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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a52707c --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #67310 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/67310) diff --git a/old/67310-0.txt b/old/67310-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a36a803..0000000 --- a/old/67310-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12305 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of British Campaigns in Flanders -1690-1794, by John William Fortescue - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794 - Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army" - -Author: John William Fortescue - -Release Date: February 3, 2022 [eBook #67310] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, David Tipple and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS -1690-1794 *** - -Transcriber’s Notes: - - Underscores are used to enclose text in italics; the three words that - end this sentence _are in italics_. - - Equals signs are used to enclose text in bold face; the four words - that end this sentence =are in bold face=. - - The 291 footnotes in the source book have been changed into endnotes. - Each endnote is labelled by a copy of its marker which consists of a - number in square brackets. - - There are 439 sidenotes. Sidenotes are enclosed by black diamond - symbols, for example, ◆July 24./Aug. 3.◆. - - Many of the 439 sidenotes consist of two dates, separated by a dash; - the first date is taken from the Julian Calendar and the second from - the Gregorian Calendar. The dates in such a pair differ by 10 days - in the 17th century and by 11 days in the 18th century. - - - - - BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS - - - - - [Illustration] - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MADRAS - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO - DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - - BRITISH CAMPAIGNS - IN FLANDERS - 1690–1794 - - BEING EXTRACTS FROM - “A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY” - - BY - THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON - 1918 - - - - - COPYRIGHT - - - - - PREFACE - - -This volume consists simply of extracts reprinted from my _History of -the British Army_. It is published in order that the troops at the -front may, if they wish it, study the experiences of their forerunners -in the Low Countries in a book which is fairly portable and fairly -inexpensive, though neither so cheap nor so compendious as _The British -Soldiers’ Guide to Northern France and Flanders_. - - J. W. F. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - PAGE - WILLIAM III.’S CAMPAIGNS 1–37 - - MARLBOROUGH’S CAMPAIGNS— - - 1701–2 38 - - 1705 51 - - 1706 (RAMILLIES) 62 - - 1707–8 (OUDENARDE) 77 - - 1709 (MALPLAQUET) 103 - - 1711 122 - - WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION— - - CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–5 (FONTENOY) 133 - - CAMPAIGNS OF 1746–7 (LAUFFELD, ROUCOUX) 158 - - WAR OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 177 - - CAMPAIGN OF 1793 (LINSELLES) 207 - - PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794 261 - - CAMPAIGN OF 1794 (VILLERS-EN-CAUCHIES, - BEAUMONT, WILLEMS, TOURCOING) 295 - - CAMPAIGN OF 1794 (_Continued_) 343 - - END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794 366 - - - - - MAPS AND PLANS - - - PAGE - Steenkirk, 23rd July (3rd Aug.) 1692 13 - - Landen, 19th (29th) July 1693 27 - - Lines of the Geete, 7th (18th) July 1705 55 - - Ramillies, 12th (23rd) May 1706 67 - - Oudenarde, 30th June (11th July) 1708 85 - - Malplaquet, 31st Aug. (11th Sept.) 1709 111 - - The Campaign of 1711 125 - - Fontenoy, 30th April (11th May) 1745 143 - - Roucoux, 30th Sept, (11th Oct.) 1746 163 - - Lauffeld, 21st June (2nd July) 1747 171 - - Attack of the Allies on the Camp of Famars, 23rd May 1793 217 - - Dunkirk and Environs, showing the Position of the Allies - from 24th Aug. to 6th Sept. 1793 237 - - Campaign of April 1794 299 - - Avesnes-le-Sec, 12th Sept. 1793; Villers-en-Cauchies, - 24th April 1794; Beaumont, 26th April 1794 303 - - Willems, 10th May 1794 319 - - The Netherlands in the 18th Century _At end_ - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER II - - -I pass now to Flanders, which is about to become for the second time -the training ground of the British Army. The judicious help sent by -Lewis the Fourteenth to Ireland had practically diverted the entire -strength of William to that quarter for two whole campaigns; and -though, as has been seen, there were English in Flanders in 1689 and -1690, the contingents which they furnished were too small and the -operations too trifling to warrant description in detail. After the -battle of the Boyne the case was somewhat altered, for, though a large -force was still required in Ireland for Ginkell’s final pacification -of 1691, William was none the less at liberty to take the field in -Flanders in person. ◆1690. October.◆ Moreover, Parliament with great -good-will had voted seventy thousand men for the ensuing year, of which -fully fifty thousand were British,[1] so that England was about to -put forth her strength in Europe on a scale unknown since the loss of -Calais. - -But first a short space must be devoted to the theatre of war, where -England was to meet and break down the overweening power of France. -Few studies are more difficult, even to the professed student, than -that of the old campaigns in Flanders, and still fewer more hopeless of -simplification to the ordinary reader. Nevertheless, however desperate -the task, an effort must be made once for all to give a broad idea of -the scene of innumerable great actions. - -Taking his stand on the northern frontier of France and looking -northward, the reader will note three great rivers running through the -country before him in, roughly speaking, three parallel semicircles, -from south-east to north-west. These are, from east to west, the -Moselle, which is merged in the Rhine at Coblentz, the Meuse, and the -Scheldt, all three of which discharge themselves into the great delta -whereof the southern key is Antwerp. But for the present let the reader -narrow the field from the Meuse in the east to the sea in the west, -and let him devote his attention first to the Meuse. He will see that, -a little to the north of the French frontier, it picks up a large -tributary from the south-west, the Sambre, which runs past Maubeuge and -Charleroi and joins the Meuse at Namur. Thence the united rivers flow -on past the fortified towns of Huy, Liège, and Maestricht to the sea. -But let the reader’s northern boundary on the Meuse for the present be -Maestricht, and let him note another river which rises a little to the -west of Maestricht and runs almost due west past Arschot and Mechlin to -the sea at Antwerp. Let this river, the Demer, be his northern, and the -Meuse from Maestricht to Namur his eastern, boundary. - -Returning to the south, let him note a river rising immediately to the -west of Charleroi, the Haine, which joins the Scheldt at Tournay, and -let him draw a line from Tournay westward through Lille and Ypres to -the sea at Dunkirk. Let this line from Dunkirk to Charleroi be carried -eastward to Namur; and there is his southern boundary. His western -boundary is, of course, the sea. Within this quadrilateral, Antwerp (or -more strictly speaking the mouth of the Scheldt), Dunkirk, Namur, and -Maestricht, lies the most famous fighting-ground of Europe. - -Glancing at it on the map, the reader will see that this quadrilateral -is cut by a number of rivers running parallel to each other from south -to north, and flowing into the main streams of the Demer and the -Scheldt. The first of these, beginning from the east, are the Great and -Little Geete, which become one before they join the main stream. It is -worth while to pause for a moment over this little slip of land between -the Geete and the Meuse. We shall see much of Namur, Huy, Liège, and -Maestricht, which command the navigation of the greater river, but we -shall see still more of the Geete, and of two smaller streams, the -Jaar and the Mehaigne, which rise almost in the same table-land with -it. On the Lower Jaar, close to Maestricht, stands the village of -Lauffeld, which shall be better known to us fifty years hence. On the -Little Geete, just above its junction with its greater namesake, are -the villages of Neerwinden and Landen. In the small space between the -heads of the Geete and the Mehaigne lies the village of Ramillies. For -this network of streams is the protection against an enemy that would -threaten the navigation of the Meuse from the north and west, and the -barrier of Spanish Flanders against invasion from the east; and the -ground is rich with the corpses and fat with the blood of men. - -The next stream to westward is the Dyle, which flows past Louvain to -the Demer, and gives its name, after the junction, to that river. The -next in order is the Senne, which flows past Park and Hal and Brussels -to the same main stream. At the head of the Senne stands the village of -Steenkirk; midway between the Dyle and Senne are the forest of Soignies -and the field of Waterloo. - -Here the tributaries of the Demer come to an end, but the row of -parallel streams is continued by the tributaries of another system, -that of the Scheldt. Easternmost of these, and next in order to the -Senne, is the Dender, which rises near Leuse and flows past Ath and -Alost to the Scheldt at Dendermond. Next comes the Scheldt itself, -with the Scarpe and the Haine, its tributaries, which it carries past -Tournay and Oudenarde to Ghent, and to the sea at Antwerp. Westernmost -of all, the Lys runs past St. Venant, where in Cromwell’s time we -saw Sir Thomas Morgan and his immortal six thousand, past Menin and -Courtrai, and is merged in the Scheldt at Ghent. - -The whole extent of the quadrilateral is about one hundred miles long -by fifty broad, with a great waterway to the west, a second to the -east, and a third, whereof the key is Ghent, roughly speaking midway -between them. The earth, fruitful by nature and enriched by art, bears -food for man and beast; the waterways provide transport for stores and -ammunition. It was a country where men could kill each other without -being starved, and hence for centuries the cockpit of Europe. - -A glance at any old map of Flanders shows how thickly studded was this -country with walled towns of less or greater strength, and explains why -a war in Flanders should generally have been a war of sieges. Every one -of these little towns, of course, had its garrison; and the manœuvres -of contending forces were governed very greatly by the effort, on one -side, to release these garrisons for active service in the field, and, -on the other, to keep them confined within their walls for as long -as possible. Hence it is obvious that an invading army necessarily -enjoyed a great advantage, since it menaced the fortresses of the enemy -while its own were unthreatened. Thus ten thousand men on the Upper -Lys could paralyse thrice their number in Ghent and Bruges and the -adjacent towns. On the other hand, if an invading general contemplated -the siege of an important town, he manœuvred to entice the garrison -into the field before he laid siege in form. Still, once set down to a -great siege, an army was stationary, and the bare fact was sufficient -to liberate hostile garrisons all over the country; and hence arose the -necessity of a second army to cover the besieging force. The skill and -subtlety manifested by great generals to compass these different ends -is unfortunately only to be apprehended by closer study than can be -expected of any but the military student. - -A second cause contributed not a little to increase the taste for a -war of sieges, namely, the example of France, then the first military -nation in Europe.[2] The Court of Versailles was particularly fond of -a siege, since it could attend the ceremony in state and take nominal -charge of the operations with much glory and little discomfort or -danger. The French passion for rule and formula also found a happy -outlet in the conduct of a siege, for, while there is no nation more -brilliant or more original, particularly in military affairs, there is -also none that is more conceited or pedantic. The craving for sieges -among the French was so great that the King took pains, by the grant of -extra pay and rations, to render this species of warfare popular with -his soldiers.[3] - -Again, it must be remembered that the object of a campaign in those -days was not necessarily to seek out an enemy and beat him. There -were two alternatives prescribed by the best authorities, namely, -to fight at an advantage or to subsist comfortably.[4] Comfortable -subsistence meant at its best subsistence at an enemy’s expense. A -campaign wherein an army lived on the enemy’s country and destroyed -all that it could not consume was eminently successful, even though -not a shot was fired. To force an enemy to consume his own supplies -was much, to compel him to supply his opponent was more, to take up -winter-quarters in his territory was very much more. Thus to enter an -enemy’s borders and keep him marching backwards and forwards for weeks -without giving him a chance of striking a blow, was in itself no small -success, and success of a kind which galled inferior generals, such as -William of Orange, to desperation and so to disaster. The tendency to -these negative campaigns was heightened once more by French example. -The French ministry of war interfered with its generals to an extent -that was always dangerous, and eventually proved calamitous. Nominally -the marshal commanding-in-chief in the field was supreme; but the -intendant or head of the administrative service, though he received his -orders from the marshal, was instructed by the King to forward those -orders at once by special messenger to Louvois, and not to execute -them without the royal authority. Great commanders such as Luxemburg -had the strength from time to time to kick themselves free from this -bondage, but the rest, embarrassed by the surveillance of an inferior -officer, preferred to live as long as possible in an enemy’s country -without risking a general action. It was left to Marlborough to advance -triumphant in one magnificent campaign from the Meuse to the sea. - -Next, a glance must be thrown at the contending parties. The defenders -of the Spanish Netherlands, for they cannot be called the assailants -of France, were confederate allies from a number of independent -states—England, Holland, Spain, the Empire, sundry states of Germany, -and Denmark, all somewhat selfish, few very efficient, and none, except -the first, very punctual. From such a heterogeneous collection swift, -secret, and united action was not to be expected. King William held the -command-in-chief, and, from his position as the soul of the alliance, -was undoubtedly the fittest for the post. But though he had carefully -studied the art of war, and though his phlegmatic temperament found its -only genuine pleasure in the excitement of the battlefield, he was not -a great general. He could form good plans, and up to a certain point -could execute them, but up to a certain point only. It should seem that -his physical weakness debarred him from steady and sustained effort. -He was strangely incapable of conducting a campaign with equal ability -throughout; he would manœuvre admirably for weeks, and forfeit all the -advantage that he had gained by the carelessness of a single day. In -a general action, of which he was fonder than most commanders of his -time, he never shone except in virtue of conspicuous personal bravery. -He lacked tactical instinct, and above all he lacked patience; in a -word, to use a modern phrase, he was a very clever amateur. - -France, on the other hand, possessed the finest and strongest army in -Europe,—well equipped, well trained, well organised, and inured to -work by countless campaigns. She had a single man in supreme control -of affairs, King Lewis the Fourteenth; a great war-minister, Louvois; -one really great general, Luxemburg; and one with flashes of genius, -Boufflers. Moreover, she possessed a line of posts in Spanish Flanders -extending from Dunkirk to the Meuse. On the Lys she had Aire and -Menin; on the Scarpe, Douay; on the Upper Scheldt, Cambray, Bouchain, -Valenciennes, and Condé; on the Sambre, Maubeuge; between Sambre and -Meuse, Philippeville and Marienburg; and on the Meuse, Dinant. Further, -in the one space where the frontier was not covered by a friendly -river, between the sea and the Scheldt, the French had constructed -fortified lines from the sea to Menin and from thence to the Scheldt -at Espierre. Thus with their frontier covered, with a place of arms on -every river, with secrecy and with unity of purpose, the French enjoyed -the approximate certainty of being able to take the field in every -campaign before the Allies could be collected to oppose them. - -◆1691.◆ - -The campaign of 1691 happily typifies the relative positions of the -combatants in almost every respect. The French concentrated ten -thousand men on the Lys. This was sufficient to paralyse all the -garrisons of the Allies on and about the river. They posted another -corps on the Moselle, which threatened the territory of Cleves. Now -Cleves was the property of the Elector of Brandenburg, and it was -not to be expected that he should allow his contingent of troops to -join King William at the general rendezvous at Brussels, and suffer -the French to play havoc among his possessions. Thus the Prussian -contingent likewise was paralysed. So while William was still ordering -his troops to concentrate at Brussels, Boufflers, who had been making -preparations all the winter, suddenly marched up from Maubeuge and, -before William was aware that he was in motion, had besieged Mons. The -fortress presently surrendered after a feeble resistance, and the line -of the Allies’ frontier between the Scheldt and Sambre was broken. -William moved down from Brussels across the Sambre in the hope of -recovering the lost town, outmanœuvred Luxemburg, who was opposed to -him, and for three days held the recapture of Mons in the hollow of -his hand. He wasted those three days in an aimless halt; Luxemburg -recovered himself by an extraordinary march; and William, finding that -there was no alternative before him but to retire to Brussels and -remain inactive, handed over the command to an incompetent officer and -returned to England. Luxemburg then closed the campaign by a brilliant -action of cavalry, which scattered the horse of the Allies to the four -winds. As no British troops except the Life Guards were present, and as -they at any rate did not disgrace themselves, it is unnecessary to say -more of the combat of Leuse. It had, however, one remarkable effect: -it increased William’s dread of the French cavalry, already morbidly -strong, to such a pitch as to lead him subsequently to a disastrous -military blunder. - -The campaign of 1691 was therefore decidedly unfavourable to the -Allies, but there was ground for hope that all might be set right -in 1692. The Treasurer, Godolphin, was nervously apprehensive that -Parliament might be unwilling to vote money for an English army in -Flanders; but the Commons cheerfully granted a total of sixty-six -thousand men, British and foreign; which, after deduction of garrisons -for the safety of the British Isles, left forty thousand free to cross -the German Ocean. - -◆1692.◆ - -Of these, twenty-three thousand were British, the most important -force that England had sent to the Continent since the days of King -Henry the Eighth. The organisation was remarkably like that of the -New Model. William was, of course, Commander-in-Chief, and under him -were a general of horse and a general of foot, with a due allowance -of lieutenant-generals, major-generals, and brigadiers. There is, -however, no sign of an officer in command of artillery or engineers, -nor any of a commissary in charge of the transport.[5] The one -strangely conspicuous functionary is the Secretary-at-War, who in -this and the following campaigns for the last time accompanied the -Commander-in-Chief on active service. But the most significant feature -in the list of the staff is the omission of the name of Marlborough. -Originally included among the generals for Flanders, he had been struck -off the roll, and dismissed from all public employment, in disgrace, -before the opening of the campaign. Though this dismissal did not want -justification, it was perhaps of all William’s blunders the greatest. - -As usual, the French were beforehand with the Allies in opening the -campaign. They had already broken the line of the defending fortresses -by the capture of Mons; they now designed to make the breach still -wider. All through the winter a vast siege-train was collecting on the -Scheldt and Meuse, with Vauban, first of living engineers, in charge -of it. ◆May.◆ In May all was ready. Marshal Joyeuse, with one corps, -was on the Moselle, as in the previous year, to hold the Brandenburgers -in check. Boufflers, with eighteen thousand men, lay on the right bank -of the Meuse, near Dinant; Luxemburg, with one hundred and fifteen -thousand more, stood in rear of the river Haine. ◆May 10/20.◆ On the -20th of May, King Lewis in person reviewed the grand army; ◆May 13/23.◆ -on the 23rd it marched for Namur; ◆May 16/26.◆ and on the 26th it had -wound itself round two sides of the town, while Boufflers, moving up -from Dinant, completed the circuit on the third side. Thus Namur was -completely invested; unless William could save it, the line of the -Sambre and one of the most important fortresses on the Meuse were lost -to the Allies. - -William, to do him justice, had strained every nerve to spur his -indolent allies to be first in the field. The contingents, awaked -by the sudden stroke at Namur, came in fast to Brussels; but it was -too late. The French had destroyed all forage and supplies on the -direct route to Namur, and William’s only way to the city lay across -the Mehaigne. Behind the Mehaigne lay Luxemburg, the ablest of the -French generals. The best of luck was essential to William’s success, -and instead of the best came the worst. Heavy rain swelled the -narrow stream into a broad flood, and the building of bridges became -impossible. There was beautiful fencing, skilful feint, and more -skilful parry, between the two generals, but William could not get -under Luxemburg’s guard. ◆May 26./June 5.◆ On the 5th of June, after a -discreditably short defence, Namur fell, almost before William’s eyes, -into the hands of the French. - -Then Luxemburg thought it time to draw the enemy away from the vicinity -of the captured city; so recrossing the Sambre, and keeping Boufflers -always between himself and that river, he marched for the Senne as if -to threaten Brussels. William followed, as in duty bound; and French -and Allies pursued a parallel course to the Senne, William on the north -and Luxemburg on the south. ◆July 23./Aug. 2.◆ The 2nd of August found -both armies across the Senne, William at Hal, facing west with the -river in his rear, and Luxemburg some five miles south of him with his -right at Steenkirk, and his centre between Hoves and Enghien, while -Boufflers lay at Manny St. Jean, seven miles in his rear. - -The terrible state of the roads owing to heavy rain had induced -Luxemburg to leave most of his artillery at Mons; and, as he had -designed merely to tempt the Allies away from Namur, the principal -object left to him was to take up a strong position wherein his worn -and harassed army could watch the enemy without fear of attack. Such -a position he thought that he had found at Steenkirk.[6] The country -at this point is more broken and rugged than is usual in Belgium. The -camp lay on high ground, with its right resting on the river Sennette -and its fight front covered by a ravine, which gradually fades away -northward into a high plateau of about a mile in extent. Beyond the -ravine was a network of wooded defiles, through which Luxemburg seems -to have hoped that no enemy could fall upon him in force unawares. It -so happened, however, that one of his most useful spies was detected, -in his true character, in William’s camp at Hal; and this was an -opportunity not to be lost. A pistol was held to the spy’s head, and -he was ordered to write a letter to Luxemburg, announcing that large -bodies of the enemy would be in motion next morning, but that nothing -more serious was contemplated than a foraging expedition. This done, -William laid his plans to surprise his enemy on the morrow. - -[Illustration: - - STEENKIRK - July 24rd./Aug. 3rd. 1692. - -_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆July 24./Aug. 3.◆ - -An hour before daybreak the advanced guard of William’s army fell -silently into its ranks, together with a strong force of pioneers to -clear the way for a march through the woods. This force consisted of -the First Guards, the Royal Scots, the Twenty-first, Fitzpatrick’s -regiment of Fusiliers, and two Danish regiments of great reputation, -the whole under the command of the Duke of Würtemberg. Presently they -moved away, and, as the sun rose, the whole army followed them in two -columns, without sound of drum or trumpet, towards Steenkirk. French -patrols scouring the country in the direction of Tubise saw the two -long lines of scarlet and white and blue wind away into the woods, and -reported what they had witnessed at headquarters; but Luxemburg, sickly -of constitution, and, in spite of his occasional energy, indolent -of temperament, rejoiced to think that, as his spy had told him, it -was no more than a foraging party. Another patrol presently sent in -another message that a large force of cavalry was advancing towards the -Sennette. Once more Luxemburg lulled himself into security with the -same comfort. - -Meanwhile the allied army was trailing through narrow defiles and -cramped close ground, till at last it emerged from the stifling woods -into an open space. Here it halted, as the straitness of the ground -demanded, in dense, heavy masses. But the advanced guard moved on -steadily till it reached the woods over against Steenkirk, where -Würtemberg disposed it for the coming attack. On his left the Bois de -Feuilly covered a spur of the same plateau as that occupied by the -French right, and there he stationed the English Guards and the two -battalions of Danes. To the right of these, but separated from them by -a ravine, he placed the three remaining British battalions in the Bois -de Zoulmont. His guns he posted, some between the two woods, and the -remainder on the right of his division. These dispositions complete, -the advanced party awaited orders to open the attack. - -It was now eleven o’clock. Luxemburg had left his bed and had ridden -out to a commanding height on his extreme right, when a third letter -was brought to him that the Allies were certainly advancing in force. -He read it, and looking to his front, saw the red coats of the Guards -moving through the wood before him, while beyond them he caught a -glimpse of the dense masses of the main body. Instantly he saw the -danger, and divined that William’s attack was designed against his -right. His own camp was formed, according to rule, with the cavalry on -the wings; and there was nothing in position to check the Allies but -a single brigade of infantry, famous under the name of Bourbonnois, -which was quartered in advance of the cavalry’s camp on his extreme -right. Moreover, nothing was ready, not a horse was bridled, not a man -standing to his arms. He despatched a messenger to summon Boufflers -to his aid, and in a few minutes was flying through the camp with his -staff, energetic but perfectly self-possessed, to set his force in -order of battle. The two battalions of Bourbonnois fell in hastily -before their camp, with a battery of six guns before them. The dragoons -of the right wing dismounted and hastened to seal up the space between -Bourbonnois and the Sennette. The horse of the right was collected, -and some of it sent off in hot speed to the left to bring the infantry -up behind them on their horses’ croups. All along the line the alarm -was given, drums were beating, men snatching hastily at their arms and -falling into their ranks ready to file away to the right. Such was the -haste, that there was no time to think of regimental precedence, a very -serious matter in the French army, and each successive brigade hurried -into the place where it was most needed, as it happened to come up. - -Meanwhile Würtemberg’s batteries had opened fire, and a cunning officer -of the Royal Scots was laying his guns with admirable precision. French -batteries hastened into position to reply to them with as deadly an -aim, and for an hour and a half the rival guns thundered against each -other unceasingly. All this time the French battalions kept massing -themselves thicker and thicker on Luxemburg’s right, and the front line -was working with desperate haste, felling trees, making breastworks, -and lining the hedges and copses while yet they might. But still -Würtemberg’s division remained unsupported, and the precious minutes -flew fast. William, or his staff for him, had made a serious blunder. -Intent though he was on fighting a battle with his infantry only, he -had put all the cavalry of one wing of his army before them on the -march, so that there was no room for the infantry to pass. Fortunately -six battalions had been intermixed with the squadrons of this wing, -and these were now with some difficulty disentangled and sent forward. -Cutts’s, Mackay’s, Lauder’s, and the Twenty-sixth formed up on -Würtemberg’s right, with the Sixth and Twenty-fifth in support; and at -last, at half-past twelve, Würtemberg gave the order to attack. - -His little force shook itself up and pressed forward with eagerness. -The Guards and Danes on the extreme left, being on the same ridge with -the enemy, were the first that came into action. Pushing on under a -terrible fire at point-blank range from the French batteries, they fell -upon Bourbonnois and the dragoons, beat them back, captured their guns, -and turned them against the enemy. On their right the Royal Scots, -Twenty-first, and Fitzpatrick’s plunged down into the ravine into -closer and more difficult ground, past copses and hedges and thickets, -until a single thick fence alone divided them from the enemy. Through -this they fired at each other furiously for a time, till the Scots -burst through the fence with their Colonel at their head, and swept the -French before them. Still further to the right, the remaining regiments -came also into action; muzzle met muzzle among the branches, and the -slaughter was terrible. Young Angus, still not yet of age, dropped -dead at the head of the Cameronians, and the veteran Mackay found the -death which he had missed at Killiecrankie. He had before the attack -sent word to General Count Solmes, that the contemplated assault could -lead only to waste of life; and he had been answered with the order to -advance. “God’s will be done,” he said calmly, and he was among the -first that fell. - -Still the British, in spite of all losses, pressed furiously on; and -famous French regiments, spoiled children of victory, wavered and gave -way before them. Bourbonnois, unable to face the Guards and Danes, -doubled its left battalion in rear of its right; Chartres, which -stood next to them, also gave way and doubled itself in rear of its -neighbour Orléans. A wide gap was thus torn in the first French line, -but not a regiment of the second line would step into it. The colonel -of the brigade in rear of it ordered, entreated, implored his men to -come forward, but they would not follow him into that terrible fire. -Suddenly the wild voice ceased, and the gesticulating figure fell in -a heap to the ground: the colonel had been shot dead, and the gap was -still unfilled. - -The first French line was broken; the second and third were dismayed -and paralysed: a little more and the British would carry the French -camp. Luxemburg perceived that this was a moment when only his best -troops could save him. In the fourth line stood the flower of his -infantry, the seven battalions of French and Swiss Guards. These -were now ordered forward to the gap; the princes of the blood placed -themselves at their head, and without firing a shot they charged down -the slope upon the British and Danes. The English Guards, thinned to -half their numbers, faced the huge columns of the Swiss and stood -up to them undaunted, till by sheer weight they were slowly rolled -back. On their right the Royal Scots also were forced back, fighting -desperately from hedge to hedge and contesting every inch of ground. -Once, the French made a dash through a fence and carried off one of -their colours. The Colonel, Sir Robert Douglas, instantly turned back -alone through the fence, recaptured the colour, and was returning with -it when he was struck by a bullet. He flung the flag over to his men -and fell to the ground dead. - -Slowly the twelve battalions retired, still fighting furiously at every -step. So fierce had been their onslaught that five lines of infantry -backed by two more of cavalry[7] had hardly sufficed to stop them, -and with but a little support they might have won the day. But that -support was not forthcoming. Message after message had been sent to -the Dutch general, Count Solmes, for reinforcements, but there came -not a man. The main body, as has been told, was all clubbed together -a mile and a half from the scene of action, with the infantry in the -rear; and Solmes, with almost criminal folly, instead of endeavouring -to extricate the foot, had ordered forward the horse. William rectified -the error as soon as he could; but the correction led to further delay -and to the increased confusion which is the inevitable result of -contradictory orders. The English infantry in rear, mad with impatience -to rescue their comrades, ran forward in disorder, probably with loud -curses on the Dutchman who had kept them back so long; and some time -was lost before they could be re-formed. Discipline was evidently a -little at fault. Solmes lost both his head and his temper. “Damn the -English,” he growled; “if they are so fond of fighting, let them have -a bellyful”; and he sent forward not a man. Fortunately junior officers -took matters into their own hands; and it was time, for Boufflers -had now arrived on the field to throw additional weight into the -French scale. The English Horse-grenadiers, the Fourth Dragoons, and -a regiment of Dutch dragoons rode forward and, dismounting, covered -the retreat of the Guards and Danes by a brilliant counter-attack. The -Buffs and Tenth advanced farther to the right, and holding their fire -till within point-blank range, poured in a volley which gave time for -the rest of Würtemberg’s division to withdraw. A demonstration against -the French left made a further diversion, and the shattered fragments -of the attacking force, grimed with sweat and smoke, fell back to the -open ground in rear of the woods, repulsed but unbeaten, and furious -with rage. - -William, it is said, could not repress a cry of anguish when he -saw them; but there was no time for emotion. Some Dutch and Danish -infantry was sent forward to check further advance of the enemy, and -preparations were made for immediate retreat. Once again the hardest -of the work was entrusted to the British; and when the columns were -formed, the grenadiers of the British regiments brought up the rear, -halting and turning about continually, until failing light put an -end to what was at worst but a half-hearted pursuit. The retreat was -conducted with admirable order; but it was not until the chill, dead -hour that precedes the dawn that the Allies regained their camp, worn -out with the fatigue of the past four-and-twenty hours. - -The action was set down at the time as the severest ever fought by -infantry, and the losses on both sides were very heavy. The Allies -lost about three thousand killed and the same number wounded, besides -thirteen hundred prisoners, nearly all of whom were wounded. Ten guns -were abandoned, the horses being too weary to draw them; the English -battalions lost two colours, and the foreign three or four more. The -British, having borne the brunt of the action, suffered most heavily of -all, the Guards, Cutts’s, and the Sixth being terribly punished. The -total French loss was about equal to that of the Allies, but the list -of the officers that fell tells a more significant tale. On the side -of the Allies four hundred and fifty officers were killed and wounded, -no fewer than seventy lieutenants in the ten battalions of Churchill’s -British brigade being killed outright. The French on their side lost -no fewer than six hundred and twenty officers killed and wounded, a -noble testimony to their self-sacrifice, but sad evidence of their -difficulty in making their men stand. In truth, with proper management -William must have won a brilliant victory; but he was a general by -book and not by instinct. Würtemberg’s advanced guard could almost -have done the work by itself but for the mistake of a long preliminary -cannonade; his attack could have been supported earlier but for the -pedantry that gave the horse precedence of the foot in the march to -the field; the foot could have pierced the French position in a dozen -different columns but for the pedantry which caused it to be first -deployed. Finally, William’s knowledge of the ground was imperfect, and -Solmes, his general of foot, was incompetent. The plan was admirably -designed and abominably executed. Nevertheless, British troops have -never fought a finer action than Steenkirk. Luxemburg thought himself -lucky to have escaped destruction; his troops were much shaken; and he -crossed the Scheldt and marched away to his winter-quarters as quietly -as possible. So ended the campaign of 1692. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER III - - -◆1692. Nov.◆ - -In November the English Parliament met, heartened indeed by the naval -victory of La Hogue, but not a little grieved over the failure of -Steenkirk. Again, the financial aspect was extremely discouraging; and -Sir Stephen Fox announced that there was not another day’s subsistence -for the Army in the treasury. The prevailing discontent found vent in -furious denunciations of Count Solmes, and a cry that English soldiers -ought to be commanded by English officers. The debate waxed hot. -The hardest of hard words were used about the Dutch generals, and a -vast deal of nonsense was talked about military matters. There were, -however, a great number of officers in the House of Commons, many of -whom had been present at the action. With much modesty and good sense -they refused to join in the outcry against the Dutch, and contrived so -to compose matters that the House committed itself to no very foolish -resolution. The votes for the Army were passed; and no difficulty was -made over the preparations for the next campaign. Finally, two new -regiments of cavalry were raised—Lord Macclesfield’s Horse, which was -disbanded twenty years later; and Conyngham’s Irish Dragoons, which -still abides with us as the Eighth, King’s Royal Irish, Hussars. - -◆1693.◆ - -Meanwhile the French military system had suffered an irreparable loss -in Louvois’s death, the source of woes unnumbered to France in the -years that were soon to come. Nevertheless, the traditions of his rule -were strong, and the French once more were first in the field, with, -as usual, a vast siege-train massed on the Meuse and on the Scheldt. -But a late spring and incessant rain delayed the opening of the -campaign till the beginning of May, when Luxemburg assembled seventy -thousand men in rear of the Haine by Mons, and Boufflers forty-eight -thousand more on the Scheldt at Tournay. The French king was with the -troops in person; and the original design was, as usual, to carry on -a war of sieges on the Meuse, Boufflers reducing the fortresses while -Luxemburg shielded him with a covering army. Lewis, however, finding -that the towns which he had intended to invest were likely to make an -inconveniently stubborn defence, presently returned home, and after -detaching thirty thousand men to the war in Germany, left Luxemburg to -do as he would. It had been better for William if the Grand Monarch had -remained in Flanders. - -The English king, on his side, assembled sixty thousand men at Brussels -as soon as the French began to move, and led them with desperate -haste to the Senne, where he took up an impregnable position at Park. -Luxemburg marched up to a position over against him, and then came -one of those deadlocks which were so common in the old campaigns. The -two armies stood looking at each other for a whole month, neither -venturing to move, neither daring to attack, both ill-supplied, -both discontented, and as a natural consequence both losing scores, -hundreds, and even thousands of men through desertion. - -◆June 26./July 6.◆ - -At last the position became insupportable, and on the 6th of -July Luxemburg moved eastward as if to resume the original plan -of operations on the Meuse. William thereupon resolved to create -a diversion by detaching a force to attack the French lines of -the Scheldt and Lys, a project which was brilliantly executed by -Würtemberg, thanks not a little to three British regiments—the Tenth, -Argyll’s, and Castleton’s—which formed part of his division. But -meanwhile Luxemburg, quite ignorant of the diversion, advanced to -the Meuse and laid siege to Huy, in the hope of forcing William to -come to its relief. He judged rightly. William left his impregnable -camp at Park and hurried to the rescue. But he came too late, and Huy -fell after a trifling resistance. Luxemburg then made great seeming -preparations for the siege of Liège, and William, trembling for the -safety of that city and of Maestricht, detached eight thousand men to -reinforce those garrisons, and then withdrew to the line of the Geete. -Luxemburg watched the whole proceeding with grim delight. Würtemberg’s -success was no doubt annoying, but William had weakened his army by -detaching this force to the Lys, and had been beguiled into weakening -it still further by reinforcing the garrison on the Meuse. This was -exactly what Luxemburg wanted. If he could bring the Allies to action -forthwith, he could reasonably hope for success. - -The ground occupied by William was a triangular space enclosed between -the Little Geete and a stream called the Landen Beck, which joins -it at Leuw. The position was not without features of strength. The -camp, which faced almost due south, was pitched on a gentle ridge -rising out of a vast plain.[8] This ridge runs parallel to the Little -Geete and has that river in its rear. The left flank was protected by -marshy ground and by the Landen Beck itself, while the villages of -Neerlanden and Rumsdorp, one on either side of the Beck and the latter -well forward on the plain, offered the further security of advanced -posts. The right rested on a little stream which runs at right angles -to the Geete and joins it at Elixheim, and on the villages of Laer -and Neerwinden which stand on its banks. From Neerlanden on the left -to Neerwinden on the right the position measured close on four miles; -and to guard this extent, besides supplying strong garrisons for the -villages, William had little more than fifty thousand men. Here then -was one signal defect: the front was too long to permit troops to be -readily moved from flank to flank, or to be withdrawn without serious -risk from the centre. But this was not all. The depth of the position -was less than half of its frontage, and thus allowed no space for the -action of cavalry. This William ignored: he was afraid of the French -horse, and was anxious that the action should be fought by infantry -only. Finally, retreat was barred by the Geete, which was unfordable -and insufficiently bridged; and therefore the forcing of the allied -right must inevitably drive the whole army into a pinfold, as Leslie’s -had been driven at the battle of Dunbar. - -Luxemburg, who knew every inch of the ground, was now anxious only lest -William should retire before he could catch him. ◆July 18/28.◆ On the -28th of July, by a great effort and a magnificent march, he brought the -whole of his army, eighty thousand strong, before William’s position. -He was now sure of his game, but he need not have been anxious, for -William, charmed with the notion of excluding the French cavalry from -all share in the action, was resolved to stand his ground Many officers -urged him to cross the Geete while yet he might; but he would not -listen. Fifteen hundred men were told off to entrench the open ground -between Neerwinden and Neerlanden. The hedges, mud-walls, and natural -defences of Neerwinden and Laer were improved to the uttermost, and the -ditches surrounding them were enlarged. Till late into the night the -King rode backward and forward, ordering matters under his own eyes, -and after a few hours’ rest began very early in the morning to make his -dispositions. - -The key of the position was the village of Neerwinden with the -adjoining hamlet of Laer, and here accordingly he stationed the best -of his troops. The defence of Laer was entrusted to Brigadier Ramsey -with the Scots Brigade, namely, the Twenty-first, Twenty-fifth, -Twenty-sixth, Mackay’s and Lauder’s regiments, reinforced by the Buffs -and the Fourth Foot. Between Laer and Neerwinden stood six battalions -of Brandenburgers, troops already of great and deserved reputation, -of whom we shall see more in the years before us. Neerwinden itself -was committed to the Hanoverians, the Dutch Guards, a battalion of the -First and a battalion of the Scots Guards. Immediately to the north or -left of the village the entrenchment was lined by the two remaining -battalions of the First and Scots Guards, the Coldstream Guards, a -battalion of the Royal Scots, and the Seventh Fusiliers. On the extreme -left of the position Neerlanden was held by the other battalion of -the Royal Scots, the Second Queen’s, and two Danish regiments, while -Rumsdorp was occupied by the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, and -Collingwood’s regiments. In a word, every important post was committed -to the British. The remainder of the infantry, with one hundred guns, -was ranged along the entrenchment, and in rear of them stood the -cavalry, powerless to act outside the trench, and too much cramped for -space to manœuvre within it. - -[Illustration: - - LANDEN - July 19th/29th 1693 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Luxemburg also was early astir, and was amazed to find how far the -front of the position had been strengthened during the night. His -centre he formed in eight lines over against the Allies’ entrenchments -between Oberwinden and Landen, every line except the second and fourth -being composed of cavalry. For the attack on Neerlanden and Rumsdorp he -detailed fifteen thousand foot and two thousand five hundred dismounted -dragoons. For the principal assault on Neerwinden he told off eighteen -thousand foot, supported by a reserve of two thousand more and by -eight thousand cavalry; while seventy guns were brought into position -to answer the artillery of the Allies. - -◆July 19/29.◆ - -Shortly after sunrise William’s cannon opened fire against the heavy -masses of the French centre; and at eight o’clock Luxemburg moved the -whole of his left to the attack of Neerwinden. Six battalions, backed -by dragoons and cavalry, were directed against Laer, and three columns, -counting in all seven brigades, were launched against Neerwinden. The -centre column, under the Duke of Berwick, was the first to come into -action. Withholding their fire till they reached the village, the -French carried the outer defences with a rush, and then meeting the -Hanoverians and the First Guards, they began the fight in earnest. It -was hedge-fighting, as at Steenkirk, muzzle to muzzle and hand to hand. -Every step was contested; the combat swayed backwards and forwards -within the village; and the carnage was frightful. The remaining French -columns came up, met with the like resistance, and made little way. -Fresh regiments were poured by the French into the fight, and at last -the First Guards, completely broken by its losses, gave way. But it -was only for a moment. They rallied on the Scots Guards; the Dutch -and Hanoverians rallied behind them, and, though the enemy had been -again reinforced, they resumed the unequal fight, nine battalions -against twenty-six, with unshaken tenacity. At Laer, on the extreme -right, the fight was equally sharp. Ramsey for a time was driven out -of the village, and the French cavalry actually forced its way into -the Allies’ position. There, however, it was charged in flank by -the Elector of Bavaria, and driven out with great slaughter. Ramsey -seized the moment to rally his brigade. The French columns, despite -their success, still remained isolated and detached, and presented no -united front. The King placed himself at the head of the Guards and -Hanoverians, and with one charge British, Dutch, and Germans fell upon -the Frenchmen and swept them out of both villages. - -The first attack on Neerwinden had failed, and a similar attack on the -allied left had been little more successful. At Neerlanden the First -and Second Foot had successfully held their own against four French -battalions until reinforcements enabled them to drive them back. -At Rumsdorp the British, being but three thousand against thirteen -thousand, were pushed out of the village, but being reinforced, -recovered a part of it and stood successfully at bay. Luxemburg, -however, was not easily discouraged. The broken troops in the left were -rallied, fresh regiments were brought forward, and a second effort was -made to carry Neerwinden. Again French impetuosity bore all before it, -and again the British and Germans, weakened and weary though they were, -rallied when all seemed lost, and hurled the enemy back, not merely -repulsed, but in confused and disorderly retreat. - -On the failure of the second attack the majority of the French officers -urged Luxemburg to retire; but the marshal was not to be turned from -his purpose. The fourteen thousand men of the Allies in Laer and -Neerwinden had lost more than a third of their numbers, while he -himself had still a considerable force of infantry interlined with the -cavalry in the centre. Twelve thousand of them, including the French -and Swiss Guards, were now drawn off to the left for a third attack. -When they were clear of the cavalry, the whole six lines of horse, -which had stood heroically for hours motionless under a heavy fire, -moved forward at a trot to the edge of the entrenchments;[9] but the -demonstration, for such it seems to have been, cost them dear, for they -were very roughly handled and compelled to retire. But now the French -reinforcements, supported by the defeated battalions, drew near, and a -third attack was delivered on Neerwinden. British and Dutch still made -a gallant fight, but the odds against their weakened battalions were -too great, and ammunition began to fail. They fought on indomitably -till the last cartridge was expended before they gave way, but they -were forced back, and Neerwinden was lost. Five French brigades then -assailed the central entrenchment at its junction with Neerwinden, -where stood the Coldstream Guards and the Seventh Fusiliers. Wholly -unmoved by the overwhelming numbers in their front and the fire from -Neerwinden on their flank, the two regiments stood firm and drove their -assailants back over the breastwork. Even when the French Household -Cavalry came spurring through Neerwinden and fell upon their flank, -they fought on undismayed, and the Coldstreamers not only repelled the -charge but captured a colour. - -Such fighting, however, could not continue for long. William, on -observing Luxemburg’s preparations for the final assault, had ordered -nine battalions from his left to reinforce his right. These never -reached their destination. The Marquis of Feuquières, an officer -even more celebrated for his acuteness as a military critic than for -his skill in the field, watched them as they moved, and suddenly led -his cavalry forward to the weakest point of the entrenchment. The -battalions hesitated, halted, and then turned about to meet this new -danger, but too late to save the forcing of the entrenchment. The -battle was now virtually over. Neerwinden was carried, Ramsey after -a superb defence had been driven out of Laer, the Brandenburgers had -perforce retreated with him, the infantry that lined the centre of the -entrenchment had forsaken it, and the French cavalry was pouring in and -cutting down the fugitives by scores. William, who had galloped away -in desperation to the left, now returned at headlong speed with six -regiments of English cavalry,[10] which delivered charge after charge -with splendid gallantry, to cover the retreat of the foot. On the left -Tolmach and Bellasys by great exertion brought off their infantry in -good order, but on the right the confusion was terrible. The rout -was complete, the few bridges were choked by a heaving mass of guns, -waggons, pack-animals, and men, and thousands of fugitives were cut -down, drowned, or trampled to death. William did all that a gallant -man could do to save the day, but in vain. His troops had done heroic -things to redeem his bad generalship; and against any living man but -Marlborough or Luxemburg they would probably have held their own. It -was the general, not the soldiers that failed. - -The losses on both sides were very severe. That of the French was about -eight thousand men; that of the Allies about twelve thousand, killed, -wounded, and prisoners, and among the dead was Count Solmes, the hated -Solmes of Steenkirk. The nineteen British battalions present lost -one hundred and thirty-five officers killed, wounded, and taken. The -French captured eighty guns and a vast quantity of colours, but the -Allies, although beaten, could also show fifty-six French flags. And, -indeed, though Luxemburg won, and deserved to win a great victory, yet -the action was not such as to make the allied troops afraid to meet the -French. They had stood up, fifty thousand against eighty thousand, and -if they were beaten they had at any rate dismayed ever Frenchman on the -field but Luxemburg. In another ten years their turn was to come, and -they were to take a part of their revenge on the very ground over which -many of them had fled. - -The campaign closed with the surrender of Charleroi, and the gain by -the French of the whole line of the Sambre. William came home to meet -the House of Commons and recommend an augmentation of the Army by -eight regiments of horse, four of dragoons, and twenty-five of foot. -The House reduced this list by the whole of the regiments of horse and -fifteen of foot, but even so it brought the total establishment up to -eighty-three thousand men. There is, however, but one new regiment of -which note need be taken in the campaign of 1694, namely, the Seventh -Dragoons, now known as the Seventh Hussars, which, raised in 1689–90 -in Scotland, now for the first time took its place on the English -establishment and its turn of service in the war of Flanders. - -◆1694.◆ - -I shall not dwell on the campaign of 1694, which is memorable only for -a marvellous march by which Luxemburg upset William’s entire plan of -campaign. Nor shall I speak at length of the abortive descent on Brest, -which is remembered mainly for the indelible stain which it has left on -the memory of Marlborough. It is only necessary to say that the French, -by Marlborough’s information, though not on Marlborough’s information -only, had full warning of an expedition which had been planned as a -surprise, and that Tolmach,[11] who was in command, unfortunately, -though most pardonably, lacked the moral courage to abandon an attack -which, unless executed as a surprise, had no chance of success. He was -repulsed with heavy loss, and died of wounds received in the action—a -hard fate for a good soldier and a gallant man. But it is unjust to -lay his death at Marlborough’s door. For the failure of the expedition -Marlborough was undoubtedly responsible, and that is quite bad enough; -but Tolmach alone was to blame for attempting an enterprise which he -knew to be hopeless. Marlborough cannot have calculated that he would -deliberately essay to do impossibilities and perish in the effort, so -cannot be held guilty of poor Tolmach’s blunders. - -◆1695.◆ - -Before the new campaign could be opened there had come changes of vital -importance to France. The vast expense of the war had told heavily on -the country, and the King’s ministers were at their wit’s end to raise -money. Moreover, the War Department had deteriorated rapidly since the -death of Louvois; and ◆January.◆ to this misfortune was now added the -death of Luxemburg, a loss which was absolutely irreparable. Lastly, -with the object of maintaining the position which they had won on the -Sambre, the French had extended their system of fortified lines from -Namur to the sea. Works so important could not be left unguarded, so -that a considerable force was locked up behind these entrenchments, -and was for all offensive purposes useless. We shall see before long -how a really great commander could laugh at these lines, and how, in -consequence, it became an open question whether they were not rather -an encumbrance than an advantage. The subject is one which is still of -interest; and it is remarkable that the French still seem to cling to -their old principles, if they may be judged by the works which they -have constructed for defence against a German invasion. - -His enemy being practically restricted to the defensive, William did -not neglect the opportunity of initiating aggressive operations. -Masking his design by a series of feints, he marched swiftly to the -Meuse and invested Namur. This fortress, more famous through its -connection with the immortal Uncle Toby even than as the masterpiece -of Cohorn, carried to yet higher perfection by Vauban, stands at the -junction of the Sambre and the Meuse, the citadel lying in the angle -between the two rivers, and the town with its defences on the left bank -of the Meuse. To the northward of the town outworks had been thrown up -on the heights of Bouge by both of these famous engineers; and it was -against these outworks that William directed his first attack. - -◆June 23./July 3.◆ - -◆June 26./July 6.◆ - -Ground was broken on the 3rd of July, and three days later an assault -was delivered on the lines of Bouge. As usual, the hardest of the work -was given to the British, and the post of greatest danger was made -over, as their high reputation demanded, to the Brigade of Guards. On -this occasion the Guards surpassed themselves alike by the coolness -of their valour and by the ardour of their attack. They marched under -a heavy fire up to the French palisades, thrust their muskets between -them, poured in one terrible volley, the first shot that they had yet -fired, and charged forthwith. In spite of a stout resistance they -swept the French out of the first work, pursued them to the second, -swept them out of that, and gathering impetus with success, drove them -from stronghold to stronghold, far beyond the original design of the -engineers, and actually to the gates of the town. In another quarter -the Royal Scots and the Seventh Fusiliers gained not less brilliant -success; and in fact it was the most creditable action that William had -fought during the whole war. It cost the Allies two thousand men killed -and wounded, the three battalions of Guards alone losing thirty-two -officers. The British were to fight many such bloody combats during the -next twenty years—combats forgotten since they were merely incidents -in the history of a siege, and so frequent that they were hardly -chronicled, and are not to be restored to memory now. I mention this, -the first of such actions, only as a type of many more to come. - -The outworks captured, the trenches were opened against the town -itself, and the next assault was directed against the counterguard of -St. Nicholas gate. This again was carried by the British, with a loss -of eight hundred men. Then came the famous attack on the counterscarp -before the gate itself, where Captain Tobias Shandy received his -memorable wound. This gave William the possession of the town. Then -came the siege of the citadel, wherein the British had the honour of -marching to the assault over half a mile of open ground, a trial which -proved too much even for them. Nevertheless, it was they who eventually -stormed a breach from which another of the assaulting columns had been -repulsed, and ensured the surrender of the citadel a few days later. -For their service on this occasion the Eighteenth Foot were made the -Royal Irish; and a Latin inscription on their colours still records -that this was the reward of their valour at Namur. - -Thus William on his return to England could for the first time show -his Parliament a solid success due to the British red-coats; and the -House of Commons gladly voted once more a total force of eighty-seven -thousand men. But the war need be followed no further. The campaign -of 1696 was interrupted by a futile attempt of the French to invade -England, and in 1697 France, reduced to utter exhaustion, gladly -concluded the Peace of Ryswick. So ended, not without honour, the -first stage of the great conflict with King Lewis the Fourteenth. The -position of the two protagonists, England and France, was not wholly -unlike that which they occupied a century later at the Peace of Amiens. -The British, though they had not reaped great victories, had made -their presence felt, and terribly felt, on the battlefield; and, as -the French in the Peninsula remembered that the British had fought -them with a tenacity which they had not found in other nations, not -only in Egypt, but even earlier at Tournay and Linselles, so, too, -after Blenheim and Ramillies they looked back to the furious attack -at Steenkirk and the indomitable defence of Neerwinden. “Without the -concurrence of the valour and power of England,” said William to the -Parliament at the close of 1695, “it were impossible to put a stop to -the ambition and greatness of France.” So it was then, and so it was a -century later, for though none know better the superlative qualities -of the French as a fighting people, yet the English are the one nation -that has never been afraid to meet them. With the Peace of Ryswick the -’prentice years of the standing Army are ended, and within five years -the old spirit, which has carried it through the bitter schooling -under King William, will break forth with overwhelming power under the -guiding genius of Marlborough. - -AUTHORITIES.—The leading authority for William’s campaigns on the -English side is D’Auvergne, and on the French side the compilation, -with its superb series of maps, by Beaurain. Supplementary on one -side are Tindal’s History, Carleton’s Memoirs, and Sterne’s _Tristram -Shandy_; and on the other the _Mémoires_ of Berwick and St. Simon, -Quincy’s _Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV_, and in particular the -_Mémoires_ of Feuquières. Many details as to Steenkirk, in particular, -respecting the casualties, are drawn from _Present State of Europe, -or Monthly Mercury_, August 1692, and as to Landen from the official -relation of the battle, published by authority, 1693. Beautiful -plans of both actions are in Beaurain, rougher plans in Quincy and -Feuquières. All details as to the establishment voted are from the -Journals of the House of Commons. Very elaborate details of the -operations are given in Colonel Clifford Walton’s _History of the -British Standing Army_. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER I - - -A European quarrel over the succession to the Spanish throne,[12] -on the death of the imbecile King Charles the Second, had long been -foreseen by William, and had been provided against, as he hoped, by a -Partition Treaty in the year 1698. The arrangement then made had been -upset by the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, and had been -superseded by a second Partition Treaty in March 1700. In November of -the same year King Charles the Second died, leaving a will wherein -Philip, Duke of Anjou, and second son of the Dauphin, was named heir -to the whole Empire of Spain. Hereupon the second Partition Treaty -went for naught. Lewis the Fourteenth, after a becoming interval of -hesitation, accepted the Spanish crown for the Duke of Anjou under the -title of King Philip the Fifth. - -◆1701.◆ - -The Emperor at once entered a protest against the will, and Lewis -prepared without delay for a campaign in Italy. William, however, for -the present merely postponed his recognition of Philip the Fifth; and -his example was followed by the United Provinces. Lewis, ever ready -and prompt, at once took measures to quicken the States to a decision. -Several towns[13] in Spanish Flanders were garrisoned, under previous -treaties, by Dutch troops. Lewis by a swift movement surrounded the -whole of them, and, having thus secured fifteen thousand of the best -men in the Dutch army, could dictate what terms he pleased. William -expected that the House of Commons would be roused to indignation by -this aggressive step, but the House was far too busy with its own -factious quarrels. When, however, the States appealed to England for -the six thousand four hundred men, which under the treaty of 1668[14] -she was bound to furnish, both Houses prepared faithfully to fulfil the -obligation. - -Then, as invariably happens in England, the work which Parliament -had undone required to be done again. Twelve battalions were ordered -to the Low Countries from Ireland, and directions were issued for -the levying of ten thousand recruits in England to take their place. -But, immediately after, came bad news from the West Indies, and -it was thought necessary to despatch thither four more battalions -from Ireland. Three regiments[15] were hastily brought up to a -joint strength of two thousand men, and shipped off. Thus, within -fifteen months of the disbandment of 1699, the garrison of Ireland -had been depleted by fifteen battalions out of twenty-one; and four -new battalions required to be raised immediately. Of these, two, -namely Brudenell’s and Mountjoy’s, were afterwards disbanded, but two -more, Lord Charlemont’s and Lord Donegal’s, are still with us as the -Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth of the Line. - -In June the twelve battalions[16] were shipped off to Holland, under -the command of John, Earl of Marlborough. Since 1698 he had been -restored to the King’s favour and was to fill his place as head of -the European coalition and General of the confederate armies in a -fashion that no man had yet dreamed of. He was full fifty years of age; -so long had the ablest man in Europe waited for work that was worthy -of his powers; and now his time was come at last. His first duties, -however, were diplomatic; and during the summer and autumn of 1701 he -was engaged in negotiations with Sweden, Prussia, and the Empire for -the formation of a Grand Alliance against France and Spain. Needless to -say he brought all to a successful issue by his inexhaustible charm, -patience, and tact. - -◆Sept.◆ - -Still the attitude of the English people towards the contest remained -doubtful, until, on the death of King James the Second, Lewis made -the fatal mistake of recognising and proclaiming his son as King -of England. Then the smouldering animosity against France leaped -instantly into flame. William seized the opportunity to dissolve -Parliament, and was rewarded by the election of a House of Commons -more nearly resembling that which had carried him through the first -war to the Peace of Ryswick. He did not fail to rouse its patriotism -and self-respect by a stirring speech from the throne, and obtained -the ratification of his agreement with the Allies, that England should -furnish a contingent of forty thousand men, eighteen thousand of -them to be British and the remainder foreigners. So the country was -committed to the War of the Spanish Succession. - -It was soon decided that all regiments in pay must be increased at -once to war-strength, and that six more battalions, together with five -regiments of horse and three of dragoons, should be sent to join the -troops already in Holland. Then, as usual, there was a rush to do in -a hurry what should have been done at leisure; and it is significant -of the results of the late ill-treatment of the Army that, though the -country was full of unemployed soldiers, it was necessary to offer -three pounds, or thrice the usual amount of levy-money, to obtain -recruits. The next step was to raise fifteen new regiments—Meredith’s, -Coote’s, Huntingdon’s, Farrington’s, Gibson’s, Lucas’s, Mohun’s, -Temple’s, and Stringer’s of foot; Fox’s, Saunderson’s, Villiers’, -Shannon’s, Mordaunt’s and Holt’s of marines. Of the foot, Gibson’s and -Farrington’s had been raised in 1694, but the officers of Farrington’s, -if not of both regiments, had been retained on half-pay, and, returning -in a body, continued the life of the regiment without interruption. -Both are still with us as the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth of the -Line. Huntingdon’s and Lucas’s also survive as the Thirty-third and -Thirty-fourth, and Meredith’s and Coote’s, which were raised in -Ireland, as the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-ninth, while the remainder -were disbanded at the close of the war. Of the marines, Saunderson’s -had originally been raised in 1694, and eventually passed into the -Line as the Thirtieth Foot, followed by Fox’s and Villiers’ as the -Thirty-first and Thirty-second. Nothing now remained but to pass the -Mutiny Act, which was speedily done; and on the 5th of May, just two -months after the death of King William, the great work of his life was -continued by a formal declaration of war. - -The field of operations, which will chiefly concern us, is mainly the -same as that wherein we followed the campaigns of King William. The -eastern boundary of the cock-pit must for a time be extended from -the Meuse to the Rhine, the northern from the Demer to the Waal, -and the southern limit must be carried from Dunkirk beyond Namur -to Bonn. But the reader should bear in mind that, in consequence of -the Spanish alliance, Spanish Flanders was no longer hostile, but -friendly, to France, so that the French frontier, for all practical -purposes, extended to the boundary of Dutch Brabant. Moreover, the -French, besides the seizure, already related, of the barrier-towns, had -contrived to occupy every stronghold on the Meuse except Maestricht, -from Namur to Venloo, so that practically they were masters so far of -the whole line of the river. - -A few leagues below Venloo stands the fortified town of Grave, and -beyond Grave, on the parallel branch of the Waal, stands the fortified -city of Nimeguen. A little to the east of Nimeguen, at a point where -the Rhine formerly forked into two streams, stood Fort Schenck, a -stronghold famous in the wars of Morgan and of Vere. These three -fortresses were the three eastern gates of the Dutch Netherlands, -commanding the two great waterways, doubly important in those days of -bad roads, which lead into the heart of the United Provinces. - -◆1702.