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display: block; text-align: justify} + +.wspace {word-spacing: .3em;} + +span.locked {white-space:nowrap;} +.pagenum br {display: none; visibility: hidden;} + +pre { + margin-top: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 1.5em; + font-size: .9em; font-family: monospace; +} +sup {font-size: .7em;} +.sans {font-family: sans-serif, serif;} +.ilb {display: inline-block; text-align: left;} +.uline {text-decoration: underline;} + + /* ]]> */ </style> +</head> + +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 ***</div> + +<div class="transnote section"> +<p class="center larger">Transcriber’s Note</p> + +<p>Larger versions of most illustrations may be seen by right-clicking them +and selecting an option to view them separately, or by double-tapping and/or +stretching them. Larger, higher-resolution versions of the maps and +diagrams may be seen by clicking or right-clicking “(<i>High-res</i>)” below +them.</p> + +<p class="covernote">New original cover art included with this eBook is granted +to the public domain. It includes an illustration taken +from the original book.</p> + +<p><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Additional notes</a> will be found near the end of this ebook.</p> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<div class="chapter section"> +<figure id="i_2" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 27em;"> + <img src="images/i_002.jpg" width="1297" height="1910" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption left">ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. + </figcaption> +</figure> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<div class="chapter section center wspace"> +<h1>THE GRAND FLEET<br> +<span class="small">1914–1916</span></h1> + +<p class="p1 larger">ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK</p> + +<p class="p2 larger"><span class="smaller">BY</span><br> +ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE<br> +<span class="smaller">OF SCAPA<br> +G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.</span></p> + +<p class="p4 b4">WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS</p> + +<figure id="i_3" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 5em;"> + <img src="images/i_003.jpg" width="221" height="220" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p class="p0 larger" style="margin-top: -2.75em;"> NEW<span class="in4"> YORK</span><br> +GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY +</p> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter section center wspace"> +<p class="p4 vspace small">COPYRIGHT, 1919,<br> +BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY +</p> + +<p class="p4"><span class="small">PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</span></p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<div class="chapter section center wspace"> +<p class="larger vspace"> +TO MY COMRADES<br> +OF THE GRAND FLEET +</p> +<div> </div> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from +the outbreak of war until the end of November, 1916, +is described.</p> + +<p>The writing of this record of the work of the Grand +Fleet, of which little has been heard by the nation +hitherto, has helped to fill in days of leisure. The manuscript +was finished by the autumn of 1918, but publication +was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice +had been signed and the German Navy had, for all practical +purposes, ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book. +The final revision has been done hastily owing to my early +departure for the Dominions, and in the circumstances I +hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if any clerical +errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances +of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the +proofs, and I am much indebted to him.</p> + +<p>The narrative necessarily includes an account of the +gradual organisation and development of the Grand Fleet, +and its bases, by successive steps, after the hoisting of my +flag on the outbreak of hostilities; and the manner in +which the changing conditions of naval warfare were met +is also dealt with.</p> + +<p>Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that +whilst the <em>principles</em> of naval strategy are unchangeable, +experience in war and changes in the weapons with which +war is waged may profoundly affect the <em>application</em> of +those principles.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">viii</span></p> + +<p>The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo-Japanese +war; in the short interval between 1904 and 1914 +further great advances took place in the technique of +warfare; these produced a striking influence on strategy +and tactics during the late war.</p> + +<p>The reasons which made it necessary, during the war, +to hide from public view the work of the Grand Fleet +no longer exist, and it will no doubt be of interest to the +nation to learn something of its operations, especially as, +for various justifiable reasons, few despatches were issued +dealing with its activities. So far as the Battle Fleet +was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one +exception, and that despatch was written and published +when it was necessary to conceal a good deal from the +enemy.</p> + +<p>As is inevitable, much of the information in this +volume is of a technical character and, though interesting +to seamen, may prove less so to the general reader. Those +who take this view may decide that Chapters IV to X, +inclusive, require only to be glanced at. Confidential +matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has +been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the +light in later years.</p> + +<p>The main portion of the book is written in narrative +form, but where it is thought that an explanation may +be useful, as to the reasons which governed any particular +movement or decision, such reason is given in order that +opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding +the purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped +to achieve it.</p> + +<p>In some parts of the book reference is made to the +Germans being superior to us in <i lang="fr">matériel</i>. There were +many directions, however, in which war experience +showed the correctness of our views and the wisdom of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">ix</span> +our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of +safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital +ship, and we did gain advantage from the heavier calibre +of our guns. Naval policy is pursued in peace conditions +under inevitable disadvantages in a democratic country, +because there are many claims on the Exchequer. Reviewing +our pre-war programmes of ship construction and +equipment, and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of +the nation generally as to the imminence of war, it is +matter for satisfaction that the Boards of Admiralty +from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so +much, and that when at last war became inevitable the +nation had in control of its destinies at Whitehall a First +Lord and a First Sea Lord who, accepting their responsibility, +mobilised the Fleet before war was actually +declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as, +I hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand +Fleet. The years of strenuous work and training carried +out by the officers and men of the Fleet, which should +never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent fighting +machine, and bore ample fruit during the war.</p> + +<p>The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed +generally the British lead. In this book reference is made +to the general efficiency of the German Navy and of the +good design and fine equipment of their ships. These +points were never questioned by British naval officers, +and the shameful surrender of the host of the German +ships in 1918 did not alter the opinions previously formed. +That surrender was the result of broken moral.</p> + +<p>More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafalgar, +and after a century of controversy, the Admiralty +considered it desirable to appoint a committee to decide +whether that action was fought in accordance with the +original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as embodied<span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">x</span> +in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that +the facts recorded in this book, and the comments +accompanying them, constitute a clear statement of +the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which +it endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its +mission.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">xi</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2> + +<table id="toc"> +<tr class="xsmall"> + <td class="tdl" colspan="2">CHAPTER</td> + <td class="tdr">PAGE</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">I</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Opening of the War</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_1">1</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">II</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">General Naval Strategy in Home Waters</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_12">12</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">III</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Grand Fleet and Its Bases</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_34">34</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">IV</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Declaration of War</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_88">88</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">V</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Submarine and Mine Menace in the North Sea</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_115">115</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">VI</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Incidents at Sea—November 1 to December 31, 1914</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_155">155</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">VII</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Dogger Bank Action</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_187">187</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">VIII</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">German Mines and Submarines</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_221">221</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">IX</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Controlling the North Sea</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_249">249</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">X</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Attempts to Entice the Enemy to Action</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_264">264</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XI</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Naval Situation in May, 1916</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_300">300</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XII</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_304">304</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XIII</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland</span> (<i>continued</i>)</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_341">341</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XIV</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland</span> (<i>continued</i>)</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_370">370</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XV</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Reflections on the Battle of Jutland</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_390">390</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XVI</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Lessons of Experience; Lord Kitchener’s Farewell</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_415">415</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">XVII</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Submarine Peril to Merchant Shipping; Recall to the Admiralty</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_445">445</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"> </td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Appendix I</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_463">463</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"> </td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Appendix II</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_490">490</a></td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">xiii</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="ILLUSTRATIONS">ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> +</div> + +<table id="loi"> +<tr> + <td class="tdl norpad"><span class="smcap">Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, of Scapa, G. C. B., O. M., G. C. V. O.</span> +<span class="fright"><a href="#i_2"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></span></td> + <td> </td> +</tr> +<tr class="xsmall"> + <td class="tdr" colspan="2">FACING PAGE</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Destroyers Raising Steam on the First Occasion of a Submarine Being Reported Inside Scapa Flow</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_28">28</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The First Obstruction at Scapa Flow</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_28b">28</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Smoke Screen Made by Destroyers</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_68">68</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Dummy Battleship, March, 1915</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_68b">68</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Commander-in-Chief, Captain of the Fleet (Commodore Lionel Halsey), and the Flag Lieutenant (Lieut.-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert) on Board H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i></span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_96">96</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Battle of Jutland as Depicted by a German Artist</span> (<i>colour</i>)</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_336">336</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i> and 3rd Division of the Battle Fleet Deploying at the Battle of Jutland</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_342">342</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i> Opening Fire at the Battle of Jutland</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_346">346</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">H.M.S. <i>Superb</i> Opening Fire at the Battle of Jutland</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_366">366</a></td> +</tr> +</table> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiv">xiv</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="PLANS_AND_DIAGRAMS">PLANS AND DIAGRAMS</h2> +</div> + +<p class="b1 bold center larger">PLANS</p> + +<table class="plans"> +<tr class="xsmall"> + <td class="tdc">PLAN</td> + <td class="tdr" colspan="2">FACING PAGE</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_48">1</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Scapa Flow and the Orkneys</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_48">48</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_74">2</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Area of Operations of 10th Cruiser Squadron</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_74">74</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_128">3</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Typical Sweep, September 8th–11th, 1914</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_128">128</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_138">4</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Approximate Dispositions, October 3rd–11th, 1914, Whilst Canadian Convoy Was Crossing</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_138">138</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_196">5</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Movements of Fleet, January 23rd–25th, 1915</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_196">196</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_290">6</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Operations off Horn Reef, May 2nd–5th, 1916</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_290">290</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_316">7</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Operations of Battle Cruiser Fleet, 2 p. m. to 6.15 p. m., May 31st, 1916</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_316">316</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_350">8</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Approximate Position of Ships of Grand Fleet, 6.45 p. m., May 31st, 1916</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_350">350</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_358">9</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Approximate Position of Ships of Grand Fleet, 7.15 p. m., May 31st, 1916</span></td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#i_358">358</a></td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p class="p2 center bold larger">DIAGRAMS</p> + +<table class="plans"> +<tr class="xsmall"> + <td class="tdl" colspan="2">DIAGRAM</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_511">1</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Before and After Deployment of the Battle Fleet, May 31st, 1916.</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_512">2</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Showing an Imaginary Deployment on the Starboard Wing Column.</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_513">3</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Battle of Jutland, Movements of Battle Fleet and Battle Cruisers.</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top"><a href="#i_514">4</a>.</td> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Operations During the Night of May 31st–June 1st, and on June 1st, 1916.</span></td> +</tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="THE_GRAND_FLEET_19141916"><span class="larger">THE GRAND FLEET, 1914–1916</span></h2> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I"><span id="toclink_1"></span>CHAPTER I<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE OPENING OF THE WAR</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Early</span> in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second +Sea Lord, I had been offered and had accepted the command +of the Home Fleets, which in the ordinary course +would have become vacant in the following December on +the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term +of command, and public announcement was made of the +intended appointment.</p> + +<p>Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years, +and he and I had served together in China fourteen years +before, when I was Flag Captain to Admiral—afterwards +Admiral of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour. He had +since had what is probably a unique period of sea service, +passing from one appointment to another without an +interval of half pay. Soon after his promotion to flag +rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old Channel +Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron +in 1907; two years later he became second in command +in the Mediterranean, and on the expiration of his term +there, in 1910, he returned to take up the appointment +of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of the +Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander-in-Chief +in 1910. The usual period for which the Commander-in-Chief +of the Home Fleet was supposed to fly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">2</span> +his flag was two years, but in 1913 the Admiralty, +accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service, +extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it +was the approaching termination of this further period of +command—to the regret of the Admiralty, for which I +can speak from personal knowledge, and to the regret +also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets—which +led to my nomination in the spring of that year.</p> + +<p>In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe +had assumed a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First +Lord, informed me that in the event of hostilities occurring +involving this country, it was considered necessary +that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets should +have the assistance of a second in command, and he added +that I had been selected for the appointment, and it was +desired that I should arrange with Sir George as to the +ship in which I should fly my flag.</p> + +<p>Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very +shortly afterwards, and it was decided between us that +the battleship <i>Centurion</i> should be my flagship. We +discussed the slight reorganisation that this would involve +in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised: +Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H. +Fitzherbert as Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E. +Hardman Jones as Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander +R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander +(N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet +Paymaster H. H. Share as Secretary.</p> + +<p>On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, +I was present at a dinner party given by Lord Morley at +the United Services Club. The party was interesting, +as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, Mr. +Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who +figured later prominently in the War.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span></p> + +<p>During the two following days conferences took +place at the Admiralty as to the disposition of the Fleet, +etc., and, in view of the threatening political situation, +the work of demobilisation after the King’s inspection +at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises were +suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord +Kitchener, who was about to return to Egypt, on one or +two occasions at the Admiralty during these days.</p> + +<p>On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second +Sea Lord, which I had discharged since December, 1912, +to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, K.C.B., and +made my final preparations for joining the Fleet as second +in command.</p> + +<p>I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following +day, and during a conversation with Mr. Churchill and +the Marquis of Milford Haven, the then First Sea Lord, +it was intimated to me that, in certain circumstances, I +might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to +Sir George Callaghan.</p> + +<p>This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, +and I protested against such an appointment being made +on what might possibly be on the very eve of war. +Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, with the +impression that the change was not one that had been +finally decided upon, but that it might take place. I +left London the same night by the mail train for Wick, +the Commander-in-Chief having informed me that he +would send a vessel to meet me there.</p> + +<p>The idea that the change might be made occupied +my thoughts during the journey to the North. As I +thought over the possibility of a transfer of command at +such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections. +During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several +telegrams to both the First Lord and the First Sea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">4</span> +Lord on the subject. I dwelt strongly upon the danger +of substituting, at such a juncture and at such short notice, +an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet, for +a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Command. +I mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admiration +and loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief that existed, +and suggested as an alternative that I should act as his +assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind +that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his +Chief of the Staff. In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated +opinion, my views remained unaltered, although it +did not occur to me that some anxiety might be felt +that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand +the strain of commanding the Fleet in the event of +war. That, however, was a matter on which the Admiralty +would be better informed than myself, and I had no hesitation +in urging the opinions expressed in my successive +telegrams.</p> + +<p>A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the <i>Boadicea</i>, the +ship in which I made the passage to Scapa Flow, was +not able to leave until late in the forenoon of August 2nd, +and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon.</p> + +<p>When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, +the knowledge of the event which was apparently +impending made the interview both embarrassing and +painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of the +possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could +not tell him.</p> + +<p>We discussed various arrangements, including the +question of the defence of Scapa Flow, for which temporary +but naturally inadequate measures were being +energetically taken with the limited resources at the disposal +of the Fleet.</p> + +<p>At about 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 4th, I received Admiralty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span> +orders to open a secret envelope which had been handed +to me in the train as I was leaving London, by an officer +from the Admiralty. This envelope contained my +appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand +Fleet”—a new designation which must be explained +later.</p> + +<p>On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded +on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> and found that the Commander-in-Chief +had received orders to turn over the command +to me.</p> + +<p>Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-Chief +during my command of the 2nd Battle Squadron. +He was, in addition, a personal friend, and I, like all those +with whom he had been in contact, had the most profound +respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over +his command at <em>the</em> moment of his life naturally caused +me feelings of the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was +impossible to dismiss the fear that the Fleet might conclude +that I had been in some measure responsible for +the change. This possibility had, of course, been present +in my mind from the moment I left London, and it +appeared to add to the objections to a change of command +at such a juncture, since any idea of this nature +prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling of loyalty +to me as the new Commander-in-Chief.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot +close this portion of my narrative without paying a warm +tribute to the manner in which Sir George accepted the +Admiralty decision, which obviously came as a great +shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant +officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make +the position easy for me, in entire disregard of his own +feelings.</p> + +<p>It was decided that I should take over the Command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span> +on the following day, but a telegram having been received +from the Admiralty ordering the Fleet to proceed to sea +at once, I returned to the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and Sir George +Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the <i>Sappho</i> +before its departure at 8.30 in the morning.</p> + +<p>At that hour I took over the Command from Sir +George Callaghan, who then struck his flag.</p> + +<p>The following ten or fourteen days were a period of +great strain and anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsibility +as the command of the Grand Fleet at such short +notice on the eve of war was in itself a matter not to be +taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together +the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the +dispositions already made and those immediately required, +and the whole problem was largely complicated by the +fact that the port on which the Fleet was based was open +to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only +obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties +of the Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were +by no means insuperable.</p> + +<p>Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at superseding +a valued chief and friend at such a moment. The +one thing that helped me through this period was the +great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by the +staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their +intense personal regret at his departure, gave me their +very warm support, and concealed from me any trace of +the feelings which they must have experienced at my +presence amongst them under such exceptional and trying +conditions. They behaved as naval officers always +behave—in a true spirit of comradeship. The same may +be said of the flag officers and captains in the Fleet, and +indeed of every officer and man.</p> + +<p>Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span> +the exception of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied +him to London. This staff included: Commodore A. F. +Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain R. N. +Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse, +C.B., Flag Commander; Fleet Paymaster C. F. Pollard, +C.B., Secretary; Commander the Hon. Matthew Best, +War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods, Signal +Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless +Officer; Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff +Officer; Lieut. W. D. Phipps, Signal Officer.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">A</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">A</a> Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the Fleet, Captain +F. C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Commander C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander, +and Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T. Weekes, Additional Secretary.</p> + +</div> + +<p>When it became certain that I was to take command +of the Fleet, I asked the Admiralty to appoint Rear-Admiral +Charles Madden as Chief of the Staff; and I +was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to +act as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George +Warrender, the next senior flag officer in the Fleet.</p> + +<p>The composition of the Grand Fleet was:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hangw"> + +<div class="center"> +<p>Fleet-Flagship—H.M.S. <i>Iron Duke</i>.</p> + +<p class="p1">Attached Ships—H.M.S. <i>Sappho</i>, H.M.S. <i>Oak</i>.</p> + +<p class="p1 larger wspace">BATTLE FLEET</p> + +<p class="p1"><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:</p> +</div> + +<p class="center">Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command).</p> + +<p class="center">Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Battleships <i>Marlborough</i> (Flag), <i>St. Vincent</i> (Rear Flag), <i>Colossus</i>, +<i>Hercules</i>, <i>Neptune</i>, <i>Vanguard</i>, <i>Collingwood</i>, <i>Superb</i>, <i>Bellona</i> +(attached Light Cruiser), <i>Cyclops</i> (repair ship)</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="center">Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B. +(in command).</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span></p> +<p class="center">Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in +command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Battleships <i>King George V.</i> (Flag), <i>Orion</i> (Rear Flag), <i>Ajax</i>, <i>Audacious</i>, +<i>Centurion</i>, <i>Conqueror</i>, <i>Monarch</i>, <i>Thunderer</i>, <i>Boadicea</i> +(attached Light Cruiser), <i>Assistance</i> (repair ship).</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O. +(in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Battleships <i>Dreadnought</i> (Flag), <i>Temeraire</i>, <i>Bellerophon</i>, <i>Blonde</i> +(attached Light Cruiser).</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command).</p> + +<p class="center">Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Battleships <i>King Edward VII.</i> (Flag), <i>Hibernia</i> (Rear Flag), +<i>Commonwealth</i>, <i>Zealandia</i>, <i>Dominion</i>, <i>Africa</i>, <i>Britannia</i>, <i>Hindustan</i>, +<i>Blanche</i> (attached Light Cruiser).</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Battleships <i>Lion</i> (Flag), <i>Princess Royal</i>, <i>Queen Mary</i>, New <i>Zealand</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-Calthorpe +(in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Cruisers <i>Shannon</i> (Flag), <i>Achilles</i>, <i>Cochrane</i>, <i>Natal</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Cruisers <i>Antrim</i> (Flag), <i>Argyll</i>, <i>Devonshire</i>, <i>Roxburgh</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">Light Cruisers <i>Southampton</i> (Flag), <i>Birmingham</i>, <i>Lowestoft</i>, <i>Nottingham</i>.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span></p> + +<p class="p2 center"><span class="smcap">Destroyer Flotillas</span></p> + +<p class="p1 center"><i>Second Flotilla</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in <i>Active</i>).</p> + +<p class="hang">Destroyers <i>Acorn</i>, <i>Alarm</i>, <i>Brisk</i>, <i>Cameleon</i>, <i>Comet</i>, <i>Fury</i>, <i>Goldfinch</i>, +<i>Hope</i>, <i>Larne</i>, <i>Lyra</i>, <i>Martin</i>, <i>Minstrel</i>, <i>Nemesis</i>, <i>Nereide</i>, +<i>Nymphe</i>, <i>Redpole</i>, <i>Rifleman</i>, <i>Ruby</i>, <i>Sheldrake</i>, <i>Staunch</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>Fourth Flotilla</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in <i>Swift</i>).</p> + +<p class="hang">Destroyers <i>Acasta</i>, <i>Achates</i>, <i>Ambuscade</i>, <i>Ardent</i>, <i>Christopher</i>, <i>Cockatrice</i>, +<i>Contest</i>, <i>Fortune</i>, <i>Garland</i>, <i>Hardy</i>, <i>Lynx</i>, <i>Midge</i>, <i>Owl</i>, +<i>Paragon</i>, <i>Porpoise</i>, <i>Shark</i>, <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, <i>Spitfire</i>, <i>Unity</i>, +<i>Victor</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>Mine-Sweeping Gunboats</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Commander L. G. Preston (in command).</p> + +<p class="hang">H.M. Ships <i>Skipjack</i> (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), <i>Circe</i>, <i>Gossamer</i>, +<i>Leda</i>, <i>Speedwell</i>, <i>Jason</i>, <i>Seagull</i>.</p> + +<p class="hang">Shetland Patrol Force: <i>Forward</i> (Scout) and four destroyers of the +River class.</p> +</div> + +<p>The above vessels formed the Fleet under the immediate +command of the Commander-in-Chief at the +outbreak of hostilities. In addition, there were in +southern waters, and also under the command of the +Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels:</p> + +<h3>THE HARWICH FORCE</h3> + +<p>This force, although an integral portion of the Grand +Fleet, was based on Harwich. It was intended that it +should join the Grand Fleet at sea, if possible, in the +event of a fleet action being imminent, and for this +reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet +for battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span> +join the Fleet, nor did I expect that it would be able +to do so. At the outbreak of war it was commanded +by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. <i>Amethyst</i> +and comprised:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hangw"> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>1st Flotilla</i></p> + +<p class="p1 center">Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in <i>Fearless</i> with +20 destroyers.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>3rd Flotilla</i></p> + +<p class="p1 center">Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in <i>Amphion</i> with +15 destroyers.</p> +</div> + +<p>Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets, +which Sir George Callaghan had commanded-in-chief, +were the Second and Third Fleets:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hangw"> + +<p class="p2 center larger">SECOND FLEET</p> + +<p class="p1 center">(under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., +K.C.M.G.).</p> + +<p class="hang">Fleet-Flagship <i>Lord Nelson</i>, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and +Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons).</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>5th Battle Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="hang"><i>Prince of Wales</i> (Flag), <i>Agamemnon</i>, <i>Bulwark</i>, <i>Formidable</i>, <i>Implacable</i>, +<i>Irresistible</i>, <i>London</i>, <i>Queen</i>, <i>Venerable</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>6th Battle Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="hang"><i>Russell</i> (Flag), <i>Cornwallis</i>, <i>Albemarle</i>, <i>Duncan</i>, <i>Exmouth</i>, <i>Vengeance</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>5th Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command).</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Carnarvon</i> (Flag), <i>Falmouth</i>, <i>Liverpool</i>.</p> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:</p> + +<p class="p1 center">Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant (in command).</p> + +<p class="center"><i>Drake</i>, <i>Good Hope</i>, <i>King Alfred</i>, <i>Leviathan</i>.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span></p> + +<p>(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however, +broken up immediately, and the ships transferred to other +duties.)</p> + +<div class="blockquot hangw"> + +<p class="p2 center"><i>Minelayer Squadron</i>, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe.</p> + +<p class="hang">H.M. Ships <i>Naiad</i> (S.O.’s ship), <i>Andromache</i>, <i>Apollo</i>, <i>Intrepid</i>, +<i>Iphigenia</i>, <i>Latona</i>, <i>Thetis</i>.</p> +</div> + +<h3>THIRD FLEET</h3> + +<p>This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle +Squadrons, consisting of our oldest battleships, and the +7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser Squadrons, comprising +our oldest cruisers.</p> + +<p>But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever +associated with the Grand Fleet were the ships of the +10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under the command of +Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet +shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being +employed mainly on blockading duties. It was composed +as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hangw"> + +<p class="hang"><i>Crescent</i> (Flag), <i>Edgar</i>, <i>Endymion</i>, <i>Gibraltar</i>, <i>Grafton</i>, <i>Hawke</i>, +<i>Royal Arthur</i>, <i>Theseus</i>.</p> +</div> + +<p>All submarines, except those of the B and C classes +which were detached for the protection of our coast and +ports from Rosyth southwards, were worked, in accordance +with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were not, +therefore, under my command. The C class submarines +were unfit for oversea work, and our operations in enemy +waters were therefore confined to boats of the D and E +classes, of which we possessed a total of 8 D’s and 9 E’s, +as against the German total of 28 boats of the U class.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II"><span id="toclink_12"></span>CHAPTER II<br> + +<span class="subhead">GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">It</span> is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the +Navy had somewhat faded from public interest during +the century that had elapsed since the Napoleonic Wars, +the last occasion on which the inhabitants of this country +had felt that their safety depended on maritime power. +Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in +a foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this +matter, and to point out the all-important influence which +Sea Power had exerted, and would exert, on history.</p> + +<p>Associations such as the Navy League had been +formed, having as their object the enlightenment of our +countrymen, and although a great work was done in this +direction, the mere necessity for such work is an indication +of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons +of the past.</p> + +<p>I therefore offer no apology for making some reference +to the use and purpose of the British Navy.</p> + +<p>The main objects for which our Navy exists may be +shortly summed up under four heads:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang2"> + +<p>1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use +of the sea, this being vital to the existence of +an island nation, particularly one which is +not self-supporting in regard to food.</p> + +<p>2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic +pressure to bear on our adversary by denying<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span> +to him the use of the sea, thus compelling +him to accept peace.</p> + +<p>3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the +passage and assist any army sent overseas, +and to protect its communications and supplies.</p> + +<p>4. To prevent invasion of this country and its +overseas Dominions by enemy forces.</p> +</div> + +<p>The above objects are achieved in the quickest and +surest manner by destroying the enemy’s armed naval +forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet. +The Fleet exists to achieve victory.</p> + +<p>But history has always shown that it is a very difficult +matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, +and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroying +his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main +body of those forces—the Battle Fleet—in positions of +safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant +threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval +Power, and force upon that Power a watching policy so +that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to sea, +before he is able to gain any advantage.</p> + +<p>The watching policy in the great wars of the +Napoleonic era was carried out by keeping our squadrons, +through fair or foul weather, in the vicinity of those ports +of the enemy in which his fleet lay. Occasionally our +ships were driven off by stress of weather, but they +regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted. +During this war, however, the advent of the submarine +and destroyer, and, to a lesser extent, the use of the +mine rendered such dispositions impossible.</p> + +<p>No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity +of enemy bases without the certainty that she would fall +an early victim to the attacks of submarines. Destroyers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span> +could, it is true, afford some measure of protection, but +destroyers have a very limited range of action, and could +not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even in +good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical +relief of the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the +great numbers that would be required for this purpose.</p> + +<p>Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be overcome, +the heavy ships would be so open to attack by +enemy destroyers at night, if cruising anywhere near +enemy bases, that they would certainly be injured, if not +sunk, before many days had passed.</p> + +<p>These facts had been recognised before the War and +a watching policy from a distance decided upon, the watch +being instituted for the purpose of preventing enemy +vessels from gaining the open sea, where they would constitute +a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch +maintained at a distance from the port under observation +is necessarily only partial, except in circumstances where +the enemy has to pass through narrow straits before gaining +open water.</p> + +<p>The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend +entirely on the number of watching vessels and the distance +that those on board them can see. At night this +distance is very short—on a dark night not more than +a quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the +average conditions of visibility obtaining in the North Sea, +it is not more than six to eight miles.</p> + +<p>The North Sea, though small in contrast with the +Atlantic, is a big water area of about 120,000 square miles +in extent. The width across it, between the Shetland +Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is 160 miles, +and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel) +would need to be watched also if a patrol were established +along this line.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span></p> + +<p>A consideration of all the circumstances had led to +the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the +Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had +determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in +the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that +the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that +the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus, +in combination, holding the enemy’s main force.</p> + +<p>To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main +Battle Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a +strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in +support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the +southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be +favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to +action should it put to sea.</p> + +<p>This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the +result of experience in the various naval manœuvres +carried out in previous years in the North Sea. These +had demonstrated quite clearly that the alternative +policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North +Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an +impracticable one, it having been shown on many occasions +that evasion of a single patrol line during the hours +of darkness, or even daylight, under the conditions of +visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is a very +simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying +regular patrol positions is always in peril of successful +submarine attack; the loss of the cruisers <i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i> +and <i>Aboukir</i> showed this. It is also open to a concentrated +attack by surface vessels.</p> + +<p>The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief +of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general +idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in compliance +with Admiralty orders at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span> +the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out +this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command +of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in +the Channel in accordance with the general strategic +dispositions.</p> + +<p>The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand +Fleet comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, +with their attached cruisers; the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, strengthened +by the addition of the <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>; the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These +dispositions continued in force for some three weeks, +when the strong influence of the submarine on naval +strategy began to make itself apparent.</p> + +<p>The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities +of submarines were found, after a short experience of +war, to need modification. In the first place, it became +quickly apparent that the German submarines possessed +a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably +greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, +for instance, looked upon as a considerable achievement +for our submarines to keep the sea for a period of five to +seven days, and they had not operated at any great distance +from the coast. It is true that submarines had on +occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but +they were then usually escorted, or even towed, and the +number of days from port to port did not approach the +length of time for which German submarines remained +at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans possessed +a considerable superiority in the number of submarines +which were capable of operating overseas, and +the frequent sighting of enemy submarines as far north +as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War, +combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span> +had established a regular submarine patrol in the centre +of the North Sea, made it evident that the German submarines +would constitute a very serious menace to our +heavy ships.</p> + +<p>The comparative strength in submarines in Home +Waters at the outbreak of war was as follows:</p> + +<table id="t17" class="section"> +<tr> + <td class="tdl" colspan="5"><i>German</i>—</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdl" style="width: 3em;">U Boats</td> + <td class="tdr top">28</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdl">of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea work, but were as good as our D class.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl p1" colspan="5"><i>British</i>—</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdl mid">D Class</td> + <td class="tdr mid">8</td> + <td class="tdc mid">{</td> + <td class="tdl">of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining units of the D class were not equal to the U boats.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td> </td> + <td class="tdl">E Class</td> + <td class="tdr top">9</td> + <td></td> + <td></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"> </td> + <td class="tdl">C Class</td> + <td class="tdr top">34</td> + <td class="tdc mid" rowspan="2">}</td> + <td class="tdl mid" rowspan="2">Unfit for oversea work and used only for local defence of the coast or in the Channel.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td> </td> + <td class="tdl">B Class</td> + <td class="tdr top">3</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under +construction, whilst we were building 19, apart from two +experimental vessels of which nothing resulted.</p> + +<p>Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in +pursuance of a policy introduced by the Admiralty in +1913–14 of widening the area of supply of these vessels. +This policy had far-reaching and beneficial results on the +subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it enabled us +to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would +otherwise have been the case.</p> + +<p>A change in previous naval practice was considered +necessary at an early period, because vessels moving at +anything but high speed, particularly in the case of a +number of ships in company, ran very considerable risks +in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to be +operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers. +This conclusion affected the movements and operations +of the Battle Fleet, since the number of destroyers we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span> +possessed was quite inadequate to form a screen for a +Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which constantly +kept the sea. The number required, for such a +screen to be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle +Fleet alone as then constituted, and that number, 40, was +all that we had stationed at the Northern Base. The fuel +capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for them to +remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days +and nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for +three or four times that period. Moreover, the destroyers +could not be kept nearly so constantly at sea as the large +ships owing to their requirements in the way of boiler-cleaning +and the refit and adjustment of their more +delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only +the machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. The +heavy ships, then, had two alternatives, either to remain +at sea without a destroyer screen or to return to harbour +with the destroyers. In the early days the first alternative +was adopted, the risk being accepted, but minimised as +far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part +of the North Sea.</p> + +<p>A further danger soon made itself apparent. It +became evident at an early period, as many naval +officers had expected, in view of German language at the +Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw +overboard the doctrines of international law when he could +gain any advantage by doing so. He accordingly proceeded +at once to lay mines in positions where he thought +they would be advantageous to his operations, in utter disregard +of the safety, not only of British, but also of neutral +merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very probable +that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the +North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might +prove effective against the Grand Fleet, and that he would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span> +do this without issuing any warning to neutral countries. +Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet were kept moving +continuously in the central and southern waters of the +North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay +mines with little danger of his operations being witnessed +(as he could carry them out under cover of darkness), +it was evident that considerable risks might be incurred +without our being aware of the fact. The policy +of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried +out with such success as to produce equality, or even +inferiority, on the part of the British Fleet as compared +with the German, in a comparatively short space of time. +The only safeguard against such action which we could +take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working +ahead of the Battle Fleet. But the number of mine-sweepers +that we possessed was wholly inadequate for +such a task; and even if this had not been so, to carry out +such an operation would have necessitated the speed of +the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the +maximum sweeping speed of mine-sweepers, and it would +have been forced also to steer a steady course without +zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships exceedingly +vulnerable to submarine attack.</p> + +<p>The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace, +combined with possible German action in regard to mine-laying, +was to cause the Battle Fleet to confine its movements +<em>under ordinary conditions</em> to the more northern +waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be taken +of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers, +and where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water +and the distance from enemy bases, that the Germans +would be able to lay mines without discovery.</p> + +<p>The fact that this course of action would be forced +upon us as the submarine and destroyer menace grew had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span> +often been present in my mind in pre-War days, when I +had expressed the view that the beginning of a naval war +would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the +larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have +no doubt that this opinion was very generally held by +officers of experience.</p> + +<p>The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was +combined with the establishment of certain cruiser patrol +<em>areas</em> in the North Sea. These areas, which were purposely +made large, were watched on a regular, organised +plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high +speed in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk +to the cruisers to a minimum, whist at the same time they +kept as effective a watch as possible, first, to intercept +German war vessels that might be covering a raid on our +coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to +operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all +merchant ships entering or leaving the North Sea should +be closely examined in order to enforce the blockade.</p> + +<p>This patrol policy was associated with periodical +sweeps of cruisers, supported by the Battle Fleet, down +into the southern waters of the North Sea, the object +being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if possible, and +in any case, owing to our movements being probably reported +to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to +make them feel that they could never move a force to +sea without the possibility of encountering our Fleet +engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which we carried +out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illustrated +in accompanying plans. On these occasions the +Battle Fleet was kept strictly concentrated during the +southern movement, and was screened as far as possible +by destroyers against submarine attack; and at times +mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">21</span> +Fleet. When this was not possible, owing to the small +number of mine-sweepers available or the state of the +weather, some of the older battleships of the 6th Battle +Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed +ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a +minefield be encountered, these older ships would be the +first to strike the mines, thus giving sufficient warning +to enable me to manœuvre the more valuable ships clear +of the field.</p> + +<p>This general policy was continued until the attack on +the <i>Theseus</i> and loss of the <i>Hawke</i>, belonging to the +10th Cruiser Squadron, by submarine attack on +October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the dispositions +then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked +to too great an extent when working without destroyers +in the central part of the North Sea.</p> + +<p>The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the +cruiser patrols to a safer position farther to the northward +and eastward of the Shetland Islands, this being combined +with a watch by the smaller craft on the Fair Island +Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the +North Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet +was often kept either in a position westward of the +Orkneys, where it was in support of the cruisers and at +the same time formed a second blockade line, or it cruised +to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser +patrols working farther south.</p> + +<p>In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on +the northern entrance to the North Sea, the principle +kept in mind was the necessity for such an organisation +of the patrols as to have, in so far as numbers permitted, +two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were +at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out +of the North Sea were forced, so far as all human foresight<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span> +could provide, to pass through the waters occupied +by one of the two groups of ships during daylight hours; +the distances apart were regulated according to the length +of the night at the different seasons of the year.</p> + +<p>As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward +and westward, it became possible to make use of the +heavy ships to assist in blockade work without running +undue risks from submarines, and the blockade increased +correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, however, +the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number +of armed merchant cruisers enabled us to establish an +effective blockade line by the use of these vessels alone, +backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such were available. +The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern +and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base +was shifted temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly. +When this occurred, it did not affect the policy of frequent +cruiser sweeps into the southern portion of the +North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still +continued.</p> + +<p>The dispositions that have been described took account +naturally of two other very important factors.</p> + +<p>The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force +to France. It was highly probable that the enemy would +endeavour to interfere with this movement, and in the +early days of the War it would not have been a difficult +matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make +at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of +enterprise which surprised me, as I think it surprised most +naval officers.</p> + +<p>The conditions for him were distinctly favourable. +Our main Fleet was based, as he must have been aware, +far away to the northward, and if he had timed an attack +on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during which he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span> +reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers, +were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a +good chance of making the attack and returning to his +base before that Fleet could intervene. Consequently, he +would only have had to deal with the comparatively light +forces based in southern waters. On the other hand, +if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the +Germans would have possessed no mean advantage.</p> + +<p>The enemy was provided with a large number of +modern destroyers, and some of them would have been +well expended over a Channel dash, which would in all +probability have met with some success. During the +transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of +the Grand Fleet kept the sea as far as possible in order +to cover the movement, but the destroyers were constantly +returning to the base to fuel.</p> + +<p>The second factor which had considerable influence on +Fleet dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a +raid or invasion by the enemy. Such a move was not +very likely in the earliest days of the War, when the +nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary +Force had not left the country. It is also probable that +the enemy had few troops to spare for the purpose. But +the chances became greater as we denuded the country of +men, and the conditions in other respects became more +favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and +expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted, +landings would probably be effected in the rivers on the +East Coast, the entrances to which were either unprotected +or inadequately protected. A beach landing on +our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather, +and the chances of encountering favourable conditions on +arrival off the coast are not great, and I always doubted +the attempt being made. In our rivers the opportunities<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span> +are greater, and are not so dependent on fine weather, +and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive +in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready +to be sunk across the channels (which are narrow and +shallow), the ships being fitted with explosive charges +below ready to blow out the bottoms in case of necessity. +I mentioned the names of certain retired naval officers +who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary preparations +in a very few days. I believe that my proposals +were carried out.</p> + +<p>The danger of raids, however, and the consequent +responsibility thrown upon the Admiralty for their prevention, +during a period when we had very little military +force in the country, led to a division of the Fleet by +Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had certain +disadvantages from a strategic point of view.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of +the “King Edward VII.” class, and the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron of four ships of the “County” class, were ordered +to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers +for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then +to be faced was that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet +having to engage the High Sea Fleet, since concentration +with the 3rd Battle Squadron could probably not be +effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of +engaging.</p> + +<p>At this time the battle cruisers <i>Princess Royal</i>, <i>Invincible</i>, +and <i>Inflexible</i> were in the Atlantic operating +against Von Spee’s squadron; and the <i>Australia</i>, <i>Indomitable</i> +had not joined the Grand Fleet. The <i>Tiger</i> was not +yet ready, so that at times our battle cruiser force consisted +of only three ships, the <i>Lion</i>, <i>Queen Mary</i>, and +<i>New Zealand</i>.</p> + +<p>Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span> +for the prevention of raids or invasion was a factor which +had a considerable influence on naval strategy.</p> + +<p>If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in +the North Sea, or if it was at sea for a cruise having +exercises for its main object, there was bound to be +present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief the chance +that he might be required suddenly to move south to engage +the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a +landing. If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a +moment very serious consequences might ensue, and +therefore all cruiser sweeps or other operations had to be +curtailed to prevent such a situation arising.</p> + +<p>One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our +naval strategy throughout the War, namely, the bombardment +of our undefended towns on the East Coast. +Such bombardments were of no immediate military value +to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority +of the Press, and the public, realised that the Navy should +not be led into false strategy because of these bombardments, +it was difficult for the Fleet to ignore them, and +I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this fact.</p> + +<p>Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was +quite impossible to ensure that the enemy would be +brought to action after such an operation, since to attain +this end it would have been necessary for the Fleet, or +a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the southern +portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even +had it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keeping +destroyers with the heavier ships, and in any case it +was false strategy to divide the Battle Fleet, as such a +course might well have resulted in disaster.</p> + +<p>The usual course adopted was to base the Battle +Cruiser Fleet on Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise +from that neighbourhood. The speed of the battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span> +cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly +superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but +there was always some risk in this case of a ship being +disabled; the flag officer in command would then have +been faced with the unpleasant alternative of abandoning +her or of risking his whole force to cover her retreat.</p> + +<p>Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the +enemy ports, so as to obtain warning of their ships leaving, +the difficulty would not have been so great, but our +submarines in those days (the only class of vessel which +could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted +with wireless installations with which they could signal +from the required positions, or indeed from positions anywhere +near the enemy’s coast, and, in any case, it must be +borne in mind that at night the exit of enemy vessels unobserved, +even under the conditions of a close submarine +look-out, is a comparatively easy matter.</p> + +<p>At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the condition +of British naval bases. As is well known, the +Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow during the latter +days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition of the +Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack, +was brought very strongly into prominence by the presence +of so valuable a Fleet at this Base.</p> + +<p>The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main +entrances navigable by all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha, +and Hoy Channels, and, in addition, has some more +narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern +side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of +providing gun defences for this Base, which the Admiralty +had decided a year or two before the War was +to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on more +than one occasion, after examination by a committee of +officers on the spot; but, since finance governs defence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span> +and the Admiralty from year to year had insufficient +money for even more urgent needs, no action had been +taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the German +naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by +enemy’s destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by submarines. +Its main, indeed its only, safety against such +attacks by submarines lay in the navigational difficulties +attendant upon entry into the harbour, combined, as regards +destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an enemy’s +force being intercepted on its outward or homeward +passage, or of its being successfully engaged in the +vicinity of the base. The sailing directions laid great +stress upon the difficulties of navigations in the approaches +to this Base, due to the very strong and varying currents, +but the Germans were well acquainted with +the Orkney and Shetland Islands. They had indeed +made it a practice to send ships to visit these islands fairly +frequently before the War, and they were, therefore, as +well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into Scapa +Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main +Fleet Base, they could deduce the fact, if they did not +know it already, that the difficulties of entry were not +insuperable.</p> + +<p>Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the +arrival of the Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July, +took immediate steps, with the resources at his disposal +in the Fleet, to improvise defences for the Base against +destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land some +12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount +them at the entrances. No searchlights could, however, +be provided, so that the guns were not of much value at +night. Arrangements were also made for placing light +cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to assist +these defences. The further step, of course, was taken<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span> +when the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols +to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in +the Fleet, however, that these measures gave much +security even against destroyer attack on a dark night, and, +it gave no security whatever against submarine attack. +Nothing but <em>obstructions</em> of some kind could give that +security. The matter was frequently discussed. Although +many brains had been at work, no satisfactory anti-submarine +obstruction had been devised. Under the urgent +pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion +generally held by experienced submarine officers was that, +whilst the least important entrances, such as the Hoy, +the Switha and the Holm Sound Channels, would be extremely +difficult for the passage of a submarine, entry by +the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a determined +submarine officer. So much for the Base at +Scapa Flow.</p> + +<p>At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better. +The only entrance to this Base is comparatively narrow, +and was defended against the entry of destroyers and +larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted by the +Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however, +no boom protection against the entry of destroyers, and +the conditions in regard to submarine attack were the +same as at Scapa Flow, there being no obstructions.</p> + +<p>At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at +Cromarty, namely, the harbour was defended by guns +only against attack by destroyers. In this case, the guns +were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at +Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to submarine +attack.</p> + +<figure id="i_28" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <img src="images/i_028.jpg" width="1302" height="884" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot short"> + +<p>DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A +SUBMARINE BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure id="i_28b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <img src="images/i_028b.jpg" width="1295" height="866" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot short"> + +<p>THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of +Fleets or Squadrons at anchor in any of the Bases used +by the Grand Fleet was immense. For my part, I was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span> +always far more concerned for the safety of the Fleet +when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceedingly +brief periods which were spent there for coaling in +the early days of the War, than I was when the Fleet +was at sea, and this anxiety was reflected in the very short +time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It was also the +cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more +than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a +submarine in the anchorage, and considerable risks were +accepted in getting the Fleet to sea in very thick weather +at night on at least one of these occasions.</p> + +<p>I have often wondered why the Germans did not +make greater efforts to reduce our strength in capital ships +by destroyer or submarine attacks on our bases in those +early days. They possessed, in comparison with the uses +for which they were required, almost a superfluity of +destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with ourselves, +and they could not have put them to a better use +than in an attack on Scapa Flow during the early months +of the 1914–1915 winter.</p> + +<p>In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home +waters fit for such an operation, all with a speed of, or +exceeding, 30 knots, this number being in addition to a +total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and with speeds +varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for +work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in +the North Sea.</p> + +<p>This country had in home waters at the same period +only 76 destroyers that could be compared with the German +vessels in view of modern requirements, and 33 of +these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76 destroyers, +40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining +36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large +and fast destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span> +their small fuel capacity, were only of use in southern +waters and were appropriated to Dover. And we possessed +25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a nominal +speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot destroyer; +the latter class was only fit for patrol work in +the vicinity of the coast.</p> + +<p>It may be said that similar reflections to those I have +mentioned might be made by the Germans as regards our +own movements, and that they were surprised that we +did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer is +obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very +short of destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware +of the thoroughness of the defences of the German naval +bases. We knew that they not only possessed the most +powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew also +that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and +we were justified in assuming that they had protected their +naval bases by extensive minefields. We, on the other +hand, were entirely unprovided with this particular form +of defence.</p> + +<p>In view of the known quality of German artillery and +mine defences and the thorough nature of their organisation, +my own view was that they also possessed, in all +probability, anti-submarine defences. For these reasons, +together with the important fact that the German rivers +are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them +in a submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack +on their ships in harbour would meet with no success, +and that we could not afford to expend any of our exceedingly +limited number of destroyers, or submarines, in +making an attack which would, in all human probability, +be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the +German defences proved the correctness of this view. +I can only imagine that the Germans credited us, also,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span> +with possessing harbour defences and obstructions which +in our case were non-existent, although we did our +best in the Fleet to give the impression that we had obstructed +the entrances, for, pending the provision of proper +obstructions, we improvised various contrivances. It +may have seemed impossible to the German mind that we +should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for +its very existence, in a position where it was open to submarine +or destroyer attack.</p> + +<p>This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those +responsible for the safety of our Fleet from the gravest +anxiety whenever the more valuable ships were in the undefended +harbours.</p> + +<p>A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet +and the High Sea Fleet in the early part of the War shows +the following figures. Only ships that had completed +their training and were fit to fight in the line are included:</p> + +<h3 class="section">BATTLESHIPS</h3> + +<p class="p1 center">(B., British; G., German)</p> + +<table id="t31b" class="bl"> +<tr class="bt bb"> + <td class="tdc" style="width: 8em;"> Date</td> + <td class="tdc">Dreadnoughts</td> + <td class="tdc">Pre-Dreadnoughts</td> + <td class="tdc">Battle cruisers</td> + <td class="tdc">Light cruisers</td> + <td class="tdc">Destroyers</td> + <td class="tdc">Airships</td> + <td class="tdc">Cruisers</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc">August 4th, 1914</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> B</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 42</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 9</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> G</td> + <td class="tdc"> 13</td> + <td class="tdc"> 16</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3</td> + <td class="tdc"> 15</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc">October 1st, 1914</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> B</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 42</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 10</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> G</td> + <td class="tdc"> 15</td> + <td class="tdc"> 16</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc">January 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> B</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">B</a></td> + <td class="tdc"> 8</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6</td> + <td class="tdc"> 17</td> + <td class="tdc"> 44</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 14</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> G</td> + <td class="tdc"> 16</td> + <td class="tdc"> 16</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc">April 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> B</td> + <td class="tdc"> 23</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 18</td> + <td class="tdc"> 54</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 17</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> G</td> + <td class="tdc"> 17</td> + <td class="tdc"> 16</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc">October 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc"> B</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25</td> + <td class="tdc"> 66</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 15</td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdc"> G</td> + <td class="tdc"> 17</td> + <td class="tdc"> 16</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 15</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnote"><br> + +<a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">B</a> 21 completed, but two of these (<i>Monarch</i> and <i>Conqueror</i>) were seriously damaged +and one other battleship was refitting. +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span></p> + +<p>The above list gives the vessels nominally available.</p> + +<p>In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s <em>selected</em> +and our <em>average</em> moment, the following facts should be remembered, +and were necessarily taken into account by me +at the time:</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two +light cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and perhaps +one battle cruiser under refit, in addition to any other +vessels that might be temporarily disabled.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was +refitting when planning an operation, and she could reinforce +her Fleet by several light cruisers and two or more +flotillas of destroyers from the Baltic.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important +factor on either side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in +the case of our ships, the comparatively short range of +their guns, due to the small amount of elevation of which +their mountings admitted.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers increased, +were of great assistance to the enemy for scouting, +each one being, in <em>favourable weather</em>, equal to at least two +light cruisers for such a purpose.</p> + +<p>(<i>e</i>) Account is not taken in the British figures of the +Harwich force, as this force could not be counted upon to +effect concentration with the remainder of the Grand Fleet +at the German selected moment.</p> + +<p>(<i>f</i>) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked +the speed necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were +very slightly faster than the battleships of the “Dreadnought” +type, and, owing to their lack of speed, they +were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an +enemy Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On +the other hand, they were very superior in fighting +qualities to the German light cruisers.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span></p> + +<p>It will be seen from the above statements that the +enemy had by far his best opportunity from the naval +point of view in the early months of the War, as he was +then much nearer equality of strength with the Grand +Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap, +which included minefields and submarines, with the High +Sea Fleet as a bait, might have been very effective at +any period of the War in inflicting considerable losses on +us. The Germans had their best opportunities between +November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915, +the situation got steadily worse for the enemy.</p> + +<p>The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this +review of relative naval strength, is that if this country +in the future decides to rely for safety against raids or +invasion on the Fleet alone, it is essential that we should +possess a considerably greater margin of superiority over +a possible enemy <em>in all classes of vessels</em> than we did in +August, 1914.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III"><span id="toclink_34"></span>CHAPTER III<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being +only at the outbreak of the War, when it was so christened. +As with the name, so with the organisation.</p> + +<p>The great majority of the really effective ships in the +Grand Fleet were the outcome of the policy initiated by +Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone when +he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord in 1904 +in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of +Lord Fisher’s first acts—and he carried through a number +of other changes which reacted favourably on the +efficiency of the Fleet for war—was the introduction of +the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the <i>Dreadnought</i>, +laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, +was the earliest example. She was closely followed +by the three “all-big-gun” battle-cruisers of the “Invincible” +class, which were of the same programme—1905–6. +Much criticism was levelled at the +<i>Dreadnought</i>, but even more at the principle embodied +in the battle-cruisers—ships with the speed of +cruisers, but the same calibre armament as battleships. +The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s +conception.</p> + +<p>Our superiority <em>in capital ships</em> at the outbreak of +war was due to the efforts of the Boards presided over by +Lord Selborne and his successors from 1904 onwards, and +Lord Fisher held the post of First Sea Lord for five and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span> +a half years of that period. At the beginning of 1909, +during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord, +great efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance +of a sufficient standard of superiority in capital ships over +Germany, and to make good our deficiencies in destroyers. +The nation has good reason for the most profound +gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude +he assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to +the table on <a href="#Page_31">page 31</a> will show the position that would +have arisen if the four additional “Dreadnoughts” had +not been included in the 1909–10 building programme. +In the later Administration, presided over by Mr. +Churchill, continued efforts were necessary, and were +made, and steps were also taken with a view to meeting +the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord +Beresford had for some years been pointing out how +essential it was to add largely to our programmes of light +cruisers and destroyers.</p> + +<p>So much for construction in pre-War days when the +Germans were carrying out their Navy Acts, one following +the other in rapid succession.</p> + +<p>It is also of interest to note the part which Lord +Fisher took in building up the Fleet organisation that +existed in 1914. He introduced the system of manning +the older ships, not in the first line, with nucleus crews +composed of the principal officers and ratings. These +ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very +short time, into a condition in which they were fit to +fight. This system superseded the old arrangement, by +which ships not in full commission were not manned at +all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the total +number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was +minimised by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably +accepted now that in the circumstances existing at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span> +time the nucleus crew system is far preferable; it raised +the general standard of the whole Navy in British waters, +and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Reserves +on the outbreak of war.</p> + +<h3>I.—<span class="smcap">The Development of the Grand Fleet</span></h3> + +<p>In the organisation existing before the War, the +Home Fleets comprised the First, Second and Third +Fleets—in fact, practically all ships in home waters which +it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war.</p> + +<p>The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home +Fleets into two parts.</p> + +<p>The <i>First</i>, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet, +comprising the latest-built ships; the force stationed at +Harwich; four ships of the 6th Battle Squadron; the 6th +and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second and Third +Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from +the Second Fleet.</p> + +<p>The <i>Second</i>, or Channel Fleet, included the older +battleships, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, +the 5th and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, and a sweeping +flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was commanded +by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, +when he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of +the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th +Battle Squadrons and the 5th Cruiser Squadron were +manned before mobilisation with nucleus crews, and were +consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at +Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle +Squadrons and 7th Cruiser Squadron were not manned +until mobilisation, and the crews consequently required +training. This training was carried out near Plymouth,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span> +and the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command +on September 3rd, 1914.</p> + +<p>The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed +as a look-out force in the Straits of Dover during the time +that the Channel Battle Fleet was patrolling to guard the +passage of the Expeditionary Force. They were subsequently +ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and +three of them, the <i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i> and <i>Aboukir</i>, were sunk +whilst patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast.</p> + +<p>These, then, were the conditions when War opened. +It was only natural that war experience should show +very quickly the many directions in which we had to recast, +or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to introduce new arrangements.</p> + +<p>Peace manœuvres, however useful, can never be a +substitute for war experience. They are many factors +which render peace manœuvres unreal. In the first place, +the available ships have to be divided so as to form the +opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far +greater moment, the manœuvres occupy much too short +a period, and many of the difficulties affecting both +<i lang="fr">matériel</i> and personnel are not experienced; thirdly, the +conditions of war cannot be reproduced without serious +inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships; finally, +in our own manœuvres there was a tendency in the rules +to give the torpedo less than its proper value as a fighting +weapon.</p> + +<p>But, more than all, it was the conditions under which +war broke out that made it necessary for us in the Grand +Fleet to build up what was almost a new organisation.</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The submarine had just become a most formidable +weapon; its development during the War was extraordinarily +rapid.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span> +start, but it also developed with great rapidity, as did the +heavier-than-air machines.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly developed +by the enemy, both defensively and offensively.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) The effective range both of the gun and of the +torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater than had +been considered possible before the War.<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">C</a></p> + +<p>(<i>e</i>) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, +and was put to many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">C</a> In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out at a maximum +range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one occasion, when the <i>Colossus</i> fired +at a target at 14,000 yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded.</p> + +</div> + +<p>On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having +the Fleet concentrated at the outbreak of war. People +had often pictured war with Germany coming as a bolt +from the blue, and even naval officers feared that when +the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously +been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might +lead the Government to delay concentration with the result +that our squadrons would be separated when war was +actually declared. Fortunately, the Admiralty in the last +days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong strategic +position. For this action the nation should be grateful +to the First Lord and First Sea Lord.</p> + +<p>It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, +there was general expectation that a great Fleet action +would at once be fought. No doubt this arose, partly, +from the boastings of German naval officers in pre-War +days, and partly from a knowledge of the great sacrifices +the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively +our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult +to imagine that the High Sea Fleet (built at vast +expense, and rightly considered by the enemy to be an +efficient weapon of war) would adopt from the outset a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span> +purely passive rôle, with the inevitable result that German +trade would be swept from the seas. But there +were two factors tending to make the High Command +adopt this course. First, there was the fear that action +with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High Sea +Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into +Allied hands, with a consequent landing of Russian +troops on German soil as the result. This fear had been +present in the German mind ever since the days of Frederick +the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during +the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt, +was that the German High Command realised that, if +Germany adopted a defensive rôle with her Fleet, it +created, by far, the most difficult situation for us. Repugnant +as this might be to high-spirited German naval officers, +it was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for, +whilst the German High Sea Fleet remained “in being” +as a fighting force, we could not afford to undertake +operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particularly +in the earlier period of the War when our margin +of superiority at Germany’s “selected moment” was not +great. The main disadvantage to the Germans, <em>apart from +their loss of trade</em>, lay in the inevitable gradual weakening +of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it is +highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end +responsible for the series of mutinies which broke out in +the High Sea Fleet during 1917 and 1918, culminating +in the final catastrophe in November, 1918. In my view, +the passive rôle was carried much too far.</p> + +<h3>II.—<span class="smcap">The Staff Organisation</span></h3> + +<p>To pass to the development of the organisation.</p> + +<p>Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff +work. In the days before the War, the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span> +of the Home Fleets consisted of the following +officers:</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander, +Flag-Lieutenant, and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was +also, in a sense, on the Personal Staff.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the +Fleet with his Secretary, a Wireless officer, a Signal officer, +and the clerical staff of the Secretary.</p> + +<p>In addition, the organisation provided for the appointment +of two War Staff officers, on mobilisation for war.</p> + +<p>This was the Staff which, together with an additional +Signal officer, I found in the <i>Iron Duke</i>, on assuming command +of the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir +George Callaghan in December, 1914 (as was originally +arranged before the War broke out, as I have explained), +to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational side +of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only +for the Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my +opinion, sufficient work and responsibility to occupy his +whole time; and I had prepared an organisation of the +Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with which the +work should be divided into two distinct branches, the +operations and the <i lang="fr">matériel</i> side, each with a secretariat. +I had communicated my views to the officers selected for +the Staff. This, in my judgment, was the correct line for +any Naval Staff organisation, and it was later introduced +by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff.</p> + +<p>When informed, just prior to the declaration of War, +that I might be required to take over the command of the +Fleet, I decided to ask, as the first step, for the services +of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as Chief of the Staff.</p> + +<p>I had brought with me from London on my own Staff, +as Second in Command of the Grand Fleet, a Captain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span> +(Captain Bentinck), with the title of Captain on the +Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a +Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and +a Signal Boatswain. These, with the exception of Captain +Bentinck (who joined Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender’s +Staff), I took to the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and my Staff +then comprised:</p> + +<ul> +<li>A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff.</li> +<li>A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet.</li> +<li>Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff.</li> +<li>A Flag-Lieutenant.</li> +<li>Three Signal officers.</li> +<li>Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two).</li> +<li>Three War Staff officers.</li> +<li>Two Signal Boatswains.</li> +<li>A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff.</li> +</ul> + +<p>The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat +with a suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this +difficulty was somewhat serious when I doubled the staff +on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>. However, it was successfully +overcome. The Staff was organised into two branches—Operations +and <i>Matériel</i>—the former directly under the +Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Captain +of the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the +work of the Captain of the Fleet became, of necessity, +very largely reduced, and he joined the operational side, +arrangements being made by which either he or the Chief +of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as +we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on +the advent of the submarine as an important factor in +naval warfare, that it was essential that an officer should +be constantly on the bridge who could take immediate +action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as might +be required.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span></p> + +<p>Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief +was so frequently required, at a moment’s notice, owing +to the swiftness with which a modern fleet moves, that I +never left my sea cabin, which was under the bridge, +to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was +at sea.</p> + +<p>The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as +already stated, under two headings. This division, as is +clear from the above remarks, affected their duties in +harbour more than when at sea. In the latter case the +two branches combined, and the whole staff became “operational.”</p> + +<p>The Staff work under these conditions was carried out +in the war-room, situated under protection, below the conning +tower. Here the movements of our own ships were +recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we were +nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the +bridge to this centre by the Signal officers, and the situation +at any moment could be seen by a glance at the charts +kept by the War Staff officer on duty.</p> + +<p>When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters, +the work was shifted from the war-room to the Admiral’s +shelter on the bridge, so that the situation could +be seen by me more readily; and finally, when, as on +May 31st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were +nearing touch with one another, the “plot” of the movements +as reported was continually under my observation.</p> + +<p>At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers engaged +on the operational side were following the movements +of such enemy vessels (chiefly, of course, submarines) +as were known to be at sea, as well as those +of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to +ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span> +each other at night—when risk of collision would be incurred +owing to ships not carrying lights, or in thick +weather.) They put into execution the orders given by +myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged +in elaborating plans of future movements and drawing +up the necessary orders for such movements as I had in +contemplation. They were also engaged in arranging all +gunnery, torpedo and other practices and exercises, and +in the constant work of the production, revision and issue +of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the +Fleet.</p> + +<p>On the <i lang="fr">matériel</i> side, the Staff work comprised that of +storing, provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions +of instruction, training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits +and repairs, etc.</p> + +<p>In action each member of the Staff had his own +particular duty allotted to him. The secretaries took +notes and recorded proceedings; certain officers had as +their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me every +movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to +attend solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy, +keeping me informed of their progress and of their possibilities; +another dealt with all questions relating to concentration +or distribution of fire, bringing to my notice +any signals required to give effect to our preconceived +arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty, +one being responsible that all signals for tactical movements +made visually were also made by “short distance” +wireless telegraphy. One wireless officer worked in the +main office and one in the auxiliary office. The Staff +was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief +free to take a comprehensive survey of the whole position, +whilst ensuring that nothing that should be done was +left undone. It must, however, be realised that the rapidity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span> +of movement of fleets is so great that, at critical +moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the Flag +Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make +instant decisions; there is no time for consultation or for +advice.</p> + +<h3>III.—<span class="smcap">Preparation of Cruising Orders</span></h3> + +<p>One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand +Fleet after the declaration of War was to lay down definitely +the various cruising orders for the Battle Fleet +and its “look-out” screen of battle-cruisers, cruisers and +light cruisers. There had been much discussion for some +years before the War as to the best disposition of cruisers +ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that +had been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but +war experience led to a series of diagrams being drawn +up giving the cruising stations of all the various classes +of cruisers and other light craft under the different conditions +that might exist. These included diagrams showing +the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards +enemy waters, under conditions of ordinary visibility, +by day, or in low visibility by day, both with the Battle +Cruiser Fleet in company and without it; a similar diagram +when moving away from enemy water by day (this +being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack +by destroyers as the fleet steered away from enemy +waters); diagrams were got out for steering towards or +away from enemy waters at night; and, finally, diagrams +were prepared, both for day and night, for the +dispositions of the cruisers and other light forces after an +action.</p> + +<p>Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle +Fleet itself, both by day and at night, were similarly +drawn up. Some of these were specially designed to give<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span> +such safety from submarine attack as was possible to the +main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of +destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of +fuel, or other causes. The dispositions for use at night +provided for the use of destroyer attack, and were designed +to give safety from collision, due to squadrons +inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when +showing no lights; this was a very possible event during +the course of a long night when a very slight error in +steering, or a slight difference in compasses, will rapidly +bring two squadrons together that started the night five +miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons separated, +as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful +submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons +gave greater freedom of movement in the case of destroyer +attack. At the same time it was necessary to +provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at daylight.</p> + +<p>The question of submarine screens was taken up +at the commencement of war. This matter had +naturally been considered before the War, but was in +its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition +of a screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter +when there is no lack of destroyers, the case is different +when a fleet is very short of the requisite number, as was +our experience, and one destroyer had often to be disposed +to endeavour to do the work of two.</p> + +<p>Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore, +drawn up to meet the different conditions resulting from +the presence of varying numbers of destroyers, or a decreased +number of ships requiring to be screened, and +also providing for the ships being in various formations. +In November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was +seventeen.</p> + +<p>Early in the War the danger of successful submarine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span> +attack on warships at sea, whether in company or proceeding +singly, had impressed on us the necessity of +taking every precaution for safety, and the practice of the +fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally +adopted in accordance with my directions. In the case +of a fleet or squadron, the usual practice was to carry out +the alterations of course by turning the ships together; +occasionally the turn was made “in succession,” but this +was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns were occasionally +made at fixed time intervals without signal.</p> + +<p>Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner +in which officers of watches kept station in a fleet, since +there is no better practice than keeping station on a line of +bearing, a far more difficult matter to the novice than +keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute the +excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915 +and 1916 very largely to this early experience. Much +theoretical investigation was instituted to determine the +method of zigzagging, both in a fleet and in a single ship, +which gave the greatest protection against submarine attack, +and actual experiments took place with our own +submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions; +the flag officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance +in this as in all other matters.</p> + +<p>The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the +instructions subsequently issued to merchant ships, and +the value of zigzagging in reducing the danger of submarine +attack was clearly shown during the year 1917 by +the comparative immunity of merchant ships that complied +with the orders as compared with those that did not +do so. Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship +into danger, but this was exceptional as compared with +the general immunity given.</p> + +<p>When the convoying of merchant ships through<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span> +the submarine zone was instituted in 1917, after I had +returned to the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet experience +was again of value in the preparation of instructions.</p> + +<p>The supremely important question of how best to +handle in action the large and increasing Fleet engaged +my attention from the commencement. In +drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of +the Fleet, both when cruising and in action, I availed +myself of the advice and assistance of the experienced +flag officers commanding the various Squadrons. Much +discussion took place on these matters, and many of the +dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual experiment +at sea before being incorporated in the +orders.</p> + +<p>The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle +Fleet from its cruising formation was a matter of the +greatest importance, and constant practice in carrying out +this manœuvre under every varying condition was given +to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were +introduced having as their object the simplification and +shortening of the manœuvre, with a view to bringing +the heaviest possible fire to bear on the enemy’s fleet as +quickly as possible. Orders were drawn up to meet +cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy +might be sighted at short range, and immediate independent +action by a divisional Flag Officer would be +necessary.</p> + +<p>In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of +the Fleet for action was complicated by the presence of +the 3rd Battle Squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts—the vessels +of the “King Edward VII.” class—as the speed +of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less +than that of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured +to solve this problem by practical experience. Much<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span> +depended on the tactics likely to be adopted by the +enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty lay in the +fact that if the 3rd Battle Squadron was placed on one +flank of the Battle Fleet when in cruising order and deployment +towards that flank became necessary in conformity +with an enemy movement, thus placing the slow +3rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the +whole Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14 +knots, in order to have the necessary reserve of speed in +hand. If, on the other hand, the 3rd Battle Squadron +was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet speed +was again reduced to that attainable by this squadron. +It was desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle +Fleet which would admit of the 3rd Battle Squadron being +in the rear after deployment, in whichever direction +deployment took place. There was still the objection, +which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced +upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the +van.</p> + +<p>The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre-Dreadnought +Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought +Squadrons, with a view to the slow squadron turning in +the opposite direction to the remainder on deployment, +and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought +Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the +3rd Battle Squadron into effective action.</p> + +<figure id="i_48" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> +<div class="right"><p>Plan N<sup>o.</sup> 1</p></div> + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_048.jpg" width="1235" height="1186" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_048-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p>The question was not one of importance subsequent +to April, 1915, from which date our superiority in battleships +of the Dreadnought type was sufficient to give me +confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under suitable +conditions, could be crushed in action without the +aid of the 3rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter +of 1914–15, when our superiority in Dreadnoughts was +frequently very slight, and the enemy possessed two +pre-Dreadnought<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> Battle Squadrons, our 3rd Battle Squadron +was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>The Battle Orders indicated the position to be +occupied by our battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers +and destroyers on deployment, as well as that of the +fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the +“Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the +Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued +shortly after war commenced were modelled on a Battle +memorandum which I had prepared when in command, +first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd Battle +Squadron. But the changing situation soon made alterations +and additions necessary, and the Orders were under +constant revision.</p> + +<p>The tactics to be pursued by the different units of +the Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were +provided for as far as possible.</p> + +<p>Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that +the Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after +deployment control the movements of all the squadrons +comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern +action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the great +length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, +and increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity +for wide decentralisation of command, <em>after the deployment</em> +of the fleet for action, was emphasised.</p> + +<p>As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid +on this point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, +of course, kept fully acquainted with the general ideas +under which the Fleet would act, so that they might be +able to interpret my wishes when acting independently. +Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close watch +on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that +squadrons could conform to his movements. The general<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span> +lines on which I intended to engage were defined. These +included the range at which it was intended to open the +engagement, the range below which it was not intended to +close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks +to be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to +this rule which might become necessary. Emphasis was +laid on the supreme necessity for a free use of our own +torpedoes when opportunity occurred.</p> + +<p>After the experience of the engagement on January +24th, 1915, between the battle-cruisers, and especially as +our superiority increased and the High Sea Fleet gave no +sign of a desire to engage, the conviction became stronger +than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy would +fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of +tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines +and torpedoes, <em>since a retiring fleet is in a position of +great tactical advantage in the employment of these +weapons</em>. The Tactical Board was in constant use for +a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the +other flag officers.</p> + +<p>In the earliest stages of the War, when the German +submarine strength was not great, one of the main problems +to be considered in regard to a fleet action was the +employment of our destroyers and light cruisers to +attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to +counter his similar attacks, which, owing to his great superiority +in destroyers, was a matter of supreme importance. +The knowledge, too, that his light cruisers and +destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships, +were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with +us) made it necessary to take into account the probability +that he would use this form of attack at the commencement +of a general action, or during the stages leading +up to it. Later, when his submarines increased in number,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span> +the method of countering the use of such vessels by +the enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action, +had also to be considered, particularly as it was not +until 1916 that the Grand Fleet was provided with any +submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that submarines +which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea became +part of the organisation.</p> + +<p>The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo attack +by the enemy, if the fleets were approximately abeam +of one another, and the risks run by the centre and rear +were pointed out, as were the different conditions produced +in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had +a position of torpedo advantage.</p> + +<p>The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater +as the War progressed, owing to the advance made in +the technique of these weapons. Before the opening of +hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had a maximum range of +about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements +in our torpedoes as the War progressed, including +a great increase in range, and we had every reason to +believe that the Germans were making similar progress, +and that the range of their torpedoes was as much in excess +of the pre-War range as was that of our own +weapons.</p> + +<p>The threat of successful torpedo attack even from +battleships in the line was, therefore, an important factor +to be taken into account, with the ships of the opposing +fleets formed in single line at the close intervals which are +necessary for successful co-operation and the concentration +of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation +into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet +action was constantly proceeding, but the single line, or +a modification of it, was, under most conditions, the best +that could be devised.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span></p> + +<p>It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be +manœuvred for advantage in gunnery position, it might +be necessary to engage under unfavourable gunnery conditions +in order to prevent the enemy reaching his own +waters.</p> + +<p>Several new manœuvres were introduced and practised +by the Fleet with a view to countering possible tactics +on the part of the enemy. These included a +“turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious +attack by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the +course of the Fleet without impairing its organisation +to meet enemy tactics necessitating such a move; +rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other new +tactical methods were introduced as time progressed +to meet the changing conditions of modern warfare.</p> + +<p>Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the conduct +of the Fleet after an action, so far as it was possible +to foresee the conditions that might arise. The object +was to arrange to continue the attack by light craft, +whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter-attack +by light forces.</p> + +<p>In the orders which were issued for the guidance of +the destroyers both before, during, and after an action, endeavour +was made to provide for all these contingencies. +The stations of the flotillas, including the Harwich +flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each +had its particular duties assigned to it. General directions +were given for the employment of the destroyers, +wide latitude being reserved to the officers commanding +flotillas.</p> + +<p>The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for.</p> + +<p>The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser, +cruiser and light cruiser when in cruising order, or in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span> +action, or after an action, were defined, particular emphasis +being laid on the necessity for ships in the van, +when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advantage +in regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the +same time engaging enemy vessels of a similar class and +preventing torpedo attacks on our own Battle Fleet from +developing.</p> + +<p>Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the +General Cruiser Instructions, that after gaining touch +with the enemy the first essential was to maintain that +touch. Instructions were also given that in the event of +the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our +Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were +to push on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet. +It will be seen later that this situation arose during the +Jutland battle.</p> + +<p>The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the principle +that <em>in action</em> their primary function was the destruction +of the similar enemy vessels if present, and, after +their destruction or in their absence, to attack the van +of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their duty +was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle +Fleet, whilst denying similar information to the enemy. +The Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle-Cruiser +Fleet was given a free hand to carry out these general +instructions.</p> + +<p>The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the +ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to +provide for the battle-cruisers being either absent or +present. In the former event, this squadron took the +place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our +battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle +Squadron was ordered to take station ahead of the remainder +of the Battle Fleet in the case of a deployment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span> +towards Heligoland, and in rear of the Battle Fleet in the +case of deployment <em>away from</em> Heligoland. The object of +this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet +at a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after +deployment. In order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron +to carry out its functions in action, it was stationed between +the Cruiser Line and the main Battle Fleet when +in cruising order.</p> + +<p>The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their +duties in action as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers +and torpedo craft, to support our destroyers, and to attack +the enemy’s battle line with torpedoes. For this +purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were required +to be in the van on deployment.</p> + +<p>The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the +fact that they should carry out an early attack on the +enemy’s Battle Fleet, commencing their attacks in clear +weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet were engaged. Under +conditions of low visibility, they were instructed to +attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be engaged. +It was pointed out that destroyers closing the +enemy’s Battle Fleet for the purpose of an attack were +also in the best position for preventing successful attacks +on our own fleets.</p> + +<p>As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the +Grand Fleet, in 1916, instructions for their conduct before, +during, and after action were drawn up. Instructions +for two other classes of vessel, namely, mine-layers +and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of +the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having +been attached to the Fleet from the commencement of +War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing, however, but slow +speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during +1915.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p> + +<h3>IV.—<span class="smcap">The Training of the Fleet</span></h3> + +<p>Inseparable from the question of the management of +the Fleet before and during action was that of the working +together of its units at sea by day and at night. This +matter was, of course, one to which great attention had +been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he +handed over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine +trained to a very high pitch of perfection by an officer +who was a past master in fleet training.</p> + +<p>But it was inevitable that war conditions should make +even greater demands on the skill of the personnel than +had previously been necessary, and in no direction was +this more necessary than at night, the number of ships +in company being far greater than had previously been +usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling +added to the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, +fleets cruising on dark, stormy nights without showing any +lights, did so for comparatively short periods, during +which the more experienced officers could, to a certain +extent, remain on deck.</p> + +<p>Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed +more than a very dim light at the stern, and frequently +not even that, adding greatly to difficulties of fleet cruising. +Consequently provision had to be made for ensuring +safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and considerable +foresight and great skill on the part of officers +was necessary.</p> + +<p>Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility +pass close to one another during hours of darkness +were warned beforehand of the danger, and arrangements +made so that they should be aware of each other’s +positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions +so as to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span> +otherwise might open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all +sorts were similarly warned so far as this was possible, +but in their case the conditions, owing to difficulties of +communication, were frequently much more embarrassing.</p> + +<p>Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night +had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the necessity +for signals, whilst giving freedom of action in an emergency. +What applied to conditions of darkness applied +equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring +safety in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, +could not as a rule be employed, since the blasts might +give warning to the enemy and place the Fleet open +to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the +other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in +close company with the larger ships for screening purposes +against submarines led, in the case of sudden fog, to a +difficult situation, as, before the Fleet could safely carry +out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the destroyers +clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by +the large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued +to meet all these conditions, and the best testimony to +the training of the Fleet prior to the War was the remarkable +freedom from accident during the early months after +the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly +commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by +no means handy vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation, +was also a source of great gratification to me, and +must have been most satisfactory to the officers and men +concerned.</p> + +<p>The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly +in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its +units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by +wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span> +presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate attention +on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements. +Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to +be stopped, because by means of <em>directional</em> wireless stations +the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could +be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt +that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and +in some cases even the <em>name</em> of the ship so signalling. +This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made +progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet +being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if +much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally +concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of +our squadrons using the same means of communication. +That was an inevitable inference.</p> + +<p>The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in +the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled +and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of signalling +that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet +had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the +Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions +that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders +somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the +object was achieved.</p> + +<p>Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea +in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in +and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet +Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the +enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time +occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet +manœuvring when much to the southward of the latitude +of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was +also carried out by visual signalling.</p> + +<p>Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span> +Fleet to enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not possible +to use visual signalling at night, except with carefully +shaded lamps which were only visible at a distance of +about a quarter of a mile, and then only by the ship +addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at +night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort +had then to be made to wireless, but by signalling before +dark all expected movements during the night, and by +arranging the course of the Fleet so that few alterations +were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost absolute +wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when important +information from the Admiralty and elsewhere +was to be transmitted to the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior +officers of squadrons, or to single ships when at sea engaged +in operations, etc., and early in the War we had +to devise a method by which this could be done without +calling up the ships in question by wireless, thus necessitating +a reply from them, and thus possibly acquainting +the enemy of their position.</p> + +<p>After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of +communicating the required information without causing +the ship herself to divulge her position was devised by +the Fleet Wireless officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. L. +Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and gradually +was greatly extended during the later stages of the War.</p> + +<p>It must not be thought that, because wireless signalling +at sea was restricted, it was not intended to make +full use of it when necessary and when silence was no +longer required, such as when the fleets were within +sight of one another. On the contrary, a great advance +was made during the War in the use of wireless telegraphy +for manœuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in +every other direction. So proficient did the ships become +under the organisation introduced by Lieutenant-Commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span> +Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very +efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in +1916 I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as +much ease and rapidity as by visual signals. At the beginning +of the War ten minutes to a quarter of an hour would +elapse before I could be sure that all ships had received +a manœuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole +Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to +three minutes. This great improvement was due to new +methods introduced, as well as to incessant practice in +harbour.</p> + +<p>Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was +very considerable indeed, and I owed a great debt of +gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, the other +wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and the wireless +officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress +was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme shortage +of wireless personnel for the expanding Fleet and +the large number of auxiliary vessels commissioned, we +were forced to discharge many of the best operators in +the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by +boys trained in the Wireless School established by the +Fleet at Scapa Flow.</p> + +<p>A point which war experience brought into considerable +prominence was the difficulty of distinguishing, +with sufficient rapidity, enemy vessels from our own +ships both before, and, more particularly during, action. +The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but was +greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. +Steps were taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrangements +made for certain distinguishing marks visible at +long distances to be worn during daylight by our own +surface vessels. The question of identification at night +was more difficult, and although we effected improvement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span> +in this respect also, the results were not so satisfactory.</p> + +<p>Of the original experimental work carried out by the +Fleet at Scapa Flow none was more important than that +connected with the safety of ships from mines. Early +in the War it had become obvious that there was danger +of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful +mine attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work +of the mine-sweepers; these vessels could not work far +afield, and in bad weather could not work even close to +their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to proceed +to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable.</p> + +<p>A solution of this difficulty was required. Commander +Cecil V. Usborne, of the <i>Colossus</i>, in these +circumstances proposed to me the trial of an apparatus +which he suggested should be towed from the bows of +ships; it was intended to fend off any mine encountered, +provided the ship did not strike it absolutely “end on.” +I ordered immediate trials; all the necessary <i lang="fr">matériel</i> was +provided with Fleet labour and appliances, and starting +with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until a +series of experiments commenced in large ships, battleships +and cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A. L. Duff +and A. C. Leveson in charge of the experiments and +great progress was made, although absolute success was +not obtained.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir +Cecil Burney, visited the base at this juncture, and, +knowing his inventive turn of mind, I discussed the +matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant +Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for +effecting the required object. His idea was to utilise +apparatus which he had devised earlier for other purposes. +His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span> +devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the +manufacture of appliances by outside manufacturers. I +urged the Admiralty to take up the question at once; +this was done, and the experiments, started at Portsmouth, +were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as preliminary +success had been obtained.</p> + +<p>The two devices were then tried over a considerable +period at Scapa Flow, still under the immediate direction +of Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson, who threw themselves +wholeheartedly into the task, Rear-Admiral +E. F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional +absence. After many disappointments the Burney +system was proved to be successful, and I at once requested +that manufacture on a large scale should be +proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate character, +and many persons at first were sceptical as to its +value, owing partly to early difficulties in manipulation. +But Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson rendered the +greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and gradually +it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had +become possessed of a most valuable safeguard. By +the time I relinquished the Command a very large number +of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and some +light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working +well. Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improvement +was constantly being effected, with the result that +during 1917 the fitting was universal. During that year +it was instrumental in saving several warships from damage +by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was +also considerable.</p> + +<p>The initial idea was that of Commander Usborne, +and both he and Lieutenant Burney displayed much +energy in working out their respective devices. But it +was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span> +success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson +eventually brought the appliance to perfection, with the +result that it was generally adopted. A modified arrangement +of the same nature was fitted to merchant ships +during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value.</p> + +<p>As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early +stage of my Command to the necessity for constant +improvement in the fighting efficiency of the Grand +Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was +considerable, left me under no delusions as to its +character. I had made it my business to keep myself +very fully acquainted with German progress. I had +first been brought into close touch with the modern +German Navy during service in China from 1899 to +1902, which included the Boxer campaign, when I +saw a great deal of its officers and men. I had then +formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent +touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had +convinced me that in <i lang="fr">matériel</i> the Germans were ahead +of us, and that the personnel, though lacking the +initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the +British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and +trained. I knew also that the German Fleet was in no +way short of officers; this was the case with us owing to the +constant political pressure in the years before the War, +and I expected that this shortage of officers would be a +great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch +of the German Navy from which I expected very good +work was the destroyer service. I had seen German destroyers +manœuvring.</p> + +<p>Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our +officers, how efficient was the gunnery and torpedo work +of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid had been its advance +in the year or two before the War. A great increase<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span> +had been made in the allowance of ammunition for +practice. Before the War this was much higher than our +own, and there was no doubt in my mind that the German +allowance would be well expended. Indeed, we had obtained +information which placed this beyond question.</p> + +<p>I was well acquainted personally with many of the +flag officers and captains in the German Navy and had +some idea of their views on naval warfare. Amongst +those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl, +the then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, +Vice-Admiral von Lans, commanding a Battle Squadron, +Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval Staff, who +later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral +von Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Commander-in-Chief +of the High Sea Fleet, who succeeded +Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval Staff, and Admiral +von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore +batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowledge +of these officers led me to expect good work in the +High Command, and I also expected that they would be +well supported.</p> + +<p>It is interesting to record that I took part in a Conference +of Allied naval officers in a pagoda at the end +of the Great Wall of China in company with Admiral +von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain in +China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts, +in 1900, and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me +as Chief of the Staff to Admiral—afterwards Admiral +of the Fleet—Sir Edward Seymour, when I was wounded +during the international expedition for the relief of the +Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on several +subsequent occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans, +who was in command of the <i>Iltis</i> at the capture of the +Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer campaign.