 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore
+Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force,
+reported himself in position Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E.,
+and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He stated later
+that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole
+period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received
+from the patrol trawler <i>Ramexo</i> that she had two Zeppelins
+in sight in Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E. It was evident
+that a very large force of airships was out. A total of at
+least ten was identified by our directional wireless stations
+and they appeared to stretch right across the North
+Sea.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a report was received from submarine
+E 23, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, that she had
+sighted ships of the High Sea Fleet steering west at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_437">437</span>
+9.19 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; the position as received in the signal appeared
+incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 N.,
+Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional
+wireless stations also led me to consider that a
+ship of the High Sea Fleet was in the position named at
+5.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, instead of at 9.19 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> On the return of E 23
+to Harwich, her captain reported that he had attacked
+the battle cruiser <i>Derfflinger</i> unsuccessfully at 3.13 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+on the 20th. At 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, in spite of the strong enemy destroyer
+screen, he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship
+of the first Battle Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau”
+type. This ship turned for home on being torpedoed,
+and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but
+at 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her,
+and the captain of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was
+sunk. Subsequent information, however, showed that she
+reached port in a damaged condition; the persistent action
+of the captain of E 23 in the face of great opposition,
+was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our
+submarine service.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our
+directional wireless stations, speed was increased, and
+course shaped to a position at which it was hoped the
+High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that
+fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in
+the neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention
+was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40
+E., where the Fleet would be favourably placed either to
+engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him
+off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience
+of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his
+objective the bombardment would be carried out either
+shortly before dusk, or at daylight, in order to facilitate
+escape afterwards, or approach before, unobserved. In<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">438</span>
+the possible alternative of the movement being designed
+to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably
+placed to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle
+Fleet was in position Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering
+south-south-east. Submarines were sighted by the
+cruiser <i>Minotaur</i> at 1.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and by the light cruiser
+<i>Boadicea</i> at 1.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; both these ships were in the vicinity
+of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary
+to avoid the submarines; this caused some slight delay
+in the southward movement.</p>
+
+<p>The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea
+in readiness to meet the Fleet, if required, and during
+the forenoon of the 19th, was directed to spread on a line
+running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, where the submarines
+would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a
+position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed
+towards our coast north of Flamborough Head; in
+such an event the enemy would be between the Fleet and
+the submarines.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Active</i>, with nine destroyers of the newly formed
+4th Flotilla in the Humber, which was also at sea, was
+directed to join the Battle Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>At 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received information by wireless that
+directional wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in a position approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long.
+1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> was in Lat. 55.15
+N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was well
+ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the
+same course after 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> as it had steered between
+5.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, which would take them to
+Hartlepool, it was evident that it might be sighted at any
+moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance between
+the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal
+was therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">439</span>
+Sea Fleet might be encountered at any moment. The
+meeting appeared to be so certain that I arranged the
+distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the assumption
+that the enemy would turn to the eastward on
+meeting us, I directed a concentration of fire of ships that
+would be ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> on deployment, of two
+ships on one, leaving the <i>Iron Duke</i> to deal with one
+ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate firing at
+Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to
+us. The weather was clear. There seemed to be a very
+good prospect that we might, on gaining touch with the
+enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was in a position to cut
+off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was probable
+that we should be to the eastward, although farther north.
+Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy
+elect to make for our coast and try to escape to the northward,
+where he would have found himself between the
+Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time passed, however,
+and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came
+in from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High
+Sea Fleet had turned back, probably owing to the fact
+that the Zeppelins had warned the German Commander-in-Chief
+of our presence and movements. On this assumption,
+at 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt
+to steer for a position to the north-westward of Terschelling,
+so that he might be ready to deliver a night attack
+on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich force.</p>
+
+<p>It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would
+leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or submarines,
+or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines already
+sighted made it probable that the trap was extensive;
+it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters
+which he had occupied unless there was a prospect of
+bringing the High Sea Fleet to action.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">440</span></p>
+
+<p>It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight
+by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and if he had turned for home, it would be
+impossible to bring him to action; I therefore passed a
+visual signal out at 3.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to Sir David Beatty to the
+effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was
+in sight by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>At 3.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding
+the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine
+in sight, and I signalled to Sir David Beatty to turn
+at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to the submarines
+was correct.</p>
+
+<p>At 3.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and
+the cruisers ahead to turn. At this time I received information
+from our directional wireless stations that
+enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 E., at 2.45
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> It was evident then that the enemy was returning
+to his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore
+turned the Battle Fleet at 3.56 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when in Lat. 54.40
+N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the course to pass up the
+searched channel so as to avoid mines.</p>
+
+<p>At 4.52 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Falmouth</i> of the 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadron in Lat. 54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by
+two torpedoes, one right forward, and one right aft. The
+ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the time, and
+the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the
+torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard
+bow after she had been hit. The <i>Chester</i>, stationed
+astern of the <i>Falmouth</i>, proceeded at full speed to zigzag
+in the vicinity with the object of keeping the submarine
+submerged and preventing further attack. Another torpedo
+was fired at the <i>Falmouth</i> at 5.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but missed.</p>
+
+<p>At 5.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the destroyers <i>Pasley</i>, <i>Pelican</i>, and
+<i>Negro</i>, detached to assist the <i>Falmouth</i>, arrived on the
+scene and the <i>Falmouth</i>, under their escort, proceeded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_441">441</span>
+towards the coast under her own steam, the <i>Chester</i> then
+leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Pelican</i> sighted a periscope, tried
+to ram the submarine, but missed. She then dropped six
+depth charges and reported that the submarine came to
+the surface almost immediately, and then appeared to
+sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled,
+and four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen
+the <i>Falmouth</i>, which was proceeding at five knots. The
+ship eventually reached the vicinity of Flamborough
+Head safely, and was there again hit by two more torpedoes
+fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat,
+and was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine destroyers
+until 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th, when she sank in Lat.
+54 N., Long. 0.2 W.</p>
+
+<p>At 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th, the destroyer <i>Porpoise</i> reported
+having rammed a submarine that had attacked the
+<i>Falmouth</i>.</p>
+
+<p>To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th.
+From 3.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> onwards frequent reports were received
+of submarines being sighted. The <i>Phaeton</i>, <i>Dublin</i>
+(twice), and <i>Southampton</i> all reported submarines in
+sight between 3.10 and 4.52 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the time at which the
+<i>Falmouth</i> was torpedoed. At 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Sir David Beatty
+reported that there was a German submarine screen of
+several boats extending north-east for some 25 miles from
+Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore
+Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s
+force of heavy ships steering east, accompanied by two
+Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving the position of the
+Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved to
+be unfavourable, and at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Commodore reported
+that he had abandoned the pursuit; he returned
+with his force to Harwich. At 6.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> reports received<span class="pagenum" id="Page_442">442</span>
+from our directional stations showed that enemy ships
+were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, giving
+clear evidence that the enemy was returning to his
+base.</p>
+
+<p>During the passage up the searched channel a
+number of submarines were sighted and frequent, and
+in some cases, large alterations of course were necessary
+to avoid them; if all the reports were correct, the
+locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines.
+Reports of submarines being seen were received between
+4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and dark, from the <i>Galatea</i>, <i>Phaeton</i>, <i>Bellona</i>,
+<i>Dublin</i>, <i>Southampton</i>, <i>Lion</i>, <i>Royal Sovereign</i> (two submarines),
+<i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, and <i>Inflexible</i>, the last ship
+reporting that two torpedoes had been fired at her at
+7.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and that both had passed close astern; at this
+time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in
+company.</p>
+
+<p>Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by
+the <i>Chatham</i>, <i>Galatea</i>, and <i>Lion</i>, and the trawlers <i>Sea
+Ranger</i> and <i>Ramexo</i>; the last-named reported having
+sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and having scored
+two hits and caused a fire in the forward car.</p>
+
+<p>During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was detached
+to Rosyth, and the Battle Fleet continued to the
+northward. Reports of submarines being sighted to the
+eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at 5
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was
+therefore taken well to the northward to avoid them, and
+approached the Pentland Firth from a north-easterly
+direction, arriving without incident between 6.30 and
+8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The experience of August 19th showed that light
+cruisers, proceeding at even the highest speed unscreened
+by destroyers, ran considerable danger from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">443</span>
+enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders
+were no doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks,
+which we could afford to run earlier in the War, were
+now unjustifiable. Representations were made to the
+Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in
+future light cruisers should be screened by at least one
+destroyer per ship; the number of destroyers available
+for the Grand Fleet did not at the time admit of
+this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number
+intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached,
+destroyers could be allotted to most of the light cruisers
+in the advanced line, provided there were not many
+absent from the Fleet carrying out extraneous services.</p>
+
+<p>The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine
+trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the
+19th of August; what had constantly puzzled me was
+that this had not been done very frequently at an earlier
+stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted
+and with some success, there seemed to be every reason
+to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was
+clear that it was unwise to take the Fleet far into
+southern waters unless an adequate destroyer force
+was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships.
+If the circumstances were exceptional and the need
+very pressing, it would be necessary to accept
+the risk. There was general agreement on this point
+between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the
+Admiralty.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of August the weekly average of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron showed:</p>
+
+<p>No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112;
+No. sent in, 35; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">444</span>
+or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrols, 10; No. on special service, 0.</p>
+
+<p>The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was
+foggy and misty during a great part of the month. Much
+mist or fog was experienced from the 1st to the 6th, the
+10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th.</p>
+
+<p>During the month Grand Fleet submarines were exercised
+at Scapa Flow in carrying out attacks on ships
+under way, and the destroyer flotillas were similarly
+practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet
+divisions being exercised in countering such attacks
+by turning movements. These exercises were continued
+for the remainder of the year, and much experience was
+obtained from them as to the different methods of dealing
+with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet
+action.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">445</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVII"><span id="toclink_445"></span>CHAPTER XVII<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING;
+RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Events</span> were to prove that my period of command
+of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer
+to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November,
+1917.</p>
+
+<p>But before coming to that development something
+must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work
+of the Grand Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>During the month of September, 1916, there was
+not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the
+4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth,
+swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward
+of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On
+the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa
+endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported
+by the <i>Talisman</i> to the eastward of the Pentland
+Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful
+search for a submarine was carried out in the same
+locality.</p>
+
+<p>On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons
+left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange
+bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea <i lang="fr">en route</i>,
+and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers
+left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on
+the 4th.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">446</span></p>
+
+<p>On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the
+eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west.</p>
+
+<p>On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, <i>Campania</i>,
+and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise
+between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the Norwegian
+coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light
+cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit.
+Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A
+submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet
+on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by another
+route, the available local patrol vessels being employed
+to keep the submarine submerged during the entry
+of the fleet to Scapa.</p>
+
+<p>Submarines were again active during the latter part
+of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the
+10th Cruiser Squadron, the position of the squadron being
+shifted for that reason.</p>
+
+<p>On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers
+left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the
+German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th.</p>
+
+<p>On the same date the yacht <i>Conqueror II.</i>, the patrol
+trawler <i>Sarah Alice</i>, and two British steamers were torpedoed
+in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines.
+On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were
+detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against
+the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these
+waters.</p>
+
+<p>Early on the 30th the <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st and 2nd
+Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left
+Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned
+to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">447</span></p>
+
+<p>During September the cruiser patrols were continuously
+maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and
+on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser
+and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol,
+consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the
+Horn Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols
+inconvenient, and German destroyers on several occasions
+during the month cruised at night in the area patrolled
+with a view to interrupting our submarines when
+recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent
+change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning
+from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy submarine
+on the surface, and, being unable to get into position
+to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did
+not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.</p>
+
+<p>The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla
+(the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the
+month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship
+the <i>Lucia</i>, with two attendant destroyers. The formation
+of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced,
+this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be
+formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers
+to 100.</p>
+
+<p>On the 21st the new battle cruiser <i>Repulse</i>, heavily
+armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection
+for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up
+gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection
+of this ship was about equal to that of the <i>Australia</i> and
+<i>New Zealand</i>, and she was greatly inferior in this respect
+to the <i>Lion</i>, and later battle cruisers. As already stated,
+experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly
+that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage
+in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they
+were provided with better protection than that given to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">448</span>
+the <i>Australia</i> and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore,
+forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably
+to the deck protection of both the <i>Repulse</i> and
+her sister ship, the <i>Renown</i>. These proposals were approved
+and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. Although
+the ships were much improved by the alteration,
+they were still far inferior in protection to the German
+battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built
+on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at
+Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most
+valuable refitting base.</p>
+
+<p>The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser
+Squadron during September were:</p>
+
+<p>No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on
+patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from
+patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0.</p>
+
+<p>The favourable weather and short nights, combined
+with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol
+were responsible for the increase in the number of ships
+intercepted.</p>
+
+<p>The weather as a whole was good during the month.
+Fog or mist was prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th
+and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise
+the conditions were favourable.</p>
+
+<p>In the early part of October, the activities of the
+enemy’s submarines in the White Sea, which had been
+considerable during the month of September, became
+more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three
+Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness,
+and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell victims
+to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some
+submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat.