◆ - -It is here that we must watch the opening of the campaign of 1702. -There were detachments of the French and of the Allies opposed to each -other on the Upper Rhine, on the Lower Rhine, and on the Lower Scheldt; -but the French grand army of sixty thousand men was designed to operate -on the Meuse, and the presence of a Prince of the blood, the Duke of -Burgundy, with old Marshal Boufflers to instruct him, sufficiently -showed that this was the quarter in which France designed to strike -her grand blow. Marlborough being still kept from the field by other -business, the command of the Allied army on the Meuse was entrusted -to Lord Athlone, better known as that Ginkell who had completed the -pacification of Ireland in 1691. His force consisted of twenty-five -thousand men, with which he lay near Cleve, in the centre of the -crescent formed by Grave, Nimeguen, and Fort Schenck, watching under -shelter of these three fortresses the army of Boufflers, which was -encamped some twenty miles to south-east of him at Uden and Xanten. -◆May 30./June 10.◆ On the 10th of June Boufflers made a sudden dash to -cut off Athlone from Nimeguen and Grave, a catastrophe which Athlone -barely averted by an almost discreditably precipitate retreat. Having -reached Nimeguen Athlone withdrew to the north of the Waal, while -all Holland trembled over the danger which had thus been so narrowly -escaped. - -Such was the position when Marlborough at last took the field, after -long grappling at the Hague with the difficulties which were fated to -dog him throughout the war. In England his position was comparatively -easy, for though Prince George of Denmark, the consort of Queen -Anne, was nominally generalissimo of all forces by sea and land, -yet Marlborough was Captain-General of all the English forces at -home and in Holland, and in addition Master-General of the Ordnance. -But it was only after considerable dispute that he was appointed -Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, and then not without provoking -much dissatisfaction among the Dutch generals, and much jealousy in -the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrück and in Athlone, both of whom aspired to -the office. These obstacles overcome, there came the question of the -plan of campaign. Here again endless obstruction was raised. The Dutch, -after their recent fright, were nervously apprehensive for the safety -of Nimeguen, the King of Prussia was much disturbed over his territory -of Cleve, and all parties who had not interests of their own to put -forward made it their business to thwart the Commander-in-Chief. -◆June 21./July 2.◆ With infinite patience Marlborough soothed them, -and at last, on the 2nd of July, he left the Hague for Nimeguen, -accompanied by two Dutch deputies, civilians, whose duty it was to see -that he did nothing imprudent. Arrived there he concentrated sixty -thousand men, of which twelve thousand were British,[17] recrossed -the Waal and encamped at Ober-Hasselt over against Grave, within two -leagues of the French. ◆July 15/26.◆ Then once more the obstruction of -his colleagues caused delay, and it was not until the 26th of July that -he could cross to the left bank of the Meuse. “Now,” he said to the -Dutch deputies, as he pointed to the French camp, “I shall soon rid you -of these troublesome neighbours.” - -Five swift marches due south brought his army over the Spanish frontier -by Hamont. Boufflers thereupon in alarm broke up his camp, summoned -Marshal Tallard from the Rhine to his assistance, crossed the Meuse -with all haste at Venloo, and pushed on at nervous speed for the Demer. -◆July 22./Aug. 2.◆ On the 2nd of August he lay between Peer and Bray, -his camping-ground ill-chosen, and his army worn out by a week of -desperate marching. Within easy striking distance, a mile or two to the -northward, lay Marlborough, his army fresh, ready, and confident. He -held the game in his hand; for an immediate attack would have dealt the -French as rude a buffet as they were to receive later at Ramillies. But -the Dutch deputies interposed; these Dogberries were content to thank -God that they were rid of a rogue. So Boufflers was allowed to cross -the Demer safely at Diest, and a first great opportunity was lost. - -Marlborough, having drawn the French away from the Meuse, was now at -liberty to add the garrison of Maestricht to his field-force, and to -besiege the fortresses on the river. Boufflers, however, emboldened -by his escape, again advanced north in the hope of cutting off a -convoy of stores that was on its way to join the Allies. Marlborough -therefore perforce moved back to Hamont and picked up his convoy. -Then, before Boufflers could divine his purpose, he had moved swiftly -south, and thrown himself across the line of the French retreat to -the Demer. ◆Aug. 11/22.◆ The French marshal hurried southward with -all possible haste, and came blundering through the defiles before -Hochtel on the road to Hasselt, only to find Marlborough waiting ready -for him at Helchteren. Once again the game was in the Englishman’s -hand. The French were in great disorder, their left in particular -being hopelessly entangled in marshy and difficult ground. Marlborough -instantly gave the order to advance, and by three o’clock the artillery -of the two armies was exchanging fire. At five Marlborough directed the -whole of his right to fall on the French left; but to his surprise and -dismay, the right did not move. A surly Dutchman, General Opdam, was -in command of the troops in question and, for no greater object than -to annoy the Commander-in-Chief, refused to execute his orders. So a -second great opportunity was lost. - -◆Aug. 12/23.◆ - -Still much might yet be won by a general attack on the next day; and -for this accordingly Marlborough at once made his preparations. But, -when the time came, the Dutch deputies interposed, entreating him -to defer the attack till the morrow morning. “By to-morrow morning -they will be gone,” answered Marlborough; but all remonstrance was -unavailing. The attack was perforce deferred; the French slipped -away in the night; and, though it was still possible to cut up their -rearguard with cavalry, a third great opportunity was lost. - -Marlborough was deeply chagrined; but although with unconquerable -patience and tact he excused Opdam’s conduct in his public despatches, -he could not deceive the troops, who were loud in their indignation -against both deputies and generals. There was now nothing left but -to reduce the fortresses on the Meuse, a part of the army being -detached for the siege while the remainder covered the operations -under the command of Marlborough. Even over their favourite pastime -of a siege, however, the Dutch were dilatory beyond measure. “England -is famous for negligence,” wrote Marlborough, “but if Englishmen were -half as negligent as the people here, they would be torn to pieces -by Parliament.”[18] ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Venloo was at length invested on -the 29th of August,[19] and after a siege of eighteen days compelled -to capitulate. The English distinguished themselves after their own -peculiar fashion. In the assault on the principal defence General -Cutts, who from his love of a hot fire was known as the Salamander, -gave orders that the attacking force, if it carried the covered way, -should not stop there but rush forward and carry as much more as it -could. It was a mad design, criminally so in the opinion of officers -who took part in it,[20] but it was madly executed, with the result -that the whole fort was captured out of hand. - -◆Sept. 26./Oct. 7.◆ - -The reduction of Stevenswaert, Maseyck, and Ruremond quickly followed; -and the French now became alarmed lest Marlborough should transfer -operations to the Rhine. Tallard was therefore sent back with a large -force to Cologne and Bonn, while Boufflers, much weakened by this and -by other detachments, lay helpless at Tongres. But the season was now -far advanced, and Marlborough had no intention of leaving Boufflers for -the winter in a position from which he might at any moment move out and -bombard Maestricht. No sooner, therefore, were his troops released by -the capture of Ruremond than he prepared to oust Boufflers. The French, -according to their usual practice, had barred the eastern entrance to -Brabant by fortified lines, which followed the line of the Geete to its -head-waters, and were thence carried across to that of the Mehaigne. -In his position at Tongres Boufflers lay midway between these lines -and Liège, in the hope of covering both; but after the fall of so many -fortresses on the Meuse he became specially anxious for Liège, and -resolved to post himself under its walls. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ He accordingly -examined the defences, selected his camping-ground, and on the 12th of -October marched up with his army to occupy it. Quite unconscious of any -danger he arrived within cannon-shot of his chosen position; and there -stood Marlborough, calmly awaiting him with a superior force. For the -fourth time Marlborough held his enemy within his grasp, but the Dutch -deputies, as usual, interposed to forbid an attack; and Boufflers, -a fourth time delivered, hurried away in the night to his lines at -Landen. Had he thrown himself into Liège Marlborough would have made -him equally uncomfortable by marching on the lines; as things were, the -French marshal perforce left the city to its fate. - -The town of Liège, which was unfortified, at once opened its gates to -the Allies; and within a week Marlborough’s batteries were playing -on the citadel. ◆Oct. 12/23.◆ On the 23rd of October the citadel was -stormed, the English being first in the breach, and a few days later -Liège, with the whole line of the Meuse, had passed into the hands of -the Allies. Thus brilliantly, in spite of four great opportunities -marred by the Dutch, ended Marlborough’s first campaign. Athlone, like -an honest man, confessed that as second in command he had opposed every -one of Marlborough’s projects, and that the success was due entirely to -his incomparable chief. He at any rate had an inkling that in Turenne’s -handsome Englishman there had arisen one of the great captains of all -time. - -Nevertheless the French had not been without their consolations in -other quarters. Towards the end of the campaign the Elector of Bavaria -had declared himself for France against the Empire, and, surprising the -all-important position of Ulm on the Danube, had opened communication -with the French force on the Upper Rhine. Villars, who commanded in -that quarter, had seconded him by defeating his opponent, Prince -Lewis of Baden, at Friedlingen, and had cleared the passages of the -Black Forest; while Tallard had, almost without an effort, possessed -himself of Trèves and Trarbach on the Moselle. The rival competitors -for the crown of Spain were France and the Empire, and the centre of -the struggle, as no one saw more clearly than Marlborough, was for the -present moving steadily towards the territory of the Empire. - -While Marlborough was engaged in his operations on the Meuse, ten -thousand English and Dutch, under the Duke of Ormonde and Admiral -Sir George Rooke, had been despatched to make a descent upon Cadiz. -The expedition was so complete a failure that there is no object in -dwelling on it. Rooke would not support Ormonde, and Ormonde was not -strong enough to master Rooke; landsmen quarrelled with seamen, and -English with Dutch. No discipline was maintained, and after some weeks -of feeble operations and shameful scenes of indiscipline and pillage, -the commanders found that they could do no more than return to England. -They were fortunate enough, however, on their way, to fall in with -the plate-fleet at Vigo, of which they captured twenty-five galleons -containing treasure worth a million sterling. Comforted by this good -fortune Rooke and Ormonde sailed homeward, and dropped anchor safely in -Portsmouth harbour. - -Meanwhile a mishap, which Marlborough called an accident, had gone near -to neutralise all the success of the past campaign. At the close of -operations the Earl, together with the Dutch deputies, had taken ship -down the Meuse, with a guard of twenty-five men on board and an escort -of fifty horse on the bank. In the night the horse lost their way, -and the boat was surprised and overpowered by a French partisan with -a following of marauders. The Dutch deputies produced French passes, -but Marlborough had none and was therefore a prisoner. Fortunately -his servant slipped into his hand an old pass that had been made out -for his brother Charles Churchill. With perfect serenity Marlborough -presented it as genuine, and was allowed to go on his way, the French -contenting themselves with the capture of the guard and the plunder of -the vessel, and never dreaming of the prize that they had let slip. The -news of his escape reached the Hague, where on his arrival rich and -poor came out to welcome him, men and women weeping for joy over his -safety. So deep was the fascination exerted on all of his kind by this -extraordinary man. - -A few days later he returned to England, where a new Parliament had -already congratulated Queen Anne on the retrieving of England’s honour -by the success of his arms. The word retrieving was warmly resented, -but though doubtless suggested by unworthy and factious animosity -against the memory of William, it was strictly true. The nation felt -that it was not in the fitness of things that Englishmen should be -beaten by Frenchmen, and they rejoiced to see the wrong set right. -Nevertheless party spirit found a still meaner level when Parliament -extended to Rooke and Ormonde the same vote of thanks that they -tendered to Marlborough. This precious pair owed even this honour -to the wisdom and good sense of their far greater comrade, for they -would have carried their quarrel over the expedition within the walls -of Parliament, had not Marlborough told them gently that the whole -of their operations were indefensible and that the less they called -attention to themselves the better. The Queen, with more discernment, -created Marlborough a Duke and settled on him a pension of £5000 a year. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER IV - - -◆1704.◆ - -Meanwhile Parliament had met on the 29th of the previous October, full -of congratulations to the Queen on the triumphs of the past campaign. -There were not wanting, of course, men who, in the madness of faction, -doubted whether Blenheim were really a victory, for the very remarkable -reason that Marlborough had won it, but they were soon silenced by -the retort that the King of France at any rate had no doubts on the -point.[21] The plans for the next campaign were designed on a large -scale, and were likely to strain the resources of the Army to the -uttermost. The West Indies demanded six battalions and Gibraltar three -battalions for garrison; Portugal claimed ten thousand men, Flanders -from twenty to twenty-five thousand; while besides this a design was on -foot, as shall presently be seen, for the further relief of Portugal by -a diversion in Catalonia. ◆1705.◆ Five millions were cheerfully voted -for the support of the war, and six new battalions were raised, namely, -Wynne’s, Bretton’s, Lepell’s, Saomes’s, Sir Charles Hotham’s, and -Lillingston’s, the last of which alone has survived to our day with the -rank of the Thirty-eighth of the Line.[22] - -Marlborough’s plan of campaign had been sufficiently foreshadowed at -the close of the previous year, namely, to advance on the line of -the Moselle and carry the war into Lorraine. The Emperor and all the -German Princes promised to be in the field early, the Dutch were with -infinite difficulty persuaded to give their consent, and after much -vexatious delay Marlborough joined his army at Trèves on the 26th of -May. ◆May 15/26.◆ Here he waited until the 17th of June for the arrival -of the German and Imperial troops. ◆June 6/17.◆ Not a man nor a horse -appeared. In deep chagrin he broke up his camp and returned to the -Meuse, having lost, as he said, one of the fairest opportunities in the -world, through the faithlessness of his allies.[23] - -His presence was sorely needed on the Meuse. Villeroy, who commanded -the French in Flanders, finding no occasion for his presence on the -Moselle, had moved out of his lines, captured Huy, and then marching -on to Liège had invested the citadel. ◆May 21.◆ The States-General -in a panic of fright urged Marlborough to return without delay, and -Overkirk, who commanded the Dutch on the Meuse, added his entreaties -to theirs. Marlborough, when once he had made up his mind to move, -never moved slowly, and by the 25th of June he was at Düren, to the -eastward of Aix-la-Chapelle. ◆June 14/25.◆ Here he was still the best -part of forty miles from the Meuse, but that distance was too near for -Villeroy, who at once abandoned Liège and fell back on Tongres. -◆June 21./July 2.◆ Marlborough, continuing his advance, crossed the -Meuse at Visé on the 2nd of July, and on the same day united his army -with Overkirk’s at Haneff on the Upper Jaar. Villeroy thereupon retired -ignominiously within his fortified lines. - -These lines, which had been making during the past three years, -were now complete. They started from the Meuse a little to the east -of Namur, passed from thence to the Mehaigne and the Little Geete, -followed the Little Geete along its left bank to Leuw, the Great Geete -from Leuw to the Demer, and the Demer itself as far as Arschot, from -which point a new line of entrenchments carried the barrier through -Lierre to Antwerp. Near Antwerp Marlborough had already had to do with -these lines in 1703, but hitherto he had made no attempt to force them. -Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria now lay before him with seventy -thousand men, a force superior to his own, but necessarily spread over -a wide front for the protection of the entrenchments. The marshal’s -headquarters were at Meerdorp, in the space between the Geete and the -Mehaigne, which he probably regarded as a weak point. Marlborough -posted himself over against him at Lens-les-Beguines, detaching a small -force to recapture Huy, while Overkirk with the Dutch army covered the -siege from Vignamont. Thus, as if daring the French to take advantage -of the dispersion of his troops, he quietly laid his plans for forcing -the lines. - -The point that he selected was on the Little Geete between Elixheim and -Neerhespen, exactly in rear of the battlefield of Landen. The abrupt -and slippery banks of the river, which the English knew but too well, -together with the entrenchments beyond it, presented extraordinary -difficulties; but the lines were on that account the less likely to be -well guarded at that particular point. Marlborough had already obtained -the leave of the States-General for the project, but he had now the far -more difficult task of gaining the consent of the Dutch generals at a -Council of War. Slangenberg and others opposed the scheme vehemently, -but were overruled; and the Duke was at length at liberty to fall to -work. - -◆June 30./July 11.◆ - -Huy fell on the 11th of July, but to the general surprise the besieging -force was not recalled. Six days later Overkirk and the covering army -crossed the Mehaigne from Vignamont, and pushed forward detachments to -the very edge of the lines between Meffle and Namur. ◆July.◆ Villeroy -fell into the trap, withdrew troops from all parts of the lines and -concentrated forty thousand men at Meerdorp. Marlborough then recalled -the troops from Huy, and made them up to a total of about eight -thousand men, both cavalry and infantry,[24] the whole being under the -command of the Count of Noyelles. The utmost secrecy was observed in -every particular. The corps composing the detachment knew nothing of -each other, and nothing of the work before them; and, lest the sight -of fascines should suggest an attack on entrenchments, these were -dispensed with, the troopers only at the last moment receiving orders -to carry each a truss of forage on the saddle before them. - -◆July 6/17.◆ - -At tattoo the detachment fell in silently before the camp of the right -wing, and at nine o’clock moved off without a sound in two columns, -the one upon Neerhespen, the other upon the Castle of Wanghe before -Elixheim. An hour later the rest of the army followed, while at the -same time Overkirk, under cover of the darkness, crossed the Mehaigne -at Tourines and joined his van to the rear of Marlborough’s army. The -distance to be traversed was from ten to fifteen miles; the night -though dry was dark; and the guides, frequently at fault, were fain to -direct themselves by the trusses dropped on the way by the advanced -detachment. ◆July 6–7/17–18.◆ Twelve years before to the very day, a -French army had toiled along the same route, wearied out and stifled by -the sun, and only kept to its task by an ugly little hunch-backed man -whom it had reverenced as Marshal Luxemburg. Now English and Dutch were -blundering on to take revenge for Luxemburg’s victory at the close of -that march. The hours fled on, the light began to break, and the army -found itself on the field of Landen, William’s entrenchment grass-grown -before it, Neerwinden and Laer lying silent to the left, and before the -villages the mound that hid the corpses of the dead. Then some at least -of the soldiers knew the work that lay before them. - -[Illustration: - - LINES OF THE - GEETE. - July 7/18 1705 - - Scale of 1/2 mile - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆July 7/18.◆ - -At four o’clock the heads of the columns halted within a mile of the -Geete, wrapped in a thick mist and hidden from the eye of the enemy. -The advanced detachment quickly cleared the villages by the river, -seized the bridge before the Castle of Wanghe, which had not been -broken down, and drove out the garrison of the Castle itself. Then the -pontoniers came forward to lay their bridges; but the infantry would -not wait for them. They scrambled impatiently through hedges and over -bogs, down one steep bank of the river and up the other, into the ditch -beyond, and finally, breathless and dripping, over the rampart into the -lines. So numerous were the hot-heads who thus went forward that they -forced three regiments of French dragoons to retire before them without -attempting resistance. Then the cavalry of the detachment began to -file rapidly over the pontoon-bridges; but meanwhile the alarm had been -given, and, before the main army could cross, the French came down in -force from the north, some twenty battalions and forty squadrons, in -all close upon fifteen thousand men, with a battery of eight guns. - -The enemy advanced rapidly, their cavalry leading, until checked by a -hollow way which lay between them and the Allies, when they halted to -deploy. Marlborough took in the whole situation at a glance. Forming -his thirty-eight squadrons into two lines, with the first line composed -entirely of British, he led them across the hollow way and charged the -French sword in hand. They answered by a feeble fire from the saddle -and broke in confusion, but, presently rallying, fell in counter-attack -upon the British and broke them in their turn. Marlborough, who was -riding on the flank, was cut off and left isolated with his trumpeter -and groom. A Frenchman galloped up and aimed at him so furious a blow -that, striking the air, he fell from his horse and was captured by the -trumpeter. Then the allied squadrons rallied, and charging the French -once more broke them past all reforming, and captured the guns. The -French infantry now retired very steadily in square, and the Duke sent -urgent messages for his own foot. But by some mistake the battalions -had been halted after crossing the Geete, so that the French were able -to make good their retreat. - -By this time Villeroy, who had spent the night in anxious expectation -of an attack at Meerdorp, had hurried up with his cavalry, only to -find that the Duke was master of the lines. Hastily giving orders -for his scattered troops to pass the Geete at Judoigne, he began his -retreat upon Louvain. Presently up came Marlborough’s infantry at an -extraordinary pace, the men as fresh and lively after fifteen hours -of fatigue as if they had just left camp. The Duke was anxious to -follow up his success forthwith, a movement which the French had good -reason to dread, but the Dutch generals opposed him, and Marlborough -was reluctantly constrained to yield. The loss of the French seems to -have been about two thousand men, most of them prisoners, a score of -standards and colours, of which the Fifth Dragoon Guards claimed four -as their own, and eighteen guns, eight of which were triple-barrelled -and were sent across the Channel to be copied in England.[25] - -◆July 8/19.◆ - -The Allies halted for the night at Tirlemont, and advancing next day -upon Louvain struck against the rear of the French columns and captured -fifteen hundred prisoners. That night they encamped a mile to the east -of Louvain, while the French, once again distributing their force -along a wider front, lined the left bank of the Dyle from the Demer -to the Yssche, with their centre at Louvain. Marlborough had hoped to -push on at once, but was stopped by heavy rains that rendered the Dyle -impassable; and it was not until ten days later that, after infinite -trouble with the Dutch, he was able to pursue his design. - -◆July 18/29.◆ - -The operations for the passage of the Dyle were conducted in much -the same way as in the forcing of the lines. An advanced detachment -was sent forward from each wing of the army, that from the right or -English[26] flank being appointed to cross the river under the Duke of -Würtemberg at Corbeek Dyle, that from the left under General Heukelom -to pass it at Neeryssche. The detachments fell in at five in the -evening, reached their appointed destination at ten, and effected their -passage with perfect success. The main bodies started at midnight, -and went somewhat astray in the darkness, though by three o’clock the -Dutch army was within supporting distance of its detachment and the -British rapidly approaching it. The river had been in fact forced, when -suddenly the Dutch generals halted their main body. Marlborough rode up -to inquire the cause, and was at once taken aside by Slangenberg. “For -God’s sake, my Lord—” began the Dutchman vehemently, and continued to -protest with violent gesticulations. No sooner was Marlborough’s back -turned than the Dutch generals, like a parcel of naughty schoolboys, -recalled Heukelom’s detachment. Thus the passage won with so much skill -was for no cause whatever abandoned, without loss indeed, but also not -without mischievous encouragement to the French, who boasted loudly -that they had repulsed their redoubtable adversary. - -Deeply hurt and annoyed though he was, the Duke, with miraculous -patience, excused in his public despatches the treachery and imbecility -which had thwarted him, and prepared to effect his purpose in another -way. His movements were hastened by news that French reinforcements, -set free by the culpable inaction of Prince Lewis of Baden, were on -their way from Alsace. ◆Aug. 5/16.◆ Unable to pass the Dyle he turned -its head-waters at Genappe, and wheeling north towards the forest of -Soignies encamped between La Hulpe and Braine l’Alleud.[27] The French -promptly took the alarm and posted themselves behind the river Yssche, -with their left at Neeryssche, and their right at Overyssche resting -on the forest of Soignies. Marlborough at once resolved to force the -passage of the river. ◆Aug. 6/17.◆ On the evening of the 17th of -August he detached his brother Charles Churchill with ten thousand -foot and two thousand horse to advance through the forest and turn -the French right; while he himself marched away at daybreak with the -rest of the army and emerged into the plain between the Yssche and the -Lasne. ◆Aug. 7/18.◆ The Duke quickly found two assailable points, and -choosing that of Overyssche, halted the army pending the arrival of the -artillery. The guns were long in arriving, Slangenberg having insisted, -despite the Duke’s express instructions, on forcing his own baggage -into the column for the express purpose of causing delay. At last about -noon the artillery appeared, and Marlborough asked formal permission of -the Dutch deputies to attack. To his surprise, although Overkirk had -already consented, they claimed to consult their generals. Slangenberg -with every mark of insolence condemned the project as murder and -massacre, the rest solemnly debated the matter for another two hours, -the auspicious moment passed away exactly as they had intended, and -another great opportunity was lost. The French reinforcements arrived, -and having been the weaker became the stronger force. Nothing more -could be done for the rest of the campaign, but to level the French -lines from the Demer to the Mehaigne. - -Thus for the third time a brilliant campaign was spoilt by the Dutch -generals and deputies. Fortunately the public indignation both in -England and in Holland was too strong for them, and Slangenberg, though -not indeed hanged as he deserved, was deprived of all further command. -Jealousy, timidity, ignorance, treachery, and flat imbecility seem -to have been the motives that inspired these men, whose conduct has -never been reprobated according to its demerit. It was they who were -responsible for the prolongation of the war, for the burden that it -laid on England, and for the untold misery that it wrought in France. -Left to himself Marlborough would have forced the French to peace in -three campaigns, and the war would not have been ended in shame and -disgrace by the Treaty of Utrecht.[28] - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER V - - -◆1706.◆ - -It is now time to revert to England and to the preparations for the -campaign of 1706. Marlborough, as usual, directly that the military -operations were concluded, had been deputed to visit the courts of -Vienna and of sundry German states in order to keep the Allies up to -the necessary pitch of unity and energy. These duties detained him in -Germany and at the Hague until January 1706, when he was at last able -to return to England. There he encountered far less obstruction than in -former years, but found, nevertheless, an increasing burden of work. -The vast extension of operations in the Peninsula, and the general -sickliness of the troops in that quarter, demanded the enlistment of an -unusually large number of recruits. One new regiment of dragoons and -eleven new battalions of foot were formed in the course of the spring, -to which it was necessary to add yet another battalion before the -close of the year.[29] Again the epidemic sickness among the horses in -Flanders had caused an extraordinary demand for them. The Dutch, after -their wonted manner, had actually taken pains to prevent the supply -of these animals to the British,[30] though, even if they had not, -the Duke had a prejudice in favour of English horses, as of English -men, as superior to any other. Finally, the stores of the Ordnance -were unequal to the constant drain of small arms, and it was necessary -to make good the deficiency by purchases from abroad. All these -difficulties and a thousand more were of course referred for solution -to Marlborough. - -◆April 14/25.◆ - -When in April he crossed once more to the Hague he found a most -discouraging state of affairs. The Dutch were backward in their -preparations; Prussia and Hanover were recalcitrant over the furnishing -of their contingents; Prince Lewis of Baden was sulking within his -lines, refusing to communicate a word of his intentions to any one; and -everybody was ready with a separate plan of campaign. The Emperor of -course desired further operations on the Moselle for his own relief; -but, after the experience of the last campaign, the Duke had wisely -resolved never again to move eastward to co-operate with the forces -of the Empire. The Dutch for their part wished to keep Marlborough in -Flanders, where he should be under the control of their deputies; but -the imbecile caprice of these worthies was little more to his taste -than the sullen jealousy of Baden. Marlborough himself was anxious -to lead a force to the help of Eugene in Italy, a scheme which, if -executed, would have carried the British to a great fighting ground -with which they are unfamiliar, the plains of Lombardy. He had almost -persuaded the States-General to approve of this plan, when all was -changed by Marshal Villars, who surprised Prince Lewis of Baden in his -lines on the Motter, and captured two important magazines. The Dutch at -once took fright and, in their anxiety to keep Marlborough for their -own defence, agreed to appoint deputies who should receive rather than -issue orders. So to the Duke’s great disappointment it was settled that -the main theatre of war should once again be Flanders. - -Villeroy meanwhile lay safely entrenched in his position of the -preceding year behind the Dyle, from which Marlborough saw little -hope of enticing him. It is said that an agent was employed to rouse -Villeroy by telling him that the Duke, knowing that the French were -afraid to leave their entrenchments, would take advantage of their -inaction to capture Namur.[31] Be that as it may, Villeroy resolved to -quit the Dyle. He knew that the Prussian and Hanoverian contingents had -not yet joined Marlborough, and that the Danish cavalry had refused -to march to him until their wages were paid; so that interest as well -as injured pride prompted the hazard of a general action. ◆May 8/19.◆ -On the 19th of May, therefore, he left his lines for Tirlemont on the -Great Geete. Marlborough, who was at Maestricht, saw with delight -that the end, for which he had not dared to hope, was accomplished. -Hastily making arrangements for the payment of the Danish troops, he -concentrated the Dutch and British at Bilsen on the Upper Demer, and -moved southward to Borchloen. ◆May 9/20.◆ Here the arrival of the Danes -raised his total force to sixty thousand men, a number but little -inferior to that of the enemy. ◆May 11/22.◆ On the very same day came -the intelligence that Villeroy had crossed the Great Geete and was -moving on Judoigne. The Duke resolved to advance forthwith and attack -him there. - -◆May 12/23.◆ - -At one o’clock in the morning of Whitsunday the 23rd of May, -Quartermaster-general Cadogan rode forward from the headquarters at -Corswarem with six hundred horse and the camp-colours towards the head -of the Great Geete, to mark out a camp by the village of Ramillies. The -morning was wet and foggy, and it was not until eight o’clock that, -on ascending the heights of Merdorp, the party dimly descried troops -in motion on the rolling ground before them. The Allied army had not -marched until two hours later than Cadogan, but Marlborough, who had -ridden on in advance of it, presently came up and pushed the cavalry -forward through the mist. Then at ten o’clock the clouds rolled away, -revealing the whole of the French army in full march towards them. - -Villeroy’s eyes were rudely opened, for he had not expected Marlborough -before the following day; but he knew the ground well, for he had been -over it before with Luxemburg, and he proceeded to take up a position -which he had seen Luxemburg deliberately reject. The table-land whereon -he stood is the highest point in the plains of Brabant. To his right -flowed the Mehaigne; in his rear ran the Great Geete; across his centre -and left the Little Geete rose and crept away sluggishly in marsh and -swamp.