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span></p> + +<p>My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong reason, +had no others existed, for making me desirous of +doing all that was possible to increase our own gunnery +and torpedo efficiency.</p> + +<p>The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground +in Kiel Bay, with every appliance for carrying out gunnery +exercises, and I felt sure that they had rendered it +safe from any hostile attack, and that the German Fleet +would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as +time progressed.</p> + +<p>We were not in so fortunate a position. There had +been no recent opportunity for carrying out gunnery and +torpedo exercises and practices; Scapa Flow had not been +used as a base for such work in peace time, except for +destroyers, and consequently no facilities existed there, +although the proximity of Cromarty, which <em>had</em> been a +Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a +certain extent at a later period. But there was no protected +area outside the harbour where practices could be +carried out in safety, and the harbour itself was not at +first secure against submarine attack. Much use, however, +was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty +later when submarine obstructions had been provided, +and the Germans had obligingly laid a mine-field which +protected the practice area from seaward. At the +commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to +depend on fleet resources for the provision of targets for +gunnery practices, and the practices themselves were carried +out under conditions which laid the ships open to +submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the +work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity +provided by constant sea work in the first months of the +War was, however, utilised to carry out such gunnery +practices as the conditions admitted.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span></p> + +<p>At first the custom was for the Fleet to use small +targets which the ships carried with them. These were +unsuitable; their small size rendered them frequently +invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea, and I felt +that the Fleet could not make progress under such conditions.</p> + +<p>Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted +to, but no really suitable rocks existed, and, in any +case, practice at them eventually involved too much risk +of submarine attack, as the German submarines began +to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards +the end of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase +in the number of destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to +the provision of submarine obstructions at Cromarty, to +carry out gunnery practices at long ranges at targets in +the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that +period.</p> + +<p>Later still, battle practice targets were brought to +Scapa Flow, and the long-range firing was carried +out in the Pentland Firth, a still more convenient +place.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for +all the preliminary gunnery practices which could be +carried out with guns up to 6-inch in calibre, and also +for night firing and for torpedo work. The fine stretch +of water was secure from submarine attack after the +obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise +by day and night without danger of attack. The Flow +was simply invaluable for this purpose. Ships were +firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control exercises, +carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing +with attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight +until dark.</p> + +<p>After dark, night firing was frequently carried out,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span> +and occasionally a division of battleships was exercised +in steaming in company, without lights, in order to give +the officers of watches practice. When the constant sea +work of the earlier months of the War gave place to occasional +cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of +the Fleet was maintained at a remarkably high standard +as a result of the work in Scapa Flow.</p> + +<p>During the period 1914–16 a marked advance was +undoubtedly made in gunnery efficiency. At an early +period of the War a memorandum was issued pointing +out the necessity for increased attention to drill and +organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon, +and it was obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers +and men. I knew that we had to deal with an enemy +who would be as perfect as constant drill could +ensure.</p> + +<p>A great extension of the system of Director Firing, +by which one officer or man could lay and fire all the guns, +was made. The situation in this respect before the War +was that a few ships had been fitted for the system, which +had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a +very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value +compared with the alternative system; there was considerable +opposition to it, and the great majority of the ships +were not fitted. In some cases the system was not favoured +even in the ships provided with it.</p> + +<p>It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out competitive +trials of the Director System and the alternative +system already in use, and the results of these trials +had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion of the +great value of the Director System. I was able to press +these views on my return to the Admiralty at the end +of 1912 as Second Sea Lord, and it was then decided to +provide all the later ships with the arrangement. Little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span> +progress had, however, been made when the War broke +out, only eight battleships having been fitted.</p> + +<p>Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the assistance +of Sir Percy Scott and the warm support of +Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by which the battleships +and battle-cruisers were supplied with this system, +without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard +for the purpose. The necessary instruments were manufactured +at various contractors’ shops, and the very laborious +task of fitting them, and the heavy electric cables, +on board the ships was carried out by electricians sent +to the various bases. The complicated work naturally +took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays occurred; +but gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy +Scott rendering invaluable assistance at headquarters.</p> + +<p>As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy +guns mounted in turrets, and by the date of the Battle +of Jutland there were few ships that were not supplied +with the system, although six of those last fitted had not +had much experience with it.</p> + +<p>The conditions under which that action was fought +converted any waverers at once to a firm belief in the +Director System, and there was never afterwards any +doubt expressed as to its great value.</p> + +<p>Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work, +and the system was extended to smaller vessels. This +had been the intention even before the action, but there +were then still many who were unconvinced. However, +during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was +pressed forward, and the system became universal for all +guns and in all classes of ships.</p> + +<p>The improvement in what may be termed the application +of existing methods of fire control may now be mentioned.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span> +Throughout the War we had gradually, as the +result of practice, increased greatly the effective range +at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid +on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the +target in order to obtain early hits. Improvement was +perhaps most rapid in the five or six months following +the Jutland action. In this action the Fire Control Instruments, +as adopted in the Service, which were the outcome +of the work of naval officers, were found to meet +the gunnery requirements most successfully. The only +important improvement that was made was the provision +of additional means for keeping the observation of +Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Various +committees were formed immediately after the battle +in order that full advantage might be taken at once of +our experience. The result was the introduction of new +rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition to greatly +increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered +it difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment +by dodging tactics.</p> + +<figure id="i_68" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <img src="images/i_068.jpg" width="1307" height="853" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure id="i_68b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <img src="images/i_068b.jpg" width="1301" height="908" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In order to cope more successfully with the latter development, +more experiments were ordered, having as +their object the determination of the inclination of the +enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and various +methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended +to the Fleet. The most promising at the time that I +relinquished command of the Fleet was that proposed +by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N., the range-finding +expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this +inclination problem for some years. A great increase +in the rapidity with which the fall of shot were “spotted +on” to a target resulted from all this work. It is not +too much to say that the interval between opening fire +and the moment at which the salvoes began to “straddle”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span> +the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of +fire when the enemy was “straddled” was very greatly +increased. The new firing rules, by standardising the +system of correcting fire, produced a marked increase +in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two +ships was concentrated on to one target and generally +paved the way for the solution of many gunnery +problems which the Fleet had previously been unable +to solve completely.</p> + +<p>The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as +a result of our experience of the German use of this device. +Prolonged experiments were carried out at Scapa +Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best method +of using smoke screens, and they were also used during +battle tactics and during range-finder exercises. The +trials included the use of smoke shell as well as funnel +and artificial smoke.</p> + +<p>In another direction efforts were made to increase +efficiency. The Jutland battle convinced us that our armour-piercing +shell was inferior in its penetrative power +to that used by the Germans, and immediately +after the action I represented this with a view to immediate +investigation. A Committee sat to consider the +matter. In 1917, as First Sea Lord, I appointed a second +Committee.</p> + +<p>With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of +a particular calibre as used at Jutland the shell would, +with oblique impact at battle range, <em>break up whilst holing +a certain thickness of plate</em>, and the shell could not, +therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s ships. A shell +of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee, of +the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and +range <em>pass whole through a plate of double the thickness</em> +before exploding and could therefore with delay action<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span> +fuse penetrate to the magazines of a capital ship. Had +our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing shell +at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being +only damaged, would probably not have been able to +reach port. The manufacture of these new type shells +for the Fleet was well advanced before the end of 1917.</p> + +<p>The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in +action, from ships, from destroyers, and from submarines, +was also greatly increased. The torpedo practices at +Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, were of +the greatest possible use.</p> + +<p>The real cause underlying the improvement was the +great keenness displayed by officers and men. Their one +idea was to strive for the highest efficiency, and +there was never apparent the least sign of weariness or +staleness in repeating time after time exercises and practices +with which they were so familiar. No tribute +that I can pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in +this connection could be sufficiently high. I know that +under my successor the improvement in fighting efficiency +continued.</p> + +<p>Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel +of the German Navy, culminating in the surrender for +internment of the majority of their capital ships, the +Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in action +the methods adopted as a result of our experience +during the first two years of war, and perfected by two +years’ further training. Had the German fleet come out +to battle a terrible punishment awaited it!</p> + +<p>Mention has been made of the development of aircraft +during the War. The possibilities resulting from the use +of the air for reconnaissance work, for assisting in the direction +of gunfire, and, finally, for offensive operations, +were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but for a considerable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span> +period the lack of suitable machines hindered +development. The first decisive step taken was the fitting +out of the <i>Campania</i>, a passenger ship of the Cunard +Line, as a sea-plane carrier to be attached to the Battle +Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force and, later, the +Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller vessels, +the <i>Vindex</i> and <i>Engadine</i>, carrying a few sea-planes. +They had been used in operations in the Heligoland +Bight, but without much success, owing to the difficulty +experienced in getting sea-planes to rise from the water +except in the finest weather.</p> + +<p>With the arrival of the <i>Campania</i> at Scapa, we were +able to investigate the difficulties attending the use of aircraft +from ships as then fitted and to indicate the direction +in which improvement was desirable and possible. It +was apparent that little improvement could be expected +so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from +the water. The first step, therefore, was to improve the +arrangements for flying off from the deck of the +<i>Campania</i>. The ship returned to Liverpool at the end +of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations +might be effected; these were not completed until +the late spring of 1916; during the alterations, the +<i>Campania</i> was also, at my request, fitted to carry a kite +balloon.</p> + +<p>The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite +balloons had been demonstrated during the Dardanelles +operations, and the <i>Menelaus</i>, kite balloon ship, was sent +to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon obvious that we +could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a fleet +action unless they were flown from the ships themselves, +and experiments were carried out, under the direction of +Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the +4th Battle Squadron, having as their object the best<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span> +method of fitting and using kite balloons from warships. +Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one +being that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand +the tension of the balloon during strong winds. The Kite +Balloon Section at Roehampton gradually solved the +difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority of the +flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided +with kite balloons, and were experiencing their utility. +From this beginning, great developments took place in +providing vessels of all classes, including light cruisers, +destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite balloons; the +balloon was used in the case of the smaller vessels +for anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the +heavy ships it was used for observation and correction +of fire.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier +had proceeded, but not with the same rapidity. It was +evident to me in 1916 that for anti-Zeppelin work we +should look towards the aeroplane flying from the deck, +rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise +from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe +for the step, owing to the landing difficulty, and the first +efforts of the Royal Naval Air Service lay in the direction +of providing a type of sea-plane that would fly well off +the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were fairly +successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air +craft machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until +the aeroplane was adopted for the work; and this took +place in 1917, when progress became rapid, and continued +until the end of the War.</p> + +<p>There remains the question of the airship, which was +also being developed during the period 1914–16, but as +this matter was not within the province of the Fleet, it +is unnecessary to touch upon it here.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span></p> + +<h3>V.—<span class="smcap">The Blockade</span></h3> + +<p>The story of the development of the Grand Fleet +would be incomplete without reference to the Blockade, +and, in particular, to the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. +In the early days of the War, the 10th Cruiser Squadron +consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class—vessels +at least twenty years old; and during August, +1914, the Admiralty commissioned three armed merchant +ships, the <i>Mantua</i>, <i>Alsatian</i> and <i>Oceanic</i>, to strengthen +the squadron for blockade work; the latter ship was lost +by shipwreck in September of that year.</p> + +<p>The Blockade in those early days was carried out by +the 10th Cruiser Squadron and by the other cruiser squadrons +attached to the Grand Fleet. During November, +1914, the ships of the “Edgar” class were withdrawn +owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the +ships’ companies utilised to commission a number of additional +armed merchant cruisers. By the end of December, +1914, the squadron consisted of eighteen ships, +being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships. A +very large proportion of the officers and men of the reconstituted +10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mercantile +Marine.</p> + +<p>The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels +called for a considerable organisation for their maintenance; +they were based on Liverpool for all the heavy +work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced base at +Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland +Islands, was gradually developed, and obstructed against +submarine attack. The work of organisation was carried +out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded the +squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stileman, +the Senior Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span> +we were much indebted for hearty co-operation and efficient +organisation at the base.</p> + +<p>The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting +and boarding all vessels bound into or out of the northern +entrance to the North Sea, and this work could obviously +not be carried out in the face of the German submarines +without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was +greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examining +vessel was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat. +As the number of German submarines increased, the +squadron was necessarily withdrawn to positions further +removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the Blockade +line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from +the Orkneys and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to +Iceland, and when freedom from ice rendered passage +round the north of Iceland possible, ships operated in that +neighbourhood.</p> + +<p>A careful organisation of the movements of the ships +was necessary to cover such an immense area of the sea, +and to provide that all ships should, as far as possible, be +intercepted. Even in the case of ships of such large coal +endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not +possible to keep much more than one-half the number in +commission on an average on the patrol line at the same +time. The remainder were either in port refitting and +refueling, or were <i lang="fr">en route</i> to and from the bases. The +distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool +was some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in +the passage each way.</p> + +<figure id="i_74" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="right"><p><i>Plan N<sup>o.</sup> 2.</i></p></div> + + <img src="images/i_074.jpg" width="993" height="618" alt=""> + +<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_074-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> + +<div class="blockquot short"> + +<p>Chart showing in pecked lines the area in which +the ships of the 10<sup>th.</sup> Cruiser Squadron usually worked +after about the middle of the year 1915; the positions +of the ships being constantly changed.</p> + +<p>Prior to this the areas were in the vicinity of A.B.C.D.G.</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run +the gauntlet of enemy submarines, which were passing +down the west coast of the Hebrides and Ireland, and +as no destroyers were available with which to screen them +against attack, the risk was considerable. They had also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span> +to face the constant danger of mine-fields. Several ships +of the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with +a resultant heavy loss of life.</p> + +<p>Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the boarding +parties was very arduous. The preliminary examination +could not be carried out without boarding, +and the manner in which the boats of the squadron were +handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in +northern latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship +of the officers and men. In this boarding work the fishermen +of the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, hardy +and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous +service.</p> + +<p>The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually +from its inception, as is well known, and after a time the +percentage of vessels that evaded the ships of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron became so low as to be almost negligible. +The procedure adopted was to send all ships, +preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any +suspicion, into Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where regular +examination services were instituted. The ships were +taken in under the supervision of an armed guard, sent +on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards underwent +many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their +lives in ships which were torpedoed by German submarines, +and in many cases, particularly in badly found sailing +ships, they underwent great hardships. The guards +were also the means of saving more than one such ship +from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew +refused to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact +and discretion on the part of the officer in charge, usually +a junior officer of the Royal Naval Reserve, were necessary +in his dealings with the neutral captains. The whole +question of the efficiency of the Blockade—as shown by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span> +the returns furnished to me from Headquarters—was constantly +under review by my Staff and myself.</p> + +<p>The fate of the detained ship was decided in London +on receipt of the report of examination. As was perhaps +natural, the sentence on many ships’ cargoes pronounced +in London was not accepted without question from the +Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with +reference to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were naturally +very critical of any suspicion of laxity in passing, +into neutral countries bordering on Germany, articles +which we suspected might find their way into Germany, +and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the +Admiralty, and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when +that Ministry was established. The difficulties with which +the Foreign Office was faced in regard to neutral susceptibilities +were naturally not so apparent in the Fleet +as to the authorities in London, and though many of our +criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some +possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were +of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giving +the naval point of view. The decisive effect of the +Blockade did not become apparent until the end, when +the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an +influence on the result of the War this powerful weapon +had exercised. Even those who during the War had +been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised at the +last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result +of the silent pressure of Sea Power.</p> + +<h3>VI.—<span class="smcap">The Grand Fleet Bases</span></h3> + +<p>Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected +state of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack +in the early part of the War. The matter was one of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span> +supreme importance, and formed the subject of very +urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains +were at work on the problem at the Admiralty, at the +bases, and in the Fleet itself.</p> + +<p>The first step was that taken under the direction of +Captain Donald S. Munro, the King’s Harbour Master +at Cromarty, who devised a system of submarine +obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep-water +obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing +to his energy and driving power, the entrance to +Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by October 26th, +1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for +Cromarty another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R., +under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, +the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of Scotland, +suggested a method for providing an obstruction for +the Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by +the end of October, 1914, and was also entirely successful.</p> + +<p>As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I requested +that obstructions on similar lines should be +fitted to the three main entrances to Scapa Flow, the +Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to be attempted) +being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the +supply of the necessary material were experienced, +and the first line of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance +was not completed until December 29th, 1914, the first +line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and that +in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile officers +and men of the Fleet had improvised obstructions, +first at Lough Swilly and Loch na Keal, and later at +Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough security +against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychological +value. These obstructions, which were kept in existence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span> +even after the completion of the more efficient methods +of dealing with the problem, involved much labour.</p> + +<p>Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disadvantages +attendant on basing the Fleet so far north as +Scapa Flow, were discussed between Sir Henry Jackson +(then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that, +with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of +intercepting the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and +of dealing with landing raids covered by the High Sea +Fleet, were so considerable as to make it eminently desirable +to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this were +feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the +result I suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions +across the Firth of Forth, which would admit not only +of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that anchorage, but +would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being +carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the +Forth, so that the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its +fighting efficiency. Many senior officers in the Grand +Fleet were not in favour of the idea, for two reasons: +first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy +with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at +Scapa; and, secondly, that practices could not be so efficiently +carried out in the Forth. There was much weight +in both these objections, although the difficulties of carrying +out practices in the Forth were exaggerated; but the +strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and +the scheme was proceeded with as proposed.</p> + +<p>That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe +carrying out of practices was completed by December, +1916, and the whole of the new obstructions were in place +by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is true, than the +anticipated date. The result certainly justified the conclusion +arrived at. When the conditions made it at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span> +all probable that the High Sea Fleet might put to +sea for an operation in southern waters, the Grand +Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the undoubted +disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by +skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers responsible.</p> + +<p>The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine +attack was only one of the many factors necessary +for their development. In pre-War days, although it +had been decided that the use of northern bases would +be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the +bases had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It +is, perhaps, desirable to remove any misunderstanding as +to the causes of this failure.</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The decision had not long been taken, and</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The necessary financial provision was lacking.</p> + +<p>Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa +Flow was affected, and, under the second, that at Rosyth, +where for some time progress in the development of the +base had been arrested.</p> + +<p>The Admiralty had taken steps to make some preparations +at Cromarty, in so far as the provision of gun +defences against attack by surface vessels was concerned, +but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a fleet beyond +a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one +of the floating docks at southern yards.</p> + +<p>In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted +our Fleet to the north, all the conveniences for the maintenance +of that fleet were still in the Channel ports. The +first step was the transference of the large floating dock +from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth, +together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were +housed in a merchant ship captured from the Germans. +Workshops were fitted up on shore under the energetic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span> +superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund R. Pears and +his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with +great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invaluable +to the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>Invergordon gradually developed into a great repairing +base. A second and smaller floating dock was purchased +early in 1916 at my request and placed there, and +by the middle of that year the base had attained large +proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapidity +and success, including the repairs of battleships +after the Jutland battle, and the great extension in +armoured-deck protection fitted to ships after the same +action.</p> + +<p>Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at +Invergordon since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow +the same possibilities as a repairing base did not exist, +although a floating dock for destroyers, for which many +requests had been made, was eventually obtained and +placed there.</p> + +<p>But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all +knowledge in other directions. In August, 1914, the +base organisation consisted only of the seagoing Fleet repair +ships <i>Cyclops</i> and <i>Assistance</i>. At an early stage the +<i>Cyclops</i> was connected to a shore telegraph cable off the +village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a +floating post office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a +few drifters) which were first requisitioned. Rear-Admiral +Francis S. Miller was appointed to her as the Senior +Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which the great +demands on her accommodation were met was a standing +wonder to me. In the early part of the War, officers on +Admiral Miller’s staff and others were obliged to make +their sleeping berths, as best they could, on the deck or +on top of their writing-tables, and it was surprising that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span> +the overcrowding in all directions did not affect health. +But the work went on very successfully in the most inconvenient +circumstances.</p> + +<p>Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing +to the weather conditions, to move the base organisations +from the north to the south-west side of Scapa Flow. +The anchorage at Long Hope was selected, whilst the +Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta, +and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store +ships, and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope +and Hoy Sound. Prior to this, the importance of the +organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands had increased +to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment +of a Senior Flag Officer in general command +of the whole district, and of the defences in particular.</p> + +<p>So much of my time was being occupied in deciding +and pressing forward the work of organisation of the base +and its obstructions and defences, in dealing with the +numerous questions relating to the patrol of the coast by +coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant +ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding such +vessels, in considering questions affecting the occupation +of land for the erection of defences, in the requisitioning +of trawlers and drifters, etc., that it was becoming +difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet work +proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who suggested +that he should waive his seniority in order to serve +as my junior officer, was appointed Vice-Admiral Commanding +the Orkneys and Shetlands. This left Rear-Admiral +Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly +heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of +a mass of work outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest +possible benefit in every way. Under Sir Stanley Colville’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span> +most able direction, the completion of the organisation +for the general defences of the Islands, the work +of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of +submarine obstructions was effected, and the work pushed +forward. Captain Stanley Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of +very wide experience, was appointed to superintend the +work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under +his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties +due to bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to +Scapa Flow were either blocked by sunken ships or obstructed +by nets, mines, and other devices.</p> + +<p>The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning +of the War consisted of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns +landed from the Fleet, were gradually reinforced by four-inch +and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the whole +being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.-Colonel +Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was +housed in huts, erected temporarily for the purpose, +and although with the handiness which characterises +a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the +officers and men eventually made themselves comfortable +even under such weather conditions as are experienced at +Scapa Flow, they endured a very considerable amount of +hardship in the early days with their accustomed cheerfulness.</p> + +<p>And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and +staying qualities of the crews of the trawlers that supported +the submarine obstructions, particularly those at +Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in positions in +which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly +and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a +few yards of a rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them +and bringing on board tons of water. The skippers knew +that they had to stick it out for the sake of the safety of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span> +the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and +under these conditions they did their duty in a manner +which calls for the highest praise.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the development of the base proper proceeded +apace. One of the earlier arrivals was the old +cruiser <i>Impérieuse</i>, which was used as a post office, depot, +and general overflow ship to the <i>Cyclops</i>. The number of +trawlers and drifters, which had their home at +Scapa Flow and which were engaged on patrol or mine-sweeping +work, attendance on the Fleet, garrison, or on +the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased with great rapidity +during the winter of 1914–15; on September 1st, 1914, +the number was <i lang="la">nil</i>, and it reached a total of some four +yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by +the summer of 1915. These vessels all looked to the +<i>Cyclops</i>, <i>Assistance</i> and <i>Impérieuse</i> for refit, pay, food, +and for every conceivable want. Gradually the number of +base ships was increased, culminating in the arrival of +the old battleship <i>Victorious</i> about March 6, 1916, as the +“home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the +Fleet, fitting the Director System, increasing the protection +to decks and magazines, carrying out minor +repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent +tasks.</p> + +<p>Mention has been made of the large number of colliers, +oilers, store ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used +by the Fleet. At one time this caused some criticism, +based principally on the time spent by the colliers at the +Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the +necessity for this. There were no facilities at the base +for the storage of coal, either in lighters or on shore. +Consequently, the whole of the coal required at the base +was necessarily kept on board the colliers. The actual +number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span> +at the base during the first two years of war was +determined by the necessity for coaling the Fleet and +getting it to sea again with the utmost possible rapidity. +We could not contemplate such a situation as the Fleet +arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing +owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of information +being received simultaneously that the High +Sea Fleet was at sea and covering a landing raid on our +coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital importance to +the Empire.</p> + +<p>Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I +gave the number necessary to enable almost the whole +Fleet to be fuelled simultaneously; in other words, +the number of colliers was dependent on the number of +coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction +was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some +ships requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of +two such ships using one collier in succession; but, +broadly speaking, the requirements were as stated. +When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum, +they return to Cardiff to refill to economise tonnage.</p> + +<p>At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of +coal by rail to Grangemouth and its transshipment to +colliers there. As we needed colliers as coal-storing ships, +so also we required ammunition ships to carry a proportion +of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There +were no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on +shore. The number of ships required for this service was, +however, much smaller.</p> + +<p>Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great advantage +over shore storage; should strategic conditions +necessitate a change of base, the coal, ammunition and +other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span> +same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating +docks.</p> + +<p>A consideration of all these facts connected with the +development of fleet bases will show that this question +necessarily required a good deal of attention on the part +of my Staff and myself, and was incidental to the development +of the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<h3>VII.—<span class="smcap">The Personnel and its Welfare</span></h3> + +<p>Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by +no means the least important, was that of the moral and +spirit of the personnel. It is, of course, impossible to +exaggerate the importance of this question as an element +in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of +war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours +spent in harbour were fully occupied in coaling and storing +the ships; but these conditions could not be continued +indefinitely. As the months passed with no sign of enemy +vessels at sea and time in harbour increased as compared +to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find +some diversion for the minds of the officers and men.</p> + +<p>The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out +under the superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis +Bayly, then commanding the 1st Battle Squadron. +Always alive to the necessity for providing occupation, +recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started +considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a +divergent nature as batteries for the defence of the submarine +obstructions then in progress, football grounds +for the men, a golf course for the officers, and landing +piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventually +divided out amongst the various squadrons. A rifle +and pistol range were also constructed, and several piers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span> +built. The whole of the work was carried out, I may +add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen” ship, +the s.s. <i>Ghourko</i>, was fitted up by the Junior Army and +Navy Stores, and this vessel played an important part +in the harbour life of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores +and provisions of all sorts, available for use by all ships, +but particularly of the smaller vessels which could not +send their mess stewards far afield in search of a change +of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical +and cinema entertainments took place on board frequently. +She was also fitted with a boxing ring, and +squadron boxing competitions were held on board with +great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures +of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catholics +and Nonconformists.</p> + +<p>The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost. +Officers lectured on board their ships to the ships’ companies +on every subject, the War included, and much +good resulted.</p> + +<p>Education was freely developed. The Admiralty +provided, at my request, schoolmasters in large numbers, +and classes for the boys and voluntary classes for the men +in the evenings in harbour were very well attended.</p> + +<p>And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to +the utmost extent possible. This took the form principally +of football, rowing regattas, athletic sports and boxing. +The keenness displayed in all these sports was a +certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign +of staleness.</p> + +<p>The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over +periods of tedium and weariness, which are most calculated +to undermine discipline. Occupation and interest +are the surest antidotes to discontent and unrest, and +never during the first two and a half years did I see signs<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span> +of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thoroughly +happy and contented, treated the War as being +in the day’s work, and looked forward eagerly to the day +on which their enemy would give them the opportunity +for which they were waiting, and for which they kept +themselves thoroughly efficient and fit.</p> + +<p>In those days the officers got to know the men even +better than they had done before, and the spirit of comradeship +between all ranks became correspondingly closer. +Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have desired +to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than +that which animated the officers and men of the Grand +Fleet.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV"><span id="toclink_88"></span>CHAPTER IV<br> + +<span class="subhead">DECLARATION OF WAR</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">At</span> 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet proceeded +to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders. The +ships accompanying the Fleet-Flagship <i>Iron Duke</i> were +the vessels of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, +the light cruisers <i>Southampton</i>, <i>Birmingham</i>, <i>Boadicea</i>, +<i>Blonde</i> and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla; the cruisers +<i>Shannon</i>, <i>Natal</i> and <i>Roxburgh</i>, and the light cruisers +<i>Nottingham</i>, <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>, which were at +Rosyth with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to +meet the Fleet at a rendezvous in Lat. 58.40 N., Long. +1.30 E. The light cruisers <i>Bellona</i> and <i>Blanche</i> were left +behind to coal.</p> + +<p>A report received from the Admiralty that three German +transports had passed the Great Belt on the evening +of August 1st had led to the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, +with the cruisers <i>Cochrane</i> and <i>Achilles</i>, and the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the +evening of August 3d to cruise to the southward of the +Fair Island Channel during the night.</p> + +<p>The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep +east as far as Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers +to carry out a wide sweep to the southward and south-westward. +These orders were in conformity with the +general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for +the Grand Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at +establishing a blockade; at preventing the enemy forces +from getting into the Atlantic to interfere with the operations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span> +of our cruisers engaged in protecting our own trade +as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and +at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to +the enemy. Pursuant to these orders, the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed +to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61 N., working +eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriving +there at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, thence to sweep to the S.E. until +5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 5th, when they were on a line drawn +S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat. 59.25 N. with the +eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The <i>Antrim</i> and +<i>Argyll</i>, being short of fuel, were detached during the +evening of August 4th to coal at Scapa.</p> + +<p>The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the +cruisers and light cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla +was detached to Rosyth to fuel. This first sweep was +begun in northern waters because the North Sea is +narrower at this point, and also because it afforded opportunity +of intercepting vessels which might have left +German ports two days previously in anticipation of +hostilities. The cruiser sweep was supported by the +Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E., turning +at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on August 5th to the westward.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled +to leave Scapa 30 per cent. short of fuel owing to the +paucity of colliers, was detached to that base at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +on the 4th, to complete with coal.</p> + +<p>During the night information was received by wireless +telegraphy that war had been declared against Germany +at midnight, 4th–5th August, and the following gracious +message was received from His Majesty the King and was +communicated to the Fleet:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span></p><div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“At this grave moment in our National History, I +send to you and through you to the officers and men of +the Fleet of which you have assumed command, the +assurance of my confidence that under your direction they +will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, +and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her +Empire in the hour of trial.”</p> +</div> + +<p>During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised +to the northward of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with +Admiralty telegraphic orders; the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as four +light cruisers and the <i>Lowestoft</i>, and the 4th Flotilla was +sent to Invergordon for a similar purpose. In the afternoon, +the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the cruiser <i>Devonshire</i>, +as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, were +detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet +turned to the southward at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 6th to meet the +3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat. +59 N., Long. 1.0 E.</p> + +<p>During August 6th the following reports were received:</p> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) Two German cruisers were reported passing +Trondhjem going north. (This came from the Admiralty.)</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north-west +end of the Shetlands going north. (This was a local +report.)</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The German liner <i>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</i> was +stated to have passed through the Stronsay Firth, Orkneys, +bound east, during the night of the 5th–6th. (Local +report.)</p> + +<p>The destroyer <i>Oak</i> was despatched to search the +vicinity of the Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained +no confirmation of the report.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) It was reported that the Germans had established<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span> +a base in Lat. 62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact +position unknown).</p> + +<p>A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in +confirmation of the last report, but a British trawler +reported that a large number of German merchant ships +had assembled in the West Fiord and in the harbours of +the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Norway. Reports +as to the Germans having established a base on the Norwegian +coast were very persistent during the early days +of the War. These reports were probably to some extent +due to the ideas prevailing before the War as to German +intentions in this respect, these views being naturally +coloured by the frequent visits of the German High Sea +Fleet in peace time to Norwegian waters, particularly +to the vicinity of Trondhjem.</p> + +<p>In 1911, when I commanded the Atlantic Fleet, arrangements +had been made for me to visit Norwegian +ports at the same time as the High Sea Fleet, in order +to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with, +it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis +intervened, and the visit was postponed. The meeting +took place in 1914, when a portion of the 2nd Battle +Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir +George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week, +very shortly before the outbreak of war.</p> + +<p>During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet cruised between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and +Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the +1st Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the eastward between +Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward along +the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa +Flow, the 3rd Battle Squadron being detached to the +N.E. to cover them. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after refuelling; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span> +2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the +north-eastward; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with +orders to search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for submarines +prior to the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at +6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 7th to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron arrived at 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and +during the day the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd +Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian +coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +and 3rd Battle Squadron. No sign of a German base +could be discovered, and the force was ordered back to +Scapa to fuel.</p> + +<p>The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed, +owing to the inadequate number of colliers, many of those +present being also unsuitable for the work of rapid coaling. +The lack of lubricating oil for the 3rd Battle +Squadron also caused trouble, but these early difficulties, +although a source of considerable anxiety at the commencement +of hostilities, were overcome later.</p> + +<p>The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was +the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was +open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the +Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be +afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off +the various entrances and to patrol outside the main +entrance; but these measures were no real defence +against submarines, and the position was such that it was +deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour +longer than was absolutely necessary for fuelling purposes. +Accordingly, at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the same day, the +Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened +through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark +by the 4th Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span> +round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to +provide some protection against destroyer attack, a request +was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two +of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the +main entrances. This measure was approved and a reply +was received that the <i>Hannibal</i> and <i>Magnificent</i> were +being despatched.</p> + +<p>The <i>Russell</i>, <i>Albemarle</i> and <i>Exmouth</i>, of the 6th +Battle Squadron, belonging originally to the Channel +Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the Grand Fleet on the +night of the 7th–8th.</p> + +<p>At 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 8th the battleships <i>Orion</i>, <i>Monarch</i> +and <i>Ajax</i> were detached to carry out target practice, and +the remainder of the Fleet proceeded to the south-eastward +from Fair Island, carrying out Fire Control Exercises; +but, on receipt of a report from the <i>Monarch</i> that +a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the practice +was stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the +2nd Flotilla being directed to search for the submarine. +At 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the officer of the watch on board the <i>Iron +Duke</i> sighted a periscope and altered course to ram; the +same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the +<i>Dreadnought</i>, but was not seen again.</p> + +<p>At 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N., +Long. 1.9 E.</p> + +<p>Shortly afterwards the <i>Orion</i> reported a strong smell +of oil, and bubbles were seen on the surface, and the +<i>Birmingham</i>, commanded by Captain A. M. Duff, of +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screening +ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, +claimed to have rammed and sunk the German submarine +U 15, which she had sighted on the surface. This initial +success was hailed with great satisfaction in the Fleet. +Subsequent information showed that the <i>Birmingham</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span> +had been handled with great promptitude. During daylight +of August 9th, the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron were cruising in company, the noon position +being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and as the presence +of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was constantly +zigzagging, the ships altering course by “Blue +Pendant” turns, that is, turning together by signal.</p> + +<p>At midnight, 9th–10th, the position of the <i>Iron Duke</i> +was Lat. 57.51 N., Long. 1.2 E.</p> + +<p>On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty +requesting that the movements of the Commodore (T) +and Commodore (S) might be directed from the Admiralty, +whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet +remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be +sufficiently conversant with the conditions in the south for +the Commander-in-Chief to control these movements. +This plan was adopted and continued throughout the War.</p> + +<p>On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as +follows:</p> + +<p>At 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> parted company from the +Fleet and proceeded to Scapa in order that the Commander-in-Chief +might communicate by land wire with +the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the +work at the fleet bases. The <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron, and the <i>Falmouth</i>, <i>Liverpool</i> and +<i>Bellona</i>, arrived at Scapa at 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the 2nd Flotilla +forming a submarine screen through the Pentland Firth.</p> + +<p>The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north +under the command of Sir George Warrender to a position +to the westward of the Shetlands, in accordance with +telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty, where +it was considered that the submarine danger in the +North Sea was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron was detached to sweep a wide area to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span> +northward and westward in advance of the Battle Fleet, +which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north as +Lat. 60 N.; this flotilla was then detached for operations +on the Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd +Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. +The latter force was directed to search for a suspected +German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavanger Fiord. +The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the +operation of endeavouring to locate this base—if it +existed—with due regard to the susceptibilities of the +Norwegians. Commodore W. E. Goodenough, commanding +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stavanger +in the <i>Southampton</i> and was assured by the +Norwegian authorities that no base had been formed in +that vicinity by the enemy.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the <i>Falmouth</i> left +Scapa at 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd +Cruiser Squadron, the <i>Hannibal</i> and <i>Magnificent</i> having +arrived at Scapa at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> These two battleships were +stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to Scapa +Flow against attack by destroyers.</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral Miller, who arrived in the <i>Hannibal</i>, +was placed in administrative charge of the base and of the +local defences, and arrangements were made for the local +Territorial Force and other inhabitants of the Orkneys +and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch the harbours. +Telephonic communication round the coast was established +by degrees.</p> + +<p>Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen +over the Orkneys on the evening of the 10th, and the +<i>Centurion</i> reported having sighted an airship north of the +Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence was attached +to these reports, which in the early days of the War +were very frequently received.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span></p> + +<p><i>August 11th.</i>—The <i>Iron Duke</i> left Scapa and rejoined +the Battle Fleet at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in Lat. 60.8 N., Long. +3.28 W. The Battle Fleet was then exercised in forming +line of battle, and also carried out sub-calibre gun practice. +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after completing +its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa +to fuel at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Flotilla, having completed +their examination of the Norwegian coast, returned, some +to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd +Cruiser Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30 +miles from Kinnaird Head. The <i>Drake</i>, flying the Flag +of Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant, which had joined the +Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the +Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old +cruisers of the “Edgar” class, had by this time been +established on a northern patrol area between the Shetlands +and the Norwegian coast, under the command of +Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair.</p> + +<p>On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe, +on the north-west coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling +base for the Fleet, and Rear-Admiral Richard P. F. +Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the base.</p> + +<p>A week of war had now elapsed without any move +whatever being made on the part of the High Sea Fleet; +the only German naval activities had been mine-laying in +southern waters during the first two days of the War, +together with some submarine activity in the North Sea. +The British Fleet during the week had been largely occupied +in boarding all merchant vessels sighted, and in instituting +as strict a blockade as was possible.</p> + +<figure id="i_96" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 26em;"> + <img src="images/i_096.jpg" width="1220" height="1933" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL HALSEY), +AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT), +ON BOARD H. M. S. “IRON DUKE”</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><i>August 12th.</i>—The Battle Fleet to the westward of the +Orkneys (noon position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.)<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span> +was exercised during the forenoon and afternoon at +battle tactics and carried out gunnery practices between 4 +and 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to fuel, +arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the +3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal, +and to test the suitability of this base and its capability +for defence against submarine attack.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been +fuelling at Scapa, left before dark on the 12th to cruise +west of the Orkneys with orders to economise fuel in +view of a projected operation to the southward.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the <i>Falmouth</i> swept +100 miles to the south-eastward from Kinnaird Head +during the day, and then returned to Cromarty to fuel.</p> + +<p>The <i>Bellona</i> and <i>Liverpool</i> swept to the south-eastward +of the Pentland Firth during the day and night of +the 12th, together with one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as +a guard against destroyer attack on the Fleet whilst coaling.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern +patrol. A report was received from Rear-Admiral Grant, +in the <i>Drake</i>, that the position in the Faroe Islands was +quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed. The <i>Drake</i> +remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe +Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were +sent to assist her in her work of blockade.</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears was on this date appointed +in charge of the Fleet Base at Cromarty.</p> + +<p>The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer +from Hamburg had arrived in England and reported that +there were fourteen enemy battleships at Cuxhaven on +the 9th inst., together with several mine-layers; that +there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and Heligoland, +and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">98</span> +entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite +news of the enemy’s main fleet.</p> + +<p><i>August 13th.</i>—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was +coaling at Scapa during the day, and the 3rd Battle +Squadron coaling and storing at Loch Ewe. My object +in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry +into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with +a second base in the event of Scapa Flow becoming +untenable by submarine attack.</p> + +<p>The <i>Albemarle</i> relieved the <i>Liverpool</i> and <i>Bellona</i> on +patrol to the eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these +two ships returning to Scapa to fuel.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of +the Orkneys; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coaling; +the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at sea sweeping to the +south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The <i>Falmouth</i> +was now attached to this squadron.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the <i>Drake</i> were on +the northern and Faroe patrols. During the day the +Commander-in-Chief held a conference with the Flag +officers of the Fleet and explained the operations contemplated +on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the +Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the westward, +except two ships which had not finished coaling, +the operation having been again delayed owing to an +insufficient number of colliers being provided. They followed +later.</p> + +<p>The <i>Ajax</i> reported a turret defective, and was sent +back to effect repairs with the aid of the <i>Cyclops</i>.</p> + +<p><i>August 14th.</i>—During the forenoon the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet and battle cruisers were carrying out target +practice. Noon position of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, Lat. 59.11 N., +Long. 4.27 W.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span></p> + +<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd +Battle Squadron from Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squadron, +rejoined the Flag, and battle exercises, including deployments, +were carried out till 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair +Island Channel on its way to carry out a sweep in the +North Sea.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 14th–15th all squadrons were +moving towards a concentration rendezvous in the North +Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons being +Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the +15th; the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was +Lat. 59.7 N., Long. 0.40 W., at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the 15th; for the +mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 3.45 E., at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron from +the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 15th.</p> + +<p>Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a +usually reliable source had been received at the Admiralty +indicating that the Germans intended carrying out a very +extensive mine-laying policy in British waters in the event +of war between the two countries. The actual positions of +many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it was +apparent, provided the information were correct, that +the enemy intended to lay mines regardless of their effect +on mercantile traffic, whether British, Allied, or neutral.</p> + +<p>The proceedings of the mine-layer <i>Köningen Louise</i> +in the first days of war tended to confirm this view, and +consequently it was thought to be quite probable that +mine-fields of an extensive character might be laid in the +North Sea, in positions where they might be expected +to be effective against any movement of our Fleet, particularly +any southward movement.</p> + +<p>The small margin of superiority which we possessed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span> +over the German fleet, as compared with the immense +difference in our naval responsibilities, made it very necessary +that precautions should be taken to safeguard the +most valuable of our ships from such a menace when operating +in waters that might be mined.</p> + +<p>It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers +accompanied the Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, although +the speed of the Fleet was necessarily reduced by +their presence in order to admit of sweeping operations, +and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased, +and although the sweeping operations could only be carried +out in an exploratory fashion, there <em>was</em> the chance +that the danger incurred by taking the whole Fleet over +possible mine-fields might be much reduced.</p> + +<p>Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers +to sea as their presence was more necessary in the vicinity +of the bases, the practice was introduced of placing one of +the older battleships of the 6th Battle Squadron ahead of +each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in order that +these less valuable ships might first discover the mines +instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and +men of the 6th Battle Squadron named their Squadron +the “Mine Bumping Squadron” on this account.</p> + +<p><i>August 15th.</i>—At noon the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position was +Lat. 58.16 N., Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in +company in cruising order and steering to the eastward, +preparatory to turning south. The plan of operations +included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by +cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, together +with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two +of our submarines had been ordered to be off the Ems +and two off the Jade by 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 16th.</p> + +<p>During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes +arrived at Scapa for reconnaissance work from the base.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span></p> + +<p><i>August 16th.</i>—At 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> was in Lat. +56.43 N., Long. 4.5 E. At 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, no report having been +received of the sighting of any German vessels, the +Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to continue the +sweep until 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> At this time the Fleet-flagship +<i>Iron Duke’s</i> position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E., +the battle cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of +the Battle Fleet. The only enemy vessel seen was one +submarine by the <i>New Zealand</i> at 10.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> in Lat. +55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E.</p> + +<p>The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at +9.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the cruisers being then well to the southward +of the latitude of the Horn Reef, the whole Fleet turned +to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a north by west +course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging.</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, +reported that the sweep of the southern force had been +unproductive.</p> + +<p>The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for +a northerly sweep, spreading from the Norwegian coast, +for a distance of 150 miles, to the westward, with the +Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron +swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along +that coast as far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird +Head, with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron prolonging +and supporting. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron extended the +front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle +Squadron.</p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of +the Battle Fleet until dusk, and then was stationed 12 +miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, spread 10 miles +apart, covered the area between the Battle Fleet and the +2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas remained +with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span> +screen by day, and keeping in rear of the Fleet at night.</p> + +<p>The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the +Battle Fleet when on the southerly course, acted as a +submarine screen during the passage to the northward. +During the night of the 16th–17th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron +was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser +Squadron to Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern +patrol, and the 6th Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla +mine-sweepers and 3rd Battle Squadron proceeded to +Scapa to fuel.</p> + +<p><i>August 17th.</i>—At 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet altered course to pass through the Fair Island +Channel, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined. +The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed astern during +the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at daylight. +The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout +daylight.</p> + +<p>At noon the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position was Lat. 58.59 +N., Long. 1.35 E. At midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long. +2.25 W., and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the 18th, Lat. 58.44 N., Long. +4.47 W.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep +sighted only neutral vessels and proceeded to work in an +area designated as No. 5 (eastward from Kinnaird Head). +Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E.</p> + +<p>This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach +to the Pentland Firth, both for blockade purposes and as +an outpost position for the Fleet at Scapa.</p> + +<p>At this time, the northern and central parts of the +North Sea were divided into certain numbered areas in +which cruisers could be directed by wireless to work without +the necessity of making a long signal.</p> + +<p>The various areas were approximately placed as +follows:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot hang6"> + +<p>Area No. 1.—Covering the route round the north end of the Shetland +Islands from the southward and eastward.</p> + +<p>Area No. 2.—Covering the Fair Island Channel to south-eastward, +working down to the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire.</p> + +<p>Area No. 3.—South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys to +Lat. of Kinnaird Head, with a width of about 50 miles +from the line Noss Head—Kinnaird Head.</p> + +<p>Area No. 4.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire +Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from +Kinnaird Head.</p> + +<p>Area No. 5.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire +Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian +territorial waters.</p> + +<p>Area No. 6.—South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head—Udsire +Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from +Kinnaird Head.</p> + +<p>Area No. 7.—Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between 50 and +150 miles from the English coast.</p> +</div> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to +resume the northern patrol; the <i>Drake</i>, and the two ships +acting with her, were ordered to return to Scapa to coal, +and directions were given for the other two ships to rejoin +the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the +day the <i>Orion</i> developed serious condenser defects, necessitating +retubing her condensers. A telegram was sent +to the Admiralty requesting that new condenser tubes +might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with dockyard +workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile +arrangements were made for giving fleet assistance to the +<i>Orion</i>, and for all suitable spare condenser tubes from +the fleet to be sent to her on arrival.</p> + +<p>The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet +had by this time become very serious, and was causing +me much anxiety; in reply to strong representations to +the Admiralty, a telegram was received explaining the +position and the efforts being made to rectify matters.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span></p> + +<p>The Admiralty also informed me of the great importance +that was attached to the efficiency of the northern +patrol, and stated that four armed merchant ships were +being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>The constant sea work had by this time shown the +inadequacy of the engine-room implements of all ships +for war conditions, and, in consequence of representations +to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen were sent to +Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The +benefit derived from this measure was very considerable.</p> + +<p>Two Fleet messenger vessels, the <i>Cambria</i> and <i>Anglia</i>, +arrived at Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for +communication between the bases, for carrying mails and +despatches, and for boarding duties.</p> + +<p><i>August 18th.</i>—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet +arrived at Loch Ewe to fuel early in the afternoon; it was +accompanied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron which was +without the <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>. The attached +cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending +the entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were +capable of doing it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet +patrolled the entrance.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached +to Scapa at daylight to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th +Cruiser Squadron had been by this time established at +Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the ships +when proceeding to fuel. The <i>Alsatian</i>, an armed merchant +ship, joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>The <i>Assistance</i> arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair +ship, and was connected to the shore telegraph system.</p> + +<p>Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west +of the Shetlands, during the night of the 18th–19th. Enquiry +showed this rumour to be false.</p> + +<p>The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear-Admiral<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span> +Arthur Christian, with his Flag in the <i>Sapphire</i>, +had been placed in command of all forces in the southern +portion of the North Sea, namely, Cruiser force C, the +destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained, +these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and +were independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag.</p> + +<p>This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss +of the <i>Cressy</i>, <i>Aboukir</i> and <i>Hogue</i>, Cruiser force C being +abolished, and the command of the destroyer and submarine +forces reverting to their own senior officers.</p> + +<p><i>August 19th, 21st, 22nd.</i>—The Battle Fleet and 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron remained in harbour during the +19th, coaling, storing, cleaning boilers, and taking in additional +ammunition up to a maximum storage. With the +exception of the <i>Orion</i>, these ships left on the 20th at 6.30 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and +Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the +21st. The battle cruiser <i>New Zealand</i> was ordered to the +Humber to join the <i>Invincible</i>.</p> + +<p>As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our +submarines in the Heligoland Bight were being followed +and watched by German trawlers fitted with wireless, I +informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat such +vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and +3rd Cruiser Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol +Area 1 alternately, and to carry out target practice in the +Cromarty Firth, <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the patrol area.</p> + +<p>The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was interfered +with by fog and the Fleet did not form up until late +at night, and passed through the Fair Island Channel into +the North Sea during the early morning of the 22nd. +The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics +during the day, and in the afternoon was joined by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span> +2nd Flotilla as a submarine screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long. +1.30 E. The position of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at midnight, +22nd–23rd, was Lat. 59.34 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to +southward.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been +detained at Scapa by fog during the 21st, carried out +target practice to the westward of the Orkneys on the +22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15 N., +Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd +Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now +comprising the <i>Drake</i> and <i>King Alfred</i>, which were +ordered to work between Scotland and Norway in areas +to the southward of the position named.</p> + +<p>There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted +except one submarine in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E., +on August 20th. The Admiralty informed me on this +date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for +Cromarty northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided +on before the War. It was, therefore, suggested that one +of the boy artificers’ floating workshops should be sent +north to work in conjunction with the dock. Steps were +taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost +on passage in bad weather near Portland.</p> + +<p><i>August 23rd.</i>—The Battle Fleet remained cruising in +the North Sea in support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the +weather being misty, with rain. The 3rd Battle Squadron +was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at daylight, the +24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron, were sweeping to the southward as far south as +Lat. 56 N.; the <i>Alsatian</i> was sent with the 6th Cruiser +Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point, on the southern +coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships, +trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span> +waters at this point, and, if so, to capture them. One-half +of the 2nd Flotilla was screening the Battle Fleet, +the second half searching for a submarine reported east +of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the <i>Ruby</i> +of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and +course altered to avoid her.</p> + +<p>The destroyers <i>Rifleman</i> and <i>Comet</i> collided in a fog, +the latter being considerably damaged.</p> + +<p>The <i>Sappho</i> was sent to search North Rona Island, a +statement having been received indicating that it might +possibly have been used by the enemy as a base for aircraft. +She reported, after examination, that the island +was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose.</p> + +<p>The <i>Ajax</i> reported having burnt out a boiler, and the +Admiralty was asked to instruct the contractors to send +to Scapa men and tubes for retubing it.</p> + +<p>The <i>King Edward VII.</i> reported cracks in the inner +A tubes of two of her 12-inch guns.</p> + +<p><i>August 24th.</i>—The Battle Fleet cruised between the +Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, and carried out battle +tactics during the forenoon, the weather becoming too +thick in the afternoon.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to +fuel, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter +being relieved by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. The remainder +of the cruisers continued their sweeping operations +as on the 23rd.</p> + +<p><i>August 25th.</i>—The 3rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to +relieve the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate support +of the cruisers at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and while <i lang="fr">en route</i> to its +position captured an Austrian steamer, the <i>Attila</i>. The +remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground, +arriving at Scapa at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 26th, with the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron to fuel. The <i>Agincourt</i>, a new<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span> +battleship which was bought from Turkey when still in +an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head and entered +with the Fleet.</p> + +<p>At 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a submarine was sighted from the bridge +of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and the Fleet manœuvred clear of the +position. One-half of the 4th Flotilla, which had screened +the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea, joined the Commander-in-Chief +at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and was ordered to search for this +submarine, but without result. The <i>Drake</i>, of the 6th +Cruiser Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at +4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the 25th, owing to condenser trouble.</p> + +<p>The <i>Dominion</i> reported two of her 12-inch guns +cracked. The <i>King Edward VII</i>. left Scapa for Devonport +to change her two guns, which had also cracked, +Vice-Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship +<i>Dominion</i>.</p> + +<p>The weather was thick during the night of the 25th–26th, +but the fog lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet +to enter Scapa.</p> + +<p><i>August 26th.</i>—The <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 2nd and 4th Battle +Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla, +were at Scapa fuelling.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th +Flotilla, left to join the 3rd Battle Squadron at sea, their +departure having been delayed for some hours by thick fog.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> for +Rosyth to coal.</p> + +<p>The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to coal, +the <i>King Alfred</i> at Scapa, and the <i>Alsatian</i> at Liverpool; +the arrangements in the large merchant-ships were such +as to render coaling from colliers a difficult and slow +progress.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the <i>Mantua</i>, left +the northern patrol to coal at Scapa.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span></p> + +<p>During the day the Admiralty informed me of some +operations which the southern forces were intended to +carry out in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th, and directed +that the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron should join in +the operations. I made urgent representations as to the +necessity of supporting the force with battle cruisers, and +informed the Admiralty that I was sending the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron to take part. I requested that the +Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Commodore, +1st Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed +direct by the Admiralty of the positions which the other +ships would occupy, and that the senior officers of the +southern force taking part should also be informed of +the presence of the battle cruisers and 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron.</p> + +<p>On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived +to join the Fleet, experience having shown that the number +of deck complements, as well as the engine-room +complements, required increasing, principally owing to +the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so constantly +manned at sea—by day against submarine attack, +and by night against destroyer attack.</p> + +<p><i>August 27th.</i>—On this date I wired to the Admiralty +proposing the erection of two wireless stations in the +Orkneys for local communication, and a directional station +to assist in locating the positions of German ships +using wireless. The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded +to sea at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to join the 1st and 3rd Battle +Squadrons at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 28th to the south-eastward of +the Orkneys in Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd +Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as a submarine screen.</p> + +<p>On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the +Pentland Firth was inaugurated by the Mine-laying +Squadron which was not required at the time for mine-laying<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span> +operations, with the object of ensuring a closer +watch on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland +Firth, and the <i>Oceanic</i>, an armed merchant cruiser, which +had joined the Fleet, was detached to carry out a patrol to +the westward of the Fair Island Channel in order to control +the traffic at this point.</p> + +<p>Information was received from the Admiralty of the +existence of mined areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head +and Tynemouth. The positions of the two latter minefields +appeared to corroborate the information obtained +prior to the outbreak of war.</p> + +<p>A collision occurred at 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> between the <i>Bellerophon</i> +and the s.s. <i>St. Clair</i>, which was passing through +the Fleet. The <i>St. Clair</i> was damaged, but the damage +to the <i>Bellerophon</i> was not serious.</p> + +<p><i>August 28th.</i>—The weather was misty with a visibility +of 4 to 6 miles until the evening, when it cleared slightly. +The Battle Fleet during the day proceeded to the southward, +the noon position being Lat. 58.19 N., Long. 0.21 +E., with cruisers in advance.</p> + +<p>The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tactics. +The sweep of light forces into the Heligoland Bight +which took place at dawn was successful in bringing enemy +light forces to action. The official despatches relating to +this operation are given in an Appendix. The events may +be shortly described here. At 6.53 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore +Tyrwhitt, commanding the Harwich force, which had +swept into the Heligoland Bight during the night to cut +off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and chased her. +From 7.20 to 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Arethusa</i> and the 3rd Flotilla +were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making +for Heligoland, sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the +<i>Arethusa</i>, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flagship, which had +been in commission only a few days, sighted two enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span> +light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later +by the light cruiser <i>Fearless</i>. At 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a hit from the +<i>Arethusa</i> wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy +ships, and they both steamed at once for Heligoland, +which was then sighted, and our ships turned to the westward. +The <i>Arethusa</i> had been considerably damaged +during the action and had suffered several casualties.</p> + +<p>At 10.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> another German light cruiser was +sighted by the <i>Arethusa</i>, and on being attacked by the +<i>Fearless</i> and destroyers turned away; she reappeared at +11.5 and engaged the <i>Arethusa</i> and <i>Fearless</i> and was +attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again turned +away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed +Sir David Beatty of the position, and that officer proceeded +at full speed to his support. The light cruiser +<i>Mainz</i> had been attacking the somewhat disabled <i>Arethusa</i> +and the <i>Fearless</i> at about 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and had suffered very +severely in the action, being practically disabled. The +arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore +Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured +her destruction.</p> + +<p>Between 12.37 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron engaged +two other German light cruisers, one of which was +sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in +a sinking condition.</p> + +<p>Even thus early in the War the difference between +the behaviour of British and German seamen was noticeable. +On the British side, in addition to other assistance +rendered to the survivors of the <i>Mainz</i> (which had been +sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer <i>Firedrake</i>, +proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of +them being wounded. A German light cruiser opened +fire on the British destroyers engaged in picking up survivors<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span> +from the German destroyer V187 when that vessel +was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for +the destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the +rescue work. The British submarine E4 afterwards took +our officers and men out of these boats and left some unwounded +Germans to take the other boats, which contained +German wounded, to Heligoland.</p> + +<p>In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser +Squadron was directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving +the armed merchant cruisers farther to the northward. The +object was to give a better chance of intercepting enemy +vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war by +establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance +courses, one of which would in all probability be crossed +of necessity during daylight hours, even if the second were +passed through at night.</p> + +<p><i>August 29th.</i>—This was a bright, fine day, with high +visibility. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at +sea with three divisions of the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and +carrying out battle tactics and other exercises.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to +fuel at 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, in company with the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron, the <i>Liverpool</i> being detached to Rosyth to land +the German prisoners captured in the Heligoland Bight +on the 28th.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Area No. 5, +which the 3rd Cruiser Squadron left during the day for +Cromarty to fuel.</p> + +<p>The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron +were in Area No. 6; the mine-layers were in Area No. 3.</p> + +<p>During the day the <i>Oak</i> arrived from Scapa with telegrams +and despatches for me and returned with similar +correspondence for the Admiralty. The <i>Oak</i> was usually +employed on this duty while the <i>Iron Duke</i> was at sea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span> +during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent +visits to a base rendering this essential.</p> + +<p>Some risk from submarine attack was naturally involved +during the time that the <i>Iron Duke</i>, or any other +heavy ship, was stopped to communicate. The risk was +recognised, and, as the number of enemy submarines increased, +it became undesirable to incur it, and the practice +of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was +abandoned; the longer time spent in harbour tended to +reduce the necessity for the practice to some extent, but +during the early part of the War this was the only means +of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was constantly +at sea.</p> + +<p>The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our +eastern coasts caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at +this time the desirability of the patrol flotillas working +somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for an increase as +soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to work +off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to +work in the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also +forwarded.</p> + +<p>The Fleet messenger <i>Cambria</i> was brought out to work +with the Battle Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant +ships owing to the shortage of light cruisers for this work.</p> + +<p><i>August 30th.</i>—In the afternoon the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet shaped course for Scapa, and arrived at 7 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 31st to fuel, the 3rd Battle Squadron being +ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to support the +2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern +portion of Area 5.</p> + +<p>The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was +continued as usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the +Area at 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 31st to fuel at Scapa.</p> + +<p>During the day the <i>Assistance</i> returned to Scapa from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span> +Loch Ewe as base ship, and the <i>Illustrious</i> arrived there +as defence ship for the entrance. I had decided her position +during my previous visit.</p> + +<p>As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I was informed +that trawlers were being taken up and armed for +patrol duties as rapidly as possible, and that arrangements +for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the subject +of correspondence between the Admiralty and myself, had +been approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields +at the entrances.</p> + +<p><i>August 31st.</i>—A sweep towards the Scottish coast +of all vessels at sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in +consequence of information having been received pointing +to the possibility of mine-laying by the enemy in the +vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the +night of August 31st–September 1st; the sweep was +arranged to intercept the enemy mine-layers on their +return trip. But it was unproductive, no mine-laying +having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep +were the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squadron, +3rd Cruiser Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>In consequence of urgent representations as to the +insufficiency of .303 rifle ammunition for the Army, all +ships disembarked 50 per cent. of their ammunition of +this calibre at the end of August for conveyance to +Woolwich.</p> + +<p>Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but +a very small number of rifles, as well as many machine-guns, +were landed from the Fleet for use by the Army.</p> + +<p>A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battleships +was held on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> on August 31st in +order to discuss with them the subject of tactics in action.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V"><span id="toclink_115"></span>CHAPTER V<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">On</span> September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron +and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, cleaning +boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition, etc. The +Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier, on the +north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with +torpedo nets had them out, as was customary, unless colliers +or store-ships were alongside.</p> + +<p>The <i>Falmouth</i>, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was +anchored to the westward of Holm Sound, and the remainder +of this squadron formed the outer or southward +line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam. The +weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at +times.</p> + +<p>At 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Falmouth</i> reported the periscope of a +submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately +opened fire, four rounds being fired by this ship; she +reported having probably hit the submarine. Directly +afterwards the <i>Vanguard</i>, one of the outer line of battleships, +also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope, +as did one of the E class destroyers, which was patrolling +between the Fleet and the Hoxa entrance.</p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh +immediately steam was ready, which was at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and +to endeavour to locate the submarine and keep her under.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span> +was also instructed to weigh at once and search for the +submarine. The whole of the ships present were ordered +to raise steam with all despatch, and to prepare for torpedo +attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, steamboats, +motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready +and which could be collected, were at once organised in +detachments to steam up and down the lines at high speed +and outside the Fleet, with the object of confusing the +submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted. Colliers +and store-ships which had steam ready were directed +to weigh and to go alongside the battleships that were +not fitted with torpedo nets, in order to act as a form of +protection against torpedoes fired at these valuable vessels. +All ships in the outer lines were directed to burn +searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine.</p> + +<p>At about 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Drake</i> reported a submarine +in sight from that ship, thus confirming the earlier reports.</p> + +<p>The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon +as steam was ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the +weather was exceedingly thick inside the harbour and considerable +difficulty was experienced in getting the Fleet +out, as at this time there were no navigational facilities +of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick +weather; but by 11 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> all the ships had left the harbour +without accident, and, although there was a dense fog +outside, the Fleet cleared the Pentland Firth successfully.</p> + +<p>The <i>Assistance</i> was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left +after the Fleet, reporting having sighted a submarine in +the entrance whilst going out. The 2nd Flotilla was left +behind to locate and, if possible, destroy the submarine, +and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa and +Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet +the Fleet at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct +from destroyers, remaining in the harbour was the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span> +<i>Cyclops</i>, lying off Scapa with the telegraph and telephone +cables on board, and directions were given to Rear-Admiral +Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the mine-sweeping +gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the +<i>Falmouth</i>.</p> + +<p>No trace of a submarine was discovered, and subsequent +investigation showed that the alarm <em>may</em> have +been false, the evidence not being conclusive either way. +The incident, however, made it clear that protection +against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as +the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open +to this form of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible +action, in the event of an alarm being given of the +presence of a submarine, was to take the Fleet to sea, +and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from +a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity +was created, which would be bad for moral, and +the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning +boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which experience was +showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the +Fleet was to be maintained.</p> + +<p>The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty +and proposals were made for blocking all the entrances +to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, by +sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending +the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance, +Rear-Admiral Miller was directed to requisition a large +number of net-drifters. The plan was to lay drift +nets in the entrance to be watched by the drifters, the +nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating +on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might +be indicated by the buoy moving with the net.</p> + +<p>The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances +were, meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span> +submarines through them, but it was realised that these +were considerable. The opinion was formed, however, +that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable +difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine +commander.</p> + +<p>By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers +consisted of vessels of the E class. A request was made +for basing a hunting flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall, +these vessels being intended to guard the approaches to +the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine hunters +generally. It was also suggested that a monetary +reward should be offered to the personnel of any trawler +through whose agency a submarine was captured or destroyed.</p> + +<p>The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had been +strengthened by the addition of a flotilla of trawlers, and +the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers were continuously +employed in keeping certain fixed channels of +approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines. +These vessels were, therefore, not available for anti-submarine +work, except to the detriment of their mine-sweeping +duties.</p> + +<p>On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were +employed in Area No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle +Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>From September 1st to September 5th the Battle +Fleet remained at sea, cruising in the area between the +north-east coast of Scotland and the coast of Norway, in +support of the cruiser squadrons working to the southward, +and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises +of the Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional +gunnery practice. The <i>Orion</i>, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, +was still absent from the Fleet, retubing condensers; the +<i>King Edward VII.</i> rejoined on the 2nd, after exchanging<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span> +defective guns; and the <i>Dominion</i> was then detached to +Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strengthened +by the arrival of the <i>Inflexible</i> from the Mediterranean, +and was employed during this period in support +of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the Battle +Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises.</p> + +<p>During the period under review reports from time to +time of the sighting of enemy submarines appeared to +indicate that they were working on a line Ekersund-Pentland +Firth, the line which they were apparently +occupying during the first few days of the War, when +U 15 was sunk by the <i>Birmingham</i>.</p> + +<p>Information received on September 3d suggested that +enemy cruisers might have passed, or might be intending +to pass, into the North Sea via the Skagerrak. The +2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were, +therefore, directed to sweep to the entrance to the +Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th, +starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E., +at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd +Cruiser Squadrons were to make a detour to the south-westward +with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the latter +proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons +to Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +with the 2nd Flotilla, was directed to sweep on a wide +front towards the Pentland Firth on the Ekersund-Pentland +line in search of enemy submarines, which it +was hoped might be caught on the surface at night. +Thence the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was to proceed +to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla to the westward of +the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span> +Longhope at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla, +which had been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at +the same time to sweep the western portion of the Ekersund-Pentland +line for submarines, and then to return +to Longhope.</p> + +<p>These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels +of any sort were sighted, except that at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the +5th the <i>Thetis</i>, mine-layer, working south-eastward +of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel, thought +to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser +Squadrons and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on +the position, but the ship was eventually identified as one +of our own vessels.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe +at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 5th to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats +having been previously detached to that base to search +the entrance for mines.</p> + +<p>During the early days of September frequent reports +were received of enemy mines having been discovered on +the east coast, and several vessels were sunk, as a consequence, +including the gunboat <i>Speedy</i>. It appeared that +the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels +flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well +as from regular mine-laying ships. The large number +of vessels trading on the east coast and of fishing craft +at sea, both British and neutral, greatly increased the +difficulty of preventing these operations. The task of +boarding and examining even a considerable percentage +of these vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser +sweeps were showing this daily. The Admiralty’s attention +was drawn to the matter, and the question was raised +of establishing some restrictions, particularly as regards +the areas in which fishing should be permitted.</p> + +<p>The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span> +was also proposed, the burning of which enabled the +enemy to fix his position accurately when engaged in +mine-laying operations. This policy of the extinction of +lights, thus started, gradually became general, and +eventually only the most important lights were exhibited +at night, and the large majority of these were only shown +when requests were made by men-of-war who required +them for entering port, the time of their exhibition being +thus reduced to a minimum.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe +until 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on September 7th, and then proceeded to +sea. The <i>Orion</i> was left behind to complete work on her +condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on September +9th, having been absent for twenty-one days.</p> + +<p>The <i>Agincourt</i>, the new battleship which since commissioning +had been engaged in gunnery and torpedo +practices either at Scapa or to the westward of the +Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea on September +7th in order to give her officers experience in +working with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty +in carrying out her practices because she had not been +supplied with “sub-calibre” guns, and this deficiency +could not be made good for some months; this caused +much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However, +she was manned with officers and a ship’s company of +a very high standard and, in spite of all disadvantages, +the early gunnery practices carried out by her in company +with the Fleet showed that she would eventually +prove to be a most valuable addition to the Fleet.</p> + +<p>Representations had been made by me to the Admiralty +that the presence of a senior Flag officer in +general command of the Orkneys and Shetlands, who +would be responsible for the defences of these islands and +the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span> +administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient +fully to occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller.</p> + +<p>Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted +the post, and as it was very desirable that the officer +holding this position should be junior to the Commander-in-Chief +of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the compliment +of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to +myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities.</p> + +<p>He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch +Ewe on September 6th, to confer with me before taking +up his appointment. He accompanied me to sea in the +<i>Iron Duke</i> on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was +embarked on board the <i>Oak</i> to the westward of the +Orkneys, and took up his command on arrival. The +result was immediately most beneficial. He was able to +devote his whole time to the questions of defence and +organisation and relieved me of all these matters which +had, as was inevitable under the previous arrangement, +occupied so much of my time in harbour and so much +of my thoughts at sea.</p> + +<p>On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock arrived +safely at Cromarty.</p> + +<p>During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet +proceeded northward from Loch Ewe <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the +North Sea, and passed through the Fair Island Channel +at 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, being joined at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> by the 3rd Battle +Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth +after dark on this date and proceeded to the north-eastward, +being joined at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 8th by the <i>Sappho</i> +and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla. These smaller +vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in order +to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine +attack, consequent on stopping for this purpose. The +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron swept to the south-eastward<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span> +of Area 6 during daylight on the 8th, and during the +night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was on a patrol +area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and +Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of intercepting +possible enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet +carried out gunnery practices and exercised battle tactics +during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at dark proceeded +to the southward to support an extensive sweep +into the Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to +carry out on September 10th. The dispositions for this +sweep were generally as follows:</p> + +<p>The 1st and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported +by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron to the northward, and the 7th Cruiser Squadron +to the westward, swept out the Heligoland Bight from +east to west, commencing from a position some ten to +twelve miles from Heligoland, which position was to be +reached one hour before dawn. The Battle Fleet, with +the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread 20 miles +ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E. +at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12 +knots speed of advance.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser +Squadrons to the southward, cruised to the north-westward +of Heligoland until 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 10th, by which +time it was clear that the sweep had been unproductive. +No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one +seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd +Flotilla was stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine +screen, and to assist the attached cruisers in boarding +duties during the day, and the 4th Flotilla, which had been +working with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, principally +for boarding duties, was also directed to join the +Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span> +of the thick weather did not do so until 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Owing +to the large number of trawlers that were met with, +nearly all of which were flying neutral colours, the boarding +duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion +attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken +wireless signals were noticed to be very strong after the +Fleet had passed these vessels; but close examination +failed to reveal anything suspicious in those that were +boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any +of them.</p> + +<p>The conditions on September 10th were very unfavourable +for the sweep into the Bight. Thick weather prevailed +both before and after daylight, and the visibility +varied from between two and five miles. The mist prevented +the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle +Fleet for eight hours, a circumstance which would have +had awkward consequences had the High Sea Fleet been +encountered with its full complement of 80 to 100 destroyers, +as might have been the case in such close proximity +to German ports.</p> + +<p>It was noted at the time that the conditions were very +unfavourable for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility +combined with the glare produced by the occasional sunshine +and absence of wind. A passage in the notes made +on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows:</p> + +<p>“The weather conditions ... were very unfavourable +for a general action owing to the low visibility and +the glare caused by brilliant sunlight and absence of +wind.... The conditions make it impossible for +the Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to +know what is going on in the van and rear ... besides +being entirely favourable to tactics largely based on the +employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers.</p> + +<p>“In addition there are great difficulties in concentrating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span> +detached ships and flotillas and in forming the +Fleet prior to battle, also in the recognition of ships and +destroyers.”</p> + +<p>This passage is of interest because of its bearing on +the Jutland battle some two years later when somewhat +similar conditions prevailed.</p> + +<p>The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much +impression on my mind that special daylight recognition +devices which could be seen at a considerable distance were +subsequently devised and used by our own light cruisers +and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy.</p> + +<p>When it became evident that there were no enemy +vessels to engage, I organised a sweep to the northward +on a large scale, with a view to intercepting any enemy +ships that might be at sea and of closely examining all +merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with.</p> + +<p>The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N., +Long. 4.0 E., the dispositions being:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>The <i>Invincible</i> (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers) +and the <i>Inflexible</i>, to sweep towards Dundee.</p> + +<p>3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of +advance.</p> + +<p>1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11 +knots speed of advance.</p> + +<p>2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed +of advance.</p> + +<p>All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more included +the <i>New Zealand</i>) to be in general support.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to extend +the sweep to the eastward.</p> +</div> + +<p>These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2.</p> + +<p>At 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn +to N. 16 E., and, later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was +stationed in a new area, No. 7, between Lat. 55.20 N.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span> +and 57.30 N., between 50 and 150 miles from the coast. +The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal; +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet, and the <i>Invincible</i> +and <i>Inflexible</i> were sent to Scapa to coal, as well as the +3rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of destroyers screening +these vessels into the base.</p> + +<p>During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron carried out battle tactics and +gunnery exercises, and the Battle Fleet then proceeded to +Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel.</p> + +<p>During the passage south and north numerous reports +of floating mines were received. The majority proved to +be fishermen’s bladders which at this time were being +frequently reported by merchant ships as floating mines.</p> + +<p>The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the +3rd meridian of East Long. between the parallels of +55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been established by the 1st +and 3rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight destroyers +and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the +“Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy +mine-layers. I was also informed that a patrol of the +“Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch coast, was being +maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames +approaches.</p> + +<p>On September 11th the <i>Hibernia</i> reported a 12-inch +gun cracked, the fifth since the outbreak of war!</p> + +<p>On the same day salvage operations on the armed +merchant-cruiser <i>Oceanic</i>, which had gone ashore in +a fog on Foula Island on September 8th, were +abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke +up eventually.</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears reported that the Portsmouth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span> +floating dock would be ready for work on September +21st, a very smart piece of mooring work +having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the +King’s Harbour Master.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch +Ewe coaling, storing and cleaning boilers, etc., from +5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on September 13th until 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on September 17th, +and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the <i>Inflexible</i> +and <i>Invincible</i>, remained at Scapa until September +18th. Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the +North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and 7 were carried out by the 2nd, +3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and the Mine-layer +Squadron, supported by the <i>Invincible</i>, <i>Inflexible</i> and +3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning +of September 14th for the purpose. The armed merchant-cruisers +<i>Alsatian</i> and <i>Mantua</i> were patrolling eastward of +the Shetlands.</p> + +<p>Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to +make general arrangements with the Admiralty for the +defence of that base, and on September 17th the First +Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War Staff, +the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S) +and (T) arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The +bombardment and capture of Heligoland was also discussed. +The proposals had been previously forwarded to +me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined by +myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of +Staff, and by the Flag officers commanding the Battle +Squadrons. The opinions of these officers against the +operation were unanimous. It had not been suggested +that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation, +except as a supporting force; the older battleships were +intended for this purpose. But the arguments against +the operation were overwhelmingly strong. It was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span> +pointed out that ships were no match for heavy fortifications +such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that +direct fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory +would be ineffective against well-placed, heavily protected +and well-concealed land guns; that, even if a storming +party were able to land and to capture the +island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated +as it was close to German naval bases, for if we could take +it in a fortified condition, it would be far easier for the +Germans to recapture it with the fortifications demolished; +that it would be under continuous attack by sea +and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured, +would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly in +southern waters, which, owing to the number of small +craft then available, was an impossibility. Aircraft +spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct, was at that +time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited +for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors +which, later on, carried out such useful work on the +Belgian coast. After a conference, at which the Flag +officers were present, I thought that the idea would be +abandoned.</p> + +<p>This was not the case, however, and the matter was +taken up later at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir +Cecil Burney, commanding the Channel Fleet. His view +coincided with those expressed by the Flag officers at the +Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared +to carry out any orders that might be given him. The +idea was not finally abandoned for some time. The +opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and myself were identical, +as indeed were those of every Flag officer with whom I +discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior +Flag officer.</p> + +<figure id="i_128" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption sans"><span class="smcap">SWEEP of SEP<sup>T.</sup> 8<sup>TH.</sup> to 11<sup>TH.</sup> 1914.</span> + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_128.jpg" width="964" height="657" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_128-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p>Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span> +visit was that of operations in the Baltic, but as no large +operations of this nature could be attempted without the +assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain +supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no +steps were taken.</p> + +<p>By this date a regular programme of dockings and +refits for all ships was recognised as necessary, and +battleships were now being detached one at a time for +this purpose. For some months after the commencement +of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than +four days for docking and for the execution of the most +urgent work, except in cases of accident or very serious +defects, as our margin of superiority was none too large, +and we were already experiencing a good deal of trouble +with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up +for the work of retubing; but the work achieved in the +four days was a very fine tribute to the dockyard organisation +and to the industry of the dockyard men.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of +September 17th, the <i>Erin</i>, a new battleship bought, incomplete, +from Turkey, being in company for the first +time in order to accustom her officers to working the ship +with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to the +westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the +18th, but was interfered with by bad weather—a frequent +experience. The Battle Fleet then proceeded into the +North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel, the position at +midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.13 W., and +course south. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa +with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of +the 19th, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at +the same time, all for the southward for a sweep into +the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet, in +search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span> +thorough examination of trawlers suspected of acting as +look-out vessels for the enemy.</p> + +<p>While on passage south during the 19th the Battle +Fleet was exercised at battle tactics. At midnight on +the 19th the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 58.3 N., +Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 20th, in Lat. 57.8 N., +Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. +The 2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa +in time to meet the Battle Fleet at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 21st, +but, owing to bad weather, the orders were cancelled +and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the 4th Flotilla, +which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers. +During daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised towards +the Norwegian coast to the northward of Lat. +57 N., in support of the battle cruisers engaged in examining +trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher +Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to rendezvous, +at 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with +the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been coaling at +Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the Commander-in-Chief.</p> + +<p>At 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position +Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of +the battle cruisers having reported at 6.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> from a +position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52 E., that the weather +was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers being +carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned +and the Fleet turned to the northward, as it was considered +that an incomplete examination would do more +harm than good.</p> + +<p>During this period the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was +working in Area 7, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in +Area 6, as usual; the <i>Alsatian</i> and <i>Mantua</i>, with the +<i>Drake</i>, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping down<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span> +the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their +patrol east of the Shetlands, where they were joined by +the armed merchant ship <i>Teutonic</i>.</p> + +<p>The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and +joined the Battle Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron +respectively on the 21st.</p> + +<p>All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped +between 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th and 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 21st, in +order that the enemy should not become aware of the +movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might prevent +the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly +deprive us of our opportunity of catching it.</p> + +<p>During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an +extensive sweep was carried out during daylight of the +21st. The Battle Fleet covered a front of 40 miles, and +battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front to the +eastward and westward.</p> + +<p>On the evening of the 21st I was informed by +wireless telegraphy from the Admiralty of a report +that a German force of two light cruisers, with +destroyers and submarines in company, had been +sighted from Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the +northward. The whole Fleet was turned to the southward +at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to cover a +front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward, +sweeping to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the +enemy vessels if they had continued a course to the northward. +The sweep to the northward was continued until +10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The <i>Iron Duke</i> was in position Lat. 59 N., +Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel +towards the Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W. +During the 22nd, visibility was very good, but no enemy +vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet +and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span> +during the night, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle +Squadron being detached to support the cruisers searching +in the North Sea areas.</p> + +<p>At 7.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals +from the <i>Cressy</i> were intercepted indicating that the +<i>Aboukir</i> and <i>Hogue</i> had been sunk by submarines in +Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 3.41 E. These vessels were +patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast, +under Admiralty orders. No further details were received, +beyond a wireless signal from Commodore (S), at +11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, that he was proceeding in the <i>Fearless</i> with +seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to intercept +the enemy submarines on their way back. The +Commander-in-Chief, thereupon, ordered the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron (from the southern position of Area 7) to proceed +at once to support the Commodore (S). By directions, +however, given by the Admiralty these orders were +cancelled, and the forces returned.</p> + +<p>At 10.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers +to proceed at once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report +had been received that the German liner <i>Brandenburg</i>, +lying at that port, was likely to sail. Constant reports +to this effect were received for several days, and the +<i>Brandenburg</i> was heard using her wireless telegraphy on +September 25th. The patrol was maintained until September +28th, when contradictory reports were to hand—one +that she had been seen at sea on the 27th, and the +other that she was being interned by the Norwegian +Government. The latter report proved to be correct. +The patrol was then moved to a position off the Utvoer +Lighthouse, Lat. 61.3 N., Long. 4.30 E., to intercept +the German destroyer <i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>, said to +be leaving a Norwegian port.</p> + +<p>During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span> +battle cruisers attempted to carry out gunnery practices, +but thick weather interfered. The force returned to +Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd Battle +Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th.</p> + +<p>On the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron proceeded +from Area 7 to sweep up the Norwegian coast, +thence going to Cromarty to coal. The squadron arrived +there on the evening of the 25th.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa +until the evening of the 25th, when it proceeded out to +the westward of the Orkneys; on the 26th bad weather +again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale +being experienced. This moderated on the morning of +the 27th, when the Battle Fleet was to the eastward of +the Shetlands, but increased again to a very strong gale +during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles per hour +and a very heavy confused sea.</p> + +<p>A considerable amount of damage was done to wireless +masts, topmasts, etc., and several ships had boats +damaged or washed away. The ships of the “Iron +Duke” class took in large quantities of water through +their 6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted +at such a low level. The gale continued during the 28th, +veering to the northward, and moderated on the 29th, on +which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved to the +southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met +and screened by destroyers which had not been able to +join the Fleet at sea owing to the bad weather.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the +morning of the 26th, and proceeded to the Norwegian +coast, sweeping down as far as the Naze in search of +enemy ships, particularly the s.s. <i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>, +reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also +to support the <i>Drake</i>, <i>Nottingham</i>, <i>Falmouth</i>, and two<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span> +destroyers, which had been sent to the vicinity of the +Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The latter vessels +had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for +enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers +experienced very heavy weather on their return across the +North Sea, and some anxiety was felt for their safety.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the +26th, and on the 29th was sent to watch off the entrances +to Bergen in Norway for the German s.s. <i>Prinz +Friedrich Wilhelm</i>. The squadron returned to Cromarty +on October 1st. On the 28th the <i>Princess Royal</i> left the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to +fuel, <i lang="fr">en route</i>) to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian +troops about to leave the Dominion for the United +Kingdom. The <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i>, which had +been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the purpose +of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the +3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from +Scapa on the arrival of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. +Additional precautions against attack by submarines +were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on this +occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a considerably +increased number in the North Sea. These precautions +included more numerous patrols by destroyers of the +2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the entrances to Scapa, and +necessarily involved a greatly increased strain on the destroyers.</p> + +<p>Further precautions against submarine attack were +also found necessary in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival +of light cruisers at Leith for refit were temporarily suspended +by Admiralty orders owing to the presence of +submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at +the destroyer <i>Stag</i>, and another at a torpedo boat off May<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span> +Island on the 25th. The destroyer <i>Cheerful</i> was also +fired at on the 26th.