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If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Decadence - Henry Sidgwick memorial lecture - -Author: Arthur James Balfour - -Release Date: June 1, 2022 [eBook #68219] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Thomas Frost and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team - at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images - generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DECADENCE *** - - - - - - CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, - C. F. CLAY, MANAGER. - London: FETTER LANE, E.C. - Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET. - - [Illustration] - - Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS. - New York: G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS. - Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD. - - [_All Rights reserved_] - - - - - DECADENCE - - _HENRY SIDGWICK MEMORIAL - LECTURE_ - - by - - THE RIGHT HON. - ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.P. - - [DELIVERED AT NEWNHAM COLLEGE, - JANUARY 25, 1908] - - - CAMBRIDGE - at the University Press - 1908 - - - - - Cambridge: - PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. - AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. - - - - -DECADENCE. - - -I must begin what I have to say with a warning and an apology. I must -warn you that the present essay makes no pretence to be an adequate -treatment of some compact and limited theme; but rather resembles those -wandering trains of thought, where we allow ourselves the luxury of -putting wide-ranging questions, to which our ignorance forbids any -confident reply. I apologise for adopting a course which thus departs -in some measure from familiar precedent. I admit its perils. But it is -just possible that when a subject, or group of subjects, is of great -inherent interest, even a tentative, and interrogative, treatment of it -may be worth attempting. - -My subject, or at least my point of departure, is Decadence. I do -not mean the sort of decadence often attributed to certain phases of -artistic or literary development, in which an overwrought technique, -straining to express sentiments too subtle or too morbid, is deemed to -have supplanted the direct inspiration of an earlier and a simpler age. -Whether these autumnal glories, these splendours touched with death, -are recurring phenomena in the literary cycle: whether, if they be, -they are connected with other forms of decadence, may be questions well -worth asking and answering. But they are not the questions with which I -am at present concerned. The decadence respecting which I wish to put -questions is not literary or artistic, it is political and national. -It is the decadence which attacks, or is alleged to attack, great -communities and historic civilisations: which is to societies of men -what senility is to man, and is often, like senility, the precursor and -the cause of final dissolution. - -It is curious how deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse are traces -of the conviction that childhood, maturity, and old age, are stages -in the corporate, as they are in the individual, life. “A young and -vigorous nation,” “a decrepit and moribund civilisation”--phrases like -these, and scores of others containing the same implication, come as -trippingly from the tongue as if they suggested no difficulty and -called for no explanation. To Macaulay (unless I am pressing his famous -metaphor too far) it seemed natural that ages hence a young country -like New Zealand should be flourishing, but not less natural that an -old country like England should have decayed. Berkeley, in a well-known -stanza, tells how the drama of civilisation has slowly travelled -westwards to find its loftiest development, but also its final -catastrophe, in the New World. While every man who is weary, hopeless, -or disillusioned talks as if he had caught these various diseases from -the decadent epoch in which he was born. - -But why _should_ civilisations thus wear out and great communities -decay? and what evidence is there that in fact they do? These -questions, though I cannot give to them any conclusive answers, are -of much more than a merely theoretic interest. For if current modes -of speech take decadence more or less for granted, with still greater -confidence do they speak of Progress as assured. Yet if both are -real they can hardly be studied apart, they must evidently limit and -qualify each other in actual experience, and they cannot be isolated in -speculation. - -Though antiquity, Pagan and Christian, took a different view, it -seems easier, _a priori_, to understand Progress than Decadence. Even -if the former be limited, as presumably it is, by the limitation of -human faculty, we should expect the ultimate boundary to be capable of -indefinite approach, and we should _not_ expect that any part of the -road towards it, once traversed, would have to be retraced. Even in the -organic world, decay and death, familiar though they be, are phenomena -that call for scientific explanation. And Weismann has definitely asked -how it comes about that the higher organisms grow old and die, seeing -that old age and death are not inseparable characteristics of living -protoplasm, and that the simplest organisms suffer no natural decay, -perishing, when they do perish, by accident, starvation, or specific -disease. - -The answer he gives to his own question is that the death of the -individual is so useful to the race, that Natural Selection has, in -all but the very lowest species, exterminated the potentially immortal. - -One is tempted to enquire, whether this ingenious explanation could be -so modified as to apply not merely to individuals but to communities. -Is it needful for the cause of civilisation as a whole, that the -organised embodiment of each particular civilisation, if and when -its free development is arrested, should make room for younger and -more vigorous competitors? And if so can we find in Natural Selection -the mechanism by which the principle of decay and dissolution shall -be so implanted in the very nature of human associations that a due -succession among them shall always be maintained? - -To this second question the answer must, I think, be in the negative. -The struggle for existence between different races and different -societies has admittedly played a great part in social development. But -to extend Weismann’s idea from the organic to the social world, would -imply a prolonged competition between groups of communities in which -decadence was the rule, and groups in which it was not;--ending in the -survival of the first, and the destruction of the second. The groups -whose members suffered periodical decadence and dissolution would be -the fittest to survive: just as, on Weismann’s theory, those species -gain in competitive efficiency whom