diff options
| author | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-21 20:39:49 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-21 20:39:49 -0800 |
| commit | 0ceba49ef2511c9d41d23db992244c81392479f6 (patch) | |
| tree | ffb829e99ede027f13e09c83c6c9303b7c37e1a0 | |
| parent | 2eab1a74260e22c6ea358348ff3fc8cdf80b70ca (diff) | |
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68219-0.txt | 1294 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68219-0.zip | bin | 28900 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68219-h.zip | bin | 319331 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68219-h/68219-h.htm | 1941 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68219-h/images/cover.jpg | bin | 240830 -> 0 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/68219-h/images/crest.jpg | bin | 64038 -> 0 bytes |
9 files changed, 17 insertions, 3235 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2223657 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #68219 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/68219) diff --git a/old/68219-0.txt b/old/68219-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f896e9e..0000000 --- a/old/68219-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1294 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Decadence, by Arthur James Balfour - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Decadence - Henry Sidgwick memorial lecture - -Author: Arthur James Balfour - -Release Date: June 1, 2022 [eBook #68219] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Thomas Frost and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team - at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images - generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DECADENCE *** - - - - - - CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, - C. F. CLAY, MANAGER. - London: FETTER LANE, E.C. - Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET. - - [Illustration] - - Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS. - New York: G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS. - Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD. - - [_All Rights reserved_] - - - - - DECADENCE - - _HENRY SIDGWICK MEMORIAL - LECTURE_ - - by - - THE RIGHT HON. - ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.P. - - [DELIVERED AT NEWNHAM COLLEGE, - JANUARY 25, 1908] - - - CAMBRIDGE - at the University Press - 1908 - - - - - Cambridge: - PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. - AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. - - - - -DECADENCE. - - -I must begin what I have to say with a warning and an apology. I must -warn you that the present essay makes no pretence to be an adequate -treatment of some compact and limited theme; but rather resembles those -wandering trains of thought, where we allow ourselves the luxury of -putting wide-ranging questions, to which our ignorance forbids any -confident reply. I apologise for adopting a course which thus departs -in some measure from familiar precedent. I admit its perils. But it is -just possible that when a subject, or group of subjects, is of great -inherent interest, even a tentative, and interrogative, treatment of it -may be worth attempting. - -My subject, or at least my point of departure, is Decadence. I do -not mean the sort of decadence often attributed to certain phases of -artistic or literary development, in which an overwrought technique, -straining to express sentiments too subtle or too morbid, is deemed to -have supplanted the direct inspiration of an earlier and a simpler age. -Whether these autumnal glories, these splendours touched with death, -are recurring phenomena in the literary cycle: whether, if they be, -they are connected with other forms of decadence, may be questions well -worth asking and answering. But they are not the questions with which I -am at present concerned. The decadence respecting which I wish to put -questions is not literary or artistic, it is political and national. -It is the decadence which attacks, or is alleged to attack, great -communities and historic civilisations: which is to societies of men -what senility is to man, and is often, like senility, the precursor and -the cause of final dissolution. - -It is curious how deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse are traces -of the conviction that childhood, maturity, and old age, are stages -in the corporate, as they are in the individual, life. “A young and -vigorous nation,” “a decrepit and moribund civilisation”--phrases like -these, and scores of others containing the same implication, come as -trippingly from the tongue as if they suggested no difficulty and -called for no explanation. To Macaulay (unless I am pressing his famous -metaphor too far) it seemed natural that ages hence a young country -like New Zealand should be flourishing, but not less natural that an -old country like England should have decayed. Berkeley, in a well-known -stanza, tells how the drama of civilisation has slowly travelled -westwards to find its loftiest development, but also its final -catastrophe, in the New World. While every man who is weary, hopeless, -or disillusioned talks as if he had caught these various diseases from -the decadent epoch in which he was born. - -But why _should_ civilisations thus wear out and great communities -decay? and what evidence is there that in fact they do? These -questions, though I cannot give to them any conclusive answers, are -of much more than a merely theoretic interest. For if current modes -of speech take decadence more or less for granted, with still greater -confidence do they speak of Progress as assured. Yet if both are -real they can hardly be studied apart, they must evidently limit and -qualify each other in actual experience, and they cannot be isolated in -speculation. - -Though antiquity, Pagan and Christian, took a different view, it -seems easier, _a priori_, to understand Progress than Decadence. Even -if the former be limited, as presumably it is, by the limitation of -human faculty, we should expect the ultimate boundary to be capable of -indefinite approach, and we should _not_ expect that any part of the -road towards it, once traversed, would have to be retraced. Even in the -organic world, decay and death, familiar though they be, are phenomena -that call for scientific explanation. And Weismann has definitely asked -how it comes about that the higher organisms grow old and die, seeing -that old age and death are not inseparable characteristics of living -protoplasm, and that the simplest organisms suffer no natural decay, -perishing, when they do perish, by accident, starvation, or specific -disease. - -The answer he gives to his own question is that the death of the -individual is so useful to the race, that Natural Selection has, in -all but the very lowest species, exterminated the potentially immortal. - -One is tempted to enquire, whether this ingenious explanation could be -so modified as to apply not merely to individuals but to communities. -Is it needful for the cause of civilisation as a whole, that the -organised embodiment of each particular civilisation, if and when -its free development is arrested, should make room for younger and -more vigorous competitors? And if so can we find in Natural Selection -the mechanism by which the principle of decay and dissolution shall -be so implanted in the very nature of human associations that a due -succession among them shall always be maintained? - -To this second question the answer must, I think, be in the negative. -The struggle for existence between different races and different -societies has admittedly played a great part in social development. But -to extend Weismann’s idea from the organic to the social world, would -imply a prolonged competition between groups of communities in which -decadence was the rule, and groups in which it was not;--ending in the -survival of the first, and the destruction of the second. The groups -whose members suffered periodical decadence and dissolution would be -the fittest to survive: just as, on Weismann’s theory, those species -gain in competitive efficiency whom death has unburdened of the old. - -Few will say that in the petty fragment of human history which alone -is open to our inspection, there is satisfactory evidence of any such -long drawn process. Some may even be disposed to ask whether there -is adequate evidence of such a phenomenon as decadence at all. And -it must be acknowledged that the affirmative answer should be given -with caution. Evidently we must not consider a diminution of national -power, whether relative or absolute, as constituting by itself a proof -of national decadence. Holland is not decadent because her place in -the hierarchy of European Powers is less exalted than it was two -hundred and fifty years ago. Spain was not necessarily decadent at -the end of the seventeenth century because she had exhausted herself -in a contest far beyond her resources either in money or in men. It -would, I think, be rash even to say that Venice was decadent at the -end of the eighteenth century, though the growth of other Powers, and -the diversion of the great trade routes, had shorn her of wealth and -international influence. These are misfortunes which in the sphere of -sociology correspond to accident or disease in the sphere of biology. -And what we are concerned to know is whether in the sphere of sociology -there is also anything corresponding to the decay of old age--a decay -which may be hastened by accident or disease, which must be ended by -accident or disease, but is certainly to be distinguished from both. - -However this question should be answered the cases I have cited are -sufficient to shew where the chief difficulty of the enquiry lies. -Decadence, even if it be a reality, never acts in isolation. It is -always complicated with, and often acts through, other more obvious -causes. It is always therefore possible to argue that to these causes, -and not to the more subtle and elusive influences collectively -described as ’decadence,’ the decline and fall of great communities is -really due. - -Yet there are historic tragedies which (as it seems to me) do most -obstinately refuse to be thus simply explained. It is in vain that -historians enumerate the public calamities which preceded, and no doubt -contributed to, the final catastrophe. Civil dissensions, military -disasters, pestilences, famines, tyrants, tax-gatherers, growing -burdens, and waning wealth--the gloomy catalogue is unrolled before our -eyes, yet somehow it does not in all cases wholly satisfy us: we feel -that some of these diseases are of a kind which a vigorous body politic -should easily be able to survive, that others are secondary symptoms of -some obscurer malady, and that in neither case do they supply us with -the full explanations of which we are in search. - -Consider for instance the long agony and final destruction of Roman -Imperialism in the West, the most momentous catastrophe of which we -have historic record. It has deeply stirred the imagination of mankind, -it has been the theme of great historians, it has been much explained -by political philosophers, yet who feels that either historians or -philosophers have laid bare the inner workings of the drama? Rome -fell, and great was the fall of it. But why it fell, by what secret -mines its defences were breached, and what made its garrison so -faint-hearted and ineffectual--this is not so clear. - -In order to measure adequately the difficulty of the problem let us -abstract our minds from historical details and compare the position of -the Empire about the middle of the second century, with its position -in the middle of the third, or again at the end of the fourth, and -ask of what forces history gives us an account, sufficient in these -periods to effect so mighty a transformation. Or, still better, imagine -an observer equipped with our current stock of political wisdom, -transported to Rome in the reign of Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius, -and in ignorance of the event, writing letters to the newspapers on the -future destinies of the Empire. What would his forecast be? - -We might suppose him to examine, in the first place, the military -position of the State, its probable enemies, its capacities for -defence. He would note that only on its eastern boundary was there -an organised military Power capable of meeting Rome on anything like -equal terms, and this only in the regions adjacent to their common -frontier. For the rest he would discover no civilised enemy along -the southern boundary to the Atlantic or along its northern boundary -from the Black Sea to the German Ocean. Warlike tribes indeed he -would find in plenty: difficult to crush within the limits of their -native forests and morasses, formidable it may be in a raid, but -without political cohesion, military unity, or the means of military -concentration;--embarrassing therefore rather than dangerous. -If reminded of Varus and his lost legions, he would ask of what -importance, in the story of a world-power could be the loss of a -few thousand men surprised at a distance from their base amid the -entanglements of a difficult and unknown country. Never, it would seem, -was Empire more fortunately circumstanced for purposes of home defence. - -But (it might be thought) the burden of securing frontiers of such -length, even against merely tribal assaults, though easy from a -strictly military point of view, might prove too heavy to be long -endured. Yet the military forces scattered through the Roman Empire, -though apparently adequate in the days of her greatness would, -according to modern ideas, seem hardly sufficient for purposes of -police, let alone defence. An army corps or less was deemed enough -to preserve what are now mighty kingdoms, from internal disorder and -external aggression. And if we compare with this the contributions, -either in the way of money or of men, exacted from the territories -subject to Rome before the Empire came into being, or at any period of -the world’s history since it dissolved away, the comparison must surely -be entirely in favour of the Empire. - -But burdens which seem light, if measured by area, may be heavy if -measured by ability to pay. Yet when has ability to pay been greater -in the regions bordering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean than -under the Roman Empire? Travel round it in imagination, eastward -from the Atlantic coast of Morocco till returning westward you reach -the head of the Adriatic Gulf, and you will have skirted a region, -still of immense natural wealth, once filled with great cities, and -fertile farms, better governed during the Empire than it has ever been -governed since (at least till Algeria became French and Egypt British); -including among its provinces what were great states before the Roman -rule, and have been great states since that rule decayed, divided -by no international jealousies, oppressed by no fear of conquest, -enterprising, cultured. Remember that to estimate its area of taxation -and recruiting you must add to these regions Bulgaria, Servia, much -of Austria and Bavaria, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, -and most of Britain, and you have conditions favourable to military -strength and economic prosperity rarely equalled in the modern world -and never in the ancient. - -Our