</p> + +<p>The month of October, 1914, opened with the +Dreadnought Battle Fleet at Scapa, with the exception +of the <i>Ajax</i>, which was <i lang="fr">en route</i> to Devonport to refit, +and the <i>Audacious</i>, which was on passage from Devonport +after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were +at sea supporting the cruisers, except the <i>Exmouth</i>, of +the 6th Battle Squadron, which was at Devonport +refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the <i>Invincible</i>, +and the <i>Inflexible</i>, were at Scapa; the <i>Princess +Royal</i> was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to +Halifax.</p> + +<p>Of the cruisers, the <i>Devonshire</i>, of the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron, was refitting at Cromarty; the <i>Theseus</i>, of the +10th Cruiser Squadron, was returning from the White +Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian officers; +the <i>Mantua</i> and <i>Alsatian</i>, armed merchant-cruisers, were +at Liverpool, coaling and making good defects.</p> + +<p>Of the destroyer flotillas, the <i>Active</i> and five destroyers +of the 2nd Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla, +were absent refitting.</p> + +<p>On October 1st regulations were brought into force +under which a large number of coastal navigational lights +were extinguished, as also were regulations closing the +east coast ports to neutral fishing craft; other regulations +were issued to control the movements of fishing vessels +in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under +which additional coastal navigation lights were extinguished +(principally in the North of Scotland), became +effective.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa +until 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 2nd, and then proceeded into the +North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron sailed at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span> +daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted 2nd +Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the <i>Invincible</i> and +<i>Inflexible</i>, with the <i>Sappho</i> and three mine-layers, left at +2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 3rd.</p> + +<p>On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took +up pre-arranged positions designed to secure a close watch +over the northern portion of the North Sea, partly with +a view to an interception of all traffic, and partly to +ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the North Sea +during the ensuing week. The main object was the protection +of an important convoy of Canadian troops, which +was crossing from Halifax, and which the battle cruiser +<i>Princess Royal</i> and the battleship <i>Majestic</i> had been +sent to meet and to protect. The <i>Princess Royal</i> +arrived at the rendezvous at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 7th, +and waited for the convoy, which was two and a half +days late.</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during +the period Oct. 3rd–11th approximately as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island +Channel from the western side.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruisers, +the <i>Sappho</i> and three mine-layers, was stationed to the northward +and eastward of the Shetland Islands.</p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion +of Area No. 4.</p> + +<p>The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5.</p> + +<p>The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island +Channel.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread, +worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle +Squadron to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle +Squadron was utilised to watch the waters between the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet and Norwegian territorial waters.</p> + +<p>The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern approaches<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span> +of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian +coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle +Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to +the bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and +for shelter when the weather necessitated this.</p> +</div> + +<p>These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3.</p> + +<p>The <i>Princess Royal</i> met the Canadian convoy in Lat. +49.45 N., Long. 27.5 W., at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 10th. +On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet passed to the +westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until daylight +on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadron, with the <i>Teutonic</i>, being withdrawn +from the patrol north of the Shetlands to a patrol line +north-west from Sule Skerry lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N., +Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th and remaining +there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for +Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged +in this operation returned to their bases for fuel, except +the 3rd Battle Squadron (the ships of which had coaled +two at a time during the operation) and the cruiser squadrons, +which had been relieved as necessary to fuel.</p> + +<p>Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the +following incidents occurred. On October 2nd the +<i>Alsatian</i> took six concealed Germans off a Danish +steamer. At 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on October 7th a submarine was +reported inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and +by the <i>Assistance</i>; she was fired at by the latter ship, in +misty weather. On receipt of the report I ordered all +vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a division +of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the submarine. +Later investigation indicated that the report +was well founded.</p> + +<p>On October 9th the <i>Alsatian</i> sighted an enemy submarine +in Lat. 61.42 N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span> +day at 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Antrim</i>, flagship of the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was missed +by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the +<i>Antrim</i> just failed to ram after the attack; numerous +reports of enemy aircraft having been sighted on the East +and West coasts of Scotland were also received.</p> + +<p>On October 10th the <i>Liverpool</i> and one-half of the 4th +Flotilla were sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the +islands in the vicinity of Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N., +Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they were not being used +as German submarine bases, in view of the attack on the +<i>Antrim</i> in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser +Squadron supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour +to this idea.</p> + +<p>Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the northward, +two or three at a time, during the operations, to +carry out gunnery practices by day and by night. Thick +fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and ships +detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable +difficulty in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly +resulted in a serious collision between a battleship of the +6th Battle Squadron and one of the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of each other +on opposite courses.</p> + +<p>On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the +morning of October 12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville +reported that a partial submarine obstruction was in place +across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even a +partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine +attack on the Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had +given me much anxiety since the beginning of hostilities.</p> + +<figure id="i_138" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption sans"><p>APPROXIMATE</p> + +<p>DISPOSITIONS OCT<sup>R.</sup> 3<sup>RD.</sup> <span class="allsmcap">TO</span> 11<sup>TH.</sup> 1914.</p> + +<p>WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING.</p> + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_138.jpg" width="812" height="607" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_138-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p>On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser +tubes of the <i>Iron Duke</i> were in a bad condition, although +the ship was quite new, and that the condensers would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span> +need either complete, or partial, retubing. The discovery +was very disconcerting when taken in conjunction with +the case of the <i>Orion</i>, the condensers of which ship had +been retubed during September; it naturally led to suspicion +being directed to the condenser tubes generally +of other ships, from which reports of cases of tubes occasionally +giving out were being received.</p> + +<p>The whole question was taken up with the Admiralty, +requests being made that all available spare tubes should +be sent at once to the Northern bases, together with some +dockyard fitters who could assist the artificers of the +Fleet in the work of retubing. Representations were also +made as to the urgent necessity of increasing the +stock of reserve tubes in case the defects became +general in the Fleet owing to the ships being so constantly +under steam at sea. The task of replacing the defective +tubes in the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> condensers was begun at once, +with the help of the artificers of the Fleet, and the +<i>Centurion</i> was detailed as the spare Fleet-Flagship in +case of emergency. But at this time the <i>Iron Duke</i> was +not kept specially in harbour for retubing work, this being +carried out as opportunity occurred, although under considerable +difficulties, since the labour of suddenly preparing +for sea, with a condenser undergoing retubing, was +very appreciable. The manner in which this heavy work +was taken in hand and rapidly completed in several ships, +largely by Fleet labour, demonstrated the extreme +efficiency and very fine spirit of the engine-room departments +of the ships of the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>From the 12th to the 16th October the 1st and 4th +Battle Squadrons remained at Scapa, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the +16th they left to carry out target practice to the westward +of the Orkneys. The 2nd Battle Squadron left Scapa +on the evening of the 13th to support the cruisers in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span> +North Sea; it joined the 3rd Battle Squadron already +there, the ships of which were being detached to Scapa +two at a time to fuel and to overhaul their machinery. +It was found necessary to give these ships, with reciprocating +engines, five days off duty periodically in order to +carry out necessary adjustments.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron and two divisions of destroyers, left +Scapa at 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 12th, to carry out a sweep of +the southern part of the North Sea. This force swept on +the 13th on a broad front down to the Dogger Bank, +thence to the Norwegian coast, and to the northward +on the 14th in conjunction with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron +(which was then prolonging the sweeping line), without +sighting any enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and light +cruisers took up a position on the 15th to support the +cruiser squadrons on patrol, the destroyers proceeding +to Lerwick to fuel.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron remained at Scapa. +The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was working the N.E. corner +of Area 6, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron at this period +was working the south-western portion of Area No. 6. +At 1.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on October 15th the <i>Theseus</i> reported that +a torpedo, which had missed, had been fired at her in +Lat. 57.50 N., Long. 0.33 E.</p> + +<p>On receipt of this report orders were given that the +ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, on patrol, were to be +withdrawn to the northern corner of the area, and later, +at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, orders were sent that they were to join the +2nd Battle Squadron still farther north, and to be used +by the battleships (which were spread for the purpose of +intercepting trade or enemy’s ships) for boarding purposes. +Meanwhile the senior officer of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron ships operating in Area 6 (H.M.S. <i>Edgar</i>) reported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span> +that he could get no reply to wireless signals from +the <i>Hawke</i>. The <i>Swift</i>, with a division of destroyers, +was ordered to proceed from Scapa at high speed to the +last reported position of the <i>Hawke</i> in Lat. 57.47 N., +Long. 0.12 E., to search for the ship. Two other +divisions of destroyers were sent, later on, to assist the +<i>Swift</i>. It is to be noted that a submarine had been +reported off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast at 8.30 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 14th, but this report did not reach the <i>Iron +Duke</i> until the afternoon of the 15th.</p> + +<p>The <i>Swift</i> reported on the 16th having picked up a +raft with an officer and 20 men, survivors of the <i>Hawke</i>, +which had been sunk by a submarine in Lat. 57.40 N., +Long. 0.13 W., on the 15th. Shortly after sighting the +raft, the <i>Swift</i> was attacked by the same or another submarine +(it was thought by more than one) whilst engaged +in her work of rescue, and torpedoes were fired at her. +Captain Wintour subsequently stated that he was only +able to effect the rescue by manœuvring at high speed in +the midst of the wreckage, etc., using the destroyers with +him to screen his movements. His experience was an +unpleasant one, as he naturally desired to remain on +the spot until he had ascertained with certainty that he +had picked up all the survivors, and this he proceeded to +do with praiseworthy persistence, bringing them to +Scapa. On the 16th reports were also received that +the destroyers <i>Alarm</i> and <i>Nymphe</i> had been attacked by +submarines to the eastward of the Pentland Firth, and +that the <i>Nymphe</i> had rammed the submarine that had +attacked her. Later examination of the <i>Nymphe’s</i> +bottom by divers showed that her starboard propeller was +damaged.</p> + +<p>At 4.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the same day, the 16th, it was +reported from one of the shore batteries that a submarine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span> +was close into the Switha entrance to Scapa Flow. The +ships inside were immediately ordered to raise steam with +all despatch, and the usual precautions were taken of +patrolling the harbour with every available small craft, +including destroyers, tugs, trawlers, drifters and picket-boats; +and colliers and store-ships were as usual sent +alongside the battleships, which were not fitted with +torpedo nets, as a precaution.</p> + +<p>The scene in the harbour on such occasions was a busy +one. Small craft of every nature were patrolling at +the sight of a periscope; all guns were manned; torpedo +nets, where fitted, were placed in position; and every +effort was made to ensure that the Fleet was as adequately +guarded by the available patrol craft as circumstances +admitted. All large ships except the repair ships <i>Cyclops</i> +and <i>Assistance</i> left harbour during the night, the <i>Iron +Duke</i> joining the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons west of +the Orkneys.</p> + +<p>At noon on the 17th Sir Stanley Colville, who had +been requested to organise a careful search for the reported +submarine, signalled that a submarine was believed +to be inside Scapa Flow and had been hunted, but not +actually located. Reports had been received that officers +and men on board several of the destroyers, and the gunboat +<i>Leda</i>, had seen the periscope of the submarine, and +that a torpedo had actually been fired at one of the hunting +vessels. It was, however, ascertained subsequently +that this torpedo was one which had been accidentally +discharged by one of our own destroyers.</p> + +<p>The accuracy or otherwise of these reports has never +yet been determined with certainty, but many of the +officers engaged in the search were convinced at the time +that a submarine was actually inside, and that they had +seen her. Indeed, a good many rounds were fired during<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span> +the day at objects which were thought at the time to be +a periscope.</p> + +<p>The reports signalled to me convinced me that, until +the matter was cleared up with certainty, and until some +more absolute security against submarine attack on the +Fleet at anchor could be provided, it was courting disaster +to base battleships or battle cruisers at Scapa Flow. We +had seen in the loss of the <i>Hawke</i> that enemy submarines +could quite well operate in northern waters, and it was +thought to be only a matter of time before they would +attempt an attack on the Fleet in Scapa Flow, if indeed +the attempt had not already been made.</p> + +<p>I decided, therefore, that it was necessary to seek for +a temporary base which could be used with safety whilst +the submarine obstructions at Scapa were being perfected. +The incident that had already occurred at Loch +Ewe cast doubt on the safety of that base, since it was +unprovided with any obstructions at all and the depth of +water made it impossible to improvise them with Fleet +resources.</p> + +<p>Accordingly I looked for other and more easily obstructed +ports, and eventually decided on Lough Swilly +for the main part of the Fleet, and Loch-na-Keal in the +Island of Mull for the ships for which berthing-space +could not be found at Lough Swilly. Both ports possessed +comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly +the water was so shallow as to make it difficult for a submarine +to enter submerged. It was also a “defended port” +and therefore possessed an organisation which would be +useful for regulating the entry of ships.</p> + +<p>The extensive dispositions necessitated by the temporary +change of base were at once ordered. Colliers, +store-ships, and auxiliaries of one kind and another, which +were either <i lang="fr">en route</i> to, or at, Scapa Flow, were diverted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span> +to the new bases; the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron were ordered to Loch-na-Keal to fuel +and to improvise anti-submarine obstructions at the +entrance; and the <i>Illustrious</i> was ordered there from Loch +Ewe to act as guard ship; the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons +and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron were detached to +cruise to the north-westward of the Hebrides for blockading +purposes, and to carry out practices; and the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 3rd +and 6th Battle Squadrons were sent to Lough Swilly to +coal. The cruiser blockade and look-out line was withdrawn +farther to the northward owing to the danger from +submarines incurred in operating in the central or +southern portions of the North Sea on a regular patrol, +and the impossibility of providing destroyers as a screen +for the ships. The new line was to the northward of the +Shetland Islands, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons +and armed merchant-cruisers carried out the patrol. There +were, therefore, two lines of blockade, one formed by the +heavy ships north-westward of the Hebrides, the second +to the northward of the Shetland Islands. The organisation +was such that it was probable that vessels attempting +to evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines +during daylight hours. In making these new dispositions +it was still intended to keep the North Sea itself under +observation by frequent cruiser sweeps.</p> + +<p>Numerous reports of submarines in the Minch at this +time led to the <i>Active</i> and two divisions of destroyers +being sent there to search for them, and the remainder of +the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were divided between blockade +duty in the Pentland Firth, work at Scapa Flow, and in +the vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands, and with the +ships at Loch-na-Keal and Lough Swilly.</p> + +<p>On October 21st the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span> +arrived at Cromarty to coal. Owing to the receipt of information +from the Admiralty early that day, that it was +reported that some German cruisers, destroyers and submarines +had left Danzig on October 17th for the North +Sea, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron were ordered to leave their bases that +morning, proceed into the North Sea, and sweep down +on a broad front to the Skagerrak, screened by the 4th +Flotilla of destroyers. The latter had to be sent back to +their base on October 22nd owing to heavy weather. The +remainder of the force swept up to the Skaw without +sighting any enemy vessels, then north along the Norwegian +coast, and proceeded, the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron to Cromarty and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron +to Scapa.</p> + +<p>On October 21st a submarine was reported just outside +Cromarty by an armed trawler, and another report +was received of one having been sighted by the destroyer +<i>Lynx</i>. The submarine obstruction at Cromarty, designed +by Captain Munro, had now been completed, and the base +was considered secure. It would, however, only accommodate +a small portion of the Fleet.</p> + +<p>The dispositions given above were maintained until +October 22nd, when the <i>Iron Duke</i>, 1st and 4th Battle +Squadrons, the <i>Active</i> and two divisions of destroyers +of the 2nd Flotilla, arrived at Lough Swilly. The 3rd and +6th Battle Squadrons and 2nd Cruiser Squadron took +their place to the north-westward of the Hebrides as an +outer blockade line and support for the cruiser squadrons. +The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and four +destroyers were detached to the southern part of the +North Sea on the 23rd to support the Commodore (T) in +carrying out aerial operations in the Heligoland Bight. +The operations failed owing to the difficulty the sea-planes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span> +experienced in rising off the water, and the 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadron returned to Cromarty.</p> + +<p>On arrival of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons at +Lough Swilly, steps were immediately taken to lay an +anti-submarine obstruction at the entrance, and this was +very smartly completed with the limited resources of the +squadrons by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 23rd, and for the first time +since the declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure +base. Wire hawsers provided by the ships of the Fleet +were suspended at varying depths between six colliers +which were anchored across the entrance, with target rafts +as intermediate supports.</p> + +<p>It was a fairly effective obstruction, and armed steamboats +from the fleet patrolled near it with destroyers as +a support.</p> + +<p>The relief to those responsible for the safety of the +Fleet was immense, and attention was at once turned to +the well-being of the personnel, which had been pressed +very hard, and to improving the efficiency of the ships in +gunnery and torpedo work. Battle practice targets were +ordered over from Lamlash, in the Island of Arran, a +pre-War practice base, with the intention of carrying out +practice in the waters north-west of Ireland. The work +of retubing the condensers of the <i>Iron Duke</i> was once +more taken in hand, and ships were given the opportunity +of overhauling and adjusting machinery, steam being +put back to longer notice than had previously been +possible. The anti-submarine defence was continually +strengthened and improved during the stay of the Fleet, +and the colliers supporting it were gradually replaced by +trawlers and drifters.</p> + +<p>In order to give the men some much-needed diversion +and exercise a pulling regatta was organised and held on +October 26th, and the men were landed for route marches<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span> +as frequently as possible during the stay of the ships at +Lough Swilly.</p> + +<p>On the 26th a submarine was reported inside +Cromarty harbour, but Sir David Beatty, who was there +with the battle cruisers, stated, after investigation, that +he did not consider the report was true.</p> + +<p>Discussions took place with the Admiralty during the +stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly on the subject of +trawlers for the patrol of the Minches and vicinity, and +the requirements were given as thirty-six trawlers for this +service, which was considered next in importance to the +provision of an adequate patrol force of this nature for +the waters in the vicinity of the bases at Scapa Flow +and Cromarty.</p> + +<p>The stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly was rendered +memorable by the unfortunate loss of the <i>Audacious</i>, +then one of our most modern battleships.</p> + +<p>Orders had been given to the 2nd Battle Squadron to +carry out target practice against the two battle practice +targets obtained from Lamlash, and the squadron left +Loch-na-Keal on the evening of October 26th for a +rendezvous in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 8.30 W., at daylight +on the 27th, where the targets which had left Lough +Swilly in tow of two tugs, the <i>Plover</i> and <i>Flying Condor</i>, +escorted by the light cruiser <i>Liverpool</i>, were to be met.</p> + +<p>The squadron was in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 8.30 W. +at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 27th, preparing for the practice, when +at that hour the <i>Audacious</i> struck a mine whilst turning. +The explosion resulted in the flooding of the port +engine-room and partly flooding the centre engine-room. +It was not clear at the time whether the ship had been +mined or torpedoed. The <i>Monarch</i> having reported sighting +a submarine at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, a precautionary signal was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span> +made to Sir George Warrender to keep the squadron +clear of the <i>Audacious</i>.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers and +other small craft were sent from Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal +to assist the <i>Audacious</i> and to prevent the submarine +(if one were present) from doing further damage; +and the armed boarding steamer <i>Cambria</i> escorted the +collier <i>Thornhill</i> (provided with towing hawsers) to the +scene. The hospital-ship <i>Soudan</i> was ordered out to give +help to survivors in case the <i>Audacious</i> sank or to the +injured, and the <i>Liverpool</i> was directed to stand by her, +but to keep moving at high speed. The battleship +<i>Exmouth</i> was put at “short notice” ready to tow the +<i>Audacious</i> in if necessary. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis +Bayly, commanding the 1st Battle Squadron, came on +board the <i>Iron Duke</i> to suggest that he should proceed to +the scene to render any assistance, an offer of which I +very gladly availed myself, as Sir George Warrender, in +the 2nd Battle Squadron, could not close the ship whilst +the danger of submarine attack existed.</p> + +<p>Shortly after the <i>Audacious</i> struck the mine, the +s.s. <i>Olympic</i>, on passage from the United States to Liverpool, +closed the ship on learning of the disaster, and +Captain Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., who was in command, +at once volunteered to help in any way possible. Captain +Dampier, of the <i>Audacious</i>, asked that his ship might be +taken in tow and brought into Lough Swilly, and Captain +Haddock, disregarding the danger of submarine attack or +of being mined, took immediate steps to carry out this +request. Unfortunately a considerable sea was running, +which increased during the day. In spite of the most magnificent +and seamanlike handling of the <i>Olympic</i> by +Captain Haddock, and later in the day excellent work on +the part of the master of the <i>Thornhill</i>, the hawsers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span> +constantly parted, owing to the state of the sea and the +weight of the <i>Audacious</i>, the stern of that ship being +almost awash by the afternoon. The two ships were +worked in a manner which Sir Lewis Bayly reported as +beyond praise. The attempts to tow the injured ship had +to be abandoned before dark, and Sir Lewis Bayly, +Captain Dampier and the few officers and men who had +remained on board to work the hawsers, etc., were taken +off the <i>Audacious</i> by 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The remainder of the +ship’s company had been removed without accident, in +spite of the heavy sea, in the course of the day by destroyers, +trawlers, and other small craft, and in the boats +of the <i>Audacious</i>.</p> + +<p>The work of the destroyers on this occasion was, as +usual, of the greatest value, and the exceedingly seamanlike +handling of the <i>Fury</i> by Lieutenant-Commander +Sumner, who, in the teeth of the greatest difficulties, took +heavy wire towing hawsers between the <i>Audacious</i> and +the towing ships on several occasions, elicited from +Sir Lewis Bayly expressions of warm admiration. +Arrangements were made for the <i>Liverpool</i> to stand by +the <i>Audacious</i> during the night, but at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> she suddenly +blew up with great violence and sank. The cause +of this explosion was never ascertained with certainty. +At the time the ship blew up the <i>Liverpool</i> was not far +distant, and a good deal of <i lang="fr">débris</i> fell on the deck of that +ship, killing one petty officer. This was the only casualty +due to the loss of the <i>Audacious</i>.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, at 1.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, information reached me from +Kingstown that the s.s. <i>Manchester Commerce</i> had been +sunk on the night of the 26th by a mine in the vicinity of +the disaster to the <i>Audacious</i>, and at 4.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a report +came from Malin Head that a four-masted sailing vessel,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span> +the <i>Caldaff</i>, had also struck a mine in the neighbourhood +on the previous night.</p> + +<p>These unfortunately belated reports disposed at once +of any idea that submarines had attacked the <i>Audacious</i>, +and at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Exmouth</i> sailed from Lough Swilly to +attempt to tow her in. Steps had already been taken to +warn outward and homeward bound vessels of the existence +of the mine-field and to divert all traffic clear of it; +and all mine-sweeping gunboats were ordered to Lough +Swilly to locate the exact limits of the mine-field and to +sweep a clear passage along the north coast of Ireland.</p> + +<p>On the arrival of the s.s. <i>Olympic</i> at Lough Swilly, +orders were given that no communication between the +ship and the shore was to take place. I wired to the +Admiralty suggesting that the loss of the <i>Audacious</i> +should be kept secret for as long as possible, so that the +enemy should not learn of it, as the fact would afford +him encouragement at a time when the military situation +was extremely critical for the Allies, and also because, as +a general policy, it was desirable to conceal from the +enemy any serious losses of which he could otherwise have +no immediate knowledge.</p> + +<p>This procedure was approved for the time, because of +the military situation, and the <i>Olympic</i> was kept at Lough +Swilly for several days. This was necessary as she had +on board a considerable number of United States passengers, +and it was known that they had taken photographs +of the <i>Audacious</i> in a sinking condition.</p> + +<p>Amongst these passengers was Mr. Schwab, of the +Bethlehem Steel Company, and it was made known to me +after a day or two that he had come over on very important +business connected with War Office contracts, and +wished to proceed to London. After an interview with +him, this was agreed to, and I asked him to call on Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span> +Fisher of the Admiralty in connection with the construction +of some submarines which I ascertained from him +that his firm was in a position to build very rapidly and +which would be of the greatest value to us. He did this, +and with the most satisfactory results, as ten submarines +were constructed—as he promised—in the extraordinarily +short space of five months. These vessels were most useful +to us later.</p> + +<p>The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough +Swilly during the remainder of October; the 2nd Battle +Squadron proceeded to Lamlash on the 29th to coal, and +to Lough Swilly on November 1st; the 3rd Battle Squadron +went to Scapa on the 27th; and the 6th Battle Squadron +to Lough Swilly.</p> + +<p>On October 27th a trawler reported very suspicious +movements on the part of a large steamer to the westward +of the island of Sule Skerry (west of the Orkneys). It +appeared possible that the ship might be a German mine-layer, +and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa was +sent to a position 120 miles from Fair Island on the Fair +Island—Heligoland line, to intercept her on returning, +with orders that, at daylight on the 29th, she should +spread widely and sweep towards Fair Island, then +sweeping over to the Norwegian coast near Jaederen’s +Point, spreading at daylight on the 30th and sweeping +up a line approximately N. 15 W. from Heligoland, +before returning to Scapa. Destroyers of the 4th +Flotilla were also sent out from Scapa on the 28th in +search of the suspected vessel, and the 3rd and 10th +Cruiser Squadrons were disposed so as to cut her off if +she passed to the north of the Shetlands. The ship was +not sighted, and no mines had been laid.</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet was considerably weakened at this +time apart from the loss of the <i>Audacious</i>. The <i>Ajax</i> had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span> +developed condenser defects; the <i>Iron Duke</i> had similar +troubles; the <i>Orion</i> had to be sent to Greenock for +examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to +be defective; the <i>Conqueror</i> was at Devonport refitting, +and the <i>New Zealand</i> was in dock at Cromarty. The +<i>Erin</i> and <i>Agincourt</i>, having been newly commissioned, +could not yet be regarded as efficient, so that the Dreadnought +Fleet only consisted of 17 effective battleships +and 5 battle cruisers; the German Dreadnought Fleet +at the time comprised 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, +with the <i>Blücher</i> in addition. The margin of superiority +was, therefore, unpleasantly small in view of the fact +that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and the +Grand Fleet only 42.</p> + +<p>During the stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly numerous +reports of the presence of submarines on the west +coast of Scotland were received, a large number of the +reports coming from the coast watchers. Destroyers were +sent on many occasions to search the localities from which +the reports emanated, and the various harbours that +could be used by submarines as a base were frequently +examined. At this period it was considered possible +that enemy submarines, acting so far from their home +ports as the west coast of Scotland, would be working +from a short or from a floating base. It was not thought—from +experience with our own submarines—that they +would be self-supporting at this distance, and the best +method of limiting their activities, if not destroying the +submarines, was to find their base. Later experience, +and a closer knowledge of German submarines, however, +showed that they were independent of such bases.</p> + +<p>It is very doubtful whether any enemy submarines +passed to the westward of Scotland during October. We, +at any rate, found no certain evidence that they were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span> +present, in spite of the very numerous reports of their +being sighted. Similarly, reports were constantly being +received of air-craft (both Zeppelins and aeroplanes) +being seen in the north of Scotland; many of the rumours +were of the most circumstantial nature, some coming +even from warships. It is quite certain that these reports +were founded on optical illusions, and it may be said that +little credence was attached to them at the time.</p> + +<p>But the currency of many rumours in those early days +of the War, sometimes supported by statements of the +most plausible character, were not only embarrassing, but +frequently involved a great deal of unproductive cruising, +for it was impossible to ignore anything which would +enable us to find out the enemy’s movements or intentions.</p> + +<p>At the end of October, news came of the unfortunate +wreck of the hospital ship <i>Rohilla</i> off Whitby, with considerable +loss of life.</p> + +<p>About this time the German land forces occupied +the Belgian coast. The effect of this occupation on naval +strategy was considered in the Grand Fleet, and Sir Lewis +Bayly and I discussed the blocking of Zeebrugge by sinking +ships across the channel. Sir Lewis Bayly considered +the scheme feasible, and wrote to me on the subject. I +then suggested to the Admiralty that such an operation +should be carried out. It was not considered practicable +by the Admiralty at the time. It is perhaps of interest +to note that the subject was discussed as early as 1914.</p> + +<p>Some two years later I caused the question to be reconsidered +after taking up the appointment of First Sea +Lord at the Admiralty (it had been under consideration +between 1914 and 1917). More than one plan was discussed +between Admiral Bacon (commanding the Dover +patrol) and myself; one idea, which I favoured, was to +utilise ships of the “Apollo” class, cutting down their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span> +upper works to render them less visible during approach. +Meanwhile, other schemes for driving the enemy +from the Belgian coast were in operation, so the question of +blocking was deferred. In September, 1917, when it became +clear that the object in view would not be effected +by military operations during that year, I gave directions +to the Plans Division of the Naval Staff, of which Rear-Admiral +Roger Keyes had recently become the head, that +plans for blocking Zeebrugge were to be prepared; later, +after considering an independent proposal by Sir Reginald +Bacon for attacking the mole by landing parties +from monitors run alongside it, I decided that the operation +was to be combined with the landing on the Zeebrugge +mole. The main objective for the landing was +the destruction of enemy destroyers known to be lying +alongside the mole, and I considered that this landing +would also be very useful in creating a diversion to facilitate +the approach of the block ships. The scheme was +eventually approved by me in November, 1917, and the +training of the storming party and selection of the block +ships were taken in hand.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI"><span id="toclink_155"></span>CHAPTER VI<br> + +<span class="subhead">INCIDENTS AT SEA—NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">On</span> November 1st I left Lough Swilly to confer at the +Admiralty with the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, +Lord Fisher, who had relieved the Marquis of Milford +Haven in this post. During this conference, held on +November 2nd, the requirements of trawlers, drifters, +etc., for the patrol of the vicinity of the various fleet +bases, the Minches, and the waters surrounding the +Orkneys and Shetlands were discussed at length and +decisions reached. The defence of the bases was also considered. +I stated that the requirements of patrol vessels +for the Orkney and Shetland areas were a total of 72, +and for the Minches of 36.</p> + +<p>The future general naval policy was also discussed, +one of the main questions being that of the 3rd and +6th Battle Squadrons joining the Channel Fleet. It +was determined that this step should be taken and the +necessary orders were given. I agreed to it with some +reluctance, as there was obviously no prospect of the 3rd +Battle Squadron being able to join the Dreadnought +Fleet before a Fleet action if stationed in southern waters, +and a dispersion of the Fleet, which resulted in the main +Battle Fleet having but a slender preponderance of +strength over the High Sea Fleet, was a measure which +was open to considerable objection. The increasing +necessity for refitting our ships, which involved sending +them as far away as Portsmouth or Devonport, combined +with the failures in condenser tubes that were occurring,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span> +led to two, or three, or even more battleships being absent +at a time, on passage, laid up, or refitting. At the +German selected moment, our main Battle Fleet might +well at this period have been reduced to 18 ships (all +Dreadnoughts), whilst the High Sea Fleet was just +rising to a strength of 16 Dreadnoughts and 16 pre-Dreadnoughts.</p> + +<p>Later, however, after the raid on East Coast towns, +the 3rd Battle Squadron was again detached from the +Channel Fleet and based on Rosyth, with the 3rd +Cruiser Squadron; the two squadrons arrived there on +November 20th after passing west of Ireland and coaling +at Scapa. The 6th Battle Squadron remained in southern +waters. The object which it was desired to attain by this +last distribution, which was ordered from the Admiralty, +was to have a naval force based farther south than Scapa, +to be more immediately available in the case of an attempt +by the enemy to land a hostile force on our east +coast.</p> + +<p>I returned to Lough Swilly at noon, November 3rd, +and found the Fleet under orders from the Admiralty to +proceed to Scapa at once. These orders were cancelled +after my arrival, and the movements of the Battle Fleet +left to my discretion. I proceeded to sea with the 1st, +2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons at 3.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and, passing +south of Tory Island, made for the vicinity of the Bills +Rocks on the coast of Galway, for target practice, which +was carried out on the 4th, the Fleet then proceeding to +the northward.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet was screened out of Lough Swilly +by the 2nd Flotilla, which then left for Scapa. This +flotilla had been employed during the stay at Lough Swilly +in providing patrols off the entrance and in hunting for +submarines, reports of which were very frequent.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p> + +<p>Prior to leaving Lough Swilly, news arrived from the +Admiralty that the light cruiser <i>Undaunted</i>, of the +Harwich force, was being chased by several German +vessels in southern waters, and that hostile battle cruisers +had been sighted off Gorleston. These occurrences had, +presumably, led to the ordering of the Fleet to Scapa. +As it was thought that the operations of the German +battle cruisers might be part of a general movement, +orders were sent to the 3rd Battle Squadron to join the +Commander-in-Chief at Scapa, the 1st and 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadrons being directed to proceed with all +dispatch towards Heligoland, with the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons were ordered +to Scapa to coal, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron +to the Shetlands for the same purpose, ready for eventualities. +These orders were cancelled when it became +apparent that the German movement was local, and that +our ships would be too late to intercept the enemy. On +this occasion, the German cruiser <i>Yorck</i>, when returning +to port, struck a German mine and sank.</p> + +<p>The base at Loch-na-Keal was abandoned when the +Fleet left Lough Swilly, and the obstructions removed +by the battleship <i>Illustrious</i>.</p> + +<p>On November 3rd the Admiralty issued a general notice +proclaiming the North Sea as an area in which hostile +operations were being carried out, and pointing out the +danger incurred by neutral vessels which entered the North +Sea without first ascertaining the steps necessary for +safety.</p> + +<p>On November 5th the <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i> left +Cromarty for Devonport by Admiralty orders, prior to +proceeding to search for Admiral von Spee’s squadron +in the South Atlantic. This order, the necessity for +which was apparent, and the subsequent results of which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span> +were undoubtedly of high value, had, however, the effect +of still further weakening the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle +Squadrons cruised between the Hebrides, Faroe Islands +and Shetlands after November 4th, and carried out gunnery +practices and battle exercises as opportunity occurred. +The 1st Battle Squadron was sent to Scapa to +coal on the 7th, the 2nd Battle Squadron on the 8th, and +the <i>Iron Duke</i> and 4th Battle Squadron arrived there on +the 9th.</p> + +<p>The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were engaged +on blockade work during this period.</p> + +<p>On November 6th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, +with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and one-half of the +4th Flotilla, was sent from Cromarty to carry out a sweep +of the North Sea, passing through the following positions, +namely:</p> + +<table id="t158" class="narrow section"> +<tr> + <td class="tdr">1.</td> + <td class="tdl">Lat. 56.0</td> + <td class="tdl">N.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Long. 1.30</td> + <td class="tdl">E.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr">2.</td> + <td class="tdl">Lat. 57.50</td> + <td class="tdl">N.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Long. 5.0</td> + <td class="tdl">E.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr">3.</td> + <td class="tdl">Lat. 60.10</td> + <td class="tdl">N.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Long. 3.15</td> + <td class="tdl">E.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr">4.</td> + <td class="tdl">Lat. 61.20</td> + <td class="tdl">N.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Long. 3.0</td> + <td class="tdl">E.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr">5.</td> + <td class="tdl">Lat. 61.0</td> + <td class="tdl">N.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Long. 1.0</td> + <td class="tdl">E.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr">6.</td> + <td class="tdl">Lat. 58.50</td> + <td class="tdl">N.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr"> </td> + <td class="tdl">Long. 0.0</td> + <td class="tdl">.</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p class="in0">thence the Battle Cruiser Squadron and destroyers were +to go to Cromarty and the light cruisers to Scapa.</p> + +<p>The new battle cruiser <i>Tiger</i>, which had been working +up gunnery and torpedo practices at Bantry Bay in +the south of Ireland, arrived at Scapa on November 6th to +continue her practices and to join the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron. It was felt that she would prove a very welcome +reinforcement when efficient, since the departure +of the <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Inflexible</i> had left us in a questionable +position with regard to battle cruisers as compared +with the Germans.</p> + +<p>After the Battle Fleet left Lough Swilly, and in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span> +consequence of information sent to me by Admiral Colville +as to the slow progress being made with the submarine +obstructions, orders were given to the various ships to +prepare sections of rope net submarine detectors for use +in the entrances to Scapa Flow, and these were rapidly +placed in position by the Fleet in Hoxa, Switha and Hoy +Sounds when the ships arrived at Scapa, armed trawlers +being detailed to watch each section. It was very disappointing +to find on returning to the base that so little +headway had been made with the supply of material for +the permanent submarine wire net obstruction, and that +the Fleet was still, therefore, open to submarine attack. +The increase in the number of patrol trawlers, however, +for service in the vicinity of the base gave some protection +to the entrances, and relieved the hard-pressed destroyers +to a welcome extent.</p> + +<p>At this time the watching and blockading cruisers +were disposed in areas between the Shetland Islands, +Faroe Islands, and Iceland and to the north-westward of +the Hebrides, but the whole of the cruisers were beginning +to show signs of overwork.</p> + +<p>The Rear-Admiral commanding the 10th Cruiser +Squadron reported that all his ships, which were very old, +were showing increasing signs of needing thorough repair +at a dockyard, and arrangements were put in hand for +sending them, three at a time, to the Clyde. In addition, +the <i>Antrim</i>, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, reported condenser +defects; the <i>Drake</i>, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, +was at Scapa making good defects, which were constantly +developing, and the <i>King Alfred</i> and <i>Leviathan</i>, +of the same squadron, were refitting at dockyard ports. +In spite of these incidents, however, large numbers of +steamers were being intercepted daily by cruisers, battleships +and destroyers, and sent into Kirkwall for examination.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span> +About this time the increase in the number of +patrol craft at Scapa made it necessary to add considerably +to the administrative organisation at that base, and +requests were sent to the Admiralty to provide depôt ships +for the local defence destroyers, the patrol trawlers, and +the other small craft, as well as adequate administrative +staffs.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa +until November 17th with steam ready at from two to +three hours’ notice, and on that date the 2nd Battle +Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser +Squadron, and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a half +flotilla as a screen, left their bases to take up positions for +preventing a suspected attempt on the part of the enemy +to send some ships into the Atlantic. The 2nd Battle +Squadron worked to the westward, and the remaining +vessels to the eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron +returned to Scapa on the 20th and the 2nd Battle Squadron +and 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the 21st.</p> + +<p>A heavy gale was experienced in the northern part of +the North Sea and in the waters surrounding the Orkneys +and Shetlands from November 11th to November 13th, +and all work in the harbour had to be suspended, ships +lying with steam up, whilst at sea most of the cruisers +were obliged to lay to. At Scapa all the sea-plane sheds +were wrecked by the gale, and the sea-planes damaged.</p> + +<p>During this stay of the Battle Fleet at Scapa the +routine was introduced of carrying out gunnery and torpedo +practices inside the harbour, two or three ships being +under way at a time for the purpose. This routine was +subsequently carried out whenever the Fleet, or any portion +of it, was at Scapa and the greatest possible benefit +was derived from it. It was found possible to carry out<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span> +practice from all guns, up to and including 6-inch, inside +the harbour by day and night, besides the ordinary sub-calibre +firing and torpedo practices by ships, and by destroyers +attacking ships, or divisions of ships.</p> + +<p>On November 11th, the battle cruiser <i>Princess Royal</i> +sailed for Halifax, by Admiralty orders, for the purpose +of strengthening the North American Squadron in operations +against Admiral von Spee’s squadron, should it +appear in northern waters. I protested, as Commander-in-Chief, +against sending so powerful a ship as the <i>Princess +Royal</i>, armed with 13.5-inch guns, since her absence left +our Battle Cruiser Squadron inferior in strength to the +German battle cruiser force. I suggested that the <i>New +Zealand</i>, carrying 12-inch guns, was, owing to her economical +coal consumption, more suited to the work required +and strong enough for the purpose. However, the +<i>Princess Royal</i> sailed and remained absent from the North +Sea until the beginning of January, 1915.</p> + +<p>At this period, reports of enemy submarines being +sighted, more particularly by shore observers in the +Hebrides, Orkneys and Shetlands, were very numerous, +and destroyers and patrol craft were frequently being sent +to search suspected bases or sheltered bays in which submarines +might be taking refuge. All such searches were, +however, fruitless, although in many cases the reports +were very circumstantial and convincing.</p> + +<p>On November 18th the mine-sweeping gunboats, +whilst searching the Fair Island Channel, sighted a +submarine on the surface and chased her at a speed of 18 +knots, but could not overhaul her. The submarine subsequently +dived. This incident was the first practical +proof of the high surface speed possessed by German +submarines.</p> + +<p>Destroyers were sent out immediately from Scapa to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span> +assist in the search, with orders to use their searchlights +after dark in order to force the submarine to keep under +water and so exhaust her batteries. The search, however, +proved abortive, although continued for 24 hours. The +use of searchlights for this purpose, begun on this occasion, +became common later on.</p> + +<p>A submarine was sighted by the 2nd Battle Squadron +at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 19th, well to the westward of the +Orkneys, and this may have been the vessel chased by +the mine-sweepers.</p> + +<p>During the gale on November 12th, the ships of the +10th Cruiser Squadron—the old “Edgar” class of cruisers—which +were on patrol between the Shetlands and Faroe +Islands had suffered much damage, many of them showing +signs of leaking and straining; boats and ventilators +were washed away; and water in large quantities found +its way below. It became evident that these old ships were +not sufficiently seaworthy to withstand the winter gales +of northern latitudes without first undergoing a thorough +repair, and arrangements were made to send them, three +at a time, to the Clyde for survey and refit. The survey +of the first three, however, revealed that some months’ +work would be required to make them efficient for winter +blockade duty, and it was then decided by the Admiralty +to pay off the whole squadron, and to utilise the crews to +commission armed merchant ships, which would be far +more suitable, as they could keep the sea for much longer +periods.</p> + +<p>The ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been +using Swarbachs Minn, a harbour in the Shetland Islands, +as an occasional coaling base. This was evacuated on +November 20th in consequence of the receipt of a report +that a submarine attack on the harbours in the Shetland +Islands was probable, all of these harbours being, at that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span> +time, defenceless against such attack. On leaving the +base, the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, not already +at a refitting port, were ordered to dockyard ports to pay +off.</p> + +<p>On November 20th, during practice, a lyddite common +shell detonated in one of the 9.2-inch guns of the <i>Achilles</i>, +and the muzzle of the gun was blown off, eleven of the +gun’s crew being injured. This occurrence cast doubt on +the safety of the whole of the lyddite shell afloat, and +restrictions on their use were issued, but were eventually +removed, after the withdrawal of all suspected shell of +this nature.</p> + +<p>At dusk on November 22nd the Grand Fleet left its +bases for the purpose of carrying out a sweep of the +North Sea, and to support an aerial operation in the +Heligoland Bight. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd +Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were included in this +movement, and met the remainder of the Fleet at sea at +9.30 <i>A.M.</i> on November 23rd in Lat. 57.40 N., Long. +2.30 E.</p> + +<p>The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +2nd Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 6th Cruiser +Squadron, and 2nd and 4th Flotillas, took part in the +operation, the Fleet proceeding south in cruising order, +with destroyers screening the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron against submarine attack by day. The +channel eastward of the Pentland Firth was, as usual, +searched by the mine-sweeping gunboats prior to the departure +of the Fleet.</p> + +<p>The Commodore (T) from Harwich, with three Light +Cruisers and eight destroyers, was directed to co-operate +in the aerial operations. During daylight on the 23rd +opportunity was taken to carry out two tactical exercises.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span> +The <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position at midnight was Lat. 56.55 N., +Long. 4.11 E. Ships were ordered to be at action stations +by dawn on the 24th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, +with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and a division of +destroyers, was detached in the afternoon of the 23rd with +directions to be in Lat. 55.10 N., Long. 6.20 E. by 5.30 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 24th.</p> + +<p>The <i>Drake</i> reported her port engine disabled at 1 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 23rd, and had consequently to be sent back +to Scapa.</p> + +<p>During the night the Admiralty informed me that the +aerial operations had been abandoned, as it was thought +that the enemy had a force present in the Bight, which +would be too strong for our detached vessels. I then +directed the Commodore (T) to meet the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron at its daylight position in Lat. 54.50 N., Long. +7.6 E., and thence to proceed towards Heligoland and +endeavour to draw any enemy forces that might be encountered +towards our Fleet. The 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed +also to proceed to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to give any +necessary support.</p> + +<p>The weather on the 24th was fine and bright with +high visibility. The Commodore (T) reconnoitred Heligoland +and reported at 10.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that there was smoke +behind the island, and ships steaming to the southward; +and that he had sighted a submarine. The Rear-Admiral +of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that he +had only sighted destroyers, and that he could not draw +the enemy towards him, and so was returning to the +northward with Commodore (T). The Vice-Admiral of +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, who was supporting, +turned to the northward shortly afterwards, his noon position +being Lat. 54.47 N., Long. 6.35 E. The 2nd Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span> +Squadron was attacked at 12.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> by an aeroplane, +which dropped five bombs near the <i>Liverpool</i>, which was +in company.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet cruised in support, the 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> position +of the <i>Iron Duke</i> being Lat. 55.23 N., Long. 5.30 +E. At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Fleet turned to the north-westward, +sighting the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron astern at +3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The battle cruisers and light cruisers were +stationed 15 miles to the eastward of the Battle Fleet +during the night, and the necessary dispositions were taken +to provide against a destroyer attack during the night.</p> + +<p>On November 25th two more tactical exercises were +carried out. During the afternoon the wind increased, +and thick weather set in, and by daylight on the 26th a +heavy southerly gale was blowing, so the attached cruisers +were sent to the bases for shelter. The 1st Battle Squadron, +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, and the destroyers, had been detached +at midnight on the 25th for Scapa, Rosyth and Invergordon +respectively. The original intention was to take +the remainder of the Fleet farther north for target practice, +but it was abandoned owing to the bad weather, +and the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons +and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa on the +27th.</p> + +<p>During the absence of the Fleet, the German submarine +U 18 was rammed at 12.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> November 24th +by mine-sweeping trawler No. 96, one mile off the Hoxa +entrance to Scapa. U 18 was damaged in the collision, +dived, hit the bottom and received further damage. All +the available patrol craft were ordered to the spot most +promptly by the Vice-Admiral commanding the Orkneys +and Shetlands and hunted her. She finally came to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span> +surface and surrendered off Muckle Skerry in the Pentland +Firth. The submarine sank as the crew came on +deck, the sea cocks, probably, having been previously +opened. The commanding officer of the submarine, who +had apparently intended to try to enter Scapa Flow, +expressed great surprise to Admiral Colville at the absence +of the Fleet. It seemed possible that he had been +deterred from his attempt by the sight of the buoys across +the entrance, probably suspecting the presence of an obstruction +which, however, was <em>not</em> there. The sinking +of the submarine caused the greatest gratification to the +local defence forces at Scapa and acted as an incentive +to further efforts. It was also, probably, a deterrent +to further attacks on the Fleet at Scapa, as the circumstances +in which U 18 was sunk were kept most secret in +order that the enemy might be led to think that her destruction +was due to nets or mines. Indeed, it is very likely that +this incident and the secrecy observed had important results +in preventing the loss of ships of the Grand Fleet when +at anchor in Scapa Flow.</p> + +<p>Great submarine activity occurred at this time in the +vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands. The <i>Dryad</i> +sighted a submarine on the 24th in Lat. 58.35 N., Long. +1.45 W.; a second was sighted by an armed trawler off +Copinsay on the same day; and a third was sighted from +the shore, proceeding to the eastward through the Pentland +Firth. On the 25th U 16 was sighted by a collier +and trawler in Lat. 58.46 N., Long. 2.15 W., and later +by the mine-sweeping gunboat <i>Skipjack</i> not far from this +position.</p> + +<p>On the return of the Fleet arrangements were made +for constructing, with Fleet resources, net obstructions +across the Hoy entrance to Scapa Flow, and, in view of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span> +the attempt of U 18, all patrols were stiffened to the utmost +extent possible.</p> + +<p>During November 27th and 28th the strong gale continued, +interfering considerably with the work on the +submarine obstructions. Several reports of the sighting +of submarines in harbours in the north of Scotland, the +Orkneys and Shetlands were received during the last days +of November, and destroyers and patrol craft were kept +very busy in searching the various bays and harbours. +In many cases charges were exploded on the bottom in +bays in which it was considered that a submarine might +be lying, in the hope of forcing her to the surface. No +known result, however, was obtained.</p> + +<p>The Fleet remained in the various bases until the end +of the month, the ships in Scapa Flow carrying out gunnery +and torpedo practices and working at the obstructions. +The <i>King George V.</i>, which had just returned +from refit at a dockyard, developed condenser defects +necessitating partial retubing; she was the fourth battleship +in which this defect had occurred since the War +started, a period of only four months, and it will be realised +that such wholesale breakdowns caused me uneasiness.</p> + +<p>During November the work of sinking block-ships in +all the entrance channels to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa +and Hoy entrances, was carried out. Unfortunately the +block-ships had been sent up in a light condition without +cement ballast which, I was informed, could not be supplied, +and they began in many cases to break up or to +shift their position during the winter gales. This fact, +combined with the great difficulty experienced in sinking +them in the exact positions required owing to the strong +tides prevailing (up to at least eight knots in strength), +and the very short periods of slack water, rendered the +work of blocking only partially effective.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span></p> + +<p>At the end of November the effective state of the +Grand Fleet was as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang3"> +<p class="center b1">Fleet-Flagship: the <i>Iron Duke</i>.</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +7 ships, the <i>Neptune</i> being away refitting.</p> + +<p><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +7 ships, of which one, the <i>King George V.</i>, was disabled, retubing +condensers.</p> + +<p><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i> (Pre-Dreadnoughts):<br> +7 ships, one ship refitting at twelve hours’ notice for steam, +and the 8th ship returning from a dockyard refit.</p> + +<p><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +5 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (the <i>Princess Royal</i> having been detached to North +America).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +3 ships. The <i>Shannon</i> was refitting.</p> + +<p><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +5 ships. The <i>Liverpool</i> was refitting.</p> + +<p><i>2nd Flotilla</i>:<br> +15 destroyers (5 refitting).</p> + +<p><i>4th Flotilla</i>:<br> +15 destroyers (5 refitting).</p> + +<p><i>10th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Nil</i> (paid off).</p> + +<p><i>Armed Merchant-Cruisers</i>:<br> +2 (2 were coaling at Liverpool).</p> + +<p><i>Mine-sweeping Gunboats</i>:<br> +5 (3 were refitting).</p> +</div> + +<p>The two new battleships, the <i>Emperor of India</i> and +<i>Benbow</i>, the former flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. +L. Duff, C.B., had arrived at Berehaven in the south of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span> +Ireland on December 1st to “work up” after commissioning. +On the same date the <i>Leviathan</i> arrived at +Cromarty to act as flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron +under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore. +His flag was transferred to her from the <i>New Zealand</i> on +December 2nd.</p> + +<p>On the night of December 2nd a very violent gale +sprang up at Scapa Flow, during which several ships +dragged their anchors, in spite of two anchors being down +and steam up; the gale lasted until the morning of the +4th. All communication between ships in Scapa Flow, +even by drifter, was suspended, and the light cruisers at +sea on patrol were forced to lie to. An officer and one +man were washed overboard from a picket-boat sheltering +under the stern of a store-ship and drowned.</p> + +<p>On December 3rd Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, +lately in command of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, hoisted +his flag in the armed merchant ship <i>Alsatian</i> to command +the merchant cruisers attached to the Grand Fleet, which +were now constituted as the new 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>At 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on December 3rd the destroyer <i>Garry</i>, +Commander W. W. Wilson, of the local defence force, +reported that she was engaging a submarine at the Holm +Sound entrance to Scapa Flow. This submarine was +possibly sheltering there from the bad weather. Destroyers +and trawlers were at once sent out to assist, +and the submarine was last reported diving to seaward. +Several rounds from her 12-pounder gun were fired by +the <i>Garry</i> at the submarine’s conning tower, but apparently +without effect, and an attempt to ram her also +failed owing to the heavy sea and very strong tides. The +submarine and the <i>Garry</i> fired torpedoes at one another, +the submarine’s torpedo passing under the stern of the +<i>Garry</i>. All ships were directed to raise steam for leaving<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span> +harbour on receipt of the first report from the Garry, +from which it was not clear whether the submarine had +passed through Holm Sound into the harbour, but this +order was cancelled when it was ascertained that she was +outside.</p> + +<p>On December 4th all the mine-sweeping gunboats +attached to the Grand Fleet were sent to Sheerness by +Admiralty direction for the purpose of carrying out +sweeping operations off the coast of Belgium; trawlers +were then the only sweeping vessels left with the Grand +Fleet.</p> + +<p>On December 5th another heavy gale was experienced, +lasting until the following morning, and all small craft at +sea were forced to shelter.</p> + +<p>In consequence of representations made to the Admiralty +of the inadequacy of the mine-sweeping force at +this time attached to the Grand Fleet, owing to the +withdrawal of the gunboats, steps were taken to fit out +eight small steamers for the purpose, and I was informed +that they would arrive on various dates during the month +of December. These vessels did not prove very satisfactory +as mine-sweepers in northern waters, and were +withdrawn later for use in the Mediterranean.</p> + +<p>During the stay of the Fleet in Scapa Flow work on +the improvised submarine obstructions was continued by +naval parties with all possible speed, and, meanwhile, +work on the permanent obstructions was in hand, though +progressing but slowly, owing to the difficulty experienced +in fitting out the trawlers at Inverness with the necessary +winches and providing the required moorings.</p> + +<p>On December 6th bad weather was again experienced. +Orders were issued on this date for a sweep down the +North Sea, but were cancelled on receipt of information +from the Admiralty that the recent bad weather had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span> +caused a very large number of mines to break adrift in +the southern portion of the North Sea. On the same day +the light cruiser <i>Sappho</i> and three armed boarding +steamers were sent to Loch Ewe and based there with +orders to work north-west of the Hebrides for the interception +of trade; the force of armed boarding steamers +was increased later. These vessels were mostly Irish mail +packets. Rather extensive alterations were necessary, +after they had been sent up, before they were fit for their +duties.</p> + +<p>During the early part of December the ships of the +2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron were mainly engaged in Areas 3, 4 and 6; the +3rd Cruiser Squadron was at Rosyth and working to the +eastward from that base.</p> + +<p>On December 7th Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. +Moore, K.C.B., assumed command of the newly constituted +1st Cruiser Squadron, and the <i>Leviathan</i> and +<i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> arrived at Scapa on that date; the +<i>Warrior</i> and <i>Black Prince</i>, with the above ships, comprised +the squadron. On December 7th, two merchant +ships, the s.s. <i>Michigan</i> and <i>City of Oxford</i>, disguised as +men-of-war, arrived at Scapa. These vessels, with +several others, had been fitted out at Belfast by Admiralty +orders with dummy turrets and guns, and altered with a +view to representing certain British battleships and battle +cruisers. The whole of these were formed into a squadron +under the command of Commodore Haddock, C.B., +R.N.R., of <i>Olympic</i> fame, and termed the Special Service +Squadron. The disguise of the ships was carried out +very cleverly, though presumably at considerable expense. +They would have been of value had it been possible to +select vessels of a suitable speed, but the highest speed +attainable by any vessel in the squadron was not more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span> +than nine to ten knots, whilst the speed of the squadron +as a whole did not exceed seven knots. The ships +could not under these conditions accompany the Fleet +to sea, and it was very difficult to find a use for them +in home waters. Commodore Haddock was, later, detached +with the squadron to Loch Ewe, where the ships +were worked up to carry out fleet movements. This he +did most successfully, so that, had the ships possessed +the requisite speed, use might have been made of them +as a squadron for various decoy purposes. But, under +the conditions existing, this was impossible, and eventually +the squadron was disbanded with the exception of +one vessel; the experiment was tried of sending her to +sea disguised as a disabled man-of-war with a considerable +heel to one side, and with patrol craft accompanying +her as if for protection, in the hope that a submarine +might be induced to attack her and so afford the patrols +an opportunity of sinking the submarine.</p> + +<p>This scheme, however, met with no success. All the +vessels were restored to their original conditions for trading +purposes, with the exception of some which were sent +to the Mediterranean and to North America, where it was +reported that they were of some use.</p> + +<p>On December 8th another gale was experienced. The +<i>Thunderer</i>, which had developed condenser defects, left +for Devonport on the 8th for refit and for retubing condensers; +yet another case of this defect!</p> + +<p>On December 9th the 1st Battle Squadron proceeded +to sea to cruise to the north-westward of the Shetland +Islands and to carry out gunnery practices as convenient. +In consequence of bad weather the Vice-Admiral sent the +attached cruiser <i>Bellona</i> back to Scapa for shelter.</p> + +<p>On December 10th the new battleships <i>Benbow</i> and +<i>Emperor of India</i> arrived from Berehaven to strengthen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span> +the 4th Battle Squadron, and proved very welcome additions +to the Fleet. They, as well as all other new ships +joining, necessarily spent several weeks in practices before +becoming efficient to join the Fleet at sea, or to take part +in action. Owing to the hurried completion of these two +ships, a great deal of fitting work was also required before +they were in a proper condition, and this delayed their +practices considerably. On the 11th another gale was +experienced which lasted until the 14th. The weather +during this period was very bad, and ships at sea (including +the 1st Battle Squadron which returned to Scapa +on the 12th) met with very bad weather. Destroyers on +patrol were unable to maintain their stations and were +forced to run for shelter, and one of them, the <i>Cockatrice</i>, +suffered some damage.</p> + +<p>On the 12th the work of retubing the port condenser +of the <i>King George V.</i> was completed; the starboard condenser +was not taken in hand owing to the small margin +of superiority of the Battle Fleet over the High Sea Fleet +at this time.</p> + +<p>During this stay of the Battle Fleet some very necessary +work in the ships of the “Iron Duke” class was +partially carried out. These ships were the first modern +battleships fitted with 6-inch guns for their secondary +armament, and the gunports were very low. Early in the +War it was found necessary to unship the ports altogether, +as the sea washed them away constantly. Water then +had free access to the inside of the ship through the opening +between the revolving shield and the ship’s side, and, +except in fine weather, water entered freely. In bad +weather the water, as deep as three to four inches, was +continually washing about the living decks and finding its +way below through the open hatches, to the great discomfort +of the ship’s company, who were continually wet, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span> +to the detriment of efficiency. Arrangements were devised +on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> to overcome this trouble, +and steps taken to have all the necessary fittings made +at various contractors’ yards. A partial bulkhead was +fitted in rear of the guns to confine the water which entered +the ship, and watertight indiarubber joints provided +between the gun shields and the ship’s side. The +result was satisfactory, and similar changes were made +in the ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class and in the +<i>Tiger</i>. The two after 6-inch guns, which were on the +main deck level, were removed altogether at the first +opportunity, and the ship’s side and armour completed in +the after embrasure in all these ships, as it was apparent +that these guns could never be worked at sea, being only +a few feet above the water line. The guns themselves +were mounted in new unarmoured casemates on the +superstructure deck level. The work connected with the +forward 6-inch guns was entirely carried out at Scapa, +with the ships at short notice for steam, and in some +cases the workmen remained in the ships and continued +the work at sea.</p> + +<p>On December 12th serious defects in the boilers of +the <i>Liverpool</i> became apparent and the speed of the ship +was limited to 17 knots. This defect, which first showed +itself in this ship, gradually affected the boilers of the +same type in all ships so fitted, as they experienced a certain +degree of wear, and from this time onwards there was +usually one, and occasionally two, light cruisers paid off +for the purpose of carrying out the necessary repairs +which occupied a period of two or three months. This +reduction in the number of efficient light cruisers was +serious, at a time when our numbers compared badly with +those possessed by the enemy.</p> + +<p>On December 14th directions were given to the 2nd<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span> +Battle Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at +Scapa, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty and +all the available destroyers which were at that base, +and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, to proceed +to sea to meet at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.20 N., Long. +0.10 W., at 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on December 15th, the force then +to proceed to the southward with a view to sweeping +the western portion of the North Sea. The 2nd Battle +Squadron—without the <i>Thunderer</i>, which was refitting, +and, therefore, comprising only six ships—left Scapa early +on the 15th, but in passing through the Pentland Firth +the attached cruisers <i>Blanche</i> and <i>Boadicea</i> were seriously +damaged by the heavy sea running as the result of the late +exceptional gales, and were forced to return. The +<i>Boadicea</i> had her bridge washed away and lost several +men swept overboard and drowned. This ship was sent +to the Clyde for repairs; the damage to the <i>Blanche</i> being +less was made good at Scapa. The number of destroyers +accompanying the force was, unfortunately, very inadequate, +the 2nd Battle Squadron being unprovided with +any vessels of this class, as the weather conditions in the +Pentland Firth made it out of the question for destroyers +to go to sea from Scapa. It was decided not to postpone +the sweep on this account. I ordered all available +destroyers out from Cromarty in the hope that the weather +conditions in the Moray Firth might be better than at +Scapa; only seven were available, however, and I therefore +asked the Admiralty to direct the Commodore (T), +with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, to meet the +northern force at a southern rendezvous at daylight on +December 16th. This proposal was not carried out, however, +the Harwich force, which was at sea, remaining a +considerable distance to the southward.</p> + +<p>Whilst the force was on passage to the southward, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span> +destroyers <i>Lynx</i>, <i>Ambuscade</i>, <i>Unity</i>, <i>Hardy</i>, <i>Shark</i>, +<i>Acasta</i> and <i>Spitfire</i>—which had left Cromarty with the +battle cruisers and on reaching the rendezvous were stationed +10 miles ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron—sighted +and became engaged before daylight on December +16th with a strong force of enemy destroyers, and, +later, with one enemy cruiser and three light cruisers. +The destroyers appeared to be screening ahead of the other +vessels and both destroyers and cruisers were engaged by +our small destroyer force. It was difficult to ascertain +the result of the engagement so far as the German vessels +were concerned, although the <i>Hardy</i> claimed to have hit +a light cruiser at close range; the <i>Hardy’s</i> steering-gear +was disabled by enemy fire, two men killed and one officer +and 14 men wounded. The <i>Ambuscade</i> and <i>Lynx</i> were +also holed, the <i>Lynx</i> having one man wounded. The +<i>Hardy</i> finally withdrew under escort of the <i>Lynx</i>. The +engagement caused our own destroyers to become scattered +and separated from the Battle Squadron, and in +the course of the day they proceeded to various east coast +ports to repair and refuel, the <i>Hardy</i> being escorted to +the Humber by the <i>Spitfire</i>. No report of this engagement +reached me at the time. My first information of +the presence of enemy forces in the vicinity of our coast +was obtained by intercepting at 8.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a wireless message +from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral commanding +the 2nd Battle Squadron, timed 8.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, stating that +Scarborough was being shelled. The Grand Fleet was at +once ordered to raise steam, and left at 12.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, steering +for a position Lat. 57 N., Long. 2.30 E. The weather +had now moderated sufficiently to allow of destroyers accompanying +the Fleet.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile Sir George Warrender, who was in command +of the 2nd Battle Squadron and was the senior<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span> +officer of the forces at sea, on receipt of the Admiralty +telegram had turned to the northward to endeavour to +intercept the enemy forces on their return passage. +Wireless signals were intercepted in the <i>Iron Duke</i> indicating +that the scout <i>Patrol</i> was being engaged by two +enemy battle cruisers and that battleships or battle +cruisers were off Scarborough and light cruisers off +Hartlepool. I knew that a gap between two mine-fields +laid by the enemy off our coast existed between Lat. +54.20 N. and 54.40 N. and concluded that any enemy +forces operating off our coasts would pass through this +gap. At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, therefore, after intercepting the various +messages mentioned above, I reminded the Vice-Admiral +of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the Vice-Admiral of the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by wireless that this gap +existed, and that the enemy would probably emerge there, +and Sir George Warrender at 10.26 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> directed Sir +David Beatty to pass through the gap towards our coast. +The Admiralty at 10.30 signalled, however, to the Vice-Admiral +of the 2nd Battle Squadron that the enemy was +probably returning towards Heligoland, and that he +should keep outside the mine-fields and steer to cut off +the enemy. Sir George Warrender then directed Sir +David Beatty to obey this latter order.</p> + +<p>I had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea from +Rosyth immediately on receipt of the first news of the +enemy, and Vice-Admiral Bradford, whose squadron was +at short notice for steam, left at 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> with directions +from me to proceed to lat. 55.50 N., Long. 1.10 W., +my object being for this force to intercept the enemy +should he pass out to the northward of the German minefields +instead of through the gap between them.</p> + +<p>Sir George Warrender, with the 2nd Battle Squadron, +the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being in company, was informed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span> +of these dispositions by me. At 11.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> he signalled +that at 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he would be in Lat. 54.24 N., Long. +2.0 E. Sir David Beatty, with the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was to the +north-westward of the Battle Squadron, and the Commodore +(T) some 60 miles to the southward, having been +ordered by the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron, +at 10.28 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, to steer for a position in Lat. 54.20 N., +Long. 1.30 E. The weather throughout the whole morning +had been very misty, with a visibility of about five +miles, and sufficient sea to cause a great deal of spray +when ships were steaming at high speed.</p> + +<p>At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, in the +<i>Southampton</i> (1st Light Cruiser Squadron), sighted an +enemy light cruiser and destroyers steering to the southward, +gave chase with the <i>Birmingham</i> and engaged them; +owing to the spray washing over the ship, and to the mist, +no result was visible. Three other enemy light cruisers, +or cruisers, were sighted to the south-westward shortly +before 11.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, at about which time touch with these +vessels was lost.</p> + +<p>At 12.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, German cruisers and destroyers were +sighted in Lat. 54.23 N., Long. 2.14 E. by the 2nd +Battle Squadron distant about five miles on a bearing +north by west, steering to the eastward, having evidently +come out through the gap in the mine-fields as was anticipated; +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at this time +was some 15 miles north of the Battle Squadron. It +seems probable that the German force passed either +between our 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron, or ahead of the former and astern of +the latter. On sighting our Battle Squadron, which turned +to close, the enemy steered to the northward and disappeared +shortly afterwards in the mist, steaming at high<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span> +speed, and without being engaged by the 2nd Battle +Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron did not sight +any enemy forces.</p> + +<p>The escape of the enemy’s force was most disappointing, +seeing that our own squadrons were in a very favourable +position for intercepting the raiders. Low visibility +was the main reason for their escape, but the absence +from the Battle Squadron (through the bad weather in +the Pentland Firth) of its attached cruisers and of a +sufficient force of destroyers was a contributory cause, as +well as the fact of our light cruisers having lost touch with +the enemy at 11.50.</p> + +<p>At 3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron +informed me of the main features of the position, and +stated that he was in Lat. 54.43 N., Long. 1.55 E., steering +to the northward, with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, adding +that he had ordered the battle cruisers and light cruisers +to rejoin him.</p> + +<p>At about 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Admiralty informed me that it +was thought, from the information given by our directional +stations, that other ships of the High Sea Fleet +were probably at sea, and at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I gave all our forces +a rendezvous at which to meet at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 17th.</p> + +<p>The force from Scapa, consisting of the 1st and 4th +Battle Squadrons, with the 2nd Flotilla, and the 1st, 2nd +and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, met at this time the force +under Sir George Warrender, the 3rd Battle Squadron +under Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, and the Commodore +(T) with three light cruisers, and proceeded to the southward. +During the afternoon of the 17th the Admiralty +was able to ascertain (by directional wireless telegraphy) +and to inform me that the ships of the High Sea Fleet, +previously reported, were now in harbour.</p> + +<p>Opportunity was then taken of the whole Fleet being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span> +in company with the Commodore (T) to carry out a battle +exercise. At dusk the Commodore (T) was detached to +Harwich, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser +Squadron to Rosyth, the 2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd +Flotilla to Scapa, and the <i>Marlborough</i> to Rosyth, for the +purpose of allowing Sir Lewis Bayly and Sir Cecil Burney +to exchange commands in accordance with orders received +from the Admiralty by wireless telegraphy when at sea.</p> + +<p>The light cruiser <i>Bellona</i> and the flotilla leader <i>Broke</i> +collided during the battle exercises, and were seriously +damaged, being sent to Rosyth under the escort of the +<i>Devonshire</i>.</p> + +<p>During the 17th wireless messages intercepted in the +<i>Iron Duke</i> showed that the enemy raiding force had laid +a large number of mines off the Yorkshire coast and that +some British and neutral merchant ships had been sunk +as a result.</p> + +<p>During December 18th the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron remained at sea to the eastward of the +Orkneys, and in the evening the battleships shaped course +for Scapa, arriving on the 19th, the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reaching +Cromarty on the same day. The 1st and 2nd Cruiser +Squadrons also proceeded to Cromarty, and the 6th +Cruiser Squadron remained out on patrol.</p> + +<p>During the 18th a submarine was reported inside +Scapa Flow, and the 2nd Battle Squadron raised steam; +but investigation showed that the report was not well +founded.</p> + +<p>The strength of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now +risen to 18 ships, and directions were given by me to +the Rear-Admiral commanding to establish patrols as +follows:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>Patrol A.—North of the Faroes and to westward of Long. +5.30 W.</p> + +<p>Patrol B.—North of the Shetlands and to westward of Long. +1.0 W.</p> + +<p>Patrol C.—South of the Faroes and to westward of a line +joining Sydero and Sule Skerry lighthouses.</p> + +<p>Patrol D.—West of the Hebrides and a line N.½W. from +St. Kilda.</p> +</div> + +<p>The <i>Sappho</i> and the seven armed boarding-steamers, +now available, were based on Loch Ewe, and completed +the blockade line between Patrol D and the Hebrides. +They were, however, shifted later on to Scapa, where +they were employed on patrol and boarding duties in +the approaches to the Pentland Firth, or at sea with +cruiser squadrons.</p> + +<p>On December 20th a report was received that the +submarine obstruction in Hoxa Sound had been found to +be pierced; this led to steam being raised by all ships at +Scapa, and the usual search by small craft was ordered; +boats were also sent to explode charges on the bottom in +the vicinity of the damaged portion of the submarine +obstruction, where it was thought a submarine might +have been entangled. Another alarm took place later, +due to some trawlers inside Scapa Flow mistaking the +concussion due to the explosion of these charges for torpedoes +and firing warning signals in consequence. The +precautions were kept in force until after daylight on the +21st. On that date Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney +arrived at Scapa in the <i>Marlborough</i> and assumed command +of the 1st Battle Squadron, Sir Lewis Bayly taking +over the command of the Channel Fleet.</p> + +<p>On the 21st the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty for Rosyth in obedience +to directions from the Admiralty that the battle cruisers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span> +and light cruisers were to be based on the latter port. +This change was one result of the Scarborough raid.</p> + +<p>The mine-sweeping gunboats rejoined the Grand Fleet +on this date.</p> + +<p>On December 23rd the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, +with the <i>Iron Duke</i>, proceeded to sea to the westward of +the Orkneys, and carried out target practice at the Sulis-Ker +Rock, north of the Hebrides, on the 24th, passed +through the Pentland Firth at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on that date, and +proceeded into the North Sea for a sweep into southern +waters.</p> + +<p>During daylight of the 25th the 1st Battle Squadron, +the 2nd Flotilla and the 6th Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, +the 3rd Battle Squadron, the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron from Rosyth, and the 1st and 2nd Cruiser +Squadrons and 4th Flotilla from Cromarty met the <i>Iron +Duke</i>, and the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons at given +rendezvous between Lat. 56.45 N., Long. 1.30., and Lat. +56.14 N., Long. 3.20 E.</p> + +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney was under treatment +on board a hospital ship and too unwell to take his +squadron to sea. Admiral Sir Stanley Colville was, +therefore, directed to hoist his flag on board the <i>Marlborough</i> +and to assume temporary command of the 1st +Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>The whole Fleet was together by 1.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the +25th, steering south-south-east at 15 knots. At 1.40 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Birmingham</i> and <i>Southampton</i>, of the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, both sighted submarines about 15 miles +to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet was then gradually turned from the +south-south-eastward course to north-north-eastward until +3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, being then in position Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 3.43<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span> +E. Course was altered to north-north-west at 3.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +and speed reduced. At 9.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Fleet again turned +to the southward, speed having to be reduced owing to +the sea becoming too heavy for the destroyers. By +midnight a south-westerly gale was blowing.</p> + +<p>At 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on December 26th the Battle Fleet was in +Lat. 55.58 N., Long. 2.16 E., with the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron 40 miles +to the southward; a speed of 11 knots was the most that +the destroyers could keep up without risk of serious damage, +and, as the weather was getting rapidly worse, they +were detached at 8.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> to their bases.</p> + +<p>By 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a whole gale was blowing from the south-eastward. +The sweep was abandoned and course altered +to the northward. At 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Rosyth and Cromarty +squadrons were ordered to proceed to their bases, the +<i>Indomitable</i>, which had joined the Fleet at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> from +the Mediterranean, being ordered to Rosyth, there to join +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. The destroyers and +light cruisers suffered somewhat from the gale, the 2nd +Flotilla unfortunately losing three men, and from the +light cruiser <i>Caroline</i> one man was washed overboard.</p> + +<p>Bad weather continued during the passage north with +a very rough sea, and on nearing the Pentland Firth the +Dreadnought Battle Fleet found the conditions to be +exceptionally severe, with a following wind which caused +the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead of the ships. +The ships were directed to enter Scapa Flow in the following +order: 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron, +4th Battle Squadron; the 2nd Battle Squadron was timed +to enter at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>—some time, of course, before daylight, +which, at this period of the year at Scapa Flow, is about +8.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p> + +<p>As the rear subdivision of the 2nd Battle Squadron<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span> +approached the entrance, the ships as usual having no +lights showing, the <i>Monarch</i> altered course and stopped +to avoid a patrol trawler which she suddenly sighted close +under her bows. The <i>Conqueror</i>, astern of her, was +unable to avoid the <i>Monarch</i> and the two ships collided; +the stern of the <i>Monarch</i> and the starboard bow of the +<i>Conqueror</i> were very seriously damaged, rendering both +ships unseaworthy. They were brought into the harbour +and safely berthed.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the 1st Battle Squadron, following astern +of the 2nd Battle Squadron, entered safely. The <i>Iron +Duke</i> was leading the 4th Battle Squadron, and, on intercepting +the wireless messages indicating that something +was wrong, I stood through the Pentland Firth to the +westward with the 4th Battle Squadron until the situation +had become clearer. The dawn was very late and a +furious gale was blowing, with a very heavy sea and strong +tide in the Firth. These conditions made the handling +of the battleships very difficult when they turned through +16 points to return to the eastward.</p> + +<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i> and 4th Battle Squadron entered at +10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The whole Fleet remained with two anchors +down and steam up on account of the weather until 1 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when the wind and sea moderated, and by the morning +of the 28th normal conditions were resumed. As a +result of the gale, it was necessary to send the destroyers +<i>Hope</i>, <i>Redpole</i> and <i>Ruby</i> to dockyards for repairs.</p> + +<p>On the 28th a new Light Cruiser Squadron, termed +the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was formed, consisting +of the <i>Falmouth</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan +Napier), <i>Gloucester</i>, <i>Yarmouth</i> and <i>Dartmouth</i>.</p> + +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney now resumed command +of the 1st Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>Enemy submarines were active at the entrance to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span> +Firth of Forth at this time; a torpedo was fired at T.B. +No. 33 and another at T.B. No. 31 on the 25th, and two +submarines were sighted during the 28th off the entrance +to the Tay.</p> + +<p>Temporary repairs to the <i>Monarch</i> and <i>Conqueror</i> +were begun as soon as the weather permitted, and the +former ship was able to leave Scapa for Devonport for +thorough repair on December 29th. It was found necessary +to obtain salvage plant and assistance in the case of +the <i>Conqueror</i>, which had sustained very extensive underwater +injury over a considerable length, and Captain +Young, of the Liverpool Salvage Association, for whose +services I applied at once, was sent up with the salvage +ship <i>Rattler</i>, arriving on December 31st. The <i>Conqueror</i> +was taken into Switha Sound and the repair ship +<i>Assistance</i> secured alongside her, and excellent temporary +repairs were effected by the 18th January, by +the staff of the <i>Assistance</i>, Captain Betty, R.N., and by +the salvage artificers under Captain Young.</p> + +<p>The second condenser of the <i>King George V.</i> was +taken in hand for retubing at this time.</p> + +<p>At the end of 1914 the condition of the Fleet was:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang3"> +<p> +Fleet-Flagship: <i>Iron Duke</i>.</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +8 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (the <i>Conqueror</i> and <i>Monarch</i> being disabled and the +<i>King George V.</i> retubing her second condenser).</p> + +<p><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +7 ships (<i>Commonwealth</i> refitting).</p> + +<p><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +7 ships (complete) but two new ships, the <i>Benbow</i> and <i>Emperor +of India</i>, not yet efficient.</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +5 ships (<i>Princess Royal</i> was away).<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span></p> + +<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +3 ships (<i>Black Prince</i> refitting).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +2 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +2 ships (2 not joined).</p> + +<p><i>10th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +14 ships (4 coaling and refitting).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Flotilla</i>:<br> +16 destroyers (4 refitting).</p> + +<p><i>4th Flotilla</i>:<br> +17 destroyers (3 refitting).</p> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII"><span id="toclink_187"></span>CHAPTER VII<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE DOGGER BANK ACTION</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Developments</span> in the intelligence system at the +Admiralty, initiated at the outbreak of war by Rear-Admiral +Henry F. Oliver, the Director of the Intelligence +Division, and an improvement in the efficiency +of our directional wireless stations and of wireless telegraphy +generally, led to our being able to obtain more +reliable knowledge of the movements of enemy vessels. +The result was that it had become unnecessary towards +the end of 1914 to keep the Fleet so constantly at sea +in anticipation of enemy movements. It was very desirable +to spare the ships to some extent since it was increasingly +evident that the War would be prolonged, and +we had already had several warnings that the strain of +constant sea work was telling on the efficiency of the +machinery. Two very disquieting examples of this were +the failure of condenser tubes on a large scale, particularly +in the battleships, and the trouble developing in the boilers +of a very considerable number of light cruisers.</p> + +<p>The problem of training personnel was also beginning +to prove serious. In order to commission the large +number of new ships which had been laid down since Lord +Fisher, full of energy and ideas, had taken up the office +of First Sea Lord (the number, of all sorts, building and +projected, being more than 600), it became evident that +it would be necessary to remove trained men from the +Grand Fleet and to replace them with boys or untrained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span> +landsmen. Under these conditions the individual +efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work, as +well as in such matters as signalling (visual and wireless) +and the other factors which are essential in a fighting +ship, could only be maintained if we could spend sufficient +time in harbour, during which regular instruction +could be given; this instruction to be followed by frequent +practices under way, in conditions where the ships would +not be liable to attack by enemy submarines, and need +not, therefore, be screened by the overworked destroyers. +The organisation for carrying out this work at Scapa Flow +was, therefore, greatly elaborated.</p> + +<p>Steps were taken to start a school for training young +wireless operators at Scapa, first on board each ship, and, +later, in a specially fitted merchant ship. The want of +wireless operators had been most seriously felt since the +War began. In addition to the needs of new warships +of all classes in this respect, the requirements for merchant +ships, trawlers and other patrol craft were immense and +could not be met. In this branch of instruction Lieut.-Commander +R. L. Nicholson, the Fleet wireless officer +on my staff, carried out invaluable work in organising +and starting the school. The training of young ratings in +visual signal duties was also taken in hand vigorously +under Commander A. E. Wood and the signal officers of +the Fleet. The Grand Fleet became, in effect, a great +school for turning out trained personnel for the Navy as +a whole, whilst still keeping watch over the High Sea +Fleet, and controlling the North Sea and its northern exit, +thus carrying out its rôle as the centre and pivot of the +whole naval side of the War.</p> + +<p>Early in 1915 the subject of the instruction and education +of the midshipmen also exercised my attention. On +mobilisation all the cadets had been removed from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span> +Dartmouth and sent to sea, with their training, of course, +very incomplete. During the first months of the War, +when the ships were either at sea or, if in harbour, were +coaling, it was impossible to give these young officers +any regular instruction, and, whilst they were learning +much that would be invaluable to them in the future, +it was evidently highly desirable that their systematic +education should be continued as far as was possible during +a war.</p> + +<p>Steps were accordingly taken in this direction. The +first essential was to obtain naval instructors for the ships +carrying midshipmen. The policy of the Admiralty, for +some years before the War, had been to reduce gradually +the number of naval instructors afloat, the idea being that +the training at the Colleges and on board the training +cruisers rendered the presence of instructors at sea +unnecessary. I never held this view personally, but, in +any case, it was clear that, as the cadets had gone to sea +with less than half their course completed, further instruction +at sea was necessary. The specialist officers +afloat could not undertake this work under war conditions +and strong representations were, therefore, made to the +Admiralty on the subject. Eventually a number of +gentlemen were entered specially for this instructional +work and, after a short course of training in navigation +at Greenwich, were sent to the Fleet, where their work +proved to be of great value to the rising generation of +officers.</p> + +<p>The blockade was becoming daily more effective, +although the blockading cruisers worked at so great a +distance from the German coast. The only interference +ever attempted by the enemy was by submarine attack +or by mines, and during the year 1915 no great success +was achieved by them in this respect when the conditions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span> +are considered. The regular blockading squadron, the +10th Cruiser Squadron, was assisted in its work by the +sweeps of our cruisers and light cruisers, accompanied +occasionally by the Battle Fleet. In addition to the +discharge of these duties, the Battle Fleet engaged in +periodical cruises, during which battle exercises were +carried out for the purpose of maintaining efficiency in +the handling of the ships and squadrons and of giving the +fresh officers, who were frequently joining the Fleet, to +replace others required for the new ships, experience in +the work of the Grand Fleet under the novel war +conditions.</p> + +<p>Pursuant to this general policy, the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet remained in harbour until January 10th, and +then left for a cruise to the westward of the Orkneys and +Shetlands. Gunnery practices were carried out by day +and at night, as well as battle exercises, and the Fleet +returned to Scapa during the day and the night of the +13th. The 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth on the 12th +for a cruise in the North Sea, and on the night of the 13th–14th +passed to the westward of the Orkneys for gunnery +practice, returning to Rosyth on the 15th.</p> + +<p>Other events of interest during the first fortnight of +January were the return of the <i>Princess Royal</i> from +North American waters on the 1st; a short cruise in the +centre of the North Sea by the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron between +the 3rd and the 5th, and by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron +between the 6th and the 8th; a cruise by the 1st Cruiser +Squadron to the westward of the Orkneys between the 4th +and 6th, and by the 6th Cruiser Squadron between the +6th and the 9th, and the 10th and 14th. On January 4th +the <i>King George V.</i> completed the work of retubing her +condenser.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span></p> + +<p>On the 9th all ships at Scapa raised steam ready for +leaving, in consequence of a report of a submarine being +sighted in Hoy Sound, and available destroyers and +trawlers were sent to patrol in the vicinity of the Hoy +anti-submarine Fleet obstructions until the Battle Fleet +left harbour on the 10th.</p> + +<p>Gales were experienced at Scapa on the 1st, 13th, 16th +and 19th of January.</p> + +<p>On January 15th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron +was reconstituted, under Vice-Admiral Sir A. G. W. +Moore, K.C.B., whose flag was transferred from the +<i>Leviathan</i>, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, to the <i>New +Zealand</i>; the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron then comprised +the <i>New Zealand</i>, <i>Indomitable</i> and <i>Invincible</i> (the last +not having yet arrived). Rear-Admiral Sir Robert +Arbuthnot, Bart., took command of the 1st Cruiser +Squadron in place of Sir Gordon Moore, flying his flag +in the <i>Defence</i>, which took the place of the <i>Leviathan</i>; +the latter vessel was transferred to the 6th Cruiser +Squadron. Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, C.B., relieved +Sir Robert Arbuthnot as Rear-Admiral in the 2nd Battle +Squadron, flying his flag in the <i>Orion</i>.</p> + +<p>On the 17th the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser +Squadrons and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth +for a cruise in the centre and southern portions of the +North Sea, and on the 19th, at dawn, arrived in position +Lat. 55 N., Long. 5.30 E. to support Commodore Tyrwhitt +in carrying out a reconnaissance in Heligoland +Bight. Nothing was sighted beyond an airship and a sea-plane, +and the force was ordered to return to its bases +and arrived during the night of the 20th–21st.</p> + +<p>On the 18th the Admiral commanding at Queenstown +reported that a German mine had been washed ashore +at Portrush, as well as bodies and wreckage, apparently<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span> +belonging to the <i>Viknor</i>, an armed merchant cruiser of +the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Anxiety had been felt as +to the safety of the <i>Viknor</i> for two or three days owing +to no reply to wireless signals being received from her, +and the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been +directed to search for her. The report from Portrush +pointed to the probability that she had struck a mine off +the north coast of Ireland, either in the <i>Audacious</i> minefield +or a field further to the southward, and had been lost +with all hands in the very heavy weather prevailing at the +time in this vicinity. All traffic round the north of +Ireland was stopped until sweepers were able to examine +the whole area.</p> + +<p>At this time a large number of German mines were +being constantly reported both in the North Sea and on +the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland, having evidently +broken adrift from their moorings in the heavy weather +which had been generally prevalent. These mines, which +were not safe when adrift, as provided for under The +Hague Convention, were a source of some danger to +ships, particularly at night. On the 18th the battleship +<i>Superb</i>, having developed defects in one of her turbines, +was sent to Portsmouth. She was absent from the Fleet +until March 11th.</p> + +<p>On January 19th, the orders for the 10th Cruiser +Squadron (blockading squadron) were somewhat modified +by me; the new centre lines of patrol positions being:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>Patrol A.—A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 62.20 N., +Long. 10.0 W.</p> + +<p>Patrol B.—A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 61.10 N., +Long. 1.15 E.</p> + +<p>Patrol C.—A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 59.40 N., +Long. 9.0 W.</p> + +<p>Patrol D.—Eastern line of patrol to be 80 miles in the direction +335° from St. Kilda.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span></p> + +<p>The ships were ordered to patrol on east and west +courses on each side of the centre line at a speed of at +least 13 knots by day, zigzagging.</p> + +<p>At the same time four ships were directed to carry +out a special patrol of the Norwegian coast between the +parallels of 62 N. and 62.20 N. This patrol was maintained +until the 22nd. As indicating the growing work +of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the +efficiency of the blockade, the Rear-Admiral of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron reported on January 18th that 80 ships +had been intercepted by his squadron since December +26th, 52 of which were eastward-bound. The strength +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 21 ships, +exclusive of the <i>Viknor</i>, the loss of which ship with her +fine ship’s company was deeply regretted.</p> + +<p>A patrol to the eastward of the Pentland Firth was +at this period being worked by the <i>Sappho</i> and five armed +boarding-steamers, which were supported at night by one +or two cruisers or light cruisers as necessary.</p> + +<p>The <i>Monarch</i> returned from being repaired at Devonport +on the 20th. Temporary repairs to the <i>Conqueror</i> +had been completed about January 18th, but the ship was +detained pending more favourable weather conditions; +on the 21st she left for a southern dockyard, escorted +by four destroyers. On clearing the Pentland Firth, +however, she found that the sea was too heavy for the +passage to be made with safety in her damaged condition, +and the ship returned to Scapa, where further work was +taken in hand and it was decided that it would be necessary +to dock her in the floating-dock at Invergordon to +effect more permanent repairs for the passage south than +could be carried out by divers at Scapa. She reached +Invergordon on January 24th.</p> + +<p>On January 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span> +Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth +left for a sweep in the southern portion of the North Sea, +in conjunction with the Harwich force. The remainder +of the Grand Fleet acted in support. The 1st and 2nd +Battle Cruiser Squadrons (except the <i>Queen Mary</i>, which +was absent refitting) and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron +were directed to a rendezvous, where the Commodore (T), +with available destroyers and light cruisers, was ordered +to meet them.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron +were ordered to the vicinity of the battle cruisers’ +rendezvous.</p> + +<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, +the 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the +2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, available destroyers of 2nd +and 4th Flotilla (a total of 28 destroyers) left Scapa +during the evening of the 23rd and proceeded towards the +same rendezvous.</p> + +<p>At 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Aurora</i>, of the Harwich force, +reported that she was in action with enemy vessels; at +7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Sir David Beatty reported enemy battle cruisers +and cruisers in sight in Lat. 54.53 N., Long. 3.32 E., +steering east. At 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, +commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported +his position as Lat. 55.10 N., Long. 3.32 E., and enemy +vessels in sight, consisting of battle cruisers, light cruisers +and destroyers, steering between south-east and south. +On receipt of these reports the Battle Fleet increased to +19 knots speed, and steered to support the battle cruisers, +and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, +which were further to the southward, were ordered to +steer for Heligoland at full speed, to act in immediate +support. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was also sent +on ahead at full speed to join the other forces.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span></p> + +<p>The proceedings of the force under Sir David Beatty +are best described in his report given in an Appendix.</p> + +<p>During the early part of the engagement Sir David +Beatty kept me informed of his position and proceedings, +but at 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a report was received from Sir Gordon +Moore that he was heavily engaged with the enemy battle +cruisers in Lat. 54.21 N., Long. 5.4 E. The fact that +this report was made by this officer caused me some uneasiness +at first, as it implied that the <i>Lion</i> could not +signal, but as the Rear-Admiral made no mention of +any casualty to the <i>Lion</i>, I concluded the cause was some +breakdown in her wireless arrangements and that all was +well.</p> + +<p>At 11.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, commanding +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported the enemy +steering south-east at 25 knots, and at noon that he had +lost touch with them; at 12.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Rear Admiral Sir +Gordon Moore reported that he was retiring north-west, +and, later, north-north-west, that the <i>Blücher</i> was out of +action, and that the remaining enemy battle cruisers were +out of sight; he added that the <i>Lion</i> had hauled out of +action. He gave his position as Lat. 54.19 N., Long. +5.22 E.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet’s position at noon was +Lat. 56.29 N., Long. 3.22 E., with the cruisers 15 +miles ahead and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron ahead +of the cruisers. At 1.15 Rear-Admiral Moore reported +in reply to my enquiry that Sir David Beatty was on +board the <i>Princess Royal</i>, that the <i>Lion</i> was damaged and +detached; Sir David Beatty then reported that the <i>Lion’s</i> +speed was reduced to 12 knots, that the <i>Blücher</i> had +been sunk, and two other enemy battle cruisers seriously +damaged, and that he was covering the retirement of the +<i>Lion</i>, which was steaming with her starboard engine only.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">196</span></p> + +<p>The hit which disabled the <i>Lion</i> was a piece of luck +for the enemy.</p> + +<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Vice-Admiral Bradford, commanding the +3rd Battle Squadron, reported that he was turning to the +northward, having all the battle cruisers in sight. The +3rd Battle Squadron was sighted from the <i>Iron Duke</i> at +3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and stationed on the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile directed the +<i>Indomitable</i> at 3.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to take the <i>Lion</i> in tow, and +this operation was effected by 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> At 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron +Duke’s</i> position was Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 4.7 E., and +at 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the battle cruisers were in sight from the +<i>Iron Duke</i>. The Battle Fleet then turned to the northward, +keeping in company with the battle cruisers until +dark.</p> + +<p>At 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Lion’s</i> starboard engine became disabled +and the speed was still further reduced.</p> + +<p>At dusk the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and +all destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with the Battle +Fleet, except those vessels which were short of fuel, had +been detached to assist the remaining destroyers in screening +the <i>Lion</i> and her escort against destroyer and submarine +attack. The heavy ships, battleships and battle +cruisers, stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo +attack. The night passed without incident, the 1st and +2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the battle cruisers +during the darkness. Wireless messages were sent on the +24th to the Senior Naval Officer, Tyne, to send out tugs +to meet the <i>Lion</i>, and this was done.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the battle cruisers +remained cruising in the North Sea during daylight on +the 25th, except the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd +Cruiser Squadron, which were detached to Rosyth at +8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span></p> + +<figure id="i_196" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption sans">MOVEMENTS <span class="allsmcap">FROM</span> JAN<sup>Y</sup>. 23<sup>RD</sup>. <span class="allsmcap">TO</span> 25<sup>TH</sup>. 1915. + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_196.jpg" width="844" height="849" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_196-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p>During these operations many floating mines were +sighted and sunk.</p> + +<p>The battle cruisers proceeded to Rosyth at dusk, and +the Battle Fleet to Scapa, except the <i>Iron Duke</i> and +<i>Centurion</i>, which were sent to Cromarty, the <i>Iron Duke</i> +to dock and refit and the <i>Centurion</i> to act as “stand by” +Fleet-Flagship during the refit. The <i>Lion</i> arrived at +Rosyth at 6.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 26th in a dense fog and was +taken up harbour for temporary repairs, the <i>Assistance</i> +being sent from Scapa to Rosyth to help in the work. +The main injury to the <i>Lion</i> was caused by two hits under +water, which pierced the feed tank and displaced an +armour plate; the permanent repairs were completed on +the Tyne, the work being carried out by the aid of coffer +dams, there being no dock there capable of taking the +ship. Her casualties consisted of 11 men wounded. The +only other battle cruiser that received injury was the +<i>Tiger</i>, in which ship Engineer Captain Taylor, a most +valuable officer, and five men were killed, 11 being +wounded; the material damage to the ship was slight.</p> + +<p>The enemy, as the result of this action, suffered the +total loss of the <i>Blücher</i>; and two battle cruisers, the +<i>Derfflinger</i> and <i>Seydlitz</i>, sustained severe injuries, a +serious fire or explosion occurring in one of the after +turrets of one ship, which put that, or possibly both after +turrets, out of action and caused a large number of +casualties amongst the crew. It was ascertained at a +later date from German prisoners that the condition of +one, if not of both ships on return to harbour was very +serious; the casualties, as well as the material injury, were +heavy. It was stated subsequently that the <i>Derfflinger</i> +had 60 killed and 250 wounded, and the <i>Seydlitz</i> about +100 killed.</p> + +<p>One of our destroyers, the <i>Meteor</i>, was damaged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span> +in the action, but was towed back to port and +repaired.</p> + +<p>On the 26th the 6th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted +and composed of the <i>Drake</i>, <i>Leviathan</i> and +<i>Cumberland</i>, and a 7th Cruiser Squadron was formed +under the command of Rear-Admiral A. W. Waymouth, +consisting of the <i>Minotaur</i> (flagship), <i>Hampshire</i> and +<i>Donegal</i>. The 1st and 6th Cruiser Squadrons were sent +to Scapa, and the 2nd and 7th to Cromarty.</p> + +<p>The <i>Britannia</i>, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, grounded +in the Firth of Forth in the fog on her way back to +Rosyth, was ashore for 36 hours, and suffered considerable +damage, necessitating repairs at a dockyard.</p> + +<p>On the 27th January the 1st Cruiser Squadron and a +division of destroyers sailed to cruise in the centre portion +of the North Sea and returned on the 30th, being relieved +by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. On January 28th +the battle cruisers <i>Princess Royal</i> and <i>Queen Mary</i>, with +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, left Rosyth to support +operations being carried out in the Heligoland Bight by +Commodore Tyrwhitt and Commodore Keyes on January +30th and 31st. Owing to fog the operations could not +be carried out, and the force returned to its bases on the +30th.</p> + +<p>A report of a submarine inside Cromarty Harbour on +the 29th caused ships to raise steam preparatory to +leaving, and all small craft to search for the submarine, +but on investigation it was considered that the report was +unreliable.</p> + +<p>On January 30th enemy submarines appeared in the +Irish Sea, one of them opening fire on Walney Island, +where the works of Messrs. Vickers, Limited, are situated. +At about this date, owing to marked enemy submarine +activity in the Irish Sea, the ships of the 10th Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">199</span> +Squadron were directed to coal temporarily at Loch +Ewe instead of at Liverpool, and two divisions of Grand +Fleet destroyers were detached to the Irish Sea to assist +in hunting the submarines.</p> + +<p>During January the number of drifting German mines +in the North Sea was very considerable. Many were +sighted and sunk by the Fleet when at sea; the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron alone, when on patrol on the 30th and +31st January sinking 12 mines.</p> + +<p>At the end of January the condition of the Grand +Fleet was as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang3"> +<p class="center larger b1">BATTLE FLEET</p> + +<p class="center b1"><i>Iron Duke</i>, Fleet-Flagship, refitting.</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +7 ships (<i>Superb</i> was away).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +6 ships (<i>Conqueror</i> was unserviceable).</p> + +<p><i>4th Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +7 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>3rd Battle Squadron</i>:<br> +6 ships (<i>Commonwealth</i> and <i>Britannia</i>, refitting).</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +2 ships (<i>Lion</i> was effecting temporary repairs; the <i>Tiger</i> refitting).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +1 ship (<i>Indomitable</i> refitting after a fire, due to defective electric +circuits).</p> + +<p><i>1st Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +3 ships (<i>Natal</i> refitting).</p> + +<p><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +3 ships (<i>Roxburgh</i> refitting).</p> + +<p><i>6th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +3 ships (complete).<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">200</span></p> + +<p><i>7th Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +3 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (complete).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +4 ships (<i>Liverpool</i> refitting).</p> + +<p><i>2nd Flotilla</i>:<br> +11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).</p> + +<p><i>4th Flotilla</i>:<br> +11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea). +</p> +</div> + +<p>The shortage of destroyers at this period was exceedingly +marked.</p> + +<p>During February the Battle Fleet remained in harbour. +No enemy movements took place or were expected +as several changes were being made in the High Sea +Fleet commands; the principal of these was the relief of +Admiral von Inghenol by Admiral von Pohl as Commander-in-Chief. +It was anticipated that the new +Flag officers would exercise their squadrons in order +to become familiar with them before attempting any +operations.</p> + +<p>The opportunity was taken of refitting the <i>Iron +Duke</i>, and the ship remained at Invergordon, in the +Cromarty Firth, until February 23rd. It was becoming +desirable to give the officers and men of the Battle Fleet +some change from Scapa Flow, where there were no +opportunities for landing for exercise or recreation, and +arrangements were made by which battle, as well as +cruiser squadrons should visit Invergordon periodically +for this purpose. The 2nd Battle Squadron accordingly +arrived at this base on February 24th.</p> + +<p>During the first half of February, 1915, eight destroyers +were absent from the Grand Fleet flotillas, +working in the Irish Channel against submarines, leaving +only a total of 20 to 22 available for the Fleet; an insufficient<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span> +number for screening purposes. This deficiency +made it desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour, +except in an emergency.</p> + +<p>The enemy’s submarine activity became much more +marked during February. Early in the month the German +Admiralty proclaimed that after February 18th all +the waters round the British Isles would be declared +unsafe for merchant-ships of all nationalities, and intimated +that Allied merchant-ships would be destroyed in +these waters and that neutral merchant-ships ran similar +risks. Enemy submarines began to operate in increasing +numbers in the English Channel, to the westward of the +English Channel, in the Irish Sea and off the west coast +of Ireland, as well as on the east coast of England, and the +losses of merchant-ships from submarine attack became +serious. The destroyers of the Grand Fleet that remained +at the northern bases were kept fully employed in searching +for and hunting reported submarines.</p> + +<p>In addition to the maintenance of the blockade by the +10th Cruiser Squadron, cruiser and light cruiser squadrons +carried out various patrol and search operations +during the month. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron cruised in +the centre portion of the North Sea from February 1st +to 3rd; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron cruised off the Shetland +Islands from the 11th–13th, then swept down +the Norwegian coast and returned to Cromarty on the +15th; the new 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out +a sweep in the southern portion of the North Sea between +the 16th and 20th with destroyers in company; +the new 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron cruised to the westward +of the Shetlands for exercise between the 15th and +18th, then passed into the North Sea and swept to the +southward, returning to Scapa on the 20th; the 1st +Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 17th for the vicinity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">202</span> +of the Norwegian coast, swept down towards the Naze and +then returned to patrol north of the Shetlands until the +21st, when the squadron arrived at Scapa; the four light +cruisers attached to the Battle Fleet, <i>Bellona</i>, <i>Blanche</i>, +<i>Boadicea</i>, and <i>Blonde</i>, with four destroyers, left Scapa on +the 18th for a line N. 37 E. 60 miles long from Lat. 57.30 +N., Long. 0.30 W., with directions to sweep towards the +Naze by day and patrol the line at night; they remained +on this duty until the 21st. The 7th Cruiser Squadron +cruised to the westward of the Fair Island Channel from +the 19th to the 22nd, and available destroyers of the 2nd +and 4th Flotillas were patrolling to the eastward of the +Fair Island Channel and the Moray Firth respectively +during the same period.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left +Rosyth on the 23rd to cover the Fleet mine-sweepers +whilst searching for mines along a projected Fleet track +in the North Sea, but, the sea being too heavy for mine-sweeping, +the squadron carried out a patrol instead until +the 25th, when the mine-sweeping operations took place, +lasting until the 27th, when the squadron returned to +Rosyth.</p> + +<p>This searching mine-sweep was carried out because of +the increasing probability of the enemy laying mines +intended to catch our heavy ships when proceeding towards +the southern portion of the North Sea, and the +consequent necessity for a periodical examination of a +route which the Fleet could traverse with some safety. +This policy was maintained throughout the period of +my command, alternative routes being periodically +examined; although it was obviously impossible to carry +out this examination frequently, it did afford some chance +of a mine-field being discovered before serious losses were +sustained by the Fleet.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">203</span></p> + +<p>During the month of February a reorganisation of +the battle cruiser and light cruiser squadrons was carried +out by Admiralty orders, and a “Battle Cruiser Fleet” +instituted under the command of Sir David Beatty, with +the title Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser +Fleet.</p> + +<p>The organisation was as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang3"> +<p class="center b1"> +<i>Lion</i>, Fleet-Flagship.</p> + +<p><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Princess Royal</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), <i>Queen +Mary</i>, <i>Tiger</i>.</p> + +<p><i>2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Australia</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham), <i>New +Zealand</i>, <i>Indefatigable</i>.</p> + +<p><i>3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Invincible</i> (to be Flag), <i>Inflexible</i>,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">D</a> <i>Indomitable</i>.</p> + +<p><i>1st Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Galatea</i> (Broad pennant of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair), +<i>Cordelia</i>, <i>Caroline</i>, <i>Inconstant</i>.</p> + +<p><i>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Southampton</i> (Broad pennant of Commodore W. E. Goodenough), +<i>Nottingham</i>, <i>Birmingham</i>, <i>Lowestoft</i>.</p> + +<p><i>3rd Light Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Falmouth</i> (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), <i>Yarmouth</i>, +<i>Gloucester</i>, <i>Liverpool</i>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">D</a> The <i>Inflexible</i> had not yet joined by the end of February.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an integral portion +of the Grand Fleet. In some respects the term “Fleet” +was an unfortunate selection, as it implied, incorrectly, +an independent organisation. On my taking office +as First Sea Lord at the end of 1916, the title was altered +to the more appropriate one of Battle Cruiser Force.</p> + +<p>The <i>Australia</i> joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet at +Rosyth on February 17th, and the <i>Invincible</i>, having +concluded the very successful operations in the South<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span> +Atlantic under Sir Doveton Sturdee, which culminated +in the destruction of Admiral von Spee’s Squadron of +cruisers and light cruisers, arrived at Scapa for gunnery +practices during the latter part of February, and joined +the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth early in March; +the <i>Indefatigable</i> also arrived on the 24th from the Mediterranean.</p> + +<p>The <i>Tiger</i> arrived in the Tyne on February 1st for +refit, and left again on the 8th. The <i>Lion</i> reached +the Tyne for repairs on February 9th, remaining there +for the remainder of the month. The strength of the +destroyer force working with the Grand Fleet was +increased on February 19th by the addition of the light +cruiser <i>Fearless</i> and two divisions of destroyers from the +1st Flotilla. These vessels had been relieved at Harwich +by new destroyers of the “M” class. This addition +brought the destroyer force actually with the Grand Fleet +up to a total of 48, and further additions were now +gradually made from the 1st Flotilla at Harwich as new +destroyers were completed to relieve them.</p> + +<p>His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet on +February 27th by visiting the ships based on Rosyth.</p> + +<p>In the course of February the destroyers of the +“River” or “E” class, based at Scapa for local defence, +were replaced, by Admiralty directions, by destroyers of +the “C” class (old 30-knot type). This change, although +dictated by the general naval situation, limited considerably +the range of activity of the local defence vessels, +owing to the poorer sea-going qualities of the destroyers +of the “C” class.</p> + +<p>During the month the destroyer <i>Erne</i> was wrecked +off Rattray Head on the Aberdeen coast, and became a +total loss; the <i>Goldfinch</i> went ashore in a fog in the north +of the Orkneys and was also lost; the <i>Sparrowhawk</i> also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">205</span> +went ashore, but was got off, though considerably +damaged. The armed merchant-cruiser <i>Clan McNaughton</i>, +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was lost with all hands +during the month, the supposition being that she +foundered in one of the numerous heavy gales. Although +a prolonged search was carried out, only a certain amount +of wreckage was found. The loss of this ship and her +efficient ship’s company brought once more into prominence +the excellent work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and +the risks to which the ships were subjected.</p> + +<p>The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were daily +increasing, and the number of ships passing the blockade +line unexamined was becoming very small. During one +week in February sixty-seven vessels were intercepted +and eighteen of them sent in with prize crews on board.</p> + +<p>During February the old battleships <i>Hannibal</i> and +<i>Magnificent</i> were relieved as guard-ships by the old +cruisers <i>Crescent</i> and <i>Royal Arthur</i>.</p> + +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral +Sir Douglas Gamble in the command of the +4th Battle Squadron during the month; Admiral +Gamble’s period of command had expired. Sir Doveton +Sturdee, who had served as Chief of the Naval Staff early +in the War, came to the Fleet fresh from his Falkland +Islands victory.</p> + +<p>The weather at the northern bases during February +was less boisterous than usual. There was a good deal of +misty and foggy weather in the early part of the month, +and a considerable amount of snow towards the end.</p> + +<p>During March the principal movements of the Fleet +were as follows:</p> + +<p>From the 4th to the 10th, the 6th Cruiser Squadron +was, with the <i>Orotava</i> of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, +cruising off the Norwegian Coast.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">206</span></p> + +<p>From the 7th to the 10th the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet was cruising in the northern portion of the North +Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser +Squadrons and the 4th Flotilla; and the Battle Cruiser +Fleet was also cruising during the same period in the +central part of the North Sea. The opportunity was +taken of carrying out various battle exercises. The 2nd +Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser Squadron did not return +with the remainder of the Battle Fleet on the 10th, but +remained at sea until the 11th. The 4th Flotilla was +forced to shelter at Lerwick from the 7th to the 9th owing +to bad weather. From March 10th to the 13th the 3rd +Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were cruising +in the centre portion of the North Sea.</p> + +<p>From the 16th to the 19th the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet again cruised in the northern and central parts of +the North Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th +Cruiser Squadrons, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, and +the 2nd Flotilla. The 2nd Flotilla, however, could not +remain at sea on the 17th owing to bad weather and was +sent back to Scapa. A collision occurred between the +<i>Nemesis</i> and <i>Nymphe</i>, which necessitated the docking of +both vessels for repairs. The flotilla was ordered out +again from Scapa early on the 18th, but only seven +destroyers were available, and they reached the Fleet at +2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on that date.</p> + +<p>The Battle Fleet and cruisers carried out a strategical +exercise in the early morning of the 18th, and then +steered for the bases, a projected second exercise being +abandoned as the Fleet was by this time in an area which +was not considered safe from submarine attack; the +visibility was also very high, and it was suspected that +at least one enemy submarine might be in the neighbourhood.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span></p> + +<p>At noon the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 58.21 N., Long. +1.12 E., zigzagging at a speed of 15 knots, and the 4th +Battle Squadron had just been detached to proceed to +Cromarty, when at 12.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil +Burney commanding the 1st Battle Squadron signalled +that a submarine’s periscope had been sighted from the +<i>Marlborough</i>, the leading ship of the port wing column, +and that a torpedo fired by the submarine had passed just +astern of the <i>Neptune</i>, the rear ship of the column. The +Fleet was at once turned away from the submarine 12 +points to starboard (ships turning together) and speed +was increased to 17 knots.