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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/7259-h.zip b/7259-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0e9d5a --- /dev/null +++ b/7259-h.zip diff --git a/7259-h/7259-h.htm b/7259-h/7259-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2abbd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/7259-h/7259-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5596 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<title>New File</title> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> +<style type="text/css"> +<!-- +h1,h2,h3,h4 { text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-variant: small-caps } + h1 { margin-top: 2em } + h2 { margin-top: 1.5em } + li.toc { font-variant: small-caps } + p.smallcaps { font-variant: small-caps } + span.char { font-variant: small-caps; } + span.stage { font-variant: small-caps; } +--> +</style> +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's Shock and Awe, by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have +to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. + +Title: Shock and Awe + Achieving Rapid Dominance + +Author: Harlan K. Ullman + James P. Wade + +Posting Date: September 22, 2014 [EBook #7259] +Release Date: January, 2005 +First Posted: April 1, 2003 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SHOCK AND AWE *** + + + + +Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p>[Note: This book was taken from the website of the Command and +Control Research Program (CCRP) within the within the Office of +the Assistant Secretary of Defense. According to the Privacy and +Security Notice:</p> + +<blockquote>2. Information presented on DODCCRP.ORG is considered +public information and may be distributed or copied unless +otherwise specified. Use of appropriate byline/photo/image +credits is requested.</blockquote> + +<p>The original electronic text was published at <a href= +"http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html">http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html</a>]</p> + +<h1 align="center">Shock and Awe:</h1> + +<h2 align="center">Achieving Rapid Dominance</h2> + +<h2 align="center"><img src="images/shockcover2.gif" width="200" height= +"307" alt="cover image"></h2> + +<p align="center">Written By</p> + +<p align="center">Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade</p> + +<p align="center"> </p> + +<p align="center">With:</p> + +<p align="center">L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. +Horner, Jonathan T. Howe, and Keith Brendley</p> + +<p align="center"><strong>NDU Press Book</strong></p> + +<p align="center"><strong>December 1996</strong></p> + +<h2 align="center">Contents</h2> + +<p><a href="#foreword">Foreword</a><br> +<a href="#prologue">Prologue</a><br> +<a href="#intro">Introduction to Rapid Dominance</a></p> + +<p><a href="#ch_01">Chapter 1. Background and Basis</a><br> +<a href="#ch_02">Chapter 2. Shock and Awe</a><br> +<a href="#ch_03">Chapter 3. Strategic, Policy, and Operational +Application</a><br> +<a href="#ch_04">Chapter 4. An Outline for System Innovation and +Technological Integration</a><br> +<a href="#ch_05">Chapter 5. Future Directions</a></p> + +<p>Appendices -- Reflections of Three Former Commanders</p> + +<blockquote><a href="#app_a">Appendix A. "Thoughts on Rapid +Dominance" by Admiral Bud Edney</a><br> +<a href="#app_b">Appendix B. "Defense Alternatives: Forces +Required" by General Chuck Horner</a><br> +<a href="#app_c">Appendix C. "Enduring Realities and Rapid +Dominance" by General Fred Franks</a></blockquote> + +<p><a href="#bio">Biographies of the Study Group Members</a></p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="foreword"></a>Foreword</h1> + +<p>We are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended +debate about the future of conflict and the future of our defense +establishment. Few will deny that the winds of change are blowing +as never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical +situation, an evolving information-oriented society, advancing +technology, and budgetary constraints. How our nation responds to +the challenge of change will determine our ability to shape the +future and defend ourselves against 21st century threats. The +major issue, however it may be manifested, involves the degree of +change that is required. Advocates, all along the spectrum from a +military technical revolution to a revolution in military affairs +to a revolution in security affairs, are making their cases. +Military institutions are by their very nature somewhat +conservative. History has shown that success has often sown the +seeds of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford to follow +in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels and +failed to stretch their imaginations.</p> + +<p>Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced +about a subject are not in the most advantageous position to +understand a new world order. Yet these same individuals are +often among the most credible voices and therefore are essential +to progress. The authors of <em>Shock and Awe</em> are a highly +accomplished and distinguished group with the credibility that +comes from years of front line experience. Thus, this work is +important not only because of the ideas contained within, but +because of the caliber and credibility of the authors.</p> + +<p>ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In +sponsoring this work and in disseminating its initial results, we +hope to contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives, +their promises, and their risks. As the authors note, this is a +work in progress meant not to provide definitive solutions but a +proposed perspective for considering future security needs and +strategies. To the extent that vigorous debate ensues we will be +successful.</p> + +<p>David S. Alberts</p> + +<p>Washington, D.C.</p> + +<p>October 1996</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="prologue"></a>Prologue</h1> + +<p>The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts +for structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which +future U. S. military forces might be configured. From the very +outset of this study group's deliberations, we agreed that the +most useful contribution we could make would be to attempt to +reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable efforts, +largely but not entirely within the Department of Defense, to +define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations, and force +structure to deal with a highly uncertain future. In approaching +this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and actual limits +and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what may prove to +be the full extent of our grasp.</p> + +<p>It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are +currently the most capable in the world and are likely to remain +so for a long time to come. Why then, many will ask, should we +examine and even propose major excursions and changes if the +country occupies this position of military superiority? For +reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are +important if only to confirm the validity of current defense +approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have +led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that +the Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this +means for more precisely defining the nature of our future +security needs. Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a +galvanizing external danger, the United States is actively +examining new strategic options and choices. The variety of +conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal with this +uncertainty exemplifies this reality.</p> + +<p>At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of +American military power, unencumbered by the danger of an +external peer competitor, have created a period of strategic +advantage during which we have the luxury of time, perhaps +measured in many years, to re-examine with a margin of safety our +defense posture. On the other hand, potential adversaries cannot +be expected to ignore this predominant military capability of the +United States and fail to try to exploit, bypass, or counter it. +In other words, faced with American military superiority in +ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most importantly, in +competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries may try to +change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant as +possible these current U.S. advantages. We proceed at our own +risk if we dismiss this possibility.</p> + +<p>Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military +capability will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major +American political parties to maintain or expand the current +level of defense capability, both the force structure and defense +infrastructure are too large to be maintained at even the present +levels and within the defense budgets that are likely to be +approved. Unless a new menace materializes, defense is headed for +"less of the same." Such reductions may have no strategic +consequences. However, that is an outcome that we believe should +not be left to chance.</p> + +<p>This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith +strategic reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs +may be caught up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and +could too easily drift into becoming advocacy or marketing +documents. As the services are forced into more jealously +guarding a declining force structure, the tendency to +"stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and special programs +is likely to increase, thereby complicating the problem of making +full use of our extraordinary technological resources. This means +that some external thinking, removed from the bureaucratic +pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating and +sustaining innovation.</p> + +<p>Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing +profound change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature +of the free enterprise system and the American personality. +Whether in information or materials-related technology or for +that matter in other areas too numerous to count, the nature of +competition is driving both product breadth and improvement at +rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One sign of these trends +is the reality that virtually all new jobs in this country are +being created by small business. In the areas of commercial +information and related management information systems, these +changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a +few years ago.</p> + +<p>On the so-called information highway, performance is +increasing dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the +time to bring to market new generation technology are +diminishing. These positive trends are not matched yet in the +defense-industrial base. One consequence of this broad commercial +transformation is that any future set of defense choices may be +inexorably linked to and dependent on this profound, ongoing +change in the commercial sector and in learning to harness +private sector advances in technology-related products. It must +also be understood that only the United States among all states +and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and +commercial capability to undertake the full exploitation of this +revolutionary potential.</p> + +<p>Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed +worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than +during the Cold War. These demands will continue and the +diversity of assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces +must be properly manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out +their missions to standards that are both high and expected by +the nation's leaders and its public. The matter of maintaining +this capability while attempting to reshape the force for a +changing future is a major and daunting challenge not to be +underestimated.</p> + +<p>These structural realities are exciting and offer a major +opportunity for real revolution and change if we are able and +daring enough to exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to +develop the concept of Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on +Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate these +multifaceted realities and facts and apply them to the common +defense at a time when uncertainty about the future is perhaps +one of the few givens. We believe the principles and ideas +underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and different +enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated by +"overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield +awareness," and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer +examination.</p> + +<p>Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war +recorded their observations, strategists and generals have been +tantalized and confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the +adversary's will to resist before, during, and after battle. +Today, we believe that an unusual opportunity exists to determine +whether or not this long-sought strategic goal of affecting the +will, understanding, and perception of an adversary can be +brought closer to fruition. Even if this task cannot be +accomplished, we believe that, at the very minimum, such an +effort will enhance and improve the ability of our military +forces to carry out their missions more successfully through +identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the +conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and +choices for employing our forces more effectively.</p> + +<p>Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of +strategy, technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has +the potential for revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid +Dominance as the possible military expression, vanguard, and +extension of this potential for revolutionary change. The +strategic centers of gravity on which Rapid Dominance +concentrates, modified by the uniquely American ability to +integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology, +and innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and +shaping the will of the adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance +will be to destroy or so confound the will to resist that an +adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic +aims and military objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid +Dominance must control the operational environment and through +that dominance, control what the adversary perceives, +understands, and knows, as well as control or regulate what is +not perceived, understood, or known.</p> + +<p>In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital +condition to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an +adversary's military power. We still must maintain the capacity +for the physical and forceful occupation of territory should +there prove to be no alternative to deploying sufficient numbers +of personnel and equipment on the ground to accomplish that +objective. Should this goal of applying our resources to +controlling, affecting, and breaking the will of an adversary to +resist remain elusive, we believe that Rapid Dominance can still +provide a variety of options and choices for dealing with the +operational demands of war and conflict.</p> + +<p>To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will +apply a variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the +necessary level of Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and +military leverage points. This means that psychological and +intangible, as well as physical and concrete effects beyond the +destruction of enemy forces and supporting military +infrastructure, will have to be achieved. It is in this broader +and deeper strategic application that Rapid Dominance perhaps +most fundamentally differentiates itself from current doctrine +and offers revolutionary application.</p> + +<p>Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the +adversary's will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock and +Awe to achieve strategic aims and military objectives, four +characteristics emerge that will define the Rapid Dominance +military force. These are noted and discussed in later chapters. +The four characteristics are near total or absolute knowledge and +understanding of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity and +timeliness in application; operational brilliance in execution; +and (near) total control and signature management of the entire +operational environment.</p> + +<p>Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that +is, it focuses on defeating the military capability of an +adversary and therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-Rapid +Dominance would seek to be more universal in application through +the overriding objective of affecting the adversary's will beyond +the boundaries traditionally defined by military capability +alone. In other words, where decisive force is likely to be most +relevant is against conventional military capabilities that can +be overwhelmed by American (and allied) military superiority. In +conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this idealized +scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be +sufficiently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make +this distinction in either theory or in practice.</p> + +<p><em>We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force +actually be fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, +this force would be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and +certainly not an antidote or preventative for a major policy +blunder, miscalculation, or mistake. It should also be fully +appreciated that situations will exist in which Rapid Dominance +(or any other doctrine) may not work or apply because of +political, strategic, or other limiting factors.</em></p> + +<p>We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an +adversary's will, perception, and understanding through Shock and +Awe on the grounds that this idea is not new and that such an +outcome may not be physically achievable or politically +desirable. On the first point, we believe the use of basic +principles of strategy can stand us in good stead even and +perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries may not +elect to fight the United States along traditional or expected +lines. On whether this ability can and should be achieved, we +believe that question should be part of a broader +examination.</p> + +<p>Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is +the way in which we attempt to integrate far more broadly +strategy, technology, and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It +is this interaction and focus which we think will provide the +most interesting results.</p> + +<p>For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious +intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of +Rapid Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Dominance in the +formation stage and not as a final product. Over the next months, +we believe further steps should be taken to refine Rapid +Dominance and to develop "paper" systems and force designs that +will add crucial specificity to this concept. Then, this Rapid +Dominance force can be assessed against five sets of +questions:</p> + +<ul> +<li>First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be fielded +with the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe to affect and +shape the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and +improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major +regional contingency (MRC)?</li> + +<li>Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its +application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War +(OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it +not, and where might it offer mixed benefits?</li> + +<li>Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance +in both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a +form of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy? +Would this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to +our own public?</li> + +<li>Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances, +coalitions, and the conduct of allied and combined +operations?</li> + +<li>Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on +defense resource investment priorities and future budgets?</li> +</ul> + +<p>From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful +results will flow.</p> + +<p>We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the +National Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In +particular, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts +of NDU whose intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his +full support, have been invaluable and without which this project +would have been far less productive.</p> + +<p>Washington, D.C.</p> + +<p>1 September 1996</p> + +<table summary="Signatures"> +<tr> +<td width="50%" valign="middle">L.A. Edney</td> +<td width="50%" valign="middle">J.T. Howe</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td width="50%" valign="middle">F.M. Franks</td> +<td width="50%" valign="middle">H.K. Ullman</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td width="50%" valign="middle">C. A. Horner</td> +<td width="50%" valign="middle">J.P. Wade</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="intro"></a>Introduction to Rapid +Dominance</h1> + +<p>The military posture and capability of the United States of +America are, today, dominant. Simply put, there is no external +adversary in the world that can successfully challenge the +extraordinary power of the American military in either regional +conflict or in "conventional" war as we know it once the United +States makes the commitment to take whatever action may be +needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis may be the most +difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and U.S. forces are not in +place. However, it will still be years, if not decades, before +potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a full +panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the +aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and +weapons systems in our inventory. Even if an adversary could +deploy similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb +training and preparation of American service personnel would +still be a daunting task.</p> + +<p>Given this reality that our military dominance can and will +extend for some considerable time to come, provided we are +prepared to use it, why then is a re-examination of American +defense posture and doctrine important? The answers to this +question involve (1) the changing nature of the domestic and +international environments; (2) the complex nature of resolving +inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside conventional +war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism, crime, and +the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource constraints; +(4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases raised +on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future of +austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called +social, economic, and information revolutions that could check or +counter many of the nation's assumptions as well as public +support currently underwriting defense.</p> + +<p>It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving +non-traditional Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law +enforcement tasks are growing and pose difficult problems and +challenges to American military forces, especially when and where +the use of force may be inappropriate or simply may not work. The +expansion of the role of UN forces to nation-building in Somalia +and its subsequent failure comes to mind as an example of this +danger. It is also arguable that the formidable nature and huge +technological lead of American military capability could induce +an adversary to move to a strategy that attempted to circumvent +all this fighting power through other clever or agile means. The +Vietnam War is a grim reminder of the political nature of +conflict and how our power was once outflanked. Training, morale, +and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring both +a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing.</p> + +<p>Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most +dominant military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in +overcoming the inertia of this success. We may be our own worst +enemy.</p> + +<p>During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense +debate was often fought over how to balance the so-called +"strategy-force structure-budget" formula. Today, that formula +has expanded to include "threat, strategy, force structure, +budget, and infrastructure." Without a "clear and present danger" +such as the Axis Powers in 1941 or, later, the Soviet Union to +coalesce public agreement on the threat, it is difficult to +construct a supporting strategy that can be effective either in +setting priorities or objectives. Hence, today's "two war" or two +nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy has +been criticized as strategically and financially excessive. As +noted by administration officials, the current force structure +does not meet the demands of the "two war," MRC strategy and, in +any event, the budget will not support the planned force +structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United +States possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and +facilities than it needs to support the current force, thereby +draining scarce resources away from fighting power. As a result, +there is a substantial defense imbalance that will erode fighting +power.</p> + +<p>In designing its defense posture, the United States has +adopted the doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming +force." This doctrine reinforces American advantages in strategic +mobility, prepositioning, technology, training, and in fielding +integrated military systems to provide and retain superiority, +and responds to the minimum casualty and collateral damage +criteria set first in the Reagan Administration. The Revolution +in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon or process +by which the United States continues to exploit technology to +maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of +achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." Through this +awareness, the United States should be able to obtain perfect or +near perfect information on virtually all technical aspects of +the battlefield and therefore be able to defeat or destroy an +adversary more effectively, with fewer losses to ourselves and +with a range of capabilities from long-range precision strike to +more effective close-in weapons.</p> + +<p>Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some +of the as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities, +changes, and trends. The deployment of American forces to Bosnia +is a reaction to and representation of major shifts occurring in +the post-Cold War world. With these shifts, this deployment is +suggestive of what may lie ahead for the use, relevance, and +design of military force. The legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, +and then, the start of the Cold War, caused the West to adopt +policies for containing and deterring the broad threat posed by +the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermonuclear weapons, +complemented over time by strong conventional forces, threatened +societal damage to Russia. Conventional forces backed by tactical +nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a massive +Soviet ground attack in Europe and, in part, to provide an +alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons.</p> + +<p>Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit +serving in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so +well in <em>Desert Storm</em> and, for the bulk of the Cold War +along with our other units, had been designed to defend NATO +against and then defeat a numerically superior, armored and +mechanized Soviet adversary advancing across the plains of +Germany. Now these troops, as well as others from both sides of +the former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW for which special +training, rules of engagement, command arrangements, and other +support structures have been put in place at short notice, few of +which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are also +operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media +coverage, can have huge domestic political impact especially if +events go wrong.</p> + +<p>Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally +configured force for such an operation is not relevant for the +moment even though this unit probably was the most appropriate +for this task. However, it is prudent to examine the consequences +of changing tasks presaged by Bosnia, in which the enemy is +instability rather than an ideological or regional adversary we +are trying to contain or defeat and neutrality on our part may be +vital to the success of the mission. Do these changes mean that +we should alter our traditional approach to the doctrine for and +design of forces? If so, how? Are there alternative or more +effective ways and means to conduct these peacekeeping-related +operations? And, in this evaluation, are there alternative +doctrines we should consider to fight wars more effectively as we +envisage scenarios under the construct of the MRC?</p> + +<p>With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian +superpower, there is no external threat to the existence or +survival of the United States as a nation and there will not be +such an immediate threat for some time to come. This means that +there is a finite window of opportunity when there is no external +adversary threatening the total existence of American society; +that our forces are far superior to any possible military +adversary choosing to confront us directly; and that, with +innovative thought, we may be able to create a more relevant, +effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common defense +at the likely levels of future spending.</p> + +<p>At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the +fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be +addressed. The industrial and technical base of the United States +is changing profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical +advantages of the American economy were never greater and it is +small business that is creating virtually all new jobs and +employment opportunities. Commercial technology and products are +turning over on ever shortening cycles. Performance, especially +in high-technology products, is improving and costs are being +driven downwards.</p> + +<p>Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense +sector, where cost is high and will create even tougher choices +among competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle +time to field new generation capabilities is lengthening and +performance, especially in computer and information systems, is +often obsolete on delivery. The defense industrial base will +continue to compress and it is not clear that the necessary level +of efficiencies or increases in effectiveness in using this base +can be identified and implemented, suggesting further pressures +on a defense budget that is only likely to be cut.</p> + +<p>Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the +military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot +wars such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships +and submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, +technology, strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our +national preference for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare +continues to shape the way we design and rationalize our military +capability. Therefore, it is no surprise that in dealing with the +MRC, American doctrine, in some ways, remains an extension of +Cold War force planning. While the magnitude and number of +dangerous threats to the nation have been remarkably reduced by +the demise of the USSR, we continue to use technology to fill +traditional missions better rather than to identify or produce +new and more effective solutions for achieving military and +strategic/political objectives.</p> + +<p>While there is much talk about "military revolutions" and +winning the "information war," what is generally meant in this +lexicon and discussion is translated into defense programs that +relate to accessing and "fusing" information across command, +control, intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and +precision strike technologies. What is most exciting among these +revolutions is the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield +awareness," that is, achieving the capability to have +near-perfect knowledge and information of the battlefield while +depriving the adversary of that capacity and producing "systems +of systems" for this purpose.</p> + +<p>The near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely +remain directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on +fielding more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons +systems and infrastructure for using those systems. The doctrine +of "decisive or overwhelming force" is the conceptual and +operational underpinning for winning the next war based largely +on this force-on-force and attrition model, and winning the +information war is vital to this end. Few have asked whether the +pattern of employing more modern technology for traditional +firepower solutions is the best one and if there are alternative +ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and +efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield +awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of +fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic +objectives?</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would +advance the military revolution to new levels and possibly new +dimensions. Rapid Dominance extends across the entire "threat, +strategy, force structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with +broad implications for how we provide for the future common +defense. Organization and management of defense and defense +resources should not be excluded from this examination although, +in this paper, they are not discussed in detail.</p> + +<p>The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, +and understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our +strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. +Clearly, the traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, +or neutralizing the adversary's military capability is a +fundamental and necessary component of Rapid Dominance. Our +intent, however, is to field a range of capabilities to induce +sufficient Shock and Awe to render the adversary impotent. This +means that physical and psychological effects must be +obtained.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to +control, on an immediate basis, the entire region of operational +interest and the environment, broadly defined, in and around that +area of interest. Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant +battlefield awareness, we envisage Rapid Dominance producing a +capability that can more effectively and efficiently achieve the +stated political or military objectives underwriting the use of +force by rendering the adversary completely impotent.</p> + +<p>In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly +before an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies +throughout the spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to +all stages of battle and conflict resolution.</p> + +<p>"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an +adversary's will both physically and psychologically. Physical +dominance includes the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, +neutralize, and to render impotent. Psychological dominance means +the ability to destroy, defeat, and neuter the will of an +adversary to resist; or convince the adversary to accept our +terms and aims short of using force. The target is the +adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The principal +mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing +sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to +convince or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military +objectives. Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and +disinformation, perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed.</p> + +<p>The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this +overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an +immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to +carry on. In crude terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of +the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's +perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be +incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels. An +adversary would be rendered totally impotent and vulnerable to +our actions. To the degree that non-lethal weaponry is useful, it +would be incorporated in the ability to Shock and Awe and achieve +Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<p>Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance +seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent +of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and +Nagasaki had on the Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for +suicidal resistance until both nuclear bombs were used. The +impact of those weapons was sufficient to transform both the +mindset of the average Japanese citizen and the outlook of the +leadership through this condition of Shock and Awe. The Japanese +simply could not comprehend the destructive power carried by a +single airplane. This incomprehension produced a state of +awe.</p> + +<p>We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential +in combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce +systems capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most +or many cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing +the full destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced +conventional technologies but must be underwritten by the ability +to do so.</p> + +<p>Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and Awe +at the appropriate level or levels is the next step in the +evolution of a doctrine for replacing or complementing +overwhelming force. By way of comparison, we have summarized how +we view the differences between the doctrines of Rapid Dominance +and Decisive Force in terms of basic elements that apply to the +objectives, uses of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties, +and technique. We recognize that there will be debate over the +relative utility and applicability of these doctrines and readers +are encouraged to participate.</p> + +<p>In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid +Dominance and Decisive Force, it is important to define the terms +as precisely as possible.</p> + +<p>The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe +must be compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the +ability to "own" the dimension of time-moving more quickly than +an opponent, operating within his decision cycle, and resolving +conflict favorably in a short period of time. "Dominance" means +the ability to control a situation totally.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the +means to anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will +involve the capability to deny an opponent things of critical +value, and to convey the unmistakable message that unconditional +compliance is the only available recourse. It will imply more +than the direct application of force. It will mean the ability to +control the environment and to master all levels of an opponent's +activities to affect will, perception, and understanding. This +could include means of communication, transportation, food +production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure as +well as the denial of military responses. Deception, +misinformation, and disinformation are key components in this +assault on the will and understanding of the opponent.</p> + +<p>Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across +tactical, strategic, and political levels will destroy the will +to resist. With Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power +with such compellance that even the strongest of wills will be +awed. Rapid Dominance will strive to achieve a dominance that is +so complete and victory is so swift, that an adversary's losses +in both manpower and material could be relatively light, and yet +the message is so unmistakable that resistance would be seen as +futile.</p> + +<p>"Decisive Force," on the other hand, implies delivering +massive enough force to prevail. Decisive means using force with +plenty of margin for error. Force implies a traditional +"force-on-force" and attrition approach. This concept does not +exclude psychological and other complementary damage imposition +techniques to enhance the application of force; they have been +used throughout the history of warfare. But such non-destructive +means would have an ancillary role. Military force would be +applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against the +military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not always an +essential component. As in <em>Desert Shield/Storm</em>, enough +time would have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force. +Such a luxury is not always feasible.</p> + +<p>The differences become clearer if broken down into their +essential elements:</p> + +<table summary="Essential Elements"> +<tr> +<td width="33%"><strong>Elements</strong> </td> +<td width="33%"><strong>Rapid Dominance</strong></td> +<td width="34%"><strong>Decisive Force</strong></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Objective</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Control the adversary's will, +perceptions, and understanding</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Prevail militarily and decisively +against a set of opposing capabilities defined by the MRC</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Use of Force</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Control the adversary's will, +perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary +impotent to act or react</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Unquestioned ability to prevail +militarily over an opponent's forces and based against the +adversary's capabilities</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Force Size</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Could be smaller than opposition, +but with decisive edge in technology, training, and +technique</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Large, highly trained, and +well-equipped. Materially overwhelming</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Scope</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">All encompassing</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Force against force (and supporting +capability)</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Speed</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Essential</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Desirable</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Casualties</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Could be relatively few in number on +both sides</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Potentially higher on both +sides</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Technique</td> +<td valign="top" width="33%">Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, +destroy</td> +<td valign="top" width="34%">Systematic destruction of military +capability. Attrition applicable in some situations</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<p>Four general categories of core characteristics and +capabilities have been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured +mission capability packages must embrace. These are identified +briefly and discussed in later chapters.</p> + +<p>First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize +<strong>knowledge</strong> of the environment, of the adversary, +and of our own forces on political, strategic, economic, and +military/operational levels. On one hand, we want to get into the +minds of the adversary far more deeply than we have in the past. +Beyond operational intelligence required for battlefield +awareness, Rapid Dominance means cultural understanding of the +adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning +and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and +strategic levels.</p> + +<p>Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve <strong>rapidity</strong> +in the sense of timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have +capabilities that can be applied swiftly and relatively faster +than an adversary's.</p> + +<p>Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total <strong>control +of the environment</strong> from complete "signature management" +of both our and the adversary's information and intelligence to +more discrete means to deceive, disguise, and misinform.</p> + +<p>Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of +operational competence that can virtually institutionalize +<strong>"brilliance."</strong> In some cases, this may mean +changing the longstanding principle of military centralization +and empowering individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen to be +crucial components in applying and directing the application of +force.</p> + +<p>As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and +capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging +reality to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is +transforming at the current rate and breadth, it could be that, +over the course of many years, the defense industrial base would +follow suit, or face irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there +are certain areas in defense which will never or may never be +eliminated or replaced. Nuclear systems are a current +example.</p> + +<p>Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may +mean that military force design and procurement will become +dependent on the private sector and commercial technology. Rapid +Dominance is a first conceptual step to deal with this +possibility.</p> + +<p>The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the +concept of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy, +technology and innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe. Based +on this, subsequent steps will involve expanding mission +capability packages concepts consisting of operations harmonized +with doctrine, organization, and systems and then move on to +field prototype systems for further test and evaluation as +advanced concept technology demonstrations.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="ch_01"></a>Background and Basis</h1> + +<p>In both relative and absolute terms, since the end of World +War II, the military strength and capability of the United States +have never been greater. Yet this condition of virtual military +superiority has created a paradox. Absent a massive threat or +massive security challenge, it is not clear that this military +advantage can (always) be translated into concrete political +terms that advance American interests. Nor is it clear that the +current structure and foundations for this extraordinary force +can be sustained for the long term without either spending more +money or imposing major changes to this structure that may exceed +the capacity of our system to accommodate. As a consequence, the +success of the current design and configuration of our forces may +ironically become self-limiting and constraining. That is not to +claim automatically that there are better military solutions or +that the current defense program is not the best our political +system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are +well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance +and measure against the current and planned program.</p> + +<p>To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset +that one thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine +of overwhelming or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To +push the conceptual envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: +Can a Rapid Dominance force lead, for example, to a force +structure that can win an MRC such as <em>Desert Shield</em> and +<em>Desert Storm</em> far more quickly and cheaply with far fewer +personnel than our planned force both in terms of stopping any +invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can Rapid +Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity +to deal with grey areas such as OOTW?</p> + +<p>Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of +political deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or +"shut down" an adversary can actually control behavior? What are +the possible political implications of this capability and what +would this power mean for conducting coalition war and for how +our allies react and respond?</p> + +<p>Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will, +perception, and understanding of an adversary rather than simply +destroying military capability, this focus must cause us to +consider the broadest spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and +across all aspects of war including intelligence, training, +education, doctrine, industrial capacity, and how we organize and +manage defense.</p> + +<p>We observe at first that even with the successful ending of +the Cold War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating +its national security and defense has been relatively and +understandably modest and cautious. In essence, while the size of +the force has been reduced from Cold War levels of 2.2 million +active duty troops to about 1.5 million, and the services have +been vocal in revising doctrine and strategy to reflect the end +of the Soviet threat, with the exception of emphasis on +jointness, there are few really fundamental differences in the +design and structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years +ago.</p> + +<p>Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States +rested on several central and widely accepted and publicly +supported propositions. The "clear and apparent danger" of the +Soviet threat was real and seen as such. The USSR was to be +contained and deterred from hostile action by a combination of +political, strategic, and military actions ranging from the +forging of a ring of alliances surrounding the USSR and its +allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear and +thermonuclear weapons.</p> + +<p>Following the truce ending the Korean War, a large, standing +military force was maintained and defined by the operational +requirements of fighting the large formations of military forces +of the USSR and its allies with similar types of military forces, +albeit outnumbered. The role of allies, principally NATO, was +assumed and taken into account in planning, although the paradox +of the issue of planning for a long versus short war in a nuclear +world remained unresolved.</p> + +<p>Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the +Cold War went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any +war might be ended quickly. The largely World War II defense, +industrial, and basing structure was retained along with the +intent to rely on our technological superiority to offset +numerical or geographical liabilities.</p> + +<p>It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense +through mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the +Second World War and the literal ability of ultimately +overwhelming the enemy using the massive application of force, +technology, and associated firepower. Two decades later, Vietnam +exposed the frailty of this approach of dependence on massive +application of firepower especially when political limits were +placed on applying that firepower.</p> + +<p>Currently, <em>Desert Storm</em> and the liberation of Kuwait +in 1991 have been taken as the examples that confirm the validity +of the doctrine of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring +that both strategic objectives and tactical methods were in +congruence. We argue that now is the time to re-examine these +premises of reliance on overwhelming or decisive force as +currently employed and deployed in the force structure if only as +a prudent check.</p> + +<p>Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major +threat to generate consensus and to rally the country around +defense and defense spending, the military posture of the United +States will erode as the defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in +the future on what is currently seen to be as sufficient force to +be "decisive" could easily prove unachievable and the results +problematic or worse for U.S. policy.</p> + +<p>The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat +is, of course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in +defining the future defense posture of the nation. The United +States has long resisted maintaining a large standing military +and the Cold War years could prove an aberration to that history. +Extending this historical observation of small standing forces, +it is clear that there is no adversary on the horizon even +remotely approaching the military power of the former USSR. While +we might conjure up nominal regional contingencies against Korea +or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for establishing the +building blocks for force structure, it will prove difficult to +sustain the current defense program over the long term without a +real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public support. +Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could easily +prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that in +Europe, defense spending is closing in on 1 to 2 percent of +GDP.</p> + +<p>Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to +grips with this new world, the structural limitations and +constraints in how we develop systems and procure weapons based +on current technological and industrial capacity for producing +them will be exacerbated by downward fiscal pressure giving us +little room for mistakes and flexibility. Air, land, space, and +sea forces are currently limited in the actual numbers and types +of systems that are available for purchase and more limited in +that there are virtually no new major systems on the horizon. +That could change.</p> + +<p>The M-1A-1 tank is in production only for foreign sales. +Despite the allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only +four active classes of warships from which to replace its +capability and, for the first time this century since aircraft +entered the inventory, is without a new aircraft in development. +The Air Force can be placed in similar straits if the F-22 +program is deferred or canceled because of rising cost and fiscal +constraints. Time will tell what happens to the Joint Strike +Fighter. Assumptions about reliance on technology and R&D +providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove +ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those +programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D +could become the main source for procuring software and other +systems needed to upgrade today's weapons systems and for +so-called "leap-ahead" technologies that may prove elusive to +create.</p> + +<p>There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed +developing new doctrine and military thought to deal with these +changing circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and +with the clear bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing +and defending an annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, +less of the same) becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While +the JCS or OSD or CINCs may have genuine need for jointly +packaged forces that are rapidly deployable irrespective of Army, +Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels, the services cannot be +expected to reverse the years of viewing the world through +service- specific arguments and doctrine.</p> + +<p>Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced +with the end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to +assume that there are no risks to the nation nor an absence of +evil-doers wishing this nation harm. It would also be +shortsighted to expect that potential adversaries are +unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge of their +environment and simplicity to overcome our current military and +technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In +addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, +our assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological +superiority should welcome thoughtful examination.</p> + +<p>Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start, +the United States should act to exploit the several major +advantages it possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and +danger of future threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a +longer view. While we may have deferred adding to the inventory +of future systems in development, current systems possess more +than enough military capability to get us through this transition +period, even if this period were to last for more than a decade. +This does not mean we can rest on our oars; if we take advantage +of this opportunity, time is on our side. If we squander this +opportunity, then we could ultimately find ourselves in +trouble.</p> + +<p>Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the +luxury of the best technically educated and trained society in +the world, and the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers +vast potential if we are clever enough to exploit this +extraordinary resource.</p> + +<p>Third, because of significant changes in law and organization +regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act, +and through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Department +of Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. The +enhanced role of the CINCs and the acceptance of jointness are +positive illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural and +political realities noted above, assuring productive innovation +continues will not be automatic. Against these conducive signs, +vision, true joint thinking, and tactical advances still are +premium commodities to be nourished and encouraged.</p> + +<p>In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful +to rely on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we +have been successful in applying containment and deterrence in +the Cold War. When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait, +then the use of force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how +can we augment or improve the use of existing military capability +should it be required.</p> + +<p>Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a +regime of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as +well as operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are seeking +the capability to dominate, control, and isolate the entire +environment in, around, over, and under the objective area as +quickly as possible, and with fewer forces than currently +envisaged, although direct insertion of forces is an important +component depending upon the tactical situation. In many cases, +this capacity need not be the traditional firepower solution of +only physically destroying an adversary's military capabilities. +Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of affecting the +adversary's will to resist as the first order of business, +quickly if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would be to +stop an attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it +be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political +deterrence that might restrain aggression in the first place.</p> + +<p>To accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action +means neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics; +to organize society; and to function; as well as to control, +regulate and deny the adversary of information, intelligence, and +understanding of what is and what is not happening. This means we +must control all necessary intelligence and information on our +forces-the ultimate form of stealth-and on an adversary's forces +as well and then exploit total situational awareness for rapid +action.</p> + +<p>Regarding the emergence of current military thought and +doctrine, as implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early +and far less mature stages of a major revolution than is +generally assumed. It is understandable that despite major +strategic reassessments, current doctrine is still highly +influenced by Cold War tactics and strategy and perhaps by the +iron grip of the history of conflict since the early 19th +century.</p> + +<p>Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has +been largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast +amounts of manpower over time and space. The United States +advanced Napoleon's use of industry and mass armies in the Civil +War and our planning up to the Cold War tended to follow this +same pattern. World War II, of course, exemplified the triumph of +this industrial, mobilization, and massive use of force +approach.</p> + +<p>In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued +that this model combining massive industrial might and manpower +finally ended in 1989. Although, by then, technological advances +to conventional military capabilities seemed to be approaching +the destructive power, or more precisely, the system lethality of +nuclear weapons. In other words, modern non-nuclear precision +weapons perhaps could produce effects against enemy targets +roughly comparable to the military lethality of theater-level +nuclear weapons. If this condition proves true, could this new +lethality fundamentally change the construct for designing +American doctrine and strategy? This question is at the heart of +the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive +force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in +place.</p> + +<p>Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the +need to prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally +powerful adversary, the United States military has conducted two +post-Cold War crises against lesser adversaries quite differently +than it fought the Cold War. In the Panama intervention in 1990 +and in Kuwait shortly thereafter, the suggestion of newer and +different methods of warfare was present. Perhaps both will turn +out to be transition campaigns, where there is much of the old, +but also signs of the new. But there are specific pieces of +evidence that should command our attention.</p> + +<p>Underlying the planning for <em>Operation Just Cause</em> in +Panama and <em>Desert Shield/Storm</em> in Kuwait was the +premeditated incorporation of a series of rapid, simultaneous +attacks designed to apply decisive force. The aim was to stun, +and then rapidly defeat the enemy through a series of carefully +orchestrated land, sea, air, and special operating forces strikes +that took place nearly simultaneously across a wide battle space +and against many military targets. The purpose of these rapid, +simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis of both +the national state and its armed forces that would lead to prompt +neutralization and capitulation.</p> + +<p>In both <em>Just Cause</em> and <em>Desert Storm</em>, the +United States (plus coalition forces in <em>Desert Storm</em>) +had such overwhelming military capabilities that, in retrospect, +the outcome was largely a matter of drafting a cogent and +coordinated operation plan based on using the entire system of +capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce a decisive +victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar principles of +intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in +<em>Desert Storm</em> unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its +allies nearly 6 months to deploy over a half million troops +before the fighting began.</p> + +<p>The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5 +Pamphlet reflect and exploit operational rapidity and +simultaneity. Yet, progress in these operational directions may +be in danger of faltering if only old Cold War yardsticks are +used to make future force investments and to direct studies about +future force structure and associated infrastructure. As in any +transition period, innovation must be joined by a willingness to +experiment. This means the establishment and cultivation of an +experimental apparatus to test and evaluate new concepts are +matters of importance both to foster innovation and assess its +application.</p> + +<p>We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek +to emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force +behavioral change in adversaries to achieve strategic or +political ends. Control and then influence come from a range of +threats and outcomes, including putting at risk the targets an +adversary holds dear, to imposing a hierarchy of Shock and Awe, +to affecting will, perception, and understanding. Achieving +control may now be theoretically possible in even more compressed +or shortened time periods because of the potential superiority of +enhanced U.S. military capability and further training and +education. To obtain this level of military superiority that can +affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least achieve +the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought, +debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if +only to test and validate contemporary doctrine.</p> + +<p>If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and +Awe beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must +follow. The end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way +as to achieve the desired objectives. From this concept follows +the need to shut down either a state or an organized enemy +through the rapid and simultaneous application (or threat of +application) of land, sea, air, space, and special operating +forces against the broadest spectrum of the adversary's power +base and center or centers of gravity and against the adversary's +will and perception at tactical and strategic levels.</p> + +<p>In <em>Desert Storm,</em> the objectives were first to evict +Iraqi forces from Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate +government. From these objectives, more limited strategic and +political objectives followed, some for purposes of maintaining +coalition solidarity and UN-imposed sanctions. Not occupying +Baghdad was one such political limitation. These strategic +objectives led to identification of the enemy's centers of +gravity as the basis for the application of force to destroy +these centers. This planning led to the repeated, rapid, and +simultaneous use of massive force with great effect.</p> + +<p>One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam +Hussein's command and control. This was accomplished by +simultaneous and massive attacks. Once command and control was +destroyed, Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) +would be destroyed as quickly as possible with overwhelming force +and with minimum casualties. As General Colin Powell simply +stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddam's army and then kill +it."</p> + +<p>There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were +completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack. +Outside the KTO, targeting was more selective, not because the +means were unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because +our military objectives were purposely limited. Given the +effectiveness of the air campaign and the overwhelming +superiority on the ground, coalition land forces required only 4 +of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to eject Iraq's forces +from Kuwait.</p> + +<p>Suppose a <em>Desert Storm</em>-type campaign were fought 20 +years from now based on a plan that exploited the concept of +Rapid Dominance. Further assume that Iraq has improved (and +rebuilt) its military and that, in a series of simultaneous and +nearly instantaneous actions, our primary objective was still to +shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its leadership, and isolate +and destroy its military forces as we did in 1991. However, two +decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably achieve this +objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not after +the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to +1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an +invasion in its tracks.</p> + +<p>Shutting the country down would entail both the physical +destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and +control of the flow of all vital information and associated +commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin +to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and +Nagasaki had on the Japanese. Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces +would be paralyzed with the neutralization or destruction of its +capabilities. Deception, disinformation, and misinformation would +be applied massively.</p> + +<p>This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also +demonstrate to the adversary our endurance and staying power, +that is, the capability to dominate over as much time as is +necessary less an enemy mistakenly try to wait it out and use +time between attacks to recover sufficiently. If the enemy still +resisted, then conventional forms of attack would follow +resulting in the physical occupation of territory. Control is +thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the stun +effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to +affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. There must be +staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the +blows, gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change +tactics much as occurred during the WWII bombing campaigns and +the air war over North Vietnam.</p> + +<p>Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide +versatility and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, +and special operating forces and in investment in technology to +produce Rapid Dominance. Different methods for commanding the +battle using both hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to +control and direct our forces are likely to be required +especially given the simultaneous application of capabilities +throughout the given battle space by the full spectrum of our +forces. To use these combinations of forces will require +adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles and +functions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in +technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the Cold +War paradigm.</p> + +<p>To develop the proper combination of forces and future +technology investment for Rapid Dominance, extensive +experimentation with this core concept will be required. This +exper-imentation must apply to all levels of military educational +institutions; it must be joint; it can be accelerated by +availability of recent advances in simulation technology; and it +must have operational trials in the field.</p> + +<p>To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and +application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is +important. The U.S. today is graduating through its college and +universities system approximately 200,000 American and foreign +scientists and engineers per year. This is a great national +resource. This technology infrastructure is dimensions larger in +number and scope than the aggregate of anywhere else in the +world. Through appreciation and exploitation of this potential, a +U.S. position of pre-eminence in science and technology could be +assured for the foreseeable future.</p> + +<p>One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the +information and information management areas- which, in the U.S., +are heavily commercially oriented. Future military application +may well be analogous to the impact of the internal combustion +engine and wireless radio on land, sea, and air forces in the +1920s and 1930s. The size of this technological lead between +ourselves and the rest of the world, especially in the base for +new information products and services, should widen further in +knowledge and in application. The "Silicon Valley" revolution is +likely to continue increasing computer capacity on an almost +annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be many +fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close +in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the +ability to condense and synthesize data.</p> + +<p>In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability +to transfer information into and out of the hands of individual +users. The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids +will enhance and potentially quicken individual decision-making +ability. Technologies associated with bioscience and +bioengineering are likely to be of particular importance in +enhancing these capabilities and are also an area of American +predominance. Material sciences, software, and communications are +all American strengths, and should remain so well into the next +century.</p> + +<p>A significant element supporting this explosion in applied +information and other technologies is the American free +enterprise system and its entrepreneurial character. This drive +is needed to translate this technology into military hardware. +The nature of the U.S. market and its competitive basis reinforce +this element. The largest challenges may be to shape and exploit +this commercial potential and then to ensure that its enduring +advantages become fundamental in the makeup of our military +forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required during the +Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is it a +massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed, its +edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper."</p> + +<p>The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new +American industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be +toward the control and management of everything that is +significant to the operations bearing on the particular Area of +Interest (AOI). And we mean everything! Control of the +environment is far broader than only the objective of achieving +dominant battlefield awareness. Control means the ability to +change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures" of all of +the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the +operational frameworks in applying force across the entire +spectrum of platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, +ships) can be measured (and controlled) from many minus decibels +of cross section, to many plus decibels; communications can be +entirely covert, i.e., many dB less than the ambient environment, +or that approaching "white noise." The location of both the +individual and his unit can be measured in real time in meters, +if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through virtual reality, +movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of square +kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both +during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence. +This occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the adversary, +including real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of +this control.</p> + +<p>A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and +immediately control the operational/environmental signatures both +individually and in the aggregate. As needed, line and +non-line-of-sight weapons of near pin-point accuracy would be +delivered across the entire area of operation. Stealthy UAVs and +mobile robotics systems, together with decoys, would be deployed +in large numbers for surveillance, targeting, strike, and +deception and would produce their own impact of electronic Shock +and Awe on the enemy. This application of force can be done as +rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand.</p> + +<p>The effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights" +that enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the +conditions and events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his +society. What is radically different in Rapid Dominance is the +comprehensive system assemblage and integration of many evolving +and even revolutionary technical advances in dominant battlefield +awareness squared-materials application, sensor and signature +control, computer and bioengineering applied to massive amounts +of data, enable weapon application with simultaneity, precision, +and lethality that to date have not been applied as a total +system. Deception, disinformation, and misinformation will become +major elements of this systemic approach.</p> + +<p>The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely +come from the commercial world as the DOD base continues to +shrink. It is clear that in certain areas, DOD must remain +involved where there is no private R&D or to fill gaps in +R&D. Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and missile defense +are examples. However, advances in commercial technology in the +Information Age are unlikely to be matched by DOD.</p> + +<p>Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our +combat officers and key enlisted personnel. Command must be +geared to achieving the best of the best-not the best among the +good. Assimilating in real time the vast amount of information +and putting information to use will no doubt lead to major +changes in the composition, competence, and authority of (even +and especially) individual military unit commanders perhaps to +the squad or private soldier level.</p> + +<p>Of course, even with the most perfect information, an +unqualified, inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may +not win except with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe. +And, we repeat that there are cases where NO military force may +be able to succeed if the objectives are unobtainable. The match +of the entrepreneurial individual with the potential of the +technology base is key. Optimizing and integrating all elements +into a total system is a certain way to exploit the opportunity +that we can perceive becoming more visible in the coming +years.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="ch_02"></a>Shock and Awe</h1> + +<p>The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect +the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through +imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary +political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or +crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the +broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include +substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the +Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects +arising from application of military power and were aimed at +destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and +similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military +writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an +adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome +a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial +importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in +ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying +that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not +brilliant, employment of force.</p> + +<p>In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, +understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is +multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first +to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock +and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and +movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions +of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the +attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and +expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history. +Indeed, TV coverage of <em>Desert Storm</em> vividly portrayed +Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and +Awe.</p> + +<p>In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock +and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling +factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our +will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and +military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. +Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics +that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control.</p> + +<p>The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of +different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order +to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that +differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, +historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a +task will be to identify current and future examples to show the +effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step +in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability +packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, +force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and +determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be +achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs +we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual +application of our alternative force package. Then the mission +capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and +OOTW.</p> + +<p>For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing +historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe +have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories +and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is +"Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's +American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply +massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an +adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy +militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to +ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of +American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to +successful application.</p> + +<p>There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of +this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers +of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, +F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed +principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and +attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words, +this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces +attrition relationships even though command and control, +logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from +this doctrine.</p> + +<p>The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a +platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining +numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against +whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning +Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear +that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts +are under consideration, for the time being, these have not +replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition +orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal +alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a +comprehensive and detailed examination of possible +alternatives.</p> + +<p>Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large +amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and +the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not +always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large +quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, +the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may +outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly +capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial +marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while +also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations +systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense +sector. This will compound the tension between quality and +quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily +fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller +understanding.</p> + +<p>Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives +that are similar to those of current doctrine. A major +distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application +of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose +Shock and Awe. This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive +and integrated interaction among all the specific components and +units that produce aggregate military capability and must include +training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our +technical and industrial capacity. It is possible that in these +resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid +Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may +constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.</p> + +<p>The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. +The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through +delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive +destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning +its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against +military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers +or systems. The employment of this capability against society and +its values, called "counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent +jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public +will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically, +would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space +of a few hours or days.</p> + +<p>The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in +determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can +actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an +adversary impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within +acceptable and probably unachievably low levels of societal +destruction; and whether a political decision would be taken in +any case to use this type of capability given the magnitude of +the consequences and the risk of failure.</p> + +<p>It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of <em>Desert +Storm</em>, similar objectives were envisioned. The differences +between this example and <em>Desert Storm</em> are through the +totality of a society that would be affected by a massive and +indiscriminate regime of destruction and the speed of imposing +those strikes as occurred to those Japanese cities. This example +of shock, awe, and intimidation rests on the proposition that +such effects must occur in very short periods of time.</p> + +<p>The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of +Shock and Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively +precise destructive power largely against military targets and +related sectors over time. It is unlikely to produce an immediate +effect on the will of the adversary to resist. In a sense, this +is an endurance contest in which the enemy is finally broken +through exhaustion. However, it is the cumulative effect of this +application of destruction power that will ultimately impose +sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical +means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to accept +whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of the +First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the +Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and +related B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year +period of 1972-73, illustrate the application of massive +bombardment.</p> + +<p>Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic +targets, is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming Force," +even though political constraints make this example most unlikely +to be repeated in the future. There is also the option of +applying massive destruction against purely civilian or +"counter-value" targets such as the firebombing of Tokyo in World +War II when unconditionality marks the terms of surrender. It is +the cumulative impact of destruction on the endurance and +capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects the will to +resist that is the central foundation of this example.</p> + +<p>The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the +question of political feasibility and acceptability, and what +circumstances would be necessary to dictate and permit use of +massive bombardment. Outright invasion and aggression such as +Iraq's attack against Kuwait could clearly qualify as reasons to +justify using this level of Shock and Awe. However, as with +Overwhelming Force, this response is not time-sensitive and would +require massive application of force for some duration as well as +political support.</p> + +<p>Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock +and Awe were not achieved through the massive application of +firepower across a broad front nor through the delivery of +massive levels of force. Instead, the intent was to apply +precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve +maximum leverage but with total economies of scale. The German +Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack across a very +broad front, although the opponent may have been deceived into +believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in multiple +locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated, +attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of +the shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in +a tank's armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum +cone of damage against the unarmored or less protected +innards.</p> + +<p>To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is +directed against military targets, it requires skill if not +brilliance in execution, or nearly total incompetence in the +adversary. The adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear +vulnerable, panics, surrenders, or both. Hitler's campaign in +France and Holland and the seizure of the Dutch forts and the +occupation of Crete in 1940 are obvious illustrations. The use of +Special Operations forces in significant numbers is an adjunct to +imposing this level of Shock and Awe.</p> + +<p><em>Desert Storm</em> could have been a classic Blitzkreig +maneuver if the attack were mounted without the long preparatory +bombardment and was concentrated in a single sector-either the +"left hook" or the Marine attack "up the middle," and with total +surprise. The major differences between the operation in Kuwait +and Germany's capture of France in 1940 were that the allies in +Saudi Arabia had complete military and technical superiority +unlike the Germans and that, once under attack, Iraq's front line +collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition license to +pick and choose the points for penetration and then dominate the +battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future adversaries +about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that they +will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior +forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving +Shock and Awe through the precise application of force.</p> + +<p>It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such +as guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to +obtain Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example, +the German Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest +difficulty in the Vietnam War, where enemy forces had relatively +few lines to be penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of +warfare.</p> + +<p>The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its +strengths. Can brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there +a flexible enough infrastructure to ensure training to that +standard, and can the supporting industrial base continue to +produce at acceptable costs the systems to maintain this +operational and technical superiority? Rapid Dominance requires a +positive answer to these questions, at least theoretically.</p> + +<p>The fifth example is named after the Chinese +philosopher-warrior, Sun Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on +selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets +to achieve Shock and Awe. This discrete or precise nature of +applying force differentiates this from Hiroshima and Massive +Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before Ho Lu, the King +of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters on war and +proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the rules +applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged +Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The +concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head cut +off the head concubine. The ladies still could not bring +themselves to take the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had +the head cut off a second concubine. From that point on, so the +story goes, the ladies learned to march with the precision of a +drill team.</p> + +<p>The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe +and hence compliance or capitulation through very selective, +utterly brutal and ruthless, and rapid application of force to +intimidate. The fundamental values or lives are the principal +targets and the aim is to convince the majority that resistance +is futile by targeting and harming the few. Both society and the +military are the targets. In a sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve +Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe but through far more selective +and informed targeting. Decapitation is merely one instrument. +This model can easily fall outside the cultural heritage and +values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major refinement. +Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to communicate +is another variant but without many historical examples to show +useful wartime applications.</p> + +<p>A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is +deception. In this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy +into what we wish the enemy to perceive and thereby trick, +cajole, induce, or force the adversary. The thrust or target is +the perception, understanding, and knowledge of the adversary. In +some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is an early example of +deception. However, as we will see, the deception model may have +new foundations in the technological innovations that are +occurring and in our ability to control the environment.</p> + +<p>The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the +Massive Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is +questionable that a decision to employ American force this +ruthlessly in quasi- or real assassination will ever be made by +the U.S. Further, the standard to maintain the ability to perform +these missions is high and dependent on both resources and on +supporting intelligence, especially human intelligence-not an +American strong point.</p> + +<p>Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is +distinct from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it +focuses on depriving an adversary of its senses in order to +impose Shock and Awe. The image here is the hostage rescue team +employing stun grenades to incapacitate an adversary, but on a +far larger scale. The stun grenade produces blinding light and +deafening noise. The result shocks and confuses the adversary and +makes him senseless. The aim in this example of achieving Shock +and Awe is to produce so much light and sound or the converse, to +deprive the adversary of all senses, and therefore to disable and +to disarm. Without senses, the adversary becomes impotent and +entirely vulnerable.</p> + +<p>A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas +is a dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high +altitude nuclear detonation that blacks out virtually all +electronic and electrical equipment better describes the intended +effect regardless of likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in +specific areas, of the ability to communicate, observe, and to +interact is a more reasonable and perhaps more achievable +variant. This deprival of senses, including all electronics and +substitution of false signals or data to create this feeling of +impotence, is another variant. Above all, Shock and Awe are +imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is deprivation of +the senses.</p> + +<p>The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part +shortcomings of other approaches. Technological solutions are +crucial but may not be conceivable outside the EMP effects of +nuclear weapons. Intelligence is clearly vital. Without precise +knowledge of who and what are to be stunned, this example will +not work.</p> + +<p>The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian" +example (or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is +based on imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and +indeed through deception, misinformation, and disinformation and +is different from the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the +early 1800s, native Haitians were seeking to extricate their +country from French control. The Haitian leaders staged a martial +parade for the visiting French military contingent and marched, +reportedly, a hand full of battalions repeatedly in review. The +French were deceived into believing that the native forces +numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that French +military action was futile and that its forces would be +overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their +freedom without firing a shot.</p> + +<p>To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian +example and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are +more crucial in this regime. However, the target or focus is the +will and perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu +category comes closest to this one except that while Sun Tzu is +selective in applying force, it is clear that imposing actual +pain and shock are essential ingredients and deception, +disin-formation, and guile are secondary. Demonstrative uses of +force are also important. The issue is how to determine what +demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the intended target +in line with the overall political aims.</p> + +<p>The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major +dependency on intelligence. One must be certain that the will and +perceptions of the adversary can be manipulated. The classic +misfire is the adversary who is not impressed and, instead, is +further provoked to action by the unintended actions of the +aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait +demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can backfire. Saddam +simply let his bluff be called.</p> + +<p>The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving +Shock and Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an +adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his +vulnerability and our own invincibility, even though applying +ultimate retribution could take a considerable period of time. +The target set encompasses both military and societal values. In +occupying a vast empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Red +Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of forces to +secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman +forces were far superior to native forces individually and +collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, +the perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance +ultimately would take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat +Diplomacy" of the nineteenth century when the British fleet would +return to the scene of any crime against the crown and extract +its retribution through the wholesale destruction of offending +villages.</p> + +<p>There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve +Shock and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the +perception of that prowess, and the inevitability of retribution +were among the most significant factors. In other words, +reprisals and the use of force to exact a severe punishment, as +well as the certainty that this sword of Damocles would descend, +were essential ingredients. The distinction between this category +and the others is the ex post facto nature of achieving Shock and +Awe. In the other categories, there is the need for seizing the +initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to achieve Shock +and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have already +been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise of +new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use +of force.