observer however might, very rightly, feel that a far-spreading -Empire like that of Rome, including regions profoundly differing in -race, history and religion, would be liable to other dangers than -those which arise from mere external aggression. One of the first -questions, therefore, which he would be disposed to ask, is whether -so heterogeneous a state was not in perpetual danger of dissolution -through the disintegrating influence of national sentiments. He would -learn probably, with a strong feeling of surprise, that with the single -exception of the Jews, the constituent nations, once conquered, were -not merely content to belong to the Empire, but could scarcely imagine -themselves doing anything else: that the Imperial system appealed, not -merely to the material needs of the component populations, but also to -their imagination and their loyalty; that Gaul, Spain, and Britain, -though but recently forced within the pale of civilisation, were as -faithful to the Imperial ideal as the Greek of Athens or the Hellenised -Orientals of Syria; and that neither historic memories, nor local -patriotism, neither disputed succession, nor public calamities, nor -administrative divisions, ever really shook the sentiment in favour of -Imperial Unity. There might be more than one Emperor: but there could -only be one Empire. Howsoever our observer might disapprove of the -Imperial system he would therefore have to admit that the Empire, with -all its shortcomings, its absolutism and its bureaucracy, had solved -more successfully than any government, before or since, the problem of -devising a scheme which equally satisfied the sentiments of East and -West; which respected local feelings, encouraged local government; in -which the Celt, the Iberian, the Berber, the Egyptian, the Asiatic, -the Greek, the Illyrian, the Italian were all at home, and which, -though based on conquest, was accepted by the conquered as the natural -organisation of the civilised world. - -Rome had thus unique sources of strength. What sources of weakness -would our observer be likely to detect behind her imposing exterior? -The diminution of population is the one which has (rightly I think) -most impressed historians: and it is difficult to resist the evidence, -either of the fact, or of its disastrous consequences. I hesitate -indeed to accept without qualification the accounts given us of the -progressive decay of the native Italian stock from the days of the -Gracchi to the disintegration of the Empire in the West: and when we -read how the dearth of men was made good (in so far as it was made -good) by the increasing inflow of slaves and adventurers from every -corner of the known world, one wonders _whose_ sons they were who, for -three centuries and more, so brilliantly led the van of modern European -culture, as it emerged from the darkness of the early Middle Ages. -Passing by such collateral issues, however, and admitting depopulation -to have been both real and serious, we may well ask whether it was not -the result of Roman decadence rather than its cause, the symptom of -some deep-seated social malady, not its origin. We are not concerned -here with the aristocracy of Rome, nor even with the people of Italy. -We are concerned with the Empire. We are not concerned with a passing -phase or fashion, but with a process which seems to have gone on with -increasing rapidity, through good times as well as bad, till the final -cataclysm. A local disease might have a local explanation, a transient -one might be due to a chance coincidence. But what can we say of a -disease which was apparently co-extensive with Imperial civilisation in -area, and which exceeded it in duration? - -I find it hard to believe that either a selfish aversion to matrimony -or a mystical admiration for celibacy, though at certain periods the -one was common in Pagan and the other in Christian circles, were -more than elements in the complex of causes by which the result was -brought about. Like the plagues which devastated Europe in the second -and third centuries, they must have greatly aggravated the evil, but -they are hardly sufficient to account for it. Nor yet can we find -an explanation of it in the discouragement, the sense of impending -doom, by which men’s spirits were oppressed long before the Imperial -power began visibly to wane, for this is one of the things which, if -historically true, does itself most urgently require explanation. - -It may be however that our wandering politician would be too well -grounded in Malthusian economics to regard a diminution of population -as in itself an overwhelming calamity. And if he were pressed to -describe the weak spots in the Empire of the Antonines he would be -disposed, I think, to look for them on the ethical rather than on the -military, the economic, or the strictly political sides of social life. -He would be inclined to say, as in effect Mr Lecky does say, that in -the institution of slavery, in the brutalities of the gladiatorial -shows, in the gratuitous distribution of bread to the urban mobs, are -to be found the corrupting influences which first weakened and then -destroyed the vigour of the State. - -I confess that I cannot easily accept this analysis of the facts. As -regards the gladiatorial shows, even had they been universal throughout -the Empire, and had they flourished more rankly as its power declined, -I should still have questioned the propriety of attributing too -far-reaching effects to such a cause. The Romans were brutal while they -were conquering the world: its conquest enabled them to be brutal with -ostentation; but we must not measure the ill consequences of their -barbaric tastes by the depth of our own disgusts, nor assume the Gothic -invasions to be the natural and fitting Nemesis of so much spectacular -shedding of innocent blood. - -As for the public distributions of corn, one would wish to have more -evidence as to its social effects. But even without fully accepting the -theory of the latest Roman historian, who believes that, under the then -prevailing conditions of transport, no very large city could exist in -Antiquity, if the supply of its food were left to private enterprise, -we cannot seriously regard this practice, strange as it seems to us, as -an important element in the problem. Granting for the sake of argument -that it demoralised the mob of Rome, it must be remembered that Rome -was not the Empire, nor did the mob of Rome govern the Empire, as once -it had governed the Republic. - -Slavery is a far more important matter. The magnitude of its effects on -ancient societies, difficult as these are to disentangle, can hardly be -exaggerated. But with what plausibility can we find in it the cause of -Rome’s decline, seeing that it was the concomitant also of its rise? -How can that which in Antiquity was common to every state, have this -exceptional and malign influence upon one? It would not in any case be -easy to accept such a theory; but surely it becomes impossible when we -bear in mind the enormous improvement effected under the Empire both in -the law and the practice of slavery. Great as were its evils, they were -diminishing evils--less ruinous as time went on to the character of the -master, less painful and degrading to the slave. Who can believe that -this immemorial custom could, in its decline, destroy a civilisation, -which, in its vigour, it had helped to create? - -Of course our observer would see much in the social system he was -examining which he would rightly regard as morally detestable and -politically pernicious. But the real question before him would not be -‘are these things good or bad?’ but ‘are these things getting better -or getting worse?’ And surely in most cases he would be obliged to -answer ‘getting better.’ Many things moreover would come under his -notice fitted to move his admiration in a much less qualified manner. -Few governments have been more anxious to foster an alien and higher -culture, than was the Roman Government to foster Greek civilisation. -In so far as Rome inherited what Alexander conquered, it carried out -the ideal which Alexander had conceived. In few periods have the rich -been readier to spend of their private fortunes on public objects. -There never was a community in which associations for every purpose of -mutual aid or enjoyment sprang more readily into existence. There never -was a military monarchy less given to wars of aggression. There never -was an age in which there was a more rapid advance in humanitarian -ideals, or a more anxious seeking after spiritual truth. There was much -discussion, there was, apart from politics, but little intolerance. -Education was well endowed, and its professors held in high esteem. -Physical culture was cared for. Law was becoming scientific. Research -was not forgotten. What more could be reasonably expected? - -According to our ordinary methods of analysis it is not easy to say -what more _could_ be reasonably expected. But plainly much more was -required. In a few generations from the time of which I am speaking -the Empire lost its extraordinary power of assimilating alien and -barbaric elements. It became too feeble either to absorb or to expel -them: and the immigrants who in happier times might have bestowed -renewed vigour on the commonwealth, became, in the hour of its decline, -a weakness and a peril. Poverty grew as population shrank. Municipal -office, once so eagerly desired, became the most cruel of burdens. -Associations connected with industry or commerce, which began by freely -exchanging public service for public privilege, found their members -subjected to ever increasing obligations, for the due performance of -which they and their children were liable in person and in property. -Thus while Christianity, and the other forces that made for mercy, were -diminishing the slavery of the slave, the needs of the Bureaucracy -compelled it to trench ever more and more upon the freedom of the -free. It was each man’s duty (so ran the argument) to serve the -commonwealth: he could best serve the commonwealth by devoting himself -to his calling if it were one of public necessity: this duty he should -be required under penalties to perform, and to devote if necessary to -its performance, labour to the limits of endurance, fortune to the -last shilling, and family to the remotest generation. Through this -crude experiment in socialism, the civilised world seemed to be rapidly -moving towards a system of universal caste, imposed by no immemorial -custom, supported by no religious scruple, but forced on an unwilling -people by the Emperor’s edict and the executioner’s lash. - -These things have severally and collectively been regarded as the -causes why in the West the Imperial system so quickly crumbled into -chaos. And so no doubt they were. But they obviously require themselves -to be explained by causes more general and more remote; and what were -these? If I answer as I feel disposed to answer--Decadence--you will -properly ask how the unknown becomes less unknown merely by receiving -a name. I reply that if there be indeed subtle changes in the social -tissues of old communities which make them, as time goes on, less -resistant to the external attacks and the internal disturbances by -which all communities are threatened, overt recognition of the fact -is a step in advance. We have not an idea of what ‘life’ consists in, -but if on that account we were to abstain from using the term, we -should not be better but worse equipped for dealing with the problems -of physiology; while on the other hand if we could translate life -into terms of matter and motion to-morrow, we should still be obliged -to use the word in order to distinguish the material movements which -constitute life or exhibit it, from those which do not. In like manner -we are ignorant of the inner character of the cell changes which -produce senescence. But should we be better fitted to form a correct -conception of the life-history of complex organisms if we refused to -recognise any cause of death but accident or disease? I admit, of -course, that the term ‘decadence’ is less precise than ‘old age’: -as sociology deals with organisms far less definite than biology. I -admit also that it explains nothing. If its use is to be justified at -all, the justification must depend not on the fact that it supplies an -explanation, but on the fact that it rules out explanations which are -obvious but inadequate. And this may be a service of some importance. -The facile generalisations with which we so often season the study of -dry historic fact; the habits of political discussion which induce us -to catalogue for purposes of debate the outward signs that distinguish -(as we are prone to think) the standing from the falling state, hide -the obscurer, but more potent, forces which silently prepare the -fate of empires. National character is subtle and elusive; not to be -expressed in statistics nor measured by the rough methods which suffice -the practical moralist or statesman. And when through an ancient and -still powerful state there spreads a mood of deep discouragement, when -the reaction against recurring ills grows feebler, and the ship rises -less buoyantly to each succeeding wave, when learning languishes, -enterprise slackens, and vigour ebbs away, then, as I think, there is -present some process of social degeneration, which we must perforce -recognise, and which, pending a satisfactory analysis, may conveniently -be distinguished by the name of ‘decadence.’ - -I am well aware that though the space I have just devoted to the -illustration of my theme provided by Roman history is out of all -proportion to the general plan of this address, yet the treatment of -it is inadequate and perhaps unconvincing. But those who are most -reluctant to admit that decay, as distinguished from misfortune, may -lower the general level of civilisation, can hardly deny that in many -cases that level may for indefinite periods shew no tendency to rise. -If decadence be unknown, is not progress exceptional? Consider the -changing politics of the unchanging East[1]. Is it not true that there, -while wars and revolutions, dynastic and religious, have shattered -ancient states and brought new ones into being, every community, as -soon as it has risen above the tribal and nomad condition, adopts -with the rarest exceptions a form of government which, from its -very generality in Eastern lands, we habitually call an ‘oriental -despotism’? We may crystallise and re-crystallise a soluble salt as -often as we please, the new crystals will always resemble the old ones. -The crystals, indeed, may be of different sizes, their component -molecules may occupy different positions within the crystalline -structure, but the structure itself will be of one immutable pattern. -So it is, or seems to be, with these oriental states. They rise, in -turn, upon the ruins of their predecessors, themselves predestined -to perish by a like fate. But whatever their origin or history, they -are always either autocracies or aggregations of autocracies; and no -differences of race, of creed, or of language seem sufficient to vary -the violent monotony of their internal history. In the eighteenth -century theorists were content to attribute the political servitude of -the Eastern world to the unscrupulous machinations of tyrants and their -tools. And such explanations are good as far as they go. But this, in -truth, is not very far. Intrigue, assassination, ruthless repression, -the whole machinery of despotism supply particular explanations of -particular incidents. They do not supply the general explanation of -the general phenomenon. They tell you how this ruler or that obtained -absolute power. They do not tell you why every ruler is absolute. -Nor can I furnish the answer. The fact remains that over large and -relatively civilised portions of the world popular government is -profoundly unpopular, in the sense that it is no natural or spontaneous -social growth. Political absolutism not political freedom is the -familiar weed of the country. Despots change but despotism remains: and -if through alien influences, like those exercised by Greek cities in -Asia, or by British rule in India, the type is modified, it may well be -doubted whether the modification could long survive the moment when its -sustaining cause was withdrawn. - -Now it would almost seem as if in lands where this political type was -normal a certain level of culture (not of course the same in each -case) could not permanently be overpassed. If under the excitement of -religion or conquest, or else through causes more complicated and more -obscure, this limit has sometimes been left behind, reaction has always -followed, and decadence set in. Many people indeed, as I have already -observed, take this as a matter of course. It seems to them the most -natural thing in the world that the glories of the Eastern Khalifate -should decay, and that the Moors in Morocco should lose even the memory -of the learning and the arts possessed but three centuries ago by the -Moors in Spain. To me it seems mysterious. But whether it be easy of -comprehension or difficult, if only it be true, does it not furnish -food for disquieting reflexion? If there are whole groups of nations -capable on their own initiative of a certain measure of civilisation, -but capable apparently of no more, and if below them again there are -(as I suppose) other races who seem incapable of either creating a -civilisation of their own, or of preserving unaided a civilisation -impressed upon them from without, by what right do we assume that -no impassable limits bar the path of Western progress? Those limits -may not yet be in sight. Surely they are not. But does not a survey -of history suggest that somewhere in the dim future they await our -approach? - -It may be replied that the history of Rome, on which I dwelt a moment -ago, shews that arrested progress, and even decadence, may be but the -prelude to a new period of vigorous growth. So that even those races -or nations which seem frozen into eternal immobility may base upon -experience their hopes of an awakening spring. - -I am not sure, however, that this is the true interpretation of the -facts. There is no spectacle indeed in all history more impressive -than the thick darkness settling down over Western Europe, blotting -out all but a faint and distorted vision of Graeco-Roman culture, and -then, as it slowly rises, unveiling the variety and rich promise of the -modern world. But I do not think we should make this unique phenomenon -support too weighty a load of theory. I should not infer from it that -when some wave of civilisation has apparently spent its force, we -have a right to regard its withdrawing sweep as but the prelude to a -new advance. I should rather conjecture that in this particular case -we should find, among other subtle causes of decadence, some obscure -disharmony between the Imperial system and the temperament of the West, -undetected even by those who suffered from it. That system, though -accepted with contentment and even with pride, though in the days of -its greatness it brought civilisation, commerce, and security in its -train, must surely have lacked some elements which are needed to foster -among Teutons, Celts, and Iberians the qualities, whatever these may -be, on which sustained progress depends. It was perhaps too oriental -for the occident, and it certainly became more oriental as time went -on. In the East it was, comparatively speaking, successful. If there -was no progress, decadence was slow; and but for what Western Europe -did, and what it failed to do, during the long struggle with militant -Mahommedanism, there might still be an Empire in the East, largely -Asiatic in population, Christian in religion, Greek in culture, Roman -by political descent. - -Had this been the course of events large portions of mankind would -doubtless have been much better governed than they are. It is not so -clear that they would have been more ‘progressive.’ Progress is with -the West: with communities of the European type. And if _their_ energy -of development is some day to be exhausted, who can believe that there -remains any external source from which it can be renewed? Where are the -untried races competent to construct out of the ruined fragments of our -civilisation a new and better habitation for the spirit of man? They -do not exist: and if the world is again to be buried under a barbaric -flood, it will not be like that which fertilised, though it first -destroyed, the western provinces of Rome, but like that which in Asia -submerged for ever the last traces of Hellenic culture. - -We are thus brought back to the question I put a few moments since. -What grounds are there for supposing that we can escape the fate to -which other races have had to submit? If for periods which, measured -on the historic scale, are of great duration, communities which have -advanced to a certain point appear able to advance no further; if -civilisations wear out, and races become effete, why should we expect -to progress indefinitely, why for us alone is the doom of man to be -reversed? - -To these questions I have no very satisfactory answers to give, nor -do I believe that our knowledge of national or social psychology -is sufficient to make a satisfactory answer possible. Some purely -tentative observations on the point may, however, furnish a fitting -conclusion to an address which has been tentative throughout, and aims -rather at suggesting trains of thought, than at completing them. - -I assume that the factors which combine to make each generation what -it is at the moment of its entrance into adult life are in the main -twofold. The one produces the raw material of society, the process -of manufacture is effected by the other. The first is physiological -inheritance, the second is the inheritance partly of external -conditions of life, partly of beliefs[2], traditions, sentiments, -customs, laws, and organisation--all that constitute the social -surroundings in which men grow up to maturity. - -I hazard no conjecture as to the share borne respectively by these two -kinds of cause in producing their joint result. Nor are we likely to -obtain satisfactory evidence on the subject till, in the interests of -science, two communities of different blood and different traditions -consent to exchange their children at birth by a universal process -of reciprocal adoption. But even in the absence of so heroic an -experiment, it seems safe to say that the mobility which makes possible -either progress or decadence, resides rather in the causes grouped -under the second head than in the physiological material on which -education, in the widest sense of that ambiguous term, has got to -work. If, as I suppose, acquired qualities are not inherited, the only -causes which could fundamentally modify the physiological character of -any particular community are its intermixture with alien races through -slavery, conquest, or immigration; or else new conditions which varied -the relative proportion in which different sections of the population -contributed to its total numbers. If, for example, the more successful -members of the community had smaller families than the less successful; -or if medical administration succeeded in extinguishing maladies to -which persons of a particular constitution were specially liable; or -if one strain in a mixed race had a larger birth rate than another--in -these cases and in others like them, there would doubtless be a change -in the physiological factor of national character. But such changes -are not likely, I suppose, to be considerable, except, perhaps, those -due to the mixture of races;--and that only in new countries whose -economic opportunities tempt immigrants widely differing in culture, -and in capacity for culture, from those whose citizenship they propose -to share. - -The flexible element in any society, that which is susceptible of -progress or decadence, must therefore be looked for rather in the -physical and psychical conditions affecting the life of its component -units, than in their inherited constitution. This last rather supplies -a limit to variations than an element which does itself vary: though -from this point of view its importance is capital. I at least find -it quite impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely -different races with an identical environment, political, religious, -educational, what you will, can ever make them alike. They have been -different and unequal since history began; different and unequal they -are destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration. - -But though the advance of each community is thus limited by its -inherited aptitudes, I do not suppose that those limits have ever been -reached by its unaided efforts. In the cases where a forward movement -has died away, the pause must in part be due to arrested development -in the variable, not to a fixed resistance in the unchanging factor -of national character. Either external conditions are unfavourable; -or the sentiments, customs and beliefs which make society possible -have hardened into shapes which make its further self-development -impossible; or through mere weariness of spirit the community resigns -itself to a contented, or perhaps a discontented, stagnation; or it -shatters itself in pursuit of impossible ideals, or for other and -obscurer reasons, flags in its endeavours, and falls short of possible -achievement. - -Now I am quite unable to offer any such general analysis of the causes -by which these hindrances to progress are produced or removed as would -furnish a reply to my question. But it may be worth noting that a -social force has come into being, new in magnitude if not in kind, -which must favourably modify such hindrances as come under all but the -last of the divisions in which I have roughly arranged them. This force -is the modern alliance between pure science and industry. That on this -we must mainly rely for the improvement of the material conditions -under which societies live is in my opinion obvious, although no one -would conjecture it from a historic survey of political controversy. -Its direct moral effects are less obvious; indeed there are many most -excellent people who would altogether deny their existence. To regard -it as a force fitted to rouse and sustain the energies of nations -would seem to them absurd: for this would be to rank it with those -other forces which have most deeply stirred the emotions of great -communities, have urged them to the greatest exertions, have released -them most effectually from the benumbing fetters of merely personal -preoccupations,--with religion, patriotism, and politics. Industrial -expansion under scientific inspiration, so far from deserving praise -like this, is in their view, at best, but a new source of material -well-being, at worst the prolific parent of physical ugliness in -many forms, machine made wares, smoky cities, polluted rivers, and -desecrated landscapes,--appropriately associated with materialism and -greed. - -I believe this view to be utterly misleading, confounding accident with -essence, transient accompaniments with inseparable characteristics. -Should we dream of thus judging the other great social forces of which -I have spoken? Are we to ignore what religion has done for the world -because it has been the fruitful excuse for the narrowest bigotries -and the most cruel persecutions? Are we to underrate the worth of -politics, because politics may mean no more than the mindless clash of -factions, or the barren exchange of one set of tyrants or jobbers for -another? Is patriotism to be despised because its manifestations have -been sometimes vulgar, sometimes selfish, sometimes brutal, sometimes -criminal? Estimates like these seem to me worse than useless. All great -social forces are not merely capable of perversion, they are constantly -perverted. Yet were they eliminated from our social system, were each -man, acting on the advice, which Voltaire gave but never followed, to -disinterest himself of all that goes on beyond the limits of his own -cabbage garden, decadence I take it, would have already far advanced. - -But if the proposition I am defending may be wrongly criticised, it -is still more likely to be wrongly praised. To some it will commend -itself as a eulogy on an industrial as distinguished from a military -civilisation: as a suggestion that in the peaceful pursuit of wealth -there is that which of itself may constitute a valuable social tonic. -This may be true, but it is not my contention. In talking of the -alliance between industry and science my emphasis is at least as much -on the word science as on the word industry. I am not concerned now -with the proportion of the population devoted to productive labour, -or the esteem in which they are held. It is on the effects which I -believe are following, and are going in yet larger measure to follow, -from the intimate relation between scientific discovery and industrial -efficiency, that I most desire to insist. - -Do you then, it will be asked, so highly rate the utilitarian aspect -of research as to regard it as a source, not merely of material -convenience, but of spiritual elevation? Is it seriously to be ranked -with religion and patriotism as an important force for raising men’s -lives above what is small, personal, and self-centred? Does it not -rather pervert pure knowledge into a new contrivance for making money, -and give a fresh triumph to the ‘growing materialism of the age’? - -I do not myself believe that this age is either less spiritual or more -sordid than its predecessors. I believe, indeed, precisely the reverse. -But however this may be, is it not plain that if a society is to be -moved by the remote speculations of isolated thinkers it can only -be on condition that their isolation is not complete? Some point of -contact they must have with the world in which they live, and if their -influence is to be based on widespread sympathy, the contact must be -in a region where there can be, if not full mutual comprehension, at -least a large measure of practical agreement and willing co-operation. -Philosophy has never touched the mass of men except through religion. -And, though the parallel is not complete, it is safe to say that -science will never touch them unaided by its practical applications. -Its wonders may be catalogued for purposes of education, they may be -illustrated by arresting experiments, by numbers and magnitudes which -startle or fatigue the imagination; but they will form no familiar -portion of the intellectual furniture of ordinary men unless they be -connected, however remotely, with the conduct of ordinary life. Critics -have made merry over the naive self-importance which represented -man as the centre and final