</p> + +<p>At 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing +under the stern of the remainder of the Battle Fleet and +signals were being made to Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton +Sturdee to steer clear of the position in which the submarine +was sighted, but before any movement was +effected the officer of the watch, Lieutenant-Commander +Piercy, of the <i>Dreadnought</i> of that Squadron, sighted a +periscope close to, one point on the port bow, the submarine +apparently steering a southerly course and +zigzagging. Captain Alderson, commanding the <i>Dreadnought</i>, +at once altered course direct for the submarine, +increased speed, followed, and rammed her. The bow +of the submarine came out of the water and her number, +U 29, was plainly visible. She sank immediately. The +<i>Blanche</i>, which passed close to the spot, reported a large +quantity of wreckage, one article of clothing and much oil +and bubbles on the surface, but no survivors.</p> + +<p>It seems probable that the captain of the submarine, +after firing at the 1st Battle Squadron, was confused by +the movements of the 4th Battle Squadron crossing astern +of the remainder of the zigzagging Fleet, at high speed, +and in trying to get clear failed to observe the <i>Dreadnought</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span> +until too late. The <i>Dreadnought</i> was admirably +handled.</p> + +<p>On arrival of the Fleet in harbour I wired to the +Admiralty urging that the fate of U 29 should be kept +secret. The secrecy regarding the loss of this submarine, +commanded by Commander Weddingen, was much +resented in Germany, and many accusations of treacherous +conduct levelled at the British, probably in the hope +that we might give information as to her fate. The policy +of secrecy was certainly correct, as it left the enemy +entirely ignorant of our methods, and possibly had some +effect of the moral of the submarine crews.</p> + +<p>The Fleet steered to the eastward until well clear of +the area in case other submarines were present, and then +shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 19th.</p> + +<p>On March 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases with the +intention of carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, but +the plan was abandoned and the Fleet returned to its +bases on the following day.</p> + +<p>The principal movements of destroyers during March, +additional to the regular patrols and fleet movements, +were as follows:</p> + +<p>From March 2nd to March 5th search was made by +a half flotilla for a number of oil drums reported as +moored in certain areas in the North Sea. The report +indicated that the enemy might be refuelling submarines +in this manner; the search disposed of the supposition.</p> + +<p>From March 8th to March 10th the Commander-in-Chief +Coast of Scotland, Sir Robert Lowry, in conjunction +with Vice-Admiral Bradford, who was the Senior +Flag Officer of Grand Fleet ships at Rosyth, and was, +therefore, responsible for all movements of these ships +from the Rosyth base, organised a search on a large<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span> +scale for a submarine reported to be operating off the +Aberdeenshire coast. The vessels employed in this operation +comprised trawler patrols and destroyers of the 1st +Flotilla, and they were rewarded on March 10th by +forcing the submarine—U 12—to the surface, when +H.M.S. <i>Ariel</i>, very skilfully handled, succeeded in ramming +and sinking her. Ten of her crew of twenty-eight +were rescued. The <i>Ariel</i> was considerably damaged, and +was docked at Leith for repairs.</p> + +<p>On March 20th and 21st a division of destroyers hunted +a submarine in the Moray Firth without success.</p> + +<p>On March 12th the <i>Faulknor</i> and six destroyers +were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate +against submarines in the Irish Sea.</p> + +<p>In the course of the month the small steamers, +specially fitted as mine-sweepers for the Grand Fleet, were +withdrawn for service abroad. The increasing number of +mines in the North Sea and the paucity of mine-sweepers +led me to decide on March 22nd to fit eight destroyers each +from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with light mine-sweeps, and +the work was taken in hand. These vessels were intended +to augment the regular force of mine-sweepers in an +emergency, as it was felt that a movement of the High +Sea Fleet for an important naval operation would in all +probability be preceded by extensive mine-laying outside +the Fleet bases, and a much stronger sweeping force than +we possessed was required to enable a passage for the +Fleet to be rapidly cleared.</p> + +<p>The <i>Conqueror</i> rejoined the Fleet on March 6th +after effecting repairs which had been carried out by +Messrs. Cammell Laird at Liverpool with most commendable +rapidity.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron experienced a further loss<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span> +during March, the <i>Bayano</i> being sunk by a submarine off +Corsewall Point, Galloway, on March 11th, with considerable +loss of life.</p> + +<p>In the course of this month Rear-Admiral W. L. +Grant succeeded Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham in +command of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the latter succeeding +Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon Moore in command of the +2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron; Vice-Admiral Patey +transferred his flag from the <i>Australia</i> to the <i>Leviathan</i> +to proceed to the West Indies as Commander-in-Chief, +and the 6th Cruiser Squadron was broken up, the ships +being transferred to service abroad.</p> + +<p>The enemy submarines were very active against merchant +shipping during March, and our losses were considerable, +both from this cause and from mines.</p> + +<p>During March the weather at the northern bases was +not very boisterous, but a great deal of mist and fog was +prevalent during the first fortnight, and during the last +fortnight snow fell on at least seven days. An average +of fifty-six ships per week was intercepted by the ships of +the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month.</p> + +<p>During April, 1915, intended Fleet movements were +prevented on several occasions by bad weather, and the +10th Cruiser Squadron and other ships at sea experienced +exceptional gales; the principal movements carried out +were as follows:</p> + +<p>From the 5th to the 8th the 3rd Battle Squadron, +3rd Cruiser Squadron and five destroyers of the 1st +Flotilla cruised in the North Sea (central portion), and +from the 5th to the 9th the Battle Cruiser Fleet with +eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the northern +portion of the North Sea.</p> + +<p>On April 8th the <i>Lancaster</i>, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, +and the <i>Caribbean</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span> +were detached to watch the Norwegian coast between +Lat. 62 and 64 N.</p> + +<p>On April 11th the whole Grand Fleet proceeded to +sea; the Battle Fleet met the Battle Cruiser Fleet +and 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth, and cruised in the +centre portion of the North Sea during the 12th and +13th, returning to the various bases on the 14th to fuel. +The opportunity was taken of carrying out battle +exercises.</p> + +<p>Whilst the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was passing +down east of the Orkneys at 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and was +being met by the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, which had come +out to screen the ships in, the <i>Neptune</i> reported having +sighted a submarine’s periscope, but as the Fleet was +steaming at 18 knots and the destroyers were taking up +screening stations it was not considered that successful +attack was probable, and the Fleet held its course for +Scapa.</p> + +<p>Submarines were also sighted during the day by the +<i>Antrim</i> in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 1.2 E., and by the +Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.40 E., +but no successful attack resulted.</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea again for a sweep +in southern waters on the 17th, and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the +18th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 1st, 2nd, +and 7th Cruiser Squadrons looking out ahead and the 2nd +and 4th Flotillas screening, was in Lat. 57.25 N., Long. +1.4 E., steering at 18 knots’ speed for a position in +Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 3.30 E., where it was intended to +meet the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron +from Rosyth.</p> + +<p>The junction took place at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the Battle Cruiser +Fleet, which had been ordered to a position a little farther +south, arriving there at this time. No enemy vessels<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span> +having been sighted, the whole Fleet was turned to the +northward shortly before dusk, when in the vicinity of +the Little Fisher Bank, to the westward of Northern Denmark. +During the night the 3rd Battle Squadron and +3rd Cruiser Squadron were detached to return to Rosyth, +and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas to Scapa; the Vice-Admiral, +Battle Cruiser Fleet, was directed to cruise independently +on the 19th; and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with +the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, proceeded to the +eastward of the Shetlands; target practice was carried +out during daylight of the 19th and the night of the 19th–20th, +and the Battle Fleet returned to its bases at Scapa +and Cromarty during the night of the 20th–21st and +fuelled. During the cruise the <i>Achilles</i>, of the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron, reported sighting a submarine at 2.40 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 18th.</p> + +<p>On the 19th the <i>Albemarle</i> and <i>Russell</i>, of the 6th +Battle Squadron, which had rejoined the 3rd Battle +Squadron from the Channel ports, were detached from +Rosyth to Scapa for practices.</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet again proceeded to sea on the night +of the 21st for another sweep towards the Danish coast, +and at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 22nd the forces from Scapa and +Cromarty, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, +<i>Russell</i> and <i>Albemarle</i>, 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser +Squadrons, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, were in position +Lat. 58.4 N., Long. 0.27 E.</p> + +<p>At 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser +Squadron joined the Commander-in-Chief, and the Battle +Cruiser Fleet took station ahead of the cruiser screen. +At dusk no enemy ships had been sighted and the Fleet +turned to the northward again, the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> position +being Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 4.53 E.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">213</span> +the Battle Cruiser Fleet were detached to return to Rosyth +during the night, and the remainder of the Fleet arrived +at the Scapa and Cromarty bases on the 23rd.</p> + +<p>During these two southerly sweeps the Fleet sighted +a large number of neutral steamers and trawlers which +were closely examined, but nothing suspicious was found, +although the interception of German wireless messages, +when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the trawlers, raised +suspicions that they were acting as look-out vessels; this +suspicion was strengthened by carrier pigeons being +sighted from various ships.</p> + +<p>One Norwegian steamer which was found to be carrying +magnetic ore to Rotterdam was sent to the Firth of +Forth.</p> + +<p>Movements of interest of individual ships during +April included the arrival of the <i>Lion</i> at Rosyth on the 7th +after completion of all repairs, the arrival of the new +Battleship <i>Warspite</i>, of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, +at Scapa on the 13th, and the commissioning on the 26th +of four more mercantile vessels to join the 10th Cruiser +Squadron.</p> + +<p>The <i>Invincible</i> was sent to the Tyne to change some +of her 12-inch guns, which had become worn during the +Falkland Island engagement.</p> + +<p>On April 10th Rear-Admiral Tottenham succeeded +Rear-Admiral Waymouth in command of the 7th Cruiser +Squadron, the latter officer’s health having unfortunately +broken down.</p> + +<p>On April 7th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron were rearranged somewhat in view of the +lengthening of the days:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang7"> +<p>Patrol Area A was north of the Faroes, the centre line being occasionally shifted.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span></p> + +<p>Patrol Area C had as its centre a line from Cape Sydero in the Faroe Islands to Lat. 58.30 N., Long. 8.0 W.</p> + +<p>Patrol Area E was north of Iceland.</p> + +<p>Patrol Area F was south of Iceland.</p> + +<p>Patrol Area G had as its centre the meridian of 3° E. Long. between Lat. 62 N. and 63½ N. A cruiser was sent to strengthen the patrol in this area.</p> +</div> + +<p>During the month the average number of vessels +intercepted weekly by the ships of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron was 68, of which an average number of 23 was +sent in weekly for examination.</p> + +<p>Enemy submarines were very active in April, and +destroyers were sent out frequently from the Fleet +bases to endeavour to destroy craft reported in the +vicinity—particularly in the neighbourhood of the Fair +Island Channel—but no success was achieved, except +in the case of the <i>Ariel</i> and U 12. The look-out and +navigational arrangements for the Pentland Firth were +improved during April by the establishment of telephonic +communications between Scapa and the Island of Swona. +Arrangements were also gradually perfected for obtaining +the exhibition of all navigational lights and fog signals +in the Pentland Firth on demand by our ships at all +times. The weather at Scapa during April was bad.</p> + +<p>Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, +9th and 10th. There was a great deal of mist and fog +during the latter part of the month as well as a moderate +amount of snow.</p> + +<p>The enemy laid a large mine-field in the middle of +the southern portion of the North Sea during April, thus +pursuing the policy which it was expected he would +adopt, regardless of the interests of neutrals. Fortunately, +information as to its existence was obtained in +time to prevent any of our ships from falling victims<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span> +to the mines. But the mine-field was undoubtedly well +placed strategically so as to interfere with the freedom of +movement of our Fleet in southern waters if it were +endeavouring to bring the High Sea Fleet to action, since +it necessitated our ships making a wide detour to the +eastward or westward to reach the waters to the southward +of the mine-field; it was doubtless laid with this +object in view.</p> + +<p>In May the Grand Fleet flotillas were much occupied +in endeavouring to locate and destroy enemy submarines, +and the movements of the heavy ships were curtailed +during the month owing to the absence of destroyers for +the purpose of acting as a submarine screen.</p> + +<p>The principal work of the destroyers in this connection—officers +and men showing a fine spirit in carrying +out what were frequently fruitless searches—was as +follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>May 1st–3rd.</i>—The 2nd Flotilla was engaged in operations +against enemy submarines reported, first, in the Fair Island +Channel and, then, to the eastward and south-eastward of the +Pentland Firth. The flotilla did not succeed in gaining touch +with the submarines.</p> + +<p><i>May 5th–7th.</i>—One half of the 1st Flotilla was searching for +a submarine off the Aberdeenshire coast, without result.</p> + +<p><i>May 7th.</i>—One division of the 2nd Flotilla was acting against +a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel, and then +proceeded to work down the shipping route west of the Hebrides +and Ireland in the hope of catching a submarine attacking +trade.</p> + +<p><i>May 8th.</i>—Half the 4th Flotilla was searching for submarines +off the east coast of the Orkneys.</p> + +<p><i>May 10th–11th.</i>—A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching +for a submarine reported to be off North Ronaldshay; later, +this division was reinforced by all available destroyers from +Scapa, with orders that the force was to continue the search +during the night, burning searchlights to assist the work and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span> +cause the submarine to submerge, thus exhausting her battery +power.</p> + +<p><i>May 13th.</i>—Six destroyers were searching for a submarine +reported west of Thurso.</p> + +<p><i>May 15th.</i>—A division of the 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to +operate against a submarine off Aberdeen.</p> + +<p><i>May 16th.</i>—A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching for +a submarine reported approaching the Fair Island Channel.</p> + +<p><i>May 19th–20th.</i>—A division of the 4th Flotilla was acting +against a submarine reported west of the Orkneys.</p> +</div> + +<p>The principal Fleet movements during the month +were:</p> + +<p><i>May 2nd to May 5th.</i>—Two forces, each consisting +of two light cruisers and eight destroyers, were engaged +in carrying out a thorough examination of all vessels, +especially fishing craft, found in the areas usually traversed +by the Fleet during southerly sweeps in order to +ascertain whether any were acting as German look-out +ships under neutral colours. A considerable number of +vessels were examined, especially trawlers, and some were +sent in for more detailed examination at the bases, but +nothing incriminating was discovered.</p> + +<p>Between May 5th and 10th the 3rd Battle Squadron +and 3rd Cruiser Squadron cruised in the northern portion +of the North Sea, being screened out from Rosyth by a +half flotilla. On the return towards Rosyth in Lat. 56.49 +N., Long. 0.39 E., and before being met by the screening +destroyers, the 3rd Battle Squadron, two torpedoes +were fired by a submarine; they were aimed apparently +at the <i>Dominion</i>, but both missed. The squadron was in +division in line ahead, steaming at 15 knots, and was zigzagging +at the time.</p> + +<p>On May 6th the mine-layer <i>Orvieto</i> and eight destroyers +left Scapa to carry out a mine-laying operation +in the Heligoland Bight. The force ran into a dense fog,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span> +and a collision occurred between the destroyers <i>Comet</i> +and <i>Nemesis</i>, the latter being seriously damaged. The +force was directed to return and left Scapa again on the +8th, carrying out the operation successfully during the +night of the 10th–11th; it returned on the 12th.</p> + +<p>The light cruisers <i>Phaeton</i> and <i>Royalist</i> left Scapa on +May 12th for a position north of the Shetlands, in order +to intercept a neutral steamer reported to have left +Bremerhaven on May 11th with wireless installations on +board. The C Patrol of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was +also moved to a position to intercept this vessel, and the +light cruiser <i>Sappho</i> and armed boarding steamer <i>Amsterdam</i> +were placed on the western side of the Fair Island +Channel. The force returned on the 14th, the report +proving to be incorrect.</p> + +<p>The whole Grand Fleet carried out a sweep of the +central part of the North Sea between May 17th and +19th, the forces from Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth meeting +at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 0.0 at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +on the 8th, and sweeping to the south-eastward at a speed +of 16 knots until the afternoon, with the Battle Cruiser +Fleet some thirty to fifty miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. +The Fleet returned to its bases on the 19th, not having +sighted any hostile vessels. Battle tactics were exercised +during the passage north.</p> + +<p>On May 21st the Fleet mine-sweepers, which had been +sent to Aberdeen beforehand in readiness, left with an +escort of two light cruisers to examine the mine-field +reported to have been laid in the centre of the southern +portion of the North Sea. Two of the sweepers collided +in a fog on leaving Aberdeen, and another went ashore; +the remainder proceeded and located the north-east corner +of the mine-field on the 22nd and 23rd; they returned to +Aberdeen on the 24th, after examining <i lang="fr">en route</i> a position<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span> +in which it was reported that paraffin barrels were moored. +These were destroyed. It was thought that they might be +intended for German submarines.</p> + +<p>Whilst the Fleet sweepers located the north-east +corner of the mine-field, paddle sweepers, under the escort +of two light cruisers from Harwich, located the south-west +corner. The search was subsequently continued under the +same conditions, and the limits of the mine-field, which +covered a large area south of Lat. 56 N. and east +of Long. 2.30 E., were determined. The enemy made +no attempt to interfere with the sweeping operations, if +indeed he was aware of them.</p> + +<p>On the 21st the patrol, comprising the <i>Sappho</i> and +armed boarding steamers, hitherto maintained in an area +east and south-east of the Pentland Firth, was moved temporarily +to the west of the Firth on account of submarine +activity. Destroyers from the Grand Fleet replaced the +original patrol at night, the interception of mercantile +traffic being carried out by the armed boarding steamers +to the westward. The destroyer <i>Rifleman</i> grounded in a +fog on the 22nd, necessitating docking for repairs.</p> + +<p>A new form of anti-submarine operation was begun +on May 23rd by the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland +(Admiral Sir R. Lowry). This consisted of two +C-class submarines operating with an armed trawler, +the idea being that the trawler should invite attack by a +submarine, thus giving our submarines an opportunity of +sinking the enemy by torpedo attack.</p> + +<p>On May 24th the Admiralty telegraphed that Italy +had entered the War on the side of the Allies.</p> + +<p>On the next day I proceeded in the <i>Iron Duke</i> to +Rosyth to confer with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who +had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. The conference +took place on the 26th and was of an important<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span> +nature. The general naval policy, so far as it concerned +the Grand Fleet, was discussed, and arrangements made +as to the procedure to be followed in future. Sir Henry +Jackson asked that Commodore Everett might join him +at the Admiralty as Naval Assistant, and, with the consent +of Commodore Everett, this was arranged. His place as +Captain of the Fleet was filled by Captain Lionel Halsey, +C.M.G., of the <i>New Zealand</i>. It was with great regret +that I parted with Commodore Everett; his long experience +in the Fleet under Sir George Callaghan and his +intimate knowledge of fleet work and unfailing tact had +been of the greatest possible assistance. The <i>Iron Duke</i> +returned to Scapa on the morning of the 28th. On the +26th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, C.B., had +hoisted his flag in the <i>Invincible</i> as Rear-Admiral commanding +the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The battleship +<i>Queen Elizabeth</i> arrived at Scapa from the Dardanelles +on the same day.</p> + +<p>From May 29th to 31st the Grand Fleet carried out +another sweep in the North Sea, the direction on this occasion +being towards the Dogger Bank. The forces from +Scapa and Cromarty concentrated in Lat. 57.35 N., +Long. 0.0 at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 30th, and steered to the +southward at 17 knots’ speed. The Rosyth force steered +for a point farther south and was in sight from the cruiser +line at 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M</span>., being ordered to keep ahead of the Fleet. +The sweep was continued until the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet was in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. No enemy +vessel was sighted.</p> + +<p>The Fleet then turned to the northward and, owing +to a northerly swell, speed had to be reduced on account +of the destroyers. During the night the Rosyth force was +detached to its base. Speed was increased as the weather +improved, and the Scapa and Cromarty forces arrived on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span> +the morning of May 31st. The <i>Iron Duke</i> left Scapa for +Cromarty during the afternoon of May 31st, and arrived +that evening.</p> + +<p>During the month the procedure of moving squadrons +between Scapa and Cromarty was continued. At this +period a second line of submarine obstructions, which was +designed to prevent the entry of destroyers, as well as +submarines, into Scapa Flow, advanced considerably towards +completion. Progress was also made with the +laying of mine-fields at the entrance. The anchorage at +Swarbachs Minn, in the Shetlands, had been selected as +a secondary coaling base for the ships of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron, and steps were taken to prepare a submarine +obstruction for the entrance, and to provide the necessary +labour for coaling the ships from colliers.</p> + +<p>The blockade work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued +actively during the month, the average number +of ships intercepted per week being 62, and the average +number sent into port for closer examination, 16.</p> + +<p>The weather at Scapa during the month was misty, +fog being experienced on the 5th, 6th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, +27th and 28th, and snow on the 11th and 12th. The wind +during the month was not strong.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII"><span id="toclink_221"></span>CHAPTER VIII<br> + +<span class="subhead">GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">In</span> the early summer of 1915 there was a vague impression +in some quarters, unsupported, so far as I am aware, by +any confirmatory evidence, that the enemy might exhibit +greater activity at sea. But during June, so far as +could be ascertained by our intelligence system and by +our submarine patrols, the Germans made no attempt to +move to sea, but concentrated attention on increased +submarine activity. The Grand Fleet, for various reasons +unconnected with this development, spent the greater +part of the time in harbour, exercising in Scapa Flow, +the ships from the Rosyth base being sent up in pairs to +exercise and carry out gunnery and torpedo practices. +The opportunity of this change of base was usually taken +for a searching sweep whilst <i lang="fr">en route</i> between the +bases, so that the North Sea was continually under observation.</p> + +<p>On June 11th, however, the Grand Fleet went to +sea for a cruise in northern waters principally for gunnery +practices and battle exercises, which were carried out on +a large scale. On this occasion the sea-planes working +from the <i>Campania</i> were utilised, so far as I am aware, +for the first time in history in observing the movements +of the squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large +hostile fleet. From this beginning, there was a great +development in the work of heavier-than-air craft operating +with a fleet. The first step was the provision of a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span> +flying-off deck in a ship for sea-planes, as the extreme +difficulty experienced by sea-planes in rising from the +water, except in very fine weather, rendered the provision +of a flying-off deck essential; the next was the substitution +of aeroplanes for sea-planes, working from special +carriers; and, finally, the provision of flying-off platforms +in fighting ships themselves, first in light cruisers, afterwards +in battle cruisers, and, eventually, in battleships; +these successive developments were rendered possible by +the progressive improvement in aircraft. In this way, +naval power was given the assistance which air power +could give it, both in reconnaissance and in making its +gunnery more effective.</p> + +<p>The Scapa force proceeded to the westward through +the Pentland Firth on the 11th. It carried out target +practice at special targets towed by colliers to the north-westward +of the Shetlands on the 12th, being joined by +the Cromarty force (the 1st Battle Squadron and 7th +Cruiser Squadron) that evening; the fleet then separated +for night-firing.</p> + +<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had also left Rosyth +on the 11th, carried out night-firing on the 12th, and the +whole Grand Fleet practised battle exercises on the 13th, +the Battle Cruiser Fleet afterwards firing at the targets +which were towed by colliers, and rejoining my flag at +daylight on the 14th. On that day further battle exercises +were carried out. The <i>Campania</i>, with her sea-planes, +again took part in these exercises, and an improvement +in the scouting work of the sea-planes was +noticeable. The Fleet then returned to the various bases, +the Scapa force passing westward of the Orkneys.</p> + +<p>Whilst the main portion of the Grand Fleet was exercising +in northern waters, the 3rd Battle Squadron and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">223</span> +3rd Cruiser Squadron, with one-half of the 1st Flotilla, +cruised in the central portion of the North Sea.</p> + +<p>Other operations during the month included:</p> + +<p>From the 1st to the 3rd, and the 5th to the 7th, further +mine-sweeping operations were carried out by the +Fleet sweepers and paddle sweepers in connection with the +German mine-field in the southern portion of the North +Sea, the operation being covered by four light cruisers and +a force of destroyers. The work of clearing that portion +of the mine-field, which it was decided to sweep up, was +completed on the 7th. On several days during the month +a force from Harwich, comprising light cruisers and destroyers, +was cruising off the Dutch coast with the object +of intercepting and attacking zeppelins. The force did +not, however, meet with any success.</p> + +<p>From the 4th to the 7th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, +with three armed boarding-steamers and three destroyers, +operated on the two trade routes, St. Abbs Head to the +Skagerrak and Rotterdam to Norwegian ports, examining +all vessels encountered; nothing of special interest +occurred. But when returning during a thick fog to +Scapa the armed boarding-steamer <i>Duke of Albany</i> +grounded on the Lother Rock, Pentland Firth, at 4 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +on the 7th, remained ashore for seven days, and was considerably +damaged.</p> + +<p>From the 18th to the 21st the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, +with the light cruisers <i>Nottingham</i> and <i>Birmingham</i>, of +the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied by four +destroyers, swept across the North Sea, steering to the +eastward from Rosyth to the entrance to the Skagerrak, +thence to the coast of Norway and back to Rosyth. This +force was attacked by at least three submarines during +the sweep, and torpedoes were fired at the <i>Birmingham</i> +on the 19th, and at the <i>Argyll</i>, the <i>Roxburgh</i> (on two<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">224</span> +occasions), and the <i>Nottingham</i> on the 20th. Two torpedoes +were fired at the <i>Nottingham</i>. These ships were proceeding +at high speed and all the attacks failed, except +the second attack on the <i>Roxburgh</i> (Captain C. R. de C. +Foot), which was hit in the bows by a torpedo at 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on +the 20th in Lat. 56.47 N., Long. 0.38 E. Fortunately, +the damage was well forward, and the <i>Roxburgh</i> was able +to maintain a speed of 14 knots during her return to +Rosyth, all available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla being +sent out to meet and screen her in. At the time of the +attack the <i>Roxburgh</i> was proceeding at high speed and +zigzagging, with one destroyer screening her. The ship +was considerably damaged, and her repairs at a dockyard +occupied a lengthened period.</p> + +<p>The incident furnished an example of the risks run +by heavy ships cruising in the North Sea in waters frequented +by submarines, unless accompanied by a much +stronger screen of destroyers than it was possible to provide +owing to the paucity of destroyers and the immense +amount of work required of them. It was noted at the +time, and considered to be suspicious, that a large fleet +of trawlers flying neutral colours was fishing in the neighbourhood +of these submarine attacks.</p> + +<p>As a result a force comprising three armed boarding-steamers +and three destroyers was despatched from Scapa +on June 26th to examine a fleet of neutral fishing vessels +working to the south-eastward of the Pentland Firth and +on the ordinary track of the Fleet when proceeding to sea. +Six vessels were sent in for detailed examination, but +nothing suspicious was found on board. The fishing fleet, +however, shifted its ground to a position clear of the track +of the Fleet.</p> + +<p>Operations against enemy submarines carried out by +Grand Fleet forces during June included the following:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>June 1st to 2nd.</i>—A division of destroyers endeavoured, without +success, to locate and attack a submarine 60 to 80 miles to +the eastward of May Island.</p> + +<p><i>June 4th to 5th.</i>—Two destroyers and two sloops operated +against a submarine, with a supposed tender, to the eastward +of the Pentland Firth.</p> + +<p><i>June 5th.</i>—The armed trawler <i>Hawk</i>, of the Peterhead area, +disabled submarine U 14 by gun fire and sank her by ramming +at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> in Lat. 57.15 N., Long. 0.32 E. One officer and +21 men were rescued. It was a fine exploit, typical of the consistently +good work of the vessels of the Peterhead patrol; it +was a success that was specially welcome at this time when submarines +were very active in northern waters.</p> +</div> + +<p>There were many other engagements between auxiliary +patrols and submarines during the month, but no +other <em>certain</em> successes. It was believed that at least one +submarine was sunk in a deep mine-field which had been +laid at my request off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast. +Appended are notes of further operations against the +enemy’s under-water craft:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>June 18th and 19th.</i>—Anti-submarine operations by three destroyers +and sloops were carried out in the Fair Island Channel.</p> + +<p><i>June 20th.</i>—Four destroyers were operating against submarines +to the westward of the Orkneys.</p> + +<p><i>June 21st and 22nd.</i>—The <i>Botha</i> and eight destroyers of the +1st Flotilla were operating against submarines in an area between +Lat. 56.20 and 57.10 N. and Long. 1 E. to 1 W.</p> + +<p><i>June 21st.</i>—Four destroyers and six gunboats were operating +to the east of the Pentland Firth against a submarine.</p> + +<p><i>June 23rd.</i>—Submarine U 40 was sunk 50 miles S.E. by S. +of Girdle Ness at 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> by submarine C 24, working in company +with a trawler.</p> + +<p><i>June 23rd.</i>—A division of destroyers was sent to operate +against a submarine to westward of the Fair Island Channel.</p> + +<p><i>June 24th–26th.</i>—Three sloops were engaged in searching for +a submarine to the eastward of Orkneys and Shetlands.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">226</span></p> + +<p><i>June 26th.</i>—A large force, comprising 20 armed trawlers +from Granton in the Firth of Forth, began to operate against +submarines in an area round Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E., remaining +out until July 7th. Two armed trawlers, with C class submarines +in company, were also operating to the southward of this +position.</p> + +<p><i>June 30th–July 1st.</i>—A force of eight destroyers was operating +against submarines in the Fair Island Channel.</p> +</div> + +<p>The anti-submarine operations by destroyers or sloops +met with no success. The invariable difficulty was the +provision of a sufficiently large number of vessels to keep +the submarine down long enough to cause her to exhaust +her battery power, a period of some 48 hours. When +destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet were used for +anti-submarine operations at any distance from the base, +the disadvantage of their not being available to accompany +the Fleet to sea in an emergency had to be accepted. +This would have led to awkward results had the Fleet +proceeded to sea with any considerable shortage of destroyers +for screening purposes on passage south and for +Fleet purposes during a Fleet action. The dilemma was +one which faced me during the whole period of my command +of the Fleet.</p> + +<p>My experience convinced me that anti-submarine +operations by destroyers in such open waters as existed +near the northern bases had but little prospect of success +unless undertaken by a considerably larger number of +vessels than were usually available at Scapa for such +operations; a contributory reason for the shortage of destroyers +was that in addition to the operations carried out +by the heavy ships, cruisers and light cruisers, for which +the presence of destroyers was necessary, there was a +constant call on these vessels for escort work during the +movements of single ships or of squadrons between bases.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">227</span></p> + +<p>Other events of interest during this month included:</p> + +<p>The formation of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron of +new light cruisers under the command of the late Commodore +Le Mesurier, C.B., in the <i>Calliope</i>. This +squadron was attached to the Battle Fleet, and in cruising +order at sea was usually stationed from three to five miles +ahead of the Battle Fleet to act as an advanced submarine +screen forcing submarines to dive. From this position +it could reach the van of the Fleet on deployment for +action, and was stationed there for the purpose of attacking +enemy destroyers with gunfire and the enemy’s Battle +Fleet with torpedoes. It was a squadron on which, as +Commander-in-Chief, I kept a hold so that I might be +certain it would be at my disposal when action with the +enemy was joined. Other light cruiser squadrons, which +occupied an advanced position in the cruiser screen, could +not be depended upon with the same certainty to occupy +the van position to which they were allotted during a fleet +action, since they might become engaged with enemy vessels +of the same class.</p> + +<p>The battle cruiser <i>Inflexible</i> joined the Fleet from +Gibraltar on June 19th.</p> + +<p>The <i>Liverpool</i> left to pay off on the 26th for repair +to boilers. Rear-Admiral W. B. Fawckner took charge +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron base at Swarbachs Minn on +the 18th.</p> + +<p>During the month observation mine-fields at the entrance +to Cromarty and off Hoy Sound, Scapa Flow, were +completed.</p> + +<p>A short visit was paid to the Fleet at Scapa Flow by +the Archbishop of York on the 26th. He held a Fleet +Confirmation in the <i>Iron Duke</i>, a great open-air service +on Flotta Island, many thousands of officers and men attending; +there was another service at Longhope, and, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">228</span> +addition, he visited the majority of the ships. He was +indeed indefatigable and left amidst the most sincere expressions +of regret. To me personally his visit gave the +greatest pleasure. From Scapa he passed to Invergordon, +where, during a two days’ stay, he held a large open-air +service, and visited most of the ships based there, moving +on to Rosyth, where an impressive open-air service +took place in one of the large graving-docks.</p> + +<p>The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued +throughout the month, an average of 73 ships being intercepted +weekly and 15 sent in for detailed examination.</p> + +<p>A serious attack was made by an enemy submarine +on the fishing fleet some 50 miles to the eastward of +the Shetlands on the night of the 23rd–24th June, about +16 drifters being sunk by bombs and gunfire. This incident +emphasised the necessity for better control over the +movements of our fishing vessels in northern waters and +of providing some form of protection for them. Steps +were taken in both directions, although they naturally +resulted in some unavoidable reduction in the operations +of the fishing fleet.</p> + +<p>The weather at Scapa during June was very misty, +fog or mist being experienced on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th, +26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th.</p> + +<p>During July, 1915, fleet movements were kept to the +lowest possible minimum owing to a threatened strike in +the Welsh coal-fields, which eventually took place on the +18th, and caused considerable anxiety as to its effect on +Fleet movements.</p> + +<p>From the 11th to the 14th the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, and the +<i>Campania</i> cruised in the vicinity of the Shetland Islands +and carried out a series of battle exercises during the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span> +cruise. The Battle Cruiser Fleet made a sweep between +the 11th and 13th down to the Dogger Bank. Whilst +the Battle Fleet was at sea the destroyer flotillas were +sent into Balta Sound (Shetland Islands) to complete +with fuel in case a move south on the part of the Battle +Fleet became necessary.</p> + +<p>On the 28th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with +two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd +Light Cruiser Squadron, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, +and 14 destroyers of the 1st and 4th Flotillas from Rosyth +and Scapa, together with Commodore Tyrwhitt and four +light cruisers and 12 destroyers from Harwich, left their +bases to carry out an operation in the Skagerrak, with the +object of intercepting trade and searching for any enemy +vessels. Only one German vessel (a trawler) was encountered, +and she was sunk after removal of the crew. A +Danish steamer was sent in to a British port with a guard +on board and the force returned to their various bases on +the 31st.</p> + +<p>As the threatened coal strike limited the movements +of the coal-burning heavy ships, the oil-burning destroyers +were used for anti-submarine work to a greater extent +than would have been desirable if greater activity of the +Fleet had been anticipated.</p> + +<p>Operations against enemy submarines included:</p> + +<p>On July 1st the <i>Hampshire</i> reported that a torpedo +had been fired at her in the Moray Firth. Twelve destroyers +and all available local patrol vessels were sent to +endeavour to locate and sink the submarine. The steamboats +from the ships at Cromarty were also despatched +to operate in the various bays in the Moray Firth, where +a submarine might elect to lie on the bottom. The boats +exploded a large number of charges on the bottom in the +hope of forcing any submarine to the surface. The operations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span> +were abandoned on the evening of the 2nd, the submarine +not having been located.</p> + +<p>On the 4th a division of the 2nd Flotilla hunted for +another submarine reported in the Moray Firth.</p> + +<p>From the 5th to the 10th the sea-plane carrier <i>Campania</i>, +with a flotilla leader, eight destroyers, four sloops +and a large number of trawlers and net-drifters, operated +against submarines that were reported to be passing +through the Fair Island Channel, being based on Pierowall +Harbour, in the north of the Orkneys. The destroyers, +sloops and patrol vessels operated in conjunction +with the sea-planes. No success was achieved, however, +although these extensive operations covered a large area.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 16th a division of destroyers +operated against a submarine reported to the southward +of the Pentland Firth, off Duncansby Head, but again +without result.</p> + +<p>From the 15th to the 19th six sloops and seven gunboats +were despatched against submarines in the Fair +Island Channel and north of the Shetlands, the <i>Campania’s</i> +sea-planes again assisting from Pierowall Harbour. +Destroyers were also helping during a portion of +the period covered by the operations. On the 16th the +gunboat <i>Speedwell</i> reported having sighted the periscope +of a submarine, ramming her at a speed of 15 knots. The +submarine was struck on her starboard quarter at an angle +of 10 degrees, but there was, unfortunately, no evidence +to show that she was sunk, although it was probable that +she was considerably damaged. She was not seen again. +On the same day a submarine was reported by the armed +yacht <i>Zaza</i>, as being in a drift-net 12 miles east-north-east +from Fair Island. Local patrol vessels, gunboats +and four destroyers concentrated on the position and explosive +charges were fired, but without certain result.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span> +From the 25th to the 27th a sub-division of destroyers +searched, fruitlessly, a large area to the northward of the +Hebrides for submarines and a reported submarine base +ship. They were assisted by four sloops operating in the +area from the 26th to the 30th.</p> + +<p>On the 18th and 19th a division of destroyers was +engaged in moving a neutral fishing fleet away from an +area to the eastward of the Firth of Forth where they +interfered with Fleet operations. Submarine C 27 had +for some little time been operating against submarines in +the North Sea from Scapa, in tow of a trawler, to which +vessel she was connected by telephone. This idea, which +had first been conceived at the Rosyth base, had also been +put into operation at Scapa, the arrangements being +made under the direction of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville. +On July 20th the trawler <i>Princess Louise</i>, Lieutenant +Morton, R.N.R., being in command, with Lieutenant +Cantlie, R.N., a submarine officer, on board, was towing +Submarine C 27 (Lieutenant-Commander Dobson) in a +submerged condition when a German submarine, U 23, +was sighted 1¼ miles off on the port bow. C 27 was informed +by telephone, telephonic communication then +breaking down. U 23 opened fire at a range of 2,000 +yards on the <i>Princess Louise</i>. Lieutenant Cantlie, being +unable to communicate further with C 27, slipped the +tow and proceeded to abandon the trawler with every +appearance of haste. U 23 closed to within 600 yards +and stopped. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Dobson, +hearing nothing further by telephone, but noticing +the splash and explosion of the projectiles in the water, +got well clear of the trawler after slipping, and then +brought his periscope to the surface for a look around. +He sighted U 23 about 900 yards off, closed to a good +position for attack within 500 yards, and fired his first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">232</span> +torpedo, which missed. His second shot hit; there was a +heavy explosion, and U 23 sank; four officers and six men +were picked up out of a crew of 34. The whole attack +was exceedingly well managed and a very well deserved +success scored, which reflected much credit on all concerned +in the operations.</p> + +<p>On the 26th a submarine was engaged about 120 miles +east of Dundee by the armed trawler <i>Taranaki</i>, which +claimed to have sunk her.</p> + +<p>On the 27th an engagement took place between the +armed trawler No. 830 and a submarine to the southward +of St. Kilda, the trawler reporting that the submarine was +hit several times by gunfire and considered to have been +badly damaged.</p> + +<p>Other events of interest during the month included +an attempt by the <i>Digby</i> to tow the Norwegian steamer +<i>Oscar II.</i>, damaged by collision with the <i>Patuca</i> on July +1st, into Stornoway, the destroyers <i>Fury</i> and <i>Staunch</i> +being detached from Scapa and local patrol vessels from +Stornoway to assist. In spite of perseverance under very +bad weather conditions, during which the ships and the +destroyers were handled with great ability, the <i>Oscar II.</i> +sank on the night of the 3rd.</p> + +<p>An expedition consisting of the armed merchant-ship +<i>Columbella</i>, the sloop <i>Acacia</i> and the two trawlers <i>Arley</i> +and <i>Mafeking</i>, left Scapa on July 29th for Bear Island +and Spitzbergen to search for a reported German submarine +base and wireless station. These vessels carried +out as thorough a search as was possible, in face of the +ice-fields in the neighbourhood of the islands; but no trace +of a submarine base was discovered, nor could it have been +possible for one to operate under such conditions.</p> + +<p>The average figures per week for the 10th Cruiser +Squadron during the month were:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">233</span></p> + +<p>Number of ships intercepted, 62; number of ships +sent in with armed guards, 10; number of ships on patrol, +15; number of ships refitting, coaling or on passage to or +from base, 9.</p> + +<p>German submarines were active in the vicinity of the +ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, and +the <i>Columbella</i> was unsuccessfully attacked on the 21st.</p> + +<p>Some armed boarding steamers were detailed to assist +the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, being withdrawn +from the patrol eastward of the Pentland Firth.</p> + +<p>The anti-submarine defence of the base at Swarbachs +Minn was practically completed during the month.</p> + +<p>An event of great interest to the officers and men of +the Fleet was a visit from His Majesty the King, who +arrived at Scapa on July 7th, crossing from Thurso in the +<i>Oak</i>, escorted by a portion of the 2nd Flotilla. +During His Majesty’s visit he stayed with Admiral Sir +Stanley Colville at Longhope and spent two very busy +days with the Fleet. His Majesty visited all the flagships, +and a large number of the officers and men of the ships +of each division of the Battle Fleet and of each vessel in +the cruiser squadrons were assembled on board the various +flagships and passed before the King. His Majesty +reviewed the officers and men of the smaller vessels, destroyers, +sloops, etc., on the island of Flotta, visited hospital +ships, and reviewed the great mass of auxiliary +vessels anchored in Scapa Flow, being greeted with enthusiastic +loyalty by the crews of these vessels: visited the +various shore batteries, and inspected the anti-submarine +defences and the boom vessels. The weather was bad, but +the programme was carried out in spite of these conditions. +The officers and men of the Fleet derived the utmost +encouragement from His Majesty’s gracious visit. +The King made the following signal to the Commander-in-Chief<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span> +as the <i>Oak</i> left the Fleet, escorted by a portion of +the 4th Flotilla:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long-cherished +desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most interesting +days spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and +admiration for the splendid force which you command with the +full confidence of myself and your fellow-countrymen.</p> + +<p>“I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the +officers and men of the Fleet. I realise the patience and determined +spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting +and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links +all ranks together.</p> + +<p>“Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever +the day of battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its +old glorious traditions.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In reply to His Majesty’s gracious message, I expressed +the appreciation of the officers and men of the +Grand Fleet, adding that it was “my conviction that the +glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in the hands of +those I have the honour to command.”</p> + +<p>During August the coal strike continued to influence +Fleet movements to a certain extent.</p> + +<p>On August 2nd the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the 2nd Battle Squadron +and the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out target practice +from Cromarty. This was a new departure, the +practice hitherto having been limited to firing at a small +target towed by other ships or by a collier to the northward +or eastward of the Shetlands, or firing at a rock. Both +were highly unsatisfactory methods, which did not enable +the gunnery efficiency of ships to be either tested or +greatly improved. Accordingly I decided to risk sending +ships out from Cromarty to fire at a large target of the +pattern used in peace practices; it was towed across the +Moray Firth, the ships firing and the towing vessels being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span> +protected from submarine attack by destroyers, sloops +and gunboats. The system was an improvement, +although very expensive in the employment of destroyers, +etc. It was continued until practice in the Pentland +Firth took its place. The usual procedure was for two +ships, screened by destroyers, to be on the firing ground +at a time, firing either independently or with concentrated +fire, with two more vessels approaching the firing ground +ready to fire when the first pair had finished. On completion +of practice the first pair returned to harbour and +were met at the entrance by the third pair, to which they +turned over their destroyers. Careful organisation insured +that ships did not have to wait at the entrance, nor was +there delay for the target to be turned round for the +return run. A large number of destroyers, sloops or gunboats, +patrolled to seaward of the target to prevent submarines +from approaching. The total number usually employed +screening and patrolling during a day’s firing was +from 22 to 28.</p> + +<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the 2nd Battle Squadron and +the 1st Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to Scapa on completion +of the practice, being relieved later by another +battle squadron and cruiser squadron in accordance with +the routine which had been established of changing bases +periodically. The special service ship No. 6 left Scapa +for Rosyth, with two destroyers, to endeavour to “draw” +submarines to attack her and give the destroyers an opportunity +of engaging them; but no attack took place.</p> + +<p>From August 5th to the 9th extensive anti-submarine +operations were carried out to the westward of the +Orkneys by a force consisting of nine destroyers, six +sloops, five gunboats and a large number of patrol +trawlers. The operations covered a very large area, the +general idea being to compel any submarine intending<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span> +to pass round the Shetland Islands or through the Fair +Island Channel to submerge for a period that would exhaust +her batteries and eventually bring her to the surface +to recharge. The limited duration of darkness in +northern latitudes assisted the operations of the hunting +vessels. No <em>certain</em> success was attained. A submarine +was sighted on the 6th at 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and a heavy explosion, +under water, close to the sloop <i>Hollyhock</i> at 9.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on +the same night might have been due to a submarine coming +to grief, while another submarine was sighted at 10.30 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 7th. Examination of a sailing vessel found +in the vicinity of this latter submarine was unproductive.</p> + +<p>The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on August +6th to cruise off the Norwegian coast, and the battleships +<i>Albemarle</i> and <i>Russell</i>, of the 6th Battle Squadron, arrived +at Scapa for practices, having left the Channel +Fleet.</p> + +<p>On August 7th I returned in the <i>Iron Duke</i> to +Cromarty in order to meet the Prime Minister and Chancellor +of the Exchequer who were about to visit Invergordon. +At 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 8th a wireless report was received +in the <i>Iron Duke</i> that a submarine was attacking +a steamer off Rosehearty on the southern shore of the +Moray Firth. The “duty” destroyer division was ordered +to sea at once, and the remaining three available destroyers +followed shortly afterwards. Meanwhile, the destroyer +<i>Christopher</i>, already on patrol in the Moray Firth, reported +herself in action at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> with the submarine, +which had submerged, the report stating that the merchant-ship +had been sunk. The second destroyer on +patrol, the <i>Midge</i>, assisted in the search for the submarine, +as did the remaining destroyers and patrol trawlers, without +result. At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the trawler mine-sweepers, which +had been carrying out the usual routine sweep on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span> +southern shore of the Moray Firth, reported the discovery +of a mine-field to the northward of Banff, and several +reports were received during the day of drifting mines +being sighted along the coast and in the Firth. All destroyers +were ordered in at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, except the two on +patrol and any others in touch with the submarine, and +vessels remaining on patrol were given the limits of the +mine-field as far as they had then been ascertained.</p> + +<p>Such investigation as could be hurriedly carried out +during the day, by signal and wireless, revealed the fact +that a yacht and a trawler on patrol on the night of the +7th–8th had sighted strange lights, but without identifying +the vessel carrying them, and it became apparent +that a German surface mine-laying vessel had been at +work. The night had been somewhat misty. Directions +were at once sent by wireless to the 4th Light Cruiser +Squadron, still at sea, to proceed at full speed towards the +Horn Reef to endeavour to intercept the returning mine-layer, +and the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, from +Rosyth, were also sent out for the purpose; the Admiralty +was also informed, and as a result the Harwich force was +sent on the same mission.</p> + +<p>As the other squadrons proceeded, the 4th Light +Cruiser Squadron was directed to the Skagerrak in case +the mine-layer endeavoured to return by that route, whilst +the remaining light cruiser squadrons made for the Horn +Reef. All the mine-sweepers and the destroyers engaged +in the anti-submarine operation mentioned earlier were +recalled to fuel with all despatch, and sweeping by the +Fleet mine-sweepers, trawlers and destroyers, organised +on a large scale, was begun on the 9th and continued until +clear routes for the ships at Cromarty and for merchant-ships, +gradually extending to 10 miles in width, had been +swept on both the northern and southern shores of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">238</span> +Moray Firth. These sweeping operations were greatly +delayed by persistent fog, although a clear channel sufficiently +wide to admit of the exit of the squadrons at +Cromarty was quickly swept. The <i>Campania</i> was sent +to Cromarty, so that her sea-planes might assist to locate +the mines, but in the rather thick waters of the Moray +Firth they were of no use for this purpose.</p> + +<p>On the afternoon of the 9th news was received that +the destroyer <i>Lynx</i> had been sunk by a mine at 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +that morning in a position stated to be two miles to the +northward of the mine-field as then located. It was very +regrettable that only three officers and 21 men were saved +out of her fine ship’s company; those lost included her +captain, Commander John F. H. Cole, an officer of great +promise. The loss of such a comparatively shallow draft +vessel showed that some of the mines had been laid near +the surface, and mine-sweeping operations were suspended +near the time of low water.</p> + +<p>At 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich +force, reported that the German mine-layer <i>Meteor</i>, +which had been sighted by his vessels in the vicinity of +the Horn Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her +own crew and that he had subsequently rescued four +officers and 39 men, survivors of the armed boarding-steamer +<i>Ramsey</i>, who had been prisoners on board the +<i>Meteor</i>. The <i>Ramsey</i> had been on patrol south-east of +the Pentland Firth, and it was ascertained from the survivors +later that she had sighted and closed the <i>Meteor</i>, +which was disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, shortly +after daylight on August 8th, with the intention of +boarding her. On closing, however, the <i>Meteor</i> suddenly +showed her true character; her powerful armament, +hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the <i>Ramsey</i>, +which was returned by the latter ship’s greatly inferior<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span> +armament of 12-pounder guns. But the surprise was too +complete and the odds too heavy, and the <i>Ramsey</i> was +sunk very quickly with her colours flying, four officers +and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by +the <i>Meteor</i>. Acting-Lieut. P. S. Atkins, R.N.R., the +senior surviving officer of the <i>Ramsey</i>, came north to report +himself to me, and gave full details of his experiences. +He stated that when the officers of the <i>Meteor</i> abandoned +and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt’s +force, the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board +a neutral fishing vessel. Shortly afterwards the British +light cruisers passed close to the fishing vessel, and Lieut. +Atkins signalled to the Commodore, stating that they were +survivors of the <i>Ramsey</i> and asked to be taken off. He +added that the Commodore, who was at that time being +attacked by both aircraft and submarines, replied, “Steer +south-west; I will return and pick you up.”</p> + +<p>Lieut. Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the +<i>Meteor</i> to steer south-west, but the Germans naturally +enough objected, as they desired to make their own coast. +However, in spite of the fact that the British were unarmed +and numerically very inferior, their arguments +prevailed and a south-west course was steered for a short +time until another fishing vessel was sighted; the British +suggested transferring to her; this was agreed to by the +Germans. As the British were leaving, the German captain, +Konstten-Kapitän von Knorr, asked Lieut. Atkins +if he had any money, to which he replied, “How could I, +seeing that you picked me up in pyjamas?” Captain von +Knorr pressed money on him, but Lieut. Atkins said that +he did not see that he would require it. However, he +eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him an +English £5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record +so gentlemanly and courteous an act, which stands out<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span> +in strong contrast to the usual behaviour of German naval +officers during the War. The money was given to me, and +I sent it to the Admiralty, asking that it might be repaid, +with the thanks of the British for the courtesy shown to +our prisoners of war.</p> + +<p>The 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons were +ordered to return to their bases on receipt of the news +of the sinking of the <i>Meteor</i>.</p> + +<p>The mine-sweeping operations in the Moray Firth on +August 9th showed that the mine-field was larger than +had been at first reported, and additional paddle mine-sweepers +were sent from the Clyde to assist the other +vessels.</p> + +<p>Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were on board the +<i>Iron Duke</i> from the 7th to the 9th, and various matters +of importance were discussed. When questioned as to +urgent requirements I pressed for the building of a large +number of sloops, a class of vessel which had proved most +useful, both as mine-sweepers and as patrol vessels, and +which could supplement the numerous destroyers then +building, which took much longer to complete.</p> + +<p>The persistence of the fog at this period is shown by +the fact that the <i>Agincourt</i>, returning to Scapa from +Portsmouth, was unable to enter the base for 36 hours +after passing Cape Wrath, only 60 miles distant, and was +forced to cruise to the westward, making repeated attempts +at entry. The <i>Ajax</i> was similarly delayed in entry +for 12 hours during the same period.</p> + +<p>On August 10th the armed merchant-ship <i>India</i>, of +the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was torpedoed and sunk by +an enemy submarine off the coast of Norway with considerable +loss of life.</p> + +<p>Four destroyers were sent on August 13th to locate +and engage a submarine that had attacked one of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span> +Fleet mine-sweepers. They did not succeed in finding +her, but on the following day an armed yacht engaged +a submarine off the Aberdeen coast and claimed to have +hit her by gunfire; and the trawler <i>Shamrock</i> claimed to +have run over another submarine.</p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, and seven destroyers +carried out a search between the 16th and 18th for enemy +vessels in the northern and central portion of the North +Sea, sweeping towards the Skagerrak, and covering a +large area by wide zigzags.</p> + +<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i> returned to Scapa from Cromarty on +the 16th.</p> + +<p>From the 18th to the 21st the <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, +was cruising in the North Sea and carrying out +exercises off the Shetland Islands, proceeding to Scapa +for practices on the 21st, and returning to Rosyth on +the 23rd.</p> + +<p>On August 18th the Fleet mine-sweeper <i>Lilac</i>, Lieut.-Commander +Leslie Fisher, while at work on the Moray +Firth mine-field, struck a mine. The whole fore part of +the ship was destroyed and the wreck of it hung down +from the after part, causing her to draw 30 feet of water +forward, instead of the usual nine to ten feet. The +weather was very bad and a heavy sea running, but by +great persistence and good seamanship, aided by very +gallant work on the part of her own crew and that of the +<i>Hollyhock</i>, Captain Preston, senior officer of Fleet mine-sweepers, +who was in command of the <i>Hollyhock</i>, succeeded +in towing her to Peterhead. She was eventually +reconstructed and rejoined the Fleet mine-sweeping flotillas. +The value of this class of vessel was clearly shown +by the incident.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span></p> + +<p>Eight destroyers from Scapa, with a flotilla leader, +were carrying out on August 23rd and 24th anti-submarine +operations in the Fair Island Channel, and a division +was similarly employed east of May Island, in the +Firth of Forth.</p> + +<p>Between August 24th and 26th the 3rd and 7th +Cruiser Squadrons exchanged bases, between Scapa and +Rosyth, carrying out a wide search of the North Sea <i lang="fr">en +route</i>, destroyers screening the ships by day.</p> + +<p>On the 24th Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G., +relieved Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas in the 1st +Battle Squadron, the latter officer being designated to +take command of the new 5th Battle Squadron (five ships +of the “Queen Elizabeth” class), as it was formed.</p> + +<p>On August 30th–31st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, +with destroyers, searched to the eastward of May Island +for enemy vessels; and from August 31 to September +1st the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied by four +destroyers, was cruising between the Firth of Forth and +the Dogger Bank for the same purpose.</p> + +<p>During the month the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons +carried out target practice in the Moray Firth, and all +battle squadrons and cruiser squadrons proceeded to sea +for cruises, independently, from their bases, screened by +destroyers.</p> + +<p>His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visited Sir +Stanley Colville at Longhope during the month, remaining +for six days. He went on board many of the ships +of the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron report for the month +showed the average weekly results as follows: Ships intercepted, +65; ships sent in, 13; number of vessels on patrol, +14; number refitting, coaling or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from +patrol, 9.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span></p> + +<p>The weather at Scapa was very misty. Fog or mist +was experienced on the 3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, +14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 31st. There were no gales.</p> + +<p>On August 3rd the large floating-dock from the Medway, +which had been towed to the Tyne, was reported as +ready for use.</p> + +<p>On the 29th the old light cruiser <i>Brilliant</i> arrived at +Lerwick to act as guard and depot ship at that base, +which was being developed as a secondary examination +base for vessels sent in by the 10th Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>An extended patrol to the south-eastward of the Pentland +Firth during the month was maintained by three +armed boarding steamers and three destroyers.</p> + +<p>The principal events of September, 1915, may perhaps +be given most conveniently and briefly in diary form:</p> + +<p>On September 1st eight destroyers, fitted for mine-sweeping, +swept the waters to the westward of the Pentland +Firth. This was the first occasion on which destroyers +were used for this purpose.</p> + +<p>September 1st and 2nd.—The <i>Black Prince</i> and four +light cruisers, with six destroyers, carried out a sweep to +the eastward from Scapa.</p> + +<p>September 2nd–5th.—The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, +the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, and the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron were cruising in northern waters. +Destroyers screened the Fleet out and back, but did not +remain with it during the cruise, being kept at the base, +ready fuelled, in case it became necessary to move to the +southward. Battle exercises and night-firing were carried +out during the cruise, as opportunity offered. The +battleship <i>Superb</i> reported sighting the periscope of a +submarine.</p> + +<p>On September 2nd the Fleet was visited by five +French gentlemen of eminence, and a representative of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span> +the United States Press. This was the first visit paid to +the Grand Fleet base by anyone not immediately connected +with the Service, and we were flattered that the +occasion should have brought to Scapa Flow representatives +of our gallant Allies from across the Channel. The +Fleet left immediately after the visit, and an opportunity +was afforded our visitors of seeing the ships leave harbour.</p> + +<p>September 4th.—Another mine-sweeping sloop, the +<i>Dahlia</i>, Lieutenant G. Parsons, R.N., struck a mine in +the Moray Firth mine-field during sweeping operations. +She was very badly damaged; Lieut. Parsons himself was +severely injured. The ship reached Invergordon with the +loss of three killed and one missing. She was subsequently +repaired.</p> + +<p>September 7th.—The 3rd Cruiser Squadron left +Scapa, with destroyers, swept down in the direction of +the Horn Reef, and arrived at Rosyth on the 9th without +sighting enemy vessels. Visibility was low during the +sweep.</p> + +<p>September 8th.—The 7th Cruiser Squadron left +Rosyth, with destroyers, swept out to the eastward, towards +the Skagerrak, then turned to the northward and +arrived at Scapa on the 10th.</p> + +<p>Two destroyers were damaged by collision with +steamers in a fog on the 8th, necessitating repairs at a +dockyard in both cases.</p> + +<p>September 10th–12th.—The <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st and +3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadrons and 16 destroyers, was cruising in the +North Sea to cover mine-laying operations carried out by +our mine-layers in the Heligoland Bight, the remainder +of the Grand Fleet being, as was usual on such occasions, +at short notice for steam. The <i>Fearless</i> and a destroyer,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span> +part of the force with the battle cruisers, collided while +at sea, the former sustaining considerable damage.</p> + +<p>September 11th.—The <i>Patia</i> and <i>Oropesa</i>, of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron, collided; the <i>Patia</i> was seriously damaged, +and was brought into port under convoy of a destroyer +and armed trawlers with considerable difficulty, +being unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine <i lang="fr">en route</i>.</p> + +<p>September 12th.—Submarine E 16, attached to the +Grand Fleet flotilla, was sent to the coast of Norway +from Aberdeen to operate against an enemy submarine +thought to be operating in those waters. On the 15th +E 16 sighted a hostile submarine off the Norwegian coast +and sank her with a torpedo. This success, one of the +earliest achieved by one submarine operating against +another, was very encouraging after the somewhat similar +success of C 27 in July.</p> + +<p>September 17th.—The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, +with four destroyers, left Rosyth to sweep to the +Skagerrak. They returned on the 19th, without having +sighted any enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>September 23rd.—The destroyer <i>Christopher</i> was +damaged in collision with the armed boarding-steamer +<i>King Orry</i> in a fog.</p> + +<p>September 26th.—The s.s. <i>Caribbean</i>, which had +been fitted out as a receiving-ship for dockyard workmen, +encountered very heavy weather whilst <i lang="fr">en route</i> from her +port to Scapa, and got into serious difficulties, taking in +a great deal of water. Her wireless distress calls off Cape +Wrath were answered by sending to her assistance the +light cruiser <i>Birkenhead</i> from Scapa, together with tugs +and yachts from Scapa and Stornoway. At 4.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on +the 27th the <i>Birkenhead</i> and patrol vessels, which were +then standing by, took off most of the crew of the <i>Caribbean</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span> +which sank at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, unfortunately with the +loss of 15 lives.</p> + +<p>During the month the battle and cruiser squadrons +carried out independent cruises by day and at night from +the Scapa and Rosyth bases, being screened by destroyers +during the exercises. The squadrons of the Battle +Cruiser Fleet, also, all visited Scapa for the purpose of +carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices.</p> + +<p>A widely extended patrol by one or more light +cruisers with destroyers, working to the south-eastward +from Scapa, was maintained during the month, in order +to guard against any attempt at mine-laying in the +Pentland Firth by enemy vessels disguised as merchant-ships. +Similar precautions were taken at Rosyth. This +patrol was henceforth regularly established when the +conditions of the moon rendered attempted mine-laying +operations at night probable.</p> + +<p>The sweeping operations in the Moray Firth were +continued on a large scale throughout the month, and +clear channels on each shore were provided. Up to +September 19th, 222 mines had been accounted for out of +the 450 which survivors of the <i>Ramsey</i> stated had been +laid by the <i>Meteor</i>. The Moray Firth mine-field, in the +centre of the Firth, was purposely left undisturbed, as it +formed an excellent anti-submarine defence in that position +and reduced the area to be patrolled by our vessels.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Cruiser Squadron became non-existent during +the month, two ships being detached by the Admiralty +on special service, and the remaining two sent into port for +somewhat extensive repairs.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s <em>weekly average</em> for the +month worked out at:</p> + +<p>Ships intercepted, 64; sent in with armed guards, 11;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span> +number of vessels on patrol, 13; number absent or <i lang="fr">en +route</i> to or from patrols, 10.</p> + +<p>The weather at Scapa showed fog or mist on the 6th, +8th, 9th, 10th, 14th, 18th, 23rd and 24th; a very heavy +gale occurred between the 25th and 28th, during which +great damage was done to the anti-submarine obstructions +at Scapa, and a good deal of damage was suffered on the +mainland in the north of Scotland, a portion of the Highland +Railway being washed away.</p> + +<p>Between June and August, 1915, I had pressed upon +the Admiralty my opinion that we should carry out a +much more comprehensive mining policy in the Heligoland +Bight. I had urged this early in the War, but the +view taken at the Admiralty was that mining on any +large scale would impede both our submarine operations +and also any Fleet operations that might be undertaken +in those waters. I felt that unless we adopted one of +two policies—namely, either a close watch by surface +ships on the exits from the German bases, or an +extensive mining policy—we could never feel that we +should receive sufficient warning of the exit of enemy +forces as to prevent mischief being done. The close +blockade by surface ships was not a feasible operation +in view of the number of craft at our disposal and the +submarine danger; our submarines were too few in number +and had not the necessary means of communication to take +the place of surface ships.</p> + +<p>I could see no alternatives to very extensive mining, +limited only by the number of mines that could be produced. +The mining proposed by me was intended to +hamper the operations of both surface vessels and submarines. +I pointed out that earlier in the War the view +had been expressed to me by the Admiralty that we +should not risk our cruisers too freely in the North Sea<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">248</span> +owing to the submarine danger, and that, if we adhered +to this policy, it was impossible to insure that the exits +to the Fleet bases would not be mined by surface mine-layers, +as the <i>Meteor</i> incident had shown, and as was also +indicated by the success of our own infrequent mining excursions +to the Heligoland Bight.</p> + +<p>The correspondence resulted in increased activity on +the part of our mine-layers, but the success of our work +was unfortunately handicapped by defects in the pattern +of mine in use at that time, especially as against +submarines.</p> + +<p>In 1917, shortly after my return to the Admiralty, +I undertook a very extensive mining policy. In the +previous year, during Sir Henry Jackson’s period as First +Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was designed, +the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him. +This was one of the replies to the submarine. One hundred +thousand of these mines were ordered by me early in +1917 to carry out various schemes for mining the Heligoland +Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later in 1917, with +the assistance of the United States, provision was made +for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the +Northern Barrage. It was not until the large supplies +of mines became available in the autumn that really effective +results against submarines by mining began to be +achieved, although the operations of German surface vessels +had previously been hampered to a very considerable +extent.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX"><span id="toclink_249"></span>CHAPTER IX<br> + +<span class="subhead">CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">During</span> the later months of 1915 the Grand Fleet continued +to sweep and control the North Sea in spite of the +enemy’s efforts to effect attrition by submarines and +mines. On October 1st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, +with destroyers escorting, left Rosyth and proceeded +towards the Little Fisher Bank; on reaching that locality +the squadron turned to the north-westward and steered +towards Scapa, arriving on the 3rd. The line thus swept +was the possible course of enemy mine-laying or other +vessels, proceeding towards, or returning from, the +vicinity of Scapa and Cromarty. No enemy ships were +sighted.</p> + +<p>On October 2nd the battleship <i>Barham</i>, Flagship of +the new 5th Battle Squadron, arrived at Scapa.</p> + +<p>Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser +Squadron (now comprising six light cruisers) and nine +destroyers, left Harwich on the 6th to sweep towards the +Skagerrak in search of enemy vessels, particularly fishing +trawlers, which were suspected of acting as outpost vessels. +The operation on this occasion was fruitful in result; 14 +German trawlers were captured and sent in; one was also +sunk. As usual during such operations when a supporting +force was not actually at sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet was +kept at short notice for steam, to be ready to put to sea +if required.</p> + +<p>On October 10th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron left +Scapa and swept down to the Little Fisher Bank, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span> +thence to Rosyth with the same object in view as that of +the Harwich force, being met at daylight on the 11th by +destroyers from Rosyth, and arriving at that base on the +12th. On this occasion the operation gave no result.</p> + +<p>The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, comprising the 1st, +2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th +Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and +the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, left Scapa on the 13th, and +proceeded into the northern portion of the North Sea for +a cruise. Owing to bad weather the destroyers were sent +back on the 11th, one, the <i>Mandate</i>, being damaged by +a heavy sea; the <i>Ardent</i> and <i>Fortune</i> collided, the former +vessel being damaged. The fleet carried out battle exercises +during the cruise, and returned to the bases at Scapa +and Cromarty on the 15th, on which day the new battleship +<i>Canada</i> joined the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>On October 18th the Harwich force, consisting of the +5th Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, sailed to +operate off the Danish coast, north of the Horn Reef, +against any enemy vessels found there. The <i>Lion</i>, with +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, left +Rosyth to support the Harwich force, which closed the +Danish coast at daylight on the 19th, then steered to the +north-westward, till dark, returning afterwards to Harwich. +The search was unproductive, no enemy vessels +being sighted. The <i>Lion</i> and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +proceeded towards Cromarty, but were diverted to Scapa +during the night of the 19th–20th, owing to a report of +suspicious vessels, possibly mine-layers, being sighted off +Noss Head. These vessels were subsequently identified +as two of our own trawlers.</p> + +<p>On October 22nd three divisions of destroyers were +sent from Scapa to hunt a submarine off Fair Island, but +were forced to return owing to bad weather.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span></p> + +<p>On October 27th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with two +armed boarding-steamers, left Scapa to search the +northern portion of the North Sea, returning on the 30th. +Nothing was sighted.</p> + +<p>On October 30th Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th +Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, left Harwich for +another sweep off the Danish coast. His force passed +through a position some 70 miles north-west of Heligoland +before daylight on the 21st, steered for the Little +Fisher Bank, and thence to Harwich. A portion of the +Battle Cruiser Fleet kept steam at short notice during the +operation, which was unproductive, except for the interception +of an ore-laden neutral steamer which was sent +in to a British port.</p> + +<p>On October 30th the <i>Birkenhead</i> and <i>Liverpool</i>, +newly commissioned light cruisers, left Scapa for a searching +and exercise cruise in the northern portion of the +North Sea, and returned to Scapa on November 1st.</p> + +<p>During October squadrons cruised independently in +the North Sea from Scapa, as in previous months, by day +and at night. The ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, as +well as the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth and squadrons +from Scapa, proceeded to Cromarty, in turn, in +order to carry out long-range firing at towed targets in +the Moray Firth, being screened from submarine attack +by destroyers. Squadrons from Rosyth proceeded also +to Scapa to carry out practices.</p> + +<p>A patrol, comprising the <i>Sappho</i> and eight armed +whalers, based on Peterhead, was instituted as a guard +against further attempted mine-laying in the Moray +Firth. The Peterhead and Cromarty mine-sweeping +vessels, which had been working under the Senior +Officer of Fleet mine-sweepers (Captain Preston) for the +clearance of the Moray Firth mine-field, reverted to their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">252</span> +proper commands, and arrangements were made for a +constant sweep by mine-sweeping trawlers of the channel +along the south shore of the Moray Firth, which was that +used by ships based on Cromarty when concentrating with +the remainder of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. It +was essential to ensure that this channel was kept clear +of mines so long as any portion of the Grand Fleet was +based on Cromarty.</p> + +<p>It may not be out of place here to state the patrol +arrangements existing in the vicinity of the Pentland +Firth at this time. Usually three armed boarding-steamers +and three destroyers were patrolling to the eastward +of the Firth. They moved to the northward during +daylight and worked for a considerable distance to the +south-eastward of the Firth at night. An extended patrol, +usually consisting of a light cruiser and a destroyer, also +worked from Peterhead. A patrol of one or two +destroyers was maintained at night off Noss Head on the +north shore of the Moray Firth. Destroyers were kept +off the entrance to Hoy Sound and Holm Sound, and +a large number of trawlers near the Hoxa Sound +entrance. In bad weather the eastern destroyer patrol +was withdrawn to work between Swona Island and +the land to the eastward and to the north-westward. The +old local defence destroyers also carried out patrol work +off the entrance, and off Kirkwall. These particulars +are of interest as conveying some idea of the sea work +in a restricted area which had to be carried out in all +weathers.</p> + +<p>From October 1st to October 11th the Fleet Flagship +<i>Iron Duke</i> was refitting at Invergordon.</p> + +<p>On October 28th the <i>Argyll</i>, <i lang="fr">en route</i> from Devonport +to Rosyth to rejoin the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, +grounded on the Bell Rock, near Dundee, early in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">253</span> +morning in thick weather, and became a total wreck; all +hands were taken off in a heavy sea by destroyers from +Rosyth. The destroyers were exceedingly well handled +under very difficult conditions. On the following day the +<i>Arlanza</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which had been +sent to the White Sea, struck a mine and was seriously +damaged, but succeeded in reaching the Yakanski anchorage, +in the neighbourhood. Repairs were impossible during +the winter and the greater part of her crew was, therefore, +brought home in the <i>Orcoma</i>, of the same squadron +which had been sent north for the purpose.</p> + +<p>From October 29th to October 30th a heavy gale was +experienced at Scapa, and considerable damage was done +to the anti-submarine defences and to the block-ships at +the entrances. Fog or mist was experienced on October +3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th, 16th and 30th.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s work showed as a weekly +average the following figures: Ships intercepted, 56; sent +in, 16; number on patrol, 14; number absent, 8. The +bad weather experienced interfered with the work of the +squadron.</p> + +<p>On November 2nd the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle +Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the +1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyers of the 4th +and 11th (old 2nd) Flotilla left for a cruise to the westward +of the Orkneys. The destroyers were sent back on +the 3rd owing to bad weather. Battle exercises and sub-calibre +firing took place during the cruise, which was +otherwise uneventful; the Fleet arrived at Scapa and +Cromarty on November 5th, being screened in by the +destroyers.</p> + +<p>On November 6th the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser +Squadrons, with destroyers, left Scapa and Rosyth respectively, +to carry out an operation in the Skagerrak.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span> +The force was timed to arrive at the eastern end of the +Skagerrak at dawn on the 7th, and to sweep westward +during daylight in order that our ships should be between +the enemy and his Baltic base if enemy ships were +sighted. The <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st and 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadrons and destroyers, left Rosyth in time to be in +a supporting position by daylight on the 7th. A large +number of vessels were boarded by the destroyers, but +nothing suspicious was encountered, and the forces returned +to the bases on November 8th.</p> + +<p>During the night of November 6th–7th the battleship +<i>Hibernia</i>, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral S. Fremantle, +with the <i>Zealandia</i> and <i>Albemarle</i>, passed through the +Pentland Firth to the westward <i lang="fr">en route</i> for southern +ports and the Mediterranean. A strong wind was +blowing against the spring tides, and a very heavy sea +was running in the Firth, as was not unusual. Whilst +passing through the Firth the <i>Albemarle</i>, Captain R. A. +Nugent, shipped two heavy seas which washed away her +fore bridge, with everyone on it, and even displaced the +roof of the conning tower; hundreds of tons of water +flooded the decks and poured down below. An officer +and one man were washed overboard and drowned, +and several men injured; Captain Nugent found himself +on the upper deck amidst the wreckage of the +bridge. The <i>Hibernia</i>, which was ahead, turned to assist +the <i>Albemarle</i>, and an urgent signal for assistance +was received on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>. One of the +emergency cruisers at Scapa was directed to raise steam +with all despatch; the <i>Hibernia</i> arrived in with the <i>Albemarle</i> +at daylight. The ship presented an extraordinary +sight, the sea having made a clean sweep of her bridge +and everything on it. In all our experience of the Pentland +Firth, we had never witnessed such havoc before. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span> +<i>Zealandia</i> was also obliged to turn back to repair her +gunports, damaged by the sea in the Firth.</p> + +<p>The next few days were marked only by comparatively +trifling incidents. On November 6th the +<i>Birkenhead</i>, which had recently been commissioned, completed +her practices at Scapa and joined the 3rd Light +Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth. Two days later the <i>Princess +Margaret</i> laid mines successfully in the Heligoland +Bight; on the 9th the <i>Crescent</i>, harbour-defence vessel at +Hoy Sound, was withdrawn and left to pay off; and +the <i>Matchless</i>, of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, struck a +drifting mine in southern waters, her stern being blown +off.</p> + +<p>On the 12th Submarine E 17 was sent into the Kattegat +to reconnoitre and ascertain whether any German +trawlers or other vessels were working there. She returned +on the 19th and reported in the negative. On the night of +the 15th–16th the s.s. <i>Kristianiafiord</i>, of the Norwegian-American +line, a ship which had been endeavouring on +other occasions to evade the blockading squadron, was +intercepted by the <i>Teutonic</i> in high latitudes; she was +steaming fast without lights, and was sent to Kirkwall for +examination. In this and in other similar cases the ships +ran great risk of being mistaken for enemy vessels and +sunk, since the methods employed by the Germans made +it very difficult to abstain from opening fire on vessels +without running the serious danger of our own ships +being sunk by surprise attack. In the case of a ship carrying +a large number of passengers, like the <i>Kristianiafiord</i>, +the risk taken was very great and could not be +justified.</p> + +<p>On November 16th the 7th Cruiser Squadron, without +the <i>Donegal</i>, but accompanied by the <i>Liverpool</i> and one +armed boarding-steamer, left Scapa to patrol an area<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span> +north of the Shetlands and Faroe Islands, with a view to +intercepting possible raiders or other vessels.</p> + +<p>At noon on the 18th a report reached me that an +enemy three-funnelled cruiser had been seen on the 17th +to pass through the Danish Sound going north. The +possible objectives of this vessel, if the report were true, +appeared to be either mine-laying off our bases or an attempt +to interfere with the White Sea traffic, the Admiralty +having informed me on the 16th that large consignments +of arms and ammunition would be passing from +France to the White Sea during November and December. +In view of the fact that the news had reached me too +late to intercept this vessel in southern waters, the dispositions +made were as follows:</p> + +<p>The <i>Donegal</i>, which had left Scapa on the 17th to +cruise along the trade route to the White Sea, was directed +to rendezvous with the <i>Orcoma</i> (a ship of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron on patrol off the Norwegian coast), and to +patrol the parallel of Lat. 66 N. between the meridians +of 5.30 E. and 7.30 E.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa for +a position Lat. 63 N., Long. 4 E., there to meet the 7th +Cruiser Squadron, already at sea. Both squadrons, widely +spread, were to sweep to the northward along the Norwegian +coast, as far as the Rost Islands, and to cruise +to the westward of the Lofoten Islands during daylight +of the 20th, then returning to their base. The 2nd Cruiser +Squadron also left Scapa and proceeded north, the ships +spread to cover a wide area to the westward of the 7th +Cruiser Squadron, in order to protect the Archangel trade. +The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa on the +18th to sweep to the eastward, with orders to return to +Cromarty on the 19th.</p> + +<p>Strong destroyer patrols were despatched from Scapa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">257</span> +and Rosyth to prevent mine-laying off the bases, and one +Battle Cruiser Squadron was put at short notice for steam. +No enemy vessels were sighted, and the <i>Donegal</i> eventually +proceeded to the White Sea, being accompanied +by the <i>Minotaur</i> as far as the North Cape.</p> + +<p>On November 19th three submarines proceeded from +Harwich to the Kattegat to obtain information relative +to the presence of any enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>On November 23rd the <i>Warspite</i> rejoined the 5th +Battle Squadron, after having been for some weeks under +repair in the Tyne, owing to injuries sustained through +grounding in the Firth of Forth.</p> + +<p>On November 28th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left +Rosyth for a cruise in the northern portion of the North +Sea, during which cruiser exercises and gunnery practices +were carried out; the squadron returned to Rosyth on +December 2nd.</p> + +<p>From November 22nd to December 7th, the <i>Donegal</i> +and <i>Hampshire</i> were protecting the White Sea trade, +working on the trade route and coaling at Alexandrovsk.</p> + +<p>During the month independent squadron exercise +cruises from the bases were continued, as was target practice +from Cromarty.</p> + +<p>The figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron gave as a +weekly average: Ships intercepted, 30; sent in, 9; number +on patrol, 10; absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i>, 9; on +special service, 3. The bad weather experienced during +the month interfered considerably with the boarding +operations of the squadron and also hampered Fleet +movements.</p> + +<p>On December 1st the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle +Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron, and the <i>Minotaur</i> of the 7th +Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to the westward for a cruise.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span> +Battle exercises were carried out on the 2nd and 3rd, and +the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty on December +4th. The exercises were specially intended to represent +the conditions that might arise if the High Sea Fleet tried +to draw the Grand Fleet over areas in which mines had +been laid or in which submarines were operating. During +the exercises the <i>Barham</i> and <i>Warspite</i> of the 5th Battle +Squadron collided, both being considerably damaged. +They were escorted to Scapa for temporary repairs and +left later, the <i>Barham</i> for Invergordon and the <i>Warspite</i> +for Devonport.</p> + +<p>On December 8th the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron +left Rosyth, swept to the eastward to the Little Fisher +Bank, and returned on the 10th.</p> + +<p>From the 11th to the 13th two ships of the 4th Light +Cruiser Squadron were cruising to the eastward of the +Fair Island Channel.</p> + +<p>On December 12th Submarines D 7 and D 8, which +were based temporarily on Blyth, were directed to leave +for the Norwegian coast to operate against enemy trade +and against enemy submarines. D 7 was directed to make +the Ryvingen Light during the dark hours and then to +cruise to intercept trade between Ryvingen and Arendal, +and between Ryvingen and the west coast of Denmark. +It was anticipated that this might draw enemy +submarines to the northward from German ports to try to +sink D 7, and D 7 was directed to be back at Ryvingen 36 +hours after she expected that the first vessel she examined +had reached port, so that she might be ready to attack +enemy submarines sent after her. D 8 was directed to +cruise on a bearing 270° from the Hantsholm Light (coast +of Denmark) in order to intercept enemy submarines sent +after D 7. Bad weather prevented D 7 leaving before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span> +December 15th. The enemy was apparently not drawn, +and no success was obtained.</p> + +<p>On December 15th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left +Scapa for a sweep to the south-eastward, and returned +on the 17th.</p> + +<p>Two neutral ships, steaming at high speed at night +without lights on the 15th and 16th, evidently intending to +evade the blockade, were intercepted by the 10th Cruiser +squadron and sent into Kirkwall.</p> + +<p>On December 20th Commodore Tyrwhitt left Harwich +with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, to sweep to the +Danish coast, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was kept at +the usual short notice for steam during the time that he +was absent until the 23rd.</p> + +<p>On December 24th the 1st Cruiser Squadron left +Scapa to search the central portion of the North Sea. +During the day anxiety was felt as to the safety of the +destroyers <i>Porpoise</i> and <i>Morning Star</i>, which had been +escorting a Russian ice-breaker to the northward and +which had hove to near the Fair Island Channel in a heavy +gale during the 23rd. The 1st Cruiser Squadron was +directed to spread and search for them, and the <i>Hampshire</i> +and <i>Donegal</i> were also sent from Scapa to endeavour +to gain touch. Both the destroyers, however, reached +Cromarty in safety, the <i>Porpoise</i> on the 25th, and the +<i>Morning Star</i> on the 26th, after having experienced very +heavy weather. Many compartments were flooded, and +very considerable damage was done. They had been +handled with great ability during the exceptionally heavy +weather. The 1st Cruiser Squadron, with the <i>Hampshire</i> +and <i>Donegal</i>, returned to Scapa on the 26th.</p> + +<p>On the 24th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron also proceeded +from Rosyth to search the North Sea, down to +the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, thence towards the Little<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">260</span> +Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. No enemy vessels were +sighted. The weather in the North Sea at this period +was very severe, and the <i>Sappho</i>, which was supporting +the armed trawler patrol to the north-eastward of Peterhead, +lost her rudder in a heavy sea.</p> + +<p>On the 30th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth and +carried out a sweep to the south-eastward, returning on +the 31st.</p> + +<p>On the same day, a lamentable disaster occurred, the +cruiser <i>Natal</i> (Captain Eric Back) being blown up in +Cromarty harbour with great loss of life. Captain Back +was amongst those who lost their lives. It was reported +by adjacent vessels at 3.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the ship was on fire, +and at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, before any action could be taken, the +ship blew up and sank, the explosion taking place in her +after magazines. Steps were taken to deal with the situation +in case the explosion had been caused by an enemy +submarine having entered the harbour, but it soon became +evident that this was not the case. Examination of the +wreck by divers later showed no signs of any external +explosion. A court-martial was subsequently held at +Chatham to investigate the causes of the disaster, but the +conclusions were not made public.</p> + +<p>During the month of December independent exercises +from the Fleet bases were continued, as well as target +practice from Cromarty. As to the latter, an interesting +practice was carried out by the <i>Iron Duke</i> at the range, +and under the conditions of battle practice before the +War, in order to ascertain, by examining the actual hits +made on the canvas of the target, whether the pre-War +standard of shooting was being maintained. Some uncertainty +existed owing to the great increase in the ranges +at which practices were carried out during the War,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span> +namely, 16,000 to 19,000 yards, as compared with the +9,500 yards, which was the maximum peace range. The +result was very satisfactory and indicated a most decided +advance on pre-War accuracy of fire.</p> + +<p>On December 13th the first target practice was carried +out in the Pentland Firth. This was in the nature +of an experiment and, being successful, practice in this +locality was later substituted for practice in the Moray +Firth; it was far more convenient for the main Fleet base +and much less extravagant in the use of screening and +protecting destroyers.</p> + +<p>On December 16th Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, +K.C.B., relieved Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, +Bart., in command of the 2nd Battle Squadron, on the +termination of the latter officer’s three years’ command.</p> + +<p>During December patrols seaward of the bases were +strengthened and considerably extended during the first +and fourth quarters of the moon in order to frustrate any +attempted mine-laying on the part of the enemy. This +“dark night” patrol subsequently became a matter of +routine.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average showed: +Ships intercepted, 35; sent in, 14; number of ships on +patrol, 12; number at bases or <i lang="fr">en route</i>, 7; number on +special service, 2.</p> + +<p>The long nights and bad weather were responsible +for the reduction in the number of vessels intercepted. +During December fog or mist were experienced at +Scapa on the 15th, 22nd, 25th and 26th; gales on the +6th, 8th and 23rd; and snow on the 3rd, 4th, 8th and +12th. Although the weather at Scapa Flow was fairly +good, gales in the North Sea and to the westward of the +Orkneys were frequent and violent during the month.</p> + +<p>Before turning to the events of 1916 it is of interest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span> +to notice the work of the “decoy ships,” known later by +the name of “Q” ships, fitted out at Scapa during the +year 1915. These vessels, five in number, were designed +to sink enemy submarines by inducing the latter to close +them for the purpose of attack by gun fire or by torpedo. +The same system was employed in southern waters, and +was developed greatly during the year 1917. At Scapa +in 1915 and 1916 the ships were manned principally by +volunteers from the Grand Fleet, or from the depôt ships +at the base. Colliers or store-ships were selected for their +size and general suitability for the work, and they were +fitted with a very carefully concealed armament, which was +kept hidden until the submarine was within point-blank +range, so that fire opened on her must be immediately +effective; unless the submarine was holed in less than a +minute after fire was opened on her she could submerge +and escape, and probably torpedo the decoy ship as well. +The five ships, the <i>Prince Charles</i>, <i>Vala</i>, <i>Duncombe</i>, +<i>Penshurst</i> and <i>Glen Isla</i>, were fitted up by Captain Farrington +of the <i>Cyclops</i>, under the direction of Admiral +Sir Stanley Colville and were marvels of ingenuity. Their +usual cruising-ground was in the vicinity of the Orkneys, +Shetlands, or Hebrides, or towards the Norwegian coast, +or the White Sea, or down the east coast of Scotland. +They worked on a route that was freely used by merchant-ships +and altered their appearance according to their route +so as to give them the look of vessels usually trading on +that route.</p> + +<p>Many stories of the “Q” ships have been told in the +Press and need not be repeated here, but a high tribute +must be paid to the extreme gallantry and splendid +discipline of the officers and men who manned these vessels. +I had personal knowledge of the work of the +vessels operating from Scapa. Their opportunities for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span> +engaging submarines successfully were rare, and the work +in the small ships in the heavy seas encountered in northern +latitudes was very arduous; there was never any lack of +volunteers for the duty, the difficulty always being that +of selection from the large number of officers and men +anxious to serve. It is satisfactory to record that the first +submarine sunk by a decoy ship fell a victim to a vessel +working from Scapa Flow.</p> + +<p>On July 25th, 1915, the <i>Prince Charles</i> (Lieutenant +W. P. Mark-Wardlaw—of Admiral Colville’s staff—in +command) sighted, near North Rona Island, the Danish +steamer <i>Louise</i>, stopped and with a submarine close to. +When the submarine sighted the <i>Prince Charles</i> she proceeded +at full speed towards her and opened fire at 5,000 +yards’ range. Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw stopped his +engines and went through the usual process of lowering +boats in a great hurry. The submarine, which was the +U 36, closed to within 500 yards, still on the surface, and +at that range the <i>Prince Charles</i> revealed her true character, +unmasked her guns, and opened a most accurate +fire with her two 6-pounders and two 3-pounders. The +U 36 was immediately holed, and two men killed in the +conning tower. She was unable to dive and sank stern +first; 4 commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 9 +men were saved by the <i>Prince Charles</i>.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_X"><span id="toclink_264"></span>CHAPTER X<br> + +<span class="subhead">ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> year 1916 opened and still no general action had +been fought in the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet +continued to dominate, paying its price—though not so +heavy as might have been expected—for the influence it +exerted on all the operations—naval, military and economic—to +which the country had by that time been committed +in face of the active operations pursued by enemy +submarines and mine-laving craft.</p> + +<p>On January 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth +to cruise in the northern part of the North Sea, and returned +during the night of the 8th–9th.</p> + +<p>The facility with which enemy mines could be laid +in the vicinity of naval bases during the long winter +nights, when there was little or no moon (as shown, <i lang="la">inter +alia</i>, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland Bight, +which, though not very frequent in 1916, became constant +in 1917), led me to extend still further the patrols +from the bases at such times; from January 2nd to +January 10th inclusive, the patrol vessels (two light +cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about 140 +miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the +Pentland Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +each day. Similar patrols were ordered to be instituted +from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however, instead of +mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected +the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span> +purpose, possibly because of the considerable mercantile +traffic using this route. The patrols in this direction did +not extend so far from the base, the sea being very frequently +too heavy in the winter months; the practice was to +search the route periodically for mines.</p> + +<p>The weather early in January had been very bad, and +both sweeping and patrol work were impracticable. In +these circumstances the enemy raider <i>Moewe</i>, disguised +as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably passed up +the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland +Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field +between Cape Wrath and a position about north from +Strathie Point, on the Scottish coast, on the night of +January 1st or 2nd. The work of the <i>Moewe</i> was facilitated +by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and +Sule Skerry Island were necessarily exhibited at night +for the sake of the large mercantile traffic using the +Pentland Firth and the Minches.</p> + +<p>On January 6th, at 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the pre-Dreadnought +battleship <i>King Edward VII.</i>, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, +left Scapa for Belfast to refit, and at 10.47 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, +when in Lat. 58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent explosion +occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain +Maclachlan first reported that the ship had been torpedoed, +but later came to the conclusion that she had been +mined, as was eventually found to be, undoubtedly, the +case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both engine-rooms +filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing +at the time with a rising sea.</p> + +<p>As soon as the report was received at Scapa the +flotilla leader <i>Kempenfelt</i> and 12 destroyers were sent out +to assist and to keep the submarine under, if one were +present. Tugs were also despatched. Meanwhile the +collier <i>Melita</i>, which had arrived on the scene, proceeded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span> +to take the <i>King Edward VII.</i> in tow, assisted by the +<i>Kempenfelt</i>; but the ship was very low in the water and +unmanageable, and the tow parted. At 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the battleship +having by this time a heavy list, Captain Maclachlan +decided to abandon her for the night, and the +destroyers <i>Musketeer</i>, <i>Marne</i>, <i>Fortune</i> and <i>Nessus</i> were +taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they +embarked all hands without loss of life, although the +destroyer <i>Musketeer</i> received considerable injury from +projections on the side of the battleship. The destroyer +<i>Nessus</i> and a tug stood by the <i>King Edward VII.</i> until +8.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> when she turned over and sank. The <i>Africa</i>, +also of the 3rd Battle Squadron, <i lang="fr">en route</i> from Belfast +to Scapa, passed safely through the mined area a few +hours before the <i>King Edward VII.</i> was mined—a very +fortunate escape!</p> + +<p>Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing +between Cape Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large +force of mine-sweepers was detached to ascertain the +limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear a passage along +the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch +Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape +Wrath, and some on Scapa, but continuous bad weather +interfered with the sweeping operations to such an extent +that, between January 7th and January 21st, no sweeping +was possible except close in shore in sheltered water. On +January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet +Bay, near Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the +loss of the <i>King Edward VII.</i> was thereby removed.</p> + +<p>On January 7th the battleship <i>Albemarle</i> left Scapa +for Archangel, and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth +to operate in the Skagerrak; she returned on the 16th, +having met with no success.</p> + +<p>On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span> +experienced at Scapa. The oiler <i>Prudentia</i> drifted across +the bows of the <i>Iron Duke</i> during the night and sank, and +one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier, a tug and three +trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an +hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The <i>Iron +Duke</i> was undamaged.</p> + +<p>Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the +10th Cruiser Squadron on patrol suffered considerable +damage from the heavy seas. The month of January, +as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally +bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over +the whole North Sea. Great injury was done to all the +anti-submarine obstructions at Scapa, many of them being +entirely destroyed. In order to make the base temporarily +as secure as possible from submarine attack, the +Fleet was directed to make and lay improvised net obstructions.</p> + +<p>On January 24 the destroyer <i>Talisman</i> reported that +a torpedo had been fired at her off Blyth. The <i>Botha</i> and +10 destroyers were sent out from Rosyth to locate and +destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing of her.</p> + +<p>On January 25th the <i>Ebro</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, +picked up a dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and +towed her to Lerwick, arriving on the 28th.</p> + +<p>On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +with six destroyers, and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, +with five destroyers, left Rosyth for operations in +the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, +during daylight on the 27th, swept through the +Skagerrak to the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron +being in support. The ships then moved to the northward; +at daylight on the 28th, the whole force, joined by +the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from +Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span> +again swept into the Skagerrak. The squadrons then +returned to their respective bases. During the operations +the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was at short +notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted outside +territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of +the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of +small vessels passing along the Norwegian coast inside +territorial waters.</p> + +<p>On January 28th the senior officer of the mine-sweepers +reported that he had swept a clear channel along +the north coast of Scotland from Cape Wrath to Scapa, +between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field laid +by the <i>Moewe</i>. This channel was instituted for warships +only for use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were directed +to steer to the northward from Cape Wrath, thence +to make Noup Head, on the north-west coast of the Orkneys, +passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa; +all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair +Island Channel to their destination.</p> + +<p>During the month of January gunnery practices were +carried out, both in the Moray Firth and in the Pentland +Firth.</p> + +<p>The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were +much restricted by the bad weather experienced, the +weekly average showing:</p> + +<p>Number of ships intercepted, 21; number sent in, 8; +number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports or +<i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 10; number on special +service, 2.</p> + +<p>Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbourhood +on January 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, +15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 30th. The weather +during the month both at Scapa and in the whole northern +area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span> +the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements +of all small craft.</p> + +<p>Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by +night from the various bases were continued in January, +as was the change of base of the Rosyth squadrons to +Scapa and Cromarty for practices.</p> + +<p>At 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron +and four destroyers left Scapa, steering towards the little +Fisher Bank, whence the destroyers returned to Scapa, +and the squadron proceeded to sweep up the Norwegian +coast during daylight hours and thence to Scapa. These +sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was considered +probable that enemy raiders, attempting to pass +out of the North Sea, would hug the coast on passage.</p> + +<p>On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, +from Harwich, was at sea endeavouring to intercept zeppelins +returning from raiding our east coast. The fishing +trawler <i>King Stephen</i> on this day sighted Zeppelin L 19 +in a sinking condition in the North Sea.</p> + +<p>On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate +off the Norwegian coast. She returned on the 13th.</p> + +<p>On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded +to a position about 150 miles to the south-eastward from +Scapa for patrol during the night and returned on the +8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out +a similar patrol, returning on the 9th.</p> + +<p>On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla, +operating from the Humber under the orders of the Rear-Admiral +of the East Coast, was attacked by enemy torpedo +craft in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, and the +<i>Arabis</i> was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending +further information as to the strength of enemy forces at +sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night +of the 10th–11th, and proceeded to the southward; the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">270</span> +5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Harwich; and +the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at Scapa, +Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and +move to the southward. The situation became clear during +the 11th, when it was evident that the enemy’s force, +which had consisted only of destroyers, had returned to +its base.</p> + +<p>At 10.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat. +57.57 N., Long. 0.20 E.) orders were given for the Grand +Fleet to return to its bases, and the squadrons arrived on +the 12th.</p> + +<p>From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, +with the armed boarding-steamers <i>Dundee</i> and <i>Duke of +Clarence</i>, from Scapa, swept from that base to the Utvoer +Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N., Long. 40.31 E.), thence down +the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed boarding-steamers +returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted +were two enemy submarines off the coast of Norway.</p> + +<p>On February 18th the new battleship <i>Malaya</i>, the gift +of the Federated Malay States, arrived at Scapa and +joined the 5th Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were +sent to the Skagerrak to examine and board merchant-vessels +with a view to stopping the iron ore trade from +Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the +submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part +of their cruise, to operate against two enemy submarines +reported off the Norwegian coast. They returned on +February 28th, not having met, outside territorial waters, +the submarines or with any vessels which were engaged +in the iron ore trade.</p> + +<p>On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were +sent without result to operate against a submarine reported +in the Fair Island Channel.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span></p> + +<p>On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with +the 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser +Squadron and flotillas, left Scapa before daylight for a +watching and exercise cruise in the northern part of the +North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight, in conjunction +with the Harwich force, had been intended, but +was abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore +Tyrwhitt that the weather and other conditions were unsuitable +for his operations. Battle exercises took place +during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which +left Rosyth at 1.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 26th, joined the Battle +Fleet at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> next day. During that day further battle +exercises were carried out, including deployments of the +whole Grand Fleet from its cruising order, so that the +battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers might +become accustomed to taking up the stations assigned to +them on deployment under certain conditions. The exercises +were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned +to its bases on the 28th.</p> + +<p>During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine-sweeping +sloops patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys +to prevent mine-laying in the approaches to the base.</p> + +<p>On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept +any enemy vessel that might be attempting to pass out into +the North Sea. Information from neutral sources had +led to a belief in the possibility of such an attempt being +made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the +information was received after the event, that is, it was +reported that the vessel in question had already left German +waters. The dispositions were made, therefore, on +this assumption, and in making them it was necessary to +place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be expected +to pass through in daylight.</p> + +<p>The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">272</span> +whether her mission were mine-laying near our bases, or +an attempt to pass out into the Atlantic. The <i>Patia</i> and +<i>Columbella</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were directed +to patrol a line running north-east from Lat. 61.45 N., +Long. 0.50 E., and ships of the same squadron on the +C Patrol line were directed to extend this line to the +north-eastward. The <i>Alcantara</i> and <i>Andes</i>, of the same +squadron, already on a special patrol line, were ordered +to remain in their position till further orders. Two +ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers +left Rosyth at 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 28th to patrol the +area covering the Farn Island—Skaw and the May +Island—Skaw trade routes, working to the eastward. +Early on the 29th the <i>Comus</i> and the <i>Calliope</i>, of the +4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the +28th with two destroyers for areas in the vicinity of Lat. +58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E., and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 3.0 E. +respectively, were directed to patrol lines 40 miles long, +running 50° to 230° respectively from a position in Lat. +61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The <i>Blanche</i>, which had also sailed, +was ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The +<i>Minotaur</i> and a destroyer were sent to patrol the Fair +Island passage during daylight on the 29th. Steps were +also taken to cover the approaches to the Pentland Firth +against mine-laying.</p> + +<p>At 8.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 29th the <i>Andes</i>, Captain G. B. +Young, R.N., reported by wireless that an enemy vessel +was in sight in Lat. 61.58 N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave +her course, speed and description; her enemy character +was assumed owing to her movements. The <i>Alcantara</i>, +Captain T. E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight +of the Andes, but sighted her at 9.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> chasing a +strange vessel, joined in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, +being then about 6,000 yards from her, ordered her to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">273</span> +stop. She complied and informed the <i>Alcantara</i> that +she was the Norwegian s.s. <i>Rena</i> from Rio to Trondjhem. +She was flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted +on her sides. At 9.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Alcantara</i>, then about +2,500 yards on the quarter of the stranger, began to +hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding. At this +moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her +hitherto concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian +ensign and staff overboard and hoisting a German ensign +at the main. But she still showed the Norwegian flag on +her sides, where it was displayed throughout the action. +At the close range at which fire was opened hitting commenced +immediately, and as the first hits on the <i>Alcantara</i> +cut all her communications, Captain Wardle experienced +great difficulty in passing orders to the guns. But the +enemy’s fire was returned quickly and with effect, in spite +of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went ahead +and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of +which hit the <i>Alcantara</i> between the boiler-rooms at about +10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, causing them gradually to fill.</p> + +<p>By 10.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the enemy was badly on fire and stopped. +A few minutes later, at 10.22 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, boats were observed +to be leaving her and the <i>Alcantara</i> ceased firing. The +latter ship was by this time listing heavily and was abandoned +shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The <i>Andes</i>, +which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range +than the <i>Alcantara</i>, rendered assistance to the boats of +the two ships.</p> + +<p>On receipt of the first signal from the <i>Andes</i>, the +<i>Calliope</i>, <i>Comus</i> and <i>Blanche</i> had been ordered to the +scene at full speed. The <i>Comus</i>, Captain Alan G. Hotham, +R.N., the nearest vessel, with the destroyer <i>Munster</i>, +arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E., as +the <i>Alcantara</i> was sinking. The <i>Munster</i> picked up the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">274</span> +crew of the <i>Alcantara</i>, and as the enemy raider still had +colours flying the <i>Comus</i> proceeded to sink her by gunfire +and to pick up the survivors in her boats. The <i>Calliope</i> +and <i>Magic</i> arrived at 1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but, not being required, +returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned +out to be the disguised raider <i>Grief</i>, armed with four +5.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes; she had a complement +of 306, of whom 209, including many wounded, were +rescued by the <i>Comus</i> and <i>Andes</i>.</p> + +<p>The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying +out blockade work under modern conditions when dealing +with an unscrupulous enemy. A raider disguised as +a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most difficult +customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had +perforce to be treated as “suspect” after an incident of +this nature. It is not possible to examine a vessel without +boarding her, and, except in very fine weather, it is necessary +for the boarding ship to be close to the suspected ship +before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously cannot +pull long distances. The experience of the <i>Alcantara</i> +showed the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An +attempt to solve the problem was made by informing all +neutrals that, when any of our vessels displayed a certain +signal, the ship to be boarded should steam towards the +boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away. +But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously +dependent to a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals, +which was not always in evidence.</p> + +<p>Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties +which did not exist in the days of our forefathers, +not the least being the advent of the torpedo and the submarine. +The German method of solving such difficulties +was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did not, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">275</span> +never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of +any seaman belonging to the Allied nations.</p> + +<p>During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights, +combined with more favourable weather, gave the 10th +Cruiser Squadron better opportunities for the blockade, +and the average weekly results were: Number of ships +intercepted, 39; number sent in, 111; number of ships on +patrol, 12; number absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from +patrol, 9; number detached on special service, 1.</p> + +<p>Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood +on February 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual +exchange of bases for practices and the independent +squadron exercises at sea from the bases were carried out +during the month.</p> + +<p>On March 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentlemen +visited the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in +the evening. The party included M. Danchenko, Count +Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir Nabakoff, M. Bashmakoff, +M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky.</p> + +<p>On March 2nd the new battleship <i>Valiant</i>, a vessel +of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, arrived at Scapa and +joined the 5th Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the +Kattegat to intercept trade and to ascertain the situation +there on the chance of any enemy vessels being found. +She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day +the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and +exercise cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea. +On the 6th the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded +into the North Sea for a southerly sweep, concentration +being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the “Long +Forties,” the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on +the meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became +very unfavourable for destroyers, and speed had eventually<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">276</span> +to be reduced to such an extent that the sweep was +abandoned, and the Fleet returned to its bases on the 7th.</p> + +<p>On March 9th a patrol consisting of one cruiser and +one armed boarding-steamer was instituted in an area +north of the Shetlands. It was designed to cover the +track of vessels <i lang="fr">en route</i> between the north of Iceland +and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of +Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was +considered probable that this route might be taken by +enemy raiders as well as by vessels attempting to evade +the blockade. The patrol was continued throughout the +year, although occasionally modified in details and frequently +doubled in strength. It was eventually successful +in intercepting and sinking the German raider <i>Wolf</i>, +in the spring of 1917, the <i>Achilles</i> (Captain F. M. Leake, +R.N.) and the armed boarding-steamer <i>Dundee</i> (Commander +Selwyn Day, R.N.R.) being the vessels engaged +in this operation. This patrol was also of use for blockade +work.</p> + +<p>On March 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with +a division of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth +at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> for operations off the Norwegian coast, the +objective being the capture of any enemy merchant-ships +found outside territorial waters between Ekersund and +the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German +merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian +ports, and especially Narvik, occasionally ventured outside +territorial waters in this locality. It was the only locality, +besides the vicinity of Stadlandet, in which they did so +venture, and in which, therefore, there was a chance of +capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser +Fleet sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the southward +of the Naze for supporting purposes. It was also +intended that the remainder of the Grand Fleet should<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">277</span> +be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly gale +sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accompanying +the Battle Fleet, and this portion of the programme +was cancelled; Sir David Beatty was informed +that, if the weather conditions farther south prevented +his destroyers from screening the battle cruisers, the latter +should return to their base and a light cruiser squadron +be left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The +conditions being unfavourable for destroyers, this course +was adopted. The weather eventually became too bad +for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain their speed, +and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed.</p> + +<p>Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on +March 14th to intercept contraband trade and for reconnoitring +purposes. She did not sight any enemy vessels, +but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying +contraband.</p> + +<p>The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was +at sea on March 14th and 15th, and the <i>Roxburgh</i> and +two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th for another sweep +on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the +Naze. This was again unproductive.</p> + +<p>The cruiser <i>Theseus</i> left Barry on the 15th for Alexandrovsk +in the White Sea. On the same date the cruiser +<i>Crescent</i>, <i lang="fr">en route</i> from Scapa to the south, was fired at +and missed by a submarine south of the Hebrides.</p> + +<p>On the 19th the light cruiser <i>Calliope</i>, with two destroyers, +left the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with +orders to proceed to the Naze and sweep <em>up</em> the Norwegian +coast to Udsire; and the <i>Comus</i> and two destroyers +left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep <em>down</em> the Norwegian +coast to the Naze, the object being again the capture +of any German merchant-ships found outside territorial +waters in this locality. The <i>Calliope</i> was forced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">278</span> +to put in to Rosyth owing to a serious fire occurring in +her after boiler-room. The <i>Comus</i> completed her sweep +in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out +aerial operations off the Danish coast, involving an attack +on the enemy’s zeppelin shed at Tondern, and the Battle +Cruiser Fleet left early that day to cover the operation. +In the course of the operations the destroyers of the +Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up returning +sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the +southward of the Horn Reef for this purpose. Some +German outpost trawlers were encountered here by the +destroyers; they were engaged and destroyed. But during +the engagement the destroyer <i>Medusa</i> was rammed by +the destroyer <i>Laverock</i>, being very seriously damaged. +The <i>Medusa</i> was taken in tow, but, the weather becoming +very bad, the towing hawser parted, and all attempts to +get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels were +in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident +that the enemy would be aware of the incident by means +of his directional wireless system, since a good deal of +wireless signalling on the part of our ships had been necessary. +It was expected, therefore, that he would send +out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark +hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in +view of the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt +rightly judged it expedient to abandon and sink the +<i>Medusa</i>, and gave orders to this effect. The ship’s company +of the <i>Medusa</i> was taken off in a most seamanlike +manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the <i>Lassoo</i>.</p> + +<p>Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was +difficult for Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact +conditions, but during the night of the 25th, having sent +his destroyers ahead, he steered with his light cruisers in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">279</span> +order to pass to the northward of the enemy’s North +Sea mine-field. At about 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> two enemy destroyers +were sighted on the port bow of the <i>Cleopatra</i> (flying +Commodore Tyrwhitt’s broad pennant) at a distance of +about 800 yards. Their presence was betrayed by the +flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of +the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the +enemy. The <i>Cleopatra</i> at once opened fire and headed +for the destroyers, and when it was seen that they were +crossing from port to starboard, Captain Loder Symonds +of the <i>Cleopatra</i> ported his helm and rammed the second +destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically +in half. There was a tremendous crash, followed by +what seemed to be two explosions, one possibly a boiler +explosion, and the second due to either a mine or depth-charge, +causing considerable damage to the stem piece +of the <i>Cleopatra</i>. The injury was subsequently found to +be far too great to have been caused by the impact alone. +The sudden alterations of course by the <i>Cleopatra</i>, combined +with the gunfire and explosions, had thrown the +squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and +navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the +<i>Cleopatra</i>, in separating from the sinking destroyer, found +herself across the <i>Undaunted’s</i> stem; the latter was +somewhat seriously damaged, and reported subsequently +that she could only steam at slow speed. The Commodore, +therefore, remained near the <i>Undaunted</i> for the night.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left +Rosyth on the 24th to cover the operations, was in the +vicinity of the Harwich force, and, on the morning of +the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the +<i>Undaunted</i>, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force +swept back towards her position, not sighting any enemy +vessels. Three of the light cruisers covered the <i>Undaunted</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">280</span> +during her passage to the Tyne, where she was +sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced +in locating the <i>Undaunted</i>, owing to a difference in “dead +reckoning” between the various ships. In order to be +prepared for eventualities the remainder of the Grand +Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of the 25th–26th, +heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa +and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility +was also very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang +up when the snow ceased. During the early afternoon +of the 26th the wireless reports from the Vice-Admiral +of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and +the <i>Undaunted</i> cleared up the situation, the latter +ship reporting herself as hove to until the weather +moderated.</p> + +<p>By 4.