[32] In his front lay four villages: Taviers on the Mehaigne to -his right, Ramillies, less advanced than Taviers, on the source of the -Little Geete to his right centre, Offus, parallel to Ramillies but -lower down the stream, to his left centre, Autréglise or Anderkirch, -between two branches of the Little Geete and parallel to Taviers, to -his left. Along the concave line formed by these villages Villeroy drew -up his army in two lines facing due east. - -The Mehaigne, on which his right rested, is at ordinary times a rapid -stream little more than twelve feet wide, with a muddy bottom, but is -bordered by swampy meadows on both sides, which are flooded after heavy -rain. From this stream the ground rises northward in a steady wave -for about half a mile, sinks gradually and rises into a higher wave -at Ramillies, sinks once more to northward of that village and rolls -downward in a gentler undulation to Autréglise. Between the Mehaigne -and Ramillies, a distance of about a mile and a half, the ground east -and west is broken by sundry hollows of sufficient inclination to offer -decided advantage or disadvantage in a combat of cavalry. A single -high knoll rises in the midst of these hollows, offering a place of -vantage from which Marlborough must almost certainly have reconnoitred -the disposition of the French right. The access to Ramillies itself is -steep and broken both to north and south; but on the eastern front the -ground rises to it for half a mile in a gentle, unbroken slope, which -modern rifles would make impassable by the bravest troops. In rear, -or to westward of the French position, the table-land is clear and -unbroken, and to the right rear or south-west stands a mound or barrow -called the tomb of Ottomond, still conspicuous and still valuable as a -key to the actions of the day.[33] The full extent of the French front -from Taviers to Autréglise covered something over four miles. - -[Illustration: - - RAMILLIES - May 12/23 1706. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Having chosen his position, Villeroy lost no time in setting his troops -in order. His left, consisting of infantry backed by cavalry,[34] -extended from Autréglise to Offus, both of which villages were strongly -occupied. His centre from Offus to Ramillies was likewise composed of -infantry. On his right, in the expanse of sound ground which stretches -for a mile and a half from the marshes of the Geete at Ramillies to -those of the Mehaigne, were massed more than one hundred and twenty -squadrons of cavalry with some battalions of infantry interlined with -them, the famous French Household Cavalry (Maison du Roi) being in the -first line. The left flank of this expanse was covered by the village -of Ramillies, which was surrounded by a ditch and defended by twenty -battalions and twenty-four guns. On the right flank not only Taviers -but Franquinay, a village still further in advance, were occupied by -detachments of infantry, while Taviers was further defended by cannon. - -Marlborough quickly perceived the defects of Villeroy’s dispositions, -which were not unlike those of Tallard at Blenheim. Taviers was too -remote from Ramillies for the maintenance of a cross-fire of artillery. -Again, the cavalry of the French left was doubtless secure against -attack behind the marshes of the Geete, but for this very reason it was -incapable of aggressive action. The French right could therefore be -turned, provided that it were not further reinforced; and accordingly -the Duke opened his manœuvres by a demonstration against the French -left. - -Presently the infantry of the Allied right moved forward in two lines -towards Offus and Autréglise, marching in all the pomp and circumstance -of war, Dutch, Germans, and British, with the red-coats conspicuous on -the extreme right flank. Striding forward to the river they halted and -seemed to be very busy in laying their pontoons. Villeroy marked the -mass of scarlet, and remembering its usual place in the battlefield, -instantly began to withdraw several battalions from his right and -centre to his left. Marlborough watched the white coats streaming -away to their new positions, and after a time ordered the infantry of -his right to fall back to some heights in their rear. The two lines -faced about and retired accordingly over the height until the first -line was out of sight. Then the second line halted and faced about once -more, crowning the ascent with the well-known scarlet, while the first -marched away with all speed, under cover of the hill and unseen by the -French, to the opposite flank. Many British battalions[35] stood on -that height all day without moving a step or firing a shot, but none -the less paralysing the French left wing. - -About half-past one the guns of both armies opened fire, and shortly -afterwards four Dutch battalions were ordered forward to carry -Franquinay and Taviers, and twelve more to attack Ramillies, while -Overkirk advanced slowly on the left with the cavalry. Franquinay was -soon cleared; Taviers resisted stoutly for a time, but was carried; -and a strong reinforcement on its way to the village was intercepted -and cut to pieces. Then Overkirk, his left flank being now cleared, -pushed forward his horse and charged. The Dutch routed the first -French line, but were driven back in confusion by the second; and the -victorious French were only checked by the advance of fresh squadrons -under Marlborough himself. Even so the Allies were at a decided -disadvantage; and Marlborough, after despatching messengers to bring -up every squadron, except the British, to the left, plunged into the -thick of the mêlée to rally the broken horse. He was recognised by -some French dragoons, who left their ranks to surround him, and in the -general confusion he was borne to the ground and in imminent danger of -capture. His aide-de-camp, Captain Molesworth, dismounted at once, and -giving him his own horse enabled him to escape. The cavalry, however, -encouraged by the Duke’s example, recovered themselves, and Marlborough -took the opportunity to shift from Molesworth’s horse to his own. -Colonel Bringfield, his equerry, held the stirrup while he mounted, -but Marlborough was hardly in the saddle before the hand that held the -stirrup relaxed its grasp, and the equerry fell to the ground, his head -carried away by a round shot.[36] - -Meanwhile the attack of the infantry on Ramillies was fully developed, -and relieved the horse from the fire of the village. Twenty fresh -squadrons came galloping up at the top of their speed and ranged -themselves in rear of the re-forming lines. But before they could come -into action the Duke of Würtemberg pushed his Danish horse along the -Mehaigne upon the right flank of the French, while the Dutch guards -advanced still further so as to fall upon their rear. These last now -emerged upon the table-land by the tomb of Ottomond, and the rest of -the Allied horse dashed themselves once against the French front. The -famous Maison du Roi after a hard fight was cut to pieces, and the -whole of the French horse, despite Villeroy’s efforts to stay them, -were driven in headlong flight across the rear of their line of battle, -leaving the battalions of infantry helpless and alone, to be ridden -over and trampled out of existence. - -Villeroy made frantic efforts to bring forward the cavalry of his left -to cover their retreat, but the ground was encumbered by his baggage, -which he had carelessly posted too close in his rear. The French troops -in Ramillies now gave way, and Marlborough ordered the whole of the -infantry that was massed before the village to advance across the -morass upon Offus, with the Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards in support. -The French broke and fled at their approach; and meanwhile the Buffs -and Twenty-first, which had so far remained inactive on the right, -forced their way through the swamps before them, and taking Autréglise -in rear swept away the last vestige of the French line on the left. -Five British squadrons followed them up and captured the entire King’s -Regiment (Régiment du Roi). The Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards also -pressed on, and coming upon the Spanish and Bavarian horse-guards, who -were striving to cover the retreat of the French artillery, charged -them and swept them away, only narrowly missing the capture of the -Elector himself, who was at their head.[37] On this the whole French -army, which so far had struggled to effect an orderly retreat, broke up -in panic and fled in all directions. - -The mass of the fugitives made for Judoigne; but the ways were blocked -by broken-down baggage-waggons and abandoned guns, and the crush and -confusion was appalling. The British cavalry, being quite fresh, -quickly took up the pursuit over the table-land. The guns and baggage -fell an easy prey, but these were left to others, while the red-coated -troopers, not without memories of Landen, pressed on, like hounds -running for blood, after the beaten enemy. The chase lay northwards -to Judoigne and beyond it towards the refuge of Louvain. Not until -two o’clock in the morning did the cavalry pause, having by that time -reached Meldert, fifteen miles from the battlefield; nay, even then -Lord Orkney with some few squadrons spurred on to Louvain itself, -rekindled the panic and set the unhappy French once more in flight -across the Dyle. - -◆May 13/24.◆ - -Nor was the main army far behind the horse. Marching far into the -night, the men slept under arms for two or three hours, started again -at three o’clock, and before the next noon had also reached Meldert and -were preparing to force the passage of the Dyle. Marlborough, who had -been in the saddle with little intermission for nearly twenty-eight -hours, here wrote to the Queen that he intended to march again that -same night; but, through the desertion of the lines of the Dyle by the -French, the army gained some respite. ◆May 14/25.◆ The next day he -crossed the Dyle at Louvain and encamped at Betlehem, ◆May 15/26.◆ the -next he advanced to Dieghem, a few miles north of Brussels, the next he - passed the Senne at Vilvorde and encamped at Grimberghen, ◆May 16/27.◆ -and here at last, after six days of incessant marching, the Duke -granted his weary troops a halt, while the French, hopelessly beaten -and demoralised, retired with all haste to Ghent. - -So ended the fight and pursuit of Ramillies, which effectually -disposed of the taunt levelled at Marlborough after Blenheim, that -he did not know how to improve a victory. The loss of the French in -killed, wounded, and prisoners was thirteen thousand men, swelled by -desertion during the pursuit to full two thousand more. The trophies -of the victors were eighty standards and colours, fifty guns, and a -vast quantity of baggage. The loss of the Allies was from four to five -thousand killed and wounded, which fell almost entirely on the Dutch -and Danes, the British, owing to their position on the extreme right, -being but little engaged until the close of the day. The chief service -of the British, therefore, was rendered in the pursuit, which they -carried forward with relentless thoroughness and vigour. The Dutch were -delighted that their troops should have done the heaviest of the work -in such an action, and the British could console themselves with the -performance of their cavalry, and above all, with the reflection that -the whole of the success was due to their incomparable chief. - -◆May–June.◆ - -The effect of the victory and of the rapid advance that followed -it was instantaneous. Louvain and the whole line of Dyle fell into -Marlborough’s hands on the day after the battle; Brussels, Malines, -and Lierre surrendered before the first halt, and gave him the line -of the Senne and the key of the French entrenchments about Antwerp; -and one day later, the surrender of Alost delivered to him one of the -strongholds on the Dender. Never pausing for a moment, he sent forward -a party to lay bridges on the Scheldt below Oudenarde in order to cut -off the French retreat into France, a movement which obliged Villeroy -forthwith to abandon the lines about Ghent and to retire up the Lys to -Courtrai. Ghent, Bruges, and Damme thereupon surrendered on the spot; -Oudenarde followed them, and after a few days Antwerp itself. Thus -within a fortnight after the victory the whole of Flanders and Brabant, -with the exception of Dendermond and one or two places of minor -importance, had succumbed to the Allies, and the French had fallen back -to their own frontier. - -◆June.◆ - -Nor was even this all. A contribution of two million livres levied in -French Flanders brought home to the Grand Monarch that the war was -now knocking at his own gates. Villars, with the greater part of his -army, was recalled from the Rhine to the Lys, and a number of French -troops were withdrawn to the same quarter from Italy. Baden had thus -the game in his own hand on the Rhine, and though he was too sulky and -incapable to turn the advantage to account, yet his inaction was no -fault of Marlborough’s. We are hardly surprised to find that in the -middle of this fortnight the Duke made urgent request for fresh stores -of champagne; he may well have needed the stimulant amid such pressure -of work and fatigue.[38] - -He now detached Overkirk to besiege Ostend and another party to -blockade Dendermond, at the same time sending off five British -battalions, which we shall presently meet again, for a descent on the -Charente which was then contemplated in England. This done he took post -with the rest of the Army at Roulers, to westward of the Lys, whence -he could at once cover the siege of Ostend and menace Menin and Ypres. -The operations at Ostend were delayed for some time through want of -artillery and the necessity of waiting for the co-operation of the -Fleet; ◆June 6/17.◆ but the trenches were finally opened on the 17th of -June, and a few weeks later the town surrendered. - -◆June 27./July 8.◆ - -Three days after this the army was reassembled for the siege of Menin. -This fortress was of peculiar strength, being esteemed one of Vauban’s -masterpieces, and was garrisoned by five thousand men. Moreover, -the French, being in command of the upper sluices of the Lys, were -able greatly to impede the operations by cutting off the water from -the lower stream, and thus rendering it less useful for purposes of -transport, But all this availed it little; for three weeks after the -opening of the trenches Menin surrendered. ◆Aug. 11/22.◆ The British -battalions[39] which had been kept inactive at Ramillies took a leading -share in the work, and some of them suffered very heavily; but they had -the satisfaction of recapturing four of the British guns that had been -taken at Landen. - -◆Aug. 25./Sept. 5.◆ - -A few days later Dendermond was attacked in earnest and was likewise -taken, after which Marlborough ◆Sept. 12/23.◆ fell back across the -Scheldt to secure the whole line of the Dender by the capture of -Ath. ◆Sept. 21./Oct. 2.◆ Ten days sufficed for the work, after which -Ath also fell into the hands of the Allies. The apathy of the French -throughout these operations sufficiently show their discouragement. -Owing to the supineness of Prince Lewis of Baden, Villars had been -able to bring up thirty-five thousand men to the assistance of -Marshal Vendôme, who had now superseded Villeroy; but even with this -reinforcement the two commanders only looked on helplessly while -Marlborough reduced fortress after fortress before their eyes. They -were, indeed, more anxious to strengthen the defences of Mons and -Charleroi, lest the Duke should break into France by that line, than -to approach him in the field. Nor were they not wholly unreasonable in -their anxiety, for Marlborough’s next move was upon the Sambre; but -incessant rain and tempestuous weather forbade any further operations, -so that Ath proved to be the last conquest of the year. Thus ended the -campaign of Ramillies, one of the most brilliant in the annals of war, -wherein Marlborough in a single month carried his arms triumphant from -the Meuse to the sea. - - - - - VOL. I BOOK VI. CHAPTER VII - - -◆1707.◆ - -Almanza was a bad opening for the new year, but worse was to follow. -Throughout the winter Marlborough had, as usual, been employed in -diplomatic negotiations, which nothing but his skill and fascination -could have carried to a successful issue. But on one most important -point the Duke was foiled by the treachery of the Emperor, who, to -further his own selfish designs on Naples, secretly concluded a treaty -with France for the neutrality of Italy, and thus enabled the whole of -the French garrisons in Italy to be withdrawn unmolested. The forces -thus liberated were at once brought up to the scene of action on the -Rhine and in Flanders, and the French were enabled to lead a superior -force in the field against Marlborough. Again, the Duke had hoped -to save Spain by an invasion of France from the side of Savoy, but -this project had been deferred until too late, owing to the Emperor’s -cupidity for the possession of Naples. Finally, though Prince Lewis of -Baden had died during the winter, he had been replaced on the Rhine by -a still more incompetent prince, the Margrave of Baireuth, who, far -from making any diversion in the Duke’s favour, never ceased pestering -him to come to his assistance. So flagrant was this deplorable person’s -incapacity that he too was superseded before the close of the campaign, -though too late for any effective purpose. His successor, however, -deserves particular notice, being none other than the Elector of -Hanover, afterwards our own King George the First, no genius in the -field, but, as shall be seen in due time, an extremely sensible and -clear-headed soldier. - -The result of these complications was that Marlborough spent the -greater part of the summer encamped, in the face of a superior -French force, at Meldert, on a branch of the Great Geete, to cover -his conquests in Flanders and Brabant. At last the Emperor, having -accomplished his desires in Naples, made a diversion towards Provence, -which drew away a part of the French force to that quarter and -enabled the Duke to move. But then bad weather intervened to prevent -any successful operations. Twice Marlborough was within an ace of -surprising Vendôme, who had superseded Villeroy in Flanders, and twice -the marshal decamped in haste and confusion only just in time to save -his army. Even so the Duke would have struck one heavy blow but for the -intervention of the Dutch deputies. But fortune favoured the French; -the rain came down in torrents, and the country was poached into such a -quagmire by the cavalry that many of the infantry were fairly swallowed -up and lost.[40] Thus tamely ended the campaign which should have -continued the work of Ramillies.[41] - -Returning home in November Marlborough found difficulties almost as -great as he had left behind him in Flanders. There were quarrels in -the Cabinet, already foreboding the time when the Queen and the people -should turn against him. The Court of France was reverting to its old -methods and endeavouring to divide England by providing the Pretender -with a force for invasion. Again the hardships of the campaign in -Flanders and the defeat of Almanza had not only created discontent, but -had enormously increased the demand for recruits. The evil work of the -Dutch deputies and the incorrigible selfishness and jealousy of the -Empire had already prolonged the war beyond the limit assigned by the -short patience of the English people. - -Happily Parliament was for the present still loyal to the war, and -voted not only the usual supplies but money for an additional ten -thousand men. Five new battalions[42] were raised, and three more of -the old establishment were detailed for service in Flanders.[43] But -far more satisfactory was the fact that in 1708 all regiments took the -field with new colours, bearing the cross of St. Andrew blended with -that of St. George, pursuant to the first article of the Treaty of -Union, passed in the previous year, between England and Scotland. - -◆1708.◆ - -The early spring of 1708 was wasted by the French in a futile endeavour -to set the Pretender afoot in Scotland with a French force at his -back; nor was it until the 9th of April that Marlborough sailed for -the Hague, where Eugene was already awaiting him. ◆Mar. 29./April 9.◆ -There the two agreed that the Duke should as usual command in Flanders, -while Eugene should take charge of an army on the Moselle, nominally -for operations on that river, but in reality to unite with Marlborough -by a rapid march and give battle to the French before they could call -in their remoter detachments. There was a considerable difficulty with -the Elector of Hanover, who was to command on the Rhine, owing to -his jealousy of Eugene; but this trouble was satisfactorily settled, -as were all troubles of the time, by the intervention of Marlborough. -Thereupon the Electoral Prince, true to the quarrelsome traditions of -his family, at once insisted on taking service with Eugene, simply -for the sake of annoying his father; thus adding one more to the many -causes of friction which, but for Marlborough, would soon have brought -the Grand Alliance to a standstill. This Electoral Prince will become -better known to us as King George the Second. - -The French on their part had made extraordinary exertions in the -hope of a successful campaign. Since Ramillies they had drawn troops -from all quarters to Flanders; and from thenceforth the tendency in -every succeeding year grew stronger for all operations to centre in -that familiar battle-ground. On the Rhine the Elector of Bavaria -held command, with Berwick, much exalted since Almanza, to help him. -The French main army in Flanders numbered little less than a hundred -thousand men, and was under the orders of Vendôme, with the Duke of -Burgundy in supreme command. The presence of the heir to the throne, of -his brother the Duke of Berry, and of the Chevalier de St. George, as -the Pretender called himself, all portended an unusual effort. - -◆May.◆ - -Marching up at the end of May from their rendezvous on the south of -the Haine, the French army moved north to the forest of Soignies. -Marlborough thereupon at once concentrated at Hal and summoned Eugene -to him with all haste. His own army numbered but eighty thousand -men, and, though as usual he showed a bold front, he knew that such -disparity of numbers was serious. The French then manœuvred towards -Waterloo as if to threaten Louvain, a movement which the Duke met by -a forced march to Park on the Dyle. ◆May 24./June 4. to June 24./July -5.◆ Here he remained perforce inactive for a whole month, waiting for -Eugene, who was delayed by some petty formalities which were judged by -the Imperial Court to be far more important than military operations. -◆June 23./July 4.◆ Suddenly, on the night of the 4th of July, the -French broke up their camp, marched westward to cross the Senne at Hal -and detached small corps against Bruges and Ghent. Unable to meet the -Allies with the sword, the French had substituted gold for steel and -had for some time been tampering with the new authorities in these -towns. The gold had done its work. Within twenty-four hours Ghent and -Bruges had opened their gates, and the keys to the navigation of the -Scheldt and Lys were lost. - -◆June 24./July 5.◆ - -Marlborough, who was quite ready for a march, was up and after the -French army immediately. At two o’clock in the morning his army was in -motion, streaming off to pass the Senne at Anderlecht. The march was -long and severe, the roads being in so bad a state that the right wing -did not reach its halting-ground until six o’clock in the evening, nor -the left wing till two o’clock on the following morning; but this great -effort brought the Allies almost within reach of the French army. -◆June 25./July 6.◆ In the night, intelligence was brought to -Marlborough that the enemy was turning back to fight him. He was in the -saddle at once, to form his line of battle; but the news was false. -The French in reality were making off as fast as they could; and, -before the truth could reach Marlborough, they were across the Dender. -Marlborough’s cavalry was instantly on their track, but could do no -more than capture a few hundred prisoners, together with most of the -French baggage. That same day came definite information of the loss -of Ghent and Bruges, and of the investment of the citadel of Ghent. -Brussels took the alarm at once. The French, as they feared, had for -once got the better of the Duke. The French army was encamped at Alost, -where, like a king between two pieces at draughts, it threatened both -the citadel of Ghent and Brussels; and all was panic in the capital. -The Duke was fain to move on to Assche, midway between Alost and -Brussels, to restore the confidence of the fearful city. - -Here Eugene joined him. Finding it hopeless to arrive in time with -his army, the Prince had pushed on alone; nor could he have arrived -more opportunely, for Marlborough was so much weakened by an attack of -fever that he was hardly fit for duty. It was indeed a trying moment. -The next design of the French was evidently aimed at Oudenarde for -the recovery of the line of the Scheldt. They were already across -the Dender and ahead of Marlborough on the road to it, and moreover -had broken down the bridges behind them; yet the Duke dared not move -lest he should expose Brussels. He sent orders to the Governor of -Ath to collect as many troops as possible, and to throw himself into -Oudenarde, which that officer punctually did; and then there was -nothing to be done but to wait. Two days sufficed to place the citadel -of Ghent in the hands of the French, and to set their army free for -further operations. ◆June 28./July 9.◆ Accordingly on the 9th of July -Vendôme sent forward detachments to invest Oudenarde, and moved with -the main army up the Dender to Lessines, from which point he intended -to cover the siege. Great was his astonishment on approaching the town -on the following day to find that Marlborough had arrived there before -him, and was not only within reach of Oudenarde, but interposed between -him and his own frontier. - -For at two o’clock on the morning of the 9th of July the Allied army -had marched off in beautiful order in five columns, and by noon had -covered fifteen miles to Herfelingen on the road to the Dender. Four -hours later Cadogan was sent forward with eight battalions and as many -squadrons to occupy Lessines and throw bridges over the Dender; and, -when tattoo beat that night, the army silently entered on a march of -thirteen further miles to the same point. ◆June 29./July 10.◆ Before -dawn came the welcome intelligence that Cadogan had reached his -destination at midnight, laid his bridges, and made his dispositions to -cover the passage of the troops. The army tramped on, always in perfect -order, crossed the river and was taking up its camping-ground, when the -heads of the enemy’s columns appeared on the distant heights and were -seen first to halt and then to retire. Marlborough on the curve of the -arc had outmarched Vendôme on the chord. - -The French, finding the whole of their plans disconcerted, now -wheeled about north-westward towards Gavre on the Scheldt, to shelter -themselves behind the river and bar the advance of the Allies on -Bruges. But the Duke had no intention to let them off so easily. -Burgundy and Vendôme were not on good terms; their differences had -already caused considerable confusion in the army; and Marlborough was -fully aware of the fact. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ At dawn on the morning of -the 11th the unwearied Cadogan started off with some eleven thousand -men[44] and twenty-four guns, to prepare the roads, construct bridges, -and make dispositions to cover the passage of the Scheldt below -Oudenarde. By half-past ten he had reached the river, just above the -village of Eyne, and on ascending the low heights above the stream -and looking westward he saw before him a kind of shallow basin or -amphitheatre, seamed by little ditches and rivulets, and broken by -hedges and enclosures. To the south the rising ground on which he -stood swept round almost to the glacis of Oudenarde, thence curved -westward from the village of Bevere into another broad hill, called the -Boser Couter, to the village of Oycke and beyond, turned from thence -northward across the valley of the river Norken to Huysse, from which -point trending still to northward it died away in the marshes of the -Scheldt. Near Oycke two small streams rise which, after pursuing for -some way a parallel course, unite to run down into the Scheldt at Eyne; -beyond them the Norken flows beneath the heights of Huysse in a line -parallel to the Scheldt. - -[Illustration: - - OUDENARDE - June 30th/July 11th 1708 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Presently parties of French horse appeared on the ground to the north. -Vendôme’s advanced-guard, under the Marquis of Biron, had crossed the -Scheldt leisurely at Gavre, six miles farther down the river, and was -now moving across his front with foragers out, in happy unconsciousness -of the presence of an enemy. A dash of Cadogan’s squadrons upon the -foragers quickly brought Biron to Eyne and beyond it, where he caught -sight of Cadogan’s detachment of scarlet and blue battalions guarding -the bridge, and presently of a body of cavalry in the act of crossing; -for Marlborough, uneasy while his advanced-guard was still in the air, -had caught up a column of Prussian horse and galloped forward with it -in all haste. Biron at once reported what he had seen to Vendôme, who, -perceiving that the mass of the Allied army was still on the wrong -side of the Scheldt, gave orders to take up a position parallel to the -river; the line to rest its left on the village of Heurne and extend -by Eyne and Beveren to Mooregem on the right. In pursuance of his -design he directed seven battalions to occupy Heurne forthwith; but -at this point the Duke of Burgundy interposed. The heights of Huysse -in rear of the Norken from Asper to Wannegem formed in his judgment a -preferable position; and there, two miles from the Scheldt, he should -form his line of battle, facing south-east. So the army was guided to -the left bank of the Norken, while the seven battalions, obeying what -they conceived to be their orders, marched down to the village not of -Heurne but of Eyne, and backed by a few squadrons, took up the position -assigned to them by Vendôme. - -Meanwhile, responding to urgent messages from Marlborough, the main -body of the Allies was hurrying forward, and by two o’clock the head -of the infantry had reached the Scheldt. Part of the cavalry passed -through Oudenarde to take advantage of the town bridge; the foot began -to cross by the pontoons, and Cadogan, who had marked the march of the -French into Eyne, at once summoned the whole of his advanced-guard -across to the left bank. Sabine’s brigade, supported by the other two, -crossed the rivulet against Eyne, while the Hanoverian cavalry moved up -to the rear of the village and cut off all hope of retreat. Presently -Sabine’s British were hotly engaged; but the French made only a poor -resistance. It is the weakness of the French soldier that he apprehends -too quickly when his officers have not given him a fair chance. Three -battalions out of the seven were captured entire, the remaining four -were killed or taken piecemeal in their flight. The cavalry, flushed -by their success, then advanced under Prince George against the few -French squadrons in rear of the village, charged them, routed them, and -drove them across the Norken. The Prince had his horse shot under him -in this encounter, for his family has never wanted for courage, and he -remembered the day of Oudenarde to the end of his life. - -The Duke of Burgundy now determined upon a general action, and made -every preparation for defence of the position behind the Norken. -But when four o’clock came and the Allied army was not yet in order -of battle, he changed his plan, pushed a body of cavalry from his -right across the stream, and set the whole of his centre and right -in motion to advance likewise. Marlborough, perceiving the movement, -judged that the attack would be directed against his left, in the -hope that Cadogan’s battalions about Eyne would be left isolated and -open to be crushed by an advance of the French left. Two of Cadogan’s -regiments, Prussians, which had been pushed forward half a mile beyond -Eyne to Groenewald, were at once reinforced by twelve more of the -advanced-guard; the British cavalry was formed up on the heights at -Bevere, and the Prussian horse further to the Allied right near Heurne. -No more could be done until the rest of the army should gradually cross -the river which divided it from the battlefield. - -At length about five o’clock thirty French battalions debouched upon -Groenewald, which was as yet held only by Cadogan’s two advanced -regiments, and began the attack. The Prussians stuck to their post -gallantly and held their own among the hedges, until presently -Cadogan’s reinforcement, and later on twenty more battalions under the -Duke of Argyll,[45] came up to their assistance. Forming in succession -on the left of the Prussians as they reached the fighting line, these -regiments extended the field of action as far south as Schaerken; and -the combat was carried on with great spirit. The ground was so strongly -enclosed that the fight resolved itself into duels of battalions, the -cream of the infantry on both sides being engaged. At one moment the -French outflanked the left of the Allies and drove them back, but -fresh battalions of Marlborough’s army kept constantly streaming into -action, which recovered the lost ground and prolonged the line of fire -always further to the south. - -Marlborough and Eugene, who had hitherto remained together, now parted, -and the Duke handing over eighteen battalions to the Prince entrusted -him with the command of the right. This accession of strength enabled -Eugene to relieve Cadogan’s corps, which had yielded ground somewhat -before Groenewald, and even to pierce through the first line of the -enemy’s infantry. General Natzmar thereupon seized the moment to throw -the Prussian cavalry against the second line. His squadrons were -received with a biting fire from the hedges as they advanced; and the -French Household Cavalry, watching the favourable moment for a charge, -drove back the Prussians with very heavy loss. - -Meanwhile Marlborough with the Hanoverian and Dutch infantry was -pressing forward slowly on his left, the French fighting with great -stubbornness and gallantry, and contesting every inch of ground from -hedge to hedge. At last the enemy, being forced back to Diepenbeck, -a few hundred yards in rear of Schaerken, stood fast, and refused, -despite all the Duke’s efforts, to give way another foot. But -Marlborough had still twenty battalions of Dutch and Danes with almost -the entire cavalry of the left at his disposal, and he had noticed -that the French right flank rested on the air. He now directed Marshal -Overkirk to lead these troops under cover of the Boser Couter round the -French right and to fall with them upon the enemy’s rear. The gallant -old Dutchman, though infirm and sick unto death, joyfully obeyed. Two -brigades were thrown at once on the flank of the troops that were so -stoutly opposing Marlborough; while the cavalry advanced quickly on -the reverse slope of the Boser Couter,[46] and then wheeling to the -right, fell on the rear of the unsuspecting French. A part of the -Household Cavalry and some squadrons of dragoons tried bravely to stand -their ground, but they were borne back and swept away. Overkirk’s -troops pressed rapidly on; and the French right was fairly surrounded -on all sides. - -Now at last an effort was made to bring forward the French left, which, -through Burgundy’s perversity or for some inscrutable reason, had -been left motionless on the other side of the Norken; but it was too -late. The infantry, though led by Vendôme himself, failed to make the -slightest impression, and the cavalry dared not advance. The ground -before them was intricate and swampy, and the whole of the British -cavalry, withdrawn from their first position by Eugene, stood waiting -to plunge down upon them directly they should move. The daylight faded -and the night came on, but the musketry flashed out incessantly in an -ever-narrowing girdle of fire, as the Allies wound themselves closer -and closer round the enveloped French right. At length at nine o’clock -Marlborough and Eugene, fearful lest their own troops should engage -each other in the darkness, with some difficulty enforced the order to -halt and cease firing. Vast numbers of the French seized the moment to -escape, but presently all the drums of the Allies began with one accord -to beat the French retreat, while the Huguenot officers shouted “À moi, -Picardie! À moi, Roussillon!” to gather the relics of the scattered -regiments of the enemy around them. In this way some thousands of -prisoners were gleaned, though the harvest which would have been reaped -in another hour of daylight was lost. In the French army all was -confusion. Vendôme tried in vain to keep the troops together till the -morning, but Burgundy gave the word for retreat; and the whole mass -ran off in disorder towards Ghent. - -So ended the battle of Oudenarde, presenting on one side a feature -rare in these days, namely, a general engagement without an order -of battle.