death has unburdened of the old. - -Few will say that in the petty fragment of human history which alone -is open to our inspection, there is satisfactory evidence of any such -long drawn process. Some may even be disposed to ask whether there -is adequate evidence of such a phenomenon as decadence at all. And -it must be acknowledged that the affirmative answer should be given -with caution. Evidently we must not consider a diminution of national -power, whether relative or absolute, as constituting by itself a proof -of national decadence. Holland is not decadent because her place in -the hierarchy of European Powers is less exalted than it was two -hundred and fifty years ago. Spain was not necessarily decadent at -the end of the seventeenth century because she had exhausted herself -in a contest far beyond her resources either in money or in men. It -would, I think, be rash even to say that Venice was decadent at the -end of the eighteenth century, though the growth of other Powers, and -the diversion of the great trade routes, had shorn her of wealth and -international influence. These are misfortunes which in the sphere of -sociology correspond to accident or disease in the sphere of biology. -And what we are concerned to know is whether in the sphere of sociology -there is also anything corresponding to the decay of old age--a decay -which may be hastened by accident or disease, which must be ended by -accident or disease, but is certainly to be distinguished from both. - -However this question should be answered the cases I have cited are -sufficient to shew where the chief difficulty of the enquiry lies. -Decadence, even if it be a reality, never acts in isolation. It is -always complicated with, and often acts through, other more obvious -causes. It is always therefore possible to argue that to these causes, -and not to the more subtle and elusive influences collectively -described as ’decadence,’ the decline and fall of great communities is -really due. - -Yet there are historic tragedies which (as it seems to me) do most -obstinately refuse to be thus simply explained. It is in vain that -historians enumerate the public calamities which preceded, and no doubt -contributed to, the final catastrophe. Civil dissensions, military -disasters, pestilences, famines, tyrants, tax-gatherers, growing -burdens, and waning wealth--the gloomy catalogue is unrolled before our -eyes, yet somehow it does not in all cases wholly satisfy us: we feel -that some of these diseases are of a kind which a vigorous body politic -should easily be able to survive, that others are secondary symptoms of -some obscurer malady, and that in neither case do they supply us with -the full explanations of which we are in search. - -Consider for instance the long agony and final destruction of Roman -Imperialism in the West, the most momentous catastrophe of which we -have historic record. It has deeply stirred the imagination of mankind, -it has been the theme of great historians, it has been much explained -by political philosophers, yet who feels that either historians or -philosophers have laid bare the inner workings of the drama? Rome -fell, and great was the fall of it. But why it fell, by what secret -mines its defences were breached, and what made its garrison so -faint-hearted and ineffectual--this is not so clear. - -In order to measure adequately the difficulty of the problem let us -abstract our minds from historical details and compare the position of -the Empire about the middle of the second century, with its position -in the middle of the third, or again at the end of the fourth, and -ask of what forces history gives us an account, sufficient in these -periods to effect so mighty a transformation. Or, still better, imagine -an observer equipped with our current stock of political wisdom, -transported to Rome in the reign of Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius, -and in ignorance of the event, writing letters to the newspapers on the -future destinies of the Empire. What would his forecast be? - -We might suppose him to examine, in the first place, the military -position of the State, its probable enemies, its capacities for -defence. He would note that only on its eastern boundary was there -an organised military Power capable of meeting Rome on anything like -equal terms, and this only in the regions adjacent to their common -frontier. For the rest he would discover no civilised enemy along -the southern boundary to the Atlantic or along its northern boundary -from the Black Sea to the German Ocean. Warlike tribes indeed he -would find in plenty: difficult to crush within the limits of their -native forests and morasses, formidable it may be in a raid, but -without political cohesion, military unity, or the means of military -concentration;--embarrassing therefore rather than dangerous. -If reminded of Varus and his lost legions, he would ask of what -importance, in the story of a world-power could be the loss of a -few thousand men surprised at a distance from their base amid the -entanglements of a difficult and unknown country. Never, it would seem, -was Empire more fortunately circumstanced for purposes of home defence. - -But (it might be thought) the burden of securing frontiers of such -length, even against merely tribal assaults, though easy from a -strictly military point of view, might prove too heavy to be long -endured. Yet the military forces scattered through the Roman Empire, -though apparently adequate in the days of her greatness would, -according to modern ideas, seem hardly sufficient for purposes of -police, let alone defence. An army corps or less was deemed enough -to preserve what are now mighty kingdoms, from internal disorder and -external aggression. And if we compare with this the contributions, -either in the way of money or of men, exacted from the territories -subject to Rome before the Empire came into being, or at any period of -the world’s history since it dissolved away, the comparison must surely -be entirely in favour of the Empire. - -But burdens which seem light, if measured by area, may be heavy if -measured by ability to pay. Yet when has ability to pay been greater -in the regions bordering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean than -under the Roman Empire? Travel round it in imagination, eastward -from the Atlantic coast of Morocco till returning westward you reach -the head of the Adriatic Gulf, and you will have skirted a region, -still of immense natural wealth, once filled with great cities, and -fertile farms, better governed during the Empire than it has ever been -governed since (at least till Algeria became French and Egypt British); -including among its provinces what were great states before the Roman -rule, and have been great states since that rule decayed, divided -by no international jealousies, oppressed by no fear of