cause of the universe, and conceived the -stupendous mechanism of nature as primarily designed to satisfy his -wants and minister to his entertainment. But there is another, and an -opposite, danger into which it is possible to fall. The material world, -howsoever it may have gained in sublimity, has, under the touch of -science, lost (so to speak) in domestic charm. Except where it affects -the immediate needs of organic life, it may seem so remote from the -concerns of men that in the majority it will rouse no curiosity, while -of those who are fascinated by its marvels, not a few will be chilled -by its impersonal and indifferent immensity. - -For this latter mood only religion or religious philosophy can supply -a cure. But for the former, the appropriate remedy is the perpetual -stimulus which the influence of science on the business of mankind -offers to their sluggish curiosity. And even now I believe this -influence to be underrated. If in the last hundred years the whole -material setting of civilised life has altered, we owe it neither to -politicians nor to political institutions. We owe it to the combined -efforts of those who have advanced science and those who have applied -it. If our outlook upon the Universe has suffered modifications in -detail so great and so numerous that they amount collectively to a -revolution, it is to men of science we owe it, not to theologians or -philosophers. On these indeed new and weighty responsibilities are -being cast. They have to harmonise and to coordinate, to prevent the -new from being one-sided, to preserve the valuable essence of what is -old. But science is the great instrument of social change, all the -greater because its object is not change but knowledge; and its silent -appropriation of this dominant function, amid the din of political and -religious strife, is the most vital of all the revolutions which have -marked the development of modern civilisation. - -It may seem fanciful to find in a single recent aspect of this -revolution an influence which resembles religion or patriotism in -its appeals to the higher side of ordinary characters--especially -since we are accustomed to regard the appropriation by industry of -scientific discoveries merely as a means of multiplying the material -conveniences of life. But if it be remembered that this process brings -vast sections of every industrial community into admiring relation -with the highest intellectual achievement, and the most disinterested -search for truth; that those who live by ministering to the common -wants of average humanity lean for support on those who search among -the deepest mysteries of Nature; that their dependence is rewarded -by growing success; that success gives in its turn an incentive to -individual effort in no wise to be measured by personal expectation of -gain; that the energies thus aroused may affect the whole character -of the community, spreading the beneficent contagion of hope and high -endeavour through channels scarcely known, to workers[3] in fields -the most remote; if all this be borne in mind it may perhaps seem not -unworthy of the place I have assigned to it. - -But I do not offer this speculation, whatever be its worth, as an -answer to my original question. It is but an aid to optimism, not a -reply to pessimism. Such a reply can only be given by a sociology -which has arrived at scientific conclusions on the life-history of -different types of society, and has risen above the empirical and -merely interrogative point of view which, for want of a better, I -have adopted in this address. No such sociology exists at present, or -seems likely soon to be created. In its absence the conclusions at -which I provisionally arrive are that we cannot regard decadence and -arrested development as less normal in human communities than progress; -though the point at which the energy of advance is exhausted (if, -and when it is reached) varies in different races and civilisations: -that the internal causes by which progress is encouraged, hindered, -or reversed, lie to a great extent beyond the field of ordinary -political discussion, and are not easily expressed in current political -terminology: that the influence which a superior civilisation, -whether acting by example or imposed by force, may have in advancing -an inferior one, though often beneficent, is not likely to be self -supporting; its withdrawal will be followed by decadence, unless the -character of the civilisation be in harmony both with the acquired -temperament and the innate capacities of those who have been induced to -accept it: that as regards those nations which still advance in virtue -of their own inherent energies, though time has brought perhaps new -causes of disquiet, it has brought also new grounds of hope; and that -whatever be the perils in front of us, there are, so far, no symptoms -either of pause or of regression in the onward movement which for more -than a thousand years has been characteristic of Western civilisation. - - - - -NOTES: - -[1] The ‘East’ is a term most loosely used. It does not here include -China and Japan and _does_ include parts of Africa. The observations -which follow have no reference either to the Jews or to the commercial -aristocracies of Phœnician origin. - -[2] Beliefs include knowledge. - -[3] This remark arises out of a train of thought suggested by two -questions which are very pertinent to the subject of the Address. - -(1) Is a due succession of men above the average in original capacity -necessary to maintain social progress? and - -(2) If so, can we discover any law according to which such men are -produced? - -I entertain no doubt myself that the answer to the first question -should be in the affirmative. Democracy is an excellent thing; but, -though quite consistent with progress, it is not progressive _per se_. -Its value is regulative not dynamic; and if it meant (as it never does) -substantial uniformity, instead of legal equality, we should become -fossilised at once. Movement may be controlled or checked by the many; -it is initiated and made effective by the few. If (for the sake of -illustration) we suppose mental capacity in all its many forms to be -mensurable and commensurable, and then imagine two societies possessing -the same average capacity--but an average made up in one case of equal -units, in the other of a majority slightly below the average and a -minority much above it, few could doubt that the second, not the first, -would show the greatest aptitude for movement. It might go wrong, but -it would go. - -The second question--how is this originality (in its higher -manifestations called genius) effectively produced? is not so simple. - -Excluding education in its narrowest sense--which few would regard as -having much to do with the matter--the only alternatives seem to be the -following: - -Original capacity may be no more than one of the ordinary variations -incidental to heredity. A community may breed a minority thus -exceptionally gifted, as it breeds a minority of men over six feet six. -There may be an average decennial output of congenital geniuses as -there is an average decennial output of congenital idiots--though the -number is likely to be smaller. - -But if this be the sole cause of the phenomenon, why does the same race -_apparently_ produce many men of genius in one generation and few in -another? Why are years of abundance so often followed by long periods -of sterility? - -The most obvious explanation of this would seem to be that in some -periods circumstances give many openings to genius, in some periods -few. The genius is constantly produced; but it is only occasionally -recognised. - -In this there must be some truth. A mob orator in Turkey, a religious -reformer in seventeenth century Spain, a military leader in the -Sandwich islands, would hardly get their chance. Yet the theory of -opportunity can scarcely be reckoned a complete explanation. For it -leaves unaccounted for the _variety_ of genius which has in some -countries marked epochs of vigorous national development. Athens in -the fifth and fourth centuries, Florence in the fifteenth and early -sixteenth centuries, Holland in the later sixteenth and seventeenth -centuries, are the typical examples. In such periods the opportunities -of statesmen, soldiers, orators, and diplomatists, may have been -specially frequent. But whence came the poets, the sculptors, the -painters, the philosophers and the men of letters? What peculiar -opportunities had _they_? - -The only explanation, if we reject the idea of a mere coincidence, -seems to be, that quite apart from opportunity, the exceptional stir -and fervour of national life evokes or may evoke qualities which in -ordinary times lie dormant, unknown even to their possessors. The -potential Miltons are ‘mute’ and ‘inglorious’ not because they cannot -find a publisher, but because they have nothing they want to publish. -They lack the kind of inspiration which, on this view, flows from -social surroundings where great things, though of quite another kind, -are being done and thought. - -If this theory be true (and it is not without its difficulties) one -would like to know whether these undoubted outbursts of originality -in the higher and rarer form of genius, are symptomatic of a general -rise in the number of persons exhibiting original capacity of a more -ordinary type. If so, then the conclusion would seem to be that some -kind of widespread exhilaration or excitement is required in order to -enable any community to extract the best results from the raw material -transmitted to it by natural inheritance. - - -_Cambridge: Printed at the University Press._ - - - - -Transcriber’s Note - - -In this file, text in _italics_ is indicated by underscores. - -On page 41, “Greek in culture Roman by political descent” was corrected -to “Greek in culture, Roman by political descent.” - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DECADENCE *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where - you are located before using this eBook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that: - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without -widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/old/68219-0.zip b/old/68219-0.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index a0afde6..0000000 --- a/old/68219-0.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/68219-h.zip b/old/68219-h.zip Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 9ad43f8..0000000 --- a/old/68219-h.zip +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/68219-h/68219-h.htm b/old/68219-h/68219-h.htm deleted file mode 100644 index 78d8910..0000000 --- a/old/68219-h/68219-h.htm +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1941 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> -<head> - <meta charset="UTF-8" /> - <title> - Decadence, by Arthur James Balfour—A Project Gutenberg eBook - </title> - <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover" /> - <style> - -body { - margin-left: 10%; - margin-right: 10%; -} - - h1,h2 { - text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ - clear: both; -} - -p { - margin-top: .51em; - text-align: justify; - margin-bottom: .49em; -} - - -.p130 {font-size: 1.3em;} -.p120 {font-size: 1.2em;} -.p110 {font-size:1.10em;} -.p105 {font-size:1.05em;} -.p90 {font-size:0.9em;} - - - -.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} -.p3 {margin-top: 3em;} -.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} - - - - - - - -.break {page-break-before: always;} - -hr { - width: 33%; - margin-top: 2em; - margin-bottom: 2em; - margin-left: 33.5%; - margin-right: 33.5%; - clear: both; -} - - -hr.chap {width: 65%; margin-left: 17.5%; margin-right: 17.5%;} -@media print { hr.chap {display: none; visibility: hidden;} } -hr.full {width: 95%; margin-left: 2.5%; margin-right: 2.5%;} - - -div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} -h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} - - - -.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ - /* visibility: hidden; */ - position: absolute; - left: 92%; - font-size: smaller; - text-align: right; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal; - font-variant: normal; -} /* page numbers */ - - - - -.center {text-align: center;} - - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} - - - -/* Images */ - -img { - max-width: 100%; - height: auto; -} -img.w100 {width: 100%;} - - -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; - page-break-inside: avoid; - max-width: 100%; -} - - -/* Footnotes */ - - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: - none; -} - - - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - - - -em, .italic {font-style: italic;} - -/* Illustration classes */ -.illowp15 {width: 15%;} -</style> -</head> - -<body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Decadence, by Arthur James Balfour</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Decadence</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em;'>Henry Sidgwick memorial lecture</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Arthur James Balfour</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: June 1, 2022 [eBook #68219]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Thomas Frost and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DECADENCE ***</div> - - - - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</span></p> - - - - -<p class="center p110"> -CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,<br /> -C. F. CLAY, <span class="smcap">Manager</span>.<br /> -</p> - -<p class="center p110"> -<b>London</b>: FETTER LANE, E.C.</p> - -<p class="center"> -<b>Glasgow</b>: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.</p> - -<div class="figcenter illowp15" id="crest" style="max-width: 8em;"> - <img class="w100" src="images/crest.jpg" alt="Crest" title="Crest" /> -</div> - -<p class="center"> -<b>Leipzig</b>: F. A. BROCKHAUS.<br /> -<b>New York</b>: G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS.<br /> -<b>Bombay and Calcutta</b>: MACMILLAN AND CO., <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span></p> - - - -<p class="center p4">[<span class="italic">All Rights reserved</span>]</p> - - - -<hr class="full x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</span></p> - -<h1 class="break">DECADENCE</h1> - -<p class="center p130 p2"><span class="italic">HENRY SIDGWICK MEMORIAL</span><br /> -<span class="italic">LECTURE</span></p> - - -<p class="p120 center p3">by<br /> -<span class="smcap">The Right Hon.</span><br /> -ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.P.</p> - - -<p class="p105 p2 center"> -[DELIVERED AT NEWNHAM COLLEGE,<br /> -JANUARY 25, 1908] -</p> - - -<p class="center p4 p120"> -<span class="smcap">Cambridge</span><br /> -at the University Press<br /> -1908</p> - - -<hr class="full x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</span></p> - -<p class="center break"><b>Cambridge:</b><br /> -<span class="p90">PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.<br /> -AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.