+69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack<span class="pagenum" id="Page_449">449</span>
+was successful. The <i>Fearless</i>, now a submarine
+parent ship, and three submarines started for the White
+Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alexandrovsk
+against the hostile submarines. They arrived
+on the 20th and began operations at once. During their
+stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any
+enemy submarines, but there was a marked decrease in
+enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of
+the presence of our vessels in those waters. The <i>Fearless</i>,
+with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return
+passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these
+waters before the ice began to form.</p>
+
+<p>On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships
+of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer
+Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning
+on the 4th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and
+swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position
+to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which
+our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had
+reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting
+suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours
+were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron;
+three were selected and sent in for examination, but were
+found to be in order.</p>
+
+<p>On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left
+Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside,
+near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in airships
+and light cruisers working together. The programme
+arranged could not be completed owing to bad
+weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion,
+and some useful hints were gained. This work was undertaken
+as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to
+accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_450">450</span>
+number of these craft completing in the near future justified
+such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of
+the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller
+class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance
+work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western
+side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable
+experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German
+High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had
+fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this
+subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval
+Air Service came under my supervision. These views
+were expressed on an occasion when the building of a
+fleet of Zeppelins was being urged on behalf of the Navy.
+It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would
+be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in
+connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual
+conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin
+and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed
+were that whatever future there might be for the latter as
+development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their
+having the radius of action necessary for scouting work
+in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already
+possessed it. My apology for making mention of this
+fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made
+that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the
+value of air-craft before the War.</p>
+
+<p>On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some
+cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of
+the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the
+eastward, returning on the 10th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers
+left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to
+bad weather.</p>
+
+<p>On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">451</span>
+sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of
+Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher
+Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of
+interest.</p>
+
+<p>On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight
+destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line between
+Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long.
+4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course
+approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order
+to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was
+repeated during daylight hours on two successive days;
+no enemy vessels were sighted.</p>
+
+<p>On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and
+the 14th and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching
+and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24th.</p>
+
+<p>During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried
+out during the month of October, the Flag officers were
+directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics
+employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with
+a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet
+these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from
+all Flag officers.</p>
+
+<p>On October 24th a division of destroyers, together
+with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel
+to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using
+this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the
+patrol.</p>
+
+<p>On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak
+to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in
+those waters. On the same day the <i>Kildonan Castle</i>,
+of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a submarine
+and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N.,
+Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol
+line was consequently moved temporarily to the westward,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_452">452</span>
+and trawlers were despatched to the neighbourhood.</p>
+
+<p>On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers
+sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the
+waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They
+returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy
+vessels.</p>
+
+<p>On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th
+Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise
+cruise in the central and northern positions of the
+North Sea, and returned without incident on November
+3rd.</p>
+
+<p>During the month the Northern patrol north of the
+Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer
+was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel
+route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn
+Reef.</p>
+
+<p>The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron
+showed the following <span class="locked">figures:—</span></p>
+
+<p>No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on
+patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from
+patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0.</p>
+
+<p>Bad weather during the month interfered with the
+operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on
+the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or
+mist.</p>
+
+<p>On November 1st I left the <i>Iron Duke</i> at Cromarty
+and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the
+First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of
+letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing
+danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and
+the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures
+to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my
+opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_453">453</span>
+first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to protect
+our communications more successfully until the submarines
+could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of
+our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace.
+From information furnished to me it was evident that
+the Germans were making special efforts to increase
+the number of their submarines very largely, and there
+did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we
+were at the time employing, of destroying submarines
+at a rate at all approaching that of their construction.</p>
+
+<p>So far as I was aware there was an insufficient
+reserve of food in the country to provide against the
+consequences of successful action by enemy submarines;
+and the construction of merchant-ships on
+an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been
+taken in hand, this being obviously an essential
+measure. I had written semi-officially for eighteen
+months before on the matter.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">T</a> It seemed to me
+questionable whether our organisation at the Admiralty
+included a sufficiently numerous and important
+staff, having as its sole business the work of
+dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem
+which was assuming such very serious proportions.
+It did not appear that new proposals and inventions
+for dealing with the submarine campaign were being
+pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly
+because of the absence of such an organisation,
+of difficulties connected with labour and <i lang="fr">matériel</i>;
+and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers
+confronting us would be successfully combated.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">T</a> The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food supplies or, at that
+time, for merchant-ship building.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">454</span></p>
+
+<p>I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson,
+was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much
+anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all subjects
+during his tenure of office at the Admiralty,
+and I was aware of his views on matters connected
+with the War, on which we had always been in complete
+agreement. His direction and assistance in connection
+with matters concerning the development and employment
+of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me,
+and invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that
+in putting forward my views as to the new and serious
+danger confronting us, and the possible methods of
+dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance
+in combating the menace. One of my suggestions
+was the formation of a committee, or department, at
+the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of
+some of the clever and younger officers who had shown
+marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole
+object would be the development of arrangements for
+dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant
+shipping, and the production of the necessary material.
+I pointed out that our existing methods were not
+meeting with the success attained at an earlier period,
+and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were responsible
+for this result.</p>
+
+<p>I had also formed and expressed the opinion that
+the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a
+Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign
+against merchant shipping had been fully tried and
+had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I
+suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing
+the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one
+flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines in
+waters where such action had some chance of success.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_455">455</span>
+I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against
+submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the
+only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be
+used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in
+an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results,
+as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water
+open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in
+which destroyers <em>could</em> act more effectively against
+submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters;
+in restricted localities, such as some parts of the
+English Channel, where the depth did not allow
+of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My contention
+was that it was probably wise to reduce the number
+of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen
+the force required to deal with the submarine danger,
+even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand
+Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should
+it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as attempted
+invasion. The alternative, which I felt <em>we
+could not face</em>, was to run the graver risk of serious
+disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant
+shipping.</p>
+
+<p>It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would
+<em>not</em> risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this
+Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some
+military advantage, I considered that with the 1st, 2nd
+and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had
+been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be
+engaged with every prospect of success, provided always
+that it was well screened from submarine attack and carefully
+handled. The only direction, apart from an attack
+on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet
+could inflict any material damage on us and which the
+Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_456">456</span>
+lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast
+towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could
+not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened
+to be at sea and in the right position at the right
+moment.</p>
+
+<p>The objection which might be raised to this policy,
+which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect
+on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea
+without being brought to action, even if it could achieve
+no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised
+very fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility
+involved in disregarding it. On the other hand,
+the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing
+and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs,
+and without delay, since the existence of the armies as
+well as that of the civil population depended on merchant
+shipping.</p>
+
+<p>I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty
+on November 5th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left
+Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, returning
+on November 4th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 3rd the <i>Botha</i>, with four destroyers of the
+14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the
+Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse
+on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to
+their bases. On the same day the <i>Faulknor</i> and six
+destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried
+out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the
+vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser
+Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla from
+Rosyth supported both forces.</p>
+
+<p>At 1.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, on November 5th, submarine J 1 on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_457">457</span>
+patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships
+of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 E.
+A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to
+prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had
+a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack
+were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded,
+in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow torpedoes
+at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took
+effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned
+to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable
+period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently
+that the two damaged ships managed to reach
+port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit
+attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack
+under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident
+showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German
+system of underwater protection in their capital ships.</p>
+
+<p>On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against
+enemy submarines on their expected tracks.</p>
+
+<p>From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was
+experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships
+were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the
+ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from
+Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the
+17th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 18th the <i>Otway</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron,
+intercepted the Norwegian steamship <i>Older</i>, which was
+found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German submarine.
+She had on board, in addition, survivors of an
+Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine.
+The <i>Otway</i> recaptured her, but was not in time
+to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs
+in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however,
+succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_458">458</span></p>
+
+<p>During the period up to November 19th, the weekly
+average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the
+following <span class="locked">figures:—</span></p>
+
+<p>No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on
+patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.</p>
+
+<p>The weather throughout the period to the 19th November
+was very bad, and the figures showed a corresponding
+reduction in the number of ships intercepted.</p>
+
+<p>Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th,
+16th, 17th and 18th.</p>
+
+<p>On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons,
+1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser
+Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in
+northern waters, during which battle exercises were carried
+out.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly before the <i>Iron Duke</i> slipped from her buoy,
+and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its
+way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First
+Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea
+Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I
+consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and
+he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in
+order to be in a position to put into practice the views I
+held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine
+menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to
+leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since
+the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was
+the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to
+fill in war time.</p>
+
+<p>I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to
+do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in
+accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed
+to meet him at Rosyth.</p>
+
+<p>I then followed the Fleet to sea in the <i>Iron Duke</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_459">459</span>
+and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned
+over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil
+Burney (second in command), with directions that the
+ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded
+in the <i>Iron Duke</i> to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning
+of the 27th.</p>
+
+<p>I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the
+27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Admiralty,
+and accepted the appointment. He intimated
+to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir
+David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the
+Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes
+in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made
+suggestions on some of these matters.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started
+my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer
+of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty
+of the task before me. The attacks already made upon
+the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due
+to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids
+on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with
+the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to
+come.</p>
+
+<p>I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the
+production of fresh material, could become effective for
+a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed,
+I was so certain of the course that events would take,
+that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of
+the <i>Iron Duke</i> (a very difficult task in view of the intense
+regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that
+they must expect to see me the object of the same
+attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor,
+Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was
+not wrong in this surmise. I left the <i>Iron Duke</i> with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_460">460</span>
+a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot
+close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet
+during my twenty-eight months’ service as Commander-in-Chief
+better than by quoting my farewell
+memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so
+well.</p>
+
+<p>“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains,
+officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my
+privilege to command since the commencement of the
+War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks
+for their loyal support during a period which I know must
+have tried their patience to the breaking-point.</p>
+
+<p>“The disappointment which has so constantly attended
+the southern movements of the Fleet might well have resulted
+in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the
+strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of
+efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing
+the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.</p>
+
+<p>“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to
+be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit
+of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I
+am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day
+to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have
+turned that experience to good account.</p>
+
+<p>“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest
+regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men
+are imbued with that spirit which has carried their forefathers
+to victory throughout all ages, whenever and
+wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and
+whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency,
+I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they
+will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes,
+and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">461</span></p>
+
+<p>“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious
+victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 2em;">“<span class="smcap">J.&nbsp;R. Jellicoe</span>,<br></span>
+“Admiral.”
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">463</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_I"><span id="toclink_463"></span>Appendix I<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 3.5em;"><i>Iron Duke,</i></span><br>
+<i>18th June, 1916.</i>
+</p>
+
+<p class="in0">
+No. 1395 H.F. 0022.<br>
+The Secretary<br>
+<span class="in4">of the <span class="smcap">Admiralty</span>,</span>
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—</p>
+
+<p>Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
+that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May,
+1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.</p>
+
+<p>2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the
+general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left
+its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued
+by me.</p>
+
+<p>3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were
+as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang3">
+
+<p><span class="in2">(<i>a</i>) Those in company with me:</span></p>
+
+<p><i>Iron Duke</i>—Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).</p>
+
+<p><i>Marlborough</i>—Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral
+Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E.