</p> + +<p>The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability +of reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is +not and may not always be the case with the United States, +although we can attempt to make others believe it will be. The +takeover of the Embassy in Tehran by dissident "students" in 1979 +and American impotence in the aftermath are suggestive of the +shortcoming. That aside, the example or perception of the +invincibility of American military power is not a bad one to +embellish.</p> + +<p>The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the +Decay and Default model and is based on the imposition of +societal breakdown over a lengthy period but without the +application of massive destruction. This example is obviously not +rapid but cumulative. In this example, both military and societal +values are targets. Selective and focused force is applied. It is +the long-term corrosive effects of the continuing breakdown in +the system and society that ultimately compels an adversary to +surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe are therefore not +immediate either in application or in producing the end result. +Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and aggravate +the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do not +threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese +water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the +preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a +variant of Shock and Awe in the form of frustration collapsing +the will to resist.</p> + +<p>The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In +many cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock +and Awe is unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by +conventional or politically acceptable means.</p> + +<p>The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted +Police," whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you +can send a bullet." The distinction between this example and the +others is that this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu +and implies that standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in +place can achieve the required objectives. There should not be +too fine a point, however, in belaboring differences with the +other examples in this regard over standoff. A stealthy aircraft +bombing unimpededly is not distinct from a cruise missile fired +at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance on target.</p> + +<p>A few observations about these examples offer insights on +which to test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It +is clear that the targets in each category include military, +civilian, industrial, infrastructure, and societal components of +a country or group. In certain cases, time is the crucial +consideration in imposing Shock and Awe and in most of the +examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden imposition of Shock +and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects of Shock and +Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved over +time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences. +Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new +technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different +is the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force, +in understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in +executing military operations with deftness, are vital. While +this recognition is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting +brilliance and therefore on the presumption that brilliance may +be taught or institutionalized and is not a function only of +gifted individuals.</p> + +<p>There is also a key distinction between selective or precise +and massive application of force. Technology, in the form of +"zero CEP" weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory +capability of systems that are both precise and have the net +consequence of imposing massive disruption, destruction, or +damage. This damage goes beyond the loss of power grids and other +easily identifiable industrial targeting sets. Loss of all +communications can have a massively destructive impact even +though physical destruction can be relatively limited.</p> + +<p>In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal +levels of power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the +attempt to keep war "immaculate," at least in limiting collateral +damage, one point should not be forgotten. Above all, war is a +nasty business or, as Sherman put it, "war is hell." While there +are surely humanitarian considerations that cannot or should not +be ignored, the ability to Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the +ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm. The +Clausewitzian dictum concerning the violent nature of war is +dismissed only at our peril.</p> + +<p>For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the +concerned Member of Congress with responsibility for providing +for the common defense, what lessons emerge from these examples +and hierarchies? First, there are always broader sets of +operational concepts and constructs available for achieving +political objectives than may be realized. Not all of these +alternatives are necessarily better or feasible. However, the +examples suggest that further intellectual and conceptual effort +is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national security +options in the future.</p> + +<p>Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in +generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally +viewed as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to +arrive "firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from +advancing, or to ensure we had ample forces on station should +they be required. Rapid Dominance would alleviate many of these +constraints as we would have the capacity to deploy effective +forces far more quickly. Therefore, in this case, we can view +time as an ally. The political issue rests in longstanding +arguments to limit the President from having the capacity to +deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation without +conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is an +obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force +packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and +experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and +emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant +presidential authority can be handled responsibly.</p> + +<p>Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of +several models, it is clear that one capability not presently in +the arsenal is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise +and timely. It is also clear that, while deception, guile, and +brilliance are important attributes in war, there are no +guarantees that they can be institutionalized in any military +force.</p> + +<p>Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates +to the Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High +Powered Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide +broad ability to incapacitate even a relatively primitive +society. In using these weapons, the nerve centers of that +society would be attacked rather than using this illustrative +system to achieve hard target kill because there were few hard +targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like systems have been and are +being carefully researched.</p> + +<p>Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, +and misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid +Dominance would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By +using complete signature management, larger formations could be +made to look like smaller and smaller formations made to seem +larger. At sea, carrier battle groups could be disguised and +smaller warships could be made to appear as large formations. +This signature management would apply across the entire spectrum +of the senses and not just radar or electronic ranges. Indeed, +gaining the ability to regulate what information and intelligence +are both available and not available to the adversary is a key +aim. This is more than denial or deception. It is control in the +fullest sense of the word.</p> + +<p>The next step is to match the four significant characteristics +that define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives +in order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure +forces and force packages accordingly, and determine those +integrated systems and innovative uses of technologies and +capabilities that will provide the necessary means to achieve +these objectives in conditions that include both the MRC and +OOTW.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="ch_03"></a>Strategic, Policy, and +Operational Application</h1> + +<p>In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid +Dominance, it is crucial to consider the political context in +which force is likely to be employed. As we enter the next +century, the probability is low that an overriding, massive, +direct threat posed by a peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge +in the near term. Without compelling reasons, public tolerance +toward American sacrifice abroad will remain low and may even +decrease. This reluctance on the part of Americans to tolerate +pain is directly correlated to perceptions of threat to U.S. +interests. Without a clear and present danger, the definition of +national interest may remain narrow.</p> + +<p>Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military +solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are +likely to be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be +resolvable before American political staying power is exhausted. +In this period, political micro-management and fine tuning are +likely to be even more prevalent as administrations respond to +public sentiments for minimizing casualties and, without a threat +or compelling reason, U.S. involvement.</p> + +<p>Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically +correct" alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to +presenting the nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a +decisive and irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was +not politically feasible because it would have shattered the +allied coalition while exceeding the authority of the UN mandate. +Military operations that impact across a whole population or +cause "innocent civilians" to suffer (e.g., some economic +sanctions, collateral damage from raids) also are likely to be +only politically acceptable in aggravated situations. For +example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or other health +problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling impacts +hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy may +be the ultimate victim.</p> + +<p>The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a +supporting foreign policy role with discrete missions that are +only one facet of a larger political context. This context is +almost certainly going to expand into militarily grey areas of +OOTW, including those impinging on law enforcement and ensuring +political stability. Forces may be called upon to deal with or +control situations on the margin rather than to achieve total +submission or defeat of an opponent. The prevailing political +preference is likely to continue to be to try to bound these +complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial constructs, +and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst of +internal conflict. Economic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), "no +fly" zones (e.g., Southern and Northern Iraq and Bosnia), "safe +havens" (e.g., Bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all +means necessary" (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection +and evacuation (e.g., Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the +kinds of OOTW tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. +Such tasks tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They +also increase vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the +bombing of the Kolbah Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996.</p> + +<p>Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct +threat to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define. +Therefore, when intervention is necessary there is likely to be +both a political and practical imperative to have allied or +international involvement or at least the political cover of the +UN, NATO, or appropriate NGOs.</p> + +<p>As more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear, +chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) +capabilities and longer range delivery means, the ability for +rogues to inflict pain will increase as will the ability to +ratchet up the political risks. WMD can easily complicate our +ability to influence positive and constructive behavior of +possessors. Because of the threat of retaliation, WMD +capabilities may become politically acceptable targets provided +collateral damage to civilians is minimized. Preemption may +become a more realistic option along the lines of Israel's +strikes against Syria's nuclear reactors in 1982. It is, however, +a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully struck +a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with +precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians +have been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical, +biological, or nuclear materials.</p> + +<p>There must also be an appropriate political context that +justifies the use of preemptive force, as opposed to less +destructive or non-lethal types of sanctions (e.g., responses to +terrorism in the case of Libya, invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, +exports of WMD to a threatening country such as Iran, the North +Korean threat to South Korea and Japan).</p> + +<p>The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability +to deter and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to +its vital interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an +unsettled, less structured, and volatile world, the ability to +use force with precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when +needed, rapidity, will still be a powerful influence on +cooperation, stability, and, where relevant, submission.</p> + +<p>Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if +achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this +turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the +breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability, +without potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely +predicted invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with +that tangled and messy situation might have been much different. +Thousands of lives might have been spared. In other grey or +marginal situations Rapid Dominance could make the difference +between a politically acceptable response or inadequate action +with consequences similar to what happened in Bosnia.</p> + +<p>In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might be +used, it is first important to know what it is that we want to +achieve with military force. We need to consider whether the +application of force will allow us to influence and control an +adversary's will or merely exacerbate a bad situation. Therefore, +it is essential to know what is of value to that adversary. An +objective, realistic, and in-depth situational grasp will be +essential to such an understanding. For example, disarming or +destroying may produce unintended consequences. For a +conventional foe that values its military and depends on +technology, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and +persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the +opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against +military formations may be considerably less and must be +carefully assessed.</p> + +<p>As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S. +security, the cost in casualties needs to be low. To be +effective, we must take away an opponent's ability to make it +cost us in terms of casualty levels we consider intolerable. In +applying Rapid Dominance we also must be defending something +which is of value to us. The lower the value in terms of our +national interests, the lower the price we are likely to be +willing to pay.</p> + +<p>In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat, +destroy, or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in OOTW, +other non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals +made more limited. For example, it may be necessary to intimidate +or capture the leadership in order to restore order or reverse an +action, or it may simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and +counter opposition to conduct of a more limited mission (e.g., +feeding the starving or protecting innocent people from +genocide).</p> + +<p>In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk +will be minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional +use of force with minimal collateral damage. This means that +there must be a belief that a mission can be accomplished and is +worth the resources necessary to do so. Before initiating action +in these often confusing situations, objectives must be clearly +established and, once engaged, there should be a willingness to +persevere through the inevitable rough patches.</p> + +<p>Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know what +we want to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task for +political leadership which is informed with military advice +concerning what is feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain. +The extent of the mission must be clearly defined. Is it to +defeat an enemy so it will no longer pose a threat? Do we only +need to stop an adversary from carrying out a particular act? +Must we control a situation entirely or only sufficiently to be +able to carry out a specific mission? Can we really affect the +adversary's will?</p> + +<p>Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be +relevant in the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of +outcomes-from reversing military action (e.g., the invasion of +Kuwait); to establishing a government more acceptable to the U.S. +and the world, probably using military coercion (Haiti, Panama); +to eliminating a threat to the U.S. or its allies. We may want to +persuade an adversary to cease an aggression or act of +interference or otherwise change behavior we cannot accept or +tolerate. Political expectations in MRCs are for the effective +use of force and for rapid success or at least steady progress. +Casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with the +threshold of American pain dependent on the directness of the +threat to U.S. interests and with the degree of compellance +appropriate to the political rationale.</p> + +<p>OOTW present a different set of challenges. These challenges +are likely to require discrete dominance of specific +circumstances rather than total dominance. The general tasks may +include a wide variety of requirements. For example, it may be +necessary to try to prevent or stop genocide (e.g., Rwanda) and +ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The task may be to cooperate +with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g., prevention of starvation +in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of employing force may be free +and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia). The requirement +could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an above-ground or +underground chemical weapons plant or documented nuclear weapons +facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states).</p> + +<p>Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights +(e.g., protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in +the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge +might be to accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to +deal with Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubtedly +will face the future requirement to reverse a potential threat to +Americans or to a region of importance with a limited military +action (e.g., in Grenada in 1983 or the Mayaguez rescue in +Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to bolster preventive diplomacy +and/or overt measures to demonstrate preparedness to assist +(e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad under threat of +invasion from Libya and recent Navy operations in the Taiwan +Strait) will still be relevant.</p> + +<p>Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda +(hostage rescue-e.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijacking-e.g., <em>Achille +Lauro</em>; deterrent to further moves-e.g., the Higgins +operation, Libyan raids, missile attack on Iraq after the threat +to former President Bush). We may also need to interdict weapons, +terrorists, or other discrete cargoes moving between nations +(e.g., North Korean missile shipments to Iran, Iranian and Libyan +arms exchanges).</p> + +<p>Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable +political alternative or a necessary political prelude to an +offensive military step (e.g., implemented as the first step in +actions to counter Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an +alternative to war with Iraq; used ineffectively against the +Serbs to try to convince them not to continue to support Bosnian +Serb aggression; and tried with Haiti as an unsuccessful +alternative to occupation). Our past experience has been that we +seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these economic +measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is required +to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in +controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations. +Sanctions almost always require full international cooperation +which cannot be assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course, some +portions of the arms embargo were deliberately allowed to be +permeable and the U.S. turned a blind eye to Iran's support of +the Bosnians.</p> + +<p>Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about +the potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabilities +enhancing these outcomes could make a decisive difference in +dealing with future challenges. History also cautions us as well +that there will be restraints in employing Rapid Dominance and +that there are fundamental differences in MRC and OOTW +applications.</p> + +<p>Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effective +in the past. They will be effective in the future, even when +applied in limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing +impact envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many examples of +how a very limited application of force made a significant +difference through the mechanisms of Shock and Awe. Experiences, +including successes and failures, illustrate some of the +potential of Rapid Dominance if implemented effectively.</p> + +<p>The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes, +which made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during +the Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging negotiations with +the North Vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an +acceptable conclusion. Daily reports following the controversial +B-52 "carpet" bombing raids in Cambodia talked of North +Vietnamese/Vietcong soldiers wandering around in a daze due to +shock and concussion. Both B-52s and naval gunfire, especially +from 16 inch guns of a battleship, had a similar impact on +invading North Vietnamese troop concentrations. The mining of +Haiphong Harbor, although initiated late in the war, was equally +effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of North +Vietnam.</p> + +<p>When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing +problems of our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as take +away substantial political leverage from the North Vietnamese, he +directed the raid to rescue prisoners jailed just outside Hanoi. +The raid itself was well executed. American forces reached and +searched the prison and returned safely. But no Americans were +freed because a last minute transfer of the POWs from the prison +had not been detected. If there had been prisoners still there to +be rescued, the operation would have been a highly dramatic and +influential event. The point is that accurate and timely +intelligence remains crucial.</p> + +<p>There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and +naval air strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the +discotheque terrorist attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The +perception that he personally might be targeted appeared to get +Gadhafi's attention.</p> + +<p>When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian +soldiers from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed +around the island to confront them. At the sight of tank guns, +the seemingly stubborn occupants surrendered almost immediately +without a fight.</p> + +<p>The cease fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow +after the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket +bombardments of Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given +that both sides were exhausted at that point, a show of force +could have been convincing. Strong U.S. action in response to +Iran's mining of neutral waters may also have had a sobering +effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iran's vulnerable +oil-producing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed with +impunity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out +to challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraq's reign of +terror, and the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped +end the war.</p> + +<p>In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned +immediate respect from potential troublemakers with their ability +to see wide areas night or day, remain on station for hours as +night patrols, and strike with precision and relative impunity. +The methodical drone of AC-130s circling in the air was enough to +restore some order, although a few civilians found the noise +unsettling. In another situation, the aftermath of systematic UN +efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed Aideed's illegal arms +facilities generated an unexpected reaction from other warlords, +including those colluding with him, which was to volunteer to +hand over their own weapons storage areas. For a fleeting moment, +Shock and Awe created an important opportunity.</p> + +<p>During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would +appear that when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of air +power, rather than occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed +finally to understand that an appearance of cooperation rather +than defiance was in their interest. This NATO message in the +form of air power, of course, was strengthened by the +effectiveness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim +counter-offensive and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters. +Sustaining the shock effect with forces on the ground was a +necessary combination to gain the staying power effect to change +the will of the Serbs. It was not accomplished by air alone. +Timing remains important.</p> + +<p>Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance might +have made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations. +Rapid Dominance might have provided a better response to those +setbacks or might have offered a more effective alternative that +would have avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the +first place (e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy rescue in 1980, +Lebanon Marine barracks bombing in 1983, response to the Pueblo +seizure by North Korea in 1968, and the reaction to the downed +helicopters during the Ranger raid in Somalia).</p> + +<p>We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated +effective application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance. +Israel's rout of Syria's air force and missile defenses in +Lebanon's Baaka Valley shows how dramatic success can have +political spillover. On the other hand, Japan's surprise attack +on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse effects of Shock and Awe and +had the unintended consequence of galvanizing the U.S. into +action.</p> + +<p>Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a +more technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these +examples and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain +improvements in capabilities would provide us with greater +flexibility in the future. This is especially true in OOTW +situations, which require a multiplicity of effective instruments +at our disposal. It is also true that certain operations such as +peacekeeping tend to be manpower intensive.</p> + +<p>If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of +value to that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated +intelligence is essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels +unprecedented in scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in +real time. The Gulf War, despite its success, showed classic +limitations in intelligence. Even though we had nearly every +intelligence asset designed to deal with the USSR available for +use, we were unable to detect the full extent of Iraq's WMD +capability; unable to find mobile missile launchers even with a +major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some cases, we could +only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing forces; and we +mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate but had +civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human +intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, +in order to understand what is happening in deep underground +facilities).</p> + +<p>Another important capability we should try to achieve in the +future is the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or +significantly influence the perceptions and understanding of +individual troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated +repeatedly in recent years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in +Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a +perception is particularly relevant when the problem appears not +to be caused by a unified population but by the ambitions of +individual leaders who have intimidated or killed off any likely +internal opposition. Such a capability requires effective +real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for accomplishing +the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to effective +"snatch" operations).</p> + +<p>In a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political +imperative, we will continue to need the ability to shut down all +commerce into and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, +and roads. We ought to be able to do this in a much more +thorough, decisive, and shocking way than we have in the past. +The ability to apply pressure or cause acquiescence employing +non-lethal means also will be important in some circumstances. +Weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do not kill in +significant numbers may be the only ones that are politically +acceptable in the future. This also means that crowd control with +minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances, the +costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically +expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the +U.S. and internationally.</p> + +<p>As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down +key electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or +within a specific sub-group or faction). We also need the ability +to control radio and television within a country. It is +important, however, in all cases, to be able to deny an +adversary's ability to communicate and to have our own means of +reaching the population with appropriate messages.</p> + +<p>In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities +selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert +stockpiles, fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to +have the capability selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or +destroy other things considered of great value to opponents. +Increased targeting precision will compound effectiveness as well +as help to avoid the political pitfalls of using force such as +the inevitable, unintended collateral damage that has been the +pattern of the past.</p> + +<p>More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, +however, will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on +utilizing Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are substantial +differences in the political constraints likely to be imposed in +dealing with MRCs and with OOTW. For example, there is much +greater latitude to use dominant force and Shock and Awe in MRCs +than in OOTW.</p> + +<p>In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional +powers which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly +dependent on technology. Although more powerful, these developed +states are also likely to be especially vulnerable to a +technologically sophisticated approach such as Rapid Dominance as +long as we maintain this military edge and the ability to +neutralize their military systems. Even in the most compelling +circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used, however, +support from other nations will be politically desirable.</p> + +<p>In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of +value to an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the +numbers and types of weapons that can be employed. For example, +the political circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be +employed are quite limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain +actions are politically as well as morally unacceptable except in +extreme cases. Such restrictions are likely to apply to targets +affecting control of access to food, water, and clean air, and to +destruction of religious and cultural centers, even if there is +low collateral damage.</p> + +<p>In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism +of using excessive force, especially if there is civilian or +collateral damage. The concept of proportionality is likely to +remain an operative principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to +extremes, especially if the marginal nature of a situation leads +to a marginal and ineffective response. Some people, both +military and civilian, even argue that superior technology should +not be employed in such situations and that an adversary should +be fought on his own terms. While such arguments should be +rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political influence +that must be considered. We should always use technology to +minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce +collateral damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same +time, there needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant +destruction or denial. Our actions must always be consistent with +our own system of values.</p> + +<p>The "rapid" component of Rapid Dominance is one of the most +appealing aspects of the concept, both politically and +militarily. The ability to take action that is timely and +decisive multiplies substantially the chances of ultimate +success. Action needs to be taken precisely when it will have +greatest impact. Often initial public outrage and political +support for action in response to a provocation subsides if a +prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take +action.</p> + +<p>The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate +information and act on it effectively, is also an important +advantage. In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few +years ago, it was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing +faster than the defensive chain of command could make counter +moves. The tradition of sending decisions up the line was simply +too slow to cope with the dynamic challenge posed by the +adversary. Commanders on scene lacked the authority to respond +and adjust to rapidly changing situations. The exercise +graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need to +institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It also +demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions +in real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing +the overall effort.</p> + +<p>The Navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the 1980s +in order to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and +the need to integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive +missile, air, sea, and undersea capabilities of a battle group +and its joint components (e.g., AWACs). This concept was one way +of solving the time problem while keeping the overall commander +in the picture. The commander could then intervene and modify +actions as necessary to conform to the broader strategy. This +type of control was helped by the evolution of electronic links +and secure communications and the availability of satellites.</p> + +<p>Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to orchestrate +it using similar principles, while applying greater selective +ability to turn on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and +devices influencing the whole operational picture. Technology +should also give commanders a much better grasp of what is +evolving during a battle. Just as the American military of today +has made "owning the night" part of its tactical advantage, +"owning" the dimension of time will be critical to the success of +Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<p>In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future +force configuration and the design of a mission capability +package (MCP) based on Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<h2>Operational Construct</h2> + +<p>Rapid Dominance is based on affecting the adversary's will, +perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient Shock and +Awe to overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our aims. Four +characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control of the environment.</p> + +<p>Application of all or of selective capabilities within the +Rapid Dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct +the application of military/defense resources and produce the +requisite outcome. Rapid Dominance envisages the execution of +specific actions in real or near real time to counter actions or +intentions deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. On the high end +of conflict, Rapid Dominance would introduce a reaction of Shock +and Awe in areas of highest value to the threatening individual, +group, or state. In many cases, prior understanding of the power +of Rapid Dominance would act as a deterrent to the objectionable +action. When used, Rapid Dominance would ensure favorable early +resolution of issues with minimal loss of lives and collateral +damage. The concept theoretically should be able to impact +adversarial situations that apply across the board to high, mid, +low, no, or minimal technology threats.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war +fighting capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a +sophisticated, interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted +intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications +systems, data analysis, and real-time deliverable actionable +information to the shooter. This network must provide total +situational awareness and supporting nodal analysis that enables +U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's decision loop in a +manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe among the +threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this +knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific +functions or all essential functions near simultaneously. This +will often times be netted pieces of data where the sum of the +parts gives the answer and the battlefield advantage to the force +possessing this rapidly netted information.</p> + +<p>The "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get +real-time actionable targeting information to the appropriate +shooter, whether the shooter is a tank division, an individual +tank, an artillery battery, an individual rifle man, a naval +battle group, an individual ship, an air wing/squadron, or an +aircraft in flight. This means the need to have the right shooter +in the right place; locating and identifying the target correctly +and quickly; allocating and assigning targets rapidly; getting +the "shoot" order or general authority to the shooter; and then +assessing the battle damage accurately.</p> + +<p>At whatever the unit level, Shock and Awe are provided by the +speed and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do +this simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a +strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, +and populous. This simultaneity and concurrency are central +tenets of imposing Shock and Awe. When the video results of these +attacks are broadcast in real time worldwide on CNN, the positive +impact on coalition support and negative impact on potential +threat support can be decisive.</p> + +<p>The first priority of a doctrine of Rapid Dominance should be +to deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions +that are either unacceptable to U.S. national security interests +or endanger the democratic community of states and access to free +markets. These political objectives are generally those +envisioned in the major and lower regional conflict scenarios +(MRC & LRC). Should deterrence fail, the application of Rapid +Dominance in these circumstances should create sufficient Shock +and Awe to the immediate threat forces and leadership as well as +provide a clear message for other potential threat partners. The +doctrine of Rapid Dominance would not be limited to MRC and LRC +scenarios. It has applications in a variety of areas such as +countering WMD, terrorism, and perhaps other tasks. The challenge +is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based +on Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat, yet +decisive enough to convey the right degree of Shock and Awe. +Rapid Dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's +problems. We repeat our disclaimer that this is not a silver +bullet. However, Rapid Dominance and its capacity for achieving +Shock and Awe could be applied for egregious threats or +violations of international law, such as:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Direct military threats to the territory of the U.S., its +friends, and allies;</li> + +<li>Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small +state;</li> + +<li>Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD;</li> + +<li>Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; +and</li> + +<li>Threat to essential world markets.</li> +</ul> + +<p>Clearly, the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign +borders and penetrating even the most closed societies. The +inequities and benefits in all societies are becoming known to +the masses as well as the power brokers. The requirement for +Rapid Dominance to develop sophisticated capabilities to +penetrate the Information Highway and create road blocks as well +as control inputs/outputs to the highway both overtly and +covertly is fundamental to the concept.</p> + +<p>These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies +targeting international crime and drug cartels using the highway. +Closer interagency cooperations and coordination between military +and law enforcement activities and capabilities must be +established. Experience with the military involvement in the drug +war revealed considerable cultural differences between these +organizations. Overcoming these cultural differences among +organizations is not easy. The required trust and confidence for +sharing sensitive information and support between these agencies +and the military needs to be developed further. Interagency +coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level of +sophistication. Some laws may need to be changed. War in +Cyberspace does not recognize domestic or foreign boundaries. In +this environment the subjects of Information Warfare and +Information In Warfare take on new meaning and require focused +development. We must become proficient within this +environment.</p> + +<h2>Operational Assumptions</h2> + +<ul> +<li>The enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict +(i.e., we are surprised).</li> + +<li>We then attain control of the initiative through superior +speed, knowledge, and capacity to act and react.</li> + +<li>Our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements must +convince the enemy there is no hope.</li> + +<li>Combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times, places, +and tempo of choosing.</li> + +<li>Allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from +political objectives through combat to include psychological +warfare.</li> + +<li>The enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest importance +to him and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness of our +attack.</li> +</ul> + +<p>From these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow +that help to define a Rapid Dominance Force with more specificity +in improving:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressor's +actions</li> + +<li>The length of time required for a decision to react</li> + +<li>Decisive responses at various levels and times after the +crises or conflict begins to develop: + +<ul> +<li>Respond in 1 to 3 days with air and missile strikes and +special forces</li> + +<li>Respond in 5 to 10 days with more massive power up to and +including a joint task force of corps size</li> + +<li>Respond in 10 to 30 days with a second corps</li> +</ul> +</li> +</ul> + +<h2>The Rapid Dominance MCP</h2> + +<p>As a next step, we need to sketch out what a Rapid Dominance +Force might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and +space joint task force supported by necessary intelligence assets +that can impose sufficient Shock and Awe to break the will of the +adversary. First, this force will emphasize capabilities to +maximize the core characteristics of knowledge of self, +adversary, and environment; rapidity; brilliance in execution; +and control of the environment.</p> + +<p>Knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness. It +means understanding the adversary's mind and anticipating his +reactions. It means targeting those things that will produce the +intended Shock and Awe. And, it means having feedback and good, +timely battle assessment to enable knowledge to be used +dynamically as well as to know how our forces will react.</p> + +<p>Rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and +always on a timely basis. Rapidity can be instant or as +required.</p> + +<p>Brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards +of operational competence and, through a superiority of +knowledge, maintaining the ability to impose Shock and Awe +through continuously surprising and psychologically and +physically breaking the adversary's will to resist. This will +require training and exercising of joint land, sea, air, space, +and special forces to new standards of excellence and competence. +It is mainly in training where the difference lies in achieving +operational brilliance. This desired standard of performance can +be achieved by making innovations to permit new levels of +battlefield fidelity for training units and developing +leaders.</p> + +<p>Control of the environment would include complete signature +control on the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. We +would control our signatures as well as what we wanted the +adversary to see or hear and what we do not want the enemy to +know. Destruction of the adversary's systems would begin with +long-range stealthy, or "stand-off" Zero CEP weapons, extend to +FOG-M type battlefield weapons to close-in systems. Small units +would be able to call in "fires" for 360 degrees on a nearly +instant basis.</p> + +<p>Attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception, +disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. "Pulse" +weapons would be used to disarm and actively deceive the enemy +through disrupting and attacking all aspects of the adversary's +electronics, information, and C4I infrastructure. It is this "lay +down" of total power across all areas in rapid and simultaneous +actions that would impose the Shock and Awe.</p> + +<p>The remainder, roughly a third of this Joint Task Force, would +consist of traditional platforms including conventional ground, +air, and amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the +necessary supporting logistical, C4I, medical and other +capabilities and ground forces to conduct and sustain +conventional or traditional operations if needed and to support +or defend traditionally vulnerable targets such as ports, roads, +and other infrastructure.</p> + +<p>Tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions +of the MRC. In general, the most rapidly deployable units of this +corps, the future equivalent of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps, +would be sent to secure or reinforce a limited area into which +the remainder of the force would flow. This AOR would be +self-protected. Our goal is that perhaps a Rapid Dominance force +of as few as 2,000 troops could successfully defend against an +enemy of 10-20,000 in an MRC and that a full corps can be +deployed within 5 to 10 days.</p> + +<p>These units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin +disarming, destroying, and disabling the enemy's military +wherewithal using "stand-off" capabilities. Forward-based or +long-range reconnaissance units could be employed/supported by +UAVs and overhead surveillance.</p> + +<p>Units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time +phased plan. These units would be used either to complete the +attack or to carry it to the adversary, occupy selective +territory physically, or carry out the requirements of the +post-war occupation campaign. Should traditional forces be +needed, they would of course be available.</p> + +<p>Protection and self-defense would partly be provided by +controlling the environment. In effect, we would cast a cloak +around the adversary and permit the adversary to see and know +what we alone provided. This would leave an adversary blind, +deaf, and dumb. With superior and rapid firepower, the blinded, +deafened enemy would be destroyed and defeated as we saw fit. +This would maximize Shock and Awe and help break the adversary's +will.</p> + +<p>In OOTW, the Rapid Dominance JTF might function as follows. +First, the ability to deploy dominant force rapidly to attack or +threaten to attack appropriate targets could be brought to bear +without involving manpower-intense or manned sensors and weapons. +Second, once deployed, since self-defense is likely to be +required against small arms, mines, and shoulder carried or +mortar weapons, certainly some form of "armor" or protective +vehicles and shelters would be necessary. However, through the +UAVs, C4I, and virtual reality systems, as well as through +signature management and other Shock and Awe weapons including +High Powered Microwave (HPM) and "stun-like" systems, this force +would have more than dominant battlefield awareness.</p> + +<p>There are, of course, caveats. Unless strategic or policy +objectives are in line with operational capabilities, military +force is unlikely to be a useful instrument. It is also unlikely +that any operational construct, no matter how brilliantly +conceived, could overcome such a disconnect. Vietnam and Somalia +remind us of these limitations.</p> + +<p>The assimilation of intelligence-strategically, culturally, +and operationally-is a central thrust and component of the +knowledge aspect of Rapid Dominance. Our forces must not only +fight smarter; these forces, at all or most levels, must be +educated and trained differently with far more emphasis on +intelligence, broadly defined. This knowledge, when applied +rapidly under conditions of brilliance and in a controlled +environment, is a centerpiece of Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<p>There must be full comprehension of the adversary across +strategic, political, military, cultural, intellectual, and +perceptual lines. This understanding must go beyond how an +adversary might use military force. Those crucial values that +motivate and underlie a nation or a group must be understood if +the appropriate level of Shock and Awe is to be achieved.</p> + +<p>There are also obvious questions that must be answered. Does +Rapid Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the +conflict spectrum involving more traditional applications of +force to achieve political objectives, as envisioned in the MRC +and LRC scenarios? Yet to be explored is the degree to which a +concept of Rapid Dominance with Shock and Awe applies to OOTW, +countering terrorism against U.S. interests, controlling rogue +states/leaders, etc. What are the political and military +prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable and +realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction +of national non-government organizations (PVOs/NGOs) present +worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care to refugees and +other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of Rapid +Dominance with a degree of Shock and Awe offend and generate +counterproductive public relations backlash from those who +believe force should only be used as a last resort and then with +a measurable degree of proportionality?</p> + +<p>At this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have +them answered at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, +and issues as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up +front and answered in the Rapid Dominance concept development +process. We must be careful that we do not overvisualize Rapid +Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable capabilities +to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance must still confront the +fog of war. Decisions will still be made based on judgment and +confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat +intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and +confidence in our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and +Awe. In fact, the key will be the ability to penetrate this fog +with increased clarity and to control events now unmanageable +through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and distributing +actionable information. Complicating the issue is the fact that +the U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-Cold War +era. As the world's only credible superpower, the U.S. cannot +avoid a leadership role but neither can it avoid the focused +criticism applied to all leaders. This is the classical "damned +if you do and damned if you don't" syndrome.</p> + +<p>At this stage, the concept of Rapid Dominance is a work in +progress. It needs to be "operationalized." By designing a +nominal MCP and fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, +we can explore the answers to many of the questions we raised +above. Three steps are needed to proceed down the road on the way +to a real capability. First, feasibility of the requisite +technical capabilities needs to be established. Second, wargaming +of the MCP must be done. Third, and perhaps most difficult, +deriving the means for implementing the most promising aspects of +Rapid Dominance must occur.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="ch_04"></a>An Outline for System +Innovation and Technological Integration</h1> + +<p>Achieving Shock and Awe is central to Rapid Dominance, and +therefore must serve as the key organizing principle for any +rigorous examination and exploitation of system concepts and +technologies for Rapid Dominance. Understanding the interplay +between technology and doctrine is not only or simply a +straightforward matter of establishing operational requirements +and then seeking to attain them through invention and design. It +is a complex and interactive process of experimentation and +discovery wherein intellect, hard work, endurance, and innovation +must drive the use of technology. Rather than make changes, +however significant, to modifying current capabilities or +building newer, similar ones, Rapid Dominance seeks to identify +and field systems specifically designed to achieve Shock and +Awe-systems that may break the mold much as the Model T Ford once +did years ago.</p> + +<p>The genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, +computer-aided design tools used by engineers, vast database +management systems in place in corporate offices, +computer-controlled machines enabling composite materials, and +the countless academic, business, and personal computers are all +evidence of the prominent and ever increasing role information +technologies have assumed in modern economies. Many of the +technologies underlying the Information Age are being spearheaded +by U.S. small business and its entrepreneurial culture. +Certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in Japan to +software development businesses in India, the rest of the world +participates and competes. But few can deny that U.S. industry +provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of +information technologies as they are most broadly defined. This +leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the United +States with an ever increasing military advantage over competing +nations.</p> + +<p>Leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporating +it into U.S. forces; it is likely to include a significant +redesign of both forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly +evolving technologies. Many of the technologies that will support +Rapid Dominance are already discernible. Unlike the impact of +nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that a single technology or +system will emerge to produce Rapid Dominance. It will only be +attainable through the broadest integration of strategic +concepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological advances, +system design, and appropriate organization of command, control, +training and education. And only a large, immensely capable +country such as the U.S. may be able to achieve this.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of +strategy, technology, and innovation. Four core characteristics +were defined earlier as crucial:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the +environment;</li> + +<li>Rapidity;</li> + +<li>Brilliance of execution; and</li> + +<li>Control of the environment.</li> +</ul> + +<p>What follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how +technology can be used in a broad system approach. Many of these +technologies currently are being addressed within the defense +community. Analysts, military strategists, acquisition planners, +and even "futurists" are wrestling with the meaning and +consequences of the Information Age. Our focus on systems and +technologies begins with these four characteristics.</p> + +<h2>Knowledge of Self, Adversary, and Environment</h2> + +<p>In the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate +where the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. Even 5 +years ago, who would have foreseen the significant involvement of +the U.S. military in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, +and the South China Sea? To which hot spots can we expect to see +U.S. troops deployed over the next 5 years? Over the next 20? In +this section we argue that, in addition to improving our force +capabilities, the U.S. must develop an intelligence repository +far more extensive than during the Cold War, covering virtually +all the important regions and organizational structures +throughout the world.</p> + +<p>During the Cold War, intelligence agencies focused more on a +bipolar world and built sizable organizations to collect +information on "the other side." This same intelligence +structure, in the main, is in place today facing a multipolar +world, where any number of power structures-whether they be +states, international organizations, or even small groups of +individuals-must be monitored with an understanding that extends +to their leadership, culture, economic direction, and military +capability.</p> + +<p>As the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his +environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift +from technology developments that once resided within our +government to those driven by commercial demands. For example, +the information technologies used by U.S. intelligence agencies +are of such complexity, importance, and expense that they are +referred to as "national assets" and are developed and managed by +large, dedicated organizations. Even here, commercial companies +are rapidly encroaching on what once seemed to be an unassailable +market position in Earth observation systems. One may already +purchase synthetic aperture radar interferometry images from any +number of sources, and panchromatic visual images with one meter +resolution will soon be available over the counter for remarkably +little cost. Indeed, the only real barrier to this burgeoning +market is the understandable concerns that governments have with +allowing such technology to be widely available. In areas such as +encryption and data security, commercial developers are more +likely to reach limits of government acceptance before those of +technological capability.</p> + +<p>With untold billions invested in communications systems, even +the most modern U.S. military communication systems often compare +poorly with commercial systems. While this has long been the case +for fielded systems, it is becoming true for even the most +sophisticated research and development programs being undertaken +by defense organizations.</p> + +<p>As a case in point, one may consider a program recently +initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency +(DARPA) called Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination +(BADD). At the heart of this program, large amounts of data are +collected within a vast database residing on commercial computers +and enterprise management systems. This information is then +disseminated to the troops through the commercial Global +Broadcast System (GBS) onto "set-top" boxes, an enabling +technology that was developed commercially. Even with this +leveraging of private industry, there is a real question as to +whether DARPA will be able to field a system that would compete +well with surprisingly similar commercial systems. Internet +channels planned by media industry giants such as BSkyB will +offer multi-megabit, interactive, digital data connections to the +Net merely as an enticement for subscribers to enroll for their +full digital broadcasting service (200 to 300 channels of digital +video and sound). Understanding that there is much more to BADD +than the little discussed here, one still almost wonders whether +DARPA could simply buy a subscription and connect it to an +appropriate, commercial, network management system. More to the +point, if even well funded and aggressive technology development +organizations such as DARPA find it difficult to remain ahead of +commercial advancements, there may be a fundamental lesson to be +learned regarding the management of defense-related +technologies.</p> + +<h2>Knowledge and Intelligence</h2> + +<p>"Intelligence" is comprised of five categories of knowledge +and understanding: a society's leadership; culture and values; +the strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; +military capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive +battlefield information. Examples of technologies and system +approaches of potential relevance in these areas are discussed +below.</p> + +<p>Understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and +involved neutral countries implies an infrastructure for +acquiring an in-depth knowledge about cultures, leadership +values, and other driving factors that allow us, when needed and +on a timely basis, to get "into their minds." Applicable +technologies include automated language translators, interactive +and autonomous computer simulations, advanced database systems +for organizing and understanding data and transactions of +individuals and institutions, and computerized educational +systems for training and learning these skills.</p> + +<p>Collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is +crucial to Rapid Dominance. Logistics, demographics, and +infrastructure are broad areas of collection along with +geography, road/rail/ship lanes, utility sites and corridors, +manufacturing, government sites, military and paramilitary +facilities, population demographics, economic and financial +pressure points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major dams +and bridges. Technologies used to provide environmental awareness +include traditional means such as satellites that can be +augmented with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing +observation routines. The vast quantities of data that reside on +the world's computer networks, if properly exploited, provide +another rich source of information. Data mining tools, such as +Web crawlers, gatherers, brokers, and repositories that pull and +organize data from public networks, will be essential to building +a more complete picture of potential adversaries. Since not all +databases and host computers are cooperative with these methods, +offensive information warfare tools will be required to obtain +specific pieces of information that are vital for national +security purposes.</p> + +<p>Once data are collected, they must be processed and +disseminated and then stored for future access. Enterprise data +storage and retrieval systems that are capable of working with +many terrabytes (1,000 gigabytes) of information are already +commonplace. Since it is impossible for humans to comprehend such +vast quantities of information without some assistance, data +exploitation tools (filters, fusion, automatic target +recognition, image understanding, etc.) will be crucial +technologies. Finally, the information, once processed, will be +of little use if not disseminated to the right people in a timely +fashion. "Intelligent data" dissemination and wide bandwidth +communications are examples of essential technologies emerging in +this area.</p> + +<p>In addition to knowledge about regions and locations where +U.S. force may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance +and up-to-date knowledge on specific "hot spots" and to have +sufficient flexibility within the system to shift attention +rapidly to new areas. Systems addressing this more time-sensitive +set of tasks would include light, quickly deployable satellites, +high altitude and endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, manned +platforms, and unattended ground sensors.</p> + +<p>As a crisis unfolds and the insertion of U.S. troops or other +military action becomes more probable, information needs and the +number of information consumers both increase dramatically. +Information that must be collected and correlated include +targeting, battle damage assessment (BDA), weather, terrain, +infrastructure, tracking of special targets, logistics, position +and status of our own troops, identification friend or foe (IFF), +and status of material. It is vitally important that sufficient +sensor systems work in all weather conditions and at night to +maintain the "operations tempo" required by Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<p>Battlefield awareness requires three information technologies: +collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable +information to a shooter. Rapid Dominance requires an +unprecedented level of real-time information collection that will +be provided by sensor systems such as space platforms, UAVs, +unattended ground sensors, and advanced manned reconnaissance +platforms. In addition, the entire infosphere of the adversary +will be monitored not only for classic information such as +operational commands but also to determine the shock effect being +created by Rapid Dominance operations. Collecting data from +cooperative sources such as one's own troops, allies, and +friendly non-combatants is also critical. While <em>Operation +Desert Storm</em> showed the value of self-location sensors such +as GPS, the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there is +still work to be done in terms of giving each commander and +soldier sufficient information to operate effectively. Much of +this information, such as the physiological status of individual +combatants, is not currently collected, and much of what is +sensed is not properly disseminated.</p> + +<p>It would be hard to overstate the importance of information +dissemination within Rapid Dominance. Administering Shock and Awe +requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is unable to +fathom, but our own forces must operate effectively, even +aggressively, within an environment that could easily lead to +serious information bottlenecks and overload. Commercial +technologies will be key to the U.S. developing a structure to +effectively disseminate information. Already, commercial +communications technologies such as global broadcast satellites +and protocols like those underlying the Internet have been used +as stop gaps by the U.S. military in major deployments.</p> + +<p>Merely transmitting the right information at the right time +will not be sufficient for operations enabling Rapid Dominance. +Information will need to be fused to create knowledge-based +displays. The technologies that will be important in this area go +beyond the data fusion algorithms currently in place and should +leverage heavily off of technologies in fields such as computer +image generation, virtual reality, and advanced simulation.</p> + +<h2>Rapidity</h2> + +<p>In a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of +operational planning, determining appropriate action, deployment, +and employment all focused toward minimizing response time. Three +factors combine to make military planning far more difficult +today than in the Cold War era. First, there is great uncertainty +early on in the location of a conflict, who the adversary may be, +and with whom one may be allied. Second, there is normally very +little time available for planning, with the military sometimes +having only weeks or days before committing troops to an +unanticipated mission. Third, vastly more information is +available to the planner, which is both a blessing and a curse. +Several technologies that partially define Intelligent Dynamic +Planning will make it easier for the commander to plan Rapid +Dominance:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Model based planning</li> + +<li>Machine intelligence</li> + +<li>Dynamic planning based upon feedback and new information</li> + +<li>Selectively automated decision aides (commanders +associate)</li> + +<li>Imbedded rehearsal and training</li> + +<li>Brilliance in Execution</li> +</ul> + +<p>It is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. However, the +standard can be set. The Dynamic Planning noted above is part of +the capability for this characteristic as are the systems and +technologies discussed below.</p> + +<h3>Technologies Critical to Achieving Brilliance in Rapid +Dominance</h3> + +<p>For shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage, +key targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed, and the +enemy must be made to feel completely helpless and unable to +consider a meaningful response. Furthermore, the enemy's +confusion must be complete, adding to a general impression of +impotence. Most importantly, strategic targets, military forces, +leadership and key societal resources must be located, tracked, +and targeted. This will require substantial sensor, +computational, and communication technologies. Designated targets +must be destroyed rapidly and with assurance. Finally, the status +and position of friendly forces must be known at all times, and +the logistics supporting them must be sufficiently flexible to +allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration, and decentralization +of location.</p> + +<p>Several technologies that can help in this are discussed +below, as divided into the following subsections: sensors, +computational systems, communications and system integration.</p> + +<h3>Sensor Technologies</h3> + +<p>Sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, +passive, imbedded, and processing.</p> + +<p><em>Active sensors:</em> By far, the most important of the +energy-emitting sensors is radar. Among the best all-weather +capabilities of any type of sensor, the role for and capabilities +of radar have steadily increased since the Second World War. +Radar systems are used for early warning, air defense, air asset +management, air traffic control, naval fleet defense, detection +and tracking of moving ground targets, missile targeting, missile +terminal guidance, terrain data development, and weather +prediction. For Rapid Dominance, radars and other active sensors +must operate with low probability of intercept. Particularly with +stealthy systems, this will present a unique challenge to +military systems where one may not expect a great amount of +"spin-on" from the commercial sector. It is vitally important to +be able to sense the enemy under all conditions and environments. +Sensors must penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such +as underground and underwater mines.</p> + +<p>There are many other important active sensor classes, three of +which are active acoustics, lidar and magnetic anomaly detectors. +Broadband underwater active acoustics could address pressing +needs such as shallow-water anti-submarine warfare and mine +detection (both buried and silt covered). The practical +application of lidar is a relatively recent development enabled +by advances in laser, power management, and data processing +technologies. Lidar can be used for fire control, weapon +guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent in the +near infrared (NIR) regime), and target imaging/recognition. +Lidar detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such as +vibration and motion and has proven very hard to spoof. Magnetic +anomaly detectors will continue to find application in areas of +anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare and in screening for weapons +at security checkpoints and elsewhere.</p> + +<p>Electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where +they create a signature of use to an enemy. The ability to emit +energy, yet in ways that are less discernible, should be an +attractive avenue to explore for the future. The coordinated +application of many sensor platforms, some of which may be +completely passive, in conjunction with emitting sensors is a +potentially major area of exploration.</p> + +<p><em>Passive sensors:</em> Among the passive sensor types, the +most important for U.S. forces is forward-looking infrared +(FLIR). FLIR technology has allowed the U.S. to "own the night," +as was handily displayed in <em>Operation Desert Storm</em>. Some +of the significant technology advancements underway in this area +include multiple wavelength sensors, very large focal planes, and +the increasing performance of uncooled sensors. Particularly in +the area of uncooled sensors, commercial developments are +underway that promise to drastically reduce the cost of competent +IR sensors.</p> + +<p>Other passive sensor technologies of note include +hyperspectral visible/NIR collection and processing and +inexpensive, scatterable, unattended ground sensors (acoustic, +seismic, "hot spot," etc.). Hyperspectral imaging allows target +searches to be conducted in the frequency domain, as opposed to +the spatial domain as is the norm today. This provides a powerful +new input for automatic target recognition (ATR) systems, is +useful for addressing low observables (LO), and is especially +important for remote imaging assets.</p> + +<p>Unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored +continually. For example, the actual area of operations for Scuds +in ODS was relatively small, but it was very difficult for +then-current sensing systems to oversee. Technologies being +developed in the area of microelectromechanical systems, in +particular, hold promise for enabling capable and inexpensive +sensor fields.</p> + +<p><em>Imbedded sensors:</em> Monitoring the position and status +of Blue and friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in +tracking the enemy. GPS presented a tremendous advantage to +troops in ODS. This capability needs to be extended down to the +individual soldier, and the status of all critical material and +personnel needs to be tracked.</p> + +<p><em>Sensor signal processing:</em> Finally, the signals from +modern sensors are of limited use without proper processing and +presentation to the user. This area will be developed further in +the computational technologies section. Technologies that are +historically grouped with sensor systems include automatic target +recognition, imbedded multisensor fusion and correlation, and +displays.</p> + +<h3>Computational Technologies</h3> + +<p>The capabilities of the integrated circuit (IC), and in +particular the microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. +Certainly, physical limits must be approached at some point, but +each looming barrier has so far been met by technological +innovation. Nevertheless, should the march of IC improvements +slow somewhat, the software and networking technologies that are +being developed at an accelerating pace will permit the vision of +Rapid Dominance to become of ever increasing utility.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance requires the collection, management, and fast +access of enormous quantities of information. Technologies that +will enable this include computational hardware advances such as +increasingly powerful workstations, reduced-cost image +generators, massively parallel machines, compact displays, +reduced-cost memory devices (i.e., DRAM, RAID, and optical +jukeboxes) client/server-specific database engines, +reconfigurable simulation cells, "wearable" PCs, advanced +human-computer interface (HCI) techniques (i.e., voice interfaces +and those coming to define "virtual reality"), and PCMCIA +technology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, +miniaturized hard drives, and modems).</p> + +<p>Software advances will be even more critical for Rapid +Dominance. Areas of importance include:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Network data engines</li> + +<li>Object-oriented architectures</li> + +<li>Advanced modeling and simulation</li> + +<li>Machine intelligence</li> + +<li>Automatic target recognition</li> + +<li>Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools</li> +</ul> + +<p>Network technologies are just now emerging but are being +driven at a frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. A +variety of advanced tools beyond "hot link" browsing are being +introduced daily. Data browsers, brokers, gatherers, and network +repositories are being released, as demonstrated by products like +<em>Harvester</em> and <em>Netscape's Catalog Server</em>. +Platform independent languages such as JAVA and their associated +virtual computational engines promise the same network +flexibility for programs that is now enjoyed by data.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the most important area of technology development for +Rapid Dominance is the development of practical object-oriented +architectures and protocols. Protocols such as CORBA, OLE, ALSP, +HLA and DIS<a href="#1"><sup>1</sup></a> are changing the face of +computing, making it much easier to link programs and databases, +and access and correlate information that was previously +"entombed" within its legacy application.</p> + +<p>One interesting application area migrating toward an +object-oriented approach is geospatial databases. In the past, +geospatial data were stored as either raster-based or vector +information, and significant processing was required for users to +make queries regarding roads, areas, or objects such as building +sites. A new approach, called a spatial database engine, creates +intuitive objects from standard geospatial databases and uses +commercial databases to add attributes to the objects. This is a +very powerful technique that allows geospatial data, a key +element of warfighting, to be managed quickly and efficiently +using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. It is +particularly useful for distributed databases such as one would +find on a network.</p> + +<p>Modeling and simulation is also benefiting from +object-oriented technologies. Simulations were once stand-alone +codes. If one wanted to simulate a joint battle, one began with +an existing model (i.e., land combat) and then modified it to +include other components (i.e., aircraft and ships). Similarly, +if a new technology were to be modeled, new code normally had to +be written, even in cases where good, validated, stand-alone +technology models existed. The obvious drawbacks to this approach +are that it is costly, often produces inferior simulations for +the new additions, and quickly results in extremely large codes +with commensurate large code management problems. Object-oriented +approaches allow models and simulations to be linked to form a +richer environment for examining new technologies and joint force +structures.</p> + +<p>Linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as +computer-aided design (CAD) programs and physics-based +simulations presents a new type of tool referred to as +simulation-based design. Once fully realized, this capability +will allow new technologies to be much more easily evaluated, +introducing a source for greater efficiency into today's somewhat +haphazard acquisition system.</p> + +<p>Simulations based on object-oriented architectures also +promise more flexibility that will enable scenarios and +unexpected situations to be made as inputs and simulated rapidly, +forming the core for a battlefield visualization system capable +of modeling "what if" situations. Outputs from these simulations +could be used for mission rehearsal. Even today, pilots and +special operations forces often "fly through" crude, +three-dimensional renderings of a mission area to familiarize +themselves with information such as surface-to-air missile (SAM) +sites and landmarks.</p> + +<p>The promise of computational technologies brings with it +potential vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats. +In a world where information plays a vital role in warfare, +information collection and processing tools will become targets. +Defenses against information warfare must be developed. The +threat is real and is growing especially in the commercial and +private sectors. Even today, malicious hackers devise +data-destroying viruses and distribute them through a plethora of +electronic media; numerous sites on the Net are dedicated to the +discussion and development of offensive computer viruses, with +ample tools for even the novice to download and employ. Moreover, +computer crimes cost the world economy billions of dollars +annually. Although information warfare poses serious threats, the +realm of information is where operations underlying Rapid +Dominance most reside, and the enemy will find himself fully +engaged should he choose to fight on our terms. Rapid Dominance +is essentially information warfare on a grand scale in all +dimensions of offensive, defensive and leveraging effective use +of available information.</p> + +<h3>Communication Technologies</h3> + +<p>One of the modern communication devices being fielded within +U.S. forces today is the SINGCARS radio. With a data rate of +somewhat less than 10 kbps, SINGCARS is woefully inadequate for +supporting Rapid Dominance. However, more appropriate +technologies are emerging:</p> + +<ul> +<li>GBS and other satellite broadcast services</li> + +<li>Wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols</li> + +<li>Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches</li> + +<li>Advanced comm relay platforms (UAV, Lightsat, Iridium, +etc.)</li> +</ul> + +<p>GBS, for example, figures prominently in the BADD (battlefield +awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at providing +close to 30 Mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. This will be +supported by multi-terrabyte databases, advanced data browsers, +and query managers, and will be linked to the Joint Tactical +Internet.</p> + +<p>Networking must also be supported by communications +technologies. The basic problem of a battlefield network is that +while some nodes may support very large data pipes, a number of +nodes will be operating at SINGCARS data rates. This led to the +BADD notion of one-way data broadcasting via GBS of large data +files (such as UAV video and overhead imagery) and very low +bandwidth data querying back to the data sources.</p> + +<p>Modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-based, +which is particularly important for Rapid Dominance, where +decisions must be made quickly based upon very large quantities +of data, some of which will be collected and transmitted in real +time. Technologies such as digital video teleconferencing, +virtual whiteboards, and even 3D virtual environments where +commanders may participate in collaborative planning sessions +will become important.</p> + +<p>Finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where +feasible, non-observable to the enemy.</p> + +<h2>Control of the Environment</h2> + +<p>The actual attack of targets in order to induce Shock and Awe +may, in some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the +enemy's perception. It will not always be necessary to destroy +numerous targets in order to induce shock. However, it would be +vitally important to give the appearance that there are no safe +havens from attack, and that any target may be attacked at any +time with impunity and force. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, +confusion must be imposed on the adversary by supplying only +information which will shape the adversary's perceptions and help +break his will. Finally, the enemy must be displaced from +selected key positions, for if he is allowed to occupy those +areas that he considers strategically important, it is difficult +to imagine how his shock could be complete.</p> + +<p>Controlling an enemy's perception of the battlespace includes +manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status, +and the environment in which he operates. This will be +accomplished by selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while +presenting him with information that is either misleading or +serves our purposes. Sensing and feedback of an enemy +leadership's perception of the situation will be critical.</p> + +<p>Technologies of interest here include those that allow systems +and entire force units to modify their signature from being very +stealthy to being completely obvious. An ability to attack enemy +information systems will also be critical, encompassing system +technologies from laser-based counter sensor weapons to embedded +computer viruses, commonly referred to as Trojan Horses. In all +cases, the goal will be to deny the enemy any information that +would be useful to him and to impose a construct of deception and +misinformation at all levels of operations.</p> + +<p>Clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield +awareness already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a +"perception attack" (a form of information warfare) to be +successfully carried out. The need and requirements for +Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) will increase dramatically. +It will be necessary to understand not only whether a target was +killed but also how enemy leadership, troops, and society viewed +this destruction.</p> + +<p>So far, primarily information technologies have been +discussed. Obviously, there will continue to be requirements for +numerous other types of systems. Among the more important system +technologies critical to achieving control of the environment +include:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Weapons platforms with stealth technology</li> + +<li>Weapons systems</li> + +<li>Robotic systems</li> +</ul> + +<h3>Weapons platforms</h3> + +<p>One of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to +move people and ordinance to within an effective range of the +target. Centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems, this +reasoning was understood intuitively. Since ordinance must still +be placed on the target, weapons platforms such as described +below still demand consideration.</p> + +<ul> +<li>Stealthy bombers and strike aircraft either land or sea +platform based</li> + +<li>Arsenal ships</li> + +<li>Submarines with conventional cruise missiles</li> + +<li>Stealthy land vehicles</li> + +<li>Stealthy observation/attack helicopters</li> +</ul> + +<p>Stealth, combined with stand off, will contribute strongly to +the protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and +will also be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned +systems. However, protection of the force is inherent within the +concept of Rapid Dominance, and it will rely upon the control of +information and the enemy's perception of events, stealth being +one of the elements enabling this control.</p> + +<h3>Weapons systems</h3> + +<p>Smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield. +Linked with information technologies, the combination will allow +killing any target that can be identified. The main element Rapid +Dominance requires of weapons systems is the ability to be +rapidly focused on objectives as identified and targeted by +commanders using the information management systems already +discussed. Commanders will require the flexibility to call +massive, precision strikes or to attack individual, high-priority +targets with near zero CEP. This implies a mixture of weapons +comprised of systems such as those mentioned below.</p> + +<ul> +<li>Cruise missiles</li> + +<li>Zero CEP, long-range cruise missile ("President's +weapon")</li> + +<li>Stand-off submunition platforms</li> + +<li>Smart submunitions</li> + +<li>Brilliant submunitions</li> + +<li>Wide area smart mines</li> + +<li>Long-range and short-range surface attack missiles</li> +</ul> + +<h3>Robotic systems</h3> + +<p>Robotic systems are an important area of consideration within +Rapid Dominance. First, selected robotic systems will enable the +force by making it more responsive in concentrating sensors and +weapons. Second, they will make fighting a 24-hour battle +feasible even with reduced manpower within the force structure. +Third, robotic systems can provide force presence even in areas +considered too dangerous for a large manned element. Finally, +since the ultimate operational goal of Rapid Dominance is to +create shock, one may consider the effect that fighting robotic +systems may have on the enemy.</p> + +<p>In examining the utility of robotic systems within Rapid +Dominance, one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic +systems have not lived up to the optimistic expectations placed +on them in the past. From the overburdening of the Aquilla UAV to +the massive and poorly planned investment in robotics made by +General Motors in the early 1980s, robotics has been an area of +unfulfilled promises. However, the reasons for a string of +spectacular failures lie more with planners' faulty attempts to +understand and incorporate the technology than by egregious +shortcomings of the technology itself. Robots have been seen as +replacements for manned systems rather than extremely complicated +and capable machines suitable for a set of tightly defined tasks. +Robotic systems, or taskable machines as some are beginning to +refer to them, hold promise for the future simply because they +represent the intersection of a myriad of fast-moving technology +areas such as information technologies, communications, +microelectronics, micro-electromechanical systems, simulation, +and computer-aided design and manufacturing. In some sense, +taskable machines are the physical embodiment of information +technologies. It may well be that in the future the joke will be, +"Never send a robot to do a man's job." But even so, there will +be ample jobs for taskable machines and the society that learns +to properly design, build, control, and integrate these systems +into their force structure will gain significant advantage over +any potential opponent.</p> + +<h2>Conclusion</h2> + +<p>The technologies and systems presented in this section are not +extraordinary nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed, +entire fields such as materials, bioengineering, and +microelectronics are left for future consideration, although they +are of obvious and vital importance. Also not addressed here are +the training, education, and organizational implications required +under a regime of Rapid Dominance. Given the overriding +importance of information collection and management, these will +need to be addressed across the defense community as it is most +broadly defined.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance combines a doctrine and operational concept +that challenges the current process of how new technologies +invented in the commercial sector are incorporated into defense, +and provides an affirmative methodology for research, +development, and system integration. We must learn to exploit the +potential of these technologies even though, in many cases, this +development process in the private sector is profoundly +independent from how we conduct the business of defense. It is +this environment of innovative upheaval that any useful +foundation for strategic and operational thought must address. +Rapid Dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this rapid +and chaotic development of technology.</p> + +<p>We believe that what will distinguish Rapid Dominance from +other doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct +to drive innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and +integrating technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently +constructed systems. Second, it is the comprehensive quality of +Rapid Dominance in which strategies, doctrine, technology, +systems, operations, training, organization, and education are +dealt with together that may make the most significant +difference. But, as the reader will discern, specific +identification and design of Rapid Dominance systems is part of +the next step.</p> + +<p><sup><a name="BM1">1</a></sup> CORBA (common object request +broker architecture), OLE (object linking and embedding), ALSP +(aggregate level simulation protocol), HLA (high-level +architecture), DIS (Distributed Interactive Simulation). These +are all protocols or the architectures defining protocols that, +in part, enable disparate software and/or hardware components to +be linked or otherwise share information and logical +elements.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="ch_05"></a>Future Directions</h1> + +<p>At this stage, Rapid Dominance is an intellectual construct +based on these key points. First, Rapid Dominance has evolved +from the collective professional, policy, and operational +experience of the study group covering the last four decades. +This experience ran from Vietnam to <em>Desert Storm</em> and +from serving with operational units in the field to being part of +the decision-making process in the Oval Office in Washington. It +also included immersion in technology and systems from +thermonuclear weapons to advanced weapons software.</p> + +<p>Second, Rapid Dominance seeks to exploit the unique juncture +of strategy, technology, and innovation created by the end of the +Cold War and to establish an alternative foundation for military +doctrine and force structure.</p> + +<p>Third, Rapid Dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as +envisaged by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to overpower or affect the +will, perception, and understanding of the adversary for +strategic aims and military objectives. But, in Rapid Dominance, +the principal mechanism for affecting the adversary's will is +through the imposition of a regime of Shock and Awe sufficient to +achieve the aims of policy. It is this relationship with and +reliance on Shock and Awe that differentiates Rapid Dominance +from attrition, maneuver, and other military doctrines including +overwhelming force.</p> + +<p>Shock and Awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and +physical levels. At one level, destroying an adversary's military +force leaving the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the +necessary Shock and Awe. At another level, the certainty of this +outcome may cause an adversary to accept our terms well short of +conflict. In the great middle ground, the appropriate balance of +Shock and Awe must cause the perception and anticipation of +certain defeat and the threat and fear of action that may shut +down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability +to fight useless short of complete physical destruction.</p> + +<p>Finally, in order to impose enough Shock and Awe to affect an +adversary's will, four core characteristics of a Rapid +Dominance-configured force were defined. First, complete +knowledge and understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the +environment are essential. This knowledge and understanding +exceed the expectations of dominant battlefield awareness and DBA +becomes a subset of Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<p>Rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is +only familiar with a particular company and not the stock market +in general, the Rapid Dominance force must have complete +knowledge and understanding of many likely adversaries and +regions. This requirement for knowledge and understanding will +place a huge, new burden on the military forces and necessitate +fundamental changes in policy, organization, training, education, +structure, and equipage.</p> + +<p>Second is rapidity. Rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and +agility and the ability to sustain control after the initial +shock. Rapidity enables us to act as quickly as needed and always +more quickly than the adversary can react or take +counter-actions. Rapidity is also an antidote to surprise. If we +cannot anticipate surprise, or are surprised, rapidity provides a +correcting capacity to neutralize the effects of that +surprise.</p> + +<p>Third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of +operations and execution in terms of brilliance. The consequences +and implications of setting brilliance as the standard and +achieving it are profound. Reconfiguration of command authority +and organization possibly to decentrali-zation down to individual +troops must follow. Allowing and encouraging an operational +doctrine of the "first to respond" will set the tempo provided +that effective de-confliction of friendly on friendly engagements +has been assured.</p> + +<p>This, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, +training, and organization will be required. The matter is not +just "fighting smarter." It is learning to fight at even higher +standards of skill and competence.</p> + +<p>Fourth is control of the environment. Control is defined in +the broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and +space and control of the "ether" in which information is passed +and received. This requires signature management throughout the +full conflict spectrum-deception, disinformation, verification, +information control, and target management-all with rapidity in +both physical and psychological impact. By depriving an adversary +of the physical use of time, space, and the ether, we play on the +adversary's will and offer the prospect of certain destruction +should resistance follow.</p> + +<p>The next step in this process must be specifically defining +this Rapid Dominance force in terms of force structure, +capabilities, doctrine, organization, and order of battle. We +have begun this effort and are focusing on a joint task force +sized somewhere between a reinforced division and a full corps +(i.e., a strength of 75,000 - 200,000). We also have the aim of +being able to deploy this force within 5 to 10 days of the order +to move and, of course, will be able to send smaller force +packages on a nearly instantaneous basis. We appreciate the +mobility and logistical implications of this requirement.