</span> -</p> - - - -<hr class="full x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - - - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</span></p> - - -<p class="break">I must begin what I have to say with a -warning and an apology. I must warn you -that the present essay makes no pretence to -be an adequate treatment of some compact -and limited theme; but rather resembles those -wandering trains of thought, where we allow -ourselves the luxury of putting wide-ranging -questions, to which our ignorance forbids any -confident reply. I apologise for adopting a -course which thus departs in some measure -from familiar precedent. I admit its perils. -But it is just possible that when a subject, or -group of subjects, is of great inherent interest, -even a tentative, and interrogative, treatment -of it may be worth attempting.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</span></p> - -<p>My subject, or at least my point of departure, -is Decadence. I do not mean the -sort of decadence often attributed to certain -phases of artistic or literary development, in -which an overwrought technique, straining to -express sentiments too subtle or too morbid, -is deemed to have supplanted the direct inspiration -of an earlier and a simpler age. -Whether these autumnal glories, these splendours -touched with death, are recurring phenomena -in the literary cycle: whether, if they -be, they are connected with other forms -of decadence, may be questions well worth -asking and answering. But they are not the -questions with which I am at present concerned. -The decadence respecting which I wish to -put questions is not literary or artistic, it is -political and national. It is the decadence -which attacks, or is alleged to attack, great -communities and historic civilisations: which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</span> -is to societies of men what senility is to man, -and is often, like senility, the precursor and -the cause of final dissolution.</p> - -<p>It is curious how deeply imbedded in -ordinary discourse are traces of the conviction -that childhood, maturity, and old age, -are stages in the corporate, as they are in -the individual, life. “A young and vigorous -nation,” “a decrepit and moribund civilisation”—phrases -like these, and scores of others -containing the same implication, come as trippingly -from the tongue as if they suggested -no difficulty and called for no explanation. -To Macaulay (unless I am pressing his famous -metaphor too far) it seemed natural that ages -hence a young country like New Zealand should -be flourishing, but not less natural that an old -country like England should have decayed. -Berkeley, in a well-known stanza, tells how the -drama of civilisation has slowly travelled westwards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</span> -to find its loftiest development, but also -its final catastrophe, in the New World. While -every man who is weary, hopeless, or disillusioned -talks as if he had caught these -various diseases from the decadent epoch in -which he was born.</p> - -<p>But why <em>should</em> civilisations thus wear out -and great communities decay? and what evidence -is there that in fact they do? These -questions, though I cannot give to them any -conclusive answers, are of much more than -a merely theoretic interest. For if current -modes of speech take decadence more or less -for granted, with still greater confidence do -they speak of Progress as assured. Yet if -both are real they can hardly be studied apart, -they must evidently limit and qualify each -other in actual experience, and they cannot -be isolated in speculation.</p> - -<p>Though antiquity, Pagan and Christian,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</span> -took a different view, it seems easier, <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">a priori</i>, -to understand Progress than Decadence. Even -if the former be limited, as presumably it is, -by the limitation of human faculty, we should -expect the ultimate boundary to be capable -of indefinite approach, and we should <em>not</em> -expect that any part of the road towards it, -once traversed, would have to be retraced. -Even in the organic world, decay and death, -familiar though they be, are phenomena that -call for scientific explanation. And Weismann -has definitely asked how it comes about that -the higher organisms grow old and die, seeing -that old age and death are not inseparable -characteristics of living protoplasm, and that -the simplest organisms suffer no natural decay, -perishing, when they do perish, by accident, -starvation, or specific disease.</p> - -<p>The answer he gives to his own question is -that the death of the individual is so useful to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</span> -the race, that Natural Selection has, in all but -the very lowest species, exterminated the potentially -immortal.</p> - -<p>One is tempted to enquire, whether this ingenious -explanation could be so modified as to -apply not merely to individuals but to communities. -Is it needful for the cause of civilisation -as a whole, that the organised embodiment of -each particular civilisation, if and when its free -development is arrested, should make room for -younger and more vigorous competitors? And -if so can we find in Natural Selection the -mechanism by which the principle of decay -and dissolution shall be so implanted in the -very nature of human associations that a due -succession among them shall always be maintained?</p> - -<p>To this second question the answer must, -I think, be in the negative. The struggle for -existence between different races and different<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</span> -societies has admittedly played a great part in -social development. But to extend Weismann’s -idea from the organic to the social world, would -imply a prolonged competition between groups -of communities in which decadence was the rule, -and groups in which it was not;—ending in the -survival of the first, and the destruction of the -second. The groups whose members suffered -periodical decadence and dissolution would be -the fittest to survive: just as, on Weismann’s -theory, those species gain in competitive efficiency -whom death has unburdened of the old.</p> - -<p>Few will say that in the petty fragment of -human history which alone is open to our inspection, -there is satisfactory evidence of any -such long drawn process. Some may even be -disposed to ask whether there is adequate -evidence of such a phenomenon as decadence -at all. And it must be acknowledged that the -affirmative answer should be given with caution.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</span> -Evidently we must not consider a diminution of -national power, whether relative or absolute, -as constituting by itself a proof of national -decadence. Holland is not decadent because -her place in the hierarchy of European Powers -is less exalted than it was two hundred and fifty -years ago. Spain was not necessarily decadent -at the end of the seventeenth century because -she had exhausted herself in a contest far beyond -her resources either in money or in men. It -would, I think, be rash even to say that Venice -was decadent at the end of the eighteenth -century, though the growth of other Powers, -and the diversion of the great trade routes, had -shorn her of wealth and international influence. -These are misfortunes which in the sphere of -sociology correspond to accident or disease in -the sphere of biology. And what we are concerned -to know is whether in the sphere of -sociology there is also anything corresponding<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</span> -to the decay of old age—a decay which may be -hastened by accident or disease, which must be -ended by accident or disease, but is certainly to -be distinguished from both.</p> - -<p>However this question should be answered -the cases I have cited are sufficient to shew -where the chief difficulty of the enquiry lies. -Decadence, even if it be a reality, never acts -in isolation. It is always complicated with, and -often acts through, other more obvious causes. -It is always therefore possible to argue that -to these causes, and not to the more subtle -and elusive influences collectively described as -’decadence,’ the decline and fall of great -communities is really due.</p> - -<p>Yet there are historic tragedies which (as -it seems to me) do most obstinately refuse -to be thus simply explained. It is in vain -that historians enumerate the public calamities -which preceded, and no doubt contributed to,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</span> -the final catastrophe. Civil dissensions, military -disasters, pestilences, famines, tyrants, tax-gatherers, -growing burdens, and waning wealth—the -gloomy catalogue is unrolled before our -eyes, yet somehow it does not in all cases wholly -satisfy us: we feel that some of these diseases -are of a kind which a vigorous body politic -should easily be able to survive, that others are -secondary symptoms of some obscurer malady, -and that in neither case do they supply us with -the full explanations of which we are in search.</p> - -<p>Consider for instance the long agony and -final destruction of Roman Imperialism in the -West, the most momentous catastrophe of which -we have historic record. It has deeply stirred the -imagination of mankind, it has been the theme -of great historians, it has been much explained -by political philosophers, yet who feels that -either historians or philosophers have laid bare -the inner workings of the drama? Rome fell,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</span> -and great was the fall of it. But why it fell, by -what secret mines its defences were breached, -and what made its garrison so faint-hearted and -ineffectual—this is not so clear.</p> - -<p>In order to measure adequately the difficulty -of the problem let us abstract our minds from -historical details and compare the position of the -Empire about the middle of the second century, -with its position in the middle of the third, or -again at the end of the fourth, and ask of what -forces history gives us an account, sufficient in -these periods to effect so mighty a transformation. -Or, still better, imagine an observer -equipped with our current stock of political -wisdom, transported to Rome in the reign of -Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius, and in -ignorance of the event, writing letters to the -newspapers on the future destinies of the Empire. -What would his forecast be?</p> - -<p>We might suppose him to examine, in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</span> -first place, the military position of the State, its -probable enemies, its capacities for defence. He -would note that only on its eastern boundary -was there an organised military Power capable -of meeting Rome on anything like equal terms, -and this only in the regions adjacent to their -common frontier. For the rest he would discover -no civilised enemy along the southern -boundary to the Atlantic or along its northern -boundary from the Black Sea to the German -Ocean. Warlike tribes indeed he would find -in plenty: difficult to crush within the limits of -their native forests and morasses, formidable it -may be in a raid, but without political cohesion, -military unity, or the means of military concentration;—embarrassing -therefore rather than -dangerous. If reminded of Varus and his lost -legions, he would ask of what importance, in -the story of a world-power could be the loss -of a few thousand men surprised at a distance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</span> -from their base amid the entanglements of -a difficult and unknown country. Never, it -would seem, was Empire more fortunately circumstanced -for purposes of home defence.</p> - -<p>But (it might be thought) the burden of -securing frontiers of such length, even against -merely tribal assaults, though easy from a -strictly military point of view, might prove -too heavy to be long endured. Yet the -military forces scattered through the Roman -Empire, though apparently adequate in the -days of her greatness would, according to -modern ideas, seem hardly sufficient for purposes -of police, let alone defence. An army -corps or less was deemed enough to preserve -what are now mighty kingdoms, from internal -disorder and external aggression. And if we -compare with this the contributions, either in -the way of money or of men, exacted from the -territories subject to Rome before the Empire<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</span> -came into being, or at any period of the world’s -history since it dissolved away, the comparison -must surely be entirely in favour of the Empire.</p> - -<p>But burdens which seem light, if measured -by area, may be heavy if measured by ability -to pay. Yet when has ability to pay been -greater in the regions bordering the Southern -and Eastern Mediterranean than under the -Roman Empire? Travel round it in imagination, -eastward from the Atlantic coast of -Morocco till returning westward you reach the -head of the Adriatic Gulf, and you will have -skirted a region, still of immense natural -wealth, once filled with great cities, and fertile -farms, better governed during the Empire than -it has ever been governed since (at least till -Algeria became French and Egypt British); -including among its provinces what were great -states before the Roman rule, and have been -great states since that rule decayed, divided by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</span> -no international jealousies, oppressed by no fear -of conquest, enterprising, cultured. Remember -that to estimate its area of taxation and recruiting -you must add to these regions Bulgaria, -Servia, much of Austria and Bavaria, Switzerland, -Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, and most -of Britain, and you have conditions favourable -to military strength and economic prosperity -rarely equalled in the modern world and never -in the ancient.</p> - -<p>Our observer however might, very rightly, -feel that a far-spreading Empire like that of -Rome, including regions profoundly differing -in race, history and religion, would be liable to -other dangers than those which arise from mere -external aggression. One of the first questions, -therefore, which he would be disposed to ask, -is whether so heterogeneous a state was not -in perpetual danger of dissolution through the -disintegrating influence of national sentiments.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</span> -He would learn probably, with a strong feeling -of surprise, that with the single exception of -the Jews, the constituent nations, once conquered, -were not merely content to belong to -the Empire, but could scarcely imagine themselves -doing anything else: that the Imperial -system appealed, not merely to the material -needs of the component populations, but also to -their imagination and their loyalty; that Gaul, -Spain, and Britain, though but recently forced -within the pale of civilisation, were as faithful -to the Imperial ideal as the Greek of Athens or -the Hellenised Orientals of Syria; and that -neither historic memories, nor local patriotism, -neither disputed succession, nor public calamities, -nor administrative divisions, ever really -shook the sentiment in favour of Imperial Unity. -There might be more than one Emperor: but -there could only be one Empire. Howsoever -our observer might disapprove of the Imperial<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</span> -system he would therefore have to admit that -the Empire, with all its shortcomings, its absolutism -and its bureaucracy, had solved more -successfully than any government, before or -since, the problem of devising a scheme which -equally satisfied the sentiments of East and -West; which respected local feelings, encouraged -local government; in which the Celt, -the Iberian, the Berber, the Egyptian, the -Asiatic, the Greek, the Illyrian, the Italian -were all at home, and which, though based on -conquest, was accepted by the conquered as -the natural organisation of the civilised world.