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diff --git a/75323-0.txt b/75323-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e205592 --- /dev/null +++ b/75323-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,19016 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 *** + + + + + +Transcriber’s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Superscripts +are represented in the forms ^Y or ^{TH}. Additional notes will be +found near the end of this ebook. + + + + +[Illustration: + + ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. +] + + + + + THE GRAND FLEET + 1914–1916 + + ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK + + + BY + ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE + OF SCAPA + G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. + + + WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS + + [Illustration] + + NEW YORK + GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY + + + + + COPYRIGHT, 1919, + BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY + + + PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA + + + + + TO MY COMRADES + OF THE GRAND FLEET + + + + +PREFACE + + +In the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from the outbreak +of war until the end of November, 1916, is described. + +The writing of this record of the work of the Grand Fleet, of which +little has been heard by the nation hitherto, has helped to fill in +days of leisure. The manuscript was finished by the autumn of 1918, +but publication was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice +had been signed and the German Navy had, for all practical purposes, +ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book. The final revision has +been done hastily owing to my early departure for the Dominions, and +in the circumstances I hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if +any clerical errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances +of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the proofs, and I am +much indebted to him. + +The narrative necessarily includes an account of the gradual +organisation and development of the Grand Fleet, and its bases, by +successive steps, after the hoisting of my flag on the outbreak of +hostilities; and the manner in which the changing conditions of naval +warfare were met is also dealt with. + +Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that whilst the +_principles_ of naval strategy are unchangeable, experience in war and +changes in the weapons with which war is waged may profoundly affect +the _application_ of those principles. + +The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo-Japanese war; in the +short interval between 1904 and 1914 further great advances took place +in the technique of warfare; these produced a striking influence on +strategy and tactics during the late war. + +The reasons which made it necessary, during the war, to hide from +public view the work of the Grand Fleet no longer exist, and it +will no doubt be of interest to the nation to learn something of +its operations, especially as, for various justifiable reasons, +few despatches were issued dealing with its activities. So far as +the Battle Fleet was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one +exception, and that despatch was written and published when it was +necessary to conceal a good deal from the enemy. + +As is inevitable, much of the information in this volume is of a +technical character and, though interesting to seamen, may prove +less so to the general reader. Those who take this view may decide +that Chapters IV to X, inclusive, require only to be glanced at. +Confidential matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has +been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the light in later +years. + +The main portion of the book is written in narrative form, but where it +is thought that an explanation may be useful, as to the reasons which +governed any particular movement or decision, such reason is given in +order that opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding the +purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped to achieve it. + +In some parts of the book reference is made to the Germans being +superior to us in _matériel_. There were many directions, however, +in which war experience showed the correctness of our views and the +wisdom of our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of +safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital ship, and we +did gain advantage from the heavier calibre of our guns. Naval policy +is pursued in peace conditions under inevitable disadvantages in a +democratic country, because there are many claims on the Exchequer. +Reviewing our pre-war programmes of ship construction and equipment, +and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of the nation generally as to +the imminence of war, it is matter for satisfaction that the Boards of +Admiralty from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so +much, and that when at last war became inevitable the nation had in +control of its destinies at Whitehall a First Lord and a First Sea Lord +who, accepting their responsibility, mobilised the Fleet before war was +actually declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as, I +hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand Fleet. The years of +strenuous work and training carried out by the officers and men of the +Fleet, which should never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent +fighting machine, and bore ample fruit during the war. + +The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed generally the British +lead. In this book reference is made to the general efficiency of the +German Navy and of the good design and fine equipment of their ships. +These points were never questioned by British naval officers, and the +shameful surrender of the host of the German ships in 1918 did not +alter the opinions previously formed. That surrender was the result of +broken moral. + +More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafalgar, and after +a century of controversy, the Admiralty considered it desirable to +appoint a committee to decide whether that action was fought in +accordance with the original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as +embodied in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that the facts recorded +in this book, and the comments accompanying them, constitute a clear +statement of the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which it +endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its mission. + + + + + CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I THE OPENING OF THE WAR 1 + + II GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 12 + + III THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES 34 + + IV DECLARATION OF WAR 88 + + V THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA 115 + + VI INCIDENTS AT SEA--NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914 155 + + VII THE DOGGER BANK ACTION 187 + + VIII GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES 221 + + IX CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA 249 + + X ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION 264 + + XI THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916 300 + + XII THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 304 + + XIII THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_continued_) 341 + + XIV THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_continued_) 370 + + XV REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 390 + + XVI THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL 415 + + XVII THE SUBMARINE PERIL TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE + ADMIRALTY 445 + + APPENDIX I 463 + + APPENDIX II 490 + + + + + ILLUSTRATIONS + + + ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE, OF SCAPA, G. C. B., O. M., G. C. V. O. + _Frontispiece_ + + FACING PAGE + + DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE + BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW 28 + + THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW 28 + + SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS 68 + + A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915 68 + + THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL + HALSEY), AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT + FITZHERBERT) ON BOARD H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ 96 + + THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND AS DEPICTED BY A GERMAN ARTIST (_colour_) 336 + + H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYING + AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 342 + + H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 346 + + H.M.S. _SUPERB_ OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 366 + + + + + PLANS AND DIAGRAMS + + + PLANS + + PLAN FACING PAGE + + 1. SCAPA FLOW AND THE ORKNEYS 48 + + 2. AREA OF OPERATIONS OF 10TH CRUISER SQUADRON 74 + + 3. TYPICAL SWEEP, SEPTEMBER 8TH–11TH, 1914 128 + + 4. APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS, OCTOBER 3RD–11TH, 1914, WHILST + CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING 138 + + 5. MOVEMENTS OF FLEET, JANUARY 23RD–25TH, 1915 196 + + 6. OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF, MAY 2ND–5TH, 1916 290 + + 7. OPERATIONS OF BATTLE CRUISER FLEET, 2 P. M. TO 6.15 P. M., + MAY 31ST, 1916 316 + + 8. APPROXIMATE POSITION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 6.45 P. M., + MAY 31ST, 1916 350 + + 9. APPROXIMATE POSITION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 7.15 P. M., + MAY 31ST, 1916 358 + + + DIAGRAMS + + DIAGRAM + + 1. BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT OF THE BATTLE FLEET, MAY 31ST, 1916. + + 2. SHOWING AN IMAGINARY DEPLOYMENT ON THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN. + + 3. BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MOVEMENTS OF BATTLE FLEET AND BATTLE CRUISERS. + + 4. OPERATIONS DURING THE NIGHT OF MAY 31ST–JUNE 1ST, AND ON + JUNE 1ST, 1916. + + + + + THE GRAND FLEET, 1914–1916 + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE OPENING OF THE WAR + + +Early in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord, +I had been offered and had accepted the command of the Home Fleets, +which in the ordinary course would have become vacant in the following +December on the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term of +command, and public announcement was made of the intended appointment. + +Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years, and he and I had +served together in China fourteen years before, when I was Flag Captain +to Admiral--afterwards Admiral of the Fleet--Sir Edward Seymour. He +had since had what is probably a unique period of sea service, passing +from one appointment to another without an interval of half pay. Soon +after his promotion to flag rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old +Channel Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron in +1907; two years later he became second in command in the Mediterranean, +and on the expiration of his term there, in 1910, he returned to take +up the appointment of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of +the Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander-in-Chief in +1910. The usual period for which the Commander-in-Chief of the Home +Fleet was supposed to fly his flag was two years, but in 1913 the +Admiralty, accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service, +extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it was the approaching +termination of this further period of command--to the regret of the +Admiralty, for which I can speak from personal knowledge, and to the +regret also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets--which led to my +nomination in the spring of that year. + +In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe had assumed +a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, informed me that +in the event of hostilities occurring involving this country, it was +considered necessary that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets +should have the assistance of a second in command, and he added that I +had been selected for the appointment, and it was desired that I should +arrange with Sir George as to the ship in which I should fly my flag. + +Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very shortly afterwards, +and it was decided between us that the battleship _Centurion_ should +be my flagship. We discussed the slight reorganisation that this +would involve in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised: +Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H. Fitzherbert as +Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E. Hardman Jones as Signal Officer; +Lieut.-Commander R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander +(N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet Paymaster H. H. +Share as Secretary. + +On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, I was present at +a dinner party given by Lord Morley at the United Services Club. The +party was interesting, as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, +Mr. Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who figured later +prominently in the War. + +During the two following days conferences took place at the Admiralty +as to the disposition of the Fleet, etc., and, in view of the +threatening political situation, the work of demobilisation after the +King’s inspection at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises +were suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord Kitchener, who +was about to return to Egypt, on one or two occasions at the Admiralty +during these days. + +On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second Sea Lord, which I +had discharged since December, 1912, to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick +Hamilton, K.C.B., and made my final preparations for joining the Fleet +as second in command. + +I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following day, and during +a conversation with Mr. Churchill and the Marquis of Milford Haven, +the then First Sea Lord, it was intimated to me that, in certain +circumstances, I might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to +Sir George Callaghan. + +This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, and I protested +against such an appointment being made on what might possibly be on +the very eve of war. Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, +with the impression that the change was not one that had been finally +decided upon, but that it might take place. I left London the same +night by the mail train for Wick, the Commander-in-Chief having +informed me that he would send a vessel to meet me there. + +The idea that the change might be made occupied my thoughts during the +journey to the North. As I thought over the possibility of a transfer +of command at such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections. +During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several telegrams to +both the First Lord and the First Sea Lord on the subject. I dwelt +strongly upon the danger of substituting, at such a juncture and at +such short notice, an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet, +for a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Command. I +mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admiration and loyalty to the +Commander-in-Chief that existed, and suggested as an alternative that I +should act as his assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind +that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his Chief of the Staff. +In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated opinion, my views remained +unaltered, although it did not occur to me that some anxiety might be +felt that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand the strain of +commanding the Fleet in the event of war. That, however, was a matter +on which the Admiralty would be better informed than myself, and I +had no hesitation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive +telegrams. + +A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the _Boadicea_, the ship in which I +made the passage to Scapa Flow, was not able to leave until late in the +forenoon of August 2nd, and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon. + +When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, the knowledge of +the event which was apparently impending made the interview both +embarrassing and painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of +the possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could not +tell him. + +We discussed various arrangements, including the question of the +defence of Scapa Flow, for which temporary but naturally inadequate +measures were being energetically taken with the limited resources at +the disposal of the Fleet. + +At about 4 A.M. on August 4th, I received Admiralty orders to open +a secret envelope which had been handed to me in the train as I was +leaving London, by an officer from the Admiralty. This envelope +contained my appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet”--a +new designation which must be explained later. + +On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded on board the _Iron +Duke_ and found that the Commander-in-Chief had received orders to turn +over the command to me. + +Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-Chief during my command +of the 2nd Battle Squadron. He was, in addition, a personal friend, +and I, like all those with whom he had been in contact, had the most +profound respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over his +command at _the_ moment of his life naturally caused me feelings of +the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was impossible to dismiss the +fear that the Fleet might conclude that I had been in some measure +responsible for the change. This possibility had, of course, been +present in my mind from the moment I left London, and it appeared to +add to the objections to a change of command at such a juncture, since +any idea of this nature prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling +of loyalty to me as the new Commander-in-Chief. + +It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot close this +portion of my narrative without paying a warm tribute to the manner +in which Sir George accepted the Admiralty decision, which obviously +came as a great shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant +officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make the position easy +for me, in entire disregard of his own feelings. + +It was decided that I should take over the Command on the following +day, but a telegram having been received from the Admiralty ordering +the Fleet to proceed to sea at once, I returned to the _Iron Duke_, and +Sir George Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the _Sappho_ before +its departure at 8.30 in the morning. + +At that hour I took over the Command from Sir George Callaghan, who +then struck his flag. + +The following ten or fourteen days were a period of great strain and +anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsibility as the command of the +Grand Fleet at such short notice on the eve of war was in itself a +matter not to be taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together +the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the dispositions +already made and those immediately required, and the whole problem was +largely complicated by the fact that the port on which the Fleet was +based was open to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only +obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties of the +Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were by no means insuperable. + +Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at superseding a valued +chief and friend at such a moment. The one thing that helped me through +this period was the great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by +the staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their intense +personal regret at his departure, gave me their very warm support, +and concealed from me any trace of the feelings which they must have +experienced at my presence amongst them under such exceptional and +trying conditions. They behaved as naval officers always behave--in a +true spirit of comradeship. The same may be said of the flag officers +and captains in the Fleet, and indeed of every officer and man. + +Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with the exception +of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied him to London. This staff +included: Commodore A. F. Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain +R. N. Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse, C.B., Flag +Commander; Fleet Paymaster C. F. Pollard, C.B., Secretary; Commander +the Hon. Matthew Best, War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods, +Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless Officer; +Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff Officer; Lieut. W. D. +Phipps, Signal Officer.[A] + + [A] Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the + Fleet, Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Commander + C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander, and Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T. + Weekes, Additional Secretary. + +When it became certain that I was to take command of the Fleet, I asked +the Admiralty to appoint Rear-Admiral Charles Madden as Chief of the +Staff; and I was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to act +as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, the next +senior flag officer in the Fleet. + +The composition of the Grand Fleet was: + + Fleet-Flagship--H.M.S. _Iron Duke_. + + Attached Ships--H.M.S. _Sappho_, H.M.S. _Oak_. + + + BATTLE FLEET + + + _1st Battle Squadron_: + + Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command). + + Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command). + + Battleships _Marlborough_ (Flag), _St. Vincent_ (Rear Flag), + _Colossus_, _Hercules_, _Neptune_, _Vanguard_, _Collingwood_, + _Superb_, _Bellona_ (attached Light Cruiser), _Cyclops_ (repair + ship) + + + _2nd Battle Squadron_: + + Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B. + (in command). + + Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in command). + + Battleships _King George V._ (Flag), _Orion_ (Rear Flag), _Ajax_, + _Audacious_, _Centurion_, _Conqueror_, _Monarch_, _Thunderer_, + _Boadicea_ (attached Light Cruiser), _Assistance_ (repair ship). + + + _4th Battle Squadron_: + + Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O. (in command). + + Battleships _Dreadnought_ (Flag), _Temeraire_, _Bellerophon_, + _Blonde_ (attached Light Cruiser). + + + _3rd Battle Squadron_: + + Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command). + + Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command). + + Battleships _King Edward VII._ (Flag), _Hibernia_ (Rear Flag), + _Commonwealth_, _Zealandia_, _Dominion_, _Africa_, _Britannia_, + _Hindustan_, _Blanche_ (attached Light Cruiser). + + + _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + + Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command). + + Battleships _Lion_ (Flag), _Princess Royal_, _Queen Mary_, New + _Zealand_. + + + _2nd Cruiser Squadron_: + + Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-Calthorpe (in command). + + Cruisers _Shannon_ (Flag), _Achilles_, _Cochrane_, _Natal_. + + + _3rd Cruiser Squadron_: + + Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command). + + Cruisers _Antrim_ (Flag), _Argyll_, _Devonshire_, _Roxburgh_. + + + _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_: + + Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command). + + Light Cruisers _Southampton_ (Flag), _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_, + _Nottingham_. + + + DESTROYER FLOTILLAS + + _Second Flotilla_: + + Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in _Active_). + + Destroyers _Acorn_, _Alarm_, _Brisk_, _Cameleon_, _Comet_, _Fury_, + _Goldfinch_, _Hope_, _Larne_, _Lyra_, _Martin_, _Minstrel_, + _Nemesis_, _Nereide_, _Nymphe_, _Redpole_, _Rifleman_, _Ruby_, + _Sheldrake_, _Staunch_. + + + _Fourth Flotilla_: + + Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in _Swift_). + + Destroyers _Acasta_, _Achates_, _Ambuscade_, _Ardent_, _Christopher_, + _Cockatrice_, _Contest_, _Fortune_, _Garland_, _Hardy_, _Lynx_, + _Midge_, _Owl_, _Paragon_, _Porpoise_, _Shark_, _Sparrowhawk_, + _Spitfire_, _Unity_, _Victor_. + + + _Mine-Sweeping Gunboats_: + + Commander L. G. Preston (in command). + + H.M. Ships _Skipjack_ (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), _Circe_, + _Gossamer_, _Leda_, _Speedwell_, _Jason_, _Seagull_. + + Shetland Patrol Force: _Forward_ (Scout) and four destroyers of the + River class. + +The above vessels formed the Fleet under the immediate command of +the Commander-in-Chief at the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, +there were in southern waters, and also under the command of the +Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels: + + +THE HARWICH FORCE + +This force, although an integral portion of the Grand Fleet, was based +on Harwich. It was intended that it should join the Grand Fleet at +sea, if possible, in the event of a fleet action being imminent, and +for this reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet for +battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so join the Fleet, +nor did I expect that it would be able to do so. At the outbreak of war +it was commanded by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. _Amethyst_ and +comprised: + + + _1st Flotilla_ + + Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in _Fearless_ with 20 destroyers. + + + _3rd Flotilla_ + + Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in _Amphion_ with 15 destroyers. + +Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets, which Sir George +Callaghan had commanded-in-chief, were the Second and Third Fleets: + + + SECOND FLEET + + (under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.). + + Fleet-Flagship _Lord Nelson_, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and + Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons). + + + _5th Battle Squadron_: + + _Prince of Wales_ (Flag), _Agamemnon_, _Bulwark_, _Formidable_, + _Implacable_, _Irresistible_, _London_, _Queen_, _Venerable_. + + + _6th Battle Squadron_: + + _Russell_ (Flag), _Cornwallis_, _Albemarle_, _Duncan_, _Exmouth_, + _Vengeance_. + + + _5th Cruiser Squadron_: + + Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command). + + _Carnarvon_ (Flag), _Falmouth_, _Liverpool_. + + + _6th Cruiser Squadron_: + + Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant (in command). + + _Drake_, _Good Hope_, _King Alfred_, _Leviathan_. + +(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however, broken up immediately, +and the ships transferred to other duties.) + + _Minelayer Squadron_, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe. + + H.M. Ships _Naiad_ (S.O.’s ship), _Andromache_, _Apollo_, + _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Latona_, _Thetis_. + + +THIRD FLEET + +This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, consisting of +our oldest battleships, and the 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser +Squadrons, comprising our oldest cruisers. + +But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever associated with the +Grand Fleet were the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under +the command of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet +shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being employed mainly +on blockading duties. It was composed as follows: + + _Crescent_ (Flag), _Edgar_, _Endymion_, _Gibraltar_, _Grafton_, + _Hawke_, _Royal Arthur_, _Theseus_. + +All submarines, except those of the B and C classes which were detached +for the protection of our coast and ports from Rosyth southwards, were +worked, in accordance with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were +not, therefore, under my command. The C class submarines were unfit +for oversea work, and our operations in enemy waters were therefore +confined to boats of the D and E classes, of which we possessed a total +of 8 D’s and 9 E’s, as against the German total of 28 boats of the U +class. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS + + +It is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the Navy had +somewhat faded from public interest during the century that had elapsed +since the Napoleonic Wars, the last occasion on which the inhabitants +of this country had felt that their safety depended on maritime power. +Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in a +foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this matter, and to +point out the all-important influence which Sea Power had exerted, and +would exert, on history. + +Associations such as the Navy League had been formed, having as their +object the enlightenment of our countrymen, and although a great work +was done in this direction, the mere necessity for such work is an +indication of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons +of the past. + +I therefore offer no apology for making some reference to the use and +purpose of the British Navy. + +The main objects for which our Navy exists may be shortly summed up +under four heads: + + 1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea, this + being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly + one which is not self-supporting in regard to food. + + 2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic pressure to bear + on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus + compelling him to accept peace. + + 3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the passage and assist + any army sent overseas, and to protect its communications and + supplies. + + 4. To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas Dominions by + enemy forces. + +The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by +destroying the enemy’s armed naval forces, and this is therefore the +first objective of our Fleet. The Fleet exists to achieve victory. + +But history has always shown that it is a very difficult matter to +impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, and that, instead of +giving us the opportunity of destroying his armed naval forces, he +usually keeps the main body of those forces--the Battle Fleet--in +positions of safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant +threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval Power, and force +upon that Power a watching policy so that the enemy may be engaged, +should he put to sea, before he is able to gain any advantage. + +The watching policy in the great wars of the Napoleonic era was +carried out by keeping our squadrons, through fair or foul weather, +in the vicinity of those ports of the enemy in which his fleet lay. +Occasionally our ships were driven off by stress of weather, but +they regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted. During +this war, however, the advent of the submarine and destroyer, and, +to a lesser extent, the use of the mine rendered such dispositions +impossible. + +No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity of enemy bases +without the certainty that she would fall an early victim to the +attacks of submarines. Destroyers could, it is true, afford some +measure of protection, but destroyers have a very limited range of +action, and could not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even +in good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical relief of +the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the great numbers that +would be required for this purpose. + +Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be overcome, the heavy +ships would be so open to attack by enemy destroyers at night, if +cruising anywhere near enemy bases, that they would certainly be +injured, if not sunk, before many days had passed. + +These facts had been recognised before the War and a watching policy +from a distance decided upon, the watch being instituted for the +purpose of preventing enemy vessels from gaining the open sea, where +they would constitute a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch +maintained at a distance from the port under observation is necessarily +only partial, except in circumstances where the enemy has to pass +through narrow straits before gaining open water. + +The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend entirely on the number +of watching vessels and the distance that those on board them can see. +At night this distance is very short--on a dark night not more than a +quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the average conditions +of visibility obtaining in the North Sea, it is not more than six to +eight miles. + +The North Sea, though small in contrast with the Atlantic, is a big +water area of about 120,000 square miles in extent. The width across +it, between the Shetland Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is +160 miles, and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel) would +need to be watched also if a patrol were established along this line. + +A consideration of all the circumstances had led to the adoption by the +Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the +Admiralty had determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in the +event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that the Grand Fleet +would control the North Sea, and that the Channel Fleet would watch the +English Channel, thus, in combination, holding the enemy’s main force. + +To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main Battle Fleet +should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a strategic position in the +North Sea where it would act in support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying +out sweeps to the southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be +favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to action should it +put to sea. + +This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the result of +experience in the various naval manœuvres carried out in previous +years in the North Sea. These had demonstrated quite clearly that the +alternative policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North +Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an impracticable +one, it having been shown on many occasions that evasion of a single +patrol line during the hours of darkness, or even daylight, under the +conditions of visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is +a very simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying regular +patrol positions is always in peril of successful submarine attack; the +loss of the cruisers _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_ showed this. It is +also open to a concentrated attack by surface vessels. + +The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet +were based, therefore, on this general idea, and when the Grand Fleet +proceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 A.M. on +August the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out this +general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral +Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in the Channel in accordance with the +general strategic dispositions. + +The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand Fleet comprised the +1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with their attached cruisers; +the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, +strengthened by the addition of the _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_; the +2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These dispositions +continued in force for some three weeks, when the strong influence of +the submarine on naval strategy began to make itself apparent. + +The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities of submarines +were found, after a short experience of war, to need modification. In +the first place, it became quickly apparent that the German submarines +possessed a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably +greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, for instance, +looked upon as a considerable achievement for our submarines to keep +the sea for a period of five to seven days, and they had not operated +at any great distance from the coast. It is true that submarines had +on occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but they were then +usually escorted, or even towed, and the number of days from port to +port did not approach the length of time for which German submarines +remained at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans possessed a +considerable superiority in the number of submarines which were capable +of operating overseas, and the frequent sighting of enemy submarines +as far north as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War, +combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy had established +a regular submarine patrol in the centre of the North Sea, made it +evident that the German submarines would constitute a very serious +menace to our heavy ships. + +The comparative strength in submarines in Home Waters at the outbreak +of war was as follows: + + _German_-- + + U Boats 28 of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea + work, but were as good as our D class. + + _British_-- + + { of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining + D Class 8 { units of the D class were not equal to the + { U boats. + + E Class 9 + + C Class 34 } Unfit for oversea work and used only for local + B Class 3 } defence of the coast or in the Channel. + +The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under construction, whilst +we were building 19, apart from two experimental vessels of which +nothing resulted. + +Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in pursuance of a +policy introduced by the Admiralty in 1913–14 of widening the area of +supply of these vessels. This policy had far-reaching and beneficial +results on the subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it +enabled us to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would +otherwise have been the case. + +A change in previous naval practice was considered necessary at an +early period, because vessels moving at anything but high speed, +particularly in the case of a number of ships in company, ran very +considerable risks in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to +be operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers. This +conclusion affected the movements and operations of the Battle Fleet, +since the number of destroyers we possessed was quite inadequate to +form a screen for a Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which +constantly kept the sea. The number required, for such a screen to +be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle Fleet alone as then +constituted, and that number, 40, was all that we had stationed at the +Northern Base. The fuel capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for +them to remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days and +nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for three or four +times that period. Moreover, the destroyers could not be kept nearly +so constantly at sea as the large ships owing to their requirements +in the way of boiler-cleaning and the refit and adjustment of their +more delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only the +machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. The heavy ships, then, +had two alternatives, either to remain at sea without a destroyer +screen or to return to harbour with the destroyers. In the early +days the first alternative was adopted, the risk being accepted, but +minimised as far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part +of the North Sea. + +A further danger soon made itself apparent. It became evident at an +early period, as many naval officers had expected, in view of German +language at the Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw +overboard the doctrines of international law when he could gain any +advantage by doing so. He accordingly proceeded at once to lay mines +in positions where he thought they would be advantageous to his +operations, in utter disregard of the safety, not only of British, +but also of neutral merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very +probable that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the +North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might prove effective +against the Grand Fleet, and that he would do this without issuing any +warning to neutral countries. Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet +were kept moving continuously in the central and southern waters of +the North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay mines with +little danger of his operations being witnessed (as he could carry +them out under cover of darkness), it was evident that considerable +risks might be incurred without our being aware of the fact. The policy +of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried out with such +success as to produce equality, or even inferiority, on the part of the +British Fleet as compared with the German, in a comparatively short +space of time. The only safeguard against such action which we could +take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working ahead of the +Battle Fleet. But the number of mine-sweepers that we possessed was +wholly inadequate for such a task; and even if this had not been so, +to carry out such an operation would have necessitated the speed of +the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the maximum sweeping +speed of mine-sweepers, and it would have been forced also to steer a +steady course without zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships +exceedingly vulnerable to submarine attack. + +The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace, combined with +possible German action in regard to mine-laying, was to cause the +Battle Fleet to confine its movements _under ordinary conditions_ to +the more northern waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be +taken of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers, and +where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water and the distance +from enemy bases, that the Germans would be able to lay mines without +discovery. + +The fact that this course of action would be forced upon us as the +submarine and destroyer menace grew had often been present in my mind +in pre-War days, when I had expressed the view that the beginning of +a naval war would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the +larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have no doubt that +this opinion was very generally held by officers of experience. + +The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was combined with the +establishment of certain cruiser patrol _areas_ in the North Sea. These +areas, which were purposely made large, were watched on a regular, +organised plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high speed +in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk to the cruisers to +a minimum, whist at the same time they kept as effective a watch as +possible, first, to intercept German war vessels that might be covering +a raid on our coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to +operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all merchant ships +entering or leaving the North Sea should be closely examined in order +to enforce the blockade. + +This patrol policy was associated with periodical sweeps of cruisers, +supported by the Battle Fleet, down into the southern waters of the +North Sea, the object being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if +possible, and in any case, owing to our movements being probably +reported to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to make them feel +that they could never move a force to sea without the possibility of +encountering our Fleet engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which +we carried out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illustrated +in accompanying plans. On these occasions the Battle Fleet was kept +strictly concentrated during the southern movement, and was screened +as far as possible by destroyers against submarine attack; and at +times mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle Fleet. +When this was not possible, owing to the small number of mine-sweepers +available or the state of the weather, some of the older battleships +of the 6th Battle Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed +ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a minefield be +encountered, these older ships would be the first to strike the mines, +thus giving sufficient warning to enable me to manœuvre the more +valuable ships clear of the field. + +This general policy was continued until the attack on the _Theseus_ +and loss of the _Hawke_, belonging to the 10th Cruiser Squadron, by +submarine attack on October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the +dispositions then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked to too +great an extent when working without destroyers in the central part of +the North Sea. + +The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the cruiser patrols to +a safer position farther to the northward and eastward of the Shetland +Islands, this being combined with a watch by the smaller craft on the +Fair Island Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the North +Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet was often kept either in +a position westward of the Orkneys, where it was in support of the +cruisers and at the same time formed a second blockade line, or it +cruised to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser +patrols working farther south. + +In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on the northern +entrance to the North Sea, the principle kept in mind was the necessity +for such an organisation of the patrols as to have, in so far as +numbers permitted, two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were +at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out of the North +Sea were forced, so far as all human foresight could provide, to pass +through the waters occupied by one of the two groups of ships during +daylight hours; the distances apart were regulated according to the +length of the night at the different seasons of the year. + +As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward and westward, it +became possible to make use of the heavy ships to assist in blockade +work without running undue risks from submarines, and the blockade +increased correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, however, +the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number of armed merchant +cruisers enabled us to establish an effective blockade line by the +use of these vessels alone, backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such +were available. The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern +and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base was shifted +temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly. When this occurred, it did not +affect the policy of frequent cruiser sweeps into the southern portion +of the North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still +continued. + +The dispositions that have been described took account naturally of two +other very important factors. + +The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force to France. It +was highly probable that the enemy would endeavour to interfere with +this movement, and in the early days of the War it would not have been +a difficult matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make +at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of enterprise +which surprised me, as I think it surprised most naval officers. + +The conditions for him were distinctly favourable. Our main Fleet was +based, as he must have been aware, far away to the northward, and if he +had timed an attack on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during +which he reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers, +were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a good chance +of making the attack and returning to his base before that Fleet could +intervene. Consequently, he would only have had to deal with the +comparatively light forces based in southern waters. On the other hand, +if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the Germans would +have possessed no mean advantage. + +The enemy was provided with a large number of modern destroyers, +and some of them would have been well expended over a Channel dash, +which would in all probability have met with some success. During the +transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet +kept the sea as far as possible in order to cover the movement, but the +destroyers were constantly returning to the base to fuel. + +The second factor which had considerable influence on Fleet +dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a raid or invasion +by the enemy. Such a move was not very likely in the earliest days of +the War, when the nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary +Force had not left the country. It is also probable that the enemy had +few troops to spare for the purpose. But the chances became greater as +we denuded the country of men, and the conditions in other respects +became more favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and +expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted, landings would +probably be effected in the rivers on the East Coast, the entrances +to which were either unprotected or inadequately protected. A beach +landing on our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather, and +the chances of encountering favourable conditions on arrival off the +coast are not great, and I always doubted the attempt being made. In +our rivers the opportunities are greater, and are not so dependent on +fine weather, and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive +in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready to be sunk +across the channels (which are narrow and shallow), the ships being +fitted with explosive charges below ready to blow out the bottoms in +case of necessity. I mentioned the names of certain retired naval +officers who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary preparations +in a very few days. I believe that my proposals were carried out. + +The danger of raids, however, and the consequent responsibility thrown +upon the Admiralty for their prevention, during a period when we had +very little military force in the country, led to a division of the +Fleet by Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had certain +disadvantages from a strategic point of view. + +The 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of the “King Edward +VII.” class, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron of four ships of the “County” +class, were ordered to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers +for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then to be faced was +that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet having to engage the High Sea +Fleet, since concentration with the 3rd Battle Squadron could probably +not be effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of engaging. + +At this time the battle cruisers _Princess Royal_, _Invincible_, +and _Inflexible_ were in the Atlantic operating against Von Spee’s +squadron; and the _Australia_, _Indomitable_ had not joined the Grand +Fleet. The _Tiger_ was not yet ready, so that at times our battle +cruiser force consisted of only three ships, the _Lion_, _Queen Mary_, +and _New Zealand_. + +Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet for the prevention +of raids or invasion was a factor which had a considerable influence on +naval strategy. + +If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in the North Sea, +or if it was at sea for a cruise having exercises for its main object, +there was bound to be present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief +the chance that he might be required suddenly to move south to +engage the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a landing. +If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a moment very serious +consequences might ensue, and therefore all cruiser sweeps or other +operations had to be curtailed to prevent such a situation arising. + +One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our naval strategy +throughout the War, namely, the bombardment of our undefended towns on +the East Coast. Such bombardments were of no immediate military value +to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Press, +and the public, realised that the Navy should not be led into false +strategy because of these bombardments, it was difficult for the Fleet +to ignore them, and I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this +fact. + +Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was quite impossible +to ensure that the enemy would be brought to action after such an +operation, since to attain this end it would have been necessary +for the Fleet, or a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the +southern portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even had +it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keeping destroyers +with the heavier ships, and in any case it was false strategy to divide +the Battle Fleet, as such a course might well have resulted in disaster. + +The usual course adopted was to base the Battle Cruiser Fleet on +Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise from that neighbourhood. The speed +of the battle cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly +superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but there was +always some risk in this case of a ship being disabled; the flag +officer in command would then have been faced with the unpleasant +alternative of abandoning her or of risking his whole force to cover +her retreat. + +Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the enemy ports, so +as to obtain warning of their ships leaving, the difficulty would not +have been so great, but our submarines in those days (the only class +of vessel which could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted with +wireless installations with which they could signal from the required +positions, or indeed from positions anywhere near the enemy’s coast, +and, in any case, it must be borne in mind that at night the exit +of enemy vessels unobserved, even under the conditions of a close +submarine look-out, is a comparatively easy matter. + +At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the condition of British +naval bases. As is well known, the Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow +during the latter days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition +of the Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack, was +brought very strongly into prominence by the presence of so valuable a +Fleet at this Base. + +The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main entrances navigable by +all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha, and Hoy Channels, and, in addition, +has some more narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern +side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of providing gun +defences for this Base, which the Admiralty had decided a year or two +before the War was to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on +more than one occasion, after examination by a committee of officers +on the spot; but, since finance governs defence, and the Admiralty +from year to year had insufficient money for even more urgent needs, +no action had been taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the +German naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by enemy’s +destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by submarines. Its main, +indeed its only, safety against such attacks by submarines lay in +the navigational difficulties attendant upon entry into the harbour, +combined, as regards destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an +enemy’s force being intercepted on its outward or homeward passage, +or of its being successfully engaged in the vicinity of the base. +The sailing directions laid great stress upon the difficulties of +navigations in the approaches to this Base, due to the very strong and +varying currents, but the Germans were well acquainted with the Orkney +and Shetland Islands. They had indeed made it a practice to send ships +to visit these islands fairly frequently before the War, and they were, +therefore, as well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into +Scapa Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main Fleet Base, +they could deduce the fact, if they did not know it already, that the +difficulties of entry were not insuperable. + +Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the arrival of the +Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July, took immediate steps, with +the resources at his disposal in the Fleet, to improvise defences for +the Base against destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land +some 12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount them at +the entrances. No searchlights could, however, be provided, so that +the guns were not of much value at night. Arrangements were also made +for placing light cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to +assist these defences. The further step, of course, was taken when +the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols to the eastward +of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in the Fleet, however, that +these measures gave much security even against destroyer attack on a +dark night, and, it gave no security whatever against submarine attack. +Nothing but _obstructions_ of some kind could give that security. The +matter was frequently discussed. Although many brains had been at work, +no satisfactory anti-submarine obstruction had been devised. Under the +urgent pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion generally +held by experienced submarine officers was that, whilst the least +important entrances, such as the Hoy, the Switha and the Holm Sound +Channels, would be extremely difficult for the passage of a submarine, +entry by the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a determined +submarine officer. So much for the Base at Scapa Flow. + +At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better. The only entrance +to this Base is comparatively narrow, and was defended against the +entry of destroyers and larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted +by the Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however, no boom +protection against the entry of destroyers, and the conditions in +regard to submarine attack were the same as at Scapa Flow, there being +no obstructions. + +At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at Cromarty, namely, the +harbour was defended by guns only against attack by destroyers. In this +case, the guns were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at +Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to submarine attack. + +[Illustration: + + DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE BEING + REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW +] + +[Illustration: + + THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW +] + +Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of Fleets or Squadrons +at anchor in any of the Bases used by the Grand Fleet was immense. +For my part, I was always far more concerned for the safety of +the Fleet when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceedingly +brief periods which were spent there for coaling in the early days of +the War, than I was when the Fleet was at sea, and this anxiety was +reflected in the very short time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It +was also the cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more +than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a submarine in the +anchorage, and considerable risks were accepted in getting the Fleet to +sea in very thick weather at night on at least one of these occasions. + +I have often wondered why the Germans did not make greater efforts +to reduce our strength in capital ships by destroyer or submarine +attacks on our bases in those early days. They possessed, in comparison +with the uses for which they were required, almost a superfluity of +destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with ourselves, and +they could not have put them to a better use than in an attack on Scapa +Flow during the early months of the 1914–1915 winter. + +In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home waters fit for such +an operation, all with a speed of, or exceeding, 30 knots, this number +being in addition to a total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and +with speeds varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for +work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in the North Sea. + +This country had in home waters at the same period only 76 destroyers +that could be compared with the German vessels in view of modern +requirements, and 33 of these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76 +destroyers, 40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining +36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large and fast +destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to their small fuel +capacity, were only of use in southern waters and were appropriated +to Dover. And we possessed 25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a +nominal speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot destroyer; +the latter class was only fit for patrol work in the vicinity of the +coast. + +It may be said that similar reflections to those I have mentioned might +be made by the Germans as regards our own movements, and that they were +surprised that we did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer +is obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very short of +destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware of the thoroughness +of the defences of the German naval bases. We knew that they not only +possessed the most powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew +also that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and we were +justified in assuming that they had protected their naval bases by +extensive minefields. We, on the other hand, were entirely unprovided +with this particular form of defence. + +In view of the known quality of German artillery and mine defences +and the thorough nature of their organisation, my own view was that +they also possessed, in all probability, anti-submarine defences. +For these reasons, together with the important fact that the German +rivers are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them in a +submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack on their ships +in harbour would meet with no success, and that we could not afford +to expend any of our exceedingly limited number of destroyers, or +submarines, in making an attack which would, in all human probability, +be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the German defences proved +the correctness of this view. I can only imagine that the Germans +credited us, also, with possessing harbour defences and obstructions +which in our case were non-existent, although we did our best in the +Fleet to give the impression that we had obstructed the entrances, for, +pending the provision of proper obstructions, we improvised various +contrivances. It may have seemed impossible to the German mind that +we should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for its very +existence, in a position where it was open to submarine or destroyer +attack. + +This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those responsible for +the safety of our Fleet from the gravest anxiety whenever the more +valuable ships were in the undefended harbours. + +A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet +in the early part of the War shows the following figures. Only ships +that had completed their training and were fit to fight in the line are +included: + + +BATTLESHIPS + +(B., British; G., German) + + -----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+-------- + Date |Dreadnoughts| Pre- | Battle | Light |Destroyers|Airships|Cruisers + | |Dreadnoughts|cruisers|cruisers| | | + -----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+-------- + August 4th, 1914 | | | | | | | + B | 20 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 42 | | 9 + G | 13 | 16 | 3 | 15 | 88 | 1 | 2 + October 1st, 1914| | | | | | | + B | 20 | 12 | 6 | 12 | 42 | | 10 + G | 15 | 16 | 3 | 14 | 88 | 3 | 2 + January 1st, 1915| | | | | | | + B | 21[B] | 8 | 6 | 17 | 44 | | 14 + G | 16 | 16 | 4 | 12 | 88 | 6 | 1 + April 1st, 1915 | | | | | | | + B | 23 | 8 | 9 | 18 | 54 | | 17 + G | 17 | 16 | 4 | 14 | 88 | 6 | + October 1st, 1915| | | | | | | + B | 25 | 10 | 10 | 25 | 66 | | 15 + G | 17 | 16 | 4 | 15 | 88 | 12 | + -----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+-------- + + [B] 21 completed, but two of these (_Monarch_ and _Conqueror_) were seriously damaged + and one other battleship was refitting. + +The above list gives the vessels nominally available. + +In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s _selected_ and our +_average_ moment, the following facts should be remembered, and were +necessarily taken into account by me at the time: + +(_a_) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two light +cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and perhaps one battle +cruiser under refit, in addition to any other vessels that might be +temporarily disabled. + +(_b_) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was refitting when +planning an operation, and she could reinforce her Fleet by several +light cruisers and two or more flotillas of destroyers from the Baltic. + +(_c_) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important factor on either +side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in the case of our ships, the +comparatively short range of their guns, due to the small amount of +elevation of which their mountings admitted. + +(_d_) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers increased, were of great +assistance to the enemy for scouting, each one being, in _favourable +weather_, equal to at least two light cruisers for such a purpose. + +(_e_) Account is not taken in the British figures of the Harwich force, +as this force could not be counted upon to effect concentration with +the remainder of the Grand Fleet at the German selected moment. + +(_f_) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked the speed +necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were very slightly faster than +the battleships of the “Dreadnought” type, and, owing to their lack of +speed, they were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an enemy +Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On the other hand, they +were very superior in fighting qualities to the German light cruisers. + +It will be seen from the above statements that the enemy had by far +his best opportunity from the naval point of view in the early months +of the War, as he was then much nearer equality of strength with the +Grand Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap, which +included minefields and submarines, with the High Sea Fleet as a bait, +might have been very effective at any period of the War in inflicting +considerable losses on us. The Germans had their best opportunities +between November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915, the +situation got steadily worse for the enemy. + +The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this review of relative +naval strength, is that if this country in the future decides to +rely for safety against raids or invasion on the Fleet alone, it is +essential that we should possess a considerably greater margin of +superiority over a possible enemy _in all classes of vessels_ than we +did in August, 1914. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES + + +The Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being only at the +outbreak of the War, when it was so christened. As with the name, so +with the organisation. + +The great majority of the really effective ships in the Grand Fleet +were the outcome of the policy initiated by Admiral of the Fleet Lord +Fisher of Kilverstone when he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord +in 1904 in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of Lord +Fisher’s first acts--and he carried through a number of other changes +which reacted favourably on the efficiency of the Fleet for war--was +the introduction of the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the +_Dreadnought_, laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, was the +earliest example. She was closely followed by the three “all-big-gun” +battle-cruisers of the “Invincible” class, which were of the same +programme--1905–6. Much criticism was levelled at the _Dreadnought_, +but even more at the principle embodied in the battle-cruisers--ships +with the speed of cruisers, but the same calibre armament as +battleships. The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s conception. + +Our superiority _in capital ships_ at the outbreak of war was due +to the efforts of the Boards presided over by Lord Selborne and his +successors from 1904 onwards, and Lord Fisher held the post of First +Sea Lord for five and a half years of that period. At the beginning +of 1909, during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord, great +efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance of a sufficient +standard of superiority in capital ships over Germany, and to make good +our deficiencies in destroyers. The nation has good reason for the +most profound gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude he +assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to the table on page +31 will show the position that would have arisen if the four additional +“Dreadnoughts” had not been included in the 1909–10 building programme. +In the later Administration, presided over by Mr. Churchill, continued +efforts were necessary, and were made, and steps were also taken with +a view to meeting the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord +Beresford had for some years been pointing out how essential it was to +add largely to our programmes of light cruisers and destroyers. + +So much for construction in pre-War days when the Germans were carrying +out their Navy Acts, one following the other in rapid succession. + +It is also of interest to note the part which Lord Fisher took in +building up the Fleet organisation that existed in 1914. He introduced +the system of manning the older ships, not in the first line, with +nucleus crews composed of the principal officers and ratings. These +ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very short +time, into a condition in which they were fit to fight. This system +superseded the old arrangement, by which ships not in full commission +were not manned at all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the +total number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was minimised +by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably accepted now that in the +circumstances existing at the time the nucleus crew system is far +preferable; it raised the general standard of the whole Navy in British +waters, and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Reserves +on the outbreak of war. + + +I.--THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND FLEET + +In the organisation existing before the War, the Home Fleets comprised +the First, Second and Third Fleets--in fact, practically all ships in +home waters which it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war. + +The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home Fleets into two +parts. + +The _First_, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet, comprising the +latest-built ships; the force stationed at Harwich; four ships of the +6th Battle Squadron; the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second +and Third Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from the +Second Fleet. + +The _Second_, or Channel Fleet, included the older battleships, the +5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, the 5th and 7th Cruiser +Squadrons, and a sweeping flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was +commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, when +he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of the Grand Fleet. + +Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and +the 5th Cruiser Squadron were manned before mobilisation with nucleus +crews, and were consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at +Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons and 7th Cruiser +Squadron were not manned until mobilisation, and the crews consequently +required training. This training was carried out near Plymouth, and +the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command on September 3rd, +1914. + +The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed as a look-out force +in the Straits of Dover during the time that the Channel Battle Fleet +was patrolling to guard the passage of the Expeditionary Force. They +were subsequently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and +three of them, the _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, were sunk whilst +patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast. + +These, then, were the conditions when War opened. It was only natural +that war experience should show very quickly the many directions +in which we had to recast, or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to +introduce new arrangements. + +Peace manœuvres, however useful, can never be a substitute for war +experience. They are many factors which render peace manœuvres unreal. +In the first place, the available ships have to be divided so as +to form the opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far +greater moment, the manœuvres occupy much too short a period, and +many of the difficulties affecting both _matériel_ and personnel are +not experienced; thirdly, the conditions of war cannot be reproduced +without serious inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships; +finally, in our own manœuvres there was a tendency in the rules to give +the torpedo less than its proper value as a fighting weapon. + +But, more than all, it was the conditions under which war broke out +that made it necessary for us in the Grand Fleet to build up what was +almost a new organisation. + +(_a_) The submarine had just become a most formidable weapon; its +development during the War was extraordinarily rapid. + +(_b_) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the start, but +it also developed with great rapidity, as did the heavier-than-air +machines. + +(_c_) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly developed by the +enemy, both defensively and offensively. + +(_d_) The effective range both of the gun and of the torpedo was +quickly shown to be much greater than had been considered possible +before the War.[C] + +(_e_) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, and was put to +many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days. + + [C] In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out + at a maximum range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one + occasion, when the _Colossus_ fired at a target at 14,000 + yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded. + +On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having the Fleet +concentrated at the outbreak of war. People had often pictured war with +Germany coming as a bolt from the blue, and even naval officers feared +that when the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously +been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might lead the +Government to delay concentration with the result that our squadrons +would be separated when war was actually declared. Fortunately, the +Admiralty in the last days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong +strategic position. For this action the nation should be grateful to +the First Lord and First Sea Lord. + +It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, there +was general expectation that a great Fleet action would at once be +fought. No doubt this arose, partly, from the boastings of German naval +officers in pre-War days, and partly from a knowledge of the great +sacrifices the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively +our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult to imagine that +the High Sea Fleet (built at vast expense, and rightly considered +by the enemy to be an efficient weapon of war) would adopt from +the outset a purely passive rôle, with the inevitable result that +German trade would be swept from the seas. But there were two factors +tending to make the High Command adopt this course. First, there was +the fear that action with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High +Sea Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into Allied +hands, with a consequent landing of Russian troops on German soil as +the result. This fear had been present in the German mind ever since +the days of Frederick the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during +the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt, was that the German +High Command realised that, if Germany adopted a defensive rôle with +her Fleet, it created, by far, the most difficult situation for us. +Repugnant as this might be to high-spirited German naval officers, it +was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for, whilst the German High +Sea Fleet remained “in being” as a fighting force, we could not afford +to undertake operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particularly +in the earlier period of the War when our margin of superiority at +Germany’s “selected moment” was not great. The main disadvantage to +the Germans, _apart from their loss of trade_, lay in the inevitable +gradual weakening of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it +is highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end responsible +for the series of mutinies which broke out in the High Sea Fleet during +1917 and 1918, culminating in the final catastrophe in November, 1918. +In my view, the passive rôle was carried much too far. + + +II.--THE STAFF ORGANISATION + +To pass to the development of the organisation. + +Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff work. In the days +before the War, the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets +consisted of the following officers: + +(_a_) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander, Flag-Lieutenant, +and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was also, in a sense, on the Personal +Staff. + +(_b_) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the Fleet with his +Secretary, a Wireless officer, a Signal officer, and the clerical staff +of the Secretary. + +In addition, the organisation provided for the appointment of two War +Staff officers, on mobilisation for war. + +This was the Staff which, together with an additional Signal officer, I +found in the _Iron Duke_, on assuming command of the Grand Fleet. + +It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir George Callaghan in +December, 1914 (as was originally arranged before the War broke out, as +I have explained), to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational +side of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only for the +Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my opinion, sufficient +work and responsibility to occupy his whole time; and I had prepared +an organisation of the Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with +which the work should be divided into two distinct branches, the +operations and the _matériel_ side, each with a secretariat. I had +communicated my views to the officers selected for the Staff. This, in +my judgment, was the correct line for any Naval Staff organisation, and +it was later introduced by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff. + +When informed, just prior to the declaration of War, that I might be +required to take over the command of the Fleet, I decided to ask, as +the first step, for the services of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as +Chief of the Staff. + +I had brought with me from London on my own Staff, as Second in Command +of the Grand Fleet, a Captain (Captain Bentinck), with the title of +Captain on the Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a +Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and a Signal +Boatswain. These, with the exception of Captain Bentinck (who joined +Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender’s Staff), I took to the _Iron Duke_, +and my Staff then comprised: + + A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff. + A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet. + Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff. + A Flag-Lieutenant. + Three Signal officers. + Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two). + Three War Staff officers. + Two Signal Boatswains. + A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff. + +The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat with a +suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this difficulty was +somewhat serious when I doubled the staff on board the _Iron Duke_. +However, it was successfully overcome. The Staff was organised into +two branches--Operations and _Matériel_--the former directly under +the Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Captain of +the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the work of the Captain of +the Fleet became, of necessity, very largely reduced, and he joined +the operational side, arrangements being made by which either he or +the Chief of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as +we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on the advent of +the submarine as an important factor in naval warfare, that it was +essential that an officer should be constantly on the bridge who could +take immediate action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as +might be required. + +Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief was so frequently +required, at a moment’s notice, owing to the swiftness with which a +modern fleet moves, that I never left my sea cabin, which was under the +bridge, to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was at sea. + +The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as already stated, under +two headings. This division, as is clear from the above remarks, +affected their duties in harbour more than when at sea. In the +latter case the two branches combined, and the whole staff became +“operational.” + +The Staff work under these conditions was carried out in the war-room, +situated under protection, below the conning tower. Here the movements +of our own ships were recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we +were nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the bridge to this +centre by the Signal officers, and the situation at any moment could be +seen by a glance at the charts kept by the War Staff officer on duty. + +When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters, the work was +shifted from the war-room to the Admiral’s shelter on the bridge, so +that the situation could be seen by me more readily; and finally, when, +as on May 31st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were nearing +touch with one another, the “plot” of the movements as reported was +continually under my observation. + +At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers engaged on the +operational side were following the movements of such enemy vessels +(chiefly, of course, submarines) as were known to be at sea, as well +as those of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to +ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet each other at +night--when risk of collision would be incurred owing to ships not +carrying lights, or in thick weather.) They put into execution the +orders given by myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged in +elaborating plans of future movements and drawing up the necessary +orders for such movements as I had in contemplation. They were also +engaged in arranging all gunnery, torpedo and other practices and +exercises, and in the constant work of the production, revision and +issue of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the Fleet. + +On the _matériel_ side, the Staff work comprised that of storing, +provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions of instruction, +training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits and repairs, etc. + +In action each member of the Staff had his own particular duty allotted +to him. The secretaries took notes and recorded proceedings; certain +officers had as their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me +every movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to attend +solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy, keeping me informed of +their progress and of their possibilities; another dealt with all +questions relating to concentration or distribution of fire, bringing +to my notice any signals required to give effect to our preconceived +arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty, one being +responsible that all signals for tactical movements made visually +were also made by “short distance” wireless telegraphy. One wireless +officer worked in the main office and one in the auxiliary office. +The Staff was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief free to +take a comprehensive survey of the whole position, whilst ensuring +that nothing that should be done was left undone. It must, however, +be realised that the rapidity of movement of fleets is so great +that, at critical moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the +Flag Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make instant +decisions; there is no time for consultation or for advice. + + +III.--PREPARATION OF CRUISING ORDERS + +One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand Fleet after +the declaration of War was to lay down definitely the various +cruising orders for the Battle Fleet and its “look-out” screen of +battle-cruisers, cruisers and light cruisers. There had been much +discussion for some years before the War as to the best disposition of +cruisers ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that had +been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but war experience led +to a series of diagrams being drawn up giving the cruising stations of +all the various classes of cruisers and other light craft under the +different conditions that might exist. These included diagrams showing +the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards enemy waters, +under conditions of ordinary visibility, by day, or in low visibility +by day, both with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in company and without +it; a similar diagram when moving away from enemy water by day (this +being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack by destroyers +as the fleet steered away from enemy waters); diagrams were got out +for steering towards or away from enemy waters at night; and, finally, +diagrams were prepared, both for day and night, for the dispositions of +the cruisers and other light forces after an action. + +Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle Fleet itself, both +by day and at night, were similarly drawn up. Some of these were +specially designed to give such safety from submarine attack as was +possible to the main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of +destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of fuel, or other +causes. The dispositions for use at night provided for the use of +destroyer attack, and were designed to give safety from collision, due +to squadrons inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when +showing no lights; this was a very possible event during the course +of a long night when a very slight error in steering, or a slight +difference in compasses, will rapidly bring two squadrons together that +started the night five miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons +separated, as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful +submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons gave greater +freedom of movement in the case of destroyer attack. At the same time +it was necessary to provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at +daylight. + +The question of submarine screens was taken up at the commencement of +war. This matter had naturally been considered before the War, but was +in its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition of a +screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter when there is no +lack of destroyers, the case is different when a fleet is very short +of the requisite number, as was our experience, and one destroyer had +often to be disposed to endeavour to do the work of two. + +Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore, drawn up to meet the +different conditions resulting from the presence of varying numbers of +destroyers, or a decreased number of ships requiring to be screened, +and also providing for the ships being in various formations. In +November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was seventeen. + +Early in the War the danger of successful submarine attack on warships +at sea, whether in company or proceeding singly, had impressed on us +the necessity of taking every precaution for safety, and the practice +of the fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally +adopted in accordance with my directions. In the case of a fleet or +squadron, the usual practice was to carry out the alterations of course +by turning the ships together; occasionally the turn was made “in +succession,” but this was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns +were occasionally made at fixed time intervals without signal. + +Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner in which officers +of watches kept station in a fleet, since there is no better practice +than keeping station on a line of bearing, a far more difficult matter +to the novice than keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute +the excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915 and 1916 +very largely to this early experience. Much theoretical investigation +was instituted to determine the method of zigzagging, both in a fleet +and in a single ship, which gave the greatest protection against +submarine attack, and actual experiments took place with our own +submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions; the flag +officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance in this as in all +other matters. + +The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the instructions +subsequently issued to merchant ships, and the value of zigzagging +in reducing the danger of submarine attack was clearly shown during +the year 1917 by the comparative immunity of merchant ships that +complied with the orders as compared with those that did not do so. +Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship into danger, but +this was exceptional as compared with the general immunity given. + +When the convoying of merchant ships through the submarine zone was +instituted in 1917, after I had returned to the Admiralty, the Grand +Fleet experience was again of value in the preparation of instructions. + +The supremely important question of how best to handle in action the +large and increasing Fleet engaged my attention from the commencement. +In drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of the Fleet, +both when cruising and in action, I availed myself of the advice and +assistance of the experienced flag officers commanding the various +Squadrons. Much discussion took place on these matters, and many of the +dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual experiment at sea +before being incorporated in the orders. + +The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle Fleet from its +cruising formation was a matter of the greatest importance, and +constant practice in carrying out this manœuvre under every varying +condition was given to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were +introduced having as their object the simplification and shortening of +the manœuvre, with a view to bringing the heaviest possible fire to +bear on the enemy’s fleet as quickly as possible. Orders were drawn +up to meet cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy might +be sighted at short range, and immediate independent action by a +divisional Flag Officer would be necessary. + +In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of the Fleet for +action was complicated by the presence of the 3rd Battle Squadron of +pre-Dreadnoughts--the vessels of the “King Edward VII.” class--as the +speed of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less than that +of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured to solve this problem +by practical experience. Much depended on the tactics likely to be +adopted by the enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty lay in the +fact that if the 3rd Battle Squadron was placed on one flank of the +Battle Fleet when in cruising order and deployment towards that flank +became necessary in conformity with an enemy movement, thus placing +the slow 3rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the whole +Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14 knots, in order to have +the necessary reserve of speed in hand. If, on the other hand, the +3rd Battle Squadron was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet +speed was again reduced to that attainable by this squadron. It was +desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle Fleet which would +admit of the 3rd Battle Squadron being in the rear after deployment, +in whichever direction deployment took place. There was still the +objection, which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced +upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the van. + +The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre-Dreadnought +Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought Squadrons, with a view to the +slow squadron turning in the opposite direction to the remainder on +deployment, and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought +Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the 3rd Battle +Squadron into effective action. + +[Illustration: Plan N^{o.} 1] + +The question was not one of importance subsequent to April, 1915, from +which date our superiority in battleships of the Dreadnought type was +sufficient to give me confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under +suitable conditions, could be crushed in action without the aid of +the 3rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter of 1914–15, when our +superiority in Dreadnoughts was frequently very slight, and the enemy +possessed two pre-Dreadnought Battle Squadrons, our 3rd Battle +Squadron was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet. + +The Battle Orders indicated the position to be occupied by our +battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers on deployment, +as well as that of the fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of +ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the +Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued shortly after war +commenced were modelled on a Battle memorandum which I had prepared +when in command, first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd +Battle Squadron. But the changing situation soon made alterations and +additions necessary, and the Orders were under constant revision. + +The tactics to be pursued by the different units of the Fleet in action +under all conceivable conditions were provided for as far as possible. + +Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that the +Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after deployment control +the movements of all the squadrons comprising that fleet under the +conditions of modern action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the +great length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, and +increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity for wide +decentralisation of command, _after the deployment_ of the fleet for +action, was emphasised. + +As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid on this +point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, of course, kept +fully acquainted with the general ideas under which the Fleet would +act, so that they might be able to interpret my wishes when acting +independently. Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close +watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that squadrons +could conform to his movements. The general lines on which I intended +to engage were defined. These included the range at which it was +intended to open the engagement, the range below which it was not +intended to close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks to +be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to this rule which +might become necessary. Emphasis was laid on the supreme necessity for +a free use of our own torpedoes when opportunity occurred. + +After the experience of the engagement on January 24th, 1915, between +the battle-cruisers, and especially as our superiority increased and +the High Sea Fleet gave no sign of a desire to engage, the conviction +became stronger than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy +would fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of +tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines and torpedoes, +_since a retiring fleet is in a position of great tactical advantage in +the employment of these weapons_. The Tactical Board was in constant +use for a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the other +flag officers. + +In the earliest stages of the War, when the German submarine strength +was not great, one of the main problems to be considered in regard to +a fleet action was the employment of our destroyers and light cruisers +to attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to counter his +similar attacks, which, owing to his great superiority in destroyers, +was a matter of supreme importance. The knowledge, too, that his light +cruisers and destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships, +were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with us) made it +necessary to take into account the probability that he would use this +form of attack at the commencement of a general action, or during +the stages leading up to it. Later, when his submarines increased +in number, the method of countering the use of such vessels by the +enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action, had also to be +considered, particularly as it was not until 1916 that the Grand Fleet +was provided with any submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that +submarines which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea became part of +the organisation. + +The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo attack by the enemy, +if the fleets were approximately abeam of one another, and the risks +run by the centre and rear were pointed out, as were the different +conditions produced in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had a +position of torpedo advantage. + +The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater as the War +progressed, owing to the advance made in the technique of these +weapons. Before the opening of hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had +a maximum range of about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements in our +torpedoes as the War progressed, including a great increase in range, +and we had every reason to believe that the Germans were making similar +progress, and that the range of their torpedoes was as much in excess +of the pre-War range as was that of our own weapons. + +The threat of successful torpedo attack even from battleships in the +line was, therefore, an important factor to be taken into account, +with the ships of the opposing fleets formed in single line at the +close intervals which are necessary for successful co-operation and +the concentration of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation +into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet action was +constantly proceeding, but the single line, or a modification of it, +was, under most conditions, the best that could be devised. + +It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be manœuvred for +advantage in gunnery position, it might be necessary to engage under +unfavourable gunnery conditions in order to prevent the enemy reaching +his own waters. + +Several new manœuvres were introduced and practised by the Fleet with +a view to countering possible tactics on the part of the enemy. These +included a “turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious attack +by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the course of the Fleet +without impairing its organisation to meet enemy tactics necessitating +such a move; rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other +new tactical methods were introduced as time progressed to meet the +changing conditions of modern warfare. + +Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the conduct of the Fleet +after an action, so far as it was possible to foresee the conditions +that might arise. The object was to arrange to continue the attack by +light craft, whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter-attack +by light forces. + +In the orders which were issued for the guidance of the destroyers both +before, during, and after an action, endeavour was made to provide for +all these contingencies. The stations of the flotillas, including the +Harwich flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each had +its particular duties assigned to it. General directions were given for +the employment of the destroyers, wide latitude being reserved to the +officers commanding flotillas. + +The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for. + +The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser, cruiser and light +cruiser when in cruising order, or in action, or after an action, were +defined, particular emphasis being laid on the necessity for ships in +the van, when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advantage in +regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the same time engaging +enemy vessels of a similar class and preventing torpedo attacks on our +own Battle Fleet from developing. + +Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the General Cruiser +Instructions, that after gaining touch with the enemy the first +essential was to maintain that touch. Instructions were also given that +in the event of the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our +Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were to push +on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It will be seen later +that this situation arose during the Jutland battle. + +The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the principle that _in +action_ their primary function was the destruction of the similar enemy +vessels if present, and, after their destruction or in their absence, +to attack the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their +duty was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, +whilst denying similar information to the enemy. The Vice-Admiral +commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was given a free hand to carry out +these general instructions. + +The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the ships of the “Queen +Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to provide for the battle-cruisers +being either absent or present. In the former event, this squadron +took the place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our +battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle Squadron was +ordered to take station ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet +in the case of a deployment towards Heligoland, and in rear of the +Battle Fleet in the case of deployment _away from_ Heligoland. The +object of this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet at +a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after deployment. In +order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron to carry out its functions in +action, it was stationed between the Cruiser Line and the main Battle +Fleet when in cruising order. + +The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their duties in action +as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers and torpedo craft, to +support our destroyers, and to attack the enemy’s battle line with +torpedoes. For this purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were +required to be in the van on deployment. + +The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the fact that +they should carry out an early attack on the enemy’s Battle Fleet, +commencing their attacks in clear weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet +were engaged. Under conditions of low visibility, they were instructed +to attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be engaged. It was +pointed out that destroyers closing the enemy’s Battle Fleet for the +purpose of an attack were also in the best position for preventing +successful attacks on our own fleets. + +As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the Grand Fleet, in +1916, instructions for their conduct before, during, and after action +were drawn up. Instructions for two other classes of vessel, namely, +mine-layers and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of +the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having been attached to the +Fleet from the commencement of War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing, +however, but slow speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during +1915. + + +IV.