conquest, -enterprising, cultured. Remember that to estimate its area of taxation -and recruiting you must add to these regions Bulgaria, Servia, much -of Austria and Bavaria, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, -and most of Britain, and you have conditions favourable to military -strength and economic prosperity rarely equalled in the modern world -and never in the ancient. - -Our observer however might, very rightly, feel that a far-spreading -Empire like that of Rome, including regions profoundly differing in -race, history and religion, would be liable to other dangers than -those which arise from mere external aggression. One of the first -questions, therefore, which he would be disposed to ask, is whether -so heterogeneous a state was not in perpetual danger of dissolution -through the disintegrating influence of national sentiments. He would -learn probably, with a strong feeling of surprise, that with the single -exception of the Jews, the constituent nations, once conquered, were -not merely content to belong to the Empire, but could scarcely imagine -themselves doing anything else: that the Imperial system appealed, not -merely to the material needs of the component populations, but also to -their imagination and their loyalty; that Gaul, Spain, and Britain, -though but recently forced within the pale of civilisation, were as -faithful to the Imperial ideal as the Greek of Athens or the Hellenised -Orientals of Syria; and that neither historic memories, nor local -patriotism, neither disputed succession, nor public calamities, nor -administrative divisions, ever really shook the sentiment in favour of -Imperial Unity. There might be more than one Emperor: but there could -only be one Empire. Howsoever our observer might disapprove of the -Imperial system he would therefore have to admit that the Empire, with -all its shortcomings, its absolutism and its bureaucracy, had solved -more successfully than any government, before or since, the problem of -devising a scheme which equally satisfied the sentiments of East and -West; which respected local feelings, encouraged local government; in -which the Celt, the Iberian, the Berber, the Egyptian, the Asiatic, -the Greek, the Illyrian, the Italian were all at home, and which, -though based on conquest, was accepted by the conquered as the natural -organisation of the civilised world. - -Rome had thus unique sources of strength. What sources of weakness -would our observer be likely to detect behind her imposing exterior? -The diminution of population is the one which has (rightly I think) -most impressed historians: and it is difficult to resist the evidence, -either of the fact, or of its disastrous consequences. I hesitate -indeed to accept without qualification the accounts given us of the -progressive decay of the native Italian stock from the days of the -Gracchi to the disintegration of the Empire in the West: and when we -read how the dearth of men was made good (in so far as it was made -good) by the increasing inflow of slaves and adventurers from every -corner of the known world, one wonders _whose_ sons they were who, for -three centuries and more, so brilliantly led the van of modern European -culture, as it emerged from the darkness of the early Middle Ages. -Passing by such collateral issues, however, and admitting depopulation -to have been both real and serious, we may well ask whether it was not -the result of Roman decadence rather than its cause, the symptom of -some deep-seated social malady, not its origin. We are not concerned -here with the aristocracy of Rome, nor even with the people of Italy. -We are concerned with the Empire. We are not concerned with a passing -phase or fashion, but with a process which seems to have gone on with -increasing rapidity, through good times as well as bad, till the final -cataclysm. A local disease might have a local explanation, a transient -one might be due to a chance coincidence. But what can we say of a -disease which was apparently co-extensive with Imperial civilisation in -area, and which exceeded it in duration? - -I find it hard to believe that either a selfish aversion to matrimony -or a mystical admiration for celibacy, though at certain periods the -one was common in Pagan and the other in Christian circles, were -more than elements in the complex of causes by which the result was -brought about. Like the plagues which devastated Europe in the second -and third centuries, they must have greatly aggravated the evil, but -they are hardly sufficient to account for it. Nor yet can we find -an explanation of it in the discouragement, the sense of impending -doom, by which men’s spirits were oppressed long before the Imperial -power began visibly to wane, for this is one of the things which, if -historically true, does itself most urgently require explanation. - -It may be however that our wandering politician would be too well -grounded in Malthusian economics to regard a diminution of population -as in itself an overwhelming calamity. And if he were pressed to -describe the weak spots in the Empire of the Antonines he would be -disposed, I think, to look for them on the ethical rather than on the -military, the economic, or the strictly political sides of social life. -He would be inclined to say, as in effect Mr Lecky does say, that in -the institution of slavery, in the brutalities of the gladiatorial -shows, in the gratuitous distribution of bread to the urban mobs, are -to be found the corrupting influences which first weakened and then -destroyed the vigour of the State. - -I confess that I cannot easily accept this analysis of the facts. As -regards the gladiatorial shows, even had they been universal throughout -the Empire, and had they flourished more rankly as its power declined, -I should still have questioned the propriety of attributing too -far-reaching effects to such a cause. The Romans were brutal while they -were conquering the world: its conquest enabled them to be brutal with -ostentation; but we must not measure the ill consequences of their -barbaric tastes by the depth of our own disgusts, nor assume the Gothic -invasions to be the natural and fitting Nemesis of so much spectacular -shedding of innocent blood. - -As for the public distributions of corn, one would wish to have more -evidence as to its social effects. But even without fully accepting the -theory of the latest Roman historian, who believes that, under the then -prevailing conditions of transport, no very large city could exist in -Antiquity, if the supply of its food were left to private enterprise, -we cannot seriously regard this practice, strange as it seems to us, as -an important element in the problem. Granting for the sake of argument -that it demoralised the mob of Rome, it must be remembered that Rome -was not the Empire, nor did the mob of Rome govern the Empire, as once -it had governed the Republic. - -Slavery