</p> - -<p>Rome had thus unique sources of strength. -What sources of weakness would our observer -be likely to detect behind her imposing exterior? -The diminution of population is the -one which has (rightly I think) most impressed -historians: and it is difficult to resist the -evidence, either of the fact, or of its disastrous<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</span> -consequences. I hesitate indeed to accept -without qualification the accounts given us of -the progressive decay of the native Italian -stock from the days of the Gracchi to the disintegration -of the Empire in the West: and -when we read how the dearth of men was -made good (in so far as it was made good) by -the increasing inflow of slaves and adventurers -from every corner of the known world, one -wonders <em>whose</em> sons they were who, for three -centuries and more, so brilliantly led the van -of modern European culture, as it emerged -from the darkness of the early Middle Ages. -Passing by such collateral issues, however, -and admitting depopulation to have been -both real and serious, we may well ask -whether it was not the result of Roman decadence -rather than its cause, the symptom -of some deep-seated social malady, not its -origin. We are not concerned here with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</span> -the aristocracy of Rome, nor even with the -people of Italy. We are concerned with -the Empire. We are not concerned with a -passing phase or fashion, but with a process -which seems to have gone on with increasing -rapidity, through good times as well as bad, -till the final cataclysm. A local disease might -have a local explanation, a transient one might -be due to a chance coincidence. But what can -we say of a disease which was apparently co-extensive -with Imperial civilisation in area, -and which exceeded it in duration?</p> - -<p>I find it hard to believe that either a selfish -aversion to matrimony or a mystical admiration -for celibacy, though at certain periods the one -was common in Pagan and the other in Christian -circles, were more than elements in the -complex of causes by which the result was -brought about. Like the plagues which devastated -Europe in the second and third<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</span> -centuries, they must have greatly aggravated -the evil, but they are hardly sufficient to -account for it. Nor yet can we find an explanation -of it in the discouragement, the sense -of impending doom, by which men’s spirits -were oppressed long before the Imperial power -began visibly to wane, for this is one of the -things which, if historically true, does itself -most urgently require explanation.</p> - -<p>It may be however that our wandering -politician would be too well grounded in -Malthusian economics to regard a diminution -of population as in itself an overwhelming -calamity. And if he were pressed to describe -the weak spots in the Empire of the -Antonines he would be disposed, I think, to -look for them on the ethical rather than on the -military, the economic, or the strictly political -sides of social life. He would be inclined to -say, as in effect Mr Lecky does say, that in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</span> -institution of slavery, in the brutalities of the -gladiatorial shows, in the gratuitous distribution -of bread to the urban mobs, are to be found the -corrupting influences which first weakened and -then destroyed the vigour of the State.</p> - -<p>I confess that I cannot easily accept this -analysis of the facts. As regards the gladiatorial -shows, even had they been universal -throughout the Empire, and had they flourished -more rankly as its power declined, I should still -have questioned the propriety of attributing too -far-reaching effects to such a cause. The -Romans were brutal while they were conquering -the world: its conquest enabled them -to be brutal with ostentation; but we must not -measure the ill consequences of their barbaric -tastes by the depth of our own disgusts, nor -assume the Gothic invasions to be the natural -and fitting Nemesis of so much spectacular -shedding of innocent blood.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</span></p> - -<p>As for the public distributions of corn, one -would wish to have more evidence as to its -social effects. But even without fully accepting -the theory of the latest Roman historian, who -believes that, under the then prevailing conditions -of transport, no very large city could exist -in Antiquity, if the supply of its food were left -to private enterprise, we cannot seriously regard -this practice, strange as it seems to us, as an -important element in the problem. Granting -for the sake of argument that it demoralised -the mob of Rome, it must be remembered that -Rome was not the Empire, nor did the mob -of Rome govern the Empire, as once it had -governed the Republic.</p> - -<p>Slavery is a far more important matter. -The magnitude of its effects on ancient -societies, difficult as these are to disentangle, -can hardly be exaggerated. But with what -plausibility can we find in it the cause of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</span> -Rome’s decline, seeing that it was the concomitant -also of its rise? How can that -which in Antiquity was common to every state, -have this exceptional and malign influence upon -one? It would not in any case be easy to -accept such a theory; but surely it becomes -impossible when we bear in mind the enormous -improvement effected under the Empire both -in the law and the practice of slavery. Great -as were its evils, they were diminishing evils—less -ruinous as time went on to the character -of the master, less painful and degrading to the -slave. Who can believe that this immemorial -custom could, in its decline, destroy a civilisation, -which, in its vigour, it had helped to -create?</p> - -<p>Of course our observer would see much in -the social system he was examining which he -would rightly regard as morally detestable and -politically pernicious. But the real question<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</span> -before him would not be ‘are these things good -or bad?’ but ‘are these things getting better -or getting worse?’ And surely in most cases -he would be obliged to answer ‘getting better.’ -Many things moreover would come under his -notice fitted to move his admiration in a much -less qualified manner. Few governments have -been more anxious to foster an alien and higher -culture, than was the Roman Government to -foster Greek civilisation. In so far as Rome -inherited what Alexander conquered, it carried -out the ideal which Alexander had conceived. -In few periods have the rich been readier to -spend of their private fortunes on public objects. -There never was a community in which associations -for every purpose of mutual aid -or enjoyment sprang more readily into existence. -There never was a military monarchy -less given to wars of aggression. There never -was an age in which there was a more rapid<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</span> -advance in humanitarian ideals, or a more -anxious seeking after spiritual truth. There -was much discussion, there was, apart from -politics, but little intolerance. Education was -well endowed, and its professors held in high -esteem. Physical culture was cared for. Law -was becoming scientific. Research was not -forgotten. What more could be reasonably -expected?</p> - -<p>According to our ordinary methods of -analysis it is not easy to say what more <em>could</em> -be reasonably expected. But plainly much more -was required. In a few generations from the -time of which I am speaking the Empire lost -its extraordinary power of assimilating alien and -barbaric elements. It became too feeble either -to absorb or to expel them: and the immigrants -who in happier times might have bestowed -renewed vigour on the commonwealth, became, -in the hour of its decline, a weakness and a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</span> -peril. Poverty grew as population shrank. -Municipal office, once so eagerly desired, became -the most cruel of burdens. Associations -connected with industry or commerce, which -began by freely exchanging public service for -public privilege, found their members subjected -to ever increasing obligations, for the due performance -of which they and their children were -liable in person and in property. Thus while -Christianity, and the other forces that made for -mercy, were diminishing the slavery of the slave, -the needs of the Bureaucracy compelled it to -trench ever more and more upon the freedom -of the free. It was each man’s duty (so ran -the argument) to serve the commonwealth: he -could best serve the commonwealth by devoting -himself to his calling if it were one of public -necessity: this duty he should be required -under penalties to perform, and to devote if -necessary to its performance, labour to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</span> -limits of endurance, fortune to the last shilling, -and family to the remotest generation. Through -this crude experiment in socialism, the civilised -world seemed to be rapidly moving towards a -system of universal caste, imposed by no immemorial -custom, supported by no religious -scruple, but forced on an unwilling people by -the Emperor’s edict and the executioner’s lash.</p> - -<p>These things have severally and collectively -been regarded as the causes why in the West -the Imperial system so quickly crumbled into -chaos. And so no doubt they were. But they -obviously require themselves to be explained -by causes more general and more remote; and -what were these? If I answer as I feel disposed -to answer—Decadence—you will properly -ask how the unknown becomes less -unknown merely by receiving a name. I reply -that if there be indeed subtle changes in the -social tissues of old communities which make<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</span> -them, as time goes on, less resistant to the -external attacks and the internal disturbances -by which all communities are threatened, overt -recognition of the fact is a step in advance. -We have not an idea of what ‘life’ consists in, -but if on that account we were to abstain from -using the term, we should not be better but -worse equipped for dealing with the problems -of physiology; while on the other hand if we -could translate life into terms of matter and -motion to-morrow, we should still be obliged to -use the word in order to distinguish the material -movements which constitute life or exhibit it, -from those which do not. In like manner we -are ignorant of the inner character of the cell -changes which produce senescence. But should -we be better fitted to form a correct conception -of the life-history of complex organisms if we -refused to recognise any cause of death but -accident or disease? I admit, of course, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</span> -the term ‘decadence’ is less precise than ‘old -age’: as sociology deals with organisms far -less definite than biology. I admit also that it -explains nothing. If its use is to be justified at -all, the justification must depend not on the -fact that it supplies an explanation, but on the -fact that it rules out explanations which are -obvious but inadequate. And this may be a -service of some importance. The facile generalisations -with which we so often season the -study of dry historic fact; the habits of political -discussion which induce us to catalogue for -purposes of debate the outward signs that distinguish -(as we are prone to think) the standing -from the falling state, hide the obscurer, but -more potent, forces which silently prepare the -fate of empires. National character is subtle -and elusive; not to be expressed in statistics -nor measured by the rough methods which -suffice the practical moralist or statesman. And<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</span> -when through an ancient and still powerful -state there spreads a mood of deep discouragement, -when the reaction against recurring ills -grows feebler, and the ship rises less buoyantly -to each succeeding wave, when learning languishes, -enterprise slackens, and vigour ebbs -away, then, as I think, there is present some -process of social degeneration, which we must -perforce recognise, and which, pending a satisfactory -analysis, may conveniently be distinguished -by the name of ‘decadence.’</p> - -<p>I am well aware that though the space I -have just devoted to the illustration of my -theme provided by Roman history is out of all -proportion to the general plan of this address, -yet the treatment of it is inadequate and perhaps -unconvincing. But those who are most reluctant -to admit that decay, as distinguished -from misfortune, may lower the general level -of civilisation, can hardly deny that in many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</span> -cases that level may for indefinite periods shew -no tendency to rise. If decadence be unknown, -is not progress exceptional? Consider the -changing politics of the unchanging East<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. Is -it not true that there, while wars and revolutions, -dynastic and religious, have shattered ancient -states and brought new ones into being, every -community, as soon as it has risen above the -tribal and nomad condition, adopts with the rarest -exceptions a form of government which, from its -very generality in Eastern lands, we habitually -call an ‘oriental despotism’? We may crystallise -and re-crystallise a soluble salt as often -as we please, the new crystals will always -resemble the old ones. The crystals, indeed, -may be of different sizes, their component<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</span> -molecules may occupy different positions within -the crystalline structure, but the structure itself -will be of one immutable pattern. So it is, or -seems to be, with these oriental states. They -rise, in turn, upon the ruins of their predecessors, -themselves predestined to perish by a like fate. -But whatever their origin or history, they are -always either autocracies or aggregations of -autocracies; and no differences of race, of -creed, or of language seem sufficient to vary -the violent monotony of their internal history. -In the eighteenth century theorists were content -to attribute the political servitude of the -Eastern world to the unscrupulous machinations -of tyrants and their tools. And such explanations -are good as far as they go. But this, -in truth, is not very far. Intrigue, assassination, -ruthless repression, the whole machinery -of despotism supply particular explanations of -particular incidents. They do not supply the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</span> -general explanation of the general phenomenon. -They tell you how this ruler or that obtained -absolute power. They do not tell you why -every ruler is absolute. Nor can I furnish the -answer. The fact remains that over large and -relatively civilised portions of the world popular -government is profoundly unpopular, in the -sense that it is no natural or spontaneous social -growth. Political absolutism not political freedom -is the familiar weed of the country. -Despots change but despotism remains: and -if through alien influences, like those exercised -by Greek cities in Asia, or by British rule in -India, the type is modified, it may well be -doubted whether the modification could long -survive the moment when its sustaining cause -was withdrawn.