+Percy F.&nbsp;G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).</p>
+
+<p><i>Colossus</i>—Captain Alfred D.&nbsp;P.&nbsp;R. Pound (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Ernest F.&nbsp;A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Hercules</i>—Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.</p>
+
+<p><i>Neptune</i>—Captain Vivian H.&nbsp;G. Bernard.</p>
+
+<p><i>Collingwood</i>—Captain James C. Ley.</p>
+
+<p><i>Revenge</i>—Captain Edward B. Kiddle.</p>
+
+<p><i>Agincourt</i>—Captain Henry M. Doughty.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_464">464</span></p>
+<p><i>St. Vincent</i>—Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Bellona</i>—Captain Arthur B.&nbsp;S. Dutton.</p>
+
+<p><i>King George V.</i>—Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of
+Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Orion</i>—Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Centurion</i>—Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Conqueror</i>—Captain Hugh H.&nbsp;D. Tothill.</p>
+
+<p><i>Erin</i>—Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.</p>
+
+<p><i>Thunderer</i>—Captain James A. Fergusson.</p>
+
+<p><i>Monarch</i>—Captain George H. Borrett.</p>
+
+<p><i>Ajax</i>—Captain George H. Baird.</p>
+
+<p><i>Boadicea</i>—Captain Louis C.&nbsp;S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Benbow</i>—Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral
+Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Superb</i>—Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Canada</i>—Captain William C.&nbsp;M. Nicholson.</p>
+
+<p><i>Bellerophon</i>—Captain Edward F. Bruen.</p>
+
+<p><i>Temeraire</i>—Captain Edwin V. Underhill.</p>
+
+<p><i>Vanguard</i>—Captain James D. Dick.</p>
+
+<p><i>Royal Oak</i>—Captain Crawford Maclachlan.</p>
+
+<p><i>Blanche</i>—Captain John M. Casement.</p>
+
+<p><i>Minotaur</i>—Captain Arthur C.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Hampshire</i>—Captain Herbert J. Savill.</p>
+
+<p><i>Cochrane</i>—Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.</p>
+
+<p><i>Shannon</i>—Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Defence</i>—Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>—Captain Henry Blackett.</p>
+
+<p><i>Black Prince</i>—Captain Thomas P. Bonham.</p>
+
+<p><i>Warrior</i>—Captain Vincent B. Molteno.</p>
+
+<p><i>Invincible</i>—Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+The Hon. Horace L.&nbsp;A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Indomitable</i>—Captain Francis W. Kennedy.</p>
+
+<p><i>Inflexible</i>—Captain Edward H.&nbsp;F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Calliope</i>—Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.</p>
+
+<p><i>Caroline</i>—Captain H. Ralph Crooke.</p>
+
+<p><i>Comus</i>—Captain Alan G. Hotham.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">465</span></p>
+<p><i>Constance</i>—Captain Cyril S. Townsend.</p>
+
+<p><i>Royalist</i>—Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Canterbury</i>—Captain Percy M.&nbsp;R. Royds.</p>
+
+<p><i>Chester</i>—Captain Robert N. Lawson.</p>
+
+<p><i>Active</i>—Captain Percy Withers.</p>
+
+<p><i>Castor</i>—Commodore (F.) James R.&nbsp;P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Tipperary</i>—Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.</p>
+
+<p><i>Broke</i>—Commander Walter L. Allen.</p>
+
+<p><i>Shark</i>—Commander Loftus W. Jones.</p>
+
+<p><i>Acasta</i>—Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Spitfire</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W.&nbsp;E. Trelawny.</p>
+
+<p><i>Sparrowhawk</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.</p>
+
+<p><i>Achates</i>—Commander Reginald B.&nbsp;C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.</p>
+
+<p><i>Ambuscade</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.</p>
+
+<p><i>Ardent</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fortune</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.</p>
+
+<p><i>Porpoise</i>—Commander Hugh D. Colville.</p>
+
+<p><i>Unity</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.</p>
+
+<p><i>Garland</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.</p>
+
+<p><i>Christopher</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.</p>
+
+<p><i>Contest</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G.&nbsp;H. Master.</p>
+
+<p><i>Owl</i>—Commander Robert G. Hamond.</p>
+
+<p><i>Hardy</i>—Commander Richard A.&nbsp;A. Plowden.</p>
+
+<p><i>Midge</i>—Lieutenant-Commander James R.&nbsp;C. Cavendish.</p>
+
+<p><i>Ophelia</i>—Commander Lewis G.&nbsp;E. Crabbe.</p>
+
+<p><i>Kempenfelt</i>—Commander Harold E. Sulivan.</p>
+
+<p><i>Ossory</i>—Commander Harold V. Dundas.</p>
+
+<p><i>Martial</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.</p>
+
+<p><i>Magic</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.</p>
+
+<p><i>Minion</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mystic</i>—Commander Claude F. Allsup.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mons</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mandate</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C.&nbsp;W. Lawrie.</p>
+
+<p><i>Michael</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.</p>
+
+<p><i>Marne</i>—Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.</p>
+
+<p><i>Milbrook</i>—Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.</p>
+
+<p><i>Manners</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.</p>
+
+<p><i>Moon</i>—Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mounsey</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.</p>
+
+<p><i>Morning Star</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">466</span></p>
+<p><i>Faulknor</i>—Captain (D) Anselan J.&nbsp;B. Stirling.</p>
+
+<p><i>Marksman</i>—Commander Norton A. Sulivan.</p>
+
+<p><i>Obedient</i>—Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mindful</i>—Lieutenant-Commander John J.&nbsp;C. Ridley.</p>
+
+<p><i>Marvel</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.</p>
+
+<p><i>Onslaught</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mænad</i>—Commander John P. Champion.</p>
+
+<p><i>Narwhal</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nessus</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.</p>
+
+<p><i>Noble</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.</p>
+
+<p><i>Opal</i>—Commander Charles G.&nbsp;C. Sumner.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nonsuch</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I.&nbsp;N. Lyon.</p>
+
+<p><i>Menace</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.</p>
+
+<p><i>Munster</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mary Rose</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.</p>
+
+<p><i>Mischief</i>—Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Oak</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Abdiel</i>—Commander Berwick Curtis.</p>
+
+<p class="p2"><span class="in2">(<i>b</i>) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:</span></p>
+
+<p><i>Lion</i>—Captain Alfred E.&nbsp;M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of
+Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.);
+Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.</p>
+
+<p><i>Princess Royal</i>—Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying
+the Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Tiger</i>—Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Queen Mary</i>—Captain Cecil I. Prowse.</p>
+
+<p><i>New Zealand</i>—Captain John F.&nbsp;E. Green (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Indefatigable</i>—Captain Charles F. Sowerby.</p>
+
+<p><i>Southampton</i>—Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nottingham</i>—Captain Charles B. Miller.</p>
+
+<p><i>Birmingham</i>—Captain Arthur A.&nbsp;M. Duff.</p>
+
+<p><i>Dublin</i>—Captain Albert C. Scott.</p>
+
+<p><i>Galatea</i>—Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Inconstant</i>—Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.</p>
+
+<p><i>Phaeton</i>—Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Cordelia</i>—Captain Tufton P.&nbsp;H. Beamish.</p>
+
+<p><i>Falmouth</i>—Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Trevylyan D.&nbsp;W. Napier, M.V.O.).</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_467">467</span></p>
+<p><i>Birkenhead</i>—Captain Edward Reeves.</p>
+
+<p><i>Gloucester</i>—Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Yarmouth</i>—Captain Thomas D. Pratt.</p>
+
+<p>“<i>Barham</i>”—Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
+Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).</p>
+
+<p><i>Warspite</i>—Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.</p>
+
+<p><i>Valiant</i>—Captain Maurice Woollcombe.</p>
+
+<p><i>Malaya</i>—Captain The Hon. Algernon D.&nbsp;E.&nbsp;H. Boyle, C.B.,
+M.V.O.</p>
+
+<p><i>Champion</i>—Captain (D.) James U. Farie.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nestor</i>—Commander The Hon. Edward B.&nbsp;S. Bingham.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nomad</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.</p>
+
+<p><i>Narborough</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.</p>
+
+<p><i>Obdurate</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H.&nbsp;H. Sams.</p>
+
+<p><i>Petard</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C.&nbsp;O. Thomson.</p>
+
+<p><i>Pelican</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nerissa</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Montague C.&nbsp;B. Legge.</p>
+
+<p><i>Onslow</i>—Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.</p>
+
+<p><i>Moresby</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.</p>
+
+<p><i>Nicator</i>—Lieutenant Jack E.&nbsp;A. Mocatta.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fearless</i>—Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.</p>
+
+<p><i>Acheron</i>—Commander Charles G. Ramsey.</p>
+
+<p><i>Ariel</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.</p>
+
+<p><i>Attack</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Charles H.&nbsp;N. James.</p>
+
+<p><i>Hydra</i>—Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.</p>
+
+<p><i>Badger</i>—Commander G.&nbsp;A. Fremantle.</p>
+
+<p><i>Goshawk</i>—Commander Dashwood F. Moir.</p>
+
+<p><i>Defender</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.</p>
+
+<p><i>Lizard</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.</p>
+
+<p><i>Lapwing</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.</p>
+
+<p><i>Lydiard</i>—Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.</p>
+
+<p><i>Liberty</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Philip W.&nbsp;S. King.</p>
+
+<p><i>Landrail</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Francis E.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;G. Hobart.</p>
+
+<p><i>Laurel</i>—Lieutenant Henry D.&nbsp;C. Stanistreet.</p>
+
+<p><i>Moorsom</i>—Commander John C. Hodgson.</p>
+
+<p><i>Morris</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.</p>
+
+<p><i>Turbulent</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.</p>
+
+<p><i>Termagent</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.</p>
+
+<p><i>Engadine</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">468</span></p>
+
+<p>4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and 2nd
+Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons
+and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the
+5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting
+to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the
+3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th
+Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.</p>
+
+<p>5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after
+the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course
+steered by the latter during the first hour of their action with the
+enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our
+battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets
+would never have been in contact.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and
+admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under
+Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous
+conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with the
+best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable advantage
+in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the German
+Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and German battle
+cruisers in the matter of protection must not be forgotten. The German
+vessels are in this respect equal to powerful battleships, whereas
+our battle cruisers, particularly those of the 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser
+Squadrons, are very lightly protected. The main difficulty with which
+our ships had to contend was the bad light. All reports mention the
+difficulty experienced in seeing the enemy vessels to the eastward,
+whilst remarking on the clearness of the western horizon. A photograph
+taken from <i>Malaya</i> during the action indicates this fact very
+clearly.</p>
+
+<p>During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged
+with the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the
+advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and
+the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting qualities
+of the personnel.</p>
+
+<p>6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir
+David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came
+upon the scene:</p>
+
+<p>“At 2.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> reports were received from <i>Galatea</i> indicating the
+presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">469</span>
+altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force
+between the enemy and his base.</p>
+
+<p>“At 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
+eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward
+and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the
+Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly
+altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at
+3.31 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> They appeared to be five battle cruisers.</p>
+
+<p>“After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders
+spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the battle
+cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled
+up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at
+long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had
+come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle
+cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first
+engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser
+squadrons was excellent and of great value.</p>
+
+<p>“From a report from <i>Galatea</i> at 2.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> it was evident that the
+enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light
+cruisers, so at 2.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered <i>Engadine</i> to send up a seaplane and
+scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by
+3.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F.&nbsp;J. Rutland, R.N., as
+Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G.&nbsp;S. Trewin, R.N., as Observer, was well
+under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in <i>Engadine</i>
+about 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low,
+and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had
+to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light
+cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in
+no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant
+Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated
+on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under
+such circumstances are of distinct value.</p>
+
+<p>“At 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of
+Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas
+taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging
+on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed
+the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle
+Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_470">470</span>
+N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun
+behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base,
+our situation was both tactically and strategically good.</p>
+
+<p>“At 3.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards,
+both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered
+to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the
+enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.</p>
+
+<p>“Shortly after 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Indefatigable</i>, after a violent explosion, fell
+out of the line, turned over and sank.</p>
+
+<p>“At 4.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened
+fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to
+slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen
+of enemy submarines. The destroyer <i>Landrail</i> of 9th Flotilla, who
+was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the
+periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable
+inconvenience from smoke, the presence of <i>Lydiard</i> and
+<i>Landrail</i> undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer submarine
+attack. <i>Nottingham</i> also reported a submarine on the starboard
+beam.</p>
+
+<p>“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, <i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i>, <i>Nicator</i>,
+<i>Narborough</i>, <i>Pelican</i>, <i>Petard</i>, <i>Obdurate</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, with <i>Moorsom</i> and
+<i>Morris</i> of 10th Flotilla, <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Termagent</i> of the 9th Flotilla,
+having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity
+offered, moved out at 4.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> simultaneously with a similar
+movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried
+out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before
+arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an
+enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce
+engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy
+were forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers
+sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained
+no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle
+cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers
+having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore
+unfavourable for torpedo attack.</p>
+
+<p>“<i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i> and <i>Nicator</i>, gallantly led by Commander the
+Hon. Edward B.&nbsp;S. Bingham, of <i>Nestor</i>, pressed home their attack on
+the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000
+and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy’s
+secondary armament. <i>Nomad</i> was badly hit and apparently remained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">471</span>
+stopped between the lines. Subsequently <i>Nestor</i> and <i>Nicator</i> altered
+course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers
+having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of
+a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a
+terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for
+torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at
+a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo,
+<i>Nestor</i> was badly hit and swung to starboard, <i>Nicator</i> altering course
+inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the
+last torpedo. <i>Nicator</i> made good her escape and subsequently rejoined
+the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. <i>Nestor</i> remained stopped, but was
+afloat when last seen. <i>Moorsom</i> also carried out an attack on the
+enemy’s battle fleet.</p>
+
+<p>“<i>Petard</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Termagent</i> also pressed home
+their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after the
+engagement with enemy destroyers. <i>Petard</i> reports that all her torpedoes
+must have crossed the enemy’s line, while <i>Nerissa</i> states that
+one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks
+were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty’s Navy, and were
+worthy of its highest traditions.</p>
+
+<p>“From 4.15 to 4.43 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the conflict between the opposing battle
+cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle
+Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very
+long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that
+of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the third
+enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward
+had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very
+indistinct.</p>
+
+<p>“At 4.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> there was a violent explosion in <i>Queen Mary</i>; she was
+enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her
+officers and men were subsequently picked up by <i>Laurel</i>.</p>
+
+<p>“At 4.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Southampton</i> reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet
+ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the enemy’s
+Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession
+to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead
+them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered
+course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. <i>Southampton</i>
+with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to observe.
+They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and
+came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. <i>Southampton’s</i> reports<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">472</span>
+were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an
+opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns.
+The position of the enemy battle fleet was communicated to them, and
+I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh
+Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in <i>Barham</i>, this squadron supported us brilliantly
+and effectively.</p>
+
+<p>“At 4.57 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and
+came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet.
+<i>Fearless</i> with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle cruisers,
+and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. <i>Champion</i> with 13th
+Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 1st and
+3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the
+southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light
+Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.</p>
+
+<p>“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships
+being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the
+enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly
+at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van
+at about 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Between 5 and 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the action continued on a
+northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this
+time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one
+of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition.