is a far more important matter. The magnitude of its effects on -ancient societies, difficult as these are to disentangle, can hardly be -exaggerated. But with what plausibility can we find in it the cause of -Rome’s decline, seeing that it was the concomitant also of its rise? -How can that which in Antiquity was common to every state, have this -exceptional and malign influence upon one? It would not in any case be -easy to accept such a theory; but surely it becomes impossible when we -bear in mind the enormous improvement effected under the Empire both in -the law and the practice of slavery. Great as were its evils, they were -diminishing evils--less ruinous as time went on to the character of the -master, less painful and degrading to the slave. Who can believe that -this immemorial custom could, in its decline, destroy a civilisation, -which, in its vigour, it had helped to create? - -Of course our observer would see much in the social system he was -examining which he would rightly regard as morally detestable and -politically pernicious. But the real question before him would not be -‘are these things good or bad?’ but ‘are these things getting better -or getting worse?’ And surely in most cases he would be obliged to -answer ‘getting better.’ Many things moreover would come under his -notice fitted to move his admiration in a much less qualified manner. -Few governments have been more anxious to foster an alien and higher -culture, than was the Roman Government to foster Greek civilisation. -In so far as Rome inherited what Alexander conquered, it carried out -the ideal which Alexander had conceived. In few periods have the rich -been readier to spend of their private fortunes on public objects. -There never was a community in which associations for every purpose of -mutual aid or enjoyment sprang more readily into existence. There never -was a military monarchy less given to wars of aggression. There never -was an age in which there was a more rapid advance in humanitarian -ideals, or a more anxious seeking after spiritual truth. There was much -discussion, there was, apart from politics, but little intolerance. -Education was well endowed, and its professors held in high esteem. -Physical culture was cared for. Law was becoming scientific. Research -was not forgotten. What more could be reasonably expected? - -According to our ordinary methods of analysis it is not easy to say -what more _could_ be reasonably expected. But plainly much more was -required. In a few generations from the time of which I am speaking -the Empire lost its extraordinary power of assimilating alien and -barbaric elements. It became too feeble either to absorb or to expel -them: and the immigrants who in happier times might have bestowed -renewed vigour on the commonwealth, became, in the hour of its decline, -a weakness and a peril. Poverty grew as population shrank. Municipal -office, once so eagerly desired, became the most cruel of burdens. -Associations connected with industry or commerce, which began by freely -exchanging public service for public privilege, found their members -subjected to ever increasing obligations, for the due performance of -which they and their children were liable in person and in property. -Thus while Christianity, and the other forces that made for mercy, were -diminishing the slavery of the slave, the needs of the Bureaucracy -compelled it to trench ever more and more upon the freedom of the -free. It was each man’s duty (so ran the argument) to serve the -commonwealth: he could best serve the commonwealth by devoting himself -to his calling if it were one of public necessity: this duty he should -be required under penalties to perform, and to devote if necessary to -its performance, labour to the limits of endurance, fortune to the -last shilling, and family to the remotest generation. Through this -crude experiment in socialism, the civilised world seemed to be rapidly -moving towards a system of universal caste, imposed by no immemorial -custom, supported by no religious scruple, but forced on an unwilling -people by the Emperor’s edict and the executioner’s lash. - -These things have severally and collectively been regarded as the -causes why in the West the Imperial system so quickly crumbled into -chaos. And so no doubt they were. But they obviously require themselves -to be explained by causes more general and more remote; and what were -these? If I answer as I feel disposed to answer--Decadence--you will -properly ask how the unknown becomes less unknown merely by receiving -a name. I reply that if there be indeed subtle changes in the social -tissues of old communities which make them, as time goes on, less -resistant to the external attacks and the internal disturbances by -which all communities are threatened, overt recognition of the fact -is a step in advance. We have not an idea of what ‘life’ consists in, -but if on that account we were to abstain from using the term, we -should not be better but worse equipped for dealing with the problems -of physiology; while on the other hand if we could translate life -into terms of matter and motion to-morrow, we should still be obliged -to use the word in order to distinguish the material movements which -constitute life or exhibit it, from those which do not. In like manner -we are ignorant of the inner character of the cell changes which -produce senescence. But should we be better fitted to form a correct -conception of the life-history of complex organisms if we refused to -recognise any cause of death but accident or disease? I admit, of -course, that the term ‘decadence’ is less precise than ‘old age’: -as sociology deals with organisms far less definite than biology. I -admit also that it explains nothing. If its use is to be justified at -all, the justification must depend not on the fact that it supplies an -explanation, but on the fact that it rules out explanations which are -obvious but inadequate. And this may be a service of some importance. -The facile generalisations with which we so often season the study of -dry historic fact; the habits of political discussion which induce us -to catalogue for purposes of debate the outward signs that distinguish -(as we are prone to think) the standing from the falling state, hide -the obscurer, but more potent, forces which silently prepare the -fate of empires. National character is subtle and elusive; not to be -expressed in statistics nor measured by the rough methods which suffice -the practical moralist or statesman. And when through an ancient and -still powerful state there spreads a mood of deep discouragement, when -the reaction against recurring ills grows feebler, and the ship rises -less buoyantly to each succeeding wave, when learning languishes, -enterprise slackens, and vigour ebbs away, then, as I think, there is -present some process of social degeneration, which we must perforce -recognise, and which, pending a satisfactory analysis, may conveniently -be distinguished by the name of ‘decadence.’ - -I am well aware that though the space I have just devoted to the -illustration of my theme provided by Roman history is out of all -proportion to the general plan of this address, yet the treatment of -it is inadequate and perhaps unconvincing. But those who are most -reluctant to admit that decay, as distinguished from misfortune, may -lower the general level of civilisation, can hardly deny that in many -cases that level may for indefinite periods shew no tendency to rise. -If decadence be unknown, is not progress exceptional? Consider the -changing politics of the unchanging East[1]. Is it not true that there, -while wars and revolutions, dynastic and religious, have shattered -ancient states and brought new ones into being, every community, as -soon as it has risen above the tribal and nomad condition, adopts -with the rarest exceptions a form of government which, from its -very generality in Eastern lands, we habitually call an ‘oriental -despotism’? We may crystallise and re-crystallise a soluble salt as -often as we please, the new crystals will always resemble the old ones. -The crystals, indeed, may be of different sizes, their component -molecules may occupy different positions within the crystalline -structure, but the structure itself will be of one immutable pattern. -So it is, or seems to be, with these oriental states. They rise, in -turn, upon the ruins of their predecessors, themselves predestined -to perish by a like fate. But whatever their origin or history, they -are always either autocracies or aggregations of autocracies; and no -differences of race, of creed, or of language seem sufficient to vary -the violent monotony of their internal history. In the eighteenth -century theorists were content to attribute the political servitude of -the Eastern world to the unscrupulous machinations of tyrants and their -tools. And such explanations are good as far as they go. But this, in -truth, is not very far. Intrigue, assassination, ruthless repression, -the whole machinery of despotism supply particular explanations of -particular incidents. They do not supply the general explanation of -the general phenomenon. They tell you how this ruler or that obtained -absolute power. They do not tell you why every ruler is absolute. -Nor can I furnish the answer. The fact remains that over large and -relatively civilised portions of the world popular government is -profoundly unpopular, in the sense that it is no natural or spontaneous -social growth. Political absolutism not political freedom is the -familiar weed of the country. Despots change but despotism remains: and -if through alien influences, like those exercised by Greek cities in -Asia, or by British rule in India, the type is modified, it may well be -doubted whether the modification could long survive the moment when its -sustaining cause was withdrawn. - -Now it would almost seem as if in lands where this political type was -normal a certain level of culture (not of course the same in each -case) could not permanently be overpassed. If under the excitement of -religion or conquest, or else through causes more complicated and more -obscure, this limit has sometimes been left behind, reaction has always -followed, and decadence set in. Many people indeed, as I have already -observed, take this as a matter of course. It seems to them the most -natural thing in the world that the glories of the Eastern Khalifate -should decay, and that the Moors in Morocco should lose even the memory -of the learning and the arts possessed but three centuries ago by the -Moors in Spain. To me it seems mysterious. But whether it be easy of -comprehension or difficult, if only it be true, does it not furnish -food for disquieting reflexion? If there are whole groups of nations -capable on their own initiative of a certain measure of civilisation, -but capable apparently of no more, and if below them again there are -(as I suppose) other races who seem incapable of either creating a -civilisation of their own, or of preserving unaided a civilisation -impressed upon them from without, by what right do we assume that -no impassable limits bar the path of Western progress? Those limits -may not yet be in sight. Surely they are not. But does not a survey -of history suggest that somewhere in the dim future they await our -approach? - -It may be replied that the history of Rome, on which I dwelt a moment -ago, shews that arrested progress, and even decadence, may be but the -prelude to a new period of vigorous growth. So that even those races -or nations which seem frozen into eternal immobility may base upon -experience their hopes of an awakening spring. - -I am not sure, however, that this is the true interpretation of the -facts. There is no spectacle indeed in all history more impressive -than the thick darkness settling down over Western Europe, blotting -out all but a faint and distorted vision of Graeco-Roman culture, and -then, as it slowly rises, unveiling the variety and rich promise of the -modern world. But I do not think we should make this unique phenomenon -support too weighty a load of theory. I should not infer from it that -when some wave of civilisation has apparently spent its force, we -have a right to regard its withdrawing sweep as but the prelude to a -new advance. I should rather conjecture that in this particular case -we should find, among other subtle causes of decadence, some obscure -disharmony between the Imperial system and the temperament of the West, -undetected even by those who suffered from it. That system, though -accepted with contentment and even with pride, though in the days of -its greatness it brought civilisation, commerce, and security in its -train, must surely have lacked some elements which are needed to foster -among Teutons, Celts, and Iberians the qualities, whatever these may -be, on which sustained progress depends. It was perhaps too oriental -for the occident, and it certainly became more oriental as time went -on. In the East it was, comparatively speaking, successful. If there -was no progress, decadence was slow; and but for what Western Europe -did, and what it failed to do, during the long struggle with militant -Mahommedanism, there might still be an Empire in the East, largely -Asiatic in population, Christian in religion, Greek in culture, Roman -by political descent. - -Had this been the course of events large portions of mankind would -doubtless have been much better governed than they are. It is not so -clear that they would have been more ‘progressive.’ Progress is with -the West: with communities of the European type. And if _their_ energy -of development is some day to be exhausted, who can believe that there -remains any external source from which it can be renewed? Where are the -untried races competent to construct out of the ruined fragments of our -civilisation a new and better habitation for the spirit of man? They -do not exist: and if the world is again to be buried under a barbaric -flood, it will not be like that which fertilised, though it first -destroyed, the western provinces of Rome, but like that which in Asia -submerged for ever the last traces of Hellenic culture. - -We are thus brought back to the question I put a few moments since. -What grounds are there for supposing that we can escape the fate to -which other races have had to submit? If for periods which, measured -on the historic scale, are of great duration, communities which have -advanced to a certain point appear able to advance no further; if -civilisations wear out, and races become effete, why should we expect -to progress indefinitely, why for us alone is the doom of man to be -reversed? - -To these questions I have no very satisfactory answers to give, nor -do I believe that our knowledge of national or social psychology -is sufficient to make a satisfactory answer possible. Some purely -tentative observations on the point may, however, furnish a fitting -conclusion to an address which has been tentative throughout, and aims -rather at suggesting trains of thought, than at completing them. - -I assume that the factors which combine to make each generation what -it is at the moment of its entrance into adult life are in the main -twofold. The one produces the raw material of society, the process -of manufacture is effected by the other. The first is physiological -inheritance, the second is the inheritance partly of external -conditions of life, partly of beliefs[2], traditions, sentiments, -customs, laws, and organisation--all that constitute the social -surroundings in which men grow up to maturity. - -I hazard no conjecture as to the share borne respectively by these two -kinds of cause in producing their joint result. Nor are we likely to -obtain satisfactory evidence on the subject till, in the interests of -science, two communities of different blood and different traditions -consent to exchange their children at birth by a universal process -of reciprocal adoption. But even in the absence of so heroic an -experiment, it seems safe to say that the mobility which makes possible -either progress or decadence, resides rather in the causes grouped -under the second head than in the physiological material on which -education, in the widest sense of that ambiguous term, has got to -work. If, as I suppose, acquired qualities are not inherited, the only -causes which could fundamentally modify the physiological character of -any particular community are its intermixture with alien races through -slavery, conquest, or immigration; or else new conditions which varied -the relative proportion in which different sections of the population -contributed to its total numbers. If, for example, the more successful -members of the community had smaller families than the less successful; -or if medical administration succeeded in extinguishing maladies to -which persons of a particular constitution were specially liable; or -if one strain in a mixed race had a larger birth rate than another--in -these cases and in others like them, there would doubtless be a change -in the physiological factor of national character. But such changes -are not likely, I suppose, to be considerable, except, perhaps, those -due to the mixture of races;--and that only in new countries whose -economic opportunities tempt immigrants widely differing in culture, -and in capacity for culture, from those whose citizenship they propose -to share. - -The flexible element in any society, that which is susceptible of -progress or decadence, must therefore be looked for rather in the -physical and psychical conditions affecting the life of its component -units, than in their inherited constitution. This last rather supplies -a limit to variations than an element which does itself vary: though -from this point of view its importance is capital. I at least find -it quite impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely -different races with an identical environment, political, religious, -educational, what you will, can ever make them alike. They have been -different and unequal since history began; different and unequal they -are destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration. - -But though the advance of each community is thus limited by its -inherited aptitudes, I do not suppose that those limits have ever been -reached by its unaided efforts. In the cases where a forward movement -has died away, the pause must in part be due to arrested development -in the variable, not to a fixed resistance in the unchanging factor -of national character. Either external conditions are unfavourable; -or the sentiments, customs and beliefs which make society possible -have hardened into shapes which make its further self-development -impossible; or through mere weariness of spirit the community resigns -itself to a contented, or perhaps a discontented, stagnation; or it -shatters itself in pursuit of impossible ideals, or for other and -obscurer reasons, flags in its endeavours, and falls short of possible -achievement. - -Now I am quite unable to offer any such general analysis of the causes -by which these hindrances to progress are produced or removed as would -furnish a reply to my question. But it may be worth noting that a -social force has come into being, new in magnitude if not in kind, -which must favourably modify such hindrances as come under all but the -last of the divisions in which I have roughly arranged them. This force -is the modern alliance between pure science and industry. That on this -we must mainly rely for the improvement of the material conditions -under which societies live is in my opinion obvious, although no one -would conjecture it from a historic survey of political controversy. -Its direct moral effects are less obvious; indeed there are many most -excellent people who would altogether deny their existence. To regard -it as a force fitted to rouse and sustain the energies of nations -would seem to them absurd: for this would be to rank it with those -other forces which have most deeply stirred the emotions of great -communities, have urged them to the greatest exertions, have released -them most effectually from the benumbing fetters of merely personal -preoccupations,--with religion, patriotism, and politics. Industrial -expansion under scientific inspiration, so far from deserving praise -like this, is in their view, at best, but a new source of material -well-being, at worst the prolific parent of physical ugliness in -many forms, machine made wares, smoky cities, polluted rivers, and -desecrated landscapes,--appropriately associated with materialism and -greed. - -I believe this view to be utterly