</p> - -<p>Now it would almost seem as if in lands -where this political type was normal a certain -level of culture (not of course the same in each<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</span> -case) could not permanently be overpassed. If -under the excitement of religion or conquest, -or else through causes more complicated and -more obscure, this limit has sometimes been -left behind, reaction has always followed, and -decadence set in. Many people indeed, as I -have already observed, take this as a matter -of course. It seems to them the most natural -thing in the world that the glories of the -Eastern Khalifate should decay, and that the -Moors in Morocco should lose even the memory -of the learning and the arts possessed but three -centuries ago by the Moors in Spain. To me -it seems mysterious. But whether it be easy -of comprehension or difficult, if only it be true, -does it not furnish food for disquieting reflexion? -If there are whole groups of nations -capable on their own initiative of a certain -measure of civilisation, but capable apparently -of no more, and if below them again there are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</span> -(as I suppose) other races who seem incapable -of either creating a civilisation of their own, or -of preserving unaided a civilisation impressed -upon them from without, by what right do we -assume that no impassable limits bar the path -of Western progress? Those limits may not -yet be in sight. Surely they are not. But -does not a survey of history suggest that -somewhere in the dim future they await our -approach?</p> - -<p>It may be replied that the history of Rome, -on which I dwelt a moment ago, shews that -arrested progress, and even decadence, may -be but the prelude to a new period of vigorous -growth. So that even those races or nations -which seem frozen into eternal immobility may -base upon experience their hopes of an awakening -spring.</p> - -<p>I am not sure, however, that this is the -true interpretation of the facts. There is no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</span> -spectacle indeed in all history more impressive -than the thick darkness settling down over -Western Europe, blotting out all but a faint -and distorted vision of Graeco-Roman culture, -and then, as it slowly rises, unveiling the variety -and rich promise of the modern world. But -I do not think we should make this unique -phenomenon support too weighty a load of -theory. I should not infer from it that when -some wave of civilisation has apparently spent -its force, we have a right to regard its withdrawing -sweep as but the prelude to a new -advance. I should rather conjecture that in -this particular case we should find, among other -subtle causes of decadence, some obscure disharmony -between the Imperial system and the -temperament of the West, undetected even by -those who suffered from it. That system, -though accepted with contentment and even -with pride, though in the days of its greatness<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</span> -it brought civilisation, commerce, and security -in its train, must surely have lacked some -elements which are needed to foster among -Teutons, Celts, and Iberians the qualities, -whatever these may be, on which sustained -progress depends. It was perhaps too oriental -for the occident, and it certainly became more -oriental as time went on. In the East it was, -comparatively speaking, successful. If there -was no progress, decadence was slow; and but -for what Western Europe did, and what it -failed to do, during the long struggle with -militant Mahommedanism, there might still be -an Empire in the East, largely Asiatic in population, -Christian in religion, Greek in culture, -Roman by political descent.</p> - -<p>Had this been the course of events large -portions of mankind would doubtless have been -much better governed than they are. It is -not so clear that they would have been more<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</span> -‘progressive.’ Progress is with the West: with -communities of the European type. And if -<em>their</em> energy of development is some day to -be exhausted, who can believe that there remains -any external source from which it can -be renewed? Where are the untried races -competent to construct out of the ruined -fragments of our civilisation a new and better -habitation for the spirit of man? They do not -exist: and if the world is again to be buried -under a barbaric flood, it will not be like that -which fertilised, though it first destroyed, the -western provinces of Rome, but like that which -in Asia submerged for ever the last traces of -Hellenic culture.</p> - -<p>We are thus brought back to the question -I put a few moments since. What grounds -are there for supposing that we can escape the -fate to which other races have had to submit? -If for periods which, measured on the historic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</span> -scale, are of great duration, communities which -have advanced to a certain point appear able to -advance no further; if civilisations wear out, -and races become effete, why should we expect -to progress indefinitely, why for us alone is the -doom of man to be reversed?</p> - -<p>To these questions I have no very satisfactory -answers to give, nor do I believe that -our knowledge of national or social psychology -is sufficient to make a satisfactory answer -possible. Some purely tentative observations -on the point may, however, furnish a fitting -conclusion to an address which has been tentative -throughout, and aims rather at suggesting -trains of thought, than at completing them.</p> - -<p>I assume that the factors which combine -to make each generation what it is at the -moment of its entrance into adult life are in -the main twofold. The one produces the raw -material of society, the process of manufacture<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</span> -is effected by the other. The first is physiological -inheritance, the second is the inheritance -partly of external conditions of life, partly of -beliefs<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, traditions, sentiments, customs, laws, -and organisation—all that constitute the social -surroundings in which men grow up to maturity.</p> - -<p>I hazard no conjecture as to the share borne -respectively by these two kinds of cause in producing -their joint result. Nor are we likely to -obtain satisfactory evidence on the subject till, -in the interests of science, two communities of -different blood and different traditions consent -to exchange their children at birth by a universal -process of reciprocal adoption. But even in the -absence of so heroic an experiment, it seems safe -to say that the mobility which makes possible -either progress or decadence, resides rather -in the causes grouped under the second head -than in the physiological material on which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</span> -education, in the widest sense of that ambiguous -term, has got to work. If, as -I suppose, acquired qualities are not inherited, -the only causes which could fundamentally -modify the physiological character of any particular -community are its intermixture with -alien races through slavery, conquest, or immigration; -or else new conditions which varied -the relative proportion in which different -sections of the population contributed to its -total numbers. If, for example, the more successful -members of the community had smaller -families than the less successful; or if medical -administration succeeded in extinguishing maladies -to which persons of a particular constitution -were specially liable; or if one strain in a -mixed race had a larger birth rate than another—in -these cases and in others like them, there -would doubtless be a change in the physiological -factor of national character. But such changes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</span> -are not likely, I suppose, to be considerable, -except, perhaps, those due to the mixture of -races;—and that only in new countries whose -economic opportunities tempt immigrants widely -differing in culture, and in capacity for culture, -from those whose citizenship they propose to -share.</p> - -<p>The flexible element in any society, that -which is susceptible of progress or decadence, -must therefore be looked for rather in the -physical and psychical conditions affecting the -life of its component units, than in their inherited -constitution. This last rather supplies a limit -to variations than an element which does itself -vary: though from this point of view its importance -is capital. I at least find it quite -impossible to believe that any attempt to provide -widely different races with an identical -environment, political, religious, educational, -what you will, can ever make them alike.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</span> -They have been different and unequal since -history began; different and unequal they are -destined to remain through future periods of -comparable duration.</p> - -<p>But though the advance of each community -is thus limited by its inherited aptitudes, I do -not suppose that those limits have ever been -reached by its unaided efforts. In the cases -where a forward movement has died away, the -pause must in part be due to arrested development -in the variable, not to a fixed resistance -in the unchanging factor of national character. -Either external conditions are unfavourable; or -the sentiments, customs and beliefs which make -society possible have hardened into shapes which -make its further self-development impossible; -or through mere weariness of spirit the community -resigns itself to a contented, or perhaps -a discontented, stagnation; or it shatters itself -in pursuit of impossible ideals, or for other and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</span> -obscurer reasons, flags in its endeavours, and -falls short of possible achievement.</p> - -<p>Now I am quite unable to offer any such -general analysis of the causes by which these -hindrances to progress are produced or removed -as would furnish a reply to my question. -But it may be worth noting that a social force -has come into being, new in magnitude if not -in kind, which must favourably modify such -hindrances as come under all but the last of the -divisions in which I have roughly arranged -them. This force is the modern alliance -between pure science and industry. That on -this we must mainly rely for the improvement -of the material conditions under which societies -live is in my opinion obvious, although no one -would conjecture it from a historic survey of -political controversy. Its direct moral effects -are less obvious; indeed there are many most -excellent people who would altogether deny<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</span> -their existence. To regard it as a force fitted -to rouse and sustain the energies of nations -would seem to them absurd: for this would -be to rank it with those other forces which have -most deeply stirred the emotions of great communities, -have urged them to the greatest -exertions, have released them most effectually -from the benumbing fetters of merely personal -preoccupations,—with religion, patriotism, and -politics. Industrial expansion under scientific -inspiration, so far from deserving praise like -this, is in their view, at best, but a new -source of material well-being, at worst the -prolific parent of physical ugliness in many -forms, machine made wares, smoky cities, -polluted rivers, and desecrated landscapes,—appropriately -associated with materialism and -greed.</p> - -<p>I believe this view to be utterly misleading, -confounding accident with essence, transient accompaniments<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</span> -with inseparable characteristics. -Should we dream of thus judging the other -great social forces of which I have spoken? -Are we to ignore what religion has done for the -world because it has been the fruitful excuse for -the narrowest bigotries and the most cruel persecutions? -Are we to underrate the worth of -politics, because politics may mean no more than -the mindless clash of factions, or the barren -exchange of one set of tyrants or jobbers for -another? Is patriotism to be despised because -its manifestations have been sometimes vulgar, -sometimes selfish, sometimes brutal, sometimes -criminal? Estimates like these seem to me -worse than useless. All great social forces -are not merely capable of perversion, they are -constantly perverted. Yet were they eliminated -from our social system, were each man, acting -on the advice, which Voltaire gave but never -followed, to disinterest himself of all that goes<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</span> -on beyond the limits of his own cabbage garden, -decadence I take it, would have already far -advanced.</p> - -<p>But if the proposition I am defending may -be wrongly criticised, it is still more likely to -be wrongly praised. To some it will commend -itself as a eulogy on an industrial as distinguished -from a military civilisation: as a -suggestion that in the peaceful pursuit of wealth -there is that which of itself may constitute a -valuable social tonic. This may be true, but -it is not my contention. In talking of the -alliance between industry and science my emphasis -is at least as much on the word science -as on the word industry. I am not concerned -now with the proportion of the population -devoted to productive labour, or the esteem -in which they are held. It is on the effects -which I believe are following, and are going -in yet larger measure to follow, from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</span> -intimate relation between scientific discovery -and industrial efficiency, that I most desire -to insist.</p> - -<p>Do you then, it will be asked, so highly rate -the utilitarian aspect of research as to regard it -as a source, not merely of material convenience, -but of spiritual elevation? Is it seriously to -be ranked with religion and patriotism as an -important force for raising men’s lives above -what is small, personal, and self-centred? Does -it not rather pervert pure knowledge into a -new contrivance for making money, and give a -fresh triumph to the ‘growing materialism of -the age’?