+This came under my personal observation and was corroborated
+by <i>Princess Royal</i> and <i>Tiger</i>. Other enemy ships also showed
+signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Onslow</i> and <i>Moresby</i>, who had
+been detached to assist <i>Engadine</i> with the seaplane, rejoined the battle
+cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of
+<i>Lion</i>. At 5.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Moresby</i>, being 2 points before the beam of the
+leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight
+minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to
+be the 6th ship in the line. <i>Moresby</i> then passed between the lines
+to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined <i>Champion</i>. In corroboration
+of this, <i>Fearless</i> reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on
+fire at about 5.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke
+and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of <i>Queen
+Mary</i> and <i>Indefatigable</i>.</p>
+
+<p>“At 5.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of
+the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward,
+keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was
+gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_473">473</span>
+head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his
+light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third
+Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide <i>Indomitable’s</i> report). Possibly Zeppelins
+were present also. At 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> British cruisers were sighted
+on the port bow, and at 5.56 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the leading battleships of the Grand
+Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and
+proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy
+down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief
+that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three
+of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships
+of the ”König“ class.</p>
+
+<p>“At about 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Onslow</i>, being on the engaged bow of <i>Lion</i>,
+sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently
+endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. <i>Onslow</i> at once
+closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000
+to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. <i>Onslow</i> then closed the
+enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be
+fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell,
+with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his
+torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at
+slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he
+closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The
+enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes
+were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed
+the enemy’s track. Damage then caused <i>Onslow</i> to stop.</p>
+
+<p>“At 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Defender</i>, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots,
+while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which
+damaged her foremost boiler, closed <i>Onslow</i> and took her in tow. Shell
+were falling all round them during this operation, which, however,
+was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing
+night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled
+on together until 1. <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> 1st June, when <i>Onslow</i> was transferred to
+tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be
+gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander
+J.&nbsp;C. Tovey of <i>Onslow</i>, and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of <i>Defender</i>,
+for special recognition. <i>Onslow</i> was possibly the destroyer
+referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser
+Squadron, as follows:</p>
+
+<p>“‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer
+(name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">474</span>
+soon after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> She apparently was able to struggle ahead again,
+and made straight for the <i>Derfflinger</i> to attack her. The incident appeared
+so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.’”</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Proceedings of Battle Fleet</span></h3>
+
+<p>7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted,
+the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and Destroyer
+Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close
+the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before
+the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the
+older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the
+engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always,
+responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess
+of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.</p>
+
+<p>The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral
+the Hon. Horace L.&nbsp;A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet,
+was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in reckoning
+between <i>Lion</i> and the <i>Iron Duke</i>, which was inevitable under the
+circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third Battle Cruiser
+Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward, and it was not until
+5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the
+sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the
+<i>Chester</i> (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged
+three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The
+engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period
+Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy
+odds, and although the ship suffered considerably in casualties her
+fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+she rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward,
+and at 6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking
+station ahead of the <i>Lion</i> at 6.21 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in accordance with the orders of
+the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He reports as
+follows:</p>
+
+<p>“I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out
+magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action
+ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors.
+At 6.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third
+Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">475</span>
+the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her, and
+caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made
+a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance
+of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Invincible</i> blew up.</p>
+
+<p>“After the loss of <i>Invincible</i>, the squadron was led by <i>Inflexible</i>
+until 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our
+leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I
+ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern
+and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent,
+not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily
+lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, although the
+visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us
+than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling
+us to punish them very severely and establish a definite
+superiority over them. The damage received by our ships during this
+period, excepting the destruction of <i>Invincible</i>, was slight. From the
+reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the
+enemy suffered severely, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head
+of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the
+majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle
+Squadron were also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral
+Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be
+safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.</p>
+
+<p>“From the report of Rear-Admiral T.&nbsp;D.&nbsp;W. Napier, M.V.O., the
+Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on
+our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> attacked with
+the torpedo. <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Yarmouth</i> both fired torpedoes at the
+leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit,
+as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light
+Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire,
+with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting
+efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral
+Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack.
+<i>Indomitable</i> reports that about this time one of the <i>Derfflinger</i> class
+fell out of the enemy’s line.”</p>
+
+<p>8. Meanwhile, at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, <i>Canterbury</i> (Captain Percy M.&nbsp;R. Royds)
+had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat
+destroyer <i>Shark</i> (Commander Loftus W. Jones), <i>Acasta</i>
+(Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and <i>Christopher</i> (Lieutenant-Commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_476">476</span>
+Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement
+the <i>Shark</i> was sunk.</p>
+
+<p>9. At 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the report of guns had become audible to me, and
+at 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard
+beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the
+position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The
+difference in reckoning between <i>Iron Duke</i> and <i>Lion</i> mentioned in
+paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation.</p>
+
+<p>10. Shortly after 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> some of the cruisers ahead, under
+Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were
+seen to be in action, and reports received show that <i>Defence</i>, Flagship
+(Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and <i>Warrior</i> (Captain Vincent B. Molteno),
+of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser
+at this time, which subsequently sank.</p>
+
+<p>11. At 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers,
+were sighted by <i>Marlborough</i> bearing before the starboard beam of the
+battle fleet.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser
+Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at
+6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.</p>
+
+<p>At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle cruisers
+and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that
+our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.</p>
+
+<p>12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir
+David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged.
+Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers
+ahead of the battle fleet.</p>
+
+<p>The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:</p>
+
+<ul class="in2">
+<li>The Commander-in-Chief,</li>
+<li>Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,</li>
+<li>Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram,</li>
+<li>Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee,</li>
+<li>Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff,</li>
+<li>Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson,</li>
+<li>Rear-Admiral Ernest F.&nbsp;A. Gaunt.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<p>13. At 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Defence</i> and <i>Warrior</i> were observed passing down
+between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy
+fire. <i>Defence</i> was seen to blow up and <i>Warrior</i> passed to the rear<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">477</span>
+disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement
+with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to complete
+their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy’s heavy
+ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to
+the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were
+caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when <i>Black
+Prince</i> (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk,
+but as a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+reporting the position of a submarine, it is possible that her loss was
+the result of a torpedo attack. There is much strong evidence of the
+presence of a large number of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the
+scene of the action.</p>
+
+<p>14. The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deployment,
+became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening
+fire at 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre
+squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser,
+opened fire at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on a battleship of the “König” class, and the
+van squadron commenced immediately afterwards.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron,
+then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard
+wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of <i>Barham</i>, and the
+first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the
+remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the direction of deployment
+he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre which was well
+executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle fleet.
+An accident to <i>Warspite’s</i> steering gear caused her helm to become
+jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy’s
+line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling
+enabled Captain Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat
+awkward situation.</p>
+
+<p>Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible
+to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle line. Towards
+the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once.
+More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight
+to twelve.</p>
+
+<p>The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from
+6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during
+which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E.
+by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned
+away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_478">478</span>
+smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations,
+of course, had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which
+commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the
+enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the
+same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.</p>
+
+<p>At 6.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Iron Duke</i> passed the wreck of <i>Invincible</i> with <i>Badger</i>
+standing by. I was not aware of the loss of <i>Queen Mary</i> and <i>Indefatigable</i>
+until the following day.</p>
+
+<p>15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High
+Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire
+kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet
+caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be
+constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line, and at
+least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this period was not effective,
+and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Battle Cruisers in the van</span></h3>
+
+<p>16. Sir David Beatty reports:</p>
+
+<p>“Between 7 and 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S.
+to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> again sighted them
+at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were
+two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the ‘König’
+class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that
+was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably
+as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>
+and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> my course was S.W.,
+speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W.
+Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment,
+one ship being on fire while another appeared to drop right astern.
+The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s line emitted volumes of
+grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of
+which they undoubtedly turned away, and at 7.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we lost sight
+of them.</p>
+
+<p>“At 7.58 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
+to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s
+line, and at 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we altered course to west in support. We soon
+located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily engaged
+at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit
+repeatedly by <i>Lion</i> and turned away 8 points, emitting very high<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">479</span>
+flames and with a heavy list to port. <i>Princess Royal</i> set fire to a three-funnelled
+battleship; <i>New Zealand</i> and <i>Indomitable</i> report that the
+third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling
+over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them,
+and <i>Falmouth</i> reported they were last seen at 8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> steaming to
+the westward.</p>
+
+<p>“At 8.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if struck
+by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however,
+examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it
+is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel. This
+seems a very probable explanation in view of the condition in which the
+enemy was last seen.”</p>
+
+<p>17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very
+much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility
+and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following”
+or “chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired,
+but only one took effect (on <i>Marlborough</i>), and even in this case the
+ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The
+menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, in weather
+conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to the difficulty
+of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy. Two
+separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Details of Battle Fleet Action</span></h3>
+
+<p>18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil
+Burney, came into action at 6.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> with the enemy’s Third Battle
+Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe
+punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and light
+cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of <i>Marlborough</i> (Captain
+George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship commenced
+at 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the “Kaiser”
+class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she
+was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard,
+but re-opened at 7.3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at a cruiser and at 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> fired fourteen
+rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König” class, hitting her frequently
+until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective
+fire was kept up, in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused
+by the torpedo, was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example
+to the squadron.</p>
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">480</span></p>
+<p>The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000
+yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s
+return fire than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of
+the Fifth Battle Squadron. <i>Colossus</i> was hit but not seriously damaged,
+and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.</p>
+
+<p>In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my Flagship
+<i>Iron Duke</i> was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading
+one of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and
+some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light
+cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the
+fire of the squadron was effective. <i>Iron Duke</i>, having previously fired
+at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on a battleship
+of the “König” class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was
+very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo, and
+only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with
+which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent
+gunnery organisation of the flagship so ably commanded by my Flag
+Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.</p>
+
+<p>The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed
+at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist.
+Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.</p>
+
+<p>The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir
+Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser” or “König”
+classes between 6.30 and 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and fired also at an enemy battle
+cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely damaged.</p>
+
+<p>19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser
+Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with
+the addition of <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> of the First Cruiser Squadron,
+occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a connecting
+link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser fleet. This
+squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity
+of coming into action.</p>
+
+<p>The attached cruisers <i>Boadicea</i>, <i>Active</i>, <i>Blanche</i>, and <i>Bellona</i> carried
+out their duties as repeating ships with remarkable rapidity and
+accuracy under difficult conditions.</p>
+
+<p>The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles
+E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack
+enemy destroyers at 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and again at 8.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> when they supported
+the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore
+James R.&nbsp;P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the Fourth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_481">481</span>
+Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le
+Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object
+was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the
+ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between
+6,500 and 8,000 yards. The <i>Calliope</i> was hit several times but did not
+sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several
+casualties. The light cruisers attacked the enemy’s battleships with
+torpedoes at this time, but were not able to observe the result; an explosion
+on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class was seen, however, at
+8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers
+were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and destroyers.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Night Dispositions</span></h3>
+
+<p>20. At 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat
+of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching
+darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night
+with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing for a
+renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain
+between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position
+in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack
+and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy’s
+heavy ships.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Night Attacks by Flotillas</span></h3>
+
+<p>21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked,
+but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore
+Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of
+very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy
+losses.</p>
+
+<p>22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth
+Flotilla occurred, including that of <i>Tipperary</i> with the gallant leader
+of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high
+pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the
+enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken and many gallant
+actions were performed by the flotilla.</p>
+
+<p>Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels
+as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from
+<i>Spitfire</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W.&nbsp;E. Trelawny), and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_482">482</span>
+other from either <i>Ardent</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden),
+<i>Ambuscade</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or <i>Garland</i>
+(Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).</p>
+
+<p>23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan
+J.&nbsp;B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked,
+which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers, comprised
+vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely surprised. A
+large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and
+third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she
+was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later
+by <i>Mænad</i> (Commander John T. Champion) on the five vessels still
+remaining resulted in the second ship in the line being also hit and
+blown up.</p>
+
+<p>The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on
+reaching the rear of the line, but <i>Onslaught</i> was the only vessel which
+received any material injuries. In <i>Onslaught</i> Sub-lieutenant Harry
+W.&nbsp;A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the
+only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out
+of action and reached Rosyth.</p>
+
+<p>24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, <i>Castor</i>
+(Commodore John R.&nbsp;P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla engaged and
+sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank range.</p>
+
+<p>The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in
+<i>Champion</i> took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At
+0.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the
+flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the <i>Petard</i> and <i>Turbulent</i>,
+switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire which severely damaged
+<i>Petard</i> and disabled <i>Turbulent</i>. At 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>Champion</i> was
+engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. <i>Moresby</i> reports
+four ships of “Deutschland” class sighted at 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> at whom
+she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by
+<i>Moresby</i> and <i>Obdurate</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>Abdiel</i>, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out
+her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.</p>
+
+<p>There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas;
+they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of
+them.</p>
+
+<p>Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light
+Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for
+about fifteen minutes at 10.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> with a squadron comprising one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_483">483</span>
+enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period <i>Southampton</i>
+and <i>Dublin</i> suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming
+and fighting qualities were not impaired. It is reasonable to suppose
+that they inflicted considerable damage on their opponents.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Proceedings on 1st June</span></h3>
+
+<p>25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the southward
+and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in
+search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own
+cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Vice-Admiral Sir
+Cecil Burney transferred his flag from <i>Marlborough</i> to <i>Revenge</i>, as the
+former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron.