misleading, confounding accident with -essence, transient accompaniments with inseparable characteristics. -Should we dream of thus judging the other great social forces of which -I have spoken? Are we to ignore what religion has done for the world -because it has been the fruitful excuse for the narrowest bigotries -and the most cruel persecutions? Are we to underrate the worth of -politics, because politics may mean no more than the mindless clash of -factions, or the barren exchange of one set of tyrants or jobbers for -another? Is patriotism to be despised because its manifestations have -been sometimes vulgar, sometimes selfish, sometimes brutal, sometimes -criminal? Estimates like these seem to me worse than useless. All great -social forces are not merely capable of perversion, they are constantly -perverted. Yet were they eliminated from our social system, were each -man, acting on the advice, which Voltaire gave but never followed, to -disinterest himself of all that goes on beyond the limits of his own -cabbage garden, decadence I take it, would have already far advanced. - -But if the proposition I am defending may be wrongly criticised, it -is still more likely to be wrongly praised. To some it will commend -itself as a eulogy on an industrial as distinguished from a military -civilisation: as a suggestion that in the peaceful pursuit of wealth -there is that which of itself may constitute a valuable social tonic. -This may be true, but it is not my contention. In talking of the -alliance between industry and science my emphasis is at least as much -on the word science as on the word industry. I am not concerned now -with the proportion of the population devoted to productive labour, -or the esteem in which they are held. It is on the effects which I -believe are following, and are going in yet larger measure to follow, -from the intimate relation between scientific discovery and industrial -efficiency, that I most desire to insist. - -Do you then, it will be asked, so highly rate the utilitarian aspect -of research as to regard it as a source, not merely of material -convenience, but of spiritual elevation? Is it seriously to be ranked -with religion and patriotism as an important force for raising men’s -lives above what is small, personal, and self-centred? Does it not -rather pervert pure knowledge into a new contrivance for making money, -and give a fresh triumph to the ‘growing materialism of the age’? - -I do not myself believe that this age is either less spiritual or more -sordid than its predecessors. I believe, indeed, precisely the reverse. -But however this may be, is it not plain that if a society is to be -moved by the remote speculations of isolated thinkers it can only -be on condition that their isolation is not complete? Some point of -contact they must have with the world in which they live, and if their -influence is to be based on widespread sympathy, the contact must be -in a region where there can be, if not full mutual comprehension, at -least a large measure of practical agreement and willing co-operation. -Philosophy has never touched the mass of men except through religion. -And, though the parallel is not complete, it is safe to say that -science will never touch them unaided by its practical applications. -Its wonders may be catalogued for purposes of education, they may be -illustrated by arresting experiments, by numbers and magnitudes which -startle or fatigue the imagination; but they will form no familiar -portion of the intellectual furniture of ordinary men unless they be -connected, however remotely, with the conduct of ordinary life. Critics -have made merry over the naive self-importance which represented -man as the centre and final cause of the universe, and conceived the -stupendous mechanism of nature as primarily designed to satisfy his -wants and minister to his entertainment. But there is another, and an -opposite, danger into which it is possible to fall. The material world, -howsoever it may have gained in sublimity, has, under the touch of -science, lost (so to speak) in domestic charm. Except where it affects -the immediate needs of organic life, it may seem so remote from the -concerns of men that in the majority it will rouse no curiosity, while -of those who are fascinated by its marvels, not a few will be chilled -by its impersonal and indifferent immensity. - -For this latter mood only religion or religious philosophy can supply -a cure. But for the former, the appropriate remedy is the perpetual -stimulus which the influence of science on the business of mankind -offers to their sluggish curiosity. And even now I believe this -influence to be underrated. If in the last hundred years the whole -material setting of civilised life has altered, we owe it neither to -politicians nor to political institutions. We owe it to the combined -efforts of those who have advanced science and those who have applied -it. If our outlook upon the Universe has suffered modifications in -detail so great and so numerous that they amount collectively to a -revolution, it is to men of science we owe it, not to theologians or -philosophers. On these indeed new and weighty responsibilities are -being cast. They have to harmonise and to coordinate, to prevent the -new from being one-sided, to preserve the valuable essence of what is -old. But science is the great instrument of social change, all the -greater because its object is not change but knowledge; and its silent -appropriation of this dominant function, amid the din of political and -religious strife, is the most vital of all the revolutions which have -marked the development of modern civilisation. - -It may seem fanciful to find in a single recent aspect of this -revolution an influence which resembles religion or patriotism in -its appeals to the higher side of ordinary characters--especially -since we are accustomed to regard the appropriation by industry of -scientific discoveries merely as a means of multiplying the material -conveniences of life. But if it be remembered that this process brings -vast sections of every industrial community into admiring relation -with the highest intellectual achievement, and the most disinterested -search for truth; that those who live by ministering to the common -wants of average humanity lean for support on those who search among -the deepest mysteries of Nature; that their dependence is rewarded -by growing success; that success gives in its turn an incentive to -individual effort in no wise to be measured by personal expectation of -gain; that the energies thus aroused may affect the whole character -of the community, spreading the beneficent contagion of hope and high -endeavour through channels scarcely known, to workers[3] in fields -the most remote; if all this be borne in mind it may perhaps seem not -unworthy of the place I have assigned to it. - -But I do not offer this speculation, whatever be its worth, as an -answer to my original question. It is but an aid to optimism, not a -reply to pessimism. Such a reply can only be given by a sociology -which has arrived at scientific conclusions on the life-history of -different types of society, and has risen above the empirical and -merely interrogative point of view which, for want of a better, I -have adopted in this address. No such sociology exists at present, or -seems likely soon to be created. In its absence the conclusions at -which I provisionally arrive are that we cannot regard decadence and -arrested development as less normal in human communities than progress; -though the point at which the energy of advance is exhausted (if, -and when it is reached) varies in different races and civilisations: -that the internal causes by which progress is encouraged, hindered, -or reversed, lie to a great extent beyond the field of ordinary -political discussion, and are not easily expressed in current political -terminology: that the influence which a superior civilisation, -whether acting by example or imposed by force, may have in advancing -an inferior one, though often beneficent, is not likely to be self -supporting; its withdrawal will be followed by decadence, unless the -character of the civilisation be in harmony both with the acquired -temperament and the innate capacities of those who have been induced to -accept it: that as regards those nations which still advance in virtue -of their own inherent energies, though time has brought perhaps new -causes of disquiet, it has brought also new grounds of hope; and that -whatever be the perils in front of us, there are, so far, no symptoms -either of pause or of regression in the onward movement which for more -than a thousand years has been characteristic of Western civilisation. - - - - -NOTES: - -[1] The ‘East’ is a term most loosely used. It does not here include -China and Japan and _does_ include parts of Africa. The observations -which follow have no reference either to the Jews or to the commercial -aristocracies of Phœnician origin. - -[2] Beliefs include knowledge. - -[3] This remark arises out of a train of thought suggested by two -questions which are very pertinent to the subject of the Address. - -(1) Is a due succession of men above the average in original capacity -necessary to maintain social progress? and - -(2) If so, can we discover any law according to which such men are -produced? - -I entertain no doubt myself that the answer to the first question -should be in the affirmative. Democracy is an excellent thing; but, -though quite consistent with progress, it is not progressive _per se_. -Its value is regulative not dynamic; and if it meant (as it never does) -substantial uniformity, instead of legal equality, we should become -fossilised at once. Movement may be controlled or checked by the many; -it is initiated and made effective by the few. If (for the sake of -illustration) we suppose mental capacity in all its many forms to be -mensurable and commensurable, and then imagine two societies possessing -the same average capacity--but an average made up in one case of equal -units, in the other of a majority slightly below the average and a -minority much above it, few could doubt that the second, not the first, -would show the greatest aptitude for movement. It might go wrong, but -it would go. - -The second question--how is this originality (in its higher -manifestations called genius) effectively produced? is not so simple. - -Excluding education in its narrowest sense--which few would regard as -having much to do with the matter--the only alternatives seem to be the -following: - -Original capacity may be no more than one of the ordinary variations -incidental to heredity. A community may breed a minority thus -exceptionally gifted, as it breeds a minority of men over six feet six. -There may be an average decennial output of congenital geniuses as -there is an average decennial output of congenital idiots--though the -number is likely to be smaller. - -But if this be the sole cause of the phenomenon, why does the same race -_apparently_ produce many men of genius in one generation and few in -another? Why are years of abundance so often followed by long periods -of sterility? - -The most obvious explanation of this would seem to be that in some -periods circumstances give many openings to genius, in some periods -few. The genius is constantly produced; but it is only occasionally -recognised. - -In this there must be some truth. A mob orator in Turkey, a religious -reformer in seventeenth century Spain, a military leader in the -Sandwich islands, would hardly get their chance. Yet the theory of -opportunity can scarcely be reckoned a complete explanation. For it -leaves unaccounted for the _variety_ of genius which has in some -countries marked epochs of vigorous national development. Athens in -the fifth and fourth centuries, Florence in the fifteenth and early -sixteenth centuries, Holland in the later sixteenth and seventeenth -centuries, are the typical examples. In such periods the opportunities -of statesmen, soldiers, orators, and diplomatists, may have been -specially frequent. But whence came the poets, the sculptors, the -painters, the philosophers and the men of letters? What peculiar -opportunities had _they_? - -The only explanation, if we reject the idea of a mere coincidence, -seems to be, that quite apart from opportunity, the exceptional stir -and fervour of national life evokes or may evoke qualities which in -ordinary times lie dormant, unknown even to their possessors. The -potential Miltons are ‘mute’ and ‘inglorious’ not because they cannot -find a publisher, but because they have nothing they want to publish. -They lack the kind of inspiration which, on this view, flows from -social surroundings where great things, though of quite another kind, -are being done and thought. - -If this theory be true (and it is not without its difficulties) one -would like to know whether these undoubted outbursts of originality -in the higher and rarer form of genius, are symptomatic of a general -rise in the number of persons exhibiting original capacity of a more -ordinary type. If so, then the conclusion would seem to be that some -kind of widespread exhilaration or excitement is required in order to -enable any community to extract the best results from the raw material -transmitted to it by natural inheritance. - - -_Cambridge: Printed at the University Press._ - - - - -Transcriber’s Note - - -In this file, text in _italics_ is indicated by underscores. - -On page 41, “Greek in culture Roman by political descent” was corrected -to “Greek in culture, Roman by political descent.” - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DECADENCE *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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