</p> + +<p>Once we design this "paper" force and equip it with "paper" +systems, we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and +tests we noted in the Prologue.</p> + +<p>The first test of this Rapid Dominance force will be against +the MRC. The comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the +programmed force and whatever emerges from the Quadrennial +Defense Review of 1997. We will need to examine closely how and +where and why Rapid Dominance and Shock and Awe work and where +they do not. At the very least, we expect that this will help +strengthen the current force and improve current capabilities. Of +course, it is our hope that this test will validate Rapid +Dominance as a legitimate doctrine.</p> + +<p>Second, the Rapid Dominance force must be tested across the +entire spectrum of OOTW. These are the most difficult tests +because, in some of them, no force may be suitable and no force +may work.</p> + +<p>Third, the test of determining the political consequences of +Rapid Dominance must be conducted. On one hand, if this force +capability can be achieved and Shock and Awe administered to +affect an adversary's will, can a form of political deterrence be +created? In the most approximate sense, and we emphasize +approximate, the analogy with nuclear deterrence might be drawn. +An adversary may be persuaded or deterred from taking action in +the first instance. On the other hand, this capacity may be seen +as politically unusable and allies and others within the United +States may not be fully trusting of the possessor always to +employ this force responsibly.</p> + +<p>Fourth is the test of the implications of Rapid Dominance for +alliances and for waging coalition warfare. Our allies are +already concerned that the United States is leaving them far +behind in military technology and capability. If we possess this +force and our allies or partners do not, how do we fight +together? Our view is that this can be worked out through +technology sharing and perhaps new divisions of labor and mission +specialization. However, these are important points to be +considered.</p> + +<p>Finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in +defense?</p> + +<p>It is also likely that because Rapid Dominance will cause +profound consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy +will make a fair examination difficult. It is no accident that +other attempts at change, especially those that ask for or are +tainted with reform, have had a short life span. It is +interesting to note in this regard that the President's +Commission on Intelligence and its fine report that recommended +changes and refinements to the U.S. intelligence community, +despite a very positive initial reception, led to only a few +meaningful actions.</p> + +<p>This discussion leads to two final points. We are all too well +aware that any strategy and force structure have vulnerabilities +and potential weaknesses. The experiences that this study group +collectively had in Vietnam makes this concern very strongly +held. We observe that in the private sector, the vulnerability of +information systems is real and is being exploited. A former +director of the FBI has told us that in New York, for example, +the number one recruiting target for organized crime is the +teenage computer whiz. We think that this "hacking," writ large +in the private sector, must be assumed as part of the defense +problem. Hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities must be even +greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the Cold War, +because exploitation can come from many more sources in the +future.</p> + +<p>Second, wags may criticize Rapid Dominance as attempting to +create a "Mission Impossible Force." To be sure, we emphasize and +demand brilliance as the operational goal. However, we also know +that the military today is seen as a leading example of the best +American society has to offer. We wish to build on this reality. +We note the experience and the performance, albeit under highly +unusual circumstances, of <em>Desert Storm</em>. We see no reason +why that level of performance cannot be made a permanent part of +the fabric of the American military.</p> + +<p>Because we have entered a period of transition in which we +enjoy a dominant military position and a greatly reduced window +of vulnerability, this is the right time for experimentation and +demonstration. Rapid Dominance is still a concept and a work in +progress, not a final road map or blueprint. But the concept does +warrant, in our view, a commitment to explore and an opportunity +that could lead to dramatically better capabilities.</p> + +<p>We believe that through Rapid Dominance and the commitment to +examine the entire range of defense across all components and +aspects, a revolution is possible. If Rapid Dominance can be +harnessed in an affordable and efficient way and an operational +capability fielded to impose sufficient Shock and Awe to affect +an adversary's will, then this will be the real Revolution in +Military Affairs. We ask those who are intrigued by this prospect +to join us.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="app_a"></a>Appendix A</h1> + +<h2 align="center">Thoughts on Rapid Dominance</h2> + +<p align="center"><strong>by Admiral Bud Edney, USN +(Ret.)</strong></p> + +<p>Why the need for a concept of Rapid Dominance? The answer lies +in the combined realities of modern technology, economics, and +politics.</p> + +<h3>Technology</h3> + +<p>The evolution or revolution of information technology is +impacting everything we do and how we do it on a worldwide basis. +The far-reaching effects of the resulting information highway +that crosses all boundaries are already impacting the strategic +decisions, economics, and politics of the world of nation states. +Borders are no defense for the penetration of information even in +highly controlled or authoritarian societies. Similarly, the +exploration and use of high technology in space, together with +the advent of sophisticated highly accurate ballistic and cruise +missiles, means borders between states are not as important for +strategic and impenetrable defenses in depth as they used to be. +The rapid advancements in telecommunications technology, combined +with the exploration and use of space vehicles to saturate a +world hungry for information, means that leaders can no longer +shield their people from the outside world. Thus information will +penetrate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile +attempt to block it out. New centers of gravity are being created +as are new vulnerability choke points. The country or power +structure that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the +information revolution as it applies to issues of national +security will remain in control of its own destiny. The United +States possesses a qualitative and quantitative lead that, when +combined with a properly focused and coordinated (harmonized) +industry, defense, and national security policy, should ensure +success for the foreseeable future. Harnessing information +technology and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal thought +in application of military force is the essence of Rapid +Dominance.</p> + +<h3>Economics</h3> + +<p>With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet +Union, there is no major power capable of destroying the U.S. +mainland. Given this absence of devastating threat, defense +expenditures will continue to be squeezed to address more +pressing domestic priorities. Voter demands for a balanced +budget, national health care, social security reform, educational +reform, family values, crime and drug use reduction, lower taxes, +etc., will combine to put increasing pressure on the defense +bottom line in the out years. The result will be a steady decline +in war fighting readiness and force structure that will place our +security interests at risk unless we leverage our technology +leadership to achieve military advantage with lower force levels +but increased war fighting effectiveness. This is also the +essence of Rapid Dominance.</p> + +<h3>Politics</h3> + +<p>The reality of current politics is that the trauma of Vietnam, +the results of the Gulf War, and our status as the only remaining +superpower after the Cold War equate to some new constraints +(real or perceived) on the application of military force to +support our foreign policy. These political sensitivities need to +be understood up front and include the following:</p> + +<ul> +<li>The U.S. is not the world's policeman</li> + +<li>Involvement of U.S. Forces must be justified as essential to +vital U.S. security interests</li> + +<li>Support of Congress and People is a necessary +prerequisite</li> + +<li>Avoid commitment of ground forces</li> + +<li>Offer instead U.S. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, +logistics support, etc.</li> + +<li>Avoid risk of loss of U.S. lives at almost all costs</li> + +<li>Ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned</li> + +<li>Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to defend themselves +aggressively</li> + +<li>Minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral +damage</li> + +<li>Specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end in +the not-too-distant future sight before committing</li> + +<li>U.S. led coalition force preferred-U.S. Forces remain under +U.S. Command. These political restraints may limit the +application of Rapid Dominance to Major and Minor Regional +Conflicts. This is an issue that needs further exploration and +analysis.</li> +</ul> + +<h3>What is Rapid Dominance?</h3> + +<p>Rapid Dominance is the full use of capabilities within a +system of systems that can decisively impact events requiring the +application of military/defense resources through affecting the +adversary's will. Rapid Dominance envisions execution in real or +near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed +detrimental to U.S. interests. On one end of the spectrum, Rapid +Dominance would introduce a regime of Shock and Awe in areas of +high value to the threatening individual, group, or state. In +many cases the prior knowledge of credible U.S. Rapid Dominance +capabilities would act as a deterrent. Rapid Dominance would +ensure favorable early resolution of issues at minimal loss of +lives and collateral damage. The concept ideally should be able +to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board, +addressing high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology threats. Some of +these aims may not be achievable given the political and +technology constraints, but need to be explored.</p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war +fighting capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a +sophisticated, interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted +intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications +systems, and data analysis to deliver in real time, actionable +information to the shooter. This network must provide total +situational awareness and nodal analysis that enables U.S. forces +to act inside the adversary's decision loop in a manner that on +the high end produces Shock and Awe among the threat parties. +Properly detailed nodal analysis of this grid of knowledge and +vulnerability will enable the shutting down of specific or all +essential functions nearly simultaneously. We expect that through +these netted pieces of data, often, the sum of the parts will +yield profound battlefield advantages to the possessor. The +"Rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real time +actionable targeting information to the shooter, whether the +shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery +battery, an individual rifleman, a naval battle group, an +individual ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. +At whatever unit level, Shock and Awe are magnified by the speed +and effectiveness of targeting. The ability to achieve Rapid +Dominance simultaneously throughout the battlefield will create +strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, +and society. When the video results of these attacks are +broadcast real time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact on +coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support +can be decisive.</p> + +<p>The top priority of Rapid Dominance should be to deter, alter, +or affect those actions that are either unacceptable to U.S. +national security interests or endanger the democratic community +of states and access to free markets. These political objectives +are generally those envisioned in the major and lesser regional +conflict scenarios (MRC & LRC). Should deterrence fail, the +application of Rapid Dominance should create sufficient Shock and +Awe to intimidate the enemy forces and leadership as well as +provide a clear message for other potential aggressors. Rapid +Dominance would not be limited to MRC and LRC scenarios. It has +application in a variety of areas, including countering WMD, +terrorism, and other political problems. The challenge is that +should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on +Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat yet decisive +enough to convey the appropriate degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid +Dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. +It initially appears that Rapid Dominance should be applied +sparingly for egregious threats or violations of international +law, such as:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small +state</li> + +<li>Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD</li> + +<li>Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale</li> + +<li>Threat to essential world markets</li> +</ul> + +<p>Clearly the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign +borders and penetrating even the most closed societies. The +inequities and benefits in closed societies are becoming known to +both the public as well as the bosses. The requirement for Rapid +Dominance to develop sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the +Information Highway and create road blocks as well as control +input/outputs to the highway both overtly and covertly is +fundamental to the concept.</p> + +<p>These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies +targeting international crime and drug cartels using the highway. +Closer interagency cooperation and coordination between military +and law enforcement activities and capabilities must be +established. Experience with the military involvement in the drug +war revealed considerable cultural differences between these +organizations. Overcoming these cultural differences is not easy. +The required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive +information and support between these agencies and the military +needs to be developed further. Interagency coordination and +cooperation must be raised to a new level of sophistication. Some +laws may need to be changed. War in Cyberspace does not recognize +domestic versus foreign boundaries. In this environment the +subjects of Information Warfare and Information In Warfare take +on new meaning and require focused development. We must become +proficient within this environment.</p> + +<p>This breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal +more thought with regard to the issues of security, +vulnerabilities (their's and our's), and the concept of Rapid +Dominance. Does Rapid Dominance apply only or mostly to the high +end of the spectrum, involving more traditional applications of +force to achieve political objectives as envisioned in the MRC +and LRC scenarios? Yet to be explored is the degree to which a +concept of Rapid Dominance applies to OOTW, countering terrorism +against U.S. interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. +What are the political and military prerequisites to apply Rapid +Dominance? Are they applicable and realistically achievable in +the increasingly complex interaction of national governments/law +enforcement organizations and international as well as local +private venture or non-government organizations (PVOs/NGOs) +present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care to +refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of +Rapid Dominance offend and generate a counterproductive public +relations backlash from those who believe force should only be +used as a last resort and then with a measurable degree of +proportionality?</p> + +<p>At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be +addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and +issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front +during the concept development phase of the development of +specific Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be careful +that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the reality +of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid +Dominance does not eliminate the fog of war. Decisions will still +be made on the leader's judgment and confidence in the +intelligence provided, the estimate of threat intentions, +knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence in +our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the +ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance. +Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly +defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the world's only +credible superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role, +but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all +leaders. We are in the classical "damned if we do and damned if +we don't" syndrome. One of the serious side effects of Rapid +Dominance could be that if you adapt a strategy of Rapid +Dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem and be +responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to such +a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if +Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less than of +vital interest? This subject needs further development beyond the +limitations of this book.</p> + +<h3>Rapid Dominance and The Future Battlefield</h3> + +<p>What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The +<em>Desert Storm</em> conflict indicated to many who analyzed it +that the real focus of battle will no longer be force on force as +we have traditionally considered it. By the time the Allied +Forces engaged the opposing Iraq forces, the enemy force for all +practical purposes had already been demoralized and smashed. This +was accomplished by establishing air superiority followed by a +carefully orchestrated campaign of precision air strikes +(including Tomahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces were +isolated by cutting off logistic support, severing communications +with its leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe +achieved by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the +open desert. Shock and awe were introduced in the manner that +stealth aircraft penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically +attacked center of gravity targets with impunity. Shock and awe +were also present in the degree that coalition forces owned the +night and could rapidly maneuver large units in terrain thought +to be foreign, imposing, and unforgiving for the predominantly +U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin Powell noted, the Coalition Forces +cut off the head and life lines to the Iraqi Army in the field +and then set about killing it. The fact that a democratically led +coalition could choose not to massacre the remnants of Iraq's +army during its panic-induced retreat underscores that we knew +how much power we had and could employ restraint. The impact of +real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed +simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living +rooms worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the +battlefield and further highlighted the compassion of that +decision. In dealing with a "butcher" we could not fall to that +level.</p> + +<p>The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile +box where you will know everything that is going on inside the +box (although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The +battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point +that controls or influences the elements of the battle. In +examining this battlefield and the application of force and Shock +and Awe, we seek to mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous +firepower on critical nodes/targets that count for the mission at +hand, rather than necessarily having to mass large armies in the +field to engage one another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised warfare +to a new level with the demonstrated effectiveness and +application of air to ground/water and surface to ground/water +launched precision guided weapons. No longer will commanders +count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but rather targets +destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an issue of +affordability here. We may not be able to get 1) high tech, 2) +MRC/OOTW, and 3) large armies. This does not eliminate the +requirement for sufficient force in the field to defend against +an all-out assault or eject another force and occupy the +contested land to ensure the objectives of conflict are carried +out. Air power can punish, simultaneously destroy center of +gravity targets, and so demoralize the opposing forces that land +campaign objectives can be achieved with smaller forces. In some +cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air campaign may result +in an early cessation of conflict before the land campaign is +necessary. This is more likely against a modernized, developed +state than an underdeveloped government.</p> + +<p>The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects +of stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved +weapon targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile +technology, space relayed command & control, real-time +surveillance from space, the introduction of JSTARS, and massive +application of night vision techniques, are the first phase of +these changes. With elements of this technology now more and more +on the open market to whomever has the cash or friends, the +advantage of obtaining greater situational awareness and +real-time processing of available data cannot be taken for +granted.</p> + +<p>In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear +that political and military decision making will have to +establish close control of the actionable information distributed +to shooters in the field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli +forces that had air superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely +accurate firepower capabilities in the most recent incursion into +Southern Lebanon against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to +respond with an artillery barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired +from close to a known UN encampment. When this artillery response +resulted in killing more than 100 refugees fleeing the Israeli +operation, the result was a public relations disaster and mission +failure for the stated limited Israeli objectives. This +represents a case of ill-conceived application of Rapid Dominance +that resulted in counter-productive Shock and Awe generating +adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was also a +case of applying high technology and state controlled Rapid +Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. +Clearly the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this +exchange. The lessons learned from this tragic incident as well +as the applicability of Rapid Dominance techniques in this +environment need further study. The massing and movement of +refugees in large numbers is a reality and a planning factor that +must be dealt with up front. The fact that the value of life +itself is viewed differently by warring factions must also be +considered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield and +the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to +achieve Rapid Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) +rules of engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may +not always be the right tactic and an escalation of targeting +different centers of gravity rather than responding directly to +events in the field promises to be more effective. The theory of +Rapid Dominance clearly needs further development, gaming, and +simulation. Each decision to apply Rapid Dominance will be +unique, complex, risky, and different than the previous one. +Knowledge and information on the battlefield as well as that +concerning center of gravity targets will be incomplete even with +a goal of total situational awareness.</p> + +<h3>Instruments to Achieve Shock and Awe</h3> + +<p>Shock and awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and +destruction that are incompre-hensible to the people at large, +specific elements/sectors of the threat society, or the +leadership. Nature in the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, +earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled fires, famine, and disease can +engender Shock and Awe. The ultimate military application of +Shock and Awe was the use of two atomic weapons against Japan in +WWII. The Shock and Awe that resulted from the use of these +weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war with Japan +(through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the further +use of these weapons for over 50 years. Not unexpectedly, these +events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the +destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. The +holocaust was a state policy of Shock and Awe that stunned the +world in its brutality and inhumanity. Yet it has not deterred +the world from executing or tolerating atrocities of equal +brutality and inhumanity (Cambodia, Syria, Rwanda, etc.). Similar +applications of Shock and Awe have differing toleration levels +and impacts depending on the environment and political system +against which it is applied. As an example, the massive bombing +raids of WWII by Germany and the U.S. did not result in a +sufficient level of Shock and Awe to end the fighting. The fear +of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather than their +actual destruction was the deciding factor in that theater. The +B-52 raids in Vietnam provided localized elements of Shock and +Awe, but until applied to the capital city of Hanoi, had no +impact toward war termination. When applied in concentrated +repetitive strikes in November/December of 1972 under +<em>Operation Rolling Thunder III</em>, the cease fire followed +in short order. In fact, throughout history there have been +weapons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of Shock +and Awe. While there has always been shock, awe, and fear +associated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused +and great enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under +favorable terms is not certain. How to apply elements of Shock +and Awe against rogue states, terrorist elements, international +drug and crime cartels, as well as in the more traditional MRCs +and LRCs needs much further study and analysis. Shock and awe, to +reach the level required to achieve Rapid Dominance, must also +bring fear to those who are in charge. It must be applied +quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity (such as +stealth bombing with air superiority). The element of impunity, +that is the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a key +element of this strategy. If on the other hand attacks are +directed at the general public a backlash could be unleased +because of the excessive and brutal losses of innocent +civilians.</p> + +<p>Much more study and analysis is needed to identify and examine +the pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of Shock +and Awe for limited objectives rather than responds in kind to a +provocation. What are the limits of the doctrine of Shock and +Awe? What circumstances merit the application? Can Shock and Awe +be used to achieve limited objectives with little or no risk of +life to allied forces or innocent civilians? Can true center of +gravity targets be identified for ideological/terrorist groups? +Can levels of Shock and Awe be categorized by effectiveness and +priority of weapons systems? If so, what are the key enabling +technologies? What types of Shock and Awe would be both +impressive and generate high returns? A few desirable +capabilities from a former CINC's perspective are listed +below:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Blow up an entire mine field simultaneously in its entirety +immediately after it had been laid.</li> + +<li>Destroy the mine laden mine-laying vehicles at their loading +point.</li> + +<li>Destroy in real time terrorist training camps or publicity +generating threats such as the recent display of 70 bomb laden +suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc worldwide. (This +probably requires inside penetration of the targeted +organization).</li> + +<li>Destroy simultaneously all/selective WMD launchers, +storage/production facilities of a rogue state.</li> + +<li>Selectively target rogue terrorist leaders as was apparently +done by the Russians in Chechnya recently when they killed the +top rebel leader by detecting and homing in on his satellite +phone conversation (helicopter rocket attack).</li> + +<li>Stop, divert, capture the cash flow to terrorist +elements.</li> +</ul> + +<h3>Thoughts on Applications of Shock and Awe</h3> + +<p>It is the use of Shock and Awe to achieve Rapid Dominance that +is so fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage if +it can be harnessed in a variety of situations. This basis for +Rapid Dominance requires a clearer under-standing of what our end +objectives are than we usually have when we stumble into the use +of military force, often it seems by default and at the last +possible minute. At this point, I have more questions than +answers. How does Rapid Dominance differ by the goals and +missions assigned? What are the key elements to apply Rapid +Dominance for each envisioned threat? What are the most likely +threats for the next 20 years? Is Rapid Dominance applicable to +all these threats? Can we separate Rapid Dominance into +categories with and without Shock and Awe?</p> + +<p>In addition to answering these and other questions, it seems +to me it would be helpful to generate a list of desirable +capabilities that would help me select a response option. This +list of capabilities would be useful to focus (1) scarce R&D +dollars to fill in the holes with technology, (2) intelligence +and surveillance collection priorities, (3) innovative thought to +further develop the concept (War College papers and Wargaming +series), and (4) development of CINC plans and requirements to +meet these capabilities. Examples of such capabilities are:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Deploying highly effective TBMD and Cruise Missile +Defense.</li> + +<li>Severing all/selective communications between leadership and +field as well as selective elements by call in the field.</li> + +<li>Intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective +threat field units.</li> + +<li>Projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat +scopes.</li> + +<li>Inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities that +generates engine failures.</li> + +<li>Inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on +key threat systems.</li> + +<li>Identifying specific location and determining strength and +material of protected targets of value.</li> + +<li>Developing dial a setting ordnance capable of destroying all +hardened targets.</li> + +<li>Detecting and tracting (destroying at will) all targets of +value including mobile targets.</li> + +<li>Detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before +launch.</li> + +<li>Detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed mine +field (land & sea).</li> + +<li>Making threat submarine movements transparent to targeting at +will.</li> +</ul> + +<p>Obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored +to the limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and +affordability. This may not even be the right type of +capabilities one might want. That is, we may need a totally +non-standard list. My judgment is that we should develop one or +two black "silver bullet" capabilities, if we get too far afield, +the system will not be able to digest the recommendations. +However, the concept of Rapid Dominance requires stepping to a +new level of getting inside the opposition's decision loop. Rapid +Dominance at the ultimate level would enable stopping, diverting, +or changing the decision process and decision executing +machinery/systems either preemptively or reactively in time to +ensure core U.S. security requirements are met.</p> + +<h3>Rapid Dominance Infrastructure</h3> + +<p>The current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition +reform is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities +necessary to implement a Rapid Dominance strategy. I would like +to reserve comments in this area until the project is further +developed. We do not need to raise reasons to discard the concept +as too hard before it is sufficiently defined. I have the feeling +that bringing these conceptual capabilities to realities within a +system of systems is neither cheap nor easy. There is still too +much waste and inefficiency in our defense acquisition process as +well as in the overlap between service requirements and +capabilities. Rapid Dominance will not be service-unique and +requires a synergistic approach from planning to execution.</p> + +<h3>Final Thoughts</h3> + +<p>The implications of the ongoing revolution in +telecommunications and information processing as it applies to +our national security interests dictate that we need new +imaginative concepts of operation to ensure the efficacy of our +international leadership in a multipolar world. With technology +upgrading capabilities by factors of 10 or more every 18 months, +we can no longer afford to have concepts of operations wait for +the technology to reach the field. The concept of Rapid Dominance +requires innovative thought and different directions than that +imbedded in our military hierarchy. We need to introduce the +concept at all levels of military professional education and +training. The best results of this effort will be generated from +the younger minds brought up on the leading edge of the +information revolution. The challenge is to engage those minds in +the solution and to take the risks required to fund priorities +enabling the development of this capability now. Such a cultural +change is not easy. One thing is certain-business as usual will +not get us there. The window of opportunity will close faster +than we think.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="app_b"></a>Appendix B</h1> + +<h2 align="center">Defense Alternatives: Forces Required</h2> + +<p align="center"><strong>by General Chuck Horner, USAF +(Ret.)</strong></p> + +<p>The end of the Cold War will require a review of United States +National Security Policy and a concomitant change in our National +Defense Strategy. This strategy will respond to the changes in +the world's security environment, including the dissolution of +the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security +alliances such as NATO and NORAD, the increased and unique threat +posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and +the widening of the spectrum of conflict which will challenge the +peace and security of our nation and its allies.</p> + +<p>The causes of conflict and the modes which threats to our +security interests will take have multiplied with the end of the +Cold War. The nuclear weapons of the Cold War remain and will +remain for some considerable time, even though there is a growing +appreciation as to the declining utility of these devices. For +sure there will be continuing pressure throughout the world to +eliminate the presence of nuclear weapons in conjunction with +efforts to halt the production, stockpiling, and deployment of +chemical and biological weapons. It is likely that START II will +be followed by START III and IV, as nations who claim ownership +of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a high cost and marginal +payoff. However, progress will be slow due to the immense +importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament and +the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated with the +disarmament process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future the +threat of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be +less likely than before. The spectrum of national security +challenges will expand as the threat of nuclear annihilation +subsides.</p> + +<p>The decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over +Iraq during <em>Desert Storm</em> should give future aggressors +of major regional conflict cause to pause. While this does not +mean that the threat of conventional warfare has vanished, it +does mean that the national leader intending to use major +conflict to achieve political aims must carefully craft strategy +that will avoid the opportunity for confrontation with a large +coalition force lead by the United States. Such a strategy might +include surprise attack; short intense military action; the +threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons; +advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions; and +warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes +attacks on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic +missiles or unconventional warfare forces. This will be warfare +for which the United States is ill trained and ill equipped.</p> + +<p>Other challenges to the world's security will take many forms +to which the military forces of the United States can play a +constructive role. These are commonly referred to as Operations +Other Than War, even though they may include the use of force to +achieve desired political goals. They include the increasingly +familiar peacemaking, peacekeeping, show of force, and +humanitarian relief efforts. Success in these operations may well +require retraining, re-equipping, or reorganizing our military +forces. Each mission should be evaluated with respect to what is +required to accomplish its unique challenges. However, the basic +doctrine, training, or equipage of the military forces should be +based on what is required to fight the residual Cold War, as well +as deal with the growing demands of a major regional +conflict.</p> + +<p>The political goals upon which our national security strategy +should be crafted are fairly straightforward. First, we should +seek to preserve and invigorate the role of leadership the United +States has maintained since the end of World War II, or the end +of the Cold War (you take your pick). Second, and not apart from +the first goal, the United States must be sufficiently strong to +prevent or deter use of effective military power against us. It +is not inconceivable that our so-called superpower status could +be defeated in battle by a crafty and well-prepared adversary. +Witness what happened to the powerful victors of WW II in +Vietnam. Third, U.S. military forces must be of sufficient size, +configuration, and readiness to bring a major conventional +conflict to a successful termination. It goes without saying that +during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to numbers +that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world. +Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. Fourth and +lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to all +the other tasks and functions for which the national command +authority calls upon the military. This first of challenges +should be used to define the military forces we field, how we +train them, and the methods we use to employ them.</p> + +<p>The strategic geographic depth the United States enjoys, +bounded by two oceans on the east and west and non-threatening +nations to the north and south, means that our nation is somewhat +immune from attack, other than by means of infiltration such as a +terrorist, or from the skies by means of long-range aircraft, and +cruise or ballistic missiles. We will require some actions and +defenses which address these threats, but the major portion of +our national defense effort must be placed on building and +sustaining offensive forces for combat in environments other than +our own soil. This dictates that our projection forces must be +capable of rapidly responding to an unforeseen crisis anywhere in +the world, keeping in mind that quick, decisive surprise favors +our potential enemies. Given that we have proven unable to +predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these forces must +also be ready at all times to carry out combat operations in most +any place. There will not be time to modernize their equipment or +train reserve force units. They must be capable of projecting and +sustaining their military power over long distances and operating +in the environment of the enemy's choosing. Last but not least, +when required, they must be capable of decisive combat, not by +attrition of the enemy force in head-to-head combat as was our +nature in past wars, but by Shock and Awe so that conflict +resolution is achieved with a maximum of success at the minimum +loss of life in the shortest time. These characteristics for our +projection force cannot be achieved easily, as the processes that +defined our Cold War doctrines, force structures, equipment, and +ways of doing business are loath to change.</p> + +<p>The Services' and joint requirements oversight processes that +define the equipment provided our military forces place emphasis +on force structure and the traditional roles for those forces. +This inertia can freeze our land, sea, air, and space +capabilities at current or near current levels, but may prove +inadequate to carry out new strategies. There are few incentives +for a Service or the Joint Staff to reward innovation or +divestiture of roles or missions in order to change the character +and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare them +to fight the battles we must envisage for the twenty-first +century.</p> + +<p>For example, the Services claim lessons learned from +<em>Desert Storm</em> which reinforce late twentieth century ways +of fighting and ignore the troublesome aspects which loom in the +future and threaten our traditional view of the battlefield. Many +acclaim the role of precision weapons for our forces, but ignore +the threat they pose if they are in the hands of the enemy. What +would be the lessons learned if several hundred canisters of live +Sensor Fused Weapons were released by a red force ballistic +missile on the 24th Division during a Fort Irwin engagement? +Certainly there would be profound changes in tactics, doctrine, +and equipment indicated for the surviving U.S. Army force. What +if radar homing Surface to Air Missiles were employed by the red +force during a Red Flag exercise in the Nevada desert, not using +centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using +decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would be +used by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stagnant +doctrines? I doubt that the Air Force would be spending millions +of dollars trying to build electronic countermeasures to hide the +large number of expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft they +continue to build, such as the F-15E.</p> + +<p>Imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile +were actually allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson +aircraft carrier during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the +attendant loss of life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range. You +would think the maritime force would reexamine the method it +provides air power from the sea, vital yet today too +vulnerable.</p> + +<p>How many times do we hear that the space forces are configured +to provide intelligence from overhead only to find in Iraq or +Bosnia that the front line forces receive products that are old, +inaccurate and altered to keep our Soviet foes from gaining +knowledge of our capabilities? Perhaps we if we would dual hat +the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the position +of J-2, or even Commander-in-Chief of a regional unified command, +there would be vast improvements in the tasking, evaluation, and +delivery of space-derived intelligence to regional combat forces. +Then we might see full understanding of the increasing role of +space forces and implement change to make them more relevant to +our national security strategies of the next century. Innovation, +not size, must be sought because we do not have the resources to +do both. Moreover, large forces drive our operational level +strategy to force-on-force engagements in the attrition warfare +model of the last century with its attendant causalities and +destruction of equipment. George Patton's dictum still stands +that directed his troops not to die for their country, but to get +the other SOB to die for his.</p> + +<p>Military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and +destruction. The ever-present television camera ensures that the +horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. War's immorality should +some day lead to its banishment. Unfortunately, that day is +probably a long way away. Nonetheless, weapons of war and their +employment tactics must minimize death and destruction. This is +not a call for non-lethal weapons; it is a call for military +forces to get right to the heart of the enemy and conclude +operations as rapidly and efficiently as they possibly can given +their equipment, training, and doctrine. This means there must be +wide flexibility in how they may function. Military operations +will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand +flexibility. Modern war will require our military leadership to +navigate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and +ever changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. We must +make our forces capable of dampening the capacity of the enemy to +use force by controlling the conflict rapidly even when +surprised. We failed to do that tactically in <em>Desert +Storm</em> in the case of the SCUD missile attacks, but were +fortunate that the Iraqis were equally inept at taking political +advantage of this card they held and skillfully employed on the +battlefield. We must also look for efficiency before we even join +in battle.</p> + +<p>Defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays +since the end of the Cold War. Given the leadership role the +United States plays in the world, one could think a reasonable +sum to devote to defense might be three percent of our gross +national product, certainly an amount much smaller than what an +average family expends for its security by means of life, health, +causality, car, medical insurance, and retirement benefits. Given +the prospect of long-term, constant funding, the Department of +Defense could then give more thought to how to build the most +modern, efficient military force within the dollars available. We +would no longer define our forces against some mythical threat or +scenario which generates impetus to protect force size rather +than quality. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and space +forces would be required to build a team based on a salary cap. +You might be willing to pay big bucks for a B-2 superstar +quarterback, but you will also need lower cost and capable +riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle. Most of all, you +would reward the Service or Agency who would innovate to provide +efficiency.</p> + +<p>Manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer +military force. Investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or +satellite might be high, but it is the operations and maintenance +costs that will drive how much resources we are required to +expend to gain and maintain a given military capability. Again +turning to <em>Desert Storm</em>, the huge advantages of +overflight precision munitions dropped from stealth aircraft has +not been understood or accepted by the operations analysts who +argue what we should build or buy next. If it had been, would the +Navy have allowed the A-12 program to fail, would the Air Force +be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions of +dollars into equipping forty year old B-52s with conventional +missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy divisions at a +personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership? Why not +build a Division force equivalent using technology and doctrine +to provide a "heavy division equivalent" force using far fewer +troops featuring speed, shock, precision fire while avoiding the +manpower costs of dollars that in peacetime include added costs +for recruitment, training, and sustaining and in war have an even +greater added cost computed in blood? Why don't we do this? The +answer is because it would require rare innovation, trust, and +support from the equally intransigent federal funding +authorities. Most importantly, the Services are not rewarded for +innovation which recognizes the contributions of another Service +or Ally.</p> + +<p>Jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel +must worship even if they don't understand or believe. Defenders +of the status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or +redundancy and these arguments have some validity. The question +becomes how much overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, +and space forces can the nation afford, and what is the +opportunity cost to the core competency of the land, sea, air, or +space force that builds and/or maintains the duplicative force +structure. A second yet vastly different question arises when +considering the unique capabilities a Service provides to support +itself and the other services. For example, how much the Air +Force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of what +the envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day, to +support the mythical scenarios. The alternative sea, land, and +space lift requirements can be postulated; however, if the Navy, +Army, or Air Force do not satisfy those sea, land, and space lift +requirement, then there is a shortfall which will in turn +generate a need for more airlift!</p> + +<p>During <em>Desert Storm</em>, nearly 90 percent of the +deployed equipment arrived by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis +had continued their first attack in August. A majority of +overland movement was provided by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks +and drivers, and the Army had neither the resources nor the +responsiveness to activate reserve forces needed to meet the +truck and rail support requirements of our military forces. As a +result, costly airlift was used to move forces that should have +traveled by land and sea. If added space capabilities had been +needed, there was almost no capability for the timely launch of a +satellite. Would it not be wise to index spending on land, sea, +air, and space launch on one and other, postulate lift +requirements on what the new force needs as it innovates and +slims down. The need to respond on a moment's notice adds to the +value of airlift and prepositioned ships. The outcome though +would be not to allow any of the Services to divert general +support money into core competencies and thereby shift the +jointness burden to another Service.</p> + +<p>Innovate. Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then +fly the fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are +unloaded. Accept the benefits of Federal Express that can be +federalized during times of national emergency as a costly, but +ready augmentation to military supply lines that has no cost +during the much longer periods of peacetime. Our nation has other +industrial capacities that also have duplicate military +capabilities. They may be 80 percent solutions, but the cost of +ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance of a military +owned and operated 100 percent solution. Iridium telephones may +not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent of the time they +will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost. Of course, this +avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our +medieval acquisition system.</p> + +<p>Finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that +will assure the future force capability will be enduring. We +cannot keep up with technology using our current ways of +acquiring military hardware and training our people in how to use +and maintain it. In many areas we would be better off to throw it +away when it breaks given the low cost, durability, and +reliability of modern solid state electronics. Why train +technicians? Give the troops a gold card and a telephone number +and they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our +government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do buy not only +integrates with that of other services and functions, but that it +can integrate with both older and newer equipment designated to +do the same function. The fighter aircraft secure radio must be +capable of communicating with the ground and sea based forces +command and control, as importantly it must be able to +communicate with the next generation fighter aircraft radio.</p> + +<p>The added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to +fight alone in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from +forming coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force +structure we maintain in declining budget years. An enduring +force must also recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively +with the forces of other nations. This means we must more freely +release our technologies to foreign nations so that our military +forces can fight side by side, so that our deployment forces can +draw from stocks of others while our logistics system seeks to +catch up with the rapidly deployed combat force.</p> + +<p>In the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of +our military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal +change in the policy side of the equation. What good are highly +trained, efficient, capable land, sea, air, and space forces if +the implementing authorities are incapable of defining +principles, goals, and integrating strategies for their +employment? While this is not the province of the military to +solve, the military must understand how disjointed policy, weak +political leadership, or dysfunctional international cooperation +will preclude success on the battlefield.</p> + +<p>Again, one of the missed lessons of <em>Desert Storm</em> was +the difficult and successful integration of international +leadership achieved by the President, Secretary of Defense, +Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congressional leaders, and +allied National Command Authorities as well as many others. It +was this leadership, coupled with the ineptness of the enemy, +that covered over the failures of our Cold War-equipped and +trained forces that fought <em>Desert Storm</em>. This does not +take anything away from the military victory, but it does make it +difficult to glean the right lessons for the future. Perhaps that +is why we are so loathe to change our forces at a time when +change is demanded by a new strategic environment and new threats +to our national security. Defining alternative forces in light of +the changed national security environment, goals and strategy +raises two questions: what kind or mix of military force and how +much best balances the requirements and funds available.</p> + +<h3>Deep Strike: A Key to Shock and Awe</h3> + +<p>In the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign +bases, all initial responses to combat operations will be some +form of deep strike. Given strategic warning (don't bet on it) +after deployment of our military forces, Deep Strike is a term +that relates to the political boundaries or proximity to military +forces. The geography of the area of conflict will further define +deep strike. But a rule of thumb might be attacks on a target +beyond range of surface-based fires except for ballistic or +cruise missiles. More important than range is the characteristics +of the Deep Strike targets. Deep Strike targets could be +classified as ones the enemy does not wish to place at high +levels of risk. They can be characterized by the functions they +perform, such as:</p> + +<ul> +<li>Leadership</li> + +<li>Command and Control (a function of leadership)</li> + +<li>Control of Military Forces, especially air and space</li> + +<li>Logistics and Sustainment</li> + +<li>National Economic Base</li> + +<li>Internal Security/Political</li> + +<li>National Will, Theirs and Ours</li> +</ul> + +<p>Intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes +must examine the functions and then define the physical objects +or people who comprise the system which is responsible for the +successful operation of the function. You define the system and +then attack the critical elements in order to achieve economy of +force. Often these target sets are difficult to define, as these +functions often represent the enemy's most valuable and therefore +protected elements. The intelligence collection associated with +each function will vary from target set to target set. Large, +fixed infrastructure, such as associated with an electrical grid, +lends itself to traditional reconnaissance and evaluation of +technical analysis. Leadership targets are better defined by +using human intelligence and subjective analysis. In all cases +success starts with innovative intelligence products, which has +not been a hallmark of United States operations. Such +intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of the +enemy, their values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments +based on our viewpoint.</p> + +<p>One target system may serve the attainment of a number of +different goals. For example, attacks on the electrical power +system of the enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and +control his military forces, operate vital elements of the +economy and thus degrade the political support required to +sustain the conflict. This same target system may be attacked a +variety of ways. Most common methods would be using stealth +aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and switching +centers. Areas with isolated populations lend themselves to using +special operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated +power grid node for transmission of energy from one highly +populated area to another. Now it is obvious that computer +signals used to command the power grid are targets as intrusion +into the enemy's control system provides the means to simply turn +off electricity to selected areas. Attacks by all these means +achieves even greater results than the sum of its parts because +enemy responses to restore electrical power will be confused as +elements such as computer intrusion are confused with bombing +destruction.</p> + +<p>The characteristics of value in attacking these important +targets systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. The +greatest effect will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated +in such a manner as to inflict maximum Shock and Awe on the enemy +element. This means operations must be coordinated and +orchestrated carefully and flexibly as enemy reaction to the +attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is projected when a +combination of functions or target sets supporting a variety of +functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In order to +achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be evaluated +quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of the +system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system. +Finally, the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the +functions as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take +hold. In order to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the +attacker must know the current and projected effects of his +strikes against elements of the enemy's residual system. If the +trick is to define the system of targets needed to conduct +successful Deep Strike, it is even more important to know how to +alter the initial plan as the battle unfolds and timing becomes +everything.</p> + +<p>The characteristics of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike +are long range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed. +Cost of the operation is a factor; however, system cost must +include peacetime operations and maintenance costs as well of the +costs during actual combat. There is also a human element in the +cost of combat operations which escalates rapidly as military +force is misused. The total cost of these operations must also +address the cost of intelligence used to support Deep Strikes. +Intelligence operations may be the most costly due to the +importance of these targets to the enemy. Alternatively, the +human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the most +inexpensive since their national importance makes them vulnerable +to knowl-edgeable dissidents.</p> + +<h3>Stand-off</h3> + +<p>Deep Strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. +Some of the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances +beyond the nation's control; for example, Seoul borders on North +Korea. Our protective oceans mean that likely conflict is +offshore. The likelihood our next adversary may have access to +surveillance, precision munitions, and long-range delivery +systems dictates that much of our operations will be at long +range, lest our forces come under attack at their ports, camps, +and bases. There will be a need for systems capable of projecting +military force from distances of 10,000KM. A sizable portion of +the force must be able to deliver ordnance of enemy targets from +ranges in excess of 5,000KM. Launching attacks from inside +1,000KM of the enemy forces will demand that friendly forces be +protected from attack by means of active and passive defenses and +dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude achieving levels +of Shock and Awe through simultaneous attack.</p> + +<h3>Survivability</h3> + +<p>Great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to +deliver the attack is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built +for the most demanding conflict must also be flexible for other +operations. Therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great +range, speed, and survivability in reaching their target, their +cost become prohibitive in large-scale operations which endure +beyond a few hours, or in smaller-scale operations where the +goals are modest and the demands on other military forces are +low. Simultaneous combat operations require a number of +expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours of the +conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock. Awe is +not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience in +being attacked; at best you may make them numb. Alternatively, +reusable long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility +to alter the Deep Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of +weapons systems ranges from the most valuable systems such as +ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less +valuable, but useful, stealth fighter and long-range +surface-to-surface high trajectory fires.</p> + +<h3>Firepower</h3> + +<p>Discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of +people and structures being in close proximity to the desired +target. It is not improbable that the national command center is +located next door to a children's hospital.</p> + +<p>Discriminate fires require precision in target cordinate +identification and location. Precision does not mean "small +warhead," although there is a beneficial impact as the right +amount of explosive is placed on the target due the penalties +imposed on the delivery vehicle required to carry the warhead +long distances. All operations involving the use of firepower +must also understand and evaluate the beneficial aspects of using +non-destructive elements in conjunction with the attack to +include all aspects of the so-called information warfare.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="app_c"></a>Appendix C</h1> + +<h2 align="center">Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance</h2> + +<p align="center"><strong>by General Fred Franks</strong></p> + +<p>Rapid Dominance, as we see it, is a markedly different concept +for the use of force to gain national security ob jectives. At +its core, Rapid Dominance blends unique capabilities of land, +sea, air, space, and special operating forces. It is important to +note the vital role of jointness in using forces from all +elements and resisting the lure of gimmicks and cost-free options +that may appear within the reach of high technology but are +not.</p> + +<p>Examining current joint force capabilities reveals some +enduring truths that should be used to evaluate future concepts. +Joint force commanders today benefit from the wide array of +capabilities available to the joint warfighting team. The ability +to combine and use forces from all dimensions in a variety of +powerful combinations to fit mission circumstances presents a +versatility of capabilities that makes defense by adversaries +difficult. Balance and versatility are key. Balance in +capabilities and the inherent versatility to combine them in +unpredictable, yet highly effective ways has served U.S. national +security interests well since the end of the Cold War. One has +only to look at the variety of methods employed in Panama (1989), +<em>Desert Storm</em> (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), +Haiti (1994), and Bosnia (1995) in both war and operations other +than war. Joint force commanders employed, and in some cases +invented, new combinations of balanced capabilities and were +willing to go beyond the confines of service doctrines to fit +mission circumstances. For example, a U.S. Army brigade of the +10th Mountain Division with helicopters replaced much of the +carrier air wing and flew off the carrier <em>Eisenhower</em> +during the Haiti operation. This force packaging capability is an +advantage unique to the U.S.</p> + +<p>As we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense +concepts such as Rapid Dominance, the key will be to maintain +that balance in land, sea, air, space, and special operating +forces combinations available to the joint force commander. U.S. +military forces are now multidimensional in capabilities, able to +use force in ways unpredictable to an adversary. U.S. forces also +have enormous versatility, able to be used in war and what have +become termed operations other than war. Balance permits +that.</p> + +<p>Moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability, +have found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly given +today's methods. Recently, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division +rapidly deployed by air from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Kuwait and was +able to fall in on equipment forward positioned and be available +for combat soon after arrival. A recent article in <em>Navy +Times</em> pointed out, "In fact, as each wave of soldiers +arrived in Kuwait, they were heading north -- combat ready -- +within six hours." This was a dramatic example of the rapid +ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using both +distant forces with those already in the theater. That +combination in that set of strategic circumstances provided a +rapid deterrent in an area of vital national security interests +to the U.S.</p> + +<p>Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and +ensuring that capacity is perceived by a potential adversary. +Staying power means the ability to press the initial advantage +gained until the strategic objective is achieved. On-the-ground +presence, in addition to forces in theater, as demonstrated in +Kuwait in 1993 and again in 1996, provided commitment and staying +power to convince Iraq that it would be disastrous to consider +any form of military action. The inherent staying power of land +forces, wherever future tactical concepts may lead, makes them a +powerful contributing partner in our Rapid Dominance concept.</p> + +<p>Finally, there is the issue of physical control. Control +combines with staying power to defeat the enemy's will. One of +the many lessons of <em>Desert Storm</em> is that it was not +until after land forces attacked Iraq and Kuwait that Iraqi +forces were expelled from Kuwait. Despite the awesome shock and +destructive effects of attacks f rom the air and sea, it was only +after coalition ground attacks to extend control to both Kuwait +and southeastern Iraq by defeat and destruction of defending +Iraqi forces that strategic objectives were secured. Control on +land was extended past the cease fire until such time in April as +the UN passed a permanent cease fire and sanctions resolution. +Land forces remaining in southeastern Iraq provided the staying +power and control.</p> + +<p>The size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in +all elements will assuredly change in the future. Early work done +in advanced warfighting experiments out of TRADOC's Battle Labs +beginning in 1992 and growing into the current Force XXI and +other promising capabilities as well as by the USMC at MCCDC at +Quantico are the precursors of how change may be discovered and +implemented. The challenge is to ensure that all components of +our fighting power are properly balanced and combined into the +most effective and lethal mixes of land, sea, air, space, and +special operating forces. This is the heart of the Rapid +Dominance force of the future.</p> + +<p>Extension of real and perceived control over the will and +ability of any adversary to oppose or threaten us will insure and +guarantee success of initial operations, thereby maximizing Shock +and Awe. Indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operationally +will be a major factor in achieving the enduring effects of Shock +and Awe. Certainly, as forces on land evolve and change, they +must meet the requirements of rapidity and sustainment and are +vital components of any mix of forces that seek by Shock and Awe +to stun and then rapidly dominate an adversary to achieve U.S. +national security objectives.</p> + +<p>We strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in +exploring defense alternatives. We must seize this time to be +bold in our thinking. More thought and hypotheses with +operational methods that break through or expand current service +doctrines are needed from a joint perspective even as services +look to the future from their own service perspective. Then there +must be rigorous experiments using both high fidelity simulations +and actual joint field trials to determine the worth of these +hypotheses to blend the wide array of technology available to the +total joint force and according to bold new concepts. The results +will determine the worth of Rapid Dominance concepts by judging +whether they will permit even more balanced, versatile, and +lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated future strategic +circumstances.</p> + +<h1 align="center"><a name="bio"></a>Study Group Members</h1> + +<p><strong>L.A. "Bud" Edney</strong> is a retired Navy admiral +and naval aviator. A veteran of over 350 combat missions in +Vietnam, Admiral Edney's senior billets included Vice Chief of +Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command/Supreme +Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Edney has an advanced degree +from Harvard and was a 1970 White House Fellow.</p> + +<p><strong>Fred M. Franks</strong> is a retired Army general and +a highly experienced combat armor officer. During the Gulf War, +he commanded VII Corps and last served as Commanding General of +the Training and Doctrine Command. He has two master's degrees +from Columbia and is a graduate of the National War College. He +is the author of <em>Into the Storm, a Study in Command,</em> +written with Tom Clancy to be published by G.P. Putnam's Sons in +1997.</p> + +<p><strong>Charles A. Horner</strong> is a retired Air Force +general and a highly experienced combat fighter and attack pilot. +During the Gulf War, General Horner commanded all allied air +forces. His last assignment was Commander-in-Chief, Space +Command. A graduate of the National War College, he now serves as +consultant to government and industry.</p> + +<p><strong>Jonathan T. Howe</strong> is a retired Navy admiral +and both a submarine and surface warfare qualified officer. He +has served as Deputy Assistant to the President for National +Security Affairs, Deputy Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, +Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe/CINC U.S. Naval +Forces Europe, and was Special Representative of the Secretary +General of the UN to Somalia. He has a Ph.D. from the Fletcher +School of Law and Diplomacy and currently heads a charitable +foundation.</p> + +<p><strong>Harlan K. Ullman</strong> divides his time between the +worlds of business and public policy. A former naval person, he +is with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and +the Center for Naval Analyses. His last book, <em>IN IRONS: U.S. +Military Might in the New Century,</em> was published by the +National Defense University Press in 1995.</p> + +<p><strong>James P. Wade, Jr.</strong>, a scientist by training, +is a West Point graduate and infantry officer. He has held many +senior positions in DOD, including head of Policy Planning, +Assistant to SECDEF for Atomic Energy, Assistant Secretary for +Acquisition, and Acting Head of Defense Research and Engineering. +He is Chairman and CEO of DGI which conducted this study.</p> + +<p><strong>Keith Brendley</strong> is a Vice President with +Defense Group Inc. He was formerly with Sarcos Research +Corporation, RAND, System Planning Corporation and NASA, Ames +Research Center. He holds mechanical engineering degrees from the +University of Illinois (B.S.) and the University of Maryland +(M.S.).</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Shock and Awe, by +Harlan K. Ullman and James P. 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Wade + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have +to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. + +Title: Shock and Awe + Achieving Rapid Dominance + +Author: Harlan K. Ullman + James P. Wade + +Posting Date: September 22, 2014 [EBook #7259] +Release Date: January, 2005 +First Posted: April 1, 2003 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SHOCK AND AWE *** + + + + +Produced by an anonymous Project Gutenberg volunteer. + + + + + + + + + +[Note: This book was taken from the website of the Command and Control +Research Program (CCRP) within the within the Office of the Assistant +Secretary of Defense. According to the Privacy and Security Notice: + + 2. Information presented on DODCCRP.ORG is considered public + information and may be distributed or copied unless otherwise + specified. Use of appropriate byline/photo/image credits is + requested. + +The original electronic text was published at +http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html] + + + + +Shock and Awe: +Achieving Rapid Dominance + +Written By + +Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade + +With: + +L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. Horner, Jonathan T. Howe, +and Keith Brendley + +NDU Press Book +December 1996 + + + + +Contents + + + +Foreword +Prologue +Introduction to Rapid Dominance + +Chapter 1. Background and Basis +Chapter 2. Shock and Awe +Chapter 3. Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application +Chapter 4. An Outline for System Innovation and Technological + Integration +Chapter 5. Future Directions + +Appendices -- Reflections of Three Former Commanders + Appendix A. "Thoughts on Rapid Dominance" by Admiral Bud Edney + Appendix B. "Defense Alternatives: Forces Required" by General + Chuck Horner + Appendix C. "Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance" by General + Fred Franks + +Biographies of the Study Group Members + + + + +Foreword + + + +We are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended debate +about the future of conflict and the future of our defense +establishment. Few will deny that the winds of change are blowing as +never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical situation, an +evolving information-oriented society, advancing technology, and +budgetary constraints. How our nation responds to the challenge of +change will determine our ability to shape the future and defend +ourselves against 21st century threats. The major issue, however it +may be manifested, involves the degree of change that is required. +Advocates, all along the spectrum from a military technical revolution +to a revolution in military affairs to a revolution in security +affairs, are making their cases. Military institutions are by their +very nature somewhat conservative. History has shown that success has +often sown the seeds of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford +to follow in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels +and failed to stretch their imaginations. + +Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced about a +subject are not in the most advantageous position to understand a new +world order. Yet these same individuals are often among the most +credible voices and therefore are essential to progress. The authors +of Shock and Awe are a highly accomplished and distinguished group +with the credibility that comes from years of front line experience. +Thus, this work is important not only because of the ideas contained +within, but because of the caliber and credibility of the authors. + +ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In sponsoring +this work and in disseminating its initial results, we hope to +contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives, their promises, +and their risks. As the authors note, this is a work in progress meant +not to provide definitive solutions but a proposed perspective for +considering future security needs and strategies. To the extent that +vigorous debate ensues we will be successful. + +David S. Alberts +Washington, D.C. +October 1996 + + + + +Prologue + + + +The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for +structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future U. +S. military forces might be configured. From the very outset of this +study group's deliberations, we agreed that the most useful +contribution we could make would be to attempt to reach beyond what we +saw as the current and commendable efforts, largely but not entirely +within the Department of Defense, to define concepts for strategy, +doctrine, operations, and force structure to deal with a highly +uncertain future. In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized +the inherent and actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach +beyond what may prove to be the full extent of our grasp. + +It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently the +most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time +to come. Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose +major excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of +military superiority? For reasons noted in this study, we believe that +excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of current +defense approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have +led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that the +Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this means for +more precisely defining the nature of our future security needs. +Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing external +danger, the United States is actively examining new strategic options +and choices. The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the +Pentagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality. + +At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of American +military power, unencumbered by the danger of an external peer +competitor, have created a period of strategic advantage during which +we have the luxury of time, perhaps measured in many years, to +re-examine with a margin of safety our defense posture. On the other +hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this +predominant military capability of the United States and fail to try +to exploit, bypass, or counter it. In other words, faced with American +military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most +importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries +may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant +as possible these current U.S. advantages. We proceed at our own risk +if we dismiss this possibility. + +Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability +will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major American political +parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability, +both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to +be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense +budgets that are likely to be approved. Unless a new menace +materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same." Such +reductions may have no strategic consequences. However, that is an +outcome that we believe should not be left to chance. + +This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith strategic +reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs may be caught +up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and could too easily +drift into becoming advocacy or marketing documents. As the services +are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure, +the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and +special programs is likely to increase, thereby complicating the +problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological +resources. This means that some external thinking, removed from the +bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating +and sustaining innovation. + +Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing profound +change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature of the free +enterprise system and the American personality. Whether in information +or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too +numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product +breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One +sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in +this country are being created by small business. In the areas of +commercial information and related management information systems, +these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a +few years ago. + +On the so-called information highway, performance is increasing +dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to bring to +market new generation technology are diminishing. These positive +trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base. One +consequence of this broad commercial transformation is that any future +set of defense choices may be inexorably linked to and dependent on +this profound, ongoing change in the commercial sector and in learning +to harness private sector advances in technology-related products. It +must also be understood that only the United States among all states +and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and commercial +capability to undertake the full exploitation of this revolutionary +potential. + +Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed +worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during +the Cold War. These demands will continue and the diversity of +assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces must be properly +manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to +standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and +its public. The matter of maintaining this capability while attempting +to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting +challenge not to be underestimated. + +These structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity +for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to +exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of +Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on Shock and Awe. Rapid +Dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts +and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about +the future is perhaps one of the few givens. We believe the principles +and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and +different enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated +by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," +and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer examination. + +Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war recorded +their observations, strategists and generals have been tantalized and +confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the adversary's will to +resist before, during, and after battle. Today, we believe that an +unusual opportunity exists to determine whether or not this +long-sought strategic goal of affecting the will, understanding, and +perception of an adversary can be brought closer to fruition. Even if +this task cannot be accomplished, we believe that, at the very +minimum, such an effort will enhance and improve the ability of our +military forces to carry out their missions more successfully through +identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the +conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and +choices for employing our forces more effectively. + +Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of strategy, +technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has the potential for +revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid Dominance as the possible +military expression, vanguard, and extension of this potential for +revolutionary change. The strategic centers of gravity on which Rapid +Dominance concentrates, modified by the uniquely American ability to +integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology, and +innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and shaping the +will of the adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy +or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no +alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military +objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must control the +operational environment and through that dominance, control what the +adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or +regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known. + +In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital condition +to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an adversary's military +power. We still must maintain the capacity for the physical and +forceful occupation of territory should there prove to be no +alternative to deploying sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment +on the ground to accomplish that objective. Should this goal of +applying our resources to controlling, affecting, and breaking the +will of an adversary to resist remain elusive, we believe that Rapid +Dominance can still provide a variety of options and choices for +dealing with the operational demands of war and conflict. + +To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply a +variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary level of +Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military leverage +points. This means that psychological and intangible, as well as +physical and concrete effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces +and supporting military infrastructure, will have to be achieved. It +is in this broader and deeper strategic application that Rapid +Dominance perhaps most fundamentally differentiates itself from +current doctrine and offers revolutionary application. + +Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the adversary's +will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe to achieve +strategic aims and military objectives, four characteristics emerge +that will define the Rapid Dominance military force. These are noted +and discussed in later chapters. The four characteristics are near +total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and +environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational +brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature +management of the entire operational environment. + +Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that is, it +focuses on defeating the military capability of an adversary and +therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-Rapid Dominance would seek to +be more universal in application through the overriding objective of +affecting the adversary's will beyond the boundaries traditionally +defined by military capability alone. In other words, where decisive +force is likely to be most relevant is against conventional military +capabilities that can be overwhelmed by American (and allied) military +superiority. In conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this +idealized scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be +sufficiently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make this +distinction in either theory or in practice. + +We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force actually be +fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, this force would +be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and certainly not an antidote +or preventative for a major policy blunder, miscalculation, or +mistake. It should also be fully appreciated that situations will +exist in which Rapid Dominance (or any other doctrine) may not work or +apply because of political, strategic, or other limiting factors. + +We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an adversary's +will, perception, and understanding through Shock and Awe on the +grounds that this idea is not new and that such an outcome may not be +physically achievable or politically desirable. On the first point, we +believe the use of basic principles of strategy can stand us in good +stead even and perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries +may not elect to fight the United States along traditional or expected +lines. On whether this ability can and should be achieved, we believe +that question should be part of a broader examination. + +Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the way in +which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy, technology, +and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It is this interaction and +focus which we think will provide the most interesting results. + +For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious +intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of Rapid +Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Dominance in the formation +stage and not as a final product. Over the next months, we believe +further steps should be taken to refine Rapid Dominance and to develop +"paper" systems and force designs that will add crucial specificity to +this concept. Then, this Rapid Dominance force can be assessed against +five sets of questions: + + - First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be fielded with + the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe to affect and shape + the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and + improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major + regional contingency (MRC)? + - Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its + application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War + (OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it + not, and where might it offer mixed benefits? + - Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance in + both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a form + of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy? Would + this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to our + own public? + - Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances, coalitions, + and the conduct of allied and combined operations? + - Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on defense + resource investment priorities and future budgets? + +From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful results +will flow. + +We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the National +Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In particular, we +owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts of NDU whose +intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his full support, +have been invaluable and without which this project would have been +far less productive. + +Washington, D.C. + +1 September 1996 + +L.A. Edney J.T. Howe +F.M. Franks H.K. Ullman +C. A. Horner J.P. Wade + + + + +Introduction to Rapid Dominance + + + +The military posture and capability of the United States of America +are, today, dominant. Simply put, there is no external adversary in +the world that can successfully challenge the extraordinary power of +the American military in either regional conflict or in "conventional" +war as we know it once the United States makes the commitment to take +whatever action may be needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis +may be the most difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and U.S. forces +are not in place. However, it will still be years, if not decades, +before potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a +full panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the +aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and +weapons systems in our inventory. Even if an adversary could deploy +similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb training and +preparation of American service personnel would still be a daunting +task. + +Given this reality that our military dominance can and will extend for +some considerable time to come, provided we are prepared to use it, +why then is a re-examination of American defense posture and doctrine +important? The answers to this question involve (1) the changing +nature of the domestic and international environments; (2) the complex +nature of resolving inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside +conventional war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism, +crime, and the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource +constraints; (4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases +raised on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future +of austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called social, +economic, and information revolutions that could check or counter many +of the nation's assumptions as well as public support currently +underwriting defense. + +It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving non-traditional +Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law enforcement tasks are growing +and pose difficult problems and challenges to American military +forces, especially when and where the use of force may be +inappropriate or simply may not work. The expansion of the role of UN +forces to nation-building in Somalia and its subsequent failure comes +to mind as an example of this danger. It is also arguable that the +formidable nature and huge technological lead of American military +capability could induce an adversary to move to a strategy that +attempted to circumvent all this fighting power through other clever +or agile means. The Vietnam War is a grim reminder of the political +nature of conflict and how our power was once outflanked. Training, +morale, and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring +both a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing. + +Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most dominant +military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in overcoming the +inertia of this success. We may be our own worst enemy. + +During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense debate was +often fought over how to balance the so-called "strategy-force +structure-budget" formula. Today, that formula has expanded to include +"threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure." +Without a "clear and present danger" such as the Axis Powers in 1941 +or, later, the Soviet Union to coalesce public agreement on the +threat, it is difficult to construct a supporting strategy that can be +effective either in setting priorities or objectives. Hence, today's +"two war" or two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC) +strategy has been criticized as strategically and financially +excessive. As noted by administration officials, the current force +structure does not meet the demands of the "two war," MRC strategy +and, in any event, the budget will not support the planned force +structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United States +possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and facilities than it +needs to support the current force, thereby draining scarce resources +away from fighting power. As a result, there is a substantial defense +imbalance that will erode fighting power. + +In designing its defense posture, the United States has adopted the +doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming force." This doctrine +reinforces American advantages in strategic mobility, prepositioning, +technology, training, and in fielding integrated military systems to +provide and retain superiority, and responds to the minimum casualty +and collateral damage criteria set first in the Reagan Administration. +The Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon +or process by which the United States continues to exploit technology +to maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of +achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." Through this awareness, +the United States should be able to obtain perfect or near perfect +information on virtually all technical aspects of the battlefield and +therefore be able to defeat or destroy an adversary more effectively, +with fewer losses to ourselves and with a range of capabilities from +long-range precision strike to more effective close-in weapons. + +Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some of the +as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities, changes, +and trends. The deployment of American forces to Bosnia is a reaction +to and representation of major shifts occurring in the post-Cold War +world. With these shifts, this deployment is suggestive of what may +lie ahead for the use, relevance, and design of military force. The +legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and then, the start of the Cold War, +caused the West to adopt policies for containing and deterring the +broad threat posed by the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermonuclear +weapons, complemented over time by strong conventional forces, +threatened societal damage to Russia. Conventional forces backed by +tactical nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a +massive Soviet ground attack in Europe and, in part, to provide an +alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons. + +Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit serving +in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so well in +_Desert Storm_ and, for the bulk of the Cold War along with our other +units, had been designed to defend NATO against and then defeat a +numerically superior, armored and mechanized Soviet adversary +advancing across the plains of Germany. Now these troops, as well as +others from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW +for which special training, rules of engagement, command arrangements, +and other support structures have been put in place at short notice, +few of which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are also +operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media coverage, can +have huge domestic political impact especially if events go wrong. + +Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally configured +force for such an operation is not relevant for the moment even though +this unit probably was the most appropriate for this task. However, it +is prudent to examine the consequences of changing tasks presaged by +Bosnia, in which the enemy is instability rather than an ideological +or regional adversary we are trying to contain or defeat and +neutrality on our part may be vital to the success of the mission. Do +these changes mean that we should alter our traditional approach to +the doctrine for and design of forces? If so, how? Are there +alternative or more effective ways and means to conduct these +peacekeeping-related operations? And, in this evaluation, are there +alternative doctrines we should consider to fight wars more +effectively as we envisage scenarios under the construct of the MRC? + +With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian superpower, +there is no external threat to the existence or survival of the United +States as a nation and there will not be such an immediate threat for +some time to come. This means that there is a finite window of +opportunity when there is no external adversary threatening the total +existence of American society; that our forces are far superior to any +possible military adversary choosing to confront us directly; and +that, with innovative thought, we may be able to create a more +relevant, effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common +defense at the likely levels of future spending. + +At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the +fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be addressed. +The industrial and technical base of the United States is changing +profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical advantages of the +American economy were never greater and it is small business that is +creating virtually all new jobs and employment opportunities. +Commercial technology and products are turning over on ever shortening +cycles. Performance, especially in high-technology products, is +improving and costs are being driven downwards. + +Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector, +where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among +competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle time to +field new generation capabilities is lengthening and performance, +especially in computer and information systems, is often obsolete on +delivery. The defense industrial base will continue to compress and it +is not clear that the necessary level of efficiencies or increases in +effectiveness in using this base can be identified and implemented, +suggesting further pressures on a defense budget that is only likely +to be cut. + +Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the +military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot wars +such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships and +submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, technology, +strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our national preference +for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare continues to shape the +way we design and rationalize our military capability. Therefore, it +is no surprise that in dealing with the MRC, American doctrine, in +some ways, remains an extension of Cold War force planning. While the +magnitude and number of dangerous threats to the nation have been +remarkably reduced by the demise of the USSR, we continue to use +technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to identify +or produce new and more effective solutions for achieving military and +strategic/political objectives. + +While there is much talk about "military revolutions" and winning the +"information war," what is generally meant in this lexicon and +discussion is translated into defense programs that relate to +accessing and "fusing" information across command, control, +intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and precision +strike technologies. What is most exciting among these revolutions is +the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield awareness," that is, +achieving the capability to have near-perfect knowledge and +information of the battlefield while depriving the adversary of that +capacity and producing "systems of systems" for this purpose. + +The near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely remain +directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on fielding +more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons systems and +infrastructure for using those systems. The doctrine of "decisive or +overwhelming force" is the conceptual and operational underpinning for +winning the next war based largely on this force-on-force and +attrition model, and winning the information war is vital to this end. +Few have asked whether the pattern of employing more modern technology +for traditional firepower solutions is the best one and if there are +alternative ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and +efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield +awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of +fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic objectives? + +Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would advance +the military revolution to new levels and possibly new dimensions. +Rapid Dominance extends across the entire "threat, strategy, force +structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with broad implications for +how we provide for the future common defense. Organization and +management of defense and defense resources should not be excluded +from this examination although, in this paper, they are not discussed +in detail. + +The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, and +understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic +policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. Clearly, the +traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the +adversary's military capability is a fundamental and necessary +component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent, however, is to field a range +of capabilities to induce sufficient Shock and Awe to render the +adversary impotent. This means that physical and psychological effects +must be obtained. + +Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to control, on an +immediate basis, the entire region of operational interest and the +environment, broadly defined, in and around that area of interest. +Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant battlefield awareness, we +envisage Rapid Dominance producing a capability that can more +effectively and efficiently achieve the stated political or military +objectives underwriting the use of force by rendering the adversary +completely impotent. + +In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly before +an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies throughout the +spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of +battle and conflict resolution. + +"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary's +will both physically and psychologically. Physical dominance includes +the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize, and to render +impotent. Psychological dominance means the ability to destroy, +defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary to resist; or convince the +adversary to accept our terms and aims short of using force. The +target is the adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The +principal mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing +sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to convince +or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. +Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinformation, +perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed. + +The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this overwhelming +level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or +sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on. In crude +terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of the environment and +paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding +of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical +and strategic levels. An adversary would be rendered totally impotent +and vulnerable to our actions. To the degree that non-lethal weaponry +is useful, it would be incorporated in the ability to Shock and Awe +and achieve Rapid Dominance. + +Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance seeks to +impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact +that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the +Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until +both nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was +sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average Japanese +citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of +Shock and Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the +destructive power carried by a single airplane. This incomprehension +produced a state of awe. + +We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential in +combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce systems +capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most or many +cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing the full +destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional +technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so. + +Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and Awe at the +appropriate level or levels is the next step in the evolution of a +doctrine for replacing or complementing overwhelming force. By way of +comparison, we have summarized how we view the differences between the +doctrines of Rapid Dominance and Decisive Force in terms of basic +elements that apply to the objectives, uses of force, force size, +scope, speed, casualties, and technique. We recognize that there will +be debate over the relative utility and applicability of these +doctrines and readers are encouraged to participate. + +In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid Dominance +and Decisive Force, it is important to define the terms as precisely +as possible. + +The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe must be +compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the ability to "own" +the dimension of time-moving more quickly than an opponent, operating +within his decision cycle, and resolving conflict favorably in a short +period of time. "Dominance" means the ability to control a situation +totally. + +Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the means to +anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will involve the +capability to deny an opponent things of critical value, and to convey +the unmistakable message that unconditional compliance is the only +available recourse. It will imply more than the direct application of +force. It will mean the ability to control the environment and to +master all levels of an opponent's activities to affect will, +perception, and understanding. This could include means of +communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and +other aspects of infrastructure as well as the denial of military +responses. Deception, misinformation, and disinformation are key +components in this assault on the will and understanding of the +opponent. + +Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tactical, +strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist. With +Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power with such compellance +that even the strongest of wills will be awed. Rapid Dominance will +strive to achieve a dominance that is so complete and victory is so +swift, that an adversary's losses in both manpower and material could +be relatively light, and yet the message is so unmistakable that +resistance would be seen as futile. + +"Decisive Force," on the other hand, implies delivering massive enough +force to prevail. Decisive means using force with plenty of margin for +error. Force implies a traditional "force-on-force" and attrition +approach. This concept does not exclude psychological and other +complementary damage imposition techniques to enhance the application +of force; they have been used throughout the history of warfare. But +such non-destructive means would have an ancillary role. Military +force would be applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against +the military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not always an +essential component. As in _Desert Shield/Storm_, enough time would +have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force. Such a luxury is +not always feasible. + +The differences become clearer if broken down into their essential +elements: + +Elements Rapid Dominance Decisive Force +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Objective Control the adversary's will, Prevail militarily and + perceptions, and understanding decisively against a set of + opposing capabilities defined + by the MRC + +Use of Control the adversary's will, Unquestioned ability to +Force perceptions, and understanding prevail militarily over an + and literally make an adversary opponent's forces and based + impotent to act or react against the adversary's + capabilities + +Force Size Could be smaller than Large, highly trained, and + opposition, but with decisive well-equipped. Materially + edge in technology, training, overwhelming + and technique + +Scope All encompassing Force against force (and + supporting capability) + +Speed Essential Desirable + +Casualties Could be relatively few in Potentially higher on both + number on both sides sides + +Technique Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, Systematic destruction of + destroy military capability. + applicable in some situations + +Four general categories of core characteristics and capabilities have +been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured mission capability +packages must embrace. These are identified briefly and discussed in +later chapters. + +First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize */knowledge/* of the +environment, of the adversary, and of our own forces on political, +strategic, economic, and military/operational levels. On one hand, we +want to get into the minds of the adversary far more deeply than we +have in the past. Beyond operational intelligence required for +battlefield awareness, Rapid Dominance means cultural understanding of +the adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning +and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and +strategic levels. + +Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve */rapidity/* in the sense of +timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have capabilities that can be applied +swiftly and relatively faster than an adversary's. + +Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total */control of the +environment/* from complete "signature management" of both our and the +adversary's information and intelligence to more discrete means to +deceive, disguise, and misinform. + +Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of operational +competence that can virtually institutionalize */"brilliance."