+<i>Marlborough</i> was detached by my direction to a base, being unsuccessfully
+attacked <i lang="fr">en route</i> by enemy submarines. The visibility
+early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and
+difficulty was experienced in meeting all ships, the torpedo-boat destroyers
+not rejoining until 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The waters from the latitude
+of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched,
+and some survivors from the destroyers <i>Ardent</i>, <i>Fortune</i>, and <i>Tipperary</i>
+were picked up, and the <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, which had been in collision
+and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken
+off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and
+at 1.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded
+in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were
+reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser
+squadron was detached to search for <i>Warrior</i>, which vessel had been
+abandoned whilst in tow of <i>Engadine</i> on her way to the base owing to
+bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no
+trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light
+cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she
+foundered.</p>
+
+<p>26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Losses</span></h3>
+
+<p>27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action
+took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by the
+enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the difficulty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">484</span>
+of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted, or the
+names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination
+of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy
+vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of
+these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure
+gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not
+entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, particularly
+those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the
+vessels sunk it is unquestionable that many other ships were very
+seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.</p>
+
+<p>28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of
+him, and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the
+water. I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled
+German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly
+after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the only
+gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British Battle Fleet,
+there appeared to be no desire on the part of the High Sea Fleet to
+continue the engagement. The battleships turned away on each occasion
+of being sighted soon after fire was opened, and although the
+British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near
+the line of approach to German ports until 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on 1st June, in
+spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the
+danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines
+and torpedo craft, the enemy made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled
+to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port.
+Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our
+position must have been known to the enemy, as at 2.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the fleet
+engaged a Zeppelin for quite five minutes, during which time she had
+ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and
+course of the British Fleet.</p>
+
+<p>29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H.&nbsp;M. Ships mentioned
+in this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy
+loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as
+Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon.
+Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse,
+Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles
+J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished
+with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led
+officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">485</span>
+mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their
+duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Personnel of the Fleet</span></h3>
+
+<p>30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night
+actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them
+justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of
+the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers,
+light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed.
+Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that
+would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the
+wounded was the admiration of all.</p>
+
+<p>I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the
+Fleet filled me.</p>
+
+<p>31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships
+during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude
+to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during
+action the officers and men of that department perform their most
+important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course
+of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and
+endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they
+were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations
+under review. Many ships attained speeds that had never before been
+reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency.
+Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and
+many instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the
+engine-room departments of injured ships.</p>
+
+<p>32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very
+largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and
+invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing
+critical operations and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties,
+they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we
+owe a deep debt of gratitude.</p>
+
+<p>33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the
+Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the flotillas. This
+was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas
+mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were
+handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th
+Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">486</span></p>
+
+<p>34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Commanding
+Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place on
+record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels were
+handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and
+ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous
+throughout the day.</p>
+
+<p>I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by
+Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand
+Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton
+Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander
+L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest
+F.&nbsp;A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet.
+They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s
+squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy battle
+fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has rendered
+me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did
+excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral
+Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David
+Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear
+of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.</p>
+
+<p>Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant
+leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated
+the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s lighter
+forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle fleet. I can fully
+sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light
+robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manœuvred
+and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard.
+The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous
+occasions, have been of the very greatest value.</p>
+
+<p>Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded
+him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner
+in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron
+into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C.
+Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work
+performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively
+of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D.&nbsp;W. Napier, Commodore William
+E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He
+states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and
+used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully endorse all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_487">487</span>
+his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report
+regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I received
+on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the
+Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the
+greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander,
+The Hon. Reginald A.&nbsp;R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the
+effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the
+enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made
+accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost
+value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander
+Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications
+under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his
+signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers
+carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform,
+where they were fully exposed to the enemy’s fire.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant
+work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden,
+K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war
+his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his
+long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity
+for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and
+have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct
+of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet
+action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist,
+and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.</p>
+
+<p>My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey,
+C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance
+in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is
+largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished
+with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance
+to me during the action.</p>
+
+<p>Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander
+Roger M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the
+two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander
+the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as observer
+aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value.
+These officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action.</p>
+
+<p>The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander
+Alexander R.&nbsp;W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_488">488</span>
+and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions.
+My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was
+also of much service to me throughout the action.</p>
+
+<p>The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet
+and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after
+the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out
+by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been invaluable
+throughout the war.</p>
+
+<p>A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all
+ships.</p>
+
+<p>My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and
+Victor H.&nbsp;T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the
+action. Their records have been of much assistance.</p>
+
+<p>To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am indebted
+for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout
+the operations.</p>
+
+<p>36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of
+their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not come
+under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of
+specially distinguishing themselves.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 16em;">I am, Sir,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 8em;">Your obedient Servant,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 1em;">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">J.&nbsp;R. Jellicoe</span>,</span><br>
+<i>Admiral</i>, <i>Commander-in-Chief</i>.
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">489</span></p>
+
+<h3 class="section">Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated
+18th June, 1916.</h3>
+
+<p class="center wspace">LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK,<br>
+<span class="smaller">31st May–1st June, 1916.</span></p>
+
+<table id="t489">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Battleships or Battle Cruisers.</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">2</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Battleships, “Dreadnought” type</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Certain</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">1</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Battleship, “Deutschland” type</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">1</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Battleship or Battle Cruiser</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Probable</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">1</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Battleship, “Dreadnought” type</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Probable.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Light Cruisers.</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">4</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Light Cruisers</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Certain</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">1</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Heavy ship or Light Cruiser</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Torpedo-boat Destroyers.</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">6</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Torpedo-boat Destroyers</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">3</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Torpedo-boat Destroyers</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Probable.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Submarines.</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">1</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Submarine</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdr top">3</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Submarines</td>
+  <td class="tdl bot">Possible.</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_490">490</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_II"><span id="toclink_490"></span>Appendix II<br>
+
+<span class="subhead">ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY,
+24th JANUARY, 1915</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><span class="smcap">Admiralty</span>,</span><br>
+<i>3rd March, 1915</i>.
+</p>
+
+<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir
+David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle
+Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday,
+the 24th of January, <span class="locked">1915:—</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot lm0">
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><i>H.M.S. Princess Royal,</i></span><br>
+<i>2nd February, 1915.</i>
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January,
+1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruisers <i>Lion</i>, Captain Alfred E.&nbsp;M. Chatfield, C.V.O.,
+flying my flag; <i>Princess Royal</i>, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-de-Camp;
+<i>Tiger</i>, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; <i>New Zealand</i>,
+Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral
+Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and <i>Indomitable</i>, Captain
+Francis W. Kennedy.</p>
+
+<p>The Light Cruisers <i>Southampton</i>, flying the broad pendant of
+Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; <i>Nottingham</i>, Captain
+Charles B. Miller; <i>Birmingham</i>, Captain Arthur A.&nbsp;M. Duff; and
+<i>Lowestoft</i>, Captain Theobald W.&nbsp;B. Kennedy, were disposed on my
+port beam.</p>
+
+<p>Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in <i>Arethusa</i>, <i>Aurora</i>,
+Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, <i>Undaunted</i>, Captain Francis G. St.
+John, M.V.O., <i>Arethusa</i>, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.</p>
+
+<p>At 7.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards
+a report reached me from <i>Aurora</i> that she was engaged with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">491</span>
+enemy’s ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to
+22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas to chase S.S.E.
+to get in touch and report movements of enemy.</p>
+
+<p>This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my
+wishes had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers,
+and reports almost immediately followed from <i>Southampton</i>, <i>Arethusa</i>,
+and <i>Aurora</i> as to the position and composition of the enemy, which
+consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and <i>Blücher</i>, 6 Light Cruisers, and a
+number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course
+to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with
+the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.</p>
+
+<p>The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the
+southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme
+visibility. At 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming
+fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position
+on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E. parallel to
+them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our
+speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the Engineer
+Staffs of <i>New Zealand</i> and <i>Indomitable</i>—these ships greatly
+exceeded their normal speed.</p>
+
+<p>At 8.52 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear
+ship, the Battle Cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so
+that guns would bear, and <i>Lion</i> fired a single shot, which fell short.
+The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light Cruisers
+ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard beam.</p>
+
+<p>Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>Lion</i> made her first hit on the <i>Blücher</i>, No. 4 in the line. The
+<i>Tiger</i> opened fire at 9.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the rear ship, the <i>Lion</i> shifted to
+No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes.
+The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>Princess Royal</i>, on coming
+into range, opened fire on <i>Blücher</i>, the range of the leading ship being
+17,500 yards at 9.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>New Zealand</i> was within range of <i>Blücher</i>,
+which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. <i>Princess
+Royal</i> shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable
+damage on her.</p>
+
+<p>Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a
+position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our
+range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening attack,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">492</span>
+the <i>Meteor</i> and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon.
+H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous ability.</p>
+
+<p>About 9.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the situation was as follows: <i>Blücher</i>, the fourth in
+their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gunfire;
+their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. <i>Lion</i> was engaging
+No. 1, <i>Princess Royal</i> No. 3, <i>New Zealand</i> No. 4, while the <i>Tiger</i>,
+who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered
+with by smoke, at their No. 4.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen
+their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared
+to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and
+certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader,
+thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers,
+therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed
+at their utmost speed.</p>
+
+<p>Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack.
+<i>Lion</i> and <i>Tiger</i> opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume
+their original course.</p>
+
+<p>The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port
+quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep touch,
+or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.48 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Blücher</i>, which had dropped considerably astern
+of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list,
+on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently
+ordered <i>Indomitable</i> to attack enemy breaking northward.</p>
+
+<p>At 10.54 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I
+personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our starboard
+bow. Immediately turned to port.</p>
+
+<p>At 11.3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> an injury to the <i>Lion</i> being reported as incapable of
+immediate repair, I directed <i>Lion</i> to shape course N.W. At 11.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>
+I called the <i>Attack</i> alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11.35
+<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the Squadron, and met
+them at noon retiring N.N.W.</p>
+
+<p>I boarded and hoisted my flag in <i>Princess Royal</i> at about 12.20
+<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the
+<i>Lion</i> fell out of the line, namely, that <i>Blücher</i> had been sunk and that
+the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course to the eastward
+in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a
+Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels
+which went to the rescue of the survivors of <i>Blücher</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">493</span></p>
+
+<p>The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan,
+H.M.S. <i>Attack</i>, in placing his vessel alongside the <i>Lion</i> and subsequently
+the <i>Princess Royal</i>, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in
+the shortest possible time.</p>
+
+<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I closed <i>Lion</i> and received a report that her starboard
+engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered
+<i>Indomitable</i> to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p>
+
+<p>The greatest credit is due to the Captains of <i>Indomitable</i> and <i>Lion</i>
+for the seamanlike manner in which the <i>Lion</i> was taken in tow under
+difficult circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation
+was a conspicuous feature.</p>
+
+<p>I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men
+who specially distinguished themselves.</p>
+
+<p>Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men for
+special mention, and as <i>Lion</i> and <i>Tiger</i> were the only ships hit by the
+enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those ships.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 6em;">I have the honour to be, Sir,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 4em;">Your obedient Servant,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 2em;">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">David Beatty</span>,</span><br>
+Vice-Admiral.