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when the Fleet was in the vicinity of +the “Long Forties,” the sea had become so heavy and +steep that destroyers with the Battle Fleet could not +safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the +whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern +waters, and the <i>Undaunted</i> was approaching a safe area, +the 5th Battle Squadron was detached at high speed, +without destroyers, to assist in covering her passage back +to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet and +cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and +Cromarty. The <i>Iron Duke</i> convoyed the destroyer +flotillas in order that they could be given their position, +as the coast was approached. The weather moderated +during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the +27th. Two destroyers collided off Noss Head just before +daylight on the 27th, one, the <i>Michael</i>, being somewhat +seriously damaged.</p> + +<p>By 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 27th the <i>Undaunted</i> was in Lat. +56.35 N., Long. 2 E., and the 5th Battle Squadron returned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">281</span> +to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser Fleet arriving at +Rosyth on the 27th.</p> + +<p>The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st +and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron +and flotillas again proceeded to sea on March 29th, +for a watching and exercise cruise in the northern part +of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on +the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st, +the destroyers having to return independently as they +were unable to maintain Fleet speed through bad weather +conditions.</p> + +<p>During March the system of carrying out target practice +in the Pentland Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of +in the Moray Firth was regularly instituted, and no further +practices took place in the Moray Firth during the year +1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory +in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that +of towing the target in the strong tides of the Pentland +Firth.</p> + +<p>On March 19th the battleship <i>Hercules</i>, which had +been laid up at Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly +six weeks, completed her repairs. These were carried out +with the assistance of artisans from the engine contractors.</p> + +<p>The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth +for the purpose of practices continued.</p> + +<p>The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average for +March showed: Number of ships intercepted, 43; number +sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number absent at +bases, or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 9; number on special +service, 1.</p> + +<p>A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced +during the month, and the weather generally in northern +waters was bad, gales occurring on the 6th, 11th, 12th, +25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">282</span></p> + +<p>On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth +and attacked Leith and Edinburgh, but did not make +any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of intercepting +some of them during their return passage, but +saw nothing of them.</p> + +<p>On April 3rd the <i>Devonshire</i> and two destroyers left +Rosyth and proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the +vicinity of Udsire lighthouse, and swept thence to the +Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or neutrals +with contraband which might be found outside territorial +waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic +in territorial waters was reported.</p> + +<p>On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate +against enemy submarines on the route which it was +thought was taken by them between the Shetlands and +Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about +30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not, +however, sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine +operations of this nature by the submarines attached to +the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent intervals +during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever any craft +were available for this purpose; the plan of operations +was constantly varied. The general scheme was to place +our craft in positions through which hostile submarines +were expected to pass, or along the routes which they +usually took.</p> + +<p>On April 6th the <i>Roxburgh</i> left Rosyth with two destroyers, +to repeat once again the operation of sweeping +down the Norwegian coast from Udsire to the Naze. The +search was again unproductive.</p> + +<p>On April 12th the armed liner <i>Campania</i> returned +from a lengthy refit at Liverpool, during which the ship +had, at my request, been provided with a “flying-off”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">283</span> +deck for her sea-planes, as experience throughout the War +had shown conclusively that it was of little use to depend +on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the +most advantageous conditions, and that the only system +which would give reasonable certainty of the machines +being able to get into the air when required was to fly +them from the ship. At the same time I formed the conclusion, +after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of +the <i>Campania</i>, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service, +that the sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown +from ships, since the weight of the floats of sea-planes +greatly limited their climbing powers, their radius of action +and their speed. This alteration to the <i>Campania</i> +was the commencement of the system, gradually introduced, +of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships +with scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from +the ship under practically all conditions. I make no apology +for referring again to this subject in view of its importance.</p> + +<p>The <i>Campania</i> had also been fitted to carry a kite +balloon aft, for use for spotting the fall of shot and for +reconnaissance purposes. This fitting was the beginning +of the arrangement, gradually introduced during 1916, of +carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success in +large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being +also provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small +craft, an arrangement which proved to be of great use +for anti-submarine and convoy work.</p> + +<p>On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron were modified; “A” and “C” patrols took up +a line running from Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 11.30 W. to +Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles apart +and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed +to the northward of Iceland.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">284</span></p> + +<p>On April 20th a force left to carry out an extensive +sweep into the Kattegat, designed (1) to intercept +and examine all mercantile traffic, (2) to operate against +enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any enemy +vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the movements +in the Kattegat of the light forces, which it was +intended should be sighted from neutral shores in the +expectation that they might be reported to the enemy +by his agents.</p> + +<p>The force included three submarines, which were ordered +to positions commanding the northern entrance to +the Sound, and the Great and Little Belts, so that enemy +forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might +be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was +decided to move south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef +with the whole Grand Fleet, the object being to induce +the enemy to keep the ships of the High Sea Fleet in +North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic, +where they might cause interference with the relaying the +Russian mine-fields, an operation which became necessary +at this season of the year after the ice had broken up. +It was thought that the appearance of the Grand Fleet +in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would probably +effect this object better than the operation in the Kattegat. +Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the +21st, with orders for the battle and cruiser squadrons to +concentrate on the morning of the 22nd in a given position +to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” whilst the +Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead +of the Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd +Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, +were ordered to an area from which they could concentrate +later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if required.</p> + +<p>At 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">285</span> +Squadron was detached, with three destroyers, to proceed +to the Skagerrak, with directions to arrive in the +vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to +sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet +was ordered to push ahead, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> of the 22nd +was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26 E., cruising in an area +north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight, when it was +intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather, +which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Battle +Fleet, with cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered +to the eastward from Scapa until shortly before dark, and +then altered course to South 18 East for the Horn Reef, +to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the 23rd.</p> + +<p>The weather had been gradually thickening since 3 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Sir David Beatty reported that the +<i>Australia</i> and <i>New Zealand</i> had collided in a fog and +had received damage necessitating both ships returning to +their base. By 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Fleet and cruisers were +also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night. +It was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such +conditions with so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers +and destroyers, when to the westward of the Little Fisher +Bank, were accordingly turned to the northward, the order +of turning being rear squadrons first and thence to the +van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special signals +had been introduced to provide for such circumstances, +and were of great use on this occasion.</p> + +<p>In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty +was experienced in carrying out the turn in the dense +fog that prevailed, especially amongst the destroyers, +and three of them, namely, the <i>Garland</i>, <i>Ardent</i> and +<i>Ambuscade</i>, were in collision; the <i>Ardent</i> was so seriously +damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her +back to a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">286</span> +neutral steamer, in passing through the Fleet in the fog, +collided with the battleship <i>Neptune</i>, doing considerable +injury to that ship.</p> + +<p>The weather cleared somewhat during the morning, +and the Fleet cruised to the westward of the Little Fisher +Bank until it was certain that the damaged destroyers +were safely on their way to their bases. The operations +were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable, +and the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the +Fleet remaining out for a further twenty-four hours, so +as to repeat the sweep to the Horn Reef on the following +day.</p> + +<p>The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th, +fuelled, and again proceeded to sea for another movement +south during the evening of that day, the 5th Battle +Squadron being sent on in advance of the remainder of +the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and strengthen +the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of +the <i>Australia</i> and <i>New Zealand</i>, damaged in collision.</p> + +<p>At 4.6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 25th, however, whilst steering to +the southward, a report was received from Commodore +Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, that +he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light cruisers +in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once influenced +the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet +increased to full speed, and shaped a course to pass down +the searched channel to the westward of the German mine-field +to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th +Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course +designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during +their expected return passage to their ports. At 4.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +the Admiralty informed me that the enemy was bombarding +Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron +was in touch with the enemy’s ships; and at 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">287</span></span> +the Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle +cruisers in sight steaming to the eastward.</p> + +<p>At 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i>, with the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet, was in Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd +Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were about +35 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70 miles to +the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the +south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as +appeared later, having evidently only just barely missed +cutting the enemy off from his base. The Battle Fleet +stood on to the south-eastward until the afternoon, when +it became evident that the Germans had escaped to their +bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and +shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 26th.</p> + +<p>On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty +as to the steps which could be taken to minimise the +danger of a recurrence of such raids on unfortified towns +on the south-east coast as that of the 25th. Although +they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly +a great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants, +and might result in much loss of life. I suggested that +the placing of the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Humber +or in the Thames might act as a deterrent, and in any case +would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy +ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting +injury by submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet, +if, by good fortune, we happened to be cruising sufficiently +far to the southward at the time. The presence of the +squadron in southern waters would be useful, also, in the +unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good +backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of +movement, due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy submarines +in southern waters, were considerable. I pointed +out that since the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">288</span> +the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was no +longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships +of the “Revenge” class were also approaching completion. +The proposal was adopted, and the 3rd Battle +Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed for the Humber +on the 29th, <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the Medway. On that port +the 3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the +ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being gradually withdrawn +for service in foreign waters. The Admiralty also +stationed some of the monitors in the more important undefended +ports.</p> + +<p>During the month of April a policy, suggested by +me, of placing the Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead +of in light cruisers, was adopted. This was made possible +by the completion of several vessels of the class. The +object was to add the light cruisers thus released to our +all too slender light cruiser force.</p> + +<p>The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron +during April were:</p> + +<p>Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10; +number of ships on patrol, 12; number absent at ports +or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 9; number on special +service, 1.</p> + +<p>A very considerable amount of mist and fog was experienced +during the month, and gales on the 8th, 16th +and 24th.</p> + +<p>On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the +vicinity of the Horn Reef. The operation was covered +by the Grand Fleet. One of its objects was, as before, +to attract the attention of the enemy’s naval forces to +the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually +drawn out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand +Fleet in southern waters would soon become known to +the enemy from neutral sources, with the result that vessels<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">289</span> +of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations in the +Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North +Sea ports. From information obtained subsequently from +reliable sources, it appeared that the operation produced +the intended result. Between the afternoon of May 2nd +and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases.</p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers +convoying the sea-plane-carriers <i>Vindex</i> and <i>Engadine</i>, +proceeded to a position just north of the Horn Reef, arriving +at dawn on May 4th; the objective of the sea-planes +was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer <i>Abdiel</i> +proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd–4th to the +southward of the Vyl Lightship on the expected track +of enemy vessels <i lang="fr">en route</i> to the North Sea via the Horn +Reef. The mine-layer <i>Princess Margaret</i> was directed +to lay mines on the same night across the expected route +taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route +passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were +completed without any interference on the part of the +enemy.</p> + +<p>Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn +Reef, three to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three +to positions off Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of +the 3rd.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">E</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">E</a> Two of our submarines collided while submerged off the Horn Reef, one +being slightly damaged.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet and destroyers proceeded to +a position for supporting the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +near the Horn Reef, with directions to arrive at daylight +on the 4th, and the Battle Fleet, with its cruiser squadrons, +the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyer +flotillas, to a supporting position to the northward of the +Battle Cruiser Fleet. The list of ships absent from the +Fleet on this occasion, owing to refit, repair, or to being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">290</span> +engaged on other operations, is given below; it is useful +as showing the reduction that takes place in the nominal +numbers comprising a watching fleet at any given moment: +Battleships, <i>Ajax</i> and <i>Dreadnought</i>; battle +cruisers, <i>New Zealand</i>, <i>Australia</i>, <i>Invincible</i>; cruisers, +<i>Black Prince</i>, <i>Warrior</i>, <i>Donegal</i>; light cruisers, <i>Southampton</i>, +<i>Gloucester</i>, <i>Blonde</i>; destroyers, 3 from the 1st +Flotilla, 6 from the 2nd Flotilla, 3 from the 11th Flotilla. +During the passage south, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron +was detached to endeavour to locate a zeppelin reported +by directional wireless to be in the centre of the +North Sea (zeppelins had been seen off the north-east +coast on the night of the 2nd). The search was unsuccessful, +but the zeppelin descended off Stavanger later +and was destroyed.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea-planes +seemed from the Battle Fleet to be ideal, but, +once more, the difficulty of getting these machines to rise +from the water was experienced, a slight sea being sufficient +to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the +attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped +bombs on the objective. The remainder were damaged +by the sea.</p> + +<p>At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a zeppelin, L 7, was sighted by the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron and attacked by gunfire by the +<i>Galatea</i> and <i>Phaeton</i>. She was damaged sufficiently to +cause her to descend near submarine E 31 in the vicinity +of the Vyl Lightship. E 31 completed her destruction +and rescued seven survivors.</p> + +<figure id="i_290" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption sans"><span class="smcap">OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF MAY 2<sup>ND.</sup> to 5<sup>TH.</sup> 1916.</span> + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_290.jpg" width="827" height="838" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_290-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p>The Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Horn Reef +during May 4th, no enemy vessels being sighted, and then +returned to its various bases. A thick fog was experienced +during the return passage, which was made without incident; +the Cromarty force was, however, taken to Scapa,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">291</span> +as a submarine had been reported off Tarbet Ness in the +Moray Firth.</p> + +<p>On May 9th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left +Scapa to carry out another sweep on the Norwegian coast +between the Naze and Udsire Lighthouse. The squadron +was divided, two ships proceeding to the Naze and two +to Udsire, arriving in position at daylight on the 10th +and then sweeping towards each other. One neutral +steamer, carrying iron ore for Lübeck, was intercepted +outside territorial waters and sent in. On the same day +the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for Scapa, +searching the central portion of the North Sea <i lang="fr">en route</i>.</p> + +<p>On the 9th, 11th and 13th the ships on the northern +patrol off the Shetlands moved in to Stadlandet for a +short period, on the chance of intercepting ships outside +territorial waters.</p> + +<p>On the 14th an unsuccessful search for a reported submarine +was carried out to the south-east of the Pentland +Firth.</p> + +<p>On the 15th Submarines D 7 and E 30 left for the +Kattegat to operate at the northern end of the Sound and +off Anholt Island. One German merchant-steamer was +intercepted and sunk outside territorial waters off the +Kullen on the 22nd by E 30. On the 18th another submarine +was sent to operate off Goteberg in Sweden. She +returned on the 25th, not having sighted any enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>On the same day a reliable report was received that +an exceptionally large force of enemy submarines was now +operating in the North Sea, and additional precautions +were taken at all the bases to strengthen the patrols and +to protect inward- and outward-bound vessels. The Vice-Admiral +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was warned to +be ready to move all his patrol lines to given alternative +positions, and on the 19th was directed to move his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">292</span> +ships to the most western of these lines. Precautions +against mine-laying by submarines were also taken, and +the waters to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” +through which the Fleet usually passed when on passage +south, were examined by the Fleet mine-sweepers, protected +by destroyers, on the 21st and subsequent days. +These vessels searched without result on the 22nd for a +submarine which was being chased by a patrol vessel in +this neighbourhood.</p> + +<p>On the 21st the <i>Donegal</i> and two destroyers were sent +to the vicinity of the entrance to Bergen to intercept a +steamer which, it was thought, had passed through the +10th Cruiser Squadron blockade during a fog. The ship +however, called later at Kirkwall, and the force was recalled.</p> + +<p>On the 23rd the first of a series of deep mine-fields +in the Moray Firth, which I had requested might be laid +with the object of catching enemy submarines, was placed +in position by the mine-layer <i>Biarritz</i>.</p> + +<p>On the 24th the <i>Donegal</i> and an armed boarding-steamer +were sent to patrol off Stadlandet with a view to +intercepting ships engaged in the iron ore trade from +Narvik. This, as before stated, was one of the few positions +at which ships were obliged for navigational reasons +to leave territorial waters.</p> + +<p>On the 24th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with +destroyers, which had been at Rosyth, left for another +search off the Norwegian coast from the Naze to Udsire, +and thence to Scapa. The search was unproductive.</p> + +<p>On the 26th two submarines were despatched to +operate against enemy submarines off the Norwegian +coast, and, on the same date, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +with six destroyers, left, via the searched channel, +to carry out a reconnaissance to the southward of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">293</span> +German North Sea mine-field. The squadron proceeded +as far east as Long. 6 E., but, unfortunately, sighted +nothing.</p> + +<p>The <i>Broke</i> and 12 destroyers left on the 27th to search +for a submarine reported to have been sighted to the eastward +of the Pentland Firth, and returned on the 28th, +not having seen her; but on the 27th Trawler Unit No. 42, +working from Peterhead, reported having engaged and +sunk a submarine at 12.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. +1.20 E., thus adding one more success to the record of +this patrol. On the 30th Fleet-sweeper <i>Gentian</i> was +missed, in a position about 40 miles due east of the Pentland +Firth, by a torpedo fired evidently by the submarine +that had been hunted on the 28th. A half flotilla and +sea-planes were sent out to search, and a submarine was +sighted at 3.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> near the position given, but she dived +and got clear away.</p> + +<p>The movements of the Fleet between the time of leaving +and returning to the bases in connection with the +Battle of Jutland are given in Chapter XI., but some +mention may be made of an incident which occurred on +the night of May 31st. A report was received at Scapa +that an enemy raider might be attempting to escape into +the Atlantic. The Vice-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron was directed to assume a patrol north of the +Shetlands in accordance with a plan which had been pre-arranged +to meet such a case. On June 3rd, after the +return of the Fleet to its bases, light cruisers were sent +out to patrol to the north-westward of the Orkneys, and +the 10th Cruiser Squadron was then directed to fall back +to a position farther west to form a second patrol line. +Nothing came of the matter.</p> + +<p>During the month of May the weekly average results +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed: Number of vessels<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">294</span> +intercepted, 55, besides 17 trawlers; number sent in, 18; +number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports +or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 9; number on special +service, 2.</p> + +<p>A good deal of fog and mist was experienced during +the month, the worst periods being from the 17th to the +20th, 24th, 26th, and the 28th to 30th.</p> + +<p>During the month of May the firing exercises in the +Pentland Firth continued, as did the usual exchange of +bases between squadrons.</p> + +<p>During the months of March, April and May, a +flotilla of submarines had been gradually organised as a +unit of the Grand Fleet. It was named the 11th Submarine +Flotilla, was based on Blyth, with the <i>Titania</i> as +parent ship and the <i>Talisman</i> and <i>Trident</i> as attendant +destroyers. Separate spheres of activity for the Grand +Fleet submarine flotillas and for the submarine flotillas +based on Harwich and Yarmouth were also arranged, the +dividing line running from a position a little to the southward +of the Horn Reef to Flamborough Head. The line +was subsequently slightly altered once or twice as the +strength of the Grand Fleet submarine flotillas increased, +but the general principle was that the Grand Fleet submarines +worked to the northward of such a line and the +remaining submarines to the southward.</p> + +<p>It may not be out of place here to mention the +organisation for getting the Grand Fleet to sea from its +bases to any desired point of concentration with rapidity +and safety, and of bringing the Fleet back into the bases +in face of probable submarine or mine attack.</p> + +<p>As the Grand Fleet increased in size, and the danger +from mine and submarine grew, so the problem of leaving +Scapa Flow and re-entering that base with safety +became more complicated. The necessity for the Fleet<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">295</span> +leaving harbour in the shortest possible time and with the +fewest possible number of signals was obvious. Similarly +on returning the various squadrons had to enter the base +with the least practicable delay in order to avoid giving +submarines engaged in watching the approaches an opportunity +for getting into positions for attacking the squadrons +in rear, after having sighted those in the van. The +operations, both of departure and entry, were rendered all +the more difficult owing to the very strong and erratic tides +experienced in the Pentland Firth, while all ships navigating +at night had to be navigated without showing lights.</p> + +<p>The usual method of departure from Scapa was as +follows: A “Preparatory Signal for leaving Scapa” consisting +of one word was made as soon as I decided to take +the Fleet to sea. On receipt of this “Preparatory Signal” +all ships raised steam for 18 knots at two hours’ notice. +Patrol destroyers were recalled by the Commodore (F) +for refuelling. All officers and men absent on patrol +duty in drifters were also recalled, and every preparation +was made for leaving harbour. The Admiral Commanding +the Orkneys and Shetlands warned the outer patrols +that the Fleet might be leaving shortly.</p> + +<p>Whilst the Fleet was raising steam in readiness to be +off at two hours’ notice a signal was made which indicated +the time at which the first squadron to leave was to move +ahead from the anchorage, together with the speed to be +maintained after passing the submarine obstructions. No +further signals were necessary. The organisation provided +for the order in which squadrons were to leave, as +well as the interval between squadrons or divisions, which +in daylight was usually one mile from the rear ship of +one squadron, or division of four ships, to the leading ship +of that following, or two miles at night. The organisation +also provided for successive squadrons or divisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">296</span> +being taken alternately north or south of the Pentland +Skerries if the Fleet proceeded to the eastward, in order +that the interval between those following the same course +might be increased.</p> + +<p>In the strong tides, particularly at night, some such +procedure had to be adopted, because the tide was not +felt until the ships were clear of Swona Island, and then +the effect of it, if running to the westward, and particularly +at the period of spring tides, when it has a speed of +10 knots, was to bring a leading squadron or division +back on top of that in rear of it. Frequently also a ship, +emerging from slack water into the strength of the tide, +would be caught by the tide on the bow, and, unless +the greatest possible care was taken to watch the steering +(and even sometimes in spite of every care), the ship +would be turned round through 8, 12 or even 16 points,<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">F</a> +becoming a danger to those astern of her, as she would +be almost unmanageable for a time. Such a situation on +a dark night, with a large fleet showing no lights, was not +pleasant, and it speaks well for the skill shown in handling +the ships that no accident occurred from this cause.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">F</a> 8 points = 90 degrees.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The practice in regard to the destroyers, when they +accompanied the Fleet (as was necessary after the +first twelve months of war), was for the various groups +which were detailed by the Commodore (F) to screen the +squadrons or divisions of the heavy ships, to meet them +just outside the submarine obstruction and screen them +from there in daylight, or on moonlight nights, and +to form astern on dark nights, in readiness to re-establish +the screen at daylight. In the early days of the War, and +indeed for the first eighteen months, the practice was for +the destroyer flotillas to be stationed some 10 miles from +the Battle Fleet at night in order to avoid any chance of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">297</span> +their being sighted and mistaken for enemy destroyers; +but this procedure caused considerable delay in forming +the submarine screen at daylight, and in thick weather +the destroyers frequently experienced difficulty in finding +the Battle Fleet. Consequently, it became the practice +to keep the destroyers actually in company at night, and +this procedure was undoubtedly preferable.</p> + +<p>After the various squadrons had passed the Pentland +Skerries, the organisation provided for their taking certain +defined routes; the usual practice was to use three +routes with the squadrons divided between them, the +routes being about seven miles apart.</p> + +<p>A concentration point, which the squadrons would +reach at the ordered speed shortly after daylight, was +given in the departure signal, and the squadrons closed +in on this point at the appointed time, so that the whole +Battle Fleet, including detachments coming from Cromarty, +was concentrated shortly after daylight, with the +cruisers in their assigned positions scouting ahead.</p> + +<p>The organisation of the Battle Fleet provided for the +strongest squadron being on the eastern flank, because +it was considered that the enemy would invariably make +towards his bases if touch was gained, and it was desired +to have our strongest squadron in the van.</p> + +<p>The “departure” organisation was carefully worked +out by my Staff and very minutely described in the Grand +Fleet orders. It was most useful, the whole Fleet, +comprising frequently 50 or more battleships, cruisers +and light cruisers, and as many as 50 destroyers, being +in daylight under weigh in one hour, and clear of the +harbour in an hour and a half after the signal was made +to proceed; on dark nights this time was lengthened by +half an hour.</p> + +<p>When returning to Scapa Flow, the usual practice<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">298</span> +was for the time of entry to be arranged so that the leading +squadrons passed the Pentland Skerries shortly before +dawn, in order to minimise the danger from submarine +attack; but it was not, of course, always possible to +arrange the time of entry in this manner. In returning +to Scapa, when the arrival was thus timed for dawn, +the different squadrons were disposed, as a rule, in two +separate lines, the lines being some five miles apart and +the squadrons in each line having an interval of about +three miles between them. One line would enter the +Pentland Firth by passing north of the Pentland Skerries +and the other by passing south of these rocks, the object +being to confuse any enemy submarines that might be +watching the approaches, and also to get the Fleet into +the Firth as quickly as possible, as once in the tideway +there was little to fear from submarine attack.</p> + +<p>If the Fleet entered Scapa Flow during darkness, +the ships anchored in the centre of the Flow in certain +specified berths, and waited for daylight before taking +up their berths in the Fleet anchorage; towards the end +of my period of command, however, coloured lights were +arranged to be placed as leading-marks for the Fleet +anchorage, so that ships could proceed to their final +berths under all conditions.</p> + +<p>As regards mines, an exploratory search of the channel +intended to be used was always carried out, if time +permitted, before the Fleet left, and similarly before +it returned. Three channels were used, each some 7 +to 10 miles in width—one passing up the east side of +the Orkneys, one running to the eastward from the Pentland +Skerries, and one passing down the Scottish coast +for a short distance and then to the eastward. Usually +the second of these channels was used.</p> + +<p>The principal difficulty with which we had to deal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">299</span> +when leaving or returning was fog. In a really dense +fog there was great risk in attempting to leave Scapa +with a large fleet, owing to the strong tides to be encountered +in the Pentland Firth, and nothing but the +gravest emergency would have justified the attempt being +made. If it became really necessary, an organisation +had been provided to meet the case, and the attempt +would have been made. The interval between the various +squadrons would have been considerably greater, and the +time occupied in leaving would have been correspondingly +increased.</p> + +<p>The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases, +Cromarty and Rosyth, were, of course, simpler, owing to +the absence of the very strong cross-tides, but fog was +even more prevalent at Rosyth than at Scapa, and the +operation of leaving with a considerable number of ships +was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed +under difficulties on very numerous occasions and with +remarkable freedom from accident during my period of +command. The approach to the Firth of Forth in thick +weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were +experienced in making the land when the position of +the ships had not been accurately ascertained by sights +for some time before approaching the base. These +approaches could have been mined by the enemy with +great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently +enterprising, and it was a standing wonder to me that +the attempt was never made.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">300</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XI"><span id="toclink_300"></span>CHAPTER XI<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">It</span> may not be out of place here to touch upon the general +naval situation in the spring of 1916—that is, on the eve of +the Battle of Jutland. What were the strategical conditions? +To what extent was it justifiable to take risks +with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks the full consequences +of which could not be foreseen owing to the new +conditions of naval warfare?</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our +available capital ships. There was very little in the way of +reserve behind it. The battleships <em>not</em> included in the +Grand Fleet were all of them pre-Dreadnoughts and +therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted of seven +ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, two ships of the +“Lord Nelson” class, and four of the “Queen” class, +all of these ships being in the Mediterranean except five of +the “King Edward VII.” class. They were required +there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the +operations in the Ægean. Five of our light cruisers were +also in the Mediterranean.</p> + +<p>The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in +the Mediterranean, but, owing to political considerations +and their duty in watching the Austrian Fleet, there +was little prospect of their leaving that locality.</p> + +<p>It is interesting to compare this situation with that +existing a century earlier. In September, 1805, the +month before Trafalgar, the disposition of British ships<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">301</span> +in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean is +given in the following table:</p> + +<table id="t301" class="bl section"> +<tr class="bt bb"> + <td class="tdc" style="width: 10em;">Station</td> + <td class="tdc" style="width: 8em;">Commander-<br>in-Chief</td> + <td class="tdc">Ships of<br>the Line</td> + <td class="tdc">Frigates</td> + <td class="tdc">Sloops and<br>small vessels</td> + <td class="tdc">Total</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">From Shetland to Beachy Head</td> + <td class="tdl">Lord Keith</td> + <td class="tdc">10</td> + <td class="tdc">15</td> + <td class="tdc">155</td> + <td class="tdc">180</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Channel</td> + <td class="tdl">Port Admirals</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 1</td> + <td class="tdc"> 51</td> + <td class="tdc"> 52</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Guernsey and Jersey</td> + <td class="tdl">Sir J. Saumarez</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Off Ushant, etc.</td> + <td class="tdl">Admiral Cornwallis</td> + <td class="tdc">26</td> + <td class="tdc">15</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20</td> + <td class="tdc"> 61</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Irish</td> + <td class="tdl">Lord Gardner</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc">10</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14</td> + <td class="tdc"> 24</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Mediterranean</td> + <td class="tdl">Lord Nelson</td> + <td class="tdc">26</td> + <td class="tdc">19</td> + <td class="tdc"> 24</td> + <td class="tdc"> 69</td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdl">In port refitting and destined to reinforce Lords Nelson and Cornwallis</td> + <td class="tdl"></td> + <td class="tdc">11</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7</td> + <td class="tdc"> 17</td> + <td class="tdc"> 35</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>In addition to Nelson’s force of 26 capital ships and +19 frigates, the Navy had, therefore, in commission in +home waters and the Mediterranean a yet more numerous +force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates. The main portion +of this force was with Cornwallis off Ushant, and +was watching Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy +Head we had 155 sloops and small vessels.</p> + +<p>In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital +ships (including battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light +cruisers, we had in commission in home waters and the +Mediterranean only 13 capital ships (all of pre-Dreadnought +types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light +cruisers. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we +had, exclusive of the Grand Fleet and Harwich force, +about 60 destroyers (mostly of old type), 6 P boats, and +33 old torpedo boats.</p> + +<p>In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the +line in England, besides 10 under construction in Russia, +and 36 frigates. In May, 1916, we had building five +capital ships and about nine light cruisers.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">302</span></p> + +<p>A consideration of these figures will show that the +situation at the two periods under review was very different, +in that, in 1805, the force engaged at Trafalgar +was only a relatively small portion of the available British +Fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the large +majority of the vessels upon which the country had to +rely for safety.</p> + +<p>Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I +had written to the Admiralty pointing out the dangers +which an intelligent use of submarines, mines and torpedoes +by the Germans, before and during a Fleet action, +would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the +tactics which I had intended to employ to meet the +expected German movement in order to bring the enemy +to action in the shortest practicable time and with the best +chance of achieving such a victory as would be decisive. +I stated that with new and untried methods of warfare +new tactics must be devised to meet them.</p> + +<p>I received in reply an expression of approval of +my views and of confidence in the manner in which I +proposed to handle the Fleet in action.</p> + +<p>Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the +margin of superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High +Sea Fleet justify me in disregarding the enemy’s torpedo +fire or meeting it otherwise than by definite movements +deduced after most careful analysis of the problem at sea +with the Fleet and on the tactical board.</p> + +<p>The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet +were taken into account in making this decision. There +was also a possibility that the Grand Fleet might later +be called upon to confront a situation of much wider +scope than that already existing.</p> + +<p>The position gradually improved after 1916. During +the latter half of that year the remaining ships of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">303</span> +“Royal Sovereign” class joined the Grand Fleet, and +greatly increased the ratio of strength of the Fleet as +compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it +was also possible to withdraw the four battleships of the +“Queen” class from the Adriatic. This greatly eased the +manning situation. And in April, 1917, the culminating +event was the entry of the United States of America into +the War on the side of the Entente. In December, 1917, +the United States sent a division of battleships to join +the Grand Fleet, and it was apparent that we could count +upon the whole battleship strength of the United States +Navy, if required, to second our efforts.</p> + +<p>Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light +cruiser and destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet increased +steadily after the Battle of Jutland, and to a very +considerable extent reduced the danger of successful torpedo +attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface craft. +The inclusion of the K. class submarines—submarines of +high speed—in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very +probable that any losses suffered by us by submarine +attack would be more than compensated by enemy losses +from the same cause.</p> + +<p>In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in +regard to battle cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory, +the general effect of all these considerations upon the +tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be overwhelming. +The position was assured, and we could have afforded to +take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most +unwise.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">304</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XII"><span id="toclink_304"></span>CHAPTER XII<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">On</span> May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea +Fleet fought the action which has become known as the +Battle of Jutland. The despatch<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">G</a> describing the battle, +as published some weeks later, was not quite in its original +form as written by me. After a conference held at the +Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some +of them because it was considered that certain passages +might convey useful information to the enemy, and others +because it was thought to be undesirable to draw attention +to certain features of British design. Amongst the latter +was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our +earlier battle cruisers.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">G</a> See <a href="#Appendix_I">Appendix</a>.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause +our battle cruisers, with their attendant light cruisers, to +occupy when at sea an advanced position, often at a considerable +distance from the Battle Fleet. Battle cruisers +were designed and built in order that they might keep +in touch with the enemy and report his movements +when he had been found; hence the heavy guns which +they carried. They were intended to find the enemy for +the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy’s strength in +order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not +been adopted the enemy’s battle cruisers could not have +been brought to action on such occasions as the engagement +of January 24th, 1915. And in the cases of raids<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">305</span> +on our coast, the battle cruisers were always sent ahead +at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle +cruisers.</p> + +<p>Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the +middle of 1916 and the heavier armaments carried by our +ships, the real risk involved in this policy was that of our +battle cruisers being drawn on to the enemy’s Battle +Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled. +Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would, +owing to their higher speed, have no difficulty in clear +weather in keeping out of range of the enemy’s Battle +Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still maintaining touch +with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the added +support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which +had been grouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to +the absence of the 3rd Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow, +the tactical advantage of our ships was even stronger, +provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an +excess of speed over the fastest enemy’s Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, +I had felt it necessary on the highest grounds, as well as +only just to the officers and men of our battle cruisers, +to give some explanation of the heavy losses incurred by +our ships in the early part of the action, when we were +opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long +range, by four battleships of the “Queen Elizabeth” +class, comprising the 5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy +battle cruisers, which were not then supported by the +German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter showed +that one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately +protected by armour as compared with the +German vessels of the battle cruiser type. It was considered +undesirable to draw attention to this publicly +while the war was in progress.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">306</span></p> + +<p>The relative values of protection and gun power had +frequently engaged my serious attention. It was also a +subject of much discussion amongst writers on naval +matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting +that all available weight should be put into gun power and +that ships should be left practically without armour. +Their views were based on the argument that “the best +defense is a powerful offensive.” Although this argument +is very true when applied to strategy, the War has +shown its fallacy as applied to <i lang="fr">matériel</i>. The loss of the +<i>Good Hope</i>, <i>Monmouth</i>, <i>Queen Mary</i>, <i>Indefatigable</i>, +<i>Invincible</i>, <i>Defence</i>, and <i>Warrior</i>, and the considerations +to which these losses gave rise, convinced naval officers +afloat, even if they did not convince others less intimately +associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships with +inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those +which possess them to a considerably greater degree, +even if the former are superior in gun power. The conviction +was strengthened by the knowledge we obtained, +that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire, +torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were +yet taken safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive +qualities, but, partly, to the limitations of our armour-piercing +shell at that time.</p> + +<p>There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters, +when comparing the relative strength of the British +and German Fleets for the purpose of future provision +of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make comparison +only on the basis of the <em>gun power</em> of the vessels +of the two Navies. Great superiority in fighting qualities +on the part of the British Fleet was suggested by this +blindness to other considerations. During my pre-War +service at the Admiralty this question was often under +discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">307</span> +argument as being very misleading, and pointed out that +the true comparison lay between the <em>displacement</em> of the +ships of the various classes, because if we assumed, as +War experience has since shown that we were justified +in assuming that the German naval designers and +constructors were not inferior in ability to our own, +it was obvious that, taking ships of equal displacement +and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if our +vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans +must possess superiority in some other direction. It was +well known at the Admiralty that their superiority lay in +greatly increased protection, combined with heavier torpedo +armament.</p> + +<p>We were also aware that the German vessels were +fitted with small tube boilers, which were very economical +in weight for a given horse-power, and, consequently, the +German vessels obtained thereby a further advantage, +the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the +ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted +a different disposition of the weight available in each +ship.</p> + +<p>The tables on pp. 308–11 give particulars of the +armament, protection, and displacement of the capital +ships of the two Navies engaged in the Battle of Jutland, +so far as they are known to me.</p> + +<p>The main facts revealed by an examination of these +tables are:</p> + +<p class="p2 center">BATTLESHIPS</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>1. The German ships of any particular period were of considerably +greater displacement as compared with contemporary +British ships.</p> + +<p>2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour +than their British contemporaries.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">308</span></p> + +<p class="p2 center section">TABLE I<br> +BRITISH BATTLESHIPS</p> + +<table id="t308-1" class="bl"> +<tr class="bt"> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdc"> Ships</td> + <td class="tdc"> Programme</td> + <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td> + <td class="tdc"> Speed</td> + <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td> + <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td> + <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td> + <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td> + <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td> + <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td> +</tr> +<tr class="smaller"> + <td></td> + <td class="tdc">Year</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc">Knots</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> + +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Royal Sovereign” Class (5)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1913–14</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25,750</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.5</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,400</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 15″ <br>14, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 13″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 13″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 4″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Queen Elizabeth” Class (5)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1912–13</td> + <td class="tdc"> 27,500</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,400</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 15″ <br>12, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 13″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 13″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Iron Duke” Class (4)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,300</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>12, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 2½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“King George V.” Class (3)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1910–11</td> + <td class="tdc"> 23,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>12, 4″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Orion” Class (4)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1909–10</td> + <td class="tdc"> 22,500</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,100</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>13, 4″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Canada</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> Emergency War Programme</td> + <td class="tdc"> 28,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 22.75</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 14″ <br>12, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7″ and 4½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Erin</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> + <td class="tdc"> 23,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 13″.5<br>16, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 3</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″ and 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Agincourt</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> + <td class="tdc"> 27,500</td> + <td class="tdc"> 22.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14, 12″ <br>20, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 3</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 1½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Hercules” Class (3)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1909–10</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″ <br>12, 4″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck only.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“St. Vincent” Class (2)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1907–8</td> + <td class="tdc"> 19,250</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″ <br>13, 4″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Bellerophon” Class (3)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1906–7</td> + <td class="tdc"> 18,600</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,500</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″ <br>12, 4″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top bb"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Dreadnought</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> 1905–6</td> + <td class="tdc"> 17,900</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p class="p2 center section">TABLE II<br> +BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS</p> + +<table id="t309-2" class="bl"> +<tr class="bt"> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdc"> Ships</td> + <td class="tdc"> Programme</td> + <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td> + <td class="tdc"> Speed</td> + <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td> + <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td> + <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td> + <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td> + <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td> + <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td> +</tr> +<tr class="smaller"> + <td></td> + <td class="tdc">Year</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc">Knots</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl"> <i>Tiger</i> (1)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 28,500</td> + <td class="tdc"> 29.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 13″.5<br>12, 6″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Lion” Class (3)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1909–10</td> + <td class="tdc"> 26,350</td> + <td class="tdc"> 28.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,600</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 13″.5<br>15, 4″ </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 2½″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“New Zealand” Class (3)</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 18,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 26.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 12″<br>14, 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 2½″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top bb"> + <td class="tdl">“Inflexible” Class (3)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1905–6</td> + <td class="tdc"> 17,250</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 12″<br>12, 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> nil</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7″</td> + <td class="tdc"> ¾″ to 2½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">310</span></p> + +<p class="p2 center section">TABLE III<br> +GERMAN BATTLESHIPS</p> + +<table id="t310-1" class="bl"> +<tr class="bt"> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdc"> Ships</td> + <td class="tdc"> Programme</td> + <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td> + <td class="tdc"> Speed</td> + <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td> + <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td> + <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td> + <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td> + <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td> + <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td> +</tr> +<tr class="smaller"> + <td></td> + <td class="tdc">Year</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc">Knots</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> + +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“König” Class (4)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 25,390</td> + <td class="tdc"> 23.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,200</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″ <br>14, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 14″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2½″ to 3″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck and secondary battery above that.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Kaiser” Class (5)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1909–11</td> + <td class="tdc"> 24,410</td> + <td class="tdc"> 21.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 12″ <br>14, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5</td> + <td class="tdc">13″.75</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc">11¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 4″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Ditto, but at after end side only armoured up to main deck.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Heligoland” Class (4)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1908–9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 22,440</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20.5</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,100</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12, 12″ <br>14, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6</td> + <td class="tdc">11″.75</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc">11¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1½″ to 2¾″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck and secondary battery above that.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top bb"> + <td class="tdl">“Nassau” Class (4)</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1907–8</td> + <td class="tdc"> 18,600</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20.0</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2,800</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12, 11″ <br>12, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6</td> + <td class="tdc">11″.75</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6½″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2″ to 4¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p class="p2 center section">TABLE IV<br> +GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS</p> + +<table id="t310-2" class="bl"> +<tr class="bt"> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc bb" colspan="7"> <span class="smcap">Armour</span></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdc"> Ships</td> + <td class="tdc"> Programme</td> + <td class="tdc"> Designed load displacement</td> + <td class="tdc"> Speed</td> + <td class="tdc"> Fuel capacity</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main and secondary guns</td> + <td class="tdc"> Submerged torpedo tubes</td> + <td class="tdc"> Main belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Upper belt</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at bow</td> + <td class="tdc"> Belt at stern</td> + <td class="tdc"> Secondary gun battery armour</td> + <td class="tdc"> Turret front plates</td> + <td class="tdc"> Protective decks</td> + <td class="tdc"> <span class="smcap">Remarks</span></td> +</tr> +<tr class="smaller"> + <td></td> + <td class="tdc">Year</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc">Knots</td> + <td class="tdc">Tons</td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> + +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl">“Derfflinger” Class<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">H</a></td> + <td class="tdc"> 1911–12</td> + <td class="tdc"> 26,180</td> + <td class="tdc"> 28.0 </td> + <td class="tdc"> 5,600</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 12″ <br>14, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 12″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3.2″</td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to upper deck with secondary battery above that.</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Seydlitz</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> 1910–11</td> + <td class="tdc"> 24,610</td> + <td class="tdc"> 26.75</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,700</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 11″ <br>12, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc">11¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 1″ to 3¼″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Moltke</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> 1908–9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 22,640</td> + <td class="tdc"> 27.25</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,200</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10, 11″ <br>12, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc"> 11″</td> + <td class="tdc"> tapering</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 10″</td> + <td class="tdc"> ? same as <i>Seydlitz</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> +</tr> +<tr class="top bb"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Von der Tann</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> 1907–8</td> + <td class="tdc"> 19,100</td> + <td class="tdc"> 26.0 </td> + <td class="tdc"> 2,900</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8, 11″ <br>10, 5″.9</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4</td> + <td class="tdc">9¾″</td> + <td class="tdc"> Ditto</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5″</td> + <td class="tdc"> 9″</td> + <td class="tdc"> ? same as <i>Seydlitz</i></td> + <td class="tdl"> Side armoured up to main deck with secondary battery armoured to upper deck.</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">H</a> <i>Lutzow</i> was similar.</p> + +</div> + +<p class="p2 center section">TABLE V<br> +Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships of the same date. N. B.—The German figures are approximate.</p> + +<table id="t310-3" class="bl"> +<tr class="bt bb"> + <td class="tdl"></td> + <td class="tdl nobl"></td> + <td class="tdc"> Displacement</td> + <td class="tdc"> Weight of<br>armour</td> + <td class="tdc"> Weight of deck<br>protection</td> + <td class="tdc"> Total</td> + <td class="tdc"> Length<br>of ship</td> + <td class="tdc"> Beam</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Battleships</span>—</td> + <td class="tdc smaller"></td> + <td class="tdc smaller"> Tons</td> + <td class="tdc smaller"> Tons</td> + <td class="tdc smaller"> Tons</td> + <td class="tdc smaller"> Feet</td> + <td class="tdc smaller"> Feet</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Monarch</i></td> + <td class="tdl nobl"> British</td> + <td class="tdc"> 22,500</td> + <td class="tdc"> 4,560</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2,010</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6,570</td> + <td class="tdc"> 545</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88½</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Kaiser</i></td> + <td class="tdl nobl"> German</td> + <td class="tdc"> 24,410</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5,430</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,130</td> + <td class="tdc"> 8,560</td> + <td class="tdc"> 564</td> + <td class="tdc"> 95 </td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Battle Cruisers</span>—</td> + <td class="tdl"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> + <td class="tdc"></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Queen Mary</i></td> + <td class="tdl nobl"> British</td> + <td class="tdc"> 27,000</td> + <td class="tdc"> 3,900</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2,300</td> + <td class="tdc"> 6,200</td> + <td class="tdc"> 660</td> + <td class="tdc"> 89 </td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdl"> <i class="in1">Seydlitz</i></td> + <td class="tdl nobl"> German</td> + <td class="tdc"> 24,610</td> + <td class="tdc"> 5,200</td> + <td class="tdc"> 2,400</td> + <td class="tdc"> 7,600</td> + <td class="tdc"> 656</td> + <td class="tdc"> 93½</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p class="p0 smaller center"><i>Note.</i>—Similar comparisons between other ships of the same date would show similar results. +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">312</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour +<em>to the upper deck</em>;, whilst nine of the earliest British +Dreadnoughts were provided with armour protection to the +<em>main deck only</em>, thus rendering them far more open to artillery +attack. The “Orion” class of battleship and the “Lion” class +of battle cruiser, designed during my service at the Admiralty +as Controller, were the first of our Dreadnoughts armoured to +the upper deck.</p> + +<p>4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships +was in nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries, +whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in <em>all cases</em> +considerably greater in the German ships.</p> + +<p>5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually +greater than in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision +more complete.</p> + +<p>6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged +torpedo tubes than the British vessels.</p> +</div> + +<p class="p2 center">BATTLE CRUISERS</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater displacement +than their British contemporaries.</p> + +<p>2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than +their British contemporaries.</p> + +<p>3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection +above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being +provided with protection to the upper deck.</p> + +<p>4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions, +including deck protection, as well as more complete watertight +subdivisions.</p> + +<p>5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged +torpedo tubes than the British ships.</p> +</div> + +<p>As against the additional protection of the German +ships our vessels of contemporary design were provided in +all cases with heavier turret guns, whilst the German +ships carried heavier secondary armaments.</p> + +<p>A point of considerable interest, which should also +be mentioned because it was to prove important, was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">313</span> +that the Germans possessed a delay-action fuse which, +combined with a highly efficient armour-piercing projectile, +ensured the burst of shell taking place <em>inside</em> +the armour of British ships instead of <em>outside</em>, or whilst +passing through the armour, which was the case with +British shells of that date fired against the thick German +armour.</p> + +<p>The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was +not widely different, although the British ships, as a +rule, were fitted to carry more fuel. Although I arranged, +after the first few months of war, to reduce the amount +of fuel carried by our ships very considerably—in fact, +by more than 25 per cent.—I was unable to reduce it further +in coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the +protection afforded by the coal, since in our case it was +necessary to be prepared to do a considerable amount of +steaming at high speed, involving expenditure of coal, +before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have +been unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with +coal below what I may call the “safety line.” On the +other hand, it was well known that, as the Germans had +no intention of fighting an action far from their bases, +they had effected a very much greater reduction in the +quantity of fuel carried with consequently a corresponding +advantage in speed.</p> + +<p>There was yet one other matter of great importance, +namely, the vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies +in regard to under-water attack. Here the Germans possessed +a very real advantage, which stood them in good +stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes:</p> + +<p>1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside +the ships, and in many cases its greater thickness.</p> + +<p>2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">314</span> +skin of the ship and the consequent additional protection +to under-water attack afforded thereby.</p> + +<p>In regard to the first point, the great majority of +our ships only carried partial internal protection, that is, +protection over a portion of the length of the ship. The +protection was usually confined to the region of the +magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran +throughout the length of the vessel.</p> + +<p>As to the second point, it was possible to place the +protective bulkhead farther “inboard” in the German +ships without cramping machinery and magazine spaces, +because the ships themselves were of much greater beam. +Consequently the explosion of a mine or a torpedo against +the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the protective +bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of +the ships than was the case with a British vessel. The +result was that, although it is known that many German +capital ships were mined and torpedoed during the war, +including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans have +not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought +battleship <i>Pommern</i> and the battle cruiser +<i>Lutzow</i>, whose injuries from shell fire were also very +extensive.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or +torpedoed, rarely survived. The recorded instances of +escape are the <i>Inflexible</i> (mined in the Dardanelles) and +the <i>Marlborough</i> (torpedoed at Jutland), and in the latter +case, although the torpedo struck at about the most +favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in +reaching port.</p> + +<p>The question will be asked why it was that British +ships were under this disadvantage. The reply is that the +whole of our Dreadnought battleships, designed before +the War, were hampered by the absence of proper dock<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">315</span> +accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked +to me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the +mistake of building our ships before we had proper dock +accommodation for them, whilst in Germany they had provided +the dock accommodation first and had designed the +ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since +docks took a long time to construct, the German policy +involved delay in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of +a type, and hence our margin of superiority in 1914. As +each successive type of Dreadnought was designed, our +constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they +went beyond a certain beam the number of docks available +would be insufficient; and it was always a matter +of great difficulty to obtain money with which to construct +adequate docks. Docks make no appeal to the +imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money. +The result was that August, 1914, found us with a superiority +in ships, but woefully lacking in dock accommodation; +and for this reason alone a Fleet action early in +the War, resulting in considerable damage to heavy ships, +would have produced embarrassing results.</p> + +<p>It is only just to our very able constructive staff at +the Admiralty to point this out; it was one of the reasons +which led to the German ships being much better equipped +to withstand under-water attack than were our own. It is +devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in mind +in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided +for the Fleet.</p> + +<p>The matter is one of which I have considerable personal +knowledge, since it came within my province as +Controller in 1909–11 and was also given to me to examine +whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless to say +that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out +with emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">316</span> +will be shown, as an introduction in a consideration of the +Battle of Jutland, if that action is to be rightly judged.</p> + +<p>In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential +to bear in mind that the time of receipt of signals, +especially of reports emanating from the bridge of a ship, +is not a true indication of the time at which the officer +making the report began his task. A varying but considerable +interval is bound to elapse; this includes the +time taken to write out the report, transmit it to the +wireless office or signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode +it on board the receiving ship, write it out and transmit +it to the bridge. The interval is greater with wireless +than with visual signals.</p> + +<h3>I.—<span class="smcap">The Battle Cruiser Fleet’s Action</span></h3> + +<p>The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose +of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the +North Sea. The orders from me under which the Fleet +acted were as follows:</p> + +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle +Squadron from Cromarty, was directed to pass through +a position in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.0 E., and to meet +the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 31st +at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.</p> + +<p>Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle +Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron, was directed +to proceed to a position in Lat. 56.40 N., Long. 5 E., +economising fuel in the destroyers as much as possible; +it was expected that he would be in that position by about +2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand +to the northward to get into visual touch with the Battle +Fleet.</p> + +<figure id="i_316" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption sans">Operations of<br> + +<span class="larger">BATTLE CRUISER FLEET</span><br> + +II·00 p.m to VI·15 p.m. 31<sup>st</sup>. May. + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_316.jpg" width="730" height="623" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_316-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">317</span></p> + +<p>The <i>Iron Duke</i> and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, +together with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the +newly commissioned light cruisers <i>Chester</i> and <i>Canterbury</i>, +which had been carrying out gunnery and torpedo +practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of +May 30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat. +57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E., having met the 2nd Battle +Squadron <i lang="fr">en route</i> at 11.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> in Lat. 58.13 N., +Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed +before sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards +the Horn Reef from the position in Lat. 57.45 N., +Long. 4.15 E.</p> + +<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about +18 miles to the north-westward of the position (A), +being actually in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 3.45 E., in +organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly delayed +for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary practice +of examining trawlers and other vessels met with <i lang="fr">en +route</i> to be carried out without causing the examining +vessels to expend unnecessary fuel in regaining station. +We had to be on our guard against scouts. The divisions +were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard +in the order: 1st–6th Divisions (screened by the 4th, +11th, and 12th Flotillas) with the 4th Light Cruiser +Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. +The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were +stationed 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six +miles apart on a line of direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; +the cruisers being eight miles apart and their positions +being in the order from east to west:</p> + +<div class="center"><div class="ilb"> +<pre> + (F.) (F.) +<i>Cochrane</i> <i>Shannon</i> <i>Minotaur</i> <i>Defence</i> <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> <i>Black Prince</i> + . . + . . + . <i>Warrior</i> + . + . + <i>Hampshire</i> (linking ship 6 miles astern of the <i>Minotaur</i>) +</pre> +</div></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">318</span></p> + +<p>The attached cruisers, the <i>Active</i>, <i>Boadicea</i>, <i>Blanche</i>, +and <i>Bellona</i>, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and +the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers +<i>Chester</i> and <i>Canterbury</i>, about 20 miles ahead, the whole +steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the speed of <em>advance</em> +being 14 knots.</p> + +<p>The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below:</p> + +<table id="t318" class="smaller section"> +<tr> + <td class="tdc" colspan="6">Line of Advance.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc xxlarge" colspan="6">↑</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc">1st Div.</td> + <td class="tdc">2nd Div.</td> + <td class="tdc">3rd Div.</td> + <td class="tdc">4th Div.</td> + <td class="tdc">5th Div.</td> + <td class="tdc">6th Div.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><i>King George V.</i>(F.)</td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Orion</i> (F.)</td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Iron Duke</i> (F.F.)</td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Benbow</i> (F.)</td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Colossus</i> (F.)</td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Marlborough</i> (F.)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><i>Ajax</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Monarch</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Royal Oak</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Bellerophon</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Collingwood</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Revenge</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><i>Centurion</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Conqueror</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Superb</i> (F.)</td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Temeraire</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Neptune</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Hercules</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><i>Erin</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Thunderer</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Canada</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Vanguard</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>St. Vincent</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Agincourt</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc" colspan="6">F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship.</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>It may be added in further explanation that the +flagships of the Battle Fleet were:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang6"> + +<p><i>Iron Duke</i>, Fleet-Flagship.—Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (Commander-in-Chief).</p> + +<p><i>King George V.</i>—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, Commanding +2nd Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Orion.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in +the 2nd Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Superb.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in +the 4th Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Benbow.</i>—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Commanding +the 4th Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Colossus.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral +in the 1st Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Marlborough.</i>—Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding +1st Battle Squadron and second in command of +the Grand Fleet.</p> +</div> + +<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, +with destroyers, were at 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. +4.40 E., and had turned to the northward, steering N. by +E., speed 19½ knots, in the order:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">319</span></p> + +<p>The <i>Lion</i> and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single +line ahead, screened by the light cruiser <i>Champion</i> and +10 destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead three miles E.N.E. +of the <i>Lion</i>, screened by six destroyers.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">I</a> The 5th Battle +Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W. +of the <i>Lion</i>, being screened by the light cruiser <i>Fearless</i> +and nine destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser +Squadrons formed a screen eight miles S.S.E. from the +<i>Lion</i>, ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and +W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to east:</p> + +<table id="t319" class="section"> +<tr class="lrpad"> + <td class="tdc">2nd Light Cruiser<br>Squadron</td> + <td class="tdc">3rd Light Cruiser<br>Squadron</td> + <td class="tdc">1st Light Cruiser<br>Squadron</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><i>Southampton</i> (F.)<br><i>Nottingham</i><br><i>Birmingham</i><br><i>Dublin</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Falmouth</i> (F.)<br><i>Birkenhead</i><br><i>Gloucester</i></td> + <td class="tdl"><i>Inconstant</i><br><i>Galatea</i> (F.)<br><i>Cordelia</i><br><i>Phaeton</i></td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">I</a> These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but happened to be at +Rosyth.</p> + +</div> + +<p>It should be added that the flagships were:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang6"> + +<p><i>Lion.</i>—Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David +Beatty.</p> + +<p><i>Princess Royal.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, commanding +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>New Zealand.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, commanding +2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Barham.</i>—Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding +5th Battle Squadron.</p> +</div> + +<p>The <i>Engadine</i>, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between +the light cruisers <i>Gloucester</i> and <i>Cordelia</i>, and the +light cruiser <i>Yarmouth</i> acted as linking ship between +the <i>Lion</i> and the light cruiser screen.</p> + +<p>The first report of enemy vessels was received from the +<i>Galatea</i>, the flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, +commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +who, at 2.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, sighted two enemy vessels to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">320</span> +E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a +neutral steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possibilities +of the situation, immediately turned his fleet to the +S.S.E., the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get +between the enemy and his base.</p> + +<p>At 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Galatea</i> reported a large amount of +smoke “as from a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a +report that the vessels were steering north. The course +of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered to the eastward +and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being +sighted at 3.31 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and identified as five battle cruisers +accompanied by destroyers.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons +changed their direction, and, judging the situation +accurately, spread to the east without waiting for orders, +forming a screen in advance of the heavy ships. Our +Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels of a +similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser +Squadron, under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with +his broad pendant in the <i>Southampton</i>, came in at high +speed towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of +them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> sighted +enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E.</p> + +<p>On receipt of the <i>Galatea’s</i> report, Sir David Beatty +ordered the <i>Engadine</i> to send up a sea-plane to scout to +the N.N.E. This was the first time that sea-planes had +been used for reconnaissance work with a fleet in an +action, and the event is notable for that reason. The +low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-plane, +with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as +pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as +observer, was able, by flying low under the clouds, to +identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the report +being received on board the <i>Lion</i> at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">321</span> +sea-plane was under heavy fire from the light cruisers +during the observation. By this time the line of battle +was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron +forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with +the destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station +ahead. The course was E.S.E., slightly converging on +the enemy, the speed 25 knots, and the range 23,000 +yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on a line of +bearing in order to clear the smoke.</p> + +<p>The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the +movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing +N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the weather was favourable, +the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E., and +the visibility good.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the wireless reports from the <i>Galatea</i> to the +<i>Lion</i> had been intercepted on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and +directions were at once given to the Battle Fleet to raise +steam for full speed, the ships being at the time at short +notice for full speed. The cruisers had been ordered to +raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle +Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +I directed Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships +of the situation. The earliest reports from the <i>Galatea</i> +had indicated the presence of light cruisers and destroyers +only, and my first impression was that these vessels, on +sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via +the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels +and were consequently not in so much danger of being +cut off as if they turned to the southward. The 3rd +Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well placed for cutting +the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place, +was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +on the receipt of the information of the presence of enemy +battle cruisers, it was directed to reinforce Sir David<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">322</span> +Beatty. About 3.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received a report from Sir +David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers and +a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the +same time.</p> + +<p>As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was +reported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close +our battle cruisers, and speed increased as rapidly as +possible. By 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the “Fleet Speed” was 20 knots, +being higher than had previously been obtained. Zigzagging +was abandoned on receipt of the <i>Galatea’s</i> first +report. The battleships were also directed to keep clear +of the wake of the next ahead in order to prevent loss of +speed from the wash.</p> + +<p>At 3.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the action between the battle cruisers +began at a range of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened +by the two forces practically simultaneously. At the commencement +the fire from the German vessels was rapid +and accurate, the <i>Lion</i> being hit twice three minutes after +fire was opened, and the <i>Lion</i>, <i>Tiger</i> and <i>Princess Royal</i> +all receiving several hits by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; observers on board +our own ships were also of opinion that our fire was +effective at that stage.</p> + +<p>At about 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> it was evident by the accuracy of the +enemy’s fire that he had obtained the range of our ships, +which was then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore +well abaft the beam, and course was altered slightly to +the southward to confuse his fire control. Course was +altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose. +The German ships frequently zigzagged for the +purpose of confusing our fire control.</p> + +<p>At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very +rapid and accurate; the <i>Lion</i> received several hits, the roof +of one of her turrets being blown off at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> At about +4.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Indefatigable</i> was hit, approximately at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">323</span> +outer edge of the upper deck level in line with the after +turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an explosion +followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell +out of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit +by another salvo forward, turned over and sank.</p> + +<p>About this time (4.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>) the 5th Battle Squadron +came into action, opening fire at a range between 19,000 +and 20,000 yards. This slower squadron was some distance +astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason partly of +the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and +partly of the light to the eastward having become less +favourable, difficulty was experienced in seeing the +targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. +At 4.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the range of the enemy’s battle cruisers +from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was +altered from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire +had slackened owing to the increase in range.</p> + +<p>The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing +the line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the +periscopes of enemy submarines were also made by more +than one ship.</p> + +<p>In accordance with the general directions given by +Sir David Beatty to the destroyers to attack when a +favourable opportunity occurred, the <i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i>, +<i>Nicator</i>, <i>Narborough</i>, <i>Pelican</i>, <i>Petard</i>, <i>Obdurate</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, +<i>Moorsom</i>, <i>Morris</i>, <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Termagant</i> moved out +at 4.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; at the same time a similar movement took +place on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser +and 15 destroyers. Both sides first steered to reach an +advantageous position at the van of the opposing battle +cruiser lines from which to deliver their attack, and then +turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement +at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the +enemy lost two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">324</span> +addition, his torpedo attack was partially frustrated; some +torpedoes were fired by the enemy, two of which crossed +the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been +turned away to avoid the attack.</p> + +<p>During this action, which reflected the greatest credit +on our destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing +to their having dropped back towards the rear of our line, +were not in a good position to attack the enemy’s battle +cruisers with torpedoes. The <i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i>, and <i>Nicator</i>, +most gallantly led by Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham +in the <i>Nestor</i>, were able to press home their attack, +causing the enemy’s battle cruisers to turn away to avoid +their torpedoes. The <i>Nomad</i> was damaged and forced +to haul out of line before getting within torpedo range of +the battle cruisers, but the <i>Nestor</i> and <i>Nicator</i> succeeded +in firing torpedoes at the battle cruisers under a heavy +fire from the German secondary armaments. The <i>Nestor</i> +was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser, +and remained stopped between the lines. She was sunk +later by the German Battle Fleet when that force +appeared on the scene, but not before she had fired her last +torpedo at the approaching ships. The <i>Nomad</i> was also +sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but this +vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. +In both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying +circumstances was shown by the officers and men. It +is gratifying to record that a considerable proportion of +the ship’s company of both destroyers was picked up by +German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed +the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle +cruisers, the <i>Nicator</i> was able to rejoin her flotilla. The +<i>Moorsom</i> also attacked the enemy’s Battle Fleet and +returned. In the meantime, the <i>Petard</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, <i>Turbulent</i> +and <i>Termagant</i> succeeded in firing torpedoes at long<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">325</span> +range (7,000 yards) at the enemy’s battle cruisers. For +his gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack +Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, who was +rescued from the <i>Nestor</i> and taken prisoner by the +Germans, received the Victoria Cross.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships +had become very fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle +cruisers began to be noticeable, the third ship in the line +being observed to be on fire at 4.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, whilst our ships +of the 5th Battle Squadron were also inflicting and receiving +some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of +the fire from the enemy’s vessels was deteriorating at +this period; our own ships were much handicapped by the +decreasing visibility, due partly to the use by the enemy +of smoke screens, under cover of which he altered course +to throw out our fire.</p> + +<p>The flagship <i>Barham</i>, of the 5th Battle Squadron, +received her first hit at 4.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>At about 4.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a second disaster befell the British +battle cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy’s +battle cruisers hit the <i>Queen Mary</i> abreast of “Q” turret +and a terrific explosion resulted, evidently caused by a +magazine blowing up. The <i>Tiger</i>, which was following +close astern of the <i>Queen Mary</i>, passed through the dense +cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal +of material fell on her decks, but otherwise the <i>Queen +Mary</i> had completely vanished. A few survivors from +this ship and from the <i>Indefatigable</i> were afterwards +rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine +ships with their splendid ships’ companies was a heavy +blow to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature +of the disaster adding to its magnitude.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">J</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">326</span></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">J</a> I was not aware of the loss of the <i>Queen Mary</i> and <i>Indefatigable</i> until +the morning of June 1st.</p> + +</div> + +<p>At 4.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore Goodenough, in the <i>Southampton</i>, +Flagship of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, +which had been scouting ahead of the Battle Cruisers, reported +that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight bearing +S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position. +Sir David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting +the Battle Fleet at 4.42 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> turned the battle cruisers +16 points in succession to starboard. This movement was +followed by the enemy’s battle cruisers, and Sir David +Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn +his ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commodore +Goodenough led the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron +to a favourable position from which to observe the +movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, within 13,000 +yards’ range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very +heavy fire, clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded +several reports of their position and movements; +the skilful manner in which the Commodore, aided by his +captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly +saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant +manœuvring of the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron +during the engagement, the position of the <i>Southampton</i>, +as obtained by reckoning, was somewhat inaccurate, +as was to be expected. This fact detracted from the value +of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by latitude +and longitude, as reported from time to time to +the <i>Iron Duke</i>, was consequently incorrect. This discrepancy +added greatly to the difficulty experienced in +ascertaining the correct moment at which to deploy the +Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the direction +of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however, +inevitable under the conditions.</p> + +<p>The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the southward +in their pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">327</span> +in excess of that which the Battle Fleet could +attain, resulted in opening the distance between the two +forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty’s +force to the northward, the <i>Iron Duke</i> and the <i>Lion</i> were +over 50 miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles +per hour.</p> + +<p>As soon as the position of the <i>Lion</i> was known after +the receipt of the report of enemy battle cruisers being +in sight, Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. S. Hood was directed +to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir David Beatty’s +force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to +the Rear-Admiral. The latter officer reported his own +position and gave his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots. +At the same time the Battle Fleet was informed that our +battle cruisers were in action with the enemy’s battle +cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral +Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company +with Sir David Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being +received, with a report that his squadron was in action.</p> + +<p>At this time I was confident that, under the determined +leadership of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our +best and fastest battleships and six battle cruisers, very +serious injury would be inflicted on the five battle cruisers +of the enemy if they could be kept within range.</p> + +<p>The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, +which was communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not +cause me any uneasiness in respect of the safety of our +own vessels, since our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron +were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not, however, +expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of +24 knots; the information furnished to me at this time +gave the designed speed of the fastest German battleships +as 20.5 knots only. Even after making full allowance for +the fact that our ships were probably carrying more fuel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">328</span> +and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving +the Germans credit for some excess over the designed +speed, no doubt existed in my mind that both our battleships +and our battle cruisers with Sir David Beatty could +keep well out of range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if +necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I learned +later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron, +<em>when going at its utmost speed</em>, found considerable +difficulty in increasing its distance from the enemy’s 3rd +Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the “König” +class, and on return to Scapa I received a report from the +Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron with a +speed of <em>23 knots</em> for a short period, this being the first +intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable +by them.</p> + +<p>To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between +the battle cruisers was renewed during the retirement of +our ships to the northward, and the two leading ships of +the 5th Battle Squadron, the <i>Barham</i> and <i>Valiant</i>, supported +our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two rear +ships of that force, the <i>Warspite</i> and <i>Malaya</i>, engaged +the leading ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet as long as +their guns would bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards.</p> + +<p>The light cruiser <i>Fearless</i>, with destroyers of the 1st +Flotilla, were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, +and the light cruiser <i>Champion</i>, with destroyers of the +13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle Squadron. The 1st and +3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in the rear +during the southerly course, now took up a position on the +starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd +Light Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During +this northerly run the fire from our ships was very +intermittent, owing to the weather thickening to the eastward,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">329</span> +although the enemy was able at times to fire with +some accuracy.</p> + +<p>From 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> until after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the light was very much +in favour of the enemy, being far clearer to the westward +than to the eastward. A photograph taken on board the +<i>Malaya</i> at 5.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> towards the western horizon established +this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted +against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 +yards distant.</p> + +<p>Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 +minutes after 5.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> owing to the enemy’s ships being +invisible, fire being reopened at about 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the +enemy’s battle cruisers, three or four of which could be +seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of some 14,000 +yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed +to be effective, the <i>Lion</i> alone firing some 15 salvoes during +this period.</p> + +<p>At 5.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the destroyer <i>Moresby</i>, which had rejoined +the Battle Cruiser Fleet after assisting the <i>Engadine</i> +with her sea-plane, fired a torpedo at the enemy’s +line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000 yards from a +favourable position—two points before the beam of the +enemy’s leading battle cruiser.</p> + +<p>At 5.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Lion’s</i> course was gradually altered +from N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled +movements and resulting position of the British Battle +Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also gradually hauled +to the eastward, being probably influenced in this movement +by reports received from their light cruisers, which +were by this time in contact with the light cruiser <i>Chester</i> +and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by +Rear-Admiral Hood.</p> + +<p>The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.</p> + +<p>At 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, in accordance with my directions, the 3rd<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">330</span> +Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, +proceeded at full speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At +5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the squadron, comprising the <i>Invincible</i> (Flag), +<i>Inflexible</i>, and <i>Indomitable</i>, in single line ahead in that +order, with the destroyers <i>Shark</i>, <i>Christopher</i>, <i>Ophelia</i>, +and <i>Acasta</i>, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had +the light cruiser <i>Canterbury</i> five miles ahead and the light +cruiser <i>Chester</i> bearing N. 70° W., and was steering S. +by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing. +According to the <i>Indomitable’s</i> report, objects could be +distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings, +and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then +onwards, according to the same report, the visibility +varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, although other +reports place it higher at times.</p> + +<p>At 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the sound of gunfire was plainly heard +to the south-westward, and the <i>Chester</i> turned in that +direction to investigate, and, at 5.36 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, sighted a three-funnelled +light cruiser on the starboard bow, with one or +two destroyers in company. The <i>Chester</i> challenged and, +receiving no reply, altered course to west to close, judging +from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel +was hostile.</p> + +<p>As the <i>Chester</i> closed, course was altered to about +north in order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by +the destroyer on a bearing favourable to the latter. This +turn brought the enemy well abaft the port beam of the +<i>Chester</i> and on an approximately parallel course. During +the turn the <i>Chester</i> sighted two or more light cruisers +astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser +opened fire on the <i>Chester</i>, the latter replying immediately +afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility +at this time, judging by the distance at which the +enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the <i>Chester</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">331</span> +could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth +salvo hit the <i>Chester</i>, put No. 1 gun port out of action, +and killed and wounded a large proportion of the gun +crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light cruisers +sighted by the <i>Chester</i> undoubtedly belonged to one of +the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the starboard +bow of their battle cruisers.</p> + +<p>Captain Lawson of the <i>Chester</i>, in view of the superior +force to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. +and towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing +the enemy’s light cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid +and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy vessels +turned after the <i>Chester</i>, and during the unequal engagement, +which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully +manœuvred his ship with a view to impeding +the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was in no +condition to engage such superior forces successfully in +her damaged state.</p> + +<p>The <i>Chester</i> closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron +and took station N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron at a later phase of the action. The +ship suffered considerable casualties, having 31 killed and +50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were +disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above +the water line. It was on board the <i>Chester</i> that the +second Victoria Cross of the action was earned, posthumously, +by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class, who was +mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, +whose age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained +standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly +awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the guns’ +crew, dead and wounded, all round him.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd +Battle Cruiser Squadron at 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and Rear-Admiral<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">332</span> +Hood turned his ships to starboard and brought the +enemy light cruisers, which were engaging the <i>Chester</i>, +and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his port +bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the +3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port +quarter of the squadron. As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood +made out his position he led his squadron with the <i>Canterbury</i> +between the enemy and the <i>Chester</i>, on a course +about W.N.W., and at 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> opened an effective fire +on the German light cruisers with his port guns, at a +range of about 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The enemy vessels +turned away from this attack and fired torpedoes at +the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were seen +later from the <i>Indomitable</i>. At about 6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Invincible</i> +and <i>Indomitable</i> turned to starboard to avoid +these torpedoes, three of which passed very close to the +latter ship, and ran alongside within 20 yards of the vessel. +The <i>Inflexible</i> turned to port.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted +astern of the first group, and the four British destroyers, +<i>Shark</i>, <i>Acasta</i>, <i>Ophelia</i> and <i>Christopher</i>, attacked them +and the large destroyer force in company with them, and +were received by a heavy fire which disabled the <i>Shark</i> +and damaged the <i>Acasta</i>. On board the <i>Shark</i> the third +V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain, +Commander Loftus Jones, this award also being, I regret +to say, posthumous.</p> + +<p>The attack of the British destroyers was carried out +with great gallantry and determination, and having frustrated +the enemy’s torpedo attack on the 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones turned his +division to regain his position on our battle cruisers. At +this moment three German vessels came into sight out +of the mist and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">333</span> +<i>Shark</i> and causing many casualties on board; Commander +Loftus Jones was amongst those wounded. Lieut.-Commander +J. O. Barron, commanding the <i>Acasta</i>, came +to the assistance of the <i>Shark</i>, but Commander Loftus +Jones refused to imperil a second destroyer, and directed +the <i>Acasta</i> to leave him. The <i>Shark</i> then became the +target for the German ships and destroyers. Commander +Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged +gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be +placed in the tube and fired; but whilst this was being +done the torpedo was hit by a shell and exploded, causing +many casualties. Those gallant officers and men in the +<i>Shark</i> who still survived, continued to fight the only gun +left in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The +captain was now wounded again, his right leg being +taken off by a shell; but he still continued to direct the +fire, until the condition of the <i>Shark</i> and the approach of +German destroyers made it probable that the ship would +fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders +for her to be sunk, countermanding this order shortly +afterwards on realising that her remaining gun could still +be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit by two torpedoes, +and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors +were picked up the next morning by a Danish +steamer. In recognition of the great gallantry displayed, +the whole of the survivors were awarded the Distinguished +Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin, +Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. +Hope, A.B.; C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; +T. W. Swan, Stoker.</p> + +<p>At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of +our advanced cruiser line, which at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> was about 16 +miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, the latter being at that +time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E., steering S.E. by S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">334</span> +at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to decreasing +visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to +be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard +flank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was about 16 +miles due east of the advanced cruiser line, but was steering +more to the southward on a converging course at a +speed of about five knots faster.</p> + +<p>At 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, +and shortly afterwards ships were seen from the <i>Minotaur</i> +to be emerging from the mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the +senior officer of the cruiser line, had recalled the ships +of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing and +had ordered them to form single line ahead on the +<i>Minotaur</i>. He then made the signal to engage the +enemy, namely, the ships in sight ahead; but before fire +was opened they replied to his challenge and were identified +as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, engaged +with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the +westward.</p> + +<p>At 5.47 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Defence</i>, with the <i>Warrior</i> astern, +sighted on a S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard +bow) three or four enemy light cruisers, and course was +altered three points to port, bringing them nearly on a +beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in +the <i>Defence</i>, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each +ship fired three salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The +salvoes fell short, and the <i>Defence</i> altered course to starboard, +brought the enemy first ahead, and then to a +bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention of +closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers +were falling in close proximity to the <i>Defence</i> and the +<i>Warrior</i>. These ships opened fire with their port guns<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">335</span> +at 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and shortly afterwards passed close across the +bows of the <i>Lion</i> from port to starboard. One light +cruiser, probably the <i>Wiesbaden</i>, was hit by the second +salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and +nearly stopped. Our ships continued to close her until +within 5,500 yards. From about 6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> onwards they +had come under fire of guns of heavy calibre from the +enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as +gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently +bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on, +probably not realising in the gathering smoke and mist +that the enemy’s heavy ships were at fairly close range. +At about 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Defence</i> was hit by two salvoes in +quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up +and the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an +officer as Sir Robert Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s +company as the officers and men of the <i>Defence</i> was a +heavy blow. The <i>Warrior</i> was very badly damaged by +shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain +Molteno was able to bring his ship out of action, having +first seen the <i>Defence</i> disappear. From diagrams made +in the <i>Warrior</i> it appears that the German battle cruisers +turned 16 points (possibly with a view either to close their +Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled <i>Wiesbaden</i>), +engaged the <i>Defence</i> and <i>Warrior</i>, and then +turned back again. This supposition is confirmed by +sketches taken on board the <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> at the +same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, however, +it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the +observations on board the <i>Warrior</i> it is certain that the +visibility was much greater in her direction from the +enemy’s line, than it was in the direction of the enemy +from the <i>Warrior</i>. Although the <i>Defence</i> and <i>Warrior</i> +were being hit frequently, those on board the <i>Warrior</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">336</span> +could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, +and it is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert +Arbuthnot not realising that he was at comparatively short +range from the German battle cruisers until he was already +under an overwhelming fire.</p> + +<p>The <i>Warrior</i> passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron +at the period when the steering gear of the <i>Warspite</i> had +become temporarily disabled.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">K</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">K</a> <i>Cf.</i> <a href="#Page_350">page 350</a>.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, the ship next to the westward +of the <i>Defence</i> and the <i>Warrior</i> in the cruiser +screen, had turned to close these ships when they became +engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in accordance +with a signal from the <i>Defence</i>. The <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> +joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on +her starboard bow, did not follow the other ships across +the bows of the battle cruisers, as to do so would have +seriously incommoded these vessels; she turned to port to +a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron.</p> + +<p>The <i>Black Prince</i> was observed from the <i>Duke of +Edinburgh</i> to turn some 12 points to port at the same +time that the <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> turned, but her subsequent +movements are not clear; the German accounts of +the action stated that the <i>Black Prince</i> was sunk by gunfire +at the same time as the <i>Defence</i>, but she was not seen +to be in action at this time by any of our vessels, and, +moreover, a wireless signal, reporting a submarine in sight +and timed 8.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, was subsequently received from her. +It is probable that the <i>Black Prince</i> passed to the rear +of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and that during the +night she found herself close to one of the German battle +squadrons, and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In +support of this theory, the German account mentions that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">337</span> +a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk in that manner +during the night. None of the ships of this class was +present during the engagement, but the <i>Black Prince</i> +might well have been mistaken for a ship of this type in +the circumstances.</p> + +<figure id="i_336" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 43em;"> + <img src="images/i_336.jpg" width="2060" height="1239" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> +<div class="blockquot"> +<p>THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AS DEPICTED DY A GERMAN ARTIST, SHOWING THE “WIESBADEN” SINKING BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES</p> + +<p>The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about +6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at the termination of their engagement with +enemy light cruisers, turning to avoid torpedoes fired at +them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood sighted +the <i>Lion</i> and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at +about 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> hoisted the signal to his squadron to form +single line ahead, and turned to take station ahead of the +<i>Lion</i> and to engage the hostile battle cruisers, which at +6.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> were sighted at a range of 8,600 yards.</p> + +<p>A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and +the fire of the squadron was judged by those on board +the <i>Invincible</i> to be very effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, +who was on the bridge of the <i>Invincible</i> with Captain +Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer +in the fore control, at about 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, saying, “Your firing +is very good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every +shot is telling.” At about 6.34 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Invincible</i>, which +had already been hit more than once by heavy shell without +appreciable damage, was struck in “Q” turret. The +shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander +Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion +followed immediately, evidently caused by the +magazine blowing up, and the ship broke in half and sank +at once, only two officers, including Commander Dannreuther, +and four men being subsequently picked up by +the destroyer <i>Badger</i>. The British Navy sustained a most +serious loss in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, +one of the most distinguished of our younger flag officers, +and in Captain Cay and the officers and men of his flagship.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">338</span> +The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships even at the +close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact that +the officers in the <i>Invincible</i> and <i>Indomitable</i> were under +the impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, +whilst officers in the <i>Inflexible</i>, stationed between these +two ships in the line, reported that her fire was being directed +at a battleship of the “Kaiser” or “König” class, +and that only one ship could be seen.</p> + +<p>Just before the loss of the <i>Invincible</i>, the 3rd Light +Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, +had carried out an effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s +battle cruisers; both the light cruisers <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Yarmouth</i> +fired torpedoes at the leading battle cruiser. It was +thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark as a heavy +under-water explosion was felt at this time.</p> + +<p>After the loss of the <i>Invincible</i>, the <i>Inflexible</i> was +left as leader of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the +<i>Invincible</i> had been passed, course was altered two points +to starboard to close the enemy ships, which were disappearing +in the mist. A further turn to starboard for +the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +the battle cruisers being clear of the leading battleships +(which were bearing N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir +David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron +to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the <i>Inflexible</i> +and <i>Indomitable</i> took station astern of the <i>New Zealand</i>.</p> + +<p>The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. +The <i>Chester</i> with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which +by 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> had got ahead of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser +screen, encountered some of the light cruisers composing +the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing so, +drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron, which, with the <i>Canterbury</i> and destroyers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">339</span> +turned to about W.N.W. to assist the <i>Chester</i> +and to engage the enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was +made by four British destroyers on the enemy’s light +cruisers. This attack was apparently thought by the Germans +to come from the flotillas with the Battle Fleet, as +far as can be judged from their report of the action; the +ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly +mistaken by their vessels for the van of our Battle +Fleet, since mention is made in the German report of the +British Battle Fleet having been sighted at this time by +the German light forces, steering in a westerly or north-westerly +direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of +the High Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.</p> + +<p>So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course +at this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly +course before, through, and immediately subsequent +to deployment, gradually hauling round afterwards, +first through south to south-west, and, then, to west, <em>but +it was not until</em> 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <em>that a westerly course was being +steered</em>.</p> + +<p>The only point that is not clear is the identity of the +light cruiser engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd +Battle Cruiser Squadron. The ship engaged by the <i>Defence</i> +and <i>Warrior</i> was apparently the <i>Wiesbaden</i>. It +seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron +engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have +been another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two +engagements took place at almost the same time, the 3rd +Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and +the <i>Defence</i> and the <i>Warrior</i> (the 1st Cruiser Squadron) +commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at +about 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and continuing it with the port guns at +6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> It is hardly possible, even in the conditions of low<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">340</span> +visibility that prevailed, that the two squadrons could have +been engaging the same vessel.</p> + +<p>Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer +<i>Onslow</i>, commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. +Tovey, which at 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> sighted an enemy’s light cruiser +in a position on the bows of the <i>Lion</i> and favourable for +torpedo attack on that ship. The <i>Onslow</i> closed and engaged +the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between +2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged +by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German battle +cruiser to attack with torpedoes; she was struck by a heavy +shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieut.-Commander +Tovey thought that his order to fire all torpedoes +had been carried out, and finding that this was not +the case, closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, +and then sighting the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes +at battleships. The <i>Onslow’s</i> engines then stopped, +but the damaged destroyer <i>Defender</i>, Lieut.-Commander +Palmer, closed her at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and took her in tow under +a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night +and the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought +her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to +the care of a tug.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">341</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIII"><span id="toclink_341"></span>CHAPTER XIII<br> + +<span class="subhead"><span class="allsmcap">THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span>—(<i>Continued</i>)</span></h2> +</div> + +<h3>II.—<span class="smcap">The Battle Fleet in Action</span></h3> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> “plot” made on the reports received between 5 and +6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> from Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron, and the report at 4.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> from Sir +David Beatty in the <i>Lion</i> giving the position of the +enemy’s Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet, +might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and +that the cruiser line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight +the enemy nearly ahead of the centre. Obviously, however, +great reliance could not be placed on the positions +given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had +been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. +I realised this, but when contact actually took place it was +found that the positions given were at least twelve miles +in error when compared with the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> reckoning. +The result was that the enemy’s Battle Fleet appeared +on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had expected, +and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated. +There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning +on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, as the movements of that ship +could be “plotted” with accuracy after leaving Scapa +Flow, there being no disturbing elements to deal with.</p> + +<p>The first accurate information regarding the position +of affairs was contained in a signal from the <i>Black Prince</i>, +of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (the starboard wing ship of +the cruiser screen), which was timed 5.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but received<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">342</span> +by me considerably later, and in which it was reported +that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south, +distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were +our own vessels.</p> + +<p>Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, +I had directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause +the range-finder operators to take ranges of ships on bearings +in every direction and to report the direction in which +the visibility appeared to be the greatest. My object was +to ascertain the most favourable bearing in which to engage +the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice +being exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibility +appeared to be best to the southward.</p> + +<p>At 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Comus</i> (Captain Hotham), of the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron, which was stationed three miles +ahead of the Battle Fleet, reported heavy gunfire on a +southerly bearing, i.e., three points from ahead, and shortly +afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing south-south-west +although no ships could be seen.</p> + +<p>At about 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received a wireless signal from +Sir Robert Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting +having sighted ships in action bearing south-south-west +and steering north-east. There was, however, no clue +as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind that +they might be the opposing battle cruisers.</p> + +<p>At 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir +Cecil Burney, leading the starboard wing division in the +<i>Marlborough</i>, inquiring what he could see. The reply was: +“Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the starboard bow.” +This reply was received at about 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position +of the enemy’s Battle Fleet and its formation caused me +to continue in the Battle Fleet on the course south-east by +south at a speed of 20 knots, in divisions line ahead disposed +abeam to starboard, the <i>Iron Duke</i> at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> being +in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E.</p> + +<figure id="i_342" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> + <img src="images/i_342.jpg" width="2110" height="1185" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot short"> + +<p>H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET +DEPLOYING AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">343</span></p> + +<p>The information so far received had not even been +sufficient to justify me in altering the bearing of the guides +of columns from the <i>Iron Duke</i> preparatory to deployment, +and they were still, therefore, on the beam. The +destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening +formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direction +of deployment before stationing them for action.</p> + +<p>At 5.56 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported +strange vessels in sight bearing south-south-west and steering +east, and at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he reported them as British battle +cruisers three to four miles distant, the <i>Lion</i> being the +leading ship.</p> + +<p>This report was made by searchlight and consequently +reached me shortly after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M</span>., but as showing the interval +that elapses between the <em>intention to make a signal</em> +and the actual receipt of it (even under conditions where +the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid delay, +and the signal staff is efficient), it is to be noted that whereas +the report gave the bearing of our vessels as south-south-west, +notes taken on board the <i>Colossus</i> placed our +battle cruisers one point on the starboard bow of that ship, +that is, on a south-south-east bearing and distant two miles +at 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>Shortly after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we sighted strange vessels bearing +south-west from the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a distance of about five +miles. They were identified as our battle cruisers, steering +east across the bows of the Battle Fleet. Owing to the +mist it was not possible to make out the number of ships +that were following the <i>Lion</i>.</p> + +<p>At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the +position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire +were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">344</span> +the noise was heavy and continuous. Our cruisers ahead +seemed to be hotly engaged, but the fact that they were not +closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents +could hardly be battleships.</p> + +<p>In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to +clearing up the situation without altering the formation +of the Battle Fleet, a signal had been made to the Battle +Fleet at 6.2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to alter course leaders together, the remainder +in succession, to south (a turn of three points). +Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 knots to allow +of the ships closing up into station. Immediately afterwards +it became apparent by the sound of the heavy firing +that enemy’s heavy ships must be in close proximity, and +the <i>Lion</i>, which was sighted at this moment, signalled at +6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-east. +Meanwhile, at about 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, I had received a wireless +report from Commodore Goodenough, commanding the +2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, to the effect that the +enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-west from their Battle +Fleet; in other words, that his Battle Fleet bore north-east +from his battle cruisers.