[47] It was undoubtedly the most hazardous action that -Marlborough ever fought. His troops were much harassed by forced -marches. They had started at two o’clock on Monday morning and had -covered fifty miles, including the passage of two rivers, when they -came into action at two o’clock on Wednesday afternoon. It would be -reckoned no small feat in these days to move eighty thousand men -over fifty miles in sixty hours, but in those days of bad roads and -heavy packs the effort must have been enormous. Finally, the army had -to pass the Scheldt in the face of the enemy, and ran no small risk -of being destroyed in detail. Yet the hazard was probably less than -it now seems to us, and generals in our own day have not hesitated -to risk similar peril with success. The French commanders were at -variance; the less competent of them, being heir-apparent, was likely -to be toadied by officers and supported by them against their better -judgment; and, finally, the entire French army was very much afraid -of Marlborough. Notwithstanding their slight success in Ghent and -Bruges, their elation had evaporated speedily when they found the -Duke before them at Lessines. All this Marlborough knew well; and -he knew also that, if an impromptu action (if one may use the term) -must be fought, there was not a man on the French side who had an -eye for a battlefield comparable to Eugene’s or his own. The event -justified his calculations; for the victory was one of men who knew -their own minds over men who did not. Another hour of daylight, so -Marlborough declared, would have enabled him to finish the war. The -total loss of the Allies in the battle was about three thousand killed -and wounded, the British infantry, though early engaged, suffering -but little, while the British cavalry, being employed to watch the -inactive French left, hardly suffered at all.[48] The French lost -six thousand killed and wounded and nine thousand prisoners only, -but they were thoroughly shaken and demoralised for the remainder of -the campaign. The wearied army of the Allies lay on its arms on the -battlefield, while Marlborough and Eugene waited impatiently for the -dawn. As soon as it was light, forty squadrons, for the most part -British, were sent forward in pursuit, while Eugene returned to his -own army to hasten its march and to collect material for a siege. -◆July 1/12.◆ The main army halted to rest for two days where it lay, -during which time the intelligence came that Berwick ad been summoned -with his army from the Moselle, and was marching with all haste to -occupy certain lines constructed by the French to cover their frontier -from Ypres to the Lys. ◆July 2–3/13–14.◆ At midnight fifty squadrons -and thirty battalions under Count Lottum, a distinguished Prussian -officer, started for these lines; the whole army followed at daybreak, -and, while on the march, the Duke received the satisfactory news that -Lottum had captured the lines without difficulty. Next day the whole of -Marlborough’s army was camped along the Lys between Menin and Commines, -within the actual territory of France. - -Detached columns were at once sent out to forage and levy -contributions. The suburbs of Arras were burnt, and no effort was -spared to bring home to the French that war was hammering at their -own gates. But the Allies were still doubtful as to the operations -that they should next undertake. So long as the French held Bruges and -Ghent they held also the navigation of the Scheldt and Lys, so that -it was of vital importance to tempt Vendôme, if possible, to evacuate -those towns. The British Government was preparing a force[49] under -General Erle for a descent upon Normandy by sea, and Marlborough was -for co-operating with this expedition, masking the fortress of Lille, -and penetrating straight into France—a plan which the reader should, if -possible, bear in mind. But the proposal was too adventurous to meet -with the approval of the Dutch, and was judged impracticable even by -Eugene unless Lille were first captured as a place of arms. Ultimately -it was decided, notwithstanding the closing of the Scheldt and Lys, -to undertake the siege of Lille; and all the energies of the Allies -were turned to the collection of sixteen thousand horses to haul the -siege-train overland from Brussels. - -During the enforced inaction of the army for the next few weeks, the -monotony was broken only by the arrival of a distinguished visitor, -Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, together -with one of his three hundred and sixty-four bastards, a little boy of -twelve named Maurice, who had run away from school to join the army. -We shall meet with this boy again as a man of fifty, under the name of -Marshal Saxe, at a village some twenty miles distant called Fontenoy. - -At length the preparations for the siege were complete, and the huge -convoy set out from Brussels for its long march. Now, if ever, was -the time for the French to strike a blow. Vendôme in the north at -Ghent and Berwick in the south at Douay had, between them, one hundred -and ten thousand men: the distance to be traversed by the convoy -was seventy-five miles, and the way was barred by the Dender and -the Scheldt. Such, however, was the skill with which the march was -conducted that the French never succeeded even in threatening the vast, -unwieldy columns, which duly reached their destination without the -loss even of a single waggon. ◆Aug. 1/12.◆ Of all the achievements of -Marlborough and Eugene, this seems to have been judged by contemporary -military men to be the greatest.[50] - -Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was one of the early conquests -of Lewis the Fourteenth, and, if the expression may be allowed, the -darling town of the Court of Versailles. Situated in a swampy plain -and watered by two rivers, the Deule and Marque, its natural position -presented difficulties of no ordinary kind to a besieging force; and, -in addition, it had been fortified by Vauban with his utmost skill. The -garrison, which had been strengthened by Berwick, amounted to fifteen -thousand men, under the command of brave old Marshal Boufflers, who -had solicited the honour of defending the fortress. To the north, as -we have seen, lay Vendôme, and to the south Berwick, with a joint -force now amounting to about ninety-four thousand men.[51] It was -for Marlborough and Eugene with an inferior strength of eighty-four -thousand men[52] to hold them at bay and to take one of the strongest -fortresses in the world before their eyes. - -A detailed account even of so famous a siege would be wearisome, the -more so since the proportion of British troops detailed for regular -work in the trenches was but five battalions,[53] but there are a few -salient features which cannot be omitted. The point selected for attack -was the north side, the first advance to which was opened by a single -English soldier, Sergeant Littler of the First Guards,[54] who swam -across the Marquette to a French post, which commanded the passage -of the stream, and let down the drawbridge. ◆Aug. 2/13.◆ Two days -later the town was fully invested, and Marlborough took post with the -covering army at Helchin on the Scheldt. - -The investment had not been accomplished for more than a fortnight, -when the Duke was informed that Berwick and Vendôme were advancing -towards the Dender to unite their forces at Lessines. After manœuvring -at first to hinder the junction Marlborough finally decided to let it -come to pass, being satisfied that, if the French designed to relieve -Lille, they could not penetrate to it in the face of his army on the -east side, but must go round and approach the city from the south. -In this case, as both armies would move in concentric circles around -Lille as a centre, Marlborough, being nearer to that centre, could be -certain of reaching any given point on the way to it before the French. -Moreover, the removal of the enemy from the east to the south would -free the convoys from Brussels from all annoyance on their march to the -siege. - -◆Aug. 22./Sept. 2.◆ - -As he had expected, the French moved south to Tournay, and then -wheeling northward entered the plain of Lille, where they found -Marlborough and Eugene drawn up ready to receive them.[55] Vendôme -and Berwick had positive orders to risk a battle; and there had been -much big talk of annihilating the Allies. Yet face to face with their -redoubtable enemies they hesitated. Finally, after a week’s delay, -which enabled Marlborough greatly to strengthen his position by -entrenchment, they advanced as if to attack in earnest, but withdrew -ignominiously after a useless cannonade, without accepting battle. Had -not Marlborough and Eugene been restrained by the Dutch deputies, the -marshals would have had a battle forced on them whether they liked it -or not, but, as things were, they were permitted to retire. To such -depth of humiliation had Marlborough reduced the proud and gallant -French army. - -◆Aug. 27–28./Sept. 7–8.◆ - -The retreat left Eugene free to press the siege with vigour; but a -great assault, which cost him three thousand men,[56] failed to give -him the advantage for which he had hoped; and a week later Marlborough -was called in from the covering army to give assistance. ◆Sept. -19–20./30–31.◆ For the next attack, on the counterscarp, the Duke lent -the Prince five thousand English, and it is said that English and -French never fought more worthily of their reputation than on that -day; but the assault was thrice repelled, and it was only through -the exertions of Eugene himself that a portion of the works was at -last captured, after a desperate effort and at frightful expense of -life. Altogether the siege was not going well. The engineers had made -blunders; a vast number of men had been thrown away to no purpose; and -ammunition and stores were beginning to run short. Lastly, Boufflers -maintained always a very grand and extremely able defence. - -Vendôme and Berwick could now think of no better expedient than to -throw themselves into strong positions along the Scarpe and Scheldt, -from Douay to Ghent, in order to cut off all convoys from Brussels. -But Marlborough was prepared for this, and had not captured Ostend -after Ramillies for nothing. England held command of the sea; and -Erle’s expedition, which had effected little or nothing on the coast -of Normandy, was at hand to help in the transport of supplies from the -new base. Erle, who had considerable talent for organisation, soon -set Ostend in order, seized two passages over the Nieuport Canal at -Leffinghe and Oudenburg, and prepared to send off his first convoy. As -its arrival was of vital importance to the maintenance of the siege, -the French were as anxious ◆Sept. 16/27.◆ to intercept as the English -to forward it. Vendôme accordingly sent off Count de la Mothe with -twenty-two thousand men to attack it on its way, while Marlborough -despatched twelve battalions and fifteen hundred horse to Ostend -itself, twelve battalions more under General Webb to Thourout, and -eighteen squadrons under Cadogan to Roulers, at two different points on -the road, to help it to its destination. - -◆Sept. 17/28.◆ - -The convoy started at night, and in the morning Cadogan sent forward -Count Lottum with a hundred and fifty horse to meet it. At noon Lottum -returned to Thourout with the intelligence that he had struck against -the advanced guard of a French force at Ichtegem, two miles beyond -Wynendale and some four miles from Thourout, on the road to Ostend. -Webb at once collected every battalion within his reach, twenty-two in -all, and marched with all speed for Ichtegem, with Lottum’s squadron in -advance. The horse, however, on emerging from the defile of Wynendale, -found the enemy advancing towards them into the plains that lay beyond -it. Lottum retired slowly, skirmishing, while Webb pushed on and -posted his men in two lines at the entrance to the defile. The strait -was bounded on either hand by a wood, and in each of these woods Webb -stationed a battalion of Germans to take the French in flank. The -dispositions were hardly complete when the enemy came up and opened -fire from nineteen pieces of artillery. Lottum and his handful of horse -then retired, while just in the nick of time three more battalions -reached Webb from the rear and formed his third line. - -The French cannonade was prolonged for nearly two hours, but with -little effect, for Webb had ordered his men to lie down. At length at -five o’clock the French advanced in four lines of infantry, backed -by as many of horse and dragoons. They came on with great steadiness -and entered the space between the two woods, with their flanks almost -brushing the covert as they passed, serenely unconscious of the peril -that awaited them. Then from right and left a staggering volley crashed -into them from the battalions concealed among the trees. Both flanks -shrank back from the fire, and huddled themselves in confusion upon -their centre. De la Mothe sent forward some dragoons in support; -and the foot, recovering themselves, pressed on against the lines -before them. So vigorous was their attack that they broke through two -battalions of the first line; but, the gap being instantly filled -from the second, they were forced back. Again they struggled forward, -trusting by the sheer weight of eight lines against two to sweep their -enemy away. But the eternal fire on front and flank became unendurable, -and, notwithstanding the blows and entreaties of their officers, the -eight lines broke up in confusion, while Webb’s battalions, coolly -advancing by platoons “as if they were at exercise,” poured volley -after volley into them as they retired. Cadogan, who had hastened up -with a few squadrons to the sound of the firing, was anxious to charge -the broken troops, but his force was considered too weak; and thus -after two hours of hot conflict ended the combat of Wynendale. The -French engaged therein numbered almost double of the Allies, and lost -close on three thousand men, while the Allies lost rather less than a -thousand of all ranks. The signal incapacity displayed by the French -commander did not lessen the credit of Webb, and Wynendale was reckoned -one of the most brilliant little affairs of the whole war.[57] - -The safe arrival of the convoy before Lille raised the hope of the -besiegers; and Vendôme, now fully alive to the importance of cutting -off communication with Ostend, marched towards that side with a -considerable force, and opening the dykes laid the whole country under -water. Marlborough went quickly after him, but the marshal would not -await his coming; and the Duke, by means of high-wheeled vehicles -and punts, contrived to overcome the difficulties caused by the -inundation. ◆Oct. 11/22.◆ At last, after a siege of sixty days the town -capitulated; and the garrison retired into the citadel, where Eugene -proceeded to beleaguer it anew. - -While the new siege was going forward, the Elector of Bavaria arrived -on the scene from the Rhine, from whence the apathy of the Elector of -Hanover had most unpardonably allowed him to withdraw, and laid siege -to Brussels with fifteen thousand men. ◆Nov. 13/24.◆ This was an -entirely new complication; and, since the French held the line of the -Scheldt in force, it was difficult to see how Marlborough could parry -the blow. Fortunately the garrison defended itself with great spirit, -the English regiments[58] setting a fine example; and the Duke, in no -wise dismayed, laid his plans with his usual secrecy and decision. -◆Nov. 15/26.◆ Spreading reports, which he confirmed by feint -movements, that he was about to place his troops in cantonments, he -marched suddenly and silently eastward on the night of the 26th of -November, crossed the Scheldt at two different points before the enemy -knew that he was near them, took a thousand prisoners, and then -remitting the bulk of his force to the siege of Lille, pushed on with -a detachment of cavalry and two battalions of English Guards to -Alost. ◆Nov. 17/28.◆ On his arrival he learned that the Elector had -raised the siege of Brussels and marched off with precipitation. The -bare name of Marlborough had been sufficient to scare him away. - -Meanwhile Eugene’s preparations before the citadel of Lille were in -rapid progress, and Marlborough was already maturing plans for a -further design before the close of the campaign. It had been the -earnest desire of both commanders to reduce Boufflers to unconditional -surrender; but time was an object, so on the 9th of December the -gallant old marshal and his heroic garrison marched out with the -honours of war. ◆Nov. 28./Dec. 9.◆ So ended the memorable siege of -Lille. It had cost the garrison eight thousand men, or more than half -of its numbers, and the Allies no fewer than fourteen thousand -men. The honours of the struggle rested decidedly with Boufflers, and -were paid to him by none more ungrudgingly than Marlborough and -Eugene. Yet as an operation of war, conducted under extraordinary -difficulties in respect of transport, under the eyes of a superior -force and subject to diversions, such as that of the Elector of -Bavaria, this siege remains one of the highest examples of consummate -military skill. - -The fall of Lille was a heavy blow for France, but it was not the last -of the campaign. Within eight days Marlborough and Eugene had invested -Ghent, which after a brief resistance surrendered with the honours of -war. The capitulation of Bruges quickly followed, and the navigation of -the Scheldt and Lys having been regained, the two commanders at last -sent their troops into winter quarters. - -But even this did not close the sum of English successes for 1708. -From the Mediterranean had come news of another conquest, due to the -far-seeing eye and far-reaching hand of Marlborough. Early in the year -Galway had withdrawn from Catalonia to Lisbon, and the command in -Catalonia had been given at Marlborough’s instance to Field-Marshal -von Staremberg, an Imperial officer of much experience and deservedly -high reputation. Staremberg, however, could do little with but ten -thousand men against the Bourbon’s army of twice his strength; so by -Marlborough’s advice the troops were used to second the operations of -the Mediterranean squadron. Sardinia, the first point aimed at, was -captured almost without resistance; and the fleet then sailed for -Minorca. Here somewhat more opposition was encountered; but after less -than a fortnight’s work, creditably managed by Major-general Stanhope, -the Island was taken at a trifling cost of life.[59] ◆Sept. 13/24.◆ -Thus the English gained their first port in the Mediterranean; and the -news of the capture of Minorca reached London on the same day as that -of the fall of Lille. - -NOTE.—I have been unable to discover any Order of Battle for the -campaign of 1708. The regiments that bear the name of Oudenarde on -their appointments are the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards, -the 2nd Dragoons, 5th Lancers, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, -1st, 3rd, 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 37th -Foot. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER VIII - - -◆1708.◆ - -The successes of the past campaign were sufficient to put the British -Parliament in good humour, and to prompt it to vote a further increase -of ten thousand German mercenaries for the following year. Nevertheless -political troubles were increasing, and there were already signs that -the rule of Godolphin and Marlborough was in danger. The death of the -Prince Consort had been a heavy blow to the Duke. Prince George may -have deserved Lord Macaulay’s character for impenetrable stupidity, but -there can be little doubt that his heavy phlegmatic character was of -infinite service to steady the weak and unstable Queen Anne. - -◆1709.◆ - -In the spring of 1709, however, it seemed reasonable to hope that -peace, which would have set all matters right, was well-nigh assured. -France, already at the last gasp through the exhaustion caused by the -war, was weakened still further by a severe winter which had added -famine to all her other troubles; and Lewis sought anxiously, even -at the price of humiliation, for peace. He approached Marlborough, -reputed the most avaricious and corruptible of men, with a gigantic -bribe to obtain good terms, but was unhesitatingly rebuffed. The Duke -stated the conditions which might be acceptable to England; and, had -the negotiations been trusted to him, there can be little doubt but -that he would have obtained the honourable peace which he above all -men most earnestly desired. He was, however, overruled by instructions -from home, imposing terms which Lewis could not be expected to grant; -the war was continued; and Marlborough, who had striven his hardest to -bring it to an end, was of course accused of prolonging it deliberately -for his own selfish ends. - -The French, now menaced by an invasion and a march of the Allies to -Paris, had strengthened their army enormously by withdrawing troops -from all quarters to Flanders, and had set in command their only -fortunate general, that very able soldier and incomparable liar, -Marshal Villars. To cover Arras, the north-eastern gate of France, -Villars had thrown up a strong line of entrenchments from the Scarpe -at Douay to the Lys, which were generally known, after the name of his -headquarters, as the lines of La Bassée. There he lay, entrenched to -the teeth, while Marlborough and Eugene, after long delay owing to the -lateness of the spring, encamped with one hundred and ten thousand men -to the south-east of Lille,◆ between two villages, with which the -reader will in due time make closer acquaintance, called Linselles and -Fontenoy. ◆June. Thence they moved south straight upon Villars’s -lines, with every apparent preparation for a direct attack upon them -and for forcing their way into France at that point. The heavy -artillery was sent to Menin on the Lys; report was everywhere rife of -the coming assault, and Villars lost no time in summoning the garrison -of Tournay to his assistance. ◆June 15/26.◆ On the 26th of June, at -seven in the evening, Marlborough issued his orders to strike tents -and march; and the whole army made up its mind for a bloody action -before the lines at dawn. To the general surprise, after advancing -some time in the direction of the French, the columns received orders -to change direction to the left. After some hours’ march eastward they -crossed a river, but the men did not know that the bridge lay over the -Marque and that it led them towards the battlefield of Bouvines; nor -was it until dawn that they saw the gray walls and the four spires of -Tournay before them, and discovered that they had invested the city. - -Tournay had been fortified by Vauban and was one of the strongest -fortresses in France,[60] but its garrison had been weakened by the -unsuspecting Villars, and there was little hope for it. The heavy -artillery of the Allies, which had been sent to Menin, went down the -Lys to Ghent and up the Scheldt to the besieged city, the trenches -were opened on the 7th of July, ◆June 26./July 7.◆ and after three -weeks, despite of the demonstrations of Villars and incessant heavy -rain, Tournay was reduced to surrender.[61] ◆July 19/28.◆ Then -followed the siege of the citadel, the most desperate enterprise yet -undertaken by the Allied troops, inasmuch as the subterraneous works -were more numerous and formidable than those above ground. The -operations were, therefore, conducted by mine and countermine, with -destructive explosions and confused combats in the darkness, which -tried the nerves of the soldiers almost beyond endurance. The men did -not object to be shot, but they dreaded to be buried alive by the -hundred together through the springing of a single mine.[62] Four -English regiments[63] bore their share in this work and suffered -heavily in the course of it, until on the 3rd of September the citadel -capitulated. ◆Aug. 23./Sept. 3.◆ - -Before the close of the siege Marlborough and Eugene, leaving a -sufficient force before Tournay, had moved back with the main army -before the lines at Douay. They had long decided that the lines were -far too formidable to be forced, but they saw no reason for -communicating this opinion to Villars. ◆Aug. 20/31.◆ On the 31st of -August Lord Orkney, with twenty squadrons and the whole of the -grenadiers of the army, marched away silently and swiftly eastward -towards St. Ghislain on the Haine. ◆Aug. 23./Sept. 3.◆ Three days -later, immediately after the capitulation of the citadel of Tournay, -the Prince of Hessen-Cassel started at four o’clock in the afternoon -in the same direction; at nine o’clock Cadogan followed him with forty -squadrons more, and at midnight the whole army broke up its camp and -marched after them. Twenty-six battalions alone were left before -Tournay to superintend the evacuation and to level the siege-works, -with orders to watch Villars carefully and not to move until he did. - -The Prince of Hessen-Cassel soon overtook Orkney, from whom he learned -that St. Ghislain was too strongly held to be carried by his small -force. The Prince therefore at once pushed on. Rain was falling in -torrents, and the roads were like rivers, but he continued his advance -eastward, behind the woods that line the Haine, almost without a halt, -till at length at two o’clock on the morning of the 6th of September -he wheeled to the right and crossed the river at Obourg three miles to -the north-east of Mons. ◆Aug. 26./Sept. 6.◆ Before him lay the river -Trouille curving round to the south by Mons, and in rear of it a line -of entrenchments, thrown up during the last war, from Mons to the -Sambre, to cover the province of Hainault. A short survey showed him -that the lines were weakly guarded; and before noon he had passed them -without opposition. His force, notwithstanding the weather and the -state of the roads, had traversed the fifty miles to Obourg in -fifty-six hours. - -Too late Villars discovered that for the second time he had been duped, -and that Marlborough had no intention of forcing his way into France -through the lines of La Bassée and the wet swampy country beyond them, -when he could pass the lines of the Trouille without loss of a man. -He was in a difficult position, for Mons was slenderly garrisoned -and difficult of access, though, if captured, it would be a valuable -acquisition to the Allies. The approach to it from the westward was -practically shut off by a kind of natural barrier of forest, running, -roughly speaking, from St. Ghislain on the Haine to the north to -Maubeuge on the Sambre to the south. In this barrier there were but -two openings, the Trouée de Boussut between the village of that name -and the Haine, and the Trouées d’Aulnois and de Louvière, which are -practically the same, some miles further to the south. These will be -more readily remembered, the northern entrance by the name of Jemappes, -the southern by the name of Malplaquet. ◆Aug. 27./Sept. 7.◆ Villars no -sooner knew what was going forward than he pushed forward a detachment -with all speed upon the northern entrance, which was the nearer to him. -The detachment came too late. The Prince of Hessen-Cassel was already -astride of the opening, his right at Jemappes, his left at Ciply. The -French thereupon fell back to await the approach of the main army of -the Allies. - -◆Aug. 26./Sept. 6.◆ - -Meanwhile that army had toiled through a sea of mud on the northern -bank of the Haine, and crossing the river had by evening invested Mons -on the eastern side. ◆Aug. 27./Sept. 7.◆ On the following day Villars -and his whole army also arrived on the scene and encamped a couple of -miles to westward of the forest-barrier, from Montreuil to Athis. -Here he was joined by old Marshal Boufflers, who had volunteered his -services at a time of such peril to France. The arrival of the gallant -veteran caused such a tumult of rejoicing in the French camp that -Marlborough and Eugene, not knowing what the clamour might portend, -withdrew all but a fraction of the investing force from the town, and, -advancing westward into the plain of Mons, caused the army to bivouac -between Ciply and Quévy in order of battle. - -◆Aug. 28./Sept. 8.◆ - -Villars meanwhile had not moved, being adroit enough to threaten -both passages and keep the Allies in doubt as to which he should -select. While, therefore, the mass of the Allied army was moved -towards the Trouée d’Aulnois, a strong detachment was sent up to watch -the Trouée de Boussut. ◆Aug. 29./Sept. 9.◆ That night Villars sent -detachments forward to occupy the southern passage, and by mid-day -of the morrow his whole army was taking up its position across the -opening. Marlborough at once moved his army forward, approaching so -close that his left wing exchanged cannon-shot with Villars’s right. -Everything pointed to an immediate attack on the French before they -should have time to entrench themselves. Whether the Dutch deputies -intervened to stay further movements is uncertain. All that is known -is that a council of war was held by the commanders of the Allies, and -that, after much debate, it was resolved to await the arrival of the -detachment from the Trouée de Boussut and of the troops that had been -left behind at Tournay, to turn the siege of Mons into a blockade, -and in the meanwhile to send eighteen battalions north to capture St. -Ghislain. Evidently in some quarter there was reluctance to hazard a -general action. - -Villars now set himself with immense energy to strengthen his -position; and, when Marlborough and Eugene surveyed the defences at -daybreak of the following morning, they were astonished at the -formidable appearance of the entrenchments. ◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆ -Marlborough was once more for attacking without further delay, but he -was opposed by the Dutch deputies and even by Eugene. The attack was -therefore fixed for the morrow; and another day was lost which Villars -did not fail to turn to excellent account. - -The entrance from the westward to the Trouée d’Aulnois or southern -entrance to the plain of Mons was marked by the two villages of Campe -du Hamlet on the north and Malplaquet on the south. About a mile in -advance of these villages the ground rose to its highest elevation, the -opening being about three thousand paces wide, and the ground broken -and hollowed to right and left by small rivulets. This was the point -selected by Villars for his position. It was bounded on his right by -the forest of Laignières, the greatest length of which ran parallel -to the Trouée, and on the left by a forest, known at different points -by the names of Taisnières, Sart and Blangies, the greatest length of -which ran at right angles to the Trouée. Villars occupied the forest -of Laignières with his extreme right, his battalions strengthening -the natural obstacles of a thick and tangled covert by means of -abatis. From the edge of the wood he constructed a triple line of -entrenchments, which ran across the opening for full a third of its -width, when they gave way to a line of nine redans. These redans in -turn yielded place to a swamp backed by more entrenchments, which -carried the defences across to the wood of Taisnières. Several cannon -were mounted on the entrenchments, and a battery of twenty guns before -the redans. On Villars’s left the forests of Taisnières and Sart -projected before the general front, forming a salient and re-entering -angle. Entrenchments and abatis were constructed in accordance with -this configuration, and two more batteries were erected on this side, -in addition to several guns at various points along the line, to -enfilade an advancing enemy. Feeling even thus insecure, Villars threw -up more entrenchments at the villages of Malplaquet and Chaussée du -Bois in rear of the wood of Sart, and was still hard at work on them -to the last possible moment before the action. Finally in rear of all -stood his cavalry, drawn up in several lines. The whole of his force -amounted to ninety-five thousand men. - -[Illustration: - - MALPLAQUET - Aug. 31st./Sept. 11th 1709 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -The position was most formidable, but it had its defects. In the first -place the open space before the entrenchments was broken at about -half a mile’s distance by a small coppice, called the wood of Tiry, -which could serve to mask the movements of the Allied centre. In the -second place the forest of Sart ran out beyond the fortified angle in a -long tongue, which would effectually conceal any troops that might be -directed against the extreme left flank. Finally the French cavalry, -being massed in rear of the entrenchments, could take no part in the -action until the defences were forced, and was therefore incapable -of delivering any counterstroke. Marlborough and Eugene accordingly -decided to make a feint attack on the French right and a true attack on -their left front and flank. Villars would then be obliged to reinforce -his left from his centre, which would enable the defences across the -open to be carried, and the whole of the allied cavalry to charge -forward and cut the French line in twain. - -◆Aug. 31./Sept. 11.