+</p>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_495">495</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX">INDEX</h2>
+
+<div class="index">
+<ul class="index">
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Abdiel</i>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed and sunk off, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Aboukir</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Acacia</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Acasta</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Achates</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Acheron</i>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Achilles</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">accident on, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinks a German raider, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Acorn</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Active</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main Fleet Base, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Intelligence Division of, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">naval policy of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">vigorous mine-laying policy adopted by, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squadron, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">substituted for seaplanes, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Africa</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Agadir crisis, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Agamemnon</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Agincourt</i>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins 4th Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Aircraft carriers, development of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in warfare, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Airships as scouts, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ajax</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Alarm</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Albemarle</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Alcantara</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Alderson, Captain, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Allen, Commander Walter L., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Allsup, Commander Claude F., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Alsatian</i>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">captures concealed Germans, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ambuscade</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">America enters the War, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">American battleships join Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Amethyst</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ammunition, for Army use, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">ships, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Amphion</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Amsterdam</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Andes</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rescues German survivors, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Andromache</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Anglia</i>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Anti-submarine defences, German, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">obstructions, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">obstructions damaged by gales, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">operations, British, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Antrim</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Apollo</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Arabis</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ardent</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Arethusa</i>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Argyll</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">aground off Scottish coast, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ariel</i>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Arlanza</i>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Arley</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Armour piercing shells, a new type of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Committees’ investigations on, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">limitations of British, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Armour protection, improved, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">question of, <a href="#Page_394">394</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Arnot, Midshipman R.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Asquith, Right Hon. H.&nbsp;H., visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Assistance</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Attack</i>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_496">496</span><i>Attila</i>, capture of, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Audacious</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_148">148</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Aurora</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Australia</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Austrian steamer captured, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Back, Captain Eric, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Backhouse, Captain Oliver, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Backhouse, Commander Roger, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Badger</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rescues survivors, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Baird, Captain George H., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Balfour, Right Hon. A.&nbsp;J., becomes First Lord, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Baltic, the, British submarines in, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proposed operations in, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Barham</i>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Barron, Commander J.&nbsp;O., <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bashmakoff, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bate, Lieut.-Commander C.&nbsp;L., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Instructions to, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">organisation of, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">title altered, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, <a href="#Page_316">316</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation of, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battle cruisers, function of, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">question of armour, protection of, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battle Fleet, composition of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">aircraft provided for, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battleships, “all-big-gun” type of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Battle Cruisers, British and German, <a href="#Page_307">307</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Battleships, British and German, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">dummy, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Bayano</i> sunk by submarine, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, commands 1st Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">discusses question of blocking Zeebrugge, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">exchange of command, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beamish, Captain Tufton P.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bear Island, reported enemy base and wireless station at, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">despatch on North Sea battle, <a href="#Page_493">493</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Belgian coast, sweeping the, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Bellerophon</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Bellona</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Benbow</i>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beresford, Lord, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>, Captain Persius’ admissions in, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bernard, Captain V.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Betty, Captain, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Biarritz</i>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bingham, Commander the Hon. E.&nbsp;B.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">awarded V.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bircham, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Birkenhead</i>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Birmingham</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Black Prince</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">uncertainty of her end, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Blackett, Captain Henry, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Blake, Lieut.-Commander C.&nbsp;P., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Blanche</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Blockade"></a>Blockade, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">work of the Fleet, <a href="#Page_73">73</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">[<i>see also</i>, <a href="#Cruiser_Squadron_10th">Cruiser Squadron (10th)</a>]</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow entrances, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Blonde</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">goes ashore, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Blūcher</i>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Blunt, Captain W.&nbsp;F., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Boadicea</i>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">damaged by heavy seas, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Boarding steamers, increased force of, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bonham, Captain Thomas P., <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Borrett, Captain George H., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Botha</i>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">497</span>Boxer campaign, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D.&nbsp;E.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bradford, Vice-Admiral E.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Dogger Bank action, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Brandenburg</i>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">interned by Norwegian Government, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Brisk</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Britannia</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">aground in Firth of Forth, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">British Expeditionary Force, transport of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">British Navy (<i>see</i> <a href="#Navy">Navy</a>)</li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Broad Fourteens,” patrolling the, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Broke</i>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Browning, Rear-Admiral M.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bruen, Captain Edward F., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bryce, Lord, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bullen, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Bulwark</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">clever device by, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Heligoland, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">exchange of command, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">flagship damaged, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">illness of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">resumes command of 1st Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Caldaff</i>, mining of, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">gives up the command, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">his Service record, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">improvises defences at Scapa, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">strikes his flag, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Calliope</i>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cambria</i>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cameleon</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cameron, Captain John E., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Campania</i>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Campbell, Commander G.&nbsp;W. McC., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Canada</i>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Canadian troops, a convoy for, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Canterbury</i>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cantlie, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Caribbean</i>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Carnarvon</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Caroline</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Carpenter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Casement, Captain John M., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Castor</i>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J.&nbsp;R.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cay, Captain Arthur L., <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Centurion</i>, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Champion</i>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Champion, Commander J.&nbsp;P., <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Channel Fleet, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">change in command of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">squadrons manned with nucleus crews, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">strengthened, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chatfield, Captain A.&nbsp;E.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Chatham</i>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cheerful</i>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Chester</i>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">her boy hero, Jack Cornwell, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">China, conference of Allied naval officers in, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Christian, Rear-Admiral, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">his command, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Christopher</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chukovsky, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Heligoland, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and position of Commander-in-Chief, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">attends conference at Loch Ewe, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Circe</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>City of Oxford</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Clan McNaughton</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cleopatra</i>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Coaling the Fleet, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Coal strike, a Welsh, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Coast lights, extinction of, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Coast towns, enemy bombardment of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cobbe, Captain M.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cochrane</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cockatrice</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cole, Commander John F.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_498">498</span>Coles, Lieut.-Commander G.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Colliers at the Fleet Base, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">insufficient number of, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Collingwood</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Colossus</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and battle of Jutland, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Columbella</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Colville, Commander Hugh D., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Colville, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">assumes temporary command of 1st Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Comet</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Commonwealth</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Comus</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Conqueror</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Conqueror II.</i> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Constance</i>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Contest</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cordelia</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Corlett, Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cornwallis</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cornwell, Jack, of <i>Chester</i>, heroism of, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cowan, Captain Walter H., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Crabbe, Commander L.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Craig, Captain Arthur W., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Crescent</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cressy</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">a floating dock transferred to, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and submarine menace, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Naval Base at, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Rear-Admiral Pears in charge of Base at, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rendered secure from submarine attacks, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cruiser Squadron (3rd), disbandment of, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Cruiser_Squadron_10th"></a>Cruiser Squadron (10th) augmented, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">blockade work of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">paid off, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">patrol areas of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cumberland</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Curtis, Commander Berwick, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Cyclops</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">D’Aeth, Captain Arthur C.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dahlia</i> strikes a mine, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dampier, Captain, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Danehenko, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dannreuther, Commander, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dardanelles operations, kite balloons in, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Dark night” patrols, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dartmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Day, Commander Selwyn, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Decoy_ships"></a>Decoy ships (Q-ships), <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Defence</i>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Defender</i>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Derfflinger</i>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Destroyer flotillas, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">detailed orders for, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">fine work in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_378">378</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Destroyers, Battle Orders for, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German superiority in number of, <a href="#Page_396">396–7</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German <i lang="la">v.</i> British, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">importance attached by Germany to attack by, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323–5</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">inadequate number of British, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">used for mine-sweeping, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">welcome additions to force of, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">work of, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Devonshire</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dick, Captain James D., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Digby</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Director-firing, system of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Displacement, question of, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dock accommodation, absence of, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">the Kaiser’s comments on, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dockyard men, fine work by, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dogger Bank action, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, <a href="#Page_493">493</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle cruiser fleet, composition of, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle fleet engaged in, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#North_Sea_battle">North Sea Battle</a>)</li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dominion</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Donaldson, Sir F., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Donegal</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Doughty, Captain Henry M., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">499</span>Dover, Straits of, mining the, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Drake</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dreadnought</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rams a submarine, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in conference, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dreyer, Captain, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dryad</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dublin</i>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Duff, Captain A.&nbsp;A.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Duff, Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;L., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Albany</i>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Clarence</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Cornwall</i>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dumaresq, Captain John S., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Duncan</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Duncombe</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dundas, Commander Harold V., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Dundee</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore at, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dutton, Captain Arthur B.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">East Coast, bombardment of undefended towns on, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">raids on, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ebro</i>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Edgar</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Edwards, Captain John D., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Elbing</i>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ellis, Captain Stanley V., <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Emperor of India</i>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ems</i> sunk by submarine, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Endymion</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Engadine</i>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">England, possibility of invasion of, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">raids on south-east coast of, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">English Channel, destroyers in, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Erin</i>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Erne</i>, wreck of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">new command for, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Everett, Commodore A.&nbsp;F., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Exmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Falkland Islands battle, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Falmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Farie, Captain (D.) James U., <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases in, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Farrington, Captain, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Faulknor</i>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_457">457</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fawckner, Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Fearless</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fergusson, Captain James A., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Field, Captain Frederick L., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Filleul, C., awarded D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fire control instruments, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fire correction methods, improved, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Firedrake</i>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fisher, Captain William W., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">destroyer programme of, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">energy as First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">improvements in Fleet organisation by, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Mr. Schwab’s visit to, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">naval policy of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">supports Director System, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fishermen’s bladders as “floating mines,” <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fishing areas, question of restriction of, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fishing vessels attacked by submarines, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">FitzGerald, Colonel, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fleet, the, a vital factor to existence of the Empire, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">concentration of, at outbreak of War, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">disposition of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#Grand_Fleet">Grand Fleet</a>, <a href="#Navy">Navy</a>)</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H.&nbsp;U., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Floating storage, advantages of, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Flotta, Island of, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Flying Condor</i>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Food question, the, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_500">500</span>Forbes, Commander Charles M., <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Formidable</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Forth, Firth of, obstructions against submarines in, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine activity in, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Fortune</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_376">376</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Forward</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Foula Islands, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fox, Captain C.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Frauenlob</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fremantle, Commander G.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Fury</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Galatea</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Garland</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Garry</i> engages a submarine, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">General Cruiser Instructions, the, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Gentian</i>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">George V., King, messages to the Fleet, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">German account of Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">bombardment of East Coast, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">breach of international law, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">disguised raiders, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">fleet (<i>see</i> <a href="#High_Sea_Fleet">High Sea Fleet</a>) gunnery, efficiency of, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">merchant steamer intercepted and sunk, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">mines and submarines, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i> (and <i lang="la">passim</i>)</li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine menace, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_115">115</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">German Bight, British submarine lays mines in, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Germans fire on British rescuers, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proclaim British waters unsafe for shipping, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rescue British crews, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">thoroughness of defences of their naval bases, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Germany, destroyer force of, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">mutinies in Navy of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">naval strength of, in early days of War, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ghourko</i>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Gibraltar</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Glen Isla</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Gloucester</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Goff, Lieut.-Commander R.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Goldfinch</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Goodenough, Commodore W.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">engages the enemy, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Good Hope</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted at, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Goshawk</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Gossamer</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gough-Calthorpe, Rear-Admiral the Hon. S., <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Grafton</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Graham, Lieut.-Commander E.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Grand_Fleet"></a>Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">a watching policy decided upon, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">all-round improvement in fighting efficiency of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and its bases, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>,
+    <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">arrival of additional seamen ratings for, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">at end of November, 1914, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">at end of 1914, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">attempts to entice enemy to action, <a href="#Page_264">264</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">bases: conditions for leaving and returning to, <a href="#Page_295">295</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle exercises, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Battle Orders, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle tactics exercises, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">blockade work [<i>see</i> <a href="#Blockade">Blockade</a>, <a href="#Cruiser_Squadron_10th">Cruiser Squadron (10th)</a>]</li>