</p> + +<p>In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our +battle cruisers were steering east, and observing that Sir +David Beatty reported at 6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that the enemy’s battle +cruisers bore south-east, it appeared from Commodore +Goodenough’s signal that the enemy’s Battle Fleet must +be <em>ahead</em> of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it +seemed to me almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could +have passed the battle cruisers. The conflicting reports +added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I +determined to hold on until matters became clearer.</p> + +<p>The conviction was, however, forming in my mind +that I should strike the enemy’s Battle Fleet on a bearing +a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be prepared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">345</span> +for deployment I turned the Fleet to a south-east course, +leaders together and the remainder in succession, and the +destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, to +take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order +disposed them as follows:</p> + +<figure id="i_345" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <img src="images/i_345.jpg" width="1194" height="399" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>There was, however, a very short interval between this +signal to the destroyers and the signal for deployment, +and consequently the destroyers did not reach their positions +before deployment. The subsequent alterations of +course to the southward and westward added to their +difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations +at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The correct +position for the two van flotillas on deployment was +three miles ahead of the Fleet, but slightly on the engaged +bow.</p> + +<p>At 6.1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, immediately on sighting the <i>Lion</i>, a signal +had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position +of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at +6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and at 6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> he signalled: “Have sighted the +enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west”; this report +gave me the first information on which I could take +effective action for deployment.</p> + +<p>At 6.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in +the <i>Barham</i>, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled +by wireless that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in +sight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was not reported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">346</span> +in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I +concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir +Cecil Burney had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron +at 6.7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> as in sight, bearing south-west from the +<i>Marlborough</i>.</p> + +<p>The first definite information received on board the +Fleet-Flagship of the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet +did not, therefore, come in until 6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and the position +given placed it thirty degrees before the starboard beam +of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, or fifty-nine degrees before the starboard +beam of the <i>Marlborough</i>, and apparently in close +proximity. There was no time to lose, as there was evident +danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle Fleet +being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet before +deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a signal +was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the +port wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being +assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately +the same as that of our battle cruisers.</p> + +<p>Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to +admit of our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle +Fleet, as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet +being blanketed by them.</p> + +<p>During the short interval, crowded with events, that +had elapsed since the first flashes and sound of gunfire +had been noted on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the question of +most urgent importance before me had been the direction +and manner of deployment.</p> + +<p>As the evidence accumulated that the enemy’s Battle +Fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well +before the beam of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, the point for decision +was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or on +the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was +to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">347</span> +the Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, but +it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of +gunfire and the reports from the <i>Lion</i> and the <i>Barham</i>, +that the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and +on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in +such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers +would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, +owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers attacking +from a commanding position in the van would be much +facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet +in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers +during such a deployment, as such an event would throw +the Fleet into confusion at a critical moment.</p> + +<figure id="i_346" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> + <img src="images/i_346.jpg" width="2112" height="1197" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p> +H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND<br> + +H. M. S. “ROYAL OAK” AND “SUPERB” ASTERN, AND “THUNDERER” AHEAD</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The further points that occurred to me were, that if +the German ships were as close as seemed probable, there +was considerable danger of the 1st Battle Squadron, and +especially the <i>Marlborough’s</i> Division, being severely +handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet +before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist. +The 1st Battle Squadron was composed of many of our +weakest ships, with only indifferent protection as compared +with the German capital ships, and an interval of +at least four minutes would elapse between each division +coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further +interval before the guns could be directed on to the ship +selected and their fire become effective after so large a +change of course.</p> + +<p>The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from +the supposed position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van +of the enemy would have a very considerable “overlap” +if the deployment took place on the starboard wing division, +whereas this would not be the case with deployment +on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate +a large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">348</span> +the “T” being crossed, and each successive division +coming into line would have to make this turn, in addition +to the 8-point turn required to form the line. I therefore +decided to deploy on the first, the port wing, division.</p> + +<p>The further knowledge which I gained of the actual +state of affairs after the action confirmed my view that the +course adopted was the best in the circumstances.</p> + +<p>The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division +show that the range of the van of the enemy’s Battle +Fleet at the moment of deployment was about 13,000 +yards. The fleets were converging rapidly, with the High +Sea Fleet holding a position of advantage such as would +enable it to engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard +division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as +they formed up astern. It is to be observed that it would +take some twenty minutes to complete the formation of +the line of battle.</p> + +<p>The German gunnery was always good at the start, +and their ships invariably found the range of a target with +great rapidity, and it would have been very bad tactics +to give them such an initial advantage, not only in regard +to gunnery but also in respect of torpedo attack, both +from ships and from destroyers.</p> + +<p>A subsequent study of the reports and the signals +received has admitted of the accompanying plans being +drawn up.</p> + +<p>The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and +show clearly how great would have been the objections to +deploying to starboard. It will be seen that the bearings +of the enemy Battle Fleet, as given by the <i>Lion</i> and the +<i>Barham</i> at 6.14 and 6.15 respectively, give a fair “cut,” +and the bearing on which the <i>Marlborough</i> opened fire +enables the position of the Battle Fleet to be placed with +considerable accuracy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">349</span></p> + +<p>Assuming that the German Battle Fleet was steaming +at 17 knots on an easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31, +it will be observed that at the latter time it bore 21 degrees +before the starboard beam of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a range +of 12,000 yards. The <i>Iron Duke</i> actually engaged the +leading battleship at this time on a bearing 20 degrees +before the starboard beam at a range of 12,000 yards. +The accuracy of the “plot” is therefore confirmed, so far +as confirmation is possible. It appears certain that between +about 6.0 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the German battle +cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and +again turned 16 points to their original course. This +is borne out by observations on board the <i>Warrior</i>, which +ship was being engaged by the <em>starboard</em> guns of enemy +vessels. The German account also shows such a turn at +this period.</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th +Battle Squadron, had sighted the <i>Marlborough</i> at 6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +and the remainder of the 6th Division of the Battle Fleet +a little later. Not seeing any other columns, he concluded +that the <i>Marlborough</i> was leading the whole line, and decided +to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral +Evan-Thomas realised that the Fleet was deploying to +port, the 6th Division being the starboard wing column. +He then determined to make a large turn of his squadron +to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division, which +by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle. +During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships +of the 5th Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy’s +leading battleships, but the shooting was not good, and +our vessels received little injury.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, however, the helm of the <i>Warspite</i> +jammed, and that ship, continuing her turn through sixteen<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">350</span> +points came under a very heavy fire and received considerable +injury. The disabled <i>Warrior</i> happened to be +in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the <i>Warspite</i> +had the effect for the moment of diverting attention +from the <i>Warrior</i>, so that the latter vessel got clear.</p> + +<p>The <i>Warspite</i> was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts +from an unpleasant position and was steered to the +northward to make good damages, and eventually, in +accordance with directions from Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, +returned independently to Rosyth, considerably +down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not +much injured.</p> + +<p>By 6.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the remaining ships of the 5th Battle +Squadron were in station astern of the <i>Agincourt</i> (1st +Battle Squadron), the last ship of the line.</p> + +<p>At 6.33 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as soon as the battle cruisers had passed +clear, the speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 +knots, and this speed was subsequently maintained. The +reduction of speed to 14 knots during the deployment +caused some “bunching” at the rear of the line as the +signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, +however, to be maintained until the battle cruisers had +formed ahead.</p> + +<p>Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity +for keeping a reserve of some three knots of speed in +hand in the case of a long line of ships, in order to allow +of station being kept in the line under conditions of action, +when ships were making alterations of course to throw +out enemy’s fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent +action on the part of single ships, or of divisions +of ships, became necessary, as well as to avoid excessive +smoke from the funnels; for this reason the Fleet speed +during the action was fixed at 17 knots. The experience +of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at +times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for +this reserve.</p> + +<figure id="i_350" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="right"><p><i>Plan 8</i></p></div> + +<p class="sans"><span class="uline">APPROXIMATE</span> POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE<br> +GRAND FLEET AT 6.45. P.M. ON<br> +31st. MAY 1916.</p> + </figcaption> + <img src="images/i_350.jpg" width="786" height="801" alt=""> +<div class="right"><a href="images/i_350-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">351</span></p> + +<p>At 6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the enemy’s salvoes were falling near +ships of the 1st Battle Squadron, and the <i>Marlborough’s</i> +Division of the Battle Squadron became engaged with +some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +immediately after turning for the deployment. At this +time fire was opened by the <i>Marlborough</i> on a ship stated +to be of the “Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards +and on a bearing 20° abaft the starboard beam; this +knowledge enables us to deduce the position of the van +of the German Battle Fleet at this time.</p> + +<p>Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s +Fleet steering to the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, +followed by the Battle Fleet in single line, the order +being, four ships of the “König” class in the van, followed +by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the +rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached +me at 4.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> from the Commodore of the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron indicated that ships of the “Kaiser” +class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. The order of +the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report, +but there is no doubt that ships of the “König” class led +during the Fleet action. The point is not, however, of +importance.</p> + +<p>At about 6.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 6th Division was in line and +our deployment was complete.</p> + +<p>Enemy shells had been falling close to the <i>Colossus</i> and +her 5th Division since 6.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and these ships opened +fire at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; but the conditions of visibility made it +difficult to distinguish the enemy’s battleships.</p> + +<p>At 6.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed +down the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our +Fleet, apparently partly disabled. Her identity could not<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">352</span> +at the time he clearly established, but her German colours +were flying and she was in a position for attacking the +Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> +fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret +guns by other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear +of the line.</p> + +<p>At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult +to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible +to form an opinion on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, in her position +towards the centre of the line, as to the formation of the +enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships in sight on the starboard +beam was not even sufficiently clear for me to permit +of fire being opened; but at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> it became certain +that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle +Fleet and that the vessels then before the beam were battleships +of the “König” class. The order was, therefore, +given to open fire, and the <i>Iron Duke</i> engaged what appeared +to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000 +yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other +ships of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) +opened fire at about the same time, and the van divisions +(2nd Battle Squadron) very shortly afterwards; +these latter ships reported engaging enemy battle cruisers +as well as battleships. The fire of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, which +came more directly under my personal observation, was +seen to be immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes +fired registering several palpable hits. It appeared +as if all the enemy ships at that time in sight from the <i>Iron +Duke</i> (not more than three or four, owing to smoke and +mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second +battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, +and settling by the stern. A large number of observers +in the <i>Thunderer</i>, <i>Benbow</i>, <i>Barham</i>, <i>Marne</i>, <i>Morning Star</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">353</span> +and <i>Magic</i> stated afterwards that they saw this ship blow +up at 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged +about 12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on +other bearings, but ranges could not at times be obtained +from the range-finders of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a greater distance +than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, in a temporary +clear channel through the mist, good ranges of +15,000 yards were obtained of a battleship at which four +salvoes were fired by the <i>Iron Duke</i> before she was again +hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was +caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly also by +the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing +Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-south-west +with a force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel +smoke to drift towards our line, thus further obscuring our +view of his Fleet.</p> + +<p>The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently +greater than in the centre at about 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and the +enemy’s fire, which was probably being concentrated on +our rear ships, was more accurate at this period, but quite +ineffective, only one ship, the <i>Colossus</i>, being hit by gunfire, +although numerous projectiles were falling near the +ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons.</p> + +<p>Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the +Battle Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at +any one time, those in the ships of the rear division did +occasionally see as many as eight, and were consequently +better able to distinguish the formation and movements +of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing +to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and +mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in +the customary manner; the only course to adopt was for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">354</span> +the captains to direct the fire of their guns on to any target +which they could distinguish.</p> + +<p>The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east +by east, as already stated, but the van had hauled on +to south-east without signal shortly after deployment in +order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as the range was +apparently opening, the course was altered by signal to +south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The +<i>King George V.</i>, leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had +just anticipated this signal by turning to south. The alteration +was made “by divisions” instead of “in succession” +in order that the enemy should be closed more rapidly by +the whole Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” involved +some small amount of “blanketing” of the rear +ships of one division by the leading ships of that next +astern, and at one time the <i>Thunderer</i> was firing over the +bows of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, causing some slight inconvenience +on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” however, +was unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was inappreciable.</p> + +<p>At 6.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> one or two torpedoes crossed the track +of the rear of our battle line, and the <i>Marlborough</i> +altered course to avoid one. They were apparently +fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which were +barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to +those on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>. They might, however, +have been fired by enemy battleships which were within +torpedo range, or by a submarine, the <i>Revenge</i> reporting +that it was thought that one had been rammed by that +ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by +the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very +skilful handling of the ships by their captains.</p> + +<p>At 6.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, however, a heavy explosion occurred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">355</span> +under the fore bridge of the <i>Marlborough</i>, abreast the +starboard forward hydraulic engine-room. The ship took +up a list of some seven degrees to starboard, but continued +in action so effectively that she avoided three more torpedoes +shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and +at 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the +“König” class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen +to turn out of line.</p> + +<p>The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to +his flagship stated that the vessel had been struck by a +“mine or torpedo.” It was assumed by me that a torpedo +had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed over the +same locality without injury from mine. This proved +to be the case, the track of this torpedo not having been +sufficiently visible to enable Captain Ross to avoid it.</p> + +<p>The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s torpedoes +being visible was a matter of great surprise to me, +and I think to other officers. Reports had been prevalent +that the Germans had succeeded in producing a torpedo +which left little or no track on the surface. The information +as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me +until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one +torpedo was reported by observers on board the destroyer +<i>Oak</i> to have passed close ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at about +7.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, finishing its run 2,000 yards beyond that ship, +and a second was observed by the <i>Benbow</i> to pass apparently +ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, neither of them +was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs +specially stationed for the purpose.</p> + +<p>Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to +south, a signal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to +take station ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> and for the 1st Battle +Squadron to form astern. This signal had, however, been +already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i><span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">356</span> +in accordance with the general battle orders giving discretionary +powers to the commanders of squadrons, and +the line had been partly reformed before the signal was +made.</p> + +<p>An incident occurred at about 6.47 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> which was an +indication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which +it is impossible to speak too highly. The destroyer <i>Acasta</i>, +which had been badly hit aft during her attack on enemy +light cruisers in company with the <i>Shark</i> and had her +engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding +officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled +the condition of his ship to the <i>Iron Duke</i> as that ship +passed, leaving the <i>Acasta</i> on her starboard or engaged +side. The ship’s company was observed to be cheering +each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that +this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were subsequently +brought into Aberdeen, being assisted by the +<i>Nonsuch</i>.</p> + +<p>Shortly after 6.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i> passed the +wreck of a ship with the bow and stern standing out of +the water, the centre portion apparently resting on the +bottom, with the destroyer <i>Badger</i> picking up survivors. +It was thought at first that this was the remains of a +German light cruiser, but inquiry of the <i>Badger</i> elicited +the lamentable news that the wreck was that of the <i>Invincible</i>. +It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk +either by a mine or by a torpedo, and, in view of the safe +passage of other ships in her vicinity, the latter appeared +to be the more probable cause of her loss. Subsequent +information, however, showed that she was destroyed by +gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already +recorded.</p> + +<p>At 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that +the enemy was to the westward.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">357</span></p> + +<p>Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, +brought the enemy’s line into view once more, and between +7.0 and 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was again in +action with battleships and also battle cruisers, as they +could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period +was very baffling. The range varied from as much as +15,000 yards at the van to as little as 8,000 in the rear, +this difference in range indicating that the enemy’s Fleet +was turning to the westward, as shown in the accompanying +plan facing <a href="#Page_358">page 358</a>.</p> + +<p>In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of +our battleships was very effective at this period. Some +instances may be given. At 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Iron Duke</i>, as +already mentioned, engaged a hostile battleship at 15,000 +yards’ range and on a bearing 74 degrees from right ahead. +At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of “Lutzow” +type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer +smoke screen; at 7.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>King George V.</i> opened +fire on a vessel, taken to be the leading ship in the enemy’s +line at a range of about 13,000 yards; the <i>Orion</i> at a +battleship<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">L</a>; the <i>St. Vincent</i> was “holding her target (a +battleship) effectively till 7.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the range being between +10,000 and 9,500 yards”; the <i>Agincourt</i> at 7.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that +showed clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least +four of her salvoes “straddled” the target; the <i>Revenge</i> +was engaging what were taken to be battle cruisers, obtaining +distinct hits on two of them; the <i>Colossus</i> from +7.12 to 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> was engaging a ship taken to be a battle +cruiser, either the <i>Derfflinger</i> or <i>Lutzow</i>, at ranges between +10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct +hits, two being on the water line; whilst the <i>Marlborough</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">358</span> +as already mentioned, “engaged a ship of the ‘König’ +class.” Other vessels reported being in effective action +during this period. The <i>Royal Oak</i>, the ship next astern +of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, opened fire at 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the leading +ship of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range +of 14,000 yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and +fire was shifted to the second ship which was lost to sight +in the mist after a few rounds had been fired. It was +difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on which fire +was being directed, but one or more of the enemy’s battle +cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as a +result of the heavy punishment they had received from our +battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron, and were +engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">L</a> The <i>Calliope</i> reported at 7.1 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>: “Two enemy battleships, ‘König’ class, +engaged by <i>Orion’s</i> division, observed to be heavily on fire.”</p> + +</div> + +<p>Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships +of the 1st Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities +for effective fire than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and +the fullest use was made of the opportunities. This squadron, +under the able command of Sir Cecil Burney, was +known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof +was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were +needed, that his careful training had borne excellent results. +The immunity of the ships of the squadron from +the enemy’s fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels +very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to +the offensive powers of the squadron.</p> + +<figure id="i_358" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"><p class="sans">APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE<br> +<span class="large">GRAND FLEET</span><br> +At 7. 15 P.M. 31st May 1916.</p> + +<p><i>Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet, +as evidenced by the positions of the ships engaged at the time, +shown in Red.</i></p> + + <img src="images/i_358.jpg" width="696" height="585" alt=""> +<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_358-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> + +<div class="blockquot sans"> +<p>The Battle Cruisers and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, +have crossed from the port to the starboard bow of +the Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>Note. Their battle station is between 5 and 6 miles +slightly on the engaged bow of the Van of the +Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>The 2nd Battle Squadron is forming ahead of the +Iron Duke.</p> + +<p>The 1st Battle Squadron is forming astern of the +Iron Duke.</p> + +<p>The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron is getting into its +battle-station on the Van of the Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>The 4th and 11th Flotillas are moving towards their +battle stations.</p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron is coming up from +the rear of the Battle Fleet to join the Battle Cruisers.</p> + +<p>The Minotaur and Cruisers are trying to get up to +their battle stations ahead of the Battle Fleet.</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>At 7.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the whole battle line was turned together +three more points to starboard to close the range further; +immediately afterwards two ships ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> +reported a submarine a little on the port bow; at 7.10 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a cruiser, +was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W. +from the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and the Fleet was turned back to +south in order to turn on to the submarine and bring the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">359</span> +ships in line ahead ready, for any required manœuvre. +A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges between +10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the +destroyers turned and passed towards the rear of the line +in a heavy smoke screen. One destroyer was seen by +several observers to sink from the effects of the gunfire.</p> + +<p>At a sufficient interval before it was considered that +the torpedoes fired by the destroyers would cross our line, +a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to turn two points +to port by subdivisions. Some minutes later a report was +made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my +Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with +an instrument for giving the necessary information) that +this turn was insufficient to clear the torpedoes, as I had +held on until the last moment; a further turn of two +points was then made for a short time. As a result of +this attack and another that followed immediately, some +twenty or more torpedoes were observed to cross the track +of the Battle Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority +of them passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons +at the rear of the line. It was fortunate that, owing +to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were apparently +near the end of their run, and were consequently +not running at high speed. They were all avoided by the +very skilful handling of the ships by their captains, to +whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in +avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in which the +ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, prevented +risk of collision and kept their station in the line. +The captains were most ably assisted by the admirable +look-out kept by the organisation that existed for dealing +with this danger.</p> + +<p>The skill shown could not, however, have prevented +several ships from being torpedoed had the range been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">360</span> +less and the torpedoes consequently running at a higher +speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow +showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that +would hit ships in a line when fired from destroyers at +ranges up to 8,000 yards was comparatively high, even +if the tracks were seen and the ships were manœuvred to +avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes are +always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the +line of bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to +judge the position of the torpedo from its track. Many +ships experienced escapes from this and other attacks; +thus the <i>Hercules</i> reported that she “turned away six +points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along +the starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the +other passed close under the stern”; the <i>Neptune</i> reported +that “the tracks of three torpedoes were seen from the fore-top, +one of which passed very close and was avoided by +the use of the helm”; in the <i>Agincourt’s</i> report, a statement +occurred that “at 7.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a torpedo just missed astern, +it having been reported from aloft and course altered”; +and again, “at 7.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> tracks of two torpedoes running +parallel were observed approaching; course altered to +avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and at 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed; +torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard +bow”; the <i>Revenge</i> remarked, “at 7.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> altered +course to port to avoid two torpedoes, one passed about +ten yards ahead and the other about twenty yards astern, +and at 7.43 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> altered course to avoid torpedoes, two +passing astern”; the <i>Colossus</i> stated, “at 7.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> turned +to port to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side”; +the <i>Barham</i> at this period reported that “at least four +torpedoes passed through the line close to the <i>Barham</i>”; +the <i>Collingwood</i> reported, “torpedo track was seen 20<span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">361</span> +degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; +large helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close +astern; at the same time another was seen to pass about +thirty yards ahead.” The captain of the <i>Collingwood</i>, in +remarking on the destroyer’s attack, added, “the great +value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me, +an outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action.”</p> + +<p>The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and +the Fleet was brought to a south by west course by +7.33 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> (that is, to a course one point to the westward +of the course of the Fleet before the destroyer attack). +The total amount by which the range was opened by the +turns was about 1,750 yards.</p> + +<p>The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th +Flotillas had been delayed in reaching their action station +at the van until about 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, owing to the turns to the +westward made by the Battle Fleet to close the enemy. +In accordance with arrangements made previously to +counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out +to engage the enemy destroyers, which, according to the +report of the Commodore Le Mesurier, commanding the +4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering towards the +head of the division led by the <i>King George V.</i>, the van +ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed +for the first attack for the reason given above, they were +in a very favourable position to counter the second destroyer +attack, which took place at 7.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The enemy’s +flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before the starboard +beam of the <i>Iron Duke</i> at a range of 9,000 yards and was +heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, 1st, and +5th Battle Squadrons. During this attack three enemy +destroyers were reported as sunk by the fire of the battleships, +light cruisers and destroyers; one of them, bearing +a Commodore’s pendant, being sunk at 7.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> by a division<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">362</span> +of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the <i>Obedient</i>, +<i>Marvel</i>, <i>Mindful</i> and <i>Onslaught</i>, which attacked them +near the rear of our battle line. The <i>Southampton</i> +and <i>Dublin</i>, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, attacked +and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least six +torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the +track of, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their +attack on the German flotilla.</p> + +<p>The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring +movement on the part of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, the +movement being covered with the aid of a heavy smoke +screen. Although this retirement was not visible from the +<i>Iron Duke</i> owing to the smoke and mist, and was, therefore, +not known to me until after the action, it was clearly +seen from the rear of our line, as is indicated by the following +citations:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>The Captain of the <i>Valiant</i> stated in his report: +“At 7.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> enemy’s Battle Fleet now altered +course together away from us and broke off the +action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which +effectually covered their retreat and obscured them +from further view.”</p> + +<p>The Captain of the <i>Malaya</i> reported, referring to +this period: “This was the last of the enemy seen in +daylight, owing to their Battle Fleet having turned +away.”</p> + +<p>Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period: +“As the destroyer attack developed, the enemy’s +Battle Fleet in sight were observed to turn at least +eight points until their sterns were towards our line. +They ceased fire, declined further action, and disappeared +into the mist.”</p> + +<p>The Captain of the <i>St. Vincent</i> said: “The target<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">363</span> +was held closely until 7.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> (32 minutes in +all), when the enemy had turned eight or ten points +away, disappearing into the mist and with a smoke +screen made by destroyers to cover them as well.”</p> + +<p>Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: “After +joining the Battle Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron +conformed to the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, +engaging the rear ships of the enemy’s battle +line, until they turned away and went out of sight, +all ships apparently covering themselves with artificial +smoke.”</p> + +<p>The Captain of the <i>Revenge</i> recorded: “A flotilla +of destroyers passed through the line and made a +most efficient smoke screen. At this period the +enemy’s fleet turned eight points to starboard and +rapidly drew out of sight.”</p> +</div> + +<p>In the German account of the action at this stage, it +is stated, in more than one passage, that the British Fleet +during this action between the Battle Fleets was to the +northward of the High Seas Fleet. This is correct of the +earlier stages. The account refers to the attacks on our +line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states finally +that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the +heavy ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the +north-eastward. The accuracy of this statement is doubtful, +since the destroyers were clearly in sight from our +heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to state that +“the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line +to a southerly and south-westerly course <em>on which the +enemy was last seen</em>, but he is no longer to be found.”</p> + +<p>This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships +bore north and north-east from the enemy and then that +the enemy turned to south and south-west, that is, <i>directly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">364</span> +away from the British Fleet</i>. Thus the fact that the German +Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans.</p> + +<p>No report of this movement of the German Fleet +reached me, and at first it was thought that his temporary +disappearance was due to the thickening mist, especially +as firing could be heard from the battleships in rear, but +at 7.41 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the enemy Battle Fleet being no longer in +sight from the <i>Iron Duke</i>, course was altered “by divisions” +three points more to starboard (namely, to south-west) +to close the enemy, and single line ahead was again +formed on the <i>Iron Duke</i> on that course.</p> + +<p>At this period the rear of our battle line was still in +action at intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s +fleet, which were probably some that had dropped astern +partially disabled, but by 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> fire had practically +ceased.</p> + +<p>At about 7.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received a report from Sir David +Beatty stating that the enemy bore north-west by west +from the <i>Lion</i>, distant 10 to 11 miles, and that the <i>Lion’s</i> +course was south-west. Although the battle cruisers were +not in sight from the <i>Iron Duke</i>, I assumed the <i>Lion</i> to +be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet, +but it appeared later from a report received in reply to directions +signalled by me at 8.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to the <i>King George V.</i> +to follow the battle cruisers, that they were not in sight +from that ship either.</p> + +<p>At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have +become divided, for whilst Sir David Beatty reported the +presence of battleships north-west by west from the <i>Lion</i>, +other enemy battleships were observed to the westward +(that is, on the starboard bow of the <i>Iron Duke</i>), and +the course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions” +to west in order to close the enemy; this alteration was +made at 7.59 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">365</span></span></p> + +<p>It will be observed that all the large alterations of +course of the Battle Fleet during the engagement were +made “by divisions” instead of “in succession from the +van, or together.” The reason was that in this way the +whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with +far greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation, +than if the movement had been carried out by the line +“in succession.”</p> + +<p>The objection to altering by turning all ships together +was the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as +the result of such a manœuvre carried out with a very +large Fleet under action conditions in misty weather, +particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of bearing +for a long period.</p> + +<p>The battleships sighted at 7.59 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> opened fire on the +ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved +out to starboard of the battle line to engage a flotilla of +enemy destroyers which were steering to attack the Battle +Fleet. The <i>Calliope</i>, the flagship of Commodore Le +Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some +damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a +torpedo at the leading battleship at a range of 6,500 +yards; an explosion was noticed on board a ship of the +“Kaiser” class by the <i>Calliope</i>.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">M</a> The ships sighted +turned away and touch could not be regained, although +sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +probably from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch +with and engaged some of the enemy’s ships very effectively +between 8.22 and 8.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The <i>Falmouth</i> was +the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch +with the enemy, at 8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; the ships then in sight +turned eight points together away from the <i>Falmouth</i>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">M</a> All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was clearly concussion +under water, and may have been caused by the <i>Calliope’s</i> torpedo obtaining +a hit.</p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">366</span></p> + +<p>At 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the light was failing and the Fleet was +turned “by divisions” to a south-west course, thus reforming +single line again.</p> + +<p>During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described +above, the battle cruisers were in action ahead as mentioned +in Sir David Beatty’s report in the Appendix.</p> + +<p>At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the +large alterations of course carried out by the High Sea +Fleet, but it was regained at 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the battle cruisers +opening fire at 7.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, though only for two and a half +minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At this +period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by +south to south-west, and this course took them from the +port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +The movements of our battle cruisers, which were at this +time between four and five miles ahead of the van of the +Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly, to +the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers +themselves, but even more to the funnel smoke from the +numerous cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers which +were attempting to gain their positions ahead of the van.</p> + +<p>The movements of the enemy’s fleet could not be distinguished +from our Battle Fleet owing again to their own +funnel and cordite smoke, and, also, to the smoke screens +which ships and destroyers were making to conceal their +movements.</p> + +<p>It will be realised that these conditions, which particularly +affected the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the +same extent to our ships ahead of our Battle Fleet. They +had little but the smoke of the enemy’s leading ships to +obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle Fleet +had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that +of the enemy’s long line of ships.</p> + +<figure id="i_366" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 44em;"> + <img src="images/i_366.jpg" width="2100" height="1226" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>H. M. S. “SUPERB” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</p> + +<p>H. M. S. “CANADA” ASTERN OF “SUPERB”</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">367</span> +Battle Fleet were very much accentuated in the Battle +Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, in his report, +remarked on this point: “As leading ship, in addition to +the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I +imagine must have been cordite fumes from the battle +cruisers after they had passed us, and from other +cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel gases from +small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense +smoke from the <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, which was unable +to draw clear.”</p> + +<p>The general position at 6.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and again at 7.15 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> is shown in plans 8 and 9.</p> + +<p>At 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, according to remarks from the <i>Minotaur</i>, +flagship of Rear-Admiral W. L. Heath, commanding +the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the position as seen from +that ship was as follows: “The 2nd Cruiser Squadron +was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port +side of the <i>King George V.</i>, gaining on her slightly, but +with all the destroyers and light craft between her and +the <i>King George V.</i> The battle cruisers were about four +miles distant on the starboard bow of the <i>Minotaur</i>; +owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers rapidly +increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some +eight miles.”<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">N</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">N</a> Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here described should +be timed at about 6.50 to 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and the diagrams show this accordingly.</p> + +</div> + +<p>At 7.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> according to a report from the <i>Shannon</i>, +of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the <i>Shannon’s</i> course was +S. 10 W., “the 2nd Cruiser Squadron endeavouring to +take station on the engaged bow of the Battle Fleet; the +Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not engaged +and turned slightly to port.” And again at 7.22 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a report says: “The <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> had now +taken station astern of the <i>Shannon</i>, the battle cruisers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">368</span> +were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading +ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross +the bows of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard. +Battle cruisers firing intermittently, light cruisers making +their way through the destroyer flotillas to attack the +enemy light cruisers.” Rear-Admiral Heath stated: +“At 7.11 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots +to take up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which +was then engaged with the enemy.” He added: “One +salvo fell short on the starboard bow of the <i>Minotaur</i> and +some others in close proximity”; and later says, “even +when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell, +no more than the flashes of the enemy’s guns could be +seen.”</p> + +<p>Further remarks from the <i>Shannon</i>, at a later stage, +were: “At 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Battle Fleet altered course to starboard +to close the enemy, and by 8.15 was lost to sight, bearing +about north by east.”</p> + +<p>“At 8.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Battle Fleet, out of sight from <i>Shannon</i>, +was heard to be in action.”</p> + +<p>“At 8.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the visibility of grey ships was about +9,000 yards.” “At 8.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>King George V.</i> again +sighted, bearing north-north-east. Visibility had again improved, +and her range was estimated at about 10,000 +yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close +enemy.”</p> + +<p>At 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the ships engaged by our battle cruisers +turned away and were lost to sight. They were located +for a moment at 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> with the aid of the 1st and 3rd +Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they disappeared +again at once, they were once more located and effectively +engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at about 10,000 yards +range. They turned away once more and were finally lost +to sight by the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (the last ships<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">369</span> +to keep in touch) at 8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, steaming to the westward.</p> + +<p>This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers +had of putting the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s +work. They had, under the very able and gallant leadership +of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the splendid squadron +so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone +far to crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser +Squadron.</p> + +<p>It will be seen from the above account that our battle +cruisers experienced great difficulty in locating and holding +the enemy after 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, even when far ahead of the +Battle Fleet, with its small craft, and therefore in a +position of freedom from the smoke of our own vessels and +the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the battle +cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The +enemy turned away on each occasion when he was located +and showed no disposition to fight.</p> + +<p>The visibility by this time had become very bad; the +light was failing, and it became necessary to decide on the +disposition for the night.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">370</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIV"><span id="toclink_370"></span>CHAPTER XIV<br> + +<span class="subhead"><span class="allsmcap">THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span>—(<i>Continued</i>)</span></h2> +</div> + +<h3>III.—<span class="smcap">The Night Action</span></h3> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> situation, which had never been at all clear to me +owing to the fact that I had not seen more than a few +ships at a time, appeared to be as follows:</p> + +<p>We were between the enemy and his bases, whether +he shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via +Heligoland direct, or via the swept channel which he was +known to use along the coast of the West Frisian Islands.</p> + +<p>I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward +of us. He had been turning on <em>interior</em> lines throughout. +We had altered course gradually during the action from +south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, or 146 +degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his +ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it +was possible that ships, which had fallen out owing to +damage, might be to the northward.</p> + +<p>The possibility of a night action was, of course, +present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not +my intention to seek such an action between the heavy +ships.</p> + +<p>It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments +against it.</p> + +<p>In the first place, such a course must have inevitably +led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a +very large destroyer force throughout the night. No<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">371</span> +senior officer would willingly court such an attack, even +if our battleships were equipped with the best searchlights +and the best arrangements for the control of the searchlights +and the gunfire at night.</p> + +<p>It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights +nor their control arrangements were at this time of +the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the +guns of the secondary armament of our battleships (a very +important factor for firing at night) had also only just +been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay +was due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without +these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of +our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could +place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by +gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the +heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with +no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were +no effective antidote at night, since, if they were disposed +with this sole object in view, they would certainly be taken +for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships.</p> + +<p>But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, +the result of night actions between heavy ships must +always be very largely a matter of <em>chance</em>, as there is +little opportunity for skill on either side. Such an action +must be fought at very close range, the decision depending +on the course of events in the first few minutes. It +is, therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general +grounds. The greater efficiency of German searchlights +at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater number +of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with +his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the +Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement +of such an action.</p> + +<p>The question then remained as to the course to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">372</span> +steered. The first desideratum was to keep the British +Fleet between the enemy and his bases, so as to be in a +position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight was +rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet +for the night as quickly as possible to avoid visual signalling +after dark; and it was also necessary to place +our destroyers in a position where the chances of their +coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a +minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking +the enemy’s capital ships during the night. The Grand +Fleet was formed at the time in practically a single line, +steering approximately west-south-west. I considered +that a southerly course would meet the situation and +would enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and, +if I put the destroyers astern, they would fulfil three +conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position +for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also turn to the +southward with a view to regaining its bases during the +night (which seemed a very probable movement on the +part of the enemy); secondly, they would also be in +position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter +search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the +heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships, +and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error +or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to +a minimum.</p> + +<p>Accordingly, at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, I signalled to the Battle +Fleet to alter course by divisions to <em>south</em>, informing the +Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and +light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding destroyer +flotillas, of my movements in order that they +should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle +Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form +divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">373</span> +columns one mile apart. This had the effect of placing +the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram:</p> + +<div class="center"><div class="ilb"> +<pre> + 1 mile 1 mile 1 mile + |<————————>|<————————>|<————————> + | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | +2nd 4th 1st 5th + + Battle Squadrons. +</pre> +</div></div> + +<p class="in0">My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was +to ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of +each other during the night, and that therefore they would +not mistake our own ships for those of the enemy.</p> + +<p>As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly +course the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station +five miles astern of the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a +signal was made to the mine-laying flotilla leader <i>Abdiel</i> +(Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay a mine-field +in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship, +over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would +pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during +the night viâ the Horn Reef. The <i>Abdiel</i> carried out this +operation unobserved in the same successful manner as +numerous other similar operations had been undertaken +by this most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one +of our submarines, stationed near the Horn Reef, which +reported on return to her base having heard several underwater +explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on June 1st, +it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines.</p> + +<p>At 10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the position of the <i>Iron Duke</i> was Lat. +56.22 N., Long. 5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, +and the order of the Fleet from west to east was:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron); +Cruiser Squadrons;</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">374</span></p> + +<p>Battle Fleet;</p> + +<p>2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squadron;</p> + +<p>4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet;</p> + +<p>11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from +west to east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet.</p> +</div> + +<p>Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward +for the night a destroyer attack took place on the 2nd +Light Cruiser Squadron at the rear of our Battle line. +This was reported to me shortly after 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but immediately +afterwards a further report stated that the enemy +had been driven off to the north-west.</p> + +<p>At 10.4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore Hawkesley, in the <i>Castor</i>, +commanding the destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern, +sighted three or more vessels at a range of 2,000 yards +which he took to be enemy battle cruisers. If the German +report is to be believed, the ships were light cruisers and +included the <i>Hamburg</i> and <i>Elbing</i>. The enemy at once +opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the <i>Castor</i> was hit, +and her bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, +making it impossible to signal to the 11th Flotilla, which +the <i>Castor</i> was leading. The damage to the <i>Castor</i> was +slight. The <i>Castor</i>, <i>Magic</i>, and <i>Marne</i> fired torpedoes +at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla +refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity +of the vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a +violent detonation, following on the discharge of the torpedoes, +had been felt in the engine-rooms of the destroyers +near the <i>Castor</i>.</p> + +<p>At 0.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Castor</i> sighted a German destroyer +on her starboard bow and opened fire with all guns at +point-blank range. She was not seen again.</p> + +<p>At 10.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted +and engaged five enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">375</span> +four light cruisers, probably of the 4th Scouting Group. +The enemy again opened fire with great rapidity and +accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading +ships, the <i>Southampton</i> and <i>Dublin</i>, at very short range. +Both vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15 +minutes’ engagement and there were fairly heavy casualties; +three fires which broke out on board the <i>Southampton</i> +were promptly extinguished by fine work on the part of +the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had +been much cut up by shell fire.</p> + +<p>The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but +fierce engagement, and it is probable that the German +light cruiser <i>Frauenlob</i>, whose loss was admitted by the +enemy, was sunk during this action, which took place in +that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron +and the German 4th Scouting Group.</p> + +<p>At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked +enemy cruisers steering a south-easterly course. Again +the vessels sighted opened fire immediately, and the flotilla +leader <i>Tipperary</i>, commanded by Captain Wintour, the +leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire +and set on fire forward; the <i>Broke</i>, leader of the 2nd half +Flotilla, received injury to her steering-gear, rendering +her temporarily unmanageable and causing her to ram +the destroyer <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, with the result that it became +necessary to abandon the latter destroyer on the +following morning after taking off her crew. The destroyer +<i>Spitfire</i> (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Trelawny), +next astern of the <i>Tipperary</i>, fired torpedoes at +a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared to be hit and in +a sinking condition, and the <i>Spitfire</i> then collided with a +German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried +off some 29 feet of her skin plating.</p> + +<p>The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">376</span> +while steering to the south-eastward, came into contact +at midnight with the enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron, +and one ship (probably the <i>Pommern</i>) was torpedoed and +sunk either by the <i>Ardent</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Marsden) +or <i>Ambuscade</i> (Lieutenant-Commander G. A. +Coles) or <i>Garland</i> (Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff). +A heavy and accurate fire was opened by the enemy and +the destroyer <i>Fortune</i> (Lieutenant-Commander F. G. +Terry) was sunk.</p> + +<p>The flotilla was again in action a little later with some +enemy battleships, and the <i>Ardent</i> attacked, and fired a +torpedo, but the result could not be observed as a very +heavy fire was concentrated on the <i>Ardent</i>, which sank +with colours flying after a very gallant night’s work. It +is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden +and one man were the only survivors, being picked up +by a destroyer on June 1st after having been five hours in +the water.</p> + +<p>The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of +the 1st Battle Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was +somewhat astern of the remainder of the Fleet during +the night, owing to the <i>Marlborough</i> not being able +to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions +for this speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also +more than five miles astern of the main portion of the +Battle Fleet. At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> also this flotilla was obliged +for some little time to steer a south-easterly course, owing +to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard +hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with +certainty. The result was that the 12th Flotilla was probably +some ten miles to the north-eastward of the 1st Battle +Squadron by midnight. The incident was a fortunate one +since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of the +enemy’s battle squadrons.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">377</span></p> + +<p>At 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in +the <i>Faulknor</i>, sighted on the starboard bow this battle +squadron, consisting of six ships steering south-east. The +leading ships were thought to belong to the “Kaiser” +class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel +to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots +to draw ahead, with the intention of turning to attack +on a north-westerly course (the reverse of the enemy’s +course), in order to give an opportunity of getting into +close range. This attack was carried out at 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> at a +range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their +torpedoes at the second and third ships in the line. Some +took effect on the third battleship in the line, the explosion +being so violent and the flame reaching to such a +height that it appeared to those in our destroyers that +the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the +magazine and destroyed the ship.</p> + +<p>Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the +enemy light cruisers, which were in company with the +battle squadron. The destroyer <i>Mænad</i> (Commander +J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the north-westward +with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had +been anticipated that the attack would have been made +with torpedo tubes bearing to starboard, and her tubes +were not ready to fire to port. Commander Champion +held on the south-easterly course and, turning later than +the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned +again to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at +2.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> fired two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth +ship in the line at a range between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, +one of which took effect. In this case, too, the flame of +the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was +not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her +were visible.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">378</span></p> + +<p>It is of interest to note that at the time of the first +attack on this squadron six battleships were visible. After +the first attack only five were seen by Captain Stirling, +and twenty-five minutes later five were sighted by the +<i>Mænad</i>, and after the <i>Mænad’s</i> attack only four were +visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships +was sunk was considered at the time to be very strong, +particularly as the reports from the <i>Mænad</i> and from +Captain Stirling were sent to me quite independently, +and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that +Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original +number in the battle squadron, and five as the number +remaining after his attack.</p> + +<p>When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle +squadron he reported the fact by wireless, but the signal +was, unfortunately, not received by any ship, owing, presumably, +to the strong interference caused by German +wireless signalling at the time.</p> + +<p>The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas +took station astern the Battle Fleet in company with the +<i>Champion</i> (Captain Farie), leader of the 13th Flotilla; +the <i>Fearless</i>, leader of the 9th Flotilla, had not been able +to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the destroyers +of these flotillas lost touch with the <i>Champion</i> +during the night, and the flotillas became somewhat +scattered.</p> + +<p>At 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a large vessel, taken at first for one of +our own ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high +speed, passing close to the <i>Petard</i> and <i>Turbulent</i>. She +rammed the <i>Turbulent</i> and opened a heavy fire on both +the <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Petard</i>; the <i>Turbulent</i> sank and the +<i>Petard</i> was damaged.</p> + +<p>At 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the destroyer <i>Moresby</i>, of the 13th Flotilla, +sighted four battleships of the “Deutschland” class,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">379</span> +and attacked, firing one torpedo; an explosion was subsequently +heard.</p> + +<p>It was impossible to state with certainty which of our +destroyers were actually successful in their attacks. The +enemy, of course, denied that any marked success was +obtained by our attacks, but information obtained after +the action made it certain that at least four battleships +of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes, in addition +to the pre-Dreadnought battleship <i>Pommern</i>, which +was admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the +light cruiser <i>Rostock</i>.</p> + +<p>Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot +be attributed to particular destroyers, the work of the +flotillas as a whole, and particularly of the 4th and 12th +Flotillas, was characterised by the splendid dash, skill and +gallantry for which our destroyers had been conspicuous +throughout the War. They were most ably led and +achieved magnificent work under very difficult conditions.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt at all that the German organisation +for night action was of a remarkably high standard. +In the first place, the use of star shell, at that time unfamiliar +to us, was of the greatest use to them in locating +our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and, +secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful +(much more so than ours), but their method of controlling +them and bringing guns and searchlights rapidly on to +any vessel sighted was excellent. It also appeared that +some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of +their secondary armament.</p> + +<p>The increased offensive power given by these devices +did not, however, prevent our destroyers from inflicting +great damage on the enemy during their night attacks, +although they led to the loss of some valuable destroyers +and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader<span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">380</span> +of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of destroyer +work and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and +other splendid officers perished with their gallant crews. +Our destroyer service has, indeed, every reason to be exceedingly +proud of the achievements of the flotillas, both +during the day action of May 31st and during the night +following that action.</p> + +<p>Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals +during the night, and, curiously enough, the under-water +explosions, four or five in number, were quite +clearly recorded on a barograph in the <i>Malaya</i>, a ship +well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There +is little doubt that these records showed the explosion of +our torpedoes against enemy ships.</p> + +<p>From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark +that our destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired +with great frequency by the enemy, and they produced +a very brilliant illumination, leaving the enemy ships in +complete darkness and not revealing their positions.</p> + +<p>At 11 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the light cruiser <i>Active</i>, astern of the 2nd +Battle Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, +and shortly afterwards saw searchlights switched on and +a heavy fire opened against this vessel by a ship, or ships, +on her starboard quarter. She appeared to be heavily hit +and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been +the <i>Black Prince</i>, which had apparently lost touch with +our fleet during the day action.</p> + +<p>Shortly after this incident the <i>Active</i> passed over some +submerged object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent +examination showed that some 15 feet of her bilge +keel had been torn away. It was not conceivable that +the object struck could have been submerged wreckage +from any ship which had taken part in the action, no +fighting having taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">381</span> +possible that the <i>Active</i> had struck an enemy submarine. +At 11.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Colossus</i> also passed over some submerged +object which was felt to scrape along the bottom +of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to +both starboard propeller blades. Again there is doubt +as to what the obstruction could have been; it was certainly +not wreckage from any ship that had been in action.</p> + +<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney +informed me that the <i>Marlborough</i> could not maintain +the Fleet speed of 17 knots any longer, on account of the +stress on the bulkheads, and that she had been obliged +to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship to +proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the +German mined area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light +cruiser <i>Fearless</i> alongside the <i>Marlborough</i>, and was +transferred in her, with his Staff, to the <i>Revenge</i>, the +<i>Fearless</i> being then detached to escort the <i>Marlborough</i>.</p> + +<p>Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements +which constituted the Battle of Jutland will be +gathered from a consideration of the distances steamed +by our ships during the operations.</p> + +<p>The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between +3.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the time of opening fire, and 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the +time that the Battle Fleet commenced action, and a +further distance of some 57 miles to 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when the +Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle +Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the commencement +of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the +turn to the southward at 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the +period covered by the night action—9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to 2 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p> + +<p>At 2.47 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered +course to north and formed single line ahead in the order—2nd +Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">382</span> +Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th Battle Squadron +rejoined at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and took station ahead of the +2nd Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>The weather was misty and the visibility even less than +on May 31st, being only some three or four miles, and +I considered it desirable under these conditions, and in +view of the fact that I was not in touch with either my +cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger of submarine +attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the +enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th +Division of the Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, +having dropped astern during the night owing to the +reduction in speed of the <i>Marlborough</i> and the change +of flag from the <i>Marlborough</i> to the <i>Revenge</i>. Partly on +account of the low visibility, and partly because of the +inevitable difference in dead reckoning between ships, due +to their many movements during the action and during +the night, considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting +the Fleet. This applied particularly to the destroyer +flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and +whose facilities for computing their positions under these +conditions were only slight; but the same difficulty was +experienced with all classes of ships, and, although awkward, +the fact did not cause me any surprise. The cruisers +were not sighted until 6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, the destroyers did not join +the Battle Fleet until 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and the 6th Division of the +Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle +Squadron, was not in company until the evening.</p> + +<p>The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet +(particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes, +rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the +Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when +deciding to steer to the southward during the night. +It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">383</span> +Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By +the time this concentration was effected it had become +apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn +Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields +in the early morning on the way to their ports. The +presence of a Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, made it +certain that our position at that time would be known +to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the information +obtained from our wireless directional stations during the +early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet +must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course +shortly after daylight.</p> + +<p>At 3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the destroyer <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, which was +lying disabled in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted +a German light cruiser two miles to the eastward, steaming +slowly to the northward. After being in sight for +about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, +bows first. The <i>Sparrowhawk</i> was subsequently sighted +by the <i>Marksman</i> and others of our destroyers, and, being +too seriously damaged for towing back to a base, was +sunk by the <i>Marksman</i>.</p> + +<p>Shortly after 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the report of gunfire to the +westward was audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 +Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier, commanding the 3rd +Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was engaging +a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle +Fleet. Course was altered “by divisions” to west at +3.44 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as it seemed that the presence of the airship +might possibly indicate the presence also of the High Sea +Fleet. At 3.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a Zeppelin was in sight from the +Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back +again to north and fire opened on the airship, which, +however, was too high for the fire to be effective. She<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">384</span> +disappeared to the eastward. She was sighted subsequently +at intervals.</p> + +<p>At 4.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions +in line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order +to widen the front and to reduce the risk of submarine attack. +At 4.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the cruiser <i>Dublin</i> reported by wireless +that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two destroyers, +and she gave her position.</p> + +<p>At 5.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle +Fleet in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed +to locate the cruiser reported by the <i>Dublin</i>, whilst the +Battle Fleet searched to the south-eastward for one of +the enemy’s battle cruisers which was thought to be in +a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still making +for a German port. At 4.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was +in Lat. 55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Commodore +of the flotillas (Commodore Hawkesley), with destroyers, +reported himself as being in Lat. 55.48 N., +Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser Fleet was +in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at +18 knots, and at 6.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> altered course to south. At +6 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, not having met the destroyers, the Battle Fleet +altered course to south-east, with the cruisers in company, +steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course until +7.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, at which time course was altered to north, the +Battle Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +and to north at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p> + +<p>The <i>Dublin</i> was sighted at 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and reported +having lost sight in a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32 +E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat destroyers she had +reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated that +the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming +fast.</p> + +<p>At 8.15 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N.,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">385</span> +Long. 6.10 E., steering north at 17 knots, turning at +8.52 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> to a south-west course.</p> + +<p>Between 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a considerable amount of +wreckage was passed, and the bodies of dead German +bluejackets were seen in the water. The wreckage of the +destroyer <i>Ardent</i> was also passed. Drifting mines in considerable +numbers were seen during the whole forenoon +of the 1st June, and there were one or two reports of submarines +being sighted. At 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser +Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle Fleet, and +course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, which +had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine +screen.</p> + +<p>At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 +N., Long. 5.25 E., and at 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Battle Cruiser +Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long. 6.11 E.</p> + +<p>It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had +either sunk or had passed inside the mine-fields <i lang="fr">en route</i> +to their bases. It had been evident since the early morning, +from the definite information obtained by our directional +stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to +port. All our own injured vessels were also <i lang="fr">en route</i> for +their bases, and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, +and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth force +to return independently. Diagram 4 shows the movement +of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the +forenoon of June 1st.</p> + +<p>The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had +been kept in port by Admiralty orders on May 31st, and +was despatched to sea on the morning of June 1st, when +I was informed that it was being sent out to join me and +to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> I instructed +Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to +screen the <i>Marlborough</i> to her base; he informed me at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">386</span> +2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that he had sighted the <i>Marlborough</i>. At 10.40 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not require +the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt +to strengthen the <i>Marlborough’s</i> escort and told him that +I did not need his ships. They would have been of great +use at daylight in June 1st had they been on the scene +at that time, and it is needless to add how much I should +have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in +the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew +well the extreme efficiency and the fine fighting spirit +of this force which, under its gallant and distinguished +commodore, had rendered such splendid service throughout +the War.</p> + +<p>The <i>Marlborough</i> reported at 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> that a torpedo +had been fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was +felt about the ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad +weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs were +ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber +at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span></p> + +<p>The <i>Warrior</i>, which had been taken in tow by the +sea-plane carrier <i>Engadine</i>, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. +3.54 E. at 8 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the 1st June, but the crew was +taken off by the <i>Engadine</i> and the ship abandoned later +in the day, as the weather had become bad and it was +evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of +rescue was very smartly carried out, the <i>Engadine</i> being +skilfully placed alongside the <i>Warrior</i> in a considerable +sea way by her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander C. G. +Robinson, and the large number of wounded transferred +to her. The reports as to the condition of the <i>Warrior</i> +were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain +afloat, and later fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore +I detached the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and subsequently +the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to search for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">387</span> +her. The search continued until the evening of June 23rd, +no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a +report received subsequently from the Captain of the +<i>Warrior</i> that her condition was such that she must have +sunk shortly after having been abandoned. During the +search for the <i>Warrior</i>, one of the cruisers of the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at +dusk, opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported +quite definitely that the submarine had been sunk. Later +evidence showed, however, that the submarine was one +of our own vessels of this class, that she had a very narrow +escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This +was one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines +being mistaken for an enemy, attacked by our own ships, +and considered to be sunk. The difficulty of ascertaining +definitely the result of an engagement with a submarine +was thereby exemplified, and was one of the +weighty reasons which led the Admiralty during the War +to refrain from publishing any figures giving the results +of engagements with submarines.</p> + +<p>Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the +destroyer <i>Broke</i>, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was +directed to search for that vessel also, assisted by two +light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely in the Tyne, +having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or +partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach +port were the <i>Acasta</i>, towed by the <i>Nonsuch</i>, and the +<i>Onslow</i>, towed by the <i>Defender</i>.</p> + +<p>The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, +and was reported ready for sea at four hours’ notice at +9.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on that date.</p> + +<p><i>Note.</i>—In the diagrams embodied in this chapter +there are some slight departures from those which accompanied +my original despatch to the Admiralty.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">388</span></p> + +<p>That despatch was sent in under constant pressure +for its early receipt and at a time when I, in common +with my Staff, was very fully occupied with the arrangements +connected with the repair of damaged ships, the +constructive alterations which the action had shown to +be necessary in our ships, and the various committees +which I had formed to report on different subjects in +the light of our experience. I was not, therefore, able +to give the personal attention to the reports which later +opportunities have afforded me, and such slight +modifications as I have made are due to a closer study +of these reports, and of the signals received during May +31st.</p> + +<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> + +<p>One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to +send to the King on the morning of June 3rd a message +of humble duty, respectful and heartfelt wishes on His +Majesty’s birthday.</p> + +<p>The following reply was received from His Majesty, +and communicated to the Fleet:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“I am deeply touched by the message which you +have sent me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It +reaches me on the morrow of a battle which has once +more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers +and men under your command. I mourn the loss of +brave men, many of them personal friends of my +own, who have fallen in their country’s cause. Yet +even more do I regret that the German High Sea +Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by +the misty weather to evade the full consequences of +an encounter they have always professed to desire, +but for which when the opportunity arrived they +showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">389</span> +enemy immediately after the opening of the general +engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gaining +a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday +amply justify my confidence in the valour and efficiency +of the fleets under your command.</p> + +<p class="right"> +“<span class="smcap">George R. I.</span>” +</p> +</div> + +<p>The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious +message, and I added in my telegram to His +Majesty that it was “a matter of the greatest gratification +to all ranks to receive such an expression of Your +Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our +gallant comrades.”</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">390</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XV"><span id="toclink_390"></span>CHAPTER XV<br> + +<span class="subhead">REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">There</span> has been some discussion on the tactics of the +Jutland Battle, and no doubt there will be more. I have +endeavoured to give the facts, so that future discussions +may take place with adequate knowledge.</p> + +<p>It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have +seen expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with +the object of enticing the enemy out to attack the +weaker portion in order to provide the opportunity for +a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May +31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the +southward of the Battle Fleet in pursuance of the policy +which had been frequently carried out on previous +occasions.</p> + +<p>Many surmises have been made as to the object with +which the High Sea Fleet put to sea on this occasion. +The view which I have always held is that the frequent +light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down +the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the +Skagerrak during the spring of 1916, may have induced +the German Commander-in-Chief to send out a force +with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged +in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle +Fleet to sea in support of this force. There is no doubt +that he did not expect to meet the whole Grand Fleet. +If confirmation of this were needed it is supplied in the +German account of the battle, in which it is stated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">391</span> +that “there was no reason for supposing that any +enemy forces were about, much less the entire British +Fleet.”</p> + +<p>Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of +the whole strategy and tactics of the War, leads naturally +to the fresh problems which the advent of new +weapons had introduced. When I took command of +the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that +of how to counter a destroyer attack in a day action. +It had excited more attention in the two or three +years before the War than any other question of +tactics, much attention was devoted to it during the +War, and for that reason it is desirable to discuss it +fully.</p> + +<p>It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what +were then known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions +between Battle Fleets as an exercise), that destroyer attacks +were actually carried out in the British Navy on +a large scale.</p> + +<p>During that year manœuvres took place between the +3rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleets, commanded +by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven, and the Atlantic +Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase +of the manœuvres of that year included some Battle +Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,” during which attacks by considerable +forces of destroyers were carried out. Before +this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the +fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place +without destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented +the matter from being made the subject of thorough +practical experiment on such a scale as to give reliable +guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into +greater prominence.</p> + +<p>The Fleet manœuvres of 1912 did not throw further<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">392</span> +light on the question, as no Fleet action took place in +which destroyers were engaged; and the subsequent +Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as I recollect, +include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged. +During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 manœuvres +most of the destroyer attacks on the “Red” +Fleet were made from towards the rear of the “Blue” +battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge +from them.</p> + +<p>To turn from manœuvre experience; during the +years 1911–14, covering the period of Sir George Callaghan’s +command of the Home Fleets, destroyer +attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that +were constantly being carried out, and officers were +impressed with the supreme importance of the whole +matter.</p> + +<p>This was the position when I took over the command +of the Grand Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the matter +immediately engaged my attention. The “counter” +which had usually been favoured by flag officers commanding +Fleets up to the date named, had been the +obvious one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ torpedo +craft on those of the enemy, as the latter advanced +to attack. It was difficult to forecast how far such a +“counter” would be successful in preventing the destroyers +from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the +distance the torpedo could be relied upon to run with +accuracy, and on its speed, both constantly increasing +figures.</p> + +<p>The great number of destroyers possessed by the +enemy, the largely increased range of torpedoes, the difficulty +which our light cruisers and flotillas might experience +in reaching a favourable position for meeting and +disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">393</span> +discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger attendant +on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low +visibility, when a destroyer attack could be instantly and +effectively launched before such a “counter” could take +place, made it essential to consider other means for dealing +with the situation.</p> + +<p>Some German documents which came into our possession +early in the War proved the importance which +the enemy attached to this form of attack, and emphasised +the gravity of the question.</p> + +<p>It was, of course, fully realised that the question had +two sides, and that if our own Battle Fleet was open to +this form of attack, that of the enemy was equally so, +but as against this there were important considerations +to which it was necessary to devote attention.</p> + +<p>The first was that the element of chance enters very +largely into torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla +of destroyers attacking a Battle Fleet at long range does +so with the idea that a certain percentage of the torpedoes +fired will take effect on the ships, the remainder +passing between the ships.</p> + +<p>Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards +having a speed of 30 knots an hour, or, in other words, +of 50 feet per second, is not comparable to a projectile +from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000 yards of say +2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly +straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course +of the target have been determined with considerable accuracy, +the torpedo will not hit. Let us assume that the +target ship <span class="allsmcap">X</span> at position <span class="allsmcap">A</span> is steaming at 15 knots, and +that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on +the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is +discharged on a line at right angles to the course of the +target at a distance of 8,000 yards (<em>see</em> <a href="#i_394">diagram</a>). The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">394</span> +target ship will advance 4,000 yards along the line <span class="allsmcap">A B</span> +whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the line +<span class="allsmcap">C D</span>. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes.</p> + +<p>It will be seen that if +the course of the target +ship has been misjudged +very slightly, or had been +altered during the passage +from <span class="allsmcap">A</span> to <span class="allsmcap">B</span>, the torpedo +will pass ahead or astern of +it. In that case it might +hit instead a ship <span class="allsmcap">Z</span> ahead or +one <span class="allsmcap">Y</span> astern of <span class="allsmcap">X</span>.</p> + +<p>There are no means +available on board a destroyer +for determining +with any real accuracy +either the speed or the +course of a ship at a distance +of four or five miles. +Hence the difficulty, and +the reason why torpedoes +are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in +expectation that <em>one</em> of the ships in the line will be hit.</p> + +<figure id="i_394" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 14em;"> + <img src="images/i_394.jpg" width="637" height="1055" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the +enemy, and the chances of achieving this object are naturally +proportional to the target presented by a ship as +compared with the space between adjacent ships.</p> + +<p>In the case of a British line of eight battleships attacked +“beam on,” the chances of a hit for torpedoes which +reach the British line may be assessed roughly at seven +to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600 feet, and the +distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next +astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">395</span> +giving a total length of <em>ships</em> of 4,800 feet, and the total +of the <em>interval</em> between them as 6,300 feet.</p> + +<p>A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes, +and at long ranges one may calculate the chances of hits +<em>on the above reasoning</em> at between three and four per +destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are correctly fired +at such a range as to ensure that they reach the British +battle line, and provided that the British ships can take +no effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">O</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">O</a> Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up to the year +1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun armament than their enemies.</p> + +</div> + +<p>It has been said that the element of chance is a large +factor in torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed. +By this it is meant that skill is not a factor that can produce +a decisive effect when dealing with torpedoes, as in +the case of guns dealing with guns. It is true that skilful +manœuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo, if sufficient +warning of its approach is given, and if its position +with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly +judged. When experience at the Jutland Battle showed +that under favourable weather conditions the track of +German torpedoes was visible for some distance, great +care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dispatches +so that future use could be made of the fact.</p> + +<p>Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that +our enemy was almost certain to possess a very considerable +superiority over us in the number of destroyers likely +to be present during a Fleet action. This was a question +which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the then +First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had discussed +it on more than one occasion when the destroyer +building programme was being considered.</p> + +<p>Our fears were realised, particularly during the first +two years of the War.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">396</span></p> + +<p>The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect +at different periods is shown in the following table, so far +as it is known to <span class="locked">me:—</span></p> + +<table id="t396" class="bl section"> +<tr class="bt bb"> + <td class="tdc" style="width: 20%;">Date</td> + <td class="tdc" style="width: 25%;">British destroyers with the Grand Fleet, including Flotilla Leaders<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">P</a></td> + <td class="tdc" style="width: 25%;">German destroyers probably attached to the High Sea Fleet</td> + <td class="tdl flush" style="width: 30%;">Additional German destroyers, less than 12 years old, that could join the High Sea Fleet at Germany’s selected moment</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">August 4th, 1914</td> + <td class="tdc"> 42</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">October 1st, 1914</td> + <td class="tdc"> 42</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 20</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">January 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"> 42</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 30</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">April 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"> 58</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> —</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">July 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"> 65</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> —</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">October 1st, 1915</td> + <td class="tdc"> 65</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> —</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">January 1st, 1916</td> + <td class="tdc"> 66</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 50</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">April 1st, 1916</td> + <td class="tdc"> 74</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> —</td> +</tr> +<tr class="bb"> + <td class="tdl">May 31st, 1916</td> + <td class="tdc"> 80</td> + <td class="tdc"> 88</td> + <td class="tdc"> 70<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">Q</a></td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">P</a> The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the figures in column 2, +since I never expected that it would be able to concentrate with the Grand +Fleet.</p> + +<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">Q</a> No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in destroyers.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at +the end of May, 1916, 70 were available to go to sea on +May 30th (an unusually large proportion). There happened, +also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight destroyers +belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied +the battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which +47 were with the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with +the Battle Cruiser Fleet, including the 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had 88, a far +larger proportion to each ship.</p> + +<p>This superiority in numbers on the part of the Germans +arose from three causes:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and destroyer +force at Harwich, the presence of which +force during a Fleet action was very improbable, +owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">397</span> +it took place, probably do so at Germany’s selected +moment and not at ours, and to the difficulty +of concentration under such circumstances.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The necessity of utilising a large number of our +destroyers for patrol purposes in the Straits of +Dover and elsewhere.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) We had not built an adequate number of destroyers +in the years before the War to meet the +many needs that only this class of vessel could fulfil, +particularly as the enemy developed his submarine +warfare against merchant-ships.</p> +</div> + +<p>The shipbuilding programmes of 1908–09, and following +years up to 1912–13, included provision for twenty +destroyers each year. Subsequent to the latter date, the +programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in order +to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we +were woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in +the Estimates, there was never sufficient money to meet +all the Admiralty’s needs. It was intimated that one or +other of the requirements had to give way at a time when +the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and +as the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary +than the destroyers, the number of the latter class +of vessel was reduced.</p> + +<p>Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme +initiated by Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage +of destroyers was most seriously felt throughout the whole +War, the conditions would probably have been even worse +had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been sacrificed +to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard +desired by the Admiralty.</p> + +<p>A third consideration that was present in my mind +was the necessity for <i>not leaving anything to chance in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">398</span> +Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one and only factor +that was vital to the existence of the Empire</i>, as indeed +to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle +Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster +befall it or even should its margin of superiority over +the enemy be eliminated.</p> + +<p>The situation was in many respects different from that +with which our Navy was faced in the time of the old wars. +In those days disaster could only come about by reason +of bad strategy or tactics owing to our enemy being in +overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force +better, and, apart from manœuvring, the action was invariably +decided by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried +weapon.</p> + +<p>During the recent War two entirely new features of +the greatest importance were introduced. First, the torpedo +could be fired at very long range, up to 15,000 yards, +either from large ships or destroyers, and at shorter range +from submarines, and the mine had been developed; the +invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be +known when they were being employed.</p> + +<p>The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious +when dealing with the attack of under-water weapons +than with gun attack are the greater damage which +one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may well be +fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to +reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it +is usually different; a ship which is being heavily hit +can—if her own offensive powers will not save her by +crushing the fire of the enemy—so manœuvre as to derange +temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein +lies the whole necessity for the exercise of care when dealing +with the underwater weapon.</p> + +<p>These considerations led me to introduce measures<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">399</span> +for dealing with destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet +other than the counter of attack by our light craft on +the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a turn +on the part of the ships, either <em>towards</em> the torpedoes or +<em>away</em> from them.</p> + +<p>In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so +that they would present as small a target as possible to +the torpedo, and incidentally that the space between the +ships should be correspondingly large. The matter is +very technical, and presents many interesting features, +one of which may be illustrated by an example:</p> + +<figure id="i_399" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 22em;"> + <img src="images/i_399.jpg" width="1040" height="541" alt=""> +</figure> + +<p>Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships +to steer direct for the attacking destroyers <em>if the moment +at which the torpedoes are fired can be ascertained</em>.</p> + +<p>This course, although applicable to one attack, leads +to difficulties in the case of successive attacks, since further +turns towards will bring the battle line within effective +range of torpedoes fired from the enemy’s battleships; +occasions will arise when this risk must be accepted.</p> + +<p>The accompanying diagram shows that the van and +centre squadrons are not so well safeguarded by a turn +towards the attacking destroyers as is the rear squadron, +for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire torpedoes from <span class="allsmcap">C</span> +(a threatening position to the van) and the van squadron<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">400</span> +turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will +steer along the line <span class="allsmcap">A B</span>.</p> + +<p>If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron +instead of the van squadron as supposed, and their objective +is the twentieth ship in the line, they will run along +the line <span class="allsmcap">C D</span>, i.e., directly at the fourth ship in the line.</p> + +<p>The target presented is, however, small, and the +chances of a flotilla attacking the rear squadron when +in a favourable position for attacking the van are not +great.</p> + +<p>The important point in the case of a turn towards is, +however, the necessity for ascertaining the moment of +discharge of the torpedoes.</p> + +<p>In the second case, that of turning away, the object +is to place the ships at such a distance from the attacking +destroyers that the torpedoes will not cross their tracks, +but if this object is not achieved the ships are in a good +position for avoiding the torpedoes if their tracks are +visible; the objection to this manœuvre is that the range +of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened.</p> + +<p>It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or +other of the manœuvres should destroyer attacks take +place under conditions which prevented an effective +“counter” by our own light craft; both manœuvres were +arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn +by divisions of four ships would delay the completion of +the manœuvre to too great an extent.</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great +deal in the way of discussion and instructions on the subject +of torpedo attack in a Fleet action. The duties of +light cruisers and destroyers in this connection were dealt +with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the supreme +importance both of making early torpedo attacks +on the enemy’s line and of immediately countering such<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">401</span> +attacks, and it was pointed out that an early attack by +our own destroyers would not only tend to stop an enemy +attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best +position to meet a hostile attack.</p> + +<p>The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroyers +were so fixed that they should be in the best positions +to effect these two objects, such positions being obviously +in the van of the Fleet; in order to provide against +a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment +in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two +flotillas, according to the numbers available, and a light +cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear.</p> + +<p>The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been +a matter of almost daily consideration, and all our experience +and thought led to the same conclusion, namely, +that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer attacks, +would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for +this belief, and some of them were as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>1. On each occasion when German vessels were met, +they had immediately retired towards their bases.</p> + +<p>2. The tactical advantages of such a move were obvious. +They might be enumerated thus:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang1"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of +advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the following +fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates, +to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the +following fleet.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of +drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine +trap.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">402</span> +with the observation of gunfire by the following +fleet.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) Considerations of moral effect will force the +stronger fleet to follow the weaker, and play into +the hands of the enemy.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<p>We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these +tactics that in all the many exercises carried out by the +Fleet during the War, it was the invariable rule to indicate +beforehand an <em>assumed</em> position of Heligoland, +and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-Chief +of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always +deployed his Fleet in the direction of Heligoland and +adopted retiring tactics. The difficulties resulting from +the employment of these retiring tactics and the best +method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore, the +subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the +senior officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very frequently +discussed and worked out on the tactical board.</p> + +<p>The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if +retiring tactics are employed in conjunction with a free +and skilful use of under-water weapons.</p> + +<p>When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st, +1916, these thoughts were in my mind, and were no doubt +present in the minds of all Flag officers in the British +Fleet. It has been mentioned that the circumstances of +the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with any +degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle +Fleet, and the deployment of our own Fleet took place +under these conditions. Even so, however, the course on +deployment (that is, south-east by east) was to a certain +extent governed by the idea of getting between the enemy +and his base on the supposition that he would be making<span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">403</span> +towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef +Channel.</p> + +<p>The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a +commanding position on the bow of the enemy caused the +enemy to make a large turn to starboard, largely because +this squadron—Rear-Admiral Hood’s—was mistaken for +the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have +already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that +at about 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> “dim shapes of enemy battleships are +discerned in a north-easterly direction.” These shapes +were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The +German account states that their battle cruisers turned +away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Battle +Fleet the chance of placing itself between the enemy +and his base. Advantage was taken of this opportunity, +and the enemy was then forced to pursue his retiring +tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns +required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed +in a position of tactical disadvantage owing to the British +Fleet working round on a wide circle outside the enemy.</p> + +<p>A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets +will show this at once.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">R</a> The course of the British Fleet +on deployment was south-east by east. Successive turns +to starboard brought the course through south by west +to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13 +points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards +apart, the German Fleet moving on the inner of these two +circles.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">R</a> <i>Cf.</i> diagram in the pocket at the end.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans +erroneously thought was in favour of the British Battle +Fleet, but which was always with the enemy, was accentuated, +and the Grand Fleet was gradually brought farther +and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">404</span> +placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in +regard to torpedo attack. This advantage was increased +by the low visibility, which rendered it difficult to see +flotillas approaching to attack until they were at fairly +short range.</p> + +<p>When the first attack by German destroyers took +place and the first of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be +approaching on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of +the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and had reached a distance of 9,000 yards +or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was +essential. Our own flotillas had been using every endeavour +to get to the van, but the frequent turns to starboard +and the movement of our battle cruisers across the +bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their movement, and +it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers could +prevent the attack from developing.</p> + +<p>The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be determined +with sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards” +and therefore the Battle Fleet was “turned away,” in +subdivisions.</p> + +<p>Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, coincidentally +with the destroyer attack the enemy made a +very large turn-away from our Fleet, and thus opened the +range much farther, disappearing entirely from view even +from our rear; this process was repeated on each occasion +of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was, +therefore, continually refusing action.</p> + +<p>It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the +whole line of battle away for this attack, or whether the +leading squadron could not have held the original course. +Such a movement was provided for in the Battle Orders, +but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000 +yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the +<i>Iron Duke</i>, the leading ship of the centre battle squadron,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">405</span> +and therefore the leading Battle Squadron was as open +to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or rear squadron; +indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to attack +the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle +Squadron was also not at the time clear of the van of the +centre squadron, as the turns that had been made had prevented +line ahead being re-formed, and the <i>Iron Duke’s</i> +Division could not turn unless the division ahead also +turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led +me to make the signal general to the Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>According to the reports of the captains of the ships +of the Battle Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed +the line of our Battle Fleet during the 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> destroyer +attack alone, in spite of the turn. The large majority +of these were observed by the ships of the 1st and 5th +Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have +crossed the line <em>ahead</em> of the <i>Iron Duke</i>, and at least +six crossed the track of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, +which was moving out to attack the enemy’s flotilla.</p> + +<p>In the case of a long line of ships there is always danger +of the torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being +forgotten or minimised by ships that are in the van, owing +to failure to realise how dangerous the torpedo fire of +ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to vessels a +long way in rear, although they themselves are quite +immune from this danger.</p> + +<p>The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable +decentralisation of command, and great stress +was laid on this point in the general instructions for “Battle +Tactics.” The opening paragraphs of this section of +the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It was +pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would +control the movements of the whole Battle Fleet before +and on deployment (except in the extreme case of very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">406</span> +low visibility rendering it necessary for the Flag officer +of a wing division to take immediate action), he could +not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel +and other smoke made both vision and communication difficult. +The necessity for wide decentralisation of command +was then pointed out, combined with a close watch +on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which +Flag officers should generally conform.</p> + +<p>The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since +Trafalgar if we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese +War, and advantage was naturally taken of the experience +to make some changes in the Battle Orders; but there +were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and, therefore, +no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief +of the Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet engagement, +“This is all going according to expectation.” +We did, however, obtain confirmation of our views as to +the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted by +the German fleet.</p> + +<p>The principal changes that were made in the Battle +Orders were in the direction of laying still further emphasis +on the discretionary power which was vested in +Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the difficulty, +always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jutland, +which the Commander-in-Chief would experience in +controlling the movements of the whole Fleet in the heat +of action; also in defining still further the different movements +that might be adopted to deal with torpedo attacks, +whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships +or from destroyers.</p> + +<p>A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo +attacks in action had been prepared by my Staff during +the spring of 1916, and a memorandum, with diagrams, +had been written showing the various situations that might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">407</span> +arise and the effect of the different counter-movements in +each case. It is of interest to note that this memorandum +was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was +fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not +actually been issued.</p> + +<p>The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in +the memorandum before it was finally issued to the Fleet.</p> + +<p>The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and +the “counter” measures adopted have been dealt with +at considerable length, since this form of attack and its +“counter” have been much discussed in the Service since +1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely to +continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject +of much future experiment.</p> + +<p>The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any +great effect, and their importance should not be exaggerated. +The turn of the British Battle Fleet opened +the range some 1,750 yards, but <em>it was not this turn which +led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy</em>. +That difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet +made a very large turn to the westward under cover of a +smoke screen at the moment of launching the earliest destroyer +attacks. Neither our battle cruisers in the van +which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary +in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain +touch until 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> because of the retirement of +the enemy.</p> + +<p>The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, +in regard to the ranges at which the +opening phases of the action should be fought, remained +unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the policy +of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside +torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line <em>in ordinary +circumstances</em>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">408</span></p> + +<p>As is very frequently the case when naval actions +do not result in overwhelming material losses by one side +or the other, or the capture or destruction of a large part +of the opposing Fleet, both sides at the time claimed a +victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped to +support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, +besides influencing neutral, and probably in particular +American, opinion.</p> + +<p>The Germans apparently based their claim on two +grounds, the first being that of having inflicted heavier +losses than they received. In order to make good this +contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk one battleship, +one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and +five destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British +side; and they concealed, until further concealment +was impossible, the sinking of the battle cruiser <i>Lutzow</i> +and the light cruiser <i>Rostock</i>, besides omitting to mention +that the <i>Seydlitz</i> had to be beached to prevent her sinking, +thereby slurring over the point that the <i>Seydlitz</i> would +undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own <i>Warrior</i> +did, had the action been fought as far from German bases +as it was from British bases. They also said nothing of +at least four German battleships being torpedoed, and +of several battleships and all their battle cruisers being +so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further +fighting for several months. The case was very different +with the British ships, as has been already stated. +If these points are borne in mind, the original German +claim to victory falls to the ground, even on the material +side. After the surrender of the German ships in November, +1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed +writer on naval matters, stated in the <i>Berliner Tageblatt</i> +of November 18th that “our Fleet’s losses were severe,” +adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was clear to every thinking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">409</span> +person that this battle must, and would be, the last +one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so +openly.”</p> + +<p>But a victory is judged not merely by material losses +and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to examine +the results of the Jutland Battle. With the single +exception of a cruise towards the English coast on August +19th, 1916—undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the +High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show +that it was still capable of going to sea—the High Sea +Fleet never again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much +outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even on August +19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately +for home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts +of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the +method of procedure that would be adopted by a Fleet +flushed with victory and belonging to a country which +was being strangled by the sea blockade.</p> + +<p>Again, in the German account of the “victory” it +is remarked that “as the dawn coloured the eastern sky +on the historic 1st of June, everyone expected that +the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed +in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation +was not realised. As far as the eye could reach the +horizon was clear. Not until the late morning did our +airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce +that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was +approaching from the southern part of the North Sea at +full speed on a northerly course. To the great regret of +all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to overtake +and attack theirs.”</p> + +<p>What are the facts? We know now that as the sun +rose, the High Sea Fleet (except such portions as were +escaping via the Skaw) was close to the Horn Reef,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">410</span> +steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for +home behind the shelter of the German minefields. +And the Grand Fleet was waiting for them to appear +and searching the waters to the westward and northward +of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained +the search during the forenoon of June 1st, +and the airship, far from sighting the Fleet <em>late in the +morning</em>, as stated, did so, first at 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and on several +occasions subsequently during the forenoon. And +if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what +an opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate +them! One is forced to the conclusion that this +victorious fleet did not consider itself capable of engaging +only twelve British battleships.</p> + +<p>I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland +Battle without mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. +From the second in command, Sir Cecil Burney, to the +youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell in the +<i>Chester</i>, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit +and determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and +trusted friend, a fine seaman who always handled his +squadron—or, in my absence, the Fleet—with marked +skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a high +reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton +Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer +who had made a special study of tactics; Rear-Admiral +Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, including +my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir +Robert Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose +deaths the nation and Fleet lost of their best—were all +officers of proved ability, in whom not myself only, but +the Fleet, had absolute confidence.</p> + +<p>In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed +a leader who throughout his Service career had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">411</span> +shown fighting qualities of the highest order, and he had +imbued his force with his own indomitable spirit.</p> + +<p>The Flag officers second in command of squadrons +had all led divisions for a considerable period, and I was +confident that they would handle their divisions as well +in action as they did during exercises, as proved to be +the case.</p> + +<p>The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons +and destroyer flotillas had invariably fulfilled every expectation +that I had formed of them. I had always admired +the manner in which the personnel of these vessels +had endured the conditions under which their work was +so frequently performed.</p> + +<p>Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-Admiral +Sir Charles Madden (my righthand man +throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its chief +members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag +officers, and with captains who had on countless occasions +shown their skill, I was indeed in a fortunate position.</p> + +<p>To the above advantages I must add those obtained +by the magnificence of the personnel of the lower ranks. +The officers and ships’ companies were as keen as any +Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait had +never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Officers +and men were day after day striving to perfect the +fighting efficiency of their ships, and well had they succeeded. +The engine room staffs had demonstrated early +in the War that they would respond magnificently to any +demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it +on the occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and +moral of the Fleet never stood higher than at the time +of the Battle of Jutland, and because of that spirit I +knew that the Fleet under my command was the most +formidable fighting machine in the world.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">412</span></p> + +<p>Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with +proper restraint. Whenever and wherever there was opportunity, +officers and men displayed courage and self-sacrifice +of the highest order. There were innumerable +instances which proved that the personnel of the present +Navy has nothing to learn in this respect from its forefathers. +The dead died heroic deaths; the wounded behaved +with marvellous fortitude. Forty-four years +passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith in, +and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket, +but they surpassed all my expectations, and so long as +that spirit endures, this country will be fortunate, and +with adequate forces will be safe.</p> + +<p>It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum +issued to the Fleet after the Jutland Battle:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><i>Iron Duke</i>,</span><br> +June 4th, 1916. +</p> + +<p class="in0">H.F. 0022 349.</p> + +<p class="in0">MEMORANDUM.</p> + +<p>I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains, +Officers and Men of the Grand Fleet my very high +appreciation of the manner in which the ships were +fought during the action on May 31st, 1916.</p> + +<p>2. At this stage, when full information is not available, +it is not possible to enter into details, but quite +sufficient is already known to enable me to state definitely +that the glorious traditions handed down to us +by generations of gallant seamen were most worthily +upheld.</p> + +<p>3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable +nature robbed the Fleet of that complete victory +which I know was expected by all ranks, which is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">413</span> +necessary for the safety of the Empire and which +will yet be ours.</p> + +<p>4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most +gallant comrades, but, although it is very difficult to +obtain accurate information as to the enemy losses, +I have no doubt that we shall find that they are certainly +not less than our own. Sufficient information +has already been received for me to make that statement +with confidence.