--THE TRAINING OF THE FLEET + +Inseparable from the question of the management of the Fleet before +and during action was that of the working together of its units at sea +by day and at night. This matter was, of course, one to which great +attention had been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he handed +over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine trained to a very +high pitch of perfection by an officer who was a past master in fleet +training. + +But it was inevitable that war conditions should make even greater +demands on the skill of the personnel than had previously been +necessary, and in no direction was this more necessary than at night, +the number of ships in company being far greater than had previously +been usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling added to +the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, fleets cruising +on dark, stormy nights without showing any lights, did so for +comparatively short periods, during which the more experienced officers +could, to a certain extent, remain on deck. + +Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed more than a very +dim light at the stern, and frequently not even that, adding greatly +to difficulties of fleet cruising. Consequently provision had to be +made for ensuring safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and +considerable foresight and great skill on the part of officers was +necessary. + +Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility pass close +to one another during hours of darkness were warned beforehand of the +danger, and arrangements made so that they should be aware of each +other’s positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions so as +to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which otherwise might +open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all sorts were similarly warned so +far as this was possible, but in their case the conditions, owing to +difficulties of communication, were frequently much more embarrassing. + +Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night had to be such as +to reduce to a minimum the necessity for signals, whilst giving freedom +of action in an emergency. What applied to conditions of darkness +applied equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring safety +in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, could not as a rule be +employed, since the blasts might give warning to the enemy and place +the Fleet open to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the +other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in close company +with the larger ships for screening purposes against submarines led, +in the case of sudden fog, to a difficult situation, as, before the +Fleet could safely carry out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the +destroyers clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by the +large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued to meet all these +conditions, and the best testimony to the training of the Fleet prior +to the War was the remarkable freedom from accident during the early +months after the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly +commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by no means handy +vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation, was also a source of +great gratification to me, and must have been most satisfactory to the +officers and men concerned. + +The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly in light +craft, the higher speeds attained by its units, the extreme importance +of reducing signalling by wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, +except in the presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate +attention on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements. +Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to be stopped, because by +means of _directional_ wireless stations the positions of ships using +wireless telegraphy could be determined by the enemy. As time went on, +we felt that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and in some +cases even the _name_ of the ship so signalling. This we deduced from +the fact that we ourselves made progress in this direction. The fact of +a German fleet being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if +much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally concluded that the +enemy could similarly locate any of our squadrons using the same means +of communication. That was an inevitable inference. + +The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in the first place, +to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled and elaborate orders, to +reduce the amount of signalling that would ordinarily be required after +the Fleet had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the +Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions that could be +anticipated, and whilst this made the orders somewhat lengthy so as to +meet every possibility, the object was achieved. + +Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea in daylight, +arrangements were made to pass signals in and out between the most +advanced cruisers and the Fleet Flagship by searchlight, except in the +presence of the enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time +occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet manœuvring when +much to the southward of the latitude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of +Aberdeen, was also carried out by visual signalling. + +Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the Fleet to +enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not possible to use visual +signalling at night, except with carefully shaded lamps which were +only visible at a distance of about a quarter of a mile, and then only +by the ship addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at +night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort had then +to be made to wireless, but by signalling before dark all expected +movements during the night, and by arranging the course of the Fleet +so that few alterations were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost +absolute wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when important +information from the Admiralty and elsewhere was to be transmitted to +the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior officers of squadrons, or to single +ships when at sea engaged in operations, etc., and early in the War +we had to devise a method by which this could be done without calling +up the ships in question by wireless, thus necessitating a reply from +them, and thus possibly acquainting the enemy of their position. + +After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of communicating +the required information without causing the ship herself to +divulge her position was devised by the Fleet Wireless officer, +Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and +gradually was greatly extended during the later stages of the War. + +It must not be thought that, because wireless signalling at sea +was restricted, it was not intended to make full use of it when +necessary and when silence was no longer required, such as when the +fleets were within sight of one another. On the contrary, a great +advance was made during the War in the use of wireless telegraphy for +manœuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in every other direction. So +proficient did the ships become under the organisation introduced +by Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very +efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in 1916 +I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as much ease and +rapidity as by visual signals. At the beginning of the War ten minutes +to a quarter of an hour would elapse before I could be sure that all +ships had received a manœuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole +Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to three minutes. +This great improvement was due to new methods introduced, as well as to +incessant practice in harbour. + +Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was very considerable +indeed, and I owed a great debt of gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander +Nicholson, the other wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and +the wireless officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress +was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme shortage of wireless +personnel for the expanding Fleet and the large number of auxiliary +vessels commissioned, we were forced to discharge many of the best +operators in the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by +boys trained in the Wireless School established by the Fleet at Scapa +Flow. + +A point which war experience brought into considerable prominence +was the difficulty of distinguishing, with sufficient rapidity, +enemy vessels from our own ships both before, and, more particularly +during, action. The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but +was greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. Steps were +taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrangements made for certain +distinguishing marks visible at long distances to be worn during +daylight by our own surface vessels. The question of identification at +night was more difficult, and although we effected improvement in this +respect also, the results were not so satisfactory. + +Of the original experimental work carried out by the Fleet at Scapa +Flow none was more important than that connected with the safety of +ships from mines. Early in the War it had become obvious that there was +danger of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful mine +attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work of the mine-sweepers; +these vessels could not work far afield, and in bad weather could not +work even close to their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to +proceed to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable. + +A solution of this difficulty was required. Commander Cecil V. Usborne, +of the _Colossus_, in these circumstances proposed to me the trial of +an apparatus which he suggested should be towed from the bows of ships; +it was intended to fend off any mine encountered, provided the ship did +not strike it absolutely “end on.” I ordered immediate trials; all the +necessary _matériel_ was provided with Fleet labour and appliances, +and starting with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until +a series of experiments commenced in large ships, battleships and +cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A. L. Duff and A. C. Leveson in charge +of the experiments and great progress was made, although absolute +success was not obtained. + +Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, visited +the base at this juncture, and, knowing his inventive turn of mind, +I discussed the matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant +Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for effecting the required +object. His idea was to utilise apparatus which he had devised earlier +for other purposes. His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than +that devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the manufacture +of appliances by outside manufacturers. I urged the Admiralty to take +up the question at once; this was done, and the experiments, started +at Portsmouth, were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as preliminary +success had been obtained. + +The two devices were then tried over a considerable period at Scapa +Flow, still under the immediate direction of Rear-Admirals Duff +and Leveson, who threw themselves wholeheartedly into the task, +Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional +absence. After many disappointments the Burney system was proved to be +successful, and I at once requested that manufacture on a large scale +should be proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate character, +and many persons at first were sceptical as to its value, owing partly +to early difficulties in manipulation. But Rear-Admirals Duff and +Leveson rendered the greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and +gradually it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had become possessed +of a most valuable safeguard. By the time I relinquished the Command a +very large number of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and +some light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working well. +Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improvement was constantly being +effected, with the result that during 1917 the fitting was universal. +During that year it was instrumental in saving several warships from +damage by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was also +considerable. + +The initial idea was that of Commander Usborne, and both he and +Lieutenant Burney displayed much energy in working out their respective +devices. But it was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final +success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson eventually brought +the appliance to perfection, with the result that it was generally +adopted. A modified arrangement of the same nature was fitted to +merchant ships during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value. + +As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early stage of my Command +to the necessity for constant improvement in the fighting efficiency +of the Grand Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was +considerable, left me under no delusions as to its character. I had +made it my business to keep myself very fully acquainted with German +progress. I had first been brought into close touch with the modern +German Navy during service in China from 1899 to 1902, which included +the Boxer campaign, when I saw a great deal of its officers and men. +I had then formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent +touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had convinced me that in +_matériel_ the Germans were ahead of us, and that the personnel, though +lacking the initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the +British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and trained. I knew +also that the German Fleet was in no way short of officers; this was +the case with us owing to the constant political pressure in the years +before the War, and I expected that this shortage of officers would be +a great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch of the German +Navy from which I expected very good work was the destroyer service. I +had seen German destroyers manœuvring. + +Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our officers, how efficient +was the gunnery and torpedo work of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid +had been its advance in the year or two before the War. A great +increase had been made in the allowance of ammunition for practice. +Before the War this was much higher than our own, and there was no +doubt in my mind that the German allowance would be well expended. +Indeed, we had obtained information which placed this beyond question. + +I was well acquainted personally with many of the flag officers and +captains in the German Navy and had some idea of their views on naval +warfare. Amongst those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl, the +then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral von Lans, +commanding a Battle Squadron, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval +Staff, who later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral von +Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Commander-in-Chief of the +High Sea Fleet, who succeeded Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval +Staff, and Admiral von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore +batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowledge of these +officers led me to expect good work in the High Command, and I also +expected that they would be well supported. + +It is interesting to record that I took part in a Conference of Allied +naval officers in a pagoda at the end of the Great Wall of China in +company with Admiral von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain +in China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts, in 1900, +and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me as Chief of the Staff to +Admiral--afterwards Admiral of the Fleet--Sir Edward Seymour, when I +was wounded during the international expedition for the relief of the +Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on several subsequent +occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans, who was in command of the +_Iltis_ at the capture of the Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer +campaign. + +My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong reason, had no others +existed, for making me desirous of doing all that was possible to +increase our own gunnery and torpedo efficiency. + +The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground in Kiel Bay, with +every appliance for carrying out gunnery exercises, and I felt sure +that they had rendered it safe from any hostile attack, and that the +German Fleet would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as +time progressed. + +We were not in so fortunate a position. There had been no recent +opportunity for carrying out gunnery and torpedo exercises and +practices; Scapa Flow had not been used as a base for such work in +peace time, except for destroyers, and consequently no facilities +existed there, although the proximity of Cromarty, which _had_ been a +Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a certain extent +at a later period. But there was no protected area outside the harbour +where practices could be carried out in safety, and the harbour itself +was not at first secure against submarine attack. Much use, however, +was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty later when submarine +obstructions had been provided, and the Germans had obligingly laid +a mine-field which protected the practice area from seaward. At the +commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to depend on fleet +resources for the provision of targets for gunnery practices, and the +practices themselves were carried out under conditions which laid the +ships open to submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the +work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity provided by +constant sea work in the first months of the War was, however, utilised +to carry out such gunnery practices as the conditions admitted. + +At first the custom was for the Fleet to use small targets which the +ships carried with them. These were unsuitable; their small size +rendered them frequently invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea, +and I felt that the Fleet could not make progress under such conditions. + +Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted to, but no really +suitable rocks existed, and, in any case, practice at them eventually +involved too much risk of submarine attack, as the German submarines +began to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards the end +of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase in the number of +destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to the provision of submarine +obstructions at Cromarty, to carry out gunnery practices at long ranges +at targets in the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that +period. + +Later still, battle practice targets were brought to Scapa Flow, and +the long-range firing was carried out in the Pentland Firth, a still +more convenient place. + +Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for all the preliminary +gunnery practices which could be carried out with guns up to 6-inch +in calibre, and also for night firing and for torpedo work. The +fine stretch of water was secure from submarine attack after the +obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise by day and +night without danger of attack. The Flow was simply invaluable for this +purpose. Ships were firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control +exercises, carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing with +attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight until dark. + +After dark, night firing was frequently carried out, and occasionally +a division of battleships was exercised in steaming in company, without +lights, in order to give the officers of watches practice. When the +constant sea work of the earlier months of the War gave place to +occasional cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of the Fleet +was maintained at a remarkably high standard as a result of the work in +Scapa Flow. + +During the period 1914–16 a marked advance was undoubtedly made in +gunnery efficiency. At an early period of the War a memorandum was +issued pointing out the necessity for increased attention to drill +and organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon, and it was +obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers and men. I knew that we +had to deal with an enemy who would be as perfect as constant drill +could ensure. + +A great extension of the system of Director Firing, by which one +officer or man could lay and fire all the guns, was made. The situation +in this respect before the War was that a few ships had been fitted for +the system, which had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a +very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value compared +with the alternative system; there was considerable opposition to it, +and the great majority of the ships were not fitted. In some cases the +system was not favoured even in the ships provided with it. + +It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out competitive trials of the +Director System and the alternative system already in use, and the +results of these trials had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion +of the great value of the Director System. I was able to press these +views on my return to the Admiralty at the end of 1912 as Second Sea +Lord, and it was then decided to provide all the later ships with the +arrangement. Little progress had, however, been made when the War +broke out, only eight battleships having been fitted. + +Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the assistance of Sir Percy +Scott and the warm support of Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by +which the battleships and battle-cruisers were supplied with this +system, without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard for +the purpose. The necessary instruments were manufactured at various +contractors’ shops, and the very laborious task of fitting them, and +the heavy electric cables, on board the ships was carried out by +electricians sent to the various bases. The complicated work naturally +took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays occurred; but +gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy Scott rendering invaluable +assistance at headquarters. + +As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy guns mounted in +turrets, and by the date of the Battle of Jutland there were few ships +that were not supplied with the system, although six of those last +fitted had not had much experience with it. + +The conditions under which that action was fought converted any +waverers at once to a firm belief in the Director System, and there was +never afterwards any doubt expressed as to its great value. + +Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work, and the system +was extended to smaller vessels. This had been the intention even +before the action, but there were then still many who were unconvinced. +However, during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was pressed +forward, and the system became universal for all guns and in all +classes of ships. + +The improvement in what may be termed the application of existing +methods of fire control may now be mentioned. Throughout the War +we had gradually, as the result of practice, increased greatly the +effective range at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid +on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the target in +order to obtain early hits. Improvement was perhaps most rapid in the +five or six months following the Jutland action. In this action the +Fire Control Instruments, as adopted in the Service, which were the +outcome of the work of naval officers, were found to meet the gunnery +requirements most successfully. The only important improvement that was +made was the provision of additional means for keeping the observation +of Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Various +committees were formed immediately after the battle in order that full +advantage might be taken at once of our experience. The result was the +introduction of new rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition +to greatly increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered it +difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment by dodging tactics. + +[Illustration: SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS] + +[Illustration: A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915] + +In order to cope more successfully with the latter development, more +experiments were ordered, having as their object the determination of +the inclination of the enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and +various methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended to the +Fleet. The most promising at the time that I relinquished command of +the Fleet was that proposed by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N., +the range-finding expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this +inclination problem for some years. A great increase in the rapidity +with which the fall of shot were “spotted on” to a target resulted from +all this work. It is not too much to say that the interval between +opening fire and the moment at which the salvoes began to “straddle” +the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of fire when the +enemy was “straddled” was very greatly increased. The new firing rules, +by standardising the system of correcting fire, produced a marked +increase in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two +ships was concentrated on to one target and generally paved the way for +the solution of many gunnery problems which the Fleet had previously +been unable to solve completely. + +The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as a result of our +experience of the German use of this device. Prolonged experiments were +carried out at Scapa Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best +method of using smoke screens, and they were also used during battle +tactics and during range-finder exercises. The trials included the use +of smoke shell as well as funnel and artificial smoke. + +In another direction efforts were made to increase efficiency. The +Jutland battle convinced us that our armour-piercing shell was inferior +in its penetrative power to that used by the Germans, and immediately +after the action I represented this with a view to immediate +investigation. A Committee sat to consider the matter. In 1917, as +First Sea Lord, I appointed a second Committee. + +With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of a particular +calibre as used at Jutland the shell would, with oblique impact at +battle range, _break up whilst holing a certain thickness of plate_, +and the shell could not, therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s +ships. A shell of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee, +of the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and range _pass +whole through a plate of double the thickness_ before exploding and +could therefore with delay action fuse penetrate to the magazines of a +capital ship. Had our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing +shell at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being +only damaged, would probably not have been able to reach port. The +manufacture of these new type shells for the Fleet was well advanced +before the end of 1917. + +The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in action, from ships, +from destroyers, and from submarines, was also greatly increased. The +torpedo practices at Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, +were of the greatest possible use. + +The real cause underlying the improvement was the great keenness +displayed by officers and men. Their one idea was to strive for the +highest efficiency, and there was never apparent the least sign of +weariness or staleness in repeating time after time exercises and +practices with which they were so familiar. No tribute that I can +pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in this connection could be +sufficiently high. I know that under my successor the improvement in +fighting efficiency continued. + +Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel of the German Navy, +culminating in the surrender for internment of the majority of their +capital ships, the Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in +action the methods adopted as a result of our experience during the +first two years of war, and perfected by two years’ further training. +Had the German fleet come out to battle a terrible punishment awaited +it! + +Mention has been made of the development of aircraft during the War. +The possibilities resulting from the use of the air for reconnaissance +work, for assisting in the direction of gunfire, and, finally, for +offensive operations, were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but +for a considerable period the lack of suitable machines hindered +development. The first decisive step taken was the fitting out of the +_Campania_, a passenger ship of the Cunard Line, as a sea-plane carrier +to be attached to the Battle Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force +and, later, the Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller +vessels, the _Vindex_ and _Engadine_, carrying a few sea-planes. They +had been used in operations in the Heligoland Bight, but without much +success, owing to the difficulty experienced in getting sea-planes to +rise from the water except in the finest weather. + +With the arrival of the _Campania_ at Scapa, we were able to +investigate the difficulties attending the use of aircraft from ships +as then fitted and to indicate the direction in which improvement was +desirable and possible. It was apparent that little improvement could +be expected so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from +the water. The first step, therefore, was to improve the arrangements +for flying off from the deck of the _Campania_. The ship returned to +Liverpool at the end of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations +might be effected; these were not completed until the late spring of +1916; during the alterations, the _Campania_ was also, at my request, +fitted to carry a kite balloon. + +The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite balloons had been +demonstrated during the Dardanelles operations, and the _Menelaus_, +kite balloon ship, was sent to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon +obvious that we could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a +fleet action unless they were flown from the ships themselves, and +experiments were carried out, under the direction of Vice-Admiral +Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the 4th Battle Squadron, having as +their object the best method of fitting and using kite balloons from +warships. Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one being +that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand the tension of +the balloon during strong winds. The Kite Balloon Section at Roehampton +gradually solved the difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority +of the flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided with kite +balloons, and were experiencing their utility. From this beginning, +great developments took place in providing vessels of all classes, +including light cruisers, destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite +balloons; the balloon was used in the case of the smaller vessels for +anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the heavy ships it was +used for observation and correction of fire. + +Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier had proceeded, +but not with the same rapidity. It was evident to me in 1916 that for +anti-Zeppelin work we should look towards the aeroplane flying from +the deck, rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise +from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe for the step, +owing to the landing difficulty, and the first efforts of the Royal +Naval Air Service lay in the direction of providing a type of sea-plane +that would fly well off the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were +fairly successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air craft +machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until the aeroplane was +adopted for the work; and this took place in 1917, when progress became +rapid, and continued until the end of the War. + +There remains the question of the airship, which was also being +developed during the period 1914–16, but as this matter was not within +the province of the Fleet, it is unnecessary to touch upon it here. + + +V.--THE BLOCKADE + +The story of the development of the Grand Fleet would be incomplete +without reference to the Blockade, and, in particular, to the work +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. In the early days of the War, the 10th +Cruiser Squadron consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class--vessels +at least twenty years old; and during August, 1914, the Admiralty +commissioned three armed merchant ships, the _Mantua_, _Alsatian_ and +_Oceanic_, to strengthen the squadron for blockade work; the latter +ship was lost by shipwreck in September of that year. + +The Blockade in those early days was carried out by the 10th Cruiser +Squadron and by the other cruiser squadrons attached to the Grand +Fleet. During November, 1914, the ships of the “Edgar” class were +withdrawn owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the ships’ +companies utilised to commission a number of additional armed merchant +cruisers. By the end of December, 1914, the squadron consisted of +eighteen ships, being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships. +A very large proportion of the officers and men of the reconstituted +10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mercantile Marine. + +The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels called for a +considerable organisation for their maintenance; they were based on +Liverpool for all the heavy work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced +base at Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland Islands, was +gradually developed, and obstructed against submarine attack. The work +of organisation was carried out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded +the squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stileman, the Senior +Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom we were much indebted for hearty +co-operation and efficient organisation at the base. + +The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting and boarding all +vessels bound into or out of the northern entrance to the North Sea, +and this work could obviously not be carried out in the face of the +German submarines without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was +greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examining vessel +was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat. As the number of +German submarines increased, the squadron was necessarily withdrawn +to positions further removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the +Blockade line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from the Orkneys +and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to Iceland, and when freedom +from ice rendered passage round the north of Iceland possible, ships +operated in that neighbourhood. + +A careful organisation of the movements of the ships was necessary to +cover such an immense area of the sea, and to provide that all ships +should, as far as possible, be intercepted. Even in the case of ships +of such large coal endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not +possible to keep much more than one-half the number in commission on an +average on the patrol line at the same time. The remainder were either +in port refitting and refueling, or were _en route_ to and from the +bases. The distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool was +some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in the passage each way. + +[Illustration: _Plan N^{o.} 2._ + + Chart showing in pecked lines the area in which the ships of the + 10^{th.} Cruiser Squadron usually worked after about the middle of + the year 1915; the positions of the ships being constantly changed. + + Prior to this the areas were in the vicinity of A.B.C.D.G. +] + +When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run the gauntlet +of enemy submarines, which were passing down the west coast of the +Hebrides and Ireland, and as no destroyers were available with which +to screen them against attack, the risk was considerable. They had +also to face the constant danger of mine-fields. Several ships of +the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with a resultant heavy +loss of life. + +Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the boarding parties was +very arduous. The preliminary examination could not be carried out +without boarding, and the manner in which the boats of the squadron +were handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in northern +latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship of the officers and +men. In this boarding work the fishermen of the Newfoundland Royal +Naval Reserve, hardy and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous +service. + +The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually from its inception, +as is well known, and after a time the percentage of vessels that +evaded the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron became so low as to +be almost negligible. The procedure adopted was to send all ships, +preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any suspicion, into +Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where regular examination services +were instituted. The ships were taken in under the supervision of an +armed guard, sent on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards +underwent many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their lives in +ships which were torpedoed by German submarines, and in many cases, +particularly in badly found sailing ships, they underwent great +hardships. The guards were also the means of saving more than one such +ship from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew refused +to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact and discretion on +the part of the officer in charge, usually a junior officer of the +Royal Naval Reserve, were necessary in his dealings with the neutral +captains. The whole question of the efficiency of the Blockade--as +shown by the returns furnished to me from Headquarters--was constantly +under review by my Staff and myself. + +The fate of the detained ship was decided in London on receipt of the +report of examination. As was perhaps natural, the sentence on many +ships’ cargoes pronounced in London was not accepted without question +from the Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with reference +to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were naturally very critical of +any suspicion of laxity in passing, into neutral countries bordering on +Germany, articles which we suspected might find their way into Germany, +and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the Admiralty, +and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when that Ministry was +established. The difficulties with which the Foreign Office was faced +in regard to neutral susceptibilities were naturally not so apparent +in the Fleet as to the authorities in London, and though many of our +criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some possibly +incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were of use. Indeed, +they were welcomed in London as giving the naval point of view. The +decisive effect of the Blockade did not become apparent until the end, +when the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an influence on +the result of the War this powerful weapon had exercised. Even those +who during the War had been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised +at the last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result of +the silent pressure of Sea Power. + + +VI.--THE GRAND FLEET BASES + +Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected state of the Grand +Fleet bases against submarine attack in the early part of the War. The +matter was one of supreme importance, and formed the subject of very +urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains were at work on +the problem at the Admiralty, at the bases, and in the Fleet itself. + +The first step was that taken under the direction of Captain Donald S. +Munro, the King’s Harbour Master at Cromarty, who devised a system of +submarine obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep-water +obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing to his energy and +driving power, the entrance to Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by +October 26th, 1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for Cromarty +another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R., under the command of +Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of +Scotland, suggested a method for providing an obstruction for the +Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by the end of October, 1914, and +was also entirely successful. + +As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I requested that +obstructions on similar lines should be fitted to the three main +entrances to Scapa Flow, the Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to +be attempted) being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the +supply of the necessary material were experienced, and the first line +of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance was not completed until December +29th, 1914, the first line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and +that in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile officers and men +of the Fleet had improvised obstructions, first at Lough Swilly and +Loch na Keal, and later at Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough +security against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychological +value. These obstructions, which were kept in existence even after the +completion of the more efficient methods of dealing with the problem, +involved much labour. + +Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disadvantages attendant +on basing the Fleet so far north as Scapa Flow, were discussed between +Sir Henry Jackson (then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that, +with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of intercepting +the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and of dealing with landing +raids covered by the High Sea Fleet, were so considerable as to make +it eminently desirable to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this +were feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the result I +suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions across the Firth of Forth, +which would admit not only of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that +anchorage, but would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being +carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the Forth, so that +the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its fighting efficiency. Many +senior officers in the Grand Fleet were not in favour of the idea, +for two reasons: first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy +with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at Scapa; and, +secondly, that practices could not be so efficiently carried out in the +Forth. There was much weight in both these objections, although the +difficulties of carrying out practices in the Forth were exaggerated; +but the strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and the +scheme was proceeded with as proposed. + +That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe carrying out of +practices was completed by December, 1916, and the whole of the new +obstructions were in place by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is +true, than the anticipated date. The result certainly justified the +conclusion arrived at. When the conditions made it at all probable +that the High Sea Fleet might put to sea for an operation in southern +waters, the Grand Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the +undoubted disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by +skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers responsible. + +The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack was +only one of the many factors necessary for their development. In +pre-War days, although it had been decided that the use of northern +bases would be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the bases +had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It is, perhaps, +desirable to remove any misunderstanding as to the causes of this +failure. + +(_a_) The decision had not long been taken, and + +(_b_) The necessary financial provision was lacking. + +Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa Flow was affected, +and, under the second, that at Rosyth, where for some time progress in +the development of the base had been arrested. + +The Admiralty had taken steps to make some preparations at Cromarty, +in so far as the provision of gun defences against attack by surface +vessels was concerned, but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a +fleet beyond a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one of the +floating docks at southern yards. + +In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted our Fleet to +the north, all the conveniences for the maintenance of that fleet were +still in the Channel ports. The first step was the transference of the +large floating dock from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty +Firth, together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were housed in +a merchant ship captured from the Germans. Workshops were fitted up +on shore under the energetic superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund +R. Pears and his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with +great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invaluable to the +Grand Fleet. + +Invergordon gradually developed into a great repairing base. A second +and smaller floating dock was purchased early in 1916 at my request +and placed there, and by the middle of that year the base had attained +large proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapidity and +success, including the repairs of battleships after the Jutland battle, +and the great extension in armoured-deck protection fitted to ships +after the same action. + +Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at Invergordon +since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow the same possibilities as a +repairing base did not exist, although a floating dock for destroyers, +for which many requests had been made, was eventually obtained and +placed there. + +But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all knowledge in other +directions. In August, 1914, the base organisation consisted only of +the seagoing Fleet repair ships _Cyclops_ and _Assistance_. At an +early stage the _Cyclops_ was connected to a shore telegraph cable off +the village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a floating post +office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a few drifters) which +were first requisitioned. Rear-Admiral Francis S. Miller was appointed +to her as the Senior Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which +the great demands on her accommodation were met was a standing wonder +to me. In the early part of the War, officers on Admiral Miller’s +staff and others were obliged to make their sleeping berths, as best +they could, on the deck or on top of their writing-tables, and it was +surprising that the overcrowding in all directions did not affect +health. But the work went on very successfully in the most inconvenient +circumstances. + +Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing to the weather +conditions, to move the base organisations from the north to the +south-west side of Scapa Flow. The anchorage at Long Hope was selected, +whilst the Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta, +and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store ships, +and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope and Hoy Sound. Prior to +this, the importance of the organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands +had increased to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment of +a Senior Flag Officer in general command of the whole district, and of +the defences in particular. + +So much of my time was being occupied in deciding and pressing forward +the work of organisation of the base and its obstructions and defences, +in dealing with the numerous questions relating to the patrol of the +coast by coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant +ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding such vessels, in +considering questions affecting the occupation of land for the erection +of defences, in the requisitioning of trawlers and drifters, etc., that +it was becoming difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet +work proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who suggested that he +should waive his seniority in order to serve as my junior officer, +was appointed Vice-Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands. This +left Rear-Admiral Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly +heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of a mass of work +outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest possible benefit in every +way. Under Sir Stanley Colville’s most able direction, the completion +of the organisation for the general defences of the Islands, the work +of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of submarine +obstructions was effected, and the work pushed forward. Captain Stanley +Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of very wide experience, was appointed to +superintend the work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under +his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties due to +bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to Scapa Flow were either +blocked by sunken ships or obstructed by nets, mines, and other devices. + +The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning of the War consisted +of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns landed from the Fleet, were gradually +reinforced by four-inch and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the +whole being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.-Colonel +Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was housed in huts, erected +temporarily for the purpose, and although with the handiness which +characterises a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the officers and +men eventually made themselves comfortable even under such weather +conditions as are experienced at Scapa Flow, they endured a very +considerable amount of hardship in the early days with their accustomed +cheerfulness. + +And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and staying qualities +of the crews of the trawlers that supported the submarine obstructions, +particularly those at Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in +positions in which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly +and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a few yards of a +rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them and bringing on board tons +of water. The skippers knew that they had to stick it out for the sake +of the safety of the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and +under these conditions they did their duty in a manner which calls for +the highest praise. + +Meanwhile the development of the base proper proceeded apace. One of +the earlier arrivals was the old cruiser _Impérieuse_, which was used +as a post office, depot, and general overflow ship to the _Cyclops_. +The number of trawlers and drifters, which had their home at Scapa Flow +and which were engaged on patrol or mine-sweeping work, attendance on +the Fleet, garrison, or on the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased +with great rapidity during the winter of 1914–15; on September 1st, +1914, the number was _nil_, and it reached a total of some four +yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by the summer +of 1915. These vessels all looked to the _Cyclops_, _Assistance_ and +_Impérieuse_ for refit, pay, food, and for every conceivable want. +Gradually the number of base ships was increased, culminating in the +arrival of the old battleship _Victorious_ about March 6, 1916, as the +“home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the Fleet, fitting the +Director System, increasing the protection to decks and magazines, +carrying out minor repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent +tasks. + +Mention has been made of the large number of colliers, oilers, store +ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used by the Fleet. At one time +this caused some criticism, based principally on the time spent by the +colliers at the Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the necessity +for this. There were no facilities at the base for the storage of +coal, either in lighters or on shore. Consequently, the whole of the +coal required at the base was necessarily kept on board the colliers. +The actual number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep +at the base during the first two years of war was determined by the +necessity for coaling the Fleet and getting it to sea again with the +utmost possible rapidity. We could not contemplate such a situation +as the Fleet arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing +owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of information +being received simultaneously that the High Sea Fleet was at sea and +covering a landing raid on our coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital +importance to the Empire. + +Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I gave the +number necessary to enable almost the whole Fleet to be fuelled +simultaneously; in other words, the number of colliers was dependent on +the number of coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction +was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some ships +requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of two such ships using +one collier in succession; but, broadly speaking, the requirements were +as stated. When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum, +they return to Cardiff to refill to economise tonnage. + +At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of coal by rail +to Grangemouth and its transshipment to colliers there. As we needed +colliers as coal-storing ships, so also we required ammunition ships to +carry a proportion of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There were +no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on shore. The number of +ships required for this service was, however, much smaller. + +Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great advantage over shore +storage; should strategic conditions necessitate a change of base, the +coal, ammunition and other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The +same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating docks. + +A consideration of all these facts connected with the development +of fleet bases will show that this question necessarily required a +good deal of attention on the part of my Staff and myself, and was +incidental to the development of the Grand Fleet. + + +VII.--THE PERSONNEL AND ITS WELFARE + +Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by no means the least +important, was that of the moral and spirit of the personnel. It is, +of course, impossible to exaggerate the importance of this question +as an element in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of +war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours spent in +harbour were fully occupied in coaling and storing the ships; but these +conditions could not be continued indefinitely. As the months passed +with no sign of enemy vessels at sea and time in harbour increased +as compared to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find some +diversion for the minds of the officers and men. + +The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out under the +superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, then commanding the +1st Battle Squadron. Always alive to the necessity for providing +occupation, recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started +considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a divergent nature +as batteries for the defence of the submarine obstructions then in +progress, football grounds for the men, a golf course for the officers, +and landing piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventually +divided out amongst the various squadrons. A rifle and pistol range +were also constructed, and several piers built. The whole of the work +was carried out, I may add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen” +ship, the s.s. _Ghourko_, was fitted up by the Junior Army and Navy +Stores, and this vessel played an important part in the harbour life +of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores and provisions of all sorts, +available for use by all ships, but particularly of the smaller vessels +which could not send their mess stewards far afield in search of a +change of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical and +cinema entertainments took place on board frequently. She was also +fitted with a boxing ring, and squadron boxing competitions were held +on board with great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures +of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catholics and +Nonconformists. + +The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost. Officers lectured +on board their ships to the ships’ companies on every subject, the War +included, and much good resulted. + +Education was freely developed. The Admiralty provided, at my request, +schoolmasters in large numbers, and classes for the boys and voluntary +classes for the men in the evenings in harbour were very well attended. + +And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to the utmost extent +possible. This took the form principally of football, rowing regattas, +athletic sports and boxing. The keenness displayed in all these sports +was a certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign of +staleness. + +The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over periods of tedium +and weariness, which are most calculated to undermine discipline. +Occupation and interest are the surest antidotes to discontent and +unrest, and never during the first two and a half years did I see +signs of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thoroughly +happy and contented, treated the War as being in the day’s work, and +looked forward eagerly to the day on which their enemy would give them +the opportunity for which they were waiting, and for which they kept +themselves thoroughly efficient and fit. + +In those days the officers got to know the men even better than they +had done before, and the spirit of comradeship between all ranks became +correspondingly closer. Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have +desired to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than that +which animated the officers and men of the Grand Fleet. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +DECLARATION OF WAR + + +At 8.30 A.M. on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea +in compliance with Admiralty orders. The ships accompanying the +Fleet-Flagship _Iron Duke_ were the vessels of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and +4th Battle Squadrons, the light cruisers _Southampton_, _Birmingham_, +_Boadicea_, _Blonde_ and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla; the +cruisers _Shannon_, _Natal_ and _Roxburgh_, and the light cruisers +_Nottingham_, _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_, which were at Rosyth with the +2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to meet the Fleet at a rendezvous +in Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 1.30 E. The light cruisers _Bellona_ and +_Blanche_ were left behind to coal. + +A report received from the Admiralty that three German transports had +passed the Great Belt on the evening of August 1st had led to the 3rd +Cruiser Squadron, with the cruisers _Cochrane_ and _Achilles_, and the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the evening of +August 3d to cruise to the southward of the Fair Island Channel during +the night. + +The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep east as far as +Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers to carry out a wide sweep to +the southward and south-westward. These orders were in conformity with +the general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for the Grand +Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at establishing a blockade; +at preventing the enemy forces from getting into the Atlantic to +interfere with the operations of our cruisers engaged in protecting +our own trade as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and +at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to the enemy. +Pursuant to these orders, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 3rd +Cruiser Squadron were directed to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61 +N., working eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriving +there at 4 P.M., thence to sweep to the S.E. until 5 A.M. on August +5th, when they were on a line drawn S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat. +59.25 N. with the eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The _Antrim_ +and _Argyll_, being short of fuel, were detached during the evening of +August 4th to coal at Scapa. + +The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the cruisers and light +cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla was detached to Rosyth to fuel. +This first sweep was begun in northern waters because the North Sea +is narrower at this point, and also because it afforded opportunity +of intercepting vessels which might have left German ports two days +previously in anticipation of hostilities. The cruiser sweep was +supported by the Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E., +turning at 3 A.M. on August 5th to the westward. + +The 3rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled to leave Scapa 30 per +cent. short of fuel owing to the paucity of colliers, was detached to +that base at 8.30 P.M. on the 4th, to complete with coal. + +During the night information was received by wireless telegraphy that +war had been declared against Germany at midnight, 4th–5th August, and +the following gracious message was received from His Majesty the King +and was communicated to the Fleet: + + “At this grave moment in our National History, I send to you and + through you to the officers and men of the Fleet of which you have + assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your + direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal + Navy, and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her + Empire in the hour of trial.” + +During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised to the northward +of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with Admiralty telegraphic orders; the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as +four light cruisers and the _Lowestoft_, and the 4th Flotilla was sent +to Invergordon for a similar purpose. In the afternoon, the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron and the cruiser _Devonshire_, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron, were detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet +turned to the southward at 3 A.M. on the 6th to meet the 3rd Battle +Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat. 59 N., Long. 1.0 E. + +During August 6th the following reports were received: + +(_a_) Two German cruisers were reported passing Trondhjem going north. +(This came from the Admiralty.) + +(_b_) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north-west end of the +Shetlands going north. (This was a local report.) + +(_c_) The German liner _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_ was stated to have +passed through the Stronsay Firth, Orkneys, bound east, during the +night of the 5th–6th. (Local report.) + +The destroyer _Oak_ was despatched to search the vicinity of the +Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained no confirmation of the report. + +(_d_) It was reported that the Germans had established a base in Lat. +62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact position unknown). + +A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in confirmation of +the last report, but a British trawler reported that a large number +of German merchant ships had assembled in the West Fiord and in the +harbours of the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Norway. Reports as +to the Germans having established a base on the Norwegian coast were +very persistent during the early days of the War. These reports were +probably to some extent due to the ideas prevailing before the War +as to German intentions in this respect, these views being naturally +coloured by the frequent visits of the German High Sea Fleet in peace +time to Norwegian waters, particularly to the vicinity of Trondhjem. + +In 1911, when I commanded the Atlantic Fleet, arrangements had been +made for me to visit Norwegian ports at the same time as the High Sea +Fleet, in order to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with, +it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis intervened, and +the visit was postponed. The meeting took place in 1914, when a portion +of the 2nd Battle Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir +George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week, very shortly +before the outbreak of war. + +During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet cruised +between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the +eastward between Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward +along the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa Flow, the +3rd Battle Squadron being detached to the N.E. to cover them. The +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after +refuelling; the 2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the +north-eastward; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with orders to +search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for submarines prior to the +arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at 6 A.M. on the 7th +to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron +arrived at 10 A.M., and during the day the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with +the 2nd Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian +coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Battle +Squadron. No sign of a German base could be discovered, and the force +was ordered back to Scapa to fuel. + +The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed, owing to the +inadequate number of colliers, many of those present being also +unsuitable for the work of rapid coaling. The lack of lubricating +oil for the 3rd Battle Squadron also caused trouble, but these early +difficulties, although a source of considerable anxiety at the +commencement of hostilities, were overcome later. + +The greatest anxiety constantly confronting me was the defenceless +nature of the base at Scapa, which was open to submarine and destroyer +attacks. Whilst the Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could +be afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off the various +entrances and to patrol outside the main entrance; but these measures +were no real defence against submarines, and the position was such that +it was deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour longer +than was absolutely necessary for fuelling purposes. Accordingly, at +6.30 P.M. on the same day, the Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, +being screened through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark +by the 4th Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass round the +Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to provide some protection against +destroyer attack, a request was forwarded to the Admiralty asking +that two of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the main +entrances. This measure was approved and a reply was received that the +_Hannibal_ and _Magnificent_ were being despatched. + +The _Russell_, _Albemarle_ and _Exmouth_, of the 6th Battle Squadron, +belonging originally to the Channel Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the +Grand Fleet on the night of the 7th–8th. + +At 9.30 P.M. on the 8th the battleships _Orion_, _Monarch_ and _Ajax_ +were detached to carry out target practice, and the remainder of the +Fleet proceeded to the south-eastward from Fair Island, carrying out +Fire Control Exercises; but, on receipt of a report from the _Monarch_ +that a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the practice was +stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the 2nd Flotilla being +directed to search for the submarine. At 6.30 P.M. the officer of the +watch on board the _Iron Duke_ sighted a periscope and altered course +to ram; the same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the +_Dreadnought_, but was not seen again. + +At 4 A.M. on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N., Long. 1.9 E. + +Shortly afterwards the _Orion_ reported a strong smell of oil, and +bubbles were seen on the surface, and the _Birmingham_, commanded by +Captain A. M. Duff, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been +screening ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, claimed to +have rammed and sunk the German submarine U 15, which she had sighted +on the surface. This initial success was hailed with great satisfaction +in the Fleet. Subsequent information showed that the _Birmingham_ +had been handled with great promptitude. During daylight of August +9th, the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron were cruising +in company, the noon position being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and +as the presence of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was constantly +zigzagging, the ships altering course by “Blue Pendant” turns, that is, +turning together by signal. + +At midnight, 9th–10th, the position of the _Iron Duke_ was Lat. 57.51 +N., Long. 1.2 E. + +On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty requesting that +the movements of the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) might be directed +from the Admiralty, whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet +remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be sufficiently +conversant with the conditions in the south for the Commander-in-Chief +to control these movements. This plan was adopted and continued +throughout the War. + +On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as follows: + +At 5 A.M. the _Iron Duke_ parted company from the Fleet and proceeded +to Scapa in order that the Commander-in-Chief might communicate by land +wire with the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the work at +the fleet bases. The _Iron Duke_, with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and +the _Falmouth_, _Liverpool_ and _Bellona_, arrived at Scapa at 2.30 +P.M., the 2nd Flotilla forming a submarine screen through the Pentland +Firth. + +The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north under the command of +Sir George Warrender to a position to the westward of the Shetlands, +in accordance with telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty, +where it was considered that the submarine danger in the North Sea +was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was +detached to sweep a wide area to northward and westward in advance of +the Battle Fleet, which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north +as Lat. 60 N.; this flotilla was then detached for operations on the +Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the +1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The latter force was directed to search for +a suspected German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavanger Fiord. +The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the operation of +endeavouring to locate this base--if it existed--with due regard to +the susceptibilities of the Norwegians. Commodore W. E. Goodenough, +commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stavanger in the +_Southampton_ and was assured by the Norwegian authorities that no base +had been formed in that vicinity by the enemy. + +The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the _Falmouth_ left Scapa at 10 P.M. on +the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the _Hannibal_ +and _Magnificent_ having arrived at Scapa at 4 P.M. These two +battleships were stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to +Scapa Flow against attack by destroyers. + +Rear-Admiral Miller, who arrived in the _Hannibal_, was placed in +administrative charge of the base and of the local defences, and +arrangements were made for the local Territorial Force and other +inhabitants of the Orkneys and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch +the harbours. Telephonic communication round the coast was established +by degrees. + +Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen over the Orkneys +on the evening of the 10th, and the _Centurion_ reported having sighted +an airship north of the Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence +was attached to these reports, which in the early days of the War were +very frequently received. + +_August 11th._--The _Iron Duke_ left Scapa and rejoined the Battle +Fleet at 5 P.M. in Lat. 60.8 N., Long. 3.28 W. The Battle Fleet +was then exercised in forming line of battle, and also carried out +sub-calibre gun practice. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after +completing its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa to fuel at 8 +P.M. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, and 4th +Flotilla, having completed their examination of the Norwegian coast, +returned, some to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd Cruiser +Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30 miles from Kinnaird +Head. The _Drake_, flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant, which +had joined the Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the +Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old cruisers of the +“Edgar” class, had by this time been established on a northern patrol +area between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast, under the command +of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair. + +On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe, on the north-west +coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling base for the Fleet, and +Rear-Admiral Richard P. F. Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the +base. + +A week of war had now elapsed without any move whatever being made +on the part of the High Sea Fleet; the only German naval activities +had been mine-laying in southern waters during the first two days of +the War, together with some submarine activity in the North Sea. The +British Fleet during the week had been largely occupied in boarding all +merchant vessels sighted, and in instituting as strict a blockade as +was possible. + +[Illustration: + + THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL + HALSEY), AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT + FITZHERBERT), ON BOARD H. M. S. “IRON DUKE”] + +_August 12th._--The Battle Fleet to the westward of the Orkneys (noon +position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.) was exercised during the +forenoon and afternoon at battle tactics and carried out gunnery +practices between 4 and 8 P.M.; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to +fuel, arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the +3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal, and to test +the suitability of this base and its capability for defence against +submarine attack. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been fuelling at Scapa, left +before dark on the 12th to cruise west of the Orkneys with orders to +economise fuel in view of a projected operation to the southward. + +The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the _Falmouth_ swept 100 miles to the +south-eastward from Kinnaird Head during the day, and then returned to +Cromarty to fuel. + +The _Bellona_ and _Liverpool_ swept to the south-eastward of the +Pentland Firth during the day and night of the 12th, together with +one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as a guard against destroyer attack on the +Fleet whilst coaling. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern patrol. A report was +received from Rear-Admiral Grant, in the _Drake_, that the position in +the Faroe Islands was quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed. +The _Drake_ remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe +Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were sent to assist +her in her work of blockade. + +Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears was on this date appointed in charge of the +Fleet Base at Cromarty. + +The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer from Hamburg had +arrived in England and reported that there were fourteen enemy +battleships at Cuxhaven on the 9th inst., together with several +mine-layers; that there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and +Heligoland, and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the +entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite news of the +enemy’s main fleet. + +_August 13th._--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was coaling at Scapa +during the day, and the 3rd Battle Squadron coaling and storing at Loch +Ewe. My object in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry +into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with a second base +in the event of Scapa Flow becoming untenable by submarine attack. + +The _Albemarle_ relieved the _Liverpool_ and _Bellona_ on patrol to the +eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these two ships returning to +Scapa to fuel. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of the Orkneys; the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coaling; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at sea +sweeping to the south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the +1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The _Falmouth_ was now +attached to this squadron. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the _Drake_ were on the northern and +Faroe patrols. During the day the Commander-in-Chief held a conference +with the Flag officers of the Fleet and explained the operations +contemplated on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 P.M. the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the westward, except two ships which +had not finished coaling, the operation having been again delayed owing +to an insufficient number of colliers being provided. They followed +later. + +The _Ajax_ reported a turret defective, and was sent back to effect +repairs with the aid of the _Cyclops_. + +_August 14th._--During the forenoon the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and +battle cruisers were carrying out target practice. Noon position of the +_Iron Duke_, Lat. 59.11 N., Long. 4.27 W. + +At 2 P.M. all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd Battle Squadron from +Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squadron, rejoined the Flag, and battle +exercises, including deployments, were carried out till 7 P.M. + +At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair Island Channel on +its way to carry out a sweep in the North Sea. + +During the night of the 14th–15th all squadrons were moving towards a +concentration rendezvous in the North Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd +Cruiser Squadrons being Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 A.M. on the 15th; +the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was Lat. 59.7 N., Long. +0.40 W., at 4 A.M. the 15th; for the mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long. +3.45 E., at 6 P.M. the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +from the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 A.M. on the 15th. + +Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a usually reliable +source had been received at the Admiralty indicating that the Germans +intended carrying out a very extensive mine-laying policy in British +waters in the event of war between the two countries. The actual +positions of many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it +was apparent, provided the information were correct, that the enemy +intended to lay mines regardless of their effect on mercantile traffic, +whether British, Allied, or neutral. + +The proceedings of the mine-layer _Köningen Louise_ in the first days +of war tended to confirm this view, and consequently it was thought to +be quite probable that mine-fields of an extensive character might be +laid in the North Sea, in positions where they might be expected to be +effective against any movement of our Fleet, particularly any southward +movement. + +The small margin of superiority which we possessed over the +German fleet, as compared with the immense difference in our naval +responsibilities, made it very necessary that precautions should be +taken to safeguard the most valuable of our ships from such a menace +when operating in waters that might be mined. + +It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers accompanied the +Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, although the speed of the Fleet +was necessarily reduced by their presence in order to admit of sweeping +operations, and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased, +and although the sweeping operations could only be carried out in an +exploratory fashion, there _was_ the chance that the danger incurred by +taking the whole Fleet over possible mine-fields might be much reduced. + +Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers to sea as their +presence was more necessary in the vicinity of the bases, the practice +was introduced of placing one of the older battleships of the 6th +Battle Squadron ahead of each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in +order that these less valuable ships might first discover the mines +instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and men of the 6th +Battle Squadron named their Squadron the “Mine Bumping Squadron” on +this account. + +_August 15th._--At noon the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 58.16 N., +Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in company in cruising order and +steering to the eastward, preparatory to turning south. The plan of +operations included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by +cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, together with +the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two of our submarines had been +ordered to be off the Ems and two off the Jade by 6 A.M. on the 16th. + +During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes arrived at Scapa for +reconnaissance work from the base. + +_August 16th._--At 4 A.M. the _Iron Duke_ was in Lat. 56.43 N., Long. +4.5 E. At 8 A.M., no report having been received of the sighting of +any German vessels, the Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to +continue the sweep until 9.30 A.M. At this time the Fleet-flagship +_Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E., the battle +cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The only +enemy vessel seen was one submarine by the _New Zealand_ at 10.35 A.M. +in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E. + +The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at 9.30 A.M., the +cruisers being then well to the southward of the latitude of the Horn +Reef, the whole Fleet turned to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a +north by west course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging. + +Rear-Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, reported that the +sweep of the southern force had been unproductive. + +The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for a northerly sweep, +spreading from the Norwegian coast, for a distance of 150 miles, to the +westward, with the Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron +swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along that coast as +far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird Head, with the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron prolonging and supporting. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron +extended the front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle +Squadron. + +The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of the Battle Fleet +until dusk, and then was stationed 12 miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser +Squadron, spread 10 miles apart, covered the area between the Battle +Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas remained +with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine screen by day, and +keeping in rear of the Fleet at night. + +The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the Battle Fleet when on +the southerly course, acted as a submarine screen during the passage +to the northward. During the night of the 16th–17th the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser Squadron to +Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern patrol, and the 6th Battle +Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla mine-sweepers and 3rd Battle Squadron +proceeded to Scapa to fuel. + +_August 17th._--At 7.15 A.M. the Dreadnought Battle Fleet altered +course to pass through the Fair Island Channel, and the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron rejoined. The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed +astern during the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at +daylight. The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout daylight. + +At noon the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 58.59 N., Long. 1.35 E. At +midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long. 2.25 W., and at 8 A.M. the 18th, Lat. +58.44 N., Long. 4.47 W. + +The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep sighted only neutral +vessels and proceeded to work in an area designated as No. 5 (eastward +from Kinnaird Head). Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E. + +This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach to the Pentland +Firth, both for blockade purposes and as an outpost position for the +Fleet at Scapa. + +At this time, the northern and central parts of the North Sea were +divided into certain numbered areas in which cruisers could be directed +by wireless to work without the necessity of making a long signal. + +The various areas were approximately placed as follows: + + Area No. 1.--Covering the route round the north end of the + Shetland Islands from the southward and eastward. + + Area No. 2.--Covering the Fair Island Channel to + south-eastward, working down to the line Kinnaird + Head--Udsire. + + Area No. 3.--South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys + to Lat. of Kinnaird Head, with a width of about 50 miles + from the line Noss Head--Kinnaird Head. + + Area No. 4.--South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird + Head--Udsire Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from + Kinnaird Head. + + Area No. 5.--South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird + Head--Udsire Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian + territorial waters. + + Area No. 6.--South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird + Head--Udsire Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from + Kinnaird Head. + + Area No. 7.--Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between + 50 and 150 miles from the English coast. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to resume the northern +patrol; the _Drake_, and the two ships acting with her, were ordered to +return to Scapa to coal, and directions were given for the other two +ships to rejoin the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the day +the _Orion_ developed serious condenser defects, necessitating retubing +her condensers. A telegram was sent to the Admiralty requesting that +new condenser tubes might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with +dockyard workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile arrangements +were made for giving fleet assistance to the _Orion_, and for all +suitable spare condenser tubes from the fleet to be sent to her on +arrival. + +The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet had by this +time become very serious, and was causing me much anxiety; in reply +to strong representations to the Admiralty, a telegram was received +explaining the position and the efforts being made to rectify matters. + +The Admiralty also informed me of the great importance that was +attached to the efficiency of the northern patrol, and stated that four +armed merchant ships were being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser +Squadron. + +The constant sea work had by this time shown the inadequacy of the +engine-room implements of all ships for war conditions, and, in +consequence of representations to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen +were sent to Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The +benefit derived from this measure was very considerable. + +Two Fleet messenger vessels, the _Cambria_ and _Anglia_, arrived at +Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for communication between the +bases, for carrying mails and despatches, and for boarding duties. + +_August 18th._--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe to +fuel early in the afternoon; it was accompanied by the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron which was without the _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_. The +attached cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending the +entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were capable of doing +it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet patrolled the entrance. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached to Scapa at daylight +to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been by this +time established at Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the +ships when proceeding to fuel. The _Alsatian_, an armed merchant ship, +joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron. + +The _Assistance_ arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair ship, and was +connected to the shore telegraph system. + +Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west of the Shetlands, +during the night of the 18th–19th. Enquiry showed this rumour to be +false. + +The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear-Admiral Arthur +Christian, with his Flag in the _Sapphire_, had been placed in command +of all forces in the southern portion of the North Sea, namely, Cruiser +force C, the destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained, +these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and were +independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag. + +This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss of the _Cressy_, +_Aboukir_ and _Hogue_, Cruiser force C being abolished, and the command +of the destroyer and submarine forces reverting to their own senior +officers. + +_August 19th, 21st, 22nd._--The Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron remained in harbour during the 19th, coaling, storing, +cleaning boilers, and taking in additional ammunition up to a maximum +storage. With the exception of the _Orion_, these ships left on the +20th at 6.30 P.M. for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and +Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the 21st. The +battle cruiser _New Zealand_ was ordered to the Humber to join the +_Invincible_. + +As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our submarines in the +Heligoland Bight were being followed and watched by German trawlers +fitted with wireless, I informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat +such vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser +Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol Area 1 alternately, and to +carry out target practice in the Cromarty Firth, _en route_ to the +patrol area. + +The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was interfered with by fog +and the Fleet did not form up until late at night, and passed through +the Fair Island Channel into the North Sea during the early morning +of the 22nd. The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics during the day, +and in the afternoon was joined by the 2nd Flotilla as a submarine +screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 1.30 E. The position of the _Iron Duke_ +at midnight, 22nd–23rd, was Lat. 59.34 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to +southward. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been detained at Scapa by +fog during the 21st, carried out target practice to the westward of the +Orkneys on the 22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15 +N., Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now comprising the _Drake_ and +_King Alfred_, which were ordered to work between Scotland and Norway +in areas to the southward of the position named. + +There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted except one submarine +in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E., on August 20th. The Admiralty informed +me on this date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for Cromarty +northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided on before the War. It +was, therefore, suggested that one of the boy artificers’ floating +workshops should be sent north to work in conjunction with the dock. +Steps were taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost on +passage in bad weather near Portland. + +_August 23rd._--The Battle Fleet remained cruising in the North Sea in +support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the weather being misty, with rain. +The 3rd Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at +daylight, the 24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, were +sweeping to the southward as far south as Lat. 56 N.; the _Alsatian_ +was sent with the 6th Cruiser Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point, +on the southern coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships, +trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial waters at +this point, and, if so, to capture them. One-half of the 2nd Flotilla +was screening the Battle Fleet, the second half searching for a +submarine reported east of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the +_Ruby_ of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 P.M., and course +altered to avoid her. + +The destroyers _Rifleman_ and _Comet_ collided in a fog, the latter +being considerably damaged. + +The _Sappho_ was sent to search North Rona Island, a statement having +been received indicating that it might possibly have been used by the +enemy as a base for aircraft. She reported, after examination, that the +island was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose. + +The _Ajax_ reported having burnt out a boiler, and the Admiralty was +asked to instruct the contractors to send to Scapa men and tubes for +retubing it. + +The _King Edward VII._ reported cracks in the inner A tubes of two of +her 12-inch guns. + +_August 24th._--The Battle Fleet cruised between the Orkneys and the +Norwegian coast, and carried out battle tactics during the forenoon, +the weather becoming too thick in the afternoon. + +The 1st Battle Squadron was detached to Scapa to fuel, as well as +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter being relieved by the +3rd Cruiser Squadron. The remainder of the cruisers continued their +sweeping operations as on the 23rd. + +_August 25th._--The 3rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to relieve the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate support of the cruisers at 6 A.M., +and while _en route_ to its position captured an Austrian steamer, the +_Attila_. The remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground, +arriving at Scapa at 7.30 A.M. on the 26th, with the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron to fuel. The _Agincourt_, a new battleship which was bought +from Turkey when still in an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head +and entered with the Fleet. + +At 5.30 P.M. a submarine was sighted from the bridge of the _Iron +Duke_, and the Fleet manœuvred clear of the position. One-half of +the 4th Flotilla, which had screened the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea, +joined the Commander-in-Chief at 5 P.M., and was ordered to search for +this submarine, but without result. The _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser +Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at 4 A.M., the 25th, owing +to condenser trouble. + +The _Dominion_ reported two of her 12-inch guns cracked. The _King +Edward VII_. left Scapa for Devonport to change her two guns, which had +also cracked, Vice-Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship +_Dominion_. + +The weather was thick during the night of the 25th–26th, but the fog +lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet to enter Scapa. + +_August 26th._--The _Iron Duke_, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla, were at Scapa fuelling. + +The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th Flotilla, left to +join the 3rd Battle Squadron at sea, their departure having been +delayed for some hours by thick fog. + +The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 P.M. for Rosyth to coal. + +The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 P.M. to coal, the _King +Alfred_ at Scapa, and the _Alsatian_ at Liverpool; the arrangements in +the large merchant-ships were such as to render coaling from colliers a +difficult and slow progress. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the _Mantua_, left the northern +patrol to coal at Scapa. + +During the day the Admiralty informed me of some operations which the +southern forces were intended to carry out in the Heligoland Bight on +the 28th, and directed that the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron should join +in the operations. I made urgent representations as to the necessity of +supporting the force with battle cruisers, and informed the Admiralty +that I was sending the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to take part. I +requested that the Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the +Commodore, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed direct by the +Admiralty of the positions which the other ships would occupy, and that +the senior officers of the southern force taking part should also be +informed of the presence of the battle cruisers and 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron. + +On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived to join the Fleet, +experience having shown that the number of deck complements, as well as +the engine-room complements, required increasing, principally owing to +the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so constantly manned at +sea--by day against submarine attack, and by night against destroyer +attack. + +_August 27th._--On this date I wired to the Admiralty proposing +the erection of two wireless stations in the Orkneys for local +communication, and a directional station to assist in locating the +positions of German ships using wireless. The remainder of the Battle +Fleet proceeded to sea at 6 P.M. to join the 1st and 3rd Battle +Squadrons at 7 A.M. on the 28th to the south-eastward of the Orkneys in +Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as +a submarine screen. + +On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the Pentland Firth +was inaugurated by the Mine-laying Squadron which was not required at +the time for mine-laying operations, with the object of ensuring a +closer watch on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland Firth, and +the _Oceanic_, an armed merchant cruiser, which had joined the Fleet, +was detached to carry out a patrol to the westward of the Fair Island +Channel in order to control the traffic at this point. + +Information was received from the Admiralty of the existence of mined +areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head and Tynemouth. The positions of the +two latter minefields appeared to corroborate the information obtained +prior to the outbreak of war. + +A collision occurred at 9.30 P.M. between the _Bellerophon_ and the +s.s. _St. Clair_, which was passing through the Fleet. The _St. Clair_ +was damaged, but the damage to the _Bellerophon_ was not serious. + +_August 28th._--The weather was misty with a visibility of 4 to 6 miles +until the evening, when it cleared slightly. The Battle Fleet during +the day proceeded to the southward, the noon position being Lat. 58.19 +N., Long. 0.21 E., with cruisers in advance. + +The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tactics. The sweep +of light forces into the Heligoland Bight which took place at dawn +was successful in bringing enemy light forces to action. The official +despatches relating to this operation are given in an Appendix. The +events may be shortly described here. At 6.53 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt, +commanding the Harwich force, which had swept into the Heligoland Bight +during the night to cut off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and +chased her. From 7.20 to 8 A.M. the _Arethusa_ and the 3rd Flotilla +were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making for Heligoland, +sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the _Arethusa_, Commodore Tyrwhitt’s +flagship, which had been in commission only a few days, sighted two +enemy light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a little later by +the light cruiser _Fearless_. At 8.25 A.M. a hit from the _Arethusa_ +wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy ships, and they both +steamed at once for Heligoland, which was then sighted, and our ships +turned to the westward. The _Arethusa_ had been considerably damaged +during the action and had suffered several casualties. + +At 10.55 A.M. another German light cruiser was sighted by the +_Arethusa_, and on being attacked by the _Fearless_ and destroyers +turned away; she reappeared at 11.5 and engaged the _Arethusa_ and +_Fearless_ and was attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again +turned away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed Sir David +Beatty of the position, and that officer proceeded at full speed to +his support. The light cruiser _Mainz_ had been attacking the somewhat +disabled _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_ at about 11.30 A.M. and had +suffered very severely in the action, being practically disabled. +The arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore +Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured her destruction. + +Between 12.37 P.M. and 1.45 P.M. the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and +1st Light Cruiser Squadron engaged two other German light cruisers, one +of which was sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in a +sinking condition. + +Even thus early in the War the difference between the behaviour of +British and German seamen was noticeable. On the British side, in +addition to other assistance rendered to the survivors of the _Mainz_ +(which had been sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer _Firedrake_, +proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of them being +wounded. A German light cruiser opened fire on the British destroyers +engaged in picking up survivors from the German destroyer V187 when +that vessel was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for the +destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the rescue work. The +British submarine E4 afterwards took our officers and men out of these +boats and left some unwounded Germans to take the other boats, which +contained German wounded, to Heligoland. + +In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser Squadron was +directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving the armed merchant cruisers +farther to the northward. The object was to give a better chance of +intercepting enemy vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war +by establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance courses, +one of which would in all probability be crossed of necessity during +daylight hours, even if the second were passed through at night. + +_August 29th._--This was a bright, fine day, with high visibility. +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at sea with three divisions of +the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and carrying out battle tactics and other +exercises. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to fuel at 7 P.M., +in company with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the _Liverpool_ being +detached to Rosyth to land the German prisoners captured in the +Heligoland Bight on the 28th. + +The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Area No. 5, which the 3rd +Cruiser Squadron left during the day for Cromarty to fuel. + +The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron were in Area No. 6; +the mine-layers were in Area No. 3. + +During the day the _Oak_ arrived from Scapa with telegrams and +despatches for me and returned with similar correspondence for the +Admiralty. The _Oak_ was usually employed on this duty while the _Iron +Duke_ was at sea during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent +visits to a base rendering this essential. + +Some risk from submarine attack was naturally involved during the +time that the _Iron Duke_, or any other heavy ship, was stopped to +communicate. The risk was recognised, and, as the number of enemy +submarines increased, it became undesirable to incur it, and the +practice of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was abandoned; +the longer time spent in harbour tended to reduce the necessity for +the practice to some extent, but during the early part of the War this +was the only means of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was +constantly at sea. + +The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our eastern coasts +caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at this time the desirability of +the patrol flotillas working somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for +an increase as soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to +work off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to work in +the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also forwarded. + +The Fleet messenger _Cambria_ was brought out to work with the Battle +Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant ships owing to the shortage +of light cruisers for this work. + +_August 30th._--In the afternoon the Dreadnought Battle Fleet shaped +course for Scapa, and arrived at 7 A.M. on the 31st to fuel, the 3rd +Battle Squadron being ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to +support the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern +portion of Area 5. + +The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was continued as +usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the Area at 3 A.M. on the 31st +to fuel at Scapa. + +During the day the _Assistance_ returned to Scapa from Loch Ewe as +base ship, and the _Illustrious_ arrived there as defence ship for the +entrance. I had decided her position during my previous visit. + +As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I was informed that trawlers +were being taken up and armed for patrol duties as rapidly as possible, +and that arrangements for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the +subject of correspondence between the Admiralty and myself, had been +approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields at the entrances. + +_August 31st._--A sweep towards the Scottish coast of all vessels at +sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in consequence of information +having been received pointing to the possibility of mine-laying by the +enemy in the vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the +night of August 31st–September 1st; the sweep was arranged to intercept +the enemy mine-layers on their return trip. But it was unproductive, +no mine-laying having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep +were the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser +Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron. + +In consequence of urgent representations as to the insufficiency of +.303 rifle ammunition for the Army, all ships disembarked 50 per cent. +of their ammunition of this calibre at the end of August for conveyance +to Woolwich. + +Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but a very small +number of rifles, as well as many machine-guns, were landed from the +Fleet for use by the Army. + +A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battleships was held on +board the _Iron Duke_ on August 31st in order to discuss with them the +subject of tactics in action. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA + + +On September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd and 4th +Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, cleaning boilers, storing, and taking in +ammunition, etc. The Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier, +on the north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with torpedo +nets had them out, as was customary, unless colliers or store-ships +were alongside. + +The _Falmouth_, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was anchored to the +westward of Holm Sound, and the remainder of this squadron formed the +outer or southward line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam. +The weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at times. + +At 6 P.M. the _Falmouth_ reported the periscope of a submarine in +sight inside the harbour, and immediately opened fire, four rounds +being fired by this ship; she reported having probably hit the +submarine. Directly afterwards the _Vanguard_, one of the outer line +of battleships, also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope, +as did one of the E class destroyers, which was patrolling between the +Fleet and the Hoxa entrance. + +The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh immediately steam +was ready, which was at 8.30 P.M., and to endeavour to locate the +submarine and keep her under. + +The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice, was also +instructed to weigh at once and search for the submarine. The whole of +the ships present were ordered to raise steam with all despatch, and +to prepare for torpedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, +steamboats, motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready and which +could be collected, were at once organised in detachments to steam up +and down the lines at high speed and outside the Fleet, with the object +of confusing the submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted. +Colliers and store-ships which had steam ready were directed to weigh +and to go alongside the battleships that were not fitted with torpedo +nets, in order to act as a form of protection against torpedoes fired +at these valuable vessels. All ships in the outer lines were directed +to burn searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine. + +At about 6.30 P.M. the _Drake_ reported a submarine in sight from that +ship, thus confirming the earlier reports. + +The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon as steam was +ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 P.M. the weather was exceedingly +thick inside the harbour and considerable difficulty was experienced +in getting the Fleet out, as at this time there were no navigational +facilities of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick +weather; but by 11 P.M. all the ships had left the harbour without +accident, and, although there was a dense fog outside, the Fleet +cleared the Pentland Firth successfully. + +The _Assistance_ was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left after the Fleet, +reporting having sighted a submarine in the entrance whilst going out. +The 2nd Flotilla was left behind to locate and, if possible, destroy +the submarine, and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa +and Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet the Fleet +at 7 A.M. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct from destroyers, +remaining in the harbour was the _Cyclops_, lying off Scapa with +the telegraph and telephone cables on board, and directions were +given to Rear-Admiral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the +mine-sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the _Falmouth_. + +No trace of a submarine was discovered, and subsequent investigation +showed that the alarm _may_ have been false, the evidence not being +conclusive either way. The incident, however, made it clear that +protection against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as +the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open to this form +of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible action, in the event of +an alarm being given of the presence of a submarine, was to take the +Fleet to sea, and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time +from a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity was +created, which would be bad for moral, and the ships were deprived of +opportunities for cleaning boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which +experience was showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the +Fleet was to be maintained. + +The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty and proposals were +made for blocking all the entrances to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and +Hoy entrances, by sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending +the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance, Rear-Admiral +Miller was directed to requisition a large number of net-drifters. +The plan was to lay drift nets in the entrance to be watched by the +drifters, the nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating +on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might be indicated +by the buoy moving with the net. + +The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances were, +meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of submarines through +them, but it was realised that these were considerable. The opinion was +formed, however, that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable +difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine commander. + +By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers consisted of +vessels of the E class. A request was made for basing a hunting +flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall, these vessels being intended to +guard the approaches to the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine +hunters generally. It was also suggested that a monetary reward should +be offered to the personnel of any trawler through whose agency a +submarine was captured or destroyed. + +The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had been strengthened by the addition +of a flotilla of trawlers, and the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers +were continuously employed in keeping certain fixed channels of +approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines. These vessels +were, therefore, not available for anti-submarine work, except to the +detriment of their mine-sweeping duties. + +On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were employed in Area +No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron. + +From September 1st to September 5th the Battle Fleet remained at sea, +cruising in the area between the north-east coast of Scotland and the +coast of Norway, in support of the cruiser squadrons working to the +southward, and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises of the +Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional gunnery practice. The +_Orion_, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, was still absent from the Fleet, +retubing condensers; the _King Edward VII._ rejoined on the 2nd, after +exchanging defective guns; and the _Dominion_ was then detached to +Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strengthened by the arrival +of the _Inflexible_ from the Mediterranean, and was employed during +this period in support of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the +Battle Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises. + +During the period under review reports from time to time of the +sighting of enemy submarines appeared to indicate that they were +working on a line Ekersund-Pentland Firth, the line which they were +apparently occupying during the first few days of the War, when U 15 +was sunk by the _Birmingham_. + +Information received on September 3d suggested that enemy cruisers +might have passed, or might be intending to pass, into the North Sea +via the Skagerrak. The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and +accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were, therefore, directed to sweep to +the entrance to the Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th, +starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E., at 4 A.M. that +day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons were to make +a detour to the south-westward with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, +the latter proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons to +Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Flotilla, +was directed to sweep on a wide front towards the Pentland Firth on +the Ekersund-Pentland line in search of enemy submarines, which it was +hoped might be caught on the surface at night. Thence the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron was to proceed to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla +to the westward of the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning +to Longhope at 9 P.M. on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla, which had +been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at the same time to sweep the +western portion of the Ekersund-Pentland line for submarines, and then +to return to Longhope. + +These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels of any sort were +sighted, except that at 6.30 A.M. on the 5th the _Thetis_, mine-layer, +working south-eastward of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel, +thought to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and +1st Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on the position, but the ship was +eventually identified as one of our own vessels. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe at 4 P.M. on the 5th +to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats having been previously detached to +that base to search the entrance for mines. + +During the early days of September frequent reports were received of +enemy mines having been discovered on the east coast, and several +vessels were sunk, as a consequence, including the gunboat _Speedy_. +It appeared that the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels +flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well as from +regular mine-laying ships. The large number of vessels trading on the +east coast and of fishing craft at sea, both British and neutral, +greatly increased the difficulty of preventing these operations. The +task of boarding and examining even a considerable percentage of these +vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser sweeps were showing this +daily. The Admiralty’s attention was drawn to the matter, and the +question was raised of establishing some restrictions, particularly as +regards the areas in which fishing should be permitted. + +The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights was also +proposed, the burning of which enabled the enemy to fix his position +accurately when engaged in mine-laying operations. This policy of the +extinction of lights, thus started, gradually became general, and +eventually only the most important lights were exhibited at night, and +the large majority of these were only shown when requests were made +by men-of-war who required them for entering port, the time of their +exhibition being thus reduced to a minimum. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe until 6 A.M. on +September 7th, and then proceeded to sea. The _Orion_ was left behind +to complete work on her condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on +September 9th, having been absent for twenty-one days. + +The _Agincourt_, the new battleship which since commissioning had +been engaged in gunnery and torpedo practices either at Scapa or to +the westward of the Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea +on September 7th in order to give her officers experience in working +with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty in carrying out her +practices because she had not been supplied with “sub-calibre” guns, +and this deficiency could not be made good for some months; this caused +much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However, she was manned +with officers and a ship’s company of a very high standard and, in +spite of all disadvantages, the early gunnery practices carried out by +her in company with the Fleet showed that she would eventually prove to +be a most valuable addition to the Fleet. + +Representations had been made by me to the Admiralty that the +presence of a senior Flag officer in general command of the Orkneys +and Shetlands, who would be responsible for the defences of these +islands and the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual +administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient fully to +occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller. + +Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted the post, and as +it was very desirable that the officer holding this position should be +junior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the +compliment of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to +myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities. + +He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch Ewe on September 6th, +to confer with me before taking up his appointment. He accompanied me +to sea in the _Iron Duke_ on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was +embarked on board the _Oak_ to the westward of the Orkneys, and took +up his command on arrival. The result was immediately most beneficial. +He was able to devote his whole time to the questions of defence and +organisation and relieved me of all these matters which had, as was +inevitable under the previous arrangement, occupied so much of my time +in harbour and so much of my thoughts at sea. + +On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock arrived safely at +Cromarty. + +During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded northward +from Loch Ewe _en route_ to the North Sea, and passed through the Fair +Island Channel at 10 P.M., being joined at 4 A.M. by the 3rd Battle +Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth after dark on +this date and proceeded to the north-eastward, being joined at 4 A.M. +on the 8th by the _Sappho_ and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla. +These smaller vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in +order to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine attack, +consequent on stopping for this purpose. The 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron swept to the south-eastward of Area 6 during daylight on +the 8th, and during the night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was +on a patrol area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and +Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of intercepting possible +enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet carried out gunnery practices and +exercised battle tactics during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at +dark proceeded to the southward to support an extensive sweep into the +Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to carry out on September +10th. The dispositions for this sweep were generally as follows: + +The 1st and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported by the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to the northward, and +the 7th Cruiser Squadron to the westward, swept out the Heligoland +Bight from east to west, commencing from a position some ten to twelve +miles from Heligoland, which position was to be reached one hour before +dawn. The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread +20 miles ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E. at 8 A.M. +on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12 knots speed of advance. + +The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons to the +southward, cruised to the north-westward of Heligoland until 11 A.M. +on the 10th, by which time it was clear that the sweep had been +unproductive. No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one +seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd Flotilla was +stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen, and to assist +the attached cruisers in boarding duties during the day, and the +4th Flotilla, which had been working with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser +Squadrons, principally for boarding duties, was also directed to join +the Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason of the +thick weather did not do so until 2 P.M. Owing to the large number of +trawlers that were met with, nearly all of which were flying neutral +colours, the boarding duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion +attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken wireless +signals were noticed to be very strong after the Fleet had passed these +vessels; but close examination failed to reveal anything suspicious in +those that were boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any +of them. + +The conditions on September 10th were very unfavourable for the sweep +into the Bight. Thick weather prevailed both before and after daylight, +and the visibility varied from between two and five miles. The mist +prevented the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle Fleet for +eight hours, a circumstance which would have had awkward consequences +had the High Sea Fleet been encountered with its full complement of 80 +to 100 destroyers, as might have been the case in such close proximity +to German ports. + +It was noted at the time that the conditions were very unfavourable +for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility combined with the glare +produced by the occasional sunshine and absence of wind. A passage in +the notes made on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows: + +“The weather conditions ... were very unfavourable for a general action +owing to the low visibility and the glare caused by brilliant sunlight +and absence of wind.... The conditions make it impossible for the +Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to know what is going on +in the van and rear ... besides being entirely favourable to tactics +largely based on the employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers. + +“In addition there are great difficulties in concentrating detached +ships and flotillas and in forming the Fleet prior to battle, also in +the recognition of ships and destroyers.” + +This passage is of interest because of its bearing on the Jutland +battle some two years later when somewhat similar conditions prevailed. + +The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much impression on my +mind that special daylight recognition devices which could be seen at +a considerable distance were subsequently devised and used by our own +light cruisers and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy. + +When it became evident that there were no enemy vessels to engage, +I organised a sweep to the northward on a large scale, with a view +to intercepting any enemy ships that might be at sea and of closely +examining all merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with. + +The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N., Long. 4.0 E., the +dispositions being: + + The _Invincible_ (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers) and the + _Inflexible_, to sweep towards Dundee. + + 3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of advance. + + 1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11 knots speed + of advance. + + 2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed of + advance. + + All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted. + + The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more included the + _New Zealand_) to be in general support. + + The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to extend + the sweep to the eastward. + +These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2. + +At 3 A.M. on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn to N. 16 E., and, +later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was stationed in a new area, No. 7, +between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.30 N., between 50 and 150 miles from +the coast. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal; the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron rejoined +the Battle Fleet, and the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ were sent to +Scapa to coal, as well as the 3rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of +destroyers screening these vessels into the base. + +During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron carried out battle tactics and gunnery exercises, and the +Battle Fleet then proceeded to Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel. + +During the passage south and north numerous reports of floating mines +were received. The majority proved to be fishermen’s bladders which at +this time were being frequently reported by merchant ships as floating +mines. + +The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the 3rd meridian of +East Long. between the parallels of 55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been +established by the 1st and 3rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight +destroyers and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the +“Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy mine-layers. I was +also informed that a patrol of the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch +coast, was being maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames +approaches. + +On September 11th the _Hibernia_ reported a 12-inch gun cracked, the +fifth since the outbreak of war! + +On the same day salvage operations on the armed merchant-cruiser +_Oceanic_, which had gone ashore in a fog on Foula Island on September +8th, were abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke up +eventually. + +Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears reported that the Portsmouth floating dock +would be ready for work on September 21st, a very smart piece of +mooring work having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the King’s +Harbour Master. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe coaling, storing and +cleaning boilers, etc., from 5 P.M. on September 13th until 6 P.M. +on September 17th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the +_Inflexible_ and _Invincible_, remained at Scapa until September 18th. +Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and +7 were carried out by the 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and +the Mine-layer Squadron, supported by the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_ +and 3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning of September +14th for the purpose. The armed merchant-cruisers _Alsatian_ and +_Mantua_ were patrolling eastward of the Shetlands. + +Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to make general +arrangements with the Admiralty for the defence of that base, and on +September 17th the First Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War +Staff, the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S) and (T) +arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The bombardment and capture +of Heligoland was also discussed. The proposals had been previously +forwarded to me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined +by myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of Staff, and by +the Flag officers commanding the Battle Squadrons. The opinions of +these officers against the operation were unanimous. It had not been +suggested that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation, except +as a supporting force; the older battleships were intended for this +purpose. But the arguments against the operation were overwhelmingly +strong. It was pointed out that ships were no match for heavy +fortifications such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that direct +fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory would be ineffective +against well-placed, heavily protected and well-concealed land guns; +that, even if a storming party were able to land and to capture the +island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated as it was +close to German naval bases, for if we could take it in a fortified +condition, it would be far easier for the Germans to recapture it +with the fortifications demolished; that it would be under continuous +attack by sea and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured, +would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly in southern waters, +which, owing to the number of small craft then available, was an +impossibility. Aircraft spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct, +was at that time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited +for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors which, later on, +carried out such useful work on the Belgian coast. After a conference, +at which the Flag officers were present, I thought that the idea would +be abandoned. + +This was not the case, however, and the matter was taken up later +at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, commanding the +Channel Fleet. His view coincided with those expressed by the Flag +officers at the Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared +to carry out any orders that might be given him. The idea was not +finally abandoned for some time. The opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and +myself were identical, as indeed were those of every Flag officer with +whom I discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior Flag +officer. + +[Illustration: SWEEP OF SEP^{T.} 8^{TH.} TO 11^{TH.} 1914.] + +Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s visit was that of +operations in the Baltic, but as no large operations of this nature +could be attempted without the assistance of Allied battleships, in +order to maintain supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no +steps were taken. + +By this date a regular programme of dockings and refits for all ships +was recognised as necessary, and battleships were now being detached +one at a time for this purpose. For some months after the commencement +of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than four days +for docking and for the execution of the most urgent work, except in +cases of accident or very serious defects, as our margin of superiority +was none too large, and we were already experiencing a good deal of +trouble with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up for the +work of retubing; but the work achieved in the four days was a very +fine tribute to the dockyard organisation and to the industry of the +dockyard men. + +The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of September 17th, +the _Erin_, a new battleship bought, incomplete, from Turkey, being +in company for the first time in order to accustom her officers to +working the ship with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to +the westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the 18th, but was +interfered with by bad weather--a frequent experience. The Battle +Fleet then proceeded into the North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel, +the position at midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.13 W., +and course south. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa with the +1st Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of the 19th, and the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at the same time, all for the southward +for a sweep into the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet, +in search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a thorough +examination of trawlers suspected of acting as look-out vessels for the +enemy. + +While on passage south during the 19th the Battle Fleet was exercised +at battle tactics. At midnight on the 19th the Battle Fleet was in +position Lat. 58.3 N., Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 A.M. on the 20th, in +Lat. 57.8 N., Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The +2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa in time to meet the +Battle Fleet at 8 A.M. on the 21st, but, owing to bad weather, the +orders were cancelled and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the +4th Flotilla, which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers. During +daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised towards the Norwegian +coast to the northward of Lat. 57 N., in support of the battle cruisers +engaged in examining trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher +Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 P.M. to rendezvous, at 5 A.M. on +the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with the 3rd Battle Squadron, +which had been coaling at Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the +Commander-in-Chief. + +At 7 A.M. on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 55.45 N., +Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of the battle cruisers having +reported at 6.20 A.M. from a position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52 +E., that the weather was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers +being carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned and the +Fleet turned to the northward, as it was considered that an incomplete +examination would do more harm than good. + +During this period the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was working in Area 7, +and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in Area 6, as usual; the _Alsatian_ and +_Mantua_, with the _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping +down the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their patrol east +of the Shetlands, where they were joined by the armed merchant ship +_Teutonic_. + +The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and joined the Battle +Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron respectively on the 21st. + +All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped between 4 P.M. +on the 20th and 4 P.M. on the 21st, in order that the enemy should not +become aware of the movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might +prevent the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly deprive us +of our opportunity of catching it. + +During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an extensive sweep +was carried out during daylight of the 21st. The Battle Fleet covered a +front of 40 miles, and battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front +to the eastward and westward. + +On the evening of the 21st I was informed by wireless telegraphy from +the Admiralty of a report that a German force of two light cruisers, +with destroyers and submarines in company, had been sighted from +Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the northward. The whole Fleet was +turned to the southward at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to +cover a front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward, sweeping +to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the enemy vessels if they +had continued a course to the northward. The sweep to the northward +was continued until 10 A.M. The _Iron Duke_ was in position Lat. 59 +N., Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel towards the +Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W. During the 22nd, visibility +was very good, but no enemy vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys +during the night, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron being +detached to support the cruisers searching in the North Sea areas. + +At 7.45 A.M. on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals from the _Cressy_ +were intercepted indicating that the _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ had been +sunk by submarines in Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 3.41 E. These vessels were +patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast, under Admiralty +orders. No further details were received, beyond a wireless signal from +Commodore (S), at 11.30 A.M., that he was proceeding in the _Fearless_ +with seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to intercept the +enemy submarines on their way back. The Commander-in-Chief, thereupon, +ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (from the southern position of Area +7) to proceed at once to support the Commodore (S). By directions, +however, given by the Admiralty these orders were cancelled, and the +forces returned. + +At 10.30 P.M. I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers to proceed at +once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report had been received that +the German liner _Brandenburg_, lying at that port, was likely to +sail. Constant reports to this effect were received for several days, +and the _Brandenburg_ was heard using her wireless telegraphy on +September 25th. The patrol was maintained until September 28th, when +contradictory reports were to hand--one that she had been seen at sea +on the 27th, and the other that she was being interned by the Norwegian +Government. The latter report proved to be correct. The patrol was then +moved to a position off the Utvoer Lighthouse, Lat. 61.3 N., Long. 4.30 +E., to intercept the German destroyer _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_, said +to be leaving a Norwegian port. + +During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and battle cruisers +attempted to carry out gunnery practices, but thick weather interfered. +The force returned to Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd +Battle Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th. + +On the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron proceeded from Area 7 to +sweep up the Norwegian coast, thence going to Cromarty to coal. The +squadron arrived there on the evening of the 25th. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until the evening of +the 25th, when it proceeded out to the westward of the Orkneys; on the +26th bad weather again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale +being experienced. This moderated on the morning of the 27th, when the +Battle Fleet was to the eastward of the Shetlands, but increased again +to a very strong gale during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles +per hour and a very heavy confused sea. + +A considerable amount of damage was done to wireless masts, topmasts, +etc., and several ships had boats damaged or washed away. The ships of +the “Iron Duke” class took in large quantities of water through their +6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted at such a low level. +The gale continued during the 28th, veering to the northward, and +moderated on the 29th, on which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved +to the southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met and +screened by destroyers which had not been able to join the Fleet at sea +owing to the bad weather. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the morning of the 26th, +and proceeded to the Norwegian coast, sweeping down as far as the +Naze in search of enemy ships, particularly the s.s. _Prinz Friedrich +Wilhelm_, reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also to support +the _Drake_, _Nottingham_, _Falmouth_, and two destroyers, which had +been sent to the vicinity of the Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The +latter vessels had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for +enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers experienced very +heavy weather on their return across the North Sea, and some anxiety +was felt for their safety. + +The 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the 26th, and on the +29th was sent to watch off the entrances to Bergen in Norway for +the German s.s. _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_. The squadron returned to +Cromarty on October 1st. On the 28th the _Princess Royal_ left the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to fuel, _en route_) +to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian troops about to leave the +Dominion for the United Kingdom. The _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_, +which had been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the purpose +of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the 3rd Battle +Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from Scapa on the arrival of +the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Additional precautions against attack +by submarines were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on +this occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a considerably +increased number in the North Sea. These precautions included more +numerous patrols by destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the +entrances to Scapa, and necessarily involved a greatly increased strain +on the destroyers. + +Further precautions against submarine attack were also found necessary +in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival of light cruisers at Leith for +refit were temporarily suspended by Admiralty orders owing to the +presence of submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at the +destroyer _Stag_, and another at a torpedo boat off May Island on the +25th. The destroyer _Cheerful_ was also fired at on the 26th. + +The month of October, 1914, opened with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet +at Scapa, with the exception of the _Ajax_, which was _en route_ to +Devonport to refit, and the _Audacious_, which was on passage from +Devonport after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were at sea +supporting the cruisers, except the _Exmouth_, of the 6th Battle +Squadron, which was at Devonport refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron, the _Invincible_, and the _Inflexible_, were at Scapa; the +_Princess Royal_ was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to +Halifax. + +Of the cruisers, the _Devonshire_, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, was +refitting at Cromarty; the _Theseus_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was +returning from the White Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian +officers; the _Mantua_ and _Alsatian_, armed merchant-cruisers, were at +Liverpool, coaling and making good defects. + +Of the destroyer flotillas, the _Active_ and five destroyers of the 2nd +Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla, were absent refitting. + +On October 1st regulations were brought into force under which a large +number of coastal navigational lights were extinguished, as also were +regulations closing the east coast ports to neutral fishing craft; +other regulations were issued to control the movements of fishing +vessels in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under which +additional coastal navigation lights were extinguished (principally in +the North of Scotland), became effective. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until 5 P.M. on October +2nd, and then proceeded into the North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron sailed at daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted +2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the _Invincible_ and +_Inflexible_, with the _Sappho_ and three mine-layers, left at 2 P.M. +on October 3rd. + +On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took up pre-arranged +positions designed to secure a close watch over the northern portion of +the North Sea, partly with a view to an interception of all traffic, +and partly to ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the North Sea +during the ensuing week. The main object was the protection of an +important convoy of Canadian troops, which was crossing from Halifax, +and which the battle cruiser _Princess Royal_ and the battleship +_Majestic_ had been sent to meet and to protect. The _Princess Royal_ +arrived at the rendezvous at 8 P.M. on October 7th, and waited for the +convoy, which was two and a half days late. + +The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during the period Oct. +3rd–11th approximately as follows: + + The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island + Channel from the western side. + + The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruisers, the + _Sappho_ and three mine-layers, was stationed to the northward and + eastward of the Shetland Islands. + + The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion of + Area No. 4. + + The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5. + + The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5. + + The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island + Channel. + + The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread, + worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle Squadron + to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle Squadron was + utilised to watch the waters between the Dreadnought Battle Fleet + and Norwegian territorial waters. + + The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern + approaches of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian + coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle + Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to the + bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and for + shelter when the weather necessitated this. + +These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3. + +The _Princess Royal_ met the Canadian convoy in Lat. 49.45 N., Long. +27.5 W., at 8 P.M. on October 10th. On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle +Fleet passed to the westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until +daylight on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadron, with the _Teutonic_, being withdrawn from the patrol +north of the Shetlands to a patrol line north-west from Sule Skerry +lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N., Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th +and remaining there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for +Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged in this operation +returned to their bases for fuel, except the 3rd Battle Squadron (the +ships of which had coaled two at a time during the operation) and the +cruiser squadrons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel. + +Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the following incidents +occurred. On October 2nd the _Alsatian_ took six concealed Germans off +a Danish steamer. At 5 A.M. on October 7th a submarine was reported +inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and by the _Assistance_; +she was fired at by the latter ship, in misty weather. On receipt of +the report I ordered all vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a +division of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the submarine. +Later investigation indicated that the report was well founded. + +On October 9th the _Alsatian_ sighted an enemy submarine in Lat. 61.42 +N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same day at 3 P.M. the _Antrim_, flagship +of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was +missed by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the _Antrim_ +just failed to ram after the attack; numerous reports of enemy aircraft +having been sighted on the East and West coasts of Scotland were also +received. + +On October 10th the _Liverpool_ and one-half of the 4th Flotilla were +sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the islands in the vicinity of +Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N., Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they +were not being used as German submarine bases, in view of the attack +on the _Antrim_ in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron +supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour to this idea. + +Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the northward, two or three +at a time, during the operations, to carry out gunnery practices by day +and by night. Thick fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and +ships detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable difficulty +in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly resulted in a serious collision +between a battleship of the 6th Battle Squadron and one of the +Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of +each other on opposite courses. + +On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the morning of October +12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville reported that a partial submarine +obstruction was in place across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even +a partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine attack on the +Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had given me much anxiety since +the beginning of hostilities. + +[Illustration: APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS OCT^{R.} 3^{RD.} TO 11^{TH.} +1914. + +WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING.] + +On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser tubes of the +_Iron Duke_ were in a bad condition, although the ship was quite +new, and that the condensers would need either complete, or +partial, retubing. The discovery was very disconcerting when taken in +conjunction with the case of the _Orion_, the condensers of which ship +had been retubed during September; it naturally led to suspicion being +directed to the condenser tubes generally of other ships, from which +reports of cases of tubes occasionally giving out were being received. + +The whole question was taken up with the Admiralty, requests being +made that all available spare tubes should be sent at once to the +Northern bases, together with some dockyard fitters who could assist +the artificers of the Fleet in the work of retubing. Representations +were also made as to the urgent necessity of increasing the stock of +reserve tubes in case the defects became general in the Fleet owing to +the ships being so constantly under steam at sea. The task of replacing +the defective tubes in the _Iron Duke’s_ condensers was begun at once, +with the help of the artificers of the Fleet, and the _Centurion_ was +detailed as the spare Fleet-Flagship in case of emergency. But at this +time the _Iron Duke_ was not kept specially in harbour for retubing +work, this being carried out as opportunity occurred, although under +considerable difficulties, since the labour of suddenly preparing for +sea, with a condenser undergoing retubing, was very appreciable. The +manner in which this heavy work was taken in hand and rapidly completed +in several ships, largely by Fleet labour, demonstrated the extreme +efficiency and very fine spirit of the engine-room departments of the +ships of the Grand Fleet. + +From the 12th to the 16th October the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons +remained at Scapa, and at 6 P.M. on the 16th they left to carry out +target practice to the westward of the Orkneys. The 2nd Battle Squadron +left Scapa on the evening of the 13th to support the cruisers in the +North Sea; it joined the 3rd Battle Squadron already there, the ships +of which were being detached to Scapa two at a time to fuel and to +overhaul their machinery. It was found necessary to give these ships, +with reciprocating engines, five days off duty periodically in order to +carry out necessary adjustments. + +The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron +and two divisions of destroyers, left Scapa at 5.30 P.M. on the 12th, +to carry out a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea. This force +swept on the 13th on a broad front down to the Dogger Bank, thence to +the Norwegian coast, and to the northward on the 14th in conjunction +with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (which was then prolonging the sweeping +line), without sighting any enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and +light cruisers took up a position on the 15th to support the cruiser +squadrons on patrol, the destroyers proceeding to Lerwick to fuel. + +The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron remained at Scapa. The 2nd Cruiser +Squadron was working the N.E. corner of Area 6, and the 10th Cruiser +Squadron at this period was working the south-western portion of Area +No. 6. At 1.15 P.M. on October 15th the _Theseus_ reported that a +torpedo, which had missed, had been fired at her in Lat. 57.50 N., +Long. 0.33 E. + +On receipt of this report orders were given that the ships of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron, on patrol, were to be withdrawn to the northern +corner of the area, and later, at 8 P.M., orders were sent that +they were to join the 2nd Battle Squadron still farther north, and +to be used by the battleships (which were spread for the purpose of +intercepting trade or enemy’s ships) for boarding purposes. Meanwhile +the senior officer of the 10th Cruiser Squadron ships operating in Area +6 (H.M.S. _Edgar_) reported that he could get no reply to wireless +signals from the _Hawke_. The _Swift_, with a division of destroyers, +was ordered to proceed from Scapa at high speed to the last reported +position of the _Hawke_ in Lat. 57.47 N., Long. 0.12 E., to search +for the ship. Two other divisions of destroyers were sent, later on, +to assist the _Swift_. It is to be noted that a submarine had been +reported off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast at 8.30 A.M. on the 14th, +but this report did not reach the _Iron Duke_ until the afternoon of +the 15th. + +The _Swift_ reported on the 16th having picked up a raft with an +officer and 20 men, survivors of the _Hawke_, which had been sunk by +a submarine in Lat. 57.40 N., Long. 0.13 W., on the 15th. Shortly +after sighting the raft, the _Swift_ was attacked by the same or +another submarine (it was thought by more than one) whilst engaged in +her work of rescue, and torpedoes were fired at her. Captain Wintour +subsequently stated that he was only able to effect the rescue by +manœuvring at high speed in the midst of the wreckage, etc., using +the destroyers with him to screen his movements. His experience was +an unpleasant one, as he naturally desired to remain on the spot +until he had ascertained with certainty that he had picked up all the +survivors, and this he proceeded to do with praiseworthy persistence, +bringing them to Scapa. On the 16th reports were also received that the +destroyers _Alarm_ and _Nymphe_ had been attacked by submarines to the +eastward of the Pentland Firth, and that the _Nymphe_ had rammed the +submarine that had attacked her. Later examination of the _Nymphe’s_ +bottom by divers showed that her starboard propeller was damaged. + +At 4.18 P.M. on the same day, the 16th, it was reported from one of the +shore batteries that a submarine was close into the Switha entrance to +Scapa Flow. The ships inside were immediately ordered to raise steam +with all despatch, and the usual precautions were taken of patrolling +the harbour with every available small craft, including destroyers, +tugs, trawlers, drifters and picket-boats; and colliers and store-ships +were as usual sent alongside the battleships, which were not fitted +with torpedo nets, as a precaution. + +The scene in the harbour on such occasions was a busy one. Small craft +of every nature were patrolling at the sight of a periscope; all guns +were manned; torpedo nets, where fitted, were placed in position; +and every effort was made to ensure that the Fleet was as adequately +guarded by the available patrol craft as circumstances admitted. All +large ships except the repair ships _Cyclops_ and _Assistance_ left +harbour during the night, the _Iron Duke_ joining the 1st and 4th +Battle Squadrons west of the Orkneys. + +At noon on the 17th Sir Stanley Colville, who had been requested to +organise a careful search for the reported submarine, signalled that +a submarine was believed to be inside Scapa Flow and had been hunted, +but not actually located. Reports had been received that officers and +men on board several of the destroyers, and the gunboat _Leda_, had +seen the periscope of the submarine, and that a torpedo had actually +been fired at one of the hunting vessels. It was, however, ascertained +subsequently that this torpedo was one which had been accidentally +discharged by one of our own destroyers. + +The accuracy or otherwise of these reports has never yet been +determined with certainty, but many of the officers engaged in the +search were convinced at the time that a submarine was actually inside, +and that they had seen her. Indeed, a good many rounds were fired +during the day at objects which were thought at the time to be a +periscope. + +The reports signalled to me convinced me that, until the matter was +cleared up with certainty, and until some more absolute security +against submarine attack on the Fleet at anchor could be provided, it +was courting disaster to base battleships or battle cruisers at Scapa +Flow. We had seen in the loss of the _Hawke_ that enemy submarines +could quite well operate in northern waters, and it was thought to be +only a matter of time before they would attempt an attack on the Fleet +in Scapa Flow, if indeed the attempt had not already been made. + +I decided, therefore, that it was necessary to seek for a temporary +base which could be used with safety whilst the submarine obstructions +at Scapa were being perfected. The incident that had already occurred +at Loch Ewe cast doubt on the safety of that base, since it was +unprovided with any obstructions at all and the depth of water made it +impossible to improvise them with Fleet resources. + +Accordingly I looked for other and more easily obstructed ports, and +eventually decided on Lough Swilly for the main part of the Fleet, +and Loch-na-Keal in the Island of Mull for the ships for which +berthing-space could not be found at Lough Swilly. Both ports possessed +comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly the water was so +shallow as to make it difficult for a submarine to enter submerged. +It was also a “defended port” and therefore possessed an organisation +which would be useful for regulating the entry of ships. + +The extensive dispositions necessitated by the temporary change of base +were at once ordered. Colliers, store-ships, and auxiliaries of one +kind and another, which were either _en route_ to, or at, Scapa Flow, +were diverted to the new bases; the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron were ordered to Loch-na-Keal to fuel and to improvise +anti-submarine obstructions at the entrance; and the _Illustrious_ +was ordered there from Loch Ewe to act as guard ship; the 1st and 4th +Battle Squadrons and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron were detached to +cruise to the north-westward of the Hebrides for blockading purposes, +and to carry out practices; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd +Cruiser Squadron and 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were sent to Lough +Swilly to coal. The cruiser blockade and look-out line was withdrawn +farther to the northward owing to the danger from submarines incurred +in operating in the central or southern portions of the North Sea +on a regular patrol, and the impossibility of providing destroyers +as a screen for the ships. The new line was to the northward of the +Shetland Islands, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and armed +merchant-cruisers carried out the patrol. There were, therefore, two +lines of blockade, one formed by the heavy ships north-westward of the +Hebrides, the second to the northward of the Shetland Islands. The +organisation was such that it was probable that vessels attempting to +evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines during daylight +hours. In making these new dispositions it was still intended to keep +the North Sea itself under observation by frequent cruiser sweeps. + +Numerous reports of submarines in the Minch at this time led to the +_Active_ and two divisions of destroyers being sent there to search +for them, and the remainder of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were divided +between blockade duty in the Pentland Firth, work at Scapa Flow, and +in the vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands, and with the ships at +Loch-na-Keal and Lough Swilly. + +On October 21st the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Cromarty to +coal. Owing to the receipt of information from the Admiralty early that +day, that it was reported that some German cruisers, destroyers and +submarines had left Danzig on October 17th for the North Sea, the 1st +Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were ordered to +leave their bases that morning, proceed into the North Sea, and sweep +down on a broad front to the Skagerrak, screened by the 4th Flotilla +of destroyers. The latter had to be sent back to their base on October +22nd owing to heavy weather. The remainder of the force swept up to the +Skaw without sighting any enemy vessels, then north along the Norwegian +coast, and proceeded, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to Cromarty and +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa. + +On October 21st a submarine was reported just outside Cromarty by an +armed trawler, and another report was received of one having been +sighted by the destroyer _Lynx_. The submarine obstruction at Cromarty, +designed by Captain Munro, had now been completed, and the base was +considered secure. It would, however, only accommodate a small portion +of the Fleet. + +The dispositions given above were maintained until October 22nd, when +the _Iron Duke_, 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, the _Active_ and two +divisions of destroyers of the 2nd Flotilla, arrived at Lough Swilly. +The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons and 2nd Cruiser Squadron took their +place to the north-westward of the Hebrides as an outer blockade line +and support for the cruiser squadrons. The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron +and four destroyers were detached to the southern part of the North +Sea on the 23rd to support the Commodore (T) in carrying out aerial +operations in the Heligoland Bight. The operations failed owing to the +difficulty the sea-planes experienced in rising off the water, and the +2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron returned to Cromarty. + +On arrival of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons at Lough Swilly, +steps were immediately taken to lay an anti-submarine obstruction at +the entrance, and this was very smartly completed with the limited +resources of the squadrons by 4 P.M. on the 23rd, and for the first +time since the declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure base. +Wire hawsers provided by the ships of the Fleet were suspended at +varying depths between six colliers which were anchored across the +entrance, with target rafts as intermediate supports. + +It was a fairly effective obstruction, and armed steamboats from the +fleet patrolled near it with destroyers as a support. + +The relief to those responsible for the safety of the Fleet was +immense, and attention was at once turned to the well-being of the +personnel, which had been pressed very hard, and to improving the +efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work. Battle practice +targets were ordered over from Lamlash, in the Island of Arran, a +pre-War practice base, with the intention of carrying out practice in +the waters north-west of Ireland. The work of retubing the condensers +of the _Iron Duke_ was once more taken in hand, and ships were given +the opportunity of overhauling and adjusting machinery, steam being +put back to longer notice than had previously been possible. The +anti-submarine defence was continually strengthened and improved during +the stay of the Fleet, and the colliers supporting it were gradually +replaced by trawlers and drifters. + +In order to give the men some much-needed diversion and exercise a +pulling regatta was organised and held on October 26th, and the men +were landed for route marches as frequently as possible during the +stay of the ships at Lough Swilly. + +On the 26th a submarine was reported inside Cromarty harbour, but Sir +David Beatty, who was there with the battle cruisers, stated, after +investigation, that he did not consider the report was true. + +Discussions took place with the Admiralty during the stay of the Fleet +at Lough Swilly on the subject of trawlers for the patrol of the +Minches and vicinity, and the requirements were given as thirty-six +trawlers for this service, which was considered next in importance to +the provision of an adequate patrol force of this nature for the waters +in the vicinity of the bases at Scapa Flow and Cromarty. + +The stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly was rendered memorable by the +unfortunate loss of the _Audacious_, then one of our most modern +battleships. + +Orders had been given to the 2nd Battle Squadron to carry out target +practice against the two battle practice targets obtained from Lamlash, +and the squadron left Loch-na-Keal on the evening of October 26th +for a rendezvous in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 8.30 W., at daylight on the +27th, where the targets which had left Lough Swilly in tow of two +tugs, the _Plover_ and _Flying Condor_, escorted by the light cruiser +_Liverpool_, were to be met. + +The squadron was in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 8.30 W. at 9 A.M. on the 27th, +preparing for the practice, when at that hour the _Audacious_ struck +a mine whilst turning. The explosion resulted in the flooding of the +port engine-room and partly flooding the centre engine-room. It was +not clear at the time whether the ship had been mined or torpedoed. +The _Monarch_ having reported sighting a submarine at 11 A.M., a +precautionary signal was made to Sir George Warrender to keep the +squadron clear of the _Audacious_. + +Meanwhile all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers and other small +craft were sent from Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal to assist the +_Audacious_ and to prevent the submarine (if one were present) from +doing further damage; and the armed boarding steamer _Cambria_ escorted +the collier _Thornhill_ (provided with towing hawsers) to the scene. +The hospital-ship _Soudan_ was ordered out to give help to survivors +in case the _Audacious_ sank or to the injured, and the _Liverpool_ +was directed to stand by her, but to keep moving at high speed. The +battleship _Exmouth_ was put at “short notice” ready to tow the +_Audacious_ in if necessary. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding +the 1st Battle Squadron, came on board the _Iron Duke_ to suggest that +he should proceed to the scene to render any assistance, an offer of +which I very gladly availed myself, as Sir George Warrender, in the +2nd Battle Squadron, could not close the ship whilst the danger of +submarine attack existed. + +Shortly after the _Audacious_ struck the mine, the s.s. _Olympic_, +on passage from the United States to Liverpool, closed the ship on +learning of the disaster, and Captain Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., who was +in command, at once volunteered to help in any way possible. Captain +Dampier, of the _Audacious_, asked that his ship might be taken in tow +and brought into Lough Swilly, and Captain Haddock, disregarding the +danger of submarine attack or of being mined, took immediate steps to +carry out this request. Unfortunately a considerable sea was running, +which increased during the day. In spite of the most magnificent and +seamanlike handling of the _Olympic_ by Captain Haddock, and later in +the day excellent work on the part of the master of the _Thornhill_, +the hawsers constantly parted, owing to the state of the sea and the +weight of the _Audacious_, the stern of that ship being almost awash +by the afternoon. The two ships were worked in a manner which Sir +Lewis Bayly reported as beyond praise. The attempts to tow the injured +ship had to be abandoned before dark, and Sir Lewis Bayly, Captain +Dampier and the few officers and men who had remained on board to work +the hawsers, etc., were taken off the _Audacious_ by 7.15 P.M. The +remainder of the ship’s company had been removed without accident, +in spite of the heavy sea, in the course of the day by destroyers, +trawlers, and other small craft, and in the boats of the _Audacious_. + +The work of the destroyers on this occasion was, as usual, of the +greatest value, and the exceedingly seamanlike handling of the _Fury_ +by Lieutenant-Commander Sumner, who, in the teeth of the greatest +difficulties, took heavy wire towing hawsers between the _Audacious_ +and the towing ships on several occasions, elicited from Sir Lewis +Bayly expressions of warm admiration. Arrangements were made for the +_Liverpool_ to stand by the _Audacious_ during the night, but at 9 +P.M. she suddenly blew up with great violence and sank. The cause of +this explosion was never ascertained with certainty. At the time the +ship blew up the _Liverpool_ was not far distant, and a good deal of +_débris_ fell on the deck of that ship, killing one petty officer. This +was the only casualty due to the loss of the _Audacious_. + +Meanwhile, at 1.8 P.M., information reached me from Kingstown that the +s.s. _Manchester Commerce_ had been sunk on the night of the 26th by a +mine in the vicinity of the disaster to the _Audacious_, and at 4.40 +P.M. a report came from Malin Head that a four-masted sailing vessel, +the _Caldaff_, had also struck a mine in the neighbourhood on the +previous night. + +These unfortunately belated reports disposed at once of any idea that +submarines had attacked the _Audacious_, and at 5 P.M. the _Exmouth_ +sailed from Lough Swilly to attempt to tow her in. Steps had already +been taken to warn outward and homeward bound vessels of the existence +of the mine-field and to divert all traffic clear of it; and all +mine-sweeping gunboats were ordered to Lough Swilly to locate the exact +limits of the mine-field and to sweep a clear passage along the north +coast of Ireland. + +On the arrival of the s.s. _Olympic_ at Lough Swilly, orders were given +that no communication between the ship and the shore was to take place. +I wired to the Admiralty suggesting that the loss of the _Audacious_ +should be kept secret for as long as possible, so that the enemy should +not learn of it, as the fact would afford him encouragement at a time +when the military situation was extremely critical for the Allies, and +also because, as a general policy, it was desirable to conceal from the +enemy any serious losses of which he could otherwise have no immediate +knowledge. + +This procedure was approved for the time, because of the military +situation, and the _Olympic_ was kept at Lough Swilly for several days. +This was necessary as she had on board a considerable number of United +States passengers, and it was known that they had taken photographs of +the _Audacious_ in a sinking condition. + +Amongst these passengers was Mr. Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel +Company, and it was made known to me after a day or two that he +had come over on very important business connected with War Office +contracts, and wished to proceed to London. After an interview with +him, this was agreed to, and I asked him to call on Lord Fisher of +the Admiralty in connection with the construction of some submarines +which I ascertained from him that his firm was in a position to build +very rapidly and which would be of the greatest value to us. He did +this, and with the most satisfactory results, as ten submarines were +constructed--as he promised--in the extraordinarily short space of five +months. These vessels were most useful to us later. + +The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough Swilly during the +remainder of October; the 2nd Battle Squadron proceeded to Lamlash on +the 29th to coal, and to Lough Swilly on November 1st; the 3rd Battle +Squadron went to Scapa on the 27th; and the 6th Battle Squadron to +Lough Swilly. + +On October 27th a trawler reported very suspicious movements on the +part of a large steamer to the westward of the island of Sule Skerry +(west of the Orkneys). It appeared possible that the ship might be a +German mine-layer, and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa was sent +to a position 120 miles from Fair Island on the Fair Island--Heligoland +line, to intercept her on returning, with orders that, at daylight on +the 29th, she should spread widely and sweep towards Fair Island, then +sweeping over to the Norwegian coast near Jaederen’s Point, spreading +at daylight on the 30th and sweeping up a line approximately N. 15 +W. from Heligoland, before returning to Scapa. Destroyers of the 4th +Flotilla were also sent out from Scapa on the 28th in search of the +suspected vessel, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were disposed +so as to cut her off if she passed to the north of the Shetlands. The +ship was not sighted, and no mines had been laid. + +The Grand Fleet was considerably weakened at this time apart from the +loss of the _Audacious_. The _Ajax_ had developed condenser defects; +the _Iron Duke_ had similar troubles; the _Orion_ had to be sent to +Greenock for examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to be +defective; the _Conqueror_ was at Devonport refitting, and the _New +Zealand_ was in dock at Cromarty. The _Erin_ and _Agincourt_, having +been newly commissioned, could not yet be regarded as efficient, so +that the Dreadnought Fleet only consisted of 17 effective battleships +and 5 battle cruisers; the German Dreadnought Fleet at the time +comprised 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, with the _Blücher_ in +addition. The margin of superiority was, therefore, unpleasantly small +in view of the fact that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and +the Grand Fleet only 42. + +During the stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly numerous reports of the +presence of submarines on the west coast of Scotland were received, a +large number of the reports coming from the coast watchers. Destroyers +were sent on many occasions to search the localities from which the +reports emanated, and the various harbours that could be used by +submarines as a base were frequently examined. At this period it was +considered possible that enemy submarines, acting so far from their +home ports as the west coast of Scotland, would be working from a short +or from a floating base. It was not thought--from experience with our +own submarines--that they would be self-supporting at this distance, +and the best method of limiting their activities, if not destroying +the submarines, was to find their base. Later experience, and a +closer knowledge of German submarines, however, showed that they were +independent of such bases. + +It is very doubtful whether any enemy submarines passed to the westward +of Scotland during October. We, at any rate, found no certain evidence +that they were present, in spite of the very numerous reports of their +being sighted. Similarly, reports were constantly being received of +air-craft (both Zeppelins and aeroplanes) being seen in the north of +Scotland; many of the rumours were of the most circumstantial nature, +some coming even from warships. It is quite certain that these reports +were founded on optical illusions, and it may be said that little +credence was attached to them at the time. + +But the currency of many rumours in those early days of the War, +sometimes supported by statements of the most plausible character, +were not only embarrassing, but frequently involved a great deal of +unproductive cruising, for it was impossible to ignore anything which +would enable us to find out the enemy’s movements or intentions. + +At the end of October, news came of the unfortunate wreck of the +hospital ship _Rohilla_ off Whitby, with considerable loss of life. + +About this time the German land forces occupied the Belgian coast. The +effect of this occupation on naval strategy was considered in the Grand +Fleet, and Sir Lewis Bayly and I discussed the blocking of Zeebrugge +by sinking ships across the channel. Sir Lewis Bayly considered the +scheme feasible, and wrote to me on the subject. I then suggested to +the Admiralty that such an operation should be carried out. It was not +considered practicable by the Admiralty at the time. It is perhaps of +interest to note that the subject was discussed as early as 1914. + +Some two years later I caused the question to be reconsidered after +taking up the appointment of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty (it had +been under consideration between 1914 and 1917). More than one plan +was discussed between Admiral Bacon (commanding the Dover patrol) +and myself; one idea, which I favoured, was to utilise ships of the +“Apollo” class, cutting down their upper works to render them less +visible during approach. Meanwhile, other schemes for driving the enemy +from the Belgian coast were in operation, so the question of blocking +was deferred. In September, 1917, when it became clear that the object +in view would not be effected by military operations during that year, +I gave directions to the Plans Division of the Naval Staff, of which +Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes had recently become the head, that plans +for blocking Zeebrugge were to be prepared; later, after considering +an independent proposal by Sir Reginald Bacon for attacking the mole +by landing parties from monitors run alongside it, I decided that +the operation was to be combined with the landing on the Zeebrugge +mole. The main objective for the landing was the destruction of enemy +destroyers known to be lying alongside the mole, and I considered that +this landing would also be very useful in creating a diversion to +facilitate the approach of the block ships. The scheme was eventually +approved by me in November, 1917, and the training of the storming +party and selection of the block ships were taken in hand. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +INCIDENTS AT SEA--NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914 + + +On November 1st I left Lough Swilly to confer at the Admiralty with the +First Lord and the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, who had relieved the +Marquis of Milford Haven in this post. During this conference, held on +November 2nd, the requirements of trawlers, drifters, etc., for the +patrol of the vicinity of the various fleet bases, the Minches, and the +waters surrounding the Orkneys and Shetlands were discussed at length +and decisions reached. The defence of the bases was also considered. +I stated that the requirements of patrol vessels for the Orkney and +Shetland areas were a total of 72, and for the Minches of 36. + +The future general naval policy was also discussed, one of the main +questions being that of the 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons joining the +Channel Fleet. It was determined that this step should be taken and +the necessary orders were given. I agreed to it with some reluctance, +as there was obviously no prospect of the 3rd Battle Squadron being +able to join the Dreadnought Fleet before a Fleet action if stationed +in southern waters, and a dispersion of the Fleet, which resulted in +the main Battle Fleet having but a slender preponderance of strength +over the High Sea Fleet, was a measure which was open to considerable +objection. The increasing necessity for refitting our ships, which +involved sending them as far away as Portsmouth or Devonport, combined +with the failures in condenser tubes that were occurring, led to two, +or three, or even more battleships being absent at a time, on passage, +laid up, or refitting. At the German selected moment, our main Battle +Fleet might well at this period have been reduced to 18 ships (all +Dreadnoughts), whilst the High Sea Fleet was just rising to a strength +of 16 Dreadnoughts and 16 pre-Dreadnoughts. + +Later, however, after the raid on East Coast towns, the 3rd Battle +Squadron was again detached from the Channel Fleet and based on Rosyth, +with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron; the two squadrons arrived there on +November 20th after passing west of Ireland and coaling at Scapa. The +6th Battle Squadron remained in southern waters. The object which it +was desired to attain by this last distribution, which was ordered +from the Admiralty, was to have a naval force based farther south than +Scapa, to be more immediately available in the case of an attempt by +the enemy to land a hostile force on our east coast. + +I returned to Lough Swilly at noon, November 3rd, and found the Fleet +under orders from the Admiralty to proceed to Scapa at once. These +orders were cancelled after my arrival, and the movements of the Battle +Fleet left to my discretion. I proceeded to sea with the 1st, 2nd and +4th Battle Squadrons at 3.45 P.M. and, passing south of Tory Island, +made for the vicinity of the Bills Rocks on the coast of Galway, for +target practice, which was carried out on the 4th, the Fleet then +proceeding to the northward. + +The Battle Fleet was screened out of Lough Swilly by the 2nd Flotilla, +which then left for Scapa. This flotilla had been employed during the +stay at Lough Swilly in providing patrols off the entrance and in +hunting for submarines, reports of which were very frequent. + +Prior to leaving Lough Swilly, news arrived from the Admiralty that +the light cruiser _Undaunted_, of the Harwich force, was being chased +by several German vessels in southern waters, and that hostile +battle cruisers had been sighted off Gorleston. These occurrences +had, presumably, led to the ordering of the Fleet to Scapa. As it +was thought that the operations of the German battle cruisers might +be part of a general movement, orders were sent to the 3rd Battle +Squadron to join the Commander-in-Chief at Scapa, the 1st and 2nd +Battle Cruiser Squadrons being directed to proceed with all dispatch +towards Heligoland, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron; the 2nd and +6th Cruiser Squadrons were ordered to Scapa to coal, and the 10th +Cruiser Squadron to the Shetlands for the same purpose, ready for +eventualities. These orders were cancelled when it became apparent that +the German movement was local, and that our ships would be too late to +intercept the enemy. On this occasion, the German cruiser _Yorck_, when +returning to port, struck a German mine and sank. + +The base at Loch-na-Keal was abandoned when the Fleet left Lough +Swilly, and the obstructions removed by the battleship _Illustrious_. + +On November 3rd the Admiralty issued a general notice proclaiming the +North Sea as an area in which hostile operations were being carried +out, and pointing out the danger incurred by neutral vessels which +entered the North Sea without first ascertaining the steps necessary +for safety. + +On November 5th the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ left Cromarty for +Devonport by Admiralty orders, prior to proceeding to search for +Admiral von Spee’s squadron in the South Atlantic. This order, the +necessity for which was apparent, and the subsequent results of which +were undoubtedly of high value, had, however, the effect of still +further weakening the Grand Fleet. + +The _Iron Duke_, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons cruised +between the Hebrides, Faroe Islands and Shetlands after November 4th, +and carried out gunnery practices and battle exercises as opportunity +occurred. The 1st Battle Squadron was sent to Scapa to coal on the 7th, +the 2nd Battle Squadron on the 8th, and the _Iron Duke_ and 4th Battle +Squadron arrived there on the 9th. + +The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were engaged on blockade work +during this period. + +On November 6th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron and one-half of the 4th Flotilla, was sent from +Cromarty to carry out a sweep of the North Sea, passing through the +following positions, namely: + + 1. Lat. 56.0 N. + Long. 1.30 E. + 2. Lat. 57.50 N. + Long. 5.0 E. + 3. Lat. 60.10 N. + Long. 3.15 E. + 4. Lat. 61.20 N. + Long. 3.0 E. + 5. Lat. 61.0 N. + Long. 1.0 E. + 6. Lat. 58.50 N. + Long. 0.0 . + +thence the Battle Cruiser Squadron and destroyers were to go to +Cromarty and the light cruisers to Scapa. + +The new battle cruiser _Tiger_, which had been working up gunnery +and torpedo practices at Bantry Bay in the south of Ireland, arrived +at Scapa on November 6th to continue her practices and to join the +1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. It was felt that she would prove a very +welcome reinforcement when efficient, since the departure of the +_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had left us in a questionable position +with regard to battle cruisers as compared with the Germans. + +After the Battle Fleet left Lough Swilly, and in consequence of +information sent to me by Admiral Colville as to the slow progress +being made with the submarine obstructions, orders were given to the +various ships to prepare sections of rope net submarine detectors for +use in the entrances to Scapa Flow, and these were rapidly placed +in position by the Fleet in Hoxa, Switha and Hoy Sounds when the +ships arrived at Scapa, armed trawlers being detailed to watch each +section. It was very disappointing to find on returning to the base +that so little headway had been made with the supply of material for +the permanent submarine wire net obstruction, and that the Fleet was +still, therefore, open to submarine attack. The increase in the number +of patrol trawlers, however, for service in the vicinity of the base +gave some protection to the entrances, and relieved the hard-pressed +destroyers to a welcome extent. + +At this time the watching and blockading cruisers were disposed in +areas between the Shetland Islands, Faroe Islands, and Iceland and to +the north-westward of the Hebrides, but the whole of the cruisers were +beginning to show signs of overwork. + +The Rear-Admiral commanding the 10th Cruiser Squadron reported that +all his ships, which were very old, were showing increasing signs of +needing thorough repair at a dockyard, and arrangements were put in +hand for sending them, three at a time, to the Clyde. In addition, the +_Antrim_, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, reported condenser defects; +the _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, was at Scapa making good +defects, which were constantly developing, and the _King Alfred_ and +_Leviathan_, of the same squadron, were refitting at dockyard ports. In +spite of these incidents, however, large numbers of steamers were being +intercepted daily by cruisers, battleships and destroyers, and sent +into Kirkwall for examination. About this time the increase in the +number of patrol craft at Scapa made it necessary to add considerably +to the administrative organisation at that base, and requests were +sent to the Admiralty to provide depôt ships for the local defence +destroyers, the patrol trawlers, and the other small craft, as well as +adequate administrative staffs. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until November 17th with +steam ready at from two to three hours’ notice, and on that date the +2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, +and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a half flotilla as a screen, left +their bases to take up positions for preventing a suspected attempt on +the part of the enemy to send some ships into the Atlantic. The 2nd +Battle Squadron worked to the westward, and the remaining vessels to +the eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron returned to Scapa on the 20th and the +2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the 21st. + +A heavy gale was experienced in the northern part of the North Sea and +in the waters surrounding the Orkneys and Shetlands from November 11th +to November 13th, and all work in the harbour had to be suspended, +ships lying with steam up, whilst at sea most of the cruisers were +obliged to lay to. At Scapa all the sea-plane sheds were wrecked by the +gale, and the sea-planes damaged. + +During this stay of the Battle Fleet at Scapa the routine was +introduced of carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices inside the +harbour, two or three ships being under way at a time for the purpose. +This routine was subsequently carried out whenever the Fleet, or any +portion of it, was at Scapa and the greatest possible benefit was +derived from it. It was found possible to carry out practice from all +guns, up to and including 6-inch, inside the harbour by day and night, +besides the ordinary sub-calibre firing and torpedo practices by ships, +and by destroyers attacking ships, or divisions of ships. + +On November 11th, the battle cruiser _Princess Royal_ sailed for +Halifax, by Admiralty orders, for the purpose of strengthening the +North American Squadron in operations against Admiral von Spee’s +squadron, should it appear in northern waters. I protested, as +Commander-in-Chief, against sending so powerful a ship as the _Princess +Royal_, armed with 13.5-inch guns, since her absence left our Battle +Cruiser Squadron inferior in strength to the German battle cruiser +force. I suggested that the _New Zealand_, carrying 12-inch guns, was, +owing to her economical coal consumption, more suited to the work +required and strong enough for the purpose. However, the _Princess +Royal_ sailed and remained absent from the North Sea until the +beginning of January, 1915. + +At this period, reports of enemy submarines being sighted, more +particularly by shore observers in the Hebrides, Orkneys and Shetlands, +were very numerous, and destroyers and patrol craft were frequently +being sent to search suspected bases or sheltered bays in which +submarines might be taking refuge. All such searches were, however, +fruitless, although in many cases the reports were very circumstantial +and convincing. + +On November 18th the mine-sweeping gunboats, whilst searching the +Fair Island Channel, sighted a submarine on the surface and chased +her at a speed of 18 knots, but could not overhaul her. The submarine +subsequently dived. This incident was the first practical proof of the +high surface speed possessed by German submarines. + +Destroyers were sent out immediately from Scapa to assist in the +search, with orders to use their searchlights after dark in order to +force the submarine to keep under water and so exhaust her batteries. +The search, however, proved abortive, although continued for 24 hours. +The use of searchlights for this purpose, begun on this occasion, +became common later on. + +A submarine was sighted by the 2nd Battle Squadron at 9 A.M. on the +19th, well to the westward of the Orkneys, and this may have been the +vessel chased by the mine-sweepers. + +During the gale on November 12th, the ships of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron--the old “Edgar” class of cruisers--which were on patrol +between the Shetlands and Faroe Islands had suffered much damage, many +of them showing signs of leaking and straining; boats and ventilators +were washed away; and water in large quantities found its way below. +It became evident that these old ships were not sufficiently seaworthy +to withstand the winter gales of northern latitudes without first +undergoing a thorough repair, and arrangements were made to send them, +three at a time, to the Clyde for survey and refit. The survey of the +first three, however, revealed that some months’ work would be required +to make them efficient for winter blockade duty, and it was then +decided by the Admiralty to pay off the whole squadron, and to utilise +the crews to commission armed merchant ships, which would be far more +suitable, as they could keep the sea for much longer periods. + +The ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been using Swarbachs Minn, +a harbour in the Shetland Islands, as an occasional coaling base. This +was evacuated on November 20th in consequence of the receipt of a +report that a submarine attack on the harbours in the Shetland Islands +was probable, all of these harbours being, at that time, defenceless +against such attack. On leaving the base, the ships of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron, not already at a refitting port, were ordered to dockyard +ports to pay off. + +On November 20th, during practice, a lyddite common shell detonated in +one of the 9.2-inch guns of the _Achilles_, and the muzzle of the gun +was blown off, eleven of the gun’s crew being injured. This occurrence +cast doubt on the safety of the whole of the lyddite shell afloat, and +restrictions on their use were issued, but were eventually removed, +after the withdrawal of all suspected shell of this nature. + +At dusk on November 22nd the Grand Fleet left its bases for the purpose +of carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, and to support an aerial +operation in the Heligoland Bight. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd +Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were included in this movement, and met +the remainder of the Fleet at sea at 9.30 A.M. on November 23rd in +Lat. 57.40 N., Long. 2.30 E. + +The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser +Squadron, 6th Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd and 4th Flotillas, took part +in the operation, the Fleet proceeding south in cruising order, with +destroyers screening the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +against submarine attack by day. The channel eastward of the Pentland +Firth was, as usual, searched by the mine-sweeping gunboats prior to +the departure of the Fleet. + +The Commodore (T) from Harwich, with three Light Cruisers and eight +destroyers, was directed to co-operate in the aerial operations. During +daylight on the 23rd opportunity was taken to carry out two tactical +exercises. The _Iron Duke’s_ position at midnight was Lat. 56.55 N., +Long. 4.11 E. Ships were ordered to be at action stations by dawn on +the 24th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron and a division of destroyers, was detached in the +afternoon of the 23rd with directions to be in Lat. 55.10 N., Long. +6.20 E. by 5.30 A.M. on the 24th. + +The _Drake_ reported her port engine disabled at 1 P.M. on the 23rd, +and had consequently to be sent back to Scapa. + +During the night the Admiralty informed me that the aerial operations +had been abandoned, as it was thought that the enemy had a force +present in the Bight, which would be too strong for our detached +vessels. I then directed the Commodore (T) to meet the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron at its daylight position in Lat. 54.50 N., Long. 7.6 E., and +thence to proceed towards Heligoland and endeavour to draw any enemy +forces that might be encountered towards our Fleet. The 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed also to +proceed to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to give any necessary support. + +The weather on the 24th was fine and bright with high visibility. +The Commodore (T) reconnoitred Heligoland and reported at 10.40 A.M. +that there was smoke behind the island, and ships steaming to the +southward; and that he had sighted a submarine. The Rear-Admiral of +the 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 11 A.M. that he had only sighted +destroyers, and that he could not draw the enemy towards him, and so +was returning to the northward with Commodore (T). The Vice-Admiral +of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, who was supporting, turned to the +northward shortly afterwards, his noon position being Lat. 54.47 N., +Long. 6.35 E. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was attacked at 12.35 P.M. by +an aeroplane, which dropped five bombs near the _Liverpool_, which was +in company. + +The Battle Fleet cruised in support, the 10 A.M. position of the +_Iron Duke_ being Lat. 55.23 N., Long. 5.30 E. At 2 P.M. the Battle +Fleet turned to the north-westward, sighting the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron astern at 3.30 P.M. The battle cruisers and light cruisers +were stationed 15 miles to the eastward of the Battle Fleet during the +night, and the necessary dispositions were taken to provide against a +destroyer attack during the night. + +On November 25th two more tactical exercises were carried out. During +the afternoon the wind increased, and thick weather set in, and by +daylight on the 26th a heavy southerly gale was blowing, so the +attached cruisers were sent to the bases for shelter. The 1st Battle +Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron, and the destroyers, had been detached at midnight on the 25th +for Scapa, Rosyth and Invergordon respectively. The original intention +was to take the remainder of the Fleet farther north for target +practice, but it was abandoned owing to the bad weather, and the _Iron +Duke_, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron +arrived at Scapa on the 27th. + +During the absence of the Fleet, the German submarine U 18 was rammed +at 12.20 P.M. November 24th by mine-sweeping trawler No. 96, one mile +off the Hoxa entrance to Scapa. U 18 was damaged in the collision, +dived, hit the bottom and received further damage. All the available +patrol craft were ordered to the spot most promptly by the Vice-Admiral +commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands and hunted her. She finally came +to the surface and surrendered off Muckle Skerry in the Pentland +Firth. The submarine sank as the crew came on deck, the sea cocks, +probably, having been previously opened. The commanding officer of the +submarine, who had apparently intended to try to enter Scapa Flow, +expressed great surprise to Admiral Colville at the absence of the +Fleet. It seemed possible that he had been deterred from his attempt +by the sight of the buoys across the entrance, probably suspecting the +presence of an obstruction which, however, was _not_ there. The sinking +of the submarine caused the greatest gratification to the local defence +forces at Scapa and acted as an incentive to further efforts. It was +also, probably, a deterrent to further attacks on the Fleet at Scapa, +as the circumstances in which U 18 was sunk were kept most secret in +order that the enemy might be led to think that her destruction was due +to nets or mines. Indeed, it is very likely that this incident and the +secrecy observed had important results in preventing the loss of ships +of the Grand Fleet when at anchor in Scapa Flow. + +Great submarine activity occurred at this time in the vicinity of the +Orkneys and Shetlands. The _Dryad_ sighted a submarine on the 24th in +Lat. 58.35 N., Long. 1.45 W.; a second was sighted by an armed trawler +off Copinsay on the same day; and a third was sighted from the shore, +proceeding to the eastward through the Pentland Firth. On the 25th U +16 was sighted by a collier and trawler in Lat. 58.46 N., Long. 2.15 +W., and later by the mine-sweeping gunboat _Skipjack_ not far from this +position. + +On the return of the Fleet arrangements were made for constructing, +with Fleet resources, net obstructions across the Hoy entrance to Scapa +Flow, and, in view of the attempt of U 18, all patrols were stiffened +to the utmost extent possible. + +During November 27th and 28th the strong gale continued, interfering +considerably with the work on the submarine obstructions. Several +reports of the sighting of submarines in harbours in the north of +Scotland, the Orkneys and Shetlands were received during the last +days of November, and destroyers and patrol craft were kept very busy +in searching the various bays and harbours. In many cases charges +were exploded on the bottom in bays in which it was considered that a +submarine might be lying, in the hope of forcing her to the surface. No +known result, however, was obtained. + +The Fleet remained in the various bases until the end of the month, +the ships in Scapa Flow carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices +and working at the obstructions. The _King George V._, which had +just returned from refit at a dockyard, developed condenser defects +necessitating partial retubing; she was the fourth battleship in which +this defect had occurred since the War started, a period of only four +months, and it will be realised that such wholesale breakdowns caused +me uneasiness. + +During November the work of sinking block-ships in all the entrance +channels to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, was carried +out. Unfortunately the block-ships had been sent up in a light +condition without cement ballast which, I was informed, could not be +supplied, and they began in many cases to break up or to shift their +position during the winter gales. This fact, combined with the great +difficulty experienced in sinking them in the exact positions required +owing to the strong tides prevailing (up to at least eight knots in +strength), and the very short periods of slack water, rendered the work +of blocking only partially effective. + +At the end of November the effective state of the Grand Fleet was as +follows: + + Fleet-Flagship: the _Iron Duke_. + + _1st Battle Squadron_: + 7 ships, the _Neptune_ being away refitting. + + _2nd Battle Squadron_: + 7 ships, of which one, the _King George V._, was disabled, + retubing condensers. + + _3rd Battle Squadron_ (Pre-Dreadnoughts): + 7 ships, one ship refitting at twelve hours’ notice for steam, + and the 8th ship returning from a dockyard refit. + + _4th Battle Squadron_: + 5 ships (complete). + + _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (the _Princess Royal_ having been detached to North + America). + + _2nd Cruiser Squadron_: + 3 ships. The _Shannon_ was refitting. + + _3rd Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _6th Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_: + 5 ships. The _Liverpool_ was refitting. + + _2nd Flotilla_: + 15 destroyers (5 refitting). + + _4th Flotilla_: + 15 destroyers (5 refitting). + + _10th Cruiser Squadron_: + _Nil_ (paid off). + + _Armed Merchant-Cruisers_: + 2 (2 were coaling at Liverpool). + + _Mine-sweeping Gunboats_: + 5 (3 were refitting). + +The two new battleships, the _Emperor of India_ and _Benbow_, the +former flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, C.B., had arrived at +Berehaven in the south of Ireland on December 1st to “work up” after +commissioning. On the same date the _Leviathan_ arrived at Cromarty +to act as flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron under the orders of +Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore. His flag was transferred to her from +the _New Zealand_ on December 2nd. + +On the night of December 2nd a very violent gale sprang up at Scapa +Flow, during which several ships dragged their anchors, in spite of +two anchors being down and steam up; the gale lasted until the morning +of the 4th. All communication between ships in Scapa Flow, even by +drifter, was suspended, and the light cruisers at sea on patrol were +forced to lie to. An officer and one man were washed overboard from a +picket-boat sheltering under the stern of a store-ship and drowned. + +On December 3rd Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, lately in command of the +10th Cruiser Squadron, hoisted his flag in the armed merchant ship +_Alsatian_ to command the merchant cruisers attached to the Grand +Fleet, which were now constituted as the new 10th Cruiser Squadron. + +At 1.45 P.M. on December 3rd the destroyer _Garry_, Commander W. W. +Wilson, of the local defence force, reported that she was engaging a +submarine at the Holm Sound entrance to Scapa Flow. This submarine was +possibly sheltering there from the bad weather. Destroyers and trawlers +were at once sent out to assist, and the submarine was last reported +diving to seaward. Several rounds from her 12-pounder gun were fired by +the _Garry_ at the submarine’s conning tower, but apparently without +effect, and an attempt to ram her also failed owing to the heavy sea +and very strong tides. The submarine and the _Garry_ fired torpedoes +at one another, the submarine’s torpedo passing under the stern of the +_Garry_. All ships were directed to raise steam for leaving harbour on +receipt of the first report from the Garry, from which it was not clear +whether the submarine had passed through Holm Sound into the harbour, +but this order was cancelled when it was ascertained that she was +outside. + +On December 4th all the mine-sweeping gunboats attached to the Grand +Fleet were sent to Sheerness by Admiralty direction for the purpose of +carrying out sweeping operations off the coast of Belgium; trawlers +were then the only sweeping vessels left with the Grand Fleet. + +On December 5th another heavy gale was experienced, lasting until the +following morning, and all small craft at sea were forced to shelter. + +In consequence of representations made to the Admiralty of the +inadequacy of the mine-sweeping force at this time attached to the +Grand Fleet, owing to the withdrawal of the gunboats, steps were taken +to fit out eight small steamers for the purpose, and I was informed +that they would arrive on various dates during the month of December. +These vessels did not prove very satisfactory as mine-sweepers in +northern waters, and were withdrawn later for use in the Mediterranean. + +During the stay of the Fleet in Scapa Flow work on the improvised +submarine obstructions was continued by naval parties with all possible +speed, and, meanwhile, work on the permanent obstructions was in hand, +though progressing but slowly, owing to the difficulty experienced in +fitting out the trawlers at Inverness with the necessary winches and +providing the required moorings. + +On December 6th bad weather was again experienced. Orders were issued +on this date for a sweep down the North Sea, but were cancelled on +receipt of information from the Admiralty that the recent bad weather +had caused a very large number of mines to break adrift in the +southern portion of the North Sea. On the same day the light cruiser +_Sappho_ and three armed boarding steamers were sent to Loch Ewe +and based there with orders to work north-west of the Hebrides for +the interception of trade; the force of armed boarding steamers was +increased later. These vessels were mostly Irish mail packets. Rather +extensive alterations were necessary, after they had been sent up, +before they were fit for their duties. + +During the early part of December the ships of the 2nd and 6th Cruiser +Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were mainly engaged in +Areas 3, 4 and 6; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was at Rosyth and working to +the eastward from that base. + +On December 7th Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore, K.C.B., assumed +command of the newly constituted 1st Cruiser Squadron, and the +_Leviathan_ and _Duke of Edinburgh_ arrived at Scapa on that date; +the _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, with the above ships, comprised the +squadron. On December 7th, two merchant ships, the s.s. _Michigan_ +and _City of Oxford_, disguised as men-of-war, arrived at Scapa. +These vessels, with several others, had been fitted out at Belfast +by Admiralty orders with dummy turrets and guns, and altered with a +view to representing certain British battleships and battle cruisers. +The whole of these were formed into a squadron under the command of +Commodore Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., of _Olympic_ fame, and termed the +Special Service Squadron. The disguise of the ships was carried out +very cleverly, though presumably at considerable expense. They would +have been of value had it been possible to select vessels of a suitable +speed, but the highest speed attainable by any vessel in the squadron +was not more than nine to ten knots, whilst the speed of the squadron +as a whole did not exceed seven knots. The ships could not under these +conditions accompany the Fleet to sea, and it was very difficult to +find a use for them in home waters. Commodore Haddock was, later, +detached with the squadron to Loch Ewe, where the ships were worked +up to carry out fleet movements. This he did most successfully, so +that, had the ships possessed the requisite speed, use might have been +made of them as a squadron for various decoy purposes. But, under the +conditions existing, this was impossible, and eventually the squadron +was disbanded with the exception of one vessel; the experiment was +tried of sending her to sea disguised as a disabled man-of-war with a +considerable heel to one side, and with patrol craft accompanying her +as if for protection, in the hope that a submarine might be induced +to attack her and so afford the patrols an opportunity of sinking the +submarine. + +This scheme, however, met with no success. All the vessels were +restored to their original conditions for trading purposes, with the +exception of some which were sent to the Mediterranean and to North +America, where it was reported that they were of some use. + +On December 8th another gale was experienced. The _Thunderer_, which +had developed condenser defects, left for Devonport on the 8th for +refit and for retubing condensers; yet another case of this defect! + +On December 9th the 1st Battle Squadron proceeded to sea to cruise to +the north-westward of the Shetland Islands and to carry out gunnery +practices as convenient. In consequence of bad weather the Vice-Admiral +sent the attached cruiser _Bellona_ back to Scapa for shelter. + +On December 10th the new battleships _Benbow_ and _Emperor of India_ +arrived from Berehaven to strengthen the 4th Battle Squadron, and +proved very welcome additions to the Fleet. They, as well as all +other new ships joining, necessarily spent several weeks in practices +before becoming efficient to join the Fleet at sea, or to take part in +action. Owing to the hurried completion of these two ships, a great +deal of fitting work was also required before they were in a proper +condition, and this delayed their practices considerably. On the 11th +another gale was experienced which lasted until the 14th. The weather +during this period was very bad, and ships at sea (including the 1st +Battle Squadron which returned to Scapa on the 12th) met with very bad +weather. Destroyers on patrol were unable to maintain their stations +and were forced to run for shelter, and one of them, the _Cockatrice_, +suffered some damage. + +On the 12th the work of retubing the port condenser of the _King George +V._ was completed; the starboard condenser was not taken in hand owing +to the small margin of superiority of the Battle Fleet over the High +Sea Fleet at this time. + +During this stay of the Battle Fleet some very necessary work in the +ships of the “Iron Duke” class was partially carried out. These ships +were the first modern battleships fitted with 6-inch guns for their +secondary armament, and the gunports were very low. Early in the War +it was found necessary to unship the ports altogether, as the sea +washed them away constantly. Water then had free access to the inside +of the ship through the opening between the revolving shield and the +ship’s side, and, except in fine weather, water entered freely. In bad +weather the water, as deep as three to four inches, was continually +washing about the living decks and finding its way below through the +open hatches, to the great discomfort of the ship’s company, who were +continually wet, and to the detriment of efficiency. Arrangements were +devised on board the _Iron Duke_ to overcome this trouble, and steps +taken to have all the necessary fittings made at various contractors’ +yards. A partial bulkhead was fitted in rear of the guns to confine +the water which entered the ship, and watertight indiarubber joints +provided between the gun shields and the ship’s side. The result was +satisfactory, and similar changes were made in the ships of the “Queen +Elizabeth” class and in the _Tiger_. The two after 6-inch guns, which +were on the main deck level, were removed altogether at the first +opportunity, and the ship’s side and armour completed in the after +embrasure in all these ships, as it was apparent that these guns could +never be worked at sea, being only a few feet above the water line. +The guns themselves were mounted in new unarmoured casemates on the +superstructure deck level. The work connected with the forward 6-inch +guns was entirely carried out at Scapa, with the ships at short notice +for steam, and in some cases the workmen remained in the ships and +continued the work at sea. + +On December 12th serious defects in the boilers of the _Liverpool_ +became apparent and the speed of the ship was limited to 17 knots. This +defect, which first showed itself in this ship, gradually affected the +boilers of the same type in all ships so fitted, as they experienced a +certain degree of wear, and from this time onwards there was usually +one, and occasionally two, light cruisers paid off for the purpose of +carrying out the necessary repairs which occupied a period of two or +three months. This reduction in the number of efficient light cruisers +was serious, at a time when our numbers compared badly with those +possessed by the enemy. + +On December 14th directions were given to the 2nd Battle Squadron +and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa, the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron at Cromarty and all the available destroyers which were at +that base, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, to proceed to +sea to meet at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.20 N., Long. 0.10 W., at 2.30 +P.M. on December 15th, the force then to proceed to the southward +with a view to sweeping the western portion of the North Sea. The 2nd +Battle Squadron--without the _Thunderer_, which was refitting, and, +therefore, comprising only six ships--left Scapa early on the 15th, but +in passing through the Pentland Firth the attached cruisers _Blanche_ +and _Boadicea_ were seriously damaged by the heavy sea running as +the result of the late exceptional gales, and were forced to return. +The _Boadicea_ had her bridge washed away and lost several men swept +overboard and drowned. This ship was sent to the Clyde for repairs; +the damage to the _Blanche_ being less was made good at Scapa. The +number of destroyers accompanying the force was, unfortunately, very +inadequate, the 2nd Battle Squadron being unprovided with any vessels +of this class, as the weather conditions in the Pentland Firth made +it out of the question for destroyers to go to sea from Scapa. It +was decided not to postpone the sweep on this account. I ordered all +available destroyers out from Cromarty in the hope that the weather +conditions in the Moray Firth might be better than at Scapa; only seven +were available, however, and I therefore asked the Admiralty to direct +the Commodore (T), with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, to meet +the northern force at a southern rendezvous at daylight on December +16th. This proposal was not carried out, however, the Harwich force, +which was at sea, remaining a considerable distance to the southward. + +Whilst the force was on passage to the southward, the destroyers +_Lynx_, _Ambuscade_, _Unity_, _Hardy_, _Shark_, _Acasta_ and +_Spitfire_--which had left Cromarty with the battle cruisers and on +reaching the rendezvous were stationed 10 miles ahead of the 2nd Battle +Squadron--sighted and became engaged before daylight on December +16th with a strong force of enemy destroyers, and, later, with one +enemy cruiser and three light cruisers. The destroyers appeared to +be screening ahead of the other vessels and both destroyers and +cruisers were engaged by our small destroyer force. It was difficult +to ascertain the result of the engagement so far as the German vessels +were concerned, although the _Hardy_ claimed to have hit a light +cruiser at close range; the _Hardy’s_ steering-gear was disabled by +enemy fire, two men killed and one officer and 14 men wounded. The +_Ambuscade_ and _Lynx_ were also holed, the _Lynx_ having one man +wounded. The _Hardy_ finally withdrew under escort of the _Lynx_. The +engagement caused our own destroyers to become scattered and separated +from the Battle Squadron, and in the course of the day they proceeded +to various east coast ports to repair and refuel, the _Hardy_ being +escorted to the Humber by the _Spitfire_. No report of this engagement +reached me at the time. My first information of the presence of enemy +forces in the vicinity of our coast was obtained by intercepting +at 8.55 A.M. a wireless message from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral +commanding the 2nd Battle Squadron, timed 8.35 A.M., stating that +Scarborough was being shelled. The Grand Fleet was at once ordered to +raise steam, and left at 12.15 P.M., steering for a position Lat. 57 +N., Long. 2.30 E. The weather had now moderated sufficiently to allow +of destroyers accompanying the Fleet. + +Meanwhile Sir George Warrender, who was in command of the 2nd Battle +Squadron and was the senior officer of the forces at sea, on receipt +of the Admiralty telegram had turned to the northward to endeavour to +intercept the enemy forces on their return passage. Wireless signals +were intercepted in the _Iron Duke_ indicating that the scout _Patrol_ +was being engaged by two enemy battle cruisers and that battleships or +battle cruisers were off Scarborough and light cruisers off Hartlepool. +I knew that a gap between two mine-fields laid by the enemy off our +coast existed between Lat. 54.20 N. and 54.40 N. and concluded that any +enemy forces operating off our coasts would pass through this gap. At +10 A.M., therefore, after intercepting the various messages mentioned +above, I reminded the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron and +the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by wireless that +this gap existed, and that the enemy would probably emerge there, and +Sir George Warrender at 10.26 A.M. directed Sir David Beatty to pass +through the gap towards our coast. The Admiralty at 10.30 signalled, +however, to the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron that the enemy +was probably returning towards Heligoland, and that he should keep +outside the mine-fields and steer to cut off the enemy. Sir George +Warrender then directed Sir David Beatty to obey this latter order. + +I had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea from Rosyth immediately +on receipt of the first news of the enemy, and Vice-Admiral Bradford, +whose squadron was at short notice for steam, left at 10 A.M. with +directions from me to proceed to lat. 55.50 N., Long. 1.10 W., my +object being for this force to intercept the enemy should he pass out +to the northward of the German minefields instead of through the gap +between them. + +Sir George Warrender, with the 2nd Battle Squadron, the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron being in company, was informed of these dispositions by me. +At 11.40 A.M. he signalled that at 12.30 P.M. he would be in Lat. 54.24 +N., Long. 2.0 E. Sir David Beatty, with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was to the north-westward of the +Battle Squadron, and the Commodore (T) some 60 miles to the southward, +having been ordered by the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron, +at 10.28 A.M., to steer for a position in Lat. 54.20 N., Long. 1.30 +E. The weather throughout the whole morning had been very misty, with +a visibility of about five miles, and sufficient sea to cause a great +deal of spray when ships were steaming at high speed. + +At 11.30 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_ (1st Light +Cruiser Squadron), sighted an enemy light cruiser and destroyers +steering to the southward, gave chase with the _Birmingham_ and engaged +them; owing to the spray washing over the ship, and to the mist, no +result was visible. Three other enemy light cruisers, or cruisers, were +sighted to the south-westward shortly before 11.50 A.M., at about which +time touch with these vessels was lost. + +At 12.16 P.M., German cruisers and destroyers were sighted in Lat. +54.23 N., Long. 2.14 E. by the 2nd Battle Squadron distant about +five miles on a bearing north by west, steering to the eastward, +having evidently come out through the gap in the mine-fields as was +anticipated; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at this time was some 15 +miles north of the Battle Squadron. It seems probable that the German +force passed either between our 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron, or ahead of the former and astern of the latter. On +sighting our Battle Squadron, which turned to close, the enemy steered +to the northward and disappeared shortly afterwards in the mist, +steaming at high speed, and without being engaged by the 2nd Battle +Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron did not sight any enemy +forces. + +The escape of the enemy’s force was most disappointing, seeing that +our own squadrons were in a very favourable position for intercepting +the raiders. Low visibility was the main reason for their escape, but +the absence from the Battle Squadron (through the bad weather in the +Pentland Firth) of its attached cruisers and of a sufficient force of +destroyers was a contributory cause, as well as the fact of our light +cruisers having lost touch with the enemy at 11.50. + +At 3 P.M. the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron informed me of +the main features of the position, and stated that he was in Lat. 54.43 +N., Long. 1.55 E., steering to the northward, with the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron, adding that he had ordered the battle cruisers and light +cruisers to rejoin him. + +At about 2 P.M. the Admiralty informed me that it was thought, from the +information given by our directional stations, that other ships of the +High Sea Fleet were probably at sea, and at 6.30 P.M. I gave all our +forces a rendezvous at which to meet at 6 A.M. on the 17th. + +The force from Scapa, consisting of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, +with the 2nd Flotilla, and the 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, +met at this time the force under Sir George Warrender, the 3rd Battle +Squadron under Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, and the Commodore (T) +with three light cruisers, and proceeded to the southward. During +the afternoon of the 17th the Admiralty was able to ascertain (by +directional wireless telegraphy) and to inform me that the ships of the +High Sea Fleet, previously reported, were now in harbour. + +Opportunity was then taken of the whole Fleet being in company with +the Commodore (T) to carry out a battle exercise. At dusk the Commodore +(T) was detached to Harwich, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser +Squadron to Rosyth, the 2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd Flotilla to Scapa, +and the _Marlborough_ to Rosyth, for the purpose of allowing Sir Lewis +Bayly and Sir Cecil Burney to exchange commands in accordance with +orders received from the Admiralty by wireless telegraphy when at sea. + +The light cruiser _Bellona_ and the flotilla leader _Broke_ collided +during the battle exercises, and were seriously damaged, being sent to +Rosyth under the escort of the _Devonshire_. + +During the 17th wireless messages intercepted in the _Iron Duke_ showed +that the enemy raiding force had laid a large number of mines off the +Yorkshire coast and that some British and neutral merchant ships had +been sunk as a result. + +During December 18th the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained at sea to +the eastward of the Orkneys, and in the evening the battleships shaped +course for Scapa, arriving on the 19th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron +and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reaching Cromarty on the same day. The +1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons also proceeded to Cromarty, and the 6th +Cruiser Squadron remained out on patrol. + +During the 18th a submarine was reported inside Scapa Flow, and the 2nd +Battle Squadron raised steam; but investigation showed that the report +was not well founded. + +The strength of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 18 ships, +and directions were given by me to the Rear-Admiral commanding to +establish patrols as follows: + + Patrol A.--North of the Faroes and to westward of Long. 5.30 W. + + Patrol B.--North of the Shetlands and to westward of Long. 1.0 W. + + Patrol C.--South of the Faroes and to westward of a line joining + Sydero and Sule Skerry lighthouses. + + Patrol D.--West of the Hebrides and a line N.½W. from St. Kilda. + +The _Sappho_ and the seven armed boarding-steamers, now available, were +based on Loch Ewe, and completed the blockade line between Patrol D and +the Hebrides. They were, however, shifted later on to Scapa, where they +were employed on patrol and boarding duties in the approaches to the +Pentland Firth, or at sea with cruiser squadrons. + +On December 20th a report was received that the submarine obstruction +in Hoxa Sound had been found to be pierced; this led to steam being +raised by all ships at Scapa, and the usual search by small craft was +ordered; boats were also sent to explode charges on the bottom in the +vicinity of the damaged portion of the submarine obstruction, where +it was thought a submarine might have been entangled. Another alarm +took place later, due to some trawlers inside Scapa Flow mistaking the +concussion due to the explosion of these charges for torpedoes and +firing warning signals in consequence. The precautions were kept in +force until after daylight on the 21st. On that date Vice-Admiral Sir +Cecil Burney arrived at Scapa in the _Marlborough_ and assumed command +of the 1st Battle Squadron, Sir Lewis Bayly taking over the command of +the Channel Fleet. + +On the 21st the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron left +Cromarty for Rosyth in obedience to directions from the Admiralty that +the battle cruisers and light cruisers were to be based on the latter +port. This change was one result of the Scarborough raid. + +The mine-sweeping gunboats rejoined the Grand Fleet on this date. + +On December 23rd the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with the _Iron +Duke_, proceeded to sea to the westward of the Orkneys, and carried out +target practice at the Sulis-Ker Rock, north of the Hebrides, on the +24th, passed through the Pentland Firth at 6 P.M. on that date, and +proceeded into the North Sea for a sweep into southern waters. + +During daylight of the 25th the 1st Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla +and the 6th Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, the 3rd Battle Squadron, the +3rd Cruiser Squadron, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, and the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons +and 4th Flotilla from Cromarty met the _Iron Duke_, and the 2nd and +4th Battle Squadrons at given rendezvous between Lat. 56.45 N., Long. +1.30., and Lat. 56.14 N., Long. 3.20 E. + +Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney was under treatment on board a hospital +ship and too unwell to take his squadron to sea. Admiral Sir Stanley +Colville was, therefore, directed to hoist his flag on board the +_Marlborough_ and to assume temporary command of the 1st Battle +Squadron. + +The whole Fleet was together by 1.20 P.M. on the 25th, steering +south-south-east at 15 knots. At 1.40 P.M. the _Birmingham_ and +_Southampton_, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, both sighted +submarines about 15 miles to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet. + +The Battle Fleet was then gradually turned from the +south-south-eastward course to north-north-eastward until 3 P.M., being +then in position Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 3.43 E. Course was altered to +north-north-west at 3.15 P.M. and speed reduced. At 9.15 P.M. the Fleet +again turned to the southward, speed having to be reduced owing to the +sea becoming too heavy for the destroyers. By midnight a south-westerly +gale was blowing. + +At 8 A.M. on December 26th the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.58 N., Long. +2.16 E., with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron 40 miles to the southward; a speed of 11 knots was the most +that the destroyers could keep up without risk of serious damage, and, +as the weather was getting rapidly worse, they were detached at 8.10 +A.M. to their bases. + +By 10 A.M. a whole gale was blowing from the south-eastward. The sweep +was abandoned and course altered to the northward. At 11 A.M. the +Rosyth and Cromarty squadrons were ordered to proceed to their bases, +the _Indomitable_, which had joined the Fleet at 8 A.M. from the +Mediterranean, being ordered to Rosyth, there to join the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron. The destroyers and light cruisers suffered somewhat +from the gale, the 2nd Flotilla unfortunately losing three men, and +from the light cruiser _Caroline_ one man was washed overboard. + +Bad weather continued during the passage north with a very rough sea, +and on nearing the Pentland Firth the Dreadnought Battle Fleet found +the conditions to be exceptionally severe, with a following wind which +caused the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead of the ships. The +ships were directed to enter Scapa Flow in the following order: 2nd +Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron; the 2nd +Battle Squadron was timed to enter at 6 A.M.--some time, of course, +before daylight, which, at this period of the year at Scapa Flow, is +about 8.30 A.M. + +As the rear subdivision of the 2nd Battle Squadron approached the +entrance, the ships as usual having no lights showing, the _Monarch_ +altered course and stopped to avoid a patrol trawler which she suddenly +sighted close under her bows. The _Conqueror_, astern of her, was +unable to avoid the _Monarch_ and the two ships collided; the stern +of the _Monarch_ and the starboard bow of the _Conqueror_ were very +seriously damaged, rendering both ships unseaworthy. They were brought +into the harbour and safely berthed. + +Meanwhile, the 1st Battle Squadron, following astern of the 2nd Battle +Squadron, entered safely. The _Iron Duke_ was leading the 4th Battle +Squadron, and, on intercepting the wireless messages indicating that +something was wrong, I stood through the Pentland Firth to the westward +with the 4th Battle Squadron until the situation had become clearer. +The dawn was very late and a furious gale was blowing, with a very +heavy sea and strong tide in the Firth. These conditions made the +handling of the battleships very difficult when they turned through 16 +points to return to the eastward. + +The _Iron Duke_ and 4th Battle Squadron entered at 10 A.M. The whole +Fleet remained with two anchors down and steam up on account of the +weather until 1 P.M., when the wind and sea moderated, and by the +morning of the 28th normal conditions were resumed. As a result of the +gale, it was necessary to send the destroyers _Hope_, _Redpole_ and +_Ruby_ to dockyards for repairs. + +On the 28th a new Light Cruiser Squadron, termed the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron, was formed, consisting of the _Falmouth_ (Flag +of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), _Gloucester_, _Yarmouth_ and +_Dartmouth_. + +Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney now resumed command of the 1st Battle +Squadron. + +Enemy submarines were active at the entrance to the Firth of Forth at +this time; a torpedo was fired at T.B. No. 33 and another at T.B. No. +31 on the 25th, and two submarines were sighted during the 28th off the +entrance to the Tay. + +Temporary repairs to the _Monarch_ and _Conqueror_ were begun as soon +as the weather permitted, and the former ship was able to leave Scapa +for Devonport for thorough repair on December 29th. It was found +necessary to obtain salvage plant and assistance in the case of the +_Conqueror_, which had sustained very extensive underwater injury over +a considerable length, and Captain Young, of the Liverpool Salvage +Association, for whose services I applied at once, was sent up with +the salvage ship _Rattler_, arriving on December 31st. The _Conqueror_ +was taken into Switha Sound and the repair ship _Assistance_ secured +alongside her, and excellent temporary repairs were effected by the +18th January, by the staff of the _Assistance_, Captain Betty, R.N., +and by the salvage artificers under Captain Young. + +The second condenser of the _King George V._ was taken in hand for +retubing at this time. + +At the end of 1914 the condition of the Fleet was: + + Fleet-Flagship: _Iron Duke_. + + _1st Battle Squadron_: + 8 ships (complete). + + _2nd Battle Squadron_: + 4 ships (the _Conqueror_ and _Monarch_ being disabled and the + _King George V._ retubing her second condenser). + + _3rd Battle Squadron_: + 7 ships (_Commonwealth_ refitting). + + _4th Battle Squadron_: + 7 ships (complete) but two new ships, the _Benbow_ and _Emperor + of India_, not yet efficient. + + _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + 5 ships (_Princess Royal_ was away). + + _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_: + 3 ships (_Black Prince_ refitting). + + _2nd Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _3rd Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _6th Cruiser Squadron_: + 2 ships (complete). + + _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_: + 2 ships (2 not joined). + + _10th Cruiser Squadron_: + 14 ships (4 coaling and refitting). + + _2nd Flotilla_: + 16 destroyers (4 refitting). + + _4th Flotilla_: + 17 destroyers (3 refitting). + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE DOGGER BANK ACTION + + +Developments in the intelligence system at the Admiralty, initiated at +the outbreak of war by Rear-Admiral Henry F. Oliver, the Director of +the Intelligence Division, and an improvement in the efficiency of our +directional wireless stations and of wireless telegraphy generally, led +to our being able to obtain more reliable knowledge of the movements of +enemy vessels. The result was that it had become unnecessary towards +the end of 1914 to keep the Fleet so constantly at sea in anticipation +of enemy movements. It was very desirable to spare the ships to +some extent since it was increasingly evident that the War would be +prolonged, and we had already had several warnings that the strain of +constant sea work was telling on the efficiency of the machinery. Two +very disquieting examples of this were the failure of condenser tubes +on a large scale, particularly in the battleships, and the trouble +developing in the boilers of a very considerable number of light +cruisers. + +The problem of training personnel was also beginning to prove serious. +In order to commission the large number of new ships which had been +laid down since Lord Fisher, full of energy and ideas, had taken up +the office of First Sea Lord (the number, of all sorts, building and +projected, being more than 600), it became evident that it would be +necessary to remove trained men from the Grand Fleet and to replace +them with boys or untrained landsmen. Under these conditions the +individual efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work, as +well as in such matters as signalling (visual and wireless) and the +other factors which are essential in a fighting ship, could only be +maintained if we could spend sufficient time in harbour, during which +regular instruction could be given; this instruction to be followed by +frequent practices under way, in conditions where the ships would not +be liable to attack by enemy submarines, and need not, therefore, be +screened by the overworked destroyers. The organisation for carrying +out this work at Scapa Flow was, therefore, greatly elaborated. + +Steps were taken to start a school for training young wireless +operators at Scapa, first on board each ship, and, later, in a +specially fitted merchant ship. The want of wireless operators had +been most seriously felt since the War began. In addition to the needs +of new warships of all classes in this respect, the requirements for +merchant ships, trawlers and other patrol craft were immense and +could not be met. In this branch of instruction Lieut.-Commander +R. L. Nicholson, the Fleet wireless officer on my staff, carried out +invaluable work in organising and starting the school. The training of +young ratings in visual signal duties was also taken in hand vigorously +under Commander A. E. Wood and the signal officers of the Fleet. The +Grand Fleet became, in effect, a great school for turning out trained +personnel for the Navy as a whole, whilst still keeping watch over the +High Sea Fleet, and controlling the North Sea and its northern exit, +thus carrying out its rôle as the centre and pivot of the whole naval +side of the War. + +Early in 1915 the subject of the instruction and education of the +midshipmen also exercised my attention. On mobilisation all the cadets +had been removed from Dartmouth and sent to sea, with their training, +of course, very incomplete. During the first months of the War, when +the ships were either at sea or, if in harbour, were coaling, it was +impossible to give these young officers any regular instruction, and, +whilst they were learning much that would be invaluable to them in +the future, it was evidently highly desirable that their systematic +education should be continued as far as was possible during a war. + +Steps were accordingly taken in this direction. The first essential +was to obtain naval instructors for the ships carrying midshipmen. The +policy of the Admiralty, for some years before the War, had been to +reduce gradually the number of naval instructors afloat, the idea being +that the training at the Colleges and on board the training cruisers +rendered the presence of instructors at sea unnecessary. I never held +this view personally, but, in any case, it was clear that, as the +cadets had gone to sea with less than half their course completed, +further instruction at sea was necessary. The specialist officers +afloat could not undertake this work under war conditions and strong +representations were, therefore, made to the Admiralty on the subject. +Eventually a number of gentlemen were entered specially for this +instructional work and, after a short course of training in navigation +at Greenwich, were sent to the Fleet, where their work proved to be of +great value to the rising generation of officers. + +The blockade was becoming daily more effective, although the blockading +cruisers worked at so great a distance from the German coast. The only +interference ever attempted by the enemy was by submarine attack or +by mines, and during the year 1915 no great success was achieved by +them in this respect when the conditions are considered. The regular +blockading squadron, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was assisted in its +work by the sweeps of our cruisers and light cruisers, accompanied +occasionally by the Battle Fleet. In addition to the discharge of +these duties, the Battle Fleet engaged in periodical cruises, during +which battle exercises were carried out for the purpose of maintaining +efficiency in the handling of the ships and squadrons and of giving +the fresh officers, who were frequently joining the Fleet, to replace +others required for the new ships, experience in the work of the Grand +Fleet under the novel war conditions. + +Pursuant to this general policy, the Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained +in harbour until January 10th, and then left for a cruise to the +westward of the Orkneys and Shetlands. Gunnery practices were carried +out by day and at night, as well as battle exercises, and the Fleet +returned to Scapa during the day and the night of the 13th. The 3rd +Battle Squadron left Rosyth on the 12th for a cruise in the North Sea, +and on the night of the 13th–14th passed to the westward of the Orkneys +for gunnery practice, returning to Rosyth on the 15th. + +Other events of interest during the first fortnight of January were +the return of the _Princess Royal_ from North American waters on the +1st; a short cruise in the centre of the North Sea by the 1st Battle +Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron between the 3rd and +the 5th, and by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron between the 6th and the 8th; +a cruise by the 1st Cruiser Squadron to the westward of the Orkneys +between the 4th and 6th, and by the 6th Cruiser Squadron between the +6th and the 9th, and the 10th and 14th. On January 4th the _King George +V._ completed the work of retubing her condenser. + +On the 9th all ships at Scapa raised steam ready for leaving, in +consequence of a report of a submarine being sighted in Hoy Sound, and +available destroyers and trawlers were sent to patrol in the vicinity +of the Hoy anti-submarine Fleet obstructions until the Battle Fleet +left harbour on the 10th. + +Gales were experienced at Scapa on the 1st, 13th, 16th and 19th of +January. + +On January 15th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted, +under Vice-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore, K.C.B., whose flag was +transferred from the _Leviathan_, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, to the +_New Zealand_; the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron then comprised the _New +Zealand_, _Indomitable_ and _Invincible_ (the last not having yet +arrived). Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., took command of +the 1st Cruiser Squadron in place of Sir Gordon Moore, flying his flag +in the _Defence_, which took the place of the _Leviathan_; the latter +vessel was transferred to the 6th Cruiser Squadron. Rear-Admiral A. C. +Leveson, C.B., relieved Sir Robert Arbuthnot as Rear-Admiral in the 2nd +Battle Squadron, flying his flag in the _Orion_. + +On the 17th the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light +Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for a cruise in the centre and southern +portions of the North Sea, and on the 19th, at dawn, arrived in +position Lat. 55 N., Long. 5.30 E. to support Commodore Tyrwhitt in +carrying out a reconnaissance in Heligoland Bight. Nothing was sighted +beyond an airship and a sea-plane, and the force was ordered to return +to its bases and arrived during the night of the 20th–21st. + +On the 18th the Admiral commanding at Queenstown reported that a +German mine had been washed ashore at Portrush, as well as bodies and +wreckage, apparently belonging to the _Viknor_, an armed merchant +cruiser of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Anxiety had been felt as to the +safety of the _Viknor_ for two or three days owing to no reply to +wireless signals being received from her, and the ships of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron had been directed to search for her. The report from +Portrush pointed to the probability that she had struck a mine off the +north coast of Ireland, either in the _Audacious_ minefield or a field +further to the southward, and had been lost with all hands in the very +heavy weather prevailing at the time in this vicinity. All traffic +round the north of Ireland was stopped until sweepers were able to +examine the whole area. + +At this time a large number of German mines were being constantly +reported both in the North Sea and on the west coasts of Scotland and +Ireland, having evidently broken adrift from their moorings in the +heavy weather which had been generally prevalent. These mines, which +were not safe when adrift, as provided for under The Hague Convention, +were a source of some danger to ships, particularly at night. On the +18th the battleship _Superb_, having developed defects in one of her +turbines, was sent to Portsmouth. She was absent from the Fleet until +March 11th. + +On January 19th, the orders for the 10th Cruiser Squadron (blockading +squadron) were somewhat modified by me; the new centre lines of patrol +positions being: + + Patrol A.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 62.20 N., Long. + 10.0 W. + + Patrol B.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 61.10 N., Long. + 1.15 E. + + Patrol C.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 59.40 N., Long. 9.0 + W. + + Patrol D.--Eastern line of patrol to be 80 miles in the direction + 335° from St. Kilda. + +The ships were ordered to patrol on east and west courses on each side +of the centre line at a speed of at least 13 knots by day, zigzagging. + +At the same time four ships were directed to carry out a special patrol +of the Norwegian coast between the parallels of 62 N. and 62.20 N. +This patrol was maintained until the 22nd. As indicating the growing +work of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the efficiency of +the blockade, the Rear-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron reported +on January 18th that 80 ships had been intercepted by his squadron +since December 26th, 52 of which were eastward-bound. The strength +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 21 ships, exclusive of +the _Viknor_, the loss of which ship with her fine ship’s company was +deeply regretted. + +A patrol to the eastward of the Pentland Firth was at this period +being worked by the _Sappho_ and five armed boarding-steamers, which +were supported at night by one or two cruisers or light cruisers as +necessary. + +The _Monarch_ returned from being repaired at Devonport on the 20th. +Temporary repairs to the _Conqueror_ had been completed about January +18th, but the ship was detained pending more favourable weather +conditions; on the 21st she left for a southern dockyard, escorted by +four destroyers. On clearing the Pentland Firth, however, she found +that the sea was too heavy for the passage to be made with safety in +her damaged condition, and the ship returned to Scapa, where further +work was taken in hand and it was decided that it would be necessary to +dock her in the floating-dock at Invergordon to effect more permanent +repairs for the passage south than could be carried out by divers at +Scapa. She reached Invergordon on January 24th. + +On January 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth left for a sweep in the southern +portion of the North Sea, in conjunction with the Harwich force. The +remainder of the Grand Fleet acted in support. The 1st and 2nd Battle +Cruiser Squadrons (except the _Queen Mary_, which was absent refitting) +and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed to a rendezvous, where +the Commodore (T), with available destroyers and light cruisers, was +ordered to meet them. + +The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were ordered to the +vicinity of the battle cruisers’ rendezvous. + +The _Iron Duke_, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st, +2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, +available destroyers of 2nd and 4th Flotilla (a total of 28 destroyers) +left Scapa during the evening of the 23rd and proceeded towards the +same rendezvous. + +At 7.20 A.M. the _Aurora_, of the Harwich force, reported that she was +in action with enemy vessels; at 7.30 A.M. Sir David Beatty reported +enemy battle cruisers and cruisers in sight in Lat. 54.53 N., Long. +3.32 E., steering east. At 7.55 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding +the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported his position as Lat. 55.10 +N., Long. 3.32 E., and enemy vessels in sight, consisting of battle +cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, steering between south-east +and south. On receipt of these reports the Battle Fleet increased to 19 +knots speed, and steered to support the battle cruisers, and the 3rd +Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which were further to the +southward, were ordered to steer for Heligoland at full speed, to act +in immediate support. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was also sent on +ahead at full speed to join the other forces. + +The proceedings of the force under Sir David Beatty are best described +in his report given in an Appendix. + +During the early part of the engagement Sir David Beatty kept me +informed of his position and proceedings, but at 11.30 A.M. a report +was received from Sir Gordon Moore that he was heavily engaged with the +enemy battle cruisers in Lat. 54.21 N., Long. 5.4 E. The fact that this +report was made by this officer caused me some uneasiness at first, as +it implied that the _Lion_ could not signal, but as the Rear-Admiral +made no mention of any casualty to the _Lion_, I concluded the cause +was some breakdown in her wireless arrangements and that all was well. + +At 11.50 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron, reported the enemy steering south-east at 25 knots, and at +noon that he had lost touch with them; at 12.5 P.M. Rear Admiral Sir +Gordon Moore reported that he was retiring north-west, and, later, +north-north-west, that the _Blücher_ was out of action, and that the +remaining enemy battle cruisers were out of sight; he added that the +_Lion_ had hauled out of action. He gave his position as Lat. 54.19 N., +Long. 5.22 E. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet’s position at noon was Lat. 56.29 N., +Long. 3.22 E., with the cruisers 15 miles ahead and the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron ahead of the cruisers. At 1.15 Rear-Admiral Moore +reported in reply to my enquiry that Sir David Beatty was on board the +_Princess Royal_, that the _Lion_ was damaged and detached; Sir David +Beatty then reported that the _Lion’s_ speed was reduced to 12 knots, +that the _Blücher_ had been sunk, and two other enemy battle cruisers +seriously damaged, and that he was covering the retirement of the +_Lion_, which was steaming with her starboard engine only. + +The hit which disabled the _Lion_ was a piece of luck for the enemy. + +At 2 P.M. Vice-Admiral Bradford, commanding the 3rd Battle Squadron, +reported that he was turning to the northward, having all the battle +cruisers in sight. The 3rd Battle Squadron was sighted from the _Iron +Duke_ at 3.30 P.M., and stationed on the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Sir +David Beatty had meanwhile directed the _Indomitable_ at 3.38 P.M. to +take the _Lion_ in tow, and this operation was effected by 5 P.M. At 4 +P.M. the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 4.7 E., and at +4.30 P.M. the battle cruisers were in sight from the _Iron Duke_. The +Battle Fleet then turned to the northward, keeping in company with the +battle cruisers until dark. + +At 7 P.M. the _Lion’s_ starboard engine became disabled and the speed +was still further reduced. + +At dusk the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and all destroyers of +the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with the Battle Fleet, except those vessels +which were short of fuel, had been detached to assist the remaining +destroyers in screening the _Lion_ and her escort against destroyer and +submarine attack. The heavy ships, battleships and battle cruisers, +stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo attack. The night passed +without incident, the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the +battle cruisers during the darkness. Wireless messages were sent on the +24th to the Senior Naval Officer, Tyne, to send out tugs to meet the +_Lion_, and this was done. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the battle cruisers remained cruising +in the North Sea during daylight on the 25th, except the 3rd Battle +Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which were detached to Rosyth at 8 +A.M. + +[Illustration: MOVEMENTS FROM JAN^Y. 23^{RD}. TO 25^{TH}. 1915.] + +During these operations many floating mines were sighted and sunk. + +The battle cruisers proceeded to Rosyth at dusk, and the Battle Fleet +to Scapa, except the _Iron Duke_ and _Centurion_, which were sent to +Cromarty, the _Iron Duke_ to dock and refit and the _Centurion_ to act +as “stand by” Fleet-Flagship during the refit. The _Lion_ arrived at +Rosyth at 6.35 A.M. on the 26th in a dense fog and was taken up harbour +for temporary repairs, the _Assistance_ being sent from Scapa to Rosyth +to help in the work. The main injury to the _Lion_ was caused by two +hits under water, which pierced the feed tank and displaced an armour +plate; the permanent repairs were completed on the Tyne, the work +being carried out by the aid of coffer dams, there being no dock there +capable of taking the ship. Her casualties consisted of 11 men wounded. +The only other battle cruiser that received injury was the _Tiger_, in +which ship Engineer Captain Taylor, a most valuable officer, and five +men were killed, 11 being wounded; the material damage to the ship was +slight. + +The enemy, as the result of this action, suffered the total loss of the +_Blücher_; and two battle cruisers, the _Derfflinger_ and _Seydlitz_, +sustained severe injuries, a serious fire or explosion occurring in +one of the after turrets of one ship, which put that, or possibly both +after turrets, out of action and caused a large number of casualties +amongst the crew. It was ascertained at a later date from German +prisoners that the condition of one, if not of both ships on return +to harbour was very serious; the casualties, as well as the material +injury, were heavy. It was stated subsequently that the _Derfflinger_ +had 60 killed and 250 wounded, and the _Seydlitz_ about 100 killed. + +One of our destroyers, the _Meteor_, was damaged in the action, but +was towed back to port and repaired. + +On the 26th the 6th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted and composed of +the _Drake_, _Leviathan_ and _Cumberland_, and a 7th Cruiser Squadron +was formed under the command of Rear-Admiral A. W. Waymouth, consisting +of the _Minotaur_ (flagship), _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_. The 1st and +6th Cruiser Squadrons were sent to Scapa, and the 2nd and 7th to +Cromarty. + +The _Britannia_, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, grounded in the Firth of +Forth in the fog on her way back to Rosyth, was ashore for 36 hours, +and suffered considerable damage, necessitating repairs at a dockyard. + +On the 27th January the 1st Cruiser Squadron and a division of +destroyers sailed to cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea and +returned on the 30th, being relieved by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. On +January 28th the battle cruisers _Princess Royal_ and _Queen Mary_, +with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, left Rosyth to support operations +being carried out in the Heligoland Bight by Commodore Tyrwhitt and +Commodore Keyes on January 30th and 31st. Owing to fog the operations +could not be carried out, and the force returned to its bases on the +30th. + +A report of a submarine inside Cromarty Harbour on the 29th caused +ships to raise steam preparatory to leaving, and all small craft to +search for the submarine, but on investigation it was considered that +the report was unreliable. + +On January 30th enemy submarines appeared in the Irish Sea, one of them +opening fire on Walney Island, where the works of Messrs. Vickers, +Limited, are situated. At about this date, owing to marked enemy +submarine activity in the Irish Sea, the ships of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron were directed to coal temporarily at Loch Ewe instead of at +Liverpool, and two divisions of Grand Fleet destroyers were detached to +the Irish Sea to assist in hunting the submarines. + +During January the number of drifting German mines in the North Sea was +very considerable. Many were sighted and sunk by the Fleet when at sea; +the 2nd Cruiser Squadron alone, when on patrol on the 30th and 31st +January sinking 12 mines. + +At the end of January the condition of the Grand Fleet was as follows: + +BATTLE FLEET + + _Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship, refitting. + + _1st Battle Squadron_: + 7 ships (_Superb_ was away). + + _2nd Battle Squadron_: + 6 ships (_Conqueror_ was unserviceable). + + _4th Battle Squadron_: + 7 ships (complete). + + _3rd Battle Squadron_: + 6 ships (_Commonwealth_ and _Britannia_, refitting). + + _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + 2 ships (_Lion_ was effecting temporary repairs; + the _Tiger_ refitting). + + _2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + 1 ship (_Indomitable_ refitting after a fire, due to defective + electric circuits). + + _1st Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _2nd Cruiser Squadron_: + 3 ships (_Natal_ refitting). + + _3rd Cruiser Squadron_: + 3 ships (_Roxburgh_ refitting). + + _6th Cruiser Squadron_: + 3 ships (complete). + + _7th Cruiser Squadron_: + 3 ships (complete). + + _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (complete). + + _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_: + 4 ships (_Liverpool_ refitting). + + _2nd Flotilla_: + 11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea). + + _4th Flotilla_: + 11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea). + +The shortage of destroyers at this period was exceedingly marked. + +During February the Battle Fleet remained in harbour. No enemy +movements took place or were expected as several changes were +being made in the High Sea Fleet commands; the principal of these +was the relief of Admiral von Inghenol by Admiral von Pohl as +Commander-in-Chief. It was anticipated that the new Flag officers would +exercise their squadrons in order to become familiar with them before +attempting any operations. + +The opportunity was taken of refitting the _Iron Duke_, and the ship +remained at Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth, until February 23rd. +It was becoming desirable to give the officers and men of the Battle +Fleet some change from Scapa Flow, where there were no opportunities +for landing for exercise or recreation, and arrangements were made by +which battle, as well as cruiser squadrons should visit Invergordon +periodically for this purpose. The 2nd Battle Squadron accordingly +arrived at this base on February 24th. + +During the first half of February, 1915, eight destroyers were absent +from the Grand Fleet flotillas, working in the Irish Channel against +submarines, leaving only a total of 20 to 22 available for the Fleet; +an insufficient number for screening purposes. This deficiency made it +desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour, except in an emergency. + +The enemy’s submarine activity became much more marked during February. +Early in the month the German Admiralty proclaimed that after February +18th all the waters round the British Isles would be declared unsafe +for merchant-ships of all nationalities, and intimated that Allied +merchant-ships would be destroyed in these waters and that neutral +merchant-ships ran similar risks. Enemy submarines began to operate +in increasing numbers in the English Channel, to the westward of the +English Channel, in the Irish Sea and off the west coast of Ireland, as +well as on the east coast of England, and the losses of merchant-ships +from submarine attack became serious. The destroyers of the Grand +Fleet that remained at the northern bases were kept fully employed in +searching for and hunting reported submarines. + +In addition to the maintenance of the blockade by the 10th Cruiser +Squadron, cruiser and light cruiser squadrons carried out various +patrol and search operations during the month. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron +cruised in the centre portion of the North Sea from February 1st to +3rd; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron cruised off the Shetland Islands from the +11th–13th, then swept down the Norwegian coast and returned to Cromarty +on the 15th; the new 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out a sweep in +the southern portion of the North Sea between the 16th and 20th with +destroyers in company; the new 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron cruised to +the westward of the Shetlands for exercise between the 15th and 18th, +then passed into the North Sea and swept to the southward, returning +to Scapa on the 20th; the 1st Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 17th +for the vicinity of the Norwegian coast, swept down towards the Naze +and then returned to patrol north of the Shetlands until the 21st, when +the squadron arrived at Scapa; the four light cruisers attached to the +Battle Fleet, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Boadicea_, and _Blonde_, with four +destroyers, left Scapa on the 18th for a line N. 37 E. 60 miles long +from Lat. 57.30 N., Long. 0.30 W., with directions to sweep towards the +Naze by day and patrol the line at night; they remained on this duty +until the 21st. The 7th Cruiser Squadron cruised to the westward of the +Fair Island Channel from the 19th to the 22nd, and available destroyers +of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were patrolling to the eastward of the +Fair Island Channel and the Moray Firth respectively during the same +period. + +The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Rosyth on the 23rd +to cover the Fleet mine-sweepers whilst searching for mines along a +projected Fleet track in the North Sea, but, the sea being too heavy +for mine-sweeping, the squadron carried out a patrol instead until the +25th, when the mine-sweeping operations took place, lasting until the +27th, when the squadron returned to Rosyth. + +This searching mine-sweep was carried out because of the increasing +probability of the enemy laying mines intended to catch our heavy +ships when proceeding towards the southern portion of the North Sea, +and the consequent necessity for a periodical examination of a route +which the Fleet could traverse with some safety. This policy was +maintained throughout the period of my command, alternative routes +being periodically examined; although it was obviously impossible to +carry out this examination frequently, it did afford some chance of a +mine-field being discovered before serious losses were sustained by the +Fleet. + +During the month of February a reorganisation of the battle cruiser +and light cruiser squadrons was carried out by Admiralty orders, and +a “Battle Cruiser Fleet” instituted under the command of Sir David +Beatty, with the title Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet. + +The organisation was as follows: + + _Lion_, Fleet-Flagship. + + _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + _Princess Royal_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), _Queen + Mary_, _Tiger_. + + _2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + _Australia_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham), _New + Zealand_, _Indefatigable_. + + _3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + _Invincible_ (to be Flag), _Inflexible_,[D] _Indomitable_. + + _1st Light Cruiser Squadron_: + _Galatea_ (Broad pennant of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair), + _Cordelia_, _Caroline_, _Inconstant_. + + _2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_: + _Southampton_ (Broad pennant of Commodore W. E. Goodenough), + _Nottingham_, _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_. + + _3rd Light Cruiser Squadron_: + _Falmouth_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), _Yarmouth_, + _Gloucester_, _Liverpool_. + + [D] The _Inflexible_ had not yet joined by the end of February. + +The Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an integral portion of the Grand +Fleet. In some respects the term “Fleet” was an unfortunate selection, +as it implied, incorrectly, an independent organisation. On my taking +office as First Sea Lord at the end of 1916, the title was altered to +the more appropriate one of Battle Cruiser Force. + +The _Australia_ joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth on February +17th, and the _Invincible_, having concluded the very successful +operations in the South Atlantic under Sir Doveton Sturdee, which +culminated in the destruction of Admiral von Spee’s Squadron of +cruisers and light cruisers, arrived at Scapa for gunnery practices +during the latter part of February, and joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet +at Rosyth early in March; the _Indefatigable_ also arrived on the 24th +from the Mediterranean. + +The _Tiger_ arrived in the Tyne on February 1st for refit, and left +again on the 8th. The _Lion_ reached the Tyne for repairs on February +9th, remaining there for the remainder of the month. The strength of +the destroyer force working with the Grand Fleet was increased on +February 19th by the addition of the light cruiser _Fearless_ and two +divisions of destroyers from the 1st Flotilla. These vessels had been +relieved at Harwich by new destroyers of the “M” class. This addition +brought the destroyer force actually with the Grand Fleet up to a total +of 48, and further additions were now gradually made from the 1st +Flotilla at Harwich as new destroyers were completed to relieve them. + +His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet on February 27th by +visiting the ships based on Rosyth. + +In the course of February the destroyers of the “River” or “E” +class, based at Scapa for local defence, were replaced, by Admiralty +directions, by destroyers of the “C” class (old 30-knot type). This +change, although dictated by the general naval situation, limited +considerably the range of activity of the local defence vessels, owing +to the poorer sea-going qualities of the destroyers of the “C” class. + +During the month the destroyer _Erne_ was wrecked off Rattray Head +on the Aberdeen coast, and became a total loss; the _Goldfinch_ went +ashore in a fog in the north of the Orkneys and was also lost; the +_Sparrowhawk_ also went ashore, but was got off, though considerably +damaged. The armed merchant-cruiser _Clan McNaughton_, of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron, was lost with all hands during the month, the +supposition being that she foundered in one of the numerous heavy +gales. Although a prolonged search was carried out, only a certain +amount of wreckage was found. The loss of this ship and her efficient +ship’s company brought once more into prominence the excellent work +of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the risks to which the ships were +subjected. + +The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were daily increasing, and +the number of ships passing the blockade line unexamined was becoming +very small. During one week in February sixty-seven vessels were +intercepted and eighteen of them sent in with prize crews on board. + +During February the old battleships _Hannibal_ and _Magnificent_ were +relieved as guard-ships by the old cruisers _Crescent_ and _Royal +Arthur_. + +Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas +Gamble in the command of the 4th Battle Squadron during the month; +Admiral Gamble’s period of command had expired. Sir Doveton Sturdee, +who had served as Chief of the Naval Staff early in the War, came to +the Fleet fresh from his Falkland Islands victory. + +The weather at the northern bases during February was less boisterous +than usual. There was a good deal of misty and foggy weather in the +early part of the month, and a considerable amount of snow towards the +end. + +During March the principal movements of the Fleet were as follows: + +From the 4th to the 10th, the 6th Cruiser Squadron was, with the +_Orotava_ of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, cruising off the Norwegian +Coast. + +From the 7th to the 10th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was cruising in +the northern portion of the North Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd, +and 7th Cruiser Squadrons and the 4th Flotilla; and the Battle Cruiser +Fleet was also cruising during the same period in the central part +of the North Sea. The opportunity was taken of carrying out various +battle exercises. The 2nd Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser Squadron did +not return with the remainder of the Battle Fleet on the 10th, but +remained at sea until the 11th. The 4th Flotilla was forced to shelter +at Lerwick from the 7th to the 9th owing to bad weather. From March +10th to the 13th the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were +cruising in the centre portion of the North Sea. + +From the 16th to the 19th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet again cruised +in the northern and central parts of the North Sea, accompanied +by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadron, and the 2nd Flotilla. The 2nd Flotilla, however, could not +remain at sea on the 17th owing to bad weather and was sent back to +Scapa. A collision occurred between the _Nemesis_ and _Nymphe_, which +necessitated the docking of both vessels for repairs. The flotilla +was ordered out again from Scapa early on the 18th, but only seven +destroyers were available, and they reached the Fleet at 2 P.M. on that +date. + +The Battle Fleet and cruisers carried out a strategical exercise in +the early morning of the 18th, and then steered for the bases, a +projected second exercise being abandoned as the Fleet was by this time +in an area which was not considered safe from submarine attack; the +visibility was also very high, and it was suspected that at least one +enemy submarine might be in the neighbourhood. + +At noon the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 58.21 N., Long. 1.12 E., +zigzagging at a speed of 15 knots, and the 4th Battle Squadron had just +been detached to proceed to Cromarty, when at 12.18 P.M. Vice-Admiral +Sir Cecil Burney commanding the 1st Battle Squadron signalled that a +submarine’s periscope had been sighted from the _Marlborough_, the +leading ship of the port wing column, and that a torpedo fired by the +submarine had passed just astern of the _Neptune_, the rear ship of the +column. The Fleet was at once turned away from the submarine 12 points +to starboard (ships turning together) and speed was increased to 17 +knots. + +At 12.30 P.M. the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing under the stern +of the remainder of the Battle Fleet and signals were being made +to Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee to steer clear of the position +in which the submarine was sighted, but before any movement was +effected the officer of the watch, Lieutenant-Commander Piercy, of the +_Dreadnought_ of that Squadron, sighted a periscope close to, one point +on the port bow, the submarine apparently steering a southerly course +and zigzagging. Captain Alderson, commanding the _Dreadnought_, at once +altered course direct for the submarine, increased speed, followed, +and rammed her. The bow of the submarine came out of the water and her +number, U 29, was plainly visible. She sank immediately. The _Blanche_, +which passed close to the spot, reported a large quantity of wreckage, +one article of clothing and much oil and bubbles on the surface, but no +survivors. + +It seems probable that the captain of the submarine, after firing at +the 1st Battle Squadron, was confused by the movements of the 4th +Battle Squadron crossing astern of the remainder of the zigzagging +Fleet, at high speed, and in trying to get clear failed to observe the +_Dreadnought_ until too late. The _Dreadnought_ was admirably handled. + +On arrival of the Fleet in harbour I wired to the Admiralty urging that +the fate of U 29 should be kept secret. The secrecy regarding the loss +of this submarine, commanded by Commander Weddingen, was much resented +in Germany, and many accusations of treacherous conduct levelled at the +British, probably in the hope that we might give information as to her +fate. The policy of secrecy was certainly correct, as it left the enemy +entirely ignorant of our methods, and possibly had some effect of the +moral of the submarine crews. + +The Fleet steered to the eastward until well clear of the area in case +other submarines were present, and then shaped course for the bases, +arriving on the 19th. + +On March 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases with the intention of +carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, but the plan was abandoned and +the Fleet returned to its bases on the following day. + +The principal movements of destroyers during March, additional to the +regular patrols and fleet movements, were as follows: + +From March 2nd to March 5th search was made by a half flotilla for a +number of oil drums reported as moored in certain areas in the North +Sea. The report indicated that the enemy might be refuelling submarines +in this manner; the search disposed of the supposition. + +From March 8th to March 10th the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland, +Sir Robert Lowry, in conjunction with Vice-Admiral Bradford, who was +the Senior Flag Officer of Grand Fleet ships at Rosyth, and was, +therefore, responsible for all movements of these ships from the Rosyth +base, organised a search on a large scale for a submarine reported to +be operating off the Aberdeenshire coast. The vessels employed in this +operation comprised trawler patrols and destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, +and they were rewarded on March 10th by forcing the submarine--U 12--to +the surface, when H.M.S. _Ariel_, very skilfully handled, succeeded in +ramming and sinking her. Ten of her crew of twenty-eight were rescued. +The _Ariel_ was considerably damaged, and was docked at Leith for +repairs. + +On March 20th and 21st a division of destroyers hunted a submarine in +the Moray Firth without success. + +On March 12th the _Faulknor_ and six destroyers were detached from the +Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against submarines in the Irish Sea. + +In the course of the month the small steamers, specially fitted as +mine-sweepers for the Grand Fleet, were withdrawn for service abroad. +The increasing number of mines in the North Sea and the paucity of +mine-sweepers led me to decide on March 22nd to fit eight destroyers +each from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with light mine-sweeps, and the +work was taken in hand. These vessels were intended to augment the +regular force of mine-sweepers in an emergency, as it was felt that a +movement of the High Sea Fleet for an important naval operation would +in all probability be preceded by extensive mine-laying outside the +Fleet bases, and a much stronger sweeping force than we possessed was +required to enable a passage for the Fleet to be rapidly cleared. + +The _Conqueror_ rejoined the Fleet on March 6th after effecting repairs +which had been carried out by Messrs. Cammell Laird at Liverpool with +most commendable rapidity. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron experienced a further loss during March, the +_Bayano_ being sunk by a submarine off Corsewall Point, Galloway, on +March 11th, with considerable loss of life. + +In the course of this month Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant succeeded +Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham in command of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, +the latter succeeding Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon Moore in command of the +2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron; Vice-Admiral Patey transferred his flag +from the _Australia_ to the _Leviathan_ to proceed to the West Indies +as Commander-in-Chief, and the 6th Cruiser Squadron was broken up, the +ships being transferred to service abroad. + +The enemy submarines were very active against merchant shipping during +March, and our losses were considerable, both from this cause and from +mines. + +During March the weather at the northern bases was not very boisterous, +but a great deal of mist and fog was prevalent during the first +fortnight, and during the last fortnight snow fell on at least seven +days. An average of fifty-six ships per week was intercepted by the +ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month. + +During April, 1915, intended Fleet movements were prevented on several +occasions by bad weather, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron and other ships +at sea experienced exceptional gales; the principal movements carried +out were as follows: + +From the 5th to the 8th the 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron +and five destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the North Sea +(central portion), and from the 5th to the 9th the Battle Cruiser Fleet +with eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the northern +portion of the North Sea. + +On April 8th the _Lancaster_, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, and the +_Caribbean_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were detached to watch the +Norwegian coast between Lat. 62 and 64 N. + +On April 11th the whole Grand Fleet proceeded to sea; the Battle Fleet +met the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth, +and cruised in the centre portion of the North Sea during the 12th +and 13th, returning to the various bases on the 14th to fuel. The +opportunity was taken of carrying out battle exercises. + +Whilst the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was passing down east of the +Orkneys at 2.30 P.M., and was being met by the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, +which had come out to screen the ships in, the _Neptune_ reported +having sighted a submarine’s periscope, but as the Fleet was steaming +at 18 knots and the destroyers were taking up screening stations it was +not considered that successful attack was probable, and the Fleet held +its course for Scapa. + +Submarines were also sighted during the day by the _Antrim_ in Lat. +57.18 N., Long. 1.2 E., and by the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 58.15 +N., Long. 2.40 E., but no successful attack resulted. + +The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea again for a sweep in southern waters +on the 17th, and at 8 A.M. on the 18th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, +with the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons looking out ahead and the +2nd and 4th Flotillas screening, was in Lat. 57.25 N., Long. 1.4 E., +steering at 18 knots’ speed for a position in Lat. 56.30 N., Long. +3.30 E., where it was intended to meet the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd +Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth. + +The junction took place at 4 P.M., the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which +had been ordered to a position a little farther south, arriving there +at this time. No enemy vessels having been sighted, the whole Fleet +was turned to the northward shortly before dusk, when in the vicinity +of the Little Fisher Bank, to the westward of Northern Denmark. +During the night the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron +were detached to return to Rosyth, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas to +Scapa; the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, was directed to cruise +independently on the 19th; and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the +1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, proceeded to the eastward of the +Shetlands; target practice was carried out during daylight of the +19th and the night of the 19th–20th, and the Battle Fleet returned to +its bases at Scapa and Cromarty during the night of the 20th–21st and +fuelled. During the cruise the _Achilles_, of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, +reported sighting a submarine at 2.40 P.M. on the 18th. + +On the 19th the _Albemarle_ and _Russell_, of the 6th Battle Squadron, +which had rejoined the 3rd Battle Squadron from the Channel ports, were +detached from Rosyth to Scapa for practices. + +The Grand Fleet again proceeded to sea on the night of the 21st for +another sweep towards the Danish coast, and at 8 A.M. on the 22nd +the forces from Scapa and Cromarty, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th +Battle Squadrons, _Russell_ and _Albemarle_, 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser +Squadrons, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, were in position Lat. 58.4 +N., Long. 0.27 E. + +At 4.30 P.M. the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron joined +the Commander-in-Chief, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station ahead +of the cruiser screen. At dusk no enemy ships had been sighted and the +Fleet turned to the northward again, the _Iron Duke’s_ position being +Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 4.53 E. + +The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the Battle Cruiser +Fleet were detached to return to Rosyth during the night, and the +remainder of the Fleet arrived at the Scapa and Cromarty bases on the +23rd. + +During these two southerly sweeps the Fleet sighted a large number of +neutral steamers and trawlers which were closely examined, but nothing +suspicious was found, although the interception of German wireless +messages, when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the trawlers, raised +suspicions that they were acting as look-out vessels; this suspicion +was strengthened by carrier pigeons being sighted from various ships. + +One Norwegian steamer which was found to be carrying magnetic ore to +Rotterdam was sent to the Firth of Forth. + +Movements of interest of individual ships during April included the +arrival of the _Lion_ at Rosyth on the 7th after completion of all +repairs, the arrival of the new Battleship _Warspite_, of the “Queen +Elizabeth” class, at Scapa on the 13th, and the commissioning on the +26th of four more mercantile vessels to join the 10th Cruiser Squadron. + +The _Invincible_ was sent to the Tyne to change some of her 12-inch +guns, which had become worn during the Falkland Island engagement. + +On April 10th Rear-Admiral Tottenham succeeded Rear-Admiral Waymouth in +command of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, the latter officer’s health having +unfortunately broken down. + +On April 7th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were +rearranged somewhat in view of the lengthening of the days: + + Patrol Area A was north of the Faroes, the centre line being + occasionally shifted. + + Patrol Area C had as its centre a line from Cape Sydero in + the Faroe Islands to Lat. 58.30 N., Long. 8.0 W. + + Patrol Area E was north of Iceland. + + Patrol Area F was south of Iceland. + + Patrol Area G had as its centre the meridian of 3° E. Long. + between Lat. 62 N. and 63½ N. A cruiser was sent to + strengthen the patrol in this area. + +During the month the average number of vessels intercepted weekly by +the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was 68, of which an average +number of 23 was sent in weekly for examination. + +Enemy submarines were very active in April, and destroyers were sent +out frequently from the Fleet bases to endeavour to destroy craft +reported in the vicinity--particularly in the neighbourhood of the +Fair Island Channel--but no success was achieved, except in the case +of the _Ariel_ and U 12. The look-out and navigational arrangements +for the Pentland Firth were improved during April by the establishment +of telephonic communications between Scapa and the Island of Swona. +Arrangements were also gradually perfected for obtaining the exhibition +of all navigational lights and fog signals in the Pentland Firth on +demand by our ships at all times. The weather at Scapa during April was +bad. + +Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th. There +was a great deal of mist and fog during the latter part of the month as +well as a moderate amount of snow. + +The enemy laid a large mine-field in the middle of the southern portion +of the North Sea during April, thus pursuing the policy which it was +expected he would adopt, regardless of the interests of neutrals. +Fortunately, information as to its existence was obtained in time +to prevent any of our ships from falling victims to the mines. But +the mine-field was undoubtedly well placed strategically so as to +interfere with the freedom of movement of our Fleet in southern waters +if it were endeavouring to bring the High Sea Fleet to action, since +it necessitated our ships making a wide detour to the eastward or +westward to reach the waters to the southward of the mine-field; it was +doubtless laid with this object in view. + +In May the Grand Fleet flotillas were much occupied in endeavouring +to locate and destroy enemy submarines, and the movements of the +heavy ships were curtailed during the month owing to the absence of +destroyers for the purpose of acting as a submarine screen. + +The principal work of the destroyers in this connection--officers +and men showing a fine spirit in carrying out what were frequently +fruitless searches--was as follows: + + _May 1st–3rd._--The 2nd Flotilla was engaged in operations against + enemy submarines reported, first, in the Fair Island Channel and, + then, to the eastward and south-eastward of the Pentland Firth. The + flotilla did not succeed in gaining touch with the submarines. + + _May 5th–7th._--One half of the 1st Flotilla was searching for a + submarine off the Aberdeenshire coast, without result. + + _May 7th._--One division of the 2nd Flotilla was acting against a + submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel, and then proceeded + to work down the shipping route west of the Hebrides and Ireland in + the hope of catching a submarine attacking trade. + + _May 8th._--Half the 4th Flotilla was searching for submarines off + the east coast of the Orkneys. + + _May 10th–11th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching + for a submarine reported to be off North Ronaldshay; later, this + division was reinforced by all available destroyers from Scapa, + with orders that the force was to continue the search during the + night, burning searchlights to assist the work and cause the + submarine to submerge, thus exhausting her battery power. + + _May 13th._--Six destroyers were searching for a submarine reported + west of Thurso. + + _May 15th._--A division of the 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to operate + against a submarine off Aberdeen. + + _May 16th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching for a + submarine reported approaching the Fair Island Channel. + + _May 19th–20th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was acting against + a submarine reported west of the Orkneys. + +The principal Fleet movements during the month were: + +_May 2nd to May 5th._--Two forces, each consisting of two light +cruisers and eight destroyers, were engaged in carrying out a +thorough examination of all vessels, especially fishing craft, found +in the areas usually traversed by the Fleet during southerly sweeps +in order to ascertain whether any were acting as German look-out +ships under neutral colours. A considerable number of vessels were +examined, especially trawlers, and some were sent in for more detailed +examination at the bases, but nothing incriminating was discovered. + +Between May 5th and 10th the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser +Squadron cruised in the northern portion of the North Sea, being +screened out from Rosyth by a half flotilla. On the return towards +Rosyth in Lat. 56.49 N., Long. 0.39 E., and before being met by the +screening destroyers, the 3rd Battle Squadron, two torpedoes were fired +by a submarine; they were aimed apparently at the _Dominion_, but both +missed. The squadron was in division in line ahead, steaming at 15 +knots, and was zigzagging at the time. + +On May 6th the mine-layer _Orvieto_ and eight destroyers left Scapa to +carry out a mine-laying operation in the Heligoland Bight. The force +ran into a dense fog, and a collision occurred between the destroyers +_Comet_ and _Nemesis_, the latter being seriously damaged. The force +was directed to return and left Scapa again on the 8th, carrying out +the operation successfully during the night of the 10th–11th; it +returned on the 12th. + +The light cruisers _Phaeton_ and _Royalist_ left Scapa on May 12th for +a position north of the Shetlands, in order to intercept a neutral +steamer reported to have left Bremerhaven on May 11th with wireless +installations on board. The C Patrol of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +was also moved to a position to intercept this vessel, and the light +cruiser _Sappho_ and armed boarding steamer _Amsterdam_ were placed on +the western side of the Fair Island Channel. The force returned on the +14th, the report proving to be incorrect. + +The whole Grand Fleet carried out a sweep of the central part of the +North Sea between May 17th and 19th, the forces from Scapa, Cromarty +and Rosyth meeting at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 0.0 at 7 +A.M. on the 8th, and sweeping to the south-eastward at a speed of 16 +knots until the afternoon, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet some thirty to +fifty miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The Fleet returned to its bases +on the 19th, not having sighted any hostile vessels. Battle tactics +were exercised during the passage north. + +On May 21st the Fleet mine-sweepers, which had been sent to Aberdeen +beforehand in readiness, left with an escort of two light cruisers to +examine the mine-field reported to have been laid in the centre of +the southern portion of the North Sea. Two of the sweepers collided +in a fog on leaving Aberdeen, and another went ashore; the remainder +proceeded and located the north-east corner of the mine-field on the +22nd and 23rd; they returned to Aberdeen on the 24th, after examining +_en route_ a position in which it was reported that paraffin barrels +were moored. These were destroyed. It was thought that they might be +intended for German submarines. + +Whilst the Fleet sweepers located the north-east corner of the +mine-field, paddle sweepers, under the escort of two light cruisers +from Harwich, located the south-west corner. The search was +subsequently continued under the same conditions, and the limits of the +mine-field, which covered a large area south of Lat. 56 N. and east of +Long. 2.30 E., were determined. The enemy made no attempt to interfere +with the sweeping operations, if indeed he was aware of them. + +On the 21st the patrol, comprising the _Sappho_ and armed boarding +steamers, hitherto maintained in an area east and south-east of the +Pentland Firth, was moved temporarily to the west of the Firth on +account of submarine activity. Destroyers from the Grand Fleet replaced +the original patrol at night, the interception of mercantile traffic +being carried out by the armed boarding steamers to the westward. The +destroyer _Rifleman_ grounded in a fog on the 22nd, necessitating +docking for repairs. + +A new form of anti-submarine operation was begun on May 23rd by the +Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland (Admiral Sir R. Lowry). This +consisted of two C-class submarines operating with an armed trawler, +the idea being that the trawler should invite attack by a submarine, +thus giving our submarines an opportunity of sinking the enemy by +torpedo attack. + +On May 24th the Admiralty telegraphed that Italy had entered the War on +the side of the Allies. + +On the next day I proceeded in the _Iron Duke_ to Rosyth to confer with +Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea +Lord. The conference took place on the 26th and was of an important +nature. The general naval policy, so far as it concerned the Grand +Fleet, was discussed, and arrangements made as to the procedure to be +followed in future. Sir Henry Jackson asked that Commodore Everett +might join him at the Admiralty as Naval Assistant, and, with the +consent of Commodore Everett, this was arranged. His place as Captain +of the Fleet was filled by Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., of the +_New Zealand_. It was with great regret that I parted with Commodore +Everett; his long experience in the Fleet under Sir George Callaghan +and his intimate knowledge of fleet work and unfailing tact had been +of the greatest possible assistance. The _Iron Duke_ returned to Scapa +on the morning of the 28th. On the 26th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace +Hood, C.B., had hoisted his flag in the _Invincible_ as Rear-Admiral +commanding the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The battleship _Queen +Elizabeth_ arrived at Scapa from the Dardanelles on the same day. + +From May 29th to 31st the Grand Fleet carried out another sweep in the +North Sea, the direction on this occasion being towards the Dogger +Bank. The forces from Scapa and Cromarty concentrated in Lat. 57.35 +N., Long. 0.0 at 7.15 A.M. on the 30th, and steered to the southward +at 17 knots’ speed. The Rosyth force steered for a point farther south +and was in sight from the cruiser line at 9.30 A.M., being ordered to +keep ahead of the Fleet. The sweep was continued until the Dreadnought +Battle Fleet was in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. No enemy vessel +was sighted. + +The Fleet then turned to the northward and, owing to a northerly swell, +speed had to be reduced on account of the destroyers. During the night +the Rosyth force was detached to its base. Speed was increased as the +weather improved, and the Scapa and Cromarty forces arrived on the +morning of May 31st. The _Iron Duke_ left Scapa for Cromarty during the +afternoon of May 31st, and arrived that evening. + +During the month the procedure of moving squadrons between Scapa and +Cromarty was continued. At this period a second line of submarine +obstructions, which was designed to prevent the entry of destroyers, +as well as submarines, into Scapa Flow, advanced considerably towards +completion. Progress was also made with the laying of mine-fields +at the entrance. The anchorage at Swarbachs Minn, in the Shetlands, +had been selected as a secondary coaling base for the ships of the +10th Cruiser Squadron, and steps were taken to prepare a submarine +obstruction for the entrance, and to provide the necessary labour for +coaling the ships from colliers. + +The blockade work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued actively +during the month, the average number of ships intercepted per week +being 62, and the average number sent into port for closer examination, +16. + +The weather at Scapa during the month was misty, fog being experienced +on the 5th, 6th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 27th and 28th, and snow on the 11th +and 12th. The wind during the month was not strong. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES + + +In the early summer of 1915 there was a vague impression in some +quarters, unsupported, so far as I am aware, by any confirmatory +evidence, that the enemy might exhibit greater activity at sea. But +during June, so far as could be ascertained by our intelligence system +and by our submarine patrols, the Germans made no attempt to move to +sea, but concentrated attention on increased submarine activity. The +Grand Fleet, for various reasons unconnected with this development, +spent the greater part of the time in harbour, exercising in Scapa +Flow, the ships from the Rosyth base being sent up in pairs to exercise +and carry out gunnery and torpedo practices. The opportunity of this +change of base was usually taken for a searching sweep whilst _en +route_ between the bases, so that the North Sea was continually under +observation. + +On June 11th, however, the Grand Fleet went to sea for a cruise +in northern waters principally for gunnery practices and battle +exercises, which were carried out on a large scale. On this occasion +the sea-planes working from the _Campania_ were utilised, so far as +I am aware, for the first time in history in observing the movements +of the squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large hostile +fleet. From this beginning, there was a great development in the work +of heavier-than-air craft operating with a fleet. The first step +was the provision of a flying-off deck in a ship for sea-planes, +as the extreme difficulty experienced by sea-planes in rising from +the water, except in very fine weather, rendered the provision of a +flying-off deck essential; the next was the substitution of aeroplanes +for sea-planes, working from special carriers; and, finally, the +provision of flying-off platforms in fighting ships themselves, first +in light cruisers, afterwards in battle cruisers, and, eventually, +in battleships; these successive developments were rendered possible +by the progressive improvement in aircraft. In this way, naval power +was given the assistance which air power could give it, both in +reconnaissance and in making its gunnery more effective. + +The Scapa force proceeded to the westward through the Pentland Firth +on the 11th. It carried out target practice at special targets towed +by colliers to the north-westward of the Shetlands on the 12th, being +joined by the Cromarty force (the 1st Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser +Squadron) that evening; the fleet then separated for night-firing. + +The Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had also left Rosyth on the 11th, +carried out night-firing on the 12th, and the whole Grand Fleet +practised battle exercises on the 13th, the Battle Cruiser Fleet +afterwards firing at the targets which were towed by colliers, and +rejoining my flag at daylight on the 14th. On that day further battle +exercises were carried out. The _Campania_, with her sea-planes, again +took part in these exercises, and an improvement in the scouting work +of the sea-planes was noticeable. The Fleet then returned to the +various bases, the Scapa force passing westward of the Orkneys. + +Whilst the main portion of the Grand Fleet was exercising in northern +waters, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with +one-half of the 1st Flotilla, cruised in the central portion of the +North Sea. + +Other operations during the month included: + +From the 1st to the 3rd, and the 5th to the 7th, further mine-sweeping +operations were carried out by the Fleet sweepers and paddle sweepers +in connection with the German mine-field in the southern portion of +the North Sea, the operation being covered by four light cruisers +and a force of destroyers. The work of clearing that portion of the +mine-field, which it was decided to sweep up, was completed on the +7th. On several days during the month a force from Harwich, comprising +light cruisers and destroyers, was cruising off the Dutch coast with +the object of intercepting and attacking zeppelins. The force did not, +however, meet with any success. + +From the 4th to the 7th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with three armed +boarding-steamers and three destroyers, operated on the two trade +routes, St. Abbs Head to the Skagerrak and Rotterdam to Norwegian +ports, examining all vessels encountered; nothing of special interest +occurred. But when returning during a thick fog to Scapa the armed +boarding-steamer _Duke of Albany_ grounded on the Lother Rock, Pentland +Firth, at 4 A.M. on the 7th, remained ashore for seven days, and was +considerably damaged. + +From the 18th to the 21st the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the light +cruisers _Nottingham_ and _Birmingham_, of the 2nd Light Cruiser +Squadron, accompanied by four destroyers, swept across the North Sea, +steering to the eastward from Rosyth to the entrance to the Skagerrak, +thence to the coast of Norway and back to Rosyth. This force was +attacked by at least three submarines during the sweep, and torpedoes +were fired at the _Birmingham_ on the 19th, and at the _Argyll_, the +_Roxburgh_ (on two occasions), and the _Nottingham_ on the 20th. Two +torpedoes were fired at the _Nottingham_. These ships were proceeding +at high speed and all the attacks failed, except the second attack +on the _Roxburgh_ (Captain C. R. de C. Foot), which was hit in the +bows by a torpedo at 2 P.M. on the 20th in Lat. 56.47 N., Long. 0.38 +E. Fortunately, the damage was well forward, and the _Roxburgh_ was +able to maintain a speed of 14 knots during her return to Rosyth, all +available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla being sent out to meet and +screen her in. At the time of the attack the _Roxburgh_ was proceeding +at high speed and zigzagging, with one destroyer screening her. The +ship was considerably damaged, and her repairs at a dockyard occupied a +lengthened period. + +The incident furnished an example of the risks run by heavy ships +cruising in the North Sea in waters frequented by submarines, +unless accompanied by a much stronger screen of destroyers than it +was possible to provide owing to the paucity of destroyers and the +immense amount of work required of them. It was noted at the time, and +considered to be suspicious, that a large fleet of trawlers flying +neutral colours was fishing in the neighbourhood of these submarine +attacks. + +As a result a force comprising three armed boarding-steamers and +three destroyers was despatched from Scapa on June 26th to examine a +fleet of neutral fishing vessels working to the south-eastward of the +Pentland Firth and on the ordinary track of the Fleet when proceeding +to sea. Six vessels were sent in for detailed examination, but nothing +suspicious was found on board. The fishing fleet, however, shifted its +ground to a position clear of the track of the Fleet. + +Operations against enemy submarines carried out by Grand Fleet forces +during June included the following: + + _June 1st to 2nd._--A division of destroyers endeavoured, without + success, to locate and attack a submarine 60 to 80 miles to the + eastward of May Island. + + _June 4th to 5th._--Two destroyers and two sloops operated against + a submarine, with a supposed tender, to the eastward of the + Pentland Firth. + + _June 5th._--The armed trawler _Hawk_, of the Peterhead area, + disabled submarine U 14 by gun fire and sank her by ramming at 7.30 + A.M. in Lat. 57.15 N., Long. 0.32 E. One officer and 21 men were + rescued. It was a fine exploit, typical of the consistently good + work of the vessels of the Peterhead patrol; it was a success that + was specially welcome at this time when submarines were very active + in northern waters. + +There were many other engagements between auxiliary patrols and +submarines during the month, but no other _certain_ successes. It was +believed that at least one submarine was sunk in a deep mine-field +which had been laid at my request off Tod Head on the Aberdeen +coast. Appended are notes of further operations against the enemy’s +under-water craft: + + _June 18th and 19th._--Anti-submarine operations by three + destroyers and sloops were carried out in the Fair Island Channel. + + _June 20th._--Four destroyers were operating against submarines to + the westward of the Orkneys. + + _June 21st and 22nd._--The _Botha_ and eight destroyers of the 1st + Flotilla were operating against submarines in an area between Lat. + 56.20 and 57.10 N. and Long. 1 E. to 1 W. + + _June 21st._--Four destroyers and six gunboats were operating to + the east of the Pentland Firth against a submarine. + + _June 23rd._--Submarine U 40 was sunk 50 miles S.E. by S. of Girdle + Ness at 9 A.M. by submarine C 24, working in company with a trawler. + + _June 23rd._--A division of destroyers was sent to operate against + a submarine to westward of the Fair Island Channel. + + _June 24th–26th._--Three sloops were engaged in searching for a + submarine to the eastward of Orkneys and Shetlands. + + _June 26th._--A large force, comprising 20 armed trawlers from + Granton in the Firth of Forth, began to operate against submarines + in an area round Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E., remaining out until July + 7th. Two armed trawlers, with C class submarines in company, were + also operating to the southward of this position. + + _June 30th–July 1st._--A force of eight destroyers was operating + against submarines in the Fair Island Channel. + +The anti-submarine operations by destroyers or sloops met with no +success. The invariable difficulty was the provision of a sufficiently +large number of vessels to keep the submarine down long enough to cause +her to exhaust her battery power, a period of some 48 hours. When +destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet were used for anti-submarine +operations at any distance from the base, the disadvantage of their +not being available to accompany the Fleet to sea in an emergency +had to be accepted. This would have led to awkward results had the +Fleet proceeded to sea with any considerable shortage of destroyers +for screening purposes on passage south and for Fleet purposes during +a Fleet action. The dilemma was one which faced me during the whole +period of my command of the Fleet. + +My experience convinced me that anti-submarine operations by destroyers +in such open waters as existed near the northern bases had but little +prospect of success unless undertaken by a considerably larger number +of vessels than were usually available at Scapa for such operations; a +contributory reason for the shortage of destroyers was that in addition +to the operations carried out by the heavy ships, cruisers and light +cruisers, for which the presence of destroyers was necessary, there was +a constant call on these vessels for escort work during the movements +of single ships or of squadrons between bases. + +Other events of interest during this month included: + +The formation of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron of new light cruisers +under the command of the late Commodore Le Mesurier, C.B., in the +_Calliope_. This squadron was attached to the Battle Fleet, and in +cruising order at sea was usually stationed from three to five miles +ahead of the Battle Fleet to act as an advanced submarine screen +forcing submarines to dive. From this position it could reach the +van of the Fleet on deployment for action, and was stationed there +for the purpose of attacking enemy destroyers with gunfire and the +enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes. It was a squadron on which, as +Commander-in-Chief, I kept a hold so that I might be certain it would +be at my disposal when action with the enemy was joined. Other light +cruiser squadrons, which occupied an advanced position in the cruiser +screen, could not be depended upon with the same certainty to occupy +the van position to which they were allotted during a fleet action, +since they might become engaged with enemy vessels of the same class. + +The battle cruiser _Inflexible_ joined the Fleet from Gibraltar on June +19th. + +The _Liverpool_ left to pay off on the 26th for repair to boilers. +Rear-Admiral W. B. Fawckner took charge of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +base at Swarbachs Minn on the 18th. + +During the month observation mine-fields at the entrance to Cromarty +and off Hoy Sound, Scapa Flow, were completed. + +A short visit was paid to the Fleet at Scapa Flow by the Archbishop +of York on the 26th. He held a Fleet Confirmation in the _Iron +Duke_, a great open-air service on Flotta Island, many thousands of +officers and men attending; there was another service at Longhope, +and, in addition, he visited the majority of the ships. He was indeed +indefatigable and left amidst the most sincere expressions of regret. +To me personally his visit gave the greatest pleasure. From Scapa he +passed to Invergordon, where, during a two days’ stay, he held a large +open-air service, and visited most of the ships based there, moving on +to Rosyth, where an impressive open-air service took place in one of +the large graving-docks. + +The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued throughout the +month, an average of 73 ships being intercepted weekly and 15 sent in +for detailed examination. + +A serious attack was made by an enemy submarine on the fishing fleet +some 50 miles to the eastward of the Shetlands on the night of the +23rd–24th June, about 16 drifters being sunk by bombs and gunfire. This +incident emphasised the necessity for better control over the movements +of our fishing vessels in northern waters and of providing some form of +protection for them. Steps were taken in both directions, although they +naturally resulted in some unavoidable reduction in the operations of +the fishing fleet. + +The weather at Scapa during June was very misty, fog or mist being +experienced on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and +30th. + +During July, 1915, fleet movements were kept to the lowest possible +minimum owing to a threatened strike in the Welsh coal-fields, which +eventually took place on the 18th, and caused considerable anxiety as +to its effect on Fleet movements. + +From the 11th to the 14th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the 1st, 2nd +and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd +and 4th Flotillas, and the _Campania_ cruised in the vicinity of the +Shetland Islands and carried out a series of battle exercises during +the cruise. The Battle Cruiser Fleet made a sweep between the 11th and +13th down to the Dogger Bank. Whilst the Battle Fleet was at sea the +destroyer flotillas were sent into Balta Sound (Shetland Islands) to +complete with fuel in case a move south on the part of the Battle Fleet +became necessary. + +On the 28th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with two ships of the +1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, the 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron, and 14 destroyers of the 1st and 4th Flotillas +from Rosyth and Scapa, together with Commodore Tyrwhitt and four light +cruisers and 12 destroyers from Harwich, left their bases to carry out +an operation in the Skagerrak, with the object of intercepting trade +and searching for any enemy vessels. Only one German vessel (a trawler) +was encountered, and she was sunk after removal of the crew. A Danish +steamer was sent in to a British port with a guard on board and the +force returned to their various bases on the 31st. + +As the threatened coal strike limited the movements of the coal-burning +heavy ships, the oil-burning destroyers were used for anti-submarine +work to a greater extent than would have been desirable if greater +activity of the Fleet had been anticipated. + +Operations against enemy submarines included: + +On July 1st the _Hampshire_ reported that a torpedo had been fired +at her in the Moray Firth. Twelve destroyers and all available local +patrol vessels were sent to endeavour to locate and sink the submarine. +The steamboats from the ships at Cromarty were also despatched to +operate in the various bays in the Moray Firth, where a submarine +might elect to lie on the bottom. The boats exploded a large number +of charges on the bottom in the hope of forcing any submarine to the +surface. The operations were abandoned on the evening of the 2nd, the +submarine not having been located. + +On the 4th a division of the 2nd Flotilla hunted for another submarine +reported in the Moray Firth. + +From the 5th to the 10th the sea-plane carrier _Campania_, with a +flotilla leader, eight destroyers, four sloops and a large number +of trawlers and net-drifters, operated against submarines that were +reported to be passing through the Fair Island Channel, being based +on Pierowall Harbour, in the north of the Orkneys. The destroyers, +sloops and patrol vessels operated in conjunction with the sea-planes. +No success was achieved, however, although these extensive operations +covered a large area. + +On the night of the 16th a division of destroyers operated against +a submarine reported to the southward of the Pentland Firth, off +Duncansby Head, but again without result. + +From the 15th to the 19th six sloops and seven gunboats were despatched +against submarines in the Fair Island Channel and north of the +Shetlands, the _Campania’s_ sea-planes again assisting from Pierowall +Harbour. Destroyers were also helping during a portion of the period +covered by the operations. On the 16th the gunboat _Speedwell_ reported +having sighted the periscope of a submarine, ramming her at a speed +of 15 knots. The submarine was struck on her starboard quarter at an +angle of 10 degrees, but there was, unfortunately, no evidence to show +that she was sunk, although it was probable that she was considerably +damaged. She was not seen again. On the same day a submarine was +reported by the armed yacht _Zaza_, as being in a drift-net 12 miles +east-north-east from Fair Island. Local patrol vessels, gunboats and +four destroyers concentrated on the position and explosive charges +were fired, but without certain result. From the 25th to the 27th a +sub-division of destroyers searched, fruitlessly, a large area to the +northward of the Hebrides for submarines and a reported submarine base +ship. They were assisted by four sloops operating in the area from the +26th to the 30th. + +On the 18th and 19th a division of destroyers was engaged in moving a +neutral fishing fleet away from an area to the eastward of the Firth +of Forth where they interfered with Fleet operations. Submarine C 27 +had for some little time been operating against submarines in the North +Sea from Scapa, in tow of a trawler, to which vessel she was connected +by telephone. This idea, which had first been conceived at the Rosyth +base, had also been put into operation at Scapa, the arrangements being +made under the direction of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville. On July 20th +the trawler _Princess Louise_, Lieutenant Morton, R.N.R., being in +command, with Lieutenant Cantlie, R.N., a submarine officer, on board, +was towing Submarine C 27 (Lieutenant-Commander Dobson) in a submerged +condition when a German submarine, U 23, was sighted 1¼ miles off on +the port bow. C 27 was informed by telephone, telephonic communication +then breaking down. U 23 opened fire at a range of 2,000 yards on the +_Princess Louise_. Lieutenant Cantlie, being unable to communicate +further with C 27, slipped the tow and proceeded to abandon the trawler +with every appearance of haste. U 23 closed to within 600 yards and +stopped. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Dobson, hearing nothing +further by telephone, but noticing the splash and explosion of the +projectiles in the water, got well clear of the trawler after slipping, +and then brought his periscope to the surface for a look around. +He sighted U 23 about 900 yards off, closed to a good position for +attack within 500 yards, and fired his first torpedo, which missed. +His second shot hit; there was a heavy explosion, and U 23 sank; four +officers and six men were picked up out of a crew of 34. The whole +attack was exceedingly well managed and a very well deserved success +scored, which reflected much credit on all concerned in the operations. + +On the 26th a submarine was engaged about 120 miles east of Dundee by +the armed trawler _Taranaki_, which claimed to have sunk her. + +On the 27th an engagement took place between the armed trawler No. 830 +and a submarine to the southward of St. Kilda, the trawler reporting +that the submarine was hit several times by gunfire and considered to +have been badly damaged. + +Other events of interest during the month included an attempt by the +_Digby_ to tow the Norwegian steamer _Oscar II._, damaged by collision +with the _Patuca_ on July 1st, into Stornoway, the destroyers _Fury_ +and _Staunch_ being detached from Scapa and local patrol vessels from +Stornoway to assist. In spite of perseverance under very bad weather +conditions, during which the ships and the destroyers were handled with +great ability, the _Oscar II._ sank on the night of the 3rd. + +An expedition consisting of the armed merchant-ship _Columbella_, the +sloop _Acacia_ and the two trawlers _Arley_ and _Mafeking_, left Scapa +on July 29th for Bear Island and Spitzbergen to search for a reported +German submarine base and wireless station. These vessels carried out +as thorough a search as was possible, in face of the ice-fields in the +neighbourhood of the islands; but no trace of a submarine base was +discovered, nor could it have been possible for one to operate under +such conditions. + +The average figures per week for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the +month were: + +Number of ships intercepted, 62; number of ships sent in with armed +guards, 10; number of ships on patrol, 15; number of ships refitting, +coaling or on passage to or from base, 9. + +German submarines were active in the vicinity of the ships of the +10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, and the _Columbella_ was +unsuccessfully attacked on the 21st. + +Some armed boarding steamers were detailed to assist the 10th Cruiser +Squadron during the month, being withdrawn from the patrol eastward of +the Pentland Firth. + +The anti-submarine defence of the base at Swarbachs Minn was +practically completed during the month. + +An event of great interest to the officers and men of the Fleet was +a visit from His Majesty the King, who arrived at Scapa on July 7th, +crossing from Thurso in the _Oak_, escorted by a portion of the 2nd +Flotilla. During His Majesty’s visit he stayed with Admiral Sir Stanley +Colville at Longhope and spent two very busy days with the Fleet. +His Majesty visited all the flagships, and a large number of the +officers and men of the ships of each division of the Battle Fleet and +of each vessel in the cruiser squadrons were assembled on board the +various flagships and passed before the King. His Majesty reviewed the +officers and men of the smaller vessels, destroyers, sloops, etc., on +the island of Flotta, visited hospital ships, and reviewed the great +mass of auxiliary vessels anchored in Scapa Flow, being greeted with +enthusiastic loyalty by the crews of these vessels: visited the various +shore batteries, and inspected the anti-submarine defences and the boom +vessels. The weather was bad, but the programme was carried out in +spite of these conditions. The officers and men of the Fleet derived +the utmost encouragement from His Majesty’s gracious visit. The King +made the following signal to the Commander-in-Chief as the _Oak_ left +the Fleet, escorted by a portion of the 4th Flotilla: + + “I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long-cherished + desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most interesting days + spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and admiration for the + splendid force which you command with the full confidence of myself + and your fellow-countrymen. + + “I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the + officers and men of the Fleet. I realise the patience and + determined spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting + and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links all + ranks together. + + “Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever the day of + battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its old glorious + traditions.” + +In reply to His Majesty’s gracious message, I expressed the +appreciation of the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, adding that it +was “my conviction that the glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in +the hands of those I have the honour to command.” + +During August the coal strike continued to influence Fleet movements to +a certain extent. + +On August 2nd the _Iron Duke_, the 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st +Cruiser Squadron carried out target practice from Cromarty. This was a +new departure, the practice hitherto having been limited to firing at +a small target towed by other ships or by a collier to the northward +or eastward of the Shetlands, or firing at a rock. Both were highly +unsatisfactory methods, which did not enable the gunnery efficiency of +ships to be either tested or greatly improved. Accordingly I decided +to risk sending ships out from Cromarty to fire at a large target of +the pattern used in peace practices; it was towed across the Moray +Firth, the ships firing and the towing vessels being protected from +submarine attack by destroyers, sloops and gunboats. The system was an +improvement, although very expensive in the employment of destroyers, +etc. It was continued until practice in the Pentland Firth took its +place. The usual procedure was for two ships, screened by destroyers, +to be on the firing ground at a time, firing either independently or +with concentrated fire, with two more vessels approaching the firing +ground ready to fire when the first pair had finished. On completion +of practice the first pair returned to harbour and were met at the +entrance by the third pair, to which they turned over their destroyers. +Careful organisation insured that ships did not have to wait at the +entrance, nor was there delay for the target to be turned round for the +return run. A large number of destroyers, sloops or gunboats, patrolled +to seaward of the target to prevent submarines from approaching. The +total number usually employed screening and patrolling during a day’s +firing was from 22 to 28. + +The _Iron Duke_, with the 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Cruiser +Squadron, proceeded to Scapa on completion of the practice, being +relieved later by another battle squadron and cruiser squadron in +accordance with the routine which had been established of changing +bases periodically. The special service ship No. 6 left Scapa for +Rosyth, with two destroyers, to endeavour to “draw” submarines to +attack her and give the destroyers an opportunity of engaging them; but +no attack took place. + +From August 5th to the 9th extensive anti-submarine operations were +carried out to the westward of the Orkneys by a force consisting of +nine destroyers, six sloops, five gunboats and a large number of patrol +trawlers. The operations covered a very large area, the general idea +being to compel any submarine intending to pass round the Shetland +Islands or through the Fair Island Channel to submerge for a period +that would exhaust her batteries and eventually bring her to the +surface to recharge. The limited duration of darkness in northern +latitudes assisted the operations of the hunting vessels. No _certain_ +success was attained. A submarine was sighted on the 6th at 7 P.M., +and a heavy explosion, under water, close to the sloop _Hollyhock_ at +9.30 P.M. on the same night might have been due to a submarine coming +to grief, while another submarine was sighted at 10.30 A.M. on the 7th. +Examination of a sailing vessel found in the vicinity of this latter +submarine was unproductive. + +The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on August 6th to cruise off +the Norwegian coast, and the battleships _Albemarle_ and _Russell_, of +the 6th Battle Squadron, arrived at Scapa for practices, having left +the Channel Fleet. + +On August 7th I returned in the _Iron Duke_ to Cromarty in order to +meet the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer who were about +to visit Invergordon. At 9 A.M. on the 8th a wireless report was +received in the _Iron Duke_ that a submarine was attacking a steamer +off Rosehearty on the southern shore of the Moray Firth. The “duty” +destroyer division was ordered to sea at once, and the remaining +three available destroyers followed shortly afterwards. Meanwhile, +the destroyer _Christopher_, already on patrol in the Moray Firth, +reported herself in action at 11 A.M. with the submarine, which had +submerged, the report stating that the merchant-ship had been sunk. The +second destroyer on patrol, the _Midge_, assisted in the search for the +submarine, as did the remaining destroyers and patrol trawlers, without +result. At 10 A.M. the trawler mine-sweepers, which had been carrying +out the usual routine sweep on the southern shore of the Moray Firth, +reported the discovery of a mine-field to the northward of Banff, and +several reports were received during the day of drifting mines being +sighted along the coast and in the Firth. All destroyers were ordered +in at 4 P.M., except the two on patrol and any others in touch with the +submarine, and vessels remaining on patrol were given the limits of the +mine-field as far as they had then been ascertained. + +Such investigation as could be hurriedly carried out during the day, +by signal and wireless, revealed the fact that a yacht and a trawler +on patrol on the night of the 7th–8th had sighted strange lights, but +without identifying the vessel carrying them, and it became apparent +that a German surface mine-laying vessel had been at work. The night +had been somewhat misty. Directions were at once sent by wireless +to the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, still at sea, to proceed at full +speed towards the Horn Reef to endeavour to intercept the returning +mine-layer, and the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, from Rosyth, +were also sent out for the purpose; the Admiralty was also informed, +and as a result the Harwich force was sent on the same mission. + +As the other squadrons proceeded, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was +directed to the Skagerrak in case the mine-layer endeavoured to return +by that route, whilst the remaining light cruiser squadrons made for +the Horn Reef. All the mine-sweepers and the destroyers engaged in +the anti-submarine operation mentioned earlier were recalled to fuel +with all despatch, and sweeping by the Fleet mine-sweepers, trawlers +and destroyers, organised on a large scale, was begun on the 9th +and continued until clear routes for the ships at Cromarty and for +merchant-ships, gradually extending to 10 miles in width, had been +swept on both the northern and southern shores of the Moray Firth. +These sweeping operations were greatly delayed by persistent fog, +although a clear channel sufficiently wide to admit of the exit of the +squadrons at Cromarty was quickly swept. The _Campania_ was sent to +Cromarty, so that her sea-planes might assist to locate the mines, but +in the rather thick waters of the Moray Firth they were of no use for +this purpose. + +On the afternoon of the 9th news was received that the destroyer _Lynx_ +had been sunk by a mine at 6 A.M. that morning in a position stated to +be two miles to the northward of the mine-field as then located. It was +very regrettable that only three officers and 21 men were saved out of +her fine ship’s company; those lost included her captain, Commander +John F. H. Cole, an officer of great promise. The loss of such a +comparatively shallow draft vessel showed that some of the mines had +been laid near the surface, and mine-sweeping operations were suspended +near the time of low water. + +At 4.30 P.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich force, reported that +the German mine-layer _Meteor_, which had been sighted by his vessels +in the vicinity of the Horn Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her +own crew and that he had subsequently rescued four officers and 39 +men, survivors of the armed boarding-steamer _Ramsey_, who had been +prisoners on board the _Meteor_. The _Ramsey_ had been on patrol +south-east of the Pentland Firth, and it was ascertained from the +survivors later that she had sighted and closed the _Meteor_, which +was disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, shortly after daylight on +August 8th, with the intention of boarding her. On closing, however, +the _Meteor_ suddenly showed her true character; her powerful armament, +hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the _Ramsey_, which was +returned by the latter ship’s greatly inferior armament of 12-pounder +guns. But the surprise was too complete and the odds too heavy, and the +_Ramsey_ was sunk very quickly with her colours flying, four officers +and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by the _Meteor_. +Acting-Lieut. P. S. Atkins, R.N.R., the senior surviving officer of the +_Ramsey_, came north to report himself to me, and gave full details +of his experiences. He stated that when the officers of the _Meteor_ +abandoned and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt’s force, +the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board a neutral fishing +vessel. Shortly afterwards the British light cruisers passed close +to the fishing vessel, and Lieut. Atkins signalled to the Commodore, +stating that they were survivors of the _Ramsey_ and asked to be taken +off. He added that the Commodore, who was at that time being attacked +by both aircraft and submarines, replied, “Steer south-west; I will +return and pick you up.” + +Lieut. Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the _Meteor_ to steer +south-west, but the Germans naturally enough objected, as they desired +to make their own coast. However, in spite of the fact that the British +were unarmed and numerically very inferior, their arguments prevailed +and a south-west course was steered for a short time until another +fishing vessel was sighted; the British suggested transferring to +her; this was agreed to by the Germans. As the British were leaving, +the German captain, Konstten-Kapitän von Knorr, asked Lieut. Atkins +if he had any money, to which he replied, “How could I, seeing that +you picked me up in pyjamas?” Captain von Knorr pressed money on him, +but Lieut. Atkins said that he did not see that he would require +it. However, he eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him +an English £5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record so +gentlemanly and courteous an act, which stands out in strong contrast +to the usual behaviour of German naval officers during the War. The +money was given to me, and I sent it to the Admiralty, asking that it +might be repaid, with the thanks of the British for the courtesy shown +to our prisoners of war. + +The 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons were ordered to return to +their bases on receipt of the news of the sinking of the _Meteor_. + +The mine-sweeping operations in the Moray Firth on August 9th showed +that the mine-field was larger than had been at first reported, and +additional paddle mine-sweepers were sent from the Clyde to assist the +other vessels. + +Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were on board the _Iron Duke_ from the 7th +to the 9th, and various matters of importance were discussed. When +questioned as to urgent requirements I pressed for the building of a +large number of sloops, a class of vessel which had proved most useful, +both as mine-sweepers and as patrol vessels, and which could supplement +the numerous destroyers then building, which took much longer to +complete. + +The persistence of the fog at this period is shown by the fact that the +_Agincourt_, returning to Scapa from Portsmouth, was unable to enter +the base for 36 hours after passing Cape Wrath, only 60 miles distant, +and was forced to cruise to the westward, making repeated attempts at +entry. The _Ajax_ was similarly delayed in entry for 12 hours during +the same period. + +On August 10th the armed merchant-ship _India_, of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron, was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine off the coast of +Norway with considerable loss of life. + +Four destroyers were sent on August 13th to locate and engage a +submarine that had attacked one of the Fleet mine-sweepers. They did +not succeed in finding her, but on the following day an armed yacht +engaged a submarine off the Aberdeen coast and claimed to have hit her +by gunfire; and the trawler _Shamrock_ claimed to have run over another +submarine. + +The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, the 4th Light Cruiser +Squadron from Scapa, and seven destroyers carried out a search between +the 16th and 18th for enemy vessels in the northern and central portion +of the North Sea, sweeping towards the Skagerrak, and covering a large +area by wide zigzags. + +The _Iron Duke_ returned to Scapa from Cromarty on the 16th. + +From the 18th to the 21st the _Lion_, with the 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was cruising in the North Sea +and carrying out exercises off the Shetland Islands, proceeding to +Scapa for practices on the 21st, and returning to Rosyth on the 23rd. + +On August 18th the Fleet mine-sweeper _Lilac_, Lieut.-Commander Leslie +Fisher, while at work on the Moray Firth mine-field, struck a mine. +The whole fore part of the ship was destroyed and the wreck of it hung +down from the after part, causing her to draw 30 feet of water forward, +instead of the usual nine to ten feet. The weather was very bad and +a heavy sea running, but by great persistence and good seamanship, +aided by very gallant work on the part of her own crew and that of the +_Hollyhock_, Captain Preston, senior officer of Fleet mine-sweepers, +who was in command of the _Hollyhock_, succeeded in towing her to +Peterhead. She was eventually reconstructed and rejoined the Fleet +mine-sweeping flotillas. The value of this class of vessel was clearly +shown by the incident. + +Eight destroyers from Scapa, with a flotilla leader, were carrying out +on August 23rd and 24th anti-submarine operations in the Fair Island +Channel, and a division was similarly employed east of May Island, in +the Firth of Forth. + +Between August 24th and 26th the 3rd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons +exchanged bases, between Scapa and Rosyth, carrying out a wide search +of the North Sea _en route_, destroyers screening the ships by day. + +On the 24th Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G., relieved Rear-Admiral +Hugh Evan-Thomas in the 1st Battle Squadron, the latter officer being +designated to take command of the new 5th Battle Squadron (five ships +of the “Queen Elizabeth” class), as it was formed. + +On August 30th–31st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, +searched to the eastward of May Island for enemy vessels; and from +August 31 to September 1st the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied +by four destroyers, was cruising between the Firth of Forth and the +Dogger Bank for the same purpose. + +During the month the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons carried out target +practice in the Moray Firth, and all battle squadrons and cruiser +squadrons proceeded to sea for cruises, independently, from their +bases, screened by destroyers. + +His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visited Sir Stanley Colville at +Longhope during the month, remaining for six days. He went on board +many of the ships of the Grand Fleet. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron report for the month showed the average +weekly results as follows: Ships intercepted, 65; ships sent in, 13; +number of vessels on patrol, 14; number refitting, coaling or _en +route_ to or from patrol, 9. + +The weather at Scapa was very misty. Fog or mist was experienced on the +3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 31st. +There were no gales. + +On August 3rd the large floating-dock from the Medway, which had been +towed to the Tyne, was reported as ready for use. + +On the 29th the old light cruiser _Brilliant_ arrived at Lerwick to +act as guard and depot ship at that base, which was being developed as +a secondary examination base for vessels sent in by the 10th Cruiser +Squadron. + +An extended patrol to the south-eastward of the Pentland Firth during +the month was maintained by three armed boarding steamers and three +destroyers. + +The principal events of September, 1915, may perhaps be given most +conveniently and briefly in diary form: + +On September 1st eight destroyers, fitted for mine-sweeping, swept +the waters to the westward of the Pentland Firth. This was the first +occasion on which destroyers were used for this purpose. + +September 1st and 2nd.--The _Black Prince_ and four light cruisers, +with six destroyers, carried out a sweep to the eastward from Scapa. + +September 2nd–5th.--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd +Cruiser Squadrons, and the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron were cruising +in northern waters. Destroyers screened the Fleet out and back, but +did not remain with it during the cruise, being kept at the base, +ready fuelled, in case it became necessary to move to the southward. +Battle exercises and night-firing were carried out during the cruise, +as opportunity offered. The battleship _Superb_ reported sighting the +periscope of a submarine. + +On September 2nd the Fleet was visited by five French gentlemen of +eminence, and a representative of the United States Press. This was +the first visit paid to the Grand Fleet base by anyone not immediately +connected with the Service, and we were flattered that the occasion +should have brought to Scapa Flow representatives of our gallant Allies +from across the Channel. The Fleet left immediately after the visit, +and an opportunity was afforded our visitors of seeing the ships leave +harbour. + +September 4th.--Another mine-sweeping sloop, the _Dahlia_, Lieutenant +G. Parsons, R.N., struck a mine in the Moray Firth mine-field during +sweeping operations. She was very badly damaged; Lieut. Parsons himself +was severely injured. The ship reached Invergordon with the loss of +three killed and one missing. She was subsequently repaired. + +September 7th.--The 3rd Cruiser Squadron left Scapa, with destroyers, +swept down in the direction of the Horn Reef, and arrived at Rosyth on +the 9th without sighting enemy vessels. Visibility was low during the +sweep. + +September 8th.--The 7th Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth, with destroyers, +swept out to the eastward, towards the Skagerrak, then turned to the +northward and arrived at Scapa on the 10th. + +Two destroyers were damaged by collision with steamers in a fog on the +8th, necessitating repairs at a dockyard in both cases. + +September 10th–12th.--The _Lion_, with the 1st and 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and 16 destroyers, +was cruising in the North Sea to cover mine-laying operations carried +out by our mine-layers in the Heligoland Bight, the remainder of the +Grand Fleet being, as was usual on such occasions, at short notice +for steam. The _Fearless_ and a destroyer, part of the force with +the battle cruisers, collided while at sea, the former sustaining +considerable damage. + +September 11th.--The _Patia_ and _Oropesa_, of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron, collided; the _Patia_ was seriously damaged, and was +brought into port under convoy of a destroyer and armed trawlers with +considerable difficulty, being unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine +_en route_. + +September 12th.--Submarine E 16, attached to the Grand Fleet flotilla, +was sent to the coast of Norway from Aberdeen to operate against an +enemy submarine thought to be operating in those waters. On the 15th +E 16 sighted a hostile submarine off the Norwegian coast and sank her +with a torpedo. This success, one of the earliest achieved by one +submarine operating against another, was very encouraging after the +somewhat similar success of C 27 in July. + +September 17th.--The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, +left Rosyth to sweep to the Skagerrak. They returned on the 19th, +without having sighted any enemy vessels. + +September 23rd.--The destroyer _Christopher_ was damaged in collision +with the armed boarding-steamer _King Orry_ in a fog. + +September 26th.--The s.s. _Caribbean_, which had been fitted out +as a receiving-ship for dockyard workmen, encountered very heavy +weather whilst _en route_ from her port to Scapa, and got into serious +difficulties, taking in a great deal of water. Her wireless distress +calls off Cape Wrath were answered by sending to her assistance the +light cruiser _Birkenhead_ from Scapa, together with tugs and yachts +from Scapa and Stornoway. At 4.45 A.M. on the 27th the _Birkenhead_ and +patrol vessels, which were then standing by, took off most of the crew +of the _Caribbean_, which sank at 7.30 A.M., unfortunately with the +loss of 15 lives. + +During the month the battle and cruiser squadrons carried out +independent cruises by day and at night from the Scapa and Rosyth +bases, being screened by destroyers during the exercises. The squadrons +of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, also, all visited Scapa for the purpose of +carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices. + +A widely extended patrol by one or more light cruisers with destroyers, +working to the south-eastward from Scapa, was maintained during the +month, in order to guard against any attempt at mine-laying in the +Pentland Firth by enemy vessels disguised as merchant-ships. Similar +precautions were taken at Rosyth. This patrol was henceforth regularly +established when the conditions of the moon rendered attempted +mine-laying operations at night probable. + +The sweeping operations in the Moray Firth were continued on a large +scale throughout the month, and clear channels on each shore were +provided. Up to September 19th, 222 mines had been accounted for out +of the 450 which survivors of the _Ramsey_ stated had been laid by the +_Meteor_. The Moray Firth mine-field, in the centre of the Firth, was +purposely left undisturbed, as it formed an excellent anti-submarine +defence in that position and reduced the area to be patrolled by our +vessels. + +The 3rd Cruiser Squadron became non-existent during the month, two +ships being detached by the Admiralty on special service, and the +remaining two sent into port for somewhat extensive repairs. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s _weekly average_ for the month worked out +at: + +Ships intercepted, 64; sent in with armed guards, 11; number of +vessels on patrol, 13; number absent or _en route_ to or from patrols, +10. + +The weather at Scapa showed fog or mist on the 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, +14th, 18th, 23rd and 24th; a very heavy gale occurred between the 25th +and 28th, during which great damage was done to the anti-submarine +obstructions at Scapa, and a good deal of damage was suffered on the +mainland in the north of Scotland, a portion of the Highland Railway +being washed away. + +Between June and August, 1915, I had pressed upon the Admiralty my +opinion that we should carry out a much more comprehensive mining +policy in the Heligoland Bight. I had urged this early in the War, +but the view taken at the Admiralty was that mining on any large +scale would impede both our submarine operations and also any Fleet +operations that might be undertaken in those waters. I felt that unless +we adopted one of two policies--namely, either a close watch by surface +ships on the exits from the German bases, or an extensive mining +policy--we could never feel that we should receive sufficient warning +of the exit of enemy forces as to prevent mischief being done. The +close blockade by surface ships was not a feasible operation in view +of the number of craft at our disposal and the submarine danger; our +submarines were too few in number and had not the necessary means of +communication to take the place of surface ships. + +I could see no alternatives to very extensive mining, limited only by +the number of mines that could be produced. The mining proposed by +me was intended to hamper the operations of both surface vessels and +submarines. I pointed out that earlier in the War the view had been +expressed to me by the Admiralty that we should not risk our cruisers +too freely in the North Sea owing to the submarine danger, and that, +if we adhered to this policy, it was impossible to insure that the +exits to the Fleet bases would not be mined by surface mine-layers, +as the _Meteor_ incident had shown, and as was also indicated by the +success of our own infrequent mining excursions to the Heligoland Bight. + +The correspondence resulted in increased activity on the part of our +mine-layers, but the success of our work was unfortunately handicapped +by defects in the pattern of mine in use at that time, especially as +against submarines. + +In 1917, shortly after my return to the Admiralty, I undertook a +very extensive mining policy. In the previous year, during Sir Henry +Jackson’s period as First Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was +designed, the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him. +This was one of the replies to the submarine. One hundred thousand +of these mines were ordered by me early in 1917 to carry out various +schemes for mining the Heligoland Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later +in 1917, with the assistance of the United States, provision was made +for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the Northern +Barrage. It was not until the large supplies of mines became available +in the autumn that really effective results against submarines by +mining began to be achieved, although the operations of German surface +vessels had previously been hampered to a very considerable extent. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA + + +During the later months of 1915 the Grand Fleet continued to sweep +and control the North Sea in spite of the enemy’s efforts to effect +attrition by submarines and mines. On October 1st the 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadron, with destroyers escorting, left Rosyth and proceeded towards +the Little Fisher Bank; on reaching that locality the squadron turned +to the north-westward and steered towards Scapa, arriving on the 3rd. +The line thus swept was the possible course of enemy mine-laying or +other vessels, proceeding towards, or returning from, the vicinity of +Scapa and Cromarty. No enemy ships were sighted. + +On October 2nd the battleship _Barham_, Flagship of the new 5th Battle +Squadron, arrived at Scapa. + +Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron (now comprising +six light cruisers) and nine destroyers, left Harwich on the 6th to +sweep towards the Skagerrak in search of enemy vessels, particularly +fishing trawlers, which were suspected of acting as outpost vessels. +The operation on this occasion was fruitful in result; 14 German +trawlers were captured and sent in; one was also sunk. As usual during +such operations when a supporting force was not actually at sea, the +Battle Cruiser Fleet was kept at short notice for steam, to be ready to +put to sea if required. + +On October 10th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa and swept +down to the Little Fisher Bank, and thence to Rosyth with the same +object in view as that of the Harwich force, being met at daylight on +the 11th by destroyers from Rosyth, and arriving at that base on the +12th. On this occasion the operation gave no result. + +The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle +Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light +Cruiser Squadron, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, left Scapa on the +13th, and proceeded into the northern portion of the North Sea for a +cruise. Owing to bad weather the destroyers were sent back on the 11th, +one, the _Mandate_, being damaged by a heavy sea; the _Ardent_ and +_Fortune_ collided, the former vessel being damaged. The fleet carried +out battle exercises during the cruise, and returned to the bases +at Scapa and Cromarty on the 15th, on which day the new battleship +_Canada_ joined the Grand Fleet. + +On October 18th the Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser +Squadron and destroyers, sailed to operate off the Danish coast, north +of the Horn Reef, against any enemy vessels found there. The _Lion_, +with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, left +Rosyth to support the Harwich force, which closed the Danish coast +at daylight on the 19th, then steered to the north-westward, till +dark, returning afterwards to Harwich. The search was unproductive, +no enemy vessels being sighted. The _Lion_ and 1st Battle Cruiser +Squadron proceeded towards Cromarty, but were diverted to Scapa during +the night of the 19th–20th, owing to a report of suspicious vessels, +possibly mine-layers, being sighted off Noss Head. These vessels were +subsequently identified as two of our own trawlers. + +On October 22nd three divisions of destroyers were sent from Scapa to +hunt a submarine off Fair Island, but were forced to return owing to +bad weather. + +On October 27th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with two armed +boarding-steamers, left Scapa to search the northern portion of the +North Sea, returning on the 30th. Nothing was sighted. + +On October 30th Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron +and destroyers, left Harwich for another sweep off the Danish coast. +His force passed through a position some 70 miles north-west of +Heligoland before daylight on the 21st, steered for the Little Fisher +Bank, and thence to Harwich. A portion of the Battle Cruiser Fleet kept +steam at short notice during the operation, which was unproductive, +except for the interception of an ore-laden neutral steamer which was +sent in to a British port. + +On October 30th the _Birkenhead_ and _Liverpool_, newly commissioned +light cruisers, left Scapa for a searching and exercise cruise in the +northern portion of the North Sea, and returned to Scapa on November +1st. + +During October squadrons cruised independently in the North Sea from +Scapa, as in previous months, by day and at night. The ships of the +Battle Cruiser Fleet, as well as the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth +and squadrons from Scapa, proceeded to Cromarty, in turn, in order to +carry out long-range firing at towed targets in the Moray Firth, being +screened from submarine attack by destroyers. Squadrons from Rosyth +proceeded also to Scapa to carry out practices. + +A patrol, comprising the _Sappho_ and eight armed whalers, based +on Peterhead, was instituted as a guard against further attempted +mine-laying in the Moray Firth. The Peterhead and Cromarty +mine-sweeping vessels, which had been working under the Senior Officer +of Fleet mine-sweepers (Captain Preston) for the clearance of the Moray +Firth mine-field, reverted to their proper commands, and arrangements +were made for a constant sweep by mine-sweeping trawlers of the channel +along the south shore of the Moray Firth, which was that used by ships +based on Cromarty when concentrating with the remainder of the Grand +Fleet in the North Sea. It was essential to ensure that this channel +was kept clear of mines so long as any portion of the Grand Fleet was +based on Cromarty. + +It may not be out of place here to state the patrol arrangements +existing in the vicinity of the Pentland Firth at this time. Usually +three armed boarding-steamers and three destroyers were patrolling to +the eastward of the Firth. They moved to the northward during daylight +and worked for a considerable distance to the south-eastward of the +Firth at night. An extended patrol, usually consisting of a light +cruiser and a destroyer, also worked from Peterhead. A patrol of one or +two destroyers was maintained at night off Noss Head on the north shore +of the Moray Firth. Destroyers were kept off the entrance to Hoy Sound +and Holm Sound, and a large number of trawlers near the Hoxa Sound +entrance. In bad weather the eastern destroyer patrol was withdrawn +to work between Swona Island and the land to the eastward and to the +north-westward. The old local defence destroyers also carried out +patrol work off the entrance, and off Kirkwall. These particulars are +of interest as conveying some idea of the sea work in a restricted area +which had to be carried out in all weathers. + +From October 1st to October 11th the Fleet Flagship _Iron Duke_ was +refitting at Invergordon. + +On October 28th the _Argyll_, _en route_ from Devonport to Rosyth +to rejoin the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, grounded on the Bell Rock, near +Dundee, early in the morning in thick weather, and became a total +wreck; all hands were taken off in a heavy sea by destroyers from +Rosyth. The destroyers were exceedingly well handled under very +difficult conditions. On the following day the _Arlanza_, of the 10th +Cruiser Squadron, which had been sent to the White Sea, struck a mine +and was seriously damaged, but succeeded in reaching the Yakanski +anchorage, in the neighbourhood. Repairs were impossible during the +winter and the greater part of her crew was, therefore, brought home in +the _Orcoma_, of the same squadron which had been sent north for the +purpose. + +From October 29th to October 30th a heavy gale was experienced at +Scapa, and considerable damage was done to the anti-submarine defences +and to the block-ships at the entrances. Fog or mist was experienced on +October 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th, 16th and 30th. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s work showed as a weekly average the +following figures: Ships intercepted, 56; sent in, 16; number on +patrol, 14; number absent, 8. The bad weather experienced interfered +with the work of the squadron. + +On November 2nd the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st, +2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the +destroyers of the 4th and 11th (old 2nd) Flotilla left for a cruise +to the westward of the Orkneys. The destroyers were sent back on the +3rd owing to bad weather. Battle exercises and sub-calibre firing took +place during the cruise, which was otherwise uneventful; the Fleet +arrived at Scapa and Cromarty on November 5th, being screened in by the +destroyers. + +On November 6th the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, with +destroyers, left Scapa and Rosyth respectively, to carry out an +operation in the Skagerrak. The force was timed to arrive at the +eastern end of the Skagerrak at dawn on the 7th, and to sweep westward +during daylight in order that our ships should be between the enemy and +his Baltic base if enemy ships were sighted. The _Lion_, with the 1st +and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and destroyers, left Rosyth in time +to be in a supporting position by daylight on the 7th. A large number +of vessels were boarded by the destroyers, but nothing suspicious was +encountered, and the forces returned to the bases on November 8th. + +During the night of November 6th–7th the battleship _Hibernia_, flying +the flag of Rear-Admiral S. Fremantle, with the _Zealandia_ and +_Albemarle_, passed through the Pentland Firth to the westward _en +route_ for southern ports and the Mediterranean. A strong wind was +blowing against the spring tides, and a very heavy sea was running in +the Firth, as was not unusual. Whilst passing through the Firth the +_Albemarle_, Captain R. A. Nugent, shipped two heavy seas which washed +away her fore bridge, with everyone on it, and even displaced the roof +of the conning tower; hundreds of tons of water flooded the decks and +poured down below. An officer and one man were washed overboard and +drowned, and several men injured; Captain Nugent found himself on the +upper deck amidst the wreckage of the bridge. The _Hibernia_, which +was ahead, turned to assist the _Albemarle_, and an urgent signal for +assistance was received on board the _Iron Duke_. One of the emergency +cruisers at Scapa was directed to raise steam with all despatch; the +_Hibernia_ arrived in with the _Albemarle_ at daylight. The ship +presented an extraordinary sight, the sea having made a clean sweep of +her bridge and everything on it. In all our experience of the Pentland +Firth, we had never witnessed such havoc before. The _Zealandia_ was +also obliged to turn back to repair her gunports, damaged by the sea in +the Firth. + +The next few days were marked only by comparatively trifling incidents. +On November 6th the _Birkenhead_, which had recently been commissioned, +completed her practices at Scapa and joined the 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadron at Rosyth. Two days later the _Princess Margaret_ laid mines +successfully in the Heligoland Bight; on the 9th the _Crescent_, +harbour-defence vessel at Hoy Sound, was withdrawn and left to pay off; +and the _Matchless_, of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, struck a drifting +mine in southern waters, her stern being blown off. + +On the 12th Submarine E 17 was sent into the Kattegat to reconnoitre +and ascertain whether any German trawlers or other vessels were +working there. She returned on the 19th and reported in the negative. +On the night of the 15th–16th the s.s. _Kristianiafiord_, of the +Norwegian-American line, a ship which had been endeavouring on other +occasions to evade the blockading squadron, was intercepted by the +_Teutonic_ in high latitudes; she was steaming fast without lights, +and was sent to Kirkwall for examination. In this and in other similar +cases the ships ran great risk of being mistaken for enemy vessels and +sunk, since the methods employed by the Germans made it very difficult +to abstain from opening fire on vessels without running the serious +danger of our own ships being sunk by surprise attack. In the case of a +ship carrying a large number of passengers, like the _Kristianiafiord_, +the risk taken was very great and could not be justified. + +On November 16th the 7th Cruiser Squadron, without the _Donegal_, but +accompanied by the _Liverpool_ and one armed boarding-steamer, left +Scapa to patrol an area north of the Shetlands and Faroe Islands, with +a view to intercepting possible raiders or other vessels. + +At noon on the 18th a report reached me that an enemy three-funnelled +cruiser had been seen on the 17th to pass through the Danish Sound +going north. The possible objectives of this vessel, if the report were +true, appeared to be either mine-laying off our bases or an attempt to +interfere with the White Sea traffic, the Admiralty having informed me +on the 16th that large consignments of arms and ammunition would be +passing from France to the White Sea during November and December. In +view of the fact that the news had reached me too late to intercept +this vessel in southern waters, the dispositions made were as follows: + +The _Donegal_, which had left Scapa on the 17th to cruise along the +trade route to the White Sea, was directed to rendezvous with the +_Orcoma_ (a ship of the 10th Cruiser Squadron on patrol off the +Norwegian coast), and to patrol the parallel of Lat. 66 N. between the +meridians of 5.30 E. and 7.30 E. + +The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa for a position Lat. +63 N., Long. 4 E., there to meet the 7th Cruiser Squadron, already at +sea. Both squadrons, widely spread, were to sweep to the northward +along the Norwegian coast, as far as the Rost Islands, and to cruise to +the westward of the Lofoten Islands during daylight of the 20th, then +returning to their base. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa and +proceeded north, the ships spread to cover a wide area to the westward +of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, in order to protect the Archangel trade. +The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa on the 18th to sweep to +the eastward, with orders to return to Cromarty on the 19th. + +Strong destroyer patrols were despatched from Scapa and Rosyth to +prevent mine-laying off the bases, and one Battle Cruiser Squadron was +put at short notice for steam. No enemy vessels were sighted, and the +_Donegal_ eventually proceeded to the White Sea, being accompanied by +the _Minotaur_ as far as the North Cape. + +On November 19th three submarines proceeded from Harwich to the +Kattegat to obtain information relative to the presence of any enemy +vessels. + +On November 23rd the _Warspite_ rejoined the 5th Battle Squadron, after +having been for some weeks under repair in the Tyne, owing to injuries +sustained through grounding in the Firth of Forth. + +On November 28th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth for a cruise in +the northern portion of the North Sea, during which cruiser exercises +and gunnery practices were carried out; the squadron returned to Rosyth +on December 2nd. + +From November 22nd to December 7th, the _Donegal_ and _Hampshire_ were +protecting the White Sea trade, working on the trade route and coaling +at Alexandrovsk. + +During the month independent squadron exercise cruises from the bases +were continued, as was target practice from Cromarty. + +The figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron gave as a weekly average: +Ships intercepted, 30; sent in, 9; number on patrol, 10; absent +at ports or _en route_, 9; on special service, 3. The bad weather +experienced during the month interfered considerably with the boarding +operations of the squadron and also hampered Fleet movements. + +On December 1st the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st +and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and the +_Minotaur_ of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to the westward for +a cruise. Battle exercises were carried out on the 2nd and 3rd, and +the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty on December 4th. The exercises +were specially intended to represent the conditions that might arise if +the High Sea Fleet tried to draw the Grand Fleet over areas in which +mines had been laid or in which submarines were operating. During +the exercises the _Barham_ and _Warspite_ of the 5th Battle Squadron +collided, both being considerably damaged. They were escorted to Scapa +for temporary repairs and left later, the _Barham_ for Invergordon and +the _Warspite_ for Devonport. + +On December 8th the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth, swept to +the eastward to the Little Fisher Bank, and returned on the 10th. + +From the 11th to the 13th two ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron +were cruising to the eastward of the Fair Island Channel. + +On December 12th Submarines D 7 and D 8, which were based temporarily +on Blyth, were directed to leave for the Norwegian coast to operate +against enemy trade and against enemy submarines. D 7 was directed to +make the Ryvingen Light during the dark hours and then to cruise to +intercept trade between Ryvingen and Arendal, and between Ryvingen and +the west coast of Denmark. It was anticipated that this might draw +enemy submarines to the northward from German ports to try to sink D 7, +and D 7 was directed to be back at Ryvingen 36 hours after she expected +that the first vessel she examined had reached port, so that she might +be ready to attack enemy submarines sent after her. D 8 was directed to +cruise on a bearing 270° from the Hantsholm Light (coast of Denmark) +in order to intercept enemy submarines sent after D 7. Bad weather +prevented D 7 leaving before December 15th. The enemy was apparently +not drawn, and no success was obtained. + +On December 15th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Scapa for a sweep to the +south-eastward, and returned on the 17th. + +Two neutral ships, steaming at high speed at night without lights on +the 15th and 16th, evidently intending to evade the blockade, were +intercepted by the 10th Cruiser squadron and sent into Kirkwall. + +On December 20th Commodore Tyrwhitt left Harwich with the 5th Light +Cruiser Squadron, to sweep to the Danish coast, and the Battle Cruiser +Fleet was kept at the usual short notice for steam during the time that +he was absent until the 23rd. + +On December 24th the 1st Cruiser Squadron left Scapa to search the +central portion of the North Sea. During the day anxiety was felt as +to the safety of the destroyers _Porpoise_ and _Morning Star_, which +had been escorting a Russian ice-breaker to the northward and which +had hove to near the Fair Island Channel in a heavy gale during the +23rd. The 1st Cruiser Squadron was directed to spread and search for +them, and the _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_ were also sent from Scapa to +endeavour to gain touch. Both the destroyers, however, reached Cromarty +in safety, the _Porpoise_ on the 25th, and the _Morning Star_ on the +26th, after having experienced very heavy weather. Many compartments +were flooded, and very considerable damage was done. They had been +handled with great ability during the exceptionally heavy weather. The +1st Cruiser Squadron, with the _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_, returned to +Scapa on the 26th. + +On the 24th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron also proceeded from Rosyth +to search the North Sea, down to the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, +thence towards the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. No enemy +vessels were sighted. The weather in the North Sea at this period was +very severe, and the _Sappho_, which was supporting the armed trawler +patrol to the north-eastward of Peterhead, lost her rudder in a heavy +sea. + +On the 30th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, +with destroyers, left Rosyth and carried out a sweep to the +south-eastward, returning on the 31st. + +On the same day, a lamentable disaster occurred, the cruiser _Natal_ +(Captain Eric Back) being blown up in Cromarty harbour with great loss +of life. Captain Back was amongst those who lost their lives. It was +reported by adjacent vessels at 3.25 P.M. that the ship was on fire, +and at 3.30 P.M., before any action could be taken, the ship blew up +and sank, the explosion taking place in her after magazines. Steps were +taken to deal with the situation in case the explosion had been caused +by an enemy submarine having entered the harbour, but it soon became +evident that this was not the case. Examination of the wreck by divers +later showed no signs of any external explosion. A court-martial was +subsequently held at Chatham to investigate the causes of the disaster, +but the conclusions were not made public. + +During the month of December independent exercises from the Fleet bases +were continued, as well as target practice from Cromarty. As to the +latter, an interesting practice was carried out by the _Iron Duke_ at +the range, and under the conditions of battle practice before the War, +in order to ascertain, by examining the actual hits made on the canvas +of the target, whether the pre-War standard of shooting was being +maintained. Some uncertainty existed owing to the great increase in the +ranges at which practices were carried out during the War, namely, +16,000 to 19,000 yards, as compared with the 9,500 yards, which was the +maximum peace range. The result was very satisfactory and indicated a +most decided advance on pre-War accuracy of fire. + +On December 13th the first target practice was carried out in the +Pentland Firth. This was in the nature of an experiment and, being +successful, practice in this locality was later substituted for +practice in the Moray Firth; it was far more convenient for the main +Fleet base and much less extravagant in the use of screening and +protecting destroyers. + +On December 16th Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, K.C.B., relieved +Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., in command of the 2nd Battle +Squadron, on the termination of the latter officer’s three years’ +command. + +During December patrols seaward of the bases were strengthened and +considerably extended during the first and fourth quarters of the moon +in order to frustrate any attempted mine-laying on the part of the +enemy. This “dark night” patrol subsequently became a matter of routine. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average showed: Ships intercepted, +35; sent in, 14; number of ships on patrol, 12; number at bases or _en +route_, 7; number on special service, 2. + +The long nights and bad weather were responsible for the reduction in +the number of vessels intercepted. During December fog or mist were +experienced at Scapa on the 15th, 22nd, 25th and 26th; gales on the +6th, 8th and 23rd; and snow on the 3rd, 4th, 8th and 12th. Although the +weather at Scapa Flow was fairly good, gales in the North Sea and to +the westward of the Orkneys were frequent and violent during the month. + +Before turning to the events of 1916 it is of interest to notice +the work of the “decoy ships,” known later by the name of “Q” ships, +fitted out at Scapa during the year 1915. These vessels, five in +number, were designed to sink enemy submarines by inducing the latter +to close them for the purpose of attack by gun fire or by torpedo. The +same system was employed in southern waters, and was developed greatly +during the year 1917. At Scapa in 1915 and 1916 the ships were manned +principally by volunteers from the Grand Fleet, or from the depôt +ships at the base. Colliers or store-ships were selected for their +size and general suitability for the work, and they were fitted with +a very carefully concealed armament, which was kept hidden until the +submarine was within point-blank range, so that fire opened on her must +be immediately effective; unless the submarine was holed in less than +a minute after fire was opened on her she could submerge and escape, +and probably torpedo the decoy ship as well. The five ships, the +_Prince Charles_, _Vala_, _Duncombe_, _Penshurst_ and _Glen Isla_, were +fitted up by Captain Farrington of the _Cyclops_, under the direction +of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville and were marvels of ingenuity. Their +usual cruising-ground was in the vicinity of the Orkneys, Shetlands, or +Hebrides, or towards the Norwegian coast, or the White Sea, or down the +east coast of Scotland. They worked on a route that was freely used by +merchant-ships and altered their appearance according to their route so +as to give them the look of vessels usually trading on that route. + +Many stories of the “Q” ships have been told in the Press and need +not be repeated here, but a high tribute must be paid to the extreme +gallantry and splendid discipline of the officers and men who manned +these vessels. I had personal knowledge of the work of the vessels +operating from Scapa. Their opportunities for engaging submarines +successfully were rare, and the work in the small ships in the heavy +seas encountered in northern latitudes was very arduous; there was +never any lack of volunteers for the duty, the difficulty always being +that of selection from the large number of officers and men anxious to +serve. It is satisfactory to record that the first submarine sunk by a +decoy ship fell a victim to a vessel working from Scapa Flow. + +On July 25th, 1915, the _Prince Charles_ (Lieutenant W. P. +Mark-Wardlaw--of Admiral Colville’s staff--in command) sighted, near +North Rona Island, the Danish steamer _Louise_, stopped and with a +submarine close to. When the submarine sighted the _Prince Charles_ she +proceeded at full speed towards her and opened fire at 5,000 yards’ +range. Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw stopped his engines and went through the +usual process of lowering boats in a great hurry. The submarine, which +was the U 36, closed to within 500 yards, still on the surface, and at +that range the _Prince Charles_ revealed her true character, unmasked +her guns, and opened a most accurate fire with her two 6-pounders and +two 3-pounders. The U 36 was immediately holed, and two men killed +in the conning tower. She was unable to dive and sank stern first; 4 +commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 9 men were saved by the +_Prince Charles_. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION + + +The year 1916 opened and still no general action had been fought in +the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet continued to dominate, paying +its price--though not so heavy as might have been expected--for the +influence it exerted on all the operations--naval, military and +economic--to which the country had by that time been committed in face +of the active operations pursued by enemy submarines and mine-laying +craft. + +On January 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth to cruise in the +northern part of the North Sea, and returned during the night of the +8th–9th. + +The facility with which enemy mines could be laid in the vicinity of +naval bases during the long winter nights, when there was little or no +moon (as shown, _inter alia_, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland +Bight, which, though not very frequent in 1916, became constant in +1917), led me to extend still further the patrols from the bases at +such times; from January 2nd to January 10th inclusive, the patrol +vessels (two light cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about +140 miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the Pentland +Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 P.M. each day. Similar patrols +were ordered to be instituted from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however, +instead of mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected +the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the purpose, possibly +because of the considerable mercantile traffic using this route. The +patrols in this direction did not extend so far from the base, the sea +being very frequently too heavy in the winter months; the practice was +to search the route periodically for mines. + +The weather early in January had been very bad, and both sweeping and +patrol work were impracticable. In these circumstances the enemy raider +_Moewe_, disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably +passed up the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland +Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field between Cape +Wrath and a position about north from Strathie Point, on the Scottish +coast, on the night of January 1st or 2nd. The work of the _Moewe_ was +facilitated by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and Sule Skerry +Island were necessarily exhibited at night for the sake of the large +mercantile traffic using the Pentland Firth and the Minches. + +On January 6th, at 7 A.M., the pre-Dreadnought battleship _King Edward +VII._, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, left Scapa for Belfast to refit, +and at 10.47 A.M., when in Lat. 58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent +explosion occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain Maclachlan +first reported that the ship had been torpedoed, but later came to the +conclusion that she had been mined, as was eventually found to be, +undoubtedly, the case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both +engine-rooms filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing at the time +with a rising sea. + +As soon as the report was received at Scapa the flotilla leader +_Kempenfelt_ and 12 destroyers were sent out to assist and to keep +the submarine under, if one were present. Tugs were also despatched. +Meanwhile the collier _Melita_, which had arrived on the scene, +proceeded to take the _King Edward VII._ in tow, assisted by the +_Kempenfelt_; but the ship was very low in the water and unmanageable, +and the tow parted. At 4 P.M., the battleship having by this time a +heavy list, Captain Maclachlan decided to abandon her for the night, +and the destroyers _Musketeer_, _Marne_, _Fortune_ and _Nessus_ were +taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they embarked all +hands without loss of life, although the destroyer _Musketeer_ received +considerable injury from projections on the side of the battleship. +The destroyer _Nessus_ and a tug stood by the _King Edward VII._ until +8.10 P.M. when she turned over and sank. The _Africa_, also of the +3rd Battle Squadron, _en route_ from Belfast to Scapa, passed safely +through the mined area a few hours before the _King Edward VII._ was +mined--a very fortunate escape! + +Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing between Cape +Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large force of mine-sweepers was +detached to ascertain the limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear +a passage along the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch +Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape Wrath, and some +on Scapa, but continuous bad weather interfered with the sweeping +operations to such an extent that, between January 7th and January +21st, no sweeping was possible except close in shore in sheltered +water. On January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet Bay, near +Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the loss of the _King Edward +VII._ was thereby removed. + +On January 7th the battleship _Albemarle_ left Scapa for Archangel, +and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth to operate in the Skagerrak; +she returned on the 16th, having met with no success. + +On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was experienced at +Scapa. The oiler _Prudentia_ drifted across the bows of the _Iron Duke_ +during the night and sank, and one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier, +a tug and three trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an +hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The _Iron Duke_ was +undamaged. + +Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +on patrol suffered considerable damage from the heavy seas. The month +of January, as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally +bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over the whole North +Sea. Great injury was done to all the anti-submarine obstructions at +Scapa, many of them being entirely destroyed. In order to make the base +temporarily as secure as possible from submarine attack, the Fleet was +directed to make and lay improvised net obstructions. + +On January 24 the destroyer _Talisman_ reported that a torpedo had been +fired at her off Blyth. The _Botha_ and 10 destroyers were sent out +from Rosyth to locate and destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing +of her. + +On January 25th the _Ebro_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, picked up a +dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and towed her to Lerwick, arriving on +the 28th. + +On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers, +and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with five destroyers, left Rosyth +for operations in the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and +destroyers, during daylight on the 27th, swept through the Skagerrak to +the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron being in support. The ships +then moved to the northward; at daylight on the 28th, the whole force, +joined by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from +Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and again swept +into the Skagerrak. The squadrons then returned to their respective +bases. During the operations the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet +was at short notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted +outside territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of the 4th Light +Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of small vessels passing along the +Norwegian coast inside territorial waters. + +On January 28th the senior officer of the mine-sweepers reported that +he had swept a clear channel along the north coast of Scotland from +Cape Wrath to Scapa, between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field +laid by the _Moewe_. This channel was instituted for warships only for +use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were directed to steer to the +northward from Cape Wrath, thence to make Noup Head, on the north-west +coast of the Orkneys, passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa; +all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair Island Channel +to their destination. + +During the month of January gunnery practices were carried out, both in +the Moray Firth and in the Pentland Firth. + +The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were much restricted by the +bad weather experienced, the weekly average showing: + +Number of ships intercepted, 21; number sent in, 8; number of ships on +patrol, 11; number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 10; +number on special service, 2. + +Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbourhood on January 5th, +6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, +24th and 30th. The weather during the month both at Scapa and in the +whole northern area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered +the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements of all small +craft. + +Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by night from the +various bases were continued in January, as was the change of base of +the Rosyth squadrons to Scapa and Cromarty for practices. + +At 6 A.M. on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers +left Scapa, steering towards the little Fisher Bank, whence the +destroyers returned to Scapa, and the squadron proceeded to sweep up +the Norwegian coast during daylight hours and thence to Scapa. These +sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was considered probable +that enemy raiders, attempting to pass out of the North Sea, would hug +the coast on passage. + +On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at +sea endeavouring to intercept zeppelins returning from raiding our east +coast. The fishing trawler _King Stephen_ on this day sighted Zeppelin +L 19 in a sinking condition in the North Sea. + +On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate off the Norwegian +coast. She returned on the 13th. + +On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded to a position about +150 miles to the south-eastward from Scapa for patrol during the night +and returned on the 8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried +out a similar patrol, returning on the 9th. + +On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla, operating from +the Humber under the orders of the Rear-Admiral of the East Coast, +was attacked by enemy torpedo craft in the vicinity of the Dogger +Bank, and the _Arabis_ was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending +further information as to the strength of enemy forces at sea, the +Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night of the 10th–11th, +and proceeded to the southward; the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed +from Harwich; and the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at +Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and move to +the southward. The situation became clear during the 11th, when it was +evident that the enemy’s force, which had consisted only of destroyers, +had returned to its base. + +At 10.30 P.M. (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 0.20 +E.) orders were given for the Grand Fleet to return to its bases, and +the squadrons arrived on the 12th. + +From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the armed +boarding-steamers _Dundee_ and _Duke of Clarence_, from Scapa, +swept from that base to the Utvoer Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N., Long. +40.31 E.), thence down the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed +boarding-steamers returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted were two +enemy submarines off the coast of Norway. + +On February 18th the new battleship _Malaya_, the gift of the Federated +Malay States, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron. + +On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were sent to the Skagerrak to +examine and board merchant-vessels with a view to stopping the iron +ore trade from Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the +submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part of their cruise, +to operate against two enemy submarines reported off the Norwegian +coast. They returned on February 28th, not having met, outside +territorial waters, the submarines or with any vessels which were +engaged in the iron ore trade. + +On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were sent without result +to operate against a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel. + +On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 7th +Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas, +left Scapa before daylight for a watching and exercise cruise in the +northern part of the North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight, +in conjunction with the Harwich force, had been intended, but was +abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore Tyrwhitt that the +weather and other conditions were unsuitable for his operations. Battle +exercises took place during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser +Fleet, which left Rosyth at 1.30 P.M. on the 26th, joined the Battle +Fleet at 8 A.M. next day. During that day further battle exercises were +carried out, including deployments of the whole Grand Fleet from its +cruising order, so that the battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers +and destroyers might become accustomed to taking up the stations +assigned to them on deployment under certain conditions. The exercises +were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned to its bases on the +28th. + +During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine-sweeping sloops +patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys to prevent mine-laying in the +approaches to the base. + +On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept any enemy vessel +that might be attempting to pass out into the North Sea. Information +from neutral sources had led to a belief in the possibility of such an +attempt being made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the +information was received after the event, that is, it was reported that +the vessel in question had already left German waters. The dispositions +were made, therefore, on this assumption, and in making them it was +necessary to place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be +expected to pass through in daylight. + +The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship, whether her +mission were mine-laying near our bases, or an attempt to pass out +into the Atlantic. The _Patia_ and _Columbella_, of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron, were directed to patrol a line running north-east from Lat. +61.45 N., Long. 0.50 E., and ships of the same squadron on the C Patrol +line were directed to extend this line to the north-eastward. The +_Alcantara_ and _Andes_, of the same squadron, already on a special +patrol line, were ordered to remain in their position till further +orders. Two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers +left Rosyth at 8 P.M. on the 28th to patrol the area covering the +Farn Island--Skaw and the May Island--Skaw trade routes, working to +the eastward. Early on the 29th the _Comus_ and the _Calliope_, of +the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the 28th with two +destroyers for areas in the vicinity of Lat. 58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E., +and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 3.0 E. respectively, were directed to patrol +lines 40 miles long, running 50° to 230° respectively from a position +in Lat. 61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The _Blanche_, which had also sailed, was +ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The _Minotaur_ and a +destroyer were sent to patrol the Fair Island passage during daylight +on the 29th. Steps were also taken to cover the approaches to the +Pentland Firth against mine-laying. + +At 8.55 A.M. on the 29th the _Andes_, Captain G. B. Young, R.N., +reported by wireless that an enemy vessel was in sight in Lat. 61.58 +N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave her course, speed and description; her +enemy character was assumed owing to her movements. The _Alcantara_, +Captain T. E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight of the +_Andes_, but sighted her at 9.10 A.M. chasing a strange vessel, joined +in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 A.M., being then about 6,000 yards from +her, ordered her to stop. She complied and informed the _Alcantara_ +that she was the Norwegian s.s. _Rena_ from Rio to Trondjhem. She was +flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted on her sides. At +9.40 A.M. the _Alcantara_, then about 2,500 yards on the quarter of +the stranger, began to hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding. +At this moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her hitherto +concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian ensign and staff overboard +and hoisting a German ensign at the main. But she still showed the +Norwegian flag on her sides, where it was displayed throughout the +action. At the close range at which fire was opened hitting commenced +immediately, and as the first hits on the _Alcantara_ cut all her +communications, Captain Wardle experienced great difficulty in passing +orders to the guns. But the enemy’s fire was returned quickly and with +effect, in spite of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went +ahead and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of which +hit the _Alcantara_ between the boiler-rooms at about 10 A.M., causing +them gradually to fill. + +By 10.15 A.M. the enemy was badly on fire and stopped. A few minutes +later, at 10.22 P.M., boats were observed to be leaving her and the +_Alcantara_ ceased firing. The latter ship was by this time listing +heavily and was abandoned shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 A.M. The +_Andes_, which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range than the +_Alcantara_, rendered assistance to the boats of the two ships. + +On receipt of the first signal from the _Andes_, the _Calliope_, +_Comus_ and _Blanche_ had been ordered to the scene at full speed. The +_Comus_, Captain Alan G. Hotham, R.N., the nearest vessel, with the +destroyer _Munster_, arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E., +as the _Alcantara_ was sinking. The _Munster_ picked up the crew of +the _Alcantara_, and as the enemy raider still had colours flying the +_Comus_ proceeded to sink her by gunfire and to pick up the survivors +in her boats. The _Calliope_ and _Magic_ arrived at 1 P.M., but, not +being required, returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned +out to be the disguised raider _Grief_, armed with four 5.9-inch guns +and two torpedo tubes; she had a complement of 306, of whom 209, +including many wounded, were rescued by the _Comus_ and _Andes_. + +The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying out blockade work +under modern conditions when dealing with an unscrupulous enemy. A +raider disguised as a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most +difficult customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had perforce +to be treated as “suspect” after an incident of this nature. It is not +possible to examine a vessel without boarding her, and, except in very +fine weather, it is necessary for the boarding ship to be close to +the suspected ship before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously +cannot pull long distances. The experience of the _Alcantara_ showed +the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An attempt to solve +the problem was made by informing all neutrals that, when any of our +vessels displayed a certain signal, the ship to be boarded should steam +towards the boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away. +But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously dependent to +a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals, which was not always in +evidence. + +Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties which did +not exist in the days of our forefathers, not the least being the +advent of the torpedo and the submarine. The German method of solving +such difficulties was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did +not, and never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of any +seaman belonging to the Allied nations. + +During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights, combined with more +favourable weather, gave the 10th Cruiser Squadron better opportunities +for the blockade, and the average weekly results were: Number of ships +intercepted, 39; number sent in, 111; number of ships on patrol, 12; +number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number +detached on special service, 1. + +Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on February +6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual exchange of bases for practices +and the independent squadron exercises at sea from the bases were +carried out during the month. + +On March 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentlemen visited +the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in the evening. The party +included M. Danchenko, Count Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir Nabakoff, M. +Bashmakoff, M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky. + +On March 2nd the new battleship _Valiant_, a vessel of the “Queen +Elizabeth” class, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron. + +Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the Kattegat to intercept +trade and to ascertain the situation there on the chance of any enemy +vessels being found. She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day +the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and exercise cruise +in the centre portion of the North Sea. On the 6th the remainder of +the Grand Fleet proceeded into the North Sea for a southerly sweep, +concentration being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the +“Long Forties,” the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on the +meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became very unfavourable +for destroyers, and speed had eventually to be reduced to such an +extent that the sweep was abandoned, and the Fleet returned to its +bases on the 7th. + +On March 9th a patrol consisting of one cruiser and one armed +boarding-steamer was instituted in an area north of the Shetlands. +It was designed to cover the track of vessels _en route_ between the +north of Iceland and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity +of Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was considered +probable that this route might be taken by enemy raiders as well as +by vessels attempting to evade the blockade. The patrol was continued +throughout the year, although occasionally modified in details and +frequently doubled in strength. It was eventually successful in +intercepting and sinking the German raider _Wolf_, in the spring +of 1917, the _Achilles_ (Captain F. M. Leake, R.N.) and the armed +boarding-steamer _Dundee_ (Commander Selwyn Day, R.N.R.) being the +vessels engaged in this operation. This patrol was also of use for +blockade work. + +On March 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a division +of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth at 7.30 A.M. for +operations off the Norwegian coast, the objective being the capture +of any enemy merchant-ships found outside territorial waters between +Ekersund and the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German +merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian ports, and especially +Narvik, occasionally ventured outside territorial waters in this +locality. It was the only locality, besides the vicinity of Stadlandet, +in which they did so venture, and in which, therefore, there was a +chance of capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet +sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the southward of the Naze +for supporting purposes. It was also intended that the remainder of the +Grand Fleet should be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly +gale sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accompanying the +Battle Fleet, and this portion of the programme was cancelled; Sir +David Beatty was informed that, if the weather conditions farther +south prevented his destroyers from screening the battle cruisers, the +latter should return to their base and a light cruiser squadron be +left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The conditions being +unfavourable for destroyers, this course was adopted. The weather +eventually became too bad for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain +their speed, and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed. + +Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on March 14th to intercept +contraband trade and for reconnoitring purposes. She did not sight any +enemy vessels, but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying +contraband. + +The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at sea on March 14th +and 15th, and the _Roxburgh_ and two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th +for another sweep on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the +Naze. This was again unproductive. + +The cruiser _Theseus_ left Barry on the 15th for Alexandrovsk in the +White Sea. On the same date the cruiser _Crescent_, _en route_ from +Scapa to the south, was fired at and missed by a submarine south of the +Hebrides. + +On the 19th the light cruiser _Calliope_, with two destroyers, left +the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with orders to proceed to the +Naze and sweep _up_ the Norwegian coast to Udsire; and the _Comus_ +and two destroyers left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep _down_ +the Norwegian coast to the Naze, the object being again the capture +of any German merchant-ships found outside territorial waters in this +locality. The _Calliope_ was forced to put in to Rosyth owing to a +serious fire occurring in her after boiler-room. The _Comus_ completed +her sweep in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels. + +On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out aerial operations +off the Danish coast, involving an attack on the enemy’s zeppelin +shed at Tondern, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet left early that day to +cover the operation. In the course of the operations the destroyers +of the Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up returning +sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the southward of the Horn +Reef for this purpose. Some German outpost trawlers were encountered +here by the destroyers; they were engaged and destroyed. But during +the engagement the destroyer _Medusa_ was rammed by the destroyer +_Laverock_, being very seriously damaged. The _Medusa_ was taken in +tow, but, the weather becoming very bad, the towing hawser parted, and +all attempts to get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels +were in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident that +the enemy would be aware of the incident by means of his directional +wireless system, since a good deal of wireless signalling on the part +of our ships had been necessary. It was expected, therefore, that he +would send out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark +hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in view of +the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt rightly judged it expedient +to abandon and sink the _Medusa_, and gave orders to this effect. The +ship’s company of the _Medusa_ was taken off in a most seamanlike +manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the _Lassoo_. + +Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was difficult for +Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact conditions, but during the +night of the 25th, having sent his destroyers ahead, he steered with +his light cruisers in order to pass to the northward of the enemy’s +North Sea mine-field. At about 10 P.M. two enemy destroyers were +sighted on the port bow of the _Cleopatra_ (flying Commodore Tyrwhitt’s +broad pennant) at a distance of about 800 yards. Their presence was +betrayed by the flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of +the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the enemy. The +_Cleopatra_ at once opened fire and headed for the destroyers, and when +it was seen that they were crossing from port to starboard, Captain +Loder Symonds of the _Cleopatra_ ported his helm and rammed the second +destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically in half. There +was a tremendous crash, followed by what seemed to be two explosions, +one possibly a boiler explosion, and the second due to either a mine +or depth-charge, causing considerable damage to the stem piece of the +_Cleopatra_. The injury was subsequently found to be far too great to +have been caused by the impact alone. The sudden alterations of course +by the _Cleopatra_, combined with the gunfire and explosions, had +thrown the squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and +navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the _Cleopatra_, +in separating from the sinking destroyer, found herself across the +_Undaunted’s_ stem; the latter was somewhat seriously damaged, and +reported subsequently that she could only steam at slow speed. The +Commodore, therefore, remained near the _Undaunted_ for the night. + +Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left Rosyth on the 24th +to cover the operations, was in the vicinity of the Harwich force, and, +on the morning of the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the +_Undaunted_, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force swept back +towards her position, not sighting any enemy vessels. Three of the +light cruisers covered the _Undaunted_ during her passage to the Tyne, +where she was sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced +in locating the _Undaunted_, owing to a difference in “dead reckoning” +between the various ships. In order to be prepared for eventualities +the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of +the 25th–26th, heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa +and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility was also +very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang up when the snow ceased. +During the early afternoon of the 26th the wireless reports from the +Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and the +_Undaunted_ cleared up the situation, the latter ship reporting herself +as hove to until the weather moderated. + +By 4.30 P.M., when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,” +the sea had become so heavy and steep that destroyers with the Battle +Fleet could not safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the +whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern waters, and +the _Undaunted_ was approaching a safe area, the 5th Battle Squadron +was detached at high speed, without destroyers, to assist in covering +her passage back to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet +and cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and Cromarty. The +_Iron Duke_ convoyed the destroyer flotillas in order that they could +be given their position, as the coast was approached. The weather +moderated during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the +27th. Two destroyers collided off Noss Head just before daylight on the +27th, one, the _Michael_, being somewhat seriously damaged. + +By 8 A.M. on the 27th the _Undaunted_ was in Lat. 56.35 N., Long. 2 +E., and the 5th Battle Squadron returned to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser +Fleet arriving at Rosyth on the 27th. + +The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st and 7th Cruiser +Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas again proceeded +to sea on March 29th, for a watching and exercise cruise in the +northern part of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on +the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st, the destroyers +having to return independently as they were unable to maintain Fleet +speed through bad weather conditions. + +During March the system of carrying out target practice in the Pentland +Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of in the Moray Firth was regularly +instituted, and no further practices took place in the Moray Firth +during the year 1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory +in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that of towing the +target in the strong tides of the Pentland Firth. + +On March 19th the battleship _Hercules_, which had been laid up at +Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly six weeks, completed her +repairs. These were carried out with the assistance of artisans from +the engine contractors. + +The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth for the purpose +of practices continued. + +The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average for March showed: Number of +ships intercepted, 43; number sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number +absent at bases, or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number on special +service, 1. + +A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced during the month, +and the weather generally in northern waters was bad, gales occurring +on the 6th, 11th, 12th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th. + +On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth and attacked Leith +and Edinburgh, but did not make any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The +2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of intercepting +some of them during their return passage, but saw nothing of them. + +On April 3rd the _Devonshire_ and two destroyers left Rosyth and +proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Udsire lighthouse, +and swept thence to the Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or +neutrals with contraband which might be found outside territorial +waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic in territorial +waters was reported. + +On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate against enemy +submarines on the route which it was thought was taken by them between +the Shetlands and Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about +30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not, however, +sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine operations of this nature by +the submarines attached to the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent +intervals during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever any craft +were available for this purpose; the plan of operations was constantly +varied. The general scheme was to place our craft in positions through +which hostile submarines were expected to pass, or along the routes +which they usually took. + +On April 6th the _Roxburgh_ left Rosyth with two destroyers, to repeat +once again the operation of sweeping down the Norwegian coast from +Udsire to the Naze. The search was again unproductive. + +On April 12th the armed liner _Campania_ returned from a lengthy +refit at Liverpool, during which the ship had, at my request, been +provided with a “flying-off” deck for her sea-planes, as experience +throughout the War had shown conclusively that it was of little use +to depend on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the most +advantageous conditions, and that the only system which would give +reasonable certainty of the machines being able to get into the air +when required was to fly them from the ship. At the same time I +formed the conclusion, after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of +the _Campania_, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service, that the +sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown from ships, since +the weight of the floats of sea-planes greatly limited their climbing +powers, their radius of action and their speed. This alteration to the +_Campania_ was the commencement of the system, gradually introduced, +of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships with +scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from the ship under practically +all conditions. I make no apology for referring again to this subject +in view of its importance. + +The _Campania_ had also been fitted to carry a kite balloon aft, for +use for spotting the fall of shot and for reconnaissance purposes. This +fitting was the beginning of the arrangement, gradually introduced +during 1916, of carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success +in large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being also +provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small craft, an +arrangement which proved to be of great use for anti-submarine and +convoy work. + +On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were +modified; “A” and “C” patrols took up a line running from Lat. 56.30 +N., Long. 11.30 W. to Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles +apart and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed to the +northward of Iceland. + +On April 20th a force left to carry out an extensive sweep into the +Kattegat, designed (1) to intercept and examine all mercantile traffic, +(2) to operate against enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any +enemy vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the movements in the +Kattegat of the light forces, which it was intended should be sighted +from neutral shores in the expectation that they might be reported to +the enemy by his agents. + +The force included three submarines, which were ordered to positions +commanding the northern entrance to the Sound, and the Great and Little +Belts, so that enemy forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might +be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was decided to move +south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef with the whole Grand Fleet, +the object being to induce the enemy to keep the ships of the High +Sea Fleet in North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic, +where they might cause interference with the relaying the Russian +mine-fields, an operation which became necessary at this season of the +year after the ice had broken up. It was thought that the appearance +of the Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would +probably effect this object better than the operation in the Kattegat. +Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the 21st, with orders +for the battle and cruiser squadrons to concentrate on the morning of +the 22nd in a given position to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” +whilst the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead of the +Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd +Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were ordered to an area from which they +could concentrate later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if +required. + +At 2.30 P.M. of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was detached, +with three destroyers, to proceed to the Skagerrak, with directions +to arrive in the vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to +sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet was ordered to +push ahead, and at 6 P.M. of the 22nd was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26 +E., cruising in an area north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight, +when it was intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather, +which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Battle Fleet, with +cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered to the eastward from Scapa +until shortly before dark, and then altered course to South 18 East for +the Horn Reef, to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the +23rd. + +The weather had been gradually thickening since 3 P.M., and at 6 P.M. +Sir David Beatty reported that the _Australia_ and _New Zealand_ had +collided in a fog and had received damage necessitating both ships +returning to their base. By 10 P.M. the Battle Fleet and cruisers +were also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night. It +was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such conditions with +so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers and destroyers, when to +the westward of the Little Fisher Bank, were accordingly turned to the +northward, the order of turning being rear squadrons first and thence +to the van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special signals +had been introduced to provide for such circumstances, and were of +great use on this occasion. + +In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty was experienced +in carrying out the turn in the dense fog that prevailed, especially +amongst the destroyers, and three of them, namely, the _Garland_, +_Ardent_ and _Ambuscade_, were in collision; the _Ardent_ was so +seriously damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her back to +a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a neutral steamer, +in passing through the Fleet in the fog, collided with the battleship +_Neptune_, doing considerable injury to that ship. + +The weather cleared somewhat during the morning, and the Fleet cruised +to the westward of the Little Fisher Bank until it was certain that +the damaged destroyers were safely on their way to their bases. The +operations were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable, and +the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the Fleet remaining +out for a further twenty-four hours, so as to repeat the sweep to the +Horn Reef on the following day. + +The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th, fuelled, and +again proceeded to sea for another movement south during the evening +of that day, the 5th Battle Squadron being sent on in advance of +the remainder of the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and +strengthen the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of the +_Australia_ and _New Zealand_, damaged in collision. + +At 4.6 A.M. on the 25th, however, whilst steering to the southward, a +report was received from Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the +Harwich force, that he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light +cruisers in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once influenced +the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet increased to full +speed, and shaped a course to pass down the searched channel to the +westward of the German mine-field to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet +and the 5th Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course +designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during their expected +return passage to their ports. At 4.20 A.M. the Admiralty informed me +that the enemy was bombarding Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser +Squadron was in touch with the enemy’s ships; and at 5.40 A.M. the +Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle cruisers in sight +steaming to the eastward. + +At 11 A.M. the _Iron Duke_, with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, was +in Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser +Squadron were about 35 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70 +miles to the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the +south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as appeared +later, having evidently only just barely missed cutting the enemy off +from his base. The Battle Fleet stood on to the south-eastward until +the afternoon, when it became evident that the Germans had escaped to +their bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and shaped +course for the bases, arriving on the 26th. + +On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty as to the steps +which could be taken to minimise the danger of a recurrence of such +raids on unfortified towns on the south-east coast as that of the 25th. +Although they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly a +great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants, and might result +in much loss of life. I suggested that the placing of the 3rd Battle +Squadron in the Humber or in the Thames might act as a deterrent, +and in any case would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy +ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting injury by +submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet, if, by good fortune, +we happened to be cruising sufficiently far to the southward at the +time. The presence of the squadron in southern waters would be useful, +also, in the unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good +backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of movement, +due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy submarines in southern waters, +were considerable. I pointed out that since the arrival of the 5th +Battle Squadron and the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was +no longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships of the +“Revenge” class were also approaching completion. The proposal was +adopted, and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed +for the Humber on the 29th, _en route_ to the Medway. On that port the +3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the ships of the 3rd Cruiser +Squadron being gradually withdrawn for service in foreign waters. The +Admiralty also stationed some of the monitors in the more important +undefended ports. + +During the month of April a policy, suggested by me, of placing the +Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead of in light cruisers, was +adopted. This was made possible by the completion of several vessels of +the class. The object was to add the light cruisers thus released to +our all too slender light cruiser force. + +The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during April +were: + +Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10; number of ships on +patrol, 12; number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; +number on special service, 1. + +A very considerable amount of mist and fog was experienced during the +month, and gales on the 8th, 16th and 24th. + +On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the vicinity of the +Horn Reef. The operation was covered by the Grand Fleet. One of its +objects was, as before, to attract the attention of the enemy’s naval +forces to the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually drawn +out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand Fleet in southern +waters would soon become known to the enemy from neutral sources, with +the result that vessels of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations +in the Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North Sea +ports. From information obtained subsequently from reliable sources, it +appeared that the operation produced the intended result. Between the +afternoon of May 2nd and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases. + +The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers convoying the +sea-plane-carriers _Vindex_ and _Engadine_, proceeded to a position +just north of the Horn Reef, arriving at dawn on May 4th; the objective +of the sea-planes was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer +_Abdiel_ proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd–4th to the +southward of the Vyl Lightship on the expected track of enemy vessels +_en route_ to the North Sea via the Horn Reef. The mine-layer _Princess +Margaret_ was directed to lay mines on the same night across the +expected route taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route +passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were completed +without any interference on the part of the enemy. + +Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn Reef, three +to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three to positions off +Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of the 3rd.[E] + + [E] Two of our submarines collided while submerged off the Horn + Reef, one being slightly damaged. + +The Battle Cruiser Fleet and destroyers proceeded to a position for +supporting the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, near the Horn Reef, with +directions to arrive at daylight on the 4th, and the Battle Fleet, +with its cruiser squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the +destroyer flotillas, to a supporting position to the northward of +the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The list of ships absent from the Fleet on +this occasion, owing to refit, repair, or to being engaged on other +operations, is given below; it is useful as showing the reduction that +takes place in the nominal numbers comprising a watching fleet at any +given moment: Battleships, _Ajax_ and _Dreadnought_; battle cruisers, +_New Zealand_, _Australia_, _Invincible_; cruisers, _Black Prince_, +_Warrior_, _Donegal_; light cruisers, _Southampton_, _Gloucester_, +_Blonde_; destroyers, 3 from the 1st Flotilla, 6 from the 2nd Flotilla, +3 from the 11th Flotilla. During the passage south, the 4th Light +Cruiser Squadron was detached to endeavour to locate a zeppelin +reported by directional wireless to be in the centre of the North Sea +(zeppelins had been seen off the north-east coast on the night of the +2nd). The search was unsuccessful, but the zeppelin descended off +Stavanger later and was destroyed. + +On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea-planes seemed from the +Battle Fleet to be ideal, but, once more, the difficulty of getting +these machines to rise from the water was experienced, a slight sea +being sufficient to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the +attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped bombs on the +objective. The remainder were damaged by the sea. + +At 10 A.M. a zeppelin, L 7, was sighted by the 1st Light Cruiser +Squadron and attacked by gunfire by the _Galatea_ and _Phaeton_. She +was damaged sufficiently to cause her to descend near submarine E 31 in +the vicinity of the Vyl Lightship. E 31 completed her destruction and +rescued seven survivors. + +[Illustration: OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF MAY 2^{ND.} TO 5^{TH.} 1916.] + +The Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Horn Reef during May 4th, no +enemy vessels being sighted, and then returned to its various bases. +A thick fog was experienced during the return passage, which was made +without incident; the Cromarty force was, however, taken to Scapa, +as a submarine had been reported off Tarbet Ness in the Moray Firth. + +On May 9th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa to carry out +another sweep on the Norwegian coast between the Naze and Udsire +Lighthouse. The squadron was divided, two ships proceeding to the Naze +and two to Udsire, arriving in position at daylight on the 10th and +then sweeping towards each other. One neutral steamer, carrying iron +ore for Lübeck, was intercepted outside territorial waters and sent in. +On the same day the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for Scapa, +searching the central portion of the North Sea _en route_. + +On the 9th, 11th and 13th the ships on the northern patrol off the +Shetlands moved in to Stadlandet for a short period, on the chance of +intercepting ships outside territorial waters. + +On the 14th an unsuccessful search for a reported submarine was carried +out to the south-east of the Pentland Firth. + +On the 15th Submarines D 7 and E 30 left for the Kattegat to operate +at the northern end of the Sound and off Anholt Island. One German +merchant-steamer was intercepted and sunk outside territorial waters +off the Kullen on the 22nd by E 30. On the 18th another submarine was +sent to operate off Goteberg in Sweden. She returned on the 25th, not +having sighted any enemy vessels. + +On the same day a reliable report was received that an exceptionally +large force of enemy submarines was now operating in the North Sea, +and additional precautions were taken at all the bases to strengthen +the patrols and to protect inward- and outward-bound vessels. The +Vice-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was warned to be ready to +move all his patrol lines to given alternative positions, and on the +19th was directed to move his ships to the most western of these +lines. Precautions against mine-laying by submarines were also taken, +and the waters to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” through which the +Fleet usually passed when on passage south, were examined by the Fleet +mine-sweepers, protected by destroyers, on the 21st and subsequent +days. These vessels searched without result on the 22nd for a submarine +which was being chased by a patrol vessel in this neighbourhood. + +On the 21st the _Donegal_ and two destroyers were sent to the vicinity +of the entrance to Bergen to intercept a steamer which, it was thought, +had passed through the 10th Cruiser Squadron blockade during a fog. The +ship however, called later at Kirkwall, and the force was recalled. + +On the 23rd the first of a series of deep mine-fields in the Moray +Firth, which I had requested might be laid with the object of catching +enemy submarines, was placed in position by the mine-layer _Biarritz_. + +On the 24th the _Donegal_ and an armed boarding-steamer were sent to +patrol off Stadlandet with a view to intercepting ships engaged in the +iron ore trade from Narvik. This, as before stated, was one of the few +positions at which ships were obliged for navigational reasons to leave +territorial waters. + +On the 24th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, which had +been at Rosyth, left for another search off the Norwegian coast from +the Naze to Udsire, and thence to Scapa. The search was unproductive. + +On the 26th two submarines were despatched to operate against enemy +submarines off the Norwegian coast, and, on the same date, the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers, left, via the searched +channel, to carry out a reconnaissance to the southward of the German +North Sea mine-field. The squadron proceeded as far east as Long. 6 E., +but, unfortunately, sighted nothing. + +The _Broke_ and 12 destroyers left on the 27th to search for a +submarine reported to have been sighted to the eastward of the Pentland +Firth, and returned on the 28th, not having seen her; but on the +27th Trawler Unit No. 42, working from Peterhead, reported having +engaged and sunk a submarine at 12.45 P.M. in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. +1.20 E., thus adding one more success to the record of this patrol. On +the 30th Fleet-sweeper _Gentian_ was missed, in a position about 40 +miles due east of the Pentland Firth, by a torpedo fired evidently by +the submarine that had been hunted on the 28th. A half flotilla and +sea-planes were sent out to search, and a submarine was sighted at 3.45 +P.M. near the position given, but she dived and got clear away. + +The movements of the Fleet between the time of leaving and returning to +the bases in connection with the Battle of Jutland are given in Chapter +XI., but some mention may be made of an incident which occurred on the +night of May 31st. A report was received at Scapa that an enemy raider +might be attempting to escape into the Atlantic. The Vice-Admiral of +the 10th Cruiser Squadron was directed to assume a patrol north of the +Shetlands in accordance with a plan which had been pre-arranged to meet +such a case. On June 3rd, after the return of the Fleet to its bases, +light cruisers were sent out to patrol to the north-westward of the +Orkneys, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron was then directed to fall back +to a position farther west to form a second patrol line. Nothing came +of the matter. + +During the month of May the weekly average results of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron showed: Number of vessels intercepted, 55, besides 17 +trawlers; number sent in, 18; number of ships on patrol, 11; number +absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number on special +service, 2. + +A good deal of fog and mist was experienced during the month, the worst +periods being from the 17th to the 20th, 24th, 26th, and the 28th to +30th. + +During the month of May the firing exercises in the Pentland Firth +continued, as did the usual exchange of bases between squadrons. + +During the months of March, April and May, a flotilla of submarines had +been gradually organised as a unit of the Grand Fleet. It was named +the 11th Submarine Flotilla, was based on Blyth, with the _Titania_ as +parent ship and the _Talisman_ and _Trident_ as attendant destroyers. +Separate spheres of activity for the Grand Fleet submarine flotillas +and for the submarine flotillas based on Harwich and Yarmouth were +also arranged, the dividing line running from a position a little +to the southward of the Horn Reef to Flamborough Head. The line was +subsequently slightly altered once or twice as the strength of the +Grand Fleet submarine flotillas increased, but the general principle +was that the Grand Fleet submarines worked to the northward of such a +line and the remaining submarines to the southward. + +It may not be out of place here to mention the organisation for +getting the Grand Fleet to sea from its bases to any desired point of +concentration with rapidity and safety, and of bringing the Fleet back +into the bases in face of probable submarine or mine attack. + +As the Grand Fleet increased in size, and the danger from mine and +submarine grew, so the problem of leaving Scapa Flow and re-entering +that base with safety became more complicated. The necessity for the +Fleet leaving harbour in the shortest possible time and with the +fewest possible number of signals was obvious. Similarly on returning +the various squadrons had to enter the base with the least practicable +delay in order to avoid giving submarines engaged in watching the +approaches an opportunity for getting into positions for attacking +the squadrons in rear, after having sighted those in the van. The +operations, both of departure and entry, were rendered all the more +difficult owing to the very strong and erratic tides experienced in the +Pentland Firth, while all ships navigating at night had to be navigated +without showing lights. + +The usual method of departure from Scapa was as follows: A “Preparatory +Signal for leaving Scapa” consisting of one word was made as soon as +I decided to take the Fleet to sea. On receipt of this “Preparatory +Signal” all ships raised steam for 18 knots at two hours’ notice. +Patrol destroyers were recalled by the Commodore (F) for refuelling. +All officers and men absent on patrol duty in drifters were also +recalled, and every preparation was made for leaving harbour. The +Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands warned the outer patrols +that the Fleet might be leaving shortly. + +Whilst the Fleet was raising steam in readiness to be off at two hours’ +notice a signal was made which indicated the time at which the first +squadron to leave was to move ahead from the anchorage, together with +the speed to be maintained after passing the submarine obstructions. +No further signals were necessary. The organisation provided for the +order in which squadrons were to leave, as well as the interval between +squadrons or divisions, which in daylight was usually one mile from the +rear ship of one squadron, or division of four ships, to the leading +ship of that following, or two miles at night. The organisation also +provided for successive squadrons or divisions being taken alternately +north or south of the Pentland Skerries if the Fleet proceeded to the +eastward, in order that the interval between those following the same +course might be increased. + +In the strong tides, particularly at night, some such procedure had to +be adopted, because the tide was not felt until the ships were clear of +Swona Island, and then the effect of it, if running to the westward, +and particularly at the period of spring tides, when it has a speed of +10 knots, was to bring a leading squadron or division back on top of +that in rear of it. Frequently also a ship, emerging from slack water +into the strength of the tide, would be caught by the tide on the bow, +and, unless the greatest possible care was taken to watch the steering +(and even sometimes in spite of every care), the ship would be turned +round through 8, 12 or even 16 points,[F] becoming a danger to those +astern of her, as she would be almost unmanageable for a time. Such a +situation on a dark night, with a large fleet showing no lights, was +not pleasant, and it speaks well for the skill shown in handling the +ships that no accident occurred from this cause. + + [F] 8 points = 90 degrees. + +The practice in regard to the destroyers, when they accompanied the +Fleet (as was necessary after the first twelve months of war), was +for the various groups which were detailed by the Commodore (F) to +screen the squadrons or divisions of the heavy ships, to meet them +just outside the submarine obstruction and screen them from there in +daylight, or on moonlight nights, and to form astern on dark nights, in +readiness to re-establish the screen at daylight. In the early days of +the War, and indeed for the first eighteen months, the practice was for +the destroyer flotillas to be stationed some 10 miles from the Battle +Fleet at night in order to avoid any chance of their being sighted and +mistaken for enemy destroyers; but this procedure caused considerable +delay in forming the submarine screen at daylight, and in thick weather +the destroyers frequently experienced difficulty in finding the Battle +Fleet. Consequently, it became the practice to keep the destroyers +actually in company at night, and this procedure was undoubtedly +preferable. + +After the various squadrons had passed the Pentland Skerries, the +organisation provided for their taking certain defined routes; the +usual practice was to use three routes with the squadrons divided +between them, the routes being about seven miles apart. + +A concentration point, which the squadrons would reach at the ordered +speed shortly after daylight, was given in the departure signal, and +the squadrons closed in on this point at the appointed time, so that +the whole Battle Fleet, including detachments coming from Cromarty, +was concentrated shortly after daylight, with the cruisers in their +assigned positions scouting ahead. + +The organisation of the Battle Fleet provided for the strongest +squadron being on the eastern flank, because it was considered that the +enemy would invariably make towards his bases if touch was gained, and +it was desired to have our strongest squadron in the van. + +The “departure” organisation was carefully worked out by my Staff and +very minutely described in the Grand Fleet orders. It was most useful, +the whole Fleet, comprising frequently 50 or more battleships, cruisers +and light cruisers, and as many as 50 destroyers, being in daylight +under weigh in one hour, and clear of the harbour in an hour and a half +after the signal was made to proceed; on dark nights this time was +lengthened by half an hour. + +When returning to Scapa Flow, the usual practice was for the time of +entry to be arranged so that the leading squadrons passed the Pentland +Skerries shortly before dawn, in order to minimise the danger from +submarine attack; but it was not, of course, always possible to arrange +the time of entry in this manner. In returning to Scapa, when the +arrival was thus timed for dawn, the different squadrons were disposed, +as a rule, in two separate lines, the lines being some five miles apart +and the squadrons in each line having an interval of about three miles +between them. One line would enter the Pentland Firth by passing north +of the Pentland Skerries and the other by passing south of these rocks, +the object being to confuse any enemy submarines that might be watching +the approaches, and also to get the Fleet into the Firth as quickly +as possible, as once in the tideway there was little to fear from +submarine attack. + +If the Fleet entered Scapa Flow during darkness, the ships anchored +in the centre of the Flow in certain specified berths, and waited for +daylight before taking up their berths in the Fleet anchorage; towards +the end of my period of command, however, coloured lights were arranged +to be placed as leading-marks for the Fleet anchorage, so that ships +could proceed to their final berths under all conditions. + +As regards mines, an exploratory search of the channel intended to be +used was always carried out, if time permitted, before the Fleet left, +and similarly before it returned. Three channels were used, each some +7 to 10 miles in width--one passing up the east side of the Orkneys, +one running to the eastward from the Pentland Skerries, and one passing +down the Scottish coast for a short distance and then to the eastward. +Usually the second of these channels was used. + +The principal difficulty with which we had to deal when leaving or +returning was fog. In a really dense fog there was great risk in +attempting to leave Scapa with a large fleet, owing to the strong tides +to be encountered in the Pentland Firth, and nothing but the gravest +emergency would have justified the attempt being made. If it became +really necessary, an organisation had been provided to meet the case, +and the attempt would have been made. The interval between the various +squadrons would have been considerably greater, and the time occupied +in leaving would have been correspondingly increased. + +The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases, Cromarty and +Rosyth, were, of course, simpler, owing to the absence of the very +strong cross-tides, but fog was even more prevalent at Rosyth than +at Scapa, and the operation of leaving with a considerable number of +ships was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed under +difficulties on very numerous occasions and with remarkable freedom +from accident during my period of command. The approach to the Firth +of Forth in thick weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were +experienced in making the land when the position of the ships had not +been accurately ascertained by sights for some time before approaching +the base. These approaches could have been mined by the enemy with +great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently enterprising, +and it was a standing wonder to me that the attempt was never made. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916 + + +It may not be out of place here to touch upon the general naval +situation in the spring of 1916--that is, on the eve of the Battle of +Jutland. What were the strategical conditions? To what extent was it +justifiable to take risks with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks +the full consequences of which could not be foreseen owing to the new +conditions of naval warfare? + +The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our available capital +ships. There was very little in the way of reserve behind it. The +battleships _not_ included in the Grand Fleet were all of them +pre-Dreadnoughts and therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted +of seven ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, two ships of the “Lord +Nelson” class, and four of the “Queen” class, all of these ships being +in the Mediterranean except five of the “King Edward VII.” class. They +were required there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the +operations in the Ægean. Five of our light cruisers were also in the +Mediterranean. + +The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in the Mediterranean, +but, owing to political considerations and their duty in watching +the Austrian Fleet, there was little prospect of their leaving that +locality. + +It is interesting to compare this situation with that existing a +century earlier. In September, 1805, the month before Trafalgar, the +disposition of British ships in commission in home waters and the +Mediterranean is given in the following table: + + ------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+------- + | | Ships | | Sloops | + Station | Commander-in-Chief | of the | Frigates | and | Total + | | Line | | small | + | | | | vessels | + ------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+------- + From Shetland to Beachy | | | | | + Head | Lord Keith | 10 | 15 | 155 | 180 + Channel | Port Admirals | | 1 | 51 | 52 + Guernsey and Jersey | Sir J. Saumarez | | 2 | 12 | 14 + Off Ushant, etc. | Admiral Cornwallis | 26 | 15 | 20 | 61 + Irish | Lord Gardner | | 10 | 14 | 24 + Mediterranean | Lord Nelson | 26 | 19 | 24 | 69 + In port refitting and | | | | | + destined to reinforce | | | | | + Lords Nelson and | | 11 | 7 | 17 | 35 + Cornwallis | | | | | + ------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+------- + +In addition to Nelson’s force of 26 capital ships and 19 frigates, the +Navy had, therefore, in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean +a yet more numerous force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates. The main +portion of this force was with Cornwallis off Ushant, and was watching +Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had 155 sloops and +small vessels. + +In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital ships (including +battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light cruisers, we had in +commission in home waters and the Mediterranean only 13 capital ships +(all of pre-Dreadnought types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light +cruisers. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had, exclusive of +the Grand Fleet and Harwich force, about 60 destroyers (mostly of old +type), 6 P boats, and 33 old torpedo boats. + +In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the line in England, +besides 10 under construction in Russia, and 36 frigates. In May, 1916, +we had building five capital ships and about nine light cruisers. + +A consideration of these figures will show that the situation at the +two periods under review was very different, in that, in 1805, the +force engaged at Trafalgar was only a relatively small portion of the +available British Fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the +large majority of the vessels upon which the country had to rely for +safety. + +Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I had written to +the Admiralty pointing out the dangers which an intelligent use of +submarines, mines and torpedoes by the Germans, before and during a +Fleet action, would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the +tactics which I had intended to employ to meet the expected German +movement in order to bring the enemy to action in the shortest +practicable time and with the best chance of achieving such a victory +as would be decisive. I stated that with new and untried methods of +warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them. + +I received in reply an expression of approval of my views and of +confidence in the manner in which I proposed to handle the Fleet in +action. + +Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the margin of +superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Sea Fleet justify me in +disregarding the enemy’s torpedo fire or meeting it otherwise than by +definite movements deduced after most careful analysis of the problem +at sea with the Fleet and on the tactical board. + +The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet were taken into +account in making this decision. There was also a possibility that the +Grand Fleet might later be called upon to confront a situation of much +wider scope than that already existing. + +The position gradually improved after 1916. During the latter half of +that year the remaining ships of the “Royal Sovereign” class joined +the Grand Fleet, and greatly increased the ratio of strength of the +Fleet as compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it was also +possible to withdraw the four battleships of the “Queen” class from the +Adriatic. This greatly eased the manning situation. And in April, 1917, +the culminating event was the entry of the United States of America +into the War on the side of the Entente. In December, 1917, the United +States sent a division of battleships to join the Grand Fleet, and it +was apparent that we could count upon the whole battleship strength of +the United States Navy, if required, to second our efforts. + +Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light cruiser and +destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet increased steadily after the +Battle of Jutland, and to a very considerable extent reduced the danger +of successful torpedo attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface +craft. The inclusion of the K. class submarines--submarines of high +speed--in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very probable that any losses +suffered by us by submarine attack would be more than compensated by +enemy losses from the same cause. + +In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in regard to battle +cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory, the general effect of all these +considerations upon the tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be +overwhelming. The position was assured, and we could have afforded to +take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most unwise. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND + + +On May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet fought the +action which has become known as the Battle of Jutland. The despatch[G] +describing the battle, as published some weeks later, was not quite +in its original form as written by me. After a conference held at the +Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some of them because +it was considered that certain passages might convey useful information +to the enemy, and others because it was thought to be undesirable to +draw attention to certain features of British design. Amongst the +latter was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our earlier +battle cruisers. + + [G] See Appendix. + +Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause our battle cruisers, +with their attendant light cruisers, to occupy when at sea an advanced +position, often at a considerable distance from the Battle Fleet. +Battle cruisers were designed and built in order that they might keep +in touch with the enemy and report his movements when he had been +found; hence the heavy guns which they carried. They were intended +to find the enemy for the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy’s +strength in order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not +been adopted the enemy’s battle cruisers could not have been brought to +action on such occasions as the engagement of January 24th, 1915. And +in the cases of raids on our coast, the battle cruisers were always +sent ahead at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle +cruisers. + +Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the middle of 1916 and +the heavier armaments carried by our ships, the real risk involved +in this policy was that of our battle cruisers being drawn on to the +enemy’s Battle Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled. +Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would, owing to their +higher speed, have no difficulty in clear weather in keeping out of +range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still +maintaining touch with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the +added support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been +grouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to the absence of the 3rd +Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow, the tactical advantage of our ships was +even stronger, provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an +excess of speed over the fastest enemy’s Battle Squadron. + +In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, I had felt it +necessary on the highest grounds, as well as only just to the officers +and men of our battle cruisers, to give some explanation of the heavy +losses incurred by our ships in the early part of the action, when we +were opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long range, +by four battleships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, comprising the +5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy battle cruisers, which were not +then supported by the German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter +showed that one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately +protected by armour as compared with the German vessels of the battle +cruiser type. It was considered undesirable to draw attention to this +publicly while the war was in progress. + +The relative values of protection and gun power had frequently engaged +my serious attention. It was also a subject of much discussion amongst +writers on naval matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting +that all available weight should be put into gun power and that ships +should be left practically without armour. Their views were based on +the argument that “the best defense is a powerful offensive.” Although +this argument is very true when applied to strategy, the War has shown +its fallacy as applied to _matériel_. The loss of the _Good Hope_, +_Monmouth_, _Queen Mary_, _Indefatigable_, _Invincible_, _Defence_, +and _Warrior_, and the considerations to which these losses gave rise, +convinced naval officers afloat, even if they did not convince others +less intimately associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships +with inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those which +possess them to a considerably greater degree, even if the former are +superior in gun power. The conviction was strengthened by the knowledge +we obtained, that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire, +torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were yet taken +safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive qualities, but, +partly, to the limitations of our armour-piercing shell at that time. + +There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters, when comparing +the relative strength of the British and German Fleets for the purpose +of future provision of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make +comparison only on the basis of the _gun power_ of the vessels of the +two Navies. Great superiority in fighting qualities on the part of the +British Fleet was suggested by this blindness to other considerations. +During my pre-War service at the Admiralty this question was often +under discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of argument +as being very misleading, and pointed out that the true comparison lay +between the _displacement_ of the ships of the various classes, because +if we assumed, as War experience has since shown that we were justified +in assuming that the German naval designers and constructors were not +inferior in ability to our own, it was obvious that, taking ships of +equal displacement and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if +our vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans must possess +superiority in some other direction. It was well known at the Admiralty +that their superiority lay in greatly increased protection, combined +with heavier torpedo armament. + +We were also aware that the German vessels were fitted with small tube +boilers, which were very economical in weight for a given horse-power, +and, consequently, the German vessels obtained thereby a further +advantage, the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the +ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted a different +disposition of the weight available in each ship. + +The tables on pp. 308–11 give particulars of the armament, protection, +and displacement of the capital ships of the two Navies engaged in the +Battle of Jutland, so far as they are known to me. + +The main facts revealed by an examination of these tables are: + + +BATTLESHIPS + + 1. The German ships of any particular period were of considerably + greater displacement as compared with contemporary British ships. + + 2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour than + their British contemporaries. + + +TABLE I + +BRITISH BATTLESHIPS + + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- + | | | | | | | ARMOUR | + | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | + Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS + | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | + | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | + “Royal Sovereign” Class (5)| 1913–14 | 25,750 | 21.5 | 3,400 | 8, 15″ | 4 | 13″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 13″ | 1″ to 4″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 14, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Queen Elizabeth” Class (5)| 1912–13 | 27,500 | 25.0 | 3,400 | 8, 15″ | 4 | 13″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 13″ | 1″ to 3″ | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Iron Duke” Class (4) | 1911–12 | 25,000 | 21.0 | 4,300 | 10, 13″.5 | 4 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 11″ | 1½″ to 2½″ | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “King George V.” Class (3) | 1910–11 | 23,000 | 21.0 | 4,000 | 10, 13″.5 | 2 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Orion” Class (4) | 1909–10 | 22,500 | 21.0 | 4,100 | 10, 13″.5 | 2 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Ditto + | | | | | 13, 4″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + _Canada_ | Emergency | 28,000 | 22.75 | 3,800 | 10, 14″ | 4 | 9″ | 7″ and 4½″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 10″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up + | War | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and + | Programme | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + _Erin_ | Ditto | 23,000 | 21.0 | 2,800 | 10, 13″.5 | 3 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 11″ | 1½″ to 3″ | Ditto + | | | | | 16, 6″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + _Agincourt_ | Ditto | 27,500 | 22.0 | 3,800 | 14, 12″ | 3 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 12″ | 1″ to 1½″ | Ditto + | | | | | 20, 6″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Hercules” Class (3) | 1909–10 | 20,000 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 11″ | 8″ | 2½″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to main deck only. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “St. Vincent” Class (2) | 1907–8 | 19,250 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 10″ | 8″ | 2″ | 2″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto + | | | | | 13, 4″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Bellerophon” Class (3) | 1906–7 | 18,600 | 21.0 | 3,500 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 10″ | 8″ | 6″ | 5″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + _Dreadnought_ | 1905–6 | 17,900 | 21.0 | 4,000 | 10, 12″ | 4 | 11″ | 8″ | 6″ | 4″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto + | | | | | 20, 12 pds.| | | | | | | | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + + +TABLE II + +BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS + + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- + | | | | | | | ARMOUR | + | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | + Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS + | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | + | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | + _Tiger_ (1) | 1911–12 | 28,500 | 29.0 | 6,800 | 8, 13″.5 | 2 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 9″ | 1″ to 3″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Lion” Class (3) | 1909–10 | 26,350 | 28.0 | 4,600 | 8, 13″.5 | 2 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | nil | 9″ | 1″ to 2½″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 15, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “New Zealand” Class (3) | | 18,800 | 26.0 | 4,000 | 8, 12″ | 2 | 6″ | | 4″ | 4″ | nil | 7″ | 1″ to 2½″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 14, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to main deck. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Inflexible” Class (3) | 1905–6 | 17,250 | 25.0 | 3,800 | 8, 12″ | 4 | 6″ | | 4″ | nil | nil | 7″ | ¾″ to 2½″ | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + + +TABLE III + +GERMAN BATTLESHIPS + + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- + | | | | | | | ARMOUR | + | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | + Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS + | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | + | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | + “König” Class (4) | 1911–12 | 25,390 | 23.0 | 4,200 | 10, 12″ | 5 | 14″ | 10″ | 6″ | 6″ | 8″ | 14″ | 2½″ to 3″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Kaiser” Class (5) | 1909–11 | 24,410 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 5 |13″.75 | 9″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 11¾″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Ditto, but at + | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | after end side + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | only armoured + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | up to main deck. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Heligoland” Class (4) | 1908–9 | 22,440 | 20.5 | 3,100 | 12, 12″ | 6 |11″.75 | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 11¾″ | 1½″ to 2¾″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to main deck and + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + “Nassau” Class (4) | 1907–8 | 18,600 | 20.0 | 2,800 | 12, 11″ | 6 |11″.75 | 7¾″ | 6″ | 4″ | 6½″ | 11″ | 2″ to 4¾″ | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + + +TABLE IV + +GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS + + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- + | | | | | | | ARMOUR | + | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | + Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS + | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | + | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | + “Derfflinger” Class[H] | 1911–12 | 26,180 | 28.0 | 5,600 | 8, 12″ | 4 | 12″ | 8″ | 5″ | 5″ | 7″ | 11″ | 1″ to 3.2″ | Side armoured up + | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to upper deck with + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + _Seydlitz_ | 1910–11 | 24,610 | 26.75 | 3,700 | 10, 11″ | 4 | 11¾″ | 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 10″ | 1″ to 3¼″ | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | + _Moltke_ | 1908–9 | 22,640 | 27.25 | 3,200 | 10, 11″ | 4 | 11″ }| tapering | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 10″ | ? same as | Ditto + | | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | }| | | | | | _Seydlitz_ | + | | | | | | | }| | | | | | | + _Von der Tann_ | 1907–8 | 19,100 | 26.0 | 2,900 | 8, 11″ | 4 | 9¾″}| | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 9″ | ? same as | Side armoured up + | | | | | 10, 5″.9 | | }| | | | | | _Seydlitz_ | to main deck with + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | armoured to upper + | | | | | | | | | | | | | | deck. + ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- + + [H] _Lutzow_ was similar. + + +TABLE V + +Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships of the same +date. N. B.--The German figures are approximate. + + -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+-------- + | | Weight of | Weight of deck | | Length | + | Displacement | armour | protection | Total | of ship | Beam + -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+-------- + BATTLESHIPS-- | | Tons | Tons | Tons | Feet | Feet + _Monarch_ British | 22,500 | 4,560 | 2,010 | 6,570 | 545 | 88½ + _Kaiser_ German | 24,410 | 5,430 | 3,130 | 8,560 | 564 | 95 + | | | | | | + BATTLE CRUISERS-- | | | | | | + _Queen Mary_ British | 27,000 | 3,900 | 2,300 | 6,200 | 660 | 89 + _Seydlitz_ German | 24,610 | 5,200 | 2,400 | 7,600 | 656 | 93½ + -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+-------- + + _Note._--Similar comparisons between other ships of the same date would show similar results. + + + 3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour _to the + upper deck_, whilst nine of the earliest British Dreadnoughts + were provided with armour protection to the _main deck only_, thus + rendering them far more open to artillery attack. The “Orion” class + of battleship and the “Lion” class of battle cruiser, designed + during my service at the Admiralty as Controller, were the first of + our Dreadnoughts armoured to the upper deck. + + 4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships was in + nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries, + whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in _all cases_ + considerably greater in the German ships. + + 5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually greater than + in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision more complete. + + 6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo + tubes than the British vessels. + + +BATTLE CRUISERS + + 1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater displacement + than their British contemporaries. + + 2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than their + British contemporaries. + + 3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection + above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being provided + with protection to the upper deck. + + 4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions, + including deck protection, as well as more complete watertight + subdivisions. + + 5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo + tubes than the British ships. + +As against the additional protection of the German ships our vessels +of contemporary design were provided in all cases with heavier turret +guns, whilst the German ships carried heavier secondary armaments. + +A point of considerable interest, which should also be mentioned +because it was to prove important, was that the Germans possessed +a delay-action fuse which, combined with a highly efficient +armour-piercing projectile, ensured the burst of shell taking place +_inside_ the armour of British ships instead of _outside_, or whilst +passing through the armour, which was the case with British shells of +that date fired against the thick German armour. + +The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was not widely +different, although the British ships, as a rule, were fitted to carry +more fuel. Although I arranged, after the first few months of war, to +reduce the amount of fuel carried by our ships very considerably--in +fact, by more than 25 per cent.--I was unable to reduce it further in +coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the protection afforded +by the coal, since in our case it was necessary to be prepared to do a +considerable amount of steaming at high speed, involving expenditure +of coal, before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have been +unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with coal below what I may +call the “safety line.” On the other hand, it was well known that, +as the Germans had no intention of fighting an action far from their +bases, they had effected a very much greater reduction in the quantity +of fuel carried with consequently a corresponding advantage in speed. + +There was yet one other matter of great importance, namely, the +vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies in regard to under-water +attack. Here the Germans possessed a very real advantage, which stood +them in good stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes: + +1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside the ships, and in +many cases its greater thickness. + +2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer skin of the ship +and the consequent additional protection to under-water attack afforded +thereby. + +In regard to the first point, the great majority of our ships only +carried partial internal protection, that is, protection over a portion +of the length of the ship. The protection was usually confined to the +region of the magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran +throughout the length of the vessel. + +As to the second point, it was possible to place the protective +bulkhead farther “inboard” in the German ships without cramping +machinery and magazine spaces, because the ships themselves were of +much greater beam. Consequently the explosion of a mine or a torpedo +against the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the +protective bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of the ships +than was the case with a British vessel. The result was that, although +it is known that many German capital ships were mined and torpedoed +during the war, including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans +have not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought +battleship _Pommern_ and the battle cruiser _Lutzow_, whose injuries +from shell fire were also very extensive. + +On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or torpedoed, rarely +survived. The recorded instances of escape are the _Inflexible_ (mined +in the Dardanelles) and the _Marlborough_ (torpedoed at Jutland), and +in the latter case, although the torpedo struck at about the most +favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in reaching port. + +The question will be asked why it was that British ships were under +this disadvantage. The reply is that the whole of our Dreadnought +battleships, designed before the War, were hampered by the absence +of proper dock accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked to +me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the mistake of building +our ships before we had proper dock accommodation for them, whilst +in Germany they had provided the dock accommodation first and had +designed the ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since +docks took a long time to construct, the German policy involved delay +in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of a type, and hence our margin +of superiority in 1914. As each successive type of Dreadnought was +designed, our constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they +went beyond a certain beam the number of docks available would be +insufficient; and it was always a matter of great difficulty to obtain +money with which to construct adequate docks. Docks make no appeal +to the imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money. The +result was that August, 1914, found us with a superiority in ships, +but woefully lacking in dock accommodation; and for this reason alone +a Fleet action early in the War, resulting in considerable damage to +heavy ships, would have produced embarrassing results. + +It is only just to our very able constructive staff at the Admiralty to +point this out; it was one of the reasons which led to the German ships +being much better equipped to withstand under-water attack than were +our own. It is devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in +mind in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided for the +Fleet. + +The matter is one of which I have considerable personal knowledge, +since it came within my province as Controller in 1909–11 and was also +given to me to examine whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless +to say that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out with +emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as will be shown, as +an introduction in a consideration of the Battle of Jutland, if that +action is to be rightly judged. + +In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential to bear +in mind that the time of receipt of signals, especially of reports +emanating from the bridge of a ship, is not a true indication of the +time at which the officer making the report began his task. A varying +but considerable interval is bound to elapse; this includes the time +taken to write out the report, transmit it to the wireless office or +signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode it on board the receiving +ship, write it out and transmit it to the bridge. The interval is +greater with wireless than with visual signals. + + +I.--THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET’S ACTION + +The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose of carrying out +one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea. The orders from me under +which the Fleet acted were as follows: + +Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle Squadron from +Cromarty, was directed to pass through a position in Lat. 58.15 N., +Long. 2.0 E., and to meet the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 P.M. +on the 31st at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E. + +Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the +5th Battle Squadron, was directed to proceed to a position in Lat. +56.40 N., Long. 5 E., economising fuel in the destroyers as much as +possible; it was expected that he would be in that position by about 2 +P.M. on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand to the northward +to get into visual touch with the Battle Fleet. + +[Illustration: + + Operations of + BATTLE CRUISER FLEET + II·00 p.m to VI·15 p.m. 31^{st}. May.] + +The _Iron Duke_ and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, together with the +3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the newly commissioned light cruisers +_Chester_ and _Canterbury_, which had been carrying out gunnery and +torpedo practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of May +30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 +E., having met the 2nd Battle Squadron _en route_ at 11.15 A.M. in +Lat. 58.13 N., Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed before +sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards the Horn Reef from +the position in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E. + +At 2 P.M. on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about 18 miles to the +north-westward of the position (A), being actually in Lat. 57.57 N., +Long. 3.45 E., in organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly +delayed for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary practice of +examining trawlers and other vessels met with _en route_ to be carried +out without causing the examining vessels to expend unnecessary fuel +in regaining station. We had to be on our guard against scouts. The +divisions were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in the order: +1st–6th Divisions (screened by the 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas) with +the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. +The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were stationed 16 +miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six miles apart on a line of +direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; the cruisers being eight miles apart +and their positions being in the order from east to west: + + (F.) (F.) + _Cochrane_ _Shannon_ _Minotaur_ _Defence_ _Duke of Edinburgh_ _Black Prince_ + . . + . . + . _Warrior_ + . + . + _Hampshire_ (linking ship 6 miles astern of the _Minotaur_) + +The attached cruisers, the _Active_, _Boadicea_, _Blanche_, and +_Bellona_, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and the 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers _Chester_ and _Canterbury_, +about 20 miles ahead, the whole steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the +speed of _advance_ being 14 knots. + +The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below: + + Line of Advance. + ^ + | + | + + 1st Div. 2nd Div. 3rd Div. 4th Div. 5th Div. 6th Div. + _King George V._(F.) _Orion_ (F.) _Iron Duke_ (F.F.) _Benbow_ (F.) _Colossus_ (F.) _Marlborough_ (F.) + _Ajax_ _Monarch_ _Royal Oak_ _Bellerophon_ _Collingwood_ _Revenge_ + _Centurion_ _Conqueror_ _Superb_ (F.) _Temeraire_ _Neptune_ _Hercules_ + _Erin_ _Thunderer_ _Canada_ _Vanguard_ _St. Vincent_ _Agincourt_ + + F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship. + +It may be added in further explanation that the flagships of the Battle +Fleet were: + + _Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship.--Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe + (Commander-in-Chief). + + _King George V._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, + Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron. + + _Orion._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in the + 2nd Battle Squadron. + + _Superb._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in the + 4th Battle Squadron. + + _Benbow._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Commanding + the 4th Battle Squadron. + + _Colossus._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral in + the 1st Battle Squadron. + + _Marlborough._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding + 1st Battle Squadron and second in command of the Grand + Fleet. + +The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, with destroyers, +were at 2 P.M. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. 4.40 E., and had turned to the +northward, steering N. by E., speed 19½ knots, in the order: + +The _Lion_ and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead, +screened by the light cruiser _Champion_ and 10 destroyers of the 13th +Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead +three miles E.N.E. of the _Lion_, screened by six destroyers.[I] The +5th Battle Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W. of +the _Lion_, being screened by the light cruiser _Fearless_ and nine +destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser Squadrons formed a +screen eight miles S.S.E. from the _Lion_, ships spread on a line of +direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to +east: + + 2nd Light Cruiser 3rd Light Cruiser 1st Light Cruiser + Squadron Squadron Squadron + _Southampton_ (F.) _Nottingham_ _Falmouth_ (F.) _Birkenhead_ _Inconstant_ _Galatea_ (F.) + _Birmingham_ _Dublin_ _Gloucester_ _Cordelia_ _Phaeton_ + + [I] These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but + happened to be at Rosyth. + +It should be added that the flagships were: + + _Lion._--Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David + Beatty. + + _Princess Royal._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, + commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. + + _New Zealand._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, commanding + 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron. + + _Barham._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding 5th + Battle Squadron. + +The _Engadine_, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between the light +cruisers _Gloucester_ and _Cordelia_, and the light cruiser _Yarmouth_ +acted as linking ship between the _Lion_ and the light cruiser screen. + +The first report of enemy vessels was received from the _Galatea_, the +flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, commanding the 1st +Light Cruiser Squadron, who, at 2.20 P.M., sighted two enemy vessels +to the E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a neutral +steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possibilities of the +situation, immediately turned his fleet to the S.S.E., the course for +the Horn Reef, so as to get between the enemy and his base. + +At 2.35 P.M. the _Galatea_ reported a large amount of smoke “as from +a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a report that the vessels were +steering north. The course of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered +to the eastward and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being sighted +at 3.31 P.M. and identified as five battle cruisers accompanied by +destroyers. + +Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their +direction, and, judging the situation accurately, spread to the +east without waiting for orders, forming a screen in advance of the +heavy ships. Our Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels +of a similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, +under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with his broad pendant in the +_Southampton_, came in at high speed towards the battle cruisers and +formed ahead of them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 P.M. sighted +enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E. + +On receipt of the _Galatea’s_ report, Sir David Beatty ordered the +_Engadine_ to send up a sea-plane to scout to the N.N.E. This was +the first time that sea-planes had been used for reconnaissance work +with a fleet in an action, and the event is notable for that reason. +The low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-plane, +with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant +Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was able, by flying low +under the clouds, to identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the +report being received on board the _Lion_ at 3.30 P.M. The sea-plane +was under heavy fire from the light cruisers during the observation. By +this time the line of battle was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser +Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the +destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station ahead. The +course was E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, the speed 25 +knots, and the range 23,000 yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on +a line of bearing in order to clear the smoke. + +The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the movements of the +Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the +weather was favourable, the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E., +and the visibility good. + +Meanwhile the wireless reports from the _Galatea_ to the _Lion_ had +been intercepted on board the _Iron Duke_, and directions were at once +given to the Battle Fleet to raise steam for full speed, the ships +being at the time at short notice for full speed. The cruisers had been +ordered to raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 P.M. the Battle +Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 P.M. I directed +Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships of the situation. The +earliest reports from the _Galatea_ had indicated the presence of light +cruisers and destroyers only, and my first impression was that these +vessels, on sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via +the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels and were +consequently not in so much danger of being cut off as if they turned +to the southward. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well +placed for cutting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place, +was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 P.M., on the +receipt of the information of the presence of enemy battle cruisers, it +was directed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. About 3.40 P.M. I received +a report from Sir David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers +and a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the same time. + +As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was reported, course +was altered in the Battle Fleet to close our battle cruisers, and speed +increased as rapidly as possible. By 4 P.M. the “Fleet Speed” was 20 +knots, being higher than had previously been obtained. Zigzagging was +abandoned on receipt of the _Galatea’s_ first report. The battleships +were also directed to keep clear of the wake of the next ahead in order +to prevent loss of speed from the wash. + +At 3.48 P.M. the action between the battle cruisers began at a range +of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened by the two forces practically +simultaneously. At the commencement the fire from the German vessels +was rapid and accurate, the _Lion_ being hit twice three minutes after +fire was opened, and the _Lion_, _Tiger_ and _Princess Royal_ all +receiving several hits by 4 P.M.; observers on board our own ships were +also of opinion that our fire was effective at that stage. + +At about 4 P.M. it was evident by the accuracy of the enemy’s fire +that he had obtained the range of our ships, which was then about +16,000 yards. The enemy bore well abaft the beam, and course was +altered slightly to the southward to confuse his fire control. Course +was altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose. The +German ships frequently zigzagged for the purpose of confusing our fire +control. + +At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very rapid and +accurate; the _Lion_ received several hits, the roof of one of her +turrets being blown off at 4 P.M. At about 4.6 P.M. the _Indefatigable_ +was hit, approximately at the outer edge of the upper deck level in +line with the after turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an +explosion followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell out +of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit by another salvo +forward, turned over and sank. + +About this time (4.8 P.M.) the 5th Battle Squadron came into action, +opening fire at a range between 19,000 and 20,000 yards. This slower +squadron was some distance astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason +partly of the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and partly +of the light to the eastward having become less favourable, difficulty +was experienced in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being +visible at a time. At 4.12 P.M. the range of the enemy’s battle +cruisers from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was altered +from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire had slackened owing to the +increase in range. + +The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing the line of +our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the periscopes of enemy +submarines were also made by more than one ship. + +In accordance with the general directions given by Sir David Beatty +to the destroyers to attack when a favourable opportunity occurred, +the _Nestor_, _Nomad_, _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, +_Obdurate_, _Nerissa_, _Moorsom_, _Morris_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_ +moved out at 4.15 P.M.; at the same time a similar movement took place +on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser and 15 destroyers. +Both sides first steered to reach an advantageous position at the +van of the opposing battle cruiser lines from which to deliver their +attack, and then turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement +at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the enemy lost +two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in addition, his torpedo +attack was partially frustrated; some torpedoes were fired by the +enemy, two of which crossed the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which +had been turned away to avoid the attack. + +During this action, which reflected the greatest credit on our +destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing to their having +dropped back towards the rear of our line, were not in a good position +to attack the enemy’s battle cruisers with torpedoes. The _Nestor_, +_Nomad_, and _Nicator_, most gallantly led by Commander the Hon. +E. B. S. Bingham in the _Nestor_, were able to press home their +attack, causing the enemy’s battle cruisers to turn away to avoid +their torpedoes. The _Nomad_ was damaged and forced to haul out of +line before getting within torpedo range of the battle cruisers, but +the _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ succeeded in firing torpedoes at the battle +cruisers under a heavy fire from the German secondary armaments. The +_Nestor_ was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser, +and remained stopped between the lines. She was sunk later by the +German Battle Fleet when that force appeared on the scene, but not +before she had fired her last torpedo at the approaching ships. The +_Nomad_ was also sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but +this vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. In +both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying circumstances +was shown by the officers and men. It is gratifying to record that +a considerable proportion of the ship’s company of both destroyers +was picked up by German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed +the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle cruisers, the +_Nicator_ was able to rejoin her flotilla. The _Moorsom_ also attacked +the enemy’s Battle Fleet and returned. In the meantime, the _Petard_, +_Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_ succeeded in firing torpedoes +at long range (7,000 yards) at the enemy’s battle cruisers. For his +gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack Commander the Hon. +E. B. S. Bingham, who was rescued from the _Nestor_ and taken prisoner +by the Germans, received the Victoria Cross. + +Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships had become very +fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle cruisers began to be +noticeable, the third ship in the line being observed to be on fire +at 4.18 P.M., whilst our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were also +inflicting and receiving some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of +the fire from the enemy’s vessels was deteriorating at this period; +our own ships were much handicapped by the decreasing visibility, due +partly to the use by the enemy of smoke screens, under cover of which +he altered course to throw out our fire. + +The flagship _Barham_, of the 5th Battle Squadron, received her first +hit at 4.23 P.M. + +At about 4.26 P.M. a second disaster befell the British battle +cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy’s battle cruisers hit the +_Queen Mary_ abreast of “Q” turret and a terrific explosion resulted, +evidently caused by a magazine blowing up. The _Tiger_, which was +following close astern of the _Queen Mary_, passed through the dense +cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal of material +fell on her decks, but otherwise the _Queen Mary_ had completely +vanished. A few survivors from this ship and from the _Indefatigable_ +were afterwards rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine +ships with their splendid ships’ companies was a heavy blow to the +Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature of the disaster adding +to its magnitude.[J] + + [J] I was not aware of the loss of the _Queen Mary_ and + _Indefatigable_ until the morning of June 1st. + +At 4.38 P.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_, Flagship of +the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been scouting ahead of the +Battle Cruisers, reported that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight +bearing S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position. Sir +David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting the Battle Fleet +at 4.42 P.M. turned the battle cruisers 16 points in succession to +starboard. This movement was followed by the enemy’s battle cruisers, +and Sir David Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn his +ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commodore Goodenough led +the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron to a favourable position from which +to observe the movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, within 13,000 +yards’ range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very heavy fire, +clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded several reports of their +position and movements; the skilful manner in which the Commodore, +aided by his captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly +saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant manœuvring of +the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron during the engagement, +the position of the _Southampton_, as obtained by reckoning, was +somewhat inaccurate, as was to be expected. This fact detracted from +the value of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by latitude +and longitude, as reported from time to time to the _Iron Duke_, +was consequently incorrect. This discrepancy added greatly to the +difficulty experienced in ascertaining the correct moment at which +to deploy the Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the +direction of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however, inevitable +under the conditions. + +The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the southward in their +pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably in excess of that which +the Battle Fleet could attain, resulted in opening the distance between +the two forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty’s +force to the northward, the _Iron Duke_ and the _Lion_ were over 50 +miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles per hour. + +As soon as the position of the _Lion_ was known after the receipt of +the report of enemy battle cruisers being in sight, Rear-Admiral the +Hon. H. S. Hood was directed to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir +David Beatty’s force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to +the Rear-Admiral. The latter officer reported his own position and gave +his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots. At the same time the Battle +Fleet was informed that our battle cruisers were in action with the +enemy’s battle cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral +Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company with Sir David +Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being received, with a report that +his squadron was in action. + +At this time I was confident that, under the determined leadership +of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our best and fastest +battleships and six battle cruisers, very serious injury would be +inflicted on the five battle cruisers of the enemy if they could be +kept within range. + +The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, which was +communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not cause me any uneasiness in +respect of the safety of our own vessels, since our ships of the 5th +Battle Squadron were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not, +however, expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of 24 knots; +the information furnished to me at this time gave the designed speed of +the fastest German battleships as 20.5 knots only. Even after making +full allowance for the fact that our ships were probably carrying +more fuel and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving +the Germans credit for some excess over the designed speed, no doubt +existed in my mind that both our battleships and our battle cruisers +with Sir David Beatty could keep well out of range of the enemy’s +Battle Fleet, if necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I +learned later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron, +_when going at its utmost speed_, found considerable difficulty +in increasing its distance from the enemy’s 3rd Battle Squadron, +consisting of ships of the “König” class, and on return to Scapa I +received a report from the Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron +with a speed of _23 knots_ for a short period, this being the first +intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable by them. + +To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between the battle cruisers +was renewed during the retirement of our ships to the northward, and +the two leading ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, the _Barham_ and +_Valiant_, supported our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two +rear ships of that force, the _Warspite_ and _Malaya_, engaged the +leading ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet as long as their guns would +bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards. + +The light cruiser _Fearless_, with destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, +were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, and the light cruiser +_Champion_, with destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle +Squadron. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in +the rear during the southerly course, now took up a position on the +starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During this northerly run +the fire from our ships was very intermittent, owing to the weather +thickening to the eastward, although the enemy was able at times to +fire with some accuracy. + +From 5 P.M. until after 6 P.M. the light was very much in favour of +the enemy, being far clearer to the westward than to the eastward. A +photograph taken on board the _Malaya_ at 5.15 P.M. towards the western +horizon established this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted +against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 yards +distant. + +Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 minutes after +5.12 P.M. owing to the enemy’s ships being invisible, fire being +reopened at about 5.40 P.M. on the enemy’s battle cruisers, three or +four of which could be seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of +some 14,000 yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed +to be effective, the _Lion_ alone firing some 15 salvoes during this +period. + +At 5.10 P.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, which had rejoined the Battle +Cruiser Fleet after assisting the _Engadine_ with her sea-plane, fired +a torpedo at the enemy’s line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000 +yards from a favourable position--two points before the beam of the +enemy’s leading battle cruiser. + +At 5.35 P.M. the _Lion’s_ course was gradually altered from N.N.E. +to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements and resulting +position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also +gradually hauled to the eastward, being probably influenced in this +movement by reports received from their light cruisers, which were by +this time in contact with the light cruiser _Chester_ and in sight of +our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hood. + +The proceedings of these vessels will now be described. + +At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full speed to reinforce +Sir David Beatty. At 5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the _Invincible_ +(Flag), _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_, in single line ahead in that +order, with the destroyers _Shark_, _Christopher_, _Ophelia_, and +_Acasta_, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had the light cruiser +_Canterbury_ five miles ahead and the light cruiser _Chester_ bearing +N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was +rapidly decreasing. According to the _Indomitable’s_ report, objects +could be distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings, +and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according to +the same report, the visibility varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, +although other reports place it higher at times. + +At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the +south-westward, and the _Chester_ turned in that direction to +investigate, and, at 5.36 P.M., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser +on the starboard bow, with one or two destroyers in company. The +_Chester_ challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west to +close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel was +hostile. + +As the _Chester_ closed, course was altered to about north in order +to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a bearing +favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy well abaft the +port beam of the _Chester_ and on an approximately parallel course. +During the turn the _Chester_ sighted two or more light cruisers astern +of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser opened fire +on the _Chester_, the latter replying immediately afterwards, at a +range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility at this time, judging by +the distance at which the enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the +_Chester_, could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth +salvo hit the _Chester_, put No. 1 gun port out of action, and killed +and wounded a large proportion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 +port guns. The light cruisers sighted by the _Chester_ undoubtedly +belonged to one of the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the +starboard bow of their battle cruisers. + +Captain Lawson of the _Chester_, in view of the superior force to +which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards the 3rd +Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy’s light cruisers, all of +which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy +vessels turned after the _Chester_, and during the unequal engagement, +which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully manœuvred +his ship with a view to impeding the accuracy of the hostile fire, +realising that she was in no condition to engage such superior forces +successfully in her damaged state. + +The _Chester_ closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and took station +N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at a later +phase of the action. The ship suffered considerable casualties, having +31 killed and 50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were +disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above the water +line. It was on board the _Chester_ that the second Victoria Cross of +the action was earned, posthumously, by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class, +who was mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, whose +age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained standing alone at a +most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, +with the guns’ crew, dead and wounded, all round him. + +Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadron at 5.40 P.M., and Rear-Admiral Hood turned his ships to +starboard and brought the enemy light cruisers, which were engaging +the _Chester_, and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his +port bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port quarter of the squadron. +As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood made out his position he led his squadron +with the _Canterbury_ between the enemy and the _Chester_, on a course +about W.N.W., and at 5.55 P.M. opened an effective fire on the German +light cruisers with his port guns, at a range of about 10,000 to +12,000 yards. The enemy vessels turned away from this attack and fired +torpedoes at the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were +seen later from the _Indomitable_. At about 6.10 P.M. the _Invincible_ +and _Indomitable_ turned to starboard to avoid these torpedoes, three +of which passed very close to the latter ship, and ran alongside within +20 yards of the vessel. The _Inflexible_ turned to port. + +Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted astern of the first +group, and the four British destroyers, _Shark_, _Acasta_, _Ophelia_ +and _Christopher_, attacked them and the large destroyer force in +company with them, and were received by a heavy fire which disabled +the _Shark_ and damaged the _Acasta_. On board the _Shark_ the third +V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain, Commander Loftus +Jones, this award also being, I regret to say, posthumous. + +The attack of the British destroyers was carried out with great +gallantry and determination, and having frustrated the enemy’s torpedo +attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones +turned his division to regain his position on our battle cruisers. +At this moment three German vessels came into sight out of the mist +and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the _Shark_ and causing +many casualties on board; Commander Loftus Jones was amongst those +wounded. Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, commanding the _Acasta_, came +to the assistance of the _Shark_, but Commander Loftus Jones refused +to imperil a second destroyer, and directed the _Acasta_ to leave him. +The _Shark_ then became the target for the German ships and destroyers. +Commander Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged +gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be placed in the tube and +fired; but whilst this was being done the torpedo was hit by a shell +and exploded, causing many casualties. Those gallant officers and men +in the _Shark_ who still survived, continued to fight the only gun left +in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The captain was now +wounded again, his right leg being taken off by a shell; but he still +continued to direct the fire, until the condition of the _Shark_ and +the approach of German destroyers made it probable that the ship would +fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders for her to be +sunk, countermanding this order shortly afterwards on realising that +her remaining gun could still be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit +by two torpedoes, and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors +were picked up the next morning by a Danish steamer. In recognition of +the great gallantry displayed, the whole of the survivors were awarded +the Distinguished Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin, +Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. Hope, A.B.; +C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; T. W. Swan, Stoker. + +At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of our advanced +cruiser line, which at 5 P.M. was about 16 miles ahead of the Battle +Fleet, the latter being at that time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E., +steering S.E. by S. at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to +decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to +be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard flank had +closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 P.M. The 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron was about 16 miles due east of the advanced cruiser +line, but was steering more to the southward on a converging course at +a speed of about five knots faster. + +At 5.40 P.M. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, and shortly +afterwards ships were seen from the _Minotaur_ to be emerging from the +mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the senior officer of the cruiser line, had +recalled the ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing +and had ordered them to form single line ahead on the _Minotaur_. He +then made the signal to engage the enemy, namely, the ships in sight +ahead; but before fire was opened they replied to his challenge and +were identified as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, +engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the westward. + +At 5.47 P.M. the _Defence_, with the _Warrior_ astern, sighted on a +S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard bow) three or four enemy +light cruisers, and course was altered three points to port, bringing +them nearly on a beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in +the _Defence_, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each ship fired three +salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The salvoes fell short, and the +_Defence_ altered course to starboard, brought the enemy first ahead, +and then to a bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention +of closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 P.M., +and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers were falling +in close proximity to the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_. These ships +opened fire with their port guns at 6.5 P.M. and shortly afterwards +passed close across the bows of the _Lion_ from port to starboard. +One light cruiser, probably the _Wiesbaden_, was hit by the second +salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and nearly +stopped. Our ships continued to close her until within 5,500 yards. +From about 6.10 P.M. onwards they had come under fire of guns of heavy +calibre from the enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as +gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently bent +on finishing off his opponent, and held on, probably not realising +in the gathering smoke and mist that the enemy’s heavy ships were at +fairly close range. At about 6.16 P.M. the _Defence_ was hit by two +salvoes in quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up and +the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an officer as Sir Robert +Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s company as the officers and men of +the _Defence_ was a heavy blow. The _Warrior_ was very badly damaged +by shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain Molteno was +able to bring his ship out of action, having first seen the _Defence_ +disappear. From diagrams made in the _Warrior_ it appears that the +German battle cruisers turned 16 points (possibly with a view either +to close their Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled +_Wiesbaden_), engaged the _Defence_ and _Warrior_, and then turned back +again. This supposition is confirmed by sketches taken on board the +_Duke of Edinburgh_ at the same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, +however, it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the +observations on board the _Warrior_ it is certain that the visibility +was much greater in her direction from the enemy’s line, than it was in +the direction of the enemy from the _Warrior_. Although the _Defence_ +and _Warrior_ were being hit frequently, those on board the _Warrior_ +could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, and it +is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert Arbuthnot not +realising that he was at comparatively short range from the German +battle cruisers until he was already under an overwhelming fire. + +The _Warrior_ passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at the period +when the steering gear of the _Warspite_ had become temporarily +disabled.[K] + + [K] _Cf._ page 350. + +The _Duke of Edinburgh_, the ship next to the westward of the _Defence_ +and the _Warrior_ in the cruiser screen, had turned to close these +ships when they became engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in +accordance with a signal from the _Defence_. The _Duke of Edinburgh_ +joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on her starboard +bow, did not follow the other ships across the bows of the battle +cruisers, as to do so would have seriously incommoded these vessels; +she turned to port to a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron. + +The _Black Prince_ was observed from the _Duke of Edinburgh_ to turn +some 12 points to port at the same time that the _Duke of Edinburgh_ +turned, but her subsequent movements are not clear; the German accounts +of the action stated that the _Black Prince_ was sunk by gunfire at +the same time as the _Defence_, but she was not seen to be in action +at this time by any of our vessels, and, moreover, a wireless signal, +reporting a submarine in sight and timed 8.48 P.M., was subsequently +received from her. It is probable that the _Black Prince_ passed to +the rear of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 P.M., and that during the +night she found herself close to one of the German battle squadrons, +and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In support of this theory, the +German account mentions that a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk +in that manner during the night. None of the ships of this class was +present during the engagement, but the _Black Prince_ might well have +been mistaken for a ship of this type in the circumstances. + +[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AS DEPICTED DY A GERMAN ARTIST, +SHOWING THE “WIESBADEN” SINKING BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES + +The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out +between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918] + +We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 6.10 P.M. at the +termination of their engagement with enemy light cruisers, turning to +avoid torpedoes fired at them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood +sighted the _Lion_ and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at about +6.16 P.M. hoisted the signal to his squadron to form single line ahead, +and turned to take station ahead of the _Lion_ and to engage the +hostile battle cruisers, which at 6.20 P.M. were sighted at a range of +8,600 yards. + +A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and the fire of the +squadron was judged by those on board the _Invincible_ to be very +effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, who was on the bridge of the _Invincible_ +with Captain Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer +in the fore control, at about 6.30 P.M., saying, “Your firing is very +good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every shot is telling.” At +about 6.34 P.M. the _Invincible_, which had already been hit more than +once by heavy shell without appreciable damage, was struck in “Q” +turret. The shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander +Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion followed +immediately, evidently caused by the magazine blowing up, and the +ship broke in half and sank at once, only two officers, including +Commander Dannreuther, and four men being subsequently picked up by +the destroyer _Badger_. The British Navy sustained a most serious loss +in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, one of the most distinguished +of our younger flag officers, and in Captain Cay and the officers and +men of his flagship. The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships +even at the close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact +that the officers in the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ were under the +impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, whilst officers +in the _Inflexible_, stationed between these two ships in the line, +reported that her fire was being directed at a battleship of the +“Kaiser” or “König” class, and that only one ship could be seen. + +Just before the loss of the _Invincible_, the 3rd Light Cruiser +Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, had carried out an +effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s battle cruisers; both the light +cruisers _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ fired torpedoes at the leading +battle cruiser. It was thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark +as a heavy under-water explosion was felt at this time. + +After the loss of the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_ was left as leader +of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the _Invincible_ had been +passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close the enemy +ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard +for the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 P.M., the battle +cruisers being clear of the leading battleships (which were bearing +N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the +_Inflexible_ and _Indomitable_ took station astern of the _New Zealand_. + +The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The _Chester_ +with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead +of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser screen, encountered some of the light +cruisers composing the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing +so, drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadron, which, with the _Canterbury_ and destroyers, turned to about +W.N.W. to assist the _Chester_ and to engage the enemy vessels. + +In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made by four +British destroyers on the enemy’s light cruisers. This attack was +apparently thought by the Germans to come from the flotillas with the +Battle Fleet, as far as can be judged from their report of the action; +the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly mistaken +by their vessels for the van of our Battle Fleet, since mention is made +in the German report of the British Battle Fleet having been sighted +at this time by the German light forces, steering in a westerly or +north-westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High +Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard. + +So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time, +the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course +before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually +hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then, +to west, _but it was not until_ 8 P.M. _that a westerly course was +being steered_. + +The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser +engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. +The ship engaged by the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ was apparently the +_Wiesbaden_. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser +Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been +another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took +place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening +fire at 5.55 P.M., and the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ (the 1st Cruiser +Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about +5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly +possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed, +that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel. + +Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer _Onslow_, +commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey, which at 6.5 P.M. sighted +an enemy’s light cruiser in a position on the bows of the _Lion_ +and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. The _Onslow_ closed +and engaged the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between 2,000 +and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged by shell fire, +succeeded in closing a German battle cruiser to attack with torpedoes; +she was struck by a heavy shell before more than one torpedo could +be fired. Lieut.-Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all +torpedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not the case, +closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting +the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The +_Onslow’s_ engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer _Defender_, +Lieut.-Commander Palmer, closed her at 7.15 P.M. and took her in tow +under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night and +the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought her back to home +waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care of a tug. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_) + + +II.--THE BATTLE FLEET IN ACTION + +The “plot” made on the reports received between 5 and 6 P.M. from +Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and the report +at 4.45 P.M. from Sir David Beatty in the _Lion_ giving the position +of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet, +might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and that the cruiser +line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight the enemy nearly ahead of +the centre. Obviously, however, great reliance could not be placed on +the positions given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which +had been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. I +realised this, but when contact actually took place it was found that +the positions given were at least twelve miles in error when compared +with the _Iron Duke’s_ reckoning. The result was that the enemy’s +Battle Fleet appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had +expected, and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated. +There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning on board the +_Iron Duke_, as the movements of that ship could be “plotted” with +accuracy after leaving Scapa Flow, there being no disturbing elements +to deal with. + +The first accurate information regarding the position of affairs was +contained in a signal from the _Black Prince_, of the 1st Cruiser +Squadron (the starboard wing ship of the cruiser screen), which was +timed 5.40 P.M., but received by me considerably later, and in which +it was reported that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south, +distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were our own +vessels. + +Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, I had +directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause the range-finder +operators to take ranges of ships on bearings in every direction and +to report the direction in which the visibility appeared to be the +greatest. My object was to ascertain the most favourable bearing in +which to engage the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice being +exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibility appeared to be +best to the southward. + +At 5.45 P.M. the _Comus_ (Captain Hotham), of the 4th Light Cruiser +Squadron, which was stationed three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, +reported heavy gunfire on a southerly bearing, i.e., three points from +ahead, and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing +south-south-west although no ships could be seen. + +At about 5.50 P.M. I received a wireless signal from Sir Robert +Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting having sighted ships +in action bearing south-south-west and steering north-east. There was, +however, no clue as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind +that they might be the opposing battle cruisers. + +At 5.55 P.M. a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, +leading the starboard wing division in the _Marlborough_, inquiring +what he could see. The reply was: “Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the +starboard bow.” This reply was received at about 6.5 P.M. + +The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position of the enemy’s +Battle Fleet and its formation caused me to continue in the Battle +Fleet on the course south-east by south at a speed of 20 knots, in +divisions line ahead disposed abeam to starboard, the _Iron Duke_ at 6 +P.M. being in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E. + +[Illustration: + + H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYING + AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND] + +The information so far received had not even been sufficient to justify +me in altering the bearing of the guides of columns from the _Iron +Duke_ preparatory to deployment, and they were still, therefore, on the +beam. The destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening +formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direction of +deployment before stationing them for action. + +At 5.56 P.M. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported strange vessels in sight +bearing south-south-west and steering east, and at 6 P.M. he reported +them as British battle cruisers three to four miles distant, the _Lion_ +being the leading ship. + +This report was made by searchlight and consequently reached me shortly +after 6 P.M., but as showing the interval that elapses between the +_intention to make a signal_ and the actual receipt of it (even under +conditions where the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid +delay, and the signal staff is efficient), it is to be noted that +whereas the report gave the bearing of our vessels as south-south-west, +notes taken on board the _Colossus_ placed our battle cruisers one +point on the starboard bow of that ship, that is, on a south-south-east +bearing and distant two miles at 6.5 P.M. + +Shortly after 6 P.M. we sighted strange vessels bearing south-west from +the _Iron Duke_ at a distance of about five miles. They were identified +as our battle cruisers, steering east across the bows of the Battle +Fleet. Owing to the mist it was not possible to make out the number of +ships that were following the _Lion_. + +At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the position of +the enemy’s Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire were visible from ahead +round to the starboard beam, and the noise was heavy and continuous. +Our cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, but the fact that they +were not closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents +could hardly be battleships. + +In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to clearing up the +situation without altering the formation of the Battle Fleet, a signal +had been made to the Battle Fleet at 6.2 P.M. to alter course leaders +together, the remainder in succession, to south (a turn of three +points). Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 knots to allow of +the ships closing up into station. Immediately afterwards it became +apparent by the sound of the heavy firing that enemy’s heavy ships +must be in close proximity, and the _Lion_, which was sighted at +this moment, signalled at 6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers +bore south-east. Meanwhile, at about 5.50 P.M., I had received a +wireless report from Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 2nd Light +Cruiser Squadron, to the effect that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore +south-west from their Battle Fleet; in other words, that his Battle +Fleet bore north-east from his battle cruisers. + +In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our battle cruisers +were steering east, and observing that Sir David Beatty reported at +6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-east, it appeared +from Commodore Goodenough’s signal that the enemy’s Battle Fleet must +be _ahead_ of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it seemed to me +almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could have passed the battle +cruisers. The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of +the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer. + +The conviction was, however, forming in my mind that I should strike +the enemy’s Battle Fleet on a bearing a little on the starboard bow, +and in order to be prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to a +south-east course, leaders together and the remainder in succession, +and the destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 P.M., to +take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order disposed +them as follows: + +[Illustration] + +There was, however, a very short interval between this signal to +the destroyers and the signal for deployment, and consequently the +destroyers did not reach their positions before deployment. The +subsequent alterations of course to the southward and westward added to +their difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations +at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The correct position for the +two van flotillas on deployment was three miles ahead of the Fleet, but +slightly on the engaged bow. + +At 6.1 P.M., immediately on sighting the _Lion_, a signal had been made +to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. +This signal was repeated at 6.10 P.M., and at 6.14 P.M. he signalled: +“Have sighted the enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west”; this +report gave me the first information on which I could take effective +action for deployment. + +At 6.15 P.M. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in the _Barham_, commanding +the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled by wireless that the enemy’s +Battle Fleet was in sight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was +not reported in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I +concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir Cecil Burney +had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron at 6.7 P.M. as in sight, +bearing south-west from the _Marlborough_. + +The first definite information received on board the Fleet-Flagship of +the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet did not, therefore, come in +until 6.14 P.M., and the position given placed it thirty degrees before +the starboard beam of the _Iron Duke_, or fifty-nine degrees before the +starboard beam of the _Marlborough_, and apparently in close proximity. +There was no time to lose, as there was evident danger of the starboard +wing column of the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German +Battle Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 P.M. a +signal was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port +wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being assumed that the +course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle +cruisers. + +Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our battle +cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was danger of the +fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them. + +During the short interval, crowded with events, that had elapsed since +the first flashes and sound of gunfire had been noted on board the +_Iron Duke_, the question of most urgent importance before me had been +the direction and manner of deployment. + +As the evidence accumulated that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was on our +starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the _Iron +Duke_, the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the +starboard or on the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was +to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the Fleet +into action at the earliest possible moment, but it became increasingly +apparent, both from the sound of gunfire and the reports from the +_Lion_ and the _Barham_, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close +proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in +such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead +of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the +operations of destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the +van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle +Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers +during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the Fleet into +confusion at a critical moment. + +[Illustration: + + H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND + H. M. S. “ROYAL OAK” AND “SUPERB” ASTERN, AND “THUNDERER” AHEAD] + +The further points that occurred to me were, that if the German ships +were as close as seemed probable, there was considerable danger of +the 1st Battle Squadron, and especially the _Marlborough’s_ Division, +being severely handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet +before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist. The 1st +Battle Squadron was composed of many of our weakest ships, with only +indifferent protection as compared with the German capital ships, and +an interval of at least four minutes would elapse between each division +coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further interval +before the guns could be directed on to the ship selected and their +fire become effective after so large a change of course. + +The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from the supposed +position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van of the enemy would have +a very considerable “overlap” if the deployment took place on the +starboard wing division, whereas this would not be the case with +deployment on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate a +large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent the “T” +being crossed, and each successive division coming into line would have +to make this turn, in addition to the 8-point turn required to form +the line. I therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port wing, +division. + +The further knowledge which I gained of the actual state of affairs +after the action confirmed my view that the course adopted was the best +in the circumstances. + +The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division show that +the range of the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at the moment of +deployment was about 13,000 yards. The fleets were converging rapidly, +with the High Sea Fleet holding a position of advantage such as would +enable it to engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard +division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as they formed up +astern. It is to be observed that it would take some twenty minutes to +complete the formation of the line of battle. + +The German gunnery was always good at the start, and their ships +invariably found the range of a target with great rapidity, and +it would have been very bad tactics to give them such an initial +advantage, not only in regard to gunnery but also in respect of torpedo +attack, both from ships and from destroyers. + +A subsequent study of the reports and the signals received has admitted +of the accompanying plans being drawn up. + +The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and show clearly how +great would have been the objections to deploying to starboard. It +will be seen that the bearings of the enemy Battle Fleet, as given +by the _Lion_ and the _Barham_ at 6.14 and 6.15 respectively, give a +fair “cut,” and the bearing on which the _Marlborough_ opened fire +enables the position of the Battle Fleet to be placed with considerable +accuracy. + +Assuming that the German Battle Fleet was steaming at 17 knots on an +easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31, it will be observed that at the +latter time it bore 21 degrees before the starboard beam of the _Iron +Duke_ at a range of 12,000 yards. The _Iron Duke_ actually engaged the +leading battleship at this time on a bearing 20 degrees before the +starboard beam at a range of 12,000 yards. The accuracy of the “plot” +is therefore confirmed, so far as confirmation is possible. It appears +certain that between about 6.0 P.M. and 6.16 P.M. the German battle +cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and again turned +16 points to their original course. This is borne out by observations +on board the _Warrior_, which ship was being engaged by the _starboard_ +guns of enemy vessels. The German account also shows such a turn at +this period. + +Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, had +sighted the _Marlborough_ at 6.6 P.M. and the remainder of the 6th +Division of the Battle Fleet a little later. Not seeing any other +columns, he concluded that the _Marlborough_ was leading the whole +line, and decided to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 P.M., +however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral Evan-Thomas +realised that the Fleet was deploying to port, the 6th Division being +the starboard wing column. He then determined to make a large turn of +his squadron to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division, +which by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle. +During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships of the 5th +Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy’s leading battleships, but +the shooting was not good, and our vessels received little injury. + +Unfortunately, however, the helm of the _Warspite_ jammed, and that +ship, continuing her turn through sixteen points came under a very +heavy fire and received considerable injury. The disabled _Warrior_ +happened to be in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the +_Warspite_ had the effect for the moment of diverting attention from +the _Warrior_, so that the latter vessel got clear. + +The _Warspite_ was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts from +an unpleasant position and was steered to the northward to make +good damages, and eventually, in accordance with directions from +Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, returned independently to Rosyth, +considerably down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not +much injured. + +By 6.38 P.M. the remaining ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were in +station astern of the _Agincourt_ (1st Battle Squadron), the last ship +of the line. + +At 6.33 P.M., as soon as the battle cruisers had passed clear, the +speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 knots, and this speed +was subsequently maintained. The reduction of speed to 14 knots during +the deployment caused some “bunching” at the rear of the line as the +signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, however, to be +maintained until the battle cruisers had formed ahead. + +Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity for keeping a +reserve of some three knots of speed in hand in the case of a long line +of ships, in order to allow of station being kept in the line under +conditions of action, when ships were making alterations of course to +throw out enemy’s fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent +action on the part of single ships, or of divisions of ships, became +necessary, as well as to avoid excessive smoke from the funnels; for +this reason the Fleet speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots. +The experience of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at +times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for this reserve. + +[Illustration: _Plan 8_ + +_APPROXIMATE_ POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE GRAND FLEET AT 6.45. P.M. ON +31st. MAY 1916.] + +At 6.14 P.M. the enemy’s salvoes were falling near ships of the 1st +Battle Squadron, and the _Marlborough’s_ Division of the Battle +Squadron became engaged with some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at +6.17 P.M. immediately after turning for the deployment. At this time +fire was opened by the _Marlborough_ on a ship stated to be of the +“Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards and on a bearing 20° abaft +the starboard beam; this knowledge enables us to deduce the position of +the van of the German Battle Fleet at this time. + +Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s Fleet steering to +the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, followed by the Battle Fleet +in single line, the order being, four ships of the “König” class in the +van, followed by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the +rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached me at 4.48 +P.M. from the Commodore of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron indicated +that ships of the “Kaiser” class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. +The order of the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report, +but there is no doubt that ships of the “König” class led during the +Fleet action. The point is not, however, of importance. + +At about 6.38 P.M. the 6th Division was in line and our deployment was +complete. + +Enemy shells had been falling close to the _Colossus_ and her 5th +Division since 6.18 P.M., and these ships opened fire at 6.30 P.M.; +but the conditions of visibility made it difficult to distinguish the +enemy’s battleships. + +At 6.23 P.M. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed down the line, +on the starboard, or engaged, side of our Fleet, apparently partly +disabled. Her identity could not at the time he clearly established, +but her German colours were flying and she was in a position for +attacking the Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 P.M. the _Iron Duke_ +fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret guns by +other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear of the line. + +At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult to +distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an opinion +on board the _Iron Duke_, in her position towards the centre of the +line, as to the formation of the enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships +in sight on the starboard beam was not even sufficiently clear for me +to permit of fire being opened; but at 6.30 P.M. it became certain +that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle Fleet and +that the vessels then before the beam were battleships of the “König” +class. The order was, therefore, given to open fire, and the _Iron +Duke_ engaged what appeared to be the leading battleship at a range of +12,000 yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other ships +of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) opened fire +at about the same time, and the van divisions (2nd Battle Squadron) +very shortly afterwards; these latter ships reported engaging enemy +battle cruisers as well as battleships. The fire of the _Iron Duke_, +which came more directly under my personal observation, was seen to be +immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes fired registering +several palpable hits. It appeared as if all the enemy ships at that +time in sight from the _Iron Duke_ (not more than three or four, owing +to smoke and mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second +battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, and settling +by the stern. A large number of observers in the _Thunderer_, _Benbow_, +_Barham_, _Marne_, _Morning Star_ and _Magic_ stated afterwards that +they saw this ship blow up at 6.50 P.M. + +The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged about 12,000 +yards to the southward, though much less on other bearings, but ranges +could not at times be obtained from the range-finders of the _Iron +Duke_ at a greater distance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 P.M., +in a temporary clear channel through the mist, good ranges of 15,000 +yards were obtained of a battleship at which four salvoes were fired by +the _Iron Duke_ before she was again hidden by smoke and mist. The very +baffling light was caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly +also by the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing +Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-south-west with a +force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel smoke to drift towards our line, +thus further obscuring our view of his Fleet. + +The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently greater +than in the centre at about 7 P.M., and the enemy’s fire, which was +probably being concentrated on our rear ships, was more accurate at +this period, but quite ineffective, only one ship, the _Colossus_, +being hit by gunfire, although numerous projectiles were falling near +the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons. + +Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the Battle Fleet +could see only three or four enemy vessels at any one time, those in +the ships of the rear division did occasionally see as many as eight, +and were consequently better able to distinguish the formation and +movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing +to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and mist, to +distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in the customary +manner; the only course to adopt was for the captains to direct the +fire of their guns on to any target which they could distinguish. + +The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east by east, as +already stated, but the van had hauled on to south-east without signal +shortly after deployment in order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 P.M., +as the range was apparently opening, the course was altered by signal +to south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The _King George +V._, leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had just anticipated this +signal by turning to south. The alteration was made “by divisions” +instead of “in succession” in order that the enemy should be closed +more rapidly by the whole Battle Fleet. + +This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” involved some small +amount of “blanketing” of the rear ships of one division by the leading +ships of that next astern, and at one time the _Thunderer_ was firing +over the bows of the _Iron Duke_, causing some slight inconvenience +on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” however, was +unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was inappreciable. + +At 6.45 P.M. one or two torpedoes crossed the track of the rear of +our battle line, and the _Marlborough_ altered course to avoid one. +They were apparently fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which +were barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to those +on board the _Iron Duke_. They might, however, have been fired by +enemy battleships which were within torpedo range, or by a submarine, +the _Revenge_ reporting that it was thought that one had been rammed +by that ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by the +observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very skilful handling of +the ships by their captains. + +At 6.45 P.M., however, a heavy explosion occurred under the fore +bridge of the _Marlborough_, abreast the starboard forward hydraulic +engine-room. The ship took up a list of some seven degrees to +starboard, but continued in action so effectively that she avoided +three more torpedoes shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 P.M., +and at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König” +class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen to turn out of line. + +The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to his flagship stated +that the vessel had been struck by a “mine or torpedo.” It was assumed +by me that a torpedo had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed +over the same locality without injury from mine. This proved to be the +case, the track of this torpedo not having been sufficiently visible to +enable Captain Ross to avoid it. + +The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s torpedoes being +visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to other +officers. Reports had been prevalent that the Germans had succeeded +in producing a torpedo which left little or no track on the surface. +The information as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me +until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one torpedo was +reported by observers on board the destroyer _Oak_ to have passed close +ahead of the _Iron Duke_ at about 7.35 P.M., finishing its run 2,000 +yards beyond that ship, and a second was observed by the _Benbow_ to +pass apparently ahead of the _Iron Duke_ at 8.30 P.M., neither of them +was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs specially +stationed for the purpose. + +Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to south, a signal was +made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead of the _Iron +Duke_ and for the 1st Battle Squadron to form astern. This signal +had, however, been already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the +_Iron Duke_ in accordance with the general battle orders giving +discretionary powers to the commanders of squadrons, and the line had +been partly reformed before the signal was made. + +An incident occurred at about 6.47 P.M. which was an indication of the +spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which it is impossible to speak too +highly. The destroyer _Acasta_, which had been badly hit aft during +her attack on enemy light cruisers in company with the _Shark_ and +had her engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding +officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled the condition of his +ship to the _Iron Duke_ as that ship passed, leaving the _Acasta_ on +her starboard or engaged side. The ship’s company was observed to be +cheering each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that +this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were subsequently brought +into Aberdeen, being assisted by the _Nonsuch_. + +Shortly after 6.55 P.M. the _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of a ship +with the bow and stern standing out of the water, the centre portion +apparently resting on the bottom, with the destroyer _Badger_ picking +up survivors. It was thought at first that this was the remains of +a German light cruiser, but inquiry of the _Badger_ elicited the +lamentable news that the wreck was that of the _Invincible_. It was +assumed at the time that she had been sunk either by a mine or by +a torpedo, and, in view of the safe passage of other ships in her +vicinity, the latter appeared to be the more probable cause of her +loss. Subsequent information, however, showed that she was destroyed by +gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already recorded. + +At 7 P.M. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that the enemy was to +the westward. + +Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, brought the enemy’s +line into view once more, and between 7.0 and 7.30 P.M. the Battle +Fleet was again in action with battleships and also battle cruisers, +as they could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period was +very baffling. The range varied from as much as 15,000 yards at the van +to as little as 8,000 in the rear, this difference in range indicating +that the enemy’s Fleet was turning to the westward, as shown in the +accompanying plan facing page 358. + +In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of our +battleships was very effective at this period. Some instances may be +given. At 7.15 P.M. the _Iron Duke_, as already mentioned, engaged a +hostile battleship at 15,000 yards’ range and on a bearing 74 degrees +from right ahead. At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of +“Lutzow” type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer smoke +screen; at 7.17 P.M. the _King George V._ opened fire on a vessel, +taken to be the leading ship in the enemy’s line at a range of about +13,000 yards; the _Orion_ at a battleship[L]; the _St. Vincent_ was +“holding her target (a battleship) effectively till 7.26 P.M., the +range being between 10,000 and 9,500 yards”; the _Agincourt_ at 7.6 +P.M. opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that showed +clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least four of her salvoes +“straddled” the target; the _Revenge_ was engaging what were taken +to be battle cruisers, obtaining distinct hits on two of them; the +_Colossus_ from 7.12 to 7.20 P.M. was engaging a ship taken to be a +battle cruiser, either the _Derfflinger_ or _Lutzow_, at ranges between +10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct hits, two being +on the water line; whilst the _Marlborough_, as already mentioned, +“engaged a ship of the ‘König’ class.” Other vessels reported being in +effective action during this period. The _Royal Oak_, the ship next +astern of the _Iron Duke_, opened fire at 7.15 P.M. on the leading ship +of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 +yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and fire was shifted to the +second ship which was lost to sight in the mist after a few rounds had +been fired. It was difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on +which fire was being directed, but one or more of the enemy’s battle +cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 P.M., as a result of the +heavy punishment they had received from our battle cruisers and the 5th +Battle Squadron, and were engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet. + + [L] The _Calliope_ reported at 7.1 P.M.: “Two enemy + battleships, ‘König’ class, engaged by _Orion’s_ division, + observed to be heavily on fire.” + +Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships of the 1st +Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities for effective fire +than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and the fullest use was made of +the opportunities. This squadron, under the able command of Sir Cecil +Burney, was known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof +was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were needed, that his +careful training had borne excellent results. The immunity of the ships +of the squadron from the enemy’s fire, whilst they were inflicting on +his vessels very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to +the offensive powers of the squadron. + +[Illustration: APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE + +GRAND FLEET + +At 7. 15 P.M. 31st May 1916. + +_Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet, as evidenced +by the positions of the ships engaged at the time, shown in Red._ + +The Battle Cruisers and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, have crossed from +the port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet. + +Note. Their battle station is between 5 and 6 miles slightly on the +engaged bow of the Van of the Battle Fleet. + +The 2nd Battle Squadron is forming ahead of the Iron Duke. + +The 1st Battle Squadron is forming astern of the Iron Duke. + +The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron is getting into its battle-station on +the Van of the Battle Fleet. + +The 4th and 11th Flotillas are moving towards their battle stations. + +The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron is coming up from the rear of the Battle +Fleet to join the Battle Cruisers. + +The Minotaur and Cruisers are trying to get up to their battle stations +ahead of the Battle Fleet.] + +At 7.5 P.M. the whole battle line was turned together three more points +to starboard to close the range further; immediately afterwards two +ships ahead of the _Iron Duke_ reported a submarine a little on the +port bow; at 7.10 P.M. a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a +cruiser, was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W. from the +_Iron Duke_, and the Fleet was turned back to south in order to turn on +to the submarine and bring the ships in line ahead ready, for any +required manœuvre. A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges +between 10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the destroyers +turned and passed towards the rear of the line in a heavy smoke screen. +One destroyer was seen by several observers to sink from the effects of +the gunfire. + +At a sufficient interval before it was considered that the torpedoes +fired by the destroyers would cross our line, a signal was made to the +Battle Fleet to turn two points to port by subdivisions. Some minutes +later a report was made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my +Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with an instrument +for giving the necessary information) that this turn was insufficient +to clear the torpedoes, as I had held on until the last moment; a +further turn of two points was then made for a short time. As a result +of this attack and another that followed immediately, some twenty or +more torpedoes were observed to cross the track of the Battle Fleet, +in spite of our turn, the large majority of them passing the ships +of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons at the rear of the line. It was +fortunate that, owing to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were +apparently near the end of their run, and were consequently not running +at high speed. They were all avoided by the very skilful handling of +the ships by their captains, to whom the highest credit is due, not +only for their skill in avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in +which the ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, prevented +risk of collision and kept their station in the line. The captains were +most ably assisted by the admirable look-out kept by the organisation +that existed for dealing with this danger. + +The skill shown could not, however, have prevented several ships from +being torpedoed had the range been less and the torpedoes consequently +running at a higher speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow +showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that would hit +ships in a line when fired from destroyers at ranges up to 8,000 yards +was comparatively high, even if the tracks were seen and the ships +were manœuvred to avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes +are always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the line of +bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to judge the position +of the torpedo from its track. Many ships experienced escapes from +this and other attacks; thus the _Hercules_ reported that she “turned +away six points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along the +starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the other passed close +under the stern”; the _Neptune_ reported that “the tracks of three +torpedoes were seen from the fore-top, one of which passed very close +and was avoided by the use of the helm”; in the _Agincourt’s_ report, +a statement occurred that “at 7.8 P.M. a torpedo just missed astern, +it having been reported from aloft and course altered”; and again, +“at 7.38 P.M. tracks of two torpedoes running parallel were observed +approaching; course altered to avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and +at 8.25 P.M. torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed; +torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard bow”; the +_Revenge_ remarked, “at 7.35 P.M. altered course to port to avoid two +torpedoes, one passed about ten yards ahead and the other about twenty +yards astern, and at 7.43 P.M. altered course to avoid torpedoes, two +passing astern”; the _Colossus_ stated, “at 7.35 P.M. turned to port +to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side”; the _Barham_ at this +period reported that “at least four torpedoes passed through the line +close to the _Barham_”; the _Collingwood_ reported, “torpedo track was +seen 20 degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; large +helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close astern; at the same +time another was seen to pass about thirty yards ahead.” The captain of +the _Collingwood_, in remarking on the destroyer’s attack, added, “the +great value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me, an +outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action.” + +The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 P.M. and the Fleet was +brought to a south by west course by 7.33 P.M. (that is, to a course +one point to the westward of the course of the Fleet before the +destroyer attack). The total amount by which the range was opened by +the turns was about 1,750 yards. + +The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th Flotillas had been +delayed in reaching their action station at the van until about 7.10 +P.M., owing to the turns to the westward made by the Battle Fleet to +close the enemy. In accordance with arrangements made previously to +counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out to engage +the enemy destroyers, which, according to the report of the Commodore +Le Mesurier, commanding the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering +towards the head of the division led by the _King George V._, the van +ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed for the first +attack for the reason given above, they were in a very favourable +position to counter the second destroyer attack, which took place at +7.25 P.M. The enemy’s flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before +the starboard beam of the _Iron Duke_ at a range of 9,000 yards and was +heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, 1st, and 5th Battle +Squadrons. During this attack three enemy destroyers were reported as +sunk by the fire of the battleships, light cruisers and destroyers; one +of them, bearing a Commodore’s pendant, being sunk at 7.50 P.M. by a +division of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the _Obedient_, _Marvel_, +_Mindful_ and _Onslaught_, which attacked them near the rear of our +battle line. The _Southampton_ and _Dublin_, of the 2nd Light Cruiser +Squadron, attacked and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least +six torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the track +of, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their attack on the German +flotilla. + +The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring movement on the +part of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, the movement being covered with the +aid of a heavy smoke screen. Although this retirement was not visible +from the _Iron Duke_ owing to the smoke and mist, and was, therefore, +not known to me until after the action, it was clearly seen from the +rear of our line, as is indicated by the following citations: + + The Captain of the _Valiant_ stated in his report: “At 7.23 P.M. + enemy’s Battle Fleet now altered course together away from us + and broke off the action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which + effectually covered their retreat and obscured them from further + view.” + + The Captain of the _Malaya_ reported, referring to this period: + “This was the last of the enemy seen in daylight, owing to their + Battle Fleet having turned away.” + + Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period: “As the destroyer + attack developed, the enemy’s Battle Fleet in sight were observed + to turn at least eight points until their sterns were towards our + line. They ceased fire, declined further action, and disappeared + into the mist.” + + The Captain of the _St. Vincent_ said: “The target was held + closely until 7.26 P.M. (32 minutes in all), when the enemy had + turned eight or ten points away, disappearing into the mist and + with a smoke screen made by destroyers to cover them as well.” + + Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: “After joining the Battle + Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron conformed to the movements of the + Commander-in-Chief, engaging the rear ships of the enemy’s battle + line, until they turned away and went out of sight, all ships + apparently covering themselves with artificial smoke.” + + The Captain of the _Revenge_ recorded: “A flotilla of destroyers + passed through the line and made a most efficient smoke screen. At + this period the enemy’s fleet turned eight points to starboard and + rapidly drew out of sight.” + +In the German account of the action at this stage, it is stated, in +more than one passage, that the British Fleet during this action +between the Battle Fleets was to the northward of the High Seas +Fleet. This is correct of the earlier stages. The account refers to +the attacks on our line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states +finally that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the heavy +ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the north-eastward. +The accuracy of this statement is doubtful, since the destroyers were +clearly in sight from our heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to +state that “the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line to a +southerly and south-westerly course _on which the enemy was last seen_, +but he is no longer to be found.” + +This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships bore north and +north-east from the enemy and then that the enemy turned to south and +south-west, that is, _directly away from the British Fleet_. Thus the +fact that the German Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans. + +No report of this movement of the German Fleet reached me, and at +first it was thought that his temporary disappearance was due to +the thickening mist, especially as firing could be heard from the +battleships in rear, but at 7.41 P.M., the enemy Battle Fleet being no +longer in sight from the _Iron Duke_, course was altered “by divisions” +three points more to starboard (namely, to south-west) to close the +enemy, and single line ahead was again formed on the _Iron Duke_ on +that course. + +At this period the rear of our battle line was still in action at +intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s fleet, which were +probably some that had dropped astern partially disabled, but by 7.55 +P.M. fire had practically ceased. + +At about 7.40 P.M. I received a report from Sir David Beatty stating +that the enemy bore north-west by west from the _Lion_, distant 10 to +11 miles, and that the _Lion’s_ course was south-west. Although the +battle cruisers were not in sight from the _Iron Duke_, I assumed the +_Lion_ to be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet, +but it appeared later from a report received in reply to directions +signalled by me at 8.10 P.M. to the _King George V._ to follow the +battle cruisers, that they were not in sight from that ship either. + +At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have become divided, for +whilst Sir David Beatty reported the presence of battleships north-west +by west from the _Lion_, other enemy battleships were observed to the +westward (that is, on the starboard bow of the _Iron Duke_), and the +course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions” to west in order +to close the enemy; this alteration was made at 7.59 P.M. + +It will be observed that all the large alterations of course of the +Battle Fleet during the engagement were made “by divisions” instead +of “in succession from the van, or together.” The reason was that in +this way the whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with far +greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation, than if the movement +had been carried out by the line “in succession.” + +The objection to altering by turning all ships together was the +inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result of such a +manœuvre carried out with a very large Fleet under action conditions in +misty weather, particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of +bearing for a long period. + +The battleships sighted at 7.59 P.M. opened fire on the ships of +the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved out to starboard of +the battle line to engage a flotilla of enemy destroyers which were +steering to attack the Battle Fleet. The _Calliope_, the flagship of +Commodore Le Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some +damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a torpedo at +the leading battleship at a range of 6,500 yards; an explosion was +noticed on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class by the _Calliope_.[M] The +ships sighted turned away and touch could not be regained, although +sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 P.M., probably +from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch with and engaged some +of the enemy’s ships very effectively between 8.22 and 8.25 P.M. The +_Falmouth_ was the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch +with the enemy, at 8.38 P.M.; the ships then in sight turned eight +points together away from the _Falmouth_. + + [M] All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was + clearly concussion under water, and may have been caused by + the _Calliope’s_ torpedo obtaining a hit. + +At 8.30 P.M. the light was failing and the Fleet was turned “by +divisions” to a south-west course, thus reforming single line again. + +During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described above, the battle +cruisers were in action ahead as mentioned in Sir David Beatty’s report +in the Appendix. + +At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the large alterations +of course carried out by the High Sea Fleet, but it was regained at +7.12 P.M., the battle cruisers opening fire at 7.14 P.M., though only +for two and a half minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At +this period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by south to +south-west, and this course took them from the port to the starboard +bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 P.M. The movements of our battle +cruisers, which were at this time between four and five miles ahead of +the van of the Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly, +to the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers themselves, +but even more to the funnel smoke from the numerous cruisers, light +cruisers and destroyers which were attempting to gain their positions +ahead of the van. + +The movements of the enemy’s fleet could not be distinguished from our +Battle Fleet owing again to their own funnel and cordite smoke, and, +also, to the smoke screens which ships and destroyers were making to +conceal their movements. + +It will be realised that these conditions, which particularly affected +the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the same extent to our ships ahead +of our Battle Fleet. They had little but the smoke of the enemy’s +leading ships to obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle +Fleet had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that of the +enemy’s long line of ships. + +[Illustration: + + H. M. S. “SUPERB” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND + + H. M. S. “CANADA” ASTERN OF “SUPERB”] + +Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the Battle Fleet +were very much accentuated in the Battle Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn +Jerram, in his report, remarked on this point: “As leading ship, in +addition to the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I imagine +must have been cordite fumes from the battle cruisers after they had +passed us, and from other cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel +gases from small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense +smoke from the _Duke of Edinburgh_, which was unable to draw clear.” + +The general position at 6.45 P.M. and again at 7.15 P.M. is shown in +plans 8 and 9. + +At 7.10 P.M., according to remarks from the _Minotaur_, flagship of +Rear-Admiral W. L. Heath, commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the +position as seen from that ship was as follows: “The 2nd Cruiser +Squadron was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port side +of the _King George V._, gaining on her slightly, but with all the +destroyers and light craft between her and the _King George V._ The +battle cruisers were about four miles distant on the starboard bow +of the _Minotaur_; owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers +rapidly increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some eight +miles.”[N] + + [N] Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here + described should be timed at about 6.50 to 7 P.M., and the + diagrams show this accordingly. + +At 7.5 P.M. according to a report from the _Shannon_, of the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron, the _Shannon’s_ course was S. 10 W., “the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron endeavouring to take station on the engaged bow of the Battle +Fleet; the Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not engaged +and turned slightly to port.” And again at 7.22 P.M. a report says: +“The _Duke of Edinburgh_ had now taken station astern of the _Shannon_, +the battle cruisers were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading +ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross the bows +of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard. Battle cruisers firing +intermittently, light cruisers making their way through the destroyer +flotillas to attack the enemy light cruisers.” Rear-Admiral Heath +stated: “At 7.11 P.M. I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots to take +up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was then engaged +with the enemy.” He added: “One salvo fell short on the starboard bow +of the _Minotaur_ and some others in close proximity”; and later says, +“even when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell, no +more than the flashes of the enemy’s guns could be seen.” + +Further remarks from the _Shannon_, at a later stage, were: “At 8 P.M. +Battle Fleet altered course to starboard to close the enemy, and by +8.15 was lost to sight, bearing about north by east.” + +“At 8.15 P.M. Battle Fleet, out of sight from _Shannon_, was heard to +be in action.” + +“At 8.30 P.M. the visibility of grey ships was about 9,000 yards.” “At +8.45 P.M. _King George V._ again sighted, bearing north-north-east. +Visibility had again improved, and her range was estimated at about +10,000 yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close enemy.” + +At 7.20 P.M. the ships engaged by our battle cruisers turned away and +were lost to sight. They were located for a moment at 8.20 P.M. with +the aid of the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they +disappeared again at once, they were once more located and effectively +engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 P.M. at about 10,000 yards range. They +turned away once more and were finally lost to sight by the 3rd Light +Cruiser Squadron (the last ships to keep in touch) at 8.38 P.M., +steaming to the westward. + +This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers had of putting +the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s work. They had, under the +very able and gallant leadership of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the +splendid squadron so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone far to +crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser Squadron. + +It will be seen from the above account that our battle cruisers +experienced great difficulty in locating and holding the enemy after +7.20 P.M., even when far ahead of the Battle Fleet, with its small +craft, and therefore in a position of freedom from the smoke of our own +vessels and the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 P.M., the battle +cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The enemy turned away +on each occasion when he was located and showed no disposition to fight. + +The visibility by this time had become very bad; the light was failing, +and it became necessary to decide on the disposition for the night. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_) + + +III.--THE NIGHT ACTION + +The situation, which had never been at all clear to me owing to the +fact that I had not seen more than a few ships at a time, appeared to +be as follows: + +We were between the enemy and his bases, whether he shaped a course +to return via the Horn Reef, via Heligoland direct, or via the swept +channel which he was known to use along the coast of the West Frisian +Islands. + +I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward of us. He had been +turning on _interior_ lines throughout. We had altered course gradually +during the action from south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, +or 146 degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his +ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it was possible +that ships, which had fallen out owing to damage, might be to the +northward. + +The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind, +but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action +between the heavy ships. + +It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it. + +In the first place, such a course must have inevitably led to our +Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large destroyer +force throughout the night. No senior officer would willingly court +such an attack, even if our battleships were equipped with the +best searchlights and the best arrangements for the control of the +searchlights and the gunfire at night. + +It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights nor their +control arrangements were at this time of the best type. The fitting +of director-firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our +battleships (a very important factor for firing at night) had also +only just been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay was +due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts +I knew well that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not +be obtained, and that we could place no dependence on beating off +destroyer attacks by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch +with the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no +corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote +at night, since, if they were disposed with this sole object in view, +they would certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by +our own ships. + +But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, the result +of night actions between heavy ships must always be very largely a +matter of _chance_, as there is little opportunity for skill on either +side. Such an action must be fought at very close range, the decision +depending on the course of events in the first few minutes. It is, +therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general grounds. The +greater efficiency of German searchlights at the time of the Jutland +action, and the greater number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, +combined with his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the +Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such +an action. + +The question then remained as to the course to be steered. The first +desideratum was to keep the British Fleet between the enemy and his +bases, so as to be in a position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight +was rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet for the +night as quickly as possible to avoid visual signalling after dark; and +it was also necessary to place our destroyers in a position where the +chances of their coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a +minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking the enemy’s +capital ships during the night. The Grand Fleet was formed at the time +in practically a single line, steering approximately west-south-west. I +considered that a southerly course would meet the situation and would +enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and, if I put the destroyers +astern, they would fulfil three conditions: first, they would be in +an excellent position for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also +turn to the southward with a view to regaining its bases during the +night (which seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy); +secondly, they would also be in position to attack enemy destroyers +should the latter search for our fleet with a view to a night attack +on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships, +and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error or of our +battleships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum. + +Accordingly, at 9 P.M., I signalled to the Battle Fleet to alter +course by divisions to _south_, informing the Flag officers of the +Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the +officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that +they should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle Fleet +to assume the second organisation and to form divisions in line ahead +disposed abeam to port, with the columns one mile apart. This had the +effect of placing the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram: + + 1 mile 1 mile 1 mile + |<-------->|<-------->|<---------> + | | | + | | | | + | | | | + | | | | + 2nd 4th 1st 5th + + Battle Squadrons. + +My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was to ensure that +adjacent columns should not lose sight of each other during the night, +and that therefore they would not mistake our own ships for those of +the enemy. + +As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course the +destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of +the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 P.M. a signal was made to the mine-laying +flotilla leader _Abdiel_ (Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay +a mine-field in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship, +over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would pass if the ships +attempted to regain their ports during the night viâ the Horn Reef. The +_Abdiel_ carried out this operation unobserved in the same successful +manner as numerous other similar operations had been undertaken by this +most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one of our submarines, +stationed near the Horn Reef, which reported on return to her base +having heard several underwater explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 A.M. +on June 1st, it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines. + +At 10 P.M. the position of the _Iron Duke_ was Lat. 56.22 N., Long. +5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, and the order of the Fleet from +west to east was: + + Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron); Cruiser + Squadrons; + + Battle Fleet; + + 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squadron; + + 4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet; + + 11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from west to + east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet. + +Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward for the night a +destroyer attack took place on the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron at the +rear of our Battle line. This was reported to me shortly after 9 P.M., +but immediately afterwards a further report stated that the enemy had +been driven off to the north-west. + +At 10.4 P.M. Commodore Hawkesley, in the _Castor_, commanding the +destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern, sighted three or more +vessels at a range of 2,000 yards which he took to be enemy battle +cruisers. If the German report is to be believed, the ships were light +cruisers and included the _Hamburg_ and _Elbing_. The enemy at once +opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the _Castor_ was hit, and her +bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, making it impossible to +signal to the 11th Flotilla, which the _Castor_ was leading. The damage +to the _Castor_ was slight. The _Castor_, _Magic_, and _Marne_ fired +torpedoes at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla +refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity of the +vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a violent detonation, +following on the discharge of the torpedoes, had been felt in the +engine-rooms of the destroyers near the _Castor_. + +At 0.15 A.M. the _Castor_ sighted a German destroyer on her starboard +bow and opened fire with all guns at point-blank range. She was not +seen again. + +At 10.20 P.M. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and engaged five +enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with four light cruisers, probably +of the 4th Scouting Group. The enemy again opened fire with great +rapidity and accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading +ships, the _Southampton_ and _Dublin_, at very short range. Both +vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15 minutes’ engagement +and there were fairly heavy casualties; three fires which broke out on +board the _Southampton_ were promptly extinguished by fine work on the +part of the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had +been much cut up by shell fire. + +The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but fierce engagement, +and it is probable that the German light cruiser _Frauenlob_, whose +loss was admitted by the enemy, was sunk during this action, which took +place in that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and the +German 4th Scouting Group. + +At 11.30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy cruisers +steering a south-easterly course. Again the vessels sighted opened fire +immediately, and the flotilla leader _Tipperary_, commanded by Captain +Wintour, the leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire +and set on fire forward; the _Broke_, leader of the 2nd half Flotilla, +received injury to her steering-gear, rendering her temporarily +unmanageable and causing her to ram the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, with +the result that it became necessary to abandon the latter destroyer +on the following morning after taking off her crew. The destroyer +_Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Trelawny), next astern of the +_Tipperary_, fired torpedoes at a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared +to be hit and in a sinking condition, and the _Spitfire_ then collided +with a German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried +off some 29 feet of her skin plating. + +The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement, while +steering to the south-eastward, came into contact at midnight with the +enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron, and one ship (probably the _Pommern_) +was torpedoed and sunk either by the _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander +Marsden) or _Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Coles) or _Garland_ +(Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff). A heavy and accurate fire was opened +by the enemy and the destroyer _Fortune_ (Lieutenant-Commander F. G. +Terry) was sunk. + +The flotilla was again in action a little later with some enemy +battleships, and the _Ardent_ attacked, and fired a torpedo, but the +result could not be observed as a very heavy fire was concentrated +on the _Ardent_, which sank with colours flying after a very gallant +night’s work. It is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden and +one man were the only survivors, being picked up by a destroyer on June +1st after having been five hours in the water. + +The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of the 1st Battle +Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was somewhat astern of the remainder +of the Fleet during the night, owing to the _Marlborough_ not being +able to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions for this +speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also more than five miles +astern of the main portion of the Battle Fleet. At 11.30 P.M. also this +flotilla was obliged for some little time to steer a south-easterly +course, owing to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard +hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with certainty. The +result was that the 12th Flotilla was probably some ten miles to the +north-eastward of the 1st Battle Squadron by midnight. The incident was +a fortunate one since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of +the enemy’s battle squadrons. + +At 1.45 A.M. Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in the _Faulknor_, +sighted on the starboard bow this battle squadron, consisting of six +ships steering south-east. The leading ships were thought to belong to +the “Kaiser” class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel +to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots to draw ahead, +with the intention of turning to attack on a north-westerly course (the +reverse of the enemy’s course), in order to give an opportunity of +getting into close range. This attack was carried out at 2 A.M. at a +range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their torpedoes at +the second and third ships in the line. Some took effect on the third +battleship in the line, the explosion being so violent and the flame +reaching to such a height that it appeared to those in our destroyers +that the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the magazine +and destroyed the ship. + +Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the enemy light +cruisers, which were in company with the battle squadron. The destroyer +_Mænad_ (Commander J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the +north-westward with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had been +anticipated that the attack would have been made with torpedo tubes +bearing to starboard, and her tubes were not ready to fire to port. +Commander Champion held on the south-easterly course and, turning later +than the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned again +to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at 2.25 A.M. fired +two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth ship in the line at a range +between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, one of which took effect. In this case, +too, the flame of the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was +not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her were visible. + +It is of interest to note that at the time of the first attack on this +squadron six battleships were visible. After the first attack only five +were seen by Captain Stirling, and twenty-five minutes later five were +sighted by the _Mænad_, and after the _Mænad’s_ attack only four were +visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships was sunk was +considered at the time to be very strong, particularly as the reports +from the _Mænad_ and from Captain Stirling were sent to me quite +independently, and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that +Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original number in the +battle squadron, and five as the number remaining after his attack. + +When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle squadron he +reported the fact by wireless, but the signal was, unfortunately, not +received by any ship, owing, presumably, to the strong interference +caused by German wireless signalling at the time. + +The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas took station astern +the Battle Fleet in company with the _Champion_ (Captain Farie), leader +of the 13th Flotilla; the _Fearless_, leader of the 9th Flotilla, +had not been able to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the +destroyers of these flotillas lost touch with the _Champion_ during the +night, and the flotillas became somewhat scattered. + +At 12.30 A.M. a large vessel, taken at first for one of our own ships, +crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed, passing close to the +_Petard_ and _Turbulent_. She rammed the _Turbulent_ and opened a heavy +fire on both the _Turbulent_ and _Petard_; the _Turbulent_ sank and the +_Petard_ was damaged. + +At 2.35 A.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, of the 13th Flotilla, sighted +four battleships of the “Deutschland” class, and attacked, firing one +torpedo; an explosion was subsequently heard. + +It was impossible to state with certainty which of our destroyers +were actually successful in their attacks. The enemy, of course, +denied that any marked success was obtained by our attacks, but +information obtained after the action made it certain that at least +four battleships of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes, +in addition to the pre-Dreadnought battleship _Pommern_, which was +admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the light cruiser +_Rostock_. + +Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot be attributed +to particular destroyers, the work of the flotillas as a whole, and +particularly of the 4th and 12th Flotillas, was characterised by the +splendid dash, skill and gallantry for which our destroyers had been +conspicuous throughout the War. They were most ably led and achieved +magnificent work under very difficult conditions. + +There is no doubt at all that the German organisation for night action +was of a remarkably high standard. In the first place, the use of star +shell, at that time unfamiliar to us, was of the greatest use to them +in locating our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and, +secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful (much more so +than ours), but their method of controlling them and bringing guns and +searchlights rapidly on to any vessel sighted was excellent. It also +appeared that some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of +their secondary armament. + +The increased offensive power given by these devices did not, however, +prevent our destroyers from inflicting great damage on the enemy during +their night attacks, although they led to the loss of some valuable +destroyers and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader +of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of destroyer work +and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and other splendid officers +perished with their gallant crews. Our destroyer service has, indeed, +every reason to be exceedingly proud of the achievements of the +flotillas, both during the day action of May 31st and during the night +following that action. + +Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals during the +night, and, curiously enough, the under-water explosions, four or five +in number, were quite clearly recorded on a barograph in the _Malaya_, +a ship well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There is +little doubt that these records showed the explosion of our torpedoes +against enemy ships. + +From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark that our +destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired with great frequency +by the enemy, and they produced a very brilliant illumination, leaving +the enemy ships in complete darkness and not revealing their positions. + +At 11 P.M. the light cruiser _Active_, astern of the 2nd Battle +Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, and shortly afterwards +saw searchlights switched on and a heavy fire opened against this +vessel by a ship, or ships, on her starboard quarter. She appeared to +be heavily hit and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been +the _Black Prince_, which had apparently lost touch with our fleet +during the day action. + +Shortly after this incident the _Active_ passed over some submerged +object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent examination showed +that some 15 feet of her bilge keel had been torn away. It was not +conceivable that the object struck could have been submerged wreckage +from any ship which had taken part in the action, no fighting having +taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed possible that the _Active_ +had struck an enemy submarine. At 11.30 P.M. the _Colossus_ also passed +over some submerged object which was felt to scrape along the bottom +of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to both starboard +propeller blades. Again there is doubt as to what the obstruction could +have been; it was certainly not wreckage from any ship that had been in +action. + +At 2 A.M. on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney informed me that +the _Marlborough_ could not maintain the Fleet speed of 17 knots any +longer, on account of the stress on the bulkheads, and that she had +been obliged to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship +to proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the German mined +area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light cruiser _Fearless_ alongside +the _Marlborough_, and was transferred in her, with his Staff, to +the _Revenge_, the _Fearless_ being then detached to escort the +_Marlborough_. + +Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements which +constituted the Battle of Jutland will be gathered from a consideration +of the distances steamed by our ships during the operations. + +The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 3.48 P.M., the time +of opening fire, and 6.17 P.M. the time that the Battle Fleet commenced +action, and a further distance of some 57 miles to 9 P.M., when the +Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle Fleet steamed +some 47 miles between the commencement of their engagement with the +High Sea Fleet and the turn to the southward at 9 P.M. + +The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the period covered by the +night action--9 P.M. to 2 A.M. + +At 2.47 A.M., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered course to north +and formed single line ahead in the order--2nd Battle Squadron, 4th +Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th +Battle Squadron rejoined at 3.30 A.M. and took station ahead of the 2nd +Battle Squadron. + +The weather was misty and the visibility even less than on May 31st, +being only some three or four miles, and I considered it desirable +under these conditions, and in view of the fact that I was not in +touch with either my cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger +of submarine attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the +enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th Division of the +Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, having dropped astern during +the night owing to the reduction in speed of the _Marlborough_ and +the change of flag from the _Marlborough_ to the _Revenge_. Partly on +account of the low visibility, and partly because of the inevitable +difference in dead reckoning between ships, due to their many movements +during the action and during the night, considerable difficulty was +experienced in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to +the destroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and whose +facilities for computing their positions under these conditions +were only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all +classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause me any +surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 A.M., the destroyers +did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 A.M., and the 6th Division of the +Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Squadron, was not +in company until the evening. + +The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particularly +the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for +the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my +intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night. +It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the +destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was +effected it had become apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for +the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields +in the early morning on the way to their ports. The presence of a +Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 A.M., made it certain that our position at +that time would be known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the +information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the +early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must have passed +the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly after daylight. + +At 3 A.M. the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, which was lying disabled in Lat. +55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted a German light cruiser two miles to +the eastward, steaming slowly to the northward. After being in sight +for about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, bows +first. The _Sparrowhawk_ was subsequently sighted by the _Marksman_ and +others of our destroyers, and, being too seriously damaged for towing +back to a base, was sunk by the _Marksman_. + +Shortly after 3.30 A.M. the report of gunfire to the westward was +audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier, +commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was +engaging a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle Fleet. +Course was altered “by divisions” to west at 3.44 A.M., as it seemed +that the presence of the airship might possibly indicate the presence +also of the High Sea Fleet. At 3.50 A.M. a Zeppelin was in sight from +the Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back again to +north and fire opened on the airship, which, however, was too high for +the fire to be effective. She disappeared to the eastward. She was +sighted subsequently at intervals. + +At 4.10 A.M. the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions in line ahead, +disposed abeam to starboard, in order to widen the front and to reduce +the risk of submarine attack. At 4.25 A.M. the cruiser _Dublin_ +reported by wireless that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two +destroyers, and she gave her position. + +At 5.15 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle Fleet in +accordance with orders signalled, and was directed to locate the +cruiser reported by the _Dublin_, whilst the Battle Fleet searched to +the south-eastward for one of the enemy’s battle cruisers which was +thought to be in a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still +making for a German port. At 4.45 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. +55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 A.M. the Commodore of the flotillas +(Commodore Hawkesley), with destroyers, reported himself as being in +Lat. 55.48 N., Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was +in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at 18 knots, and +at 6.15 A.M. altered course to south. At 6 A.M., not having met the +destroyers, the Battle Fleet altered course to south-east, with the +cruisers in company, steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course +until 7.15 A.M., at which time course was altered to north, the Battle +Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 A.M. and to north at 8 A.M. + +The _Dublin_ was sighted at 7.55 A.M. and reported having lost sight in +a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32 E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat +destroyers she had reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated +that the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming fast. + +At 8.15 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 6.10 E., +steering north at 17 knots, turning at 8.52 A.M. to a south-west course. + +Between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. a considerable amount of wreckage was passed, +and the bodies of dead German bluejackets were seen in the water. The +wreckage of the destroyer _Ardent_ was also passed. Drifting mines in +considerable numbers were seen during the whole forenoon of the 1st +June, and there were one or two reports of submarines being sighted. +At 10 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the +Battle Fleet, and course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, +which had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine screen. + +At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 5.25 E., +and at 12.30 P.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long. +6.11 E. + +It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had either sunk or had +passed inside the mine-fields _en route_ to their bases. It had been +evident since the early morning, from the definite information obtained +by our directional stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to +port. All our own injured vessels were also _en route_ for their bases, +and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, and gave the necessary +instructions to the Rosyth force to return independently. Diagram 4 +shows the movement of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the +forenoon of June 1st. + +The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had been kept in port by +Admiralty orders on May 31st, and was despatched to sea on the morning +of June 1st, when I was informed that it was being sent out to join me +and to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 A.M. I instructed Commodore +Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to screen the _Marlborough_ +to her base; he informed me at 2.30 P.M. that he had sighted the +_Marlborough_. At 10.40 A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I +did not require the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt to +strengthen the _Marlborough’s_ escort and told him that I did not need +his ships. They would have been of great use at daylight in June 1st +had they been on the scene at that time, and it is needless to add how +much I should have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in +the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew well the extreme +efficiency and the fine fighting spirit of this force which, under its +gallant and distinguished commodore, had rendered such splendid service +throughout the War. + +The _Marlborough_ reported at 11 A.M. that a torpedo had been fired at +her and had missed. Some anxiety was felt about the ship on the morning +of June 2nd, as bad weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs +were ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber at 8 A.M. + +The _Warrior_, which had been taken in tow by the sea-plane carrier +_Engadine_, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 3.54 E. at 8 A.M. on the +1st June, but the crew was taken off by the _Engadine_ and the ship +abandoned later in the day, as the weather had become bad and it +was evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of rescue +was very smartly carried out, the _Engadine_ being skilfully placed +alongside the _Warrior_ in a considerable sea way by her Captain, +Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson, and the large number of wounded +transferred to her. The reports as to the condition of the _Warrior_ +were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain afloat, and +later fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore I detached the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron, and subsequently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, +to search for her. The search continued until the evening of June +23rd, no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a report +received subsequently from the Captain of the _Warrior_ that her +condition was such that she must have sunk shortly after having been +abandoned. During the search for the _Warrior_, one of the cruisers of +the 2nd Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at dusk, +opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported quite definitely that +the submarine had been sunk. Later evidence showed, however, that the +submarine was one of our own vessels of this class, that she had a +very narrow escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This was +one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines being mistaken for +an enemy, attacked by our own ships, and considered to be sunk. The +difficulty of ascertaining definitely the result of an engagement with +a submarine was thereby exemplified, and was one of the weighty reasons +which led the Admiralty during the War to refrain from publishing any +figures giving the results of engagements with submarines. + +Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the destroyer _Broke_, +and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was directed to search for that vessel +also, assisted by two light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely +in the Tyne, having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or +partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach port were +the _Acasta_, towed by the _Nonsuch_, and the _Onslow_, towed by the +_Defender_. + +The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, and was reported +ready for sea at four hours’ notice at 9.45 P.M. on that date. + +_Note._--In the diagrams embodied in this chapter there are some slight +departures from those which accompanied my original despatch to the +Admiralty. + +That despatch was sent in under constant pressure for its early receipt +and at a time when I, in common with my Staff, was very fully occupied +with the arrangements connected with the repair of damaged ships, the +constructive alterations which the action had shown to be necessary +in our ships, and the various committees which I had formed to report +on different subjects in the light of our experience. I was not, +therefore, able to give the personal attention to the reports which +later opportunities have afforded me, and such slight modifications +as I have made are due to a closer study of these reports, and of the +signals received during May 31st. + + * * * * * + +One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to send to the King +on the morning of June 3rd a message of humble duty, respectful and +heartfelt wishes on His Majesty’s birthday. + +The following reply was received from His Majesty, and communicated to +the Fleet: + + “I am deeply touched by the message which you have sent me on + behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow of a battle + which has once more displayed the splendid gallantry of the + officers and men under your command. I mourn the loss of brave men, + many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their + country’s cause. Yet even more do I regret that the German High Sea + Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by the misty weather + to evade the full consequences of an encounter they have always + professed to desire, but for which when the opportunity arrived + they showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the enemy + immediately after the opening of the general engagement robbed + us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events + of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valour and + efficiency of the fleets under your command. + + “GEORGE R. I.” + +The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious message, and +I added in my telegram to His Majesty that it was “a matter of the +greatest gratification to all ranks to receive such an expression +of Your Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our gallant +comrades.” + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND + + +There has been some discussion on the tactics of the Jutland Battle, +and no doubt there will be more. I have endeavoured to give the facts, +so that future discussions may take place with adequate knowledge. + +It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have seen +expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with the object of enticing +the enemy out to attack the weaker portion in order to provide the +opportunity for a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May +31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the southward of the +Battle Fleet in pursuance of the policy which had been frequently +carried out on previous occasions. + +Many surmises have been made as to the object with which the High Sea +Fleet put to sea on this occasion. The view which I have always held +is that the frequent light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down +the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the Skagerrak during the +spring of 1916, may have induced the German Commander-in-Chief to send +out a force with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged +in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle Fleet to sea +in support of this force. There is no doubt that he did not expect to +meet the whole Grand Fleet. If confirmation of this were needed it is +supplied in the German account of the battle, in which it is stated +that “there was no reason for supposing that any enemy forces were +about, much less the entire British Fleet.” + +Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of the whole +strategy and tactics of the War, leads naturally to the fresh problems +which the advent of new weapons had introduced. When I took command +of the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that of how to counter a +destroyer attack in a day action. It had excited more attention in the +two or three years before the War than any other question of tactics, +much attention was devoted to it during the War, and for that reason it +is desirable to discuss it fully. + +It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what were then +known as “P.Z. Exercises” (that is, actions between Battle Fleets as +an exercise), that destroyer attacks were actually carried out in the +British Navy on a large scale. + +During that year manœuvres took place between the 3rd and 4th Divisions +of the Home Fleets, commanded by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven, +and the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase of the +manœuvres of that year included some Battle Fleet “P.Z. Exercises,” +during which attacks by considerable forces of destroyers were carried +out. Before this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the +fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place without +destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented the matter from being +made the subject of thorough practical experiment on such a scale as to +give reliable guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into +greater prominence. + +The Fleet manœuvres of 1912 did not throw further light on the +question, as no Fleet action took place in which destroyers were +engaged; and the subsequent Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as +I recollect, include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged. +During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 manœuvres most of the +destroyer attacks on the “Red” Fleet were made from towards the rear of +the “Blue” battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge from +them. + +To turn from manœuvre experience; during the years 1911–14, covering +the period of Sir George Callaghan’s command of the Home Fleets, +destroyer attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that +were constantly being carried out, and officers were impressed with the +supreme importance of the whole matter. + +This was the position when I took over the command of the Grand +Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the matter immediately engaged my +attention. The “counter” which had usually been favoured by flag +officers commanding Fleets up to the date named, had been the obvious +one of an attack by our own light cruisers’ torpedo craft on those +of the enemy, as the latter advanced to attack. It was difficult to +forecast how far such a “counter” would be successful in preventing the +destroyers from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the distance +the torpedo could be relied upon to run with accuracy, and on its +speed, both constantly increasing figures. + +The great number of destroyers possessed by the enemy, the largely +increased range of torpedoes, the difficulty which our light cruisers +and flotillas might experience in reaching a favourable position +for meeting and disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter +could discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger attendant +on meeting the enemy’s fleet in weather of low visibility, when a +destroyer attack could be instantly and effectively launched before +such a “counter” could take place, made it essential to consider other +means for dealing with the situation. + +Some German documents which came into our possession early in the War +proved the importance which the enemy attached to this form of attack, +and emphasised the gravity of the question. + +It was, of course, fully realised that the question had two sides, and +that if our own Battle Fleet was open to this form of attack, that of +the enemy was equally so, but as against this there were important +considerations to which it was necessary to devote attention. + +The first was that the element of chance enters very largely into +torpedo warfare of this nature. A flotilla of destroyers attacking +a Battle Fleet at long range does so with the idea that a certain +percentage of the torpedoes fired will take effect on the ships, the +remainder passing between the ships. + +Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards having a speed of +30 knots an hour, or, in other words, of 50 feet per second, is not +comparable to a projectile from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000 +yards of say 2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly +straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course of the target +have been determined with considerable accuracy, the torpedo will not +hit. Let us assume that the target ship X at position A is steaming at +15 knots, and that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on +the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is discharged +on a line at right angles to the course of the target at a distance of +8,000 yards (_see_ diagram). The target ship will advance 4,000 yards +along the line A B whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the +line C D. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes. + +It will be seen that if the course of the target ship has been +misjudged very slightly, or had been altered during the passage from +A to B, the torpedo will pass ahead or astern of it. In that case it +might hit instead a ship Z ahead or one Y astern of X. + +There are no means available on board a destroyer for determining +with any real accuracy either the speed or the course of a ship at a +distance of four or five miles. Hence the difficulty, and the reason +why torpedoes are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in +expectation that _one_ of the ships in the line will be hit. + +[Illustration] + +The object in view is thus rather to “brown” the enemy, and the chances +of achieving this object are naturally proportional to the target +presented by a ship as compared with the space between adjacent ships. + +In the case of a British line of eight battleships attacked “beam on,” +the chances of a hit for torpedoes which reach the British line may be +assessed roughly at seven to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600 +feet, and the distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next +astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus giving a +total length of _ships_ of 4,800 feet, and the total of the _interval_ +between them as 6,300 feet. + +A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes, and at long ranges +one may calculate the chances of hits _on the above reasoning_ at +between three and four per destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are +correctly fired at such a range as to ensure that they reach the +British battle line, and provided that the British ships can take no +effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.[O] + + [O] Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up + to the year 1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun + armament than their enemies. + +It has been said that the element of chance is a large factor in +torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed. By this it is meant +that skill is not a factor that can produce a decisive effect when +dealing with torpedoes, as in the case of guns dealing with guns. It +is true that skilful manœuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo, +if sufficient warning of its approach is given, and if its position +with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly judged. When +experience at the Jutland Battle showed that under favourable weather +conditions the track of German torpedoes was visible for some distance, +great care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dispatches so +that future use could be made of the fact. + +Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that our enemy was +almost certain to possess a very considerable superiority over us in +the number of destroyers likely to be present during a Fleet action. +This was a question which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the +then First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had discussed it on +more than one occasion when the destroyer building programme was being +considered. + +Our fears were realised, particularly during the first two years of the +War. + +The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect at different +periods is shown in the following table, so far as it is known to me:-- + + ------------------+--------------+-------------+----------------------- + | British | German | Additional German + | destroyers | destroyers | destroyers, less than + | with the | probably | 12 years old, that + Date | Grand Fleet, | attached to | could join the High + | including | the High | Sea Fleet at Germany’s + | Flotilla | Sea Fleet | selected moment. + | Leaders[P] | | + ------------------+--------------+-------------+----------------------- + August 4th, 1914 | 42 | 88 | 20 + October 1st, 1914 | 42 | 88 | 20 + January 1st, 1915 | 42 | 88 | 30 + April 1st, 1915 | 58 | 88 | -- + July 1st, 1915 | 65 | 88 | -- + October 1st, 1915 | 65 | 88 | -- + January 1st, 1916 | 66 | 88 | 50 + April 1st, 1916 | 74 | 88 | -- + May 31st, 1916 | 80 | 88 | 70[Q] + ------------------+--------------+-------------+------------------------ + + [P] The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the + figures in column 2, since I never expected that it would + be able to concentrate with the Grand Fleet. + + [Q] No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in + destroyers. + +Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at the end of May, +1916, 70 were available to go to sea on May 30th (an unusually large +proportion). There happened, also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight +destroyers belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied the +battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which 47 were with +the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with the Battle Cruiser Fleet, +including the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had +88, a far larger proportion to each ship. + +This superiority in numbers on the part of the Germans arose from three +causes: + + (_a_) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and destroyer force + at Harwich, the presence of which force during a Fleet action was + very improbable, owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if + it took place, probably do so at Germany’s selected moment and + not at ours, and to the difficulty of concentration under such + circumstances. + + (_b_) The necessity of utilising a large number of our destroyers for + patrol purposes in the Straits of Dover and elsewhere. + + (_c_) We had not built an adequate number of destroyers in the + years before the War to meet the many needs that only this class + of vessel could fulfil, particularly as the enemy developed his + submarine warfare against merchant-ships. + +The shipbuilding programmes of 1908–09, and following years up to +1912–13, included provision for twenty destroyers each year. Subsequent +to the latter date, the programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in +order to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessel in which we were +woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in the Estimates, +there was never sufficient money to meet all the Admiralty’s needs. It +was intimated that one or other of the requirements had to give way at +a time when the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and as +the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary than the +destroyers, the number of the latter class of vessel was reduced. + +Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme initiated by +Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage of destroyers was most +seriously felt throughout the whole War, the conditions would probably +have been even worse had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been +sacrificed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard desired +by the Admiralty. + +A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity +for _not leaving anything to chance in a Fleet action, because our +Fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of +the Empire_, as indeed to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside +the Battle Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster +befall it or even should its margin of superiority over the enemy be +eliminated. + +The situation was in many respects different from that with which our +Navy was faced in the time of the old wars. In those days disaster +could only come about by reason of bad strategy or tactics owing to our +enemy being in overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force +better, and, apart from manœuvring, the action was invariably decided +by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried weapon. + +During the recent War two entirely new features of the greatest +importance were introduced. First, the torpedo could be fired at very +long range, up to 15,000 yards, either from large ships or destroyers, +and at shorter range from submarines, and the mine had been developed; +the invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be known +when they were being employed. + +The reasons which make it necessary to be more cautious when dealing +with the attack of under-water weapons than with gun attack are the +greater damage which one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may +well be fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to +reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it is usually +different; a ship which is being heavily hit can--if her own offensive +powers will not save her by crushing the fire of the enemy--so manœuvre +as to derange temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein lies +the whole necessity for the exercise of care when dealing with the +underwater weapon. + +These considerations led me to introduce measures for dealing with +destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet other than the counter of attack +by our light craft on the enemy’s destroyers. These measures involved a +turn on the part of the ships, either _towards_ the torpedoes or _away_ +from them. + +In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so that they would +present as small a target as possible to the torpedo, and incidentally +that the space between the ships should be correspondingly large. The +matter is very technical, and presents many interesting features, one +of which may be illustrated by an example: + +[Illustration] + +Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships to steer direct +for the attacking destroyers _if the moment at which the torpedoes are +fired can be ascertained_. + +This course, although applicable to one attack, leads to difficulties +in the case of successive attacks, since further turns towards will +bring the battle line within effective range of torpedoes fired from +the enemy’s battleships; occasions will arise when this risk must be +accepted. + +The accompanying diagram shows that the van and centre squadrons are +not so well safeguarded by a turn towards the attacking destroyers +as is the rear squadron, for if the enemy’s flotilla is seen to fire +torpedoes from C (a threatening position to the van) and the van +squadron turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will +steer along the line A B. + +If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron instead of the +van squadron as supposed, and their objective is the twentieth ship +in the line, they will run along the line C D, i.e., directly at the +fourth ship in the line. + +The target presented is, however, small, and the chances of a flotilla +attacking the rear squadron when in a favourable position for attacking +the van are not great. + +The important point in the case of a turn towards is, however, the +necessity for ascertaining the moment of discharge of the torpedoes. + +In the second case, that of turning away, the object is to place +the ships at such a distance from the attacking destroyers that the +torpedoes will not cross their tracks, but if this object is not +achieved the ships are in a good position for avoiding the torpedoes if +their tracks are visible; the objection to this manœuvre is that the +range of the enemy’s battle line is necessarily opened. + +It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or other of the +manœuvres should destroyer attacks take place under conditions which +prevented an effective “counter” by our own light craft; both manœuvres +were arranged to be carried out “by subdivisions” as a turn by +divisions of four ships would delay the completion of the manœuvre to +too great an extent. + +The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great deal in the way of +discussion and instructions on the subject of torpedo attack in a Fleet +action. The duties of light cruisers and destroyers in this connection +were dealt with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the +supreme importance both of making early torpedo attacks on the enemy’s +line and of immediately countering such attacks, and it was pointed +out that an early attack by our own destroyers would not only tend to +stop an enemy attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best +position to meet a hostile attack. + +The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroyers were so fixed +that they should be in the best positions to effect these two objects, +such positions being obviously in the van of the Fleet; in order to +provide against a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment +in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two flotillas, +according to the numbers available, and a light cruiser squadron, were +also stationed in the rear. + +The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been a matter of almost +daily consideration, and all our experience and thought led to the same +conclusion, namely, that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer +attacks, would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for this +belief, and some of them were as follows: + + 1. On each occasion when German vessels were met, they had + immediately retired towards their bases. + + 2. The tactical advantages of such a move were obvious. They might + be enumerated thus: + + (_a_) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of advantage + in regard to torpedo attack on the following fleet. The + retiring fleet also eliminates, to a large extent, danger of + torpedo attack by the following fleet. + + (_b_) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of drawing its + opponent over a mine or submarine trap. + + (_c_) Smoke screens can be used with effect to interfere with + the observation of gunfire by the following fleet. + + (_d_) Considerations of moral effect will force the stronger + fleet to follow the weaker, and play into the hands of the + enemy. + +We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these tactics that in +all the many exercises carried out by the Fleet during the War, it was +the invariable rule to indicate beforehand an _assumed_ position of +Heligoland, and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in-Chief +of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always deployed his Fleet +in the direction of Heligoland and adopted retiring tactics. The +difficulties resulting from the employment of these retiring tactics +and the best method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore, +the subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the senior +officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very frequently discussed +and worked out on the tactical board. + +The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if retiring tactics +are employed in conjunction with a free and skilful use of under-water +weapons. + +When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st, 1916, these thoughts +were in my mind, and were no doubt present in the minds of all +Flag officers in the British Fleet. It has been mentioned that the +circumstances of the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with +any degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, +and the deployment of our own Fleet took place under these conditions. +Even so, however, the course on deployment (that is, south-east by +east) was to a certain extent governed by the idea of getting between +the enemy and his base on the supposition that he would be making +towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef Channel. + +The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a commanding position +on the bow of the enemy caused the enemy to make a large turn to +starboard, largely because this squadron--Rear-Admiral Hood’s--was +mistaken for the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have +already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that at +about 5.45 P.M. “dim shapes of enemy battleships are discerned in a +north-easterly direction.” These shapes were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle +Cruiser Squadron. The German account states that their battle cruisers +turned away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Battle Fleet +the chance of placing itself between the enemy and his base. Advantage +was taken of this opportunity, and the enemy was then forced to pursue +his retiring tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns +required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed in a position +of tactical disadvantage owing to the British Fleet working round on a +wide circle outside the enemy. + +A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets will show this at +once.[R] The course of the British Fleet on deployment was south-east +by east. Successive turns to starboard brought the course through south +by west to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13 +points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards apart, the +German Fleet moving on the inner of these two circles. + + [R] _Cf._ diagram in the pocket at the end. + +The result was that the “overlap,” which the Germans erroneously +thought was in favour of the British Battle Fleet, but which was always +with the enemy, was accentuated, and the Grand Fleet was gradually +brought farther and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet, +placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in regard to +torpedo attack. This advantage was increased by the low visibility, +which rendered it difficult to see flotillas approaching to attack +until they were at fairly short range. + +When the first attack by German destroyers took place and the first +of the enemy’s flotillas was seen to be approaching on a bearing 30 +degrees before the beam of the _Iron Duke_, and had reached a distance +of 9,000 yards or less, the “counter” of a turn “towards” or “away” was +essential. Our own flotillas had been using every endeavour to get to +the van, but the frequent turns to starboard and the movement of our +battle cruisers across the bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their +movement, and it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers +could prevent the attack from developing. + +The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be determined with +sufficient accuracy for a turn “towards” and therefore the Battle Fleet +was “turned away,” in subdivisions. + +Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, coincidentally +with the destroyer attack the enemy made a very large turn-away from +our Fleet, and thus opened the range much farther, disappearing +entirely from view even from our rear; this process was repeated on +each occasion of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was, +therefore, continually refusing action. + +It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the whole line of +battle away for this attack, or whether the leading squadron could not +have held the original course. Such a movement was provided for in the +Battle Orders, but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000 +yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the _Iron Duke_, the +leading ship of the centre battle squadron, and therefore the leading +Battle Squadron was as open to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or +rear squadron; indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to +attack the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle Squadron was +also not at the time clear of the van of the centre squadron, as the +turns that had been made had prevented line ahead being re-formed, and +the _Iron Duke’s_ Division could not turn unless the division ahead +also turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led me to make +the signal general to the Battle Fleet. + +According to the reports of the captains of the ships of the Battle +Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed the line of our Battle +Fleet during the 7.10 P.M. destroyer attack alone, in spite of the +turn. The large majority of these were observed by the ships of the 1st +and 5th Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have crossed the +line _ahead_ of the _Iron Duke_, and at least six crossed the track +of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was moving out to attack the +enemy’s flotilla. + +In the case of a long line of ships there is always danger of the +torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being forgotten or minimised by +ships that are in the van, owing to failure to realise how dangerous +the torpedo fire of ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to +vessels a long way in rear, although they themselves are quite immune +from this danger. + +The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable +decentralisation of command, and great stress was laid on this point in +the general instructions for “Battle Tactics.” The opening paragraphs +of this section of the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It +was pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would control the +movements of the whole Battle Fleet before and on deployment (except +in the extreme case of very low visibility rendering it necessary for +the Flag officer of a wing division to take immediate action), he could +not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel and other +smoke made both vision and communication difficult. The necessity for +wide decentralisation of command was then pointed out, combined with a +close watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which Flag +officers should generally conform. + +The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since Trafalgar if +we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese War, and advantage was +naturally taken of the experience to make some changes in the Battle +Orders; but there were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and, +therefore, no radical alterations were necessary. As the Chief of the +Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet engagement, “This is all +going according to expectation.” We did, however, obtain confirmation +of our views as to the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted +by the German fleet. + +The principal changes that were made in the Battle Orders were in the +direction of laying still further emphasis on the discretionary power +which was vested in Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the +difficulty, always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jutland, which +the Commander-in-Chief would experience in controlling the movements of +the whole Fleet in the heat of action; also in defining still further +the different movements that might be adopted to deal with torpedo +attacks, whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships or from +destroyers. + +A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo attacks in +action had been prepared by my Staff during the spring of 1916, and +a memorandum, with diagrams, had been written showing the various +situations that might arise and the effect of the different +counter-movements in each case. It is of interest to note that this +memorandum was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was +fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not actually been +issued. + +The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in the memorandum before +it was finally issued to the Fleet. + +The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and the “counter” +measures adopted have been dealt with at considerable length, since +this form of attack and its “counter” have been much discussed in the +Service since 1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely +to continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject of much +future experiment. + +The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any great effect, and +their importance should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British +Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, but _it was not this +turn which led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy_. That +difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet made a very large +turn to the westward under cover of a smoke screen at the moment of +launching the earliest destroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers +in the van which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary +in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain touch until +8.20 P.M. because of the retirement of the enemy. + +The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, in +regard to the ranges at which the opening phases of the action should +be fought, remained unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the +policy of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside +torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line _in ordinary circumstances_. + +As is very frequently the case when naval actions do not result in +overwhelming material losses by one side or the other, or the capture +or destruction of a large part of the opposing Fleet, both sides at +the time claimed a victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped +to support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, besides +influencing neutral, and probably in particular American, opinion. + +The Germans apparently based their claim on two grounds, the first +being that of having inflicted heavier losses than they received. In +order to make good this contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk +one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and five +destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British side; and they +concealed, until further concealment was impossible, the sinking of +the battle cruiser _Lutzow_ and the light cruiser _Rostock_, besides +omitting to mention that the _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to prevent +her sinking, thereby slurring over the point that the _Seydlitz_ would +undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own _Warrior_ did, had the +action been fought as far from German bases as it was from British +bases. They also said nothing of at least four German battleships being +torpedoed, and of several battleships and all their battle cruisers +being so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further +fighting for several months. The case was very different with the +British ships, as has been already stated. If these points are borne in +mind, the original German claim to victory falls to the ground, even on +the material side. After the surrender of the German ships in November, +1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed writer on naval +matters, stated in the _Berliner Tageblatt_ of November 18th that “our +Fleet’s losses were severe,” adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was +clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be, +the last one. Authoritative quarters,” he declared, “said so openly.” + +But a victory is judged not merely by material losses and damage, but +by its results. It is profitable to examine the results of the Jutland +Battle. With the single exception of a cruise towards the English +coast on August 19th, 1916--undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the +High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show that it was still +capable of going to sea--the High Sea Fleet never again, up to the end +of 1917, ventured much outside the “Heligoland triangle,” and even +on August 19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately for +home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts of the approach +of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the method of procedure that would +be adopted by a Fleet flushed with victory and belonging to a country +which was being strangled by the sea blockade. + +Again, in the German account of the “victory” it is remarked that “as +the dawn coloured the eastern sky on the historic 1st of June, everyone +expected that the rising sun would illuminate the British line deployed +in readiness to renew the battle. This expectation was not realised. As +far as the eye could reach the horizon was clear. Not until the late +morning did our airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce +that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was approaching from +the southern part of the North Sea at full speed on a northerly course. +To the great regret of all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to +overtake and attack theirs.” + +What are the facts? We know now that as the sun rose, the High Sea +Fleet (except such portions as were escaping via the Skaw) was close +to the Horn Reef, steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for +home behind the shelter of the German minefields. And the Grand Fleet +was waiting for them to appear and searching the waters to the westward +and northward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it maintained +the search during the forenoon of June 1st, and the airship, far from +sighting the Fleet _late in the morning_, as stated, did so, first at +3.30 A.M., and on several occasions subsequently during the forenoon. +And if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what an +opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to annihilate them! One +is forced to the conclusion that this victorious fleet did not consider +itself capable of engaging only twelve British battleships. + +I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland Battle without +mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. From the second in command, Sir +Cecil Burney, to the youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell +in the _Chester_, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit and +determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and trusted friend, a +fine seaman who always handled his squadron--or, in my absence, the +Fleet--with marked skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a +high reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton Sturdee, the +victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer who had made a special study +of tactics; Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, +including my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir Robert +Arbuthnot and Rear-Admiral Hood, by whose deaths the nation and Fleet +lost of their best--were all officers of proved ability, in whom not +myself only, but the Fleet, had absolute confidence. + +In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet possessed a leader who +throughout his Service career had shown fighting qualities of the +highest order, and he had imbued his force with his own indomitable +spirit. + +The Flag officers second in command of squadrons had all led divisions +for a considerable period, and I was confident that they would handle +their divisions as well in action as they did during exercises, as +proved to be the case. + +The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyer flotillas +had invariably fulfilled every expectation that I had formed of them. I +had always admired the manner in which the personnel of these vessels +had endured the conditions under which their work was so frequently +performed. + +Assisted as I was by a brilliant Staff, with Rear-Admiral Sir Charles +Madden (my righthand man throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its +chief members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag officers, and +with captains who had on countless occasions shown their skill, I was +indeed in a fortunate position. + +To the above advantages I must add those obtained by the magnificence +of the personnel of the lower ranks. The officers and ships’ companies +were as keen as any Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait +had never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Officers and +men were day after day striving to perfect the fighting efficiency of +their ships, and well had they succeeded. The engine room staffs had +demonstrated early in the War that they would respond magnificently +to any demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it on the +occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and moral of the Fleet never +stood higher than at the time of the Battle of Jutland, and because +of that spirit I knew that the Fleet under my command was the most +formidable fighting machine in the world. + +Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with proper restraint. +Whenever and wherever there was opportunity, officers and men displayed +courage and self-sacrifice of the highest order. There were innumerable +instances which proved that the personnel of the present Navy has +nothing to learn in this respect from its forefathers. The dead +died heroic deaths; the wounded behaved with marvellous fortitude. +Forty-four years passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith +in, and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket, but they +surpassed all my expectations, and so long as that spirit endures, this +country will be fortunate, and with adequate forces will be safe. + +It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum issued to the Fleet +after the Jutland Battle: + + _Iron Duke_, + June 4th, 1916. + + H.F. 0022 349. + + MEMORANDUM. + + I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains, Officers and + Men of the Grand Fleet my very high appreciation of the manner in + which the ships were fought during the action on May 31st, 1916. + + 2. At this stage, when full information is not available, it is not + possible to enter into details, but quite sufficient is already + known to enable me to state definitely that the glorious traditions + handed down to us by generations of gallant seamen were most + worthily upheld. + + 3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable nature robbed the + Fleet of that complete victory which I know was expected by all + ranks, which is necessary for the safety of the Empire and which + will yet be ours. + + 4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most gallant comrades, + but, although it is very difficult to obtain accurate information + as to the enemy losses, I have no doubt that we shall find that + they are certainly not less than our own. Sufficient information + has already been received for me to make that statement with + confidence. + + I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information on this + point at an early date, but do not wish to delay the issue of this + expression of my keen appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my + confidence in future complete victory. + + 5. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful spirit and + fortitude of the wounded has filled me with the greatest admiration. + + I am more proud than ever to have the honour of commanding a fleet + manned by such officers and men. + + J. R. JELLICOE. + Admiral, + Commander-in-Chief. + + The Flag Officers, Commodores and + Officers in command of H.M. ships + of the Grand Fleet. + +My official despatch on the battle to the Board of Admiralty was +forwarded on June 19th, and the following letter was afterwards +promulgated to the Grand Fleet:-- + + ADMIRALTY, + July 4th, 1916. + + SIR,--My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered + your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand + Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on the 31st + May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the + Battle Cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and + Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet. + + 2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines + of the Grand Fleet on this, the first Fleet action which has + occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the + enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of + the 31st May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry and + devotion which characterised all who took part in the battle; the + ships of every class were handled with skill and determination; + their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid + testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff; + while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally + conspicuous. + + 3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of + the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems + with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to + account. The expectations of the country were high; they have been + well fulfilled. + + 4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your + proceedings on this occasion. + + I am, Sir, your obedient Servant, + W. GRAHAM GREENE. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL + + +The ships which had received damage in the Jutland Battle had to +be repaired without delay. The great majority of the repairs were +completed during June or by the first week in July, and, whilst under +repair, the opportunity was taken of effecting certain alterations +which experience gained in the action had shown to be desirable. +The _Marlborough_ was the only large ship whose repairs occupied +any considerable length of time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in +August, although the work upon her was handicapped to some extent by +being carried out in a floating dock moored in a somewhat inconvenient +position. The light cruiser _Chester_ was also detained at Hull until +July 29th, as her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a +great many alterations were carried out. The principal points affecting +_matériel_ to which attention was directed were: + + (_a_) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent the flash of + cordite charges, ignited by the explosion of a shell in a turret + or in positions between the turret and the magazine, being + communicated to the magazine itself. It was probable that the loss + of one, if not two, of our battle cruisers was due to this cause, + after the armour had been pierced. + + (_b_) Better measures were required to prevent the charges of small + guns from being ignited by bursting shell, and to localise any + fires due to this cause, in the case of guns of the secondary + battery in large ships, and the main armament in small ships. + + (_c_) Increased deck armour protection in large ships had been shown + to be desirable in order that shell or fragments of shell might not + reach the magazines. This need was particularly felt in all our + earlier ships of the Dreadnought type, since their side armour was + not carried to the upper deck level. The long range at which most + modern sea actions are fought, and the consequent large angle of + descent of the projectiles made our ships very vulnerable in this + respect. + + (_d_) The pressing need for a better armour-piercing projectile with + an improved fuze was also revealed. + + (_e_) Improved arrangements for flooding magazines and drenching + exposed cartridges had to be made. + +Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet to deal with all +questions of this nature, as well as the important matter of possible +developments in the fire-control system with a view to improving the +methods of correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be “straddled” +with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great gunnery +knowledge and experience of Captain F. C. Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were +of immense assistance, and he was most ably seconded by the numerous +highly skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers and +in the ships of the fleet. + +The action taken in connection with these matters was prompt, with +the gratifying result that before I relinquished the command of the +Fleet, the great majority of the heavy ships had been provided with +additional deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings +for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work was carried out +while the ships were at their usual notice for steam, much of it being +actually done at Scapa Flow by the dockyard artificers berthed there on +board the _Victorious_: the work carried out by these artificers and by +the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with most commendable +rapidity. + +Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty, as First Sea Lord, +and under the immediate direction of Captain Dreyer, then Director of +Naval Ordnance, a new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new +type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for guns of 12-inch +calibre and above, which certainly doubled their offensive power. + +The investigation into the possibility of further development in +fire-correction methods, a subject to which constant attention had been +given throughout the War, was at first carried out by two independent +committees. Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee, +composed of the most experienced and most successful gunnery officers +in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as the result, drawn up and +passed for adoption in the Fleet; these had already produced a most +convincing and most satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of +fire before I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no exaggeration +to say that the average time taken to find the gun range of the enemy +with these new methods was about one half of that previously required. + +Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders. The majority +had been installed in the Fleet before the great increases in the +range of opening effective fire had come about, as the result of +experience during the War. Our most modern ships at Jutland were +provided with range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of +the ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet long. +During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply range-finders up to +25 and 30 feet in length; a series of experiments with stereoscopic +range-finders was also instituted in the same year. It had become known +that the Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be stated, +in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that the developments +introduced in the fire-control arrangements of the Grand Fleet after +the Battle of Jutland did not affect the _instruments_ already in use, +which fully met our requirements, but the _methods_ of using those +instruments and particularly the system of correction of fire. + +On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and Cruiser Squadrons were +re-organised as follows:-- + + BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON + + _Lion_ (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet). + + _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + _Princess Royal_ (Flag), _New Zealand_, _Tiger_. + + _2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_: + _Australia_ (Flag), _Indomitable_, _Inflexible_. + + CRUISER SQUADRONS + + _2nd Cruiser Squadron_: + _Minotaur_ (Flag), _Duke of Edinburgh_, _Cochrane_, _Shannon_, + _Achilles_, _Donegal_. + + _3rd Cruiser Squadron_: + _Antrim_, _Roxburgh_, _Devonshire_. + +On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived at Scapa _en route_ +to Archangel. In the morning he crossed from Thurso in the _Oak_, and +came on board the _Iron Duke_ on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me, +and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him. Before lunch +we went round the ship. The officers and men naturally greeted him +with much respect, and he can have had no doubt of the admiration in +which he was held. During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming +trip, and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it as a +real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he confessed, had been +very great, adding that he had felt that he could not have gone on +without this break, which he welcomed very much. He was not, however, +very sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He mentioned the +difficulty which he experienced in dealing with questions discussed +in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by most soldiers and sailors, whose +training does not fit them to state or to argue a case, and who +frequently find great difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule, +accustomed to carry out their ideas without having first to bring +conviction to the minds of men who, although possessing great general +knowledge and administrative experience, have naturally but little +acquaintance with naval and military affairs which in themselves form a +lifelong study. + +After lunch conversation turned to the Jutland action, and Lord +Kitchener evinced much interest in the tactics and the general story of +the action. + +Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the idea that he was working +to a time-table, and that he felt that he had not a day to lose. He +mentioned three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed +astonishment at the programme which he had planned to carry out in the +restricted period. He was most anxious not to lose a moment on the sea +trip and asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest time +in which the passage could be made. + +During the day the weather at Scapa, which had been bad in the +morning, gradually became worse, and by the afternoon it was blowing +a gale from the north-eastward. It had been originally intended that +the _Hampshire_ should take the route which passed up the eastern +side of the Orkneys, following the channel ordinarily searched by +mine-sweeping vessels as a routine measure; but as the north-easterly +gale was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweeping was out of +the question, and it was also obvious that the escorting destroyers +could not face the sea at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which +route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest, and finally +decided that the _Hampshire_ should pass close in shore, and not take +the alternative route passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry +Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this decision were:-- + + (_a_) With a north-easterly wind there would be less sea and, + therefore, more chance of the destroyers being able to keep up with + the _Hampshire_. + + (_b_) It was practically impossible that this route could have + been mined by any surface mine-layer owing to the dark period in + Northern latitudes being confined to a couple of hours, during + which no ship could expect to approach the shore for mine-laying + without having first been sighted. + + (_c_) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries, and was, + therefore, under frequent observation. + +At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines had been confined +to water well to the southward of the Firth of Forth, presumably +because of their small radius of action. Danger from this source was, +therefore, considered to be very remote. + +Finally the weather itself was a protection against submarine attack +which was at that time more to be feared than the danger from submarine +laid mines. Mine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not been +practicable for three or four days owing to the weather conditions. + +At about 4 P.M. Lord Kitchener proceeded on board the _Hampshire_, +accompanied by his Staff comprising Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F. +Donaldson, Colonel FitzGerald, Mr. O’Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr. +Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second-Lieutenant McPherson, +Cameron Highlanders. The _Hampshire_ sailed at 5.30 P.M. escorted by +two destroyers. Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16 +knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers back if +they could not maintain the _Hampshire’s_ speed. Experience had proved +that high speed was a valuable protection against submarines. + +At about 7 P.M. Captain Savill, commanding the _Hampshire_, ordered the +two destroyers back to Scapa, as they were unable to face the heavy +seas at the speed of the _Hampshire_. Between 7.30 and 7.45 P.M. the +_Hampshire_ struck a mine about 1½ miles off shore, between the Brough +of Birsay and Marwick Head; she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The +incident was witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone message +was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands that the +cruiser was in difficulties. He at once ordered out patrol vessels and +informed me, with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene +immediately. + +The evidence of the few survivors of the _Hampshire_ showed that Lord +Kitchener was below when the ship was mined, and that an officer +escorted him on deck. Captain Savill was heard to give directions from +the bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and his Staff, +and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently on deck, but was not seen +after the ship sank. The weather conditions prevented any boats being +hoisted out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the ship +sank. + +The scene of the disaster was searched during the night by destroyers +and patrol craft, but the only survivors were twelve men who drifted +ashore on a Carley raft, although many bodies were picked up by the +searching vessels, and many drifted ashore. + +The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered. + +At the time of the disaster the _Hampshire_ was steaming at 13½ knots, +the wind being north-north-west, with a force of 50 miles an hour. +The cold water and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest +swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which was north-east at 4 +P.M. at Scapa, had become north-north-west by the time the _Hampshire_ +was outside, and there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the +Orkneys, as had been anticipated. + +The hours that passed after the receipt of the report of the +_Hampshire_ being in difficulties were most anxious ones. In spite +of the fact that the destroyers had been sent back, it seemed almost +incredible that the wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as +was actually the case, as the conditions in Scapa Flow were not so bad +as to indicate so extremely heavy a sea off the Brough of Birsay; and +even when it was reported that the _Hampshire_ had sunk (a report which +took some time to come through), there was hope that, at any rate, Lord +Kitchener and his mission would be saved by boat. As the hours passed +and no news was received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety +became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the certainty that +this great man, who had served his country so faithfully and well in +its greatest emergency, had met his death when under the care of the +Navy, the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord Kitchener had +inspired the Service with confidence and trust. The Navy had frequently +worked under him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been one of +the outstanding figures in the European War on the side of the Entente. +Everyone in the Grand Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had +fallen upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the feelings +of the Fleet generally were intensified in me, on whom lay the main +responsibility for his safe passage to Archangel, so far as such safety +could be ensured. + +I have often wondered since that fatal day whether anything could have +been done that was not done, but short of postponing the departure of +the _Hampshire_ altogether, until weather conditions admitted of a +channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could have been done. Such a +decision would have resulted in two or three days’ delay in starting, +and would never have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover, +with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy mine-laying +possibilities, I did not consider the delay necessary as I should +not have hesitated, if need had arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to +sea on the same night and by the same route as that traversed by the +_Hampshire_. + +My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming. There was, at first, +doubt in the minds of some people as to whether the loss of the +_Hampshire_ was due to a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were +set at rest by the sweeping operations which were undertaken as soon as +the weather admitted. They resulted in the discovery of moored mines of +the type laid in southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines being +easily distinguishable from those laid by surface vessels. + +During the month of June cruisers were kept constantly patrolling the +route to Archangel to protect shipping against possible enemy raiders, +as the traffic was very heavy at this period. The _Donegal_, _Antrim_, +_Devonshire_ and _Roxburgh_ were the vessels employed. They visited the +Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Stadlandet, _en route_ to and from +patrol, with a view to intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick. + +The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla were employed in watching +the waters in the Kattegat and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the +Norwegian coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft. A +regular submarine patrol was also begun off the Horn Reef, and was +continued up to the time of my relinquishing command of the Fleet. At +first two, and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol, +which was of great utility in giving information of the movements of +the few enemy surface vessels that ever ventured so far from their +base, and also proved of use for attacking enemy submarines. At +the commencement, the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and +look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with that of the German +submarines, by reason of their bad wireless equipment, which admitted +of a range of some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were attached +to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly the absolute necessity of +effecting an improvement in this particular, stating that I was quite +prepared to sacrifice some of the torpedo armament should this be +necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install efficient wireless +apparatus in the only class of vessel that could carry out a watching +patrol in the vicinity of German bases. Eventually arrangements were +made to provide them with a wireless installation which gave a range of +300 to 400 miles. + +When our submarines had been equipped in this way we were at once +able to establish an efficient chain of outposts off the Horn +Reef by the Grand Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the +northward the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the result that +in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult for the enemy to put +to sea unobserved and unreported. The comparative inefficiency of the +wireless installation in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our +destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had to face during +the first two years of War. It should be added that while patrolling +in the Kattegat, submarine G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside +territorial waters, the German steamship _Ems_, on passage from +Christiania to Lübeck with oil, zinc and copper. The crew were rescued. + +The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the month, other than +the usual patrols, were as follows:-- + +The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth on the +14th for the Naze, thence steered up the Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and +returned to Rosyth. + +The _Comus_ and _Constance_ left Scapa on the 25th, swept down the +Norwegian coast and returned on the 27th. + +The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers carried out a similar +sweep from Rosyth between the 29th June and July 1st. + +On June 22nd the first mines from a British submarine mine-layer were +laid by E 41 in the German Bight. + +His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with a visit on the +14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in the _Oak_, at 5 P.M., being +escorted by the destroyers of the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round +the Fleet in the _Oak_, His Majesty proceeded on board the _Iron Duke_, +where he spent the night. On the following day the King visited all +the flagships, on board of which a large percentage of officers and +men from the various squadrons were assembled, and left for Thurso in +the _Oak_ at 5 P.M., proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth, +honouring the squadrons at each of these bases with a visit. + +His Majesty addressed a representative gathering of officers and men +from the ships at Scapa, who had been assembled on board the _Iron +Duke_ on the morning of the 15th in the following terms:-- + +“Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand Fleet, you have +waited for nearly two years with most exemplary patience for the +opportunity of meeting and engaging the enemy’s fleet. + +“I can well understand how trying has been this period, and how great +must have been the relief when you knew on May 31st that the enemy had +been sighted. + +“Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching darkness prevented +that complete result which you all expected, but you did all that was +possible in the circumstances. You drove the enemy into his harbours, +and inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet another page +to the glorious traditions of the British Navy. + +“You could not do more, and for your splendid work I thank you.” + +The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during June, +gave as the figures:-- + +No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No. sent in, 20; No. on +patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to a given patrol, 8; No. +on special service, 1. + +A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during the +month--especially in the latter half--and this interfered somewhat with +the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. A very dense fog prevailed in +the Pentland Firth on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally +from the northward, were prevalent during the first portion of the +month, and a northerly gale occurred on the 5th. + +No large Fleet movements took place during June, as it was known that +the greater part of the High Sea Fleet was under repair as the result +of the Jutland action. + +During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only engaged in one cruise, +namely, from the 17th to the 20th. The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle +Squadrons, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, +the _Campania_, with sea-planes, and destroyer flotillas left Scapa +between noon and 1.30 P.M. on the 17th, and proceeded to the northward +and eastward of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of carrying +out a series of battle exercises on the 18th and 19th; they were based +on the experience gained of enemy tactics during the Jutland action. +Some of the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise, +and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during the forenoon of +the 20th. Fog was met with as the ships approached the Pentland Firth, +making entry somewhat difficult. + +Cruiser movements during the month comprised:-- + + (_a_) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by Grand Fleet Cruisers + to protect trade against raiders. + + (_b_) The establishment on the 7th of a regular patrol of two + cruisers and two destroyers in an area well to the northward of the + Shetlands, this patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and + armed boarding-steamer which had been previously placed there. + + (_c_) Extensive dispositions were made on the 9th to intercept a + German raider reported from neutral quarters, as about to leave + for the Atlantic. These dispositions included a close patrol by + two light cruiser squadrons and eight destroyers from Rosyth of an + area 80 to 100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which it was + expected the enemy would pass; a further patrol by the 4th Light + Cruiser Squadron and six destroyers was established farther north + to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; two cruisers + were ordered to patrol north of the Shetlands, local patrol + vessels being between these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half + flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island Channel.[S] + + (_d_) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left Rosyth on the 12th + and swept up the Norwegian coast and back, returning on the 15th. + + (_e_) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six destroyers repeated + the sweep, returning on the 20th. + + (_f_) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth + and swept to the southward in the direction of the Horn Reef from a + position near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having sighted + anything. + + (_g_) Two light cruisers and four destroyers repeated the sweep of + the Norwegian coast on the 24th. + + (_h_) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left + Rosyth on the 26th, and proceeded to a position to the westward of + the Little Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to the Naze + on the look out for enemy raiders or Zeppelins, reports having + been received of the frequent presence of Zeppelins on this line; + the force turned to the northward from the Naze and swept along + the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceeding thence to Scapa. The + sweep was again uneventful. + + [S] The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy + vessels being sighted; the report was probably incorrect. + +The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla were active during +the month in the Kattegat and patrolling off the Horn Reef. They +reported on the 20th that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft +were visible. + +The attacks by enemy submarines on warships reported during the month +were: + +The mine-sweeping sloop _Rosemary_ of the Southern Force was torpedoed +on the 4th, but was towed into the Humber. + +The light cruiser _Galatea_ was missed by a torpedo on the 12th, in +Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E. + +The armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Cornwall_ was missed by two +torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged in boarding a ship south-east of +the Pentland Skerries. + +The light cruiser _Yarmouth_ was missed by a torpedo on the 26th. + +Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were sunk by the gunfire +of four enemy submarines, on the 11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11 +E., their guns being entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which +the submarines are armed. This combined attack on the trawlers of the +Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the regrettable loss of the +three trawlers, was a great and well deserved tribute paid by the enemy +to the work of that patrol which had been uniformly successful, and had +proved a great annoyance to the German submarines. + +Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy submarines on the 7th, +to the eastward of the Pentland Firth; on the 12th, two divisions +of destroyers were sent from Scapa to attack the submarine that had +fired at the _Duke of Cornwall_, the _Musketeer_ dropping a depth +charge close to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought +considerably damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea-planes from +Scapa were sent after a submarine reported by the armed boarding +steamer _Dundee_ as sighted 10 miles east-south-east of the Pentland +Skerries, but she was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of +destroyers again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity, but +failed to do so. + +Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered by the sweeping +trawlers in the southern channel in the Moray Firth on the 26th, and +were swept up by trawlers and fleet sweepers before any damage was done. + +The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed: + +No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No. sent in, 23; No. on +patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 10; +No. on special service, 0. + +The armed merchant-steamer _Arlanza_, after temporary repairs at +Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July for refit. + +The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist being experienced +at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd, +24th and 25th. + +During the month of August the principal cruiser movements, apart from +those in connection with the Battle Fleet, were as follows: + + (_a_) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers in an area well + to the northward of the Shetlands was continued. + + (_b_) The “dark night” light cruiser extended-patrol seaward of the + Fleet bases was maintained. + + (_c_) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route was continued. + + (_d_) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as follows: + +On the 1st, two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a +sweep down the Norwegian coast, returning on the 3rd, having sighted +nothing of interest; on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers +from Rosyth swept from Lat. 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30 N., Long. +5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th, without result. On the +12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Scapa +and proceeded towards Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of 10 +British merchant-ships which had been brought out of the Baltic. These +vessels were escorted across the North Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy +arrived safely on the 14th. + +On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers _Dundee_ and +_King Orry_, which had been disguised as merchant-ships, left Scapa +for operations off the Norwegian coast. It was hoped that they would +be able to close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband without +exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better chance of +capturing them than any vessel having the appearance of a warship. The +_Dundee_ operated between Udsire and Lister, and the _King Orry_ off +Stadlandet, both being localities in which ships were in the habit +of leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser _Constance_ and two +destroyers were sent to support the _Dundee_, keeping well to seaward +of her, as that ship was operating in waters in which enemy warships +might be found. The operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying +a cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being sent in. + +On the 30th the _Abdiel_ left Scapa to lay mines in the vicinity of +the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation successfully, and without +being observed, on the night of the 31st–1st. + +The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kattegat and in the +vicinity of the Horn Reef continued. The submarines, returning on the +17th, reported having been attacked by a German decoy trawler in the +Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to operate against this +vessel, but met with no success. + +Casualties to war-vessels during the month included: The light cruiser +_Cleopatra_, of the Harwich force, which was mined on the 4th near +the Thornton Ridge off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be +repaired; the destroyer _Lassoo_, also of the Harwich force, was sunk +by mine or submarine near the Maas Lightship off the Dutch coast on +the 13th; the armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Albany_ was sunk by +a submarine on the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland +Skerries, with considerable loss of life, including Commander G. N. +Ramage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea-planes, and an airship were +sent out from Scapa at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of +her, although the armed boarding-steamer _Duke of Clarence_ which had +stood by the _Duke of Albany_ and rescued the survivors reported that +she had passed over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser +_Blonde_ went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland Firth, in thick +weather on the 10th, but was lightened and towed off on the 11th, +having sustained considerable injuries; the battleships _Warspite_ and +_Valiant_ collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the 24th, whilst, +respectively, returning from and proceeding to the night firing area, +both ships being considerably damaged, with the result that they had to +be docked. + +On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by an enemy submarine, +and the departure of the _Marlborough_ from the Tyne was thereby +delayed; the coincidence that mines were frequently laid in this +neighbourhood when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs, +led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that locality. On +the 4th or 5th August a considerable number of mines of the submarine +type were also laid in the War channel in the White Sea by enemy +vessels. + +On August 3rd four “C” class submarines left the Nore in tow of tugs +for Archangel, _en route_ by the canal system for service in the +Baltic. These submarines performed very useful work in those waters +during the year 1917. + +The increase in mine-laying by German submarines gave rise to anxiety +that the movements of the Grand Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields +near the bases at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new +mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was strengthened +during July by withdrawing a certain number of trawlers from patrol +duty in order to form a mine-sweeping flotilla; during the latter +half of 1916 the Grand Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty +comprised two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as well as two +flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in addition one flotilla of +paddle mine-sweepers was based on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These +flotillas were all additional to the small local sweeping force of +trawlers at the various fleet bases. + +On August 18th the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for a sweep in southern +waters. The presence of an unusually large number of submarines in the +North Sea--a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before the +Jutland Battle--had suggested the possibility of movement on the part +of the enemy and a sweep appeared desirable. The _Iron Duke_, after +leaving Scapa Flow, proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle +Fleet screened by two destroyers to communicate with the _Royalist_, +and at 7.55 P.M., as the ships were about to communicate, a submarine +on the starboard bow, about 250 yards off, fired a torpedo, which +passed close astern of the screening destroyer _Onslaught_ on that +bow. Only one torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the +attack, and did not get into the position intended for attacking the +_Iron Duke_, which was proceeding at high speed, and zigzagging, and, +therefore, fired at the _Onslaught_ instead. Communication between the +_Iron Duke_ and _Royalist_ was deferred until after dark in consequence +of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal. + +The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid the submarine, and +passed her without further incident, and the Battle Fleet and cruisers +concentrated at daylight on the 19th, in the vicinity of the “Long +Forties,” steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 knots. +The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a position 30 miles +ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 A.M. on the 19th the _Nottingham_, +one of the light cruiser screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst +zigzagging at 20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34 +N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the torpedoes struck +the port side almost simultaneously. The first report indicated that +she had been hit by mines _or_ torpedoes, and, until it was clear that +a mine-field did not exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this +locality, and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascertained +that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this became clear the +southward course of the Fleet was shaped to pass to the eastward of the +submarine. Meanwhile the _Dublin_ cruised at high speed in the vicinity +of the _Nottingham_ for the purpose of keeping the submarine down +so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26 A.M. the _Nottingham_ +was hit by a third torpedo, and it became evident that she could not +float much longer. Her boats were lowered, and the majority of the +ship’s company placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 A.M., just as the +destroyers _Penn_ and _Oracle_, which had been sent to her assistance, +arrived on the scene. These two destroyers picked up all the survivors, +except Captain Miller, one officer, and several men who remained on +board until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter from the +_Dublin_. Several torpedoes were fired at the _Dublin_ and the two +destroyers during their work of rescue, but all fortunately missed. + +From 8.24 A.M. onwards Zeppelins were frequently in sight from both +the Battle Fleet, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at, +but they kept at too long a range for our fire to be effective. The +_Galatea_ sighted the first airship at 8.24 A.M., and the second was +seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 A.M.; at 10 A.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt, +who was at sea with the Harwich force, reported himself in position +Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E., and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He +stated later that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole +period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received from the +patrol trawler _Ramexo_ that she had two Zeppelins in sight in Lat. 57 +N., Long. 1 E. It was evident that a very large force of airships was +out. A total of at least ten was identified by our directional wireless +stations and they appeared to stretch right across the North Sea. + +At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine E 23, on patrol +in the Heligoland Bight, that she had sighted ships of the High Sea +Fleet steering west at 9.19 A.M.; the position as received in the +signal appeared incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 +N., Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our directional +wireless stations also led me to consider that a ship of the High Sea +Fleet was in the position named at 5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 A.M. +On the return of E 23 to Harwich, her captain reported that he had +attacked the battle cruiser _Derfflinger_ unsuccessfully at 3.13 A.M. +on the 20th. At 5 A.M., in spite of the strong enemy destroyer screen, +he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battleship of the first Battle +Squadron, a ship of the “Nassau” type. This ship turned for home on +being torpedoed, and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but +at 7.20 A.M. E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, and the captain +of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was sunk. Subsequent information, +however, showed that she reached port in a damaged condition; the +persistent action of the captain of E 23 in the face of great +opposition, was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our +submarine service. + +On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our directional wireless +stations, speed was increased, and course shaped to a position at +which it was hoped the High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective +of that fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in the +neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention was to make for a +position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 E., where the Fleet would be +favourably placed either to engage the enemy before he closed the coast +or to cut him off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience +of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his objective +the bombardment would be carried out either shortly before dusk, or +at daylight, in order to facilitate escape afterwards, or approach +before, unobserved. In the possible alternative of the movement being +designed to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably placed +to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle Fleet was in position +Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steering south-south-east. Submarines +were sighted by the cruiser _Minotaur_ at 1.23 P.M., and by the light +cruiser _Boadicea_ at 1.38 P.M.; both these ships were in the vicinity +of the Battle Fleet which was manœuvred as necessary to avoid the +submarines; this caused some slight delay in the southward movement. + +The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea in readiness to +meet the Fleet, if required, and during the forenoon of the 19th, was +directed to spread on a line running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, +where the submarines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a +position to attack the enemy’s vessels should they proceed towards our +coast north of Flamborough Head; in such an event the enemy would be +between the Fleet and the submarines. + +The _Active_, with nine destroyers of the newly formed 4th Flotilla +in the Humber, which was also at sea, was directed to join the Battle +Fleet. + +At 1.45 P.M. I received information by wireless that directional +wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 P.M. in a position +approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. 1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 +P.M. was in Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet +was well ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the same course +after 12.30 P.M. as it had steered between 5.30 A.M. and 12.30 P.M., +which would take them to Hartlepool, it was evident that it might +be sighted at any moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance +between the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal was +therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High Sea Fleet might be +encountered at any moment. The meeting appeared to be so certain that +I arranged the distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the +assumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on meeting us, +I directed a concentration of fire of ships that would be ahead of +the _Iron Duke_ on deployment, of two ships on one, leaving the _Iron +Duke_ to deal with one ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate +firing at Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to us. The +weather was clear. There seemed to be a very good prospect that we +might, on gaining touch with the enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was +in a position to cut off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was +probable that we should be to the eastward, although farther north. +Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy elect to make +for our coast and try to escape to the northward, where he would have +found himself between the Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time +passed, however, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came in +from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High Sea Fleet had +turned back, probably owing to the fact that the Zeppelins had warned +the German Commander-in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this +assumption, at 2.35 P.M. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt to steer for a +position to the north-westward of Terschelling, so that he might be +ready to deliver a night attack on the enemy’s fleet with the Harwich +force. + +It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would leave a trap behind +him in the shape of mines or submarines, or both; and, indeed, the +numerous submarines already sighted made it probable that the trap was +extensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters which he had +occupied unless there was a prospect of bringing the High Sea Fleet to +action. + +It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight by 4 P.M., and if +he had turned for home, it would be impossible to bring him to action; +I therefore passed a visual signal out at 3.5 P.M. to Sir David Beatty +to the effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was in +sight by 4 P.M. + +At 3.20 P.M., however, the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 3rd Light +Cruiser Squadron reported a submarine in sight, and I signalled to Sir +David Beatty to turn at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to +the submarines was correct. + +At 3.40 P.M. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and the cruisers ahead +to turn. At this time I received information from our directional +wireless stations that enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 +E., at 2.45 P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning to +his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore turned the Battle +Fleet at 3.56 P.M., when in Lat. 54.40 N., Long. 1.01 E., reversing the +course to pass up the searched channel so as to avoid mines. + +At 4.52 P.M. the _Falmouth_ of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron in Lat. +54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by two torpedoes, one right forward, +and one right aft. The ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the +time, and the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the +torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the starboard bow after +she had been hit. The _Chester_, stationed astern of the _Falmouth_, +proceeded at full speed to zigzag in the vicinity with the object of +keeping the submarine submerged and preventing further attack. Another +torpedo was fired at the _Falmouth_ at 5.14 P.M., but missed. + +At 5.20 P.M. the destroyers _Pasley_, _Pelican_, and _Negro_, detached +to assist the _Falmouth_, arrived on the scene and the _Falmouth_, +under their escort, proceeded towards the coast under her own steam, +the _Chester_ then leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward. + +At 6.55 P.M. the _Pelican_ sighted a periscope, tried to ram the +submarine, but missed. She then dropped six depth charges and reported +that the submarine came to the surface almost immediately, and then +appeared to sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled, and +four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen the _Falmouth_, +which was proceeding at five knots. The ship eventually reached the +vicinity of Flamborough Head safely, and was there again hit by two +more torpedoes fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat, and +was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine destroyers until 8 P.M. on +the 20th, when she sank in Lat. 54 N., Long. 0.2 W. + +At 2.30 P.M. on the 20th, the destroyer _Porpoise_ reported having +rammed a submarine that had attacked the _Falmouth_. + +To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th. From 3.10 P.M. +onwards frequent reports were received of submarines being sighted. The +_Phaeton_, _Dublin_ (twice), and _Southampton_ all reported submarines +in sight between 3.10 and 4.52 P.M., the time at which the _Falmouth_ +was torpedoed. At 6 P.M. Sir David Beatty reported that there was a +German submarine screen of several boats extending north-east for +some 25 miles from Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 P.M. Commodore +Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy’s force of heavy ships +steering east, accompanied by two Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving +the position of the Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved +to be unfavourable, and at 7.30 P.M. the Commodore reported that he had +abandoned the pursuit; he returned with his force to Harwich. At 6.20 +P.M. reports received from our directional stations showed that enemy +ships were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 P.M., giving clear +evidence that the enemy was returning to his base. + +During the passage up the searched channel a number of submarines +were sighted and frequent, and in some cases, large alterations of +course were necessary to avoid them; if all the reports were correct, +the locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines. Reports +of submarines being seen were received between 4 P.M. and dark, +from the _Galatea_, _Phaeton_, _Bellona_, _Dublin_, _Southampton_, +_Lion_, _Royal Sovereign_ (two submarines), _Queen Elizabeth_, and +_Inflexible_, the last ship reporting that two torpedoes had been fired +at her at 7.50 P.M., and that both had passed close astern; at this +time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in company. + +Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by the _Chatham_, +_Galatea_, and _Lion_, and the trawlers _Sea Ranger_ and _Ramexo_; the +last-named reported having sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and +having scored two hits and caused a fire in the forward car. + +During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was detached to Rosyth, +and the Battle Fleet continued to the northward. Reports of submarines +being sighted to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at +5 A.M. and 3.30 P.M. on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was therefore +taken well to the northward to avoid them, and approached the Pentland +Firth from a north-easterly direction, arriving without incident +between 6.30 and 8 P.M. + +The experience of August 19th showed that light cruisers, proceeding +at even the highest speed unscreened by destroyers, ran considerable +danger from enemy submarines. The enemy’s submarine commanders were no +doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks, which we could afford to run +earlier in the War, were now unjustifiable. Representations were made +to the Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in future +light cruisers should be screened by at least one destroyer per ship; +the number of destroyers available for the Grand Fleet did not at the +time admit of this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number +intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached, destroyers +could be allotted to most of the light cruisers in the advanced line, +provided there were not many absent from the Fleet carrying out +extraneous services. + +The ease with which the enemy could lay a submarine trap for the Fleet +had been demonstrated on the 19th of August; what had constantly +puzzled me was that this had not been done very frequently at an +earlier stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted +and with some success, there seemed to be every reason to expect a +repetition of the operation, and it was clear that it was unwise to +take the Fleet far into southern waters unless an adequate destroyer +force was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. If the +circumstances were exceptional and the need very pressing, it would be +necessary to accept the risk. There was general agreement on this point +between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the Admiralty. + +During the month of August the weekly average of the 10th Cruiser +Squadron showed: + +No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112; No. sent in, 35; No. +on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrols, +10; No. on special service, 0. + +The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was foggy and misty +during a great part of the month. Much mist or fog was experienced from +the 1st to the 6th, the 10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th. + +During the month Grand Fleet submarines were exercised at Scapa Flow in +carrying out attacks on ships under way, and the destroyer flotillas +were similarly practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet +divisions being exercised in countering such attacks by turning +movements. These exercises were continued for the remainder of the +year, and much experience was obtained from them as to the different +methods of dealing with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet +action. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY + + +Events were to prove that my period of command of the Grand Fleet was +drawing to a close, my transfer to the Admiralty occurring at the end +of November, 1917. + +But before coming to that development something must be said in +continuation of the narrative of the work of the Grand Fleet. + +During the month of September, 1916, there was not much movement by +the Fleet as a whole. On the 4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and +2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, swept +towards the Naze, then down to the southward of the Little Fisher Bank, +and back to Rosyth. On the same day three divisions of destroyers from +Scapa endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported by +the _Talisman_ to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries. On the 7th a +further unsuccessful search for a submarine was carried out in the same +locality. + +On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons left Rosyth and +Scapa respectively to exchange bases, carrying out a search of the +North Sea _en route_, and on the 20th two light cruisers and four +destroyers left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on the +4th. + +On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the eastward made +it necessary to move the patrol line of the 10th Cruiser Squadron +temporarily farther west. + +On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 4th +Light Cruiser Squadron, _Campania_, and the destroyer flotillas left +Scapa for a cruise between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the +Norwegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light cruisers, +and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. Battle exercises were +carried out during the cruise. A submarine was reported on the intended +track of the fleet on return, and the base was, therefore, approached +by another route, the available local patrol vessels being employed to +keep the submarine submerged during the entry of the fleet to Scapa. + +Submarines were again active during the latter part of the month in +the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the +position of the squadron being shifted for that reason. + +On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth to +search the waters to the southward of the German North Sea mine-field, +returning on the 28th. + +On the same date the yacht _Conqueror II._, the patrol trawler _Sarah +Alice_, and two British steamers were torpedoed in the Fair Island +Channel by enemy submarines. On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, +destroyers were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate +against the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these waters. + +Early on the 30th the _Lion_, with the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser +Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and accompanied by a +destroyer escort, left Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, +then turned to the northward and proceeded to Scapa. + +During September the cruiser patrols were continuously maintained to +the northward of the Shetlands and on the Archangel routes, each patrol +consisting of a cruiser and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine +patrol, consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the Horn +Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols inconvenient, and +German destroyers on several occasions during the month cruised at +night in the area patrolled with a view to interrupting our submarines +when recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent change of +position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning from patrol on the +29th, sighted an enemy submarine on the surface, and, being unable to +get into position to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did +not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged. + +The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla (the 10th +Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the month, the base being the +River Tees, and the parent ship the _Lucia_, with two attendant +destroyers. The formation of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also +commenced, this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be +formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers to 100. + +On the 21st the new battle cruiser _Repulse_, heavily armed and of high +speed, but with inadequate protection for a battle cruiser, joined the +Fleet at Scapa to work up gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour +protection of this ship was about equal to that of the _Australia_ +and _New Zealand_, and she was greatly inferior in this respect to +the _Lion_, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, experience +during the War had demonstrated very clearly that our battle cruisers +were at a marked disadvantage in engaging German vessels of the same +class, unless they were provided with better protection than that given +to the _Australia_ and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore, +forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably to the deck +protection of both the _Repulse_ and her sister ship, the _Renown_. +These proposals were approved and the work carried out at the Fleet +bases. Although the ships were much improved by the alteration, they +were still far inferior in protection to the German battle cruisers. + +On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built on the Tyne, for +light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at Invergordon, and was a very +useful addition to that most valuable refitting base. + +The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser Squadron during +September were: + +No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on patrol, 15; No. +absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; No. on special +service, 0. + +The favourable weather and short nights, combined with the large number +of vessels maintained on patrol were responsible for the increase in +the number of ships intercepted. + +The weather as a whole was good during the month. Fog or mist was +prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th and 27th, and a gale occurred on +the 18th. Otherwise the conditions were favourable. + +In the early part of October, the activities of the enemy’s submarines +in the White Sea, which had been considerable during the month of +September, became more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three +Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, and a British +vessel and Russian steamer fell victims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., +Long. 35.3 E. Some submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in +Lat. 69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack +was successful. The _Fearless_, now a submarine parent ship, and +three submarines started for the White Sea on October 13th from Scapa +to operate from Alexandrovsk against the hostile submarines. They +arrived on the 20th and began operations at once. During their stay in +the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any enemy submarines, +but there was a marked decrease in enemy operations, possibly due to +the cramping effect of the presence of our vessels in those waters. +The _Fearless_, with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return +passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these waters before +the ice began to form. + +On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships of the 2nd Cruiser +Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to +the eastward, returning on the 4th. + +On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and swept towards the +Naze, thence proceeding to a position to the south-westward of the +Little Fisher Bank, in which our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef +patrol had reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting +suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours were found there +by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; three were selected and sent in for +examination, but were found to be in order. + +On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left Scapa to meet at sea +the airships stationed at Longside, near Peterhead, with a view to +gaining experience in airships and light cruisers working together. +The programme arranged could not be completed owing to bad weather, +but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, and some useful hints +were gained. This work was undertaken as a preliminary to the airships +being detailed to accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, +as the number of these craft completing in the near future justified +such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of the Zeppelin +type, it was felt that those of the smaller class might be able to +carry out useful reconnaissance work ahead of the Fleet if moving south +on the western side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable +experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German High Sea Fleet in +this respect. That experience had fully confirmed the views put forward +in 1913 on this subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval +Air Service came under my supervision. These views were expressed on +an occasion when the building of a fleet of Zeppelins was being urged +on behalf of the Navy. It was then pointed out with emphasis how +great would be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in +connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual conflict was +proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin and heavier-than-air +craft, but the views expressed were that whatever future there might +be for the latter as development proceeded, there was no likelihood +of their having the radius of action necessary for scouting work in a +fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already possessed it. My +apology for making mention of this fact is that it controverts the +assertion so constantly made that the senior officers in the Navy were +not alive to the value of air-craft before the War. + +On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some cruisers of the 2nd +Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left +Scapa to cruise to the eastward, returning on the 10th. + +On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers left for a sweep, +but were recalled on the 16th owing to bad weather. + +On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth +for a position to the westward of Ekersund, and thence swept down to +the Little Fisher Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of +interest. + +On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers left +the northern bases to spread on a line between Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 +E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, +on a course approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order to +search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was repeated during +daylight hours on two successive days; no enemy vessels were sighted. + +On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and the 14th and 15th +Flotillas left Scapa for a watching and exercise cruise to the +eastward, returning on the 24th. + +During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried out during the +month of October, the Flag officers were directed to carry out battle +exercises based on the tactics employed by the enemy during the Jutland +action, with a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet +these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from all Flag +officers. + +On October 24th a division of destroyers, together with sea-planes, was +sent to the Fair Island Channel to operate against enemy submarines +reported to be using this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during +the patrol. + +On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak to operate against +an enemy decoy vessel reported in those waters. On the same day the +_Kildonan Castle_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a +submarine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., Long. 18.30 +W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol line was consequently moved +temporarily to the westward, and trawlers were despatched to the +neighbourhood. + +On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth +to carry out a reconnaissance of the waters south of the German North +Sea mine-field. They returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy +vessels. + +On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th Flotilla left Rosyth +for an observation and exercise cruise in the central and northern +positions of the North Sea, and returned without incident on November +3rd. + +During the month the Northern patrol north of the Shetlands by one +cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was continued, as were the +patrol on the Archangel route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn +Reef. + +The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following +figures:-- + +No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on patrol, 12; No. +absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 12; No. on special +service, 0. + +Bad weather during the month interfered with the operations of the +squadron; gales were experienced on the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. +There was little fog or mist. + +On November 1st I left the _Iron Duke_ at Cromarty and proceeded to the +Admiralty at the request of the First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was +the result of letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing +danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity +for the adoption of most energetic measures to deal with this danger. +It had been for some time my opinion that unless the Navy could devise +effective means, first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, +to protect our communications more successfully until the submarines +could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of our being forced into +making an unsatisfactory peace. From information furnished to me it +was evident that the Germans were making special efforts to increase +the number of their submarines very largely, and there did not seem +to be much prospect, with the methods we were at the time employing, +of destroying submarines at a rate at all approaching that of their +construction. + +So far as I was aware there was an insufficient reserve of food in +the country to provide against the consequences of successful action +by enemy submarines; and the construction of merchant-ships on an +adequate scale to replace those lost had not been taken in hand, this +being obviously an essential measure. I had written semi-officially for +eighteen months before on the matter.[T] It seemed to me questionable +whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently +numerous and important staff, having as its sole business the work of +dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem which was assuming +such very serious proportions. It did not appear that new proposals +and inventions for dealing with the submarine campaign were being +pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly because of the +absence of such an organisation, of difficulties connected with labour +and _matériel_; and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers +confronting us would be successfully combated. + + [T] The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food + supplies or, at that time, for merchant-ship building. + +I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was alive to the +danger, and that it caused him much anxiety. We had corresponded very +freely on all subjects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty, +and I was aware of his views on matters connected with the War, on +which we had always been in complete agreement. His direction and +assistance in connection with matters concerning the development +and employment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, and +invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that in putting forward my +views as to the new and serious danger confronting us, and the possible +methods of dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance in +combating the menace. One of my suggestions was the formation of a +committee, or department, at the Admiralty under a senior officer, +and composed of some of the clever and younger officers who had +shown marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole object would +be the development of arrangements for dealing with the submarine +warfare against merchant shipping, and the production of the necessary +material. I pointed out that our existing methods were not meeting with +the success attained at an earlier period, and gave the reasons which, +in my opinion, were responsible for this result. + +I had also formed and expressed the opinion that the High Sea Fleet +would not be risked again in a Fleet action, at any rate, until the +submarine campaign against merchant shipping had been fully tried and +had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I suggested to the +Admiralty the desirability of reducing the number of destroyers in the +Grand Fleet by one flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines +in waters where such action had some chance of success. I pointed +out, once again, that offensive action against submarines in the +northern part of the North Sea (the only waters in which Grand Fleet +destroyers could be used, and yet be available for work with the +Fleet in an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results, +as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water open to them, +always dive and escape. The areas in which destroyers _could_ act more +effectively against submarines were comparatively narrow and deep +waters; in restricted localities, such as some parts of the English +Channel, where the depth did not allow of their resting on the bottom, +if hunted. My contention was that it was probably wise to reduce the +number of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen +the force required to deal with the submarine danger, even if this +reduction necessitated sending the Grand Fleet to sea short of one +battle squadron, should it have to deal with a grave emergency, such +as attempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt _we could not +face_, was to run the graver risk of serious disaster from successful +submarine warfare on merchant shipping. + +It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would _not_ risk a fleet +action for some time, and even if this Fleet undertook an operation +having as its objective some military advantage, I considered that +with the 1st, 2nd and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had +been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be engaged with +every prospect of success, provided always that it was well screened +from submarine attack and carefully handled. The only direction, apart +from an attack on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet +could inflict any material damage on us and which the Grand Fleet could +expect to be in a position to prevent, lay in attempted invasion. The +bombardment of coast towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could +not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened to be at sea +and in the right position at the right moment. + +The objection which might be raised to this policy, which was otherwise +to my mind correct, was the effect on the public mind of the High Sea +Fleet being at sea without being brought to action, even if it could +achieve no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised very +fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility involved +in disregarding it. On the other hand, the submarine danger to our +shipping was most pressing and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with +at all costs, and without delay, since the existence of the armies as +well as that of the civil population depended on merchant shipping. + +I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty on November 5th. + +On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron +and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa to cruise eastward of the +Shetland Islands, returning on November 4th. + +On the 3rd the _Botha_, with four destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, left +Scapa for a sweep northward along the Norwegian coast from a position +near Udsire Lighthouse on the probable track of enemy submarines +returning to their bases. On the same day the _Faulknor_ and six +destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried out a similar +sweep to the northward, starting from the vicinity of the Little Fisher +Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th +Flotilla from Rosyth supported both forces. + +At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on patrol off the Horn +Reef, sighted four enemy battleships of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 +N., Long. 6.53 E. A considerable sea was running, making it difficult +to prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had a strong +destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack were very difficult. +But Commander Lawrence succeeded, in spite of these difficulties, in +firing his four bow torpedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them +took effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned to the +southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable period, but +unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently that the two damaged ships +managed to reach port, but this fact does not detract from the great +credit attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack under +exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident showed, as in previous +cases, the efficiency of the German system of underwater protection in +their capital ships. + +On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against enemy submarines on +their expected tracks. + +From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was experienced in +northern waters; several merchant ships were disabled and assistance +was rendered to them by the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by +tugs from Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 17th. + +On the 18th the _Otway_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, intercepted the +Norwegian steamship _Older_, which was found to be in charge of a prize +crew from a German submarine. She had on board, in addition, survivors +of an Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine. +The _Otway_ recaptured her, but was not in time to prevent the Germans +from exploding several bombs in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did +not, however, succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway. + +During the period up to November 19th, the weekly average of work of +the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:-- + +No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on patrol, 13; No. +absent, 11; No. on special service, 0. + +The weather throughout the period to the 19th November was very bad, +and the figures showed a corresponding reduction in the number of ships +intercepted. + +Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 16th, 17th and 18th. + +On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 1st and 2nd +Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers proceeded +to sea for a cruise in northern waters, during which battle exercises +were carried out. + +Shortly before the _Iron Duke_ slipped from her buoy, and whilst the +remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its way out of harbour, I received +a telegram from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post +of First Sea Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I +consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and he stated his +opinion that I ought to accept the post in order to be in a position +to put into practice the views I held as to the steps required to deal +with the submarine menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to +leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since the outbreak +of the War, for a position which I knew was the most difficult that a +sailor could be called upon to fill in war time. + +I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to do whatever was +considered best for the Service, and in accordance with the wish +expressed in his telegram, agreed to meet him at Rosyth. + +I then followed the Fleet to sea in the _Iron Duke_, and having +completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned over the Command of the +Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (second in command), with directions +that the ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded in the +_Iron Duke_ to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning of the 27th. + +I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 27th, on the question +of taking up the work at the Admiralty, and accepted the appointment. +He intimated to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir +David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the Grand Fleet, and +informed me also of the other changes in Flag appointments that would +be effected. I made suggestions on some of these matters. + +Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started my preparations +for the change of duties and the transfer of command. I was under +no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The attacks +already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses +due to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids on our +coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with the means existing, +fully prepared me for what was to come. + +I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the production of fresh +material, could become effective for a period of at least six to twelve +months. Indeed, I was so certain of the course that events would take, +that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of the _Iron Duke_ +(a very difficult task in view of the intense regret that I felt at +leaving them), I said that they must expect to see me the object of the +same attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry +Jackson, had been exposed. I was not wrong in this surmise. I left the +_Iron Duke_ with a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot +close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet during my twenty-eight +months’ service as Commander-in-Chief better than by quoting my +farewell memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so well. + +“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, officers and +men of the Fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the +commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all +ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have +tried their patience to the breaking-point. + +“The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southern +movements of the Fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to +staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to maintain the +highest state of efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for +testing the result were so seldom provided by our enemy. + +“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say, +with absolute confidence, that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm +has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the Fleet gains in +efficiency from day to day. We have benefited by experience, and we +have turned that experience to good account. + +“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so +with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with that spirit +which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages, +whenever and wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and +whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am +perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than +their match, ship for ship in all classes, and that the result will +never be for one moment in doubt. + +“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in +a just and lasting peace! + + “J. R. JELLICOE, + “Admiral.” + + + + +Appendix I + +BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH + + + _Iron Duke, + 18th June, 1916._ + + No. 1395 H.F. 0022. + The Secretary + of the ADMIRALTY, + + SIR,-- + + Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that + the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, 1916, to + the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark. + + 2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the + general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left + its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions + issued by me. + + 3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were as + follows: + + (_a_) Those in company with me: + + _Iron Duke_--Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag). + + _Marlborough_--Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of + Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E. + Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff). + + _Colossus_--Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of + Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.). + + _Hercules_--Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker. + + _Neptune_--Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard. + + _Collingwood_--Captain James C. Ley. + + _Revenge_--Captain Edward B. Kiddle. + + _Agincourt_--Captain Henry M. Doughty. + + _St. Vincent_--Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O. + + _Bellona_--Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton. + + _King George V._--Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of + Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.). + + _Orion_--Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of + Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.). + + _Centurion_--Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O. + + _Conqueror_--Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill. + + _Erin_--Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C. + + _Thunderer_--Captain James A. Fergusson. + + _Monarch_--Captain George H. Borrett. + + _Ajax_--Captain George H. Baird. + + _Boadicea_--Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O. + + _Benbow_--Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral + Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.). + + _Superb_--Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral + Alexander L. Duff, C.B.). + + _Canada_--Captain William C. M. Nicholson. + + _Bellerophon_--Captain Edward F. Bruen. + + _Temeraire_--Captain Edwin V. Underhill. + + _Vanguard_--Captain James D. Dick. + + _Royal Oak_--Captain Crawford Maclachlan. + + _Blanche_--Captain John M. Casement. + + _Minotaur_--Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of + Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.). + + _Hampshire_--Captain Herbert J. Savill. + + _Cochrane_--Captain Eustace La T. Leatham. + + _Shannon_--Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O. + + _Defence_--Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral + Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.). + + _Duke of Edinburgh_--Captain Henry Blackett. + + _Black Prince_--Captain Thomas P. Bonham. + + _Warrior_--Captain Vincent B. Molteno. + + _Invincible_--Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral + The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.). + + _Indomitable_--Captain Francis W. Kennedy. + + _Inflexible_--Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O. + + _Calliope_--Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier. + + _Caroline_--Captain H. Ralph Crooke. + + _Comus_--Captain Alan G. Hotham. + + _Constance_--Captain Cyril S. Townsend. + + _Royalist_--Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O. + + _Canterbury_--Captain Percy M. R. Royds. + + _Chester_--Captain Robert N. Lawson. + + _Active_--Captain Percy Withers. + + _Castor_--Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O. + + _Tipperary_--Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour. + + _Broke_--Commander Walter L. Allen. + + _Shark_--Commander Loftus W. Jones. + + _Acasta_--Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron. + + _Spitfire_--Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny. + + _Sparrowhawk_--Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins. + + _Achates_--Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C. + + _Ambuscade_--Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles. + + _Ardent_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden. + + _Fortune_--Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry. + + _Porpoise_--Commander Hugh D. Colville. + + _Unity_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky. + + _Garland_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff. + + _Christopher_--Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr. + + _Contest_--Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master. + + _Owl_--Commander Robert G. Hamond. + + _Hardy_--Commander Richard A. A. Plowden. + + _Midge_--Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish. + + _Ophelia_--Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe. + + _Kempenfelt_--Commander Harold E. Sulivan. + + _Ossory_--Commander Harold V. Dundas. + + _Martial_--Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison. + + _Magic_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter. + + _Minion_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings. + + _Mystic_--Commander Claude F. Allsup. + + _Mons_--Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin. + + _Mandate_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie. + + _Michael_--Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate. + + _Marne_--Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford. + + _Milbrook_--Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor. + + _Manners_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison. + + _Moon_--Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin. + + _Mounsey_--Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre. + + _Morning Star_--Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher. + + _Faulknor_--Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling. + + _Marksman_--Commander Norton A. Sulivan. + + _Obedient_--Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell. + + _Mindful_--Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley. + + _Marvel_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb. + + _Onslaught_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C. + + _Mænad_--Commander John P. Champion. + + _Narwhal_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson. + + _Nessus_--Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter. + + _Noble_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer. + + _Opal_--Commander Charles G. C. Sumner. + + _Nonsuch_--Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon. + + _Menace_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand. + + _Munster_--Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell. + + _Mary Rose_--Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan. + + _Mischief_--Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O. + + _Oak_--Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O. + + _Abdiel_--Commander Berwick Curtis. + + (_b_) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty: + + _Lion_--Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of + Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); Captain + Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff. + + _Princess Royal_--Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying the + Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.). + + _Tiger_--Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O. + + _Queen Mary_--Captain Cecil I. Prowse. + + _New Zealand_--Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of + Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.). + + _Indefatigable_--Captain Charles F. Sowerby. + + _Southampton_--Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C. + + _Nottingham_--Captain Charles B. Miller. + + _Birmingham_--Captain Arthur A. M. Duff. + + _Dublin_--Captain Albert C. Scott. + + _Galatea_--Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O. + + _Inconstant_--Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G. + + _Phaeton_--Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O. + + _Cordelia_--Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish. + + _Falmouth_--Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral + Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.). + + _Birkenhead_--Captain Edward Reeves. + + _Gloucester_--Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O. + + _Yarmouth_--Captain Thomas D. Pratt. + + “_Barham_”--Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral + Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.). + + _Warspite_--Captain Edward M. Phillpotts. + + _Valiant_--Captain Maurice Woollcombe. + + _Malaya_--Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O. + + _Champion_--Captain (D.) James U. Farie. + + _Nestor_--Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham. + + _Nomad_--Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield. + + _Narborough_--Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett. + + _Obdurate_--Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams. + + _Petard_--Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson. + + _Pelican_--Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie. + + _Nerissa_--Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge. + + _Onslow_--Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey. + + _Moresby_--Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison. + + _Nicator_--Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta. + + _Fearless_--Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper. + + _Acheron_--Commander Charles G. Ramsey. + + _Ariel_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet. + + _Attack_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James. + + _Hydra_--Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop. + + _Badger_--Commander G. A. Fremantle. + + _Goshawk_--Commander Dashwood F. Moir. + + _Defender_--Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer. + + _Lizard_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke. + + _Lapwing_--Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye. + + _Lydiard_--Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith. + + _Liberty_--Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King. + + _Landrail_--Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart. + + _Laurel_--Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet. + + _Moorsom_--Commander John C. Hodgson. + + _Morris_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham. + + _Turbulent_--Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart. + + _Termagent_--Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake. + + _Engadine_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson. + + 4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and + 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser + Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, + supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my + directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which + was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd + Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th + Flotillas. + + 5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after + the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly + course steered by the latter during the first hour of their action + with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, + as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward + the main fleets would never have been in contact. + + The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and + admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron + under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, + disadvantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with + the best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable + advantage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the + German Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and + German battle cruisers in the matter of protection must not be + forgotten. The German vessels are in this respect equal to powerful + battleships, whereas our battle cruisers, particularly those of the + 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, are very lightly protected. + The main difficulty with which our ships had to contend was the bad + light. All reports mention the difficulty experienced in seeing the + enemy vessels to the eastward, whilst remarking on the clearness of + the western horizon. A photograph taken from _Malaya_ during the + action indicates this fact very clearly. + + During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged with + the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the + advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and + the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting + qualities of the personnel. + + 6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir David + Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon + the scene: + + “At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from _Galatea_ indicating + the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was + immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to + place my force between the enemy and his base. + + “At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the + eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward + and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the + Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly + altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at + 3.31 P.M. They appeared to be five battle cruisers. + + “After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser + Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders + spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the + battle cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we + had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light + cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser + Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station + ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the + course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the + work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great + value. + + “From a report from _Galatea_ at 2.25 P.M. it was evident that + the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit + of light cruisers, so at 2.45 P.M. I ordered _Engadine_ to send + up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out + very quickly, and by 3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant + F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin, + R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the + enemy were received in _Engadine_ about 3.30 P.M. Owing to clouds + it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four + enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 + feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire + on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered + with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant + Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated + on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such + circumstances are of distinct value. + + “At 3.30 P.M. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of + Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the + 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th + Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly + converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, + and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The + 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now + bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was + good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy + and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically + good. + + “At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both + forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered + to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., + the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 + yards. + + “Shortly after 4 P.M. _Indefatigable_, after a violent explosion, + fell out of the line, turned over and sank. + + “At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened + fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to + slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through + a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer _Landrail_ of 9th + Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, + sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though + causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of + _Lydiard_ and _Landrail_ undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers + from closer submarine attack. _Nottingham_ also reported a + submarine on the starboard beam. + + “Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, _Nestor_, _Nomad_, + _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, _Obdurate_, + _Nerissa_, with _Moorsom_ and _Morris_ of 10th Flotilla, + _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ of the 9th Flotilla, having been + ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity + offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar + movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out + in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before + arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they + intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 + destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with + the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle + cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their + torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in + this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was + rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having + dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore + unfavourable for torpedo attack. + + “_Nestor_, _Nomad_ and _Nicator_, gallantly led by Commander + the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of _Nestor_, pressed home their + attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them + at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy + fire from the enemy’s secondary armament. _Nomad_ was badly hit + and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently + _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ altered course to the S.E., and in a short + time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found + themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. + Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and + their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo + at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. + Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, _Nestor_ was badly hit + and swung to starboard, _Nicator_ altering course inside her to + avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last + torpedo. _Nicator_ made good her escape and subsequently rejoined + the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. _Nestor_ remained stopped, but was + afloat when last seen. _Moorsom_ also carried out an attack on the + enemy’s battle fleet. + + “_Petard_, _Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ also pressed home + their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after + the engagement with enemy destroyers. _Petard_ reports that all + her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while _Nerissa_ + states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These + destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His + Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. + + “From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing battle + cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th + Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately + at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and + rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 + P.M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to + the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline + of the ships very indistinct. + + “At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in _Queen Mary_; she + was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of + her officers and men were subsequently picked up by _Laurel_. + + “At 4.38 P.M. _Southampton_ reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet + ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy’s + Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in + succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course + to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers + altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. + _Southampton_ with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the + southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the + enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective + fire. _Southampton’s_ reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle + Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the + enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy + battle fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter + course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in + _Barham_, this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively. + + “At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and + came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet. + _Fearless_ with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle + cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. _Champion_ + with 13th Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At + 5 P.M. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been + following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard + bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter. + + “The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being + silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the + enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up + clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had + turned their van at about 6 P.M. Between 5 and 6 P.M. the action + continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 + yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, + and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in + a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal + observation and was corroborated by _Princess Royal_ and _Tiger_. + Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 + P.M. _Onslow_ and _Moresby_, who had been detached to assist + _Engadine_ with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons + and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of _Lion_. At 5.10 + P.M. _Moresby_, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy + ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later + she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th + ship in the line. _Moresby_ then passed between the lines to clear + the range of smoke, and rejoined _Champion_. In corroboration of + this, _Fearless_ reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily + on fire at about 5.10 P.M., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of + smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of + _Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_. + + “At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position + of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the + north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He + was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment + at the head of his line, and probably acting on information + received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged + with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide _Indomitable’s_ + report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 P.M. British + cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 P.M. the leading + battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon + altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought + the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the + Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. + At this time only three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, + closely followed by battleships of the ”König“ class. + + “At about 6.5 P.M. _Onslow_, being on the engaged bow of _Lion_, + sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from + us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. _Onslow_ at + once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from + 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. _Onslow_ then + closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all + torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by + a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. + Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer + proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had + three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and + torpedoed her. The enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the + remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly, + they must have crossed the enemy’s track. Damage then caused + _Onslow_ to stop. + + “At 7.15 P.M. _Defender_, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, + while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell + which damaged her foremost boiler, closed _Onslow_ and took her + in tow. Shell were falling all round them during this operation, + which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy + weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was + re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1. P.M. 1st June, + when _Onslow_ was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances + of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am + recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of _Onslow_, and + Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of _Defender_, for special recognition. + _Onslow_ was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral + Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, as follows: + + “‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a + destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled + condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle + ahead again, and made straight for the _Derfflinger_ to attack her. + The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to + investigate it further.’” + + + PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET + + 7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, + the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and + Destroyer Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course + to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that + elapsed before the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the + steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested. + Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner + in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet + maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the + older vessels. + + The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the + Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet, + was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in + reckoning between _Lion_ and the _Iron Duke_, which was inevitable + under the circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third + Battle Cruiser Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward, + and it was not until 5.30 P.M. that this squadron observed flashes + of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward. + Rear-Admiral Hood sent the _Chester_ (Captain Robert N. Lawson) + to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light + cruisers at about 5.45 P.M. The engagement lasted for about twenty + minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with + great skill against heavy odds, and although the ship suffered + considerably in casualties her fighting and steaming qualities were + unimpaired, and at about 6.5 P.M. she rejoined the Third Battle + Cruiser Squadron. + + The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, + and at 6.10 P.M. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking + station ahead of the _Lion_ at 6.21 P.M. in accordance with the + orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He + reports as follows: + + “I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out + magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action + ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval + ancestors. At 6.25 P.M. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support + of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only + 8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot + fire into her, and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At + the same time I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of + the bearing and distance of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 P.M. + _Invincible_ blew up. + + “After the loss of _Invincible_, the squadron was led by + _Inflexible_ until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were + clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 + miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong + the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this + time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy + ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note + that after 6 P.M., although the visibility became reduced, it was + undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals + their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very + severely and establish a definite superiority over them. The damage + received by our ships during this period, excepting the destruction + of _Invincible_, was slight. From the reports of other ships and + my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered severely, + battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was + crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our + battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron were + also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas + shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely + said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution. + + “From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third + Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our + starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 P.M. attacked with + the torpedo. _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ both fired torpedoes at the + leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo + hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light + Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with + gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that + the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. + Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and + effective attack. _Indomitable_ reports that about this time one of + the _Derfflinger_ class fell out of the enemy’s line.” + + 8. Meanwhile, at 6 P.M., _Canterbury_ (Captain Percy M. R. Royds) + had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on + the torpedo-boat destroyer _Shark_ (Commander Loftus W. Jones), + _Acasta_ (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and _Christopher_ + (Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this + engagement the _Shark_ was sunk. + + 9. At 5.45 P.M. the report of guns had become audible to me, and at + 5.55 P.M. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard + beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the + position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The + difference in reckoning between _Iron Duke_ and _Lion_ mentioned in + paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation. + + 10. Shortly after 5.55 P.M. some of the cruisers ahead, under + Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were seen + to be in action, and reports received show that _Defence_, Flagship + (Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and _Warrior_ (Captain Vincent B. + Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light + cruiser at this time, which subsequently sank. + + 11. At 6 P.M. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers, + were sighted by _Marlborough_ bearing before the starboard beam of + the battle fleet. + + At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet, + reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at + 6.14 P.M. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet. + + At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle + cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to + ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels. + + 12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir + David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became + engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers + ahead of the battle fleet. + + The divisions of the battle fleet were led by: + + The Commander-in-Chief, + Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, + Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, + Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, + Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, + Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, + Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt. + + 13. At 6.16 P.M. _Defence_ and _Warrior_ were observed passing down + between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy + fire. _Defence_ was seen to blow up and _Warrior_ passed to the + rear disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during + his engagement with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to + complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the + enemy’s heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in + close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his + ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not + known when _Black Prince_ (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same + squadron, was sunk, but as a wireless signal was received from her + between 8 and 9 P.M. reporting the position of a submarine, it is + possible that her loss was the result of a torpedo attack. There + is much strong evidence of the presence of a large number of enemy + submarines in the vicinity of the scene of the action. + + 14. The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deployment, + became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire + at 6.17 P.M. on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre + squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light + cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König” + class, and the van squadron commenced immediately afterwards. + + At 6.6 P.M. the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron, + then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard + wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of _Barham_, + and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form + ahead of the remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the + direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre + which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from + the enemy battle fleet. An accident to _Warspite’s_ steering gear + caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship + in the direction of the enemy’s line, during which time she was + hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Phillpotts to + extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation. + + Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was + possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle + line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever + visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but + never more than eight to twelve. + + The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from + 6.17 P.M. to 8.20 P.M. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, + during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from + S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly + turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks + and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and + the alterations, of course, had the effect of bringing the British + Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on + the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle + line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his + bases. + + At 6.55 P.M. _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of _Invincible_ with + _Badger_ standing by. I was not aware of the loss of _Queen Mary_ + and _Indefatigable_ until the following day. + + 15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High + Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective + fire kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand + Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were + seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the + line, and at least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this + period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was + insignificant. + + + THE BATTLE CRUISERS IN THE VAN + + 16. Sir David Beatty reports: + + “Between 7 and 7.12 P.M. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to + regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 P.M. again sighted them + at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time + were two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the + ‘König’ class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, + but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved + considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged + at 7.17 P.M. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 P.M. my + course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship + bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed + signs of punishment, one ship being on fire while another appeared + to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s + line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as + with a pall, under cover of which they undoubtedly turned away, and + at 7.45 P.M. we lost sight of them. + + “At 7.58 P.M. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons + to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s line, + and at 8.20 P.M. we altered course to west in support. We soon + located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily + engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship + was hit repeatedly by _Lion_ and turned away 8 points, emitting + very high flames and with a heavy list to port. _Princess Royal_ + set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; _New Zealand_ and + _Indomitable_ report that the third ship, which they both engaged, + hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which + now came down enveloped them, and _Falmouth_ reported they were + last seen at 8.38 P.M. steaming to the westward. + + “At 8.40 P.M. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if + struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, + however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an + occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a + great vessel. This seems a very probable explanation in view of the + condition in which the enemy was last seen.” + + 17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much + on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and + by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following” or + “chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, + but only one took effect (on _Marlborough_), and even in this case + the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. + The menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, in + weather conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to + the difficulty of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy. + Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy. + + + DETAILS OF BATTLE FLEET ACTION + + 18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, + came into action at 6.15 P.M. with the enemy’s Third Battle + Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe + punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and + light cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of _Marlborough_ + (Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This + ship commenced at 6.17 P.M. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of + the “Kaiser” class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, + and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable + list to starboard, but re-opened at 7.3 P.M. at a cruiser and at + 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König” + class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The + manner in which this effective fire was kept up, in spite of the + disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo, was most + creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron. + + The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. + The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s return fire + than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of + the Fifth Battle Squadron. _Colossus_ was hit but not seriously + damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency. + + In the Fourth Battle Squadron--in which squadron my Flagship _Iron + Duke_ was placed--Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading one + of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and + some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and + light cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, + but the fire of the squadron was effective. _Iron Duke_, having + previously fired at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire + at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König” class at a range of + 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting + commenced at the second salvo, and only ceased when the target + ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established + was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the + flagship so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C. + Dreyer. + + The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed + at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the + mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships. + + The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir + Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser” or + “König” classes between 6.30 and 7.20 P.M., and fired also at an + enemy battle cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely + damaged. + + 19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser + Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with + the addition of _Duke of Edinburgh_ of the First Cruiser Squadron, + occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a + connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser + fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not + have an opportunity of coming into action. + + The attached cruisers _Boadicea_, _Active_, _Blanche_, and + _Bellona_ carried out their duties as repeating ships with + remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions. + + The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. + Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to + attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 P.M. and again at 8.18 P.M. when + they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under + Commodore James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the + Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore + Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their + object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, + when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet + at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The _Calliope_ was hit several + times but did not sustain serious damage, although, I regret to + say, she had several casualties. The light cruisers attacked the + enemy’s battleships with torpedoes at this time, but were not able + to observe the result; an explosion on board a ship of the “Kaiser” + class was seen, however, at 8.38 P.M. + + During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers + were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and + destroyers. + + + NIGHT DISPOSITIONS + + 20. At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat + of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching + darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the + night with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing + for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to + remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a + position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from + destroyer attack and at the same time be favourably situated for + attacking the enemy’s heavy ships. + + + NIGHT ATTACKS BY FLOTILLAS + + 21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, + but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore + Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of + very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy + losses. + + 22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth + Flotilla occurred, including that of _Tipperary_ with the gallant + leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his + flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering + severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels + was taken and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla. + + Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels as + the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from + _Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the + other from either _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), + _Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or _Garland_ + (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff). + + 23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan + J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, + which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers, + comprised vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely + surprised. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at + the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third + ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack + made twenty minutes later by _Mænad_ (Commander John T. Champion) + on the five vessels still remaining resulted in the second ship in + the line being also hit and blown up. + + The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on + reaching the rear of the line, but _Onslaught_ was the only vessel + which received any material injuries. In _Onslaught_ Sub-lieutenant + Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, + R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship + successfully out of action and reached Rosyth. + + 24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, + _Castor_ (Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla + engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank + range. + + The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in + _Champion_ took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. + At 0.30 A.M. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear + of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the _Petard_ + and _Turbulent_, switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire + which severely damaged _Petard_ and disabled _Turbulent_. At 3.30 + A.M. _Champion_ was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy + destroyers. _Moresby_ reports four ships of “Deutschland” class + sighted at 2.35 A.M. at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes + later an explosion was felt by _Moresby_ and _Obdurate_. + + _Abdiel_, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out + her duties with the success which has always characterised her work. + + There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; + they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of + them. + + Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light + Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close + action for about fifteen minutes at 10.20 P.M. with a squadron + comprising one enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which + period _Southampton_ and _Dublin_ suffered rather heavy casualties, + although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. + It is reasonable to suppose that they inflicted considerable damage + on their opponents. + + + PROCEEDINGS ON 1ST JUNE + + 25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the + southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in + search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own + cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 A.M. Vice-Admiral Sir + Cecil Burney transferred his flag from _Marlborough_ to _Revenge_, + as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed + of the squadron. _Marlborough_ was detached by my direction to a + base, being unsuccessfully attacked _en route_ by enemy submarines. + The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less + than on 31st May, and difficulty was experienced in meeting all + ships, the torpedo-boat destroyers not rejoining until 9 A.M. + The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of + the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the + destroyers _Ardent_, _Fortune_, and _Tipperary_ were picked up, and + the _Sparrowhawk_, which had been in collision and was no longer + seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large + amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 P.M., + it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning + to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached + without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron + was detached to search for _Warrior_, which vessel had been + abandoned whilst in tow of _Engadine_ on her way to the base owing + to bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but + no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by + a light cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident + that she foundered. + + 26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 + P.M. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action. + + + LOSSES + + 27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action + took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by + the enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the + difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted, + or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most + careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified + to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews + with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that + the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to + numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards + the particular class of vessel, particularly those which were sunk + during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk it is + unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by + gunfire and by torpedo attack. + + 28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him, + and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the water. + I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled + German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly + after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the + only gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British + Battle Fleet, there appeared to be no desire on the part of the + High Sea Fleet to continue the engagement. The battleships turned + away on each occasion of being sighted soon after fire was opened, + and although the British Fleet remained in the proximity of the + battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 + A.M. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances + from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to + enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft, the enemy made no + sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the + High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved + this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been + known to the enemy, as at 2.50 A.M. the fleet engaged a Zeppelin + for quite five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity + to note and subsequently report the position and course of the + British Fleet. + + 29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned in + this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss + of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as + Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. + Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, + Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles + J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished + with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They + led officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is + mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their + duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire. + + + THE PERSONNEL OF THE FLEET + + 30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night + actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do + them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious + traditions of the past were most worthily upheld--whether in heavy + ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers--the same admirable + spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with + a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The + heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all. + + I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the + Fleet filled me. + + 31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships + during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the + prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, + and that during action the officers and men of that department + perform their most important duties without the incentive which a + knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The + qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under + these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained + throughout the operations under review. Many ships attained speeds + that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly + their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were + conspicuous by their absence, and many instances are reported of + magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of + injured ships. + + 32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out + very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely + admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials + for performing critical operations and with their staff seriously + depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the + greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude. + + 33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot + of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the + flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the + squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels + composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also + the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd + Cruiser Squadron. + + 34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Commanding + Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place + on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels + were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill + and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous + throughout the day. + + I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by + Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand + Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton + Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander + L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest + F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet. + They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s + squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy + battle fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has + rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the + squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by + Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir + David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action + in rear of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the + evening. + + Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant + leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He + appreciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s + lighter forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle + fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening + mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for + which he had manœuvred and for which the vessels in company with + him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on + this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest + value. + + Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded + him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in + which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into + action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William + C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good + work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command + respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore + William E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He + states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes + and used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully + endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract + from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his + staff: + + “I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I + received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief + of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment + was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My + Flag-Commander, The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most + valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling + me to take advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary, + Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as + they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping + the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander + Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under + the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his + signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these + officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the + manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the + enemy’s fire.” + + 35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant + work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, + K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war + his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, + his long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and + his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest + assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety + inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the + stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the + action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment never at + fault. I owe him more than I can say. + + My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., + the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance in + the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation + is largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and + replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much + assistance to me during the action. + + Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander Roger + M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the two fleets + with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander + the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as observer + aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These + officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action. + + The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander + Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers, and + all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. My + Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also + of much service to me throughout the action. + + The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet + and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and + after the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work + carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have + been invaluable throughout the war. + + A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all + ships. + + My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and Victor + H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the + action. Their records have been of much assistance. + + To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am + indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning + throughout the operations. + + 36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of + their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not + come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of + specially distinguishing themselves. + + I am, Sir, + Your obedient Servant, + (_Signed_) J. R. JELLICOE, + _Admiral_, _Commander-in-Chief_. + + +Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated 18th June, +1916. + + +LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK, 31st May–1st June, 1916. + + +_Battleships or Battle Cruisers._ + + 2 Battleships, “Dreadnought” type Certain. + 1 Battleship, “Deutschland” type Certain. + + 1 Battleship or Battle Cruiser Probable. + 1 Battleship, “Dreadnought” type Probable. + + +_Light Cruisers._ + + 4 Light Cruisers Certain. + 1 Heavy ship or Light Cruiser Certain. + + +_Torpedo-boat Destroyers._ + + 6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers Certain. + 3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers Probable. + + +_Submarines._ + + 1 Submarine Certain. + 3 Submarines Possible. + + + + +Appendix II + +ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY, 24th JANUARY, 1915 + + + ADMIRALTY, + _3rd March, 1915_. + +The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David +Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser +Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of +January, 1915:-- + + _H.M.S. Princess Royal, + 2nd February, 1915._ + + SIR,--I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January, + 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company: + + The Battle Cruisers _Lion_, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, + C.V.O., flying my flag; _Princess Royal_, Captain Osmond de B. + Brock, Aide-de-Camp; _Tiger_, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; _New + Zealand_, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the + flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and + _Indomitable_, Captain Francis W. Kennedy. + + The Light Cruisers _Southampton_, flying the broad pendant of + Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; _Nottingham_, Captain + Charles B. Miller; _Birmingham_, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and + _Lowestoft_, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my + port beam. + + Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in _Arethusa_, _Aurora_, + Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, _Undaunted_, Captain Francis G. St. + John, M.V.O., _Arethusa_, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead. + + At 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly + afterwards a report reached me from _Aurora_ that she was engaged + with enemy’s ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., + increased to 22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas + to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy. + + This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my wishes + had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers, and + reports almost immediately followed from _Southampton_, _Arethusa_, + and _Aurora_ as to the position and composition of the enemy, which + consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and _Blücher_, 6 Light Cruisers, and + a number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course + to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with + the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements. + + The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the + southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme + visibility. At 7.30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow + steaming fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles. + + Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our + position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to + S.E. parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, + gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots. + Great credit is due to the Engineer Staffs of _New Zealand_ and + _Indomitable_--these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed. + + At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear + ship, the Battle Cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so + that guns would bear, and _Lion_ fired a single shot, which fell + short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light + Cruisers ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard + beam. + + Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9 + A.M. _Lion_ made her first hit on the _Blücher_, No. 4 in the line. + The _Tiger_ opened fire at 9.20 A.M. on the rear ship, the _Lion_ + shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being + hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 A.M. + _Princess Royal_, on coming into range, opened fire on _Blücher_, + the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards at 9.35 A.M. _New + Zealand_ was within range of _Blücher_, which had dropped somewhat + astern, and opened fire on her. _Princess Royal_ shifted to the + third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her. + + Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a + position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul + our range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening + attack, the _Meteor_ and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain + the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous + ability. + + About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows: _Blücher_, the fourth + in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely + from gunfire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. + _Lion_ was engaging No. 1, _Princess Royal_ No. 3, _New Zealand_ + No. 4, while the _Tiger_, who was second in our line, fired first + at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4. + + The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen + their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now + appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their + distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port + quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our + line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line + of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed. + + Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. + _Lion_ and _Tiger_ opened fire on them, and caused them to retire + and resume their original course. + + The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port + quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep + touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line. + + At 10.48 A.M. the _Blücher_, which had dropped considerably + astern of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with + a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. + I consequently ordered _Indomitable_ to attack enemy breaking + northward. + + At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and + I personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our + starboard bow. Immediately turned to port. + + At 11.3 A.M. an injury to the _Lion_ being reported as incapable + of immediate repair, I directed _Lion_ to shape course N.W. At + 11.20 A.M. I called the _Attack_ alongside, shifting my flag to + her at about 11.35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the + Squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W. + + I boarded and hoisted my flag in _Princess Royal_ at about 12.20 + P.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since + the _Lion_ fell out of the line, namely, that _Blücher_ had been + sunk and that the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course + to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also + informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop + bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of + _Blücher_. + + The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. + _Attack_, in placing his vessel alongside the _Lion_ and + subsequently the _Princess Royal_, enabled the transfer of flag to + be made in the shortest possible time. + + At 2 P.M. I closed _Lion_ and received a report that her starboard + engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 P.M. I + ordered _Indomitable_ to take her in tow, which was accomplished by + 5 P.M. + + The greatest credit is due to the Captains of _Indomitable_ and + _Lion_ for the seamanlike manner in which the _Lion_ was taken in + tow under difficult circumstances. + + The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a + conspicuous feature. + + I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men + who specially distinguished themselves. + + Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men + for special mention, and as _Lion_ and _Tiger_ were the only ships + hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those + ships. + + I have the honour to be, Sir, + Your obedient Servant, + (_Signed_) DAVID BEATTY, + Vice-Admiral. + + + + + INDEX + + + _Abdiel_, 289, 373, 433, 465, 484 + + Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed and sunk off, 209 + + _Aboukir_, loss of, 15, 37, 105, 132 + + _Acacia_, 233 + + _Acasta_, 9, 176, 464 + in Jutland battle, 332, 333, 356, 387, 476 + + _Achates_, 9, 464 + + _Acheron_, 466 + + _Achilles_, 8, 88, 212, 419 + accident on, 163 + sinks a German raider, 276 + + _Acorn_, 9 + + _Active_, 9, 134, 144, 145, 318, 380, 381, 439, 464, 482 + + Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main Fleet Base, 15 + Intelligence Division of, 187 + naval policy of, 34, 302 + vigorous mine-laying policy adopted by, 249 + + Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, 303 + + Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 165 + + Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, 95 + substituted for seaplanes, 222, 283 + + _Africa_, 8, 266 + + Agadir crisis, 91 + + _Agamemnon_, 10 + + _Agincourt_, 108, 152, 241, 308, 318, 463 + in Jutland battle, 357, 360 + joins 4th Battle Squadron, 121 + + Aircraft carriers, development of, 72 + in warfare, 70, 153 + + Airships as scouts, 37, 450 + + _Ajax_, 8, 93, 98, 107, 135, 152, 241, 290, 318, 463 + + _Alarm_, 9, 142 + + _Albemarle_, 10, 93, 98, 212, 237, 249, 266 + + _Alcantara_, 272, 273 + sinking of, 273 + + Alderson, Captain, 207 + + Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S., 203, 320, 466, 489 + + Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., 466 + + Allen, Commander Walter L., 464 + + Allsup, Commander Claude F., 464 + + _Alsatian_, 73, 105, 107, 109, 127, 131, 135, 169 + captures concealed Germans, 138 + + _Ambuscade_, 9, 176, 286, 464 + in Jutland battle, 376, 483 + + America enters the War, 303 + + American battleships join Grand Fleet, 303 + + _Amethyst_, 10 + + Ammunition, for Army use, 114 + ships, 84 + + _Amphion_, 10 + + _Amsterdam_, 217 + + _Andes_, 272, 273 + rescues German survivors, 274 + + _Andromache_, 11 + + _Anglia_, 104 + + Anti-submarine defences, German, 30 + obstructions, 144, 146 + obstructions damaged by gales, 247, 267 + operations, British, 146, 218 _et seq._, 282 + + _Antrim_, 8, 89, 138, 159, 211, 419, 424 + + _Apollo_, 11 + + _Arabis_, sinking of, 269 + + Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, 8, 191, 334, 342, 410, 463, 477 + death of, 335, 410, 487 + + _Ardent_, 9, 483 + in collision, 250, 286 + loss of, 376, 385, 485 + + _Arethusa_, 111 + in action, 493, 494 + + _Argyll_, 8, 89, 223 + aground off Scottish coast, 252 + + _Ariel_, 209, 466 + sinks a submarine, 214 + + _Arlanza_, 253, 431 + + _Arley_, 233 + + Armour piercing shells, a new type of, 69, 417 + Committees’ investigations on, 69 + limitations of British, 306 + + Armour protection, improved, 417 + question of, 394 _et seq._, 468 + + Arnot, Midshipman R. G., 484 + + Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the Fleet, 237, 241 + + _Assistance_, 8, 80, 83, 105, 114, 116, 138, 143, 186, 197 + + Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., 239, 240 + + Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, 24, 157, 161 + + _Attack_, 466, 496 + + _Attila_, capture of, 108 + + _Audacious_, 8, 135, 149, 150, 151 + loss of, 148 _et seq._ + + _Aurora_, 194, 493, 494 + + _Australia_, 24, 203, 204, 210, 290, 418 + in collision, 285 + + Austrian steamer captured, 108 + + + Back, Captain Eric, 260 + + Backhouse, Captain Oliver, 463 + + Backhouse, Commander Roger, 7 + + Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, 154 + + _Badger_, 467 + rescues survivors, 338, 356, 479 + + Baird, Captain George H., 463 + + Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes First Lord, 453 + offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First Sea Lord, 458 + + Baltic, the, British submarines in, 434 + proposed operations in, 129 + + _Barham_, 249, 320, 325, 328, 345, 348, 352, 360, 463, 472, 478 + in collision, 258 + + Barron, Commander J. O., 333, 356, 464, 476 + + Bashmakoff, M., 275 + + Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., 465 + + Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, 71 + Instructions to, 53 + organisation of, 203 + title altered, 204 + + Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._ + + Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation of, 418 + + Battle cruisers, function of, 304 + question of armour, protection of, 305, 306 + + Battle Fleet, composition of, 7 + aircraft provided for, 71 + + Battleships, “all-big-gun” type of, 34 + and Battle Cruisers, British and German, 307 _et seq._ + + Battleships, British and German, 31 + dummy, 171 + + _Bayano_ sunk by submarine, 210 + + Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, commands 1st Battle Squadron, 7, 85, + 149 + discusses question of blocking Zeebrugge, 154 + exchange of command, 180, 182 + + Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., 466 + + Bear Island, reported enemy base and wireless station at, 233 + + Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., 466 + + Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, 8, 111, 177, 178, 203, 285, 322, 466, + 477, 494 + + Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and Jutland battle, 320, 321, 325, + 341, 345, 369, 440, 442, 468, 480 + despatch on North Sea battle, 493 _et seq._ + tribute to, 411, 489 + + Belgian coast, sweeping the, 170 + + Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., 7, 359, 490 + + _Bellerophon_, 8, 110, 318, 463 + + _Bellona_, 7, 88, 94, 97, 98, 173, 202, 318, 442, 463, 482 + in collision, 180 + + _Benbow_, 169, 173, 186, 318, 352, 355, 463 + + Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., 2, 7, 41, 465 + tribute to, 489 + + Beresford, Lord, 35 + + _Berliner Tageblatt_, Captain Persius’ admissions in, 408 + + Bernard, Captain V. H. G., 463 + + Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., 7, 490 + + Betty, Captain, 185 + + _Biarritz_, 292 + + Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S., 324, 463, 470 + awarded V. C., 325 + + Bircham, Lieutenant, 77 + + _Birkenhead_, 246, 251, 255, 319, 466 + + _Birmingham_, 8, 88, 178, 182, 203, 223, 319, 466, 493 + sinks a submarine, 93, 119 + + _Black Prince_, 171, 187, 244, 290, 318, 336, 380, 463 + uncertainty of her end, 336, 337, 478 + + Blackett, Captain Henry, 463 + + Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., 467 + + _Blanche_, 8, 88, 175, 202, 207, 272, 273, 318, 463, 482 + + Blockade, Ministry of, 76 + work of the Fleet, 73 _et seq._, 96, 97, 189 + [_see also_, Cruiser Squadron (10th)] + + Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow entrances, 167 + + _Blonde_, 8, 88, 202, 290 + goes ashore, 433 + + _Blūcher_, 152, 494, 495 + sinking of, 195, 197, 496 + + Blunt, Captain W. F., 10, 466 + + _Boadicea_, 4, 8, 88, 202, 318, 438, 463, 482 + damaged by heavy seas, 175 + + Boarding steamers, increased force of, 171 + + Bonham, Captain Thomas P., 463, 478 + death of, 487 + + Borrett, Captain George H., 463 + + _Botha_, 225, 267, 457 + + Boxer campaign, 62, 63 + + Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., 465 + + Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. H., 466 + + Bradford, Vice-Admiral E. E., 8, 48, 108, 176, 179, 208 + and Dogger Bank action, 196 + + _Brandenburg_, 132 + interned by Norwegian Government, 133 + + _Brisk_, 9 + + _Britannia_, 8, 199 + aground in Firth of Forth, 198 + + British Expeditionary Force, transport of, 22, 23, 37 + + British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, 28, 31 + + British Navy (_see_ Navy) + + “Broad Fourteens,” patrolling the, 37, 127, 132 + + Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., 203, 319, 465, 489, 493, 496 + + _Broke_, 180, 293, 375, 387, 464 + + Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, 467 + + Browning, Rear-Admiral M. E., 8 + + Bruen, Captain Edward F., 463 + + Bryce, Lord, 2 + + Bullen, Lieut.-Commander, 278 + + _Bulwark_, 10 + + Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, 60 + clever device by, 61 + + Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, 10, 16, 36, 207, 358, 459, 462, 477, + 480 + and Heligoland, 129 + and Jutland battle, 319, 342, 343, 362, 381 + exchange of command, 180, 181 + flagship damaged, 355, 485 + illness of, 182 + joins Grand Fleet, 36 + resumes command of 1st Battle Squadron, 185 + tribute to, 410, 488 + + + _Caldaff_, mining of, 150 + + Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, 55 + gives up the command, 5 + his Service record, 1 + improvises defences at Scapa, 27 + strikes his flag, 6 + + Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, 496 + + _Calliope_, 227, 272, 277, 365, 464, 482 + + _Cambria_, 104, 114, 148 + + _Cameleon_, 9 + + Cameron, Captain John E., 466 + + _Campania_, 71, 221, 222, 229, 230, 231, 238, 282, 283, 428, 446 + + Campbell, Commander G. W. McC., 465 + + _Canada_, 308, 318, 463 + joins Grand Fleet, 250 + + Canadian troops, a convoy for, 134, 136 + + _Canterbury_, 317, 318, 330, 332, 339, 464, 476 + + Cantlie, Lieutenant, 232 + + _Caribbean_, 211, 246 + sinking of, 246 + + _Carnarvon_, 10 + + _Caroline_, 203, 464 + + Carpenter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. F. B., 2 + + Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., 465 + + Casement, Captain John M., 463 + + _Castor_, 374, 464 + + Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J. R. C., 464 + + Cay, Captain Arthur L., 337, 338, 463 + death of, 487 + + _Centurion_, 2, 8, 95, 140, 198, 318, 463 + + _Champion_, 319, 329, 378, 463, 472, 484 + + Champion, Commander J. P., 377, 465, 484 + + Channel Fleet, 15, 16, 36 + change in command of, 182 + squadrons manned with nucleus crews, 36 + strengthened, 155 + + Chatfield, Captain A. E. M., 465, 493 + + _Chatham_, 443 + + _Cheerful_, 135 + + _Chester_, 317, 318, 330, 339, 415, 441, 464, 475 + her boy hero, Jack Cornwell, 332, 410 + in action, 330 _et seq._ + + China, conference of Allied naval officers in, 63 + + Christian, Rear-Admiral, 101, 105 + his command, 105 + + _Christopher_, 9, 236, 245, 331, 332, 464, 476 + + Chukovsky, M., 275 + + Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 3, 35 + and Heligoland, 128 + and position of Commander-in-Chief, 3 + attends conference at Loch Ewe, 127 + interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, 3 + + _Circe_, 9 + + _City of Oxford_, 171 + + _Clan McNaughton_, loss of, 205 + + _Cleopatra_, 279, 433 + + Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, 462 + + Coaling the Fleet, 83, 92, 104, 108, 109 + + Coal strike, a Welsh, 229, 230, 235 + + Coast lights, extinction of, 121, 136 + + Coast towns, enemy bombardment of, 25, 287, 456 + + Cobbe, Captain M. H., 11 + + _Cochrane_, 8, 88, 318, 419, 463 + + _Cockatrice_, 9, 173 + + Cole, Commander John F. H., 242 + + Coles, Lieut.-Commander G. A., 376, 464, 483 + + Colliers at the Fleet Base, 83 + insufficient number of, 84, 92, 98 + + _Collingwood_, 7, 319, 361, 462 + + _Colossus_, 7, 38 (_note_), 60, 318, 319 + and battle of Jutland, 351, 353, 357, 360, 381, 462, 481 + + _Columbella_, 233, 272 + + Colville, Commander Hugh D., 464 + + Colville, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, 81, 82, 122, 143, 159, 166, 231, + 234, 243 + assumes temporary command of 1st Battle Squadron, 182 + + _Comet_, 9, 107, 217 + + _Commonwealth_, 8, 186, 199 + + _Comus_, 272, 273, 277, 278, 342, 426, 464 + + _Conqueror_, 8, 31 (_note_), 152, 184, 193, 199, 318, 463 + + _Conqueror II._ torpedoed, 446 + + _Constance_, 426, 432, 464 + + _Contest_, 9, 464 + + _Cordelia_, 203, 319, 320, 466 + + Corlett, Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey, 466 + + _Cornwallis_, 10 + + Cornwell, Jack, of _Chester_, heroism of, 332, 410 + + Cowan, Captain Walter H., 465 + + Crabbe, Commander L. G. E., 464 + + Craig, Captain Arthur W., 466 + + _Crescent_, 11, 205, 255, 277 + + _Cressy_, loss of, 15, 37, 105 + + Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, 64, 65 + a floating dock transferred to, 79, 80, 106, 122 + and submarine menace, 64 + Naval Base at, 28 + Rear-Admiral Pears in charge of Base at, 97 + rendered secure from submarine attacks, 77, 146 + + Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, 464 + + Cruiser Squadron (3rd), disbandment of, 245 + + Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, 210 + + Cruiser Squadron (10th) augmented, 181 + blockade work of, 73, 158, 193, 201, 205, 214, 220, 228, 233, 243, + 247, 253, 257, 261, 268, 275, 281, 288, 294, 427, 431, 444, + 448, 452, 458 + paid off, 163 + patrol areas of, 96, 98, 103, 137, 145, 181, 192, 206, 213, 272, 283 + + Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of, 418, 419 + + Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, 463 + + _Cumberland_, 198 + + Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, 10 + + Curtis, Commander Berwick, 373, 465, 484 + + Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, 97 + + _Cyclops_, 7, 80, 83, 98, 117, 143 + + + D’Aeth, Captain Arthur C. S. H., 464 + + _Dahlia_ strikes a mine, 245 + + Dampier, Captain, 149 + + Danehenko, M., 275 + + Dannreuther, Commander, 337 + + Dardanelles operations, kite balloons in, 71 + + “Dark night” patrols, 261, 264, 432 + + _Dartmouth_, 185 + + Day, Commander Selwyn, 276 + + De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, 11, 73, 96, 169 + + Decoy ships (Q-ships), 262 + + _Defence_, 191, 318, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 463 + loss of, 306, 336, 477 + + _Defender_, 340, 387, 467, 474 + + _Derfflinger_, 197, 357, 437, 474 + + Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of, 447 + + Destroyer flotillas, 9, 118 + detailed orders for, 52 + fine work in Jutland battle, 378 + + Destroyers, Battle Orders for, 52, 54 + German, 29, 50, 62 + German superiority in number of, 396–7 + German _v._ British, 29 + importance attached by Germany to attack by, 393 + in action, 176, 323–5, 339, 340 + inadequate number of British, 17, 18, 29, 175, 179, 200, 201, 397 + in collision, 245, 246, 280, 286 + used for mine-sweeping, 244 + welcome additions to force of, 204 + work of, 215 + + _Devonshire_, 8, 90, 135, 180, 282, 419, 424 + + Dick, Captain James D., 463 + + _Digby_, 233 + + Director-firing, system of, 66 + + Displacement, question of, 307 + + Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, 232 + + Dock accommodation, absence of, 315, 316 + the Kaiser’s comments on, 315 + + Dockyard men, fine work by, 129, 417 + + Dogger Bank action, 187 _et seq._ + Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493 _et seq._ + battle cruiser fleet, composition of, 203 + battle fleet engaged in, 199 + (_See also_ North Sea Battle) + + _Dominion_, 8, 108, 119, 217 + + Donaldson, Sir F., 421 + + _Donegal_, 198, 255, 256, 290, 292, 419, 424, 458 + + Doughty, Captain Henry M., 463 + + Dover, Straits of, mining the, 249 + + _Drake_, 10, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 108, 116, 131, 134, 159, 164, 198 + + _Dreadnought_, 8, 34, 93, 207, 208, 290, 308 + rams a submarine, 207 + + Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in conference, 114 + + Dreyer, Captain, 7 (_note_), 342, 416, 417, 462, 481 + tribute to, 416, 481 + + _Dryad_, 166 + + _Dublin_, 319, 362, 375, 384, 436, 442, 466, 485 + + Duff, Captain A. A. M., 93, 466, 493 + + Duff, Rear-Admiral A. L., 60, 61, 62, 169, 318, 463, 477, 488 + tribute to, 488 + + _Duke of Albany_, 223, 433 + + _Duke of Clarence_, 270, 433 + + _Duke of Cornwall_, 430 + + _Duke of Edinburgh_, 171, 318, 336, 368, 419, 463, 482 + + Dumaresq, Captain John S., 463 + + _Duncan_, 10 + + _Duncombe_, 262 + + Dundas, Commander Harold V., 464 + + _Dundee_, 270, 276, 432, 433 + + Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore at, 266 + + Dutton, Captain Arthur B. S., 463 + + + East Coast, bombardment of undefended towns on, 25 + raids on, 156 + + _Ebro_, 267 + + _Edgar_, 11, 141 + + Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, 282 + + Edwards, Captain John D., 466 + + _Elbing_, 374 + + Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, 421 + + Ellis, Captain Stanley V., 463, 477 + death of, 487 + + _Emperor of India_, 169, 173, 186 + + _Ems_ sunk by submarine, 426 + + _Endymion_, 11 + + _Engadine_, 71, 289, 320, 321, 386, 467, 469, 472, 485 + + England, possibility of invasion of, 23, 456 + raids on south-east coast of, 287 + + English Channel, destroyers in, 455 + + _Erin_, 129, 152, 308, 318, 463 + + _Erne_, wreck of, 205 + + Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, 131 + + Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., 7, 320, 466 + and Jutland battle, 326, 345, 349, 363, 369, 410, 467, 472, 476, 478 + new command for, 243 + tribute to, 488, 489 + + Everett, Commodore A. F., 7, 219 + + _Exmouth_, 10, 93, 135, 148, 150 + + Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., 465 + + + Falkland Islands battle, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205 + + _Falmouth_, 10, 16, 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104, 115, 134, 185, 319, 338, + 466 + and Jutland battle, 366, 441, 476, 479 + sinking of, 441 + + Farie, Captain (D.) James U., 378, 466, 484 + + Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases in, 96, 97 + + Farrington, Captain, 262 + + _Faulknor_, 208, 377, 457, 465 + + Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, 465 + + Fawckner, Rear-Admiral W. B., 228 + + _Fearless_, 10, 111, 132, 204, 245, 319, 449, 466 + and Jutland battle, 328, 378, 381, 472, 473 + + Fergusson, Captain James A., 463 + + Field, Captain Frederick L., 463 + + Filleul, C., awarded D. S. M., 334 + + Fire control instruments, 68 + + Fire correction methods, improved, 417 + + _Firedrake_, 112 + + Fisher, Captain William W., 463 + + Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, 242 + + Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord, 34, 155 + destroyer programme of, 408 + energy as First Sea Lord, 187 + improvements in Fleet organisation by, 35 + Mr. Schwab’s visit to, 151 + naval policy of, 34 + supports Director System, 67 + + Fishermen’s bladders as “floating mines,” 126 + + Fishing areas, question of restriction of, 121, 136 + + Fishing vessels attacked by submarines, 228 + + FitzGerald, Colonel, 421 + + Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert, 2, 490 + + Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, 110 + + Fleet, the, a vital factor to existence of the Empire, 308 + concentration of, at outbreak of War, 38 + disposition of, 15 + (_See also_ Grand Fleet, Navy) + + Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H. U., 465 + + Floating storage, advantages of, 84 + + Flotta, Island of, 81 + + _Flying Condor_, 148 + + Food question, the, 453 + + Forbes, Commander Charles M., 7 (_note_), 490 + + _Formidable_, 10 + + Forth, Firth of, obstructions against submarines in, 78 + submarine activity in, 185 + + _Fortune_, 9, 267, 464, 485 + in collision, 250 + loss of, 376 + + _Forward_, 9 + + Foula Islands, 105 + + Fox, Captain C. H., 10 + + _Frauenlob_, loss of, 375 + + Fremantle, Commander G. A., 467 + + Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., 254 + + _Fury_, 9, 150, 233 + + + _Galatea_, 203, 290, 319, 430, 466 + and Jutland battle, 319, 436, 443, 468, 469 + + Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, 8, 205 + + _Garland_, 9, 286, 376, 464, 483 + + _Garry_ engages a submarine, 169 + + Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., 61, 319, 462, 477, 488 + relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, 243 + tribute to, 488 + + General Cruiser Instructions, the, 53 + + _Gentian_, 293 + + George V., King, messages to the Fleet, 89, 234, 288 + visits the Fleet, 204, 234, 426 + + German account of Jutland battle, 363 + bombardment of East Coast, 25 + breach of international law, 18 + disguised raiders, 273, 274 + fleet (_see_ High Sea Fleet) gunnery, efficiency of, 348 + merchant steamer intercepted and sunk, 291 + mines and submarines, 221 _et seq._ (and _passim_) + submarine menace, 13, 16, 28, 37, 100, 113, 115 _et seq._ + + German Bight, British submarine lays mines in, 426 + + Germans fire on British rescuers, 112 + proclaim British waters unsafe for shipping, 201 + rescue British crews, 325, 486 + thoroughness of defences of their naval bases, 30 + + Germany, destroyer force of, 392, 396, 397 + mutinies in Navy of, 39 + naval strength of, in early days of War, 32, 33 + + _Ghourko_, 86 + + _Gibraltar_, 11 + + _Glen Isla_, 262 + + Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., 467 + + _Gloucester_, 185, 203, 290, 320, 466 + + Goff, Lieut.-Commander R. S., 376, 464, 483 + + _Goldfinch_, 9 + loss of, 205 + + Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L., 467 + + Goodenough, Commodore W. E., 8, 95, 112, 194, 203, 320, 326, 341, + 344, 466, 489, 493 + and Dogger Bank battle, 195 + engages the enemy, 178 + + _Good Hope_, 10 + loss of, 307 + + Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted at, 157 + + _Goshawk_, 467 + + _Gossamer_, 9 + + Gough-Calthorpe, Rear-Admiral the Hon. S., 8 + + _Grafton_, 11 + + Graham, Lieut.-Commander E. S., 467 + + Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, 152 + a watching policy decided upon, 14 + all-round improvement in fighting efficiency of, 70 + and its bases, 26, 28, 34 _et seq._, 76 _et seq._, 144 + arrival of additional seamen ratings for, 109 + at end of November, 1914, 168 + at end of 1914, 185 + attempts to entice enemy to action, 264 _et seq._ + bases: conditions for leaving and returning to, 295 _et seq._ + battle exercises, 258 + Battle Orders, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408 + battle tactics exercises, 47 + blockade work [_see_ Blockade, Cruiser Squadron (10th)] + compared with High Sea Fleet, 31 + composition of, 7 _et seq._ + condenser and boiler troubles of, 103, 108, 121, 129, 139, 152, + 156, 159, 167, 172, 174, 185, 187, 190 + constitution of, in May, 1916, and a parallel, 300 _et seq._ + countering retiring battle tactics, 50 + cruising formation and deployment, 47, 271 + destroyer force of, 396 + development of, 36 + disposition and movements of, after declaration of war, 90 _et seq._ + efficiency of engine-room departments of, 140, 387 + Fleet movements: a month’s work, 216 + gunnery practice of, 64 _et seq._ + inception of, 34 + kite balloons provided for, 71, 72 + lectures, system of, 86 + measures against invasion and raids, 23, 24 + messages from the King to, 89, 234, 388 + naval instruction and education problem, 188 + new Submarine Flotilla, 447 + peace and war conditions compared, 55 + personnel and welfare of, 85 _et seq._, 410, 487 + pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, 47, 48 + problem of tactics in Fleet actions, 391 + Royal visits to, 204, 233, 426 + Russian gentlemen’s visit to, 275 + sea-plane reconnaissances of, 221 + ships fitted with Director-firing system, 67 + signalling by, and why reduced, 56 _et seq._ + spirit of comradeship in, 87 + sports, 86 + submarines attached to, 303 + tables showing armament, protection and displacement of capital + ships in, 308–310 + the Staff Organisation, 39 _et seq._ + training of, 55 _et seq._ + work of medical officers, 488 + + Grant, Captain E. P. F. G., 462 + + Grant, Rear-Admiral W. L., 10, 96, 97 + in command of 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 210 + + Great War, declaration of, 88 + first reports of enemy movements, 90 + naval strategy in home waters, 12 _et seq._ + opening of, 1 _et seq._ + + Green, Captain J. F. E., 466 + + Greene, W. Graham, 414 + + _Grief_, 274 + + Griffin, W. C. R., a D. S. M. for, 334 + + Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W., 465 + + Gun power, question of, 306 + + Gun, range of, 38 (and _note_) + + Gunfire, correction of, 68 + + Gunnery efficiency: a new departure, 235 + work of German High Sea Fleet, 62, 64 + + Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., 467 + + + Haddock, Commodore, 149, 171, 172 + + Haldane, Lord, 2 + + Halsey, Commodore Lionel, 7 (_note_), 219, 411 + + _Hamburg_, 374 + + Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick, becomes Second Sea Lord, 3 + + Hamond, Commander Robert G., 464 + + _Hampshire_, 198, 230, 257, 259, 420, 463 + Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel in, 421 + strikes a mine and sinks, 422 + survivors of, 422 + + _Hannibal_, 93, 95, 205 + + Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., 2 + + _Hardy_, 9, 176, 464 + + Harris, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald N. A., 82 + + Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G. C., 465 + + Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, 464 + + Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G. B., 465 + + Harwich, mined areas near, 110 + + Harwich Force, 9, 385 + provided with aircraft, 71 + + _Hawk_ sinks a submarine, 225 + + _Hawke_, 11 + loss of, 21, 141 + + Hawksley, Commodore J. R. P., 9, 374, 384, 463, 477, 482 + + Heath, Rear-Admiral H. L., 334, 367, 368, 463, 477, 482 + + Heaton-Ellis, Captain E. H. F., 464 + + Heligoland, a comprehensive mining policy urged, 248 + fortifications of, 128 + proposals for bombardment and capture of, 128 + + Heligoland Bight, British submarines followed by German trawlers, 105 + dispositions for sweeping, 123 + enemy light forces in action, 111 + mining policy in, 248, 249, 264 + projected operations in, 109 + + _Hercules_, 7, 281, 318, 360, 462 + + _Hibernia_, 8, 127, 254 + + High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand Fleet, 31, 302 + changes in commands of, 200 + defensive rôle of, 39 + destroyer force of, 396 + efficiency of, ix, 62, 63 + position of, in Jutland battle, 341 + probable tactics of, correctly anticipated, 401 + superiority of protection in, 307 + surrender of, ix, 39, 70 + tables showing armament, protection and displacement of, 308–310 + under repair, 428 + + _Hindustan_, 8 + + Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F. E. H. G., 467 + + Hodgson, Commander John C., 467 + + _Hogue_, sinking of, 15, 37, 105, 132 + + _Hollyhock_, 236, 242 + + Holtzendorff, Admiral von, 63 + + Homan, Lieut.-Commander Edwin A., 465 + + Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace, 219, 327, 330, 332, 337, 410, + 463, 474, 475, 489 + goes down with _Invincible_, 338, 487 + + _Hope_, 9, 184 + + Hope, C. C., awarded D. S. M., 334 + + Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, 464 + + Hotham, Captain Alan G., 273, 342, 464 + + Howell, T. O. G., awarded D. S. M., 334 + + Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H. V., 465 + + Hutchinson, Commander Reginald B. C., 464 + + _Hydra_, 467 + + + _Illustrious_, 114, 146, 157 + + _Iltis_ and her commander, 63 + + _Impérieuse_, 83 + + _Implacable_, 10 + + _Inconstant_, 203, 319, 466 + + _Indefatigable_, 203, 204, 466 + loss of, 306, 323, 326, 370 + + _India_ torpedoed and sunk, 241 + + _Indomitable_, 24, 191, 199, 203, 330, 332, 338, 418, 464, 476, 480, + 493, 494, 495, 496 + and Jutland battle, 330, 332, 338 + joins Grand Fleet, 183 + takes _Lion_ in tow, 196 + + _Inflexible_, 24, 119, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 157, 203, 228, + 330, 418, 442, 464 + and Jutland battle, 332, 338, 339, 475 + joins the Fleet, 228 + mined in Dardanelles, 314 + loss of, 306 + + Ingenohl, Admiral von, 63, 200 + + International law, German disregard of, 18 + + _Intrepid_, 11 + + Invergordon as repairing base, 80 + exercise and recreation at, 200 + floating docks at, 79, 80, 448 + + _Invincible_, 24, 105, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 157, 191, 203, + 204, 213, 219, 290, 330, 332, 463 + loss of, 306, 337–338, 475 + survivors rescued by _Badger_, 356 + + _Iphigenia_, 11 + + Irish mail packets as armed boarding steamers, 171 + + Irish Sea, submarine activity in, 198, 209 + + _Iron Duke_, 5, 6, 7, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100, 101, 106, 108, 122, 132, + 143, 144, 146, 152, 164, 168, 174, 187, 194, 197, 212, 219, + 220, 267, 317, 318, 345, 357, 373, 462, 479 + Confirmation by Archbishop of York on, 228 + disconcerting discovery on, 139 + in action, 349, 352, 353, 357, 481 + refitting at Invergordon, 200, 252 + Staff of, 39 _et seq._ + the King’s speech to Fleet, 426, 427 + + _Irresistible_, 10 + + Irvin, Commander (Acting) W. D., 465 + + Italy enters Great War, 219 + + + Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, 78, 460 + and the submarine menace, 454 + becomes First Sea Lord, 219, 249 + + James, Lieut.-Commander C. H. N., 466 + + _Jason_, 9 + + Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J. R. (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), 318, 462 + accepts command of Home Fleets, 1 + and Kaiser’s criticism of dock accommodation, 315 + and raids on unfortified towns, 287, 288 + and the value of aircraft in war, 450 + appointed Commander-in-Chief of Grand Fleet, 5 + as First Sea Lord, 417, 459 + Battle Orders of, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408 + bids farewell to Fleet, 460 + Birthday message to the King, 388 + confers with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, 219 + confers with Premier and Chancellor of Exchequer, 241 + despatches on Jutland battle, 304, 388, 462 + embarrassing interview with Sir G. Callaghan, 4 + entertains Lord Kitchener, 419 + extensive mining policy of, 249 + memorandum to Fleet from, 412, 460 + objections to change of Command, 3, 4 + proposals for handling Fleet in action approved by Admiralty, 302 + proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, 154 + reorganises his Staff, 39 _et seq._ + selects his Staff, 2 + suggested scheme of submarine obstructions by, 78 + tribute to personnel of Fleet, 410, 411, 487 + visits the Admiralty, 453 + wounded in China, 63 + + Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. Martyn, 316, 318, 367, 410, 463, + 477, 482 + relieves Admiral Warrender, 261 + tribute to, 488 + + Jones, Commander Loftus W., 464, 476 + gallantry of, 333 + posthumous award of V. C. to, 332, 333 + + Jutland, Battle of, 304 _et seq._ + Admiral Jellicoe’s memorandum to Fleet, 412 + area covered by different engagements, 381 + battle cruiser fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._, 479 + battle fleet in action, 341 _et seq._, 474, 480 + battle opens, 322 + despatches on, 304, 388, 462 + Director System in use at, 67 + disposition of Fleet, 318 _et seq._ + enemy losses, 486, 492 + enemy sighted, 320, 342, 374 + German version of, 363, 408, 409 + Grand Fleet congratulated by Admiralty, 414 + inferiority of British armour-piercing shell in, 69 + night attacks by flotillas, 483 + night dispositions, 483 + proceedings on 1st June, 485 + reflections on, 390 _et seq._ + repairing and altering ships damaged in, 415 + results of, 409 + retiring tactics of enemy, 362, 407, 408 + the night action, 370 _et seq._ + + + _Kaiser_, 310 + + Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A., 484 + + _Kempenfelt_, 265, 266, 464 + + Kennedy, Captain Francis W., 464, 493 + + Kennedy, Captain Theobald W. B., 493 + + Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M., 464, 476 + + Keyes, Commodore, 105, 196 + rescues enemy crews, 112 + + Kiddle, Captain E. B., 462 + + Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron’s visit to, 91 + + Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, 64 + + _Kildonan Castle_, 452 + + King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W. S., 467 + + _King Alfred_, 10, 106, 109, 159 + + _King Edward VII._, 8, 107, 108, 119 + mined and sunk, 264, 265 + + _King George V._, 8, 167, 168, 173, 185, 190, 318, 463 + and battle of Jutland, 345, 354, 357, 368 + + _King Orry_, 246, 432 + + _King Stephen_ sights sinking Zeppelin, 269 + + Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, 2, 3 + at Scapa, 419 + death of, 422 + sails on _Hampshire_, 421 + + Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, 72 + + Kite balloons, 71, 283 + + Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitän von, 240 + + _Köningen Luise_, 99 + + _Kristianiafiord_ intercepted by _Teutonic_, 255 + + _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, 90 + + Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer sunk off, 291 + + + Lamlash, as pre-War practice base, 147 + + _Lancaster_, 210 + + _Landrail_, 467, 470 + + Lans, Vice-Admiral von, 63 + + _Lapwing_, 467 + + _Larne_, 9 + + _Lassoo_, 278 + sinking of, 433 + + _Latona_, 11 + + _Laurel_, 467, 471 + + _Laverock_, 27 + + Lawrence, Commander, 457 + + Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W., 464 + + Lawson, Captain R. N., 7, 331, 464, 475 + + Leake, Captain F. M., 276 + + Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., 463 + + Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A. M., 464 + + _Leda_, 9, 143 + + Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C. B., 466 + + Leggett, Captain Oliver E., 491 + + Leith, Zeppelin attack on, 282 + + Le Mesurier, Commodore, 227, 268, 361, 365, 464, 482 + + Lerwick, coaling base at, 105 + + Leveson, Rear-Admiral A. C., 60, 61, 62, 191, 318, 463, 477, 488 + tribute to, 488 + + _Leviathan_, 10, 159, 169, 171, 191, 198, 210 + + Ley, Captain J. C., 462 + + _Liberty_, 467 + + Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, 184, 226 + + Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, 396 + + _Lilac_ strikes a mine, 242 + + Lion, 8, 24, 195, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 213, 242, 245, 250, 254, + 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 327, 329, 418, 442, 443, 446, 465, + 472, 474, 475, 480, 493, 494, 495, 496 + and Jutland battle, 322, 323, 329, 480, 495 + taken in tow by _Indomitable_, 496 + + _Liverpool_, 10, 16, 88, 94, 97, 98, 104, 113, 138, 148, 150, 165, + 168, 174, 200, 203, 228, 251, 255 + + _Lizard_, 467 + + Loch Ewe, a conference at, 128 + as coaling base, 96 + submarine activity at, 138 + + Loch-na-Keal, base at, 144 + base abandoned, 57 + improvised obstructions at, 77 + + _London_, 10 + + “Long Forties,” the, 275 + + Long Hope, anchorage at, 81 + + _Lord Nelson_, 10 + + Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstructions at, 146 + base at, 144 + Battle Squadrons at, 146 + diversion at, 147 + improvised obstructions at, 77, 146 + + _Louise_ (Danish steamer), 263 + + _Lowestoft_, 8, 90, 203, 493 + + Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, 286 + + Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, 77, 208, 219 + + _Lucia_, 447 + + _Lutzow_, 310 (_note_), 357 + loss of, 314, 408 + + Lyddite shell, suspected, 163 + + _Lydiard_, 467, 470 + + _Lynx_, 9, 176 + sunk by a mine, 238 + + Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H. I. N., 465 + + _Lyra_, 9 + + + Maclachlan, Captain, 265, 266, 463 + + Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., 7, 40, 128, 411, 459, 490 + + _Mænad_, 376, 377, 465, 484 + + _Mafeking_, 232 + + _Magic_, 274, 353, 374, 464 + + _Magnificent_, 93, 95, 205 + + Mahan, Admiral, vii, 12, 302 + + _Mainz_ disabled in action, 111 + her survivors rescued, 112 + + _Majestic_, 136 + + Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, 464 + + _Malaya_, 270, 328, 362, 380, 466, 468 + + _Manchester Commerce_, sinking of, 150 + + _Mandate_, 250, 464 + + _Manners_, 465 + + _Mantua_, 73, 109, 127, 131, 135 + + _Marksman_, 383, 465 + + Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W. P., 263 + + _Marlborough_, 7, 180, 181, 207, 318, 319, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, + 349, 351, 354, 358, 376, 381, 382, 386, 415, 434, 462, 477, + 480, 481, 485 + in action at Jutland battle, 351, 354, 358 + torpedoed, 316, 355 + + _Marne_, 266, 353, 374, 465 + + Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, 376, 464, 483 + + _Martial_, 464 + + _Martin_, 9 + + _Marvel_, 362, 465 + + _Mary Rose_, 465 + + Master, Lieut.-Commander E. G. H., 464 + + _Matchless_ strikes a mine, 255 + + McKenna, Mr., as First Lord, 35 + visits the Fleet, 237, 241 + + McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, 421 + + Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, 464, 495 + + Mediterranean, ships in the, 300 + + _Medusa_ rammed and sunk, 278 + + _Melita_, 265 + + _Menace_, 465 + + _Menelaus_ (kite balloon ship), 71 + + Merchant-ships attacked by submarines, 237, 241 + camouflaged, 171 + commissioned for blockade work, 73 + convoying, 46, 433 + instructions for safety of, 47 + serious loss of, 201, 210 + squadron disbanded, 172 + submarine peril to, 446 _et seq._ + + _Meteor_, 495 + damaged in Dogger Bank battle, 197 + + _Meteor_ (German mine-layer) abandoned and sunk, 239 + number of mines laid by, 247 + + _Michael_, 280, 465 + + _Michigan_, 171 + + _Midge_, 9, 237, 464 + + Milford Haven, Marquis of, 3, 391 + succeeded by Lord Fisher, 155 + + _Millbrook_, 465 + + Miller, Captain Charles B., 436, 466, 493 + + Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., 80, 81, 95, 117, 122 + + Minches, the, submarines reported in, 145 + + _Mindful_, 362, 465 + + “Mine Bumping Squadron,” the, 100 + + Minelayer Squadron, 11 + + Mine-layers, increased activity of British, 248 + Instructions to, 54 + + Mines, British, defective pattern of, 248 + experiments to counter, 60 + German, 18, 38, 96, 99, 113, 120, 150, 192, 214, 221 _et seq._ + success of new type of, 249 + the Northern Barrage, 249 + + Minesweepers, 9, 19, 60, 118, 202, 223, 266 + chase submarine, 161 + in collision, 218 + inadequacy of force of, 19, 170 + maximum speed of, 19 + withdrawn for service abroad, 209, 434 + + Mine-sweeping force strengthened, 434 + + Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine, 165 + + _Minion_, 464 + + Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, 76 + + _Minotaur_, 198, 257, 272, 318, 334, 367, 419, 438, 463 + + _Minstrel_, 9 + + _Mischief_, 465 + + Mocatta, Lieutenant Jack E. A., 466 + + _Moewe_ lays extensive minefield off Scottish coast, 265 + + Moir, Commander Dashwood F., 467 + + Molteno, Captain, 335, 463, 477 + + _Moltke_, 310 + + _Monarch_, 8, 31 (_note_), 93, 148, 184, 193, 310, 318, 463 + + Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, 128 + + _Monmouth_, loss of, 306 + + _Mons_, 464 + + _Moon_, 465 + + Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, 169, 171, 191, 493 + and Dogger Bank battle, 193 + succeeded by Rear-Admiral Pakenham, 210 + + _Moorsom_, 324, 325, 467, 470 + + Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, 209 + gunnery practice in, 65 + + _Moresby_, 329, 379, 466, 472, 474 + + Morley, Lord, dinner party at United Services Club, 2 + + _Morning Star_, 259, 353, 465 + + _Morris_, 324, 467, 470 + + Morton, Lieutenant, 232 + + _Mounsey_, 465 + + Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, 166 + + Munro, Captain Donald S., 127 + devises system of submarine obstruction, 77, 146 + + _Munster_, 465 + rescues crew of _Alcantara_, 273 + + _Musketeer_, 266, 431 + + _Mystic_, 464 + + + Nabakoff, Vladimir, 275 + + _Naiad_, 11 + + Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, 185, 203, 338, 383, 466, 476, 489 + engages a Zeppelin, 382 + + Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, 13 + + _Narborough_, 324, 366, 370 + + Narvik, iron ore trade of, 276, 292 + + _Narwhal_, 465 + + _Natal_, 8, 88, 199 + blown up in Cromarty harbour, 260 + court-martial on loss of, 260 + + Naval instructors, reduced number of, 189 + + Naval manœuvres of 1912, 392 + + Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix. + + Naval situation in May, 1916, 300 _et seq._ + + Navigation lights, extinction of, 121, 136 + + Navy Acts, German, 35 + + Navy League, the, formation of, 12 + + Navy, the, a lesson for the future, 33 + composition of, at opening of Great War, 7 _et seq._ + disposition of, in early days of Great War, 19 _et seq._ + grief of, at Kitchener’s fate, 424 + partition of, 36 + use and purpose of, 12 + + Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., 465 + + _Negro_, 441 + + _Nemesis_, 9, 206, 217 + + _Neptune_, 7, 168, 207, 211, 318, 360, 462 + in collision, 286 + + _Nerissa_, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471 + + _Nessus_, 266, 465 + + _Nestor_, 323, 324, 466, 470, 471 + + Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, 75 + + _New Zealand_, 8, 24, 101, 105, 126, 152, 169, 191, 203, 285, 290, + 319, 339, 418, 466, 493, 494 + and Jutland battle, 480 + and North Sea action, 495 + + _Nicator_, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471 + + Nicholson, Captain William C. M., 463 + + Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., 493 + + Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R. L., 2, 491 + organises wireless school, 188 + signalling system of, 58 + tribute to, 59, 491 + + Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, 10 + + _Noble_, 465 + + _Nomad_, 323, 324, 466, 470 + + _Nonsuch_, 356, 387, 465 + + North American Squadron joined by _Princess Royal_, 161 + + North east coast, Zeppelins on, 290 + + North Rona Island, a reported enemy base on, 107 + + North Sea, area of, 14 + controlling the, 249 _et seq._ + cruiser patrol areas in, 20 + drifting German mines in, 199 + Fleet in, 15 + northern and central areas of, 102, 103 + proclaimed a dangerous area, 157 + reported mooring of oil drums in, 208 + submarine and mine menace in, 17, 96, 116 _et seq._, 209 _et passim_ + sweeps, 15, 88–9, 99, 116 _et seq._, 127, 158, 163, 171, 175, 194, + 201 _et seq._, 211, 217, 219, 221, 223, 241, 246, 249 _et + seq._, 264, 267 _et seq._, 435, 445 _et seq._, 462 _et seq._ + the Northern Barrage mine-field, 249 + + North Sea battle, 187 _et seq._ + Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493 + (_cf._ Dogger Bank) + + Norway, German Fleet’s peace-time visits to, 91 + + Norwegian coast, British patrol of, 193 + British submarines’ operations against enemy on, 258 + reported German bases on, 91, 95, 107 + steamers sunk, 449 + sweeping, 277, 429, 432 + + _Nottingham_, 8, 88, 134, 203, 223, 224, 319, 435, 466, 470, 493 + torpedoed and sunk, 437 + + Nugent, Captain R. A., 254 + + _Nymphe_, 9 + in collision, 206 + rams a submarine, 142 + + + _Oak_, 7, 90, 113, 233, 355, 419, 465 + King George V. on, 426 + + _Obdurate_, 325, 466, 470, 485 + + _Obedient_, 361, 465 + + O’Beirne, Mr., 421 + + Observation mine-fields, 228 + + _Oceanic_, 110 + loss of, 73, 127 + + _Older_, German crew on, 458 + + Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., 186 + + _Olympic_, 149, 151 + + _Onslaught_, 362, 436, 464, 484 + + _Onslow_, 340, 387, 472 + heroism of captain and crew of, 340, 473, 474 + + Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A. G., 465 + + _Opal_, 465 + + _Ophelia_, 330, 332, 364 + + _Oracle_, 336 + + _Orcoma_, 253, 256 + + _Orion_, 8, 93, 103, 105, 119, 121, 152, 191, 318, 357, 463 + + Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, 81, 82, 122 + submarine activity in, 166 + wireless stations in, 110 + + _Oropesa_ in collision, 244 + + _Orotava_, 206 + + _Orvieto_, 217 + + _Oscar II._, loss of, 233 + + _Ossory_, 464 + + _Otway_, 458 + + _Owl_, 9, 464 + + + Pakenham, Rear-Admiral, W. C., 8, 203, 319, 466, 489 + succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, 210 + + Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, 340, 467, 474 + + _Paragon_, 9 + + Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, 463 + + Parker, Captain Henry Wise, 463 + + Parsons, Lieutenant G., 245 + + _Pasley_, 441 + + Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West Indies, 210 + + _Patia_, 245, 271 + + _Patrol_ engaged by battle cruisers, 177 + + _Patuca_, 233 + + Peace manœuvres, unreality of, 37 + + Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R., 80, 97, 127 + + Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, 63 + + _Pelican_, 324, 441, 466, 470 + + Pelly, Captain Henry B., 465, 493 + + _Penn_, 436 + + _Penshurst_, 262 + + Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled, 110, 252 + gunnery practice in, 65, 281 + + Persius, Captain, an admission by, 409 + + _Petard_, 324, 325, 378, 470, 471, 484 + + Peterhead, good work of patrol at, 225 + patrol sinks a submarine, 293 + trawlers sunk by enemy, 430 + + _Phaeton_, 217, 320, 442, 466 + attacks a Zeppelin, 290 + + Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., 350, 466, 478 + + Phipps, Lieutenant W. D., 7 + + Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, 207 + + Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, 82 + + _Plover_, 147 + + Plowden, Commander Richard A. A., 464 + + Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon. Reginald A. R., 489 + + Pohl, Admiral von, 63, 200 + + Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C. A., 465 + + Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C. F., 7 + + _Pommern_, loss of, 314, 376, 379 + + _Porpoise_, 9, 259, 464 + rams a submarine, 442 + + Portrush, German wreckage ashore at, 191 + + Pound, Captain A. D. P. R., 462 + + Pratt, Captain Thomas D., 466 + + Preston, Commander L. G., 9, 242, 251 + + _Prince Charles_, 262, 263 + sinks a U-boat, 263 + + _Prince of Wales_, 10 + + _Princess Louise_, 232 + attacked by submarine, 232 + + _Princess Margaret_, 255, 289 + + _Princess Royal_, 8, 135, 186, 190, 195, 198, 418, 473 + convoys Canadian troops, 134, 136, 137 + in Dogger Bank battle, 203, 493, 494, 495, 496 + in Jutland battle, 320, 322, 466, 480 + joins North American Squadron, 161, 168 + + _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_, 134 + + Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, 240 + + Prowse, Captain Cecil I., 465 + death of, 487 + + _Prudentia_, loss of, 267 + + Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P. F., 96 + + “P. Z. Exercises,” 391 + + + “Q” ships (_see_ Decoy ships) + + _Queen_, 10 + + _Queen Elizabeth_, 219, 442 + + _Queen Mary_, 8, 24, 194, 198, 203, 310, 465 loss of, 306, 325, 471 + + + Ramage, Commander G. N., 434 + + _Ramexo_, 437, 443 + + Ramsey, Commander Charles G., 466 + + _Ramsey_ sunk by disguised mine-layer, 239 + + Range of gun and torpedo, 38 + + Range-finders, improved, 418 + + Range-finding experiments, 68 + + _Rattler_, 185 + + Rawlings, Lieut.-Commander H. C., 464 + + _Redpole_, 9, 184 + + Reeves, Captain Edward, 466 + + _Rena_, 273 + + _Renown_, her deck protection improved, 448 + + _Repulse_, her deck protection improved, 448 + joins the Fleet, 447 + + Retiring tactics, advantages of, 401 + + _Revenge_, 318, 354, 357, 360, 363, 381, 462, 486 + + Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J. C., 465 + + _Rifleman_, 9, 107, 218 + + Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J. W., 68 + + Robertson, Mr., 421 + + Robinson, Lieut.-Commander Charles G., 385, 467 + + _Rohilla_, wreck of, 153 + + Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D., 466 + + Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a merchant-ship at, 237 + + _Rosemary_ torpedoed, 430 + + Ross, Captain George P., 355, 462, 481 + + _Rostock_, 379, 409 + + Rosyth, a conference at, 78 + base at, 28 + conditions for leaving and returning to base at, 299 + development of base at, 79 + German prisoners landed at, 113 + interview with Mr. Balfour at, 459 + submarine obstructions for, 77 + the coal difficulty at, 84 + 3rd Battle Squadron at, 24, 156 + + _Roxburgh_, 8, 88, 199, 223, 277, 282, 420, 425 + hit by torpedo, 224 + + _Royal Arthur_, 11, 205 + + Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work of, 72 + + _Royal Oak_, 318, 358, 463 + + _Royal Sovereign_, 442 + + _Royalist_, 217, 435, 464 + + Royds, Captain Percy M. R., 464, 476 + + _Ruby_, 9, 184 + + _Russell_, 10, 93, 237 + + Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F., 465 + + Russian steamer sunk, 449 + + Russians relay their mine-fields, 284 + visit Grand Fleet, 275 + + Russo-Japanese War, advances in technique in, viii + + Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F. S., 321, 469 + + + _St. Clair_, 110 + + St. John, Captain F. G., 493 + + _St. Vincent_, 7, 318, 357, 362, 463 + + Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J. S., 7 + + Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H. H., 466 + + _Sapphire_, 105 + + _Sappho_, 7, 107, 122, 136, 137, 171, 181, 193, 217, 218, 251, 258 + + _Sarah Alice_ torpedoed, 446 + + Savill, Captain, 422, 463 + + Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, 80 + a wireless school established at, 59, 188 + adopted as main Fleet Base, 15, 26 + arrival of _Campania_ at, 71 + arrival of air- and sea-planes at, 100 + blocking the channels, 77, 167 + defenceless nature of base at, 92, 114, 143 + entrances to, 26, 28, 159, 298 + gunnery and torpedo practice at, 65, 70, 160 + recreation and occupation at, 85–7 + reinforcing gun defences of, 82 + situation of, 27 + submarine menace, 139 + submarine obstruction pierced, 181 + submarine obstructions at, 144, 170 + + Scarborough, bombardment of, 176 + + Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe, 151 + + Schwann, Captain O., 283 + + Scott, Captain Albert C., 466 + + Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing system, 66, 67 + + Scottish coast, _Moewe_ lays minefield on, 265 + submarines on, 153 + + _Seagull_, 9 + + Sea-plane carriers, orders to, 54 + sheds wrecked by gale, 160 + + Seaplanes as scouts, 469 + difficulties of, 71, 221, 222, 282–3, 290 + first reconnaissance work with Fleet, 321 + replaced by aeroplanes, 222, 283 + + _Sea Ranger_, 443 + + Searchlights, 162 + excellence of German, 379 + signalling by, 57 + + Second Fleet, 10 + + Selborne, Earl of, 34 + + Seven Years’ War, 39 + + _Seydlitz_, 197, 310, 409 + + Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, 1, 63 + + Seymour, Lieut.-Commander Ralph W., 489 + + _Shamrock_, 241 + + Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, 63 + + _Shannon_, 8, 88, 168, 318, 368, 419, 463 + + Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., 2, 491 + + _Shark_, 9, 176, 330, 368, 419, 463 + heroism of captain and crew, 333 + loss of, 332, 476 + survivors awarded D. S. M., 334 + + _Sheldrake_, 9 + + Shetland Patrol Force, 9 + + Signalling by searchlight, 57 + + _Skipjack_, 9, 166 + + Smith, C. H., awarded D. S. M., 334 + + Smoke screens, 69, 325, 357, 359, 362, 363, 366, 408, 479 + + _Soudan_, 148 + + South Atlantic, von Spee’s Squadron in, 24, 157, 161, 204 + + _Southampton_, 8, 88, 95, 178, 182, 203, 290, 319, 320, 326, 442, + 466, 493, 494 + and Jutland battle, 362, 375, 471, 472, 485 + + South-east coast, raids on, 287 + + Sowerby, Captain Charles F., 466 + death of, 487 + + _Sparrowhawk_, 9, 205, 464 + rammed, 375 + sinking of, 383, 485 + + “Special Service Squadron,” the, 171 + + Spee, Admiral von, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205 + + _Speedwell_, 9 + + _Speedy_, loss of, 120 + + Spickernell, Frank T., 489 + + _Spitfire_, 9, 176, 375, 464, 483 + + Spithead, Naval Review at, 3 + + Spitzbergen, reported German submarine base and wireless station at, + 233 + + Stadlandet, patrols off, 276, 292 + + _Stag_, 135 + + Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D. C., 467 + + Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., 463 + + Star shells, 378, 379 + + _Staunch_, 9, 233 + + Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, 290 + + Stileman, Rear-Admiral H. H., 73 + + Stirling, Captain A. J. B., 377, 378, 465, 483 + + Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A. P., 10 + + Stuart, Lieut.-Commander Dudley, 467 + + Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, 207, 318, 410, 463, 477, 488 + destroys von Spee’s squadron, 204 + in Jutland battle, 482 + kite balloon experiments of, 71 + succeeds Sir D. Gamble, 205 + tribute to, 488 + + Submarine activity in White Sea, 449 + attack under difficulties, 457 + C 27 sinks a German U-boat, 232 + flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand Fleet, 294 + flotillas, Instructions to, 54 + menace, 76, 115, 434, 445, 453 _et passim_ + obstructions (system of), 28, 77, 159, 170, 220, 225 + patrols, 225, 426 + peril to merchant shipping, 445 _et seq._ + screens, question of, 45 + sinks German steamship, 426 + surrender of a German, 166 + + Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of, 447 + + Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet, 54, 425 + comparative strength of British and German, 11, 17 + defences against, at Scapa Flow, 27 + German, 17 + in collision, 289 (_note_) + reason for suppressing news of engagements with, 387 + sunk by Navy, 93, 165, 166, 207, 214, 225, 226, 246, 263 + + Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, 152 + + Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, 182 + + Sulivan, Commander Harold E., 464 + + Sulivan, Commander Norton A., 465 + + Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G. C., 150, 465 + + _Superb_, 7, 192, 199, 244, 318, 463 + + Swan, T. W., awarded D. S. M., 334 + + Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, 73, 162, 220 + defences of, 232 + evacuation of, 162 + + _Swift_, 9, 141, 142 + + Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy destroyer, 280 + + + Taku forts, capture of, 63 + + _Talisman_, 267, 294, 445 + + _Taranaki_, 232 + + Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, 291 + + Tay, River, submarines off entrance to, 187 + + Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed in action, 197 + + Telephonic communications, establishment of, 214 + + _Temeraire_, 8, 318, 463 + + _Termagant_, 324, 325, 467, 470, 471 + + Terry, Lieut.-Commander F. G., 375, 464 + + _Teutonic_, 131, 137 + intercepts a Norwegian-American liner, 255 + + _Theseus_, 11, 21, 135, 141, 277 + + Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., 466 + + _Thetis_, 11, 120 + + Third Fleet, 11 + + Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E. C. O., 466 + + _Thornhill_, 148, 149 + + _Thunderer_, 8, 172, 175, 318, 352, 354, 463 + + _Tiger_, 24, 174, 199, 203, 204, 308, 420, 467 + in Dogger Bank battle, 196, 493, 494, 495 + in Jutland action, 322, 325, 472 + joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 158 + + _Tipperary_, 376, 463, 485 + loss of, 483 + + Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G., 466 + + Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, 63 + + _Titania_, 294 + + Tolstoy, Count Alexis, 275 + + Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, 278, 289 + + Torpedo attacks: + caution required in, 399 + practices at Scapa Flow, 70 + range of, 38 + warfare: + element of chance in, 393, 395 + importance attached by Germany to, 393 + measures for combating, 359, 399 + work of German Navy, 62 + + Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, 51 + reports on, at battle of Jutland, 360 + + Tothill, Captain Hugh H. D., 463 + + Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds Rear-Admiral Waymouth, 213 + + Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J. C., 340, 467, 475 + heroism of and tribute to, 340, 374–5 + + Townsend, Captain Cyril S., 464 + + Trafalgar, Battle of, 302 + + Trawlers, German, engaged and destroyed, 278 + support marine obstructions at Scapa Flow, 82 + suspicious, 106, 124, 224 + + Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C. W. E., 375, 465, 483 + + Trewin, Assistant-Paymaster G. S., 321, 469 + + _Trident_, 294 + + Trondhjem, _Brandenburg_ at, 132 + + _Turbulent_, 325, 326, 379, 467, 470, 471, 484 + rammed and sunk, 378–80 + + Turkish battleships, purchase of, 108, 129 + + Tynemouth, minefields off, 110 + + Tyrwhitt, Commodore R. Y., 10, 191, 198, 229, 239, 249, 251, 259, + 271, 278, 279, 286, 385, 386, 436, 440, 442, 493 + a successful haul of German trawlers, 249 + chases a destroyer, 111 + orders sinking of _Medusa_, 278 + + + U-boat losses, 93, 164, 165, 207, 214, 225, 226, 246, 262 + + _Undaunted_, 157, 279, 280, 493 + + Underhill, Captain Edwin V., 463 + + United Services Club, dinner party at, 2 + + United States enters the War, 303 + + _Unity_, 9, 176, 464 + + Usborne, Commander Cecil V., 60, 61 + + Usedom, Admiral von, 63 + + Utvoer Lighthouse, 133, 270 + + + _Vala_, 262 + + _Valiant_, 275, 328, 362, 466 + in collision, 434 + + _Vanguard_, 7, 115, 318, 463 + + _Venerable_, 10 + + _Vengeance_, 10 + + _Victor_, 9 + + Victoria Cross awards, 325, 332 + + _Victorious_, 83, 417 + + _Viknor_, 192 + loss of, 193 + + _Vindex_, 71, 289 + + Visual signalling, 57 + + _Von der Tann_, 310 + + + Wales, Prince of, visits Scapa, 243 + + Walney Island, submarine attack on, 198 + + Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C. A., 465 + + Wardle, Captain T. E., 272 + + Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in command of 2nd Battle + Squadron, 7, 41, 91, 94, 148, 177, 178, 179 + terminates his command, 261 + + _Warrior_, 171, 290, 318, 334, 335, 336, 463 + abandoned and sunk, 306, 386, 387, 485 + in Jutland battle, 385, 477 + + _Warspite_, 213, 256, 336, 466 + in collision, 258, 434 + in Jutland battle, 328, 349, 350, 478 + + Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W., 198 + breakdown in health, 213 + + Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., 7 (_note_), 491 + + Welsh coal-fields, strike in, 229, 235 + + White Sea, enemy submarines in, 448, 449 + protecting the trade route, 256, 257 + + Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, 466 + + _Wiesbaden_ badly crippled, 335, 340 + + William II., Emperor, criticises British dock accommodation, 315 + + Wilson, Commander W. W., 169 + + Wintour, Captain Charles J., 9, 376, 464 + death of, 380, 483, 487 + unpleasant experience of, 142 + + Wireless school at Scapa, 59, 188 + + Wireless signalling, and why restricted, 56, 57 + + Wireless telegraphy, 38, 56 _et seq._, 110 + improved system of, 58, 59, 188 + + Withers, Captain Percy, 464 + + _Wolf_ intercepted and sunk, 276 + + Woods, Commander A. E., 188 + + Woods, Commander Alexander R. W., 7, 490 + + Woollcombe, Captain Louis C. S., 463 + + Woollcombe, Captain Maurice, 466 + + Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C., 464 + + + _Yarmouth_, 185, 203, 320, 430, 466 + in Jutland battle, 338, 476 + + Yegoroff, M., 275 + + _Yorck_, sinking of, 157 + + York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, 228 + + Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, 180 + + Young, Captain G. B., 272 + + Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage Association, 187 + + + _Zaza_, 231 + + _Zealandia_, 8, 254, 255 + + Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and considered impracticable, 154 + + Zeppelin activity, 436, 437, 442, 443 + bombs rescuers, 496 + engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle, 486 + shed, Tondern, attack on, 278, 289 + + Zeppelins as scouts, 32, 451 + destruction of, 169, 290 + raids by, 282 + + Zigzagging, procedure of, 46 + + + + +[Illustration: + + _Diagram I._ + + PLAN OF + JUTLAND BATTLE + BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT + +The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6.0. P.M. is fixed by a report +from the Marlborough and confirmed at 6.4. P.M. by a report from the +Rear-Admiral 1st Battle Squadron in the Colossus. + +The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by a report from the +Marlborough at 6.5. P.M. taken in conjunction with the reports of the +Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron. + +The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from the report of the +Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet and from the Lion and Indomitable. + +The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6.7. P.M. is fixed by a +report from the Lion received at 6.6. P.M.; this gave the bearing; the +distance is obtained by a consideration of the ranges at which the Lion +was firing. + +The position of the Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed at 6.14. P.M. from the +Lion and at 6.15. P.M. from the Barham; the latter being signalled +by wireless, an interval of four minutes being allowed between +transmission and receipt. + +Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers are fixed by the +bearings on which our Battle Cruisers were firing and the ranges given, +and by a consideration of the German reports which show a 32 point turn +between 6.6. and 6.15. P.M. + +Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are fixed by bearings +and ranges given by the Marlborough at 6.17. P.M., Iron Duke at 6.31. +P.M. and Monarch at 6.33. P.M. + +The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are fixed by reports +and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral +5th Battle Squadron. + + _Note._--In studying this diagram it should be borne in mind that + only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due to the + smoke and mist.] + + +[Illustration: + + _Diagram II._ + + DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT + HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON + THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN. + +It should be borne in mind that no information as to the position of +the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until 6.14. P.M., and that the +only reports received had been one at 6.6. P.M., giving a bearing of +the Enemy Battle Cruisers from the “Lion”, and a report at 5.50. P.M. +from the “Southampton” to the effect that the Enemy Battle Fleet bore +north-east from his Battle Cruisers (and were therefore presumably +ahead of them and right ahead of our Battle Fleet.) + +There had therefore been no sufficient information on which to +re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment on the starboard wing +column to meet an enemy before the starboard beam would necessarily be +an awkward manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration of +the starboard wing column to port and a very large alteration of course +of the remaining columns when coming into line astern of it. + +A torpedo attack during deployment would under these conditions throw +the British Battle Fleet into great confusion and a concentration of +gunfire on the turning point would be very effective; our own gunfire, +owing to the large alterations of course and the consequent difficulty +of obtaining correct fire control data would be correspondingly +ineffective: our own destroyers had been spread ahead of the Battle +Fleet as a submarine screen until 6.8 P.M. and were moving across the +front in an unformed condition to the two flanks. + +The movements that would probably have resulted and the number of ships +on each side in action are shown in the diagram for each 3-minute +interval from 6.16 to 6.28 P.M. + +The three ships of the 5th. Battle Squadron would eventually have come +into line ahead of the 6th. division, but would possibly have masked +the fire of that division during the movement.] + + +[Illustration: + + _Diagram III._ + + DIAGRAM SHOWING + ORDER OF THE BATTLEFLEET + + BATTLE OF JUTLAND + + 31^{st.} MAY 1916 + + _“Minotaur’s” track chart records that at 8 p.m. “King George V” + bore N 10 E (true) from her, distant about 5 miles. + + It also records that “Lion” bore W by S (true) from her, distant + about 5 miles. + + If these records are reliable “Lion’s” 8 p.m. position would be + at X, and her track between 7.20 and 8 p.m., presumably as shewn + thus:---- + + “Minotaur’s” records however, do not profess to give exact + distances._] + + +[Illustration: + + _Diagram IV._ + + TRACK OF SQUADRONS + DURING NIGHT OF + May 31st. to June 1st. and + Forenoon of June 1st. 1916. + + +BATTLE FLEET. + + During night, Battle Fleet in 3 columns, 1 mile apart, disposed + abeam. + + From 2.45 A. M. to 3.30 A. M., in single line. + + From 3.30 A. M. onward, in 6 columns, 1 mile apart, disposed + abeam. + + +POSITIONS OF CRUISERS ETC. + + Dublin at 4.30 A. M. in Lat. 55° 30′ N., Long. 6° 36′ E. + Commodore of Flotillas at 5.0 A. M. in Lat. 55° 48′ N., Long. + 6° 22′ E. + + Vice Admiral 1st Battle Squadron with 6th Division at 6.40 + A. M. in Lat. 55° 55′ N., Long. 5° 15′ E. steering S. SE. 19 + knots. + + 3 Submarines off Vyl Light Ship on bearing 270°, 4 miles, 12 + miles and 20 miles respectively from Lightship.] + + + + +Transcriber’s Notes + + +Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a +predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they +were not changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation +marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left +unbalanced. + +Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs +and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support +hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to +the corresponding illustrations. + +Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them, +have been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed at the end of +the book. + +The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page +references. + +Original text uses two forms of the following words; both retained here: + + “moral” and “morale” + + “underwater” and “under-water” + + “minefield” and “mine-field” + + “seaplanes” and “sea-planes” + +Redundant book title on page 1 has been removed by Transcriber. + +Page 316: The times in the illustration's heading use a mix of Roman +and Arabic numerals. + +Page 360: The time shown as “7.8” was printed that way. It may mean “8 +minutes after 7”. Similar times appear on other pages. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75323 *** |