</p> - -<p>I do not myself believe that this age is -either less spiritual or more sordid than its -predecessors. I believe, indeed, precisely the -reverse. But however this may be, is it not -plain that if a society is to be moved by the -remote speculations of isolated thinkers it can<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</span> -only be on condition that their isolation is not -complete? Some point of contact they must -have with the world in which they live, and -if their influence is to be based on widespread -sympathy, the contact must be in a region where -there can be, if not full mutual comprehension, -at least a large measure of practical agreement -and willing co-operation. Philosophy has never -touched the mass of men except through -religion. And, though the parallel is not complete, -it is safe to say that science will never -touch them unaided by its practical applications. -Its wonders may be catalogued for purposes of -education, they may be illustrated by arresting -experiments, by numbers and magnitudes which -startle or fatigue the imagination; but they will -form no familiar portion of the intellectual furniture -of ordinary men unless they be connected, -however remotely, with the conduct of ordinary -life. Critics have made merry over the naive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</span> -self-importance which represented man as the -centre and final cause of the universe, and -conceived the stupendous mechanism of nature -as primarily designed to satisfy his wants and -minister to his entertainment. But there is -another, and an opposite, danger into which it -is possible to fall. The material world, howsoever -it may have gained in sublimity, has, -under the touch of science, lost (so to speak) in -domestic charm. Except where it affects the -immediate needs of organic life, it may seem -so remote from the concerns of men that in the -majority it will rouse no curiosity, while of -those who are fascinated by its marvels, not a -few will be chilled by its impersonal and -indifferent immensity.</p> - -<p>For this latter mood only religion or religious -philosophy can supply a cure. But for -the former, the appropriate remedy is the -perpetual stimulus which the influence of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</span> -science on the business of mankind offers to -their sluggish curiosity. And even now I -believe this influence to be underrated. If -in the last hundred years the whole material -setting of civilised life has altered, we owe it -neither to politicians nor to political institutions. -We owe it to the combined efforts of those -who have advanced science and those who -have applied it. If our outlook upon the -Universe has suffered modifications in detail so -great and so numerous that they amount collectively -to a revolution, it is to men of science -we owe it, not to theologians or philosophers. -On these indeed new and weighty responsibilities -are being cast. They have to harmonise -and to coordinate, to prevent the new from -being one-sided, to preserve the valuable essence -of what is old. But science is the great instrument -of social change, all the greater because -its object is not change but knowledge;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</span> -and its silent appropriation of this dominant -function, amid the din of political and religious -strife, is the most vital of all the revolutions -which have marked the development of modern -civilisation.</p> - -<p>It may seem fanciful to find in a single recent -aspect of this revolution an influence which -resembles religion or patriotism in its appeals -to the higher side of ordinary characters—especially -since we are accustomed to regard -the appropriation by industry of scientific discoveries -merely as a means of multiplying the -material conveniences of life. But if it be -remembered that this process brings vast sections -of every industrial community into admiring relation -with the highest intellectual achievement, -and the most disinterested search for truth; -that those who live by ministering to the -common wants of average humanity lean for -support on those who search among the deepest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</span> -mysteries of Nature; that their dependence is -rewarded by growing success; that success -gives in its turn an incentive to individual -effort in no wise to be measured by personal -expectation of gain; that the energies thus -aroused may affect the whole character of -the community, spreading the beneficent contagion -of hope and high endeavour through -channels scarcely known, to workers<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> in fields -the most remote; if all this be borne in mind it -may perhaps seem not unworthy of the place -I have assigned to it.</p> - -<p>But I do not offer this speculation, whatever -be its worth, as an answer to my original -question. It is but an aid to optimism, not -a reply to pessimism. Such a reply can only -be given by a sociology which has arrived -at scientific conclusions on the life-history of -different types of society, and has risen above<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</span> -the empirical and merely interrogative point of -view which, for want of a better, I have adopted -in this address. No such sociology exists at -present, or seems likely soon to be created. -In its absence the conclusions at which I -provisionally arrive are that we cannot regard -decadence and arrested development as less -normal in human communities than progress; -though the point at which the energy of advance -is exhausted (if, and when it is reached) varies -in different races and civilisations: that the -internal causes by which progress is encouraged, -hindered, or reversed, lie to a great extent -beyond the field of ordinary political discussion, -and are not easily expressed in current -political terminology: that the influence which a -superior civilisation, whether acting by example -or imposed by force, may have in advancing -an inferior one, though often beneficent, is not -likely to be self supporting; its withdrawal will<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</span> -be followed by decadence, unless the character -of the civilisation be in harmony both with the -acquired temperament and the innate capacities -of those who have been induced to accept it: -that as regards those nations which still advance -in virtue of their own inherent energies, though -time has brought perhaps new causes of disquiet, -it has brought also new grounds of hope; and -that whatever be the perils in front of us, there -are, so far, no symptoms either of pause or of -regression in the onward movement which for -more than a thousand years has been characteristic -of Western civilisation.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak p130" id="NOTES">Notes:</h2> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a> The ‘East’ is a term most loosely used. It does not here -include China and Japan and <em>does</em> include parts of Africa. The -observations which follow have no reference either to the Jews -or to the commercial aristocracies of Phœnician origin.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a> Beliefs include knowledge.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</span></p> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a> This remark arises out of a train of thought suggested -by two questions which are very pertinent to the subject -of the Address.</p> - -<p>(1) Is a due succession of men above the average -in original capacity necessary to maintain social progress? -and</p> - -<p>(2) If so, can we discover any law according to which -such men are produced?</p> - -<p>I entertain no doubt myself that the answer to the first -question should be in the affirmative. Democracy is an excellent -thing; but, though quite consistent with progress, it -is not progressive <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">per se</i>. Its value is regulative not dynamic; -and if it meant (as it never does) substantial uniformity, -instead of legal equality, we should become fossilised at once. -Movement may be controlled or checked by the many; it -is initiated and made effective by the few. If (for the -sake of illustration) we suppose mental capacity in all its -many forms to be mensurable and commensurable, and -then imagine two societies possessing the same average -capacity—but an average made up in one case of equal -units, in the other of a majority slightly below the average -and a minority much above it, few could doubt that the -second, not the first, would show the greatest aptitude for -movement. It might go wrong, but it would go.</p> - -<p>The second question—how is this originality (in its -higher manifestations called genius) effectively produced? -is not so simple.</p> - -<p>Excluding education in its narrowest sense—which few -would regard as having much to do with the matter—the -only alternatives seem to be the following:</p> - -<p>Original capacity may be no more than one of the -ordinary variations incidental to heredity. A community -may breed a minority thus exceptionally gifted, as it breeds -a minority of men over six feet six. There may be an -average decennial output of congenital geniuses as there is -an average decennial output of congenital idiots—though -the number is likely to be smaller.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</span></p> - -<p>But if this be the sole cause of the phenomenon, -why does the same race <em>apparently</em> produce many men -of genius in one generation and few in another? Why -are years of abundance so often followed by long periods -of sterility?</p> - -<p>The most obvious explanation of this would seem to -be that in some periods circumstances give many openings -to genius, in some periods few. The genius is constantly -produced; but it is only occasionally recognised.</p> - -<p>In this there must be some truth. A mob orator in -Turkey, a religious reformer in seventeenth century Spain, -a military leader in the Sandwich islands, would hardly get -their chance. Yet the theory of opportunity can scarcely -be reckoned a complete explanation. For it leaves unaccounted -for the <em>variety</em> of genius which has in some -countries marked epochs of vigorous national development. -Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, Florence in the -fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Holland in the later -sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are the typical examples. -In such periods the opportunities of statesmen, soldiers, -orators, and diplomatists, may have been specially frequent. -But whence came the poets, the sculptors, the painters, -the philosophers and the men of letters? What peculiar -opportunities had <em>they</em>?</p> - -<p>The only explanation, if we reject the idea of a mere -coincidence, seems to be, that quite apart from opportunity, -the exceptional stir and fervour of national life evokes or -may evoke qualities which in ordinary times lie dormant, -unknown even to their possessors. The potential Miltons<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</span> -are ‘mute’ and ‘inglorious’ not because they cannot find -a publisher, but because they have nothing they want to -publish. They lack the kind of inspiration which, on this -view, flows from social surroundings where great things, -though of quite another kind, are being done and thought.</p> - -<p>If this theory be true (and it is not without its -difficulties) one would like to know whether these undoubted -outbursts of originality in the higher and rarer -form of genius, are symptomatic of a general rise in the -number of persons exhibiting original capacity of a more -ordinary type. If so, then the conclusion would seem to -be that some kind of widespread exhilaration or excitement -is required in order to enable any community to extract -the best results from the raw material transmitted to it by -natural inheritance.</p> - -</div> - - -<p class="center p2"><span class="italic">Cambridge: Printed at the University Press.</span></p> - -<div class="transnote p3"> -<p class="center"> -<b>Transcriber’s Note</b></p> - - -<p>The formatting of the notes was substantially altered for this edition.</p> - -<p>On page 41, “Greek in culture Roman by political descent” was corrected -to “Greek in culture, Roman by political descent.”</p></div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DECADENCE ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. -</div> - -<div style='margin-top:1em; font-size:1.1em; text-align:center'>START: FULL LICENSE</div> -<div style='text-align:center;font-size:0.9em'>THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE</div> -<div style='text-align:center;font-size:0.9em'>PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project -Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™ -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person -or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™ -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the -Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™ -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when -you share it without charge with others. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work -on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the -phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: -</div> - -<blockquote> - <div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most - other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions - whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms - of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online - at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you - are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws - of the country where you are located before using this eBook. - </div> -</blockquote> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project -Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™ -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg™ License. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format -other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain -Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works -provided that: -</div> - -<div style='margin-left:0.7em;'> - <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> - • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation.” - </div> - - <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> - • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ - works. - </div> - - <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> - • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - </div> - - <div style='text-indent:-0.7em'> - • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works. - </div> -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right -of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™ -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™ -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact -</div> - -<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread -public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state -visit <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/donate/">www.gutenberg.org/donate</a>. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate -</div> - -<div style='display:block; font-size:1.1em; margin:1em 0; font-weight:bold'> -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. -</div> - -</div> -</body> -</html> diff --git a/old/68219-h/images/cover.jpg b/old/68219-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 3bb5f75..0000000 --- a/old/68219-h/images/cover.jpg +++ /dev/null diff --git a/old/68219-h/images/crest.jpg b/old/68219-h/images/crest.jpg Binary files differdeleted file mode 100644 index 8fe190b..0000000 --- a/old/68219-h/images/crest.jpg +++ /dev/null |