</p> + +<p>I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information +on this point at an early date, but do not wish +to delay the issue of this expression of my keen +appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my confidence +in future complete victory.</p> + +<p>5. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful +spirit and fortitude of the wounded has filled me +with the greatest admiration.</p> + +<p>I am more proud than ever to have the honour of +commanding a fleet manned by such officers and men.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="larger" style="margin-right: 2em;">J. R. JELLICOE.</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 4em;">Admiral,</span><br> +Commander-in-Chief. +</p> + +<p class="hang"><span class="larger">The Flag Officers, Commodores<br> +and Officers in command of<br> +H.M. ships of the Grand Fleet.</span></p> +</div> + +<p>My official despatch on the battle to the Board of +Admiralty was forwarded on June 19th, and the +following letter was afterwards promulgated to the +Grand <span class="locked">Fleet:—</span></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">414</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><span class="smcap">Admiralty</span>,</span><br> +July 4th, 1916. +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty +have considered your reports on the action off +the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under +your command and the German High Sea Fleet on +the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral +Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and +those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding +Officers of the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, +and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the +first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak +of the war, as a result of which the enemy, +severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The +events of the 31st May and 1st June gave ample +proof of the gallantry and devotion which characterised +all who took part in the battle; the ships of +every class were handled with skill and determination; +their steaming under battle conditions afforded +a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the +engineering staff; while individual initiative and tactical +subordination were equally conspicuous.</p> + +<p>3. The results of the action prove that the officers +and men of the Grand Fleet have known both +how to study the new problems with which they are +confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. +The expectations of the country were high; +they have been well fulfilled.</p> + +<p>4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their +full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.</p> + +<p class="right"> +I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,<br> +<span style="margin-right: 3.5em;"><span class="smcap">W. Graham Greene</span>.</span> +</p> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">415</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVI"><span id="toclink_415"></span>CHAPTER XVI<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S +FAREWELL</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> ships which had received damage in the Jutland +Battle had to be repaired without delay. The great +majority of the repairs were completed during June +or by the first week in July, and, whilst under repair, +the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations +which experience gained in the action had shown +to be desirable. The <i>Marlborough</i> was the only large +ship whose repairs occupied any considerable length of +time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in August, although +the work upon her was handicapped to some extent +by being carried out in a floating dock moored in a +somewhat inconvenient position. The light cruiser +<i>Chester</i> was also detained at Hull until July 29th, as +her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a +great many alterations were carried out. The principal +points affecting <i lang="fr">matériel</i> to which attention was directed +were:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang1"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent +the flash of cordite charges, ignited by the explosion +of a shell in a turret or in positions between +the turret and the magazine, being communicated +to the magazine itself. It was probable +that the loss of one, if not two, of our battle +cruisers was due to this cause, after the armour +had been pierced.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">416</span></p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) Better measures were required to prevent the +charges of small guns from being ignited by +bursting shell, and to localise any fires due to this +cause, in the case of guns of the secondary battery +in large ships, and the main armament in +small ships.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Increased deck armour protection in large +ships had been shown to be desirable in order +that shell or fragments of shell might not reach +the magazines. This need was particularly felt +in all our earlier ships of the Dreadnought type, +since their side armour was not carried to the +upper deck level. The long range at which most +modern sea actions are fought, and the consequent +large angle of descent of the projectiles +made our ships very vulnerable in this respect.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) The pressing need for a better armour-piercing +projectile with an improved fuze was also +revealed.</p> + +<p>(<i>e</i>) Improved arrangements for flooding magazines +and drenching exposed cartridges had to +be made.</p> +</div> + +<p>Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet +to deal with all questions of this nature, as well as the +important matter of possible developments in the fire-control +system with a view to improving the methods of +correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled” +with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great +gunnery knowledge and experience of Captain F. C. +Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were of immense assistance, +and he was most ably seconded by the numerous highly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">417</span> +skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers +and in the ships of the fleet.</p> + +<p>The action taken in connection with these matters +was prompt, with the gratifying result that before I relinquished +the command of the Fleet, the great majority +of the heavy ships had been provided with additional +deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings +for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work +was carried out while the ships were at their usual notice +for steam, much of it being actually done at Scapa Flow +by the dockyard artificers berthed there on board the +<i>Victorious</i>: the work carried out by these artificers and +by the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with +most commendable rapidity.</p> + +<p>Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty, +as First Sea Lord, and under the immediate direction +of Captain Dreyer, then Director of Naval Ordnance, a +new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new +type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for +guns of 12-inch calibre and above, which certainly doubled +their offensive power.</p> + +<p>The investigation into the possibility of further development +in fire-correction methods, a subject to which +constant attention had been given throughout the War, +was at first carried out by two independent committees. +Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee, +composed of the most experienced and most successful +gunnery officers in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as +the result, drawn up and passed for adoption in the Fleet; +these had already produced a most convincing and most +satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of fire before +I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no +exaggeration to say that the average time taken to find<span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">418</span> +the gun range of the enemy with these new methods was +about one half of that previously required.</p> + +<p>Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders. +The majority had been installed in the Fleet before the +great increases in the range of opening effective fire had +come about, as the result of experience during the War. +Our most modern ships at Jutland were provided with +range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of the +ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet +long. During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply +range-finders up to 25 and 30 feet in length; a series of +experiments with stereoscopic range-finders was also instituted +in the same year. It had become known that the +Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be +stated, in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that +the developments introduced in the fire-control arrangements +of the Grand Fleet after the Battle of Jutland +did not affect the <em>instruments</em> already in use, which fully +met our requirements, but the <em>methods</em> of using those +instruments and particularly the system of correction of +fire.</p> + +<p>On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and +Cruiser Squadrons were re-organised as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot hangw"> +<p class="center b1"><span class="smcap">Battle Cruiser Squadron</span></p> + +<p class="center"><i>Lion</i> (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet).</p> + +<p class="hang"><i>1st Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Princess Royal</i> (Flag), <i>New Zealand</i>, <i>Tiger</i>.</p> + +<p class="hang"><i>2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Australia</i> (Flag), <i>Indomitable</i>, <i>Inflexible</i>.</p> + +<p class="p1 b1 center"><span class="smcap">Cruiser Squadrons</span></p> + +<p class="hang"><i>2nd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Minotaur</i> (Flag), <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, <i>Cochrane</i>, <i>Shannon</i>, <i>Achilles</i>, <i>Donegal</i>.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">419</span></p> + +<p class="hang"><i>3rd Cruiser Squadron</i>:<br> +<i>Antrim</i>, <i>Roxburgh</i>, <i>Devonshire</i>.</p> +</div> + +<p>On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived +at Scapa <i lang="fr">en route</i> to Archangel. In the morning he +crossed from Thurso in the <i>Oak</i>, and came on board the +<i>Iron Duke</i> on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me, +and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him. +Before lunch we went round the ship. The officers and +men naturally greeted him with much respect, and he can +have had no doubt of the admiration in which he was held. +During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming trip, +and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it +as a real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he confessed, +had been very great, adding that he had felt that +he could not have gone on without this break, which he +welcomed very much. He was not, however, very +sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He mentioned +the difficulty which he experienced in dealing with +questions discussed in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by +most soldiers and sailors, whose training does not fit them +to state or to argue a case, and who frequently find great +difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule, accustomed +to carry out their ideas without having first to bring conviction +to the minds of men who, although possessing +great general knowledge and administrative experience, +have naturally but little acquaintance with naval and +military affairs which in themselves form a lifelong +study.</p> + +<p>After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland +action, and Lord Kitchener evinced much interest in +the tactics and the general story of the action.</p> + +<p>Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the +idea that he was working to a time-table, and that +he felt that he had not a day to lose. He mentioned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">420</span> +three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed +astonishment at the programme which he had planned +to carry out in the restricted period. He was most +anxious not to lose a moment on the sea trip and +asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest +time in which the passage could be made.</p> + +<p>During the day the weather at Scapa, which had +been bad in the morning, gradually became worse, +and by the afternoon it was blowing a gale from the +north-eastward. It had been originally intended that +the <i>Hampshire</i> should take the route which passed +up the eastern side of the Orkneys, following the +channel ordinarily searched by mine-sweeping vessels as +a routine measure; but as the north-easterly gale +was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweeping +was out of the question, and it was also obvious +that the escorting destroyers could not face the sea +at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which +route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest, +and finally decided that the <i>Hampshire</i> should pass +close in shore, and not take the alternative route +passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry +Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this decision +<span class="locked">were:—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot hang1"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) With a north-easterly wind there would be less +sea and, therefore, more chance of the destroyers +being able to keep up with the <i>Hampshire</i>.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) It was practically impossible that this route +could have been mined by any surface mine-layer +owing to the dark period in Northern +latitudes being confined to a couple of hours, +during which no ship could expect to approach +the shore for mine-laying without having first +been sighted.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">421</span></p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries, +and was, therefore, under frequent observation.</p> +</div> + +<p>At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines +had been confined to water well to the southward of the +Firth of Forth, presumably because of their small radius +of action. Danger from this source was, therefore, considered +to be very remote.</p> + +<p>Finally the weather itself was a protection against +submarine attack which was at that time more to be +feared than the danger from submarine laid mines. +Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not +been practicable for three or four days owing to the +weather conditions.</p> + +<p>At about 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Lord Kitchener proceeded on board +the <i>Hampshire</i>, accompanied by his Staff comprising +Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F. Donaldson, Colonel +FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr. +Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-Lieutenant +McPherson, Cameron Highlanders. The +<i>Hampshire</i> sailed at 5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> escorted by two destroyers. +Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16 +knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers +back if they could not maintain the <i>Hampshire’s</i> speed. +Experience had proved that high speed was a valuable +protection against submarines.</p> + +<p>At about 7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Captain Savill, commanding the +<i>Hampshire</i>, ordered the two destroyers back to Scapa, +as they were unable to face the heavy seas at the +speed of the <i>Hampshire</i>. Between 7.30 and 7.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +the <i>Hampshire</i> struck a mine about 1½ miles off shore, +between the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head; +she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The incident was +witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone message<span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">422</span> +was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys +and Shetlands that the cruiser was in difficulties. +He at once ordered out patrol vessels and informed me, +with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene +immediately.</p> + +<p>The evidence of the few survivors of the <i>Hampshire</i> +showed that Lord Kitchener was below when the ship +was mined, and that an officer escorted him on deck. +Captain Savill was heard to give directions from the +bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and +his Staff, and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently +on deck, but was not seen after the ship sank. The +weather conditions prevented any boats being hoisted +out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the +ship sank.</p> + +<p>The scene of the disaster was searched during the night +by destroyers and patrol craft, but the only survivors +were twelve men who drifted ashore on a Carley raft, although +many bodies were picked up by the searching +vessels, and many drifted ashore.</p> + +<p>The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered.</p> + +<p>At the time of the disaster the <i>Hampshire</i> was +steaming at 13½ knots, the wind being north-north-west, +with a force of 50 miles an hour. The cold water +and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest +swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which +was north-east at 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at Scapa, had become north-north-west +by the time the <i>Hampshire</i> was outside, and +there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the Orkneys, +as had been anticipated.</p> + +<p>The hours that passed after the receipt of the report +of the <i>Hampshire</i> being in difficulties were most anxious +ones. In spite of the fact that the destroyers had +been sent back, it seemed almost incredible that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">423</span> +wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as +was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow +were not so bad as to indicate so extremely heavy a +sea off the Brough of Birsay; and even when it was +reported that the <i>Hampshire</i> had sunk (a report which +took some time to come through), there was hope that, +at any rate, Lord Kitchener and his mission would be +saved by boat. As the hours passed and no news was +received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety +became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the +certainty that this great man, who had served his +country so faithfully and well in its greatest emergency, +had met his death when under the care of the Navy, +the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord +Kitchener had inspired the Service with confidence +and trust. The Navy had frequently worked under +him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been +one of the outstanding figures in the European War +on the side of the Entente. Everyone in the Grand +Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had fallen +upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the +feelings of the Fleet generally were intensified in me, +on whom lay the main responsibility for his safe +passage to Archangel, so far as such safety could be +ensured.</p> + +<p>I have often wondered since that fatal day whether +anything could have been done that was not done, +but short of postponing the departure of the <i>Hampshire</i> +altogether, until weather conditions admitted +of a channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could +have been done. Such a decision would have resulted +in two or three days’ delay in starting, and would never +have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover, +with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">424</span> +mine-laying possibilities, I did not consider the delay +necessary as I should not have hesitated, if need had +arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to sea on the same +night and by the same route as that traversed by +the <i>Hampshire</i>.</p> + +<p>My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming. +There was, at first, doubt in the minds of some people +as to whether the loss of the <i>Hampshire</i> was due to +a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were set +at rest by the sweeping operations which were undertaken +as soon as the weather admitted. They resulted +in the discovery of moored mines of the type laid in +southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines +being easily distinguishable from those laid by surface +vessels.</p> + +<p>During the month of June cruisers were kept constantly +patrolling the route to Archangel to protect +shipping against possible enemy raiders, as the traffic +was very heavy at this period. The <i>Donegal</i>, <i>Antrim</i>, +<i>Devonshire</i> and <i>Roxburgh</i> were the vessels employed. +They visited the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of +Stadlandet, <i lang="fr">en route</i> to and from patrol, with a view to +intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick.</p> + +<p>The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla +were employed in watching the waters in the Kattegat +and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the Norwegian +coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft. +A regular submarine patrol was also begun off the +Horn Reef, and was continued up to the time of my +relinquishing command of the Fleet. At first two, +and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol, +which was of great utility in giving information of the +movements of the few enemy surface vessels that ever +ventured so far from their base, and also proved of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">425</span> +use for attacking enemy submarines. At the commencement, +the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and +look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with +that of the German submarines, by reason of their bad +wireless equipment, which admitted of a range of +some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were +attached to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly +the absolute necessity of effecting an improvement in +this particular, stating that I was quite prepared to +sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this +be necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install +efficient wireless apparatus in the only class of vessel +that could carry out a watching patrol in the vicinity +of German bases. Eventually arrangements were made +to provide them with a wireless installation which gave +a range of 300 to 400 miles.</p> + +<p>When our submarines had been equipped in this +way we were at once able to establish an efficient +chain of outposts off the Horn Reef by the Grand +Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the northward +the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the +result that in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult +for the enemy to put to sea unobserved and unreported. +The comparative inefficiency of the wireless installation +in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our +destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had +to face during the first two years of War. It should be +added that while patrolling in the Kattegat, submarine +G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside territorial +waters, the German steamship <i>Ems</i>, on passage from +Christiania to Lübeck with oil, zinc and copper. The +crew were rescued.</p> + +<p>The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the +month, other than the usual patrols, were as <span class="locked">follows:—</span></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">426</span></p> + +<p>The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, +left Rosyth on the 14th for the Naze, thence steered +up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and returned to +Rosyth.</p> + +<p>The <i>Comus</i> and <i>Constance</i> left Scapa on the 25th, +swept down the Norwegian coast and returned on +the 27th.</p> + +<p>The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers carried +out a similar sweep from Rosyth between the 29th +June and July 1st.</p> + +<p>On June 22nd the first mines from a British submarine +mine-layer were laid by E 41 in the German +Bight.</p> + +<p>His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with +a visit on the 14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in +the <i>Oak</i>, at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, being escorted by the destroyers of +the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round the Fleet in +the <i>Oak</i>, His Majesty proceeded on board the <i>Iron Duke</i>, +where he spent the night. On the following day the +King visited all the flagships, on board of which a large +percentage of officers and men from the various squadrons +were assembled, and left for Thurso in the <i>Oak</i> at 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, +proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth, honouring +the squadrons at each of these bases with a +visit.</p> + +<p>His Majesty addressed a representative gathering +of officers and men from the ships at Scapa, who had +been assembled on board the <i>Iron Duke</i> on the morning +of the 15th in the following <span class="locked">terms:—</span></p> + +<p>“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand +Fleet, you have waited for nearly two years with most +exemplary patience for the opportunity of meeting and +engaging the enemy’s fleet.</p> + +<p>“I can well understand how trying has been this period,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">427</span> +and how great must have been the relief when you knew +on May 31st that the enemy had been sighted.</p> + +<p>“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching +darkness prevented that complete result which you all +expected, but you did all that was possible in the circumstances. +You drove the enemy into his harbours, and +inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet +another page to the glorious traditions of the British +Navy.</p> + +<p>“You could not do more, and for your splendid work +I thank you.”</p> + +<p>The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +during June, gave as the <span class="locked">figures:—</span></p> + +<p>No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No. +sent in, 20; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports +or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to a given patrol, 8; No. on special +service, 1.</p> + +<p>A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during +the month—especially in the latter half—and this interfered +somewhat with the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. +A very dense fog prevailed in the Pentland Firth +on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally from +the northward, were prevalent during the first portion +of the month, and a northerly gale occurred on the +5th.</p> + +<p>No large Fleet movements took place during June, +as it was known that the greater part of the High Sea +Fleet was under repair as the result of the Jutland +action.</p> + +<p>During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only engaged +in one cruise, namely, from the 17th to the 20th. +The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 2nd +and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, +the <i>Campania</i>, with sea-planes, and destroyer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">428</span> +flotillas left Scapa between noon and 1.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the +17th, and proceeded to the northward and eastward +of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of +carrying out a series of battle exercises on the 18th +and 19th; they were based on the experience gained +of enemy tactics during the Jutland action. Some of +the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise, +and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during +the forenoon of the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships +approached the Pentland Firth, making entry somewhat +difficult.</p> + +<p>Cruiser movements during the month <span class="locked">comprised:—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot hang1"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by +Grand Fleet Cruisers to protect trade against +raiders.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The establishment on the 7th of a regular +patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an +area well to the northward of the Shetlands, this +patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and +armed boarding-steamer which had been previously +placed there.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) Extensive dispositions were made on the +9th to intercept a German raider reported +from neutral quarters, as about to leave for +the Atlantic. These dispositions included a +close patrol by two light cruiser squadrons and +eight destroyers from Rosyth of an area 80 to +100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which +it was expected the enemy would pass; a further +patrol by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron +and six destroyers was established farther north +to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; +two cruisers were ordered to patrol north of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">429</span> +the Shetlands, local patrol vessels being between +these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half +flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island +Channel.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">S</a></p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left +Rosyth on the 12th and swept up the Norwegian +coast and back, returning on the 15th.</p> + +<p>(<i>e</i>) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six +destroyers repeated the sweep, returning on the +20th.</p> + +<p>(<i>f</i>) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroyers +left Rosyth and swept to the southward in +the direction of the Horn Reef from a position +near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having +sighted anything.</p> + +<p>(<i>g</i>) Two light cruisers and four destroyers repeated +the sweep of the Norwegian coast on the +24th.</p> + +<p>(<i>h</i>) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four +destroyers, left Rosyth on the 26th, and proceeded +to a position to the westward of the Little +Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to +the Naze on the look out for enemy raiders or +Zeppelins, reports having been received of the frequent +presence of Zeppelins on this line; the force +turned to the northward from the Naze and swept +along the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceeding +thence to Scapa. The sweep was again uneventful.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">S</a> The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy vessels being +sighted; the report was probably incorrect.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla +were active during the month in the Kattegat and patrolling +off the Horn Reef. They reported on the 20th<span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">430</span> +that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft were +visible.</p> + +<p>The attacks by enemy submarines on warships reported +during the month were:</p> + +<p>The mine-sweeping sloop <i>Rosemary</i> of the Southern +Force was torpedoed on the 4th, but was towed into the +Humber.</p> + +<p>The light cruiser <i>Galatea</i> was missed by a torpedo on +the 12th, in Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E.</p> + +<p>The armed boarding-steamer <i>Duke of Cornwall</i> was +missed by two torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged +in boarding a ship south-east of the Pentland +Skerries.</p> + +<p>The light cruiser <i>Yarmouth</i> was missed by a torpedo +on the 26th.</p> + +<p>Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were +sunk by the gunfire of four enemy submarines, on the +11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11 E., their guns being +entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which the submarines +are armed. This combined attack on the trawlers +of the Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the +regrettable loss of the three trawlers, was a great and +well deserved tribute paid by the enemy to the work +of that patrol which had been uniformly successful, +and had proved a great annoyance to the German submarines.</p> + +<p>Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy submarines +on the 7th, to the eastward of the Pentland Firth; +on the 12th, two divisions of destroyers were sent from +Scapa to attack the submarine that had fired at the <i>Duke +of Cornwall</i>, the <i>Musketeer</i> dropping a depth charge close +to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought considerably +damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-planes +from Scapa were sent after a submarine reported<span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">431</span> +by the armed boarding steamer <i>Dundee</i> as sighted 10 +miles east-south-east of the Pentland Skerries, but she +was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of destroyers +again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity, +but failed to do so.</p> + +<p>Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered +by the sweeping trawlers in the southern channel in the +Moray Firth on the 26th, and were swept up by trawlers +and fleet sweepers before any damage was done.</p> + +<p>The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +showed:</p> + +<p>No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No. +sent in, 23; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or +<i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrol, 10; No. on special service, 0.</p> + +<p>The armed merchant-steamer <i>Arlanza</i>, after temporary +repairs at Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July +for refit.</p> + +<p>The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist +being experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on +the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd, 24th and 25th.</p> + +<p>During the month of August the principal cruiser +movements, apart from those in connection with the Battle +Fleet, were as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang1"> + +<p>(<i>a</i>) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers +in an area well to the northward of the Shetlands +was continued.</p> + +<p>(<i>b</i>) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-patrol +seaward of the Fleet bases was maintained.</p> + +<p>(<i>c</i>) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route +was continued.</p> + +<p>(<i>d</i>) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as follows:</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">432</span></p> + +<p>On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers +left Rosyth for a sweep down the Norwegian coast, returning +on the 3rd, having sighted nothing of interest; +on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers from +Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30 +N., Long. 5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th, +without result. On the 12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, +with four destroyers, left Scapa and proceeded towards +Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of +10 British merchant-ships which had been brought out of +the Baltic. These vessels were escorted across the North +Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy arrived safely on +the 14th.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers +<i>Dundee</i> and <i>King Orry</i>, which had been disguised as +merchant-ships, left Scapa for operations off the Norwegian +coast. It was hoped that they would be able to +close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband without +exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better +chance of capturing them than any vessel having the +appearance of a warship. The <i>Dundee</i> operated between +Udsire and Lister, and the <i>King Orry</i> off Stadlandet, +both being localities in which ships were in the habit of +leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser <i>Constance</i> +and two destroyers were sent to support the <i>Dundee</i>, +keeping well to seaward of her, as that ship was operating +in waters in which enemy warships might be found. The +operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying a +cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being +sent in.</p> + +<p>On the 30th the <i>Abdiel</i> left Scapa to lay mines in the +vicinity of the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation +successfully, and without being observed, on the night of +the 31st–1st.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_433">433</span></p> + +<p>The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kattegat +and in the vicinity of the Horn Reef continued. +The submarines, returning on the 17th, reported having +been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the +Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to +operate against this vessel, but met with no success.</p> + +<p>Casualties to war-vessels during the month included: +The light cruiser <i>Cleopatra</i>, of the Harwich force, +which was mined on the 4th near the Thornton Ridge +off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be +repaired; the destroyer <i>Lassoo</i>, also of the Harwich force, +was sunk by mine or submarine near the Maas Lightship +off the Dutch coast on the 13th; the armed boarding-steamer +<i>Duke of Albany</i> was sunk by a submarine on +the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries, +with considerable loss of life, including Commander +G. N. Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-planes, +and an airship were sent out from Scapa +at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of +her, although the armed boarding-steamer <i>Duke of +Clarence</i> which had stood by the <i>Duke of Albany</i> and +rescued the survivors reported that she had passed +over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser +<i>Blonde</i> went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland +Firth, in thick weather on the 10th, but was lightened +and towed off on the 11th, having sustained considerable +injuries; the battleships <i>Warspite</i> and <i>Valiant</i> +collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the +24th, whilst, respectively, returning from and proceeding +to the night firing area, both ships being considerably +damaged, with the result that they had to +be docked.</p> + +<p>On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_434">434</span> +an enemy submarine, and the departure of the <i>Marlborough</i> +from the Tyne was thereby delayed; the coincidence +that mines were frequently laid in this neighbourhood +when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs, +led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that +locality. On the 4th or 5th August a considerable number +of mines of the submarine type were also laid in the War +channel in the White Sea by enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>On August 3rd four “C” class submarines left the +Nore in tow of tugs for Archangel, <i lang="fr">en route</i> by the canal +system for service in the Baltic. These submarines performed +very useful work in those waters during the year +1917.</p> + +<p>The increase in mine-laying by German submarines +gave rise to anxiety that the movements of the Grand +Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields near the bases +at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new +mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was +strengthened during July by withdrawing a certain number +of trawlers from patrol duty in order to form a mine-sweeping +flotilla; during the latter half of 1916 the Grand +Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty comprised +two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as +well as two flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in +addition one flotilla of paddle mine-sweepers was based +on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These flotillas were +all additional to the small local sweeping force of trawlers +at the various fleet bases.</p> + +<p>On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea +for a sweep in southern waters. The presence of an unusually +large number of submarines in the North Sea—a +phenomenon which had been observed shortly before +the Jutland Battle—had suggested the possibility of +movement on the part of the enemy and a sweep appeared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_435">435</span> +desirable. The <i>Iron Duke</i>, after leaving Scapa Flow, +proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet +screened by two destroyers to communicate with the +<i>Royalist</i>, and at 7.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, as the ships were about to communicate, +a submarine on the starboard bow, about 250 +yards off, fired a torpedo, which passed close astern of the +screening destroyer <i>Onslaught</i> on that bow. Only one +torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the +attack, and did not get into the position intended for attacking +the <i>Iron Duke</i>, which was proceeding at high +speed, and zigzagging, and, therefore, fired at the <i>Onslaught</i> +instead. Communication between the <i>Iron Duke</i> +and <i>Royalist</i> was deferred until after dark in consequence +of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal.</p> + +<p>The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid +the submarine, and passed her without further incident, +and the Battle Fleet and cruisers concentrated at daylight +on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,” +steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 +knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a +position 30 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +on the 19th the <i>Nottingham</i>, one of the light cruiser +screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst zigzagging at +20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34 +N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the +torpedoes struck the port side almost simultaneously. The +first report indicated that she had been hit by mines <em>or</em> +torpedoes, and, until it was clear that a mine-field did not +exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this locality, +and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascertained +that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this +became clear the southward course of the Fleet was +shaped to pass to the eastward of the submarine. Meanwhile +the <i>Dublin</i> cruised at high speed in the vicinity of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_436">436</span> +the <i>Nottingham</i> for the purpose of keeping the submarine +down so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Nottingham</i> was hit by a third torpedo, and it +became evident that she could not float much longer. Her +boats were lowered, and the majority of the ship’s company +placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, just +as the destroyers <i>Penn</i> and <i>Oracle</i>, which had been sent +to her assistance, arrived on the scene. These two destroyers +picked up all the survivors, except Captain Miller, +one officer, and several men who remained on board +until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter +from the <i>Dublin</i>. Several torpedoes were fired at the +<i>Dublin</i> and the two destroyers during their work of rescue, +but all fortunately missed.</p> + +<p>From 8.24 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> onwards Zeppelins were frequently +in sight from both the Battle Fleet, and the Battle +Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at, but they kept at too +long a range for our fire to be effective. The <i>Galatea</i> +sighted the first airship at 8.24 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, and the second was +seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; at 10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Commodore +Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, +reported himself in position Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E., +and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He stated later +that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole +period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received +from the patrol trawler <i>Ramexo</i> that she had two Zeppelins +in sight in Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E. It was evident +that a very large force of airships was out. A total of at +least ten was identified by our directional wireless stations +and they appeared to stretch right across the North +Sea.</p> + +<p>At 10.10 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> a report was received from submarine +E 23, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, that she had +sighted ships of the High Sea Fleet steering west at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_437">437</span> +9.19 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>; the position as received in the signal appeared +incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 N., +Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional +wireless stations also led me to consider that a +ship of the High Sea Fleet was in the position named at +5.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, instead of at 9.19 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> On the return of E 23 +to Harwich, her captain reported that he had attacked +the battle cruiser <i>Derfflinger</i> unsuccessfully at 3.13 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +on the 20th. At 5 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, in spite of the strong enemy destroyer +screen, he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship +of the first Battle Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau” +type. This ship turned for home on being torpedoed, +and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but +at 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, +and the captain of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was +sunk. Subsequent information, however, showed that she +reached port in a damaged condition; the persistent action +of the captain of E 23 in the face of great opposition, +was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our +submarine service.</p> + +<p>On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our +directional wireless stations, speed was increased, and +course shaped to a position at which it was hoped the +High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that +fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in +the neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention +was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 +E., where the Fleet would be favourably placed either to +engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him +off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience +of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his +objective the bombardment would be carried out either +shortly before dusk, or at daylight, in order to facilitate +escape afterwards, or approach before, unobserved. In<span class="pagenum" id="Page_438">438</span> +the possible alternative of the movement being designed +to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably +placed to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle +Fleet was in position Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering +south-south-east. Submarines were sighted by the +cruiser <i>Minotaur</i> at 1.23 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and by the light cruiser +<i>Boadicea</i> at 1.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>; both these ships were in the vicinity +of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary +to avoid the submarines; this caused some slight delay +in the southward movement.</p> + +<p>The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea +in readiness to meet the Fleet, if required, and during +the forenoon of the 19th, was directed to spread on a line +running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, where the submarines +would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a +position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed +towards our coast north of Flamborough Head; in +such an event the enemy would be between the Fleet and +the submarines.</p> + +<p>The <i>Active</i>, with nine destroyers of the newly formed +4th Flotilla in the Humber, which was also at sea, was +directed to join the Battle Fleet.</p> + +<p>At 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I received information by wireless that +directional wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in a position approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. +1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> was in Lat. 55.15 +N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was well +ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the +same course after 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> as it had steered between +5.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 12.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, which would take them to +Hartlepool, it was evident that it might be sighted at any +moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance between +the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal +was therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High<span class="pagenum" id="Page_439">439</span> +Sea Fleet might be encountered at any moment. The +meeting appeared to be so certain that I arranged the +distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the assumption +that the enemy would turn to the eastward on +meeting us, I directed a concentration of fire of ships that +would be ahead of the <i>Iron Duke</i> on deployment, of two +ships on one, leaving the <i>Iron Duke</i> to deal with one +ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate firing at +Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to +us. The weather was clear. There seemed to be a very +good prospect that we might, on gaining touch with the +enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was in a position to cut +off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was probable +that we should be to the eastward, although farther north. +Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy +elect to make for our coast and try to escape to the northward, +where he would have found himself between the +Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time passed, however, +and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came +in from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High +Sea Fleet had turned back, probably owing to the fact +that the Zeppelins had warned the German Commander-in-Chief +of our presence and movements. On this assumption, +at 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt +to steer for a position to the north-westward of Terschelling, +so that he might be ready to deliver a night attack +on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich force.</p> + +<p>It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would +leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or submarines, +or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines already +sighted made it probable that the trap was extensive; +it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters +which he had occupied unless there was a prospect of +bringing the High Sea Fleet to action.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_440">440</span></p> + +<p>It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight +by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and if he had turned for home, it would be +impossible to bring him to action; I therefore passed a +visual signal out at 3.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to Sir David Beatty to the +effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was +in sight by 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>At 3.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding +the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine +in sight, and I signalled to Sir David Beatty to turn +at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to the submarines +was correct.</p> + +<p>At 3.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and +the cruisers ahead to turn. At this time I received information +from our directional wireless stations that +enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 E., at 2.45 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> It was evident then that the enemy was returning +to his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore +turned the Battle Fleet at 3.56 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when in Lat. 54.40 +N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the course to pass up the +searched channel so as to avoid mines.</p> + +<p>At 4.52 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Falmouth</i> of the 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadron in Lat. 54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by +two torpedoes, one right forward, and one right aft. The +ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the time, and +the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the +torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard +bow after she had been hit. The <i>Chester</i>, stationed +astern of the <i>Falmouth</i>, proceeded at full speed to zigzag +in the vicinity with the object of keeping the submarine +submerged and preventing further attack. Another torpedo +was fired at the <i>Falmouth</i> at 5.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, but missed.</p> + +<p>At 5.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the destroyers <i>Pasley</i>, <i>Pelican</i>, and +<i>Negro</i>, detached to assist the <i>Falmouth</i>, arrived on the +scene and the <i>Falmouth</i>, under their escort, proceeded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_441">441</span> +towards the coast under her own steam, the <i>Chester</i> then +leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward.</p> + +<p>At 6.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the <i>Pelican</i> sighted a periscope, tried +to ram the submarine, but missed. She then dropped six +depth charges and reported that the submarine came to +the surface almost immediately, and then appeared to +sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled, +and four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen +the <i>Falmouth</i>, which was proceeding at five knots. The +ship eventually reached the vicinity of Flamborough +Head safely, and was there again hit by two more torpedoes +fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat, +and was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine destroyers +until 8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th, when she sank in Lat. +54 N., Long. 0.2 W.</p> + +<p>At 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th, the destroyer <i>Porpoise</i> reported +having rammed a submarine that had attacked the +<i>Falmouth</i>.</p> + +<p>To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th. +From 3.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> onwards frequent reports were received +of submarines being sighted. The <i>Phaeton</i>, <i>Dublin</i> +(twice), and <i>Southampton</i> all reported submarines in +sight between 3.10 and 4.52 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, the time at which the +<i>Falmouth</i> was torpedoed. At 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Sir David Beatty +reported that there was a German submarine screen of +several boats extending north-east for some 25 miles from +Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Commodore +Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s +force of heavy ships steering east, accompanied by two +Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving the position of the +Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved to +be unfavourable, and at 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Commodore reported +that he had abandoned the pursuit; he returned +with his force to Harwich. At 6.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> reports received<span class="pagenum" id="Page_442">442</span> +from our directional stations showed that enemy ships +were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, giving +clear evidence that the enemy was returning to his +base.</p> + +<p>During the passage up the searched channel a +number of submarines were sighted and frequent, and +in some cases, large alterations of course were necessary +to avoid them; if all the reports were correct, the +locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines. +Reports of submarines being seen were received between +4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and dark, from the <i>Galatea</i>, <i>Phaeton</i>, <i>Bellona</i>, +<i>Dublin</i>, <i>Southampton</i>, <i>Lion</i>, <i>Royal Sovereign</i> (two submarines), +<i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, and <i>Inflexible</i>, the last ship +reporting that two torpedoes had been fired at her at +7.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and that both had passed close astern; at this +time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in +company.</p> + +<p>Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by +the <i>Chatham</i>, <i>Galatea</i>, and <i>Lion</i>, and the trawlers <i>Sea +Ranger</i> and <i>Ramexo</i>; the last-named reported having +sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and having scored +two hits and caused a fire in the forward car.</p> + +<p>During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was detached +to Rosyth, and the Battle Fleet continued to the +northward. Reports of submarines being sighted to the +eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at 5 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> and 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was +therefore taken well to the northward to avoid them, and +approached the Pentland Firth from a north-easterly +direction, arriving without incident between 6.30 and +8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>The experience of August 19th showed that light +cruisers, proceeding at even the highest speed unscreened +by destroyers, ran considerable danger from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_443">443</span> +enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders +were no doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks, +which we could afford to run earlier in the War, were +now unjustifiable. Representations were made to the +Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in +future light cruisers should be screened by at least one +destroyer per ship; the number of destroyers available +for the Grand Fleet did not at the time admit of +this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number +intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached, +destroyers could be allotted to most of the light cruisers +in the advanced line, provided there were not many +absent from the Fleet carrying out extraneous services.</p> + +<p>The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine +trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the +19th of August; what had constantly puzzled me was +that this had not been done very frequently at an earlier +stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted +and with some success, there seemed to be every reason +to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was +clear that it was unwise to take the Fleet far into +southern waters unless an adequate destroyer force +was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. +If the circumstances were exceptional and the need +very pressing, it would be necessary to accept +the risk. There was general agreement on this point +between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the +Admiralty.</p> + +<p>During the month of August the weekly average of the +10th Cruiser Squadron showed:</p> + +<p>No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112; +No. sent in, 35; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports<span class="pagenum" id="Page_444">444</span> +or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from patrols, 10; No. on special service, 0.</p> + +<p>The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was +foggy and misty during a great part of the month. Much +mist or fog was experienced from the 1st to the 6th, the +10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th.</p> + +<p>During the month Grand Fleet submarines were exercised +at Scapa Flow in carrying out attacks on ships +under way, and the destroyer flotillas were similarly +practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet +divisions being exercised in countering such attacks +by turning movements. These exercises were continued +for the remainder of the year, and much experience was +obtained from them as to the different methods of dealing +with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet +action.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_445">445</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XVII"><span id="toclink_445"></span>CHAPTER XVII<br> + +<span class="subhead">THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; +RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">Events</span> were to prove that my period of command +of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer +to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November, +1917.</p> + +<p>But before coming to that development something +must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work +of the Grand Fleet.</p> + +<p>During the month of September, 1916, there was +not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the +4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, +swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward +of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On +the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa +endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported +by the <i>Talisman</i> to the eastward of the Pentland +Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful +search for a submarine was carried out in the same +locality.</p> + +<p>On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons +left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange +bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea <i lang="fr">en route</i>, +and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers +left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on +the 4th.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_446">446</span></p> + +<p>On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the +eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the +10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west.</p> + +<p>On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, <i>Campania</i>, +and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise +between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the Norwegian +coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light +cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. +Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A +submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet +on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by another +route, the available local patrol vessels being employed +to keep the submarine submerged during the entry +of the fleet to Scapa.</p> + +<p>Submarines were again active during the latter part +of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the +10th Cruiser Squadron, the position of the squadron being +shifted for that reason.</p> + +<p>On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers +left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the +German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th.</p> + +<p>On the same date the yacht <i>Conqueror II.</i>, the patrol +trawler <i>Sarah Alice</i>, and two British steamers were torpedoed +in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines. +On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were +detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against +the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these +waters.</p> + +<p>Early on the 30th the <i>Lion</i>, with the 1st and 2nd +Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser +Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left +Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned +to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_447">447</span></p> + +<p>During September the cruiser patrols were continuously +maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and +on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser +and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol, +consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the +Horn Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols +inconvenient, and German destroyers on several occasions +during the month cruised at night in the area patrolled +with a view to interrupting our submarines when +recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent +change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning +from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy submarine +on the surface, and, being unable to get into position +to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did +not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.</p> + +<p>The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla +(the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the +month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship +the <i>Lucia</i>, with two attendant destroyers. The formation +of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced, +this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be +formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers +to 100.</p> + +<p>On the 21st the new battle cruiser <i>Repulse</i>, heavily +armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection +for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up +gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection +of this ship was about equal to that of the <i>Australia</i> and +<i>New Zealand</i>, and she was greatly inferior in this respect +to the <i>Lion</i>, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, +experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly +that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage +in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they +were provided with better protection than that given to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_448">448</span> +the <i>Australia</i> and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore, +forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably +to the deck protection of both the <i>Repulse</i> and +her sister ship, the <i>Renown</i>. These proposals were approved +and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. Although +the ships were much improved by the alteration, +they were still far inferior in protection to the German +battle cruisers.</p> + +<p>On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built +on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at +Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most +valuable refitting base.</p> + +<p>The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser +Squadron during September were:</p> + +<p>No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on +patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from +patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0.</p> + +<p>The favourable weather and short nights, combined +with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol +were responsible for the increase in the number of ships +intercepted.</p> + +<p>The weather as a whole was good during the month. +Fog or mist was prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th +and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise +the conditions were favourable.</p> + +<p>In the early part of October, the activities of the +enemy’s submarines in the White Sea, which had been +considerable during the month of September, became +more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three +Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, +and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell victims +to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some +submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat. +69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack<span class="pagenum" id="Page_449">449</span> +was successful. The <i>Fearless</i>, now a submarine +parent ship, and three submarines started for the White +Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alexandrovsk +against the hostile submarines. They arrived +on the 20th and began operations at once. During their +stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any +enemy submarines, but there was a marked decrease in +enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of +the presence of our vessels in those waters. The <i>Fearless</i>, +with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return +passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these +waters before the ice began to form.</p> + +<p>On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships +of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer +Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning +on the 4th.</p> + +<p>On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and +swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position +to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which +our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had +reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting +suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours +were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; +three were selected and sent in for examination, but were +found to be in order.</p> + +<p>On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left +Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside, +near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in airships +and light cruisers working together. The programme +arranged could not be completed owing to bad +weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, +and some useful hints were gained. This work was undertaken +as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to +accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_450">450</span> +number of these craft completing in the near future justified +such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of +the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller +class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance +work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western +side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable +experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German +High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had +fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this +subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval +Air Service came under my supervision. These views +were expressed on an occasion when the building of a +fleet of Zeppelins was being urged on behalf of the Navy. +It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would +be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in +connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual +conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin +and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed +were that whatever future there might be for the latter as +development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their +having the radius of action necessary for scouting work +in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already +possessed it. My apology for making mention of this +fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made +that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the +value of air-craft before the War.</p> + +<p>On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some +cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of +the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the +eastward, returning on the 10th.</p> + +<p>On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers +left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to +bad weather.</p> + +<p>On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers<span class="pagenum" id="Page_451">451</span> +sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of +Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher +Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of +interest.</p> + +<p>On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight +destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line between +Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. +4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course +approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order +to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was +repeated during daylight hours on two successive days; +no enemy vessels were sighted.</p> + +<p>On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and +the 14th and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching +and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24th.</p> + +<p>During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried +out during the month of October, the Flag officers were +directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics +employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with +a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet +these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from +all Flag officers.</p> + +<p>On October 24th a division of destroyers, together +with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel +to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using +this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the +patrol.</p> + +<p>On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak +to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in +those waters. On the same day the <i>Kildonan Castle</i>, +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a submarine +and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., +Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol +line was consequently moved temporarily to the westward,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_452">452</span> +and trawlers were despatched to the neighbourhood.</p> + +<p>On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers +sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the +waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They +returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy +vessels.</p> + +<p>On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th +Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise +cruise in the central and northern positions of the +North Sea, and returned without incident on November +3rd.</p> + +<p>During the month the Northern patrol north of the +Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer +was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel +route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn +Reef.</p> + +<p>The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron +showed the following <span class="locked">figures:—</span></p> + +<p>No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on +patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or <i lang="fr">en route</i> to or from +patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0.</p> + +<p>Bad weather during the month interfered with the +operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on +the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or +mist.</p> + +<p>On November 1st I left the <i>Iron Duke</i> at Cromarty +and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the +First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of +letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing +danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and +the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures +to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my +opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_453">453</span> +first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to protect +our communications more successfully until the submarines +could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of +our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace. +From information furnished to me it was evident that +the Germans were making special efforts to increase +the number of their submarines very largely, and there +did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we +were at the time employing, of destroying submarines +at a rate at all approaching that of their construction.</p> + +<p>So far as I was aware there was an insufficient +reserve of food in the country to provide against the +consequences of successful action by enemy submarines; +and the construction of merchant-ships on +an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been +taken in hand, this being obviously an essential +measure. I had written semi-officially for eighteen +months before on the matter.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">T</a> It seemed to me +questionable whether our organisation at the Admiralty +included a sufficiently numerous and important +staff, having as its sole business the work of +dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem +which was assuming such very serious proportions. +It did not appear that new proposals and inventions +for dealing with the submarine campaign were being +pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly +because of the absence of such an organisation, +of difficulties connected with labour and <i lang="fr">matériel</i>; +and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers +confronting us would be successfully combated.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">T</a> The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food supplies or, at that +time, for merchant-ship building.</p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_454">454</span></p> + +<p>I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, +was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much +anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all subjects +during his tenure of office at the Admiralty, +and I was aware of his views on matters connected +with the War, on which we had always been in complete +agreement. His direction and assistance in connection +with matters concerning the development and employment +of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, +and invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that +in putting forward my views as to the new and serious +danger confronting us, and the possible methods of +dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance +in combating the menace. One of my suggestions +was the formation of a committee, or department, at +the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of +some of the clever and younger officers who had shown +marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole +object would be the development of arrangements for +dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant +shipping, and the production of the necessary material. +I pointed out that our existing methods were not +meeting with the success attained at an earlier period, +and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were responsible +for this result.</p> + +<p>I had also formed and expressed the opinion that +the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a +Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign +against merchant shipping had been fully tried and +had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I +suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing +the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one +flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines in +waters where such action had some chance of success.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_455">455</span> +I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against +submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the +only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be +used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in +an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results, +as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water +open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in +which destroyers <em>could</em> act more effectively against +submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters; +in restricted localities, such as some parts of the +English Channel, where the depth did not allow +of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My contention +was that it was probably wise to reduce the number +of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen +the force required to deal with the submarine danger, +even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand +Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should +it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as attempted +invasion. The alternative, which I felt <em>we +could not face</em>, was to run the graver risk of serious +disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant +shipping.</p> + +<p>It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would +<em>not</em> risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this +Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some +military advantage, I considered that with the 1st, 2nd +and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had +been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be +engaged with every prospect of success, provided always +that it was well screened from submarine attack and carefully +handled. The only direction, apart from an attack +on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet +could inflict any material damage on us and which the +Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_456">456</span> +lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast +towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could +not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened +to be at sea and in the right position at the right +moment.</p> + +<p>The objection which might be raised to this policy, +which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect +on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea +without being brought to action, even if it could achieve +no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised +very fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility +involved in disregarding it. On the other hand, +the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing +and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs, +and without delay, since the existence of the armies as +well as that of the civil population depended on merchant +shipping.</p> + +<p>I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty +on November 5th.</p> + +<p>On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left +Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, returning +on November 4th.</p> + +<p>On the 3rd the <i>Botha</i>, with four destroyers of the +14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the +Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse +on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to +their bases. On the same day the <i>Faulknor</i> and six +destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried +out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the +vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla from +Rosyth supported both forces.</p> + +<p>At 1.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, on November 5th, submarine J 1 on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_457">457</span> +patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships +of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 E. +A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to +prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had +a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack +were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded, +in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow torpedoes +at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took +effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned +to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable +period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently +that the two damaged ships managed to reach +port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit +attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack +under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident +showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German +system of underwater protection in their capital ships.</p> + +<p>On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against +enemy submarines on their expected tracks.</p> + +<p>From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was +experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships +were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the +ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from +Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the +17th.</p> + +<p>On the 18th the <i>Otway</i>, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, +intercepted the Norwegian steamship <i>Older</i>, which was +found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German submarine. +She had on board, in addition, survivors of an +Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine. +The <i>Otway</i> recaptured her, but was not in time +to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs +in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however, +succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_458">458</span></p> + +<p>During the period up to November 19th, the weekly +average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the +following <span class="locked">figures:—</span></p> + +<p>No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on +patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.</p> + +<p>The weather throughout the period to the 19th November +was very bad, and the figures showed a corresponding +reduction in the number of ships intercepted.</p> + +<p>Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, +16th, 17th and 18th.</p> + +<p>On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, +1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser +Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in +northern waters, during which battle exercises were carried +out.</p> + +<p>Shortly before the <i>Iron Duke</i> slipped from her buoy, +and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its +way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First +Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea +Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I +consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and +he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in +order to be in a position to put into practice the views I +held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine +menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to +leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since +the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was +the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to +fill in war time.</p> + +<p>I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to +do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in +accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed +to meet him at Rosyth.</p> + +<p>I then followed the Fleet to sea in the <i>Iron Duke</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_459">459</span> +and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned +over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil +Burney (second in command), with directions that the +ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded +in the <i>Iron Duke</i> to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning +of the 27th.</p> + +<p>I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the +27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Admiralty, +and accepted the appointment. He intimated +to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir +David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the +Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes +in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made +suggestions on some of these matters.</p> + +<p>Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started +my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer +of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty +of the task before me. The attacks already made upon +the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due +to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids +on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with +the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to +come.</p> + +<p>I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the +production of fresh material, could become effective for +a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed, +I was so certain of the course that events would take, +that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of +the <i>Iron Duke</i> (a very difficult task in view of the intense +regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that +they must expect to see me the object of the same +attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, +Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was +not wrong in this surmise. I left the <i>Iron Duke</i> with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_460">460</span> +a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot +close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet +during my twenty-eight months’ service as Commander-in-Chief +better than by quoting my farewell +memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so +well.</p> + +<p>“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, +officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my +privilege to command since the commencement of the +War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks +for their loyal support during a period which I know must +have tried their patience to the breaking-point.</p> + +<p>“The disappointment which has so constantly attended +the southern movements of the Fleet might well have resulted +in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the +strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of +efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing +the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.</p> + +<p>“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to +be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit +of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I +am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day +to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have +turned that experience to good account.</p> + +<p>“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest +regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men +are imbued with that spirit which has carried their forefathers +to victory throughout all ages, whenever and +wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and +whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, +I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they +will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes, +and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_461">461</span></p> + +<p>“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious +victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 2em;">“<span class="smcap">J. R. Jellicoe</span>,<br></span> +“Admiral.” +</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_463">463</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_I"><span id="toclink_463"></span>Appendix I<br> + +<span class="subhead">BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH</span></h2> +</div> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 3.5em;"><i>Iron Duke,</i></span><br> +<i>18th June, 1916.</i> +</p> + +<p class="in0"> +No. 1395 H.F. 0022.<br> +The Secretary<br> +<span class="in4">of the <span class="smcap">Admiralty</span>,</span> +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—</p> + +<p>Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty +that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, +1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.</p> + +<p>2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the +general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left +its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued +by me.</p> + +<p>3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were +as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang3"> + +<p><span class="in2">(<i>a</i>) Those in company with me:</span></p> + +<p><i>Iron Duke</i>—Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).</p> + +<p><i>Marlborough</i>—Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral +Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E. +Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).</p> + +<p><i>Colossus</i>—Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).</p> + +<p><i>Hercules</i>—Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.</p> + +<p><i>Neptune</i>—Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.</p> + +<p><i>Collingwood</i>—Captain James C. Ley.</p> + +<p><i>Revenge</i>—Captain Edward B. Kiddle.</p> + +<p><i>Agincourt</i>—Captain Henry M. Doughty.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_464">464</span></p> +<p><i>St. Vincent</i>—Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Bellona</i>—Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.</p> + +<p><i>King George V.</i>—Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of +Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).</p> + +<p><i>Orion</i>—Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).</p> + +<p><i>Centurion</i>—Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Conqueror</i>—Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.</p> + +<p><i>Erin</i>—Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.</p> + +<p><i>Thunderer</i>—Captain James A. Fergusson.</p> + +<p><i>Monarch</i>—Captain George H. Borrett.</p> + +<p><i>Ajax</i>—Captain George H. Baird.</p> + +<p><i>Boadicea</i>—Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Benbow</i>—Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral +Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).</p> + +<p><i>Superb</i>—Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).</p> + +<p><i>Canada</i>—Captain William C. M. Nicholson.</p> + +<p><i>Bellerophon</i>—Captain Edward F. Bruen.</p> + +<p><i>Temeraire</i>—Captain Edwin V. Underhill.</p> + +<p><i>Vanguard</i>—Captain James D. Dick.</p> + +<p><i>Royal Oak</i>—Captain Crawford Maclachlan.</p> + +<p><i>Blanche</i>—Captain John M. Casement.</p> + +<p><i>Minotaur</i>—Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).</p> + +<p><i>Hampshire</i>—Captain Herbert J. Savill.</p> + +<p><i>Cochrane</i>—Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.</p> + +<p><i>Shannon</i>—Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Defence</i>—Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).</p> + +<p><i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>—Captain Henry Blackett.</p> + +<p><i>Black Prince</i>—Captain Thomas P. Bonham.</p> + +<p><i>Warrior</i>—Captain Vincent B. Molteno.</p> + +<p><i>Invincible</i>—Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).</p> + +<p><i>Indomitable</i>—Captain Francis W. Kennedy.</p> + +<p><i>Inflexible</i>—Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Calliope</i>—Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.</p> + +<p><i>Caroline</i>—Captain H. Ralph Crooke.</p> + +<p><i>Comus</i>—Captain Alan G. Hotham.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_465">465</span></p> +<p><i>Constance</i>—Captain Cyril S. Townsend.</p> + +<p><i>Royalist</i>—Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.</p> + +<p><i>Canterbury</i>—Captain Percy M. R. Royds.</p> + +<p><i>Chester</i>—Captain Robert N. Lawson.</p> + +<p><i>Active</i>—Captain Percy Withers.</p> + +<p><i>Castor</i>—Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Tipperary</i>—Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.</p> + +<p><i>Broke</i>—Commander Walter L. Allen.</p> + +<p><i>Shark</i>—Commander Loftus W. Jones.</p> + +<p><i>Acasta</i>—Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.</p> + +<p><i>Spitfire</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.</p> + +<p><i>Sparrowhawk</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.</p> + +<p><i>Achates</i>—Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.</p> + +<p><i>Ambuscade</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.</p> + +<p><i>Ardent</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.</p> + +<p><i>Fortune</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.</p> + +<p><i>Porpoise</i>—Commander Hugh D. Colville.</p> + +<p><i>Unity</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.</p> + +<p><i>Garland</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.</p> + +<p><i>Christopher</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.</p> + +<p><i>Contest</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.</p> + +<p><i>Owl</i>—Commander Robert G. Hamond.</p> + +<p><i>Hardy</i>—Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.</p> + +<p><i>Midge</i>—Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.</p> + +<p><i>Ophelia</i>—Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.</p> + +<p><i>Kempenfelt</i>—Commander Harold E. Sulivan.</p> + +<p><i>Ossory</i>—Commander Harold V. Dundas.</p> + +<p><i>Martial</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.</p> + +<p><i>Magic</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.</p> + +<p><i>Minion</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.</p> + +<p><i>Mystic</i>—Commander Claude F. Allsup.</p> + +<p><i>Mons</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.</p> + +<p><i>Mandate</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.</p> + +<p><i>Michael</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.</p> + +<p><i>Marne</i>—Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.</p> + +<p><i>Milbrook</i>—Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.</p> + +<p><i>Manners</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.</p> + +<p><i>Moon</i>—Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.</p> + +<p><i>Mounsey</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.</p> + +<p><i>Morning Star</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_466">466</span></p> +<p><i>Faulknor</i>—Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.</p> + +<p><i>Marksman</i>—Commander Norton A. Sulivan.</p> + +<p><i>Obedient</i>—Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.</p> + +<p><i>Mindful</i>—Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.</p> + +<p><i>Marvel</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.</p> + +<p><i>Onslaught</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.</p> + +<p><i>Mænad</i>—Commander John P. Champion.</p> + +<p><i>Narwhal</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.</p> + +<p><i>Nessus</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.</p> + +<p><i>Noble</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.</p> + +<p><i>Opal</i>—Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.</p> + +<p><i>Nonsuch</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.</p> + +<p><i>Menace</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.</p> + +<p><i>Munster</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.</p> + +<p><i>Mary Rose</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.</p> + +<p><i>Mischief</i>—Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Oak</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Abdiel</i>—Commander Berwick Curtis.</p> + +<p class="p2"><span class="in2">(<i>b</i>) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:</span></p> + +<p><i>Lion</i>—Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of +Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); +Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.</p> + +<p><i>Princess Royal</i>—Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying +the Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).</p> + +<p><i>Tiger</i>—Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Queen Mary</i>—Captain Cecil I. Prowse.</p> + +<p><i>New Zealand</i>—Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).</p> + +<p><i>Indefatigable</i>—Captain Charles F. Sowerby.</p> + +<p><i>Southampton</i>—Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.</p> + +<p><i>Nottingham</i>—Captain Charles B. Miller.</p> + +<p><i>Birmingham</i>—Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.</p> + +<p><i>Dublin</i>—Captain Albert C. Scott.</p> + +<p><i>Galatea</i>—Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Inconstant</i>—Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.</p> + +<p><i>Phaeton</i>—Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Cordelia</i>—Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.</p> + +<p><i>Falmouth</i>—Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_467">467</span></p> +<p><i>Birkenhead</i>—Captain Edward Reeves.</p> + +<p><i>Gloucester</i>—Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.</p> + +<p><i>Yarmouth</i>—Captain Thomas D. Pratt.</p> + +<p>“<i>Barham</i>”—Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral +Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).</p> + +<p><i>Warspite</i>—Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.</p> + +<p><i>Valiant</i>—Captain Maurice Woollcombe.</p> + +<p><i>Malaya</i>—Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., +M.V.O.</p> + +<p><i>Champion</i>—Captain (D.) James U. Farie.</p> + +<p><i>Nestor</i>—Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.</p> + +<p><i>Nomad</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.</p> + +<p><i>Narborough</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.</p> + +<p><i>Obdurate</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.</p> + +<p><i>Petard</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.</p> + +<p><i>Pelican</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.</p> + +<p><i>Nerissa</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.</p> + +<p><i>Onslow</i>—Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.</p> + +<p><i>Moresby</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.</p> + +<p><i>Nicator</i>—Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.</p> + +<p><i>Fearless</i>—Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.</p> + +<p><i>Acheron</i>—Commander Charles G. Ramsey.</p> + +<p><i>Ariel</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.</p> + +<p><i>Attack</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.</p> + +<p><i>Hydra</i>—Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.</p> + +<p><i>Badger</i>—Commander G. A. Fremantle.</p> + +<p><i>Goshawk</i>—Commander Dashwood F. Moir.</p> + +<p><i>Defender</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.</p> + +<p><i>Lizard</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.</p> + +<p><i>Lapwing</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.</p> + +<p><i>Lydiard</i>—Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.</p> + +<p><i>Liberty</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.</p> + +<p><i>Landrail</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.</p> + +<p><i>Laurel</i>—Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.</p> + +<p><i>Moorsom</i>—Commander John C. Hodgson.</p> + +<p><i>Morris</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.</p> + +<p><i>Turbulent</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.</p> + +<p><i>Termagent</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.</p> + +<p><i>Engadine</i>—Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_468">468</span></p> + +<p>4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and 2nd +Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons +and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the +5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting +to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the +3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.</p> + +<p>5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after +the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course +steered by the latter during the first hour of their action with the +enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our +battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets +would never have been in contact.</p> + +<p>The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and +admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under +Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous +conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with the +best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable advantage +in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the German +Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and German battle +cruisers in the matter of protection must not be forgotten. The German +vessels are in this respect equal to powerful battleships, whereas +our battle cruisers, particularly those of the 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadrons, are very lightly protected. The main difficulty with which +our ships had to contend was the bad light. All reports mention the +difficulty experienced in seeing the enemy vessels to the eastward, +whilst remarking on the clearness of the western horizon. A photograph +taken from <i>Malaya</i> during the action indicates this fact very +clearly.</p> + +<p>During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged +with the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the +advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and +the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting qualities +of the personnel.</p> + +<p>6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir +David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came +upon the scene:</p> + +<p>“At 2.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> reports were received from <i>Galatea</i> indicating the +presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_469">469</span> +altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force +between the enemy and his base.</p> + +<p>“At 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the +eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward +and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the +Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly +altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at +3.31 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> They appeared to be five battle cruisers.</p> + +<p>“After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders +spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the battle +cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled +up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at +long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had +come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle +cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first +engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser +squadrons was excellent and of great value.</p> + +<p>“From a report from <i>Galatea</i> at 2.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> it was evident that the +enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light +cruisers, so at 2.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered <i>Engadine</i> to send up a seaplane and +scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by +3.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as +Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as Observer, was well +under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in <i>Engadine</i> +about 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, +and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had +to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light +cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in +no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant +Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated +on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under +such circumstances are of distinct value.</p> + +<p>“At 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of +Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas +taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging +on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed +the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle +Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_470">470</span> +N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun +behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, +our situation was both tactically and strategically good.</p> + +<p>“At 3.48 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, +both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered +to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the +enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.</p> + +<p>“Shortly after 4 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Indefatigable</i>, after a violent explosion, fell +out of the line, turned over and sank.</p> + +<p>“At 4.8 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened +fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to +slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen +of enemy submarines. The destroyer <i>Landrail</i> of 9th Flotilla, who +was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the +periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable +inconvenience from smoke, the presence of <i>Lydiard</i> and +<i>Landrail</i> undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer submarine +attack. <i>Nottingham</i> also reported a submarine on the starboard +beam.</p> + +<p>“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, <i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i>, <i>Nicator</i>, +<i>Narborough</i>, <i>Pelican</i>, <i>Petard</i>, <i>Obdurate</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, with <i>Moorsom</i> and +<i>Morris</i> of 10th Flotilla, <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Termagent</i> of the 9th Flotilla, +having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity +offered, moved out at 4.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> simultaneously with a similar +movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried +out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before +arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an +enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce +engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy +were forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers +sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained +no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle +cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers +having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore +unfavourable for torpedo attack.</p> + +<p>“<i>Nestor</i>, <i>Nomad</i> and <i>Nicator</i>, gallantly led by Commander the +Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of <i>Nestor</i>, pressed home their attack on +the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000 +and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy’s +secondary armament. <i>Nomad</i> was badly hit and apparently remained<span class="pagenum" id="Page_471">471</span> +stopped between the lines. Subsequently <i>Nestor</i> and <i>Nicator</i> altered +course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers +having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of +a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a +terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for +torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at +a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, +<i>Nestor</i> was badly hit and swung to starboard, <i>Nicator</i> altering course +inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the +last torpedo. <i>Nicator</i> made good her escape and subsequently rejoined +the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. <i>Nestor</i> remained stopped, but was +afloat when last seen. <i>Moorsom</i> also carried out an attack on the +enemy’s battle fleet.</p> + +<p>“<i>Petard</i>, <i>Nerissa</i>, <i>Turbulent</i> and <i>Termagent</i> also pressed home +their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after the +engagement with enemy destroyers. <i>Petard</i> reports that all her torpedoes +must have crossed the enemy’s line, while <i>Nerissa</i> states that +one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks +were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty’s Navy, and were +worthy of its highest traditions.</p> + +<p>“From 4.15 to 4.43 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the conflict between the opposing battle +cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle +Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very +long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that +of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the third +enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward +had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very +indistinct.</p> + +<p>“At 4.26 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> there was a violent explosion in <i>Queen Mary</i>; she was +enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her +officers and men were subsequently picked up by <i>Laurel</i>.</p> + +<p>“At 4.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Southampton</i> reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet +ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the enemy’s +Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession +to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead +them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered +course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. <i>Southampton</i> +with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to observe. +They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and +came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. <i>Southampton’s</i> reports<span class="pagenum" id="Page_472">472</span> +were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an +opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns. +The position of the enemy battle fleet was communicated to them, and +I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh +Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in <i>Barham</i>, this squadron supported us brilliantly +and effectively.</p> + +<p>“At 4.57 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and +came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet. +<i>Fearless</i> with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle cruisers, +and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. <i>Champion</i> with 13th +Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the 1st and +3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the +southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.</p> + +<p>“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships +being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the +enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly +at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van +at about 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> Between 5 and 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the action continued on a +northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this +time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one +of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. +This came under my personal observation and was corroborated +by <i>Princess Royal</i> and <i>Tiger</i>. Other enemy ships also showed +signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Onslow</i> and <i>Moresby</i>, who had +been detached to assist <i>Engadine</i> with the seaplane, rejoined the battle +cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of +<i>Lion</i>. At 5.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Moresby</i>, being 2 points before the beam of the +leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight +minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to +be the 6th ship in the line. <i>Moresby</i> then passed between the lines +to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined <i>Champion</i>. In corroboration +of this, <i>Fearless</i> reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on +fire at about 5.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke +and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of <i>Queen +Mary</i> and <i>Indefatigable</i>.</p> + +<p>“At 5.35 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of +the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, +keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was +gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_473">473</span> +head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his +light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third +Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide <i>Indomitable’s</i> report). Possibly Zeppelins +were present also. At 5.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> British cruisers were sighted +on the port bow, and at 5.56 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the leading battleships of the Grand +Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and +proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy +down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief +that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three +of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships +of the ”König“ class.</p> + +<p>“At about 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Onslow</i>, being on the engaged bow of <i>Lion</i>, +sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently +endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. <i>Onslow</i> at once +closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 +to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. <i>Onslow</i> then closed the +enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be +fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, +with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his +torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at +slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he +closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The +enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes +were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed +the enemy’s track. Damage then caused <i>Onslow</i> to stop.</p> + +<p>“At 7.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Defender</i>, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, +while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which +damaged her foremost boiler, closed <i>Onslow</i> and took her in tow. Shell +were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, +was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing +night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled +on together until 1. <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> 1st June, when <i>Onslow</i> was transferred to +tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be +gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander +J. C. Tovey of <i>Onslow</i>, and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of <i>Defender</i>, +for special recognition. <i>Onslow</i> was possibly the destroyer +referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadron, as follows:</p> + +<p>“‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer +(name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition<span class="pagenum" id="Page_474">474</span> +soon after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, +and made straight for the <i>Derfflinger</i> to attack her. The incident appeared +so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.’”</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Proceedings of Battle Fleet</span></h3> + +<p>7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, +the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and Destroyer +Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close +the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before +the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the +older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the +engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, +responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess +of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.</p> + +<p>The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral +the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet, +was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in reckoning +between <i>Lion</i> and the <i>Iron Duke</i>, which was inevitable under the +circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third Battle Cruiser +Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward, and it was not until +5.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> that this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the +sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the +<i>Chester</i> (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged +three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> The +engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period +Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy +odds, and although the ship suffered considerably in casualties her +fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +she rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p>The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, +and at 6.10 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking +station ahead of the <i>Lion</i> at 6.21 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> in accordance with the orders of +the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He reports as +follows:</p> + +<p>“I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out +magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action +ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. +At 6.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third +Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_475">475</span> +the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her, and +caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made +a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance +of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Invincible</i> blew up.</p> + +<p>“After the loss of <i>Invincible</i>, the squadron was led by <i>Inflexible</i> +until 6.50 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our +leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I +ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern +and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, +not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily +lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, although the +visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us +than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling +us to punish them very severely and establish a definite +superiority over them. The damage received by our ships during this +period, excepting the destruction of <i>Invincible</i>, was slight. From the +reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the +enemy suffered severely, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head +of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the +majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle +Squadron were also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral +Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be +safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.</p> + +<p>“From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the +Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on +our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> attacked with +the torpedo. <i>Falmouth</i> and <i>Yarmouth</i> both fired torpedoes at the +leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, +as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light +Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, +with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting +efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral +Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. +<i>Indomitable</i> reports that about this time one of the <i>Derfflinger</i> class +fell out of the enemy’s line.”</p> + +<p>8. Meanwhile, at 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, <i>Canterbury</i> (Captain Percy M. R. Royds) +had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat +destroyer <i>Shark</i> (Commander Loftus W. Jones), <i>Acasta</i> +(Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and <i>Christopher</i> (Lieutenant-Commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_476">476</span> +Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement +the <i>Shark</i> was sunk.</p> + +<p>9. At 5.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the report of guns had become audible to me, and +at 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard +beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the +position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The +difference in reckoning between <i>Iron Duke</i> and <i>Lion</i> mentioned in +paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation.</p> + +<p>10. Shortly after 5.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> some of the cruisers ahead, under +Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were +seen to be in action, and reports received show that <i>Defence</i>, Flagship +(Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and <i>Warrior</i> (Captain Vincent B. Molteno), +of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser +at this time, which subsequently sank.</p> + +<p>11. At 6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers, +were sighted by <i>Marlborough</i> bearing before the starboard beam of the +battle fleet.</p> + +<p>At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser +Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at +6.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.</p> + +<p>At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle cruisers +and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that +our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.</p> + +<p>12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir +David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. +Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers +ahead of the battle fleet.</p> + +<p>The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:</p> + +<ul class="in2"> +<li>The Commander-in-Chief,</li> +<li>Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,</li> +<li>Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram,</li> +<li>Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee,</li> +<li>Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff,</li> +<li>Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson,</li> +<li>Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt.</li> +</ul> + +<p>13. At 6.16 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Defence</i> and <i>Warrior</i> were observed passing down +between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy +fire. <i>Defence</i> was seen to blow up and <i>Warrior</i> passed to the rear<span class="pagenum" id="Page_477">477</span> +disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement +with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to complete +their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy’s heavy +ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to +the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were +caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when <i>Black +Prince</i> (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, +but as a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +reporting the position of a submarine, it is possible that her loss was +the result of a torpedo attack. There is much strong evidence of the +presence of a large number of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the +scene of the action.</p> + +<p>14. The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deployment, +became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening +fire at 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre +squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser, +opened fire at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on a battleship of the “König” class, and the +van squadron commenced immediately afterwards.</p> + +<p>At 6.6 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron, +then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard +wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of <i>Barham</i>, and the +first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the +remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the direction of deployment +he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre which was well +executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle fleet. +An accident to <i>Warspite’s</i> steering gear caused her helm to become +jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy’s +line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling +enabled Captain Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat +awkward situation.</p> + +<p>Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible +to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle line. Towards +the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. +More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight +to twelve.</p> + +<p>The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from +6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> to 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during +which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E. +by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned +away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_478">478</span> +smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations, +of course, had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which +commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the +enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the +same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.</p> + +<p>At 6.55 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> <i>Iron Duke</i> passed the wreck of <i>Invincible</i> with <i>Badger</i> +standing by. I was not aware of the loss of <i>Queen Mary</i> and <i>Indefatigable</i> +until the following day.</p> + +<p>15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High +Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire +kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet +caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be +constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line, and at +least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this period was not effective, +and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Battle Cruisers in the van</span></h3> + +<p>16. Sir David Beatty reports:</p> + +<p>“Between 7 and 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. +to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> again sighted them +at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were +two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the ‘König’ +class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that +was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably +as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> +and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> my course was S.W., +speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. +Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment, +one ship being on fire while another appeared to drop right astern. +The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s line emitted volumes of +grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of +which they undoubtedly turned away, and at 7.45 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we lost sight +of them.</p> + +<p>“At 7.58 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons +to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s +line, and at 8.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> we altered course to west in support. We soon +located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily engaged +at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit +repeatedly by <i>Lion</i> and turned away 8 points, emitting very high<span class="pagenum" id="Page_479">479</span> +flames and with a heavy list to port. <i>Princess Royal</i> set fire to a three-funnelled +battleship; <i>New Zealand</i> and <i>Indomitable</i> report that the +third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling +over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, +and <i>Falmouth</i> reported they were last seen at 8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> steaming to +the westward.</p> + +<p>“At 8.40 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if struck +by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, +examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it +is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel. This +seems a very probable explanation in view of the condition in which the +enemy was last seen.”</p> + +<p>17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very +much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility +and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following” +or “chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, +but only one took effect (on <i>Marlborough</i>), and even in this case the +ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The +menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, in weather +conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to the difficulty +of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy. Two +separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Details of Battle Fleet Action</span></h3> + +<p>18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil +Burney, came into action at 6.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> with the enemy’s Third Battle +Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe +punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and light +cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of <i>Marlborough</i> (Captain +George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship commenced +at 6.17 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the “Kaiser” +class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she +was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, +but re-opened at 7.3 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> at a cruiser and at 7.12 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> fired fourteen +rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König” class, hitting her frequently +until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective +fire was kept up, in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused +by the torpedo, was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example +to the squadron.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_480">480</span></p> +<p>The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 +yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s +return fire than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of +the Fifth Battle Squadron. <i>Colossus</i> was hit but not seriously damaged, +and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.</p> + +<p>In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my Flagship +<i>Iron Duke</i> was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading +one of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and +some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light +cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the +fire of the squadron was effective. <i>Iron Duke</i>, having previously fired +at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on a battleship +of the “König” class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was +very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo, and +only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with +which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent +gunnery organisation of the flagship so ably commanded by my Flag +Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.</p> + +<p>The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed +at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. +Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.</p> + +<p>The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir +Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser” or “König” +classes between 6.30 and 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, and fired also at an enemy battle +cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely damaged.</p> + +<p>19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser +Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with +the addition of <i>Duke of Edinburgh</i> of the First Cruiser Squadron, +occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a connecting +link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser fleet. This +squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity +of coming into action.</p> + +<p>The attached cruisers <i>Boadicea</i>, <i>Active</i>, <i>Blanche</i>, and <i>Bellona</i> carried +out their duties as repeating ships with remarkable rapidity and +accuracy under difficult conditions.</p> + +<p>The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles +E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack +enemy destroyers at 7.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> and again at 8.18 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> when they supported +the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore +James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the Fourth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_481">481</span> +Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le +Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object +was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the +ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between +6,500 and 8,000 yards. The <i>Calliope</i> was hit several times but did not +sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several +casualties. The light cruisers attacked the enemy’s battleships with +torpedoes at this time, but were not able to observe the result; an explosion +on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class was seen, however, at +8.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers +were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and destroyers.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Night Dispositions</span></h3> + +<p>20. At 9 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat +of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching +darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night +with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing for a +renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain +between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position +in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack +and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy’s +heavy ships.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Night Attacks by Flotillas</span></h3> + +<p>21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, +but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore +Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of +very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy +losses.</p> + +<p>22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth +Flotilla occurred, including that of <i>Tipperary</i> with the gallant leader +of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high +pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the +enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken and many gallant +actions were performed by the flotilla.</p> + +<p>Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels +as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from +<i>Spitfire</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_482">482</span> +other from either <i>Ardent</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), +<i>Ambuscade</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or <i>Garland</i> +(Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).</p> + +<p>23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan +J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, +which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers, comprised +vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely surprised. A +large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and +third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she +was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later +by <i>Mænad</i> (Commander John T. Champion) on the five vessels still +remaining resulted in the second ship in the line being also hit and +blown up.</p> + +<p>The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on +reaching the rear of the line, but <i>Onslaught</i> was the only vessel which +received any material injuries. In <i>Onslaught</i> Sub-lieutenant Harry +W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the +only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out +of action and reached Rosyth.