+<li class="isub1">compared with High Sea Fleet, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">composition of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">condenser and boiler troubles of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">constitution of, in May, 1916, and a parallel, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">countering retiring battle tactics, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">cruising formation and deployment, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">destroyer force of, <a href="#Page_396">396</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">development of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">disposition and movements of, after declaration of war, <a href="#Page_90">90</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">efficiency of engine-room departments of, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_501">501</span>Fleet movements: a month’s work, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">gunnery practice of, <a href="#Page_64">64</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">inception of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">kite balloons provided for, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">lectures, system of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">measures against invasion and raids, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">messages from the King to, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">naval instruction and education problem, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">new Submarine Flotilla, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">peace and war conditions compared, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">personnel and welfare of, <a href="#Page_85">85</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">problem of tactics in Fleet actions, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Royal visits to, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Russian gentlemen’s visit to, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sea-plane reconnaissances of, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">ships fitted with Director-firing system, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">signalling by, and why reduced, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">spirit of comradeship in, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sports, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarines attached to, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tables showing armament, protection and displacement of capital ships in, <a href="#Page_308">308–310</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">the Staff Organisation, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">training of, <a href="#Page_55">55</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">work of medical officers, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Grant, Captain E.&nbsp;P.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Grant, Rear-Admiral W.&nbsp;L., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in command of 3rd Cruiser Squadron, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Great War, declaration of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">first reports of enemy movements, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">naval strategy in home waters, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">opening of, <a href="#Page_1">1</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Green, Captain J.&nbsp;F.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Greene, W. Graham, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Grief</i>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Griffin, W.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;R., a D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M. for, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gun power, question of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gun, range of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a> (and <i>note</i>)</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gunfire, correction of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gunnery efficiency: a new departure, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">work of German High Sea Fleet, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Haddock, Commodore, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Haldane, Lord, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Halsey, Commodore Lionel, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hamburg</i>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick, becomes Second Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hamond, Commander Robert G., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hampshire</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel in, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">strikes a mine and sinks, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">survivors of, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hannibal</i>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hardy</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Harris, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald N.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Harwich, mined areas near, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Harwich Force, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">provided with aircraft, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hawk</i> sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hawke</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hawksley, Commodore J.&nbsp;R.&nbsp;P., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Heath, Rear-Admiral H.&nbsp;L., <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Heaton-Ellis, Captain E.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;F., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Heligoland, a comprehensive mining policy urged, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">fortifications of, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proposals for bombardment and capture of, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Heligoland Bight, British submarines followed by German trawlers, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">dispositions for sweeping, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">enemy light forces in action, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">mining policy in, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">projected operations in, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hercules</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hibernia</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="High_Sea_Fleet"></a>High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">changes in commands of, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">defensive rôle of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">destroyer force of, <a href="#Page_396">396</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">efficiency of, ix, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">position of, in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">probable tactics of, correctly anticipated, <a href="#Page_401">401</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">superiority of protection in, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">surrender of, ix, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tables showing armament, protection and displacement of, <a href="#Page_308">308–310</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">under repair, <a href="#Page_428">428</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hindustan</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F.&nbsp;E.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hodgson, Commander John C., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hogue</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_502">502</span><i>Hollyhock</i>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Holtzendorff, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Homan, Lieut.-Commander Edwin A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">goes down with <i>Invincible</i>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hope</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hope, C.&nbsp;C., awarded D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hotham, Captain Alan G., <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Howell, T.&nbsp;O.&nbsp;G., awarded D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H.&nbsp;V., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hutchinson, Commander Reginald B.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hydra</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Illustrious</i>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Iltis</i> and her commander, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Impérieuse</i>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Implacable</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Inconstant</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Indefatigable</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>India</i> torpedoed and sunk, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Indomitable</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">takes <i>Lion</i> in tow, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Inflexible</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins the Fleet, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">mined in Dardanelles, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ingenohl, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">International law, German disregard of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Intrepid</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Invergordon as repairing base, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">exercise and recreation at, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">floating docks at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Invincible</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337–338</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">survivors rescued by <i>Badger</i>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Iphigenia</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Irish mail packets as armed boarding steamers, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Irish Sea, submarine activity in, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Iron Duke</i>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Confirmation by Archbishop of York on, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">disconcerting discovery on, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">refitting at Invergordon, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Staff of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">the King’s speech to Fleet, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Irresistible</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Irvin, Commander (Acting) W.&nbsp;D., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Italy enters Great War, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and the submarine menace, <a href="#Page_454">454</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">becomes First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">James, Lieut.-Commander C.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;N., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Jason</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J.&nbsp;R. (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">accepts command of Home Fleets, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Kaiser’s criticism of dock accommodation, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and raids on unfortified towns, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and the value of aircraft in war, <a href="#Page_450">450</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">appointed Commander-in-Chief of Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">as First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Battle Orders of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">bids farewell to Fleet, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Birthday message to the King, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">confers with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">confers with Premier and Chancellor of Exchequer, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">despatches on Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">embarrassing interview with Sir G. Callaghan, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">entertains Lord Kitchener, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">extensive mining policy of, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">memorandum to Fleet from, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">objections to change of Command, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proposals for handling Fleet in action approved by Admiralty, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">reorganises his Staff, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">selects his Staff, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">suggested scheme of submarine obstructions by, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to personnel of Fleet, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">visits the Admiralty, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">wounded in China, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. Martyn, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">relieves Admiral Warrender, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jones, Commander Loftus W., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">gallantry of, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_503">503</span>posthumous award of V.&nbsp;C. to, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jutland, Battle of, <a href="#Page_304">304</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">Admiral Jellicoe’s memorandum to Fleet, <a href="#Page_412">412</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">area covered by different engagements, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle cruiser fleet’s action, <a href="#Page_316">316</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle fleet in action, <a href="#Page_341">341</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">battle opens, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">despatches on, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Director System in use at, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">disposition of Fleet, <a href="#Page_318">318</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">enemy losses, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">enemy sighted, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German version of, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Grand Fleet congratulated by Admiralty, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">inferiority of British armour-piercing shell in, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">night attacks by flotillas, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">night dispositions, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proceedings on 1st June, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">reflections on, <a href="#Page_390">390</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">repairing and altering ships damaged in, <a href="#Page_415">415</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">results of, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">retiring tactics of enemy, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">the night action, <a href="#Page_370">370</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Kaiser</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H.&nbsp;W.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kempenfelt</i>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kennedy, Captain Francis W., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kennedy, Captain Theobald W.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Keyes, Commodore, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rescues enemy crews, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kiddle, Captain E.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron’s visit to, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kildonan Castle</i>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>King Alfred</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>King Edward VII.</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">mined and sunk, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>King George V.</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and battle of Jutland, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>King Orry</i>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>King Stephen</i> sights sinking Zeppelin, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">at Scapa, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sails on <i>Hampshire</i>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kite balloons, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitän von, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Köningen Luise</i>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kristianiafiord</i> intercepted by <i>Teutonic</i>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</i>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer sunk off, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Lamlash, as pre-War practice base, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lancaster</i>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Landrail</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lans, Vice-Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lapwing</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Larne</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lassoo</i>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Latona</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Laurel</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Laverock</i>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lawrence, Commander, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lawson, Captain R.&nbsp;N., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Leake, Captain F.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Leda</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Leggett, Captain Oliver E., <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Leith, Zeppelin attack on, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Le Mesurier, Commodore, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lerwick, coaling base at, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Leveson, Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Leviathan</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ley, Captain J.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Liberty</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, <a href="#Page_396">396</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lilac</i> strikes a mine, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lion, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">taken in tow by <i>Indomitable</i>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Liverpool</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lizard</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Loch Ewe, a conference at, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">as coaling base, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine activity at, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Loch-na-Keal, base at, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">504</span>base abandoned, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">improvised obstructions at, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>London</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Long Forties,” the, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Long Hope, anchorage at, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lord Nelson</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstructions at, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">base at, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Battle Squadrons at, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">diversion at, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">improvised obstructions at, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Louise</i> (Danish steamer), <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lowestoft</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lucia</i>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lutzow</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lyddite shell, suspected, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lydiard</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lynx</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sunk by a mine, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H.&nbsp;I.&nbsp;N., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Lyra</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Maclachlan, Captain, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mænad</i>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mafeking</i>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Magic</i>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Magnificent</i>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mahan, Admiral, vii, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mainz</i> disabled in action, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">her survivors rescued, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Majestic</i>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Malaya</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Manchester Commerce</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mandate</i>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Manners</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mantua</i>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Marksman</i>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W.&nbsp;P., <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Marlborough</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in action at Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">torpedoed, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Marne</i>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Martial</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Martin</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Marvel</i>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mary Rose</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Master, Lieut.-Commander E.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Matchless</i> strikes a mine, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">McKenna, Mr., as First Lord, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mediterranean, ships in the, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Medusa</i> rammed and sunk, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Melita</i>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Menace</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Menelaus</i> (kite balloon ship), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Merchant-ships attacked by submarines, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">camouflaged, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">commissioned for blockade work, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">convoying, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">instructions for safety of, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">serious loss of, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">squadron disbanded, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine peril to, <a href="#Page_446">446</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Meteor</i>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">damaged in Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Meteor</i> (German mine-layer) abandoned and sunk, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">number of mines laid by, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Michael</i>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Michigan</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Midge</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Milford Haven, Marquis of, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">succeeded by Lord Fisher, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Millbrook</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Miller, Captain Charles B., <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Minches, the, submarines reported in, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mindful</i>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Mine Bumping Squadron,” the, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Minelayer Squadron, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mine-layers, increased activity of British, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Instructions to, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mines, British, defective pattern of, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">experiments to counter, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">success of new type of, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">the Northern Barrage, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Minesweepers, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">chase submarine, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">inadequacy of force of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">maximum speed of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">withdrawn for service abroad, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mine-sweeping force strengthened, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Minion</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_505">505</span><i>Minotaur</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Minstrel</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mischief</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mocatta, Lieutenant Jack E.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Moewe</i> lays extensive minefield off Scottish coast, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Moir, Commander Dashwood F., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Molteno, Captain, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Moltke</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Monarch</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Monmouth</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mons</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Moon</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">succeeded by Rear-Admiral Pakenham, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Moorsom</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">gunnery practice in, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Moresby</i>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Morley, Lord, dinner party at United Services Club, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Morning Star</i>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Morris</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Morton, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mounsey</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Munro, Captain Donald S., <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">devises system of submarine obstruction, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Munster</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rescues crew of <i>Alcantara</i>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Musketeer</i>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Mystic</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Nabakoff, Vladimir, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Naiad</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">engages a Zeppelin, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Narborough</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Narvik, iron ore trade of, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Narwhal</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Natal</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">blown up in Cromarty harbour, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">court-martial on loss of, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Naval instructors, reduced number of, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Naval manœuvres of 1912, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix.</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Naval situation in May, 1916, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Navigation lights, extinction of, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Navy Acts, German, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Navy League, the, formation of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Navy"></a>Navy, the, a lesson for the future, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">composition of, at opening of Great War, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">disposition of, in early days of Great War, <a href="#Page_19">19</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">grief of, at Kitchener’s fate, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">partition of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">use and purpose of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Negro</i>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nemesis</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Neptune</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nerissa</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nessus</i>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nestor</i>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>New Zealand</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and North Sea action, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nicator</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nicholson, Captain William C.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R.&nbsp;L., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">organises wireless school, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">signalling system of, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Noble</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nomad</i>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nonsuch</i>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North American Squadron joined by <i>Princess Royal</i>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North east coast, Zeppelins on, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North Rona Island, a reported enemy base on, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North Sea, area of, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">controlling the, <a href="#Page_249">249</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">cruiser patrol areas in, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">drifting German mines in, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Fleet in, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">northern and central areas of, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">proclaimed a dangerous area, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">reported mooring of oil drums in, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine and mine menace in, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a> <i lang="la">et passim</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">sweeps, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–9</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>,