◆ - -The dawn of the 11th of September broke in dense heavy mist which -completely veiled the combatants from each other. At three o’clock -prayers were said in the Allied camp, and then the artillery was -moved into position. Forty pieces were massed in a single battery -on the open ground against the French left, and were covered with -an epaulment for defence against enfilading fire; twenty-eight more -were stationed against the French right, and the lighter pieces were -distributed, as usual, among the different brigades. Then the columns -of attack were formed. Twenty-eight battalions under Count Lottum were -directed against the eastern face of the salient angle of the forest -of Taisnières, and forty battalions of Eugene’s army under General -Schulemberg against the northern face, while a little to the right of -Schulemberg two thousand men under General Gauvain were to press on the -French left flank in rear of their entrenchments. Behind Schulemberg -fifteen British battalions under Lord Orkney were drawn up in a single -line on the open ground, ready to advance against the centre as soon -as Schulemberg and Lottum should have done their work. Far away beyond -Gauvain, General Withers with five British and fourteen foreign -battalions and six squadrons was to turn the extreme French left at the -village of La Folie. - -For the feint against the French right, thirty-one battalions, chiefly -Dutch, were massed together under the Prince of Orange. The cavalry was -detailed in different divisions to support the infantry. The Prince -of Orange was backed by twenty-one Dutch squadrons under the Prince -of Hesse, Orkney by thirty more under Auvergne, Lottum by the British -and Hanoverian cavalry, and Schulemberg by Eugene’s horse. The orders -given to the cavalry were to sustain the foot as closely as possible -without advancing into range of grape-shot, and, as soon as the -central entrenchments were forced, to press forward, form before the -entrenchments and drive the French army from the field. The whole force -of the Allies was, as near as may be, equal to that of the French. - -At half-past seven the fog lifted, and the guns of both armies opened -fire. Eugene and Marlborough thereupon parted, the former taking -charge of the right, the latter of the left of the army. Then the -divisions of Orange and of Lottum advanced in two dense columns up the -glade. Presently the Dutch halted, just beyond range of grape-shot, -while Lottum’s column pushed on under a terrific fire to the rear -of the forty-gun battery and deployed to the right in three lines. -Then the fire of the cannon slackened for a time, till about nine -o’clock a salvo of the forty guns gave the signal for attack. Lottum’s -and Schulemberg’s divisions thereupon advanced perpendicularly to -each other, each in three lines, Gauvain’s men crept into the wood -unperceived, and Orkney extended his scarlet battalions across the -glade. - -Entering the wood, Schulemberg’s Austrians made the best of their way -through marshes and streams and fallen trees, nearer and nearer to -the French entrenchments. The enemy suffered them to approach within -pistol-shot, only to deliver a volley which sent them staggering back; -and, though the Austrians extended their line till it joined Gauvain’s -detachment, yet they could make little way against the French fire. -Lottum’s attack was hardly more successful. Heedless of the tempest of -shot in their front and flank the Germans pressed steadily on, passed -a swamp and a stream under a galling fire, and fell fiercely upon the -breastwork beyond; but, being disordered by the ground and thinned by -heavy losses, they were forced to fall back. Schulemberg then resumed -the attack with his second line, but with all his exertions could -not carry the face of the angle opposed to him. Picardie, the senior -regiment of the French Line, held this post and would not yield it to -the fiercest assault. The utmost that Schulemberg could accomplish was -to sweep away the regiments in the wood, and so to uncover its flank. - -Lottum, too, extended his front and attacked once more, Orkney -detaching three British battalions, the Buffs, Sixteenth, and -Temple’s, to his assistance, while Marlborough took personal command -of Auvergne’s cavalry in support. The Buffs on Lottum’s extreme -left found a swamp between them and the entrenchments, so deep as -to be almost impassable. In they plunged, notwithstanding, and were -struggling through it when a French officer drew out twelve battalions -and moved them down straight upon their left flank. The British brigade -would have been in a sorry plight had not Villars caught sight of -Marlborough at the head of Auvergne’s horse and instantly recalled -his troops. So the red-coats scrambled on, and, turning the flank of -the entrenchment while Lottum’s men attacked the front, at length with -desperate fighting and heavy loss forced the French back into the wood. -Thus exposed to the double attack of Lottum and Schulemberg, Picardie -at last fell back, but joined itself to Champagne, the next regiment -in seniority; and the two gallant corps, finding a rallying-point -behind an abatis, turned and stood once more. Their comrades gave way -in disorder, but the wood was so dense that the troops on both sides -became disjointed, and the opposing lines broke up into a succession of -small parties, fighting desperately from tree to tree with no further -guidance than their own fury. - -The entrenchments on the French left had been forced; and Villars sent -urgent messages to his right for reinforcements. But Boufflers could -spare him none. After Schulemberg and Lottum had been engaged for half -an hour, the Prince of Orange lost patience and, without waiting for -orders, opened not a false but a real attack against the French right. -On the extreme left of Orange’s division were two Highland regiments of -the Dutch service, Tullibardine’s and Hepburn’s, and next to them King -William’s favourite Blue Guards. These were to attack the defences in -the forest of Laignières, while the rest fell upon the entrenchments -in the open; and it was at the head of the Highlanders and of the Blue -Guards that Orange took his place. A tremendous fire of grape and -musketry saluted them as they advanced, and within the first few yards -most of the Prince’s staff were struck dead by his side. His own horse -was killed beneath him, but he disentangled himself and continued to -lead the advance on foot. A few minutes more brought his battalions -under the fire of a French battery on their left flank. Whole ranks -were swept away, but still the Prince was to be seen waving his hat in -front of his troops; and Highlanders and Dutchmen pressing steadily on -carried the first entrenchment with a rush. They then halted to deploy, -but, before they could advance further, Boufflers had rallied his men, -and charging down upon his assailants drove them back headlong. On -Orange’s right, success as short-lived was bought at as dear a price. -The Prince still exerted himself with the utmost gallantry, but his -attack was beaten back at all points. The loss of the Dutch amounted to -six thousand killed and wounded; the Blue Guards had been annihilated, -and the Hanoverian battalions, which had supported them, had suffered -little less severely. In fact, the Prince’s precipitation had brought -about little less than a disaster. - -The confusion in this part of the field called both Marlborough and -Eugene to the Allied left to restore order. Further useless sacrifice -of life was checked, for enough and more than enough had been done -to prevent Boufflers from detaching troops to Villars. But soon came -an urgent message requiring the presence of the Duke and the Prince -once more on the right. Schulemberg and Lottum had continued to push -their attack as best they could; and red-coated English, blue-coated -Prussians, and white-coated Austrians were struggling forward from tree -to tree, tripping over felled trunks, bursting through tangled foliage, -panting through quagmires, loading and firing and cursing, guided only -by the flashes before them in the cloud of foul blinding smoke. But now -on the extreme right Withers was steadily advancing; and his turning -movement, though the Duke and Eugene knew it not, was gradually forcing -the French out of the wood. Villars, seeing the danger, called the -Irish Brigade and other regiments from the centre, and launched them -full upon the British and Prussians. Such was the impetuosity of the -Irish that they forced their opponents back some way, until their own -formation was broken by the density of the forest. Eugene hastened -to the spot to rally the retreating battalions and, though struck by -a musket ball in the head, refused to leave the field. Then up came -Withers, just when he was wanted. The Eighteenth Royal Irish met the -French Royal Regiment of Ireland, crushed it with two volleys by sheer -superiority of fire, drove it back in disorder, and pressed on.[64] -Eugene also advanced and was met by Villars, who at this critical -moment was bringing forward his reinforcements in person. A musket -shot struck the Marshal above the knee. Totally unmoved, the gallant -man called for a chair from which to continue to direct his troops, -but presently fainting from pain was carried insensible from the -field. The French, notwithstanding his fall, still barred the advance -of the Allies, but they had been driven from their entrenchments and -from the wood on the left, and only held their own by the help of the -troops that had been withdrawn from the centre. The moment for which -Marlborough had waited was now come. - -The forty-gun battery was moved forward, and Orkney leading his British -battalions against the redans captured them, though not without -considerable loss, at the first rush. Two Hanoverian battalions on -their left turned the flank of the adjoining entrenchments; and -Orange, renewing his attack, cleared the whole of the defences in -the glade. The Allied cavalry followed close behind him. Auvergne’s -Dutch were the first to pass the entrenchments, and, though charged -by the French while in the act of deploying, succeeded in repelling -the first attack. But now Boufflers came up at the head of the French -Gendarmerie, and drove Auvergne’s men back irresistibly to the edge of -the entrenchments. Here, however, the French were checked, for Orkney -had lined the parapet with his British; and, though the Gendarmerie -thrice strove gallantly to make an end of the Dutch, they were every -time driven back by the fire of the infantry. Meanwhile the central -battery, which had been parted right and left into two divisions, -advanced and supported the infantry by a cross-fire, and Marlborough, -coming up with the British and Prussian horse, charged the Gendarmerie -in their turn. Boufflers, however, was again ready with fresh troops, -and falling upon Marlborough with the French Household Cavalry crashed -through his two leading lines and threw even the third into disorder. -Then Eugene advancing at the head of the Imperial horse threw the last -reserves into the mêlée and drove the French back. Simultaneously the -Prince of Hesse hurled his squadrons against the infantry of the French -right, and, with the help of the Dutch foot, isolated it still further -from the centre. Boufflers now saw that the day was lost and ordered a -general retreat to Bavay, while he could yet keep his troops together. -The movement was conducted in admirable order, for the French, though -beaten, were not routed, while the Allies were too much exhausted to -pursue. So Boufflers retired unmolested, though it was not yet three -o’clock, honoured alike by friend and foe for his bravery and his skill. - -Thus ended the battle of Malplaquet, one of the bloodiest ever fought -by mortal men. Little is known of the details of the fighting, these -being swallowed up in the shade of the forest of Taisnières, where -no man could see what was going forward. All that is certain is that -neither side gave quarter, and that the combat was not only fierce but -savage. The loss of the French was about twelve thousand men, and the -trophies taken from them, against which they could show trophies of -their own, were five hundred prisoners, fifty standards and colours and -sixteen guns. The loss of the Allies was not less than twenty thousand -men killed and wounded, due chiefly to the mad onset of the Prince of -Orange. The Dutch infantry out of thirty battalions lost eight thousand -men, or more than half of their number; the British out of twenty -battalions lost nineteen hundred men,[65] the heaviest sufferers being -the Coldstream Guards, Buffs, Orrery’s and Temple’s.[66] - -The more closely the battle is studied, the more the conviction grows -that no action of Marlborough’s was fought less in accordance with his -own plans. We have seen that he would have preferred to fight it on -either of the two preceding days, and that he yielded to Eugene against -his own judgment in suffering it to be postponed. Then again there was -the almost criminal folly of the Prince of Orange, which upset all -preconcerted arrangements, threw away thousands of lives to no purpose, -and not only permitted the French to retreat unharmed at the close of -the day, but seriously imperilled the success of the action at its -beginning. Nevertheless there are still not wanting men to believe the -slanders of the contemptible faction then rising to power in England, -that Marlborough fought the battle from pure lust of slaughter. - -Notwithstanding all blunders, which were none of Marlborough’s making, -Malplaquet was a very grand action. The French were equal in number to -the Allies, and occupied a position which was described at the time as -a fortified citadel. They were commanded by an able general, whom they -liked and trusted, they were in good heart, and they looked forward -confidently to victory. Yet they were driven back and obliged to leave -Mons to its fate; and though Villars with his usual bluster described -the victory as more disastrous than defeat, yet French officers could -not help asking themselves whether resistance to Marlborough and Eugene -were not hopeless. Luxemburg with seventy-five thousand men against -fifty thousand had only with difficulty succeeded in forcing the faulty -position of Landen; yet the French had failed to hold the far more -formidable lines of Malplaquet against an army no stronger than their -own. Say Villars what he might, and beyond all doubt he fought a fine -fight, the inference could not be encouraging to France. - -It was not until the third day after the fight that the Allies -returned to the investment of Mons. Eugene was wounded, and -Marlborough not only worn out by fatigue but deeply distressed over -the enormous sacrifice of life. The siege was retarded by the marshy -nature of the ground and by heavy rain; but on the 9th of October the -garrison capitulated, and therewith the campaign came to an end. -◆Sept. 28./Oct. 9.◆ Tournay had given the Allies firm foothold on the -Upper Scheldt, and Mons was of great value to cover the captured towns -in Flanders and Brabant. The season’s operations had not been without -good fruit, despite the heavy losses at Malplaquet. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER X - - -◆1711.◆ - -The French, fully aware of the political changes in England, had during -the winter made extraordinary exertions to prolong the war for yet one -more campaign, and to that end had covered the northern frontier with -a fortified barrier on a gigantic scale. Starting from the coast of -Picardy the lines followed the course of the river Canche almost to its -source. From thence across to the Gy, or southern fork of the Upper -Scarpe, ran a line of earthworks, extending from Oppy to Montenancourt. -From the latter point the Gy and the Scarpe were dammed so as to form -inundations as far as Biache, at which place a canal led the line of -defence from the Scarpe to the Sensée. Here more inundations between -the two rivers carried the barrier to Bouchain, whence it followed -the Scheldt to Valenciennes. From thence more earthworks prolonged the -lines to the Sambre, which carried them at last to their end at Namur. - -This was a formidable obstacle to the advance of the Allies, but no -lines had sufficed to stop Marlborough yet; and with Eugene by his -side the Duke did not despair. Before he could start for the campaign, -however, the news came that the Emperor Joseph was dead of smallpox, -an event which signified the almost certain accession of the Archduke -Charles to the Imperial crown and the consequent withdrawal of his -candidature for the throne of Spain. Eugene was consequently detained -at home; and, worse than this, a fine opportunity was afforded -for making a breach in the Grand Alliance. To render the Duke’s -difficulties still greater, though his force was already weakened -by the necessity of finding garrisons for the towns captured in the -previous year, the English Government had withdrawn from him five -battalions[67] for an useless expedition to Newfoundland under the -command of Mrs. Masham’s brother, General Hill; an expedition which may -be dismissed for the present without further mention than that it was -dogged by misfortune from first to last, suffered heavy loss through -shipwreck, and accomplished literally nothing. - -Nevertheless the Imperial army was present, though without Eugene. The -whole of the forces were assembled a little to the south of Lille at -Orchies; ◆April 20./May 1.◆ and on the 1st of May Marlborough moved -forward to a position parallel to that of Villars, who lay in rear of -the river Sensée with his left at Oisy and his right at Bouchain. -There both armies remained stationary and inactive for six -weeks. Eugene came, but presently received orders to return and to -bring his troops with him. ◆June 3/14.◆ On the 14th of June -Marlborough moved away one march westward to the plain of Lens in -order to conceal this enforced diminution of his strength. The -position invited a battle, but Villars only moved down within his -lines, parallel to the Duke; and once more both armies remained -inactive for five weeks. After the departure of Eugene the French -commander detached a portion of his troops to the Rhine, but even so -he had one hundred and thirty-one battalions against ninety-four, and -one hundred and eighty-seven squadrons against one hundred and -forty-five of the Allies. - -We now approach what is perhaps the most remarkable and certainly the -most entertaining feat of the Duke during the whole war. Villars, -bound by his instructions, would not come out and fight; his lines -could not be forced by an army of inferior strength, and they could -therefore be passed only by stratagem. The inundation on the Sensée -between Arras and Bouchain could be traversed only by two causeways, -the larger of which was defended by a strong fort at Arleux, while the -other was covered by a redoubt at Aubigny, half a mile below -it. Marlborough knew that he could take the fort at Arleux at any time -and demolish it, but he knew also that Villars would certainly retake -it and rebuild as soon as his back was turned. He therefore set -himself to induce Villars to demolish it himself. ◆June 25./July 6.◆ -With this view he detached a strong force under General Rantzau to -capture the fort, which was done without difficulty. The Duke then -gave orders that the captured works should be greatly strengthened, -and, for their further protection, posted a large force under the -Prussian General Hompesch on the glacis of Douay, some six miles -distant from the fort. - -[Illustration: - - THE CAMPAIGN OF 1711. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -As fate ordained it, Hompesch, thinking himself secure under the guns -of Douay, neglected his outposts and even his sentries, and was -surprised two days later by a sudden attack from Villars, which was -only repulsed with considerable difficulty and not a little -shame. ◆June 28./July 9.◆ Villars was in ecstasies over his success, -and Marlborough displayed considerable annoyance. However, the Duke -reinforced Hompesch, as if to show the value which he attached to -Arleux, and pushed forward the new works with the greatest vigour. -Finally, when all was completed, he threw a weak garrison into the -fort and led the rest of the army away two marches westward, encamping -opposite the lines between the Canche and the Scarpe. ◆July 10/21.◆ -Villars likewise moved westward parallel to him, and took up a -position between Oppy and Montenancourt; but, before he started, he -detached a force to attack Arleux. The commander of the fort sent a -message to Marlborough that he could not possibly hold it, and the -Duke at once despatched Cadogan with a strong force to relieve it. It -was noticed, however, that Cadogan made no such haste as the urgency -of the occasion would have seemed to require; and indeed, before he -had gone half-way, he returned with the intelligence that Arleux had -surrendered. - -Villars was elated beyond measure; and Marlborough for the first time -in his life seemed to be greatly distressed and cast down. Throwing -off his usual serenity, he proclaimed in public with much passion that -he would be even with Villars yet, and would attack him, come what -might of it, where he lay. Then came the news that Villars had razed -the entire works of Arleux, over which Marlborough had spent such -pains, entirely to the ground. This increased the Duke’s -ill-temper. He declared that he would avenge this insult to his army, -and renewed his menace of a direct attack on the entrenchments. -◆July 15/26.◆ Villars now detached a force to make a diversion in -Brabant; and this step seemed to drive Marlborough distracted. Vowing -that he would check the march of this detachment, he sent off ten -thousand men under Lord Albemarle to Béthune, and the whole of his -baggage and heavy artillery to Douay. ◆July 17/28.◆ Having thus -weakened an army already inferior to that of the French, he repaired -the roads that led towards the enemy’s entrenchments, and on the 1st -of August, with much display of vindictiveness, sulkiness, and general -vexation, advanced one march nearer to the lines, encamping between -Houdain and St. Pol. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ His army watched his -proceedings with amazement, for it had never expected such behaviour -from Corporal John. - -Villars meanwhile was in a transport of delight. He drew every man, -not only from all parts of the lines but also from the neighbouring -garrisons, towards the threatened point, and asked nothing better than -that Marlborough should attack. In the height of exultation he -actually wrote to Versailles that he had brought the Duke to his _ne -plus ultra_. Marlborough’s strange manner still remained the -same. ◆July 22./August 2.◆ On the 2nd of August he advanced to within -a league of the lines, his left being opposite to Aubigny on the Upper -Scarpe; and during that day and the next set the whole of his cavalry -to work to collect fascines. ◆July 23./August 3.◆ At nightfall of the -3rd he sent away all his light artillery, together with every wheeled -vehicle, under escort of a strong detachment, and next morning rode -forward with most of his generals to reconnoitre the eastern end of -the lines. ◆July 24./August 4.◆ Captain Parker of the Eighteenth Royal -Irish, who had obtained permission to ride with the Staff, was amazed -at the Duke’s demeanour. Marlborough had now thrown off all his -ill-temper and was calm and cool as usual, indicating this point and -that to his officers. “Your brigade, General, will attack here, such -and such brigades will be on your right and left, such another in -support, and you will be careful of this, that, and other.” The -generals listened and stared; they understood the instructions clearly -enough, but they could not help regarding them as madness. So the -reconnaissance proceeded, drearily enough, and was just concluding -when General Cadogan turned his horse, unnoticed, out of the crowd, -struck in his spurs and galloped back to camp at the top of his -speed. Presently the Duke also turned, and, riding back very slowly, -issued orders to prepare for a general attack on the morrow. - -At this all ranks of the army, from the general to the drummer, fell -into the deepest depression. Not a man could fail to see that direct -assault of the lines was a hopeless enterprise at the best of times, -and doubly hopeless now that half of the army and the whole of the -artillery had been detached for other service. Again the violent and -unprecedented outburst of surliness and ill-temper was difficult to -explain; and the only possible explanation was that the Duke, rendered -desperate by failure and misfortunes, had thrown prudence to the winds -and cared not what he did. A few only clung faintly to the hope that -the chief, who had led them so often to victory, might still have some -surprise in store for them; but the most part gave themselves up for -lost, and lamented loudly that they should ever have lived to see such -a change come over the Old Corporal. - -So passed the afternoon among the tents of the Allies; but meanwhile -Cadogan with forty hussars at his heels had long started from the camp -and was galloping hard across the plain of Lens to Douay, five leagues -away. There he found Hompesch ready with his garrison, now strengthened -by detachments from Béthune and elsewhere to twelve thousand foot and -two thousand horse, and told him that the time was come. Hompesch -thereupon issued his orders for the troops to be ready to march that -night. Still the main army under Marlborough knew nothing of this, and -passed the day in dismal apprehension till the sun went down, and the -drummers came forward to beat tattoo. Then a column of cavalry trotted -out westward, attracting every French eye and stirring every French -brain with curiosity as to the purport of the movement. The drums began -to roll; and the order ran quietly down the line to strike tents and -prepare to march immediately. - -Never was command more welcome. Within an hour all was ready and the -army was formed into four columns. The cavalry, having done their work -of distracting French vigilance to the wrong quarter, returned unseen -by the enemy; and at nine o’clock the whole army faced to its left and -marched off eastward in utter silence, with Marlborough himself at the -head of the vanguard. - -◆July 24–25./August 4–5.◆ - -The night was fine, and under the radiant moonlight the men swung -forward bravely hour after hour over the plain of Lens. The moon -paled; the dawn crept up into the east throwing its ghastly light on -the host of weary, sleepless faces; and presently the columns reached -the Scarpe at Vitry. So far the march had lasted eight hours, and -fifteen miles had been passed. Pontoon-bridges were already laid -across the river, and on the further bank, punctual to appointment, -stood Brigadier Sutton with the field-artillery. The river was passed, -and presently a messenger came spurring from the east with a despatch -for the Duke of Marlborough. ◆July 25./August 5.◆ He read it; and -words were passed down the columns of march which filled them with new -life. “Generals Cadogan and Hompesch” (such was their purport) -“crossed the causeway at Arleux unopposed at three o’clock this -morning, and are in possession of the enemy’s lines. The Duke desires -that the infantry will step out.” The right wing of horse halted to -form the rearguard and bring up stragglers, while a cloud of dust in -the van told that the Duke and fifty squadrons with him were pushing -forward at the trot. Then the infantry shook themselves up and stepped -out with a will. - -◆July 25./August 5.◆ - -Villars had received intelligence of Marlborough’s march only two hours -after he had started, but he was so thoroughly bewildered by the Duke’s -intricate manœvres that he did not awake to the true position until -three hours later. Then, quite distracted, he put himself at the head -of the Household Cavalry and galloped off at full speed. So furiously -rode he that he wore down all but a hundred of his troopers and -pushed on with these alone. But even so Marlborough was before him. -At eight o’clock he crossed the lower causeway at Aubanchœuil-au-bac -and passing his cavalry over the Sensée barred the road from the west -by the village of Oisy. Presently Villars, advancing reckless of all -precautions, blundered into the middle of the outposts. Before he could -retire, his whole escort was captured, and he himself only by miracle -escaped the same fate. - -The Marshal now looked anxiously for the arrival of his main body of -horse; but the Allied infantry had caught sight of the French on the -other side of the Sensée, and, weary though they were, had braced -themselves to race them for the goal. Nevertheless the severity of the -march and the burden of their packs began to tell heavily on the foot. -Hundreds dropped down unconscious, and many died there and then, but -they were left where they lay to await the arrival of the rearguard; -for no halt was called, and each regiment pushed on as cheerfully as -possible with such men as still survived. Thus they were still ahead -of the French when they turned off to the causeway at Arleux, and, -Marlborough having thrown additional bridges over the Sensée, they came -quickly into their positions. The right wing of infantry crossed the -river about four o’clock in the afternoon, having covered close upon -forty miles in eighteen hours; and by five o’clock the whole force -was drawn up between Oisy and the Scheldt within striking distance of -Arras, Cambrai, and Bouchain. So vanished the ne plus ultra of Villars, -a warning to all generals who put their sole trust in fortified lines. - -Marlborough halted for the next day to give his troops rest and to -allow the stragglers to come in. Fully half the men of the infantry had -fallen out, and there were many who did not rejoin the army until the -third day. Villars on his side moved forward and offered Marlborough -battle under the walls of Cambrai; but the Duke would not accept it, -though the Dutch deputies, perverse and treacherous to the last, tried -hard to persuade him. Had the deputies marched in the ranks of the -infantry with muskets on their shoulders and a kit of fifty pounds’ -weight on their backs, they would have been less eager for the fray. -Marlborough’s own design, long matured in his own mind, was the -capture of Bouchain, and his only fear was lest Villars should cross -the Scheldt before him and prevent it. The deputies, however, who -had been so anxious to hurry the army into an engagement under every -possible disadvantage, shrank from the peril of a siege carried on by -an inferior under the eyes of a superior force. But Marlborough, even -if he had not been able to adduce Lille as a precedent, was determined -to have his own way, and carried his point. ◆July 27./August 7.◆ At -noon on the 7th of August he marched down almost within cannon-shot -of Cambrai, ready to fall on Villars should he attempt to pass the -Scheldt, halted until his pontoon-bridges had been laid a few miles -further down the stream, and then gradually withdrawing his troops -threw the whole of them across the river unmolested. - -It is hardly credible that a vast number of foolish civilians, Dutch, -Austrian, and even English, blamed Marlborough for declining battle -before Cambrai, and that he was actually obliged to explain why he -refused to sacrifice the fruit of his manœvres by attacking a superior -force in a strong position with an army not only smaller in numbers at -its best, but much thinned by a forced march and exhausted by fatigue. -“I despair of being ever able to please all men,” he wrote. “Those who -are capable of judging will be satisfied with my endeavours: others -I leave to their own reflections, and go on with the discharge of my -duty.” - -It is possible that Villars only refrained from hindering -Marlborough’s passage of the Scheldt in deference to orders from -Versailles, of which the Duke was as well aware as himself; but it is -more than doubtful whether he ever intended the British to capture -Bouchain. Though inferior in numbers, however, Marlborough covered -himself so skilfully with entrenchments that Villars could not hinder -him, while all attempts at diversion were met so readily that not one -of them succeeded. ◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Finally, the garrison surrendered as -prisoners of war under the very eyes of Villars. The Duke would have -followed up his success by the siege of Quesnoi, the town before which -English troops first came under the fire of cannon in the year of -Crecy; but by this time Lewis, with the help of the contemptible -Harley, had succeeded in detaching England from the Grand Alliance. -Though, therefore, the English ministers continued to encourage -Marlborough in his operations, in order to conceal their own infamous -conduct from the Allies, yet they took good care that those operations -should proceed no further. So with the capture of Bouchain the last -and not the least remarkable of Marlborough’s campaigns came, always -victoriously, to an end. - - - - - CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–1748 - - - - - VOL. II. BOOK VII. CHAPTER V - - -However fortunate might be the issue of Dettingen, it served at least -its purpose in preventing the despatch of French reinforcements to the -Danube and to Bohemia; and the campaign of 1743 closed with the utter -collapse of Belleisle’s great schemes and with the expulsion of the -French from Germany. It was now clear that the war would be carried on -in the familiar cockpit of the Austrian Netherlands. Such a theatre -was convenient for France, since it lay close to her own borders, and -convenient for the Allies, because the Dutch had at last been persuaded -to join them, and because the British would be brought nearer to their -base at Ostend. Marshal Saxe, whose fine talent had hitherto been -wasted under incompetent French Generals in Bohemia, was appointed to -the chief command of the French in Flanders; and every effort was made -to give him a numerous and well-equipped army, and to enable him to -open his campaign in good time. - -◆1744.◆ - -In England the preparations by no means corresponded with the -necessities of the position. The estimates indeed provided for a force -of twenty-one thousand British in Flanders in 1744 as against sixteen -thousand in the previous year, but only at the cost of depleting the -weak garrison left in England; for the actual number of men voted -for the two years was the same. All British officers of experience -strongly urged upon the Government the importance of being first -in the field,[68] but, when an army was to be made up in different -proportions of English, Dutch, Germans and Austrians, it needed a -Marlborough to bring the discordant Courts into harmony as well as to -make ready the troops for an early campaign. By the beginning of April -eighty thousand French soldiers had marched from their winter quarters, -and were concentrated on the frontier between the Scheldt and the -Sambre, while the Allies were still scattered about in cantonments, -not exceeding even then a total strength of fifty-live thousand men. -Wade, the English commander, delayed first by confusion at home and -next by contrary winds, was still in England while the French were -concentrating, and not a single English recruit, to repair the losses -of the past campaign, had arrived in Flanders. Then arose disputes -as to the disposition of the Allied forces, both Austrians and Dutch -being nervously apprehensive of leaving their towns on the frontier -without garrisons. When in the second week in May the Allied Army was -at last collected close to Brussels, it was still weaker by twenty -thousand men than it should have been, and found itself confronted -with the task of holding Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and the Sambre -against a superior force of French.[69] May passed away and June came, -but the Allies remained helpless and motionless in their camp, while -Saxe, after a short march westward, turned north and advanced steadily -between the Scheldt and the Lys. His principal object was not very -difficult to divine. By the middle of June his detachments had seized -Ypres and Fort Knock, which commanded the canal from Nieuport to Ypres, -thus cutting off the British from one of their bases on the coast. It -remained to be seen whether he would aim next at Ostend, where the -whole of the British stores of ordnance were accumulated, or whether he -would attempt Bruges and Ghent in order to secure the navigation of the -Bruges Canal as well as of the Scheldt and Lys. Again, it was always -open to him, if he pleased, to besiege Tournay, a fortress which the -Allies would not willingly lose. Thus the problem set to the Allies -was not easy of solution; but of all solutions they chose the worst. -The Dutch and Austrians could not bear the notion of forsaking any one -of their darling strongholds, and insisted that the strength of the -army should be frittered away in providing weak garrisons for the -defence of all.[70] Wade, to do him justice, was for keeping all the -troops together, crossing the Scheldt, and taking up a strong position -to cover Ghent; but the Austrians would not consent, lest they should -expose Brussels.[71] Wade was certainly not a strong man, but he must -not be too hardly judged. Marlborough had spent the most anxious days -of all his campaigns in distraction between the safety of Ghent and of -Brussels, and had only extricated himself by the march that preceded -the battle of Oudenarde. - -Meanwhile King George had been exerting himself with great energy, -though two months too late, to provide Wade with additional troops, -both British and Dutch, and had begged that Prince Charles of Lorraine -might cross the Rhine with his whole army, and direct the operations -in Flanders as Commander-in-Chief of all the Allies. It was a wise -step in every way, since the Prince’s relationship to Queen Maria -Theresa assured to him the seniority in rank which was needed to hold -so heterogeneous a host in coherence. ◆July.