/* In +some cases, this may mean changing the longstanding principle of +military centralization and empowering individual soldiers, sailors, +and airmen to be crucial components in applying and directing the +application of force. + +As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and +capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging reality +to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is transforming at the +current rate and breadth, it could be that, over the course of many +years, the defense industrial base would follow suit, or face +irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there are certain areas in +defense which will never or may never be eliminated or replaced. +Nuclear systems are a current example. + +Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may mean that +military force design and procurement will become dependent on the +private sector and commercial technology. Rapid Dominance is a first +conceptual step to deal with this possibility. + +The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the concept +of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy, technology and +innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe. Based on this, subsequent +steps will involve expanding mission capability packages concepts +consisting of operations harmonized with doctrine, organization, and +systems and then move on to field prototype systems for further test +and evaluation as advanced concept technology demonstrations. + + + + +Background and Basis + + + +In both relative and absolute terms, since the end of World War II, +the military strength and capability of the United States have never +been greater. Yet this condition of virtual military superiority has +created a paradox. Absent a massive threat or massive security +challenge, it is not clear that this military advantage can (always) +be translated into concrete political terms that advance American +interests. Nor is it clear that the current structure and foundations +for this extraordinary force can be sustained for the long term +without either spending more money or imposing major changes to this +structure that may exceed the capacity of our system to accommodate. +As a consequence, the success of the current design and configuration +of our forces may ironically become self-limiting and constraining. +That is not to claim automatically that there are better military +solutions or that the current defense program is not the best our +political system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are +well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance and +measure against the current and planned program. + +To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that one +thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine of overwhelming +or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To push the conceptual +envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: Can a Rapid Dominance +force lead, for example, to a force structure that can win an MRC such +as _Desert Shield_ and _Desert Storm _far more quickly and cheaply +with far fewer personnel than our planned force both in terms of +stopping any invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can +Rapid Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity +to deal with grey areas such as OOTW? + +Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of political +deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or "shut down" an +adversary can actually control behavior? What are the possible +political implications of this capability and what would this power +mean for conducting coalition war and for how our allies react and +respond? + +Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will, perception, +and understanding of an adversary rather than simply destroying +military capability, this focus must cause us to consider the broadest +spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and across all aspects of war +including intelligence, training, education, doctrine, industrial +capacity, and how we organize and manage defense. + +We observe at first that even with the successful ending of the Cold +War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating its national +security and defense has been relatively and understandably modest and +cautious. In essence, while the size of the force has been reduced +from Cold War levels of 2.2 million active duty troops to about 1.5 +million, and the services have been vocal in revising doctrine and +strategy to reflect the end of the Soviet threat, with the exception +of emphasis on jointness, there are few really fundamental differences +in the design and structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years +ago. + +Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States rested on +several central and widely accepted and publicly supported +propositions. The "clear and apparent danger" of the Soviet threat was +real and seen as such. The USSR was to be contained and deterred from +hostile action by a combination of political, strategic, and military +actions ranging from the forging of a ring of alliances surrounding +the USSR and its allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of +nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. + +Following the truce ending the Korean War, a large, standing military +force was maintained and defined by the operational requirements of +fighting the large formations of military forces of the USSR and its +allies with similar types of military forces, albeit outnumbered. The +role of allies, principally NATO, was assumed and taken into account +in planning, although the paradox of the issue of planning for a long +versus short war in a nuclear world remained unresolved. + +Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the Cold War +went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any war might be +ended quickly. The largely World War II defense, industrial, and +basing structure was retained along with the intent to rely on our +technological superiority to offset numerical or geographical +liabilities. + +It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense through +mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the Second World War +and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming the enemy using the +massive application of force, technology, and associated firepower. +Two decades later, Vietnam exposed the frailty of this approach of +dependence on massive application of firepower especially when +political limits were placed on applying that firepower. + +Currently, _Desert Storm_ and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 have +been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the doctrine +of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that both strategic +objectives and tactical methods were in congruence. We argue that now +is the time to re-examine these premises of reliance on overwhelming +or decisive force as currently employed and deployed in the force +structure if only as a prudent check. + +Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major threat to +generate consensus and to rally the country around defense and defense +spending, the military posture of the United States will erode as the +defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in the future on what is +currently seen to be as sufficient force to be "decisive" could easily +prove unachievable and the results problematic or worse for U.S. +policy. + +The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat is, of +course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining the future +defense posture of the nation. The United States has long resisted +maintaining a large standing military and the Cold War years could +prove an aberration to that history. Extending this historical +observation of small standing forces, it is clear that there is no +adversary on the horizon even remotely approaching the military power +of the former USSR. While we might conjure up nominal regional +contingencies against Korea or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for +establishing the building blocks for force structure, it will prove +difficult to sustain the current defense program over the long term +without a real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public +support. Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could +easily prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that +in Europe, defense spending is closing in on 1 to 2 percent of GDP. + +Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to grips with +this new world, the structural limitations and constraints in how we +develop systems and procure weapons based on current technological and +industrial capacity for producing them will be exacerbated by downward +fiscal pressure giving us little room for mistakes and flexibility. +Air, land, space, and sea forces are currently limited in the actual +numbers and types of systems that are available for purchase and more +limited in that there are virtually no new major systems on the +horizon. That could change. + +The M-1A-1 tank is in production only for foreign sales. Despite the +allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only four active +classes of warships from which to replace its capability and, for the +first time this century since aircraft entered the inventory, is +without a new aircraft in development. The Air Force can be placed in +similar straits if the F-22 program is deferred or canceled because of +rising cost and fiscal constraints. Time will tell what happens to the +Joint Strike Fighter. Assumptions about reliance on technology and R&D +providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove +ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those +programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D could become +the main source for procuring software and other systems needed to +upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called "leap-ahead" +technologies that may prove elusive to create. + +There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing new +doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing +circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and with the clear +bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and defending an +annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, less of the same) +becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While the JCS or OSD or CINCs +may have genuine need for jointly packaged forces that are rapidly +deployable irrespective of Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels, +the services cannot be expected to reverse the years of viewing the +world through service- specific arguments and doctrine. + +Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced with the +end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to assume that there +are no risks to the nation nor an absence of evil-doers wishing this +nation harm. It would also be shortsighted to expect that potential +adversaries are unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge +of their environment and simplicity to overcome our current military +and technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In +addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our +assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological superiority +should welcome thoughtful examination. + +Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start, the United +States should act to exploit the several major advantages it +possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and danger of future +threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a longer view. While we +may have deferred adding to the inventory of future systems in +development, current systems possess more than enough military +capability to get us through this transition period, even if this +period were to last for more than a decade. This does not mean we can +rest on our oars; if we take advantage of this opportunity, time is on +our side. If we squander this opportunity, then we could ultimately +find ourselves in trouble. + +Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the luxury of +the best technically educated and trained society in the world, and +the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers vast potential if we +are clever enough to exploit this extraordinary resource. + +Third, because of significant changes in law and organization +regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and +through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Department of +Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. The enhanced role +of the CINCs and the acceptance of jointness are positive +illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural and political +realities noted above, assuring productive innovation continues will +not be automatic. Against these conducive signs, vision, true joint +thinking, and tactical advances still are premium commodities to be +nourished and encouraged. + +In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful to rely +on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we have been +successful in applying containment and deterrence in the Cold War. +When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait, then the use of +force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how can we augment or +improve the use of existing military capability should it be required. + +Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a regime +of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as well as +operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are seeking the capability +to dominate, control, and isolate the entire environment in, around, +over, and under the objective area as quickly as possible, and with +fewer forces than currently envisaged, although direct insertion of +forces is an important component depending upon the tactical +situation. In many cases, this capacity need not be the traditional +firepower solution of only physically destroying an adversary's +military capabilities. Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of +affecting the adversary's will to resist as the first order of +business, quickly if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would +be to stop an attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it +be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political deterrence +that might restrain aggression in the first place. + +To accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action means +neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics; to organize +society; and to function; as well as to control, regulate and deny the +adversary of information, intelligence, and understanding of what is +and what is not happening. This means we must control all necessary +intelligence and information on our forces-the ultimate form of +stealth-and on an adversary's forces as well and then exploit total +situational awareness for rapid action. + +Regarding the emergence of current military thought and doctrine, as +implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early and far less mature +stages of a major revolution than is generally assumed. It is +understandable that despite major strategic reassessments, current +doctrine is still highly influenced by Cold War tactics and strategy +and perhaps by the iron grip of the history of conflict since the +early 19th century. + +Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has been +largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast amounts of +manpower over time and space. The United States advanced Napoleon's +use of industry and mass armies in the Civil War and our planning up +to the Cold War tended to follow this same pattern. World War II, of +course, exemplified the triumph of this industrial, mobilization, and +massive use of force approach. + +In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued that this +model combining massive industrial might and manpower finally ended in +1989. Although, by then, technological advances to conventional +military capabilities seemed to be approaching the destructive power, +or more precisely, the system lethality of nuclear weapons. In other +words, modern non-nuclear precision weapons perhaps could produce +effects against enemy targets roughly comparable to the military +lethality of theater-level nuclear weapons. If this condition proves +true, could this new lethality fundamentally change the construct for +designing American doctrine and strategy? This question is at the +heart of the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive +force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in place. + +Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the need to +prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally powerful adversary, +the United States military has conducted two post-Cold War crises +against lesser adversaries quite differently than it fought the Cold +War. In the Panama intervention in 1990 and in Kuwait shortly +thereafter, the suggestion of newer and different methods of warfare +was present. Perhaps both will turn out to be transition campaigns, +where there is much of the old, but also signs of the new. But there +are specific pieces of evidence that should command our attention. + +Underlying the planning for _Operation Just Cause_ in Panama and +_Desert Shield/Storm_ in Kuwait was the premeditated incorporation of +a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply decisive +force. The aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the enemy through +a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air, and special +operating forces strikes that took place nearly simultaneously across +a wide battle space and against many military targets. The purpose of +these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis +of both the national state and its armed forces that would lead to +prompt neutralization and capitulation. + +In both _Just Cause_ and _Desert Storm_, the United States (plus +coalition forces in _Desert Storm_) had such overwhelming military +capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a matter of +drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan based on using the +entire system of capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce +a decisive victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar +principles of intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in +_Desert Storm_ unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its allies nearly 6 +months to deploy over a half million troops before the fighting began. + +The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5 Pamphlet +reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simultaneity. Yet, +progress in these operational directions may be in danger of faltering +if only old Cold War yardsticks are used to make future force +investments and to direct studies about future force structure and +associated infrastructure. As in any transition period, innovation +must be joined by a willingness to experiment. This means the +establishment and cultivation of an experimental apparatus to test and +evaluate new concepts are matters of importance both to foster +innovation and assess its application. + +We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek to +emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force behavioral +change in adversaries to achieve strategic or political ends. Control +and then influence come from a range of threats and outcomes, +including putting at risk the targets an adversary holds dear, to +imposing a hierarchy of Shock and Awe, to affecting will, perception, +and understanding. Achieving control may now be theoretically possible +in even more compressed or shortened time periods because of the +potential superiority of enhanced U.S. military capability and further +training and education. To obtain this level of military superiority +that can affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least +achieve the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought, +debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if only +to test and validate contemporary doctrine. + +If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and Awe +beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must follow. The +end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way as to achieve +the desired objectives. From this concept follows the need to shut +down either a state or an organized enemy through the rapid and +simultaneous application (or threat of application) of land, sea, air, +space, and special operating forces against the broadest spectrum of +the adversary's power base and center or centers of gravity and +against the adversary's will and perception at tactical and strategic +levels. + +In _Desert Storm_, the objectives were first to evict Iraqi forces +from Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate government. From these +objectives, more limited strategic and political objectives followed, +some for purposes of maintaining coalition solidarity and UN-imposed +sanctions. Not occupying Baghdad was one such political limitation. +These strategic objectives led to identification of the enemy's +centers of gravity as the basis for the application of force to +destroy these centers. This planning led to the repeated, rapid, and +simultaneous use of massive force with great effect. + +One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam Hussein's +command and control. This was accomplished by simultaneous and massive +attacks. Once command and control was destroyed, Iraqi forces in the +Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) would be destroyed as quickly as +possible with overwhelming force and with minimum casualties. As +General Colin Powell simply stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddam's +army and then kill it." + +There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were +completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack. Outside +the KTO, targeting was more selective, not because the means were +unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because our military +objectives were purposely limited. Given the effectiveness of the air +campaign and the overwhelming superiority on the ground, coalition +land forces required only 4 of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to +eject Iraq's forces from Kuwait. + +Suppose a _Desert Storm_-type campaign were fought 20 years from now +based on a plan that exploited the concept of Rapid Dominance. Further +assume that Iraq has improved (and rebuilt) its military and that, in +a series of simultaneous and nearly instantaneous actions, our primary +objective was still to shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its +leadership, and isolate and destroy its military forces as we did in +1991. However, two decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably +achieve this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not +after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to +1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an +invasion in its tracks. + +Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction +of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow +of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to +achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping +nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese. +Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces would be paralyzed with the +neutralization or destruction of its capabilities. Deception, +disinformation, and misinformation would be applied massively. + +This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also demonstrate +to the adversary our endurance and staying power, that is, the +capability to dominate over as much time as is necessary less an enemy +mistakenly try to wait it out and use time between attacks to recover +sufficiently. If the enemy still resisted, then conventional forms of +attack would follow resulting in the physical occupation of territory. +Control is thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the +stun effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to +affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. There must be +staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the blows, +gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change tactics +much as occurred during the WWII bombing campaigns and the air war +over North Vietnam. + +Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide versatility +and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, and special +operating forces and in investment in technology to produce Rapid +Dominance. Different methods for commanding the battle using both +hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to control and direct our +forces are likely to be required especially given the simultaneous +application of capabilities throughout the given battle space by the +full spectrum of our forces. To use these combinations of forces will +require adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles +and functions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in +technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the Cold War +paradigm. + +To develop the proper combination of forces and future technology +investment for Rapid Dominance, extensive experimentation with this +core concept will be required. This exper-imentation must apply to all +levels of military educational institutions; it must be joint; it can +be accelerated by availability of recent advances in simulation +technology; and it must have operational trials in the field. + +To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and +application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is important. +The U.S. today is graduating through its college and universities +system approximately 200,000 American and foreign scientists and +engineers per year. This is a great national resource. This technology +infrastructure is dimensions larger in number and scope than the +aggregate of anywhere else in the world. Through appreciation and +exploitation of this potential, a U.S. position of pre-eminence in +science and technology could be assured for the foreseeable future. + +One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the information and +information management areas- which, in the U.S., are heavily +commercially oriented. Future military application may well be +analogous to the impact of the internal combustion engine and wireless +radio on land, sea, and air forces in the 1920s and 1930s. The size of +this technological lead between ourselves and the rest of the world, +especially in the base for new information products and services, +should widen further in knowledge and in application. The "Silicon +Valley" revolution is likely to continue increasing computer capacity +on an almost annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be +many fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close +in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the ability +to condense and synthesize data. + +In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability to +transfer information into and out of the hands of individual users. +The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids will enhance +and potentially quicken individual decision-making ability. +Technologies associated with bioscience and bioengineering are likely +to be of particular importance in enhancing these capabilities and are +also an area of American predominance. Material sciences, software, +and communications are all American strengths, and should remain so +well into the next century. + +A significant element supporting this explosion in applied information +and other technologies is the American free enterprise system and its +entrepreneurial character. This drive is needed to translate this +technology into military hardware. The nature of the U.S. market and +its competitive basis reinforce this element. The largest challenges +may be to shape and exploit this commercial potential and then to +ensure that its enduring advantages become fundamental in the makeup +of our military forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required +during the Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is +it a massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed, its +edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper." + +The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new American +industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be toward the control +and management of everything that is significant to the operations +bearing on the particular Area of Interest (AOI). And we mean +everything! Control of the environment is far broader than only the +objective of achieving dominant battlefield awareness. Control means +the ability to change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures" +of all of the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the +operational frameworks in applying force across the entire spectrum of +platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, ships) can be measured +(and controlled) from many minus decibels of cross section, to many +plus decibels; communications can be entirely covert, i.e., many dB +less than the ambient environment, or that approaching "white noise." +The location of both the individual and his unit can be measured in +real time in meters, if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through +virtual reality, movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of +square kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both +during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence. This +occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the adversary, including +real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of this control. + +A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and immediately +control the operational/environmental signatures both individually and +in the aggregate. As needed, line and non-line-of-sight weapons of +near pin-point accuracy would be delivered across the entire area of +operation. Stealthy UAVs and mobile robotics systems, together with +decoys, would be deployed in large numbers for surveillance, +targeting, strike, and deception and would produce their own impact of +electronic Shock and Awe on the enemy. This application of force can +be done as rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand. + +The effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights" that +enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the conditions and +events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his society. What is +radically different in Rapid Dominance is the comprehensive system +assemblage and integration of many evolving and even revolutionary +technical advances in dominant battlefield awareness squared-materials +application, sensor and signature control, computer and bioengineering +applied to massive amounts of data, enable weapon application with +simultaneity, precision, and lethality that to date have not been +applied as a total system. Deception, disinformation, and +misinformation will become major elements of this systemic approach. + +The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely come from the +commercial world as the DOD base continues to shrink. It is clear that +in certain areas, DOD must remain involved where there is no private +R&D or to fill gaps in R&D. Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and +missile defense are examples. However, advances in commercial +technology in the Information Age are unlikely to be matched by DOD. + +Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our combat +officers and key enlisted personnel. Command must be geared to +achieving the best of the best-not the best among the good. +Assimilating in real time the vast amount of information and putting +information to use will no doubt lead to major changes in the +composition, competence, and authority of (even and especially) +individual military unit commanders perhaps to the squad or private +soldier level. + +Of course, even with the most perfect information, an unqualified, +inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may not win except +with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe. And, we repeat that +there are cases where NO military force may be able to succeed if the +objectives are unobtainable. The match of the entrepreneurial +individual with the potential of the technology base is key. +Optimizing and integrating all elements into a total system is a +certain way to exploit the opportunity that we can perceive becoming +more visible in the coming years. + + + + +Shock and Awe + + + +The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, +perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing +sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, +strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to +the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been +characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, +friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were +necessary effects arising from application of military power and were +aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and +similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military +writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an +adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a +commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial +importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending +battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock +and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, +employment of force. + +In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, +understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is +multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to +examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe +affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or +television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors +of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and +death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock +transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of _Desert +Storm_ vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of +battlefield Shock and Awe. + +In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe +can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force +or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the +Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military +objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock +and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid +Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control. + +The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of +different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to +identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that +differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, +historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task +will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of +Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this +methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages +consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force +structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how +best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To +repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain +by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative +force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in +conditions of both MRCs and OOTW. + +For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing +historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have +been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap +exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming +Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force +structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or +overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to +disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as +few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as +possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and +operationally, is crucial to successful application. + +There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this +approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly +capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and +18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be +used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and +supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally +been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though +command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be +disaggregated from this doctrine. + +The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a +platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of +worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this +doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will +prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and +other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the +time being, these have not replaced the current platform and +force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will +be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a +comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives. + +Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts +of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to +transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, +especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of +decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of +maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money +provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. +Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the +performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time +to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still +endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between +quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is +necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller +understanding. + +Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that +are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is that +Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a +broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This +breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction +among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate +military capability and must include training and education, as well +as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is +possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial +areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that +otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force. + +The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The +intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of +instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction +directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and +public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic +objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment +of this capability against society and its values, called +"counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively +destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to +resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly +incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days. + +The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in +determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can +actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an adversary +impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and +probably unachievably low levels of societal destruction; and whether +a political decision would be taken in any case to use this type of +capability given the magnitude of the consequences and the risk of +failure. + +It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of _Desert Storm_, +similar objectives were envisioned. The differences between this +example and _Desert Storm_ are through the totality of a society that +would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of +destruction and the speed of imposing those strikes as occurred to +those Japanese cities. This example of shock, awe, and intimidation +rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in very short +periods of time. + +The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of Shock and +Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive +power largely against military targets and related sectors over time. +It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the +adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which +the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion. However, it is the +cumulative effect of this application of destruction power that will +ultimately impose sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy +the physical means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to +accept whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of the +First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the +Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and related +B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of +1972-73, illustrate the application of massive bombardment. + +Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic targets, +is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming Force," even though +political constraints make this example most unlikely to be repeated +in the future. There is also the option of applying massive +destruction against purely civilian or "counter-value" targets such as +the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II when unconditionality marks +the terms of surrender. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on +the endurance and capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects +the will to resist that is the central foundation of this example. + +The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the question +of political feasibility and acceptability, and what circumstances +would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive bombardment. +Outright invasion and aggression such as Iraq's attack against Kuwait +could clearly qualify as reasons to justify using this level of Shock +and Awe. However, as with Overwhelming Force, this response is not +time-sensitive and would require massive application of force for some +duration as well as political support. + +Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock and Awe +were not achieved through the massive application of firepower across +a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of force. +Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly +focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of +scale. The German Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack +across a very broad front, although the opponent may have been +deceived into believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in +multiple locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated, +attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the +shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank's +armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum cone of damage +against the unarmored or less protected innards. + +To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is directed +against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance in +execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. The +adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics, +surrenders, or both. Hitler's campaign in France and Holland and the +seizure of the Dutch forts and the occupation of Crete in 1940 are +obvious illustrations. The use of Special Operations forces in +significant numbers is an adjunct to imposing this level of Shock and +Awe. + +_Desert Storm_ could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the +attack were mounted without the long preparatory bombardment and was +concentrated in a single sector-either the "left hook" or the Marine +attack "up the middle," and with total surprise. The major differences +between the operation in Kuwait and Germany's capture of France in +1940 were that the allies in Saudi Arabia had complete military and +technical superiority unlike the Germans and that, once under attack, +Iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition +license to pick and choose the points for penetration and then +dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future +adversaries about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that +they will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior +forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving Shock +and Awe through the precise application of force. + +It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as +guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to obtain +Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example, the German +Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the +Vietnam War, where enemy forces had relatively few lines to be +penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of warfare. + +The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths. Can +brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there a flexible enough +infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the +supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the +systems to maintain this operational and technical superiority? Rapid +Dominance requires a positive answer to these questions, at least +theoretically. + +The fifth example is named after the Chinese philosopher-warrior, Sun +Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on selective, instant decapitation +of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe. This +discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this from +Hiroshima and Massive Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before +Ho Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters +on war and proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the +rules applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged +Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The +concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head cut off the +head concubine. The ladies still could not bring themselves to take +the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had the head cut off a +second concubine. From that point on, so the story goes, the ladies +learned to march with the precision of a drill team. + +The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe and hence +compliance or capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal and +ruthless, and rapid application of force to intimidate. The +fundamental values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is +to convince the majority that resistance is futile by targeting and +harming the few. Both society and the military are the targets. In a +sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe +but through far more selective and informed targeting. Decapitation is +merely one instrument. This model can easily fall outside the cultural +heritage and values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major +refinement. Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to +communicate is another variant but without many historical examples to +show useful wartime applications. + +A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is deception. In +this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish the +enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the +adversary. The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and +knowledge of the adversary. In some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is +an early example of deception. However, as we will see, the deception +model may have new foundations in the technological innovations that +are occurring and in our ability to control the environment. + +The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the Massive +Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is questionable that a +decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in quasi- or real +assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Further, the standard to +maintain the ability to perform these missions is high and dependent +on both resources and on supporting intelligence, especially human +intelligence-not an American strong point. + +Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is distinct +from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it focuses on +depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose Shock and Awe. +The image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to +incapacitate an adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade +produces blinding light and deafening noise. The result shocks and +confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. The aim in this +example of achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so much light and +sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses, and +therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the adversary +becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable. + +A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas is a +dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high altitude nuclear +detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and electrical +equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of +likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in specific areas, of the +ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is a more reasonable +and perhaps more achievable variant. This deprival of senses, +including all electronics and substitution of false signals or data to +create this feeling of impotence, is another variant. Above all, Shock +and Awe are imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is +deprivation of the senses. + +The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part shortcomings of +other approaches. Technological solutions are crucial but may not be +conceivable outside the EMP effects of nuclear weapons. Intelligence +is clearly vital. Without precise knowledge of who and what are to be +stunned, this example will not work. + +The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian" example +(or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is based on +imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and indeed through +deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from +the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the early 1800s, native +Haitians were seeking to extricate their country from French control. +The Haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting French +military contingent and marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions +repeatedly in review. The French were deceived into believing that the +native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that +French military action was futile and that its forces would be +overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their +freedom without firing a shot. + +To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian example +and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are more crucial +in this regime. However, the target or focus is the will and +perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu category comes +closest to this one except that while Sun Tzu is selective in applying +force, it is clear that imposing actual pain and shock are essential +ingredients and deception, disin-formation, and guile are secondary. +Demonstrative uses of force are also important. The issue is how to +determine what demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the +intended target in line with the overall political aims. + +The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major dependency on +intelligence. One must be certain that the will and perceptions of the +adversary can be manipulated. The classic misfire is the adversary who +is not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the +unintended actions of the aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis' +invasion of Kuwait demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can +backfire. Saddam simply let his bluff be called. + +The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving Shock and +Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through +the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own +invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a +considerable period of time. The target set encompasses both military +and societal values. In occupying a vast empire stretching from the +Atlantic to the Red Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of +forces to secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman +forces were far superior to native forces individually and +collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the +perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would +take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat Diplomacy" of the +nineteenth century when the British fleet would return to the scene of +any crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the +wholesale destruction of offending villages. + +There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve Shock +and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the perception of that +prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most +significant factors. In other words, reprisals and the use of force to +exact a severe punishment, as well as the certainty that this sword of +Damocles would descend, were essential ingredients. The distinction +between this category and the others is the ex post facto nature of +achieving Shock and Awe. In the other categories, there is the need +for seizing the initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to +achieve Shock and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have +already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise +of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use +of force. + +The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of +reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is not and +may not always be the case with the United States, although we can +attempt to make others believe it will be. The takeover of the Embassy +in Tehran by dissident "students" in 1979 and American impotence in +the aftermath are suggestive of the shortcoming. That aside, the +example or perception of the invincibility of American military power +is not a bad one to embellish. + +The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the Decay and +Default model and is based on the imposition of societal breakdown +over a lengthy period but without the application of massive +destruction. This example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In +this example, both military and societal values are targets. Selective +and focused force is applied. It is the long-term corrosive effects of +the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately +compels an adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe +are therefore not immediate either in application or in producing the +end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and +aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do +not threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese +water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the +preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a +variant of Shock and Awe in the form of frustration collapsing the +will to resist. + +The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In many +cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock and Awe is +unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by conventional or +politically acceptable means. + +The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police," +whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you can send a +bullet." The distinction between this example and the others is that +this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu and implies that +standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place can achieve the +required objectives. There should not be too fine a point, however, in +belaboring differences with the other examples in this regard over +standoff. A stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from +a cruise missile fired at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance +on target. + +A few observations about these examples offer insights on which to +test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It is clear that +the targets in each category include military, civilian, industrial, +infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. In +certain cases, time is the crucial consideration in imposing Shock and +Awe and in most of the examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden +imposition of Shock and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects +of Shock and Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved +over time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences. +Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new +technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different is +the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force, in +understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in executing +military operations with deftness, are vital. While this recognition +is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore +on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or institutionalized +and is not a function only of gifted individuals. + +There is also a key distinction between selective or precise and +massive application of force. Technology, in the form of "zero CEP" +weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capability of systems +that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive +disruption, destruction, or damage. This damage goes beyond the loss +of power grids and other easily identifiable industrial targeting +sets. Loss of all communications can have a massively destructive +impact even though physical destruction can be relatively limited. + +In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels of +power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the attempt to keep war +"immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one point should +not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty business or, as Sherman +put it, "war is hell." While there are surely humanitarian +considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability to +Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare, +intimidate, and disarm. The Clausewitzian dictum concerning the +violent nature of war is dismissed only at our peril. + +For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the concerned +Member of Congress with responsibility for providing for the common +defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and hierarchies? +First, there are always broader sets of operational concepts and +constructs available for achieving political objectives than may be +realized. Not all of these alternatives are necessarily better or +feasible. However, the examples suggest that further intellectual and +conceptual effort is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national +security options in the future. + +Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in +generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally viewed +as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to arrive +"firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to +ensure we had ample forces on station should they be required. Rapid +Dominance would alleviate many of these constraints as we would have +the capacity to deploy effective forces far more quickly. Therefore, +in this case, we can view time as an ally. The political issue rests +in longstanding arguments to limit the President from having the +capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation +without conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is +an obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force +packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and +experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and +emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant +presidential authority can be handled responsibly. + +Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several +models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arsenal +is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise and timely. It is +also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important +attributes in war, there are no guarantees that they can be +institutionalized in any military force. + +Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates to the +Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High Powered +Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide broad ability +to incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. In using these +weapons, the nerve centers of that society would be attacked rather +than using this illustrative system to achieve hard target kill +because there were few hard targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like +systems have been and are being carefully researched. + +Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, and +misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid Dominance +would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By using complete +signature management, larger formations could be made to look like +smaller and smaller formations made to seem larger. At sea, carrier +battle groups could be disguised and smaller warships could be made to +appear as large formations. This signature management would apply +across the entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or +electronic ranges. Indeed, gaining the ability to regulate what +information and intelligence are both available and not available to +the adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception. It +is control in the fullest sense of the word. + +The next step is to match the four significant characteristics that +define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives in +order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces +and force packages accordingly, and determine those integrated systems +and innovative uses of technologies and capabilities that will provide +the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that +include both the MRC and OOTW. + + + + +Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application + + + +In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid Dominance, +it is crucial to consider the political context in which force is +likely to be employed. As we enter the next century, the probability +is low that an overriding, massive, direct threat posed by a +peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge in the near term. Without +compelling reasons, public tolerance toward American sacrifice abroad +will remain low and may even decrease. This reluctance on the part of +Americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated to perceptions of +threat to U.S. interests. Without a clear and present danger, the +definition of national interest may remain narrow. + +Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military +solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are likely to +be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be resolvable +before American political staying power is exhausted. In this period, +political micro-management and fine tuning are likely to be even more +prevalent as administrations respond to public sentiments for +minimizing casualties and, without a threat or compelling reason, U.S. +involvement. + +Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically correct" +alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to presenting the +nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive and +irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was not politically +feasible because it would have shattered the allied coalition while +exceeding the authority of the UN mandate. Military operations that +impact across a whole population or cause "innocent civilians" to +suffer (e.g., some economic sanctions, collateral damage from raids) +also are likely to be only politically acceptable in aggravated +situations. For example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or +other health problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling +impacts hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy +may be the ultimate victim. + +The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a supporting +foreign policy role with discrete missions that are only one facet of +a larger political context. This context is almost certainly going to +expand into militarily grey areas of OOTW, including those impinging +on law enforcement and ensuring political stability. Forces may be +called upon to deal with or control situations on the margin rather +than to achieve total submission or defeat of an opponent. The +prevailing political preference is likely to continue to be to try to +bound these complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial +constructs, and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst +of internal conflict. Economic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), "no +fly" zones (e.g., Southern and Northern Iraq and Bosnia), "safe +havens" (e.g., Bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all means +necessary" (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection and +evacuation (e.g., Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the kinds of +OOTW tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. Such tasks +tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They also increase +vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the bombing of the Kolbah +Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996. + +Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct threat +to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define. Therefore, +when intervention is necessary there is likely to be both a political +and practical imperative to have allied or international involvement +or at least the political cover of the UN, NATO, or appropriate NGOs. + +As more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear, chemical, +and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and +longer range delivery means, the ability for rogues to inflict pain +will increase as will the ability to ratchet up the political risks. +WMD can easily complicate our ability to influence positive and +constructive behavior of possessors. Because of the threat of +retaliation, WMD capabilities may become politically acceptable +targets provided collateral damage to civilians is minimized. +Preemption may become a more realistic option along the lines of +Israel's strikes against Syria's nuclear reactors in 1982. It is, +however, a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully +struck a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with +precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians have +been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or +nuclear materials. + +There must also be an appropriate political context that justifies the +use of preemptive force, as opposed to less destructive or non-lethal +types of sanctions (e.g., responses to terrorism in the case of Libya, +invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, exports of WMD to a threatening country +such as Iran, the North Korean threat to South Korea and Japan). + +The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability to deter +and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to its vital +interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an unsettled, less +structured, and volatile world, the ability to use force with +precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when needed, rapidity, will +still be a powerful influence on cooperation, stability, and, where +relevant, submission. + +Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if +achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this +turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the +breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability, without +potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely predicted +invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with that tangled +and messy situation might have been much different. Thousands of lives +might have been spared. In other grey or marginal situations Rapid +Dominance could make the difference between a politically acceptable +response or inadequate action with consequences similar to what +happened in Bosnia. + +In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might be used, it +is first important to know what it is that we want to achieve with +military force. We need to consider whether the application of force +will allow us to influence and control an adversary's will or merely +exacerbate a bad situation. Therefore, it is essential to know what is +of value to that adversary. An objective, realistic, and in-depth +situational grasp will be essential to such an understanding. For +example, disarming or destroying may produce unintended consequences. +For a conventional foe that values its military and depends on +technology, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and +persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the +opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against military +formations may be considerably less and must be carefully assessed. + +As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S. security, the +cost in casualties needs to be low. To be effective, we must take away +an opponent's ability to make it cost us in terms of casualty levels +we consider intolerable. In applying Rapid Dominance we also must be +defending something which is of value to us. The lower the value in +terms of our national interests, the lower the price we are likely to +be willing to pay. + +In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat, destroy, +or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in OOTW, other +non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals made more +limited. For example, it may be necessary to intimidate or capture the +leadership in order to restore order or reverse an action, or it may +simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and counter opposition to +conduct of a more limited mission (e.g., feeding the starving or +protecting innocent people from genocide). + +In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk will be +minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional use of force +with minimal collateral damage. This means that there must be a belief +that a mission can be accomplished and is worth the resources +necessary to do so. Before initiating action in these often confusing +situations, objectives must be clearly established and, once engaged, +there should be a willingness to persevere through the inevitable +rough patches. + +Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know what we want +to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task for political +leadership which is informed with military advice concerning what is +feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain. The extent of the +mission must be clearly defined. Is it to defeat an enemy so it will +no longer pose a threat? Do we only need to stop an adversary from +carrying out a particular act? Must we control a situation entirely or +only sufficiently to be able to carry out a specific mission? Can we +really affect the adversary's will? + +Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be relevant in +the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of outcomes-from reversing +military action (e.g., the invasion of Kuwait); to establishing a +government more acceptable to the U.S. and the world, probably using +military coercion (Haiti, Panama); to eliminating a threat to the U.S. +or its allies. We may want to persuade an adversary to cease an +aggression or act of interference or otherwise change behavior we +cannot accept or tolerate. Political expectations in MRCs are for the +effective use of force and for rapid success or at least steady +progress. Casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with +the threshold of American pain dependent on the directness of the +threat to U.S. interests and with the degree of compellance +appropriate to the political rationale. + +OOTW present a different set of challenges. These challenges are +likely to require discrete dominance of specific circumstances rather +than total dominance. The general tasks may include a wide variety of +requirements. For example, it may be necessary to try to prevent or +stop genocide (e.g., Rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The +task may be to cooperate with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g., +prevention of starvation in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of employing +force may be free and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia). The +requirement could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an +above-ground or underground chemical weapons plant or documented +nuclear weapons facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states). + +Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights (e.g., +protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in the Gulf +during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge might be to +accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to deal with +Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubtedly will face the +future requirement to reverse a potential threat to Americans or to a +region of importance with a limited military action (e.g., in Grenada +in 1983 or the Mayaguez rescue in Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to +bolster preventive diplomacy and/or overt measures to demonstrate +preparedness to assist (e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad +under threat of invasion from Libya and recent Navy operations in the +Taiwan Strait) will still be relevant. + +Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda (hostage +rescue-e.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijacking-e.g., _Achille Lauro_; deterrent +to further moves-e.g., the Higgins operation, Libyan raids, missile +attack on Iraq after the threat to former President Bush). We may also +need to interdict weapons, terrorists, or other discrete cargoes +moving between nations (e.g., North Korean missile shipments to Iran, +Iranian and Libyan arms exchanges). + +Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable political +alternative or a necessary political prelude to an offensive military +step (e.g., implemented as the first step in actions to counter +Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an alternative to war with +Iraq; used ineffectively against the Serbs to try to convince them not +to continue to support Bosnian Serb aggression; and tried with Haiti +as an unsuccessful alternative to occupation). Our past experience has +been that we seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these +economic measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is +required to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in +controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations. Sanctions +almost always require full international cooperation which cannot be +assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course, some portions of the arms +embargo were deliberately allowed to be permeable and the U.S. turned +a blind eye to Iran's support of the Bosnians. + +Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about the +potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabilities enhancing +these outcomes could make a decisive difference in dealing with future +challenges. History also cautions us as well that there will be +restraints in employing Rapid Dominance and that there are fundamental +differences in MRC and OOTW applications. + +Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effective in the +past. They will be effective in the future, even when applied in +limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing impact +envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many examples of how a very +limited application of force made a significant difference through the +mechanisms of Shock and Awe. Experiences, including successes and +failures, illustrate some of the potential of Rapid Dominance if +implemented effectively. + +The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes, which +made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during the +Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging negotiations with the North +Vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an acceptable +conclusion. Daily reports following the controversial B-52 "carpet" +bombing raids in Cambodia talked of North Vietnamese/Vietcong soldiers +wandering around in a daze due to shock and concussion. Both B-52s and +naval gunfire, especially from 16 inch guns of a battleship, had a +similar impact on invading North Vietnamese troop concentrations. The +mining of Haiphong Harbor, although initiated late in the war, was +equally effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of North +Vietnam. + +When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing problems of +our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as take away substantial +political leverage from the North Vietnamese, he directed the raid to +rescue prisoners jailed just outside Hanoi. The raid itself was well +executed. American forces reached and searched the prison and returned +safely. But no Americans were freed because a last minute transfer of +the POWs from the prison had not been detected. If there had been +prisoners still there to be rescued, the operation would have been a +highly dramatic and influential event. The point is that accurate and +timely intelligence remains crucial. + +There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and naval air +strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the discotheque terrorist +attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The perception that he +personally might be targeted appeared to get Gadhafi's attention. + +When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian soldiers +from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed around the island +to confront them. At the sight of tank guns, the seemingly stubborn +occupants surrendered almost immediately without a fight. + +The cease fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow after +the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket bombardments of +Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given that both sides were +exhausted at that point, a show of force could have been convincing. +Strong U.S. action in response to Iran's mining of neutral waters may +also have had a sobering effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iran's +vulnerable oil-producing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed +with impunity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out +to challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraq's reign of terror, and +the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped end the war. + +In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned immediate +respect from potential troublemakers with their ability to see wide +areas night or day, remain on station for hours as night patrols, and +strike with precision and relative impunity. The methodical drone of +AC-130s circling in the air was enough to restore some order, although +a few civilians found the noise unsettling. In another situation, the +aftermath of systematic UN efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed +Aideed's illegal arms facilities generated an unexpected reaction from +other warlords, including those colluding with him, which was to +volunteer to hand over their own weapons storage areas. For a fleeting +moment, Shock and Awe created an important opportunity. + +During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would appear that +when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of air power, rather than +occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed finally to understand that an +appearance of cooperation rather than defiance was in their interest. +This NATO message in the form of air power, of course, was +strengthened by the effectiveness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim +counter-offensive and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters. Sustaining +the shock effect with forces on the ground was a necessary combination +to gain the staying power effect to change the will of the Serbs. It +was not accomplished by air alone. Timing remains important. + +Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance might have +made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations. Rapid +Dominance might have provided a better response to those setbacks or +might have offered a more effective alternative that would have +avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the first place +(e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy rescue in 1980, Lebanon Marine +barracks bombing in 1983, response to the Pueblo seizure by North +Korea in 1968, and the reaction to the downed helicopters during the +Ranger raid in Somalia). + +We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated effective +application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance. Israel's rout +of Syria's air force and missile defenses in Lebanon's Baaka Valley +shows how dramatic success can have political spillover. On the other +hand, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse +effects of Shock and Awe and had the unintended consequence of +galvanizing the U.S. into action. + +Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a more +technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these examples +and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain improvements +in capabilities would provide us with greater flexibility in the +future. This is especially true in OOTW situations, which require a +multiplicity of effective instruments at our disposal. It is also true +that certain operations such as peacekeeping tend to be manpower +intensive. + +If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value to +that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelligence is +essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels unprecedented in +scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real time. The Gulf +War, despite its success, showed classic limitations in intelligence. +Even though we had nearly every intelligence asset designed to deal +with the USSR available for use, we were unable to detect the full +extent of Iraq's WMD capability; unable to find mobile missile +launchers even with a major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some +cases, we could only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing +forces; and we mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate +but had civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human +intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, in +order to understand what is happening in deep underground facilities). + +Another important capability we should try to achieve in the future is +the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or significantly +influence the perceptions and understanding of individual +troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent +years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in +Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a perception is particularly relevant +when the problem appears not to be caused by a unified population but +by the ambitions of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed +off any likely internal opposition. Such a capability requires +effective real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for +accomplishing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to +effective "snatch" operations). + +In a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political imperative, +we will continue to need the ability to shut down all commerce into +and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, and roads. We ought +to be able to do this in a much more thorough, decisive, and shocking +way than we have in the past. The ability to apply pressure or cause +acquiescence employing non-lethal means also will be important in some +circumstances. Weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do +not kill in significant numbers may be the only ones that are +politically acceptable in the future. This also means that crowd +control with minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances, +the costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically +expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the U.S. and +internationally. + +As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down key +electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or within a +specific sub-group or faction). We also need the ability to control +radio and television within a country. It is important, however, in +all cases, to be able to deny an adversary's ability to communicate +and to have our own means of reaching the population with appropriate +messages. + +In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities +selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert stockpiles, +fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to have the capability +selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or destroy other things +considered of great value to opponents. Increased targeting precision +will compound effectiveness as well as help to avoid the political +pitfalls of using force such as the inevitable, unintended collateral +damage that has been the pattern of the past. + +More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, however, +will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on utilizing +Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are substantial differences in +the political constraints likely to be imposed in dealing with MRCs +and with OOTW. For example, there is much greater latitude to use +dominant force and Shock and Awe in MRCs than in OOTW. + +In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional powers +which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly dependent on +technology. Although more powerful, these developed states are also +likely to be especially vulnerable to a technologically sophisticated +approach such as Rapid Dominance as long as we maintain this military +edge and the ability to neutralize their military systems. Even in the +most compelling circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used, +however, support from other nations will be politically desirable. + +In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of value to +an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the numbers and +types of weapons that can be employed. For example, the political +circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be employed are quite +limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain actions are politically as +well as morally unacceptable except in extreme cases. Such +restrictions are likely to apply to targets affecting control of +access to food, water, and clean air, and to destruction of religious +and cultural centers, even if there is low collateral damage. + +In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism of using +excessive force, especially if there is civilian or collateral damage. +The concept of proportionality is likely to remain an operative +principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to extremes, especially if +the marginal nature of a situation leads to a marginal and ineffective +response. Some people, both military and civilian, even argue that +superior technology should not be employed in such situations and that +an adversary should be fought on his own terms. While such arguments +should be rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political +influence that must be considered. We should always use technology to +minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce collateral +damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same time, there +needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant destruction or denial. +Our actions must always be consistent with our own system of values. + +The "rapid" component of Rapid Dominance is one of the most appealing +aspects of the concept, both politically and militarily. The ability +to take action that is timely and decisive multiplies substantially +the chances of ultimate success. Action needs to be taken precisely +when it will have greatest impact. Often initial public outrage and +political support for action in response to a provocation subsides if +a prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take action. + +The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate +information and act on it effectively, is also an important advantage. +In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few years ago, it +was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing faster than the +defensive chain of command could make counter moves. The tradition of +sending decisions up the line was simply too slow to cope with the +dynamic challenge posed by the adversary. Commanders on scene lacked +the authority to respond and adjust to rapidly changing situations. +The exercise graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need +to institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It also +demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions in +real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing the +overall effort. + +The Navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the 1980s in order +to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and the need to +integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive missile, air, sea, +and undersea capabilities of a battle group and its joint components +(e.g., AWACs). This concept was one way of solving the time problem +while keeping the overall commander in the picture. The commander +could then intervene and modify actions as necessary to conform to the +broader strategy. This type of control was helped by the evolution of +electronic links and secure communications and the availability of +satellites. + +Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to orchestrate it using +similar principles, while applying greater selective ability to turn +on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and devices influencing the +whole operational picture. Technology should also give commanders a +much better grasp of what is evolving during a battle. Just as the +American military of today has made "owning the night" part of its +tactical advantage, "owning" the dimension of time will be critical to +the success of Rapid Dominance. + +In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future force +configuration and the design of a mission capability package (MCP) +based on Rapid Dominance. + + +Operational Construct + +Rapid Dominance is based on affecting the adversary's will, +perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to +overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our aims. Four +characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control of the environment. + +Application of all or of selective capabilities within the Rapid +Dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct the +application of military/defense resources and produce the requisite +outcome. Rapid Dominance envisages the execution of specific actions +in real or near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed +detrimental to U.S. interests. On the high end of conflict, Rapid +Dominance would introduce a reaction of Shock and Awe in areas of +highest value to the threatening individual, group, or state. In many +cases, prior understanding of the power of Rapid Dominance would act +as a deterrent to the objectionable action. When used, Rapid Dominance +would ensure favorable early resolution of issues with minimal loss of +lives and collateral damage. The concept theoretically should be able +to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board to high, +mid, low, no, or minimal technology threats. + +Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting +capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated, +interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence, +surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, data analysis, +and real-time deliverable actionable information to the shooter. This +network must provide total situational awareness and supporting nodal +analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's +decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe +among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this +knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific functions or +all essential functions near simultaneously. This will often times be +netted pieces of data where the sum of the parts gives the answer and +the battlefield advantage to the force possessing this rapidly netted +information. + +The "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real-time +actionable targeting information to the appropriate shooter, whether +the shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery +battery, an individual rifle man, a naval battle group, an individual +ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. This means the +need to have the right shooter in the right place; locating and +identifying the target correctly and quickly; allocating and assigning +targets rapidly; getting the "shoot" order or general authority to the +shooter; and then assessing the battle damage accurately. + +At whatever the unit level, Shock and Awe are provided by the speed +and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do this +simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic Shock +and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and populous. This +simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets of imposing Shock and +Awe. When the video results of these attacks are broadcast in real +time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact on coalition support and +negative impact on potential threat support can be decisive. + +The first priority of a doctrine of Rapid Dominance should be to +deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions that are +either unacceptable to U.S. national security interests or endanger +the democratic community of states and access to free markets. These +political objectives are generally those envisioned in the major and +lower regional conflict scenarios (MRC & LRC). Should deterrence fail, +the application of Rapid Dominance in these circumstances should +create sufficient Shock and Awe to the immediate threat forces and +leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential +threat partners. The doctrine of Rapid Dominance would not be limited +to MRC and LRC scenarios. It has applications in a variety of areas +such as countering WMD, terrorism, and perhaps other tasks. The +challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response +based on Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat, yet +decisive enough to convey the right degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid +Dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. We +repeat our disclaimer that this is not a silver bullet. However, Rapid +Dominance and its capacity for achieving Shock and Awe could be +applied for egregious threats or violations of international law, such +as: + + - Direct military threats to the territory of the U.S., its friends, + and allies; + - Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state; + - Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD; + - Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; and + - Threat to essential world markets. + +Clearly, the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and +penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and +benefits in all societies are becoming known to the masses as well as +the power brokers. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop +sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and +create road blocks as well as control inputs/outputs to the highway +both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept. + +These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting +international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer +interagency cooperations and coordination between military and law +enforcement activities and capabilities must be established. +Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed +considerable cultural differences between these organizations. +Overcoming these cultural differences among organizations is not easy. +The required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive information +and support between these agencies and the military needs to be +developed further. Interagency coordination and cooperation must be +raised to a new level of sophistication. Some laws may need to be +changed. War in Cyberspace does not recognize domestic or foreign +boundaries. In this environment the subjects of Information Warfare +and Information In Warfare take on new meaning and require focused +development. We must become proficient within this environment. + +Operational Assumptions + + - The enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict (i.e., + we are surprised). + - We then attain control of the initiative through superior speed, + knowledge, and capacity to act and react. + - Our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements must + convince the enemy there is no hope. + - Combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times, places, and + tempo of choosing. + - Allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from political + objectives through combat to include psychological warfare. + - The enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest importance to him + and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness of our attack. + +From these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow that help +to define a Rapid Dominance Force with more specificity in improving: + + - Intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressor's actions + - The length of time required for a decision to react + - Decisive responses at various levels and times after the crises or + conflict begins to develop: + - Respond in 1 to 3 days with air and missile strikes and special + forces + - Respond in 5 to 10 days with more massive power up to and + including a joint task force of corps size + - Respond in 10 to 30 days with a second corps + + +The Rapid Dominance MCP + +As a next step, we need to sketch out what a Rapid Dominance Force +might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and space joint +task force supported by necessary intelligence assets that can impose +sufficient Shock and Awe to break the will of the adversary. First, +this force will emphasize capabilities to maximize the core +characteristics of knowledge of self, adversary, and environment; +rapidity; brilliance in execution; and control of the environment. + +Knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness. It means +understanding the adversary's mind and anticipating his reactions. It +means targeting those things that will produce the intended Shock and +Awe. And, it means having feedback and good, timely battle assessment +to enable knowledge to be used dynamically as well as to know how our +forces will react. + +Rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and always on +a timely basis. Rapidity can be instant or as required. + +Brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards of +operational competence and, through a superiority of knowledge, +maintaining the ability to impose Shock and Awe through continuously +surprising and psychologically and physically breaking the adversary's +will to resist. This will require training and exercising of joint +land, sea, air, space, and special forces to new standards of +excellence and competence. It is mainly in training where the +difference lies in achieving operational brilliance. This desired +standard of performance can be achieved by making innovations to +permit new levels of battlefield fidelity for training units and +developing leaders. + +Control of the environment would include complete signature control on +the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. We would control our +signatures as well as what we wanted the adversary to see or hear and +what we do not want the enemy to know. Destruction of the adversary's +systems would begin with long-range stealthy, or "stand-off" Zero CEP +weapons, extend to FOG-M type battlefield weapons to close-in systems. +Small units would be able to call in "fires" for 360 degrees on a +nearly instant basis. + +Attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception, +disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. "Pulse" weapons +would be used to disarm and actively deceive the enemy through +disrupting and attacking all aspects of the adversary's electronics, +information, and C4I infrastructure. It is this "lay down" of total +power across all areas in rapid and simultaneous actions that would +impose the Shock and Awe. + +The remainder, roughly a third of this Joint Task Force, would consist +of traditional platforms including conventional ground, air, and +amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the necessary +supporting logistical, C4I, medical and other capabilities and ground +forces to conduct and sustain conventional or traditional operations +if needed and to support or defend traditionally vulnerable targets +such as ports, roads, and other infrastructure. + +Tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions of the +MRC. In general, the most rapidly deployable units of this corps, the +future equivalent of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps, would be sent to +secure or reinforce a limited area into which the remainder of the +force would flow. This AOR would be self-protected. Our goal is that +perhaps a Rapid Dominance force of as few as 2,000 troops could +successfully defend against an enemy of 10-20,000 in an MRC and that a +full corps can be deployed within 5 to 10 days. + +These units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin disarming, +destroying, and disabling the enemy's military wherewithal using +"stand-off" capabilities. Forward-based or long-range reconnaissance +units could be employed/supported by UAVs and overhead surveillance. + +Units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time phased +plan. These units would be used either to complete the attack or to +carry it to the adversary, occupy selective territory physically, or +carry out the requirements of the post-war occupation campaign. Should +traditional forces be needed, they would of course be available. + +Protection and self-defense would partly be provided by controlling +the environment. In effect, we would cast a cloak around the adversary +and permit the adversary to see and know what we alone provided. This +would leave an adversary blind, deaf, and dumb. With superior and +rapid firepower, the blinded, deafened enemy would be destroyed and +defeated as we saw fit. This would maximize Shock and Awe and help +break the adversary's will. + +In OOTW, the Rapid Dominance JTF might function as follows. First, the +ability to deploy dominant force rapidly to attack or threaten to +attack appropriate targets could be brought to bear without involving +manpower-intense or manned sensors and weapons. Second, once deployed, +since self-defense is likely to be required against small arms, mines, +and shoulder carried or mortar weapons, certainly some form of "armor" +or protective vehicles and shelters would be necessary. However, +through the UAVs, C4I, and virtual reality systems, as well as through +signature management and other Shock and Awe weapons including High +Powered Microwave (HPM) and "stun-like" systems, this force would have +more than dominant battlefield awareness. + +There are, of course, caveats. Unless strategic or policy objectives +are in line with operational capabilities, military force is unlikely +to be a useful instrument. It is also unlikely that any operational +construct, no matter how brilliantly conceived, could overcome such a +disconnect. Vietnam and Somalia remind us of these limitations. + +The assimilation of intelligence-strategically, culturally, and +operationally-is a central thrust and component of the knowledge +aspect of Rapid Dominance. Our forces must not only fight smarter; +these forces, at all or most levels, must be educated and trained +differently with far more emphasis on intelligence, broadly defined. +This knowledge, when applied rapidly under conditions of brilliance +and in a controlled environment, is a centerpiece of Rapid Dominance. + +There must be full comprehension of the adversary across strategic, +political, military, cultural, intellectual, and perceptual lines. +This understanding must go beyond how an adversary might use military +force. Those crucial values that motivate and underlie a nation or a +group must be understood if the appropriate level of Shock and Awe is +to be achieved. + +There are also obvious questions that must be answered. Does Rapid +Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the conflict +spectrum involving more traditional applications of force to achieve +political objectives, as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet +to be explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance +with Shock and Awe applies to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. +interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the +political and military prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are +they applicable and realistically achievable in the increasingly +complex interaction of national non-government organizations +(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care +to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of +Rapid Dominance with a degree of Shock and Awe offend and generate +counterproductive public relations backlash from those who believe +force should only be used as a last resort and then with a measurable +degree of proportionality? + +At this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have them +answered at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and issues +as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up front and +answered in the Rapid Dominance concept development process. We must +be careful that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the +reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept. +Rapid Dominance must still confront the fog of war. Decisions will +still be made based on judgment and confidence in the intelligence +provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center +of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to +inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the key will be the ability to +penetrate this fog with increased clarity and to control events now +unmanageable through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and distributing +actionable information. Complicating the issue is the fact that the +U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the +world's only credible superpower, the U.S. cannot avoid a leadership +role but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all +leaders. This is the classical "damned if you do and damned if you +don't" syndrome. + +At this stage, the concept of Rapid Dominance is a work in progress. +It needs to be "operationalized." By designing a nominal MCP and +fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, we can explore the +answers to many of the questions we raised above. Three steps are +needed to proceed down the road on the way to a real capability. +First, feasibility of the requisite technical capabilities needs to be +established. Second, wargaming of the MCP must be done. Third, and +perhaps most difficult, deriving the means for implementing the most +promising aspects of Rapid Dominance must occur. + + + + +An Outline for System Innovation and Technological Integration + + + +Achieving Shock and Awe is central to Rapid Dominance, and therefore +must serve as the key organizing principle for any rigorous +examination and exploitation of system concepts and technologies for +Rapid Dominance. Understanding the interplay between technology and +doctrine is not only or simply a straightforward matter of +establishing operational requirements and then seeking to attain them +through invention and design. It is a complex and interactive process +of experimentation and discovery wherein intellect, hard work, +endurance, and innovation must drive the use of technology. Rather +than make changes, however significant, to modifying current +capabilities or building newer, similar ones, Rapid Dominance seeks to +identify and field systems specifically designed to achieve Shock and +Awe-systems that may break the mold much as the Model T Ford once did +years ago. + +The genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, computer-aided +design tools used by engineers, vast database management systems in +place in corporate offices, computer-controlled machines enabling +composite materials, and the countless academic, business, and +personal computers are all evidence of the prominent and ever +increasing role information technologies have assumed in modern +economies. Many of the technologies underlying the Information Age are +being spearheaded by U.S. small business and its entrepreneurial +culture. Certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in Japan +to software development businesses in India, the rest of the world +participates and competes. But few can deny that U.S. industry +provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of +information technologies as they are most broadly defined. This +leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the United States +with an ever increasing military advantage over competing nations. + +Leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporating it into +U.S. forces; it is likely to include a significant redesign of both +forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly evolving technologies. +Many of the technologies that will support Rapid Dominance are already +discernible. Unlike the impact of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that +a single technology or system will emerge to produce Rapid Dominance. +It will only be attainable through the broadest integration of +strategic concepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological +advances, system design, and appropriate organization of command, +control, training and education. And only a large, immensely capable +country such as the U.S. may be able to achieve this. + +Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of strategy, +technology, and innovation. Four core characteristics were defined +earlier as crucial: + + - Complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the environment; + - Rapidity; + - Brilliance of execution; and + - Control of the environment. + +What follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how technology +can be used in a broad system approach. Many of these technologies +currently are being addressed within the defense community. Analysts, +military strategists, acquisition planners, and even "futurists" are +wrestling with the meaning and consequences of the Information Age. +Our focus on systems and technologies begins with these four +characteristics. + + +Knowledge of Self, Adversary, and Environment + +In the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate where +the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. Even 5 years ago, +who would have foreseen the significant involvement of the U.S. +military in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and the South +China Sea? To which hot spots can we expect to see U.S. troops +deployed over the next 5 years? Over the next 20? In this section we +argue that, in addition to improving our force capabilities, the U.S. +must develop an intelligence repository far more extensive than during +the Cold War, covering virtually all the important regions and +organizational structures throughout the world. + +During the Cold War, intelligence agencies focused more on a bipolar +world and built sizable organizations to collect information on "the +other side." This same intelligence structure, in the main, is in +place today facing a multipolar world, where any number of power +structures-whether they be states, international organizations, or +even small groups of individuals-must be monitored with an +understanding that extends to their leadership, culture, economic +direction, and military capability. + +As the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his +environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift from +technology developments that once resided within our government to +those driven by commercial demands. For example, the information +technologies used by U.S. intelligence agencies are of such +complexity, importance, and expense that they are referred to as +"national assets" and are developed and managed by large, dedicated +organizations. Even here, commercial companies are rapidly encroaching +on what once seemed to be an unassailable market position in Earth +observation systems. One may already purchase synthetic aperture radar +interferometry images from any number of sources, and panchromatic +visual images with one meter resolution will soon be available over +the counter for remarkably little cost. Indeed, the only real barrier +to this burgeoning market is the understandable concerns that +governments have with allowing such technology to be widely available. +In areas such as encryption and data security, commercial developers +are more likely to reach limits of government acceptance before those +of technological capability. + +With untold billions invested in communications systems, even the most +modern U.S. military communication systems often compare poorly with +commercial systems. While this has long been the case for fielded +systems, it is becoming true for even the most sophisticated research +and development programs being undertaken by defense organizations. + +As a case in point, one may consider a program recently initiated by +the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) called +Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD). At the heart of +this program, large amounts of data are collected within a vast +database residing on commercial computers and enterprise management +systems. This information is then disseminated to the troops through +the commercial Global Broadcast System (GBS) onto "set-top" boxes, an +enabling technology that was developed commercially. Even with this +leveraging of private industry, there is a real question as to whether +DARPA will be able to field a system that would compete well with +surprisingly similar commercial systems. Internet channels planned by +media industry giants such as BSkyB will offer multi-megabit, +interactive, digital data connections to the Net merely as an +enticement for subscribers to enroll for their full digital +broadcasting service (200 to 300 channels of digital video and sound). +Understanding that there is much more to BADD than the little +discussed here, one still almost wonders whether DARPA could simply +buy a subscription and connect it to an appropriate, commercial, +network management system. More to the point, if even well funded and +aggressive technology development organizations such as DARPA find it +difficult to remain ahead of commercial advancements, there may be a +fundamental lesson to be learned regarding the management of +defense-related technologies. + + +Knowledge and Intelligence + +"Intelligence" is comprised of five categories of knowledge and +understanding: a society's leadership; culture and values; the +strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; military +capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive battlefield +information. Examples of technologies and system approaches of +potential relevance in these areas are discussed below. + +Understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and involved +neutral countries implies an infrastructure for acquiring an in-depth +knowledge about cultures, leadership values, and other driving factors +that allow us, when needed and on a timely basis, to get "into their +minds." Applicable technologies include automated language +translators, interactive and autonomous computer simulations, advanced +database systems for organizing and understanding data and +transactions of individuals and institutions, and computerized +educational systems for training and learning these skills. + +Collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is crucial +to Rapid Dominance. Logistics, demographics, and infrastructure are +broad areas of collection along with geography, road/rail/ship lanes, +utility sites and corridors, manufacturing, government sites, military +and paramilitary facilities, population demographics, economic and +financial pressure points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major +dams and bridges. Technologies used to provide environmental awareness +include traditional means such as satellites that can be augmented +with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing observation +routines. The vast quantities of data that reside on the world's +computer networks, if properly exploited, provide another rich source +of information. Data mining tools, such as Web crawlers, gatherers, +brokers, and repositories that pull and organize data from public +networks, will be essential to building a more complete picture of +potential adversaries. Since not all databases and host computers are +cooperative with these methods, offensive information warfare tools +will be required to obtain specific pieces of information that are +vital for national security purposes. + +Once data are collected, they must be processed and disseminated and +then stored for future access. Enterprise data storage and retrieval +systems that are capable of working with many terrabytes (1,000 +gigabytes) of information are already commonplace. Since it is +impossible for humans to comprehend such vast quantities of +information without some assistance, data exploitation tools (filters, +fusion, automatic target recognition, image understanding, etc.) will +be crucial technologies. Finally, the information, once processed, +will be of little use if not disseminated to the right people in a +timely fashion. "Intelligent data" dissemination and wide bandwidth +communications are examples of essential technologies emerging in this +area. + +In addition to knowledge about regions and locations where U.S. force +may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance and up-to-date +knowledge on specific "hot spots" and to have sufficient flexibility +within the system to shift attention rapidly to new areas. Systems +addressing this more time-sensitive set of tasks would include light, +quickly deployable satellites, high altitude and endurance unmanned +aerial vehicles, manned platforms, and unattended ground sensors. + +As a crisis unfolds and the insertion of U.S. troops or other military +action becomes more probable, information needs and the number of +information consumers both increase dramatically. Information that +must be collected and correlated include targeting, battle damage +assessment (BDA), weather, terrain, infrastructure, tracking of +special targets, logistics, position and status of our own troops, +identification friend or foe (IFF), and status of material. It is +vitally important that sufficient sensor systems work in all weather +conditions and at night to maintain the "operations tempo" required by +Rapid Dominance. + +Battlefield awareness requires three information technologies: +collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable +information to a shooter. Rapid Dominance requires an unprecedented +level of real-time information collection that will be provided by +sensor systems such as space platforms, UAVs, unattended ground +sensors, and advanced manned reconnaissance platforms. In addition, +the entire infosphere of the adversary will be monitored not only for +classic information such as operational commands but also to determine +the shock effect being created by Rapid Dominance operations. +Collecting data from cooperative sources such as one's own troops, +allies, and friendly non-combatants is also critical. While _Operation +Desert Storm_ showed the value of self-location sensors such as GPS, +the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there is still work to +be done in terms of giving each commander and soldier sufficient +information to operate effectively. Much of this information, such as +the physiological status of individual combatants, is not currently +collected, and much of what is sensed is not properly disseminated. + +It would be hard to overstate the importance of information +dissemination within Rapid Dominance. Administering Shock and Awe +requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is unable to fathom, +but our own forces must operate effectively, even aggressively, within +an environment that could easily lead to serious information +bottlenecks and overload. Commercial technologies will be key to the +U.S. developing a structure to effectively disseminate information. +Already, commercial communications technologies such as global +broadcast satellites and protocols like those underlying the Internet +have been used as stop gaps by the U.S. military in major deployments. + +Merely transmitting the right information at the right time will not +be sufficient for operations enabling Rapid Dominance. Information +will need to be fused to create knowledge-based displays. The +technologies that will be important in this area go beyond the data +fusion algorithms currently in place and should leverage heavily off +of technologies in fields such as computer image generation, virtual +reality, and advanced simulation. + + +Rapidity + +In a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of operational +planning, determining appropriate action, deployment, and employment +all focused toward minimizing response time. Three factors combine to +make military planning far more difficult today than in the Cold War +era. First, there is great uncertainty early on in the location of a +conflict, who the adversary may be, and with whom one may be allied. +Second, there is normally very little time available for planning, +with the military sometimes having only weeks or days before +committing troops to an unanticipated mission. Third, vastly more +information is available to the planner, which is both a blessing and +a curse. Several technologies that partially define Intelligent +Dynamic Planning will make it easier for the commander to plan Rapid +Dominance: + + - Model based planning + - Machine intelligence + - Dynamic planning based upon feedback and new information + - Selectively automated decision aides (commanders associate) + - Imbedded rehearsal and training + - Brilliance in Execution + +It is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. However, the standard +can be set. The Dynamic Planning noted above is part of the capability +for this characteristic as are the systems and technologies discussed +below. + + + Technologies Critical to Achieving Brilliance in Rapid Dominance + +For shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage, key +targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed, and the enemy must +be made to feel completely helpless and unable to consider a +meaningful response. Furthermore, the enemy's confusion must be +complete, adding to a general impression of impotence. Most +importantly, strategic targets, military forces, leadership and key +societal resources must be located, tracked, and targeted. This will +require substantial sensor, computational, and communication +technologies. Designated targets must be destroyed rapidly and with +assurance. Finally, the status and position of friendly forces must be +known at all times, and the logistics supporting them must be +sufficiently flexible to allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration, +and decentralization of location. + +Several technologies that can help in this are discussed below, as +divided into the following subsections: sensors, computational +systems, communications and system integration. + + + Sensor Technologies + +Sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, passive, +imbedded, and processing. + +_Active sensors:_ By far, the most important of the energy-emitting +sensors is radar. Among the best all-weather capabilities of any type +of sensor, the role for and capabilities of radar have steadily +increased since the Second World War. Radar systems are used for early +warning, air defense, air asset management, air traffic control, naval +fleet defense, detection and tracking of moving ground targets, +missile targeting, missile terminal guidance, terrain data +development, and weather prediction. For Rapid Dominance, radars and +other active sensors must operate with low probability of intercept. +Particularly with stealthy systems, this will present a unique +challenge to military systems where one may not expect a great amount +of "spin-on" from the commercial sector. It is vitally important to be +able to sense the enemy under all conditions and environments. Sensors +must penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such as +underground and underwater mines. + +There are many other important active sensor classes, three of which +are active acoustics, lidar and magnetic anomaly detectors. Broadband +underwater active acoustics could address pressing needs such as +shallow-water anti-submarine warfare and mine detection (both buried +and silt covered). The practical application of lidar is a relatively +recent development enabled by advances in laser, power management, and +data processing technologies. Lidar can be used for fire control, +weapon guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent in the +near infrared (NIR) regime), and target imaging/recognition. Lidar +detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such as vibration and +motion and has proven very hard to spoof. Magnetic anomaly detectors +will continue to find application in areas of anti-mine and +anti-submarine warfare and in screening for weapons at security +checkpoints and elsewhere. + +Electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where they +create a signature of use to an enemy. The ability to emit energy, yet +in ways that are less discernible, should be an attractive avenue to +explore for the future. The coordinated application of many sensor +platforms, some of which may be completely passive, in conjunction +with emitting sensors is a potentially major area of exploration. + +_Passive sensors:_ Among the passive sensor types, the most important +for U.S. forces is forward-looking infrared (FLIR). FLIR technology +has allowed the U.S. to "own the night," as was handily displayed in +_Operation Desert Storm_. Some of the significant technology +advancements underway in this area include multiple wavelength +sensors, very large focal planes, and the increasing performance of +uncooled sensors. Particularly in the area of uncooled sensors, +commercial developments are underway that promise to drastically +reduce the cost of competent IR sensors. + +Other passive sensor technologies of note include hyperspectral +visible/NIR collection and processing and inexpensive, scatterable, +unattended ground sensors (acoustic, seismic, "hot spot," etc.). +Hyperspectral imaging allows target searches to be conducted in the +frequency domain, as opposed to the spatial domain as is the norm +today. This provides a powerful new input for automatic target +recognition (ATR) systems, is useful for addressing low observables +(LO), and is especially important for remote imaging assets. + +Unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored +continually. For example, the actual area of operations for Scuds in +ODS was relatively small, but it was very difficult for then-current +sensing systems to oversee. Technologies being developed in the area +of microelectromechanical systems, in particular, hold promise for +enabling capable and inexpensive sensor fields. + +_Imbedded sensors:_ Monitoring the position and status of Blue and +friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in tracking the +enemy. GPS presented a tremendous advantage to troops in ODS. This +capability needs to be extended down to the individual soldier, and +the status of all critical material and personnel needs to be tracked. + +_Sensor signal processing:_ Finally, the signals from modern sensors +are of limited use without proper processing and presentation to the +user. This area will be developed further in the computational +technologies section. Technologies that are historically grouped with +sensor systems include automatic target recognition, imbedded +multisensor fusion and correlation, and displays. + + + Computational Technologies + +The capabilities of the integrated circuit (IC), and in particular the +microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. Certainly, physical +limits must be approached at some point, but each looming barrier has +so far been met by technological innovation. Nevertheless, should the +march of IC improvements slow somewhat, the software and networking +technologies that are being developed at an accelerating pace will +permit the vision of Rapid Dominance to become of ever increasing +utility. + +Rapid Dominance requires the collection, management, and fast access +of enormous quantities of information. Technologies that will enable +this include computational hardware advances such as increasingly +powerful workstations, reduced-cost image generators, massively +parallel machines, compact displays, reduced-cost memory devices +(i.e., DRAM, RAID, and optical jukeboxes) client/server-specific +database engines, reconfigurable simulation cells, "wearable" PCs, +advanced human-computer interface (HCI) techniques (i.e., voice +interfaces and those coming to define "virtual reality"), and PCMCIA +technology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, miniaturized +hard drives, and modems). + +Software advances will be even more critical for Rapid Dominance. +Areas of importance include: + + - Network data engines + - Object-oriented architectures + - Advanced modeling and simulation + - Machine intelligence + - Automatic target recognition + - Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools + +Network technologies are just now emerging but are being driven at a +frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. A variety of advanced +tools beyond "hot link" browsing are being introduced daily. Data +browsers, brokers, gatherers, and network repositories are being +released, as demonstrated by products like _Harvester_ and _Netscape's +Catalog Server_. Platform independent languages such as JAVA and their +associated virtual computational engines promise the same network +flexibility for programs that is now enjoyed by data. + +Perhaps the most important area of technology development for Rapid +Dominance is the development of practical object-oriented +architectures and protocols. Protocols such as CORBA, OLE, ALSP, HLA +and DIS[1] are changing the face of computing, making it much easier +to link programs and databases, and access and correlate information +that was previously "entombed" within its legacy application. + +[Footnote 1: CORBA (common object request broker architecture), OLE +(object linking and embedding), ALSP (aggregate level simulation +protocol), HLA (high-level architecture), DIS (Distributed Interactive +Simulation). These are all protocols or the architectures defining +protocols that, in part, enable disparate software and/or hardware +components to be linked or otherwise share information and logical +elements.] + +One interesting application area migrating toward an object-oriented +approach is geospatial databases. In the past, geospatial data were +stored as either raster-based or vector information, and significant +processing was required for users to make queries regarding roads, +areas, or objects such as building sites. A new approach, called a +spatial database engine, creates intuitive objects from standard +geospatial databases and uses commercial databases to add attributes +to the objects. This is a very powerful technique that allows +geospatial data, a key element of warfighting, to be managed quickly +and efficiently using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. It is +particularly useful for distributed databases such as one would find +on a network. + +Modeling and simulation is also benefiting from object-oriented +technologies. Simulations were once stand-alone codes. If one wanted +to simulate a joint battle, one began with an existing model (i.e., +land combat) and then modified it to include other components (i.e., +aircraft and ships). Similarly, if a new technology were to be +modeled, new code normally had to be written, even in cases where +good, validated, stand-alone technology models existed. The obvious +drawbacks to this approach are that it is costly, often produces +inferior simulations for the new additions, and quickly results in +extremely large codes with commensurate large code management +problems. Object-oriented approaches allow models and simulations to +be linked to form a richer environment for examining new technologies +and joint force structures. + +Linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as +computer-aided design (CAD) programs and physics-based simulations +presents a new type of tool referred to as simulation-based design. +Once fully realized, this capability will allow new technologies to be +much more easily evaluated, introducing a source for greater +efficiency into today's somewhat haphazard acquisition system. + +Simulations based on object-oriented architectures also promise more +flexibility that will enable scenarios and unexpected situations to be +made as inputs and simulated rapidly, forming the core for a +battlefield visualization system capable of modeling "what if" +situations. Outputs from these simulations could be used for mission +rehearsal. Even today, pilots and special operations forces often "fly +through" crude, three-dimensional renderings of a mission area to +familiarize themselves with information such as surface-to-air missile +(SAM) sites and landmarks. + +The promise of computational technologies brings with it potential +vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats. In a world +where information plays a vital role in warfare, information +collection and processing tools will become targets. Defenses against +information warfare must be developed. The threat is real and is +growing especially in the commercial and private sectors. Even today, +malicious hackers devise data-destroying viruses and distribute them +through a plethora of electronic media; numerous sites on the Net are +dedicated to the discussion and development of offensive computer +viruses, with ample tools for even the novice to download and employ. +Moreover, computer crimes cost the world economy billions of dollars +annually. Although information warfare poses serious threats, the +realm of information is where operations underlying Rapid Dominance +most reside, and the enemy will find himself fully engaged should he +choose to fight on our terms. Rapid Dominance is essentially +information warfare on a grand scale in all dimensions of offensive, +defensive and leveraging effective use of available information. + + + Communication Technologies + +One of the modern communication devices being fielded within U.S. +forces today is the SINGCARS radio. With a data rate of somewhat less +than 10 kbps, SINGCARS is woefully inadequate for supporting Rapid +Dominance. However, more appropriate technologies are emerging: + + - GBS and other satellite broadcast services + - Wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols + - Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches + - Advanced comm relay platforms (UAV, Lightsat, Iridium, etc.) + +GBS, for example, figures prominently in the BADD (battlefield +awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at providing close +to 30 Mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. This will be supported by +multi-terrabyte databases, advanced data browsers, and query managers, +and will be linked to the Joint Tactical Internet. + +Networking must also be supported by communications technologies. The +basic problem of a battlefield network is that while some nodes may +support very large data pipes, a number of nodes will be operating at +SINGCARS data rates. This led to the BADD notion of one-way data +broadcasting via GBS of large data files (such as UAV video and +overhead imagery) and very low bandwidth data querying back to the +data sources. + +Modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-based, which is +particularly important for Rapid Dominance, where decisions must be +made quickly based upon very large quantities of data, some of which +will be collected and transmitted in real time. Technologies such as +digital video teleconferencing, virtual whiteboards, and even 3D +virtual environments where commanders may participate in collaborative +planning sessions will become important. + +Finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where +feasible, non-observable to the enemy. + + +Control of the Environment + +The actual attack of targets in order to induce Shock and Awe may, in +some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the enemy's +perception. It will not always be necessary to destroy numerous +targets in order to induce shock. However, it would be vitally +important to give the appearance that there are no safe havens from +attack, and that any target may be attacked at any time with impunity +and force. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, confusion must be +imposed on the adversary by supplying only information which will +shape the adversary's perceptions and help break his will. Finally, +the enemy must be displaced from selected key positions, for if he is +allowed to occupy those areas that he considers strategically +important, it is difficult to imagine how his shock could be complete. + +Controlling an enemy's perception of the battlespace includes +manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status, and +the environment in which he operates. This will be accomplished by +selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while presenting him with +information that is either misleading or serves our purposes. Sensing +and feedback of an enemy leadership's perception of the situation will +be critical. + +Technologies of interest here include those that allow systems and +entire force units to modify their signature from being very stealthy +to being completely obvious. An ability to attack enemy information +systems will also be critical, encompassing system technologies from +laser-based counter sensor weapons to embedded computer viruses, +commonly referred to as Trojan Horses. In all cases, the goal will be +to deny the enemy any information that would be useful to him and to +impose a construct of deception and misinformation at all levels of +operations. + +Clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield awareness +already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a "perception attack" (a +form of information warfare) to be successfully carried out. The need +and requirements for Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) will increase +dramatically. It will be necessary to understand not only whether a +target was killed but also how enemy leadership, troops, and society +viewed this destruction. + +So far, primarily information technologies have been discussed. +Obviously, there will continue to be requirements for numerous other +types of systems. Among the more important system technologies +critical to achieving control of the environment include: + + - Weapons platforms with stealth technology + - Weapons systems + - Robotic systems + + + Weapons platforms + +One of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to move +people and ordinance to within an effective range of the target. +Centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems, this reasoning was +understood intuitively. Since ordinance must still be placed on the +target, weapons platforms such as described below still demand +consideration. + + - Stealthy bombers and strike aircraft either land or sea platform + based + - Arsenal ships + - Submarines with conventional cruise missiles + - Stealthy land vehicles + - Stealthy observation/attack helicopters + +Stealth, combined with stand off, will contribute strongly to the +protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and will also +be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned systems. However, +protection of the force is inherent within the concept of Rapid +Dominance, and it will rely upon the control of information and the +enemy's perception of events, stealth being one of the elements +enabling this control. + + + Weapons systems + +Smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield. Linked +with information technologies, the combination will allow killing any +target that can be identified. The main element Rapid Dominance +requires of weapons systems is the ability to be rapidly focused on +objectives as identified and targeted by commanders using the +information management systems already discussed. Commanders will +require the flexibility to call massive, precision strikes or to +attack individual, high-priority targets with near zero CEP. This +implies a mixture of weapons comprised of systems such as those +mentioned below. + + - Cruise missiles + - Zero CEP, long-range cruise missile ("President's weapon") + - Stand-off submunition platforms + - Smart submunitions + - Brilliant submunitions + - Wide area smart mines + - Long-range and short-range surface attack missiles + + + Robotic systems + +Robotic systems are an important area of consideration within Rapid +Dominance. First, selected robotic systems will enable the force by +making it more responsive in concentrating sensors and weapons. +Second, they will make fighting a 24-hour battle feasible even with +reduced manpower within the force structure. Third, robotic systems +can provide force presence even in areas considered too dangerous for +a large manned element. Finally, since the ultimate operational goal +of Rapid Dominance is to create shock, one may consider the effect +that fighting robotic systems may have on the enemy. + +In examining the utility of robotic systems within Rapid Dominance, +one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic systems have not +lived up to the optimistic expectations placed on them in the past. +From the overburdening of the Aquilla UAV to the massive and poorly +planned investment in robotics made by General Motors in the early +1980s, robotics has been an area of unfulfilled promises. However, the +reasons for a string of spectacular failures lie more with planners' +faulty attempts to understand and incorporate the technology than by +egregious shortcomings of the technology itself. Robots have been seen +as replacements for manned systems rather than extremely complicated +and capable machines suitable for a set of tightly defined tasks. +Robotic systems, or taskable machines as some are beginning to refer +to them, hold promise for the future simply because they represent the +intersection of a myriad of fast-moving technology areas such as +information technologies, communications, microelectronics, +micro-electromechanical systems, simulation, and computer-aided design +and manufacturing. In some sense, taskable machines are the physical +embodiment of information technologies. It may well be that in the +future the joke will be, "Never send a robot to do a man's job." But +even so, there will be ample jobs for taskable machines and the +society that learns to properly design, build, control, and integrate +these systems into their force structure will gain significant +advantage over any potential opponent. + + +Conclusion + +The technologies and systems presented in this section are not +extraordinary nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed, entire +fields such as materials, bioengineering, and microelectronics are +left for future consideration, although they are of obvious and vital +importance. Also not addressed here are the training, education, and +organizational implications required under a regime of Rapid +Dominance. Given the overriding importance of information collection +and management, these will need to be addressed across the defense +community as it is most broadly defined. + +Rapid Dominance combines a doctrine and operational concept that +challenges the current process of how new technologies invented in the +commercial sector are incorporated into defense, and provides an +affirmative methodology for research, development, and system +integration. We must learn to exploit the potential of these +technologies even though, in many cases, this development process in +the private sector is profoundly independent from how we conduct the +business of defense. It is this environment of innovative upheaval +that any useful foundation for strategic and operational thought must +address. Rapid Dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this +rapid and chaotic development of technology. + +We believe that what will distinguish Rapid Dominance from other +doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct to drive +innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and integrating +technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently constructed +systems. Second, it is the comprehensive quality of Rapid Dominance in +which strategies, doctrine, technology, systems, operations, training, +organization, and education are dealt with together that may make the +most significant difference. But, as the reader will discern, specific +identification and design of Rapid Dominance systems is part of the +next step. + + + + +Future Directions + + + +At this stage, Rapid Dominance is an intellectual construct based on +these key points. First, Rapid Dominance has evolved from the +collective professional, policy, and operational experience of the +study group covering the last four decades. This experience ran from +Vietnam to_ Desert Storm_ and from serving with operational units in +the field to being part of the decision-making process in the Oval +Office in Washington. It also included immersion in technology and +systems from thermonuclear weapons to advanced weapons software. + +Second, Rapid Dominance seeks to exploit the unique juncture of +strategy, technology, and innovation created by the end of the Cold +War and to establish an alternative foundation for military doctrine +and force structure. + +Third, Rapid Dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as +envisaged by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to overpower or affect the will, +perception, and understanding of the adversary for strategic aims and +military objectives. But, in Rapid Dominance, the principal mechanism +for affecting the adversary's will is through the imposition of a +regime of Shock and Awe sufficient to achieve the aims of policy. It +is this relationship with and reliance on Shock and Awe that +differentiates Rapid Dominance from attrition, maneuver, and other +military doctrines including overwhelming force. + +Shock and Awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and physical +levels. At one level, destroying an adversary's military force leaving +the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the necessary Shock and +Awe. At another level, the certainty of this outcome may cause an +adversary to accept our terms well short of conflict. In the great +middle ground, the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause the +perception and anticipation of certain defeat and the threat and fear +of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or +render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical +destruction. + +Finally, in order to impose enough Shock and Awe to affect an +adversary's will, four core characteristics of a Rapid Dominance- +configured force were defined. First, complete knowledge and +understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the environment are +essential. This knowledge and understanding exceed the expectations of +dominant battlefield awareness and DBA becomes a subset of Rapid +Dominance. + +Rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is only +familiar with a particular company and not the stock market in +general, the Rapid Dominance force must have complete knowledge and +understanding of many likely adversaries and regions. This requirement +for knowledge and understanding will place a huge, new burden on the +military forces and necessitate fundamental changes in policy, +organization, training, education, structure, and equipage. + +Second is rapidity. Rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and agility +and the ability to sustain control after the initial shock. Rapidity +enables us to act as quickly as needed and always more quickly than +the adversary can react or take counter-actions. Rapidity is also an +antidote to surprise. If we cannot anticipate surprise, or are +surprised, rapidity provides a correcting capacity to neutralize the +effects of that surprise. + +Third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of operations +and execution in terms of brilliance. The consequences and +implications of setting brilliance as the standard and achieving it +are profound. Reconfiguration of command authority and organization +possibly to decentrali-zation down to individual troops must follow. +Allowing and encouraging an operational doctrine of the "first to +respond" will set the tempo provided that effective de-confliction of +friendly on friendly engagements has been assured. + +This, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, training, +and organization will be required. The matter is not just "fighting +smarter." It is learning to fight at even higher standards of skill +and competence. + +Fourth is control of the environment. Control is defined in the +broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and space and +control of the "ether" in which information is passed and received. +This requires signature management throughout the full conflict +spectrum-deception, disinformation, verification, information control, +and target management-all with rapidity in both physical and +psychological impact. By depriving an adversary of the physical use of +time, space, and the ether, we play on the adversary's will and offer +the prospect of certain destruction should resistance follow. + +The next step in this process must be specifically defining this Rapid +Dominance force in terms of force structure, capabilities, doctrine, +organization, and order of battle. We have begun this effort and are +focusing on a joint task force sized somewhere between a reinforced +division and a full corps (i.e., a strength of 75,000 - 200,000). We +also have the aim of being able to deploy this force within 5 to 10 +days of the order to move and, of course, will be able to send smaller +force packages on a nearly instantaneous basis. We appreciate the +mobility and logistical implications of this requirement. + +Once we design this "paper" force and equip it with "paper" systems, +we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and tests we +noted in the Prologue. + +The first test of this Rapid Dominance force will be against the MRC. +The comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the programmed +force and whatever emerges from the Quadrennial Defense Review of +1997. We will need to examine closely how and where and why Rapid +Dominance and Shock and Awe work and where they do not. At the very +least, we expect that this will help strengthen the current force and +improve current capabilities. Of course, it is our hope that this test +will validate Rapid Dominance as a legitimate doctrine. + +Second, the Rapid Dominance force must be tested across the entire +spectrum of OOTW. These are the most difficult tests because, in some +of them, no force may be suitable and no force may work. + +Third, the test of determining the political consequences of Rapid +Dominance must be conducted. On one hand, if this force capability can +be achieved and Shock and Awe administered to affect an adversary's +will, can a form of political deterrence be created? In the most +approximate sense, and we emphasize approximate, the analogy with +nuclear deterrence might be drawn. An adversary may be persuaded or +deterred from taking action in the first instance. On the other hand, +this capacity may be seen as politically unusable and allies and +others within the United States may not be fully trusting of the +possessor always to employ this force responsibly. + +Fourth is the test of the implications of Rapid Dominance for +alliances and for waging coalition warfare. Our allies are already +concerned that the United States is leaving them far behind in +military technology and capability. If we possess this force and our +allies or partners do not, how do we fight together? Our view is that +this can be worked out through technology sharing and perhaps new +divisions of labor and mission specialization. However, these are +important points to be considered. + +Finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in defense? + +It is also likely that because Rapid Dominance will cause profound +consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy will make a +fair examination difficult. It is no accident that other attempts at +change, especially those that ask for or are tainted with reform, have +had a short life span. It is interesting to note in this regard that +the President's Commission on Intelligence and its fine report that +recommended changes and refinements to the U.S. intelligence +community, despite a very positive initial reception, led to only a +few meaningful actions. + +This discussion leads to two final points. We are all too well aware +that any strategy and force structure have vulnerabilities and +potential weaknesses. The experiences that this study group +collectively had in Vietnam makes this concern very strongly held. We +observe that in the private sector, the vulnerability of information +systems is real and is being exploited. A former director of the FBI +has told us that in New York, for example, the number one recruiting +target for organized crime is the teenage computer whiz. We think that +this "hacking," writ large in the private sector, must be assumed as +part of the defense problem. Hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities +must be even greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the Cold +War, because exploitation can come from many more sources in the +future. + +Second, wags may criticize Rapid Dominance as attempting to create a +"Mission Impossible Force." To be sure, we emphasize and demand +brilliance as the operational goal. However, we also know that the +military today is seen as a leading example of the best American +society has to offer. We wish to build on this reality. We note the +experience and the performance, albeit under highly unusual +circumstances, of_ Desert Storm_. We see no reason why that level of +performance cannot be made a permanent part of the fabric of the +American military. + +Because we have entered a period of transition in which we enjoy a +dominant military position and a greatly reduced window of +vulnerability, this is the right time for experimentation and +demonstration. Rapid Dominance is still a concept and a work in +progress, not a final road map or blueprint. But the concept does +warrant, in our view, a commitment to explore and an opportunity that +could lead to dramatically better capabilities. + +We believe that through Rapid Dominance and the commitment to examine +the entire range of defense across all components and aspects, a +revolution is possible. If Rapid Dominance can be harnessed in an +affordable and efficient way and an operational capability fielded to +impose sufficient Shock and Awe to affect an adversary's will, then +this will be the real Revolution in Military Affairs. We ask those who +are intrigued by this prospect to join us. + + + + +Appendix A + +Thoughts on Rapid Dominance +by Admiral Bud Edney, USN (Ret.) + + + +Why the need for a concept of Rapid Dominance? The answer lies in the +combined realities of modern technology, economics, and politics. + + +Technology + +The evolution or revolution of information technology is impacting +everything we do and how we do it on a worldwide basis. The +far-reaching effects of the resulting information highway that crosses +all boundaries are already impacting the strategic decisions, +economics, and politics of the world of nation states. Borders are no +defense for the penetration of information even in highly controlled +or authoritarian societies. Similarly, the exploration and use of high +technology in space, together with the advent of sophisticated highly +accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, means borders between states +are not as important for strategic and impenetrable defenses in depth +as they used to be. The rapid advancements in telecommunications +technology, combined with the exploration and use of space vehicles to +saturate a world hungry for information, means that leaders can no +longer shield their people from the outside world. Thus information +will penetrate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile +attempt to block it out. New centers of gravity are being created as +are new vulnerability choke points. The country or power structure +that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the information +revolution as it applies to issues of national security will remain in +control of its own destiny. The United States possesses a qualitative +and quantitative lead that, when combined with a properly focused and +coordinated (harmonized) industry, defense, and national security +policy, should ensure success for the foreseeable future. Harnessing +information technology and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal +thought in application of military force is the essence of Rapid +Dominance. + + +Economics + +With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, +there is no major power capable of destroying the U.S. mainland. Given +this absence of devastating threat, defense expenditures will continue +to be squeezed to address more pressing domestic priorities. Voter +demands for a balanced budget, national health care, social security +reform, educational reform, family values, crime and drug use +reduction, lower taxes, etc., will combine to put increasing pressure +on the defense bottom line in the out years. The result will be a +steady decline in war fighting readiness and force structure that will +place our security interests at risk unless we leverage our technology +leadership to achieve military advantage with lower force levels but +increased war fighting effectiveness. This is also the essence of +Rapid Dominance. + + +Politics + +The reality of current politics is that the trauma of Vietnam, the +results of the Gulf War, and our status as the only remaining +superpower after the Cold War equate to some new constraints (real or +perceived) on the application of military force to support our foreign +policy. These political sensitivities need to be understood up front +and include the following: + + - The U.S. is not the world's policeman + - Involvement of U.S. Forces must be justified as essential to vital + U.S. security interests + - Support of Congress and People is a necessary prerequisite + - Avoid commitment of ground forces + - Offer instead U.S. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, logistics + support, etc. + - Avoid risk of loss of U.S. lives at almost all costs + - Ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned + - Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to defend themselves + aggressively + - Minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage + - Specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end in the + not-too-distant future sight before committing + - U.S. led coalition force preferred-U.S. Forces remain under U.S. + Command. These political restraints may limit the application of + Rapid Dominance to Major and Minor Regional Conflicts. This is an + issue that needs further exploration and analysis. + + +What is Rapid Dominance? + +Rapid Dominance is the full use of capabilities within a system of +systems that can decisively impact events requiring the application of +military/defense resources through affecting the adversary's will. +Rapid Dominance envisions execution in real or near real time to +counter actions or intentions deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. On +one end of the spectrum, Rapid Dominance would introduce a regime of +Shock and Awe in areas of high value to the threatening individual, +group, or state. In many cases the prior knowledge of credible U.S. +Rapid Dominance capabilities would act as a deterrent. Rapid Dominance +would ensure favorable early resolution of issues at minimal loss of +lives and collateral damage. The concept ideally should be able to +impact adversarial situations that apply across the board, addressing +high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology threats. Some of these aims may +not be achievable given the political and technology constraints, but +need to be explored. + +Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting +capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated, +interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence, +surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, and data +analysis to deliver in real time, actionable information to the +shooter. This network must provide total situational awareness and +nodal analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's +decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe +among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this +grid of knowledge and vulnerability will enable the shutting down of +specific or all essential functions nearly simultaneously. We expect +that through these netted pieces of data, often, the sum of the parts +will yield profound battlefield advantages to the possessor. The +"Rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real time +actionable targeting information to the shooter, whether the shooter +is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery battery, an +individual rifleman, a naval battle group, an individual ship, an air +wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. At whatever unit level, Shock +and Awe are magnified by the speed and effectiveness of targeting. The +ability to achieve Rapid Dominance simultaneously throughout the +battlefield will create strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing +forces, their leadership, and society. When the video results of these +attacks are broadcast real time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact +on coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support +can be decisive. + +The top priority of Rapid Dominance should be to deter, alter, or +affect those actions that are either unacceptable to U.S. national +security interests or endanger the democratic community of states and +access to free markets. These political objectives are generally those +envisioned in the major and lesser regional conflict scenarios (MRC & +LRC). Should deterrence fail, the application of Rapid Dominance +should create sufficient Shock and Awe to intimidate the enemy forces +and leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential +aggressors. Rapid Dominance would not be limited to MRC and LRC +scenarios. It has application in a variety of areas, including +countering WMD, terrorism, and other political problems. The challenge +is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on +Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat yet decisive enough +to convey the appropriate degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance +cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. It initially +appears that Rapid Dominance should be applied sparingly for egregious +threats or violations of international law, such as: + + - Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state + - Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD + - Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale + - Threat to essential world markets + +Clearly the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and +penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and +benefits in closed societies are becoming known to both the public as +well as the bosses. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop +sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and +create road blocks as well as control input/outputs to the highway +both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept. + +These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting +international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer +interagency cooperation and coordination between military and law +enforcement activities and capabilities must be established. +Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed +considerable cultural differences between these organizations. +Overcoming these cultural differences is not easy. The required trust +and confidence for sharing sensitive information and support between +these agencies and the military needs to be developed further. +Interagency coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level +of sophistication. Some laws may need to be changed. War in Cyberspace +does not recognize domestic versus foreign boundaries. In this +environment the subjects of Information Warfare and Information In +Warfare take on new meaning and require focused development. We must +become proficient within this environment. + +This breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal more +thought with regard to the issues of security, vulnerabilities +(their's and our's), and the concept of Rapid Dominance. Does Rapid +Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the spectrum, +involving more traditional applications of force to achieve political +objectives as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet to be +explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance applies +to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. interests, controlling +rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the political and military +prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable and +realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of +national governments/law enforcement organizations and international +as well as local private venture or non-government organizations +(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care +to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of +Rapid Dominance offend and generate a counterproductive public +relations backlash from those who believe force should only be used as +a last resort and then with a measurable degree of proportionality? + +At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be +addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and +issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front +during the concept development phase of the development of specific +Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be careful that we do not +overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable +capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance does not eliminate +the fog of war. Decisions will still be made on the leader's judgment +and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat +intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence +in our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the +ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance. +Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly +defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the world's only credible +superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role, but neither can +it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. We are in the +classical "damned if we do and damned if we don't" syndrome. One of the +serious side effects of Rapid Dominance could be that if you adapt a +strategy of Rapid Dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem +and be responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to +such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if +Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less than of vital +interest? This subject needs further development beyond the limitations +of this book. + + +Rapid Dominance and The Future Battlefield + +What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The _Desert +Storm_ conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real focus +of battle will no longer be force on force as we have traditionally +considered it. By the time the Allied Forces engaged the opposing Iraq +forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes had already been +demoralized and smashed. This was accomplished by establishing air +superiority followed by a carefully orchestrated campaign of precision +air strikes (including Tomahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces +were isolated by cutting off logistic support, severing communications +with its leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe achieved +by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the open desert. +Shock and awe were introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft +penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center of +gravity targets with impunity. Shock and awe were also present in the +degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly +maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and +unforgiving for the predominantly U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin +Powell noted, the Coalition Forces cut off the head and life lines to +the Iraqi Army in the field and then set about killing it. The fact +that a democratically led coalition could choose not to massacre the +remnants of Iraq's army during its panic-induced retreat underscores +that we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint. The +impact of real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed +simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living rooms +worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the battlefield and +further highlighted the compassion of that decision. In dealing with a +"butcher" we could not fall to that level. + +The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile box +where you will know everything that is going on inside the box +(although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The +battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that +controls or influences the elements of the battle. In examining this +battlefield and the application of force and Shock and Awe, we seek to +mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous firepower on critical +nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than +necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one +another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised warfare to a new level with the +demonstrated effectiveness and application of air to ground/water and +surface to ground/water launched precision guided weapons. No longer +will commanders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but +rather targets destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an issue +of affordability here. We may not be able to get 1) high tech, 2) +MRC/OOTW, and 3) large armies. This does not eliminate the requirement +for sufficient force in the field to defend against an all-out assault +or eject another force and occupy the contested land to ensure the +objectives of conflict are carried out. Air power can punish, +simultaneously destroy center of gravity targets, and so demoralize +the opposing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with +smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air +campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict before the land +campaign is necessary. This is more likely against a modernized, +developed state than an underdeveloped government. + +The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of +stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon +targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology, space +relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from space, the +introduction of JSTARS, and massive application of night vision +techniques, are the first phase of these changes. With elements of +this technology now more and more on the open market to whomever has +the cash or friends, the advantage of obtaining greater situational +awareness and real-time processing of available data cannot be taken +for granted. + +In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that +political and military decision making will have to establish close +control of the actionable information distributed to shooters in the +field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli forces that had air +superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely accurate firepower +capabilities in the most recent incursion into Southern Lebanon +against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with an artillery +barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired from close to a known UN +encampment. When this artillery response resulted in killing more than +100 refugees fleeing the Israeli operation, the result was a public +relations disaster and mission failure for the stated limited Israeli +objectives. This represents a case of ill-conceived application of +Rapid Dominance that resulted in counter-productive Shock and Awe +generating adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was +also a case of applying high technology and state controlled Rapid +Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. Clearly +the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this exchange. The +lessons learned from this tragic incident as well as the applicability +of Rapid Dominance techniques in this environment need further study. +The massing and movement of refugees in large numbers is a reality and +a planning factor that must be dealt with up front. The fact that the +value of life itself is viewed differently by warring factions must +also be considered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield +and the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to +achieve Rapid Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules +of engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may not always be +the right tactic and an escalation of targeting different centers of +gravity rather than responding directly to events in the field +promises to be more effective. The theory of Rapid Dominance clearly +needs further development, gaming, and simulation. Each decision to +apply Rapid Dominance will be unique, complex, risky, and different +than the previous one. Knowledge and information on the battlefield as +well as that concerning center of gravity targets will be incomplete +even with a goal of total situational awareness. + + +Instruments to Achieve Shock and Awe + +Shock and awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and destruction +that are incompre-hensible to the people at large, specific +elements/sectors of the threat society, or the leadership. Nature in +the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled +fires, famine, and disease can engender Shock and Awe. The ultimate +military application of Shock and Awe was the use of two atomic +weapons against Japan in WWII. The Shock and Awe that resulted from +the use of these weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war +with Japan (through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the +further use of these weapons for over 50 years. Not unexpectedly, +these events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the +destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. The holocaust +was a state policy of Shock and Awe that stunned the world in its +brutality and inhumanity. Yet it has not deterred the world from +executing or tolerating atrocities of equal brutality and inhumanity +(Cambodia, Syria, Rwanda, etc.). Similar applications of Shock and Awe +have differing toleration levels and impacts depending on the +environment and political system against which it is applied. As an +example, the massive bombing raids of WWII by Germany and the U.S. did +not result in a sufficient level of Shock and Awe to end the fighting. +The fear of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather than +their actual destruction was the deciding factor in that theater. The +B-52 raids in Vietnam provided localized elements of Shock and Awe, +but until applied to the capital city of Hanoi, had no impact toward +war termination. When applied in concentrated repetitive strikes in +November/December of 1972 under _Operation Rolling Thunder III_, the +cease fire followed in short order. In fact, throughout history there +have been weapons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of +Shock and Awe. While there has always been shock, awe, and fear +associated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused and +great enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under favorable terms +is not certain. How to apply elements of Shock and Awe against rogue +states, terrorist elements, international drug and crime cartels, as +well as in the more traditional MRCs and LRCs needs much further study +and analysis. Shock and awe, to reach the level required to achieve +Rapid Dominance, must also bring fear to those who are in charge. It +must be applied quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity +(such as stealth bombing with air superiority). The element of +impunity, that is the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a +key element of this strategy. If on the other hand attacks are +directed at the general public a backlash could be unleased because of +the excessive and brutal losses of innocent civilians. + +Much more study and analysis is needed to identify and examine the +pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of Shock and Awe +for limited objectives rather than responds in kind to a provocation. +What are the limits of the doctrine of Shock and Awe? What +circumstances merit the application? Can Shock and Awe be used to +achieve limited objectives with little or no risk of life to allied +forces or innocent civilians? Can true center of gravity targets be +identified for ideological/terrorist groups? Can levels of Shock and +Awe be categorized by effectiveness and priority of weapons systems? +If so, what are the key enabling technologies? What types of Shock and +Awe would be both impressive and generate high returns? A few +desirable capabilities from a former CINC's perspective are listed +below: + + - Blow up an entire mine field simultaneously in its entirety + immediately after it had been laid. + - Destroy the mine laden mine-laying vehicles at their loading + point. + - Destroy in real time terrorist training camps or publicity + generating threats such as the recent display of 70 bomb laden + suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc worldwide. (This + probably requires inside penetration of the targeted + organization). + - Destroy simultaneously all/selective WMD launchers, + storage/production facilities of a rogue state. + - Selectively target rogue terrorist leaders as was apparently done + by the Russians in Chechnya recently when they killed the top + rebel leader by detecting and homing in on his satellite phone + conversation (helicopter rocket attack). + - Stop, divert, capture the cash flow to terrorist elements. + + +Thoughts on Applications of Shock and Awe + +It is the use of Shock and Awe to achieve Rapid Dominance that is so +fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage if it can be +harnessed in a variety of situations. This basis for Rapid Dominance +requires a clearer under-standing of what our end objectives are than +we usually have when we stumble into the use of military force, often +it seems by default and at the last possible minute. At this point, I +have more questions than answers. How does Rapid Dominance differ by +the goals and missions assigned? What are the key elements to apply +Rapid Dominance for each envisioned threat? What are the most likely +threats for the next 20 years? Is Rapid Dominance applicable to all +these threats? Can we separate Rapid Dominance into categories with +and without Shock and Awe? + +In addition to answering these and other questions, it seems to me it +would be helpful to generate a list of desirable capabilities that +would help me select a response option. This list of capabilities +would be useful to focus (1) scarce R&D dollars to fill in the holes +with technology, (2) intelligence and surveillance collection +priorities, (3) innovative thought to further develop the concept (War +College papers and Wargaming series), and (4) development of CINC +plans and requirements to meet these capabilities. Examples of such +capabilities are: + + - Deploying highly effective TBMD and Cruise Missile Defense. + - Severing all/selective communications between leadership and field + as well as selective elements by call in the field. + - Intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective threat + field units. + - Projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat scopes. + - Inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities that generates + engine failures. + - Inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on key + threat systems. + - Identifying specific location and determining strength and + material of protected targets of value. + - Developing dial a setting ordnance capable of destroying all + hardened targets. + - Detecting and tracting (destroying at will) all targets of value + including mobile targets. + - Detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before launch. + - Detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed mine + field (land & sea). + - Making threat submarine movements transparent to targeting at + will. + +Obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored to the +limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and affordability. This +may not even be the right type of capabilities one might want. That +is, we may need a totally non-standard list. My judgment is that we +should develop one or two black "silver bullet" capabilities, if we +get too far afield, the system will not be able to digest the +recommendations. However, the concept of Rapid Dominance requires +stepping to a new level of getting inside the opposition's decision +loop. Rapid Dominance at the ultimate level would enable stopping, +diverting, or changing the decision process and decision executing +machinery/systems either preemptively or reactively in time to ensure +core U.S. security requirements are met. + + +Rapid Dominance Infrastructure + +The current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition reform +is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities necessary to +implement a Rapid Dominance strategy. I would like to reserve comments +in this area until the project is further developed. We do not need to +raise reasons to discard the concept as too hard before it is +sufficiently defined. I have the feeling that bringing these +conceptual capabilities to realities within a system of systems is +neither cheap nor easy. There is still too much waste and inefficiency +in our defense acquisition process as well as in the overlap between +service requirements and capabilities. Rapid Dominance will not be +service-unique and requires a synergistic approach from planning to +execution. + + +Final Thoughts + +The implications of the ongoing revolution in telecommunications and +information processing as it applies to our national security +interests dictate that we need new imaginative concepts of operation +to ensure the efficacy of our international leadership in a multipolar +world. With technology upgrading capabilities by factors of 10 or more +every 18 months, we can no longer afford to have concepts of +operations wait for the technology to reach the field. The concept of +Rapid Dominance requires innovative thought and different directions +than that imbedded in our military hierarchy. We need to introduce the +concept at all levels of military professional education and training. +The best results of this effort will be generated from the younger +minds brought up on the leading edge of the information revolution. +The challenge is to engage those minds in the solution and to take the +risks required to fund priorities enabling the development of this +capability now. Such a cultural change is not easy. One thing is +certain-business as usual will not get us there. The window of +opportunity will close faster than we think. + + + + +Appendix B + +Defense Alternatives: Forces Required +by General Chuck Horner, USAF (Ret.) + + + +The end of the Cold War will require a review of United States +National Security Policy and a concomitant change in our National +Defense Strategy. This strategy will respond to the changes in the +world's security environment, including the dissolution of the Soviet +Union and Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security alliances such +as NATO and NORAD, the increased and unique threat posed by the +proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the widening of the +spectrum of conflict which will challenge the peace and security of +our nation and its allies. + +The causes of conflict and the modes which threats to our security +interests will take have multiplied with the end of the Cold War. The +nuclear weapons of the Cold War remain and will remain for some +considerable time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to +the declining utility of these devices. For sure there will be +continuing pressure throughout the world to eliminate the presence of +nuclear weapons in conjunction with efforts to halt the production, +stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and biological weapons. It is +likely that START II will be followed by START III and IV, as nations +who claim ownership of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a high +cost and marginal payoff. However, progress will be slow due to the +immense importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament +and the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated with the +disarmament process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future the threat +of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be less likely +than before. The spectrum of national security challenges will expand +as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides. + +The decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over Iraq during +_Desert Storm_ should give future aggressors of major regional +conflict cause to pause. While this does not mean that the threat of +conventional warfare has vanished, it does mean that the national +leader intending to use major conflict to achieve political aims must +carefully craft strategy that will avoid the opportunity for +confrontation with a large coalition force lead by the United States. +Such a strategy might include surprise attack; short intense military +action; the threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical +weapons; advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions; and +warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes attacks +on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic missiles or +unconventional warfare forces. This will be warfare for which the +United States is ill trained and ill equipped. + +Other challenges to the world's security will take many forms to which +the military forces of the United States can play a constructive role. +These are commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War, even +though they may include the use of force to achieve desired political +goals. They include the increasingly familiar peacemaking, +peacekeeping, show of force, and humanitarian relief efforts. Success +in these operations may well require retraining, re-equipping, or +reorganizing our military forces. Each mission should be evaluated +with respect to what is required to accomplish its unique challenges. +However, the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military +forces should be based on what is required to fight the residual Cold +War, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major regional +conflict. + +The political goals upon which our national security strategy should +be crafted are fairly straightforward. First, we should seek to +preserve and invigorate the role of leadership the United States has +maintained since the end of World War II, or the end of the Cold War +(you take your pick). Second, and not apart from the first goal, the +United States must be sufficiently strong to prevent or deter use of +effective military power against us. It is not inconceivable that our +so-called superpower status could be defeated in battle by a crafty +and well-prepared adversary. Witness what happened to the powerful +victors of WWII in Vietnam. Third, U.S. military forces must be of +sufficient size, configuration, and readiness to bring a major +conventional conflict to a successful termination. It goes without +saying that during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to +numbers that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world. +Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. Fourth and +lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to all the +other tasks and functions for which the national command authority +calls upon the military. This first of challenges should be used to +define the military forces we field, how we train them, and the +methods we use to employ them. + +The strategic geographic depth the United States enjoys, bounded by +two oceans on the east and west and non-threatening nations to the +north and south, means that our nation is somewhat immune from attack, +other than by means of infiltration such as a terrorist, or from the +skies by means of long-range aircraft, and cruise or ballistic +missiles. We will require some actions and defenses which address +these threats, but the major portion of our national defense effort +must be placed on building and sustaining offensive forces for combat +in environments other than our own soil. This dictates that our +projection forces must be capable of rapidly responding to an +unforeseen crisis anywhere in the world, keeping in mind that quick, +decisive surprise favors our potential enemies. Given that we have +proven unable to predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these +forces must also be ready at all times to carry out combat operations +in most any place. There will not be time to modernize their equipment +or train reserve force units. They must be capable of projecting and +sustaining their military power over long distances and operating in +the environment of the enemy's choosing. Last but not least, when +required, they must be capable of decisive combat, not by attrition of +the enemy force in head-to-head combat as was our nature in past wars, +but by Shock and Awe so that conflict resolution is achieved with a +maximum of success at the minimum loss of life in the shortest time. +These characteristics for our projection force cannot be achieved +easily, as the processes that defined our Cold War doctrines, force +structures, equipment, and ways of doing business are loath to change. + +The Services' and joint requirements oversight processes that define +the equipment provided our military forces place emphasis on force +structure and the traditional roles for those forces. This inertia can +freeze our land, sea, air, and space capabilities at current or near +current levels, but may prove inadequate to carry out new strategies. +There are few incentives for a Service or the Joint Staff to reward +innovation or divestiture of roles or missions in order to change the +character and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare +them to fight the battles we must envisage for the twenty-first +century. + +For example, the Services claim lessons learned from _Desert Storm_ +which reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and ignore the +troublesome aspects which loom in the future and threaten our +traditional view of the battlefield. Many acclaim the role of +precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the threat they pose if +they are in the hands of the enemy. What would be the lessons learned +if several hundred canisters of live Sensor Fused Weapons were +released by a red force ballistic missile on the 24th Division during +a Fort Irwin engagement? Certainly there would be profound changes in +tactics, doctrine, and equipment indicated for the surviving U.S. Army +force. What if radar homing Surface to Air Missiles were employed by +the red force during a Red Flag exercise in the Nevada desert, not +using centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using +decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would be used +by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stagnant doctrines? +I doubt that the Air Force would be spending millions of dollars +trying to build electronic countermeasures to hide the large number of +expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft they continue to build, such +as the F-15E. + +Imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile were +actually allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson aircraft +carrier during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the attendant loss +of life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range. You would think the +maritime force would reexamine the method it provides air power from +the sea, vital yet today too vulnerable. + +How many times do we hear that the space forces are configured to +provide intelligence from overhead only to find in Iraq or Bosnia that +the front line forces receive products that are old, inaccurate and +altered to keep our Soviet foes from gaining knowledge of our +capabilities? Perhaps we if we would dual hat the Director of the +Central Intelligence Agency to the position of J-2, or even +Commander-in-Chief of a regional unified command, there would be vast +improvements in the tasking, evaluation, and delivery of space-derived +intelligence to regional combat forces. Then we might see full +understanding of the increasing role of space forces and implement +change to make them more relevant to our national security strategies +of the next century. Innovation, not size, must be sought because we +do not have the resources to do both. Moreover, large forces drive our +operational level strategy to force-on-force engagements in the +attrition warfare model of the last century with its attendant +causalities and destruction of equipment. George Patton's dictum still +stands that directed his troops not to die for their country, but to +get the other SOB to die for his. + +Military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and +destruction. The ever-present television camera ensures that the +horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. War's immorality should some +day lead to its banishment. Unfortunately, that day is probably a long +way away. Nonetheless, weapons of war and their employment tactics +must minimize death and destruction. This is not a call for non-lethal +weapons; it is a call for military forces to get right to the heart of +the enemy and conclude operations as rapidly and efficiently as they +possibly can given their equipment, training, and doctrine. This means +there must be wide flexibility in how they may function. Military +operations will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand +flexibility. Modern war will require our military leadership to +navigate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and ever +changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. We must make our +forces capable of dampening the capacity of the enemy to use force by +controlling the conflict rapidly even when surprised. We failed to do +that tactically in _Desert Storm_ in the case of the SCUD missile +attacks, but were fortunate that the Iraqis were equally inept at +taking political advantage of this card they held and skillfully +employed on the battlefield. We must also look for efficiency before +we even join in battle. + +Defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays since +the end of the Cold War. Given the leadership role the United States +plays in the world, one could think a reasonable sum to devote to +defense might be three percent of our gross national product, +certainly an amount much smaller than what an average family expends +for its security by means of life, health, causality, car, medical +insurance, and retirement benefits. Given the prospect of long-term, +constant funding, the Department of Defense could then give more +thought to how to build the most modern, efficient military force +within the dollars available. We would no longer define our forces +against some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus to +protect force size rather than quality. The Army, Navy, Air Force, +Marine Corps, and space forces would be required to build a team based +on a salary cap. You might be willing to pay big bucks for a B-2 +superstar quarterback, but you will also need lower cost and capable +riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle. Most of all, you would +reward the Service or Agency who would innovate to provide efficiency. + +Manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer military +force. Investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite might be +high, but it is the operations and maintenance costs that will drive +how much resources we are required to expend to gain and maintain a +given military capability. Again turning to _Desert Storm_, the huge +advantages of overflight precision munitions dropped from stealth +aircraft has not been understood or accepted by the operations +analysts who argue what we should build or buy next. If it had been, +would the Navy have allowed the A-12 program to fail, would the Air +Force be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions of +dollars into equipping forty year old B-52s with conventional +missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy divisions at a +personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership? Why not build +a Division force equivalent using technology and doctrine to provide a +"heavy division equivalent" force using far fewer troops featuring +speed, shock, precision fire while avoiding the manpower costs of +dollars that in peacetime include added costs for recruitment, +training, and sustaining and in war have an even greater added cost +computed in blood? Why don't we do this? The answer is because it +would require rare innovation, trust, and support from the equally +intransigent federal funding authorities. Most importantly, the +Services are not rewarded for innovation which recognizes the +contributions of another Service or Ally. + +Jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel must +worship even if they don't understand or believe. Defenders of the +status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or redundancy and +these arguments have some validity. The question becomes how much +overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, and space forces can the +nation afford, and what is the opportunity cost to the core competency +of the land, sea, air, or space force that builds and/or maintains the +duplicative force structure. A second yet vastly different question +arises when considering the unique capabilities a Service provides to +support itself and the other services. For example, how much the Air +Force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of what the +envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day, to support +the mythical scenarios. The alternative sea, land, and space lift +requirements can be postulated; however, if the Navy, Army, or Air +Force do not satisfy those sea, land, and space lift requirement, then +there is a shortfall which will in turn generate a need for more +airlift! + +During _Desert Storm_, nearly 90 percent of the deployed equipment +arrived by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis had continued their +first attack in August. A majority of overland movement was provided +by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and the Army had neither +the resources nor the responsiveness to activate reserve forces needed +to meet the truck and rail support requirements of our military +forces. As a result, costly airlift was used to move forces that +should have traveled by land and sea. If added space capabilities had +been needed, there was almost no capability for the timely launch of a +satellite. Would it not be wise to index spending on land, sea, air, +and space launch on one and other, postulate lift requirements on what +the new force needs as it innovates and slims down. The need to +respond on a moment's notice adds to the value of airlift and +prepositioned ships. The outcome though would be not to allow any of +the Services to divert general support money into core competencies +and thereby shift the jointness burden to another Service. + +Innovate. Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly the +fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded. Accept +the benefits of Federal Express that can be federalized during times +of national emergency as a costly, but ready augmentation to military +supply lines that has no cost during the much longer periods of +peacetime. Our nation has other industrial capacities that also have +duplicate military capabilities. They may be 80 percent solutions, but +the cost of ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance of a +military owned and operated 100 percent solution. Iridium telephones +may not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent of the time they +will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost. Of course, this +avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our medieval +acquisition system. + +Finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that will +assure the future force capability will be enduring. We cannot keep up +with technology using our current ways of acquiring military hardware +and training our people in how to use and maintain it. In many areas +we would be better off to throw it away when it breaks given the low +cost, durability, and reliability of modern solid state electronics. +Why train technicians? Give the troops a gold card and a telephone +number and they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our +government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do buy not only +integrates with that of other services and functions, but that it can +integrate with both older and newer equipment designated to do the +same function. The fighter aircraft secure radio must be capable of +communicating with the ground and sea based forces command and +control, as importantly it must be able to communicate with the next +generation fighter aircraft radio. + +The added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to fight +alone in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from forming +coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force structure we +maintain in declining budget years. An enduring force must also +recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively with the forces of +other nations. This means we must more freely release our technologies +to foreign nations so that our military forces can fight side by side, +so that our deployment forces can draw from stocks of others while our +logistics system seeks to catch up with the rapidly deployed combat +force. + +In the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our +military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal change in +the policy side of the equation. What good are highly trained, +efficient, capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the +implementing authorities are incapable of defining principles, goals, +and integrating strategies for their employment? While this is not the +province of the military to solve, the military must understand how +disjointed policy, weak political leadership, or dysfunctional +international cooperation will preclude success on the battlefield. + +Again, one of the missed lessons of _Desert Storm_ was the difficult +and successful integration of international leadership achieved by the +President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of +Staff, Congressional leaders, and allied National Command Authorities +as well as many others. It was this leadership, coupled with the +ineptness of the enemy, that covered over the failures of our Cold +War-equipped and trained forces that fought _Desert Storm_. This does +not take anything away from the military victory, but it does make it +difficult to glean the right lessons for the future. Perhaps that is +why we are so loathe to change our forces at a time when change is +demanded by a new strategic environment and new threats to our +national security. Defining alternative forces in light of the changed +national security environment, goals and strategy raises two +questions: what kind or mix of military force and how much best +balances the requirements and funds available. + + +Deep Strike: A Key to Shock and Awe + +In the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases, all +initial responses to combat operations will be some form of deep +strike. Given strategic warning (don't bet on it) after deployment of +our military forces, Deep Strike is a term that relates to the +political boundaries or proximity to military forces. The geography of +the area of conflict will further define deep strike. But a rule of +thumb might be attacks on a target beyond range of surface-based fires +except for ballistic or cruise missiles. More important than range is +the characteristics of the Deep Strike targets. Deep Strike targets +could be classified as ones the enemy does not wish to place at high +levels of risk. They can be characterized by the functions they +perform, such as: + + - Leadership + - Command and Control (a function of leadership) + - Control of Military Forces, especially air and space + - Logistics and Sustainment + - National Economic Base + - Internal Security/Political + - National Will, Theirs and Ours + +Intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes must +examine the functions and then define the physical objects or people +who comprise the system which is responsible for the successful +operation of the function. You define the system and then attack the +critical elements in order to achieve economy of force. Often these +target sets are difficult to define, as these functions often +represent the enemy's most valuable and therefore protected elements. +The intelligence collection associated with each function will vary +from target set to target set. Large, fixed infrastructure, such as +associated with an electrical grid, lends itself to traditional +reconnaissance and evaluation of technical analysis. Leadership +targets are better defined by using human intelligence and subjective +analysis. In all cases success starts with innovative intelligence +products, which has not been a hallmark of United States operations. +Such intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of the +enemy, their values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments based +on our viewpoint. + +One target system may serve the attainment of a number of different +goals. For example, attacks on the electrical power system of the +enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and control his military +forces, operate vital elements of the economy and thus degrade the +political support required to sustain the conflict. This same target +system may be attacked a variety of ways. Most common methods would be +using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and +switching centers. Areas with isolated populations lend themselves to +using special operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated +power grid node for transmission of energy from one highly populated +area to another. Now it is obvious that computer signals used to +command the power grid are targets as intrusion into the enemy's +control system provides the means to simply turn off electricity to +selected areas. Attacks by all these means achieves even greater +results than the sum of its parts because enemy responses to restore +electrical power will be confused as elements such as computer +intrusion are confused with bombing destruction. + +The characteristics of value in attacking these important targets +systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. The greatest effect +will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated in such a manner as +to inflict maximum Shock and Awe on the enemy element. This means +operations must be coordinated and orchestrated carefully and flexibly +as enemy reaction to the attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is +projected when a combination of functions or target sets supporting a +variety of functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In +order to achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be +evaluated quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of +the system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system. +Finally, the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the +functions as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take hold. In +order to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the attacker must +know the current and projected effects of his strikes against elements +of the enemy's residual system. If the trick is to define the system +of targets needed to conduct successful Deep Strike, it is even more +important to know how to alter the initial plan as the battle unfolds +and timing becomes everything. + +The characteristics of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike are long +range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed. Cost of the +operation is a factor; however, system cost must include peacetime +operations and maintenance costs as well of the costs during actual +combat. There is also a human element in the cost of combat operations +which escalates rapidly as military force is misused. The total cost +of these operations must also address the cost of intelligence used to +support Deep Strikes. Intelligence operations may be the most costly +due to the importance of these targets to the enemy. Alternatively, +the human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the most +inexpensive since their national importance makes them vulnerable to +knowl-edgeable dissidents. + + +Stand-off + +Deep Strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. Some of +the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances beyond the +nation's control; for example, Seoul borders on North Korea. Our +protective oceans mean that likely conflict is offshore. The +likelihood our next adversary may have access to surveillance, +precision munitions, and long-range delivery systems dictates that +much of our operations will be at long range, lest our forces come +under attack at their ports, camps, and bases. There will be a need +for systems capable of projecting military force from distances of +10,000KM. A sizable portion of the force must be able to deliver +ordnance of enemy targets from ranges in excess of 5,000KM. Launching +attacks from inside 1,000KM of the enemy forces will demand that +friendly forces be protected from attack by means of active and +passive defenses and dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude +achieving levels of Shock and Awe through simultaneous attack. + + +Survivability + +Great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the +attack is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built for the most +demanding conflict must also be flexible for other operations. +Therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed, and +survivability in reaching their target, their cost become prohibitive +in large-scale operations which endure beyond a few hours, or in +smaller-scale operations where the goals are modest and the demands on +other military forces are low. Simultaneous combat operations require +a number of expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours of +the conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock. Awe is +not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience in being +attacked; at best you may make them numb. Alternatively, reusable +long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility to alter the +Deep Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of weapons systems +ranges from the most valuable systems such as ballistic missiles, +cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less valuable, but useful, +stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface high trajectory +fires. + + +Firepower + +Discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of people and +structures being in close proximity to the desired target. It is not +improbable that the national command center is located next door to a +children's hospital. + +Discriminate fires require precision in target cordinate +identification and location. Precision does not mean "small warhead," +although there is a beneficial impact as the right amount of explosive +is placed on the target due the penalties imposed on the delivery +vehicle required to carry the warhead long distances. All operations +involving the use of firepower must also understand and evaluate the +beneficial aspects of using non-destructive elements in conjunction +with the attack to include all aspects of the so-called information +warfare. + + + + +Appendix C + +Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance +by General Fred Franks + + + +Rapid Dominance, as we see it, is a markedly different concept for the +use of force to gain national security ob jectives. At its core, Rapid +Dominance blends unique capabilities of land, sea, air, space, and +special operating forces. It is important to note the vital role of +jointness in using forces from all elements and resisting the lure of +gimmicks and cost-free options that may appear within the reach of +high technology but are not. + +Examining current joint force capabilities reveals some enduring +truths that should be used to evaluate future concepts. Joint force +commanders today benefit from the wide array of capabilities available +to the joint warfighting team. The ability to combine and use forces +from all dimensions in a variety of powerful combinations to fit +mission circumstances presents a versatility of capabilities that +makes defense by adversaries difficult. Balance and versatility are +key. Balance in capabilities and the inherent versatility to combine +them in unpredictable, yet highly effective ways has served U.S. +national security interests well since the end of the Cold War. One +has only to look at the variety of methods employed in Panama (1989), +Desert Storm (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994), and +Bosnia (1995) in both war and operations other than war. Joint force +commanders employed, and in some cases invented, new combinations of +balanced capabilities and were willing to go beyond the confines of +service doctrines to fit mission circumstances. For example, a U.S. +Army brigade of the 10th Mountain Division with helicopters replaced +much of the carrier air wing and flew off the carrier Eisenhower +during the Haiti operation. This force packaging capability is an +advantage unique to the U.S. + +As we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense concepts +such as Rapid Dominance, the key will be to maintain that balance in +land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces combinations +available to the joint force commander. U.S. military forces are now +multidimensional in capabilities, able to use force in ways +unpredictable to an adversary. U.S. forces also have enormous +versatility, able to be used in war and what have become termed +operations other than war. Balance permits that. + +Moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability, have +found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly given today's +methods. Recently, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division rapidly +deployed by air from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Kuwait and was able to fall +in on equipment forward positioned and be available for combat soon +after arrival. A recent article in Navy Times pointed out, "In fact, +as each wave of soldiers arrived in Kuwait, they were heading north -- +combat ready -- within six hours." This was a dramatic example of the +rapid ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using +both distant forces with those already in the theater. That +combination in that set of strategic circumstances provided a rapid +deterrent in an area of vital national security interests to the U.S. + +Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and ensuring that +capacity is perceived by a potential adversary. Staying power means +the ability to press the initial advantage gained until the strategic +objective is achieved. On-the-ground presence, in addition to forces +in theater, as demonstrated in Kuwait in 1993 and again in 1996, +provided commitment and staying power to convince Iraq that it would +be disastrous to consider any form of military action. The inherent +staying power of land forces, wherever future tactical concepts may +lead, makes them a powerful contributing partner in our Rapid +Dominance concept. + +Finally, there is the issue of physical control. Control combines with +staying power to defeat the enemy's will. One of the many lessons of +Desert Storm is that it was not until after land forces attacked Iraq +and Kuwait that Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. Despite the +awesome shock and destructive effects of attacks f rom the air and +sea, it was only after coalition ground attacks to extend control to +both Kuwait and southeastern Iraq by defeat and destruction of +defending Iraqi forces that strategic objectives were secured. Control +on land was extended past the cease fire until such time in April as +the UN passed a permanent cease fire and sanctions resolution. Land +forces remaining in southeastern Iraq provided the staying power and +control. + +The size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in all +elements will assuredly change in the future. Early work done in +advanced warfighting experiments out of TRADOC's Battle Labs beginning +in 1992 and growing into the current Force XXI and other promising +capabilities as well as by the USMC at MCCDC at Quantico are the +precursors of how change may be discovered and implemented. The +challenge is to ensure that all components of our fighting power are +properly balanced and combined into the most effective and lethal +mixes of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. This is +the heart of the Rapid Dominance force of the future. + +Extension of real and perceived control over the will and ability of +any adversary to oppose or threaten us will insure and guarantee +success of initial operations, thereby maximizing Shock and Awe. +Indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operationally will be a +major factor in achieving the enduring effects of Shock and Awe. +Certainly, as forces on land evolve and change, they must meet the +requirements of rapidity and sustainment and are vital components of +any mix of forces that seek by Shock and Awe to stun and then rapidly +dominate an adversary to achieve U.S. national security objectives. + +We strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in exploring +defense alternatives. We must seize this time to be bold in our +thinking. More thought and hypotheses with operational methods that +break through or expand current service doctrines are needed from a +joint perspective even as services look to the future from their own +service perspective. Then there must be rigorous experiments using +both high fidelity simulations and actual joint field trials to +determine the worth of these hypotheses to blend the wide array of +technology available to the total joint force and according to bold +new concepts. The results will determine the worth of Rapid Dominance +concepts by judging whether they will permit even more balanced, +versatile, and lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated future +strategic circumstances. + + + + +Study Group Members + + + +*/L.A. "Bud" Edney/* is a retired Navy admiral and naval aviator. A +veteran of over 350 combat missions in Vietnam, Admiral Edney's senior +billets included Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, +Atlantic Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Edney has +an advanced degree from Harvard and was a 1970 White House Fellow. + +*/Fred M. Franks/* is a retired Army general and a highly experienced +combat armor officer. During the Gulf War, he commanded VII Corps and +last served as Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine +Command. He has two master's degrees from Columbia and is a graduate +of the National War College. He is the author of _Into the Storm, a +Study in Command,_ written with Tom Clancy to be published by G.P. +Putnam's Sons in 1997. + +*/Charles A. Horner/* is a retired Air Force general and a highly +experienced combat fighter and attack pilot. During the Gulf War, +General Horner commanded all allied air forces. His last assignment +was Commander-in-Chief, Space Command. A graduate of the National War +College, he now serves as consultant to government and industry. + +*/Jonathan T. Howe/* is a retired Navy admiral and both a submarine and +surface warfare qualified officer. He has served as Deputy Assistant +to the President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Chairman of +NATO's Military Committee, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern +Europe/CINC U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and was Special Representative +of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia. He has a Ph.D. from the +Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and currently heads a charitable +foundation. + +*/Harlan K. Ullman/* divides his time between the worlds of business and +public policy. A former naval person, he is with the Center for +Strategic and International Studies and the Center for Naval Analyses. +His last book, _IN IRONS: U.S. Military Might in the New Century,_ was +published by the National Defense University Press in 1995. + +*/James P. Wade, Jr./*, a scientist by training, is a West Point +graduate and infantry officer. He has held many senior positions in +DOD, including head of Policy Planning, Assistant to SECDEF for Atomic +Energy, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, and Acting Head of +Defense Research and Engineering. He is Chairman and CEO of DGI which +conducted this study. + +*/Keith Brendley/* is a Vice President with Defense Group Inc. He was +formerly with Sarcos Research Corporation, RAND, System Planning +Corporation and NASA, Ames Research Center. He holds mechanical +engineering degrees from the University of Illinois (B.S.) and the +University of Maryland (M.S.). + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Shock and Awe, by +Harlan K. Ullman and James P. 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Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Shock and Awe + Achieving Rapid Dominance + +Author: Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade + +Release Date: January, 2005 [EBook #7259] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on April 1, 2003] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SHOCK AND AWE *** + + + + +[Note: This book was taken from the website of the Command and Control +Research Program (CCRP) within the within the Office of the Assistant +Secretary of Defense. According to the Privacy and Security Notice: + + 2. Information presented on DODCCRP.ORG is considered public + information and may be distributed or copied unless otherwise + specified. Use of appropriate byline/photo/image credits is + requested. + +The original electronic text was published at +http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html] + + + + +Shock and Awe: +Achieving Rapid Dominance + +Written By + +Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade + +With: + +L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. Horner, Jonathan T. Howe, +and Keith Brendley + +NDU Press Book +December 1996 + + + + +Contents + + + +Foreword +Prologue +Introduction to Rapid Dominance + +Chapter 1. Background and Basis +Chapter 2. Shock and Awe +Chapter 3. Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application +Chapter 4. An Outline for System Innovation and Technological + Integration +Chapter 5. Future Directions + +Appendices -- Reflections of Three Former Commanders + Appendix A. "Thoughts on Rapid Dominance" by Admiral Bud Edney + Appendix B. "Defense Alternatives: Forces Required" by General + Chuck Horner + Appendix C. "Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance" by General + Fred Franks + +Biographies of the Study Group Members + + + + +Foreword + + + +We are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended debate +about the future of conflict and the future of our defense +establishment. Few will deny that the winds of change are blowing as +never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical situation, an +evolving information-oriented society, advancing technology, and +budgetary constraints. How our nation responds to the challenge of +change will determine our ability to shape the future and defend +ourselves against 21st century threats. The major issue, however it +may be manifested, involves the degree of change that is required. +Advocates, all along the spectrum from a military technical revolution +to a revolution in military affairs to a revolution in security +affairs, are making their cases. Military institutions are by their +very nature somewhat conservative. History has shown that success has +often sown the seeds of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford +to follow in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels +and failed to stretch their imaginations. + +Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced about a +subject are not in the most advantageous position to understand a new +world order. Yet these same individuals are often among the most +credible voices and therefore are essential to progress. The authors +of Shock and Awe are a highly accomplished and distinguished group +with the credibility that comes from years of front line experience. +Thus, this work is important not only because of the ideas contained +within, but because of the caliber and credibility of the authors. + +ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In sponsoring +this work and in disseminating its initial results, we hope to +contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives, their promises, +and their risks. As the authors note, this is a work in progress meant +not to provide definitive solutions but a proposed perspective for +considering future security needs and strategies. To the extent that +vigorous debate ensues we will be successful. + +David S. Alberts +Washington, D.C. +October 1996 + + + + +Prologue + + + +The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for +structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future U. +S. military forces might be configured. From the very outset of this +study group's deliberations, we agreed that the most useful +contribution we could make would be to attempt to reach beyond what we +saw as the current and commendable efforts, largely but not entirely +within the Department of Defense, to define concepts for strategy, +doctrine, operations, and force structure to deal with a highly +uncertain future. In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized +the inherent and actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach +beyond what may prove to be the full extent of our grasp. + +It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently the +most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time +to come. Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose +major excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of +military superiority? For reasons noted in this study, we believe that +excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of current +defense approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have +led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that the +Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this means for +more precisely defining the nature of our future security needs. +Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing external +danger, the United States is actively examining new strategic options +and choices. The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the +Pentagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality. + +At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of American +military power, unencumbered by the danger of an external peer +competitor, have created a period of strategic advantage during which +we have the luxury of time, perhaps measured in many years, to +re-examine with a margin of safety our defense posture. On the other +hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this +predominant military capability of the United States and fail to try +to exploit, bypass, or counter it. In other words, faced with American +military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most +importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries +may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant +as possible these current U.S. advantages. We proceed at our own risk +if we dismiss this possibility. + +Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability +will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major American political +parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability, +both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to +be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense +budgets that are likely to be approved. Unless a new menace +materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same." Such +reductions may have no strategic consequences. However, that is an +outcome that we believe should not be left to chance. + +This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith strategic +reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs may be caught +up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and could too easily +drift into becoming advocacy or marketing documents. As the services +are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure, +the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and +special programs is likely to increase, thereby complicating the +problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological +resources. This means that some external thinking, removed from the +bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating +and sustaining innovation. + +Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing profound +change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature of the free +enterprise system and the American personality. Whether in information +or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too +numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product +breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One +sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in +this country are being created by small business. In the areas of +commercial information and related management information systems, +these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a +few years ago. + +On the so-called information highway, performance is increasing +dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to bring to +market new generation technology are diminishing. These positive +trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base. One +consequence of this broad commercial transformation is that any future +set of defense choices may be inexorably linked to and dependent on +this profound, ongoing change in the commercial sector and in learning +to harness private sector advances in technology-related products. It +must also be understood that only the United States among all states +and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and commercial +capability to undertake the full exploitation of this revolutionary +potential. + +Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed +worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during +the Cold War. These demands will continue and the diversity of +assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces must be properly +manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to +standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and +its public. The matter of maintaining this capability while attempting +to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting +challenge not to be underestimated. + +These structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity +for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to +exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of +Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on Shock and Awe. Rapid +Dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts +and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about +the future is perhaps one of the few givens. We believe the principles +and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and +different enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated +by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness," +and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer examination. + +Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war recorded +their observations, strategists and generals have been tantalized and +confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the adversary's will to +resist before, during, and after battle. Today, we believe that an +unusual opportunity exists to determine whether or not this +long-sought strategic goal of affecting the will, understanding, and +perception of an adversary can be brought closer to fruition. Even if +this task cannot be accomplished, we believe that, at the very +minimum, such an effort will enhance and improve the ability of our +military forces to carry out their missions more successfully through +identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the +conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and +choices for employing our forces more effectively. + +Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of strategy, +technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has the potential for +revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid Dominance as the possible +military expression, vanguard, and extension of this potential for +revolutionary change. The strategic centers of gravity on which Rapid +Dominance concentrates, modified by the uniquely American ability to +integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology, and +innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and shaping the +will of the adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy +or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no +alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military +objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must control the +operational environment and through that dominance, control what the +adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or +regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known. + +In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital condition +to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an adversary's military +power. We still must maintain the capacity for the physical and +forceful occupation of territory should there prove to be no +alternative to deploying sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment +on the ground to accomplish that objective. Should this goal of +applying our resources to controlling, affecting, and breaking the +will of an adversary to resist remain elusive, we believe that Rapid +Dominance can still provide a variety of options and choices for +dealing with the operational demands of war and conflict. + +To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply a +variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary level of +Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military leverage +points. This means that psychological and intangible, as well as +physical and concrete effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces +and supporting military infrastructure, will have to be achieved. It +is in this broader and deeper strategic application that Rapid +Dominance perhaps most fundamentally differentiates itself from +current doctrine and offers revolutionary application. + +Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the adversary's +will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe to achieve +strategic aims and military objectives, four characteristics emerge +that will define the Rapid Dominance military force. These are noted +and discussed in later chapters. The four characteristics are near +total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and +environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational +brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature +management of the entire operational environment. + +Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that is, it +focuses on defeating the military capability of an adversary and +therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-Rapid Dominance would seek to +be more universal in application through the overriding objective of +affecting the adversary's will beyond the boundaries traditionally +defined by military capability alone. In other words, where decisive +force is likely to be most relevant is against conventional military +capabilities that can be overwhelmed by American (and allied) military +superiority. In conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this +idealized scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be +sufficiently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make this +distinction in either theory or in practice. + +We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force actually be +fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, this force would +be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and certainly not an antidote +or preventative for a major policy blunder, miscalculation, or +mistake. It should also be fully appreciated that situations will +exist in which Rapid Dominance (or any other doctrine) may not work or +apply because of political, strategic, or other limiting factors. + +We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an adversary's +will, perception, and understanding through Shock and Awe on the +grounds that this idea is not new and that such an outcome may not be +physically achievable or politically desirable. On the first point, we +believe the use of basic principles of strategy can stand us in good +stead even and perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries +may not elect to fight the United States along traditional or expected +lines. On whether this ability can and should be achieved, we believe +that question should be part of a broader examination. + +Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the way in +which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy, technology, +and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It is this interaction and +focus which we think will provide the most interesting results. + +For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious +intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of Rapid +Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Dominance in the formation +stage and not as a final product. Over the next months, we believe +further steps should be taken to refine Rapid Dominance and to develop +"paper" systems and force designs that will add crucial specificity to +this concept. Then, this Rapid Dominance force can be assessed against +five sets of questions: + + - First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be fielded with + the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe to affect and shape + the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and + improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major + regional contingency (MRC)? + - Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its + application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War + (OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it + not, and where might it offer mixed benefits? + - Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance in + both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a form + of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy? Would + this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to our + own public? + - Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances, coalitions, + and the conduct of allied and combined operations? + - Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on defense + resource investment priorities and future budgets? + +From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful results +will flow. + +We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the National +Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In particular, we +owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts of NDU whose +intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his full support, +have been invaluable and without which this project would have been +far less productive. + +Washington, D.C. + +1 September 1996 + +L.A. Edney J.T. Howe +F.M. Franks H.K. Ullman +C. A. Horner J.P. Wade + + + + +Introduction to Rapid Dominance + + + +The military posture and capability of the United States of America +are, today, dominant. Simply put, there is no external adversary in +the world that can successfully challenge the extraordinary power of +the American military in either regional conflict or in "conventional" +war as we know it once the United States makes the commitment to take +whatever action may be needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis +may be the most difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and U.S. forces +are not in place. However, it will still be years, if not decades, +before potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a +full panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the +aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and +weapons systems in our inventory. Even if an adversary could deploy +similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb training and +preparation of American service personnel would still be a daunting +task. + +Given this reality that our military dominance can and will extend for +some considerable time to come, provided we are prepared to use it, +why then is a re-examination of American defense posture and doctrine +important? The answers to this question involve (1) the changing +nature of the domestic and international environments; (2) the complex +nature of resolving inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside +conventional war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism, +crime, and the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource +constraints; (4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases +raised on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future +of austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called social, +economic, and information revolutions that could check or counter many +of the nation's assumptions as well as public support currently +underwriting defense. + +It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving non-traditional +Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law enforcement tasks are growing +and pose difficult problems and challenges to American military +forces, especially when and where the use of force may be +inappropriate or simply may not work. The expansion of the role of UN +forces to nation-building in Somalia and its subsequent failure comes +to mind as an example of this danger. It is also arguable that the +formidable nature and huge technological lead of American military +capability could induce an adversary to move to a strategy that +attempted to circumvent all this fighting power through other clever +or agile means. The Vietnam War is a grim reminder of the political +nature of conflict and how our power was once outflanked. Training, +morale, and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring +both a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing. + +Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most dominant +military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in overcoming the +inertia of this success. We may be our own worst enemy. + +During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense debate was +often fought over how to balance the so-called "strategy-force +structure-budget" formula. Today, that formula has expanded to include +"threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure." +Without a "clear and present danger" such as the Axis Powers in 1941 +or, later, the Soviet Union to coalesce public agreement on the +threat, it is difficult to construct a supporting strategy that can be +effective either in setting priorities or objectives. Hence, today's +"two war" or two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC) +strategy has been criticized as strategically and financially +excessive. As noted by administration officials, the current force +structure does not meet the demands of the "two war," MRC strategy +and, in any event, the budget will not support the planned force +structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United States +possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and facilities than it +needs to support the current force, thereby draining scarce resources +away from fighting power. As a result, there is a substantial defense +imbalance that will erode fighting power. + +In designing its defense posture, the United States has adopted the +doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming force." This doctrine +reinforces American advantages in strategic mobility, prepositioning, +technology, training, and in fielding integrated military systems to +provide and retain superiority, and responds to the minimum casualty +and collateral damage criteria set first in the Reagan Administration. +The Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon +or process by which the United States continues to exploit technology +to maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of +achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." Through this awareness, +the United States should be able to obtain perfect or near perfect +information on virtually all technical aspects of the battlefield and +therefore be able to defeat or destroy an adversary more effectively, +with fewer losses to ourselves and with a range of capabilities from +long-range precision strike to more effective close-in weapons. + +Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some of the +as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities, changes, +and trends. The deployment of American forces to Bosnia is a reaction +to and representation of major shifts occurring in the post-Cold War +world. With these shifts, this deployment is suggestive of what may +lie ahead for the use, relevance, and design of military force. The +legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and then, the start of the Cold War, +caused the West to adopt policies for containing and deterring the +broad threat posed by the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermonuclear +weapons, complemented over time by strong conventional forces, +threatened societal damage to Russia. Conventional forces backed by +tactical nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a +massive Soviet ground attack in Europe and, in part, to provide an +alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons. + +Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit serving +in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so well in +_Desert Storm_ and, for the bulk of the Cold War along with our other +units, had been designed to defend NATO against and then defeat a +numerically superior, armored and mechanized Soviet adversary +advancing across the plains of Germany. Now these troops, as well as +others from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW +for which special training, rules of engagement, command arrangements, +and other support structures have been put in place at short notice, +few of which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are also +operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media coverage, can +have huge domestic political impact especially if events go wrong. + +Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally configured +force for such an operation is not relevant for the moment even though +this unit probably was the most appropriate for this task. However, it +is prudent to examine the consequences of changing tasks presaged by +Bosnia, in which the enemy is instability rather than an ideological +or regional adversary we are trying to contain or defeat and +neutrality on our part may be vital to the success of the mission. Do +these changes mean that we should alter our traditional approach to +the doctrine for and design of forces? If so, how? Are there +alternative or more effective ways and means to conduct these +peacekeeping-related operations? And, in this evaluation, are there +alternative doctrines we should consider to fight wars more +effectively as we envisage scenarios under the construct of the MRC? + +With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian superpower, +there is no external threat to the existence or survival of the United +States as a nation and there will not be such an immediate threat for +some time to come. This means that there is a finite window of +opportunity when there is no external adversary threatening the total +existence of American society; that our forces are far superior to any +possible military adversary choosing to confront us directly; and +that, with innovative thought, we may be able to create a more +relevant, effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common +defense at the likely levels of future spending. + +At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the +fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be addressed. +The industrial and technical base of the United States is changing +profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical advantages of the +American economy were never greater and it is small business that is +creating virtually all new jobs and employment opportunities. +Commercial technology and products are turning over on ever shortening +cycles. Performance, especially in high-technology products, is +improving and costs are being driven downwards. + +Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector, +where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among +competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle time to +field new generation capabilities is lengthening and performance, +especially in computer and information systems, is often obsolete on +delivery. The defense industrial base will continue to compress and it +is not clear that the necessary level of efficiencies or increases in +effectiveness in using this base can be identified and implemented, +suggesting further pressures on a defense budget that is only likely +to be cut. + +Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the +military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot wars +such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships and +submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, technology, +strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our national preference +for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare continues to shape the +way we design and rationalize our military capability. Therefore, it +is no surprise that in dealing with the MRC, American doctrine, in +some ways, remains an extension of Cold War force planning. While the +magnitude and number of dangerous threats to the nation have been +remarkably reduced by the demise of the USSR, we continue to use +technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to identify +or produce new and more effective solutions for achieving military and +strategic/political objectives. + +While there is much talk about "military revolutions" and winning the +"information war," what is generally meant in this lexicon and +discussion is translated into defense programs that relate to +accessing and "fusing" information across command, control, +intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and precision +strike technologies. What is most exciting among these revolutions is +the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield awareness," that is, +achieving the capability to have near-perfect knowledge and +information of the battlefield while depriving the adversary of that +capacity and producing "systems of systems" for this purpose. + +The near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely remain +directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on fielding +more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons systems and +infrastructure for using those systems. The doctrine of "decisive or +overwhelming force" is the conceptual and operational underpinning for +winning the next war based largely on this force-on-force and +attrition model, and winning the information war is vital to this end. +Few have asked whether the pattern of employing more modern technology +for traditional firepower solutions is the best one and if there are +alternative ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and +efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield +awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of +fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic objectives? + +Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would advance +the military revolution to new levels and possibly new dimensions. +Rapid Dominance extends across the entire "threat, strategy, force +structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with broad implications for +how we provide for the future common defense. Organization and +management of defense and defense resources should not be excluded +from this examination although, in this paper, they are not discussed +in detail. + +The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, and +understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic +policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. Clearly, the +traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the +adversary's military capability is a fundamental and necessary +component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent, however, is to field a range +of capabilities to induce sufficient Shock and Awe to render the +adversary impotent. This means that physical and psychological effects +must be obtained. + +Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to control, on an +immediate basis, the entire region of operational interest and the +environment, broadly defined, in and around that area of interest. +Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant battlefield awareness, we +envisage Rapid Dominance producing a capability that can more +effectively and efficiently achieve the stated political or military +objectives underwriting the use of force by rendering the adversary +completely impotent. + +In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly before +an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies throughout the +spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of +battle and conflict resolution. + +"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary's +will both physically and psychologically. Physical dominance includes +the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize, and to render +impotent. Psychological dominance means the ability to destroy, +defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary to resist; or convince the +adversary to accept our terms and aims short of using force. The +target is the adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The +principal mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing +sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to convince +or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives. +Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinformation, +perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed. + +The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this overwhelming +level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or +sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on. In crude +terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of the environment and +paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding +of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical +and strategic levels. An adversary would be rendered totally impotent +and vulnerable to our actions. To the degree that non-lethal weaponry +is useful, it would be incorporated in the ability to Shock and Awe +and achieve Rapid Dominance. + +Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance seeks to +impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact +that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the +Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until +both nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was +sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average Japanese +citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of +Shock and Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the +destructive power carried by a single airplane. This incomprehension +produced a state of awe. + +We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential in +combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce systems +capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most or many +cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing the full +destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional +technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so. + +Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and Awe at the +appropriate level or levels is the next step in the evolution of a +doctrine for replacing or complementing overwhelming force. By way of +comparison, we have summarized how we view the differences between the +doctrines of Rapid Dominance and Decisive Force in terms of basic +elements that apply to the objectives, uses of force, force size, +scope, speed, casualties, and technique. We recognize that there will +be debate over the relative utility and applicability of these +doctrines and readers are encouraged to participate. + +In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid Dominance +and Decisive Force, it is important to define the terms as precisely +as possible. + +The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe must be +compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the ability to "own" +the dimension of time-moving more quickly than an opponent, operating +within his decision cycle, and resolving conflict favorably in a short +period of time. "Dominance" means the ability to control a situation +totally. + +Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the means to +anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will involve the +capability to deny an opponent things of critical value, and to convey +the unmistakable message that unconditional compliance is the only +available recourse. It will imply more than the direct application of +force. It will mean the ability to control the environment and to +master all levels of an opponent's activities to affect will, +perception, and understanding. This could include means of +communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and +other aspects of infrastructure as well as the denial of military +responses. Deception, misinformation, and disinformation are key +components in this assault on the will and understanding of the +opponent. + +Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tactical, +strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist. With +Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power with such compellance +that even the strongest of wills will be awed. Rapid Dominance will +strive to achieve a dominance that is so complete and victory is so +swift, that an adversary's losses in both manpower and material could +be relatively light, and yet the message is so unmistakable that +resistance would be seen as futile. + +"Decisive Force," on the other hand, implies delivering massive enough +force to prevail. Decisive means using force with plenty of margin for +error. Force implies a traditional "force-on-force" and attrition +approach. This concept does not exclude psychological and other +complementary damage imposition techniques to enhance the application +of force; they have been used throughout the history of warfare. But +such non-destructive means would have an ancillary role. Military +force would be applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against +the military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not always an +essential component. As in _Desert Shield/Storm_, enough time would +have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force. Such a luxury is +not always feasible. + +The differences become clearer if broken down into their essential +elements: + +Elements Rapid Dominance Decisive Force +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Objective Control the adversary's will, Prevail militarily and + perceptions, and understanding decisively against a set of + opposing capabilities defined + by the MRC + +Use of Control the adversary's will, Unquestioned ability to +Force perceptions, and understanding prevail militarily over an + and literally make an adversary opponent's forces and based + impotent to act or react against the adversary's + capabilities + +Force Size Could be smaller than Large, highly trained, and + opposition, but with decisive well-equipped. Materially + edge in technology, training, overwhelming + and technique + +Scope All encompassing Force against force (and + supporting capability) + +Speed Essential Desirable + +Casualties Could be relatively few in Potentially higher on both + number on both sides sides + +Technique Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, Systematic destruction of + destroy military capability. + applicable in some situations + +Four general categories of core characteristics and capabilities have +been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured mission capability +packages must embrace. These are identified briefly and discussed in +later chapters. + +First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize */knowledge/* of the +environment, of the adversary, and of our own forces on political, +strategic, economic, and military/operational levels. On one hand, we +want to get into the minds of the adversary far more deeply than we +have in the past. Beyond operational intelligence required for +battlefield awareness, Rapid Dominance means cultural understanding of +the adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning +and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and +strategic levels. + +Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve */rapidity/* in the sense of +timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have capabilities that can be applied +swiftly and relatively faster than an adversary's. + +Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total */control of the +environment/* from complete "signature management" of both our and the +adversary's information and intelligence to more discrete means to +deceive, disguise, and misinform. + +Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of operational +competence that can virtually institutionalize */"brilliance."/* In +some cases, this may mean changing the longstanding principle of +military centralization and empowering individual soldiers, sailors, +and airmen to be crucial components in applying and directing the +application of force. + +As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and +capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging reality +to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is transforming at the +current rate and breadth, it could be that, over the course of many +years, the defense industrial base would follow suit, or face +irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there are certain areas in +defense which will never or may never be eliminated or replaced. +Nuclear systems are a current example. + +Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may mean that +military force design and procurement will become dependent on the +private sector and commercial technology. Rapid Dominance is a first +conceptual step to deal with this possibility. + +The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the concept +of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy, technology and +innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe. Based on this, subsequent +steps will involve expanding mission capability packages concepts +consisting of operations harmonized with doctrine, organization, and +systems and then move on to field prototype systems for further test +and evaluation as advanced concept technology demonstrations. + + + + +Background and Basis + + + +In both relative and absolute terms, since the end of World War II, +the military strength and capability of the United States have never +been greater. Yet this condition of virtual military superiority has +created a paradox. Absent a massive threat or massive security +challenge, it is not clear that this military advantage can (always) +be translated into concrete political terms that advance American +interests. Nor is it clear that the current structure and foundations +for this extraordinary force can be sustained for the long term +without either spending more money or imposing major changes to this +structure that may exceed the capacity of our system to accommodate. +As a consequence, the success of the current design and configuration +of our forces may ironically become self-limiting and constraining. +That is not to claim automatically that there are better military +solutions or that the current defense program is not the best our +political system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are +well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance and +measure against the current and planned program. + +To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that one +thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine of overwhelming +or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To push the conceptual +envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: Can a Rapid Dominance +force lead, for example, to a force structure that can win an MRC such +as _Desert Shield_ and _Desert Storm _far more quickly and cheaply +with far fewer personnel than our planned force both in terms of +stopping any invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can +Rapid Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity +to deal with grey areas such as OOTW? + +Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of political +deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or "shut down" an +adversary can actually control behavior? What are the possible +political implications of this capability and what would this power +mean for conducting coalition war and for how our allies react and +respond? + +Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will, perception, +and understanding of an adversary rather than simply destroying +military capability, this focus must cause us to consider the broadest +spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and across all aspects of war +including intelligence, training, education, doctrine, industrial +capacity, and how we organize and manage defense. + +We observe at first that even with the successful ending of the Cold +War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating its national +security and defense has been relatively and understandably modest and +cautious. In essence, while the size of the force has been reduced +from Cold War levels of 2.2 million active duty troops to about 1.5 +million, and the services have been vocal in revising doctrine and +strategy to reflect the end of the Soviet threat, with the exception +of emphasis on jointness, there are few really fundamental differences +in the design and structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years +ago. + +Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States rested on +several central and widely accepted and publicly supported +propositions. The "clear and apparent danger" of the Soviet threat was +real and seen as such. The USSR was to be contained and deterred from +hostile action by a combination of political, strategic, and military +actions ranging from the forging of a ring of alliances surrounding +the USSR and its allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of +nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. + +Following the truce ending the Korean War, a large, standing military +force was maintained and defined by the operational requirements of +fighting the large formations of military forces of the USSR and its +allies with similar types of military forces, albeit outnumbered. The +role of allies, principally NATO, was assumed and taken into account +in planning, although the paradox of the issue of planning for a long +versus short war in a nuclear world remained unresolved. + +Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the Cold War +went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any war might be +ended quickly. The largely World War II defense, industrial, and +basing structure was retained along with the intent to rely on our +technological superiority to offset numerical or geographical +liabilities. + +It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense through +mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the Second World War +and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming the enemy using the +massive application of force, technology, and associated firepower. +Two decades later, Vietnam exposed the frailty of this approach of +dependence on massive application of firepower especially when +political limits were placed on applying that firepower. + +Currently, _Desert Storm_ and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 have +been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the doctrine +of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that both strategic +objectives and tactical methods were in congruence. We argue that now +is the time to re-examine these premises of reliance on overwhelming +or decisive force as currently employed and deployed in the force +structure if only as a prudent check. + +Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major threat to +generate consensus and to rally the country around defense and defense +spending, the military posture of the United States will erode as the +defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in the future on what is +currently seen to be as sufficient force to be "decisive" could easily +prove unachievable and the results problematic or worse for U.S. +policy. + +The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat is, of +course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining the future +defense posture of the nation. The United States has long resisted +maintaining a large standing military and the Cold War years could +prove an aberration to that history. Extending this historical +observation of small standing forces, it is clear that there is no +adversary on the horizon even remotely approaching the military power +of the former USSR. While we might conjure up nominal regional +contingencies against Korea or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for +establishing the building blocks for force structure, it will prove +difficult to sustain the current defense program over the long term +without a real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public +support. Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could +easily prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that +in Europe, defense spending is closing in on 1 to 2 percent of GDP. + +Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to grips with +this new world, the structural limitations and constraints in how we +develop systems and procure weapons based on current technological and +industrial capacity for producing them will be exacerbated by downward +fiscal pressure giving us little room for mistakes and flexibility. +Air, land, space, and sea forces are currently limited in the actual +numbers and types of systems that are available for purchase and more +limited in that there are virtually no new major systems on the +horizon. That could change. + +The M-1A-1 tank is in production only for foreign sales. Despite the +allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only four active +classes of warships from which to replace its capability and, for the +first time this century since aircraft entered the inventory, is +without a new aircraft in development. The Air Force can be placed in +similar straits if the F-22 program is deferred or canceled because of +rising cost and fiscal constraints. Time will tell what happens to the +Joint Strike Fighter. Assumptions about reliance on technology and R&D +providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove +ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those +programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D could become +the main source for procuring software and other systems needed to +upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called "leap-ahead" +technologies that may prove elusive to create. + +There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing new +doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing +circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and with the clear +bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and defending an +annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, less of the same) +becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While the JCS or OSD or CINCs +may have genuine need for jointly packaged forces that are rapidly +deployable irrespective of Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels, +the services cannot be expected to reverse the years of viewing the +world through service- specific arguments and doctrine. + +Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced with the +end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to assume that there +are no risks to the nation nor an absence of evil-doers wishing this +nation harm. It would also be shortsighted to expect that potential +adversaries are unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge +of their environment and simplicity to overcome our current military +and technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In +addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our +assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological superiority +should welcome thoughtful examination. + +Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start, the United +States should act to exploit the several major advantages it +possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and danger of future +threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a longer view. While we +may have deferred adding to the inventory of future systems in +development, current systems possess more than enough military +capability to get us through this transition period, even if this +period were to last for more than a decade. This does not mean we can +rest on our oars; if we take advantage of this opportunity, time is on +our side. If we squander this opportunity, then we could ultimately +find ourselves in trouble. + +Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the luxury of +the best technically educated and trained society in the world, and +the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers vast potential if we +are clever enough to exploit this extraordinary resource. + +Third, because of significant changes in law and organization +regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and +through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Department of +Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. The enhanced role +of the CINCs and the acceptance of jointness are positive +illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural and political +realities noted above, assuring productive innovation continues will +not be automatic. Against these conducive signs, vision, true joint +thinking, and tactical advances still are premium commodities to be +nourished and encouraged. + +In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful to rely +on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we have been +successful in applying containment and deterrence in the Cold War. +When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait, then the use of +force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how can we augment or +improve the use of existing military capability should it be required. + +Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a regime +of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as well as +operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are seeking the capability +to dominate, control, and isolate the entire environment in, around, +over, and under the objective area as quickly as possible, and with +fewer forces than currently envisaged, although direct insertion of +forces is an important component depending upon the tactical +situation. In many cases, this capacity need not be the traditional +firepower solution of only physically destroying an adversary's +military capabilities. Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of +affecting the adversary's will to resist as the first order of +business, quickly if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would +be to stop an attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it +be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political deterrence +that might restrain aggression in the first place. + +To accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action means +neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics; to organize +society; and to function; as well as to control, regulate and deny the +adversary of information, intelligence, and understanding of what is +and what is not happening. This means we must control all necessary +intelligence and information on our forces-the ultimate form of +stealth-and on an adversary's forces as well and then exploit total +situational awareness for rapid action. + +Regarding the emergence of current military thought and doctrine, as +implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early and far less mature +stages of a major revolution than is generally assumed. It is +understandable that despite major strategic reassessments, current +doctrine is still highly influenced by Cold War tactics and strategy +and perhaps by the iron grip of the history of conflict since the +early 19th century. + +Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has been +largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast amounts of +manpower over time and space. The United States advanced Napoleon's +use of industry and mass armies in the Civil War and our planning up +to the Cold War tended to follow this same pattern. World War II, of +course, exemplified the triumph of this industrial, mobilization, and +massive use of force approach. + +In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued that this +model combining massive industrial might and manpower finally ended in +1989. Although, by then, technological advances to conventional +military capabilities seemed to be approaching the destructive power, +or more precisely, the system lethality of nuclear weapons. In other +words, modern non-nuclear precision weapons perhaps could produce +effects against enemy targets roughly comparable to the military +lethality of theater-level nuclear weapons. If this condition proves +true, could this new lethality fundamentally change the construct for +designing American doctrine and strategy? This question is at the +heart of the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive +force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in place. + +Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the need to +prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally powerful adversary, +the United States military has conducted two post-Cold War crises +against lesser adversaries quite differently than it fought the Cold +War. In the Panama intervention in 1990 and in Kuwait shortly +thereafter, the suggestion of newer and different methods of warfare +was present. Perhaps both will turn out to be transition campaigns, +where there is much of the old, but also signs of the new. But there +are specific pieces of evidence that should command our attention. + +Underlying the planning for _Operation Just Cause_ in Panama and +_Desert Shield/Storm_ in Kuwait was the premeditated incorporation of +a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply decisive +force. The aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the enemy through +a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air, and special +operating forces strikes that took place nearly simultaneously across +a wide battle space and against many military targets. The purpose of +these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis +of both the national state and its armed forces that would lead to +prompt neutralization and capitulation. + +In both _Just Cause_ and _Desert Storm_, the United States (plus +coalition forces in _Desert Storm_) had such overwhelming military +capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a matter of +drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan based on using the +entire system of capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce +a decisive victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar +principles of intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in +_Desert Storm_ unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its allies nearly 6 +months to deploy over a half million troops before the fighting began. + +The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5 Pamphlet +reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simultaneity. Yet, +progress in these operational directions may be in danger of faltering +if only old Cold War yardsticks are used to make future force +investments and to direct studies about future force structure and +associated infrastructure. As in any transition period, innovation +must be joined by a willingness to experiment. This means the +establishment and cultivation of an experimental apparatus to test and +evaluate new concepts are matters of importance both to foster +innovation and assess its application. + +We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek to +emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force behavioral +change in adversaries to achieve strategic or political ends. Control +and then influence come from a range of threats and outcomes, +including putting at risk the targets an adversary holds dear, to +imposing a hierarchy of Shock and Awe, to affecting will, perception, +and understanding. Achieving control may now be theoretically possible +in even more compressed or shortened time periods because of the +potential superiority of enhanced U.S. military capability and further +training and education. To obtain this level of military superiority +that can affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least +achieve the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought, +debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if only +to test and validate contemporary doctrine. + +If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and Awe +beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must follow. The +end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way as to achieve +the desired objectives. From this concept follows the need to shut +down either a state or an organized enemy through the rapid and +simultaneous application (or threat of application) of land, sea, air, +space, and special operating forces against the broadest spectrum of +the adversary's power base and center or centers of gravity and +against the adversary's will and perception at tactical and strategic +levels. + +In _Desert Storm_, the objectives were first to evict Iraqi forces +from Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate government. From these +objectives, more limited strategic and political objectives followed, +some for purposes of maintaining coalition solidarity and UN-imposed +sanctions. Not occupying Baghdad was one such political limitation. +These strategic objectives led to identification of the enemy's +centers of gravity as the basis for the application of force to +destroy these centers. This planning led to the repeated, rapid, and +simultaneous use of massive force with great effect. + +One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam Hussein's +command and control. This was accomplished by simultaneous and massive +attacks. Once command and control was destroyed, Iraqi forces in the +Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) would be destroyed as quickly as +possible with overwhelming force and with minimum casualties. As +General Colin Powell simply stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddam's +army and then kill it." + +There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were +completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack. Outside +the KTO, targeting was more selective, not because the means were +unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because our military +objectives were purposely limited. Given the effectiveness of the air +campaign and the overwhelming superiority on the ground, coalition +land forces required only 4 of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to +eject Iraq's forces from Kuwait. + +Suppose a _Desert Storm_-type campaign were fought 20 years from now +based on a plan that exploited the concept of Rapid Dominance. Further +assume that Iraq has improved (and rebuilt) its military and that, in +a series of simultaneous and nearly instantaneous actions, our primary +objective was still to shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its +leadership, and isolate and destroy its military forces as we did in +1991. However, two decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably +achieve this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not +after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to +1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an +invasion in its tracks. + +Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction +of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow +of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to +achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping +nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese. +Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces would be paralyzed with the +neutralization or destruction of its capabilities. Deception, +disinformation, and misinformation would be applied massively. + +This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also demonstrate +to the adversary our endurance and staying power, that is, the +capability to dominate over as much time as is necessary less an enemy +mistakenly try to wait it out and use time between attacks to recover +sufficiently. If the enemy still resisted, then conventional forms of +attack would follow resulting in the physical occupation of territory. +Control is thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the +stun effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to +affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. There must be +staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the blows, +gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change tactics +much as occurred during the WWII bombing campaigns and the air war +over North Vietnam. + +Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide versatility +and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, and special +operating forces and in investment in technology to produce Rapid +Dominance. Different methods for commanding the battle using both +hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to control and direct our +forces are likely to be required especially given the simultaneous +application of capabilities throughout the given battle space by the +full spectrum of our forces. To use these combinations of forces will +require adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles +and functions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in +technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the Cold War +paradigm. + +To develop the proper combination of forces and future technology +investment for Rapid Dominance, extensive experimentation with this +core concept will be required. This exper-imentation must apply to all +levels of military educational institutions; it must be joint; it can +be accelerated by availability of recent advances in simulation +technology; and it must have operational trials in the field. + +To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and +application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is important. +The U.S. today is graduating through its college and universities +system approximately 200,000 American and foreign scientists and +engineers per year. This is a great national resource. This technology +infrastructure is dimensions larger in number and scope than the +aggregate of anywhere else in the world. Through appreciation and +exploitation of this potential, a U.S. position of pre-eminence in +science and technology could be assured for the foreseeable future. + +One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the information and +information management areas- which, in the U.S., are heavily +commercially oriented. Future military application may well be +analogous to the impact of the internal combustion engine and wireless +radio on land, sea, and air forces in the 1920s and 1930s. The size of +this technological lead between ourselves and the rest of the world, +especially in the base for new information products and services, +should widen further in knowledge and in application. The "Silicon +Valley" revolution is likely to continue increasing computer capacity +on an almost annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be +many fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close +in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the ability +to condense and synthesize data. + +In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability to +transfer information into and out of the hands of individual users. +The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids will enhance +and potentially quicken individual decision-making ability. +Technologies associated with bioscience and bioengineering are likely +to be of particular importance in enhancing these capabilities and are +also an area of American predominance. Material sciences, software, +and communications are all American strengths, and should remain so +well into the next century. + +A significant element supporting this explosion in applied information +and other technologies is the American free enterprise system and its +entrepreneurial character. This drive is needed to translate this +technology into military hardware. The nature of the U.S. market and +its competitive basis reinforce this element. The largest challenges +may be to shape and exploit this commercial potential and then to +ensure that its enduring advantages become fundamental in the makeup +of our military forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required +during the Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is +it a massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed, its +edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper." + +The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new American +industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be toward the control +and management of everything that is significant to the operations +bearing on the particular Area of Interest (AOI). And we mean +everything! Control of the environment is far broader than only the +objective of achieving dominant battlefield awareness. Control means +the ability to change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures" +of all of the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the +operational frameworks in applying force across the entire spectrum of +platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, ships) can be measured +(and controlled) from many minus decibels of cross section, to many +plus decibels; communications can be entirely covert, i.e., many dB +less than the ambient environment, or that approaching "white noise." +The location of both the individual and his unit can be measured in +real time in meters, if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through +virtual reality, movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of +square kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both +during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence. This +occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the adversary, including +real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of this control. + +A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and immediately +control the operational/environmental signatures both individually and +in the aggregate. As needed, line and non-line-of-sight weapons of +near pin-point accuracy would be delivered across the entire area of +operation. Stealthy UAVs and mobile robotics systems, together with +decoys, would be deployed in large numbers for surveillance, +targeting, strike, and deception and would produce their own impact of +electronic Shock and Awe on the enemy. This application of force can +be done as rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand. + +The effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights" that +enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the conditions and +events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his society. What is +radically different in Rapid Dominance is the comprehensive system +assemblage and integration of many evolving and even revolutionary +technical advances in dominant battlefield awareness squared-materials +application, sensor and signature control, computer and bioengineering +applied to massive amounts of data, enable weapon application with +simultaneity, precision, and lethality that to date have not been +applied as a total system. Deception, disinformation, and +misinformation will become major elements of this systemic approach. + +The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely come from the +commercial world as the DOD base continues to shrink. It is clear that +in certain areas, DOD must remain involved where there is no private +R&D or to fill gaps in R&D. Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and +missile defense are examples. However, advances in commercial +technology in the Information Age are unlikely to be matched by DOD. + +Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our combat +officers and key enlisted personnel. Command must be geared to +achieving the best of the best-not the best among the good. +Assimilating in real time the vast amount of information and putting +information to use will no doubt lead to major changes in the +composition, competence, and authority of (even and especially) +individual military unit commanders perhaps to the squad or private +soldier level. + +Of course, even with the most perfect information, an unqualified, +inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may not win except +with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe. And, we repeat that +there are cases where NO military force may be able to succeed if the +objectives are unobtainable. The match of the entrepreneurial +individual with the potential of the technology base is key. +Optimizing and integrating all elements into a total system is a +certain way to exploit the opportunity that we can perceive becoming +more visible in the coming years. + + + + +Shock and Awe + + + +The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, +perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing +sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, +strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to +the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been +characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog, +friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were +necessary effects arising from application of military power and were +aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and +similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military +writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an +adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a +commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial +importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending +battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock +and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant, +employment of force. + +In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will, +understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is +multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to +examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe +affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or +television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors +of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and +death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock +transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of _Desert +Storm_ vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of +battlefield Shock and Awe. + +In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe +can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force +or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the +Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military +objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock +and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid +Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control. + +The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of +different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to +identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that +differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, +historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task +will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of +Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this +methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages +consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force +structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how +best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To +repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain +by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative +force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in +conditions of both MRCs and OOTW. + +For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing +historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have +been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap +exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming +Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force +structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or +overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to +disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as +few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as +possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and +operationally, is crucial to successful application. + +There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this +approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly +capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and +18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be +used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and +supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally +been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though +command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be +disaggregated from this doctrine. + +The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a +platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of +worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this +doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will +prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and +other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the +time being, these have not replaced the current platform and +force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will +be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a +comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives. + +Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts +of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to +transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow, +especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of +decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of +maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money +provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed. +Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the +performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time +to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still +endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between +quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is +necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller +understanding. + +Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that +are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is that +Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a +broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This +breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction +among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate +military capability and must include training and education, as well +as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is +possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial +areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that +otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force. + +The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The +intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of +instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction +directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and +public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic +objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment +of this capability against society and its values, called +"counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively +destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to +resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly +incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days. + +The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in +determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can +actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an adversary +impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and +probably unachievably low levels of societal destruction; and whether +a political decision would be taken in any case to use this type of +capability given the magnitude of the consequences and the risk of +failure. + +It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of _Desert Storm_, +similar objectives were envisioned. The differences between this +example and _Desert Storm_ are through the totality of a society that +would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of +destruction and the speed of imposing those strikes as occurred to +those Japanese cities. This example of shock, awe, and intimidation +rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in very short +periods of time. + +The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of Shock and +Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive +power largely against military targets and related sectors over time. +It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the +adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which +the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion. However, it is the +cumulative effect of this application of destruction power that will +ultimately impose sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy +the physical means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to +accept whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of the +First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the +Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and related +B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of +1972-73, illustrate the application of massive bombardment. + +Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic targets, +is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming Force," even though +political constraints make this example most unlikely to be repeated +in the future. There is also the option of applying massive +destruction against purely civilian or "counter-value" targets such as +the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II when unconditionality marks +the terms of surrender. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on +the endurance and capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects +the will to resist that is the central foundation of this example. + +The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the question +of political feasibility and acceptability, and what circumstances +would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive bombardment. +Outright invasion and aggression such as Iraq's attack against Kuwait +could clearly qualify as reasons to justify using this level of Shock +and Awe. However, as with Overwhelming Force, this response is not +time-sensitive and would require massive application of force for some +duration as well as political support. + +Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock and Awe +were not achieved through the massive application of firepower across +a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of force. +Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly +focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of +scale. The German Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack +across a very broad front, although the opponent may have been +deceived into believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in +multiple locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated, +attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the +shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank's +armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum cone of damage +against the unarmored or less protected innards. + +To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is directed +against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance in +execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. The +adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics, +surrenders, or both. Hitler's campaign in France and Holland and the +seizure of the Dutch forts and the occupation of Crete in 1940 are +obvious illustrations. The use of Special Operations forces in +significant numbers is an adjunct to imposing this level of Shock and +Awe. + +_Desert Storm_ could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the +attack were mounted without the long preparatory bombardment and was +concentrated in a single sector-either the "left hook" or the Marine +attack "up the middle," and with total surprise. The major differences +between the operation in Kuwait and Germany's capture of France in +1940 were that the allies in Saudi Arabia had complete military and +technical superiority unlike the Germans and that, once under attack, +Iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition +license to pick and choose the points for penetration and then +dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future +adversaries about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that +they will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior +forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving Shock +and Awe through the precise application of force. + +It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as +guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to obtain +Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example, the German +Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the +Vietnam War, where enemy forces had relatively few lines to be +penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of warfare. + +The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths. Can +brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there a flexible enough +infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the +supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the +systems to maintain this operational and technical superiority? Rapid +Dominance requires a positive answer to these questions, at least +theoretically. + +The fifth example is named after the Chinese philosopher-warrior, Sun +Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on selective, instant decapitation +of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe. This +discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this from +Hiroshima and Massive Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before +Ho Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters +on war and proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the +rules applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged +Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The +concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head cut off the +head concubine. The ladies still could not bring themselves to take +the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had the head cut off a +second concubine. From that point on, so the story goes, the ladies +learned to march with the precision of a drill team. + +The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe and hence +compliance or capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal and +ruthless, and rapid application of force to intimidate. The +fundamental values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is +to convince the majority that resistance is futile by targeting and +harming the few. Both society and the military are the targets. In a +sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe +but through far more selective and informed targeting. Decapitation is +merely one instrument. This model can easily fall outside the cultural +heritage and values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major +refinement. Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to +communicate is another variant but without many historical examples to +show useful wartime applications. + +A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is deception. In +this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish the +enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the +adversary. The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and +knowledge of the adversary. In some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is +an early example of deception. However, as we will see, the deception +model may have new foundations in the technological innovations that +are occurring and in our ability to control the environment. + +The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the Massive +Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is questionable that a +decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in quasi- or real +assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Further, the standard to +maintain the ability to perform these missions is high and dependent +on both resources and on supporting intelligence, especially human +intelligence-not an American strong point. + +Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is distinct +from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it focuses on +depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose Shock and Awe. +The image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to +incapacitate an adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade +produces blinding light and deafening noise. The result shocks and +confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. The aim in this +example of achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so much light and +sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses, and +therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the adversary +becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable. + +A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas is a +dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high altitude nuclear +detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and electrical +equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of +likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in specific areas, of the +ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is a more reasonable +and perhaps more achievable variant. This deprival of senses, +including all electronics and substitution of false signals or data to +create this feeling of impotence, is another variant. Above all, Shock +and Awe are imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is +deprivation of the senses. + +The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part shortcomings of +other approaches. Technological solutions are crucial but may not be +conceivable outside the EMP effects of nuclear weapons. Intelligence +is clearly vital. Without precise knowledge of who and what are to be +stunned, this example will not work. + +The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian" example +(or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is based on +imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and indeed through +deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from +the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the early 1800s, native +Haitians were seeking to extricate their country from French control. +The Haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting French +military contingent and marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions +repeatedly in review. The French were deceived into believing that the +native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that +French military action was futile and that its forces would be +overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their +freedom without firing a shot. + +To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian example +and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are more crucial +in this regime. However, the target or focus is the will and +perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu category comes +closest to this one except that while Sun Tzu is selective in applying +force, it is clear that imposing actual pain and shock are essential +ingredients and deception, disin-formation, and guile are secondary. +Demonstrative uses of force are also important. The issue is how to +determine what demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the +intended target in line with the overall political aims. + +The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major dependency on +intelligence. One must be certain that the will and perceptions of the +adversary can be manipulated. The classic misfire is the adversary who +is not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the +unintended actions of the aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis' +invasion of Kuwait demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can +backfire. Saddam simply let his bluff be called. + +The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving Shock and +Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through +the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own +invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a +considerable period of time. The target set encompasses both military +and societal values. In occupying a vast empire stretching from the +Atlantic to the Red Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of +forces to secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman +forces were far superior to native forces individually and +collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the +perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would +take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat Diplomacy" of the +nineteenth century when the British fleet would return to the scene of +any crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the +wholesale destruction of offending villages. + +There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve Shock +and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the perception of that +prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most +significant factors. In other words, reprisals and the use of force to +exact a severe punishment, as well as the certainty that this sword of +Damocles would descend, were essential ingredients. The distinction +between this category and the others is the ex post facto nature of +achieving Shock and Awe. In the other categories, there is the need +for seizing the initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to +achieve Shock and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have +already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise +of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use +of force. + +The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of +reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is not and +may not always be the case with the United States, although we can +attempt to make others believe it will be. The takeover of the Embassy +in Tehran by dissident "students" in 1979 and American impotence in +the aftermath are suggestive of the shortcoming. That aside, the +example or perception of the invincibility of American military power +is not a bad one to embellish. + +The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the Decay and +Default model and is based on the imposition of societal breakdown +over a lengthy period but without the application of massive +destruction. This example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In +this example, both military and societal values are targets. Selective +and focused force is applied. It is the long-term corrosive effects of +the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately +compels an adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe +are therefore not immediate either in application or in producing the +end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and +aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do +not threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese +water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the +preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a +variant of Shock and Awe in the form of frustration collapsing the +will to resist. + +The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In many +cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock and Awe is +unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by conventional or +politically acceptable means. + +The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police," +whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you can send a +bullet." The distinction between this example and the others is that +this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu and implies that +standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place can achieve the +required objectives. There should not be too fine a point, however, in +belaboring differences with the other examples in this regard over +standoff. A stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from +a cruise missile fired at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance +on target. + +A few observations about these examples offer insights on which to +test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It is clear that +the targets in each category include military, civilian, industrial, +infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. In +certain cases, time is the crucial consideration in imposing Shock and +Awe and in most of the examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden +imposition of Shock and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects +of Shock and Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved +over time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences. +Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new +technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different is +the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force, in +understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in executing +military operations with deftness, are vital. While this recognition +is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore +on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or institutionalized +and is not a function only of gifted individuals. + +There is also a key distinction between selective or precise and +massive application of force. Technology, in the form of "zero CEP" +weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capability of systems +that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive +disruption, destruction, or damage. This damage goes beyond the loss +of power grids and other easily identifiable industrial targeting +sets. Loss of all communications can have a massively destructive +impact even though physical destruction can be relatively limited. + +In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels of +power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the attempt to keep war +"immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one point should +not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty business or, as Sherman +put it, "war is hell." While there are surely humanitarian +considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability to +Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare, +intimidate, and disarm. The Clausewitzian dictum concerning the +violent nature of war is dismissed only at our peril. + +For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the concerned +Member of Congress with responsibility for providing for the common +defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and hierarchies? +First, there are always broader sets of operational concepts and +constructs available for achieving political objectives than may be +realized. Not all of these alternatives are necessarily better or +feasible. However, the examples suggest that further intellectual and +conceptual effort is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national +security options in the future. + +Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in +generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally viewed +as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to arrive +"firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to +ensure we had ample forces on station should they be required. Rapid +Dominance would alleviate many of these constraints as we would have +the capacity to deploy effective forces far more quickly. Therefore, +in this case, we can view time as an ally. The political issue rests +in longstanding arguments to limit the President from having the +capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation +without conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is +an obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force +packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and +experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and +emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant +presidential authority can be handled responsibly. + +Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several +models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arsenal +is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise and timely. It is +also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important +attributes in war, there are no guarantees that they can be +institutionalized in any military force. + +Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates to the +Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High Powered +Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide broad ability +to incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. In using these +weapons, the nerve centers of that society would be attacked rather +than using this illustrative system to achieve hard target kill +because there were few hard targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like +systems have been and are being carefully researched. + +Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, and +misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid Dominance +would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By using complete +signature management, larger formations could be made to look like +smaller and smaller formations made to seem larger. At sea, carrier +battle groups could be disguised and smaller warships could be made to +appear as large formations. This signature management would apply +across the entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or +electronic ranges. Indeed, gaining the ability to regulate what +information and intelligence are both available and not available to +the adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception. It +is control in the fullest sense of the word. + +The next step is to match the four significant characteristics that +define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives in +order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces +and force packages accordingly, and determine those integrated systems +and innovative uses of technologies and capabilities that will provide +the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that +include both the MRC and OOTW. + + + + +Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application + + + +In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid Dominance, +it is crucial to consider the political context in which force is +likely to be employed. As we enter the next century, the probability +is low that an overriding, massive, direct threat posed by a +peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge in the near term. Without +compelling reasons, public tolerance toward American sacrifice abroad +will remain low and may even decrease. This reluctance on the part of +Americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated to perceptions of +threat to U.S. interests. Without a clear and present danger, the +definition of national interest may remain narrow. + +Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military +solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are likely to +be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be resolvable +before American political staying power is exhausted. In this period, +political micro-management and fine tuning are likely to be even more +prevalent as administrations respond to public sentiments for +minimizing casualties and, without a threat or compelling reason, U.S. +involvement. + +Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically correct" +alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to presenting the +nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive and +irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was not politically +feasible because it would have shattered the allied coalition while +exceeding the authority of the UN mandate. Military operations that +impact across a whole population or cause "innocent civilians" to +suffer (e.g., some economic sanctions, collateral damage from raids) +also are likely to be only politically acceptable in aggravated +situations. For example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or +other health problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling +impacts hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy +may be the ultimate victim. + +The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a supporting +foreign policy role with discrete missions that are only one facet of +a larger political context. This context is almost certainly going to +expand into militarily grey areas of OOTW, including those impinging +on law enforcement and ensuring political stability. Forces may be +called upon to deal with or control situations on the margin rather +than to achieve total submission or defeat of an opponent. The +prevailing political preference is likely to continue to be to try to +bound these complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial +constructs, and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst +of internal conflict. Economic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), "no +fly" zones (e.g., Southern and Northern Iraq and Bosnia), "safe +havens" (e.g., Bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all means +necessary" (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection and +evacuation (e.g., Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the kinds of +OOTW tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. Such tasks +tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They also increase +vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the bombing of the Kolbah +Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996. + +Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct threat +to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define. Therefore, +when intervention is necessary there is likely to be both a political +and practical imperative to have allied or international involvement +or at least the political cover of the UN, NATO, or appropriate NGOs. + +As more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear, chemical, +and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and +longer range delivery means, the ability for rogues to inflict pain +will increase as will the ability to ratchet up the political risks. +WMD can easily complicate our ability to influence positive and +constructive behavior of possessors. Because of the threat of +retaliation, WMD capabilities may become politically acceptable +targets provided collateral damage to civilians is minimized. +Preemption may become a more realistic option along the lines of +Israel's strikes against Syria's nuclear reactors in 1982. It is, +however, a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully +struck a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with +precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians have +been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or +nuclear materials. + +There must also be an appropriate political context that justifies the +use of preemptive force, as opposed to less destructive or non-lethal +types of sanctions (e.g., responses to terrorism in the case of Libya, +invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, exports of WMD to a threatening country +such as Iran, the North Korean threat to South Korea and Japan). + +The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability to deter +and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to its vital +interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an unsettled, less +structured, and volatile world, the ability to use force with +precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when needed, rapidity, will +still be a powerful influence on cooperation, stability, and, where +relevant, submission. + +Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if +achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this +turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the +breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability, without +potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely predicted +invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with that tangled +and messy situation might have been much different. Thousands of lives +might have been spared. In other grey or marginal situations Rapid +Dominance could make the difference between a politically acceptable +response or inadequate action with consequences similar to what +happened in Bosnia. + +In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might be used, it +is first important to know what it is that we want to achieve with +military force. We need to consider whether the application of force +will allow us to influence and control an adversary's will or merely +exacerbate a bad situation. Therefore, it is essential to know what is +of value to that adversary. An objective, realistic, and in-depth +situational grasp will be essential to such an understanding. For +example, disarming or destroying may produce unintended consequences. +For a conventional foe that values its military and depends on +technology, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and +persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the +opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against military +formations may be considerably less and must be carefully assessed. + +As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S. security, the +cost in casualties needs to be low. To be effective, we must take away +an opponent's ability to make it cost us in terms of casualty levels +we consider intolerable. In applying Rapid Dominance we also must be +defending something which is of value to us. The lower the value in +terms of our national interests, the lower the price we are likely to +be willing to pay. + +In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat, destroy, +or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in OOTW, other +non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals made more +limited. For example, it may be necessary to intimidate or capture the +leadership in order to restore order or reverse an action, or it may +simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and counter opposition to +conduct of a more limited mission (e.g., feeding the starving or +protecting innocent people from genocide). + +In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk will be +minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional use of force +with minimal collateral damage. This means that there must be a belief +that a mission can be accomplished and is worth the resources +necessary to do so. Before initiating action in these often confusing +situations, objectives must be clearly established and, once engaged, +there should be a willingness to persevere through the inevitable +rough patches. + +Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know what we want +to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task for political +leadership which is informed with military advice concerning what is +feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain. The extent of the +mission must be clearly defined. Is it to defeat an enemy so it will +no longer pose a threat? Do we only need to stop an adversary from +carrying out a particular act? Must we control a situation entirely or +only sufficiently to be able to carry out a specific mission? Can we +really affect the adversary's will? + +Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be relevant in +the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of outcomes-from reversing +military action (e.g., the invasion of Kuwait); to establishing a +government more acceptable to the U.S. and the world, probably using +military coercion (Haiti, Panama); to eliminating a threat to the U.S. +or its allies. We may want to persuade an adversary to cease an +aggression or act of interference or otherwise change behavior we +cannot accept or tolerate. Political expectations in MRCs are for the +effective use of force and for rapid success or at least steady +progress. Casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with +the threshold of American pain dependent on the directness of the +threat to U.S. interests and with the degree of compellance +appropriate to the political rationale. + +OOTW present a different set of challenges. These challenges are +likely to require discrete dominance of specific circumstances rather +than total dominance. The general tasks may include a wide variety of +requirements. For example, it may be necessary to try to prevent or +stop genocide (e.g., Rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The +task may be to cooperate with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g., +prevention of starvation in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of employing +force may be free and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia). The +requirement could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an +above-ground or underground chemical weapons plant or documented +nuclear weapons facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states). + +Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights (e.g., +protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in the Gulf +during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge might be to +accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to deal with +Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubtedly will face the +future requirement to reverse a potential threat to Americans or to a +region of importance with a limited military action (e.g., in Grenada +in 1983 or the Mayaguez rescue in Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to +bolster preventive diplomacy and/or overt measures to demonstrate +preparedness to assist (e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad +under threat of invasion from Libya and recent Navy operations in the +Taiwan Strait) will still be relevant. + +Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda (hostage +rescue-e.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijacking-e.g., _Achille Lauro_; deterrent +to further moves-e.g., the Higgins operation, Libyan raids, missile +attack on Iraq after the threat to former President Bush). We may also +need to interdict weapons, terrorists, or other discrete cargoes +moving between nations (e.g., North Korean missile shipments to Iran, +Iranian and Libyan arms exchanges). + +Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable political +alternative or a necessary political prelude to an offensive military +step (e.g., implemented as the first step in actions to counter +Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an alternative to war with +Iraq; used ineffectively against the Serbs to try to convince them not +to continue to support Bosnian Serb aggression; and tried with Haiti +as an unsuccessful alternative to occupation). Our past experience has +been that we seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these +economic measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is +required to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in +controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations. Sanctions +almost always require full international cooperation which cannot be +assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course, some portions of the arms +embargo were deliberately allowed to be permeable and the U.S. turned +a blind eye to Iran's support of the Bosnians. + +Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about the +potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabilities enhancing +these outcomes could make a decisive difference in dealing with future +challenges. History also cautions us as well that there will be +restraints in employing Rapid Dominance and that there are fundamental +differences in MRC and OOTW applications. + +Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effective in the +past. They will be effective in the future, even when applied in +limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing impact +envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many examples of how a very +limited application of force made a significant difference through the +mechanisms of Shock and Awe. Experiences, including successes and +failures, illustrate some of the potential of Rapid Dominance if +implemented effectively. + +The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes, which +made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during the +Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging negotiations with the North +Vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an acceptable +conclusion. Daily reports following the controversial B-52 "carpet" +bombing raids in Cambodia talked of North Vietnamese/Vietcong soldiers +wandering around in a daze due to shock and concussion. Both B-52s and +naval gunfire, especially from 16 inch guns of a battleship, had a +similar impact on invading North Vietnamese troop concentrations. The +mining of Haiphong Harbor, although initiated late in the war, was +equally effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of North +Vietnam. + +When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing problems of +our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as take away substantial +political leverage from the North Vietnamese, he directed the raid to +rescue prisoners jailed just outside Hanoi. The raid itself was well +executed. American forces reached and searched the prison and returned +safely. But no Americans were freed because a last minute transfer of +the POWs from the prison had not been detected. If there had been +prisoners still there to be rescued, the operation would have been a +highly dramatic and influential event. The point is that accurate and +timely intelligence remains crucial. + +There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and naval air +strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the discotheque terrorist +attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The perception that he +personally might be targeted appeared to get Gadhafi's attention. + +When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian soldiers +from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed around the island +to confront them. At the sight of tank guns, the seemingly stubborn +occupants surrendered almost immediately without a fight. + +The cease fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow after +the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket bombardments of +Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given that both sides were +exhausted at that point, a show of force could have been convincing. +Strong U.S. action in response to Iran's mining of neutral waters may +also have had a sobering effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iran's +vulnerable oil-producing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed +with impunity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out +to challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraq's reign of terror, and +the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped end the war. + +In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned immediate +respect from potential troublemakers with their ability to see wide +areas night or day, remain on station for hours as night patrols, and +strike with precision and relative impunity. The methodical drone of +AC-130s circling in the air was enough to restore some order, although +a few civilians found the noise unsettling. In another situation, the +aftermath of systematic UN efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed +Aideed's illegal arms facilities generated an unexpected reaction from +other warlords, including those colluding with him, which was to +volunteer to hand over their own weapons storage areas. For a fleeting +moment, Shock and Awe created an important opportunity. + +During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would appear that +when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of air power, rather than +occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed finally to understand that an +appearance of cooperation rather than defiance was in their interest. +This NATO message in the form of air power, of course, was +strengthened by the effectiveness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim +counter-offensive and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters. Sustaining +the shock effect with forces on the ground was a necessary combination +to gain the staying power effect to change the will of the Serbs. It +was not accomplished by air alone. Timing remains important. + +Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance might have +made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations. Rapid +Dominance might have provided a better response to those setbacks or +might have offered a more effective alternative that would have +avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the first place +(e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy rescue in 1980, Lebanon Marine +barracks bombing in 1983, response to the Pueblo seizure by North +Korea in 1968, and the reaction to the downed helicopters during the +Ranger raid in Somalia). + +We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated effective +application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance. Israel's rout +of Syria's air force and missile defenses in Lebanon's Baaka Valley +shows how dramatic success can have political spillover. On the other +hand, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse +effects of Shock and Awe and had the unintended consequence of +galvanizing the U.S. into action. + +Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a more +technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these examples +and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain improvements +in capabilities would provide us with greater flexibility in the +future. This is especially true in OOTW situations, which require a +multiplicity of effective instruments at our disposal. It is also true +that certain operations such as peacekeeping tend to be manpower +intensive. + +If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value to +that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelligence is +essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels unprecedented in +scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real time. The Gulf +War, despite its success, showed classic limitations in intelligence. +Even though we had nearly every intelligence asset designed to deal +with the USSR available for use, we were unable to detect the full +extent of Iraq's WMD capability; unable to find mobile missile +launchers even with a major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some +cases, we could only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing +forces; and we mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate +but had civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human +intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, in +order to understand what is happening in deep underground facilities). + +Another important capability we should try to achieve in the future is +the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or significantly +influence the perceptions and understanding of individual +troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent +years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in +Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a perception is particularly relevant +when the problem appears not to be caused by a unified population but +by the ambitions of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed +off any likely internal opposition. Such a capability requires +effective real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for +accomplishing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to +effective "snatch" operations). + +In a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political imperative, +we will continue to need the ability to shut down all commerce into +and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, and roads. We ought +to be able to do this in a much more thorough, decisive, and shocking +way than we have in the past. The ability to apply pressure or cause +acquiescence employing non-lethal means also will be important in some +circumstances. Weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do +not kill in significant numbers may be the only ones that are +politically acceptable in the future. This also means that crowd +control with minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances, +the costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically +expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the U.S. and +internationally. + +As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down key +electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or within a +specific sub-group or faction). We also need the ability to control +radio and television within a country. It is important, however, in +all cases, to be able to deny an adversary's ability to communicate +and to have our own means of reaching the population with appropriate +messages. + +In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities +selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert stockpiles, +fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to have the capability +selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or destroy other things +considered of great value to opponents. Increased targeting precision +will compound effectiveness as well as help to avoid the political +pitfalls of using force such as the inevitable, unintended collateral +damage that has been the pattern of the past. + +More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, however, +will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on utilizing +Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are substantial differences in +the political constraints likely to be imposed in dealing with MRCs +and with OOTW. For example, there is much greater latitude to use +dominant force and Shock and Awe in MRCs than in OOTW. + +In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional powers +which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly dependent on +technology. Although more powerful, these developed states are also +likely to be especially vulnerable to a technologically sophisticated +approach such as Rapid Dominance as long as we maintain this military +edge and the ability to neutralize their military systems. Even in the +most compelling circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used, +however, support from other nations will be politically desirable. + +In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of value to +an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the numbers and +types of weapons that can be employed. For example, the political +circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be employed are quite +limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain actions are politically as +well as morally unacceptable except in extreme cases. Such +restrictions are likely to apply to targets affecting control of +access to food, water, and clean air, and to destruction of religious +and cultural centers, even if there is low collateral damage. + +In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism of using +excessive force, especially if there is civilian or collateral damage. +The concept of proportionality is likely to remain an operative +principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to extremes, especially if +the marginal nature of a situation leads to a marginal and ineffective +response. Some people, both military and civilian, even argue that +superior technology should not be employed in such situations and that +an adversary should be fought on his own terms. While such arguments +should be rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political +influence that must be considered. We should always use technology to +minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce collateral +damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same time, there +needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant destruction or denial. +Our actions must always be consistent with our own system of values. + +The "rapid" component of Rapid Dominance is one of the most appealing +aspects of the concept, both politically and militarily. The ability +to take action that is timely and decisive multiplies substantially +the chances of ultimate success. Action needs to be taken precisely +when it will have greatest impact. Often initial public outrage and +political support for action in response to a provocation subsides if +a prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take action. + +The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate +information and act on it effectively, is also an important advantage. +In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few years ago, it +was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing faster than the +defensive chain of command could make counter moves. The tradition of +sending decisions up the line was simply too slow to cope with the +dynamic challenge posed by the adversary. Commanders on scene lacked +the authority to respond and adjust to rapidly changing situations. +The exercise graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need +to institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It also +demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions in +real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing the +overall effort. + +The Navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the 1980s in order +to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and the need to +integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive missile, air, sea, +and undersea capabilities of a battle group and its joint components +(e.g., AWACs). This concept was one way of solving the time problem +while keeping the overall commander in the picture. The commander +could then intervene and modify actions as necessary to conform to the +broader strategy. This type of control was helped by the evolution of +electronic links and secure communications and the availability of +satellites. + +Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to orchestrate it using +similar principles, while applying greater selective ability to turn +on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and devices influencing the +whole operational picture. Technology should also give commanders a +much better grasp of what is evolving during a battle. Just as the +American military of today has made "owning the night" part of its +tactical advantage, "owning" the dimension of time will be critical to +the success of Rapid Dominance. + +In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future force +configuration and the design of a mission capability package (MCP) +based on Rapid Dominance. + + +Operational Construct + +Rapid Dominance is based on affecting the adversary's will, +perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to +overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our aims. Four +characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and +control of the environment. + +Application of all or of selective capabilities within the Rapid +Dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct the +application of military/defense resources and produce the requisite +outcome. Rapid Dominance envisages the execution of specific actions +in real or near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed +detrimental to U.S. interests. On the high end of conflict, Rapid +Dominance would introduce a reaction of Shock and Awe in areas of +highest value to the threatening individual, group, or state. In many +cases, prior understanding of the power of Rapid Dominance would act +as a deterrent to the objectionable action. When used, Rapid Dominance +would ensure favorable early resolution of issues with minimal loss of +lives and collateral damage. The concept theoretically should be able +to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board to high, +mid, low, no, or minimal technology threats. + +Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting +capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated, +interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence, +surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, data analysis, +and real-time deliverable actionable information to the shooter. This +network must provide total situational awareness and supporting nodal +analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's +decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe +among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this +knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific functions or +all essential functions near simultaneously. This will often times be +netted pieces of data where the sum of the parts gives the answer and +the battlefield advantage to the force possessing this rapidly netted +information. + +The "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real-time +actionable targeting information to the appropriate shooter, whether +the shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery +battery, an individual rifle man, a naval battle group, an individual +ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. This means the +need to have the right shooter in the right place; locating and +identifying the target correctly and quickly; allocating and assigning +targets rapidly; getting the "shoot" order or general authority to the +shooter; and then assessing the battle damage accurately. + +At whatever the unit level, Shock and Awe are provided by the speed +and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do this +simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic Shock +and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and populous. This +simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets of imposing Shock and +Awe. When the video results of these attacks are broadcast in real +time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact on coalition support and +negative impact on potential threat support can be decisive. + +The first priority of a doctrine of Rapid Dominance should be to +deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions that are +either unacceptable to U.S. national security interests or endanger +the democratic community of states and access to free markets. These +political objectives are generally those envisioned in the major and +lower regional conflict scenarios (MRC & LRC). Should deterrence fail, +the application of Rapid Dominance in these circumstances should +create sufficient Shock and Awe to the immediate threat forces and +leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential +threat partners. The doctrine of Rapid Dominance would not be limited +to MRC and LRC scenarios. It has applications in a variety of areas +such as countering WMD, terrorism, and perhaps other tasks. The +challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response +based on Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat, yet +decisive enough to convey the right degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid +Dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. We +repeat our disclaimer that this is not a silver bullet. However, Rapid +Dominance and its capacity for achieving Shock and Awe could be +applied for egregious threats or violations of international law, such +as: + + - Direct military threats to the territory of the U.S., its friends, + and allies; + - Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state; + - Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD; + - Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; and + - Threat to essential world markets. + +Clearly, the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and +penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and +benefits in all societies are becoming known to the masses as well as +the power brokers. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop +sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and +create road blocks as well as control inputs/outputs to the highway +both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept. + +These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting +international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer +interagency cooperations and coordination between military and law +enforcement activities and capabilities must be established. +Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed +considerable cultural differences between these organizations. +Overcoming these cultural differences among organizations is not easy. +The required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive information +and support between these agencies and the military needs to be +developed further. Interagency coordination and cooperation must be +raised to a new level of sophistication. Some laws may need to be +changed. War in Cyberspace does not recognize domestic or foreign +boundaries. In this environment the subjects of Information Warfare +and Information In Warfare take on new meaning and require focused +development. We must become proficient within this environment. + +Operational Assumptions + + - The enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict (i.e., + we are surprised). + - We then attain control of the initiative through superior speed, + knowledge, and capacity to act and react. + - Our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements must + convince the enemy there is no hope. + - Combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times, places, and + tempo of choosing. + - Allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from political + objectives through combat to include psychological warfare. + - The enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest importance to him + and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness of our attack. + +From these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow that help +to define a Rapid Dominance Force with more specificity in improving: + + - Intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressor's actions + - The length of time required for a decision to react + - Decisive responses at various levels and times after the crises or + conflict begins to develop: + - Respond in 1 to 3 days with air and missile strikes and special + forces + - Respond in 5 to 10 days with more massive power up to and + including a joint task force of corps size + - Respond in 10 to 30 days with a second corps + + +The Rapid Dominance MCP + +As a next step, we need to sketch out what a Rapid Dominance Force +might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and space joint +task force supported by necessary intelligence assets that can impose +sufficient Shock and Awe to break the will of the adversary. First, +this force will emphasize capabilities to maximize the core +characteristics of knowledge of self, adversary, and environment; +rapidity; brilliance in execution; and control of the environment. + +Knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness. It means +understanding the adversary's mind and anticipating his reactions. It +means targeting those things that will produce the intended Shock and +Awe. And, it means having feedback and good, timely battle assessment +to enable knowledge to be used dynamically as well as to know how our +forces will react. + +Rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and always on +a timely basis. Rapidity can be instant or as required. + +Brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards of +operational competence and, through a superiority of knowledge, +maintaining the ability to impose Shock and Awe through continuously +surprising and psychologically and physically breaking the adversary's +will to resist. This will require training and exercising of joint +land, sea, air, space, and special forces to new standards of +excellence and competence. It is mainly in training where the +difference lies in achieving operational brilliance. This desired +standard of performance can be achieved by making innovations to +permit new levels of battlefield fidelity for training units and +developing leaders. + +Control of the environment would include complete signature control on +the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. We would control our +signatures as well as what we wanted the adversary to see or hear and +what we do not want the enemy to know. Destruction of the adversary's +systems would begin with long-range stealthy, or "stand-off" Zero CEP +weapons, extend to FOG-M type battlefield weapons to close-in systems. +Small units would be able to call in "fires" for 360 degrees on a +nearly instant basis. + +Attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception, +disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. "Pulse" weapons +would be used to disarm and actively deceive the enemy through +disrupting and attacking all aspects of the adversary's electronics, +information, and C4I infrastructure. It is this "lay down" of total +power across all areas in rapid and simultaneous actions that would +impose the Shock and Awe. + +The remainder, roughly a third of this Joint Task Force, would consist +of traditional platforms including conventional ground, air, and +amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the necessary +supporting logistical, C4I, medical and other capabilities and ground +forces to conduct and sustain conventional or traditional operations +if needed and to support or defend traditionally vulnerable targets +such as ports, roads, and other infrastructure. + +Tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions of the +MRC. In general, the most rapidly deployable units of this corps, the +future equivalent of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps, would be sent to +secure or reinforce a limited area into which the remainder of the +force would flow. This AOR would be self-protected. Our goal is that +perhaps a Rapid Dominance force of as few as 2,000 troops could +successfully defend against an enemy of 10-20,000 in an MRC and that a +full corps can be deployed within 5 to 10 days. + +These units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin disarming, +destroying, and disabling the enemy's military wherewithal using +"stand-off" capabilities. Forward-based or long-range reconnaissance +units could be employed/supported by UAVs and overhead surveillance. + +Units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time phased +plan. These units would be used either to complete the attack or to +carry it to the adversary, occupy selective territory physically, or +carry out the requirements of the post-war occupation campaign. Should +traditional forces be needed, they would of course be available. + +Protection and self-defense would partly be provided by controlling +the environment. In effect, we would cast a cloak around the adversary +and permit the adversary to see and know what we alone provided. This +would leave an adversary blind, deaf, and dumb. With superior and +rapid firepower, the blinded, deafened enemy would be destroyed and +defeated as we saw fit. This would maximize Shock and Awe and help +break the adversary's will. + +In OOTW, the Rapid Dominance JTF might function as follows. First, the +ability to deploy dominant force rapidly to attack or threaten to +attack appropriate targets could be brought to bear without involving +manpower-intense or manned sensors and weapons. Second, once deployed, +since self-defense is likely to be required against small arms, mines, +and shoulder carried or mortar weapons, certainly some form of "armor" +or protective vehicles and shelters would be necessary. However, +through the UAVs, C4I, and virtual reality systems, as well as through +signature management and other Shock and Awe weapons including High +Powered Microwave (HPM) and "stun-like" systems, this force would have +more than dominant battlefield awareness. + +There are, of course, caveats. Unless strategic or policy objectives +are in line with operational capabilities, military force is unlikely +to be a useful instrument. It is also unlikely that any operational +construct, no matter how brilliantly conceived, could overcome such a +disconnect. Vietnam and Somalia remind us of these limitations. + +The assimilation of intelligence-strategically, culturally, and +operationally-is a central thrust and component of the knowledge +aspect of Rapid Dominance. Our forces must not only fight smarter; +these forces, at all or most levels, must be educated and trained +differently with far more emphasis on intelligence, broadly defined. +This knowledge, when applied rapidly under conditions of brilliance +and in a controlled environment, is a centerpiece of Rapid Dominance. + +There must be full comprehension of the adversary across strategic, +political, military, cultural, intellectual, and perceptual lines. +This understanding must go beyond how an adversary might use military +force. Those crucial values that motivate and underlie a nation or a +group must be understood if the appropriate level of Shock and Awe is +to be achieved. + +There are also obvious questions that must be answered. Does Rapid +Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the conflict +spectrum involving more traditional applications of force to achieve +political objectives, as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet +to be explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance +with Shock and Awe applies to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. +interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the +political and military prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are +they applicable and realistically achievable in the increasingly +complex interaction of national non-government organizations +(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care +to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of +Rapid Dominance with a degree of Shock and Awe offend and generate +counterproductive public relations backlash from those who believe +force should only be used as a last resort and then with a measurable +degree of proportionality? + +At this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have them +answered at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and issues +as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up front and +answered in the Rapid Dominance concept development process. We must +be careful that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the +reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept. +Rapid Dominance must still confront the fog of war. Decisions will +still be made based on judgment and confidence in the intelligence +provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center +of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to +inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the key will be the ability to +penetrate this fog with increased clarity and to control events now +unmanageable through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and distributing +actionable information. Complicating the issue is the fact that the +U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the +world's only credible superpower, the U.S. cannot avoid a leadership +role but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all +leaders. This is the classical "damned if you do and damned if you +don't" syndrome. + +At this stage, the concept of Rapid Dominance is a work in progress. +It needs to be "operationalized." By designing a nominal MCP and +fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, we can explore the +answers to many of the questions we raised above. Three steps are +needed to proceed down the road on the way to a real capability. +First, feasibility of the requisite technical capabilities needs to be +established. Second, wargaming of the MCP must be done. Third, and +perhaps most difficult, deriving the means for implementing the most +promising aspects of Rapid Dominance must occur. + + + + +An Outline for System Innovation and Technological Integration + + + +Achieving Shock and Awe is central to Rapid Dominance, and therefore +must serve as the key organizing principle for any rigorous +examination and exploitation of system concepts and technologies for +Rapid Dominance. Understanding the interplay between technology and +doctrine is not only or simply a straightforward matter of +establishing operational requirements and then seeking to attain them +through invention and design. It is a complex and interactive process +of experimentation and discovery wherein intellect, hard work, +endurance, and innovation must drive the use of technology. Rather +than make changes, however significant, to modifying current +capabilities or building newer, similar ones, Rapid Dominance seeks to +identify and field systems specifically designed to achieve Shock and +Awe-systems that may break the mold much as the Model T Ford once did +years ago. + +The genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, computer-aided +design tools used by engineers, vast database management systems in +place in corporate offices, computer-controlled machines enabling +composite materials, and the countless academic, business, and +personal computers are all evidence of the prominent and ever +increasing role information technologies have assumed in modern +economies. Many of the technologies underlying the Information Age are +being spearheaded by U.S. small business and its entrepreneurial +culture. Certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in Japan +to software development businesses in India, the rest of the world +participates and competes. But few can deny that U.S. industry +provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of +information technologies as they are most broadly defined. This +leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the United States +with an ever increasing military advantage over competing nations. + +Leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporating it into +U.S. forces; it is likely to include a significant redesign of both +forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly evolving technologies. +Many of the technologies that will support Rapid Dominance are already +discernible. Unlike the impact of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that +a single technology or system will emerge to produce Rapid Dominance. +It will only be attainable through the broadest integration of +strategic concepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological +advances, system design, and appropriate organization of command, +control, training and education. And only a large, immensely capable +country such as the U.S. may be able to achieve this. + +Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of strategy, +technology, and innovation. Four core characteristics were defined +earlier as crucial: + + - Complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the environment; + - Rapidity; + - Brilliance of execution; and + - Control of the environment. + +What follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how technology +can be used in a broad system approach. Many of these technologies +currently are being addressed within the defense community. Analysts, +military strategists, acquisition planners, and even "futurists" are +wrestling with the meaning and consequences of the Information Age. +Our focus on systems and technologies begins with these four +characteristics. + + +Knowledge of Self, Adversary, and Environment + +In the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate where +the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. Even 5 years ago, +who would have foreseen the significant involvement of the U.S. +military in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and the South +China Sea? To which hot spots can we expect to see U.S. troops +deployed over the next 5 years? Over the next 20? In this section we +argue that, in addition to improving our force capabilities, the U.S. +must develop an intelligence repository far more extensive than during +the Cold War, covering virtually all the important regions and +organizational structures throughout the world. + +During the Cold War, intelligence agencies focused more on a bipolar +world and built sizable organizations to collect information on "the +other side." This same intelligence structure, in the main, is in +place today facing a multipolar world, where any number of power +structures-whether they be states, international organizations, or +even small groups of individuals-must be monitored with an +understanding that extends to their leadership, culture, economic +direction, and military capability. + +As the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his +environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift from +technology developments that once resided within our government to +those driven by commercial demands. For example, the information +technologies used by U.S. intelligence agencies are of such +complexity, importance, and expense that they are referred to as +"national assets" and are developed and managed by large, dedicated +organizations. Even here, commercial companies are rapidly encroaching +on what once seemed to be an unassailable market position in Earth +observation systems. One may already purchase synthetic aperture radar +interferometry images from any number of sources, and panchromatic +visual images with one meter resolution will soon be available over +the counter for remarkably little cost. Indeed, the only real barrier +to this burgeoning market is the understandable concerns that +governments have with allowing such technology to be widely available. +In areas such as encryption and data security, commercial developers +are more likely to reach limits of government acceptance before those +of technological capability. + +With untold billions invested in communications systems, even the most +modern U.S. military communication systems often compare poorly with +commercial systems. While this has long been the case for fielded +systems, it is becoming true for even the most sophisticated research +and development programs being undertaken by defense organizations. + +As a case in point, one may consider a program recently initiated by +the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) called +Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD). At the heart of +this program, large amounts of data are collected within a vast +database residing on commercial computers and enterprise management +systems. This information is then disseminated to the troops through +the commercial Global Broadcast System (GBS) onto "set-top" boxes, an +enabling technology that was developed commercially. Even with this +leveraging of private industry, there is a real question as to whether +DARPA will be able to field a system that would compete well with +surprisingly similar commercial systems. Internet channels planned by +media industry giants such as BSkyB will offer multi-megabit, +interactive, digital data connections to the Net merely as an +enticement for subscribers to enroll for their full digital +broadcasting service (200 to 300 channels of digital video and sound). +Understanding that there is much more to BADD than the little +discussed here, one still almost wonders whether DARPA could simply +buy a subscription and connect it to an appropriate, commercial, +network management system. More to the point, if even well funded and +aggressive technology development organizations such as DARPA find it +difficult to remain ahead of commercial advancements, there may be a +fundamental lesson to be learned regarding the management of +defense-related technologies. + + +Knowledge and Intelligence + +"Intelligence" is comprised of five categories of knowledge and +understanding: a society's leadership; culture and values; the +strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; military +capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive battlefield +information. Examples of technologies and system approaches of +potential relevance in these areas are discussed below. + +Understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and involved +neutral countries implies an infrastructure for acquiring an in-depth +knowledge about cultures, leadership values, and other driving factors +that allow us, when needed and on a timely basis, to get "into their +minds." Applicable technologies include automated language +translators, interactive and autonomous computer simulations, advanced +database systems for organizing and understanding data and +transactions of individuals and institutions, and computerized +educational systems for training and learning these skills. + +Collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is crucial +to Rapid Dominance. Logistics, demographics, and infrastructure are +broad areas of collection along with geography, road/rail/ship lanes, +utility sites and corridors, manufacturing, government sites, military +and paramilitary facilities, population demographics, economic and +financial pressure points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major +dams and bridges. Technologies used to provide environmental awareness +include traditional means such as satellites that can be augmented +with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing observation +routines. The vast quantities of data that reside on the world's +computer networks, if properly exploited, provide another rich source +of information. Data mining tools, such as Web crawlers, gatherers, +brokers, and repositories that pull and organize data from public +networks, will be essential to building a more complete picture of +potential adversaries. Since not all databases and host computers are +cooperative with these methods, offensive information warfare tools +will be required to obtain specific pieces of information that are +vital for national security purposes. + +Once data are collected, they must be processed and disseminated and +then stored for future access. Enterprise data storage and retrieval +systems that are capable of working with many terrabytes (1,000 +gigabytes) of information are already commonplace. Since it is +impossible for humans to comprehend such vast quantities of +information without some assistance, data exploitation tools (filters, +fusion, automatic target recognition, image understanding, etc.) will +be crucial technologies. Finally, the information, once processed, +will be of little use if not disseminated to the right people in a +timely fashion. "Intelligent data" dissemination and wide bandwidth +communications are examples of essential technologies emerging in this +area. + +In addition to knowledge about regions and locations where U.S. force +may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance and up-to-date +knowledge on specific "hot spots" and to have sufficient flexibility +within the system to shift attention rapidly to new areas. Systems +addressing this more time-sensitive set of tasks would include light, +quickly deployable satellites, high altitude and endurance unmanned +aerial vehicles, manned platforms, and unattended ground sensors. + +As a crisis unfolds and the insertion of U.S. troops or other military +action becomes more probable, information needs and the number of +information consumers both increase dramatically. Information that +must be collected and correlated include targeting, battle damage +assessment (BDA), weather, terrain, infrastructure, tracking of +special targets, logistics, position and status of our own troops, +identification friend or foe (IFF), and status of material. It is +vitally important that sufficient sensor systems work in all weather +conditions and at night to maintain the "operations tempo" required by +Rapid Dominance. + +Battlefield awareness requires three information technologies: +collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable +information to a shooter. Rapid Dominance requires an unprecedented +level of real-time information collection that will be provided by +sensor systems such as space platforms, UAVs, unattended ground +sensors, and advanced manned reconnaissance platforms. In addition, +the entire infosphere of the adversary will be monitored not only for +classic information such as operational commands but also to determine +the shock effect being created by Rapid Dominance operations. +Collecting data from cooperative sources such as one's own troops, +allies, and friendly non-combatants is also critical. While _Operation +Desert Storm_ showed the value of self-location sensors such as GPS, +the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there is still work to +be done in terms of giving each commander and soldier sufficient +information to operate effectively. Much of this information, such as +the physiological status of individual combatants, is not currently +collected, and much of what is sensed is not properly disseminated. + +It would be hard to overstate the importance of information +dissemination within Rapid Dominance. Administering Shock and Awe +requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is unable to fathom, +but our own forces must operate effectively, even aggressively, within +an environment that could easily lead to serious information +bottlenecks and overload. Commercial technologies will be key to the +U.S. developing a structure to effectively disseminate information. +Already, commercial communications technologies such as global +broadcast satellites and protocols like those underlying the Internet +have been used as stop gaps by the U.S. military in major deployments. + +Merely transmitting the right information at the right time will not +be sufficient for operations enabling Rapid Dominance. Information +will need to be fused to create knowledge-based displays. The +technologies that will be important in this area go beyond the data +fusion algorithms currently in place and should leverage heavily off +of technologies in fields such as computer image generation, virtual +reality, and advanced simulation. + + +Rapidity + +In a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of operational +planning, determining appropriate action, deployment, and employment +all focused toward minimizing response time. Three factors combine to +make military planning far more difficult today than in the Cold War +era. First, there is great uncertainty early on in the location of a +conflict, who the adversary may be, and with whom one may be allied. +Second, there is normally very little time available for planning, +with the military sometimes having only weeks or days before +committing troops to an unanticipated mission. Third, vastly more +information is available to the planner, which is both a blessing and +a curse. Several technologies that partially define Intelligent +Dynamic Planning will make it easier for the commander to plan Rapid +Dominance: + + - Model based planning + - Machine intelligence + - Dynamic planning based upon feedback and new information + - Selectively automated decision aides (commanders associate) + - Imbedded rehearsal and training + - Brilliance in Execution + +It is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. However, the standard +can be set. The Dynamic Planning noted above is part of the capability +for this characteristic as are the systems and technologies discussed +below. + + + Technologies Critical to Achieving Brilliance in Rapid Dominance + +For shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage, key +targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed, and the enemy must +be made to feel completely helpless and unable to consider a +meaningful response. Furthermore, the enemy's confusion must be +complete, adding to a general impression of impotence. Most +importantly, strategic targets, military forces, leadership and key +societal resources must be located, tracked, and targeted. This will +require substantial sensor, computational, and communication +technologies. Designated targets must be destroyed rapidly and with +assurance. Finally, the status and position of friendly forces must be +known at all times, and the logistics supporting them must be +sufficiently flexible to allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration, +and decentralization of location. + +Several technologies that can help in this are discussed below, as +divided into the following subsections: sensors, computational +systems, communications and system integration. + + + Sensor Technologies + +Sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, passive, +imbedded, and processing. + +_Active sensors:_ By far, the most important of the energy-emitting +sensors is radar. Among the best all-weather capabilities of any type +of sensor, the role for and capabilities of radar have steadily +increased since the Second World War. Radar systems are used for early +warning, air defense, air asset management, air traffic control, naval +fleet defense, detection and tracking of moving ground targets, +missile targeting, missile terminal guidance, terrain data +development, and weather prediction. For Rapid Dominance, radars and +other active sensors must operate with low probability of intercept. +Particularly with stealthy systems, this will present a unique +challenge to military systems where one may not expect a great amount +of "spin-on" from the commercial sector. It is vitally important to be +able to sense the enemy under all conditions and environments. Sensors +must penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such as +underground and underwater mines. + +There are many other important active sensor classes, three of which +are active acoustics, lidar and magnetic anomaly detectors. Broadband +underwater active acoustics could address pressing needs such as +shallow-water anti-submarine warfare and mine detection (both buried +and silt covered). The practical application of lidar is a relatively +recent development enabled by advances in laser, power management, and +data processing technologies. Lidar can be used for fire control, +weapon guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent in the +near infrared (NIR) regime), and target imaging/recognition. Lidar +detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such as vibration and +motion and has proven very hard to spoof. Magnetic anomaly detectors +will continue to find application in areas of anti-mine and +anti-submarine warfare and in screening for weapons at security +checkpoints and elsewhere. + +Electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where they +create a signature of use to an enemy. The ability to emit energy, yet +in ways that are less discernible, should be an attractive avenue to +explore for the future. The coordinated application of many sensor +platforms, some of which may be completely passive, in conjunction +with emitting sensors is a potentially major area of exploration. + +_Passive sensors:_ Among the passive sensor types, the most important +for U.S. forces is forward-looking infrared (FLIR). FLIR technology +has allowed the U.S. to "own the night," as was handily displayed in +_Operation Desert Storm_. Some of the significant technology +advancements underway in this area include multiple wavelength +sensors, very large focal planes, and the increasing performance of +uncooled sensors. Particularly in the area of uncooled sensors, +commercial developments are underway that promise to drastically +reduce the cost of competent IR sensors. + +Other passive sensor technologies of note include hyperspectral +visible/NIR collection and processing and inexpensive, scatterable, +unattended ground sensors (acoustic, seismic, "hot spot," etc.). +Hyperspectral imaging allows target searches to be conducted in the +frequency domain, as opposed to the spatial domain as is the norm +today. This provides a powerful new input for automatic target +recognition (ATR) systems, is useful for addressing low observables +(LO), and is especially important for remote imaging assets. + +Unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored +continually. For example, the actual area of operations for Scuds in +ODS was relatively small, but it was very difficult for then-current +sensing systems to oversee. Technologies being developed in the area +of microelectromechanical systems, in particular, hold promise for +enabling capable and inexpensive sensor fields. + +_Imbedded sensors:_ Monitoring the position and status of Blue and +friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in tracking the +enemy. GPS presented a tremendous advantage to troops in ODS. This +capability needs to be extended down to the individual soldier, and +the status of all critical material and personnel needs to be tracked. + +_Sensor signal processing:_ Finally, the signals from modern sensors +are of limited use without proper processing and presentation to the +user. This area will be developed further in the computational +technologies section. Technologies that are historically grouped with +sensor systems include automatic target recognition, imbedded +multisensor fusion and correlation, and displays. + + + Computational Technologies + +The capabilities of the integrated circuit (IC), and in particular the +microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. Certainly, physical +limits must be approached at some point, but each looming barrier has +so far been met by technological innovation. Nevertheless, should the +march of IC improvements slow somewhat, the software and networking +technologies that are being developed at an accelerating pace will +permit the vision of Rapid Dominance to become of ever increasing +utility. + +Rapid Dominance requires the collection, management, and fast access +of enormous quantities of information. Technologies that will enable +this include computational hardware advances such as increasingly +powerful workstations, reduced-cost image generators, massively +parallel machines, compact displays, reduced-cost memory devices +(i.e., DRAM, RAID, and optical jukeboxes) client/server-specific +database engines, reconfigurable simulation cells, "wearable" PCs, +advanced human-computer interface (HCI) techniques (i.e., voice +interfaces and those coming to define "virtual reality"), and PCMCIA +technology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, miniaturized +hard drives, and modems). + +Software advances will be even more critical for Rapid Dominance. +Areas of importance include: + + - Network data engines + - Object-oriented architectures + - Advanced modeling and simulation + - Machine intelligence + - Automatic target recognition + - Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools + +Network technologies are just now emerging but are being driven at a +frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. A variety of advanced +tools beyond "hot link" browsing are being introduced daily. Data +browsers, brokers, gatherers, and network repositories are being +released, as demonstrated by products like _Harvester_ and _Netscape's +Catalog Server_. Platform independent languages such as JAVA and their +associated virtual computational engines promise the same network +flexibility for programs that is now enjoyed by data. + +Perhaps the most important area of technology development for Rapid +Dominance is the development of practical object-oriented +architectures and protocols. Protocols such as CORBA, OLE, ALSP, HLA +and DIS[1] are changing the face of computing, making it much easier +to link programs and databases, and access and correlate information +that was previously "entombed" within its legacy application. + +[Footnote 1: CORBA (common object request broker architecture), OLE +(object linking and embedding), ALSP (aggregate level simulation +protocol), HLA (high-level architecture), DIS (Distributed Interactive +Simulation). These are all protocols or the architectures defining +protocols that, in part, enable disparate software and/or hardware +components to be linked or otherwise share information and logical +elements.] + +One interesting application area migrating toward an object-oriented +approach is geospatial databases. In the past, geospatial data were +stored as either raster-based or vector information, and significant +processing was required for users to make queries regarding roads, +areas, or objects such as building sites. A new approach, called a +spatial database engine, creates intuitive objects from standard +geospatial databases and uses commercial databases to add attributes +to the objects. This is a very powerful technique that allows +geospatial data, a key element of warfighting, to be managed quickly +and efficiently using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. It is +particularly useful for distributed databases such as one would find +on a network. + +Modeling and simulation is also benefiting from object-oriented +technologies. Simulations were once stand-alone codes. If one wanted +to simulate a joint battle, one began with an existing model (i.e., +land combat) and then modified it to include other components (i.e., +aircraft and ships). Similarly, if a new technology were to be +modeled, new code normally had to be written, even in cases where +good, validated, stand-alone technology models existed. The obvious +drawbacks to this approach are that it is costly, often produces +inferior simulations for the new additions, and quickly results in +extremely large codes with commensurate large code management +problems. Object-oriented approaches allow models and simulations to +be linked to form a richer environment for examining new technologies +and joint force structures. + +Linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as +computer-aided design (CAD) programs and physics-based simulations +presents a new type of tool referred to as simulation-based design. +Once fully realized, this capability will allow new technologies to be +much more easily evaluated, introducing a source for greater +efficiency into today's somewhat haphazard acquisition system. + +Simulations based on object-oriented architectures also promise more +flexibility that will enable scenarios and unexpected situations to be +made as inputs and simulated rapidly, forming the core for a +battlefield visualization system capable of modeling "what if" +situations. Outputs from these simulations could be used for mission +rehearsal. Even today, pilots and special operations forces often "fly +through" crude, three-dimensional renderings of a mission area to +familiarize themselves with information such as surface-to-air missile +(SAM) sites and landmarks. + +The promise of computational technologies brings with it potential +vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats. In a world +where information plays a vital role in warfare, information +collection and processing tools will become targets. Defenses against +information warfare must be developed. The threat is real and is +growing especially in the commercial and private sectors. Even today, +malicious hackers devise data-destroying viruses and distribute them +through a plethora of electronic media; numerous sites on the Net are +dedicated to the discussion and development of offensive computer +viruses, with ample tools for even the novice to download and employ. +Moreover, computer crimes cost the world economy billions of dollars +annually. Although information warfare poses serious threats, the +realm of information is where operations underlying Rapid Dominance +most reside, and the enemy will find himself fully engaged should he +choose to fight on our terms. Rapid Dominance is essentially +information warfare on a grand scale in all dimensions of offensive, +defensive and leveraging effective use of available information. + + + Communication Technologies + +One of the modern communication devices being fielded within U.S. +forces today is the SINGCARS radio. With a data rate of somewhat less +than 10 kbps, SINGCARS is woefully inadequate for supporting Rapid +Dominance. However, more appropriate technologies are emerging: + + - GBS and other satellite broadcast services + - Wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols + - Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches + - Advanced comm relay platforms (UAV, Lightsat, Iridium, etc.) + +GBS, for example, figures prominently in the BADD (battlefield +awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at providing close +to 30 Mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. This will be supported by +multi-terrabyte databases, advanced data browsers, and query managers, +and will be linked to the Joint Tactical Internet. + +Networking must also be supported by communications technologies. The +basic problem of a battlefield network is that while some nodes may +support very large data pipes, a number of nodes will be operating at +SINGCARS data rates. This led to the BADD notion of one-way data +broadcasting via GBS of large data files (such as UAV video and +overhead imagery) and very low bandwidth data querying back to the +data sources. + +Modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-based, which is +particularly important for Rapid Dominance, where decisions must be +made quickly based upon very large quantities of data, some of which +will be collected and transmitted in real time. Technologies such as +digital video teleconferencing, virtual whiteboards, and even 3D +virtual environments where commanders may participate in collaborative +planning sessions will become important. + +Finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where +feasible, non-observable to the enemy. + + +Control of the Environment + +The actual attack of targets in order to induce Shock and Awe may, in +some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the enemy's +perception. It will not always be necessary to destroy numerous +targets in order to induce shock. However, it would be vitally +important to give the appearance that there are no safe havens from +attack, and that any target may be attacked at any time with impunity +and force. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, confusion must be +imposed on the adversary by supplying only information which will +shape the adversary's perceptions and help break his will. Finally, +the enemy must be displaced from selected key positions, for if he is +allowed to occupy those areas that he considers strategically +important, it is difficult to imagine how his shock could be complete. + +Controlling an enemy's perception of the battlespace includes +manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status, and +the environment in which he operates. This will be accomplished by +selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while presenting him with +information that is either misleading or serves our purposes. Sensing +and feedback of an enemy leadership's perception of the situation will +be critical. + +Technologies of interest here include those that allow systems and +entire force units to modify their signature from being very stealthy +to being completely obvious. An ability to attack enemy information +systems will also be critical, encompassing system technologies from +laser-based counter sensor weapons to embedded computer viruses, +commonly referred to as Trojan Horses. In all cases, the goal will be +to deny the enemy any information that would be useful to him and to +impose a construct of deception and misinformation at all levels of +operations. + +Clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield awareness +already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a "perception attack" (a +form of information warfare) to be successfully carried out. The need +and requirements for Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) will increase +dramatically. It will be necessary to understand not only whether a +target was killed but also how enemy leadership, troops, and society +viewed this destruction. + +So far, primarily information technologies have been discussed. +Obviously, there will continue to be requirements for numerous other +types of systems. Among the more important system technologies +critical to achieving control of the environment include: + + - Weapons platforms with stealth technology + - Weapons systems + - Robotic systems + + + Weapons platforms + +One of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to move +people and ordinance to within an effective range of the target. +Centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems, this reasoning was +understood intuitively. Since ordinance must still be placed on the +target, weapons platforms such as described below still demand +consideration. + + - Stealthy bombers and strike aircraft either land or sea platform + based + - Arsenal ships + - Submarines with conventional cruise missiles + - Stealthy land vehicles + - Stealthy observation/attack helicopters + +Stealth, combined with stand off, will contribute strongly to the +protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and will also +be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned systems. However, +protection of the force is inherent within the concept of Rapid +Dominance, and it will rely upon the control of information and the +enemy's perception of events, stealth being one of the elements +enabling this control. + + + Weapons systems + +Smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield. Linked +with information technologies, the combination will allow killing any +target that can be identified. The main element Rapid Dominance +requires of weapons systems is the ability to be rapidly focused on +objectives as identified and targeted by commanders using the +information management systems already discussed. Commanders will +require the flexibility to call massive, precision strikes or to +attack individual, high-priority targets with near zero CEP. This +implies a mixture of weapons comprised of systems such as those +mentioned below. + + - Cruise missiles + - Zero CEP, long-range cruise missile ("President's weapon") + - Stand-off submunition platforms + - Smart submunitions + - Brilliant submunitions + - Wide area smart mines + - Long-range and short-range surface attack missiles + + + Robotic systems + +Robotic systems are an important area of consideration within Rapid +Dominance. First, selected robotic systems will enable the force by +making it more responsive in concentrating sensors and weapons. +Second, they will make fighting a 24-hour battle feasible even with +reduced manpower within the force structure. Third, robotic systems +can provide force presence even in areas considered too dangerous for +a large manned element. Finally, since the ultimate operational goal +of Rapid Dominance is to create shock, one may consider the effect +that fighting robotic systems may have on the enemy. + +In examining the utility of robotic systems within Rapid Dominance, +one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic systems have not +lived up to the optimistic expectations placed on them in the past. +From the overburdening of the Aquilla UAV to the massive and poorly +planned investment in robotics made by General Motors in the early +1980s, robotics has been an area of unfulfilled promises. However, the +reasons for a string of spectacular failures lie more with planners' +faulty attempts to understand and incorporate the technology than by +egregious shortcomings of the technology itself. Robots have been seen +as replacements for manned systems rather than extremely complicated +and capable machines suitable for a set of tightly defined tasks. +Robotic systems, or taskable machines as some are beginning to refer +to them, hold promise for the future simply because they represent the +intersection of a myriad of fast-moving technology areas such as +information technologies, communications, microelectronics, +micro-electromechanical systems, simulation, and computer-aided design +and manufacturing. In some sense, taskable machines are the physical +embodiment of information technologies. It may well be that in the +future the joke will be, "Never send a robot to do a man's job." But +even so, there will be ample jobs for taskable machines and the +society that learns to properly design, build, control, and integrate +these systems into their force structure will gain significant +advantage over any potential opponent. + + +Conclusion + +The technologies and systems presented in this section are not +extraordinary nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed, entire +fields such as materials, bioengineering, and microelectronics are +left for future consideration, although they are of obvious and vital +importance. Also not addressed here are the training, education, and +organizational implications required under a regime of Rapid +Dominance. Given the overriding importance of information collection +and management, these will need to be addressed across the defense +community as it is most broadly defined. + +Rapid Dominance combines a doctrine and operational concept that +challenges the current process of how new technologies invented in the +commercial sector are incorporated into defense, and provides an +affirmative methodology for research, development, and system +integration. We must learn to exploit the potential of these +technologies even though, in many cases, this development process in +the private sector is profoundly independent from how we conduct the +business of defense. It is this environment of innovative upheaval +that any useful foundation for strategic and operational thought must +address. Rapid Dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this +rapid and chaotic development of technology. + +We believe that what will distinguish Rapid Dominance from other +doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct to drive +innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and integrating +technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently constructed +systems. Second, it is the comprehensive quality of Rapid Dominance in +which strategies, doctrine, technology, systems, operations, training, +organization, and education are dealt with together that may make the +most significant difference. But, as the reader will discern, specific +identification and design of Rapid Dominance systems is part of the +next step. + + + + +Future Directions + + + +At this stage, Rapid Dominance is an intellectual construct based on +these key points. First, Rapid Dominance has evolved from the +collective professional, policy, and operational experience of the +study group covering the last four decades. This experience ran from +Vietnam to_ Desert Storm_ and from serving with operational units in +the field to being part of the decision-making process in the Oval +Office in Washington. It also included immersion in technology and +systems from thermonuclear weapons to advanced weapons software. + +Second, Rapid Dominance seeks to exploit the unique juncture of +strategy, technology, and innovation created by the end of the Cold +War and to establish an alternative foundation for military doctrine +and force structure. + +Third, Rapid Dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as +envisaged by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to overpower or affect the will, +perception, and understanding of the adversary for strategic aims and +military objectives. But, in Rapid Dominance, the principal mechanism +for affecting the adversary's will is through the imposition of a +regime of Shock and Awe sufficient to achieve the aims of policy. It +is this relationship with and reliance on Shock and Awe that +differentiates Rapid Dominance from attrition, maneuver, and other +military doctrines including overwhelming force. + +Shock and Awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and physical +levels. At one level, destroying an adversary's military force leaving +the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the necessary Shock and +Awe. At another level, the certainty of this outcome may cause an +adversary to accept our terms well short of conflict. In the great +middle ground, the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause the +perception and anticipation of certain defeat and the threat and fear +of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or +render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical +destruction. + +Finally, in order to impose enough Shock and Awe to affect an +adversary's will, four core characteristics of a Rapid Dominance- +configured force were defined. First, complete knowledge and +understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the environment are +essential. This knowledge and understanding exceed the expectations of +dominant battlefield awareness and DBA becomes a subset of Rapid +Dominance. + +Rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is only +familiar with a particular company and not the stock market in +general, the Rapid Dominance force must have complete knowledge and +understanding of many likely adversaries and regions. This requirement +for knowledge and understanding will place a huge, new burden on the +military forces and necessitate fundamental changes in policy, +organization, training, education, structure, and equipage. + +Second is rapidity. Rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and agility +and the ability to sustain control after the initial shock. Rapidity +enables us to act as quickly as needed and always more quickly than +the adversary can react or take counter-actions. Rapidity is also an +antidote to surprise. If we cannot anticipate surprise, or are +surprised, rapidity provides a correcting capacity to neutralize the +effects of that surprise. + +Third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of operations +and execution in terms of brilliance. The consequences and +implications of setting brilliance as the standard and achieving it +are profound. Reconfiguration of command authority and organization +possibly to decentrali-zation down to individual troops must follow. +Allowing and encouraging an operational doctrine of the "first to +respond" will set the tempo provided that effective de-confliction of +friendly on friendly engagements has been assured. + +This, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, training, +and organization will be required. The matter is not just "fighting +smarter." It is learning to fight at even higher standards of skill +and competence. + +Fourth is control of the environment. Control is defined in the +broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and space and +control of the "ether" in which information is passed and received. +This requires signature management throughout the full conflict +spectrum-deception, disinformation, verification, information control, +and target management-all with rapidity in both physical and +psychological impact. By depriving an adversary of the physical use of +time, space, and the ether, we play on the adversary's will and offer +the prospect of certain destruction should resistance follow. + +The next step in this process must be specifically defining this Rapid +Dominance force in terms of force structure, capabilities, doctrine, +organization, and order of battle. We have begun this effort and are +focusing on a joint task force sized somewhere between a reinforced +division and a full corps (i.e., a strength of 75,000 - 200,000). We +also have the aim of being able to deploy this force within 5 to 10 +days of the order to move and, of course, will be able to send smaller +force packages on a nearly instantaneous basis. We appreciate the +mobility and logistical implications of this requirement. + +Once we design this "paper" force and equip it with "paper" systems, +we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and tests we +noted in the Prologue. + +The first test of this Rapid Dominance force will be against the MRC. +The comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the programmed +force and whatever emerges from the Quadrennial Defense Review of +1997. We will need to examine closely how and where and why Rapid +Dominance and Shock and Awe work and where they do not. At the very +least, we expect that this will help strengthen the current force and +improve current capabilities. Of course, it is our hope that this test +will validate Rapid Dominance as a legitimate doctrine. + +Second, the Rapid Dominance force must be tested across the entire +spectrum of OOTW. These are the most difficult tests because, in some +of them, no force may be suitable and no force may work. + +Third, the test of determining the political consequences of Rapid +Dominance must be conducted. On one hand, if this force capability can +be achieved and Shock and Awe administered to affect an adversary's +will, can a form of political deterrence be created? In the most +approximate sense, and we emphasize approximate, the analogy with +nuclear deterrence might be drawn. An adversary may be persuaded or +deterred from taking action in the first instance. On the other hand, +this capacity may be seen as politically unusable and allies and +others within the United States may not be fully trusting of the +possessor always to employ this force responsibly. + +Fourth is the test of the implications of Rapid Dominance for +alliances and for waging coalition warfare. Our allies are already +concerned that the United States is leaving them far behind in +military technology and capability. If we possess this force and our +allies or partners do not, how do we fight together? Our view is that +this can be worked out through technology sharing and perhaps new +divisions of labor and mission specialization. However, these are +important points to be considered. + +Finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in defense? + +It is also likely that because Rapid Dominance will cause profound +consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy will make a +fair examination difficult. It is no accident that other attempts at +change, especially those that ask for or are tainted with reform, have +had a short life span. It is interesting to note in this regard that +the President's Commission on Intelligence and its fine report that +recommended changes and refinements to the U.S. intelligence +community, despite a very positive initial reception, led to only a +few meaningful actions. + +This discussion leads to two final points. We are all too well aware +that any strategy and force structure have vulnerabilities and +potential weaknesses. The experiences that this study group +collectively had in Vietnam makes this concern very strongly held. We +observe that in the private sector, the vulnerability of information +systems is real and is being exploited. A former director of the FBI +has told us that in New York, for example, the number one recruiting +target for organized crime is the teenage computer whiz. We think that +this "hacking," writ large in the private sector, must be assumed as +part of the defense problem. Hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities +must be even greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the Cold +War, because exploitation can come from many more sources in the +future. + +Second, wags may criticize Rapid Dominance as attempting to create a +"Mission Impossible Force." To be sure, we emphasize and demand +brilliance as the operational goal. However, we also know that the +military today is seen as a leading example of the best American +society has to offer. We wish to build on this reality. We note the +experience and the performance, albeit under highly unusual +circumstances, of_ Desert Storm_. We see no reason why that level of +performance cannot be made a permanent part of the fabric of the +American military. + +Because we have entered a period of transition in which we enjoy a +dominant military position and a greatly reduced window of +vulnerability, this is the right time for experimentation and +demonstration. Rapid Dominance is still a concept and a work in +progress, not a final road map or blueprint. But the concept does +warrant, in our view, a commitment to explore and an opportunity that +could lead to dramatically better capabilities. + +We believe that through Rapid Dominance and the commitment to examine +the entire range of defense across all components and aspects, a +revolution is possible. If Rapid Dominance can be harnessed in an +affordable and efficient way and an operational capability fielded to +impose sufficient Shock and Awe to affect an adversary's will, then +this will be the real Revolution in Military Affairs. We ask those who +are intrigued by this prospect to join us. + + + + +Appendix A + +Thoughts on Rapid Dominance +by Admiral Bud Edney, USN (Ret.) + + + +Why the need for a concept of Rapid Dominance? The answer lies in the +combined realities of modern technology, economics, and politics. + + +Technology + +The evolution or revolution of information technology is impacting +everything we do and how we do it on a worldwide basis. The +far-reaching effects of the resulting information highway that crosses +all boundaries are already impacting the strategic decisions, +economics, and politics of the world of nation states. Borders are no +defense for the penetration of information even in highly controlled +or authoritarian societies. Similarly, the exploration and use of high +technology in space, together with the advent of sophisticated highly +accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, means borders between states +are not as important for strategic and impenetrable defenses in depth +as they used to be. The rapid advancements in telecommunications +technology, combined with the exploration and use of space vehicles to +saturate a world hungry for information, means that leaders can no +longer shield their people from the outside world. Thus information +will penetrate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile +attempt to block it out. New centers of gravity are being created as +are new vulnerability choke points. The country or power structure +that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the information +revolution as it applies to issues of national security will remain in +control of its own destiny. The United States possesses a qualitative +and quantitative lead that, when combined with a properly focused and +coordinated (harmonized) industry, defense, and national security +policy, should ensure success for the foreseeable future. Harnessing +information technology and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal +thought in application of military force is the essence of Rapid +Dominance. + + +Economics + +With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, +there is no major power capable of destroying the U.S. mainland. Given +this absence of devastating threat, defense expenditures will continue +to be squeezed to address more pressing domestic priorities. Voter +demands for a balanced budget, national health care, social security +reform, educational reform, family values, crime and drug use +reduction, lower taxes, etc., will combine to put increasing pressure +on the defense bottom line in the out years. The result will be a +steady decline in war fighting readiness and force structure that will +place our security interests at risk unless we leverage our technology +leadership to achieve military advantage with lower force levels but +increased war fighting effectiveness. This is also the essence of +Rapid Dominance. + + +Politics + +The reality of current politics is that the trauma of Vietnam, the +results of the Gulf War, and our status as the only remaining +superpower after the Cold War equate to some new constraints (real or +perceived) on the application of military force to support our foreign +policy. These political sensitivities need to be understood up front +and include the following: + + - The U.S. is not the world's policeman + - Involvement of U.S. Forces must be justified as essential to vital + U.S. security interests + - Support of Congress and People is a necessary prerequisite + - Avoid commitment of ground forces + - Offer instead U.S. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, logistics + support, etc. + - Avoid risk of loss of U.S. lives at almost all costs + - Ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned + - Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to defend themselves + aggressively + - Minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage + - Specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end in the + not-too-distant future sight before committing + - U.S. led coalition force preferred-U.S. Forces remain under U.S. + Command. These political restraints may limit the application of + Rapid Dominance to Major and Minor Regional Conflicts. This is an + issue that needs further exploration and analysis. + + +What is Rapid Dominance? + +Rapid Dominance is the full use of capabilities within a system of +systems that can decisively impact events requiring the application of +military/defense resources through affecting the adversary's will. +Rapid Dominance envisions execution in real or near real time to +counter actions or intentions deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. On +one end of the spectrum, Rapid Dominance would introduce a regime of +Shock and Awe in areas of high value to the threatening individual, +group, or state. In many cases the prior knowledge of credible U.S. +Rapid Dominance capabilities would act as a deterrent. Rapid Dominance +would ensure favorable early resolution of issues at minimal loss of +lives and collateral damage. The concept ideally should be able to +impact adversarial situations that apply across the board, addressing +high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology threats. Some of these aims may +not be achievable given the political and technology constraints, but +need to be explored. + +Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting +capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated, +interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence, +surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, and data +analysis to deliver in real time, actionable information to the +shooter. This network must provide total situational awareness and +nodal analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's +decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe +among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this +grid of knowledge and vulnerability will enable the shutting down of +specific or all essential functions nearly simultaneously. We expect +that through these netted pieces of data, often, the sum of the parts +will yield profound battlefield advantages to the possessor. The +"Rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real time +actionable targeting information to the shooter, whether the shooter +is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery battery, an +individual rifleman, a naval battle group, an individual ship, an air +wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. At whatever unit level, Shock +and Awe are magnified by the speed and effectiveness of targeting. The +ability to achieve Rapid Dominance simultaneously throughout the +battlefield will create strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing +forces, their leadership, and society. When the video results of these +attacks are broadcast real time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact +on coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support +can be decisive. + +The top priority of Rapid Dominance should be to deter, alter, or +affect those actions that are either unacceptable to U.S. national +security interests or endanger the democratic community of states and +access to free markets. These political objectives are generally those +envisioned in the major and lesser regional conflict scenarios (MRC & +LRC). Should deterrence fail, the application of Rapid Dominance +should create sufficient Shock and Awe to intimidate the enemy forces +and leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential +aggressors. Rapid Dominance would not be limited to MRC and LRC +scenarios. It has application in a variety of areas, including +countering WMD, terrorism, and other political problems. The challenge +is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on +Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat yet decisive enough +to convey the appropriate degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance +cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. It initially +appears that Rapid Dominance should be applied sparingly for egregious +threats or violations of international law, such as: + + - Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state + - Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD + - Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale + - Threat to essential world markets + +Clearly the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and +penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and +benefits in closed societies are becoming known to both the public as +well as the bosses. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop +sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and +create road blocks as well as control input/outputs to the highway +both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept. + +These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting +international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer +interagency cooperation and coordination between military and law +enforcement activities and capabilities must be established. +Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed +considerable cultural differences between these organizations. +Overcoming these cultural differences is not easy. The required trust +and confidence for sharing sensitive information and support between +these agencies and the military needs to be developed further. +Interagency coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level +of sophistication. Some laws may need to be changed. War in Cyberspace +does not recognize domestic versus foreign boundaries. In this +environment the subjects of Information Warfare and Information In +Warfare take on new meaning and require focused development. We must +become proficient within this environment. + +This breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal more +thought with regard to the issues of security, vulnerabilities +(their's and our's), and the concept of Rapid Dominance. Does Rapid +Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the spectrum, +involving more traditional applications of force to achieve political +objectives as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet to be +explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance applies +to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. interests, controlling +rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the political and military +prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable and +realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of +national governments/law enforcement organizations and international +as well as local private venture or non-government organizations +(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care +to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of +Rapid Dominance offend and generate a counterproductive public +relations backlash from those who believe force should only be used as +a last resort and then with a measurable degree of proportionality? + +At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be +addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and +issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front +during the concept development phase of the development of specific +Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be careful that we do not +overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable +capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance does not eliminate +the fog of war. Decisions will still be made on the leader's judgment +and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat +intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence +in our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the +ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance. +Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly +defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the world's only credible +superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role, but neither can +it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. We are in the +classical "damned if we do and damned if we don't" syndrome. One of the +serious side effects of Rapid Dominance could be that if you adapt a +strategy of Rapid Dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem +and be responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to +such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if +Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less than of vital +interest? This subject needs further development beyond the limitations +of this book. + + +Rapid Dominance and The Future Battlefield + +What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The _Desert +Storm_ conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real focus +of battle will no longer be force on force as we have traditionally +considered it. By the time the Allied Forces engaged the opposing Iraq +forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes had already been +demoralized and smashed. This was accomplished by establishing air +superiority followed by a carefully orchestrated campaign of precision +air strikes (including Tomahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces +were isolated by cutting off logistic support, severing communications +with its leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe achieved +by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the open desert. +Shock and awe were introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft +penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center of +gravity targets with impunity. Shock and awe were also present in the +degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly +maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and +unforgiving for the predominantly U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin +Powell noted, the Coalition Forces cut off the head and life lines to +the Iraqi Army in the field and then set about killing it. The fact +that a democratically led coalition could choose not to massacre the +remnants of Iraq's army during its panic-induced retreat underscores +that we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint. The +impact of real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed +simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living rooms +worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the battlefield and +further highlighted the compassion of that decision. In dealing with a +"butcher" we could not fall to that level. + +The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile box +where you will know everything that is going on inside the box +(although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The +battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that +controls or influences the elements of the battle. In examining this +battlefield and the application of force and Shock and Awe, we seek to +mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous firepower on critical +nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than +necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one +another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised warfare to a new level with the +demonstrated effectiveness and application of air to ground/water and +surface to ground/water launched precision guided weapons. No longer +will commanders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but +rather targets destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an issue +of affordability here. We may not be able to get 1) high tech, 2) +MRC/OOTW, and 3) large armies. This does not eliminate the requirement +for sufficient force in the field to defend against an all-out assault +or eject another force and occupy the contested land to ensure the +objectives of conflict are carried out. Air power can punish, +simultaneously destroy center of gravity targets, and so demoralize +the opposing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with +smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air +campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict before the land +campaign is necessary. This is more likely against a modernized, +developed state than an underdeveloped government. + +The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of +stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon +targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology, space +relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from space, the +introduction of JSTARS, and massive application of night vision +techniques, are the first phase of these changes. With elements of +this technology now more and more on the open market to whomever has +the cash or friends, the advantage of obtaining greater situational +awareness and real-time processing of available data cannot be taken +for granted. + +In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that +political and military decision making will have to establish close +control of the actionable information distributed to shooters in the +field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli forces that had air +superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely accurate firepower +capabilities in the most recent incursion into Southern Lebanon +against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with an artillery +barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired from close to a known UN +encampment. When this artillery response resulted in killing more than +100 refugees fleeing the Israeli operation, the result was a public +relations disaster and mission failure for the stated limited Israeli +objectives. This represents a case of ill-conceived application of +Rapid Dominance that resulted in counter-productive Shock and Awe +generating adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was +also a case of applying high technology and state controlled Rapid +Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. Clearly +the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this exchange. The +lessons learned from this tragic incident as well as the applicability +of Rapid Dominance techniques in this environment need further study. +The massing and movement of refugees in large numbers is a reality and +a planning factor that must be dealt with up front. The fact that the +value of life itself is viewed differently by warring factions must +also be considered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield +and the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to +achieve Rapid Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules +of engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may not always be +the right tactic and an escalation of targeting different centers of +gravity rather than responding directly to events in the field +promises to be more effective. The theory of Rapid Dominance clearly +needs further development, gaming, and simulation. Each decision to +apply Rapid Dominance will be unique, complex, risky, and different +than the previous one. Knowledge and information on the battlefield as +well as that concerning center of gravity targets will be incomplete +even with a goal of total situational awareness. + + +Instruments to Achieve Shock and Awe + +Shock and awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and destruction +that are incompre-hensible to the people at large, specific +elements/sectors of the threat society, or the leadership. Nature in +the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled +fires, famine, and disease can engender Shock and Awe. The ultimate +military application of Shock and Awe was the use of two atomic +weapons against Japan in WWII. The Shock and Awe that resulted from +the use of these weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war +with Japan (through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the +further use of these weapons for over 50 years. Not unexpectedly, +these events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the +destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. The holocaust +was a state policy of Shock and Awe that stunned the world in its +brutality and inhumanity. Yet it has not deterred the world from +executing or tolerating atrocities of equal brutality and inhumanity +(Cambodia, Syria, Rwanda, etc.). Similar applications of Shock and Awe +have differing toleration levels and impacts depending on the +environment and political system against which it is applied. As an +example, the massive bombing raids of WWII by Germany and the U.S. did +not result in a sufficient level of Shock and Awe to end the fighting. +The fear of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather than +their actual destruction was the deciding factor in that theater. The +B-52 raids in Vietnam provided localized elements of Shock and Awe, +but until applied to the capital city of Hanoi, had no impact toward +war termination. When applied in concentrated repetitive strikes in +November/December of 1972 under _Operation Rolling Thunder III_, the +cease fire followed in short order. In fact, throughout history there +have been weapons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of +Shock and Awe. While there has always been shock, awe, and fear +associated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused and +great enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under favorable terms +is not certain. How to apply elements of Shock and Awe against rogue +states, terrorist elements, international drug and crime cartels, as +well as in the more traditional MRCs and LRCs needs much further study +and analysis. Shock and awe, to reach the level required to achieve +Rapid Dominance, must also bring fear to those who are in charge. It +must be applied quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity +(such as stealth bombing with air superiority). The element of +impunity, that is the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a +key element of this strategy. If on the other hand attacks are +directed at the general public a backlash could be unleased because of +the excessive and brutal losses of innocent civilians. + +Much more study and analysis is needed to identify and examine the +pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of Shock and Awe +for limited objectives rather than responds in kind to a provocation. +What are the limits of the doctrine of Shock and Awe? What +circumstances merit the application? Can Shock and Awe be used to +achieve limited objectives with little or no risk of life to allied +forces or innocent civilians? Can true center of gravity targets be +identified for ideological/terrorist groups? Can levels of Shock and +Awe be categorized by effectiveness and priority of weapons systems? +If so, what are the key enabling technologies? What types of Shock and +Awe would be both impressive and generate high returns? A few +desirable capabilities from a former CINC's perspective are listed +below: + + - Blow up an entire mine field simultaneously in its entirety + immediately after it had been laid. + - Destroy the mine laden mine-laying vehicles at their loading + point. + - Destroy in real time terrorist training camps or publicity + generating threats such as the recent display of 70 bomb laden + suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc worldwide. (This + probably requires inside penetration of the targeted + organization). + - Destroy simultaneously all/selective WMD launchers, + storage/production facilities of a rogue state. + - Selectively target rogue terrorist leaders as was apparently done + by the Russians in Chechnya recently when they killed the top + rebel leader by detecting and homing in on his satellite phone + conversation (helicopter rocket attack). + - Stop, divert, capture the cash flow to terrorist elements. + + +Thoughts on Applications of Shock and Awe + +It is the use of Shock and Awe to achieve Rapid Dominance that is so +fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage if it can be +harnessed in a variety of situations. This basis for Rapid Dominance +requires a clearer under-standing of what our end objectives are than +we usually have when we stumble into the use of military force, often +it seems by default and at the last possible minute. At this point, I +have more questions than answers. How does Rapid Dominance differ by +the goals and missions assigned? What are the key elements to apply +Rapid Dominance for each envisioned threat? What are the most likely +threats for the next 20 years? Is Rapid Dominance applicable to all +these threats? Can we separate Rapid Dominance into categories with +and without Shock and Awe? + +In addition to answering these and other questions, it seems to me it +would be helpful to generate a list of desirable capabilities that +would help me select a response option. This list of capabilities +would be useful to focus (1) scarce R&D dollars to fill in the holes +with technology, (2) intelligence and surveillance collection +priorities, (3) innovative thought to further develop the concept (War +College papers and Wargaming series), and (4) development of CINC +plans and requirements to meet these capabilities. Examples of such +capabilities are: + + - Deploying highly effective TBMD and Cruise Missile Defense. + - Severing all/selective communications between leadership and field + as well as selective elements by call in the field. + - Intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective threat + field units. + - Projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat scopes. + - Inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities that generates + engine failures. + - Inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on key + threat systems. + - Identifying specific location and determining strength and + material of protected targets of value. + - Developing dial a setting ordnance capable of destroying all + hardened targets. + - Detecting and tracting (destroying at will) all targets of value + including mobile targets. + - Detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before launch. + - Detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed mine + field (land & sea). + - Making threat submarine movements transparent to targeting at + will. + +Obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored to the +limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and affordability. This +may not even be the right type of capabilities one might want. That +is, we may need a totally non-standard list. My judgment is that we +should develop one or two black "silver bullet" capabilities, if we +get too far afield, the system will not be able to digest the +recommendations. However, the concept of Rapid Dominance requires +stepping to a new level of getting inside the opposition's decision +loop. Rapid Dominance at the ultimate level would enable stopping, +diverting, or changing the decision process and decision executing +machinery/systems either preemptively or reactively in time to ensure +core U.S. security requirements are met. + + +Rapid Dominance Infrastructure + +The current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition reform +is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities necessary to +implement a Rapid Dominance strategy. I would like to reserve comments +in this area until the project is further developed. We do not need to +raise reasons to discard the concept as too hard before it is +sufficiently defined. I have the feeling that bringing these +conceptual capabilities to realities within a system of systems is +neither cheap nor easy. There is still too much waste and inefficiency +in our defense acquisition process as well as in the overlap between +service requirements and capabilities. Rapid Dominance will not be +service-unique and requires a synergistic approach from planning to +execution. + + +Final Thoughts + +The implications of the ongoing revolution in telecommunications and +information processing as it applies to our national security +interests dictate that we need new imaginative concepts of operation +to ensure the efficacy of our international leadership in a multipolar +world. With technology upgrading capabilities by factors of 10 or more +every 18 months, we can no longer afford to have concepts of +operations wait for the technology to reach the field. The concept of +Rapid Dominance requires innovative thought and different directions +than that imbedded in our military hierarchy. We need to introduce the +concept at all levels of military professional education and training. +The best results of this effort will be generated from the younger +minds brought up on the leading edge of the information revolution. +The challenge is to engage those minds in the solution and to take the +risks required to fund priorities enabling the development of this +capability now. Such a cultural change is not easy. One thing is +certain-business as usual will not get us there. The window of +opportunity will close faster than we think. + + + + +Appendix B + +Defense Alternatives: Forces Required +by General Chuck Horner, USAF (Ret.) + + + +The end of the Cold War will require a review of United States +National Security Policy and a concomitant change in our National +Defense Strategy. This strategy will respond to the changes in the +world's security environment, including the dissolution of the Soviet +Union and Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security alliances such +as NATO and NORAD, the increased and unique threat posed by the +proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the widening of the +spectrum of conflict which will challenge the peace and security of +our nation and its allies. + +The causes of conflict and the modes which threats to our security +interests will take have multiplied with the end of the Cold War. The +nuclear weapons of the Cold War remain and will remain for some +considerable time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to +the declining utility of these devices. For sure there will be +continuing pressure throughout the world to eliminate the presence of +nuclear weapons in conjunction with efforts to halt the production, +stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and biological weapons. It is +likely that START II will be followed by START III and IV, as nations +who claim ownership of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a high +cost and marginal payoff. However, progress will be slow due to the +immense importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament +and the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated with the +disarmament process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future the threat +of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be less likely +than before. The spectrum of national security challenges will expand +as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides. + +The decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over Iraq during +_Desert Storm_ should give future aggressors of major regional +conflict cause to pause. While this does not mean that the threat of +conventional warfare has vanished, it does mean that the national +leader intending to use major conflict to achieve political aims must +carefully craft strategy that will avoid the opportunity for +confrontation with a large coalition force lead by the United States. +Such a strategy might include surprise attack; short intense military +action; the threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical +weapons; advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions; and +warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes attacks +on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic missiles or +unconventional warfare forces. This will be warfare for which the +United States is ill trained and ill equipped. + +Other challenges to the world's security will take many forms to which +the military forces of the United States can play a constructive role. +These are commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War, even +though they may include the use of force to achieve desired political +goals. They include the increasingly familiar peacemaking, +peacekeeping, show of force, and humanitarian relief efforts. Success +in these operations may well require retraining, re-equipping, or +reorganizing our military forces. Each mission should be evaluated +with respect to what is required to accomplish its unique challenges. +However, the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military +forces should be based on what is required to fight the residual Cold +War, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major regional +conflict. + +The political goals upon which our national security strategy should +be crafted are fairly straightforward. First, we should seek to +preserve and invigorate the role of leadership the United States has +maintained since the end of World War II, or the end of the Cold War +(you take your pick). Second, and not apart from the first goal, the +United States must be sufficiently strong to prevent or deter use of +effective military power against us. It is not inconceivable that our +so-called superpower status could be defeated in battle by a crafty +and well-prepared adversary. Witness what happened to the powerful +victors of WWII in Vietnam. Third, U.S. military forces must be of +sufficient size, configuration, and readiness to bring a major +conventional conflict to a successful termination. It goes without +saying that during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to +numbers that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world. +Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. Fourth and +lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to all the +other tasks and functions for which the national command authority +calls upon the military. This first of challenges should be used to +define the military forces we field, how we train them, and the +methods we use to employ them. + +The strategic geographic depth the United States enjoys, bounded by +two oceans on the east and west and non-threatening nations to the +north and south, means that our nation is somewhat immune from attack, +other than by means of infiltration such as a terrorist, or from the +skies by means of long-range aircraft, and cruise or ballistic +missiles. We will require some actions and defenses which address +these threats, but the major portion of our national defense effort +must be placed on building and sustaining offensive forces for combat +in environments other than our own soil. This dictates that our +projection forces must be capable of rapidly responding to an +unforeseen crisis anywhere in the world, keeping in mind that quick, +decisive surprise favors our potential enemies. Given that we have +proven unable to predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these +forces must also be ready at all times to carry out combat operations +in most any place. There will not be time to modernize their equipment +or train reserve force units. They must be capable of projecting and +sustaining their military power over long distances and operating in +the environment of the enemy's choosing. Last but not least, when +required, they must be capable of decisive combat, not by attrition of +the enemy force in head-to-head combat as was our nature in past wars, +but by Shock and Awe so that conflict resolution is achieved with a +maximum of success at the minimum loss of life in the shortest time. +These characteristics for our projection force cannot be achieved +easily, as the processes that defined our Cold War doctrines, force +structures, equipment, and ways of doing business are loath to change. + +The Services' and joint requirements oversight processes that define +the equipment provided our military forces place emphasis on force +structure and the traditional roles for those forces. This inertia can +freeze our land, sea, air, and space capabilities at current or near +current levels, but may prove inadequate to carry out new strategies. +There are few incentives for a Service or the Joint Staff to reward +innovation or divestiture of roles or missions in order to change the +character and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare +them to fight the battles we must envisage for the twenty-first +century. + +For example, the Services claim lessons learned from _Desert Storm_ +which reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and ignore the +troublesome aspects which loom in the future and threaten our +traditional view of the battlefield. Many acclaim the role of +precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the threat they pose if +they are in the hands of the enemy. What would be the lessons learned +if several hundred canisters of live Sensor Fused Weapons were +released by a red force ballistic missile on the 24th Division during +a Fort Irwin engagement? Certainly there would be profound changes in +tactics, doctrine, and equipment indicated for the surviving U.S. Army +force. What if radar homing Surface to Air Missiles were employed by +the red force during a Red Flag exercise in the Nevada desert, not +using centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using +decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would be used +by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stagnant doctrines? +I doubt that the Air Force would be spending millions of dollars +trying to build electronic countermeasures to hide the large number of +expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft they continue to build, such +as the F-15E. + +Imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile were +actually allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson aircraft +carrier during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the attendant loss +of life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range. You would think the +maritime force would reexamine the method it provides air power from +the sea, vital yet today too vulnerable. + +How many times do we hear that the space forces are configured to +provide intelligence from overhead only to find in Iraq or Bosnia that +the front line forces receive products that are old, inaccurate and +altered to keep our Soviet foes from gaining knowledge of our +capabilities? Perhaps we if we would dual hat the Director of the +Central Intelligence Agency to the position of J-2, or even +Commander-in-Chief of a regional unified command, there would be vast +improvements in the tasking, evaluation, and delivery of space-derived +intelligence to regional combat forces. Then we might see full +understanding of the increasing role of space forces and implement +change to make them more relevant to our national security strategies +of the next century. Innovation, not size, must be sought because we +do not have the resources to do both. Moreover, large forces drive our +operational level strategy to force-on-force engagements in the +attrition warfare model of the last century with its attendant +causalities and destruction of equipment. George Patton's dictum still +stands that directed his troops not to die for their country, but to +get the other SOB to die for his. + +Military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and +destruction. The ever-present television camera ensures that the +horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. War's immorality should some +day lead to its banishment. Unfortunately, that day is probably a long +way away. Nonetheless, weapons of war and their employment tactics +must minimize death and destruction. This is not a call for non-lethal +weapons; it is a call for military forces to get right to the heart of +the enemy and conclude operations as rapidly and efficiently as they +possibly can given their equipment, training, and doctrine. This means +there must be wide flexibility in how they may function. Military +operations will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand +flexibility. Modern war will require our military leadership to +navigate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and ever +changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. We must make our +forces capable of dampening the capacity of the enemy to use force by +controlling the conflict rapidly even when surprised. We failed to do +that tactically in _Desert Storm_ in the case of the SCUD missile +attacks, but were fortunate that the Iraqis were equally inept at +taking political advantage of this card they held and skillfully +employed on the battlefield. We must also look for efficiency before +we even join in battle. + +Defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays since +the end of the Cold War. Given the leadership role the United States +plays in the world, one could think a reasonable sum to devote to +defense might be three percent of our gross national product, +certainly an amount much smaller than what an average family expends +for its security by means of life, health, causality, car, medical +insurance, and retirement benefits. Given the prospect of long-term, +constant funding, the Department of Defense could then give more +thought to how to build the most modern, efficient military force +within the dollars available. We would no longer define our forces +against some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus to +protect force size rather than quality. The Army, Navy, Air Force, +Marine Corps, and space forces would be required to build a team based +on a salary cap. You might be willing to pay big bucks for a B-2 +superstar quarterback, but you will also need lower cost and capable +riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle. Most of all, you would +reward the Service or Agency who would innovate to provide efficiency. + +Manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer military +force. Investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite might be +high, but it is the operations and maintenance costs that will drive +how much resources we are required to expend to gain and maintain a +given military capability. Again turning to _Desert Storm_, the huge +advantages of overflight precision munitions dropped from stealth +aircraft has not been understood or accepted by the operations +analysts who argue what we should build or buy next. If it had been, +would the Navy have allowed the A-12 program to fail, would the Air +Force be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions of +dollars into equipping forty year old B-52s with conventional +missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy divisions at a +personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership? Why not build +a Division force equivalent using technology and doctrine to provide a +"heavy division equivalent" force using far fewer troops featuring +speed, shock, precision fire while avoiding the manpower costs of +dollars that in peacetime include added costs for recruitment, +training, and sustaining and in war have an even greater added cost +computed in blood? Why don't we do this? The answer is because it +would require rare innovation, trust, and support from the equally +intransigent federal funding authorities. Most importantly, the +Services are not rewarded for innovation which recognizes the +contributions of another Service or Ally. + +Jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel must +worship even if they don't understand or believe. Defenders of the +status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or redundancy and +these arguments have some validity. The question becomes how much +overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, and space forces can the +nation afford, and what is the opportunity cost to the core competency +of the land, sea, air, or space force that builds and/or maintains the +duplicative force structure. A second yet vastly different question +arises when considering the unique capabilities a Service provides to +support itself and the other services. For example, how much the Air +Force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of what the +envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day, to support +the mythical scenarios. The alternative sea, land, and space lift +requirements can be postulated; however, if the Navy, Army, or Air +Force do not satisfy those sea, land, and space lift requirement, then +there is a shortfall which will in turn generate a need for more +airlift! + +During _Desert Storm_, nearly 90 percent of the deployed equipment +arrived by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis had continued their +first attack in August. A majority of overland movement was provided +by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and the Army had neither +the resources nor the responsiveness to activate reserve forces needed +to meet the truck and rail support requirements of our military +forces. As a result, costly airlift was used to move forces that +should have traveled by land and sea. If added space capabilities had +been needed, there was almost no capability for the timely launch of a +satellite. Would it not be wise to index spending on land, sea, air, +and space launch on one and other, postulate lift requirements on what +the new force needs as it innovates and slims down. The need to +respond on a moment's notice adds to the value of airlift and +prepositioned ships. The outcome though would be not to allow any of +the Services to divert general support money into core competencies +and thereby shift the jointness burden to another Service. + +Innovate. Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly the +fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded. Accept +the benefits of Federal Express that can be federalized during times +of national emergency as a costly, but ready augmentation to military +supply lines that has no cost during the much longer periods of +peacetime. Our nation has other industrial capacities that also have +duplicate military capabilities. They may be 80 percent solutions, but +the cost of ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance of a +military owned and operated 100 percent solution. Iridium telephones +may not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent of the time they +will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost. Of course, this +avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our medieval +acquisition system. + +Finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that will +assure the future force capability will be enduring. We cannot keep up +with technology using our current ways of acquiring military hardware +and training our people in how to use and maintain it. In many areas +we would be better off to throw it away when it breaks given the low +cost, durability, and reliability of modern solid state electronics. +Why train technicians? Give the troops a gold card and a telephone +number and they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our +government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do buy not only +integrates with that of other services and functions, but that it can +integrate with both older and newer equipment designated to do the +same function. The fighter aircraft secure radio must be capable of +communicating with the ground and sea based forces command and +control, as importantly it must be able to communicate with the next +generation fighter aircraft radio. + +The added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to fight +alone in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from forming +coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force structure we +maintain in declining budget years. An enduring force must also +recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively with the forces of +other nations. This means we must more freely release our technologies +to foreign nations so that our military forces can fight side by side, +so that our deployment forces can draw from stocks of others while our +logistics system seeks to catch up with the rapidly deployed combat +force. + +In the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our +military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal change in +the policy side of the equation. What good are highly trained, +efficient, capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the +implementing authorities are incapable of defining principles, goals, +and integrating strategies for their employment? While this is not the +province of the military to solve, the military must understand how +disjointed policy, weak political leadership, or dysfunctional +international cooperation will preclude success on the battlefield. + +Again, one of the missed lessons of _Desert Storm_ was the difficult +and successful integration of international leadership achieved by the +President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of +Staff, Congressional leaders, and allied National Command Authorities +as well as many others. It was this leadership, coupled with the +ineptness of the enemy, that covered over the failures of our Cold +War-equipped and trained forces that fought _Desert Storm_. This does +not take anything away from the military victory, but it does make it +difficult to glean the right lessons for the future. Perhaps that is +why we are so loathe to change our forces at a time when change is +demanded by a new strategic environment and new threats to our +national security. Defining alternative forces in light of the changed +national security environment, goals and strategy raises two +questions: what kind or mix of military force and how much best +balances the requirements and funds available. + + +Deep Strike: A Key to Shock and Awe + +In the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases, all +initial responses to combat operations will be some form of deep +strike. Given strategic warning (don't bet on it) after deployment of +our military forces, Deep Strike is a term that relates to the +political boundaries or proximity to military forces. The geography of +the area of conflict will further define deep strike. But a rule of +thumb might be attacks on a target beyond range of surface-based fires +except for ballistic or cruise missiles. More important than range is +the characteristics of the Deep Strike targets. Deep Strike targets +could be classified as ones the enemy does not wish to place at high +levels of risk. They can be characterized by the functions they +perform, such as: + + - Leadership + - Command and Control (a function of leadership) + - Control of Military Forces, especially air and space + - Logistics and Sustainment + - National Economic Base + - Internal Security/Political + - National Will, Theirs and Ours + +Intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes must +examine the functions and then define the physical objects or people +who comprise the system which is responsible for the successful +operation of the function. You define the system and then attack the +critical elements in order to achieve economy of force. Often these +target sets are difficult to define, as these functions often +represent the enemy's most valuable and therefore protected elements. +The intelligence collection associated with each function will vary +from target set to target set. Large, fixed infrastructure, such as +associated with an electrical grid, lends itself to traditional +reconnaissance and evaluation of technical analysis. Leadership +targets are better defined by using human intelligence and subjective +analysis. In all cases success starts with innovative intelligence +products, which has not been a hallmark of United States operations. +Such intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of the +enemy, their values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments based +on our viewpoint. + +One target system may serve the attainment of a number of different +goals. For example, attacks on the electrical power system of the +enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and control his military +forces, operate vital elements of the economy and thus degrade the +political support required to sustain the conflict. This same target +system may be attacked a variety of ways. Most common methods would be +using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and +switching centers. Areas with isolated populations lend themselves to +using special operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated +power grid node for transmission of energy from one highly populated +area to another. Now it is obvious that computer signals used to +command the power grid are targets as intrusion into the enemy's +control system provides the means to simply turn off electricity to +selected areas. Attacks by all these means achieves even greater +results than the sum of its parts because enemy responses to restore +electrical power will be confused as elements such as computer +intrusion are confused with bombing destruction. + +The characteristics of value in attacking these important targets +systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. The greatest effect +will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated in such a manner as +to inflict maximum Shock and Awe on the enemy element. This means +operations must be coordinated and orchestrated carefully and flexibly +as enemy reaction to the attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is +projected when a combination of functions or target sets supporting a +variety of functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In +order to achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be +evaluated quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of +the system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system. +Finally, the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the +functions as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take hold. In +order to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the attacker must +know the current and projected effects of his strikes against elements +of the enemy's residual system. If the trick is to define the system +of targets needed to conduct successful Deep Strike, it is even more +important to know how to alter the initial plan as the battle unfolds +and timing becomes everything. + +The characteristics of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike are long +range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed. Cost of the +operation is a factor; however, system cost must include peacetime +operations and maintenance costs as well of the costs during actual +combat. There is also a human element in the cost of combat operations +which escalates rapidly as military force is misused. The total cost +of these operations must also address the cost of intelligence used to +support Deep Strikes. Intelligence operations may be the most costly +due to the importance of these targets to the enemy. Alternatively, +the human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the most +inexpensive since their national importance makes them vulnerable to +knowl-edgeable dissidents. + + +Stand-off + +Deep Strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. Some of +the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances beyond the +nation's control; for example, Seoul borders on North Korea. Our +protective oceans mean that likely conflict is offshore. The +likelihood our next adversary may have access to surveillance, +precision munitions, and long-range delivery systems dictates that +much of our operations will be at long range, lest our forces come +under attack at their ports, camps, and bases. There will be a need +for systems capable of projecting military force from distances of +10,000KM. A sizable portion of the force must be able to deliver +ordnance of enemy targets from ranges in excess of 5,000KM. Launching +attacks from inside 1,000KM of the enemy forces will demand that +friendly forces be protected from attack by means of active and +passive defenses and dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude +achieving levels of Shock and Awe through simultaneous attack. + + +Survivability + +Great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the +attack is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built for the most +demanding conflict must also be flexible for other operations. +Therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed, and +survivability in reaching their target, their cost become prohibitive +in large-scale operations which endure beyond a few hours, or in +smaller-scale operations where the goals are modest and the demands on +other military forces are low. Simultaneous combat operations require +a number of expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours of +the conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock. Awe is +not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience in being +attacked; at best you may make them numb. Alternatively, reusable +long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility to alter the +Deep Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of weapons systems +ranges from the most valuable systems such as ballistic missiles, +cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less valuable, but useful, +stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface high trajectory +fires. + + +Firepower + +Discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of people and +structures being in close proximity to the desired target. It is not +improbable that the national command center is located next door to a +children's hospital. + +Discriminate fires require precision in target cordinate +identification and location. Precision does not mean "small warhead," +although there is a beneficial impact as the right amount of explosive +is placed on the target due the penalties imposed on the delivery +vehicle required to carry the warhead long distances. All operations +involving the use of firepower must also understand and evaluate the +beneficial aspects of using non-destructive elements in conjunction +with the attack to include all aspects of the so-called information +warfare. + + + + +Appendix C + +Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance +by General Fred Franks + + + +Rapid Dominance, as we see it, is a markedly different concept for the +use of force to gain national security ob jectives. At its core, Rapid +Dominance blends unique capabilities of land, sea, air, space, and +special operating forces. It is important to note the vital role of +jointness in using forces from all elements and resisting the lure of +gimmicks and cost-free options that may appear within the reach of +high technology but are not. + +Examining current joint force capabilities reveals some enduring +truths that should be used to evaluate future concepts. Joint force +commanders today benefit from the wide array of capabilities available +to the joint warfighting team. The ability to combine and use forces +from all dimensions in a variety of powerful combinations to fit +mission circumstances presents a versatility of capabilities that +makes defense by adversaries difficult. Balance and versatility are +key. Balance in capabilities and the inherent versatility to combine +them in unpredictable, yet highly effective ways has served U.S. +national security interests well since the end of the Cold War. One +has only to look at the variety of methods employed in Panama (1989), +Desert Storm (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994), and +Bosnia (1995) in both war and operations other than war. Joint force +commanders employed, and in some cases invented, new combinations of +balanced capabilities and were willing to go beyond the confines of +service doctrines to fit mission circumstances. For example, a U.S. +Army brigade of the 10th Mountain Division with helicopters replaced +much of the carrier air wing and flew off the carrier Eisenhower +during the Haiti operation. This force packaging capability is an +advantage unique to the U.S. + +As we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense concepts +such as Rapid Dominance, the key will be to maintain that balance in +land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces combinations +available to the joint force commander. U.S. military forces are now +multidimensional in capabilities, able to use force in ways +unpredictable to an adversary. U.S. forces also have enormous +versatility, able to be used in war and what have become termed +operations other than war. Balance permits that. + +Moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability, have +found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly given today's +methods. Recently, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division rapidly +deployed by air from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Kuwait and was able to fall +in on equipment forward positioned and be available for combat soon +after arrival. A recent article in Navy Times pointed out, "In fact, +as each wave of soldiers arrived in Kuwait, they were heading north -- +combat ready -- within six hours." This was a dramatic example of the +rapid ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using +both distant forces with those already in the theater. That +combination in that set of strategic circumstances provided a rapid +deterrent in an area of vital national security interests to the U.S. + +Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and ensuring that +capacity is perceived by a potential adversary. Staying power means +the ability to press the initial advantage gained until the strategic +objective is achieved. On-the-ground presence, in addition to forces +in theater, as demonstrated in Kuwait in 1993 and again in 1996, +provided commitment and staying power to convince Iraq that it would +be disastrous to consider any form of military action. The inherent +staying power of land forces, wherever future tactical concepts may +lead, makes them a powerful contributing partner in our Rapid +Dominance concept. + +Finally, there is the issue of physical control. Control combines with +staying power to defeat the enemy's will. One of the many lessons of +Desert Storm is that it was not until after land forces attacked Iraq +and Kuwait that Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. Despite the +awesome shock and destructive effects of attacks f rom the air and +sea, it was only after coalition ground attacks to extend control to +both Kuwait and southeastern Iraq by defeat and destruction of +defending Iraqi forces that strategic objectives were secured. Control +on land was extended past the cease fire until such time in April as +the UN passed a permanent cease fire and sanctions resolution. Land +forces remaining in southeastern Iraq provided the staying power and +control. + +The size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in all +elements will assuredly change in the future. Early work done in +advanced warfighting experiments out of TRADOC's Battle Labs beginning +in 1992 and growing into the current Force XXI and other promising +capabilities as well as by the USMC at MCCDC at Quantico are the +precursors of how change may be discovered and implemented. The +challenge is to ensure that all components of our fighting power are +properly balanced and combined into the most effective and lethal +mixes of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. This is +the heart of the Rapid Dominance force of the future. + +Extension of real and perceived control over the will and ability of +any adversary to oppose or threaten us will insure and guarantee +success of initial operations, thereby maximizing Shock and Awe. +Indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operationally will be a +major factor in achieving the enduring effects of Shock and Awe. +Certainly, as forces on land evolve and change, they must meet the +requirements of rapidity and sustainment and are vital components of +any mix of forces that seek by Shock and Awe to stun and then rapidly +dominate an adversary to achieve U.S. national security objectives. + +We strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in exploring +defense alternatives. We must seize this time to be bold in our +thinking. More thought and hypotheses with operational methods that +break through or expand current service doctrines are needed from a +joint perspective even as services look to the future from their own +service perspective. Then there must be rigorous experiments using +both high fidelity simulations and actual joint field trials to +determine the worth of these hypotheses to blend the wide array of +technology available to the total joint force and according to bold +new concepts. The results will determine the worth of Rapid Dominance +concepts by judging whether they will permit even more balanced, +versatile, and lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated future +strategic circumstances. + + + + +Study Group Members + + + +*/L.A. "Bud" Edney/* is a retired Navy admiral and naval aviator. A +veteran of over 350 combat missions in Vietnam, Admiral Edney's senior +billets included Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, +Atlantic Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Edney has +an advanced degree from Harvard and was a 1970 White House Fellow. + +*/Fred M. Franks/* is a retired Army general and a highly experienced +combat armor officer. During the Gulf War, he commanded VII Corps and +last served as Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine +Command. He has two master's degrees from Columbia and is a graduate +of the National War College. He is the author of _Into the Storm, a +Study in Command,_ written with Tom Clancy to be published by G.P. +Putnam's Sons in 1997. + +*/Charles A. Horner/* is a retired Air Force general and a highly +experienced combat fighter and attack pilot. During the Gulf War, +General Horner commanded all allied air forces. His last assignment +was Commander-in-Chief, Space Command. A graduate of the National War +College, he now serves as consultant to government and industry. + +*/Jonathan T. Howe/* is a retired Navy admiral and both a submarine and +surface warfare qualified officer. He has served as Deputy Assistant +to the President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Chairman of +NATO's Military Committee, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern +Europe/CINC U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and was Special Representative +of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia. He has a Ph.D. from the +Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and currently heads a charitable +foundation. + +*/Harlan K. Ullman/* divides his time between the worlds of business and +public policy. A former naval person, he is with the Center for +Strategic and International Studies and the Center for Naval Analyses. +His last book, _IN IRONS: U.S. Military Might in the New Century,_ was +published by the National Defense University Press in 1995. + +*/James P. Wade, Jr./*, a scientist by training, is a West Point +graduate and infantry officer. He has held many senior positions in +DOD, including head of Policy Planning, Assistant to SECDEF for Atomic +Energy, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, and Acting Head of +Defense Research and Engineering. He is Chairman and CEO of DGI which +conducted this study. + +*/Keith Brendley/* is a Vice President with Defense Group Inc. He was +formerly with Sarcos Research Corporation, RAND, System Planning +Corporation and NASA, Ames Research Center. He holds mechanical +engineering degrees from the University of Illinois (B.S.) and the +University of Maryland (M.S.). + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Shock and Awe +by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. 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