+    <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_445">445</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">the Northern Barrage mine-field, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="North_Sea_battle"></a>North Sea battle, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">(<i>cf.</i> Dogger Bank)</li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">506</span>Norway, German Fleet’s peace-time visits to, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Norwegian coast, British patrol of, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">British submarines’ operations against enemy on, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">reported German bases on, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">steamers sunk, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sweeping, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nottingham</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">torpedoed and sunk, <a href="#Page_437">437</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nugent, Captain R.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Nymphe</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rams a submarine, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Oak</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">King George V. on, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Obdurate</i>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Obedient</i>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">O’Beirne, Mr., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Observation mine-fields, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Oceanic</i>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Older</i>, German crew on, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Olympic</i>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Onslaught</i>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Onslow</i>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">heroism of captain and crew of, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Opal</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ophelia</i>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Oracle</i>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Orcoma</i>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Orion</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine activity in, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">wireless stations in, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Oropesa</i> in collision, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Orotava</i>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Orvieto</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Oscar II.</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ossory</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Otway</i>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Owl</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Pakenham, Rear-Admiral, W.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Paragon</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Parker, Captain Henry Wise, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Parsons, Lieutenant G., <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Pasley</i>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West Indies, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Patia</i>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Patrol</i> engaged by battle cruisers, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Patuca</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Peace manœuvres, unreality of, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R., <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Pelican</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pelly, Captain Henry B., <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Penn</i>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Penshurst</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">gunnery practice in, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Persius, Captain, an admission by, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Petard</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Peterhead, good work of patrol at, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">patrol sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">trawlers sunk by enemy, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Phaeton</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">attacks a Zeppelin, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phipps, Lieutenant W.&nbsp;D., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Plover</i>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Plowden, Commander Richard A.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon. Reginald A.&nbsp;R., <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pohl, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C.&nbsp;F., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Pommern</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Porpoise</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rams a submarine, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Portrush, German wreckage ashore at, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pound, Captain A.&nbsp;D.&nbsp;P.&nbsp;R., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pratt, Captain Thomas D., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Preston, Commander L.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Prince Charles</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinks a U-boat, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Prince of Wales</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Princess Louise</i>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">attacked by submarine, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Princess Margaret</i>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Princess Royal</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">convoys Canadian troops, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins North American Squadron, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Prowse, Captain Cecil I., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_507">507</span><i>Prudentia</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P.&nbsp;F., <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“P.&nbsp;Z. Exercises,” <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">“Q” ships (<i>see</i> <a href="#Decoy_ships">Decoy ships</a>)</li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Queen</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Queen Mary</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_465">465</a> loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Ramage, Commander G.&nbsp;N., <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ramexo</i>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ramsey, Commander Charles G., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ramsey</i> sunk by disguised mine-layer, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Range of gun and torpedo, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Range-finders, improved, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Range-finding experiments, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rattler</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rawlings, Lieut.-Commander H.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Redpole</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Reeves, Captain Edward, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rena</i>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Renown</i>, her deck protection improved, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Repulse</i>, her deck protection improved, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins the Fleet, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Retiring tactics, advantages of, <a href="#Page_401">401</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Revenge</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rifleman</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J.&nbsp;W., <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Robertson, Mr., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Robinson, Lieut.-Commander Charles G., <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rohilla</i>, wreck of, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a merchant-ship at, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rosemary</i> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ross, Captain George P., <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rostock</i>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rosyth, a conference at, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">base at, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">conditions for leaving and returning to base at, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">development of base at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German prisoners landed at, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">interview with Mr. Balfour at, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine obstructions for, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">the coal difficulty at, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">3rd Battle Squadron at, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Roxburgh</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">hit by torpedo, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Royal Arthur</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Royal Oak</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Royal Sovereign</i>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Royalist</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Royds, Captain Percy M.&nbsp;R., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Ruby</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Russell</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Russian steamer sunk, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Russians relay their mine-fields, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">visit Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Russo-Japanese War, advances in technique in, viii</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>St. Clair</i>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">St. John, Captain F.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>St. Vincent</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Sapphire</i>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Sappho</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Sarah Alice</i> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Savill, Captain, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">a wireless school established at, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">adopted as main Fleet Base, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">arrival of <i>Campania</i> at, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">arrival of air- and sea-planes at, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">blocking the channels, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">defenceless nature of base at, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">entrances to, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">gunnery and torpedo practice at, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">recreation and occupation at, <a href="#Page_85">85–7</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">reinforcing gun defences of, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">situation of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine menace, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine obstruction pierced, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarine obstructions at, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scarborough, bombardment of, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Schwann, Captain O., <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scott, Captain Albert C., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing system, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scottish coast, <i>Moewe</i> lays minefield on, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">submarines on, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Seagull</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sea-plane carriers, orders to, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sheds wrecked by gale, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seaplanes as scouts, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">difficulties of, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282–3</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">first reconnaissance work with Fleet, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_508">508</span>replaced by aeroplanes, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Sea Ranger</i>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Searchlights, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">excellence of German, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">signalling by, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Second Fleet, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Selborne, Earl of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seven Years’ War, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Seydlitz</i>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seymour, Lieut.-Commander Ralph W., <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Shamrock</i>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Shannon</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Shark</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">heroism of captain and crew, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">survivors awarded D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Sheldrake</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Shetland Patrol Force, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Signalling by searchlight, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Skipjack</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Smith, C.&nbsp;H., awarded D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Smoke screens, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Soudan</i>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">South Atlantic, von Spee’s Squadron in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Southampton</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">South-east coast, raids on, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sowerby, Captain Charles F., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Sparrowhawk</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rammed, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Special Service Squadron,” the, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Spee, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Speedwell</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Speedy</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Spickernell, Frank T., <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Spitfire</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Spithead, Naval Review at, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Spitzbergen, reported German submarine base and wireless station at, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stadlandet, patrols off, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Stag</i>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Star shells, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Staunch</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stileman, Rear-Admiral H.&nbsp;H., <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stirling, Captain A.&nbsp;J.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A.&nbsp;P., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stuart, Lieut.-Commander Dudley, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">destroys von Spee’s squadron, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">kite balloon experiments of, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">succeeds Sir D. Gamble, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Submarine activity in White Sea, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">attack under difficulties, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">C 27 sinks a German U-boat, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">flotillas, Instructions to, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">menace, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a> <i lang="la">et passim</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">obstructions (system of), <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">patrols, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">peril to merchant shipping, <a href="#Page_445">445</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li>
+<li class="isub1">screens, question of, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sinks German steamship, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">surrender of a German, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">comparative strength of British and German, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">defences against, at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_289">289</a> (<i>note</i>)</li>
+<li class="isub1">reason for suppressing news of engagements with, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">sunk by Navy, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sulivan, Commander Harold E., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sulivan, Commander Norton A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Superb</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Swan, T.&nbsp;W., awarded D.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">defences of, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">evacuation of, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Swift</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy destroyer, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Taku forts, capture of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Talisman</i>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Taranaki</i>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tay, River, submarines off entrance to, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">509</span>Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed in action, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Telephonic communications, establishment of, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Temeraire</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Termagant</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Terry, Lieut.-Commander F.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Teutonic</i>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">intercepts a Norwegian-American liner, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Theseus</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Thetis</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Third Fleet, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E.&nbsp;C.&nbsp;O., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Thornhill</i>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Thunderer</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Tiger</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland action, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Tipperary</i>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Titania</i>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tolstoy, Count Alexis, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Torpedo attacks:</li>
+<li class="isub1">caution required in, <a href="#Page_399">399</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">practices at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">range of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">warfare:</li>
+<li class="isub2">element of chance in, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">importance attached by Germany to, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">measures for combating, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">work of German Navy, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">reports on, at battle of Jutland, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tothill, Captain Hugh H.&nbsp;D., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds Rear-Admiral Waymouth, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">heroism of and tribute to, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374–5</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Townsend, Captain Cyril S., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trafalgar, Battle of, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trawlers, German, engaged and destroyed, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">support marine obstructions at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">suspicious, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C.&nbsp;W.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trewin, Assistant-Paymaster G.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Trident</i>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trondhjem, <i>Brandenburg</i> at, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Turbulent</i>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">rammed and sunk, <a href="#Page_378">378–80</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Turkish battleships, purchase of, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tynemouth, minefields off, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tyrwhitt, Commodore R.&nbsp;Y., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">a successful haul of German trawlers, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">chases a destroyer, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">orders sinking of <i>Medusa</i>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">U-boat losses, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Undaunted</i>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Underhill, Captain Edwin V., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">United Services Club, dinner party at, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">United States enters the War, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Unity</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Usborne, Commander Cecil V., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Usedom, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Utvoer Lighthouse, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Vala</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Valiant</i>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Vanguard</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Venerable</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Vengeance</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Victor</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Victoria Cross awards, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Victorious</i>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Viknor</i>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Vindex</i>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Visual signalling, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Von der Tann</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Wales, Prince of, visits Scapa, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Walney Island, submarine attack on, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C.&nbsp;A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wardle, Captain T.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in command of 2nd Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">terminates his command, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Warrior</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">abandoned and sunk, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Warspite</i>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W., <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">510</span>breakdown in health, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V.&nbsp;H.&nbsp;T., <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Welsh coal-fields, strike in, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">White Sea, enemy submarines in, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">protecting the trade route, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Wiesbaden</i> badly crippled, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">William II., Emperor, criticises British dock accommodation, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wilson, Commander W.&nbsp;W., <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wintour, Captain Charles J., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">unpleasant experience of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wireless school at Scapa, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wireless signalling, and why restricted, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wireless telegraphy, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">improved system of, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Withers, Captain Percy, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Wolf</i> intercepted and sunk, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Woods, Commander A.&nbsp;E., <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Woods, Commander Alexander R.&nbsp;W., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Woollcombe, Captain Louis C.&nbsp;S., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Woollcombe, Captain Maurice, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Yarmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Yegoroff, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Yorck</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Young, Captain G.&nbsp;B., <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage Association, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><i>Zaza</i>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Zealandia</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and considered impracticable, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Zeppelin activity, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">bombs rescuers, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">shed, Tondern, attack on, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Zeppelins as scouts, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">destruction of, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">raids by, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Zigzagging, procedure of, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">511</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<figure id="i_511" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="right"><p><i>Diagram I.</i></p></div>
+
+<p class="sans">
+PLAN OF<br>
+<span class="large">JUTLAND BATTLE</span><br>
+BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT
+</p>
+
+  <img src="images/i_511.jpg" width="784" height="663" alt="">
+<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_511-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot sans">
+<p>The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6.0. P.M. is fixed
+by a report from the Marlborough and confirmed at
+6.4. P.M. by a report from the Rear-Admiral 1st Battle
+Squadron in the Colossus.</p>
+
+<p>The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by
+a report from the Marlborough at 6.5. P.M. taken
+in conjunction with the reports of the Rear-Admiral
+5th Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from
+the report of the Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet
+and from the Lion and Indomitable.</p>
+
+<p>The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6.7. P.M.
+is fixed by a report from the Lion received at 6.6. P.M.;
+this gave the bearing; the distance is obtained by a
+consideration of the ranges at which the Lion was firing.</p>
+
+<p>The position of the Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed at 6.14.
+P.M. from the Lion and at 6.15. P.M. from the Barham;
+the latter being signalled by wireless, an interval of four
+minutes being allowed between transmission and
+receipt.</p>
+
+<p>Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers
+are fixed by the bearings on which our Battle Cruisers
+were firing and the ranges given, and by a consideration
+of the German reports which show a 32 point turn
+between 6.6. and 6.15. P.M.</p>
+
+<p>Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are
+fixed by bearings and ranges given by the Marlborough
+at 6.17. P.M., Iron Duke at 6.31. P.M. and Monarch
+at 6.33. P.M.</p>
+
+<p>The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are
+fixed by reports and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of
+Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron.</p>
+
+<p><i>Note.</i>—In studying this diagram it should be borne in mind that
+only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due
+to the smoke and mist.</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_512">512</span></p>
+<hr>
+
+<figure id="i_512" class="figcenter section" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="right"><p class="right"><i>Diagram II.</i></p></div>
+
+<p class="sans">
+DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT<br>
+HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON<br>
+THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN.</p>
+
+  <img src="images/i_512.jpg" width="715" height="803" alt="">
+<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_512-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot sans">
+<p>It should be borne in mind that no information as to
+the position of the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until
+6.14. P.M., and that the only reports received had been
+one at 6.6. P.M., giving a bearing of the Enemy Battle
+Cruisers from the “Lion”, and a report at 5.50. P.M.
+from the “Southampton” to the effect that the Enemy
+Battle Fleet bore north-east from his Battle Cruisers
+(and were therefore presumably ahead of them and right
+ahead of our Battle Fleet.)</p>
+
+<p>There had therefore been no sufficient information on
+which to re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment
+on the starboard wing column to meet an enemy before
+the starboard beam would necessarily be an awkward
+manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration
+of the starboard wing column to port and a very large
+alteration of course of the remaining columns when
+coming into line astern of it.</p>
+
+<p>A torpedo attack during deployment would under these
+conditions throw the British Battle Fleet into great
+confusion and a concentration of gunfire on the turning
+point would be very effective; our own gunfire, owing to
+the large alterations of course and the consequent
+difficulty of obtaining correct fire control data would be
+correspondingly ineffective: our own destroyers had been
+spread ahead of the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen
+until 6.8 P.M. and were moving across the front in an
+unformed condition to the two flanks.</p>
+
+<p>The movements that would probably have resulted and
+the number of ships on each side in action are shown in
+the diagram for each 3-minute interval from 6.16 to
+6.28 P.M.</p>
+
+<p>The three ships of the 5th. Battle Squadron would
+eventually have come into line ahead of the 6th. division,
+but would possibly have masked the fire of that division
+during the movement.</p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_513">513</span></p>
+
+<hr>
+<figure id="i_513" class="figcenter section" style="max-width: 36em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="right"><p><i>Diagram III.</i></p></div>
+
+<p class="sans">
+DIAGRAM SHOWING<br>
+ORDER <span class="allsmcap">OF THE</span> BATTLEFLEET<br>
+
+<span class="large">BATTLE <span class="allsmcap">OF</span> JUTLAND</span><br>
+
+31<sup>st.</sup> MAY 1916
+</p>
+
+  <img src="images/i_513.jpg" width="687" height="842" alt="">
+<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_513-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p><i>“Minotaur’s” track chart records that at 8 p.m.
+“King George V” bore N 10 E (true) from her,
+distant about 5 miles.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>It also records that “Lion” bore W by S (true)
+from her, distant about 5 miles.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>If these records are reliable “Lion’s” 8 p.m.
+position would be at X, and her track between
+7.20 and 8 p.m., presumably as
+shewn thus:——</i></p>
+
+<p><i>“Minotaur’s” records however, do not profess
+to give exact distances.</i></p>
+</div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_514">514</span></p>
+<hr>
+
+<figure id="i_514" class="figcenter section" style="max-width: 33em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<div class="right"><p><i>Diagram IV.</i></p></div>
+
+<p class="sans">
+<span class="larger">TRACK OF SQUADRONS</span><br>
+DURING NIGHT OF<br>
+May 31st. to June 1st. and<br>
+Forenoon of June 1st. 1916.
+</p>
+
+  <img src="images/i_514.jpg" width="539" height="735" alt="">
+<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_514-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div>
+
+<div class="sans">
+<div class="left"><p>BATTLE FLEET.</p></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot in2">
+
+<p>During night, Battle Fleet in 3 columns, 1 mile apart,
+disposed abeam.</p>
+
+<p>From 2.45 A.&nbsp;M. to 3.30 A.&nbsp;M., in single line.</p>
+
+<p>From 3.30 A.&nbsp;M. onward, in 6 columns, 1 mile apart,
+disposed abeam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="left"><p>POSITIONS OF CRUISERS ETC.</p></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot in2">
+
+<p>Dublin at 4.30 A.&nbsp;M. in Lat. 55° 30′ N., Long. 6° 36′ E.
+Commodore of Flotillas at 5.0 A.&nbsp;M. in Lat. 55° 48′ N.,
+Long. 6° 22′ E.</p>
+
+<p>Vice Admiral 1st Battle Squadron with 6th Division at
+6.40 A.&nbsp;M. in Lat. 55° 55′ N., Long. 5° 15′ E. steering
+S. SE. 19 knots.</p>
+
+<p>3 Submarines off Vyl Light Ship on bearing 270°, 4
+miles, 12 miles and 20 miles respectively from Lightship.</p>
+</div></div>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<div class="chapter section transnote">
+<h2 id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
+were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
+marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
+unbalanced.</p>
+
+<p>Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs
+and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support
+hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to
+the corresponding illustrations.</p>
+
+<p>Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them,
+have been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed at the end of
+the book.</p>
+
+<p>The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
+references.</p>
+
+<p>Original text uses two forms of the following words; both retained here:</p>
+
+<ul class="in4">
+<li>“moral” and “morale”</li>
+
+<li>“underwater” and “under-water”</li>
+
+<li>“minefield” and “mine-field”</li>
+
+<li>“seaplanes” and “sea-planes”</li>
+</ul>
+
+<p>Redundant book title on <a href="#Page_1">page 1</a> has been removed by Transcriber.</p>
+
+<p><a href="#Page_316">Page 316</a>: The times in the illustration's heading use a mix of Roman
+and Arabic numerals.</p>
+
+<p><a href="#Page_360">Page 360</a>: The time shown as “7.8” was printed that way. It may mean “8
+minutes after 7”. Similar times appear on other pages.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
+
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
+Procedures for determining public domain status are described in
+the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org.
+
+No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in
+jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize
+this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright
+status under the laws that apply to them.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
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+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #75323 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75323)