◆ Prince Charles did his -share of the work admirably, forcing his passage across the Rhine with -great skill in the face of the French, and taking up a strong position -on the frontier of Alsace. A few days later the British reinforcements -reached Wade, and King George issued positive orders to him to take -the offensive and “commence hostilities of all kinds.”[72] - -It seemed, indeed, as if the time were come for pressing home upon -the French; but just at this critical moment Frederick of Prussia -intervened in favour of France, and, by a threat to invade Bohemia, -brought Prince Charles back quickly over the Rhine. None the less -Wade and his fellows held a council of war and resolved to bring Saxe -to action if possible. ◆July 20/31.◆ King George gave his gracious -approval to their plan, and on the 31st of July the Allies turned -westward and crossed the Scheldt. It still remained to be seen, -however, whether Saxe would allow an action to be forced on him; for -he lay now, entrenched to the teeth, on the Lys between Menin and -Courtrai, which was a pretty clear indication that he would not. At -this moment Lord Stair, who had followed the course of operations -carefully from England, came forward, like a true pupil of Marlborough, -with a new plan of campaign. His advice was that the Allies should turn -Saxe’s tactics against himself. They should march south to Orchies, -between Lille and Tournay, and there encamp, where they would be within -reach of half-a-dozen French fortified towns. The French would not dare -to leave the fortresses defenceless; and the garrisons necessary to -render them secure would absorb the whole of their force in the field. -Then the Allies could send detachments into France and lay Picardy -under contribution, or possibly carry out the plan, rejected two years -before, of a march to the Seine. The King of Prussia’s action only made -some bold stroke of the kind the more imperative.[73] - -Stair had gained over the Austrian general D’Arenberg to this project -in 1742; but it was hardly likely to be accepted by him now. Carteret, -in forwarding Stair’s memorandum to Wade, gave him no positive orders -except at least to do something; but poor Wade found it impossible to -make the Austrians do anything. The Allies having crossed the Scheldt -halted inactive for weeks, and no persuasion could induce D’Arenberg -to move. At last the army did march down to the plains of Lille, but -without its artillery, so that it could not be said seriously to -threaten the French fortresses. The Dutch and Austrians had undertaken -to furnish a siege-train, but had taken no step to procure one of the -ten thousand horses that were required to transport it. After a short -sojourn in the south the Allies marched helplessly northward once -more. August passed away and September came, but even in the fourth -month of the campaign the Dutch and Austrians were still without their -artillery.[74] Wade boldly proposed to force Saxe’s lines on the -Lys: the Austrians refused. He proposed to pounce on a detachment of -fourteen thousand men, which Saxe had imprudently isolated from his -main army: D’Arenberg carefully sent a weak body of cavalry to reveal -to the detachment the danger of its position. Finally, in the first -week of October the Allies retired into winter-quarters, which was -precisely the object for which D’Arenberg had been working from the -first. Despite of the English subsidies, he had no money with which to -pay his troops, and he wished to spare the Austrian Netherlands the -burden of furnishing forage and contributions. Wade, sick in body and -distressed in mind, at once resigned his command. He had had enough of -the Austrian alliance, and King George before long was to have enough -of it also.[75] - -◆1745.◆ - -Once again, despite the endless length to which the war was dragging -on, the establishment of the British forces remained virtually -unaugmented for the year 1745. The troops allotted for service in -Flanders were indeed raised to a strength of twenty-five thousand men, -but this was effected only by reducing the garrison of Great -Britain to fifteen thousand, which, as events were to prove before the -year’s end, created a situation of perilous weakness. Moreover, the -past campaign had revealed a failing in one of the confederated powers -which was hardly less serious than the impecuniosity and selfishness -of Austria. The Dutch army, which under Marlborough had done such -brilliant service, was become hopelessly inefficient. The competition -of rival demagogues for popular favour had reduced it to such weakness -in numbers, that it hardly sufficed to find efficient garrisons for the -fortified towns. Concurrently its discipline had suffered; and General -Ligonier had already complained that the Dutch troops which served -with the Allies in 1744 were intolerably insubordinate and disorderly, -setting a bad example to the whole army.[76] In February 1745 Ligonier -again brought the matter to the notice of the English Government. The -Dutch, he said, would probably keep all their men in garrison, and, if -the Allies were so weak that they could only find garrisons for the -fortresses on the frontier, the French would be free to go where they -pleased. It would be far better, therefore, to make a great effort, -collect a hundred thousand men, take the offensive, and end the war -in a single campaign. Ten thousand men would be required to guard the -line of the Bruges Canal, and the remainder should besiege Maubeuge -and Landrecies and enter France by the line of the Sambre, making the -Meuse the main line of communication, as open alike to the passage -of reinforcements from England, from Holland, and from Germany.[77] -Such counsel was not likely to find acceptance with the men who had -mismanaged the war so far. One important change, however, was made by -the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland to be Commander-in-Chief in -Flanders, and also in Great Britain.[78] The Duke at the time of this -promotion still wanted a month to complete his twenty-fifth year, but -he had from his boyhood been an enthusiastic soldier, he had studied -his profession, he had shown bravery at Dettingen, and, young though -he might be, he was older than Condé had been when he first gained -military fame. Finally, it was an immense advantage that a Prince of -a reigning family should preside over so motley an army as that of -the Allies, since there would be the less disposition to cavil at his -authority. - -Cumberland entered upon his work energetically enough, crossed over to -Flanders early in April, made all his arrangements for concentration at -Brussels on the 2nd of May, and actually began his march southward on -the following day.[79] ◆April 22./May 3.◆ Even so, however, Marshal Saxe -had taken the field before him, assembling his troops in Hainault, as in -the previous year, so that it was impossible to divine which of the -fortresses of the barrier he might intend to attack. After a feint which -pointed to the siege of Mons, he marched rapidly upon Tournay and -invested it on the 30th of April, ◆Apr. 19/30.◆ screening his movements -so skilfully with his cavalry that not a word as to his operations -reached Cumberland until nearly a week later. Cumberland, after leaving -Soignies on the 3rd of May, moved slowly south-westward by Cambron, -Maulbay, and Leuse, and arrived on the evening of the 9th at Brissoel, -within sight of Saxe’s army. ◆April 28./May 9.◆ The ground immediately -in front of the Allies was broken by little copses, woods, and -enclosures, all of them crammed with mercenary irregular -troops—Pandours, Grassins, and the like—which, imitated first from the -Austrians, had by this time become a necessary part of the French as of -every army. Beyond this broken ground a wide plain swept in a gentle, -almost unbroken slope to the village of Fontenoy, which formed the -centre of Saxe’s position. The advanced parties of irregulars, together -with twelve squadrons drawn up on the slope before Fontenoy, forbade -Cumberland’s further advance for that day, and the Allies encamped for -the night. Headquarters were fixed at Maubray, a village in full sight -of Fontenoy, and a bare mile and a half to the south-eastward of the -French camp. - -◆April 29./May 10.◆ - -On the next day the French advanced posts were pushed out of the -copses, and Cumberland, together with the Prince of Waldeck and -the Count of Königseck, who commanded the Dutch and the Austrians -respectively, went forward to reconnoitre the position. Saxe’s army -occupied the crest of the slope, lying astride of the two roads that -lead from Condé and from Leuse to Tournay. His right rested on the -village of Anthoin and on the Scheldt, the tower of Anthoin Castle -marking the western boundary of his position with clearness enough. -From thence his line extended due east along the crest of the height -for about a mile to the village of Fontenoy. A few hundred yards -before Fontenoy stands the hamlet of Bourgeon, but this was now -veiled in smoke and flame, having been fired by the Pandours as they -retired. From Anthoin to Fontenoy Saxe’s front faced due south, but -eastward from Fontenoy it turned back almost at right angles to the -forest of Barry and the village of Ramecroix, fronting considerably -to eastward of south. The village of Vezon, however, which lies in -the same straight line with Fontenoy, due east of Anthoin, was also -occupied by the French as an advanced post. This was quickly cleared -by Cumberland’s troops, and the Allied Generals completed their -reconnaissance. Saxe’s position was undoubtedly strong by nature and -had been strengthened still further by art. Beyond Anthoin the French -right flank was secured by a battery erected on the western bank of -the Scheldt, while the village itself was entrenched, and held by -two brigades. Between Anthoin and Fontenoy three redoubts had been -constructed, and the space was defended by three brigades of infantry -backed by eight squadrons of horse. Fontenoy itself had been fortified -with works and cannon, and made as strong as possible; and from -Fontenoy to the forest of Barry ran a double line of entrenchments, -the first line held by nine and the second by eleven battalions of -infantry. At the edge of the forest of Barry were two more redoubts, -the foremost of them called the Redoubt d’Eu, both armed with cannon to -sweep the open space between the forest and Fontenoy; in rear of the -forest were posted nine more battalions, and in rear of all two strong -lines of cavalry. The flower of the French army, both horse and foot, -was stationed in this space on Saxe’s left, for the English had the -right of the line in the Allied Army, and Saxe knew the reputation of -the red-coats. - -The Allied Generals decided to attack on the following day. Königseck, -it is said, was for harassing Saxe’s communications and compelling -him to raise the siege of Tournay; but, finding himself overruled -by Cumberland and by Waldeck, he gave way. Cumberland’s force was -decidedly inferior in numbers, being less than fifty thousand against -fifty-six thousand men, but he was young and impetuous, and had -been strongly impressed by the disastrous inaction of the preceding -campaign. It was agreed that the Dutch and Austrians should assail the -French centre and right, the Dutch in particular being responsible -for Fontenoy, while the British attacked the French left between that -village and the forest of Barry. - -[Illustration: - - FONTENOY - April 30th/May 11th 1745 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆April 30./May 11.◆ - -At two o’clock on the following morning the British began to move out -of their camp upon Vezon, the cavalry leading. The advance took much -time, for there were many narrow lanes to be traversed before the force -could debouch upon the slope, and, when the slope was passed, it was -still necessary to defile through the village of Vezon. Cumberland’s -order of attack was simple. Brigadier Ingoldsby, with the Twelfth and -Thirteenth Foot, the Forty-second Highlanders, a Hanoverian battalion, -and three six-pounder cannon, was to assault the Redoubt d’Eu on the -right flank of the line of the British advance, and to carry it with -the bayonet. The remainder of the infantry was simply to march up -across the thousand yards of open ground between it and Fontenoy and -sweep the enemy out of their entrenchments. - -Before five o’clock the advanced squadrons of the British horse, -fifteen in all, under General Campbell, had passed through Vezon and -deployed in the plain beyond, to cover the formation of the infantry -for the attack. The French batteries in Fontenoy and the redoubt at -once opened fire on them, but the cavalry endured the fire for an -hour unmoved, until at length a shot carried away General Campbell’s -leg. The gallant veteran, who had fought at Malplaquet and was now -seventy-eight years of age, was carried dying from the field, full of -lamentation that he could take no further part in the action. No one -but himself seems to have known for what purpose his squadrons had been -brought forward, and accordingly after his fall they were withdrawn. -The infantry then moved up to the front, where General Ligonier -proceeded to form them in two lines, without further interruption, -to use his own simple words, than a lively and murderous cannonade -from the French. Cumberland meanwhile ordered up seven six-pounders -to the right of the British front, which quickly came into action. -Conspicuous before the French front rode an officer on a white horse, -and the English gunners at once began to lay wagers who should kill -him. The second or third shot brought the white charger to the ground, -and his rider was carried, shattered and dying, to the rear. He was -Count Grammont, the gallant but thoughtless officer who had spoiled -the combinations of Noailles at Dettingen. Then, turning to their more -legitimate work, the gunners quickly made their presence felt among -the French field-batteries; but the round shot never ceased to plough -into the scarlet ranks of the British from Fontenoy and from the -Redoubt d’Eu. Ligonier’s two lines of infantry were soon formed, with -the cavalry in two more lines in their rear; and the General presently -sent word to Cumberland that he was ready to advance as soon as Waldeck -should lead his Dutch against Fontenoy. The name of the aide-de-camp -who carried this message should not be omitted, for he was Captain -Jeffery Amherst of the First Guards. - -Thereupon the Dutch and Austrians, in the centre and left, advanced -against Fontenoy and Anthoin, but flinching from the fire in front, -and above all from that in their flank from the battery on the other -side of the Scheldt, soon shrank back under cover and could not be -induced to move forward again.[80] Worst of all, the Dutch cavalry was -smitten with panic, galloped back on to the top of some of the British -squadrons, and fled away wildly to Hal crying out that all was lost. -Things therefore went ill on the Allied left; and meanwhile on the -right there was enacted a blunder still more fatal. For Ingoldsby, -misconceiving his instructions, hesitated to make his attack on the -Redoubt d’Eu, and despite repeated orders from Cumberland never -delivered it at all. Cumberland, however, was impatient. Without -further delay he placed himself at the head of the British, who were -standing as Ligonier had arrayed them, in most beautiful order. In the -first line, counting from right to left, stood a battalion of the First -Guards, another of the Scots Guards, and another of the Coldstream, -the First, Twenty-first, Thirty-first, Eighth, Twenty-fifth, -Thirty-third, and Nineteenth; in the second line the Buffs occupied the -post of honour on the right, and next to them came in succession the -Twenty-third, Thirty-second, Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth, -and Twentieth. Certain Hanoverian battalions joined them on the extreme -left. The drums beat, the men shouldered arms, and the detachments -harnessed themselves to the two light field-guns that accompanied -each battalion. Ingoldsby saw what was going forward and aligned his -battalions with them on the right. Then the word was given to advance, -and the two lines moved off with the slow and measured step for which -they were famous in Europe. - -Forward tramped the ranks of scarlet, silent and stately as if -on parade. Full half a mile of ground was to be traversed before -they could close with the invisible enemy that awaited them in the -entrenchments over the crest of the slope, and the way was marked -clearly by the red flashes and puffs of white smoke that leaped from -Fontenoy and the Redoubt d’Eu on either flank. The shot plunged -fiercely and more fiercely into the serried lines as they advanced into -that murderous cross-fire, but the gaping ranks were quietly closed, -the perfect order was never lost, the stately step was never hurried. -Only the Hanoverians in the second line, finding that they were cramped -for space, dropped back quietly and decorously, and marched on in third -line behind the British. Silent and inexorable the scarlet lines strode -on. They came abreast of village and redoubt, and the shot which had -hitherto swept away files now swept away ranks. Then the first line -passed beyond redoubt and village, and the French cannon took it in -reverse. The gaps grew wider and more frequent, the front grew narrower -as the men closed up, but still the proud battalions advanced, strewing -the sward behind them with scarlet, like some mass of red blossom that -floats down a lazy stream and sheds its petals as it goes. - -At last the crest of the ridge was gained and the ranks of the French -battalions came suddenly into view little more than a hundred yards -distant, their coats alone visible behind the breastwork. Next to the -forest of Barry, and exposed to the extreme right of the British, a -line of red showed the presence of the Swiss Guards; next to them stood -a line of blue, the four battalions of the French Guards, and next to -the Guards a line of white, the regiments of Courtin, Aubeterre, and of -the King, the choicest battalions of the French Army. Closer and closer -came the British, still with arms shouldered, always silent, always -with the same slow, measured tread, till they had advanced to within -fifty yards of the French. Then at length Lord Charles Hay of the First -Guards stepped forward with flask in hand, and doffing his hat drank -politely to his enemies. “I hope, gentlemen,” he shouted, “that you are -going to wait for us to-day and not swim the Scheldt as you swam the -Main at Dettingen. Men of the King’s company,” he continued, turning -round to his own people, “these are the French Guards, and I hope you -are going to beat them to-day”; and the English Guards answered with a -cheer. The French officers hurried to the front, for the appearance of -the British was a surprise to them, and called for a cheer in reply. -But only a half-hearted murmur came from the French ranks, which -quickly died away and gave place to a few sharp words of command; -for the British were now within thirty yards. “For what we are about -to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful,” murmured an English -Guardsman as he looked down the barrels of the French muskets, but -before his comrades round him had done laughing the French Guards had -fired; and the turn of the British had come at last.[81] - -For despite of that deadly march through the cross-fire of the French -batteries to the muzzles of the French muskets, the scarlet ranks still -glared unbroken through the smoke; and now the British muskets, so -long shouldered, were levelled, and with crash upon crash the volleys -rang out from end to end of the line, first the First Guards, then the -Coldstreams, then the Scots, and so through brigade after brigade, -two battalions loading while the third fired, a ceaseless, rolling, -infernal fire. Down dropped the whole of the French front rank, blue -coats, red coats and white, before the storm. Nineteen officers and six -hundred men of the French and Swiss Guards fell at the first discharge; -regiment Courtin was crushed out of existence; regiment Aubeterre, -striving hard to stem the tide, was swept aside by a single imperious -volley which laid half of its men on the ground. The British infantry -were perfectly in hand; their officers could be seen coolly tapping -the muskets of the men with their canes so that every discharge might -be low and deadly; while the battalion-guns also poured in round after -round of grape with terrible effect. The first French line was utterly -shattered and broken. Even while the British were advancing, Saxe had -brought up additional troops to meet them and had posted regiments -Couronne and Soissonois in rear of the King’s regiment, and the Brigade -Royal in rear of the French Guards; but all alike went down before the -irresistible volleys. The red-coats continued their triumphant advance -for full three hundred yards into the heart of the French camp, and old -Ligonier’s heart leaped within him, for he thought that the battle was -won. - -Saxe for his part thought little differently from Ligonier; but -though half dead with dropsy, reduced to suck a bullet to assuage his -intolerable thirst, so weak that he could not ride but was carried -about the field in a wicker litter, the gallant German never for a -moment lost his head. Sending a message to the French King, who with -the Dauphin was watching the action from a windmill in the rear, -to retire across the Scheldt without delay, he strove to gain time -to rally his infantry. On the first repulse of the French Guards -Cumberland had detached two battalions to help the Dutch by a flanking -attack on Fontenoy. Seeing that this movement must be checked at -all hazards, Saxe headed these troops back by a charge of cavalry; -whereupon one of the battalions extended itself along the left flank -of the British. Partly in this way, partly owing to the incessant -play of the French artillery on both flanks, the two British lines -assumed the form of two huge oblong columns which gradually became -welded into one. The change was not untimely, for now the first line -of the French cavalry, which had been posted in rear of the forest of -Barry, came down upon the British at full gallop, only to reel back -shivered to fragments by the same terrible fire. Then the second line -tried its fortune, but met with no better fate. Finally, the Household -Cavalry, the famous Maison du Roi, burning with all the ardour of -Dettingen unavenged, was launched against the scarlet columns, and -like its predecessors, came flying back, a mob of riderless horses -and uncontrollable men, decimated, shattered and repulsed by the -never-ending fire. “It was like charging two flaming fortresses rather -than two columns of infantry.”[82] - -Nevertheless some time was hereby gained for the broken French infantry -to re-form. The British, once arrived within the French camp, came to -a halt, and looked at last to see how the Dutch were faring on their -left. As has already been told, Waldeck’s attack had been a total -failure, and the British, unsupported and always under a cross-fire of -artillery, fell back to the crest of the ridge and were re-formed for a -second attack. Waldeck undertook to make another attempt on Fontenoy, -and Cumberland, in reliance upon his help, again advanced at the head -of the British. But meanwhile Saxe had brought forward his reserves -from Ramecroix, and among them the Irish brigade, to meet him, while -artillery had also been brought up from the French right to play upon -the British front. The French Guards and the rest of the troops of the -French first line had also been rallied, and the task of the British -was well-nigh desperate. The Irish brigade, which consisted of six -battalions, was made up not of Irish only but of Scots and English -also, desperate characters who went into action with a rope round -their necks, and would fight like devils. Yet, even in this second -attack the British carried their advance as far as in the first, the -perfection of their fire-discipline enabling them to beat back even the -Irish brigade for a time. But their losses had been frightfully heavy; -the Dutch would not move one foot to the attack of Fontenoy, and the -cannonade in front added to that in the flanks became unendurable. The -French infantry likewise closed round on them in superior numbers on -both flanks, and it became apparent that there was nothing for it but a -retreat. - -Ligonier sent back two battalions to secure the roads leading through -Vezon, and the retreat then began in perfectly good order. The French -Household Cavalry made a furious charge upon the rear of the column -as it faced about, but found to its cost that the infernal fire was -not yet quenched. The three battalions of Guards and a battalion of -Hanoverians turned sternly about to meet them, and gave them a few -parting volleys, which wholly extinguished one regiment and brought -down every officer of another. A few British squadrons, the Blues -conspicuous among them, pushed forward, in spite of heavy losses, -through the cross-fire to lend what help they could, and the remnant -of the heroic battalions retired, facing about in succession at every -hundred yards, as steadily and proudly as they had advanced. - -Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of the fifteen -thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore -themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand were -killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions just -exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth -and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men, -the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather fewer than three -hundred men apiece, and the three battalions of Guards, which lost -each of them about two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot, -Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of -the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed -or wounded. Many regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in -particular the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the -British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The -loss of the French was never made public, but was certainly at least -equal to that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no -great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. As an example of the -prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel -in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of artillery, -remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly for half a -mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched up to within -pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their volley before they -discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions to pieces, -repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry, halted under a heavy -cannonade, retired for some distance and re-formed under a cross-fire, -advanced again with both artillery and musketry playing on front and -flanks, made the bravest brigade in the French service recoil, repelled -another desperate attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly -under a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the British -commanders it was Ingoldsby’s misunderstanding of his orders and his -failure to capture the Redoubt d’Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby -was duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however, -acquitted of all but an error in judgment; and indeed there was no -question of cowardice, for he accompanied the remainder of the infantry -in its advance with his own detachment and was severely wounded. It is -customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head against a wall in -attempting such an attack; and no doubt he was guilty of a tactical -blunder in assaulting a re-entrant angle before the salient had been -carried. But he could hardly have been expected to count on such bad -luck as the failure of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on -the other. The sheer audacity of his advance went near to give him -the victory. Saxe owned that he never dreamed that any General would -attempt such a stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland -is blamed also for not attacking either the Redoubt d’Eu or Fontenoy -after he had penetrated into the French camp. This charge is less -easy to rebut, for the French always know when they are beaten, and -seeing their left rolled up and troops advancing on Fontenoy in -flank and rear would probably have given up the game for lost, and -that the more readily since their ammunition in Fontenoy was for the -moment nearly exhausted. Even so, however, Saxe’s reserves were always -at hand at Ramecroix, and would have required to be held in check. -Another puzzling question, namely, why Cumberland did not make greater -use of his artillery in the action, is answered by the fact that the -contractors for the horsing of the guns ran off with the horses early -in the day. Such an occurrence was by no means unusual, and yet it -never happened to Marlborough, not even at Malplaquet. Altogether, the -conclusion seems to be that Cumberland stumbled on to a brilliant feat -of arms by mistake, and, though seconded by his troops with bravery -equal to his own, was not a General of sufficient capacity to turn his -success to account. - -At the close of the action Cumberland retreated to Ath and encamped -under the guns of that fortress, leaving his wounded to the mercy of -the French, who, by a strange perversion of their usual chivalry, -treated them with shameful barbarity. Among the wounded, strangely -enough, were a few of the new sect of Methodists founded by John -Wesley, who faced death and wounds with the stern exultation that had -once inspired the troopers of Cromwell. One of them wrote to Wesley -that, even after a bullet in each arm had forced him to retire from the -field, he hardly knew whether he was on earth or in heaven, such was -the sweetness of the day. This man and a few more of his kind probably -helped their fellow-sufferers through the misery of the days following -the battle, until Cumberland’s furious remonstrances with Saxe procured -for them better treatment. - -From Ath Cumberland fell back to Lessines and drew out such British -corps as were in garrison in Flanders, to replace those which had -suffered most heavily in the action. Meanwhile Tournay, very shortly -after the battle, fell by treachery into the hands of the French; and -Saxe’s field-army being thus raised to a force nearly double that of -the Allies, Cumberland was reduced to utter helplessness. The mischief -of Fontenoy lay not in the repulse and the loss of men, for the -British did not consider themselves to have been beaten, but in the -destruction of all confidence in the Dutch troops. The troubles which -had harassed Wade to despair now reappeared. Cumberland, -notwithstanding his inferiority in strength, was expected somehow to -defend Flanders, Brabant, and above all Brussels, and yet -simultaneously to keep an active army in the field. Worse than this, -he attempted to fulfil the expectation. Against his better judgment he -weakened his force still further by detaching a force for the garrison -of Mons,[83] after which, instead of taking up a strong position on -the Scheldt to cover Ghent at all hazards, he yielded to the pressure -of the Austrians and crossed the Dender to protect Brussels.[84] -Halting too long between two opinions he at last sent off a detachment -for the defence of Ghent, half of which was cut off and driven back -with heavy loss, while the other half, after enduring much rough usage -on the march, entered Ghent only to see the town surprised by the -French on the following day. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ Four British -regiments took part in this unlucky enterprise and suffered severely, -while the Royal Scots and the Twenty-third, which had been despatched -to Ghent after Fontenoy, of course became prisoners.[85] Moreover, a -vast quantity of British military stores were captured in Ghent, -although Cumberland had a week before ordered that they should be -removed.[86] After this blow Cumberland retired to Vilvorde, a little -to the north of Brussels, still hoping to cover both that city and -Antwerp, and so to preserve his communications both with Germany and -with the sea. Here again he sacrificed his better judgment to the -clamour of the Austrians, for he would much have preferred to secure -Antwerp only. His position was in fact most critical, and he was -keenly alive to it.[87] Just when his anxiety was greatest there came -a letter from the Secretary of State, announcing that invasion of -England was imminent, and hoping that troops could be spared from -Flanders without prejudice to his operations. “What!” answered -Ligonier indignantly; “are you aware that the enemy has seventy -thousand men against our thirty thousand, and that they can place a -superior force on the canal before us and send another army round -between us and Antwerp, to cut off our supplies and force us to fight -at a disadvantage? ◆August.◆ This is our position, and this is the -result of providing His Royal Highness with insufficient troops; and -yet you speak of our having a corps to spare to defend England!”[88] - -Saxe’s plan for reducing the Allies was in fact uniformly the same -throughout the whole of the war, namely to cut off their -communications with the sea on one side and with Germany on the -other. Even before he began to press Cumberland northward toward -Antwerp, he had detached a force to lay siege to Ostend, which was the -English base. Cumberland, on his side, had advised that the dykes -should be broken down and the country inundated in order to preserve -it, and both Dutch and Austrians had promised that this should be -done; but as usual it was not done, and before the end of August -Ostend had surrendered to the French. ◆Aug. 13/24.◆ The English base -was then perforce shifted to Antwerp. But by this time the requests -for the return of troops to England had become urgent and imperative -orders. ◆Sept.–Oct.◆ First ten battalions were recalled, then the rest -of the foot, and at last practically the whole of the army, including -Cumberland himself.[89] The cause was the Jacobite rebellion which was -stamped out by the victory of Culloden in April 1746. - -AUTHORITIES.—The official account of Fontenoy was drawn up by -Ligonier in French and translated into English, with some omissions, -for publication. The French version is far the better and will be -found in the State Papers. The account in the _Life of the Duke of -Cumberland_ is poor, though valuable as having been drawn up from the -reports of the English Generals. Of the French accounts Voltaire’s is -the best known, and, as might be expected from such a hand, admirably -spirited. More valuable are the accounts in the _Conquête des Pays -Bas_, in the _Mémoires du Maréchal de Saxe_, where Saxe’s own report -may be read, in the _Campagnes des Pays Bas_, and in Espagnac. The -newspapers furnish a few picturesque incidents of some value. - - - - - VOL. II BOOK VII. CHAPTER VII - - -◆1746.◆ - -The virtual evacuation of the Low Countries by the British, in -consequence of the Jacobite Rebellion, was an advantage too obvious to -be overlooked by the French. At the end of January, though -winter-quarters were not yet broken up, they severed the communication -between Antwerp and Brussels, and a week later took the town of -Brussels itself by escalade. The citadel, after defending itself for a -fortnight, went the way of the town, and the capital of the Spanish -Netherlands was turned into a French place of arms.