</p> + +<p>24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, <i>Castor</i> +(Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla engaged and +sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank range.</p> + +<p>The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in +<i>Champion</i> took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At +0.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the +flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the <i>Petard</i> and <i>Turbulent</i>, +switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire which severely damaged +<i>Petard</i> and disabled <i>Turbulent</i>. At 3.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>Champion</i> was +engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. <i>Moresby</i> reports +four ships of “Deutschland” class sighted at 2.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> at whom +she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by +<i>Moresby</i> and <i>Obdurate</i>.</p> + +<p><i>Abdiel</i>, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out +her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.</p> + +<p>There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; +they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of +them.</p> + +<p>Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light +Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for +about fifteen minutes at 10.20 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> with a squadron comprising one<span class="pagenum" id="Page_483">483</span> +enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period <i>Southampton</i> +and <i>Dublin</i> suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming +and fighting qualities were not impaired. It is reasonable to suppose +that they inflicted considerable damage on their opponents.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Proceedings on 1st June</span></h3> + +<p>25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the southward +and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in +search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own +cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> Vice-Admiral Sir +Cecil Burney transferred his flag from <i>Marlborough</i> to <i>Revenge</i>, as the +former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron. +<i>Marlborough</i> was detached by my direction to a base, being unsuccessfully +attacked <i lang="fr">en route</i> by enemy submarines. The visibility +early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and +difficulty was experienced in meeting all ships, the torpedo-boat destroyers +not rejoining until 9 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> The waters from the latitude +of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, +and some survivors from the destroyers <i>Ardent</i>, <i>Fortune</i>, and <i>Tipperary</i> +were picked up, and the <i>Sparrowhawk</i>, which had been in collision +and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken +off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and +at 1.15 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded +in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were +reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser +squadron was detached to search for <i>Warrior</i>, which vessel had been +abandoned whilst in tow of <i>Engadine</i> on her way to the base owing to +bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no +trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light +cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she +foundered.</p> + +<p>26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Losses</span></h3> + +<p>27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action +took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by the +enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the difficulty<span class="pagenum" id="Page_484">484</span> +of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted, or the +names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination +of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy +vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of +these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure +gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not +entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, particularly +those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the +vessels sunk it is unquestionable that many other ships were very +seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.</p> + +<p>28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of +him, and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the +water. I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled +German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly +after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the only +gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British Battle Fleet, +there appeared to be no desire on the part of the High Sea Fleet to +continue the engagement. The battleships turned away on each occasion +of being sighted soon after fire was opened, and although the +British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near +the line of approach to German ports until 11 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on 1st June, in +spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the +danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines +and torpedo craft, the enemy made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled +to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. +Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our +position must have been known to the enemy, as at 2.50 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the fleet +engaged a Zeppelin for quite five minutes, during which time she had +ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and +course of the British Fleet.</p> + +<p>29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned +in this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy +loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as +Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. +Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, +Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles +J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished +with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led +officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_485">485</span> +mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their +duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Personnel of the Fleet</span></h3> + +<p>30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night +actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them +justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of +the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers, +light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed. +Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that +would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the +wounded was the admiration of all.</p> + +<p>I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the +Fleet filled me.</p> + +<p>31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships +during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude +to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during +action the officers and men of that department perform their most +important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course +of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and +endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they +were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations +under review. Many ships attained speeds that had never before been +reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. +Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and +many instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the +engine-room departments of injured ships.</p> + +<p>32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very +largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and +invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing +critical operations and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, +they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we +owe a deep debt of gratitude.</p> + +<p>33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the +Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the flotillas. This +was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas +mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were +handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th +Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_486">486</span></p> + +<p>34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Commanding +Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place on +record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels were +handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and +ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous +throughout the day.</p> + +<p>I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by +Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand +Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton +Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander +L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest +F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet. +They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s +squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy battle +fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has rendered +me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did +excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral +Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David +Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear +of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.</p> + +<p>Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant +leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated +the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s lighter +forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle fleet. I can fully +sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light +robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manœuvred +and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. +The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous +occasions, have been of the very greatest value.</p> + +<p>Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded +him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner +in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron +into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. +Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work +performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively +of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore William +E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He +states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and +used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully endorse all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_487">487</span> +his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report +regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>“I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I received +on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the +Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the +greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, +The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the +effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the +enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made +accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost +value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander +Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications +under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his +signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers +carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, +where they were fully exposed to the enemy’s fire.”</p> +</div> + +<p>35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant +work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, +K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war +his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his +long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity +for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and +have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct +of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet +action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, +and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.</p> + +<p>My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, +C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance +in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is +largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished +with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance +to me during the action.</p> + +<p>Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander +Roger M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the +two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander +the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as observer +aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. +These officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action.</p> + +<p>The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander +Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_488">488</span> +and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. +My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was +also of much service to me throughout the action.</p> + +<p>The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet +and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after +the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out +by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been invaluable +throughout the war.</p> + +<p>A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all +ships.</p> + +<p>My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and +Victor H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the +action. Their records have been of much assistance.</p> + +<p>To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am indebted +for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout +the operations.</p> + +<p>36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of +their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not come +under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of +specially distinguishing themselves.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 16em;">I am, Sir,</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 8em;">Your obedient Servant,</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 1em;">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">J. R. Jellicoe</span>,</span><br> +<i>Admiral</i>, <i>Commander-in-Chief</i>. +</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_489">489</span></p> + +<h3 class="section">Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated +18th June, 1916.</h3> + +<p class="center wspace">LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK,<br> +<span class="smaller">31st May–1st June, 1916.</span></p> + +<table id="t489"> +<tr> + <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Battleships or Battle Cruisers.</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">2</td> + <td class="tdl">Battleships, “Dreadnought” type</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Certain</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">1</td> + <td class="tdl">Battleship, “Deutschland” type</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">1</td> + <td class="tdl">Battleship or Battle Cruiser</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Probable</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">1</td> + <td class="tdl">Battleship, “Dreadnought” type</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Probable.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Light Cruisers.</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">4</td> + <td class="tdl">Light Cruisers</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Certain</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">1</td> + <td class="tdl">Heavy ship or Light Cruiser</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Torpedo-boat Destroyers.</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">6</td> + <td class="tdl">Torpedo-boat Destroyers</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">3</td> + <td class="tdl">Torpedo-boat Destroyers</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Probable.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Submarines.</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">1</td> + <td class="tdl">Submarine</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Certain.</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdr top">3</td> + <td class="tdl">Submarines</td> + <td class="tdl bot">Possible.</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_490">490</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_II"><span id="toclink_490"></span>Appendix II<br> + +<span class="subhead">ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY, +24th JANUARY, 1915</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><span class="smcap">Admiralty</span>,</span><br> +<i>3rd March, 1915</i>. +</p> + +<p class="in0"><span class="firstword">The</span> following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir +David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle +Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, +the 24th of January, <span class="locked">1915:—</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot lm0"> +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 4em;"><i>H.M.S. Princess Royal,</i></span><br> +<i>2nd February, 1915.</i> +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January, +1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:</p> + +<p>The Battle Cruisers <i>Lion</i>, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O., +flying my flag; <i>Princess Royal</i>, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-de-Camp; +<i>Tiger</i>, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; <i>New Zealand</i>, +Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral +Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and <i>Indomitable</i>, Captain +Francis W. Kennedy.</p> + +<p>The Light Cruisers <i>Southampton</i>, flying the broad pendant of +Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; <i>Nottingham</i>, Captain +Charles B. Miller; <i>Birmingham</i>, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and +<i>Lowestoft</i>, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my +port beam.</p> + +<p>Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in <i>Arethusa</i>, <i>Aurora</i>, +Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, <i>Undaunted</i>, Captain Francis G. St. +John, M.V.O., <i>Arethusa</i>, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.</p> + +<p>At 7.25 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards +a report reached me from <i>Aurora</i> that she was engaged with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_491">491</span> +enemy’s ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to +22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas to chase S.S.E. +to get in touch and report movements of enemy.</p> + +<p>This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my +wishes had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers, +and reports almost immediately followed from <i>Southampton</i>, <i>Arethusa</i>, +and <i>Aurora</i> as to the position and composition of the enemy, which +consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and <i>Blücher</i>, 6 Light Cruisers, and a +number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course +to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with +the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.</p> + +<p>The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the +southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme +visibility. At 7.30 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming +fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.</p> + +<p>Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position +on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E. parallel to +them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our +speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the Engineer +Staffs of <i>New Zealand</i> and <i>Indomitable</i>—these ships greatly +exceeded their normal speed.</p> + +<p>At 8.52 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span>, as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear +ship, the Battle Cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so +that guns would bear, and <i>Lion</i> fired a single shot, which fell short. +The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light Cruisers +ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard beam.</p> + +<p>Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>Lion</i> made her first hit on the <i>Blücher</i>, No. 4 in the line. The +<i>Tiger</i> opened fire at 9.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> on the rear ship, the <i>Lion</i> shifted to +No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes. +The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>Princess Royal</i>, on coming +into range, opened fire on <i>Blücher</i>, the range of the leading ship being +17,500 yards at 9.35 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> <i>New Zealand</i> was within range of <i>Blücher</i>, +which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. <i>Princess +Royal</i> shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable +damage on her.</p> + +<p>Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a +position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our +range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening attack,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_492">492</span> +the <i>Meteor</i> and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon. +H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous ability.</p> + +<p>About 9.45 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the situation was as follows: <i>Blücher</i>, the fourth in +their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gunfire; +their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. <i>Lion</i> was engaging +No. 1, <i>Princess Royal</i> No. 3, <i>New Zealand</i> No. 4, while the <i>Tiger</i>, +who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered +with by smoke, at their No. 4.</p> + +<p>The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen +their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared +to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and +certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, +thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, +therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed +at their utmost speed.</p> + +<p>Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. +<i>Lion</i> and <i>Tiger</i> opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume +their original course.</p> + +<p>The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port +quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep touch, +or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.</p> + +<p>At 10.48 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> the <i>Blücher</i>, which had dropped considerably astern +of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, +on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently +ordered <i>Indomitable</i> to attack enemy breaking northward.</p> + +<p>At 10.54 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I +personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our starboard +bow. Immediately turned to port.</p> + +<p>At 11.3 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> an injury to the <i>Lion</i> being reported as incapable of +immediate repair, I directed <i>Lion</i> to shape course N.W. At 11.20 <span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> +I called the <i>Attack</i> alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11.35 +<span class="allsmcap">A.M.</span> I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the Squadron, and met +them at noon retiring N.N.W.</p> + +<p>I boarded and hoisted my flag in <i>Princess Royal</i> at about 12.20 +<span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span>, when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the +<i>Lion</i> fell out of the line, namely, that <i>Blücher</i> had been sunk and that +the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course to the eastward +in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a +Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels +which went to the rescue of the survivors of <i>Blücher</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_493">493</span></p> + +<p>The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, +H.M.S. <i>Attack</i>, in placing his vessel alongside the <i>Lion</i> and subsequently +the <i>Princess Royal</i>, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in +the shortest possible time.</p> + +<p>At 2 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I closed <i>Lion</i> and received a report that her starboard +engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span> I ordered +<i>Indomitable</i> to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 <span class="allsmcap">P.M.</span></p> + +<p>The greatest credit is due to the Captains of <i>Indomitable</i> and <i>Lion</i> +for the seamanlike manner in which the <i>Lion</i> was taken in tow under +difficult circumstances.</p> + +<p>The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation +was a conspicuous feature.</p> + +<p>I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men +who specially distinguished themselves.</p> + +<p>Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men for +special mention, and as <i>Lion</i> and <i>Tiger</i> were the only ships hit by the +enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those ships.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="margin-right: 6em;">I have the honour to be, Sir,</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 4em;">Your obedient Servant,</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 2em;">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">David Beatty</span>,</span><br> +Vice-Admiral. +</p> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_495">495</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX">INDEX</h2> + +<div class="index"> +<ul class="index"> +<li class="ifrst"><i>Abdiel</i>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed and sunk off, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Aboukir</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Acacia</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Acasta</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Achates</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Acheron</i>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Achilles</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> +<li class="isub1">accident on, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinks a German raider, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Acorn</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Active</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, + <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_439">439</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main Fleet Base, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Intelligence Division of, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> +<li class="isub1">naval policy of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li class="isub1">vigorous mine-laying policy adopted by, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squadron, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> +<li class="isub1">substituted for seaplanes, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Africa</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Agadir crisis, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Agamemnon</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Agincourt</i>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins 4th Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Aircraft carriers, development of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in warfare, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Airships as scouts, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_450">450</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ajax</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, + <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Alarm</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Albemarle</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Alcantara</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Alderson, Captain, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S., <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Allen, Commander Walter L., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Allsup, Commander Claude F., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Alsatian</i>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> +<li class="isub1">captures concealed Germans, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ambuscade</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx">America enters the War, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li class="indx">American battleships join Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Amethyst</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ammunition, for Army use, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> +<li class="isub1">ships, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Amphion</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Amsterdam</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Andes</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rescues German survivors, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Andromache</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Anglia</i>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Anti-submarine defences, German, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> +<li class="isub1">obstructions, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> +<li class="isub1">obstructions damaged by gales, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> +<li class="isub1">operations, British, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Antrim</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, + <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Apollo</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Arabis</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ardent</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Arethusa</i>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Argyll</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></li> +<li class="isub1">aground off Scottish coast, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ariel</i>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Arlanza</i>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Arley</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Armour piercing shells, a new type of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Committees’ investigations on, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> +<li class="isub1">limitations of British, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Armour protection, improved, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> +<li class="isub1">question of, <a href="#Page_394">394</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Arnot, Midshipman R. G., <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Assistance</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, + <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Attack</i>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_496">496</span><i>Attila</i>, capture of, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Audacious</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_148">148</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Aurora</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Australia</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Austrian steamer captured, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Back, Captain Eric, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Backhouse, Captain Oliver, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Backhouse, Commander Roger, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Badger</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rescues survivors, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Baird, Captain George H., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes First Lord, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li> +<li class="isub1">offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Baltic, the, British submarines in, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proposed operations in, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Barham</i>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, + <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Barron, Commander J. O., <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bashmakoff, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Instructions to, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> +<li class="isub1">organisation of, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> +<li class="isub1">title altered, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, <a href="#Page_316">316</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation of, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Battle cruisers, function of, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> +<li class="isub1">question of armour, protection of, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Battle Fleet, composition of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> +<li class="isub1">aircraft provided for, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Battleships, “all-big-gun” type of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Battle Cruisers, British and German, <a href="#Page_307">307</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">Battleships, British and German, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> +<li class="isub1">dummy, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Bayano</i> sunk by submarine, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, commands 1st Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> +<li class="isub1">discusses question of blocking Zeebrugge, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> +<li class="isub1">exchange of command, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bear Island, reported enemy base and wireless station at, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, + <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> +<li class="isub1">despatch on North Sea battle, <a href="#Page_493">493</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Belgian coast, sweeping the, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Bellerophon</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Bellona</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Benbow</i>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, + <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beresford, Lord, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>, Captain Persius’ admissions in, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bernard, Captain V. H. G., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Betty, Captain, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Biarritz</i>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S., <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> +<li class="isub1">awarded V. C., <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bircham, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Birkenhead</i>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Birmingham</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Black Prince</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">uncertainty of her end, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Blackett, Captain Henry, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Blanche</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Blockade"></a>Blockade, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> +<li class="isub1">work of the Fleet, <a href="#Page_73">73</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> +<li class="isub1">[<i>see also</i>, <a href="#Cruiser_Squadron_10th">Cruiser Squadron (10th)</a>]</li> + +<li class="indx">Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow entrances, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Blonde</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> +<li class="isub1">goes ashore, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Blūcher</i>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Blunt, Captain W. F., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Boadicea</i>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> +<li class="isub1">damaged by heavy seas, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Boarding steamers, increased force of, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bonham, Captain Thomas P., <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Borrett, Captain George H., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Botha</i>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_497">497</span>Boxer campaign, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. H., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bradford, Vice-Admiral E. E., <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Dogger Bank action, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Brandenburg</i>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> +<li class="isub1">interned by Norwegian Government, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Brisk</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Britannia</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> +<li class="isub1">aground in Firth of Forth, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> + +<li class="indx">British Expeditionary Force, transport of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> + +<li class="indx">British Navy (<i>see</i> <a href="#Navy">Navy</a>)</li> + +<li class="indx">“Broad Fourteens,” patrolling the, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, + <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Broke</i>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Browning, Rear-Admiral M. E., <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bruen, Captain Edward F., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bryce, Lord, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bullen, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Bulwark</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> +<li class="isub1">clever device by, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, + <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Heligoland, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> +<li class="isub1">exchange of command, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> +<li class="isub1">flagship damaged, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> +<li class="isub1">illness of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> +<li class="isub1">resumes command of 1st Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Caldaff</i>, mining of, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> +<li class="isub1">gives up the command, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> +<li class="isub1">his Service record, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> +<li class="isub1">improvises defences at Scapa, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> +<li class="isub1">strikes his flag, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Calliope</i>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, + <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cambria</i>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cameleon</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cameron, Captain John E., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Campania</i>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, + <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_428">428</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Campbell, Commander G. W. McC., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Canada</i>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Canadian troops, a convoy for, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Canterbury</i>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, + <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cantlie, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Caribbean</i>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Carnarvon</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Caroline</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Carpenter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. F. B., <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Casement, Captain John M., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Castor</i>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J. R. C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cay, Captain Arthur L., <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Centurion</i>, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Champion</i>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, + <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Champion, Commander J. P., <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Channel Fleet, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> +<li class="isub1">change in command of, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> +<li class="isub1">squadrons manned with nucleus crews, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> +<li class="isub1">strengthened, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chatfield, Captain A. E. M., <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Chatham</i>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cheerful</i>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Chester</i>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>, + <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> +<li class="isub1">her boy hero, Jack Cornwell, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_330">330</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">China, conference of Allied naval officers in, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Christian, Rear-Admiral, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> +<li class="isub1">his command, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Christopher</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, + <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chukovsky, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Heligoland, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and position of Commander-in-Chief, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> +<li class="isub1">attends conference at Loch Ewe, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> +<li class="isub1">interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Circe</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>City of Oxford</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Clan McNaughton</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cleopatra</i>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Coaling the Fleet, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Coal strike, a Welsh, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Coast lights, extinction of, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Coast towns, enemy bombardment of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cobbe, Captain M. H., <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cochrane</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cockatrice</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cole, Commander John F. H., <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_498">498</span>Coles, Lieut.-Commander G. A., <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Colliers at the Fleet Base, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> +<li class="isub1">insufficient number of, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Collingwood</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Colossus</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and battle of Jutland, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Columbella</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Colville, Commander Hugh D., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Colville, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, + <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> +<li class="isub1">assumes temporary command of 1st Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Comet</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Commonwealth</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Comus</i>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>, + <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Conqueror</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Conqueror II.</i> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Constance</i>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Contest</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cordelia</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Corlett, Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cornwallis</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cornwell, Jack, of <i>Chester</i>, heroism of, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cowan, Captain Walter H., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Crabbe, Commander L. G. E., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Craig, Captain Arthur W., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Crescent</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cressy</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li class="isub1">a floating dock transferred to, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and submarine menace, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Naval Base at, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Rear-Admiral Pears in charge of Base at, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rendered secure from submarine attacks, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cruiser Squadron (3rd), disbandment of, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Cruiser_Squadron_10th"></a>Cruiser Squadron (10th) augmented, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> +<li class="isub1">blockade work of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, + <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a>, <a href="#Page_444">444</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>, + <a href="#Page_452">452</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> +<li class="isub1">paid off, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> +<li class="isub1">patrol areas of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cumberland</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Curtis, Commander Berwick, <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Cyclops</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">D’Aeth, Captain Arthur C. S. H., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dahlia</i> strikes a mine, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dampier, Captain, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Danehenko, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dannreuther, Commander, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dardanelles operations, kite balloons in, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“Dark night” patrols, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dartmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Day, Commander Selwyn, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li class="indx">De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Decoy_ships"></a>Decoy ships (Q-ships), <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Defence</i>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Defender</i>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Derfflinger</i>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Destroyer flotillas, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li> +<li class="isub1">detailed orders for, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> +<li class="isub1">fine work in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_378">378</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Destroyers, Battle Orders for, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German superiority in number of, <a href="#Page_396">396–7</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German <i lang="la">v.</i> British, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> +<li class="isub1">importance attached by Germany to attack by, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323–5</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li> +<li class="isub1">inadequate number of British, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> +<li class="isub1">used for mine-sweeping, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> +<li class="isub1">welcome additions to force of, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> +<li class="isub1">work of, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Devonshire</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, + <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dick, Captain James D., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Digby</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Director-firing, system of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Displacement, question of, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dock accommodation, absence of, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li> +<li class="isub1">the Kaiser’s comments on, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dockyard men, fine work by, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dogger Bank action, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, <a href="#Page_493">493</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">battle cruiser fleet, composition of, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> +<li class="isub1">battle fleet engaged in, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> +<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#North_Sea_battle">North Sea Battle</a>)</li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dominion</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Donaldson, Sir F., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Donegal</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, + <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_424">424</a>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Doughty, Captain Henry M., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_499">499</span>Dover, Straits of, mining the, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Drake</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, + <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dreadnought</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rams a submarine, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in conference, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dreyer, Captain, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, + <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_416">416</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dryad</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dublin</i>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, + <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Duff, Captain A. A. M., <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Duff, Rear-Admiral A. L., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Albany</i>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Clarence</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Cornwall</i>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Duke of Edinburgh</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dumaresq, Captain John S., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Duncan</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Duncombe</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dundas, Commander Harold V., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Dundee</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore at, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dutton, Captain Arthur B. S., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">East Coast, bombardment of undefended towns on, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> +<li class="isub1">raids on, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ebro</i>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Edgar</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Edwards, Captain John D., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Elbing</i>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ellis, Captain Stanley V., <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Emperor of India</i>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ems</i> sunk by submarine, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Endymion</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Engadine</i>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, + <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> + +<li class="indx">England, possibility of invasion of, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_456">456</a></li> +<li class="isub1">raids on south-east coast of, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> + +<li class="indx">English Channel, destroyers in, <a href="#Page_455">455</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Erin</i>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Erne</i>, wreck of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_369">369</a>, + <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> +<li class="isub1">new command for, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Everett, Commodore A. F., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Exmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Falkland Islands battle, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Falmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, + <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, + <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Farie, Captain (D.) James U., <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases in, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Farrington, Captain, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Faulknor</i>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_457">457</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fawckner, Rear-Admiral W. B., <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Fearless</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fergusson, Captain James A., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Field, Captain Frederick L., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Filleul, C., awarded D. S. M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fire control instruments, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fire correction methods, improved, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Firedrake</i>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fisher, Captain William W., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> +<li class="isub1">destroyer programme of, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> +<li class="isub1">energy as First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> +<li class="isub1">improvements in Fleet organisation by, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Mr. Schwab’s visit to, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> +<li class="isub1">naval policy of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> +<li class="isub1">supports Director System, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fishermen’s bladders as “floating mines,” <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fishing areas, question of restriction of, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fishing vessels attacked by submarines, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li class="indx">FitzGerald, Colonel, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fleet, the, a vital factor to existence of the Empire, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li> +<li class="isub1">concentration of, at outbreak of War, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> +<li class="isub1">disposition of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> +<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> <a href="#Grand_Fleet">Grand Fleet</a>, <a href="#Navy">Navy</a>)</li> + +<li class="indx">Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H. U., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Floating storage, advantages of, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Flotta, Island of, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Flying Condor</i>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Food question, the, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_500">500</span>Forbes, Commander Charles M., <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Formidable</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Forth, Firth of, obstructions against submarines in, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine activity in, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Fortune</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_376">376</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Forward</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Foula Islands, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fox, Captain C. H., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Frauenlob</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fremantle, Commander G. A., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Fury</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Galatea</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_468">468</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Garland</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Garry</i> engages a submarine, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, + <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> +<li class="isub1">relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="indx">General Cruiser Instructions, the, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Gentian</i>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> + +<li class="indx">George V., King, messages to the Fleet, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> +<li class="isub1">visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> + +<li class="indx">German account of Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></li> +<li class="isub1">bombardment of East Coast, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> +<li class="isub1">breach of international law, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> +<li class="isub1">disguised raiders, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> +<li class="isub1">fleet (<i>see</i> <a href="#High_Sea_Fleet">High Sea Fleet</a>) gunnery, efficiency of, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> +<li class="isub1">merchant steamer intercepted and sunk, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> +<li class="isub1">mines and submarines, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i> (and <i lang="la">passim</i>)</li> +<li class="isub1">submarine menace, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, + <a href="#Page_115">115</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">German Bight, British submarine lays mines in, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Germans fire on British rescuers, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proclaim British waters unsafe for shipping, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rescue British crews, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> +<li class="isub1">thoroughness of defences of their naval bases, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Germany, destroyer force of, <a href="#Page_392">392</a>, <a href="#Page_396">396</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></li> +<li class="isub1">mutinies in Navy of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> +<li class="isub1">naval strength of, in early days of War, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ghourko</i>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Gibraltar</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Glen Isla</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Gloucester</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Goff, Lieut.-Commander R. S., <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Goldfinch</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Goodenough, Commodore W. E., <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a>, + <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> +<li class="isub1">engages the enemy, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Good Hope</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted at, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Goshawk</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Gossamer</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gough-Calthorpe, Rear-Admiral the Hon. S., <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Grafton</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Graham, Lieut.-Commander E. S., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Grand_Fleet"></a>Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> +<li class="isub1">a watching policy decided upon, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> +<li class="isub1">all-round improvement in fighting efficiency of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and its bases, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li class="isub1">arrival of additional seamen ratings for, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> +<li class="isub1">at end of November, 1914, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> +<li class="isub1">at end of 1914, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> +<li class="isub1">attempts to entice enemy to action, <a href="#Page_264">264</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">bases: conditions for leaving and returning to, <a href="#Page_295">295</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">battle exercises, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Battle Orders, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> +<li class="isub1">battle tactics exercises, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> +<li class="isub1">blockade work [<i>see</i> <a href="#Blockade">Blockade</a>, <a href="#Cruiser_Squadron_10th">Cruiser Squadron (10th)</a>]</li> +<li class="isub1">compared with High Sea Fleet, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> +<li class="isub1">composition of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">condenser and boiler troubles of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, + <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li> +<li class="isub1">constitution of, in May, 1916, and a parallel, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">countering retiring battle tactics, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li> +<li class="isub1">cruising formation and deployment, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> +<li class="isub1">destroyer force of, <a href="#Page_396">396</a></li> +<li class="isub1">development of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> +<li class="isub1">disposition and movements of, after declaration of war, <a href="#Page_90">90</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">efficiency of engine-room departments of, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_501">501</span>Fleet movements: a month’s work, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li> +<li class="isub1">gunnery practice of, <a href="#Page_64">64</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">inception of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> +<li class="isub1">kite balloons provided for, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> +<li class="isub1">lectures, system of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> +<li class="isub1">measures against invasion and raids, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> +<li class="isub1">messages from the King to, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> +<li class="isub1">naval instruction and education problem, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> +<li class="isub1">new Submarine Flotilla, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li> +<li class="isub1">peace and war conditions compared, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li> +<li class="isub1">personnel and welfare of, <a href="#Page_85">85</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> +<li class="isub1">pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> +<li class="isub1">problem of tactics in Fleet actions, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Royal visits to, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Russian gentlemen’s visit to, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sea-plane reconnaissances of, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> +<li class="isub1">ships fitted with Director-firing system, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> +<li class="isub1">signalling by, and why reduced, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">spirit of comradeship in, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sports, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarines attached to, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tables showing armament, protection and displacement of capital ships in, <a href="#Page_308">308–310</a></li> +<li class="isub1">the Staff Organisation, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">training of, <a href="#Page_55">55</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">work of medical officers, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Grant, Captain E. P. F. G., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Grant, Rear-Admiral W. L., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in command of 3rd Cruiser Squadron, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Great War, declaration of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> +<li class="isub1">first reports of enemy movements, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> +<li class="isub1">naval strategy in home waters, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">opening of, <a href="#Page_1">1</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">Green, Captain J. F. E., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Greene, W. Graham, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Grief</i>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Griffin, W. C. R., a D. S. M. for, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gun power, question of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gun, range of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a> (and <i>note</i>)</li> + +<li class="indx">Gunfire, correction of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gunnery efficiency: a new departure, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> +<li class="isub1">work of German High Sea Fleet, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Haddock, Commodore, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Haldane, Lord, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Halsey, Commodore Lionel, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hamburg</i>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick, becomes Second Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hamond, Commander Robert G., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hampshire</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel in, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> +<li class="isub1">strikes a mine and sinks, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li> +<li class="isub1">survivors of, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hannibal</i>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hardy</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Harris, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald N. A., <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G. C., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G. B., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Harwich, mined areas near, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Harwich Force, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> +<li class="isub1">provided with aircraft, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hawk</i> sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hawke</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hawksley, Commodore J. R. P., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, + <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Heath, Rear-Admiral H. L., <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, + <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Heaton-Ellis, Captain E. H. F., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Heligoland, a comprehensive mining policy urged, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> +<li class="isub1">fortifications of, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proposals for bombardment and capture of, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Heligoland Bight, British submarines followed by German trawlers, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> +<li class="isub1">dispositions for sweeping, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> +<li class="isub1">enemy light forces in action, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> +<li class="isub1">mining policy in, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> +<li class="isub1">projected operations in, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hercules</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hibernia</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="High_Sea_Fleet"></a>High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li class="isub1">changes in commands of, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> +<li class="isub1">defensive rôle of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> +<li class="isub1">destroyer force of, <a href="#Page_396">396</a></li> +<li class="isub1">efficiency of, ix, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> +<li class="isub1">position of, in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li> +<li class="isub1">probable tactics of, correctly anticipated, <a href="#Page_401">401</a></li> +<li class="isub1">superiority of protection in, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li> +<li class="isub1">surrender of, ix, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tables showing armament, protection and displacement of, <a href="#Page_308">308–310</a></li> +<li class="isub1">under repair, <a href="#Page_428">428</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hindustan</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F. E. H. G., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hodgson, Commander John C., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hogue</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_502">502</span><i>Hollyhock</i>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Holtzendorff, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Homan, Lieut.-Commander Edwin A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, + <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> +<li class="isub1">goes down with <i>Invincible</i>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hope</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hope, C. C., awarded D. S. M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hotham, Captain Alan G., <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Howell, T. O. G., awarded D. S. M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H. V., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hutchinson, Commander Reginald B. C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Hydra</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Illustrious</i>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Iltis</i> and her commander, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Impérieuse</i>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Implacable</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Inconstant</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Indefatigable</i>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>India</i> torpedoed and sunk, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Indomitable</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, + <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> +<li class="isub1">takes <i>Lion</i> in tow, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Inflexible</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, + <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins the Fleet, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> +<li class="isub1">mined in Dardanelles, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ingenohl, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li class="indx">International law, German disregard of, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Intrepid</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Invergordon as repairing base, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> +<li class="isub1">exercise and recreation at, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> +<li class="isub1">floating docks at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Invincible</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, + <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337–338</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> +<li class="isub1">survivors rescued by <i>Badger</i>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Iphigenia</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Irish mail packets as armed boarding steamers, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Irish Sea, submarine activity in, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Iron Duke</i>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, + <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, + <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Confirmation by Archbishop of York on, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> +<li class="isub1">disconcerting discovery on, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in action, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li> +<li class="isub1">refitting at Invergordon, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Staff of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">the King’s speech to Fleet, <a href="#Page_426">426</a>, <a href="#Page_427">427</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Irresistible</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Irvin, Commander (Acting) W. D., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Italy enters Great War, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and the submarine menace, <a href="#Page_454">454</a></li> +<li class="isub1">becomes First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + +<li class="indx">James, Lieut.-Commander C. H. N., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Jason</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J. R. (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> +<li class="isub1">accepts command of Home Fleets, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Kaiser’s criticism of dock accommodation, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and raids on unfortified towns, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and the value of aircraft in war, <a href="#Page_450">450</a></li> +<li class="isub1">appointed Commander-in-Chief of Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> +<li class="isub1">as First Sea Lord, <a href="#Page_417">417</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Battle Orders of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>, <a href="#Page_406">406</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> +<li class="isub1">bids farewell to Fleet, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Birthday message to the King, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> +<li class="isub1">confers with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> +<li class="isub1">confers with Premier and Chancellor of Exchequer, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> +<li class="isub1">despatches on Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> +<li class="isub1">embarrassing interview with Sir G. Callaghan, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> +<li class="isub1">entertains Lord Kitchener, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> +<li class="isub1">extensive mining policy of, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li class="isub1">memorandum to Fleet from, <a href="#Page_412">412</a>, <a href="#Page_460">460</a></li> +<li class="isub1">objections to change of Command, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proposals for handling Fleet in action approved by Admiralty, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> +<li class="isub1">reorganises his Staff, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">selects his Staff, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> +<li class="isub1">suggested scheme of submarine obstructions by, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to personnel of Fleet, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> +<li class="isub1">visits the Admiralty, <a href="#Page_453">453</a></li> +<li class="isub1">wounded in China, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. Martyn, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, + <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> +<li class="isub1">relieves Admiral Warrender, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jones, Commander Loftus W., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> +<li class="isub1">gallantry of, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_503">503</span>posthumous award of V. C. to, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jutland, Battle of, <a href="#Page_304">304</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">Admiral Jellicoe’s memorandum to Fleet, <a href="#Page_412">412</a></li> +<li class="isub1">area covered by different engagements, <a href="#Page_381">381</a></li> +<li class="isub1">battle cruiser fleet’s action, <a href="#Page_316">316</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> +<li class="isub1">battle fleet in action, <a href="#Page_341">341</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> +<li class="isub1">battle opens, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li> +<li class="isub1">despatches on, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Director System in use at, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> +<li class="isub1">disposition of Fleet, <a href="#Page_318">318</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">enemy losses, <a href="#Page_486">486</a>, <a href="#Page_492">492</a></li> +<li class="isub1">enemy sighted, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German version of, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Grand Fleet congratulated by Admiralty, <a href="#Page_414">414</a></li> +<li class="isub1">inferiority of British armour-piercing shell in, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li> +<li class="isub1">night attacks by flotillas, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> +<li class="isub1">night dispositions, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proceedings on 1st June, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> +<li class="isub1">reflections on, <a href="#Page_390">390</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">repairing and altering ships damaged in, <a href="#Page_415">415</a></li> +<li class="isub1">results of, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li> +<li class="isub1">retiring tactics of enemy, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_407">407</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> +<li class="isub1">the night action, <a href="#Page_370">370</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Kaiser</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A., <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Kempenfelt</i>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kennedy, Captain Francis W., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kennedy, Captain Theobald W. B., <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Keyes, Commodore, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rescues enemy crews, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kiddle, Captain E. B., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron’s visit to, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Kildonan Castle</i>, <a href="#Page_452">452</a></li> + +<li class="indx">King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W. S., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>King Alfred</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>King Edward VII.</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> +<li class="isub1">mined and sunk, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>King George V.</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and battle of Jutland, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>King Orry</i>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>King Stephen</i> sights sinking Zeppelin, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> +<li class="isub1">at Scapa, <a href="#Page_419">419</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_422">422</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sails on <i>Hampshire</i>, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kite balloons, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitän von, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Köningen Luise</i>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Kristianiafiord</i> intercepted by <i>Teutonic</i>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</i>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer sunk off, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Lamlash, as pre-War practice base, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lancaster</i>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Landrail</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lans, Vice-Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lapwing</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Larne</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lassoo</i>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Latona</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Laurel</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Laverock</i>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lawrence, Commander, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lawson, Captain R. N., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Leake, Captain F. M., <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A. M., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Leda</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C. B., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Leggett, Captain Oliver E., <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Leith, Zeppelin attack on, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Le Mesurier, Commodore, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_365">365</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, + <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lerwick, coaling base at, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Leveson, Rear-Admiral A. C., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Leviathan</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ley, Captain J. C., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Liberty</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, <a href="#Page_396">396</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lilac</i> strikes a mine, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lion, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, + <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a>, <a href="#Page_446">446</a>, + <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, + <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> +<li class="isub1">taken in tow by <i>Indomitable</i>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Liverpool</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, + <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, + <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lizard</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Loch Ewe, a conference at, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> +<li class="isub1">as coaling base, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine activity at, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Loch-na-Keal, base at, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_504">504</span>base abandoned, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> +<li class="isub1">improvised obstructions at, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>London</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“Long Forties,” the, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Long Hope, anchorage at, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lord Nelson</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstructions at, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> +<li class="isub1">base at, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Battle Squadrons at, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> +<li class="isub1">diversion at, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> +<li class="isub1">improvised obstructions at, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Louise</i> (Danish steamer), <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lowestoft</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lucia</i>, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lutzow</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lyddite shell, suspected, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lydiard</i>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lynx</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sunk by a mine, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H. I. N., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Lyra</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Maclachlan, Captain, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_411">411</a>, <a href="#Page_459">459</a>, + <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mænad</i>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mafeking</i>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Magic</i>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Magnificent</i>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mahan, Admiral, vii, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mainz</i> disabled in action, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> +<li class="isub1">her survivors rescued, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Majestic</i>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Malaya</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, + <a href="#Page_468">468</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Manchester Commerce</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mandate</i>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Manners</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mantua</i>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Marksman</i>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W. P., <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Marlborough</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, + <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, + <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_415">415</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, + <a href="#Page_480">480</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in action at Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li> +<li class="isub1">torpedoed, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Marne</i>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Martial</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Martin</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Marvel</i>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mary Rose</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Master, Lieut.-Commander E. G. H., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Matchless</i> strikes a mine, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li class="indx">McKenna, Mr., as First Lord, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> +<li class="isub1">visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> + +<li class="indx">McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mediterranean, ships in the, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Medusa</i> rammed and sunk, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Melita</i>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Menace</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Menelaus</i> (kite balloon ship), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Merchant-ships attacked by submarines, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> +<li class="isub1">camouflaged, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> +<li class="isub1">commissioned for blockade work, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> +<li class="isub1">convoying, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_433">433</a></li> +<li class="isub1">instructions for safety of, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> +<li class="isub1">serious loss of, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> +<li class="isub1">squadron disbanded, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine peril to, <a href="#Page_446">446</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Meteor</i>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> +<li class="isub1">damaged in Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Meteor</i> (German mine-layer) abandoned and sunk, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> +<li class="isub1">number of mines laid by, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Michael</i>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Michigan</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Midge</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Milford Haven, Marquis of, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> +<li class="isub1">succeeded by Lord Fisher, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Millbrook</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Miller, Captain Charles B., <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Minches, the, submarines reported in, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mindful</i>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“Mine Bumping Squadron,” the, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Minelayer Squadron, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mine-layers, increased activity of British, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Instructions to, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mines, British, defective pattern of, <a href="#Page_248">248</a></li> +<li class="isub1">experiments to counter, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">success of new type of, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li class="isub1">the Northern Barrage, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Minesweepers, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> +<li class="isub1">chase submarine, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> +<li class="isub1">inadequacy of force of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> +<li class="isub1">maximum speed of, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> +<li class="isub1">withdrawn for service abroad, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mine-sweeping force strengthened, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Minion</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_505">505</span><i>Minotaur</i>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, <a href="#Page_438">438</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Minstrel</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mischief</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mocatta, Lieutenant Jack E. A., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Moewe</i> lays extensive minefield off Scottish coast, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Moir, Commander Dashwood F., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Molteno, Captain, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Moltke</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Monarch</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Monmouth</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mons</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Moon</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> +<li class="isub1">succeeded by Rear-Admiral Pakenham, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Moorsom</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> +<li class="isub1">gunnery practice in, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Moresby</i>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Morley, Lord, dinner party at United Services Club, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Morning Star</i>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Morris</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Morton, Lieutenant, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mounsey</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Munro, Captain Donald S., <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> +<li class="isub1">devises system of submarine obstruction, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Munster</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rescues crew of <i>Alcantara</i>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Musketeer</i>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_431">431</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Mystic</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Nabakoff, Vladimir, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Naiad</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, + <a href="#Page_476">476</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> +<li class="isub1">engages a Zeppelin, <a href="#Page_382">382</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Narborough</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Narvik, iron ore trade of, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Narwhal</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Natal</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> +<li class="isub1">blown up in Cromarty harbour, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> +<li class="isub1">court-martial on loss of, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Naval instructors, reduced number of, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Naval manœuvres of 1912, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix.</li> + +<li class="indx">Naval situation in May, 1916, <a href="#Page_300">300</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> + +<li class="indx">Navigation lights, extinction of, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Navy Acts, German, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Navy League, the, formation of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Navy"></a>Navy, the, a lesson for the future, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li> +<li class="isub1">composition of, at opening of Great War, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">disposition of, in early days of Great War, <a href="#Page_19">19</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">grief of, at Kitchener’s fate, <a href="#Page_424">424</a></li> +<li class="isub1">partition of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> +<li class="isub1">use and purpose of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Negro</i>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nemesis</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Neptune</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nerissa</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nessus</i>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nestor</i>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>New Zealand</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and North Sea action, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nicator</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nicholson, Captain William C. M., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R. L., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> +<li class="isub1">organises wireless school, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> +<li class="isub1">signalling system of, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Noble</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nomad</i>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nonsuch</i>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North American Squadron joined by <i>Princess Royal</i>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North east coast, Zeppelins on, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North Rona Island, a reported enemy base on, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North Sea, area of, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> +<li class="isub1">controlling the, <a href="#Page_249">249</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">cruiser patrol areas in, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> +<li class="isub1">drifting German mines in, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Fleet in, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> +<li class="isub1">northern and central areas of, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> +<li class="isub1">proclaimed a dangerous area, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> +<li class="isub1">reported mooring of oil drums in, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine and mine menace in, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a> <i lang="la">et passim</i></li> +<li class="isub1">sweeps, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–9</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, + <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, + <a href="#Page_445">445</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">the Northern Barrage mine-field, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="North_Sea_battle"></a>North Sea battle, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> +<li class="isub1">(<i>cf.</i> Dogger Bank)</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_506">506</span>Norway, German Fleet’s peace-time visits to, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Norwegian coast, British patrol of, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> +<li class="isub1">British submarines’ operations against enemy on, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> +<li class="isub1">reported German bases on, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> +<li class="isub1">steamers sunk, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sweeping, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_429">429</a>, <a href="#Page_432">432</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nottingham</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> +<li class="isub1">torpedoed and sunk, <a href="#Page_437">437</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nugent, Captain R. A., <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Nymphe</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rams a submarine, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Oak</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, + <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> +<li class="isub1">King George V. on, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Obdurate</i>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Obedient</i>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">O’Beirne, Mr., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Observation mine-fields, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Oceanic</i>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Older</i>, German crew on, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Olympic</i>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Onslaught</i>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Onslow</i>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></li> +<li class="isub1">heroism of captain and crew of, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A. G., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Opal</i>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ophelia</i>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Oracle</i>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Orcoma</i>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Orion</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, + <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine activity in, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> +<li class="isub1">wireless stations in, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Oropesa</i> in collision, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Orotava</i>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Orvieto</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Oscar II.</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ossory</i>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Otway</i>, <a href="#Page_458">458</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Owl</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Pakenham, Rear-Admiral, W. C., <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> +<li class="isub1">succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_474">474</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Paragon</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Parker, Captain Henry Wise, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Parsons, Lieutenant G., <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Pasley</i>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West Indies, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Patia</i>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Patrol</i> engaged by battle cruisers, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Patuca</i>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Peace manœuvres, unreality of, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R., <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Pelican</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_441">441</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pelly, Captain Henry B., <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Penn</i>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Penshurst</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> +<li class="isub1">gunnery practice in, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Persius, Captain, an admission by, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Petard</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, + <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Peterhead, good work of patrol at, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> +<li class="isub1">patrol sinks a submarine, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> +<li class="isub1">trawlers sunk by enemy, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Phaeton</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">attacks a Zeppelin, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phipps, Lieutenant W. D., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Plover</i>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Plowden, Commander Richard A. A., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon. Reginald A. R., <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pohl, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C. A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C. F., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Pommern</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Porpoise</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rams a submarine, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Portrush, German wreckage ashore at, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pound, Captain A. D. P. R., <a href="#Page_463">462</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pratt, Captain Thomas D., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Preston, Commander L. G., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Prince Charles</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinks a U-boat, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Prince of Wales</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Princess Louise</i>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> +<li class="isub1">attacked by submarine, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Princess Margaret</i>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Princess Royal</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a>, <a href="#Page_473">473</a></li> +<li class="isub1">convoys Canadian troops, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a>, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, <a href="#Page_480">480</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins North American Squadron, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Prowse, Captain Cecil I., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_507">507</span><i>Prudentia</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P. F., <a href="#Page_96">96</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“P. Z. Exercises,” <a href="#Page_391">391</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">“Q” ships (<i>see</i> <a href="#Decoy_ships">Decoy ships</a>)</li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Queen</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Queen Elizabeth</i>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Queen Mary</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, + <a href="#Page_465">465</a> loss of, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Ramage, Commander G. N., <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ramexo</i>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ramsey, Commander Charles G., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ramsey</i> sunk by disguised mine-layer, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Range of gun and torpedo, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Range-finders, improved, <a href="#Page_418">418</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Range-finding experiments, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rattler</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rawlings, Lieut.-Commander H. C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Redpole</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Reeves, Captain Edward, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rena</i>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Renown</i>, her deck protection improved, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Repulse</i>, her deck protection improved, <a href="#Page_448">448</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins the Fleet, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Retiring tactics, advantages of, <a href="#Page_401">401</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Revenge</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, + <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J. C., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rifleman</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J. W., <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Robertson, Mr., <a href="#Page_421">421</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Robinson, Lieut.-Commander Charles G., <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rohilla</i>, wreck of, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a merchant-ship at, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rosemary</i> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_430">430</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ross, Captain George P., <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_463">462</a>, <a href="#Page_481">481</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Rostock</i>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rosyth, a conference at, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> +<li class="isub1">base at, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> +<li class="isub1">conditions for leaving and returning to base at, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li> +<li class="isub1">development of base at, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German prisoners landed at, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> +<li class="isub1">interview with Mr. Balfour at, <a href="#Page_459">459</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine obstructions for, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> +<li class="isub1">the coal difficulty at, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> +<li class="isub1">3rd Battle Squadron at, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Roxburgh</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, + <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li> +<li class="isub1">hit by torpedo, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Royal Arthur</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work of, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Royal Oak</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Royal Sovereign</i>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Royalist</i>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_435">435</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Royds, Captain Percy M. R., <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Ruby</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Russell</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Russian steamer sunk, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Russians relay their mine-fields, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> +<li class="isub1">visit Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Russo-Japanese War, advances in technique in, viii</li> + +<li class="indx">Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F. S., <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>St. Clair</i>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">St. John, Captain F. G., <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>St. Vincent</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J. S., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H. H., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Sapphire</i>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Sappho</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Sarah Alice</i> torpedoed, <a href="#Page_446">446</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Savill, Captain, <a href="#Page_422">422</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> +<li class="isub1">a wireless school established at, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> +<li class="isub1">adopted as main Fleet Base, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> +<li class="isub1">arrival of <i>Campania</i> at, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> +<li class="isub1">arrival of air- and sea-planes at, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> +<li class="isub1">blocking the channels, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> +<li class="isub1">defenceless nature of base at, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> +<li class="isub1">entrances to, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li> +<li class="isub1">gunnery and torpedo practice at, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> +<li class="isub1">recreation and occupation at, <a href="#Page_85">85–7</a></li> +<li class="isub1">reinforcing gun defences of, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> +<li class="isub1">situation of, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine menace, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine obstruction pierced, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarine obstructions at, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Scarborough, bombardment of, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Schwann, Captain O., <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Scott, Captain Albert C., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing system, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Scottish coast, <i>Moewe</i> lays minefield on, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> +<li class="isub1">submarines on, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Seagull</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sea-plane carriers, orders to, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sheds wrecked by gale, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Seaplanes as scouts, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li> +<li class="isub1">difficulties of, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282–3</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> +<li class="isub1">first reconnaissance work with Fleet, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_508">508</span>replaced by aeroplanes, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Sea Ranger</i>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Searchlights, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> +<li class="isub1">excellence of German, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> +<li class="isub1">signalling by, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Second Fleet, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Selborne, Earl of, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Seven Years’ War, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Seydlitz</i>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_409">409</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Seymour, Lieut.-Commander Ralph W., <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Shamrock</i>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Shannon</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Shark</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>, <a href="#Page_419">419</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">heroism of captain and crew, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> +<li class="isub1">survivors awarded D. S. M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Sheldrake</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Shetland Patrol Force, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Signalling by searchlight, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Skipjack</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Smith, C. H., awarded D. S. M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Smoke screens, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>, + <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href="#Page_408">408</a>, <a href="#Page_479">479</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Soudan</i>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="indx">South Atlantic, von Spee’s Squadron in, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Southampton</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a>, + <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a></li> +<li class="isub1">and Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> + +<li class="indx">South-east coast, raids on, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sowerby, Captain Charles F., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Sparrowhawk</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rammed, <a href="#Page_375">375</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinking of, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“Special Service Squadron,” the, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Spee, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Speedwell</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Speedy</i>, loss of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Spickernell, Frank T., <a href="#Page_489">489</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Spitfire</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Spithead, Naval Review at, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Spitzbergen, reported German submarine base and wireless station at, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stadlandet, patrols off, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Stag</i>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D. C., <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Star shells, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Staunch</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stileman, Rear-Admiral H. H., <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stirling, Captain A. J. B., <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href="#Page_378">378</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A. P., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stuart, Lieut.-Commander Dudley, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_410">410</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a>, + <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> +<li class="isub1">destroys von Spee’s squadron, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_482">482</a></li> +<li class="isub1">kite balloon experiments of, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> +<li class="isub1">succeeds Sir D. Gamble, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li> +<li class="isub1">tribute to, <a href="#Page_488">488</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Submarine activity in White Sea, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li> +<li class="isub1">attack under difficulties, <a href="#Page_457">457</a></li> +<li class="isub1">C 27 sinks a German U-boat, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> +<li class="isub1">flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> +<li class="isub1">flotillas, Instructions to, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li> +<li class="isub1">menace, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a>, <a href="#Page_453">453</a> <i lang="la">et passim</i></li> +<li class="isub1">obstructions (system of), <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> +<li class="isub1">patrols, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> +<li class="isub1">peril to merchant shipping, <a href="#Page_445">445</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i></li> +<li class="isub1">screens, question of, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sinks German steamship, <a href="#Page_426">426</a></li> +<li class="isub1">surrender of a German, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of, <a href="#Page_447">447</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_425">425</a></li> +<li class="isub1">comparative strength of British and German, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li> +<li class="isub1">defences against, at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> +<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_289">289</a> (<i>note</i>)</li> +<li class="isub1">reason for suppressing news of engagements with, <a href="#Page_387">387</a></li> +<li class="isub1">sunk by Navy, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sulivan, Commander Harold E., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sulivan, Commander Norton A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G. C., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Superb</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Swan, T. W., awarded D. S. M., <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li> +<li class="isub1">defences of, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> +<li class="isub1">evacuation of, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Swift</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy destroyer, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Taku forts, capture of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Talisman</i>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_445">445</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Taranaki</i>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tay, River, submarines off entrance to, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_509">509</span>Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed in action, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Telephonic communications, establishment of, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Temeraire</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Termagant</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, <a href="#Page_471">471</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Terry, Lieut.-Commander F. G., <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Teutonic</i>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> +<li class="isub1">intercepts a Norwegian-American liner, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Theseus</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Thetis</i>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Third Fleet, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E. C. O., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Thornhill</i>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Thunderer</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, + <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Tiger</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, + <a href="#Page_420">420</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Dogger Bank battle, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a>, <a href="#Page_490">494</a>, <a href="#Page_495">495</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland action, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_472">472</a></li> +<li class="isub1">joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Tipperary</i>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G., <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Titania</i>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tolstoy, Count Alexis, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Torpedo attacks:</li> +<li class="isub1">caution required in, <a href="#Page_399">399</a></li> +<li class="isub1">practices at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> +<li class="isub1">range of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li> +<li class="isub1">warfare:</li> +<li class="isub2">element of chance in, <a href="#Page_393">393</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> +<li class="isub2">importance attached by Germany to, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> +<li class="isub2">measures for combating, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a></li> +<li class="isub1">work of German Navy, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> +<li class="isub1">reports on, at battle of Jutland, <a href="#Page_360">360</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tothill, Captain Hugh H. D., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds Rear-Admiral Waymouth, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J. C., <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_475">475</a></li> +<li class="isub1">heroism of and tribute to, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_374">374–5</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Townsend, Captain Cyril S., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trafalgar, Battle of, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trawlers, German, engaged and destroyed, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> +<li class="isub1">support marine obstructions at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> +<li class="isub1">suspicious, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C. W. E., <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href="#Page_465">465</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trewin, Assistant-Paymaster G. S., <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_469">469</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Trident</i>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trondhjem, <i>Brandenburg</i> at, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Turbulent</i>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, <a href="#Page_467">467</a>, <a href="#Page_470">470</a>, + <a href="#Page_471">471</a>, <a href="#Page_484">484</a></li> +<li class="isub1">rammed and sunk, <a href="#Page_378">378–80</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Turkish battleships, purchase of, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tynemouth, minefields off, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tyrwhitt, Commodore R. Y., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_440">440</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, + <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> +<li class="isub1">a successful haul of German trawlers, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li> +<li class="isub1">chases a destroyer, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> +<li class="isub1">orders sinking of <i>Medusa</i>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">U-boat losses, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Undaunted</i>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_493">493</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Underhill, Captain Edwin V., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">United Services Club, dinner party at, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li class="indx">United States enters the War, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Unity</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Usborne, Commander Cecil V., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Usedom, Admiral von, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Utvoer Lighthouse, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Vala</i>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Valiant</i>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Vanguard</i>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Venerable</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Vengeance</i>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Victor</i>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Victoria Cross awards, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Victorious</i>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_417">417</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Viknor</i>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> +<li class="isub1">loss of, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Vindex</i>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Visual signalling, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Von der Tann</i>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Wales, Prince of, visits Scapa, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Walney Island, submarine attack on, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C. A., <a href="#Page_465">465</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wardle, Captain T. E., <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in command of 2nd Battle Squadron, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, + <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li> +<li class="isub1">terminates his command, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Warrior</i>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> +<li class="isub1">abandoned and sunk, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_485">485</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, <a href="#Page_477">477</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Warspite</i>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in collision, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_434">434</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_478">478</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W., <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li> +<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_510">510</span>breakdown in health, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_491">491</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Welsh coal-fields, strike in, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li> + +<li class="indx">White Sea, enemy submarines in, <a href="#Page_448">448</a>, <a href="#Page_449">449</a></li> +<li class="isub1">protecting the trade route, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Wiesbaden</i> badly crippled, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li> + +<li class="indx">William II., Emperor, criticises British dock accommodation, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wilson, Commander W. W., <a href="#Page_169">169</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wintour, Captain Charles J., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> +<li class="isub1">death of, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>, <a href="#Page_483">483</a>, <a href="#Page_487">487</a></li> +<li class="isub1">unpleasant experience of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wireless school at Scapa, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wireless signalling, and why restricted, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wireless telegraphy, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> <i lang="la">et seq.</i>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> +<li class="isub1">improved system of, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Withers, Captain Percy, <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Wolf</i> intercepted and sunk, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Woods, Commander A. E., <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Woods, Commander Alexander R. W., <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_490">490</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Woollcombe, Captain Louis C. S., <a href="#Page_463">463</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Woollcombe, Captain Maurice, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C., <a href="#Page_464">464</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Yarmouth</i>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_430">430</a>, <a href="#Page_466">466</a></li> +<li class="isub1">in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_476">476</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Yegoroff, M., <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Yorck</i>, sinking of, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx">York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Young, Captain G. B., <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage Association, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Zaza</i>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Zealandia</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and considered impracticable, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Zeppelin activity, <a href="#Page_436">436</a>, <a href="#Page_437">437</a>, <a href="#Page_442">442</a>, <a href="#Page_443">443</a></li> +<li class="isub1">bombs rescuers, <a href="#Page_496">496</a></li> +<li class="isub1">engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle, <a href="#Page_486">486</a></li> +<li class="isub1">shed, Tondern, attack on, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Zeppelins as scouts, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_451">451</a></li> +<li class="isub1">destruction of, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> +<li class="isub1">raids by, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Zigzagging, procedure of, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> +</ul> +</div> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_511">511</span></p> +</div> + +<figure id="i_511" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="right"><p><i>Diagram I.</i></p></div> + +<p class="sans"> +PLAN OF<br> +<span class="large">JUTLAND BATTLE</span><br> +BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT +</p> + + <img src="images/i_511.jpg" width="784" height="663" alt=""> +<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_511-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> + +<div class="blockquot sans"> +<p>The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6.0. P.M. is fixed +by a report from the Marlborough and confirmed at +6.4. P.M. by a report from the Rear-Admiral 1st Battle +Squadron in the Colossus.</p> + +<p>The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by +a report from the Marlborough at 6.5. P.M. taken +in conjunction with the reports of the Rear-Admiral +5th Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p>The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from +the report of the Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet +and from the Lion and Indomitable.</p> + +<p>The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6.7. P.M. +is fixed by a report from the Lion received at 6.6. P.M.; +this gave the bearing; the distance is obtained by a +consideration of the ranges at which the Lion was firing.</p> + +<p>The position of the Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed at 6.14. +P.M. from the Lion and at 6.15. P.M. from the Barham; +the latter being signalled by wireless, an interval of four +minutes being allowed between transmission and +receipt.</p> + +<p>Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers +are fixed by the bearings on which our Battle Cruisers +were firing and the ranges given, and by a consideration +of the German reports which show a 32 point turn +between 6.6. and 6.15. P.M.</p> + +<p>Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are +fixed by bearings and ranges given by the Marlborough +at 6.17. P.M., Iron Duke at 6.31. P.M. and Monarch +at 6.33. P.M.</p> + +<p>The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are +fixed by reports and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of +Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron.</p> + +<p><i>Note.</i>—In studying this diagram it should be borne in mind that +only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due +to the smoke and mist.</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_512">512</span></p> +<hr> + +<figure id="i_512" class="figcenter section" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="right"><p class="right"><i>Diagram II.</i></p></div> + +<p class="sans"> +DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT<br> +HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON<br> +THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN.</p> + + <img src="images/i_512.jpg" width="715" height="803" alt=""> +<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_512-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> + +<div class="blockquot sans"> +<p>It should be borne in mind that no information as to +the position of the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until +6.14. P.M., and that the only reports received had been +one at 6.6. P.M., giving a bearing of the Enemy Battle +Cruisers from the “Lion”, and a report at 5.50. P.M. +from the “Southampton” to the effect that the Enemy +Battle Fleet bore north-east from his Battle Cruisers +(and were therefore presumably ahead of them and right +ahead of our Battle Fleet.)</p> + +<p>There had therefore been no sufficient information on +which to re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment +on the starboard wing column to meet an enemy before +the starboard beam would necessarily be an awkward +manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration +of the starboard wing column to port and a very large +alteration of course of the remaining columns when +coming into line astern of it.</p> + +<p>A torpedo attack during deployment would under these +conditions throw the British Battle Fleet into great +confusion and a concentration of gunfire on the turning +point would be very effective; our own gunfire, owing to +the large alterations of course and the consequent +difficulty of obtaining correct fire control data would be +correspondingly ineffective: our own destroyers had been +spread ahead of the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen +until 6.8 P.M. and were moving across the front in an +unformed condition to the two flanks.</p> + +<p>The movements that would probably have resulted and +the number of ships on each side in action are shown in +the diagram for each 3-minute interval from 6.16 to +6.28 P.M.</p> + +<p>The three ships of the 5th. Battle Squadron would +eventually have come into line ahead of the 6th. division, +but would possibly have masked the fire of that division +during the movement.</p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_513">513</span></p> + +<hr> +<figure id="i_513" class="figcenter section" style="max-width: 36em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="right"><p><i>Diagram III.</i></p></div> + +<p class="sans"> +DIAGRAM SHOWING<br> +ORDER <span class="allsmcap">OF THE</span> BATTLEFLEET<br> + +<span class="large">BATTLE <span class="allsmcap">OF</span> JUTLAND</span><br> + +31<sup>st.</sup> MAY 1916 +</p> + + <img src="images/i_513.jpg" width="687" height="842" alt=""> +<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_513-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p><i>“Minotaur’s” track chart records that at 8 p.m. +“King George V” bore N 10 E (true) from her, +distant about 5 miles.</i></p> + +<p><i>It also records that “Lion” bore W by S (true) +from her, distant about 5 miles.</i></p> + +<p><i>If these records are reliable “Lion’s” 8 p.m. +position would be at X, and her track between +7.20 and 8 p.m., presumably as +shewn thus:——</i></p> + +<p><i>“Minotaur’s” records however, do not profess +to give exact distances.</i></p> +</div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_514">514</span></p> +<hr> + +<figure id="i_514" class="figcenter section" style="max-width: 33em;"> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<div class="right"><p><i>Diagram IV.</i></p></div> + +<p class="sans"> +<span class="larger">TRACK OF SQUADRONS</span><br> +DURING NIGHT OF<br> +May 31st. to June 1st. and<br> +Forenoon of June 1st. 1916. +</p> + + <img src="images/i_514.jpg" width="539" height="735" alt=""> +<div class="right larger"><a href="images/i_514-large.jpg">(<i>Hi-res</i>)</a></div> + +<div class="sans"> +<div class="left"><p>BATTLE FLEET.</p></div> + +<div class="blockquot in2"> + +<p>During night, Battle Fleet in 3 columns, 1 mile apart, +disposed abeam.</p> + +<p>From 2.45 A. M. to 3.30 A. M., in single line.</p> + +<p>From 3.30 A. M. onward, in 6 columns, 1 mile apart, +disposed abeam.</p> +</div> + +<div class="left"><p>POSITIONS OF CRUISERS ETC.</p></div> + +<div class="blockquot in2"> + +<p>Dublin at 4.30 A. M. in Lat. 55° 30′ N., Long. 6° 36′ E. +Commodore of Flotillas at 5.0 A. M. in Lat. 55° 48′ N., +Long. 6° 22′ E.</p> + +<p>Vice Admiral 1st Battle Squadron with 6th Division at +6.40 A. M. in Lat. 55° 55′ N., Long. 5° 15′ E. steering +S. SE. 19 knots.</p> + +<p>3 Submarines off Vyl Light Ship on bearing 270°, 4 +miles, 12 miles and 20 miles respectively from Lightship.</p> +</div></div> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<div class="chapter section transnote"> +<h2 id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> + +<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a +predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they +were not changed.</p> + +<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation +marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left +unbalanced.</p> + +<p>Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs +and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support +hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to +the corresponding illustrations.</p> + +<p>Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them, +have been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed at the end of +the book.</p> + +<p>The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page +references.</p> + +<p>Original text uses two forms of the following words; both retained here:</p> + +<ul class="in4"> +<li>“moral” and “morale”</li> + +<li>“underwater” and “under-water”</li> + +<li>“minefield” and “mine-field”</li> + +<li>“seaplanes” and “sea-planes”</li> +</ul> + +<p>Redundant book title on <a href="#Page_1">page 1</a> has been removed by Transcriber.</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_316">Page 316</a>: The times in the illustration's heading use a mix of Roman +and Arabic numerals.</p> + +<p><a href="#Page_360">Page 360</a>: The time shown as “7.8” was printed that way. It may mean “8 +minutes after 7”. Similar times appear on other pages.</p> +</div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + |