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+Project Gutenberg's Shock and Awe, by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
+other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
+the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
+www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
+to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
+
+Title: Shock and Awe
+       Achieving Rapid Dominance
+
+Author: Harlan K. Ullman
+        James P. Wade
+
+Posting Date: September 22, 2014 [EBook #7259]
+Release Date: January, 2005
+First Posted: April 1, 2003
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SHOCK AND AWE ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer.
+
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+
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+[Note: This book was taken from the website of the Command and Control
+Research Program (CCRP) within the within the Office of the Assistant
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+
+    2. Information presented on DODCCRP.ORG is considered public
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+
+The original electronic text was published at
+http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html]
+
+
+
+
+Shock and Awe:
+Achieving Rapid Dominance
+
+Written By
+
+Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade
+
+With:
+
+L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. Horner, Jonathan T. Howe,
+and Keith Brendley
+
+NDU Press Book
+December 1996
+
+
+
+
+Contents
+
+
+
+Foreword
+Prologue
+Introduction to Rapid Dominance
+
+Chapter 1. Background and Basis
+Chapter 2. Shock and Awe
+Chapter 3. Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application
+Chapter 4. An Outline for System Innovation and Technological
+           Integration
+Chapter 5. Future Directions
+
+Appendices -- Reflections of Three Former Commanders
+    Appendix A. "Thoughts on Rapid Dominance" by Admiral Bud Edney
+    Appendix B. "Defense Alternatives: Forces Required" by General
+                 Chuck Horner
+    Appendix C. "Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance" by General
+                 Fred Franks
+
+Biographies of the Study Group Members
+
+
+
+
+Foreword
+
+
+
+We are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended debate
+about the future of conflict and the future of our defense
+establishment. Few will deny that the winds of change are blowing as
+never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical situation, an
+evolving information-oriented society, advancing technology, and
+budgetary constraints. How our nation responds to the challenge of
+change will determine our ability to shape the future and defend
+ourselves against 21st century threats. The major issue, however it
+may be manifested, involves the degree of change that is required.
+Advocates, all along the spectrum from a military technical revolution
+to a revolution in military affairs to a revolution in security
+affairs, are making their cases. Military institutions are by their
+very nature somewhat conservative. History has shown that success has
+often sown the seeds of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford
+to follow in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels
+and failed to stretch their imaginations.
+
+Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced about a
+subject are not in the most advantageous position to understand a new
+world order. Yet these same individuals are often among the most
+credible voices and therefore are essential to progress. The authors
+of Shock and Awe are a highly accomplished and distinguished group
+with the credibility that comes from years of front line experience.
+Thus, this work is important not only because of the ideas contained
+within, but because of the caliber and credibility of the authors.
+
+ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In sponsoring
+this work and in disseminating its initial results, we hope to
+contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives, their promises,
+and their risks. As the authors note, this is a work in progress meant
+not to provide definitive solutions but a proposed perspective for
+considering future security needs and strategies. To the extent that
+vigorous debate ensues we will be successful.
+
+David S. Alberts
+Washington, D.C.
+October 1996
+
+
+
+
+Prologue
+
+
+
+The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
+structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future U.
+S. military forces might be configured. From the very outset of this
+study group's deliberations, we agreed that the most useful
+contribution we could make would be to attempt to reach beyond what we
+saw as the current and commendable efforts, largely but not entirely
+within the Department of Defense, to define concepts for strategy,
+doctrine, operations, and force structure to deal with a highly
+uncertain future. In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized
+the inherent and actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach
+beyond what may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
+
+It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently the
+most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time
+to come. Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose
+major excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
+military superiority? For reasons noted in this study, we believe that
+excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of current
+defense approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have
+led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that the
+Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this means for
+more precisely defining the nature of our future security needs.
+Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing external
+danger, the United States is actively examining new strategic options
+and choices. The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the
+Pentagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
+
+At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of American
+military power, unencumbered by the danger of an external peer
+competitor, have created a period of strategic advantage during which
+we have the luxury of time, perhaps measured in many years, to
+re-examine with a margin of safety our defense posture. On the other
+hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this
+predominant military capability of the United States and fail to try
+to exploit, bypass, or counter it. In other words, faced with American
+military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most
+importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries
+may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant
+as possible these current U.S. advantages. We proceed at our own risk
+if we dismiss this possibility.
+
+Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability
+will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major American political
+parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability,
+both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to
+be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense
+budgets that are likely to be approved. Unless a new menace
+materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same." Such
+reductions may have no strategic consequences. However, that is an
+outcome that we believe should not be left to chance.
+
+This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith strategic
+reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs may be caught
+up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and could too easily
+drift into becoming advocacy or marketing documents. As the services
+are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure,
+the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and
+special programs is likely to increase, thereby complicating the
+problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological
+resources. This means that some external thinking, removed from the
+bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating
+and sustaining innovation.
+
+Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing profound
+change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature of the free
+enterprise system and the American personality. Whether in information
+or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too
+numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product
+breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One
+sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in
+this country are being created by small business. In the areas of
+commercial information and related management information systems,
+these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a
+few years ago.
+
+On the so-called information highway, performance is increasing
+dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to bring to
+market new generation technology are diminishing. These positive
+trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base. One
+consequence of this broad commercial transformation is that any future
+set of defense choices may be inexorably linked to and dependent on
+this profound, ongoing change in the commercial sector and in learning
+to harness private sector advances in technology-related products. It
+must also be understood that only the United States among all states
+and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and commercial
+capability to undertake the full exploitation of this revolutionary
+potential.
+
+Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed
+worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during
+the Cold War. These demands will continue and the diversity of
+assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces must be properly
+manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to
+standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and
+its public. The matter of maintaining this capability while attempting
+to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting
+challenge not to be underestimated.
+
+These structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity
+for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to
+exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of
+Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on Shock and Awe. Rapid
+Dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts
+and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about
+the future is perhaps one of the few givens. We believe the principles
+and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and
+different enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated
+by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness,"
+and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer examination.
+
+Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war recorded
+their observations, strategists and generals have been tantalized and
+confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the adversary's will to
+resist before, during, and after battle. Today, we believe that an
+unusual opportunity exists to determine whether or not this
+long-sought strategic goal of affecting the will, understanding, and
+perception of an adversary can be brought closer to fruition. Even if
+this task cannot be accomplished, we believe that, at the very
+minimum, such an effort will enhance and improve the ability of our
+military forces to carry out their missions more successfully through
+identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the
+conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and
+choices for employing our forces more effectively.
+
+Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of strategy,
+technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has the potential for
+revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid Dominance as the possible
+military expression, vanguard, and extension of this potential for
+revolutionary change. The strategic centers of gravity on which Rapid
+Dominance concentrates, modified by the uniquely American ability to
+integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology, and
+innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and shaping the
+will of the adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy
+or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no
+alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military
+objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must control the
+operational environment and through that dominance, control what the
+adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or
+regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known.
+
+In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital condition
+to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an adversary's military
+power. We still must maintain the capacity for the physical and
+forceful occupation of territory should there prove to be no
+alternative to deploying sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment
+on the ground to accomplish that objective. Should this goal of
+applying our resources to controlling, affecting, and breaking the
+will of an adversary to resist remain elusive, we believe that Rapid
+Dominance can still provide a variety of options and choices for
+dealing with the operational demands of war and conflict.
+
+To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply a
+variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary level of
+Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military leverage
+points. This means that psychological and intangible, as well as
+physical and concrete effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces
+and supporting military infrastructure, will have to be achieved. It
+is in this broader and deeper strategic application that Rapid
+Dominance perhaps most fundamentally differentiates itself from
+current doctrine and offers revolutionary application.
+
+Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the adversary's
+will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe to achieve
+strategic aims and military objectives, four characteristics emerge
+that will define the Rapid Dominance military force. These are noted
+and discussed in later chapters. The four characteristics are near
+total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and
+environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational
+brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature
+management of the entire operational environment.
+
+Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that is, it
+focuses on defeating the military capability of an adversary and
+therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-Rapid Dominance would seek to
+be more universal in application through the overriding objective of
+affecting the adversary's will beyond the boundaries traditionally
+defined by military capability alone. In other words, where decisive
+force is likely to be most relevant is against conventional military
+capabilities that can be overwhelmed by American (and allied) military
+superiority. In conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this
+idealized scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be
+sufficiently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make this
+distinction in either theory or in practice.
+
+We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force actually be
+fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, this force would
+be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and certainly not an antidote
+or preventative for a major policy blunder, miscalculation, or
+mistake. It should also be fully appreciated that situations will
+exist in which Rapid Dominance (or any other doctrine) may not work or
+apply because of political, strategic, or other limiting factors.
+
+We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an adversary's
+will, perception, and understanding through Shock and Awe on the
+grounds that this idea is not new and that such an outcome may not be
+physically achievable or politically desirable. On the first point, we
+believe the use of basic principles of strategy can stand us in good
+stead even and perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries
+may not elect to fight the United States along traditional or expected
+lines. On whether this ability can and should be achieved, we believe
+that question should be part of a broader examination.
+
+Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the way in
+which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy, technology,
+and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It is this interaction and
+focus which we think will provide the most interesting results.
+
+For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious
+intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of Rapid
+Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Dominance in the formation
+stage and not as a final product. Over the next months, we believe
+further steps should be taken to refine Rapid Dominance and to develop
+"paper" systems and force designs that will add crucial specificity to
+this concept. Then, this Rapid Dominance force can be assessed against
+five sets of questions:
+
+  - First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be fielded with
+    the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe to affect and shape
+    the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and
+    improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major
+    regional contingency (MRC)?
+  - Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its
+    application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War
+    (OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it
+    not, and where might it offer mixed benefits?
+  - Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance in
+    both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a form
+    of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy? Would
+    this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to our
+    own public?
+  - Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances, coalitions,
+    and the conduct of allied and combined operations?
+  - Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on defense
+    resource investment priorities and future budgets?
+
+From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful results
+will flow.
+
+We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the National
+Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In particular, we
+owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts of NDU whose
+intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his full support,
+have been invaluable and without which this project would have been
+far less productive.
+
+Washington, D.C.
+
+1 September 1996
+
+L.A. Edney       J.T. Howe
+F.M. Franks      H.K. Ullman
+C. A. Horner     J.P. Wade
+
+
+
+
+Introduction to Rapid Dominance
+
+
+
+The military posture and capability of the United States of America
+are, today, dominant. Simply put, there is no external adversary in
+the world that can successfully challenge the extraordinary power of
+the American military in either regional conflict or in "conventional"
+war as we know it once the United States makes the commitment to take
+whatever action may be needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis
+may be the most difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and U.S. forces
+are not in place. However, it will still be years, if not decades,
+before potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a
+full panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the
+aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and
+weapons systems in our inventory. Even if an adversary could deploy
+similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb training and
+preparation of American service personnel would still be a daunting
+task.
+
+Given this reality that our military dominance can and will extend for
+some considerable time to come, provided we are prepared to use it,
+why then is a re-examination of American defense posture and doctrine
+important? The answers to this question involve (1) the changing
+nature of the domestic and international environments; (2) the complex
+nature of resolving inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside
+conventional war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism,
+crime, and the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource
+constraints; (4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases
+raised on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future
+of austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called social,
+economic, and information revolutions that could check or counter many
+of the nation's assumptions as well as public support currently
+underwriting defense.
+
+It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving non-traditional
+Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law enforcement tasks are growing
+and pose difficult problems and challenges to American military
+forces, especially when and where the use of force may be
+inappropriate or simply may not work. The expansion of the role of UN
+forces to nation-building in Somalia and its subsequent failure comes
+to mind as an example of this danger. It is also arguable that the
+formidable nature and huge technological lead of American military
+capability could induce an adversary to move to a strategy that
+attempted to circumvent all this fighting power through other clever
+or agile means. The Vietnam War is a grim reminder of the political
+nature of conflict and how our power was once outflanked. Training,
+morale, and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring
+both a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing.
+
+Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most dominant
+military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in overcoming the
+inertia of this success. We may be our own worst enemy.
+
+During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense debate was
+often fought over how to balance the so-called "strategy-force
+structure-budget" formula. Today, that formula has expanded to include
+"threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure."
+Without a "clear and present danger" such as the Axis Powers in 1941
+or, later, the Soviet Union to coalesce public agreement on the
+threat, it is difficult to construct a supporting strategy that can be
+effective either in setting priorities or objectives. Hence, today's
+"two war" or two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC)
+strategy has been criticized as strategically and financially
+excessive. As noted by administration officials, the current force
+structure does not meet the demands of the "two war," MRC strategy
+and, in any event, the budget will not support the planned force
+structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United States
+possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and facilities than it
+needs to support the current force, thereby draining scarce resources
+away from fighting power. As a result, there is a substantial defense
+imbalance that will erode fighting power.
+
+In designing its defense posture, the United States has adopted the
+doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming force." This doctrine
+reinforces American advantages in strategic mobility, prepositioning,
+technology, training, and in fielding integrated military systems to
+provide and retain superiority, and responds to the minimum casualty
+and collateral damage criteria set first in the Reagan Administration.
+The Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon
+or process by which the United States continues to exploit technology
+to maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of
+achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." Through this awareness,
+the United States should be able to obtain perfect or near perfect
+information on virtually all technical aspects of the battlefield and
+therefore be able to defeat or destroy an adversary more effectively,
+with fewer losses to ourselves and with a range of capabilities from
+long-range precision strike to more effective close-in weapons.
+
+Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some of the
+as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities, changes,
+and trends. The deployment of American forces to Bosnia is a reaction
+to and representation of major shifts occurring in the post-Cold War
+world. With these shifts, this deployment is suggestive of what may
+lie ahead for the use, relevance, and design of military force. The
+legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and then, the start of the Cold War,
+caused the West to adopt policies for containing and deterring the
+broad threat posed by the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermonuclear
+weapons, complemented over time by strong conventional forces,
+threatened societal damage to Russia. Conventional forces backed by
+tactical nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a
+massive Soviet ground attack in Europe and, in part, to provide an
+alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons.
+
+Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit serving
+in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so well in
+_Desert Storm_ and, for the bulk of the Cold War along with our other
+units, had been designed to defend NATO against and then defeat a
+numerically superior, armored and mechanized Soviet adversary
+advancing across the plains of Germany. Now these troops, as well as
+others from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW
+for which special training, rules of engagement, command arrangements,
+and other support structures have been put in place at short notice,
+few of which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are also
+operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media coverage, can
+have huge domestic political impact especially if events go wrong.
+
+Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally configured
+force for such an operation is not relevant for the moment even though
+this unit probably was the most appropriate for this task. However, it
+is prudent to examine the consequences of changing tasks presaged by
+Bosnia, in which the enemy is instability rather than an ideological
+or regional adversary we are trying to contain or defeat and
+neutrality on our part may be vital to the success of the mission. Do
+these changes mean that we should alter our traditional approach to
+the doctrine for and design of forces? If so, how? Are there
+alternative or more effective ways and means to conduct these
+peacekeeping-related operations? And, in this evaluation, are there
+alternative doctrines we should consider to fight wars more
+effectively as we envisage scenarios under the construct of the MRC?
+
+With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian superpower,
+there is no external threat to the existence or survival of the United
+States as a nation and there will not be such an immediate threat for
+some time to come. This means that there is a finite window of
+opportunity when there is no external adversary threatening the total
+existence of American society; that our forces are far superior to any
+possible military adversary choosing to confront us directly; and
+that, with innovative thought, we may be able to create a more
+relevant, effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common
+defense at the likely levels of future spending.
+
+At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the
+fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be addressed.
+The industrial and technical base of the United States is changing
+profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical advantages of the
+American economy were never greater and it is small business that is
+creating virtually all new jobs and employment opportunities.
+Commercial technology and products are turning over on ever shortening
+cycles. Performance, especially in high-technology products, is
+improving and costs are being driven downwards.
+
+Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector,
+where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among
+competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle time to
+field new generation capabilities is lengthening and performance,
+especially in computer and information systems, is often obsolete on
+delivery. The defense industrial base will continue to compress and it
+is not clear that the necessary level of efficiencies or increases in
+effectiveness in using this base can be identified and implemented,
+suggesting further pressures on a defense budget that is only likely
+to be cut.
+
+Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the
+military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot wars
+such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships and
+submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, technology,
+strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our national preference
+for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare continues to shape the
+way we design and rationalize our military capability. Therefore, it
+is no surprise that in dealing with the MRC, American doctrine, in
+some ways, remains an extension of Cold War force planning. While the
+magnitude and number of dangerous threats to the nation have been
+remarkably reduced by the demise of the USSR, we continue to use
+technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to identify
+or produce new and more effective solutions for achieving military and
+strategic/political objectives.
+
+While there is much talk about "military revolutions" and winning the
+"information war," what is generally meant in this lexicon and
+discussion is translated into defense programs that relate to
+accessing and "fusing" information across command, control,
+intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and precision
+strike technologies. What is most exciting among these revolutions is
+the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield awareness," that is,
+achieving the capability to have near-perfect knowledge and
+information of the battlefield while depriving the adversary of that
+capacity and producing "systems of systems" for this purpose.
+
+The near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely remain
+directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on fielding
+more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons systems and
+infrastructure for using those systems. The doctrine of "decisive or
+overwhelming force" is the conceptual and operational underpinning for
+winning the next war based largely on this force-on-force and
+attrition model, and winning the information war is vital to this end.
+Few have asked whether the pattern of employing more modern technology
+for traditional firepower solutions is the best one and if there are
+alternative ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and
+efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield
+awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of
+fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic objectives?
+
+Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would advance
+the military revolution to new levels and possibly new dimensions.
+Rapid Dominance extends across the entire "threat, strategy, force
+structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with broad implications for
+how we provide for the future common defense. Organization and
+management of defense and defense resources should not be excluded
+from this examination although, in this paper, they are not discussed
+in detail.
+
+The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, and
+understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic
+policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. Clearly, the
+traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the
+adversary's military capability is a fundamental and necessary
+component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent, however, is to field a range
+of capabilities to induce sufficient Shock and Awe to render the
+adversary impotent. This means that physical and psychological effects
+must be obtained.
+
+Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to control, on an
+immediate basis, the entire region of operational interest and the
+environment, broadly defined, in and around that area of interest.
+Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant battlefield awareness, we
+envisage Rapid Dominance producing a capability that can more
+effectively and efficiently achieve the stated political or military
+objectives underwriting the use of force by rendering the adversary
+completely impotent.
+
+In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly before
+an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies throughout the
+spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of
+battle and conflict resolution.
+
+"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary's
+will both physically and psychologically. Physical dominance includes
+the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize, and to render
+impotent. Psychological dominance means the ability to destroy,
+defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary to resist; or convince the
+adversary to accept our terms and aims short of using force. The
+target is the adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The
+principal mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing
+sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to convince
+or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives.
+Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinformation,
+perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed.
+
+The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this overwhelming
+level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or
+sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on. In crude
+terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of the environment and
+paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding
+of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical
+and strategic levels. An adversary would be rendered totally impotent
+and vulnerable to our actions. To the degree that non-lethal weaponry
+is useful, it would be incorporated in the ability to Shock and Awe
+and achieve Rapid Dominance.
+
+Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance seeks to
+impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact
+that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the
+Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until
+both nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was
+sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average Japanese
+citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of
+Shock and Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the
+destructive power carried by a single airplane. This incomprehension
+produced a state of awe.
+
+We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential in
+combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce systems
+capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most or many
+cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing the full
+destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional
+technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so.
+
+Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and Awe at the
+appropriate level or levels is the next step in the evolution of a
+doctrine for replacing or complementing overwhelming force. By way of
+comparison, we have summarized how we view the differences between the
+doctrines of Rapid Dominance and Decisive Force in terms of basic
+elements that apply to the objectives, uses of force, force size,
+scope, speed, casualties, and technique. We recognize that there will
+be debate over the relative utility and applicability of these
+doctrines and readers are encouraged to participate.
+
+In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid Dominance
+and Decisive Force, it is important to define the terms as precisely
+as possible.
+
+The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe must be
+compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the ability to "own"
+the dimension of time-moving more quickly than an opponent, operating
+within his decision cycle, and resolving conflict favorably in a short
+period of time. "Dominance" means the ability to control a situation
+totally.
+
+Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the means to
+anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will involve the
+capability to deny an opponent things of critical value, and to convey
+the unmistakable message that unconditional compliance is the only
+available recourse. It will imply more than the direct application of
+force. It will mean the ability to control the environment and to
+master all levels of an opponent's activities to affect will,
+perception, and understanding. This could include means of
+communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and
+other aspects of infrastructure as well as the denial of military
+responses. Deception, misinformation, and disinformation are key
+components in this assault on the will and understanding of the
+opponent.
+
+Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tactical,
+strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist. With
+Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power with such compellance
+that even the strongest of wills will be awed. Rapid Dominance will
+strive to achieve a dominance that is so complete and victory is so
+swift, that an adversary's losses in both manpower and material could
+be relatively light, and yet the message is so unmistakable that
+resistance would be seen as futile.
+
+"Decisive Force," on the other hand, implies delivering massive enough
+force to prevail. Decisive means using force with plenty of margin for
+error. Force implies a traditional "force-on-force" and attrition
+approach. This concept does not exclude psychological and other
+complementary damage imposition techniques to enhance the application
+of force; they have been used throughout the history of warfare. But
+such non-destructive means would have an ancillary role. Military
+force would be applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against
+the military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not always an
+essential component. As in _Desert Shield/Storm_, enough time would
+have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force. Such a luxury is
+not always feasible.
+
+The differences become clearer if broken down into their essential
+elements:
+
+Elements    Rapid Dominance                  Decisive Force
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Objective   Control the adversary's will,    Prevail militarily and
+            perceptions, and understanding   decisively against a set of
+                                             opposing capabilities defined
+                                             by the MRC
+
+Use of      Control the adversary's will,    Unquestioned ability to
+Force       perceptions, and understanding   prevail militarily over an
+            and literally make an adversary  opponent's forces and based
+            impotent to act or react         against the adversary's
+                                             capabilities
+
+Force Size  Could be smaller than            Large, highly trained, and
+            opposition, but with decisive    well-equipped. Materially
+            edge in technology, training,    overwhelming
+            and technique
+
+Scope       All encompassing                 Force against force (and
+                                             supporting capability)
+
+Speed       Essential                        Desirable
+
+Casualties  Could be relatively few in       Potentially higher on both
+            number on both sides             sides
+
+Technique   Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny,  Systematic destruction of
+            destroy                          military capability.
+                                             applicable in some situations
+
+Four general categories of core characteristics and capabilities have
+been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured mission capability
+packages must embrace. These are identified briefly and discussed in
+later chapters.
+
+First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize */knowledge/* of the
+environment, of the adversary, and of our own forces on political,
+strategic, economic, and military/operational levels. On one hand, we
+want to get into the minds of the adversary far more deeply than we
+have in the past. Beyond operational intelligence required for
+battlefield awareness, Rapid Dominance means cultural understanding of
+the adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning
+and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and
+strategic levels.
+
+Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve */rapidity/* in the sense of
+timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have capabilities that can be applied
+swiftly and relatively faster than an adversary's.
+
+Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total */control of the
+environment/* from complete "signature management" of both our and the
+adversary's information and intelligence to more discrete means to
+deceive, disguise, and misinform.
+
+Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of operational
+competence that can virtually institutionalize */"brilliance."/* In
+some cases, this may mean changing the longstanding principle of
+military centralization and empowering individual soldiers, sailors,
+and airmen to be crucial components in applying and directing the
+application of force.
+
+As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and
+capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging reality
+to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is transforming at the
+current rate and breadth, it could be that, over the course of many
+years, the defense industrial base would follow suit, or face
+irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there are certain areas in
+defense which will never or may never be eliminated or replaced.
+Nuclear systems are a current example.
+
+Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may mean that
+military force design and procurement will become dependent on the
+private sector and commercial technology. Rapid Dominance is a first
+conceptual step to deal with this possibility.
+
+The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the concept
+of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy, technology and
+innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe. Based on this, subsequent
+steps will involve expanding mission capability packages concepts
+consisting of operations harmonized with doctrine, organization, and
+systems and then move on to field prototype systems for further test
+and evaluation as advanced concept technology demonstrations.
+
+
+
+
+Background and Basis
+
+
+
+In both relative and absolute terms, since the end of World War II,
+the military strength and capability of the United States have never
+been greater. Yet this condition of virtual military superiority has
+created a paradox. Absent a massive threat or massive security
+challenge, it is not clear that this military advantage can (always)
+be translated into concrete political terms that advance American
+interests. Nor is it clear that the current structure and foundations
+for this extraordinary force can be sustained for the long term
+without either spending more money or imposing major changes to this
+structure that may exceed the capacity of our system to accommodate.
+As a consequence, the success of the current design and configuration
+of our forces may ironically become self-limiting and constraining.
+That is not to claim automatically that there are better military
+solutions or that the current defense program is not the best our
+political system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are
+well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance and
+measure against the current and planned program.
+
+To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that one
+thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine of overwhelming
+or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To push the conceptual
+envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: Can a Rapid Dominance
+force lead, for example, to a force structure that can win an MRC such
+as _Desert Shield_ and _Desert Storm _far more quickly and cheaply
+with far fewer personnel than our planned force both in terms of
+stopping any invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can
+Rapid Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity
+to deal with grey areas such as OOTW?
+
+Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of political
+deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or "shut down" an
+adversary can actually control behavior? What are the possible
+political implications of this capability and what would this power
+mean for conducting coalition war and for how our allies react and
+respond?
+
+Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will, perception,
+and understanding of an adversary rather than simply destroying
+military capability, this focus must cause us to consider the broadest
+spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and across all aspects of war
+including intelligence, training, education, doctrine, industrial
+capacity, and how we organize and manage defense.
+
+We observe at first that even with the successful ending of the Cold
+War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating its national
+security and defense has been relatively and understandably modest and
+cautious. In essence, while the size of the force has been reduced
+from Cold War levels of 2.2 million active duty troops to about 1.5
+million, and the services have been vocal in revising doctrine and
+strategy to reflect the end of the Soviet threat, with the exception
+of emphasis on jointness, there are few really fundamental differences
+in the design and structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years
+ago.
+
+Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States rested on
+several central and widely accepted and publicly supported
+propositions. The "clear and apparent danger" of the Soviet threat was
+real and seen as such. The USSR was to be contained and deterred from
+hostile action by a combination of political, strategic, and military
+actions ranging from the forging of a ring of alliances surrounding
+the USSR and its allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of
+nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
+
+Following the truce ending the Korean War, a large, standing military
+force was maintained and defined by the operational requirements of
+fighting the large formations of military forces of the USSR and its
+allies with similar types of military forces, albeit outnumbered. The
+role of allies, principally NATO, was assumed and taken into account
+in planning, although the paradox of the issue of planning for a long
+versus short war in a nuclear world remained unresolved.
+
+Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the Cold War
+went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any war might be
+ended quickly. The largely World War II defense, industrial, and
+basing structure was retained along with the intent to rely on our
+technological superiority to offset numerical or geographical
+liabilities.
+
+It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense through
+mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the Second World War
+and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming the enemy using the
+massive application of force, technology, and associated firepower.
+Two decades later, Vietnam exposed the frailty of this approach of
+dependence on massive application of firepower especially when
+political limits were placed on applying that firepower.
+
+Currently, _Desert Storm_ and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 have
+been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the doctrine
+of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that both strategic
+objectives and tactical methods were in congruence. We argue that now
+is the time to re-examine these premises of reliance on overwhelming
+or decisive force as currently employed and deployed in the force
+structure if only as a prudent check.
+
+Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major threat to
+generate consensus and to rally the country around defense and defense
+spending, the military posture of the United States will erode as the
+defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in the future on what is
+currently seen to be as sufficient force to be "decisive" could easily
+prove unachievable and the results problematic or worse for U.S.
+policy.
+
+The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat is, of
+course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining the future
+defense posture of the nation. The United States has long resisted
+maintaining a large standing military and the Cold War years could
+prove an aberration to that history. Extending this historical
+observation of small standing forces, it is clear that there is no
+adversary on the horizon even remotely approaching the military power
+of the former USSR. While we might conjure up nominal regional
+contingencies against Korea or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for
+establishing the building blocks for force structure, it will prove
+difficult to sustain the current defense program over the long term
+without a real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public
+support. Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could
+easily prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that
+in Europe, defense spending is closing in on 1 to 2 percent of GDP.
+
+Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to grips with
+this new world, the structural limitations and constraints in how we
+develop systems and procure weapons based on current technological and
+industrial capacity for producing them will be exacerbated by downward
+fiscal pressure giving us little room for mistakes and flexibility.
+Air, land, space, and sea forces are currently limited in the actual
+numbers and types of systems that are available for purchase and more
+limited in that there are virtually no new major systems on the
+horizon. That could change.
+
+The M-1A-1 tank is in production only for foreign sales. Despite the
+allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only four active
+classes of warships from which to replace its capability and, for the
+first time this century since aircraft entered the inventory, is
+without a new aircraft in development. The Air Force can be placed in
+similar straits if the F-22 program is deferred or canceled because of
+rising cost and fiscal constraints. Time will tell what happens to the
+Joint Strike Fighter. Assumptions about reliance on technology and R&D
+providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove
+ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those
+programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D could become
+the main source for procuring software and other systems needed to
+upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called "leap-ahead"
+technologies that may prove elusive to create.
+
+There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing new
+doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing
+circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and with the clear
+bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and defending an
+annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, less of the same)
+becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While the JCS or OSD or CINCs
+may have genuine need for jointly packaged forces that are rapidly
+deployable irrespective of Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels,
+the services cannot be expected to reverse the years of viewing the
+world through service- specific arguments and doctrine.
+
+Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced with the
+end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to assume that there
+are no risks to the nation nor an absence of evil-doers wishing this
+nation harm. It would also be shortsighted to expect that potential
+adversaries are unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge
+of their environment and simplicity to overcome our current military
+and technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In
+addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our
+assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological superiority
+should welcome thoughtful examination.
+
+Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start, the United
+States should act to exploit the several major advantages it
+possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and danger of future
+threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a longer view. While we
+may have deferred adding to the inventory of future systems in
+development, current systems possess more than enough military
+capability to get us through this transition period, even if this
+period were to last for more than a decade. This does not mean we can
+rest on our oars; if we take advantage of this opportunity, time is on
+our side. If we squander this opportunity, then we could ultimately
+find ourselves in trouble.
+
+Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the luxury of
+the best technically educated and trained society in the world, and
+the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers vast potential if we
+are clever enough to exploit this extraordinary resource.
+
+Third, because of significant changes in law and organization
+regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and
+through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Department of
+Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. The enhanced role
+of the CINCs and the acceptance of jointness are positive
+illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural and political
+realities noted above, assuring productive innovation continues will
+not be automatic. Against these conducive signs, vision, true joint
+thinking, and tactical advances still are premium commodities to be
+nourished and encouraged.
+
+In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful to rely
+on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we have been
+successful in applying containment and deterrence in the Cold War.
+When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait, then the use of
+force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how can we augment or
+improve the use of existing military capability should it be required.
+
+Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a regime
+of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as well as
+operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are seeking the capability
+to dominate, control, and isolate the entire environment in, around,
+over, and under the objective area as quickly as possible, and with
+fewer forces than currently envisaged, although direct insertion of
+forces is an important component depending upon the tactical
+situation. In many cases, this capacity need not be the traditional
+firepower solution of only physically destroying an adversary's
+military capabilities. Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of
+affecting the adversary's will to resist as the first order of
+business, quickly if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would
+be to stop an attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it
+be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political deterrence
+that might restrain aggression in the first place.
+
+To accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action means
+neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics; to organize
+society; and to function; as well as to control, regulate and deny the
+adversary of information, intelligence, and understanding of what is
+and what is not happening. This means we must control all necessary
+intelligence and information on our forces-the ultimate form of
+stealth-and on an adversary's forces as well and then exploit total
+situational awareness for rapid action.
+
+Regarding the emergence of current military thought and doctrine, as
+implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early and far less mature
+stages of a major revolution than is generally assumed. It is
+understandable that despite major strategic reassessments, current
+doctrine is still highly influenced by Cold War tactics and strategy
+and perhaps by the iron grip of the history of conflict since the
+early 19th century.
+
+Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has been
+largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast amounts of
+manpower over time and space. The United States advanced Napoleon's
+use of industry and mass armies in the Civil War and our planning up
+to the Cold War tended to follow this same pattern. World War II, of
+course, exemplified the triumph of this industrial, mobilization, and
+massive use of force approach.
+
+In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued that this
+model combining massive industrial might and manpower finally ended in
+1989. Although, by then, technological advances to conventional
+military capabilities seemed to be approaching the destructive power,
+or more precisely, the system lethality of nuclear weapons. In other
+words, modern non-nuclear precision weapons perhaps could produce
+effects against enemy targets roughly comparable to the military
+lethality of theater-level nuclear weapons. If this condition proves
+true, could this new lethality fundamentally change the construct for
+designing American doctrine and strategy? This question is at the
+heart of the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive
+force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in place.
+
+Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the need to
+prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally powerful adversary,
+the United States military has conducted two post-Cold War crises
+against lesser adversaries quite differently than it fought the Cold
+War. In the Panama intervention in 1990 and in Kuwait shortly
+thereafter, the suggestion of newer and different methods of warfare
+was present. Perhaps both will turn out to be transition campaigns,
+where there is much of the old, but also signs of the new. But there
+are specific pieces of evidence that should command our attention.
+
+Underlying the planning for _Operation Just Cause_ in Panama and
+_Desert Shield/Storm_ in Kuwait was the premeditated incorporation of
+a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply decisive
+force. The aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the enemy through
+a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air, and special
+operating forces strikes that took place nearly simultaneously across
+a wide battle space and against many military targets. The purpose of
+these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis
+of both the national state and its armed forces that would lead to
+prompt neutralization and capitulation.
+
+In both _Just Cause_ and _Desert Storm_, the United States (plus
+coalition forces in _Desert Storm_) had such overwhelming military
+capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a matter of
+drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan based on using the
+entire system of capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce
+a decisive victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar
+principles of intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in
+_Desert Storm_ unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its allies nearly 6
+months to deploy over a half million troops before the fighting began.
+
+The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5 Pamphlet
+reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simultaneity. Yet,
+progress in these operational directions may be in danger of faltering
+if only old Cold War yardsticks are used to make future force
+investments and to direct studies about future force structure and
+associated infrastructure. As in any transition period, innovation
+must be joined by a willingness to experiment. This means the
+establishment and cultivation of an experimental apparatus to test and
+evaluate new concepts are matters of importance both to foster
+innovation and assess its application.
+
+We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek to
+emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force behavioral
+change in adversaries to achieve strategic or political ends. Control
+and then influence come from a range of threats and outcomes,
+including putting at risk the targets an adversary holds dear, to
+imposing a hierarchy of Shock and Awe, to affecting will, perception,
+and understanding. Achieving control may now be theoretically possible
+in even more compressed or shortened time periods because of the
+potential superiority of enhanced U.S. military capability and further
+training and education. To obtain this level of military superiority
+that can affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least
+achieve the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought,
+debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if only
+to test and validate contemporary doctrine.
+
+If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and Awe
+beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must follow. The
+end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way as to achieve
+the desired objectives. From this concept follows the need to shut
+down either a state or an organized enemy through the rapid and
+simultaneous application (or threat of application) of land, sea, air,
+space, and special operating forces against the broadest spectrum of
+the adversary's power base and center or centers of gravity and
+against the adversary's will and perception at tactical and strategic
+levels.
+
+In _Desert Storm_, the objectives were first to evict Iraqi forces
+from Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate government. From these
+objectives, more limited strategic and political objectives followed,
+some for purposes of maintaining coalition solidarity and UN-imposed
+sanctions. Not occupying Baghdad was one such political limitation.
+These strategic objectives led to identification of the enemy's
+centers of gravity as the basis for the application of force to
+destroy these centers. This planning led to the repeated, rapid, and
+simultaneous use of massive force with great effect.
+
+One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam Hussein's
+command and control. This was accomplished by simultaneous and massive
+attacks. Once command and control was destroyed, Iraqi forces in the
+Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) would be destroyed as quickly as
+possible with overwhelming force and with minimum casualties. As
+General Colin Powell simply stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddam's
+army and then kill it."
+
+There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were
+completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack. Outside
+the KTO, targeting was more selective, not because the means were
+unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because our military
+objectives were purposely limited. Given the effectiveness of the air
+campaign and the overwhelming superiority on the ground, coalition
+land forces required only 4 of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to
+eject Iraq's forces from Kuwait.
+
+Suppose a _Desert Storm_-type campaign were fought 20 years from now
+based on a plan that exploited the concept of Rapid Dominance. Further
+assume that Iraq has improved (and rebuilt) its military and that, in
+a series of simultaneous and nearly instantaneous actions, our primary
+objective was still to shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its
+leadership, and isolate and destroy its military forces as we did in
+1991. However, two decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably
+achieve this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not
+after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to
+1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an
+invasion in its tracks.
+
+Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction
+of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow
+of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to
+achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping
+nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese.
+Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces would be paralyzed with the
+neutralization or destruction of its capabilities. Deception,
+disinformation, and misinformation would be applied massively.
+
+This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also demonstrate
+to the adversary our endurance and staying power, that is, the
+capability to dominate over as much time as is necessary less an enemy
+mistakenly try to wait it out and use time between attacks to recover
+sufficiently. If the enemy still resisted, then conventional forms of
+attack would follow resulting in the physical occupation of territory.
+Control is thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the
+stun effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to
+affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. There must be
+staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the blows,
+gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change tactics
+much as occurred during the WWII bombing campaigns and the air war
+over North Vietnam.
+
+Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide versatility
+and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, and special
+operating forces and in investment in technology to produce Rapid
+Dominance. Different methods for commanding the battle using both
+hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to control and direct our
+forces are likely to be required especially given the simultaneous
+application of capabilities throughout the given battle space by the
+full spectrum of our forces. To use these combinations of forces will
+require adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles
+and functions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in
+technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the Cold War
+paradigm.
+
+To develop the proper combination of forces and future technology
+investment for Rapid Dominance, extensive experimentation with this
+core concept will be required. This exper-imentation must apply to all
+levels of military educational institutions; it must be joint; it can
+be accelerated by availability of recent advances in simulation
+technology; and it must have operational trials in the field.
+
+To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and
+application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is important.
+The U.S. today is graduating through its college and universities
+system approximately 200,000 American and foreign scientists and
+engineers per year. This is a great national resource. This technology
+infrastructure is dimensions larger in number and scope than the
+aggregate of anywhere else in the world. Through appreciation and
+exploitation of this potential, a U.S. position of pre-eminence in
+science and technology could be assured for the foreseeable future.
+
+One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the information and
+information management areas- which, in the U.S., are heavily
+commercially oriented. Future military application may well be
+analogous to the impact of the internal combustion engine and wireless
+radio on land, sea, and air forces in the 1920s and 1930s. The size of
+this technological lead between ourselves and the rest of the world,
+especially in the base for new information products and services,
+should widen further in knowledge and in application. The "Silicon
+Valley" revolution is likely to continue increasing computer capacity
+on an almost annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be
+many fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close
+in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the ability
+to condense and synthesize data.
+
+In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability to
+transfer information into and out of the hands of individual users.
+The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids will enhance
+and potentially quicken individual decision-making ability.
+Technologies associated with bioscience and bioengineering are likely
+to be of particular importance in enhancing these capabilities and are
+also an area of American predominance. Material sciences, software,
+and communications are all American strengths, and should remain so
+well into the next century.
+
+A significant element supporting this explosion in applied information
+and other technologies is the American free enterprise system and its
+entrepreneurial character. This drive is needed to translate this
+technology into military hardware. The nature of the U.S. market and
+its competitive basis reinforce this element. The largest challenges
+may be to shape and exploit this commercial potential and then to
+ensure that its enduring advantages become fundamental in the makeup
+of our military forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required
+during the Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is
+it a massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed, its
+edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper."
+
+The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new American
+industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be toward the control
+and management of everything that is significant to the operations
+bearing on the particular Area of Interest (AOI). And we mean
+everything! Control of the environment is far broader than only the
+objective of achieving dominant battlefield awareness. Control means
+the ability to change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures"
+of all of the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the
+operational frameworks in applying force across the entire spectrum of
+platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, ships) can be measured
+(and controlled) from many minus decibels of cross section, to many
+plus decibels; communications can be entirely covert, i.e., many dB
+less than the ambient environment, or that approaching "white noise."
+The location of both the individual and his unit can be measured in
+real time in meters, if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through
+virtual reality, movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of
+square kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both
+during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence. This
+occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the adversary, including
+real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of this control.
+
+A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and immediately
+control the operational/environmental signatures both individually and
+in the aggregate. As needed, line and non-line-of-sight weapons of
+near pin-point accuracy would be delivered across the entire area of
+operation. Stealthy UAVs and mobile robotics systems, together with
+decoys, would be deployed in large numbers for surveillance,
+targeting, strike, and deception and would produce their own impact of
+electronic Shock and Awe on the enemy. This application of force can
+be done as rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand.
+
+The effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights" that
+enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the conditions and
+events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his society. What is
+radically different in Rapid Dominance is the comprehensive system
+assemblage and integration of many evolving and even revolutionary
+technical advances in dominant battlefield awareness squared-materials
+application, sensor and signature control, computer and bioengineering
+applied to massive amounts of data, enable weapon application with
+simultaneity, precision, and lethality that to date have not been
+applied as a total system. Deception, disinformation, and
+misinformation will become major elements of this systemic approach.
+
+The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely come from the
+commercial world as the DOD base continues to shrink. It is clear that
+in certain areas, DOD must remain involved where there is no private
+R&D or to fill gaps in R&D. Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and
+missile defense are examples. However, advances in commercial
+technology in the Information Age are unlikely to be matched by DOD.
+
+Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our combat
+officers and key enlisted personnel. Command must be geared to
+achieving the best of the best-not the best among the good.
+Assimilating in real time the vast amount of information and putting
+information to use will no doubt lead to major changes in the
+composition, competence, and authority of (even and especially)
+individual military unit commanders perhaps to the squad or private
+soldier level.
+
+Of course, even with the most perfect information, an unqualified,
+inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may not win except
+with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe. And, we repeat that
+there are cases where NO military force may be able to succeed if the
+objectives are unobtainable. The match of the entrepreneurial
+individual with the potential of the technology base is key.
+Optimizing and integrating all elements into a total system is a
+certain way to exploit the opportunity that we can perceive becoming
+more visible in the coming years.
+
+
+
+
+Shock and Awe
+
+
+
+The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will,
+perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing
+sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political,
+strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to
+the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been
+characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog,
+friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were
+necessary effects arising from application of military power and were
+aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and
+similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military
+writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an
+adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a
+commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial
+importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending
+battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock
+and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant,
+employment of force.
+
+In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will,
+understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is
+multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to
+examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe
+affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or
+television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors
+of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and
+death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock
+transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of _Desert
+Storm_ vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of
+battlefield Shock and Awe.
+
+In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe
+can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force
+or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the
+Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military
+objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock
+and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid
+Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
+
+The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of
+different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to
+identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that
+differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage,
+historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task
+will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of
+Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this
+methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages
+consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force
+structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how
+best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To
+repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain
+by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative
+force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in
+conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
+
+For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing
+historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have
+been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap
+exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming
+Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force
+structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or
+overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to
+disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as
+few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as
+possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and
+operationally, is crucial to successful application.
+
+There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this
+approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly
+capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and
+18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be
+used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and
+supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally
+been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though
+command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be
+disaggregated from this doctrine.
+
+The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a
+platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of
+worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this
+doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will
+prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and
+other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the
+time being, these have not replaced the current platform and
+force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will
+be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a
+comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
+
+Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts
+of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to
+transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow,
+especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of
+decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of
+maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money
+provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed.
+Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the
+performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time
+to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still
+endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between
+quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is
+necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller
+understanding.
+
+Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that
+are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is that
+Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a
+broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This
+breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction
+among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate
+military capability and must include training and education, as well
+as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is
+possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial
+areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that
+otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
+
+The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The
+intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of
+instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction
+directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and
+public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic
+objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment
+of this capability against society and its values, called
+"counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively
+destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to
+resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly
+incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days.
+
+The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in
+determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can
+actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an adversary
+impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and
+probably unachievably low levels of societal destruction; and whether
+a political decision would be taken in any case to use this type of
+capability given the magnitude of the consequences and the risk of
+failure.
+
+It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of _Desert Storm_,
+similar objectives were envisioned. The differences between this
+example and _Desert Storm_ are through the totality of a society that
+would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of
+destruction and the speed of imposing those strikes as occurred to
+those Japanese cities. This example of shock, awe, and intimidation
+rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in very short
+periods of time.
+
+The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of Shock and
+Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive
+power largely against military targets and related sectors over time.
+It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the
+adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which
+the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion. However, it is the
+cumulative effect of this application of destruction power that will
+ultimately impose sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy
+the physical means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to
+accept whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of the
+First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the
+Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and related
+B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of
+1972-73, illustrate the application of massive bombardment.
+
+Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic targets,
+is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming Force," even though
+political constraints make this example most unlikely to be repeated
+in the future. There is also the option of applying massive
+destruction against purely civilian or "counter-value" targets such as
+the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II when unconditionality marks
+the terms of surrender. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on
+the endurance and capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects
+the will to resist that is the central foundation of this example.
+
+The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the question
+of political feasibility and acceptability, and what circumstances
+would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive bombardment.
+Outright invasion and aggression such as Iraq's attack against Kuwait
+could clearly qualify as reasons to justify using this level of Shock
+and Awe. However, as with Overwhelming Force, this response is not
+time-sensitive and would require massive application of force for some
+duration as well as political support.
+
+Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock and Awe
+were not achieved through the massive application of firepower across
+a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of force.
+Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly
+focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of
+scale. The German Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack
+across a very broad front, although the opponent may have been
+deceived into believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in
+multiple locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated,
+attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the
+shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank's
+armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum cone of damage
+against the unarmored or less protected innards.
+
+To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is directed
+against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance in
+execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. The
+adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics,
+surrenders, or both. Hitler's campaign in France and Holland and the
+seizure of the Dutch forts and the occupation of Crete in 1940 are
+obvious illustrations. The use of Special Operations forces in
+significant numbers is an adjunct to imposing this level of Shock and
+Awe.
+
+_Desert Storm_ could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the
+attack were mounted without the long preparatory bombardment and was
+concentrated in a single sector-either the "left hook" or the Marine
+attack "up the middle," and with total surprise. The major differences
+between the operation in Kuwait and Germany's capture of France in
+1940 were that the allies in Saudi Arabia had complete military and
+technical superiority unlike the Germans and that, once under attack,
+Iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition
+license to pick and choose the points for penetration and then
+dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future
+adversaries about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that
+they will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior
+forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving Shock
+and Awe through the precise application of force.
+
+It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as
+guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to obtain
+Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example, the German
+Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the
+Vietnam War, where enemy forces had relatively few lines to be
+penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of warfare.
+
+The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths. Can
+brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there a flexible enough
+infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the
+supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the
+systems to maintain this operational and technical superiority? Rapid
+Dominance requires a positive answer to these questions, at least
+theoretically.
+
+The fifth example is named after the Chinese philosopher-warrior, Sun
+Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on selective, instant decapitation
+of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe. This
+discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this from
+Hiroshima and Massive Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before
+Ho Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters
+on war and proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the
+rules applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged
+Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The
+concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head cut off the
+head concubine. The ladies still could not bring themselves to take
+the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had the head cut off a
+second concubine. From that point on, so the story goes, the ladies
+learned to march with the precision of a drill team.
+
+The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe and hence
+compliance or capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal and
+ruthless, and rapid application of force to intimidate. The
+fundamental values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is
+to convince the majority that resistance is futile by targeting and
+harming the few. Both society and the military are the targets. In a
+sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe
+but through far more selective and informed targeting. Decapitation is
+merely one instrument. This model can easily fall outside the cultural
+heritage and values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major
+refinement. Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to
+communicate is another variant but without many historical examples to
+show useful wartime applications.
+
+A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is deception. In
+this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish the
+enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the
+adversary. The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and
+knowledge of the adversary. In some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is
+an early example of deception. However, as we will see, the deception
+model may have new foundations in the technological innovations that
+are occurring and in our ability to control the environment.
+
+The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the Massive
+Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is questionable that a
+decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in quasi- or real
+assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Further, the standard to
+maintain the ability to perform these missions is high and dependent
+on both resources and on supporting intelligence, especially human
+intelligence-not an American strong point.
+
+Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is distinct
+from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it focuses on
+depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose Shock and Awe.
+The image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to
+incapacitate an adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade
+produces blinding light and deafening noise. The result shocks and
+confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. The aim in this
+example of achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so much light and
+sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses, and
+therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the adversary
+becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable.
+
+A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas is a
+dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high altitude nuclear
+detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and electrical
+equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of
+likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in specific areas, of the
+ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is a more reasonable
+and perhaps more achievable variant. This deprival of senses,
+including all electronics and substitution of false signals or data to
+create this feeling of impotence, is another variant. Above all, Shock
+and Awe are imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is
+deprivation of the senses.
+
+The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part shortcomings of
+other approaches. Technological solutions are crucial but may not be
+conceivable outside the EMP effects of nuclear weapons. Intelligence
+is clearly vital. Without precise knowledge of who and what are to be
+stunned, this example will not work.
+
+The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian" example
+(or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is based on
+imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and indeed through
+deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from
+the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the early 1800s, native
+Haitians were seeking to extricate their country from French control.
+The Haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting French
+military contingent and marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions
+repeatedly in review. The French were deceived into believing that the
+native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that
+French military action was futile and that its forces would be
+overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their
+freedom without firing a shot.
+
+To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian example
+and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are more crucial
+in this regime. However, the target or focus is the will and
+perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu category comes
+closest to this one except that while Sun Tzu is selective in applying
+force, it is clear that imposing actual pain and shock are essential
+ingredients and deception, disin-formation, and guile are secondary.
+Demonstrative uses of force are also important. The issue is how to
+determine what demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the
+intended target in line with the overall political aims.
+
+The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major dependency on
+intelligence. One must be certain that the will and perceptions of the
+adversary can be manipulated. The classic misfire is the adversary who
+is not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the
+unintended actions of the aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis'
+invasion of Kuwait demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can
+backfire. Saddam simply let his bluff be called.
+
+The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving Shock and
+Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through
+the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own
+invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a
+considerable period of time. The target set encompasses both military
+and societal values. In occupying a vast empire stretching from the
+Atlantic to the Red Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of
+forces to secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman
+forces were far superior to native forces individually and
+collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the
+perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would
+take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat Diplomacy" of the
+nineteenth century when the British fleet would return to the scene of
+any crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the
+wholesale destruction of offending villages.
+
+There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve Shock
+and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the perception of that
+prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most
+significant factors. In other words, reprisals and the use of force to
+exact a severe punishment, as well as the certainty that this sword of
+Damocles would descend, were essential ingredients. The distinction
+between this category and the others is the ex post facto nature of
+achieving Shock and Awe. In the other categories, there is the need
+for seizing the initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to
+achieve Shock and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have
+already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise
+of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use
+of force.
+
+The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of
+reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is not and
+may not always be the case with the United States, although we can
+attempt to make others believe it will be. The takeover of the Embassy
+in Tehran by dissident "students" in 1979 and American impotence in
+the aftermath are suggestive of the shortcoming. That aside, the
+example or perception of the invincibility of American military power
+is not a bad one to embellish.
+
+The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the Decay and
+Default model and is based on the imposition of societal breakdown
+over a lengthy period but without the application of massive
+destruction. This example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In
+this example, both military and societal values are targets. Selective
+and focused force is applied. It is the long-term corrosive effects of
+the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately
+compels an adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe
+are therefore not immediate either in application or in producing the
+end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and
+aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do
+not threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese
+water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the
+preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a
+variant of Shock and Awe in the form of frustration collapsing the
+will to resist.
+
+The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In many
+cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock and Awe is
+unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by conventional or
+politically acceptable means.
+
+The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police,"
+whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you can send a
+bullet." The distinction between this example and the others is that
+this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu and implies that
+standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place can achieve the
+required objectives. There should not be too fine a point, however, in
+belaboring differences with the other examples in this regard over
+standoff. A stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from
+a cruise missile fired at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance
+on target.
+
+A few observations about these examples offer insights on which to
+test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It is clear that
+the targets in each category include military, civilian, industrial,
+infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. In
+certain cases, time is the crucial consideration in imposing Shock and
+Awe and in most of the examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden
+imposition of Shock and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects
+of Shock and Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved
+over time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences.
+Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new
+technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different is
+the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force, in
+understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in executing
+military operations with deftness, are vital. While this recognition
+is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore
+on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or institutionalized
+and is not a function only of gifted individuals.
+
+There is also a key distinction between selective or precise and
+massive application of force. Technology, in the form of "zero CEP"
+weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capability of systems
+that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive
+disruption, destruction, or damage. This damage goes beyond the loss
+of power grids and other easily identifiable industrial targeting
+sets. Loss of all communications can have a massively destructive
+impact even though physical destruction can be relatively limited.
+
+In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels of
+power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the attempt to keep war
+"immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one point should
+not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty business or, as Sherman
+put it, "war is hell." While there are surely humanitarian
+considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability to
+Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare,
+intimidate, and disarm. The Clausewitzian dictum concerning the
+violent nature of war is dismissed only at our peril.
+
+For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the concerned
+Member of Congress with responsibility for providing for the common
+defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and hierarchies?
+First, there are always broader sets of operational concepts and
+constructs available for achieving political objectives than may be
+realized. Not all of these alternatives are necessarily better or
+feasible. However, the examples suggest that further intellectual and
+conceptual effort is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national
+security options in the future.
+
+Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in
+generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally viewed
+as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to arrive
+"firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to
+ensure we had ample forces on station should they be required. Rapid
+Dominance would alleviate many of these constraints as we would have
+the capacity to deploy effective forces far more quickly. Therefore,
+in this case, we can view time as an ally. The political issue rests
+in longstanding arguments to limit the President from having the
+capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation
+without conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is
+an obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force
+packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and
+experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and
+emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant
+presidential authority can be handled responsibly.
+
+Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several
+models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arsenal
+is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise and timely. It is
+also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important
+attributes in war, there are no guarantees that they can be
+institutionalized in any military force.
+
+Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates to the
+Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High Powered
+Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide broad ability
+to incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. In using these
+weapons, the nerve centers of that society would be attacked rather
+than using this illustrative system to achieve hard target kill
+because there were few hard targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like
+systems have been and are being carefully researched.
+
+Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, and
+misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid Dominance
+would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By using complete
+signature management, larger formations could be made to look like
+smaller and smaller formations made to seem larger. At sea, carrier
+battle groups could be disguised and smaller warships could be made to
+appear as large formations. This signature management would apply
+across the entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or
+electronic ranges. Indeed, gaining the ability to regulate what
+information and intelligence are both available and not available to
+the adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception. It
+is control in the fullest sense of the word.
+
+The next step is to match the four significant characteristics that
+define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and
+control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives in
+order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces
+and force packages accordingly, and determine those integrated systems
+and innovative uses of technologies and capabilities that will provide
+the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that
+include both the MRC and OOTW.
+
+
+
+
+Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application
+
+
+
+In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid Dominance,
+it is crucial to consider the political context in which force is
+likely to be employed. As we enter the next century, the probability
+is low that an overriding, massive, direct threat posed by a
+peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge in the near term. Without
+compelling reasons, public tolerance toward American sacrifice abroad
+will remain low and may even decrease. This reluctance on the part of
+Americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated to perceptions of
+threat to U.S. interests. Without a clear and present danger, the
+definition of national interest may remain narrow.
+
+Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military
+solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are likely to
+be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be resolvable
+before American political staying power is exhausted. In this period,
+political micro-management and fine tuning are likely to be even more
+prevalent as administrations respond to public sentiments for
+minimizing casualties and, without a threat or compelling reason, U.S.
+involvement.
+
+Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically correct"
+alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to presenting the
+nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive and
+irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was not politically
+feasible because it would have shattered the allied coalition while
+exceeding the authority of the UN mandate. Military operations that
+impact across a whole population or cause "innocent civilians" to
+suffer (e.g., some economic sanctions, collateral damage from raids)
+also are likely to be only politically acceptable in aggravated
+situations. For example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or
+other health problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling
+impacts hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy
+may be the ultimate victim.
+
+The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a supporting
+foreign policy role with discrete missions that are only one facet of
+a larger political context. This context is almost certainly going to
+expand into militarily grey areas of OOTW, including those impinging
+on law enforcement and ensuring political stability. Forces may be
+called upon to deal with or control situations on the margin rather
+than to achieve total submission or defeat of an opponent. The
+prevailing political preference is likely to continue to be to try to
+bound these complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial
+constructs, and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst
+of internal conflict. Economic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), "no
+fly" zones (e.g., Southern and Northern Iraq and Bosnia), "safe
+havens" (e.g., Bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all means
+necessary" (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection and
+evacuation (e.g., Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the kinds of
+OOTW tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. Such tasks
+tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They also increase
+vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the bombing of the Kolbah
+Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996.
+
+Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct threat
+to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define. Therefore,
+when intervention is necessary there is likely to be both a political
+and practical imperative to have allied or international involvement
+or at least the political cover of the UN, NATO, or appropriate NGOs.
+
+As more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear, chemical,
+and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and
+longer range delivery means, the ability for rogues to inflict pain
+will increase as will the ability to ratchet up the political risks.
+WMD can easily complicate our ability to influence positive and
+constructive behavior of possessors. Because of the threat of
+retaliation, WMD capabilities may become politically acceptable
+targets provided collateral damage to civilians is minimized.
+Preemption may become a more realistic option along the lines of
+Israel's strikes against Syria's nuclear reactors in 1982. It is,
+however, a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully
+struck a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with
+precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians have
+been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or
+nuclear materials.
+
+There must also be an appropriate political context that justifies the
+use of preemptive force, as opposed to less destructive or non-lethal
+types of sanctions (e.g., responses to terrorism in the case of Libya,
+invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, exports of WMD to a threatening country
+such as Iran, the North Korean threat to South Korea and Japan).
+
+The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability to deter
+and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to its vital
+interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an unsettled, less
+structured, and volatile world, the ability to use force with
+precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when needed, rapidity, will
+still be a powerful influence on cooperation, stability, and, where
+relevant, submission.
+
+Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if
+achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this
+turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the
+breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability, without
+potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely predicted
+invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with that tangled
+and messy situation might have been much different. Thousands of lives
+might have been spared. In other grey or marginal situations Rapid
+Dominance could make the difference between a politically acceptable
+response or inadequate action with consequences similar to what
+happened in Bosnia.
+
+In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might be used, it
+is first important to know what it is that we want to achieve with
+military force. We need to consider whether the application of force
+will allow us to influence and control an adversary's will or merely
+exacerbate a bad situation. Therefore, it is essential to know what is
+of value to that adversary. An objective, realistic, and in-depth
+situational grasp will be essential to such an understanding. For
+example, disarming or destroying may produce unintended consequences.
+For a conventional foe that values its military and depends on
+technology, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and
+persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the
+opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against military
+formations may be considerably less and must be carefully assessed.
+
+As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S. security, the
+cost in casualties needs to be low. To be effective, we must take away
+an opponent's ability to make it cost us in terms of casualty levels
+we consider intolerable. In applying Rapid Dominance we also must be
+defending something which is of value to us. The lower the value in
+terms of our national interests, the lower the price we are likely to
+be willing to pay.
+
+In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat, destroy,
+or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in OOTW, other
+non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals made more
+limited. For example, it may be necessary to intimidate or capture the
+leadership in order to restore order or reverse an action, or it may
+simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and counter opposition to
+conduct of a more limited mission (e.g., feeding the starving or
+protecting innocent people from genocide).
+
+In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk will be
+minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional use of force
+with minimal collateral damage. This means that there must be a belief
+that a mission can be accomplished and is worth the resources
+necessary to do so. Before initiating action in these often confusing
+situations, objectives must be clearly established and, once engaged,
+there should be a willingness to persevere through the inevitable
+rough patches.
+
+Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know what we want
+to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task for political
+leadership which is informed with military advice concerning what is
+feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain. The extent of the
+mission must be clearly defined. Is it to defeat an enemy so it will
+no longer pose a threat? Do we only need to stop an adversary from
+carrying out a particular act? Must we control a situation entirely or
+only sufficiently to be able to carry out a specific mission? Can we
+really affect the adversary's will?
+
+Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be relevant in
+the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of outcomes-from reversing
+military action (e.g., the invasion of Kuwait); to establishing a
+government more acceptable to the U.S. and the world, probably using
+military coercion (Haiti, Panama); to eliminating a threat to the U.S.
+or its allies. We may want to persuade an adversary to cease an
+aggression or act of interference or otherwise change behavior we
+cannot accept or tolerate. Political expectations in MRCs are for the
+effective use of force and for rapid success or at least steady
+progress. Casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with
+the threshold of American pain dependent on the directness of the
+threat to U.S. interests and with the degree of compellance
+appropriate to the political rationale.
+
+OOTW present a different set of challenges. These challenges are
+likely to require discrete dominance of specific circumstances rather
+than total dominance. The general tasks may include a wide variety of
+requirements. For example, it may be necessary to try to prevent or
+stop genocide (e.g., Rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The
+task may be to cooperate with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g.,
+prevention of starvation in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of employing
+force may be free and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia). The
+requirement could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an
+above-ground or underground chemical weapons plant or documented
+nuclear weapons facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states).
+
+Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights (e.g.,
+protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in the Gulf
+during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge might be to
+accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to deal with
+Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubtedly will face the
+future requirement to reverse a potential threat to Americans or to a
+region of importance with a limited military action (e.g., in Grenada
+in 1983 or the Mayaguez rescue in Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to
+bolster preventive diplomacy and/or overt measures to demonstrate
+preparedness to assist (e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad
+under threat of invasion from Libya and recent Navy operations in the
+Taiwan Strait) will still be relevant.
+
+Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda (hostage
+rescue-e.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijacking-e.g., _Achille Lauro_; deterrent
+to further moves-e.g., the Higgins operation, Libyan raids, missile
+attack on Iraq after the threat to former President Bush). We may also
+need to interdict weapons, terrorists, or other discrete cargoes
+moving between nations (e.g., North Korean missile shipments to Iran,
+Iranian and Libyan arms exchanges).
+
+Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable political
+alternative or a necessary political prelude to an offensive military
+step (e.g., implemented as the first step in actions to counter
+Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an alternative to war with
+Iraq; used ineffectively against the Serbs to try to convince them not
+to continue to support Bosnian Serb aggression; and tried with Haiti
+as an unsuccessful alternative to occupation). Our past experience has
+been that we seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these
+economic measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is
+required to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in
+controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations. Sanctions
+almost always require full international cooperation which cannot be
+assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course, some portions of the arms
+embargo were deliberately allowed to be permeable and the U.S. turned
+a blind eye to Iran's support of the Bosnians.
+
+Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about the
+potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabilities enhancing
+these outcomes could make a decisive difference in dealing with future
+challenges. History also cautions us as well that there will be
+restraints in employing Rapid Dominance and that there are fundamental
+differences in MRC and OOTW applications.
+
+Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effective in the
+past. They will be effective in the future, even when applied in
+limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing impact
+envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many examples of how a very
+limited application of force made a significant difference through the
+mechanisms of Shock and Awe. Experiences, including successes and
+failures, illustrate some of the potential of Rapid Dominance if
+implemented effectively.
+
+The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes, which
+made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during the
+Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging negotiations with the North
+Vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an acceptable
+conclusion. Daily reports following the controversial B-52 "carpet"
+bombing raids in Cambodia talked of North Vietnamese/Vietcong soldiers
+wandering around in a daze due to shock and concussion. Both B-52s and
+naval gunfire, especially from 16 inch guns of a battleship, had a
+similar impact on invading North Vietnamese troop concentrations. The
+mining of Haiphong Harbor, although initiated late in the war, was
+equally effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of North
+Vietnam.
+
+When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing problems of
+our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as take away substantial
+political leverage from the North Vietnamese, he directed the raid to
+rescue prisoners jailed just outside Hanoi. The raid itself was well
+executed. American forces reached and searched the prison and returned
+safely. But no Americans were freed because a last minute transfer of
+the POWs from the prison had not been detected. If there had been
+prisoners still there to be rescued, the operation would have been a
+highly dramatic and influential event. The point is that accurate and
+timely intelligence remains crucial.
+
+There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and naval air
+strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the discotheque terrorist
+attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The perception that he
+personally might be targeted appeared to get Gadhafi's attention.
+
+When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian soldiers
+from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed around the island
+to confront them. At the sight of tank guns, the seemingly stubborn
+occupants surrendered almost immediately without a fight.
+
+The cease fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow after
+the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket bombardments of
+Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given that both sides were
+exhausted at that point, a show of force could have been convincing.
+Strong U.S. action in response to Iran's mining of neutral waters may
+also have had a sobering effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iran's
+vulnerable oil-producing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed
+with impunity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out
+to challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraq's reign of terror, and
+the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped end the war.
+
+In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned immediate
+respect from potential troublemakers with their ability to see wide
+areas night or day, remain on station for hours as night patrols, and
+strike with precision and relative impunity. The methodical drone of
+AC-130s circling in the air was enough to restore some order, although
+a few civilians found the noise unsettling. In another situation, the
+aftermath of systematic UN efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed
+Aideed's illegal arms facilities generated an unexpected reaction from
+other warlords, including those colluding with him, which was to
+volunteer to hand over their own weapons storage areas. For a fleeting
+moment, Shock and Awe created an important opportunity.
+
+During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would appear that
+when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of air power, rather than
+occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed finally to understand that an
+appearance of cooperation rather than defiance was in their interest.
+This NATO message in the form of air power, of course, was
+strengthened by the effectiveness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim
+counter-offensive and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters. Sustaining
+the shock effect with forces on the ground was a necessary combination
+to gain the staying power effect to change the will of the Serbs. It
+was not accomplished by air alone. Timing remains important.
+
+Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance might have
+made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations. Rapid
+Dominance might have provided a better response to those setbacks or
+might have offered a more effective alternative that would have
+avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the first place
+(e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy rescue in 1980, Lebanon Marine
+barracks bombing in 1983, response to the Pueblo seizure by North
+Korea in 1968, and the reaction to the downed helicopters during the
+Ranger raid in Somalia).
+
+We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated effective
+application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance. Israel's rout
+of Syria's air force and missile defenses in Lebanon's Baaka Valley
+shows how dramatic success can have political spillover. On the other
+hand, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse
+effects of Shock and Awe and had the unintended consequence of
+galvanizing the U.S. into action.
+
+Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a more
+technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these examples
+and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain improvements
+in capabilities would provide us with greater flexibility in the
+future. This is especially true in OOTW situations, which require a
+multiplicity of effective instruments at our disposal. It is also true
+that certain operations such as peacekeeping tend to be manpower
+intensive.
+
+If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value to
+that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelligence is
+essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels unprecedented in
+scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real time. The Gulf
+War, despite its success, showed classic limitations in intelligence.
+Even though we had nearly every intelligence asset designed to deal
+with the USSR available for use, we were unable to detect the full
+extent of Iraq's WMD capability; unable to find mobile missile
+launchers even with a major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some
+cases, we could only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing
+forces; and we mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate
+but had civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human
+intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, in
+order to understand what is happening in deep underground facilities).
+
+Another important capability we should try to achieve in the future is
+the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or significantly
+influence the perceptions and understanding of individual
+troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent
+years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in
+Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a perception is particularly relevant
+when the problem appears not to be caused by a unified population but
+by the ambitions of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed
+off any likely internal opposition. Such a capability requires
+effective real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for
+accomplishing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to
+effective "snatch" operations).
+
+In a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political imperative,
+we will continue to need the ability to shut down all commerce into
+and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, and roads. We ought
+to be able to do this in a much more thorough, decisive, and shocking
+way than we have in the past. The ability to apply pressure or cause
+acquiescence employing non-lethal means also will be important in some
+circumstances. Weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do
+not kill in significant numbers may be the only ones that are
+politically acceptable in the future. This also means that crowd
+control with minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances,
+the costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically
+expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the U.S. and
+internationally.
+
+As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down key
+electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or within a
+specific sub-group or faction). We also need the ability to control
+radio and television within a country. It is important, however, in
+all cases, to be able to deny an adversary's ability to communicate
+and to have our own means of reaching the population with appropriate
+messages.
+
+In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities
+selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert stockpiles,
+fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to have the capability
+selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or destroy other things
+considered of great value to opponents. Increased targeting precision
+will compound effectiveness as well as help to avoid the political
+pitfalls of using force such as the inevitable, unintended collateral
+damage that has been the pattern of the past.
+
+More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, however,
+will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on utilizing
+Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are substantial differences in
+the political constraints likely to be imposed in dealing with MRCs
+and with OOTW. For example, there is much greater latitude to use
+dominant force and Shock and Awe in MRCs than in OOTW.
+
+In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional powers
+which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly dependent on
+technology. Although more powerful, these developed states are also
+likely to be especially vulnerable to a technologically sophisticated
+approach such as Rapid Dominance as long as we maintain this military
+edge and the ability to neutralize their military systems. Even in the
+most compelling circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used,
+however, support from other nations will be politically desirable.
+
+In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of value to
+an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the numbers and
+types of weapons that can be employed. For example, the political
+circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be employed are quite
+limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain actions are politically as
+well as morally unacceptable except in extreme cases. Such
+restrictions are likely to apply to targets affecting control of
+access to food, water, and clean air, and to destruction of religious
+and cultural centers, even if there is low collateral damage.
+
+In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism of using
+excessive force, especially if there is civilian or collateral damage.
+The concept of proportionality is likely to remain an operative
+principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to extremes, especially if
+the marginal nature of a situation leads to a marginal and ineffective
+response. Some people, both military and civilian, even argue that
+superior technology should not be employed in such situations and that
+an adversary should be fought on his own terms. While such arguments
+should be rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political
+influence that must be considered. We should always use technology to
+minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce collateral
+damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same time, there
+needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant destruction or denial.
+Our actions must always be consistent with our own system of values.
+
+The "rapid" component of Rapid Dominance is one of the most appealing
+aspects of the concept, both politically and militarily. The ability
+to take action that is timely and decisive multiplies substantially
+the chances of ultimate success. Action needs to be taken precisely
+when it will have greatest impact. Often initial public outrage and
+political support for action in response to a provocation subsides if
+a prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take action.
+
+The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate
+information and act on it effectively, is also an important advantage.
+In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few years ago, it
+was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing faster than the
+defensive chain of command could make counter moves. The tradition of
+sending decisions up the line was simply too slow to cope with the
+dynamic challenge posed by the adversary. Commanders on scene lacked
+the authority to respond and adjust to rapidly changing situations.
+The exercise graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need
+to institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It also
+demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions in
+real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing the
+overall effort.
+
+The Navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the 1980s in order
+to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and the need to
+integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive missile, air, sea,
+and undersea capabilities of a battle group and its joint components
+(e.g., AWACs). This concept was one way of solving the time problem
+while keeping the overall commander in the picture. The commander
+could then intervene and modify actions as necessary to conform to the
+broader strategy. This type of control was helped by the evolution of
+electronic links and secure communications and the availability of
+satellites.
+
+Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to orchestrate it using
+similar principles, while applying greater selective ability to turn
+on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and devices influencing the
+whole operational picture. Technology should also give commanders a
+much better grasp of what is evolving during a battle. Just as the
+American military of today has made "owning the night" part of its
+tactical advantage, "owning" the dimension of time will be critical to
+the success of Rapid Dominance.
+
+In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future force
+configuration and the design of a mission capability package (MCP)
+based on Rapid Dominance.
+
+
+Operational Construct
+
+Rapid Dominance is based on affecting the adversary's will,
+perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to
+overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our aims. Four
+characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and
+control of the environment.
+
+Application of all or of selective capabilities within the Rapid
+Dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct the
+application of military/defense resources and produce the requisite
+outcome. Rapid Dominance envisages the execution of specific actions
+in real or near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed
+detrimental to U.S. interests. On the high end of conflict, Rapid
+Dominance would introduce a reaction of Shock and Awe in areas of
+highest value to the threatening individual, group, or state. In many
+cases, prior understanding of the power of Rapid Dominance would act
+as a deterrent to the objectionable action. When used, Rapid Dominance
+would ensure favorable early resolution of issues with minimal loss of
+lives and collateral damage. The concept theoretically should be able
+to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board to high,
+mid, low, no, or minimal technology threats.
+
+Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting
+capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated,
+interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence,
+surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, data analysis,
+and real-time deliverable actionable information to the shooter. This
+network must provide total situational awareness and supporting nodal
+analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's
+decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe
+among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this
+knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific functions or
+all essential functions near simultaneously. This will often times be
+netted pieces of data where the sum of the parts gives the answer and
+the battlefield advantage to the force possessing this rapidly netted
+information.
+
+The "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real-time
+actionable targeting information to the appropriate shooter, whether
+the shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery
+battery, an individual rifle man, a naval battle group, an individual
+ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. This means the
+need to have the right shooter in the right place; locating and
+identifying the target correctly and quickly; allocating and assigning
+targets rapidly; getting the "shoot" order or general authority to the
+shooter; and then assessing the battle damage accurately.
+
+At whatever the unit level, Shock and Awe are provided by the speed
+and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do this
+simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic Shock
+and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and populous. This
+simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets of imposing Shock and
+Awe. When the video results of these attacks are broadcast in real
+time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact on coalition support and
+negative impact on potential threat support can be decisive.
+
+The first priority of a doctrine of Rapid Dominance should be to
+deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions that are
+either unacceptable to U.S. national security interests or endanger
+the democratic community of states and access to free markets. These
+political objectives are generally those envisioned in the major and
+lower regional conflict scenarios (MRC & LRC). Should deterrence fail,
+the application of Rapid Dominance in these circumstances should
+create sufficient Shock and Awe to the immediate threat forces and
+leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential
+threat partners. The doctrine of Rapid Dominance would not be limited
+to MRC and LRC scenarios. It has applications in a variety of areas
+such as countering WMD, terrorism, and perhaps other tasks. The
+challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response
+based on Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat, yet
+decisive enough to convey the right degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid
+Dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. We
+repeat our disclaimer that this is not a silver bullet. However, Rapid
+Dominance and its capacity for achieving Shock and Awe could be
+applied for egregious threats or violations of international law, such
+as:
+
+  - Direct military threats to the territory of the U.S., its friends,
+    and allies;
+  - Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state;
+  - Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD;
+  - Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; and
+  - Threat to essential world markets.
+
+Clearly, the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and
+penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and
+benefits in all societies are becoming known to the masses as well as
+the power brokers. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop
+sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and
+create road blocks as well as control inputs/outputs to the highway
+both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept.
+
+These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting
+international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer
+interagency cooperations and coordination between military and law
+enforcement activities and capabilities must be established.
+Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed
+considerable cultural differences between these organizations.
+Overcoming these cultural differences among organizations is not easy.
+The required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive information
+and support between these agencies and the military needs to be
+developed further. Interagency coordination and cooperation must be
+raised to a new level of sophistication. Some laws may need to be
+changed. War in Cyberspace does not recognize domestic or foreign
+boundaries. In this environment the subjects of Information Warfare
+and Information In Warfare take on new meaning and require focused
+development. We must become proficient within this environment.
+
+Operational Assumptions
+
+  - The enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict (i.e.,
+    we are surprised).
+  - We then attain control of the initiative through superior speed,
+    knowledge, and capacity to act and react.
+  - Our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements must
+    convince the enemy there is no hope.
+  - Combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times, places, and
+    tempo of choosing.
+  - Allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from political
+    objectives through combat to include psychological warfare.
+  - The enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest importance to him
+    and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness of our attack.
+
+From these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow that help
+to define a Rapid Dominance Force with more specificity in improving:
+
+  - Intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressor's actions
+  - The length of time required for a decision to react
+  - Decisive responses at various levels and times after the crises or
+    conflict begins to develop:
+    - Respond in 1 to 3 days with air and missile strikes and special
+      forces
+    - Respond in 5 to 10 days with more massive power up to and
+      including a joint task force of corps size
+    - Respond in 10 to 30 days with a second corps
+
+
+The Rapid Dominance MCP
+
+As a next step, we need to sketch out what a Rapid Dominance Force
+might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and space joint
+task force supported by necessary intelligence assets that can impose
+sufficient Shock and Awe to break the will of the adversary. First,
+this force will emphasize capabilities to maximize the core
+characteristics of knowledge of self, adversary, and environment;
+rapidity; brilliance in execution; and control of the environment.
+
+Knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness. It means
+understanding the adversary's mind and anticipating his reactions. It
+means targeting those things that will produce the intended Shock and
+Awe. And, it means having feedback and good, timely battle assessment
+to enable knowledge to be used dynamically as well as to know how our
+forces will react.
+
+Rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and always on
+a timely basis. Rapidity can be instant or as required.
+
+Brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards of
+operational competence and, through a superiority of knowledge,
+maintaining the ability to impose Shock and Awe through continuously
+surprising and psychologically and physically breaking the adversary's
+will to resist. This will require training and exercising of joint
+land, sea, air, space, and special forces to new standards of
+excellence and competence. It is mainly in training where the
+difference lies in achieving operational brilliance. This desired
+standard of performance can be achieved by making innovations to
+permit new levels of battlefield fidelity for training units and
+developing leaders.
+
+Control of the environment would include complete signature control on
+the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. We would control our
+signatures as well as what we wanted the adversary to see or hear and
+what we do not want the enemy to know. Destruction of the adversary's
+systems would begin with long-range stealthy, or "stand-off" Zero CEP
+weapons, extend to FOG-M type battlefield weapons to close-in systems.
+Small units would be able to call in "fires" for 360 degrees on a
+nearly instant basis.
+
+Attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception,
+disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. "Pulse" weapons
+would be used to disarm and actively deceive the enemy through
+disrupting and attacking all aspects of the adversary's electronics,
+information, and C4I infrastructure. It is this "lay down" of total
+power across all areas in rapid and simultaneous actions that would
+impose the Shock and Awe.
+
+The remainder, roughly a third of this Joint Task Force, would consist
+of traditional platforms including conventional ground, air, and
+amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the necessary
+supporting logistical, C4I, medical and other capabilities and ground
+forces to conduct and sustain conventional or traditional operations
+if needed and to support or defend traditionally vulnerable targets
+such as ports, roads, and other infrastructure.
+
+Tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions of the
+MRC. In general, the most rapidly deployable units of this corps, the
+future equivalent of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps, would be sent to
+secure or reinforce a limited area into which the remainder of the
+force would flow. This AOR would be self-protected. Our goal is that
+perhaps a Rapid Dominance force of as few as 2,000 troops could
+successfully defend against an enemy of 10-20,000 in an MRC and that a
+full corps can be deployed within 5 to 10 days.
+
+These units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin disarming,
+destroying, and disabling the enemy's military wherewithal using
+"stand-off" capabilities. Forward-based or long-range reconnaissance
+units could be employed/supported by UAVs and overhead surveillance.
+
+Units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time phased
+plan. These units would be used either to complete the attack or to
+carry it to the adversary, occupy selective territory physically, or
+carry out the requirements of the post-war occupation campaign. Should
+traditional forces be needed, they would of course be available.
+
+Protection and self-defense would partly be provided by controlling
+the environment. In effect, we would cast a cloak around the adversary
+and permit the adversary to see and know what we alone provided. This
+would leave an adversary blind, deaf, and dumb. With superior and
+rapid firepower, the blinded, deafened enemy would be destroyed and
+defeated as we saw fit. This would maximize Shock and Awe and help
+break the adversary's will.
+
+In OOTW, the Rapid Dominance JTF might function as follows. First, the
+ability to deploy dominant force rapidly to attack or threaten to
+attack appropriate targets could be brought to bear without involving
+manpower-intense or manned sensors and weapons. Second, once deployed,
+since self-defense is likely to be required against small arms, mines,
+and shoulder carried or mortar weapons, certainly some form of "armor"
+or protective vehicles and shelters would be necessary. However,
+through the UAVs, C4I, and virtual reality systems, as well as through
+signature management and other Shock and Awe weapons including High
+Powered Microwave (HPM) and "stun-like" systems, this force would have
+more than dominant battlefield awareness.
+
+There are, of course, caveats. Unless strategic or policy objectives
+are in line with operational capabilities, military force is unlikely
+to be a useful instrument. It is also unlikely that any operational
+construct, no matter how brilliantly conceived, could overcome such a
+disconnect. Vietnam and Somalia remind us of these limitations.
+
+The assimilation of intelligence-strategically, culturally, and
+operationally-is a central thrust and component of the knowledge
+aspect of Rapid Dominance. Our forces must not only fight smarter;
+these forces, at all or most levels, must be educated and trained
+differently with far more emphasis on intelligence, broadly defined.
+This knowledge, when applied rapidly under conditions of brilliance
+and in a controlled environment, is a centerpiece of Rapid Dominance.
+
+There must be full comprehension of the adversary across strategic,
+political, military, cultural, intellectual, and perceptual lines.
+This understanding must go beyond how an adversary might use military
+force. Those crucial values that motivate and underlie a nation or a
+group must be understood if the appropriate level of Shock and Awe is
+to be achieved.
+
+There are also obvious questions that must be answered. Does Rapid
+Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the conflict
+spectrum involving more traditional applications of force to achieve
+political objectives, as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet
+to be explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance
+with Shock and Awe applies to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S.
+interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the
+political and military prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are
+they applicable and realistically achievable in the increasingly
+complex interaction of national non-government organizations
+(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care
+to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of
+Rapid Dominance with a degree of Shock and Awe offend and generate
+counterproductive public relations backlash from those who believe
+force should only be used as a last resort and then with a measurable
+degree of proportionality?
+
+At this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have them
+answered at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and issues
+as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up front and
+answered in the Rapid Dominance concept development process. We must
+be careful that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the
+reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept.
+Rapid Dominance must still confront the fog of war. Decisions will
+still be made based on judgment and confidence in the intelligence
+provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center
+of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to
+inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the key will be the ability to
+penetrate this fog with increased clarity and to control events now
+unmanageable through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and distributing
+actionable information. Complicating the issue is the fact that the
+U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the
+world's only credible superpower, the U.S. cannot avoid a leadership
+role but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all
+leaders. This is the classical "damned if you do and damned if you
+don't" syndrome.
+
+At this stage, the concept of Rapid Dominance is a work in progress.
+It needs to be "operationalized." By designing a nominal MCP and
+fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, we can explore the
+answers to many of the questions we raised above. Three steps are
+needed to proceed down the road on the way to a real capability.
+First, feasibility of the requisite technical capabilities needs to be
+established. Second, wargaming of the MCP must be done. Third, and
+perhaps most difficult, deriving the means for implementing the most
+promising aspects of Rapid Dominance must occur.
+
+
+
+
+An Outline for System Innovation and Technological Integration
+
+
+
+Achieving Shock and Awe is central to Rapid Dominance, and therefore
+must serve as the key organizing principle for any rigorous
+examination and exploitation of system concepts and technologies for
+Rapid Dominance. Understanding the interplay between technology and
+doctrine is not only or simply a straightforward matter of
+establishing operational requirements and then seeking to attain them
+through invention and design. It is a complex and interactive process
+of experimentation and discovery wherein intellect, hard work,
+endurance, and innovation must drive the use of technology. Rather
+than make changes, however significant, to modifying current
+capabilities or building newer, similar ones, Rapid Dominance seeks to
+identify and field systems specifically designed to achieve Shock and
+Awe-systems that may break the mold much as the Model T Ford once did
+years ago.
+
+The genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, computer-aided
+design tools used by engineers, vast database management systems in
+place in corporate offices, computer-controlled machines enabling
+composite materials, and the countless academic, business, and
+personal computers are all evidence of the prominent and ever
+increasing role information technologies have assumed in modern
+economies. Many of the technologies underlying the Information Age are
+being spearheaded by U.S. small business and its entrepreneurial
+culture. Certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in Japan
+to software development businesses in India, the rest of the world
+participates and competes. But few can deny that U.S. industry
+provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of
+information technologies as they are most broadly defined. This
+leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the United States
+with an ever increasing military advantage over competing nations.
+
+Leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporating it into
+U.S. forces; it is likely to include a significant redesign of both
+forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly evolving technologies.
+Many of the technologies that will support Rapid Dominance are already
+discernible. Unlike the impact of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that
+a single technology or system will emerge to produce Rapid Dominance.
+It will only be attainable through the broadest integration of
+strategic concepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological
+advances, system design, and appropriate organization of command,
+control, training and education. And only a large, immensely capable
+country such as the U.S. may be able to achieve this.
+
+Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of strategy,
+technology, and innovation. Four core characteristics were defined
+earlier as crucial:
+
+  - Complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the environment;
+  - Rapidity;
+  - Brilliance of execution; and
+  - Control of the environment.
+
+What follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how technology
+can be used in a broad system approach. Many of these technologies
+currently are being addressed within the defense community. Analysts,
+military strategists, acquisition planners, and even "futurists" are
+wrestling with the meaning and consequences of the Information Age.
+Our focus on systems and technologies begins with these four
+characteristics.
+
+
+Knowledge of Self, Adversary, and Environment
+
+In the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate where
+the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. Even 5 years ago,
+who would have foreseen the significant involvement of the U.S.
+military in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and the South
+China Sea? To which hot spots can we expect to see U.S. troops
+deployed over the next 5 years? Over the next 20? In this section we
+argue that, in addition to improving our force capabilities, the U.S.
+must develop an intelligence repository far more extensive than during
+the Cold War, covering virtually all the important regions and
+organizational structures throughout the world.
+
+During the Cold War, intelligence agencies focused more on a bipolar
+world and built sizable organizations to collect information on "the
+other side." This same intelligence structure, in the main, is in
+place today facing a multipolar world, where any number of power
+structures-whether they be states, international organizations, or
+even small groups of individuals-must be monitored with an
+understanding that extends to their leadership, culture, economic
+direction, and military capability.
+
+As the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his
+environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift from
+technology developments that once resided within our government to
+those driven by commercial demands. For example, the information
+technologies used by U.S. intelligence agencies are of such
+complexity, importance, and expense that they are referred to as
+"national assets" and are developed and managed by large, dedicated
+organizations. Even here, commercial companies are rapidly encroaching
+on what once seemed to be an unassailable market position in Earth
+observation systems. One may already purchase synthetic aperture radar
+interferometry images from any number of sources, and panchromatic
+visual images with one meter resolution will soon be available over
+the counter for remarkably little cost. Indeed, the only real barrier
+to this burgeoning market is the understandable concerns that
+governments have with allowing such technology to be widely available.
+In areas such as encryption and data security, commercial developers
+are more likely to reach limits of government acceptance before those
+of technological capability.
+
+With untold billions invested in communications systems, even the most
+modern U.S. military communication systems often compare poorly with
+commercial systems. While this has long been the case for fielded
+systems, it is becoming true for even the most sophisticated research
+and development programs being undertaken by defense organizations.
+
+As a case in point, one may consider a program recently initiated by
+the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) called
+Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD). At the heart of
+this program, large amounts of data are collected within a vast
+database residing on commercial computers and enterprise management
+systems. This information is then disseminated to the troops through
+the commercial Global Broadcast System (GBS) onto "set-top" boxes, an
+enabling technology that was developed commercially. Even with this
+leveraging of private industry, there is a real question as to whether
+DARPA will be able to field a system that would compete well with
+surprisingly similar commercial systems. Internet channels planned by
+media industry giants such as BSkyB will offer multi-megabit,
+interactive, digital data connections to the Net merely as an
+enticement for subscribers to enroll for their full digital
+broadcasting service (200 to 300 channels of digital video and sound).
+Understanding that there is much more to BADD than the little
+discussed here, one still almost wonders whether DARPA could simply
+buy a subscription and connect it to an appropriate, commercial,
+network management system. More to the point, if even well funded and
+aggressive technology development organizations such as DARPA find it
+difficult to remain ahead of commercial advancements, there may be a
+fundamental lesson to be learned regarding the management of
+defense-related technologies.
+
+
+Knowledge and Intelligence
+
+"Intelligence" is comprised of five categories of knowledge and
+understanding: a society's leadership; culture and values; the
+strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; military
+capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive battlefield
+information. Examples of technologies and system approaches of
+potential relevance in these areas are discussed below.
+
+Understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and involved
+neutral countries implies an infrastructure for acquiring an in-depth
+knowledge about cultures, leadership values, and other driving factors
+that allow us, when needed and on a timely basis, to get "into their
+minds." Applicable technologies include automated language
+translators, interactive and autonomous computer simulations, advanced
+database systems for organizing and understanding data and
+transactions of individuals and institutions, and computerized
+educational systems for training and learning these skills.
+
+Collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is crucial
+to Rapid Dominance. Logistics, demographics, and infrastructure are
+broad areas of collection along with geography, road/rail/ship lanes,
+utility sites and corridors, manufacturing, government sites, military
+and paramilitary facilities, population demographics, economic and
+financial pressure points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major
+dams and bridges. Technologies used to provide environmental awareness
+include traditional means such as satellites that can be augmented
+with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing observation
+routines. The vast quantities of data that reside on the world's
+computer networks, if properly exploited, provide another rich source
+of information. Data mining tools, such as Web crawlers, gatherers,
+brokers, and repositories that pull and organize data from public
+networks, will be essential to building a more complete picture of
+potential adversaries. Since not all databases and host computers are
+cooperative with these methods, offensive information warfare tools
+will be required to obtain specific pieces of information that are
+vital for national security purposes.
+
+Once data are collected, they must be processed and disseminated and
+then stored for future access. Enterprise data storage and retrieval
+systems that are capable of working with many terrabytes (1,000
+gigabytes) of information are already commonplace. Since it is
+impossible for humans to comprehend such vast quantities of
+information without some assistance, data exploitation tools (filters,
+fusion, automatic target recognition, image understanding, etc.) will
+be crucial technologies. Finally, the information, once processed,
+will be of little use if not disseminated to the right people in a
+timely fashion. "Intelligent data" dissemination and wide bandwidth
+communications are examples of essential technologies emerging in this
+area.
+
+In addition to knowledge about regions and locations where U.S. force
+may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance and up-to-date
+knowledge on specific "hot spots" and to have sufficient flexibility
+within the system to shift attention rapidly to new areas. Systems
+addressing this more time-sensitive set of tasks would include light,
+quickly deployable satellites, high altitude and endurance unmanned
+aerial vehicles, manned platforms, and unattended ground sensors.
+
+As a crisis unfolds and the insertion of U.S. troops or other military
+action becomes more probable, information needs and the number of
+information consumers both increase dramatically. Information that
+must be collected and correlated include targeting, battle damage
+assessment (BDA), weather, terrain, infrastructure, tracking of
+special targets, logistics, position and status of our own troops,
+identification friend or foe (IFF), and status of material. It is
+vitally important that sufficient sensor systems work in all weather
+conditions and at night to maintain the "operations tempo" required by
+Rapid Dominance.
+
+Battlefield awareness requires three information technologies:
+collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable
+information to a shooter. Rapid Dominance requires an unprecedented
+level of real-time information collection that will be provided by
+sensor systems such as space platforms, UAVs, unattended ground
+sensors, and advanced manned reconnaissance platforms. In addition,
+the entire infosphere of the adversary will be monitored not only for
+classic information such as operational commands but also to determine
+the shock effect being created by Rapid Dominance operations.
+Collecting data from cooperative sources such as one's own troops,
+allies, and friendly non-combatants is also critical. While _Operation
+Desert Storm_ showed the value of self-location sensors such as GPS,
+the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there is still work to
+be done in terms of giving each commander and soldier sufficient
+information to operate effectively. Much of this information, such as
+the physiological status of individual combatants, is not currently
+collected, and much of what is sensed is not properly disseminated.
+
+It would be hard to overstate the importance of information
+dissemination within Rapid Dominance. Administering Shock and Awe
+requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is unable to fathom,
+but our own forces must operate effectively, even aggressively, within
+an environment that could easily lead to serious information
+bottlenecks and overload. Commercial technologies will be key to the
+U.S. developing a structure to effectively disseminate information.
+Already, commercial communications technologies such as global
+broadcast satellites and protocols like those underlying the Internet
+have been used as stop gaps by the U.S. military in major deployments.
+
+Merely transmitting the right information at the right time will not
+be sufficient for operations enabling Rapid Dominance. Information
+will need to be fused to create knowledge-based displays. The
+technologies that will be important in this area go beyond the data
+fusion algorithms currently in place and should leverage heavily off
+of technologies in fields such as computer image generation, virtual
+reality, and advanced simulation.
+
+
+Rapidity
+
+In a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of operational
+planning, determining appropriate action, deployment, and employment
+all focused toward minimizing response time. Three factors combine to
+make military planning far more difficult today than in the Cold War
+era. First, there is great uncertainty early on in the location of a
+conflict, who the adversary may be, and with whom one may be allied.
+Second, there is normally very little time available for planning,
+with the military sometimes having only weeks or days before
+committing troops to an unanticipated mission. Third, vastly more
+information is available to the planner, which is both a blessing and
+a curse. Several technologies that partially define Intelligent
+Dynamic Planning will make it easier for the commander to plan Rapid
+Dominance:
+
+  - Model based planning
+  - Machine intelligence
+  - Dynamic planning based upon feedback and new information
+  - Selectively automated decision aides (commanders associate)
+  - Imbedded rehearsal and training
+  - Brilliance in Execution
+
+It is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. However, the standard
+can be set. The Dynamic Planning noted above is part of the capability
+for this characteristic as are the systems and technologies discussed
+below.
+
+
+  Technologies Critical to Achieving Brilliance in Rapid Dominance
+
+For shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage, key
+targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed, and the enemy must
+be made to feel completely helpless and unable to consider a
+meaningful response. Furthermore, the enemy's confusion must be
+complete, adding to a general impression of impotence. Most
+importantly, strategic targets, military forces, leadership and key
+societal resources must be located, tracked, and targeted. This will
+require substantial sensor, computational, and communication
+technologies. Designated targets must be destroyed rapidly and with
+assurance. Finally, the status and position of friendly forces must be
+known at all times, and the logistics supporting them must be
+sufficiently flexible to allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration,
+and decentralization of location.
+
+Several technologies that can help in this are discussed below, as
+divided into the following subsections: sensors, computational
+systems, communications and system integration.
+
+
+  Sensor Technologies
+
+Sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, passive,
+imbedded, and processing.
+
+_Active sensors:_ By far, the most important of the energy-emitting
+sensors is radar. Among the best all-weather capabilities of any type
+of sensor, the role for and capabilities of radar have steadily
+increased since the Second World War. Radar systems are used for early
+warning, air defense, air asset management, air traffic control, naval
+fleet defense, detection and tracking of moving ground targets,
+missile targeting, missile terminal guidance, terrain data
+development, and weather prediction. For Rapid Dominance, radars and
+other active sensors must operate with low probability of intercept.
+Particularly with stealthy systems, this will present a unique
+challenge to military systems where one may not expect a great amount
+of "spin-on" from the commercial sector. It is vitally important to be
+able to sense the enemy under all conditions and environments. Sensors
+must penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such as
+underground and underwater mines.
+
+There are many other important active sensor classes, three of which
+are active acoustics, lidar and magnetic anomaly detectors. Broadband
+underwater active acoustics could address pressing needs such as
+shallow-water anti-submarine warfare and mine detection (both buried
+and silt covered). The practical application of lidar is a relatively
+recent development enabled by advances in laser, power management, and
+data processing technologies. Lidar can be used for fire control,
+weapon guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent in the
+near infrared (NIR) regime), and target imaging/recognition. Lidar
+detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such as vibration and
+motion and has proven very hard to spoof. Magnetic anomaly detectors
+will continue to find application in areas of anti-mine and
+anti-submarine warfare and in screening for weapons at security
+checkpoints and elsewhere.
+
+Electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where they
+create a signature of use to an enemy. The ability to emit energy, yet
+in ways that are less discernible, should be an attractive avenue to
+explore for the future. The coordinated application of many sensor
+platforms, some of which may be completely passive, in conjunction
+with emitting sensors is a potentially major area of exploration.
+
+_Passive sensors:_ Among the passive sensor types, the most important
+for U.S. forces is forward-looking infrared (FLIR). FLIR technology
+has allowed the U.S. to "own the night," as was handily displayed in
+_Operation Desert Storm_. Some of the significant technology
+advancements underway in this area include multiple wavelength
+sensors, very large focal planes, and the increasing performance of
+uncooled sensors. Particularly in the area of uncooled sensors,
+commercial developments are underway that promise to drastically
+reduce the cost of competent IR sensors.
+
+Other passive sensor technologies of note include hyperspectral
+visible/NIR collection and processing and inexpensive, scatterable,
+unattended ground sensors (acoustic, seismic, "hot spot," etc.).
+Hyperspectral imaging allows target searches to be conducted in the
+frequency domain, as opposed to the spatial domain as is the norm
+today. This provides a powerful new input for automatic target
+recognition (ATR) systems, is useful for addressing low observables
+(LO), and is especially important for remote imaging assets.
+
+Unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored
+continually. For example, the actual area of operations for Scuds in
+ODS was relatively small, but it was very difficult for then-current
+sensing systems to oversee. Technologies being developed in the area
+of microelectromechanical systems, in particular, hold promise for
+enabling capable and inexpensive sensor fields.
+
+_Imbedded sensors:_ Monitoring the position and status of Blue and
+friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in tracking the
+enemy. GPS presented a tremendous advantage to troops in ODS. This
+capability needs to be extended down to the individual soldier, and
+the status of all critical material and personnel needs to be tracked.
+
+_Sensor signal processing:_ Finally, the signals from modern sensors
+are of limited use without proper processing and presentation to the
+user. This area will be developed further in the computational
+technologies section. Technologies that are historically grouped with
+sensor systems include automatic target recognition, imbedded
+multisensor fusion and correlation, and displays.
+
+
+  Computational Technologies
+
+The capabilities of the integrated circuit (IC), and in particular the
+microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. Certainly, physical
+limits must be approached at some point, but each looming barrier has
+so far been met by technological innovation. Nevertheless, should the
+march of IC improvements slow somewhat, the software and networking
+technologies that are being developed at an accelerating pace will
+permit the vision of Rapid Dominance to become of ever increasing
+utility.
+
+Rapid Dominance requires the collection, management, and fast access
+of enormous quantities of information. Technologies that will enable
+this include computational hardware advances such as increasingly
+powerful workstations, reduced-cost image generators, massively
+parallel machines, compact displays, reduced-cost memory devices
+(i.e., DRAM, RAID, and optical jukeboxes) client/server-specific
+database engines, reconfigurable simulation cells, "wearable" PCs,
+advanced human-computer interface (HCI) techniques (i.e., voice
+interfaces and those coming to define "virtual reality"), and PCMCIA
+technology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, miniaturized
+hard drives, and modems).
+
+Software advances will be even more critical for Rapid Dominance.
+Areas of importance include:
+
+  - Network data engines
+  - Object-oriented architectures
+  - Advanced modeling and simulation
+  - Machine intelligence
+  - Automatic target recognition
+  - Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools
+
+Network technologies are just now emerging but are being driven at a
+frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. A variety of advanced
+tools beyond "hot link" browsing are being introduced daily. Data
+browsers, brokers, gatherers, and network repositories are being
+released, as demonstrated by products like _Harvester_ and _Netscape's
+Catalog Server_. Platform independent languages such as JAVA and their
+associated virtual computational engines promise the same network
+flexibility for programs that is now enjoyed by data.
+
+Perhaps the most important area of technology development for Rapid
+Dominance is the development of practical object-oriented
+architectures and protocols. Protocols such as CORBA, OLE, ALSP, HLA
+and DIS[1] are changing the face of computing, making it much easier
+to link programs and databases, and access and correlate information
+that was previously "entombed" within its legacy application.
+
+[Footnote 1: CORBA (common object request broker architecture), OLE
+(object linking and embedding), ALSP (aggregate level simulation
+protocol), HLA (high-level architecture), DIS (Distributed Interactive
+Simulation). These are all protocols or the architectures defining
+protocols that, in part, enable disparate software and/or hardware
+components to be linked or otherwise share information and logical
+elements.]
+
+One interesting application area migrating toward an object-oriented
+approach is geospatial databases. In the past, geospatial data were
+stored as either raster-based or vector information, and significant
+processing was required for users to make queries regarding roads,
+areas, or objects such as building sites. A new approach, called a
+spatial database engine, creates intuitive objects from standard
+geospatial databases and uses commercial databases to add attributes
+to the objects. This is a very powerful technique that allows
+geospatial data, a key element of warfighting, to be managed quickly
+and efficiently using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. It is
+particularly useful for distributed databases such as one would find
+on a network.
+
+Modeling and simulation is also benefiting from object-oriented
+technologies. Simulations were once stand-alone codes. If one wanted
+to simulate a joint battle, one began with an existing model (i.e.,
+land combat) and then modified it to include other components (i.e.,
+aircraft and ships). Similarly, if a new technology were to be
+modeled, new code normally had to be written, even in cases where
+good, validated, stand-alone technology models existed. The obvious
+drawbacks to this approach are that it is costly, often produces
+inferior simulations for the new additions, and quickly results in
+extremely large codes with commensurate large code management
+problems. Object-oriented approaches allow models and simulations to
+be linked to form a richer environment for examining new technologies
+and joint force structures.
+
+Linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as
+computer-aided design (CAD) programs and physics-based simulations
+presents a new type of tool referred to as simulation-based design.
+Once fully realized, this capability will allow new technologies to be
+much more easily evaluated, introducing a source for greater
+efficiency into today's somewhat haphazard acquisition system.
+
+Simulations based on object-oriented architectures also promise more
+flexibility that will enable scenarios and unexpected situations to be
+made as inputs and simulated rapidly, forming the core for a
+battlefield visualization system capable of modeling "what if"
+situations. Outputs from these simulations could be used for mission
+rehearsal. Even today, pilots and special operations forces often "fly
+through" crude, three-dimensional renderings of a mission area to
+familiarize themselves with information such as surface-to-air missile
+(SAM) sites and landmarks.
+
+The promise of computational technologies brings with it potential
+vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats. In a world
+where information plays a vital role in warfare, information
+collection and processing tools will become targets. Defenses against
+information warfare must be developed. The threat is real and is
+growing especially in the commercial and private sectors. Even today,
+malicious hackers devise data-destroying viruses and distribute them
+through a plethora of electronic media; numerous sites on the Net are
+dedicated to the discussion and development of offensive computer
+viruses, with ample tools for even the novice to download and employ.
+Moreover, computer crimes cost the world economy billions of dollars
+annually. Although information warfare poses serious threats, the
+realm of information is where operations underlying Rapid Dominance
+most reside, and the enemy will find himself fully engaged should he
+choose to fight on our terms. Rapid Dominance is essentially
+information warfare on a grand scale in all dimensions of offensive,
+defensive and leveraging effective use of available information.
+
+
+  Communication Technologies
+
+One of the modern communication devices being fielded within U.S.
+forces today is the SINGCARS radio. With a data rate of somewhat less
+than 10 kbps, SINGCARS is woefully inadequate for supporting Rapid
+Dominance. However, more appropriate technologies are emerging:
+
+  - GBS and other satellite broadcast services
+  - Wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols
+  - Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches
+  - Advanced comm relay platforms (UAV, Lightsat, Iridium, etc.)
+
+GBS, for example, figures prominently in the BADD (battlefield
+awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at providing close
+to 30 Mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. This will be supported by
+multi-terrabyte databases, advanced data browsers, and query managers,
+and will be linked to the Joint Tactical Internet.
+
+Networking must also be supported by communications technologies. The
+basic problem of a battlefield network is that while some nodes may
+support very large data pipes, a number of nodes will be operating at
+SINGCARS data rates. This led to the BADD notion of one-way data
+broadcasting via GBS of large data files (such as UAV video and
+overhead imagery) and very low bandwidth data querying back to the
+data sources.
+
+Modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-based, which is
+particularly important for Rapid Dominance, where decisions must be
+made quickly based upon very large quantities of data, some of which
+will be collected and transmitted in real time. Technologies such as
+digital video teleconferencing, virtual whiteboards, and even 3D
+virtual environments where commanders may participate in collaborative
+planning sessions will become important.
+
+Finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where
+feasible, non-observable to the enemy.
+
+
+Control of the Environment
+
+The actual attack of targets in order to induce Shock and Awe may, in
+some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the enemy's
+perception. It will not always be necessary to destroy numerous
+targets in order to induce shock. However, it would be vitally
+important to give the appearance that there are no safe havens from
+attack, and that any target may be attacked at any time with impunity
+and force. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, confusion must be
+imposed on the adversary by supplying only information which will
+shape the adversary's perceptions and help break his will. Finally,
+the enemy must be displaced from selected key positions, for if he is
+allowed to occupy those areas that he considers strategically
+important, it is difficult to imagine how his shock could be complete.
+
+Controlling an enemy's perception of the battlespace includes
+manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status, and
+the environment in which he operates. This will be accomplished by
+selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while presenting him with
+information that is either misleading or serves our purposes. Sensing
+and feedback of an enemy leadership's perception of the situation will
+be critical.
+
+Technologies of interest here include those that allow systems and
+entire force units to modify their signature from being very stealthy
+to being completely obvious. An ability to attack enemy information
+systems will also be critical, encompassing system technologies from
+laser-based counter sensor weapons to embedded computer viruses,
+commonly referred to as Trojan Horses. In all cases, the goal will be
+to deny the enemy any information that would be useful to him and to
+impose a construct of deception and misinformation at all levels of
+operations.
+
+Clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield awareness
+already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a "perception attack" (a
+form of information warfare) to be successfully carried out. The need
+and requirements for Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) will increase
+dramatically. It will be necessary to understand not only whether a
+target was killed but also how enemy leadership, troops, and society
+viewed this destruction.
+
+So far, primarily information technologies have been discussed.
+Obviously, there will continue to be requirements for numerous other
+types of systems. Among the more important system technologies
+critical to achieving control of the environment include:
+
+  - Weapons platforms with stealth technology
+  - Weapons systems
+  - Robotic systems
+
+
+  Weapons platforms
+
+One of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to move
+people and ordinance to within an effective range of the target.
+Centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems, this reasoning was
+understood intuitively. Since ordinance must still be placed on the
+target, weapons platforms such as described below still demand
+consideration.
+
+  - Stealthy bombers and strike aircraft either land or sea platform
+    based
+  - Arsenal ships
+  - Submarines with conventional cruise missiles
+  - Stealthy land vehicles
+  - Stealthy observation/attack helicopters
+
+Stealth, combined with stand off, will contribute strongly to the
+protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and will also
+be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned systems. However,
+protection of the force is inherent within the concept of Rapid
+Dominance, and it will rely upon the control of information and the
+enemy's perception of events, stealth being one of the elements
+enabling this control.
+
+
+  Weapons systems
+
+Smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield. Linked
+with information technologies, the combination will allow killing any
+target that can be identified. The main element Rapid Dominance
+requires of weapons systems is the ability to be rapidly focused on
+objectives as identified and targeted by commanders using the
+information management systems already discussed. Commanders will
+require the flexibility to call massive, precision strikes or to
+attack individual, high-priority targets with near zero CEP. This
+implies a mixture of weapons comprised of systems such as those
+mentioned below.
+
+  - Cruise missiles
+  - Zero CEP, long-range cruise missile ("President's weapon")
+  - Stand-off submunition platforms
+  - Smart submunitions
+  - Brilliant submunitions
+  - Wide area smart mines
+  - Long-range and short-range surface attack missiles
+
+
+  Robotic systems
+
+Robotic systems are an important area of consideration within Rapid
+Dominance. First, selected robotic systems will enable the force by
+making it more responsive in concentrating sensors and weapons.
+Second, they will make fighting a 24-hour battle feasible even with
+reduced manpower within the force structure. Third, robotic systems
+can provide force presence even in areas considered too dangerous for
+a large manned element. Finally, since the ultimate operational goal
+of Rapid Dominance is to create shock, one may consider the effect
+that fighting robotic systems may have on the enemy.
+
+In examining the utility of robotic systems within Rapid Dominance,
+one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic systems have not
+lived up to the optimistic expectations placed on them in the past.
+From the overburdening of the Aquilla UAV to the massive and poorly
+planned investment in robotics made by General Motors in the early
+1980s, robotics has been an area of unfulfilled promises. However, the
+reasons for a string of spectacular failures lie more with planners'
+faulty attempts to understand and incorporate the technology than by
+egregious shortcomings of the technology itself. Robots have been seen
+as replacements for manned systems rather than extremely complicated
+and capable machines suitable for a set of tightly defined tasks.
+Robotic systems, or taskable machines as some are beginning to refer
+to them, hold promise for the future simply because they represent the
+intersection of a myriad of fast-moving technology areas such as
+information technologies, communications, microelectronics,
+micro-electromechanical systems, simulation, and computer-aided design
+and manufacturing. In some sense, taskable machines are the physical
+embodiment of information technologies. It may well be that in the
+future the joke will be, "Never send a robot to do a man's job." But
+even so, there will be ample jobs for taskable machines and the
+society that learns to properly design, build, control, and integrate
+these systems into their force structure will gain significant
+advantage over any potential opponent.
+
+
+Conclusion
+
+The technologies and systems presented in this section are not
+extraordinary nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed, entire
+fields such as materials, bioengineering, and microelectronics are
+left for future consideration, although they are of obvious and vital
+importance. Also not addressed here are the training, education, and
+organizational implications required under a regime of Rapid
+Dominance. Given the overriding importance of information collection
+and management, these will need to be addressed across the defense
+community as it is most broadly defined.
+
+Rapid Dominance combines a doctrine and operational concept that
+challenges the current process of how new technologies invented in the
+commercial sector are incorporated into defense, and provides an
+affirmative methodology for research, development, and system
+integration. We must learn to exploit the potential of these
+technologies even though, in many cases, this development process in
+the private sector is profoundly independent from how we conduct the
+business of defense. It is this environment of innovative upheaval
+that any useful foundation for strategic and operational thought must
+address. Rapid Dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this
+rapid and chaotic development of technology.
+
+We believe that what will distinguish Rapid Dominance from other
+doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct to drive
+innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and integrating
+technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently constructed
+systems. Second, it is the comprehensive quality of Rapid Dominance in
+which strategies, doctrine, technology, systems, operations, training,
+organization, and education are dealt with together that may make the
+most significant difference. But, as the reader will discern, specific
+identification and design of Rapid Dominance systems is part of the
+next step.
+
+
+
+
+Future Directions
+
+
+
+At this stage, Rapid Dominance is an intellectual construct based on
+these key points. First, Rapid Dominance has evolved from the
+collective professional, policy, and operational experience of the
+study group covering the last four decades. This experience ran from
+Vietnam to_ Desert Storm_ and from serving with operational units in
+the field to being part of the decision-making process in the Oval
+Office in Washington. It also included immersion in technology and
+systems from thermonuclear weapons to advanced weapons software.
+
+Second, Rapid Dominance seeks to exploit the unique juncture of
+strategy, technology, and innovation created by the end of the Cold
+War and to establish an alternative foundation for military doctrine
+and force structure.
+
+Third, Rapid Dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as
+envisaged by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to overpower or affect the will,
+perception, and understanding of the adversary for strategic aims and
+military objectives. But, in Rapid Dominance, the principal mechanism
+for affecting the adversary's will is through the imposition of a
+regime of Shock and Awe sufficient to achieve the aims of policy. It
+is this relationship with and reliance on Shock and Awe that
+differentiates Rapid Dominance from attrition, maneuver, and other
+military doctrines including overwhelming force.
+
+Shock and Awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and physical
+levels. At one level, destroying an adversary's military force leaving
+the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the necessary Shock and
+Awe. At another level, the certainty of this outcome may cause an
+adversary to accept our terms well short of conflict. In the great
+middle ground, the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause the
+perception and anticipation of certain defeat and the threat and fear
+of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or
+render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical
+destruction.
+
+Finally, in order to impose enough Shock and Awe to affect an
+adversary's will, four core characteristics of a Rapid Dominance-
+configured force were defined. First, complete knowledge and
+understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the environment are
+essential. This knowledge and understanding exceed the expectations of
+dominant battlefield awareness and DBA becomes a subset of Rapid
+Dominance.
+
+Rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is only
+familiar with a particular company and not the stock market in
+general, the Rapid Dominance force must have complete knowledge and
+understanding of many likely adversaries and regions. This requirement
+for knowledge and understanding will place a huge, new burden on the
+military forces and necessitate fundamental changes in policy,
+organization, training, education, structure, and equipage.
+
+Second is rapidity. Rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and agility
+and the ability to sustain control after the initial shock. Rapidity
+enables us to act as quickly as needed and always more quickly than
+the adversary can react or take counter-actions. Rapidity is also an
+antidote to surprise. If we cannot anticipate surprise, or are
+surprised, rapidity provides a correcting capacity to neutralize the
+effects of that surprise.
+
+Third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of operations
+and execution in terms of brilliance. The consequences and
+implications of setting brilliance as the standard and achieving it
+are profound. Reconfiguration of command authority and organization
+possibly to decentrali-zation down to individual troops must follow.
+Allowing and encouraging an operational doctrine of the "first to
+respond" will set the tempo provided that effective de-confliction of
+friendly on friendly engagements has been assured.
+
+This, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, training,
+and organization will be required. The matter is not just "fighting
+smarter." It is learning to fight at even higher standards of skill
+and competence.
+
+Fourth is control of the environment. Control is defined in the
+broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and space and
+control of the "ether" in which information is passed and received.
+This requires signature management throughout the full conflict
+spectrum-deception, disinformation, verification, information control,
+and target management-all with rapidity in both physical and
+psychological impact. By depriving an adversary of the physical use of
+time, space, and the ether, we play on the adversary's will and offer
+the prospect of certain destruction should resistance follow.
+
+The next step in this process must be specifically defining this Rapid
+Dominance force in terms of force structure, capabilities, doctrine,
+organization, and order of battle. We have begun this effort and are
+focusing on a joint task force sized somewhere between a reinforced
+division and a full corps (i.e., a strength of 75,000 - 200,000). We
+also have the aim of being able to deploy this force within 5 to 10
+days of the order to move and, of course, will be able to send smaller
+force packages on a nearly instantaneous basis. We appreciate the
+mobility and logistical implications of this requirement.
+
+Once we design this "paper" force and equip it with "paper" systems,
+we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and tests we
+noted in the Prologue.
+
+The first test of this Rapid Dominance force will be against the MRC.
+The comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the programmed
+force and whatever emerges from the Quadrennial Defense Review of
+1997. We will need to examine closely how and where and why Rapid
+Dominance and Shock and Awe work and where they do not. At the very
+least, we expect that this will help strengthen the current force and
+improve current capabilities. Of course, it is our hope that this test
+will validate Rapid Dominance as a legitimate doctrine.
+
+Second, the Rapid Dominance force must be tested across the entire
+spectrum of OOTW. These are the most difficult tests because, in some
+of them, no force may be suitable and no force may work.
+
+Third, the test of determining the political consequences of Rapid
+Dominance must be conducted. On one hand, if this force capability can
+be achieved and Shock and Awe administered to affect an adversary's
+will, can a form of political deterrence be created? In the most
+approximate sense, and we emphasize approximate, the analogy with
+nuclear deterrence might be drawn. An adversary may be persuaded or
+deterred from taking action in the first instance. On the other hand,
+this capacity may be seen as politically unusable and allies and
+others within the United States may not be fully trusting of the
+possessor always to employ this force responsibly.
+
+Fourth is the test of the implications of Rapid Dominance for
+alliances and for waging coalition warfare. Our allies are already
+concerned that the United States is leaving them far behind in
+military technology and capability. If we possess this force and our
+allies or partners do not, how do we fight together? Our view is that
+this can be worked out through technology sharing and perhaps new
+divisions of labor and mission specialization. However, these are
+important points to be considered.
+
+Finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in defense?
+
+It is also likely that because Rapid Dominance will cause profound
+consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy will make a
+fair examination difficult. It is no accident that other attempts at
+change, especially those that ask for or are tainted with reform, have
+had a short life span. It is interesting to note in this regard that
+the President's Commission on Intelligence and its fine report that
+recommended changes and refinements to the U.S. intelligence
+community, despite a very positive initial reception, led to only a
+few meaningful actions.
+
+This discussion leads to two final points. We are all too well aware
+that any strategy and force structure have vulnerabilities and
+potential weaknesses. The experiences that this study group
+collectively had in Vietnam makes this concern very strongly held. We
+observe that in the private sector, the vulnerability of information
+systems is real and is being exploited. A former director of the FBI
+has told us that in New York, for example, the number one recruiting
+target for organized crime is the teenage computer whiz. We think that
+this "hacking," writ large in the private sector, must be assumed as
+part of the defense problem. Hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities
+must be even greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the Cold
+War, because exploitation can come from many more sources in the
+future.
+
+Second, wags may criticize Rapid Dominance as attempting to create a
+"Mission Impossible Force." To be sure, we emphasize and demand
+brilliance as the operational goal. However, we also know that the
+military today is seen as a leading example of the best American
+society has to offer. We wish to build on this reality. We note the
+experience and the performance, albeit under highly unusual
+circumstances, of_ Desert Storm_. We see no reason why that level of
+performance cannot be made a permanent part of the fabric of the
+American military.
+
+Because we have entered a period of transition in which we enjoy a
+dominant military position and a greatly reduced window of
+vulnerability, this is the right time for experimentation and
+demonstration. Rapid Dominance is still a concept and a work in
+progress, not a final road map or blueprint. But the concept does
+warrant, in our view, a commitment to explore and an opportunity that
+could lead to dramatically better capabilities.
+
+We believe that through Rapid Dominance and the commitment to examine
+the entire range of defense across all components and aspects, a
+revolution is possible. If Rapid Dominance can be harnessed in an
+affordable and efficient way and an operational capability fielded to
+impose sufficient Shock and Awe to affect an adversary's will, then
+this will be the real Revolution in Military Affairs. We ask those who
+are intrigued by this prospect to join us.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix A
+
+Thoughts on Rapid Dominance
+by Admiral Bud Edney, USN (Ret.)
+
+
+
+Why the need for a concept of Rapid Dominance? The answer lies in the
+combined realities of modern technology, economics, and politics.
+
+
+Technology
+
+The evolution or revolution of information technology is impacting
+everything we do and how we do it on a worldwide basis. The
+far-reaching effects of the resulting information highway that crosses
+all boundaries are already impacting the strategic decisions,
+economics, and politics of the world of nation states. Borders are no
+defense for the penetration of information even in highly controlled
+or authoritarian societies. Similarly, the exploration and use of high
+technology in space, together with the advent of sophisticated highly
+accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, means borders between states
+are not as important for strategic and impenetrable defenses in depth
+as they used to be. The rapid advancements in telecommunications
+technology, combined with the exploration and use of space vehicles to
+saturate a world hungry for information, means that leaders can no
+longer shield their people from the outside world. Thus information
+will penetrate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile
+attempt to block it out. New centers of gravity are being created as
+are new vulnerability choke points. The country or power structure
+that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the information
+revolution as it applies to issues of national security will remain in
+control of its own destiny. The United States possesses a qualitative
+and quantitative lead that, when combined with a properly focused and
+coordinated (harmonized) industry, defense, and national security
+policy, should ensure success for the foreseeable future. Harnessing
+information technology and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal
+thought in application of military force is the essence of Rapid
+Dominance.
+
+
+Economics
+
+With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union,
+there is no major power capable of destroying the U.S. mainland. Given
+this absence of devastating threat, defense expenditures will continue
+to be squeezed to address more pressing domestic priorities. Voter
+demands for a balanced budget, national health care, social security
+reform, educational reform, family values, crime and drug use
+reduction, lower taxes, etc., will combine to put increasing pressure
+on the defense bottom line in the out years. The result will be a
+steady decline in war fighting readiness and force structure that will
+place our security interests at risk unless we leverage our technology
+leadership to achieve military advantage with lower force levels but
+increased war fighting effectiveness. This is also the essence of
+Rapid Dominance.
+
+
+Politics
+
+The reality of current politics is that the trauma of Vietnam, the
+results of the Gulf War, and our status as the only remaining
+superpower after the Cold War equate to some new constraints (real or
+perceived) on the application of military force to support our foreign
+policy. These political sensitivities need to be understood up front
+and include the following:
+
+  - The U.S. is not the world's policeman
+  - Involvement of U.S. Forces must be justified as essential to vital
+    U.S. security interests
+  - Support of Congress and People is a necessary prerequisite
+  - Avoid commitment of ground forces
+  - Offer instead U.S. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, logistics
+    support, etc.
+  - Avoid risk of loss of U.S. lives at almost all costs
+  - Ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned
+  - Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to defend themselves
+    aggressively
+  - Minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage
+  - Specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end in the
+    not-too-distant future sight before committing
+  - U.S. led coalition force preferred-U.S. Forces remain under U.S.
+    Command. These political restraints may limit the application of
+    Rapid Dominance to Major and Minor Regional Conflicts. This is an
+    issue that needs further exploration and analysis.
+
+
+What is Rapid Dominance?
+
+Rapid Dominance is the full use of capabilities within a system of
+systems that can decisively impact events requiring the application of
+military/defense resources through affecting the adversary's will.
+Rapid Dominance envisions execution in real or near real time to
+counter actions or intentions deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. On
+one end of the spectrum, Rapid Dominance would introduce a regime of
+Shock and Awe in areas of high value to the threatening individual,
+group, or state. In many cases the prior knowledge of credible U.S.
+Rapid Dominance capabilities would act as a deterrent. Rapid Dominance
+would ensure favorable early resolution of issues at minimal loss of
+lives and collateral damage. The concept ideally should be able to
+impact adversarial situations that apply across the board, addressing
+high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology threats. Some of these aims may
+not be achievable given the political and technology constraints, but
+need to be explored.
+
+Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting
+capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated,
+interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence,
+surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, and data
+analysis to deliver in real time, actionable information to the
+shooter. This network must provide total situational awareness and
+nodal analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's
+decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe
+among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this
+grid of knowledge and vulnerability will enable the shutting down of
+specific or all essential functions nearly simultaneously. We expect
+that through these netted pieces of data, often, the sum of the parts
+will yield profound battlefield advantages to the possessor. The
+"Rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real time
+actionable targeting information to the shooter, whether the shooter
+is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery battery, an
+individual rifleman, a naval battle group, an individual ship, an air
+wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. At whatever unit level, Shock
+and Awe are magnified by the speed and effectiveness of targeting. The
+ability to achieve Rapid Dominance simultaneously throughout the
+battlefield will create strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing
+forces, their leadership, and society. When the video results of these
+attacks are broadcast real time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact
+on coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support
+can be decisive.
+
+The top priority of Rapid Dominance should be to deter, alter, or
+affect those actions that are either unacceptable to U.S. national
+security interests or endanger the democratic community of states and
+access to free markets. These political objectives are generally those
+envisioned in the major and lesser regional conflict scenarios (MRC &
+LRC). Should deterrence fail, the application of Rapid Dominance
+should create sufficient Shock and Awe to intimidate the enemy forces
+and leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential
+aggressors. Rapid Dominance would not be limited to MRC and LRC
+scenarios. It has application in a variety of areas, including
+countering WMD, terrorism, and other political problems. The challenge
+is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on
+Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat yet decisive enough
+to convey the appropriate degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance
+cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. It initially
+appears that Rapid Dominance should be applied sparingly for egregious
+threats or violations of international law, such as:
+
+  - Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state
+  - Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD
+  - Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale
+  - Threat to essential world markets
+
+Clearly the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and
+penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and
+benefits in closed societies are becoming known to both the public as
+well as the bosses. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop
+sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and
+create road blocks as well as control input/outputs to the highway
+both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept.
+
+These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting
+international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer
+interagency cooperation and coordination between military and law
+enforcement activities and capabilities must be established.
+Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed
+considerable cultural differences between these organizations.
+Overcoming these cultural differences is not easy. The required trust
+and confidence for sharing sensitive information and support between
+these agencies and the military needs to be developed further.
+Interagency coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level
+of sophistication. Some laws may need to be changed. War in Cyberspace
+does not recognize domestic versus foreign boundaries. In this
+environment the subjects of Information Warfare and Information In
+Warfare take on new meaning and require focused development. We must
+become proficient within this environment.
+
+This breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal more
+thought with regard to the issues of security, vulnerabilities
+(their's and our's), and the concept of Rapid Dominance. Does Rapid
+Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the spectrum,
+involving more traditional applications of force to achieve political
+objectives as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet to be
+explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance applies
+to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. interests, controlling
+rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the political and military
+prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable and
+realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of
+national governments/law enforcement organizations and international
+as well as local private venture or non-government organizations
+(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care
+to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of
+Rapid Dominance offend and generate a counterproductive public
+relations backlash from those who believe force should only be used as
+a last resort and then with a measurable degree of proportionality?
+
+At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be
+addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and
+issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front
+during the concept development phase of the development of specific
+Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be careful that we do not
+overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable
+capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance does not eliminate
+the fog of war. Decisions will still be made on the leader's judgment
+and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat
+intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence
+in our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the
+ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance.
+Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly
+defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the world's only credible
+superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role, but neither can
+it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. We are in the
+classical "damned if we do and damned if we don't" syndrome. One of the
+serious side effects of Rapid Dominance could be that if you adapt a
+strategy of Rapid Dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem
+and be responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to
+such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if
+Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less than of vital
+interest? This subject needs further development beyond the limitations
+of this book.
+
+
+Rapid Dominance and The Future Battlefield
+
+What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The _Desert
+Storm_ conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real focus
+of battle will no longer be force on force as we have traditionally
+considered it. By the time the Allied Forces engaged the opposing Iraq
+forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes had already been
+demoralized and smashed. This was accomplished by establishing air
+superiority followed by a carefully orchestrated campaign of precision
+air strikes (including Tomahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces
+were isolated by cutting off logistic support, severing communications
+with its leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe achieved
+by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the open desert.
+Shock and awe were introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft
+penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center of
+gravity targets with impunity. Shock and awe were also present in the
+degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly
+maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and
+unforgiving for the predominantly U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin
+Powell noted, the Coalition Forces cut off the head and life lines to
+the Iraqi Army in the field and then set about killing it. The fact
+that a democratically led coalition could choose not to massacre the
+remnants of Iraq's army during its panic-induced retreat underscores
+that we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint. The
+impact of real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed
+simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living rooms
+worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the battlefield and
+further highlighted the compassion of that decision. In dealing with a
+"butcher" we could not fall to that level.
+
+The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile box
+where you will know everything that is going on inside the box
+(although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The
+battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that
+controls or influences the elements of the battle. In examining this
+battlefield and the application of force and Shock and Awe, we seek to
+mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous firepower on critical
+nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than
+necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one
+another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised warfare to a new level with the
+demonstrated effectiveness and application of air to ground/water and
+surface to ground/water launched precision guided weapons. No longer
+will commanders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but
+rather targets destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an issue
+of affordability here. We may not be able to get 1) high tech, 2)
+MRC/OOTW, and 3) large armies. This does not eliminate the requirement
+for sufficient force in the field to defend against an all-out assault
+or eject another force and occupy the contested land to ensure the
+objectives of conflict are carried out. Air power can punish,
+simultaneously destroy center of gravity targets, and so demoralize
+the opposing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with
+smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air
+campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict before the land
+campaign is necessary. This is more likely against a modernized,
+developed state than an underdeveloped government.
+
+The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of
+stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon
+targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology, space
+relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from space, the
+introduction of JSTARS, and massive application of night vision
+techniques, are the first phase of these changes. With elements of
+this technology now more and more on the open market to whomever has
+the cash or friends, the advantage of obtaining greater situational
+awareness and real-time processing of available data cannot be taken
+for granted.
+
+In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that
+political and military decision making will have to establish close
+control of the actionable information distributed to shooters in the
+field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli forces that had air
+superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely accurate firepower
+capabilities in the most recent incursion into Southern Lebanon
+against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with an artillery
+barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired from close to a known UN
+encampment. When this artillery response resulted in killing more than
+100 refugees fleeing the Israeli operation, the result was a public
+relations disaster and mission failure for the stated limited Israeli
+objectives. This represents a case of ill-conceived application of
+Rapid Dominance that resulted in counter-productive Shock and Awe
+generating adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was
+also a case of applying high technology and state controlled Rapid
+Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. Clearly
+the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this exchange. The
+lessons learned from this tragic incident as well as the applicability
+of Rapid Dominance techniques in this environment need further study.
+The massing and movement of refugees in large numbers is a reality and
+a planning factor that must be dealt with up front. The fact that the
+value of life itself is viewed differently by warring factions must
+also be considered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield
+and the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to
+achieve Rapid Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules
+of engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may not always be
+the right tactic and an escalation of targeting different centers of
+gravity rather than responding directly to events in the field
+promises to be more effective. The theory of Rapid Dominance clearly
+needs further development, gaming, and simulation. Each decision to
+apply Rapid Dominance will be unique, complex, risky, and different
+than the previous one. Knowledge and information on the battlefield as
+well as that concerning center of gravity targets will be incomplete
+even with a goal of total situational awareness.
+
+
+Instruments to Achieve Shock and Awe
+
+Shock and awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and destruction
+that are incompre-hensible to the people at large, specific
+elements/sectors of the threat society, or the leadership. Nature in
+the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled
+fires, famine, and disease can engender Shock and Awe. The ultimate
+military application of Shock and Awe was the use of two atomic
+weapons against Japan in WWII. The Shock and Awe that resulted from
+the use of these weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war
+with Japan (through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the
+further use of these weapons for over 50 years. Not unexpectedly,
+these events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the
+destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. The holocaust
+was a state policy of Shock and Awe that stunned the world in its
+brutality and inhumanity. Yet it has not deterred the world from
+executing or tolerating atrocities of equal brutality and inhumanity
+(Cambodia, Syria, Rwanda, etc.). Similar applications of Shock and Awe
+have differing toleration levels and impacts depending on the
+environment and political system against which it is applied. As an
+example, the massive bombing raids of WWII by Germany and the U.S. did
+not result in a sufficient level of Shock and Awe to end the fighting.
+The fear of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather than
+their actual destruction was the deciding factor in that theater. The
+B-52 raids in Vietnam provided localized elements of Shock and Awe,
+but until applied to the capital city of Hanoi, had no impact toward
+war termination. When applied in concentrated repetitive strikes in
+November/December of 1972 under _Operation Rolling Thunder III_, the
+cease fire followed in short order. In fact, throughout history there
+have been weapons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of
+Shock and Awe. While there has always been shock, awe, and fear
+associated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused and
+great enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under favorable terms
+is not certain. How to apply elements of Shock and Awe against rogue
+states, terrorist elements, international drug and crime cartels, as
+well as in the more traditional MRCs and LRCs needs much further study
+and analysis. Shock and awe, to reach the level required to achieve
+Rapid Dominance, must also bring fear to those who are in charge. It
+must be applied quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity
+(such as stealth bombing with air superiority). The element of
+impunity, that is the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a
+key element of this strategy. If on the other hand attacks are
+directed at the general public a backlash could be unleased because of
+the excessive and brutal losses of innocent civilians.
+
+Much more study and analysis is needed to identify and examine the
+pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of Shock and Awe
+for limited objectives rather than responds in kind to a provocation.
+What are the limits of the doctrine of Shock and Awe? What
+circumstances merit the application? Can Shock and Awe be used to
+achieve limited objectives with little or no risk of life to allied
+forces or innocent civilians? Can true center of gravity targets be
+identified for ideological/terrorist groups? Can levels of Shock and
+Awe be categorized by effectiveness and priority of weapons systems?
+If so, what are the key enabling technologies? What types of Shock and
+Awe would be both impressive and generate high returns? A few
+desirable capabilities from a former CINC's perspective are listed
+below:
+
+  - Blow up an entire mine field simultaneously in its entirety
+    immediately after it had been laid.
+  - Destroy the mine laden mine-laying vehicles at their loading
+    point.
+  - Destroy in real time terrorist training camps or publicity
+    generating threats such as the recent display of 70 bomb laden
+    suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc worldwide. (This
+    probably requires inside penetration of the targeted
+    organization).
+  - Destroy simultaneously all/selective WMD launchers,
+    storage/production facilities of a rogue state.
+  - Selectively target rogue terrorist leaders as was apparently done
+    by the Russians in Chechnya recently when they killed the top
+    rebel leader by detecting and homing in on his satellite phone
+    conversation (helicopter rocket attack).
+  - Stop, divert, capture the cash flow to terrorist elements.
+
+
+Thoughts on Applications of Shock and Awe
+
+It is the use of Shock and Awe to achieve Rapid Dominance that is so
+fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage if it can be
+harnessed in a variety of situations. This basis for Rapid Dominance
+requires a clearer under-standing of what our end objectives are than
+we usually have when we stumble into the use of military force, often
+it seems by default and at the last possible minute. At this point, I
+have more questions than answers. How does Rapid Dominance differ by
+the goals and missions assigned? What are the key elements to apply
+Rapid Dominance for each envisioned threat? What are the most likely
+threats for the next 20 years? Is Rapid Dominance applicable to all
+these threats? Can we separate Rapid Dominance into categories with
+and without Shock and Awe?
+
+In addition to answering these and other questions, it seems to me it
+would be helpful to generate a list of desirable capabilities that
+would help me select a response option. This list of capabilities
+would be useful to focus (1) scarce R&D dollars to fill in the holes
+with technology, (2) intelligence and surveillance collection
+priorities, (3) innovative thought to further develop the concept (War
+College papers and Wargaming series), and (4) development of CINC
+plans and requirements to meet these capabilities. Examples of such
+capabilities are:
+
+  - Deploying highly effective TBMD and Cruise Missile Defense.
+  - Severing all/selective communications between leadership and field
+    as well as selective elements by call in the field.
+  - Intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective threat
+    field units.
+  - Projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat scopes.
+  - Inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities that generates
+    engine failures.
+  - Inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on key
+    threat systems.
+  - Identifying specific location and determining strength and
+    material of protected targets of value.
+  - Developing dial a setting ordnance capable of destroying all
+    hardened targets.
+  - Detecting and tracting (destroying at will) all targets of value
+    including mobile targets.
+  - Detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before launch.
+  - Detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed mine
+    field (land & sea).
+  - Making threat submarine movements transparent to targeting at
+    will.
+
+Obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored to the
+limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and affordability. This
+may not even be the right type of capabilities one might want. That
+is, we may need a totally non-standard list. My judgment is that we
+should develop one or two black "silver bullet" capabilities, if we
+get too far afield, the system will not be able to digest the
+recommendations. However, the concept of Rapid Dominance requires
+stepping to a new level of getting inside the opposition's decision
+loop. Rapid Dominance at the ultimate level would enable stopping,
+diverting, or changing the decision process and decision executing
+machinery/systems either preemptively or reactively in time to ensure
+core U.S. security requirements are met.
+
+
+Rapid Dominance Infrastructure
+
+The current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition reform
+is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities necessary to
+implement a Rapid Dominance strategy. I would like to reserve comments
+in this area until the project is further developed. We do not need to
+raise reasons to discard the concept as too hard before it is
+sufficiently defined. I have the feeling that bringing these
+conceptual capabilities to realities within a system of systems is
+neither cheap nor easy. There is still too much waste and inefficiency
+in our defense acquisition process as well as in the overlap between
+service requirements and capabilities. Rapid Dominance will not be
+service-unique and requires a synergistic approach from planning to
+execution.
+
+
+Final Thoughts
+
+The implications of the ongoing revolution in telecommunications and
+information processing as it applies to our national security
+interests dictate that we need new imaginative concepts of operation
+to ensure the efficacy of our international leadership in a multipolar
+world. With technology upgrading capabilities by factors of 10 or more
+every 18 months, we can no longer afford to have concepts of
+operations wait for the technology to reach the field. The concept of
+Rapid Dominance requires innovative thought and different directions
+than that imbedded in our military hierarchy. We need to introduce the
+concept at all levels of military professional education and training.
+The best results of this effort will be generated from the younger
+minds brought up on the leading edge of the information revolution.
+The challenge is to engage those minds in the solution and to take the
+risks required to fund priorities enabling the development of this
+capability now. Such a cultural change is not easy. One thing is
+certain-business as usual will not get us there. The window of
+opportunity will close faster than we think.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix B
+
+Defense Alternatives: Forces Required
+by General Chuck Horner, USAF (Ret.)
+
+
+
+The end of the Cold War will require a review of United States
+National Security Policy and a concomitant change in our National
+Defense Strategy. This strategy will respond to the changes in the
+world's security environment, including the dissolution of the Soviet
+Union and Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security alliances such
+as NATO and NORAD, the increased and unique threat posed by the
+proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the widening of the
+spectrum of conflict which will challenge the peace and security of
+our nation and its allies.
+
+The causes of conflict and the modes which threats to our security
+interests will take have multiplied with the end of the Cold War. The
+nuclear weapons of the Cold War remain and will remain for some
+considerable time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to
+the declining utility of these devices. For sure there will be
+continuing pressure throughout the world to eliminate the presence of
+nuclear weapons in conjunction with efforts to halt the production,
+stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and biological weapons. It is
+likely that START II will be followed by START III and IV, as nations
+who claim ownership of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a high
+cost and marginal payoff. However, progress will be slow due to the
+immense importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament
+and the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated with the
+disarmament process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future the threat
+of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be less likely
+than before. The spectrum of national security challenges will expand
+as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides.
+
+The decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over Iraq during
+_Desert Storm_ should give future aggressors of major regional
+conflict cause to pause. While this does not mean that the threat of
+conventional warfare has vanished, it does mean that the national
+leader intending to use major conflict to achieve political aims must
+carefully craft strategy that will avoid the opportunity for
+confrontation with a large coalition force lead by the United States.
+Such a strategy might include surprise attack; short intense military
+action; the threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical
+weapons; advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions; and
+warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes attacks
+on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic missiles or
+unconventional warfare forces. This will be warfare for which the
+United States is ill trained and ill equipped.
+
+Other challenges to the world's security will take many forms to which
+the military forces of the United States can play a constructive role.
+These are commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War, even
+though they may include the use of force to achieve desired political
+goals. They include the increasingly familiar peacemaking,
+peacekeeping, show of force, and humanitarian relief efforts. Success
+in these operations may well require retraining, re-equipping, or
+reorganizing our military forces. Each mission should be evaluated
+with respect to what is required to accomplish its unique challenges.
+However, the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military
+forces should be based on what is required to fight the residual Cold
+War, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major regional
+conflict.
+
+The political goals upon which our national security strategy should
+be crafted are fairly straightforward. First, we should seek to
+preserve and invigorate the role of leadership the United States has
+maintained since the end of World War II, or the end of the Cold War
+(you take your pick). Second, and not apart from the first goal, the
+United States must be sufficiently strong to prevent or deter use of
+effective military power against us. It is not inconceivable that our
+so-called superpower status could be defeated in battle by a crafty
+and well-prepared adversary. Witness what happened to the powerful
+victors of WWII in Vietnam. Third, U.S. military forces must be of
+sufficient size, configuration, and readiness to bring a major
+conventional conflict to a successful termination. It goes without
+saying that during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to
+numbers that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world.
+Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. Fourth and
+lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to all the
+other tasks and functions for which the national command authority
+calls upon the military. This first of challenges should be used to
+define the military forces we field, how we train them, and the
+methods we use to employ them.
+
+The strategic geographic depth the United States enjoys, bounded by
+two oceans on the east and west and non-threatening nations to the
+north and south, means that our nation is somewhat immune from attack,
+other than by means of infiltration such as a terrorist, or from the
+skies by means of long-range aircraft, and cruise or ballistic
+missiles. We will require some actions and defenses which address
+these threats, but the major portion of our national defense effort
+must be placed on building and sustaining offensive forces for combat
+in environments other than our own soil. This dictates that our
+projection forces must be capable of rapidly responding to an
+unforeseen crisis anywhere in the world, keeping in mind that quick,
+decisive surprise favors our potential enemies. Given that we have
+proven unable to predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these
+forces must also be ready at all times to carry out combat operations
+in most any place. There will not be time to modernize their equipment
+or train reserve force units. They must be capable of projecting and
+sustaining their military power over long distances and operating in
+the environment of the enemy's choosing. Last but not least, when
+required, they must be capable of decisive combat, not by attrition of
+the enemy force in head-to-head combat as was our nature in past wars,
+but by Shock and Awe so that conflict resolution is achieved with a
+maximum of success at the minimum loss of life in the shortest time.
+These characteristics for our projection force cannot be achieved
+easily, as the processes that defined our Cold War doctrines, force
+structures, equipment, and ways of doing business are loath to change.
+
+The Services' and joint requirements oversight processes that define
+the equipment provided our military forces place emphasis on force
+structure and the traditional roles for those forces. This inertia can
+freeze our land, sea, air, and space capabilities at current or near
+current levels, but may prove inadequate to carry out new strategies.
+There are few incentives for a Service or the Joint Staff to reward
+innovation or divestiture of roles or missions in order to change the
+character and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare
+them to fight the battles we must envisage for the twenty-first
+century.
+
+For example, the Services claim lessons learned from _Desert Storm_
+which reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and ignore the
+troublesome aspects which loom in the future and threaten our
+traditional view of the battlefield. Many acclaim the role of
+precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the threat they pose if
+they are in the hands of the enemy. What would be the lessons learned
+if several hundred canisters of live Sensor Fused Weapons were
+released by a red force ballistic missile on the 24th Division during
+a Fort Irwin engagement? Certainly there would be profound changes in
+tactics, doctrine, and equipment indicated for the surviving U.S. Army
+force. What if radar homing Surface to Air Missiles were employed by
+the red force during a Red Flag exercise in the Nevada desert, not
+using centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using
+decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would be used
+by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stagnant doctrines?
+I doubt that the Air Force would be spending millions of dollars
+trying to build electronic countermeasures to hide the large number of
+expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft they continue to build, such
+as the F-15E.
+
+Imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile were
+actually allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson aircraft
+carrier during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the attendant loss
+of life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range. You would think the
+maritime force would reexamine the method it provides air power from
+the sea, vital yet today too vulnerable.
+
+How many times do we hear that the space forces are configured to
+provide intelligence from overhead only to find in Iraq or Bosnia that
+the front line forces receive products that are old, inaccurate and
+altered to keep our Soviet foes from gaining knowledge of our
+capabilities? Perhaps we if we would dual hat the Director of the
+Central Intelligence Agency to the position of J-2, or even
+Commander-in-Chief of a regional unified command, there would be vast
+improvements in the tasking, evaluation, and delivery of space-derived
+intelligence to regional combat forces. Then we might see full
+understanding of the increasing role of space forces and implement
+change to make them more relevant to our national security strategies
+of the next century. Innovation, not size, must be sought because we
+do not have the resources to do both. Moreover, large forces drive our
+operational level strategy to force-on-force engagements in the
+attrition warfare model of the last century with its attendant
+causalities and destruction of equipment. George Patton's dictum still
+stands that directed his troops not to die for their country, but to
+get the other SOB to die for his.
+
+Military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and
+destruction. The ever-present television camera ensures that the
+horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. War's immorality should some
+day lead to its banishment. Unfortunately, that day is probably a long
+way away. Nonetheless, weapons of war and their employment tactics
+must minimize death and destruction. This is not a call for non-lethal
+weapons; it is a call for military forces to get right to the heart of
+the enemy and conclude operations as rapidly and efficiently as they
+possibly can given their equipment, training, and doctrine. This means
+there must be wide flexibility in how they may function. Military
+operations will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand
+flexibility. Modern war will require our military leadership to
+navigate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and ever
+changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. We must make our
+forces capable of dampening the capacity of the enemy to use force by
+controlling the conflict rapidly even when surprised. We failed to do
+that tactically in _Desert Storm_ in the case of the SCUD missile
+attacks, but were fortunate that the Iraqis were equally inept at
+taking political advantage of this card they held and skillfully
+employed on the battlefield. We must also look for efficiency before
+we even join in battle.
+
+Defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays since
+the end of the Cold War. Given the leadership role the United States
+plays in the world, one could think a reasonable sum to devote to
+defense might be three percent of our gross national product,
+certainly an amount much smaller than what an average family expends
+for its security by means of life, health, causality, car, medical
+insurance, and retirement benefits. Given the prospect of long-term,
+constant funding, the Department of Defense could then give more
+thought to how to build the most modern, efficient military force
+within the dollars available. We would no longer define our forces
+against some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus to
+protect force size rather than quality. The Army, Navy, Air Force,
+Marine Corps, and space forces would be required to build a team based
+on a salary cap. You might be willing to pay big bucks for a B-2
+superstar quarterback, but you will also need lower cost and capable
+riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle. Most of all, you would
+reward the Service or Agency who would innovate to provide efficiency.
+
+Manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer military
+force. Investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite might be
+high, but it is the operations and maintenance costs that will drive
+how much resources we are required to expend to gain and maintain a
+given military capability. Again turning to _Desert Storm_, the huge
+advantages of overflight precision munitions dropped from stealth
+aircraft has not been understood or accepted by the operations
+analysts who argue what we should build or buy next. If it had been,
+would the Navy have allowed the A-12 program to fail, would the Air
+Force be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions of
+dollars into equipping forty year old B-52s with conventional
+missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy divisions at a
+personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership? Why not build
+a Division force equivalent using technology and doctrine to provide a
+"heavy division equivalent" force using far fewer troops featuring
+speed, shock, precision fire while avoiding the manpower costs of
+dollars that in peacetime include added costs for recruitment,
+training, and sustaining and in war have an even greater added cost
+computed in blood? Why don't we do this? The answer is because it
+would require rare innovation, trust, and support from the equally
+intransigent federal funding authorities. Most importantly, the
+Services are not rewarded for innovation which recognizes the
+contributions of another Service or Ally.
+
+Jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel must
+worship even if they don't understand or believe. Defenders of the
+status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or redundancy and
+these arguments have some validity. The question becomes how much
+overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, and space forces can the
+nation afford, and what is the opportunity cost to the core competency
+of the land, sea, air, or space force that builds and/or maintains the
+duplicative force structure. A second yet vastly different question
+arises when considering the unique capabilities a Service provides to
+support itself and the other services. For example, how much the Air
+Force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of what the
+envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day, to support
+the mythical scenarios. The alternative sea, land, and space lift
+requirements can be postulated; however, if the Navy, Army, or Air
+Force do not satisfy those sea, land, and space lift requirement, then
+there is a shortfall which will in turn generate a need for more
+airlift!
+
+During _Desert Storm_, nearly 90 percent of the deployed equipment
+arrived by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis had continued their
+first attack in August. A majority of overland movement was provided
+by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and the Army had neither
+the resources nor the responsiveness to activate reserve forces needed
+to meet the truck and rail support requirements of our military
+forces. As a result, costly airlift was used to move forces that
+should have traveled by land and sea. If added space capabilities had
+been needed, there was almost no capability for the timely launch of a
+satellite. Would it not be wise to index spending on land, sea, air,
+and space launch on one and other, postulate lift requirements on what
+the new force needs as it innovates and slims down. The need to
+respond on a moment's notice adds to the value of airlift and
+prepositioned ships. The outcome though would be not to allow any of
+the Services to divert general support money into core competencies
+and thereby shift the jointness burden to another Service.
+
+Innovate. Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly the
+fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded. Accept
+the benefits of Federal Express that can be federalized during times
+of national emergency as a costly, but ready augmentation to military
+supply lines that has no cost during the much longer periods of
+peacetime. Our nation has other industrial capacities that also have
+duplicate military capabilities. They may be 80 percent solutions, but
+the cost of ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance of a
+military owned and operated 100 percent solution. Iridium telephones
+may not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent of the time they
+will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost. Of course, this
+avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our medieval
+acquisition system.
+
+Finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that will
+assure the future force capability will be enduring. We cannot keep up
+with technology using our current ways of acquiring military hardware
+and training our people in how to use and maintain it. In many areas
+we would be better off to throw it away when it breaks given the low
+cost, durability, and reliability of modern solid state electronics.
+Why train technicians? Give the troops a gold card and a telephone
+number and they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our
+government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do buy not only
+integrates with that of other services and functions, but that it can
+integrate with both older and newer equipment designated to do the
+same function. The fighter aircraft secure radio must be capable of
+communicating with the ground and sea based forces command and
+control, as importantly it must be able to communicate with the next
+generation fighter aircraft radio.
+
+The added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to fight
+alone in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from forming
+coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force structure we
+maintain in declining budget years. An enduring force must also
+recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively with the forces of
+other nations. This means we must more freely release our technologies
+to foreign nations so that our military forces can fight side by side,
+so that our deployment forces can draw from stocks of others while our
+logistics system seeks to catch up with the rapidly deployed combat
+force.
+
+In the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our
+military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal change in
+the policy side of the equation. What good are highly trained,
+efficient, capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the
+implementing authorities are incapable of defining principles, goals,
+and integrating strategies for their employment? While this is not the
+province of the military to solve, the military must understand how
+disjointed policy, weak political leadership, or dysfunctional
+international cooperation will preclude success on the battlefield.
+
+Again, one of the missed lessons of _Desert Storm_ was the difficult
+and successful integration of international leadership achieved by the
+President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
+Staff, Congressional leaders, and allied National Command Authorities
+as well as many others. It was this leadership, coupled with the
+ineptness of the enemy, that covered over the failures of our Cold
+War-equipped and trained forces that fought _Desert Storm_. This does
+not take anything away from the military victory, but it does make it
+difficult to glean the right lessons for the future. Perhaps that is
+why we are so loathe to change our forces at a time when change is
+demanded by a new strategic environment and new threats to our
+national security. Defining alternative forces in light of the changed
+national security environment, goals and strategy raises two
+questions: what kind or mix of military force and how much best
+balances the requirements and funds available.
+
+
+Deep Strike: A Key to Shock and Awe
+
+In the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases, all
+initial responses to combat operations will be some form of deep
+strike. Given strategic warning (don't bet on it) after deployment of
+our military forces, Deep Strike is a term that relates to the
+political boundaries or proximity to military forces. The geography of
+the area of conflict will further define deep strike. But a rule of
+thumb might be attacks on a target beyond range of surface-based fires
+except for ballistic or cruise missiles. More important than range is
+the characteristics of the Deep Strike targets. Deep Strike targets
+could be classified as ones the enemy does not wish to place at high
+levels of risk. They can be characterized by the functions they
+perform, such as:
+
+  - Leadership
+  - Command and Control (a function of leadership)
+  - Control of Military Forces, especially air and space
+  - Logistics and Sustainment
+  - National Economic Base
+  - Internal Security/Political
+  - National Will, Theirs and Ours
+
+Intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes must
+examine the functions and then define the physical objects or people
+who comprise the system which is responsible for the successful
+operation of the function. You define the system and then attack the
+critical elements in order to achieve economy of force. Often these
+target sets are difficult to define, as these functions often
+represent the enemy's most valuable and therefore protected elements.
+The intelligence collection associated with each function will vary
+from target set to target set. Large, fixed infrastructure, such as
+associated with an electrical grid, lends itself to traditional
+reconnaissance and evaluation of technical analysis. Leadership
+targets are better defined by using human intelligence and subjective
+analysis. In all cases success starts with innovative intelligence
+products, which has not been a hallmark of United States operations.
+Such intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of the
+enemy, their values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments based
+on our viewpoint.
+
+One target system may serve the attainment of a number of different
+goals. For example, attacks on the electrical power system of the
+enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and control his military
+forces, operate vital elements of the economy and thus degrade the
+political support required to sustain the conflict. This same target
+system may be attacked a variety of ways. Most common methods would be
+using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and
+switching centers. Areas with isolated populations lend themselves to
+using special operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated
+power grid node for transmission of energy from one highly populated
+area to another. Now it is obvious that computer signals used to
+command the power grid are targets as intrusion into the enemy's
+control system provides the means to simply turn off electricity to
+selected areas. Attacks by all these means achieves even greater
+results than the sum of its parts because enemy responses to restore
+electrical power will be confused as elements such as computer
+intrusion are confused with bombing destruction.
+
+The characteristics of value in attacking these important targets
+systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. The greatest effect
+will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated in such a manner as
+to inflict maximum Shock and Awe on the enemy element. This means
+operations must be coordinated and orchestrated carefully and flexibly
+as enemy reaction to the attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is
+projected when a combination of functions or target sets supporting a
+variety of functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In
+order to achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be
+evaluated quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of
+the system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system.
+Finally, the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the
+functions as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take hold. In
+order to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the attacker must
+know the current and projected effects of his strikes against elements
+of the enemy's residual system. If the trick is to define the system
+of targets needed to conduct successful Deep Strike, it is even more
+important to know how to alter the initial plan as the battle unfolds
+and timing becomes everything.
+
+The characteristics of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike are long
+range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed. Cost of the
+operation is a factor; however, system cost must include peacetime
+operations and maintenance costs as well of the costs during actual
+combat. There is also a human element in the cost of combat operations
+which escalates rapidly as military force is misused. The total cost
+of these operations must also address the cost of intelligence used to
+support Deep Strikes. Intelligence operations may be the most costly
+due to the importance of these targets to the enemy. Alternatively,
+the human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the most
+inexpensive since their national importance makes them vulnerable to
+knowl-edgeable dissidents.
+
+
+Stand-off
+
+Deep Strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. Some of
+the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances beyond the
+nation's control; for example, Seoul borders on North Korea. Our
+protective oceans mean that likely conflict is offshore. The
+likelihood our next adversary may have access to surveillance,
+precision munitions, and long-range delivery systems dictates that
+much of our operations will be at long range, lest our forces come
+under attack at their ports, camps, and bases. There will be a need
+for systems capable of projecting military force from distances of
+10,000KM. A sizable portion of the force must be able to deliver
+ordnance of enemy targets from ranges in excess of 5,000KM. Launching
+attacks from inside 1,000KM of the enemy forces will demand that
+friendly forces be protected from attack by means of active and
+passive defenses and dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude
+achieving levels of Shock and Awe through simultaneous attack.
+
+
+Survivability
+
+Great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the
+attack is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built for the most
+demanding conflict must also be flexible for other operations.
+Therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed, and
+survivability in reaching their target, their cost become prohibitive
+in large-scale operations which endure beyond a few hours, or in
+smaller-scale operations where the goals are modest and the demands on
+other military forces are low. Simultaneous combat operations require
+a number of expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours of
+the conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock. Awe is
+not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience in being
+attacked; at best you may make them numb. Alternatively, reusable
+long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility to alter the
+Deep Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of weapons systems
+ranges from the most valuable systems such as ballistic missiles,
+cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less valuable, but useful,
+stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface high trajectory
+fires.
+
+
+Firepower
+
+Discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of people and
+structures being in close proximity to the desired target. It is not
+improbable that the national command center is located next door to a
+children's hospital.
+
+Discriminate fires require precision in target cordinate
+identification and location. Precision does not mean "small warhead,"
+although there is a beneficial impact as the right amount of explosive
+is placed on the target due the penalties imposed on the delivery
+vehicle required to carry the warhead long distances. All operations
+involving the use of firepower must also understand and evaluate the
+beneficial aspects of using non-destructive elements in conjunction
+with the attack to include all aspects of the so-called information
+warfare.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix C
+
+Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance
+by General Fred Franks
+
+
+
+Rapid Dominance, as we see it, is a markedly different concept for the
+use of force to gain national security ob jectives. At its core, Rapid
+Dominance blends unique capabilities of land, sea, air, space, and
+special operating forces. It is important to note the vital role of
+jointness in using forces from all elements and resisting the lure of
+gimmicks and cost-free options that may appear within the reach of
+high technology but are not.
+
+Examining current joint force capabilities reveals some enduring
+truths that should be used to evaluate future concepts. Joint force
+commanders today benefit from the wide array of capabilities available
+to the joint warfighting team. The ability to combine and use forces
+from all dimensions in a variety of powerful combinations to fit
+mission circumstances presents a versatility of capabilities that
+makes defense by adversaries difficult. Balance and versatility are
+key. Balance in capabilities and the inherent versatility to combine
+them in unpredictable, yet highly effective ways has served U.S.
+national security interests well since the end of the Cold War. One
+has only to look at the variety of methods employed in Panama (1989),
+Desert Storm (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994), and
+Bosnia (1995) in both war and operations other than war. Joint force
+commanders employed, and in some cases invented, new combinations of
+balanced capabilities and were willing to go beyond the confines of
+service doctrines to fit mission circumstances. For example, a U.S.
+Army brigade of the 10th Mountain Division with helicopters replaced
+much of the carrier air wing and flew off the carrier Eisenhower
+during the Haiti operation. This force packaging capability is an
+advantage unique to the U.S.
+
+As we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense concepts
+such as Rapid Dominance, the key will be to maintain that balance in
+land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces combinations
+available to the joint force commander. U.S. military forces are now
+multidimensional in capabilities, able to use force in ways
+unpredictable to an adversary. U.S. forces also have enormous
+versatility, able to be used in war and what have become termed
+operations other than war. Balance permits that.
+
+Moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability, have
+found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly given today's
+methods. Recently, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division rapidly
+deployed by air from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Kuwait and was able to fall
+in on equipment forward positioned and be available for combat soon
+after arrival. A recent article in Navy Times pointed out, "In fact,
+as each wave of soldiers arrived in Kuwait, they were heading north --
+combat ready -- within six hours." This was a dramatic example of the
+rapid ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using
+both distant forces with those already in the theater. That
+combination in that set of strategic circumstances provided a rapid
+deterrent in an area of vital national security interests to the U.S.
+
+Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and ensuring that
+capacity is perceived by a potential adversary. Staying power means
+the ability to press the initial advantage gained until the strategic
+objective is achieved. On-the-ground presence, in addition to forces
+in theater, as demonstrated in Kuwait in 1993 and again in 1996,
+provided commitment and staying power to convince Iraq that it would
+be disastrous to consider any form of military action. The inherent
+staying power of land forces, wherever future tactical concepts may
+lead, makes them a powerful contributing partner in our Rapid
+Dominance concept.
+
+Finally, there is the issue of physical control. Control combines with
+staying power to defeat the enemy's will. One of the many lessons of
+Desert Storm is that it was not until after land forces attacked Iraq
+and Kuwait that Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. Despite the
+awesome shock and destructive effects of attacks f rom the air and
+sea, it was only after coalition ground attacks to extend control to
+both Kuwait and southeastern Iraq by defeat and destruction of
+defending Iraqi forces that strategic objectives were secured. Control
+on land was extended past the cease fire until such time in April as
+the UN passed a permanent cease fire and sanctions resolution. Land
+forces remaining in southeastern Iraq provided the staying power and
+control.
+
+The size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in all
+elements will assuredly change in the future. Early work done in
+advanced warfighting experiments out of TRADOC's Battle Labs beginning
+in 1992 and growing into the current Force XXI and other promising
+capabilities as well as by the USMC at MCCDC at Quantico are the
+precursors of how change may be discovered and implemented. The
+challenge is to ensure that all components of our fighting power are
+properly balanced and combined into the most effective and lethal
+mixes of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. This is
+the heart of the Rapid Dominance force of the future.
+
+Extension of real and perceived control over the will and ability of
+any adversary to oppose or threaten us will insure and guarantee
+success of initial operations, thereby maximizing Shock and Awe.
+Indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operationally will be a
+major factor in achieving the enduring effects of Shock and Awe.
+Certainly, as forces on land evolve and change, they must meet the
+requirements of rapidity and sustainment and are vital components of
+any mix of forces that seek by Shock and Awe to stun and then rapidly
+dominate an adversary to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
+
+We strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in exploring
+defense alternatives. We must seize this time to be bold in our
+thinking. More thought and hypotheses with operational methods that
+break through or expand current service doctrines are needed from a
+joint perspective even as services look to the future from their own
+service perspective. Then there must be rigorous experiments using
+both high fidelity simulations and actual joint field trials to
+determine the worth of these hypotheses to blend the wide array of
+technology available to the total joint force and according to bold
+new concepts. The results will determine the worth of Rapid Dominance
+concepts by judging whether they will permit even more balanced,
+versatile, and lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated future
+strategic circumstances.
+
+
+
+
+Study Group Members
+
+
+
+*/L.A. "Bud" Edney/* is a retired Navy admiral and naval aviator. A
+veteran of over 350 combat missions in Vietnam, Admiral Edney's senior
+billets included Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief,
+Atlantic Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Edney has
+an advanced degree from Harvard and was a 1970 White House Fellow.
+
+*/Fred M. Franks/* is a retired Army general and a highly experienced
+combat armor officer. During the Gulf War, he commanded VII Corps and
+last served as Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine
+Command. He has two master's degrees from Columbia and is a graduate
+of the National War College. He is the author of _Into the Storm, a
+Study in Command,_ written with Tom Clancy to be published by G.P.
+Putnam's Sons in 1997.
+
+*/Charles A. Horner/* is a retired Air Force general and a highly
+experienced combat fighter and attack pilot. During the Gulf War,
+General Horner commanded all allied air forces. His last assignment
+was Commander-in-Chief, Space Command. A graduate of the National War
+College, he now serves as consultant to government and industry.
+
+*/Jonathan T. Howe/* is a retired Navy admiral and both a submarine and
+surface warfare qualified officer. He has served as Deputy Assistant
+to the President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Chairman of
+NATO's Military Committee, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern
+Europe/CINC U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and was Special Representative
+of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia. He has a Ph.D. from the
+Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and currently heads a charitable
+foundation.
+
+*/Harlan K. Ullman/* divides his time between the worlds of business and
+public policy. A former naval person, he is with the Center for
+Strategic and International Studies and the Center for Naval Analyses.
+His last book, _IN IRONS: U.S. Military Might in the New Century,_ was
+published by the National Defense University Press in 1995.
+
+*/James P. Wade, Jr./*, a scientist by training, is a West Point
+graduate and infantry officer. He has held many senior positions in
+DOD, including head of Policy Planning, Assistant to SECDEF for Atomic
+Energy, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, and Acting Head of
+Defense Research and Engineering. He is Chairman and CEO of DGI which
+conducted this study.
+
+*/Keith Brendley/* is a Vice President with Defense Group Inc. He was
+formerly with Sarcos Research Corporation, RAND, System Planning
+Corporation and NASA, Ames Research Center. He holds mechanical
+engineering degrees from the University of Illinois (B.S.) and the
+University of Maryland (M.S.).
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Shock and Awe, by 
+Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SHOCK AND AWE ***
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