[90] The -consternation in Holland was great, and was increased when the French -presently besieged and captured Antwerp. ◆May 20/31.◆ Meanwhile the -British Commander, Lord Dunmore, who had been left in the Netherlands -with a few squadrons of cavalry, could only look on in absolute -helplessness. It was not until June that the Hessian troops in British -pay and a few British battalions could be embarked, together with -General Ligonier to command them, from England; and it was not until -July, owing to foul winds, that they were finally landed at -Williamstadt. The change of base was significant in itself, for, since -the capture of Ostend and Antwerp, there was no haven for British -ships except in the United Provinces. Even after the disembarkation -these forces were found to be still unready to take the field. The -Hessians had not a grain of powder among them, and there were neither -horses for the artillery nor waggons for the baggage. Again, to add -small difficulties to great, the Austrian General, Batthyany, having -no British officer as his peer in command, denied to the British -troops the place of honour at the right of the line. It was a trifling -matter, but yet sufficient to embarrass counsel, destroy harmony, and -delay operations.[91] - -While the Allies were thus painfully drawing their forces together, the -activity of the French never ceased. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ The Prince of -Conti was detached with a considerable force to the Haine, where he -quickly reduced Mons and St. Ghislain, thus throwing down almost the -last relics of the Austrian barrier in the south. ◆July 13/24.◆ Thence -moving to the Sambre, Conti laid siege to Charleroi. It was now -sufficiently clear that the plan of the French campaign was to operate -on the line of the Meuse for the invasion of Holland. Maestricht once -taken, the rest would be easy, for most of the Dutch army were prisoners -in the hands of the French; and, with the possession of the line of the -Meuse, communication between the Allied forces of England and of Austria -would be cut off. But before Maestricht could be touched, Namur must -first be captured; and the campaign of 1746 accordingly centred about -Namur. - -For the first fortnight of July the Allies remained at Terheyden, a -little to the north of Breda, Saxe’s army lying some thirty miles -south-westward of them about Antwerp. ◆July 6/17.◆ On the 17th of July -the Allies at last got on the march, still with some faint hopes of -saving Charleroi, and proceeded south-eastward, a movement which Saxe at -once parried by marching parallel with them to the Dyle between Arschot -and Louvain. Pushing forward, despite endless difficulties of transport -and forage, through a wretched barren country, the Allies, now under -command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, reached Peer, turned southward -across the Denier at Hasselt, and by the 27th of July were at Borchloen. -◆July 16/27.◆ They were thus actually on the eastern side of the French -main army, within reach of the Mehaigne and not without good hope of -saving Namur if not Charleroi. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ On the 1st of August -they crossed the Mehaigne, only to learn to their bitter disappointment -that Charleroi had surrendered that very morning. Saxe meanwhile, with -the principal part of his army, still lay entrenched at Louvain, with -detachments pushed forward to Tirlemont and Gembloux. The Allies -continued their march before the eyes of these detachments to Masy on -the Orneau, and there took up a position between that river and the -head-waters of the Mehaigne, fronting to the north-east. This was the -line approved through many generations of war as the best for the -protection of Namur.[92] - -Saxe now drew nearer to them, and the two armies lay opposite to each -other, in many places not more than a musket-shot apart, both entrenched -to the teeth. The Allies so far had decidedly gained a success, but they -were outnumbered by the French by three to two, and they were confined -within a narrow space wherein subsistence was extremely difficult; -while, if they moved, Namur was lost. Ligonier, who was most uneasy over -the situation, longed for five thousand cavalry with which to make a -dash at Malines and so to call the enemy back in haste to defend -Brussels and Antwerp.[93] Prince Charles, however, was averse from -operations of such a nature. His hope was that Saxe would offer him -battle on the historic plain of Ramillies, where, notwithstanding the -disparity of numbers, he trusted that the quality of his troops and the -traditions of victory would enable him to prevail. But Saxe had no -intention of doing anything of the kind. He did indeed shift his -position farther to the north and east, with the field of Ramillies in -his rear, but it was not to offer battle. ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Pushing out -detachments to eastward he captured Huy, and cutting off the Allies’ -communications with Liège and Maestricht forced them to cross the Meuse -and to fall back on Maestricht from the other side of the river. Cross -the Meuse the Allies accordingly did, unmolested, to Ligonier’s great -relief, by twenty thousand French who were stationed on the eastern bank -of the stream. They then opened communication with Maestricht, five -leagues away, while Saxe extended his army comfortably with its face to -the eastward along the line of the Jaar from Warem to Tongres, waiting -till want of forage should compel the Allies to recross the Meuse. -◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Back they came over the river within a fortnight, as he -had expected, and the Marshal, without attempting to dispute the -passage, retreated quietly for a few miles, knowing full well that his -enemy could not follow him from lack of bread. Ligonier never in his -life longed so intensely for the end of a campaign.[94] - -On the 17th of September the Allies advanced upon the French and -offered battle. ◆Sept. 6/17.◆ Saxe answered by retiring to an -impregnable position between Tongres and the Demer. There was no -occasion for him to fight, when his enemies were short of provisions -and their cavalry was going to ruin from want of forage. So there the -two armies remained once more, within sight of each other but -unwilling to fight, because an attack on the entrenchments of either -host would have led to the certain destruction of the attacking -force.◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆ But meanwhile the trenches had been opened -before Namur by a French corps under the Prince of Clermont, and -within nine days the town had fallen. Ligonier again urged his design, -for which he had prepared the necessary magazines, to upset Saxe’s -plans by a dash upon Antwerp, but he could find no support in the -council of war; so there was nothing for the Allies to do but to wait -until some further French success should compel them to move. Such a -success was not long in coming. The castle of Namur surrendered after -a miserable defence of but eleven days; Clermont’s corps was released -for operations in the field, and the Allies were forced to fall back -for the protection of Liège. ◆Sept. 27./Oct. 7.◆ Accordingly, on the -7th of October they crossed the Jaar, not without annoyance from the -enemy, and took up a new position, which gave them indeed possession -of Liège, but placed them between the Meuse in their rear, and an army -of nearly twice their strength on the Jaar before their front.[95] - -[Illustration: - - ROUCOUX - Sep. 30th/Oct. 11th 1746 -] - -◆Sept. 29./Oct. 10.◆ - -Now at last Saxe resolved to strike a blow. On the 10th of October he -crossed the Jaar with evident intention of an attack, and the Allied -army received orders to be ready for action before the following dawn. -The Allies’ position faced very nearly due west, the army being drawn -up astride of the two paved roads leading into Liège from Tongres and -St. Trond. Their extreme right rested on the Jaar and was covered by -the villages of Slins, Fexhe, and Enick, all of which were strongly -entrenched and occupied by the Austrians. South of Enick extended an -open plain from that village to the village of Liers, and in this -plain was posted the Hanoverian infantry and four British battalions, -the Eighth, Nineteenth, Thirty-third, and Forty-third Foot, with the -Hessian infantry on their left, in rear of Liers. The Hanoverian -cavalry prolonged the line southward to the village of Varoux, and the -Sixth and Seventh Dragoons and Scots Greys continued it to the village -of Roucoux, from which point Dutch troops carried it on to the village -of Ance, which formed the extreme left of the position. Ligonier did -not like the situation, for he did not see how the turning of the left -flank could be prevented if, as would certainly be the case, the French -should seriously attempt it. Prince Charles, knowing that, if his right -were turned, his retreat to Maestricht would be cut off, had taken -care to hold the right flank in real strength and dared not weaken it; -but the position, with the Meuse in its rear, was perilously shallow, -while the convergence of two ravines from the Jaar and Mehaigne into -its centre allowed of but one narrow way of communication between the -right and the left of the army. The defects of the Allies’ dispositions -were in fact not unlike those which had proved fatal to King William -at Landen; and Ligonier’s anxiety was proved to rest on all too good -foundation. - -◆Sept. 30./Oct. 11.◆ - -The morning of the 11th of October opened with bad news for the Allies. -The French had been admitted into Liège by the inhabitants behind the -backs of the Dutch, so that the Prince of Waldeck, who commanded on the -left, was obliged to withdraw eight battalions from Roucoux and post -them _en potence_ on his left flank, with his cavalry in support. Thus -the defence of Roucoux, as well as of Liers and Varoux, was left to -eight battalions of British, Hanoverians, and Hessians only. This made -the outlook for the Allied left the worse, since it was evident that -the brunt of the French attack would fall upon it. Saxe gave Prince -Charles little time for reflection. He had one hundred and twenty -thousand men against eighty thousand, and he knew that of the eighty -thousand at least one-third were tied to the Austrian entrenchments -about the Jaar. He opened the action by a furious assault upon the -Dutch on the left wing, his infantry being formed in dense columns, -so that the attack could be renewed continually by fresh troops. -Simultaneously fifty-five battalions in three similar columns were -launched upon Liers, Varoux, and Roucoux. Outmatched though they were, -Dutch, Germans, and British all fought splendidly and repelled more -than one attack. But, to use Ligonier’s words, as soon as two French -brigades had been repulsed in each village, a third brigade ran in; -and the eight battalions, though they still held Liers, were forced -to withdraw both from Roucoux and Varoux. Being rallied, however, by -Ligonier, they advanced again and recaptured both villages; and the -Nineteenth and Forty-third took up a position in a hollow road which -they held to the last. The Dutch now began to retire across the rear -of the position from the left, in good order despite of heavy losses, -while Ligonier checked the enemy in the plain with the British cavalry. -When the Dutch had passed, he ordered his own men to retreat in the -same direction, still covering the movement with the cavalry and with -the Thirteenth and Twenty-sixth Foot, which had been sent to the field -from the garrison of Maestricht. The Austrians formed a rear-guard in -turn when the British and their German comrades had passed; and thus -the whole army filed off, unpursued and in perfect order, and crossed -the Meuse in safety on the following morning. - -The action may be looked upon as a fortunate escape for the Allies, -since it was impossible, humanly speaking, that it could have issued -favourably for them. Prince Charles, in seeking to cover both Liège -and Maestricht, had attempted too much. His army thus occupied too -wide a front, the villages in the centre were too weakly held, there -was hardly anywhere a second line of infantry, and the left flank -could not be sustained against so superior an enemy. The total loss of -the Allies was about five thousand men, which was sufficiently severe -considering that but a third of the army was engaged. The casualties of -the British were three hundred and fifty killed and wounded, of whom -no fewer than two hundred belonged to the Forty-third. The French lost -as many men as the Allies, or more, and gained little by the action -except eight guns captured from the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians. -Had not the Allied troops been far better in quality and discipline -than the French, they must have been lost during their retreat with -superior numbers both in flank and rear. Both armies presently retired -into winter-quarters, and the campaign ended far less disastrously than -might have been feared for the Allies.[96] - -Unfortunately, however, it was not in Flanders only that discredit fell -upon the British arms. At the end of September a force of six -battalions[97] was sent, under command of General St. Clair, to the -coast of Brittany to attack Port L’Orient and destroy the stores of the -French East India Company there. ◆Sept. 20./Oct. 1.◆ The enterprise -was conducted with amazing feebleness. The troops landed at Ouimperle -Bay practically unopposed, but, being fired at on their march on the -following day, were turned loose to the plunder of a small town as a -punishment to the inhabitants for their resistance. On the following day -they reached L’Orient, which the Deputy Governor of the East India -Company offered to surrender on good terms. His overtures, however, were -rejected and a siege was begun in form; but, after a few days of firing -and the loss of about a hundred men killed and wounded, St. Clair -thought it prudent to retreat; and on the 12th of October the troops -re-embarked and returned to England. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ Anything more -pointless than the design or more contemptible than the execution of -this project can hardly be conceived, for it simply employed regiments -which were badly needed in Flanders and America, in useless operations -which did not amount to a diversion. - -◆1747.◆ - -If the cause of Queen Maria Theresa was to be saved, it was evident -that great efforts were imperative in the coming campaign of 1747. -To meet the vast numbers brought into the field by the French the -Austrians promised to have sixty thousand men at Maseyck on the Meuse -by April; the British contributed four regiments of cavalry and -fourteen battalions of infantry; and it was hoped that the Allies would -take the field with a total strength of one hundred and ten battalions, -one hundred and sixty squadrons, and two hundred and twenty guns, -besides irregular troops, the whole to be under command of the Duke -of Cumberland.[98] Unfortunately the weather was adverse to an early -opening of the campaign; and the French, by the seizure of Cadsand -and Sluys, which were shamefully surrendered by the Dutch, closed the -southern mouth of the Scheldt below Antwerp. This was a sad blow to the -arrangements for the transport of the Allies, since it brought about -the necessity of hauling all the forage for the British overland from -Breda. Had Cumberland been in a position to open the campaign before -the French, he meant to have laid siege to Antwerp; as things were, he -was compelled, thanks chiefly to the apathy of the Dutch, to attempt -to bring Saxe to a general action. His last letter before beginning -operations has, however, an interest of another kind. It contained a -recommendation that Major James Wolfe might be permitted to purchase -a vacant lieutenant-colonelcy in the Eighth Foot, that officer having -served constantly and well during the past two years as a major of -brigade, and proved himself capable and desirous to do his duty.[99] - -The French being encamped between Malines and Louvain, Cumberland -collected his troops at Tilburg and advanced straight upon them, -encamping on the 26th of May on the Great Neth, a little to the east of -Antwerp, between Lierre and Herenthout. ◆May 15/26.◆ Saxe, entrenched as -usual to the teeth, remained immovable for three weeks, and Cumberland -despaired of bringing him to action. At length the news that a detached -corps of thirty thousand French, under the Prince of Clermont, was on -the old ground about Tongres, moved Cumberland to march to the Demer, in -the hope of overwhelming Clermont before Saxe could join him. ◆June -15/26.◆ Saxe, however, was on his guard, and on the 29th of June -prepared to concentrate the whole of his army at Tongres. ◆June 18/29.◆ -Cumberland thereupon decided to take up Saxe’s camp of the previous -year, from Bilsen, on the head-waters of the Demer, to Tongres. ◆June -19/30.◆ So sending forward Count Daun, afterwards well known as an -antagonist of Frederick the Great, with a corps of Austrians to occupy -Bilsen, he ordered the rest of the army to follow as quickly as possible -on the next day. ◆June 20./July 1.◆ Riding forward at daybreak of the -morrow, Cumberland was dismayed to see the French advancing in two -columns from Tongres, as if to fall upon the head of his own army. This -was a surprise. Cumberland knew that Saxe was in motion but had not -expected him so soon; and indeed Saxe had made a notable march, for his -army had not left Louvain until the 29th of June and had traversed -little less than fifty miles in two days. The Duke lost no time in -setting such troops as were on the spot in order of battle, and hurried -away to see if those on the march could be brought up in time to force -back the French, and to secure the position of his choice. But the -French cavalry was too quick for him, and, before Ligonier could bring -up the English horse, had occupied the centre of the ground which -Cumberland had intended for himself. Ligonier drew up his squadrons -before them to bar their farther advance, and the Allied infantry, as it -came up, was formed in order of battle, fronting, however, not to -eastward, as had been originally designed, but almost due south. In -fact, owing to Saxe’s unexpected arrival and to deficient arrangements -by the staff of the Allies, there seems to have been considerable delay -in putting the Allied army into any formation at all, or the French -might certainly have been forced back to Tongres. Saxe’s rear had not -yet come up and the men were fatigued by a long and harassing march; but -Cumberland was not the man to fight an action of the type of Oudenarde, -and the opportunity was lost.[100] - -The position now occupied by the Allies extended from some rising -ground known as the Commanderie, a little to the south-east of Bilsen, -along a chain of villages and low heights to the Jaar, a little to the -south of Maestricht. The Commanderie being the right of the line was -held by the Austrians, with a strong corps thrown back _en potence_ -to Bilsen to protect the right flank; for it was as important on this -field as on that of Roucoux that the retreat into Holland should not -be cut off. The ground possessed natural features of strength which -were turned to good account, so good account indeed that the Allied -right, like the French left at Ramillies, could neither attack nor -be attacked. Eastward from the Commanderie the Austrians occupied -the heights of Spaeven, together with the villages of Gross and Klein -Spaeven; next to them the Dutch formed the centre of the line, while -the Hanoverians and British held the villages of Val, or Vlytingen, and -Lauffeld, and prolonged the line to its extreme left at the village of -Kesselt. - -◆June 21./July 2.◆ - -There the Allies lay on their arms until nightfall, while Saxe’s weary -battalions tramped on till far into the night up to their bivouacs. At -daybreak the French were seen to be in motion, marching and -countermarching in a way that Cumberland did not quite understand; the -fact being that Saxe, as at Roucoux, was doubling the left wing of his -army in rear of the right, for the formation of those dense columns of -attack which he could handle with such consummate skill. After observing -them until nine o’clock, Cumberland came to the conclusion that the -Marshal meditated no immediate movement, and retired to the Commanderie -for breakfast. He had hardly sat down when an urgent message arrived -from Ligonier that the enemy was on the point of attacking. Cumberland -at once returned and moved the left of his line somewhat forward, -setting fire to the village of Vlytingen and occupying Lauffeld with -three British and two Hessian battalions. Lauffeld was a straggling -village a quarter of a mile long, covered by a multitude of small -enclosures with mud walls about six feet high, which were topped by -growing hedges. It was thus easily turned into a strong post for -infantry; and cannon were posted both in its front and flanks. The -remainder of the British were drawn up for the most part in rear of -Lauffeld in order to feed and relieve its garrison, the brigade of -Guards being posted in the hedges before Vlytingen. The British cavalry -stood on the right of the infantry and joined their line to that of the -Dutch. - -[Illustration: - - LAUFFELD - June 21st/July 2nd 1747 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Meanwhile Saxe, sending forward a cloud of irregular troops to mask -his movements, had despatched Count d’Estrées and the Count of Ségur -with a strong force of infantry and cavalry to seize the villages of -Montenaken and Wilre on the left flank of the Allies. This service was -performed with little loss. At the same time he directed the Marquis -of Salières, with six brigades of foot and twenty guns, to attack -Vlytingen, and launched five brigades, with as many guns, backed by a -large force of cavalry, against Lauffeld. The assault of the French -infantry upon Lauffeld was met by a furious resistance. It was just -such another struggle as that of Neerwinden, from hedge to hedge -and from wall to wall; and the French, for all their superiority of -numbers, were driven back headlong from the village with terrible loss. -Salières met with little better success against the brigade of Guards -in the hedges of Vlytingen; but with great readiness he turned half -of his guns to his right against Lauffeld and the remainder against a -ravine on his left, with most destructive effect. Cumberland, observing -the fury with which Saxe had concentrated his attack against these two -villages, asked the Austrians to relieve him by a diversion upon his -right; but the Austrian troops could not face the fire of Salières’s -guns, and it became clear that Vlytingen and Lauffeld must be held by -the British and Hanoverians alone. - -Saxe’s first attack had been brilliantly repulsed. He at once replaced -the beaten troops by two fresh brigades of infantry, with cavalry to -support them, and renewed the assault, but with no better success. The -British were driven back from the outer defences only to stand more -fiercely by those within, and Lauffeld remained unconquered. But Saxe -was not to be deterred from his purpose. Two more brigades, including -the six Irish battalions that had saved the day at Fontenoy, were -added to those already on the spot, and the whole of them launched -for a third attack against Lauffeld. They were met by the same -stubborn resistance and the same deadly fire; and the Irish brigade -lost no fewer than sixty officers in the struggle. Nevertheless Irish -impetuosity carried the rest of the troops forward; the British were -borne back to the rearmost edge of the village, and the French began -to swarm up the slope beyond it. Cumberland promptly ordered the whole -of his line of infantry to advance; and the French at once gave way -before them. The French cavalry was obliged to drive the foot forward -at the sword’s point, but Cumberland continued steadily to gain ground -despite their efforts. Then at an unlucky moment, some Dutch squadrons -in the centre were seized with panic and came galloping straight -into the British line, carried away the Hessians and one squadron of -the Greys and fell pell-mell upon the Twenty-first and Twenty-third -Fusiliers. The Twenty-first, anticipating the treatment of the Belgians -at Waterloo, gave the Dutchmen a volley and partly saved themselves, -but the Twenty-third suffered terribly, and the whole line was thrown -into confusion. Before order could be restored, Salières had thrown -three more brigades upon Lauffeld, which closed in round it, blocking -up a hollow road which formed the entrance into it from the rear, and -barring the way for all further reinforcements of the Allies. The few -troops that were left in the village were speedily overpowered, and -Lauffeld was lost. - -Some of Daun’s Austrians now advanced to Cumberland’s help from the -right; but three French brigades of cavalry, which were waiting before -Vlytingen, at once moved forward to check them, and charging boldly -into them succeeded in turning them back, though themselves roughly -handled when retiring from the charge. Meanwhile Saxe had brought up -ten guns to right and left of Lauffeld, and reinforcing the cavalry -of D’Estrées and Ségur extended it in one long line from Lauffeld to -Wilre, for a final crushing attack on the Allied left. Order had been -restored among the British infantry, who were now retreating with great -steadiness; but they were wholly unsupported. Ligonier, determined -to save them at any cost, caught up the Greys, Inniskillings, and -Cumberland’s dragoons, and led them straight against the masses of the -French cavalry. The gallant brigade charged home, crashed headlong -through the horse, and fell upon the infantry beyond, but being galled -by their fire and attacked in all quarters by other French squadrons, -was broken past all rallying and very heavily punished. Ligonier -himself was overthrown and taken prisoner. Cumberland, who had plunged -into the broken ranks to try to rally the British troopers, was cut off -by the French dragoons, and only with difficulty contrived to join the -remainder of his cavalry on the left. With these he covered the retreat -of the army, which was successfully effected in good order and with -little further loss. - -So ended the battle of Lauffeld, in which the British bore the brunt -with a firmness that extorted the praise even of Frenchmen, but of -which few Englishmen have ever heard. The troops, in Cumberland’s -words, behaved one and all so well that he could not commend any one -regiment without doing injustice to the rest. The total loss of the -five regiments of horse and fourteen battalions of foot was close upon -two thousand men.[101] The three devoted regiments which charged with -Ligonier were the worst sufferers, the Greys losing one hundred and -sixty men, the Inniskillings one hundred and twenty, and Cumberland’s -dragoons nearly one hundred. The loss of the whole of the Allies was -about six thousand men, that of the French decidedly greater, amounting -indeed, according to Saxe’s account, to not less than ten thousand -men. The British, moreover, had nine French colours and five French -standards as trophies for their consolation. Finally, the French failed -to accomplish the object of the action, which was to cut off the Allies -from Maestricht. - -After the battle the Allies crossed the Meuse and encamped at Heer, a -little to the east of Maestricht, while Saxe returned to his quarters -at Tongres. The French then detached a corps for the capture of -Bergen-op-Zoom; but the most important transactions of the war still -went forward on the Meuse, where constant negotiations were carried -on between Saxe and Cumberland. The campaign closed with the fall of -Bergen-op-Zoom and with the capture of most of the strong places in -Dutch Brabant. - -By this time King George and his people in England were thoroughly sick -of the war. The British had suffered severely in every action, but had -reaped no success except in the fortunate victory of Dettingen. The -Dutch had proved themselves useless and contemptible as Allies, their -Government feeble and corrupt in council, their troops unstable if not -dangerous in action. The Austrians, in spite of lavish subsidies, had -never furnished the troops that they had promised, and had invariably -obstructed operations through the obstinacy of their Generals and the -selfishness of their ends. ◆1748.◆ The opening of the campaign of 1748 -was even more unpromising for the Allies. Saxe, strong in the possession -of a superior force, kept Cumberland in suspense between apprehensions -for Breda and for Maestricht, and, when finally he laid siege to -Maestricht, could match one hundred and fifteen thousand men against -Cumberland’s five-and-thirty thousand. War on such terms against such a -master as Saxe was ridiculous. Moreover, the Dutch, despite of a recent -revolution, were more supine than ever; the Prince of Orange, who was -the new ruler, actually keeping two thousand of his troops from the -field that they might adorn the baptism of one of his babies. In the -face of such facts Cumberland pressed earnestly for peace;[102] and on -the 30th of April preliminaries were signed, which six months later were -expanded into the definite treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. ◆Apr. 19/30.◆ - -◆October.◆ - -The peace left matters practically as they had stood before the war, -with the significant exception that Frederick the Great retained -Silesia. Not a word was said as to the regulation of trade between -England and Spain, which had been the original ground of quarrel; -and, as between England and France, it was agreed that there should -be mutual restitution of all captures. Yet this could not set the two -countries in the same position as before the war. The French were -utterly exhausted; but the British, though not a little harassed by -the cost of maintaining armies and producing subsidies, had received a -military training which was to stand them in good stead for the great -struggle that lay before them. - -AUTHORITIES.—The official correspondence in the Record Office. _F.O. -Military Auxiliary Expeditions._ _Campagnes de Louis XV. Espagnac._ -_Life of the Duke of Cumberland._ Some useful details as to Lauffeld are -to be found in the _Gentleman’s Magazine_. - - - - - THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793–1794 - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER III - - -◆1793.◆ - -War was declared by the French Convention on the 1st of February 1793, -and Dumouriez was ordered to invade Holland forthwith. The Convention, -thirsting for the wealth of the Bank of Amsterdam, was anxious to make -sure of it before the Allies could put their strength into the field. -Two months earlier, when his troops were heartened by the victory of -Jemappe, no order could have been more welcome to Dumouriez than this; -and even now, though he had few men upon whom he could depend, he -resolved if possible to make good the defects of his army by swift and -sudden action. The French troops on the northern frontier were very -widely scattered, their cantonments extending north and south on the -lower Meuse from Roermond to Maastricht, and east and west from the -upper Rhine through Aachen to Liège and Namur. His original plan had -been to turn all the waterways and fortresses that bar the entrance -into Holland from the south, and to invade it by way of Nimeguen; but -time was so precious that he resolved to collect a small force of but -seventeen thousand men at Antwerp, and to march from thence with all -secrecy direct upon Amsterdam. At the same time he directed thirty -thousand men from the east under General Miranda to take the Dutch -fortresses of Maastricht and Venloo, and then to make for Nimeguen. -Speed, in his view, was everything, for the Austrians had already forty -thousand men cantoned to the east of the Rhine, and were shortly to be -reinforced. - -Meanwhile the Allies were still making up their plans for the next -campaign. Brunswick and Prince Frederick Josias of Coburg-Saalfeld, -who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army, met at -Frankfurt, and, after many conferences between the 6th and the 14th -of February, decided upon a scheme of operations, which by their own -showing required forty thousand more men than they had any expectation -of collecting. They saved themselves, however, by laying it down as a -cardinal principle that, until Mainz were recovered from the French, -the Allied forces must not attempt to pass from the east to the west -bank of the Meuse. Belgium (so argued the Austrians) had been eaten -up, and so long as the navigation of the Rhine was blocked at Mainz, -the subsistence of the Imperial troops on the west of the Meuse must -be difficult. Moreover, if the French should retire before an Austrian -advance, and mass all their forces on the Rhine, then they might beat -Brunswick, who, unless his retreat were assured by the possession of -Mainz, would be in danger of utter destruction. The reader should take -note of this decision, for not only is it the key to much that appears -puzzling in the coming campaign, but it is an excellent example of -the principle on which Coburg and Brunswick conducted war, namely, to -look at risks first and at objects afterwards. The immediate problem -of the defence of the Dutch provinces was left without so much as an -attempt at solution. Both Grenville in England and Auckland at the -Hague had long foreseen the certainty of a French attack upon them, and -had strained every nerve to stir the authorities to action. But the -Stadtholder was a man of almost inhuman dulness, apathy and stupidity; -and all popular energy was paralysed by the spirit of faction, which, -never inactive in Holland, had under the influence of French agents -become almost a spirit of revolution. The Dutch army was so defective -in training, equipment and discipline that it had ceased to exist as -an efficient force; and its few foreign corps, which alone deserved -the name of regiments, had been driven to mutiny by a reduction of -their pay below the rate fixed by their contract. Even in January and -February, Auckland wrote that the Stadtholder looked for British ships -and British troops to save him,[103] and that the French party was -derisively insinuating that England, nominally the faithful ally of -the Dutch Republic, was content to desert her in the hour of danger. -Finally, on the 15th of February he begged that the Duke of York might -be sent over with a few officers of experience, even if without troops, -to take command of the Dutch. “Men, commanders, ships and money,” -he wrote, “we could not ask for more if this country were a part of -Yorkshire, but I incline to think that it should be considered so for -the present; and if it is brought to a question whether we are to -conquer it and keep it, or whether Dumouriez is to do it, I have no -doubt as to the decision.” - -Still the British Government hesitated, for, thanks to its neglect of -the Army, it possessed but a handful of troops, and was unwilling to -move them to the Continent. ◆Feb. 16.◆ Then suddenly, on the 16th of -February, Dumouriez dashed out from Antwerp with his tiny force in four -columns. One small body instantly pushed northward towards Moerdyk, to -collect boats for the passage of the arm of the sea called the -Hollandsdiep; another marched upon Klundert and Willemstadt, a third -north-eastward to attack Breda, and a fourth to the north-west to -blockade Bergen-op-Zoom and Steenbergen. Everywhere his coming was -welcomed by the Dutch. Breda, with large stores of munitions of war, was -disgracefully surrendered on the 26th of February; ◆Feb. 26.◆ Klundert -and Gertruydenberg fell in quick succession; Willemstadt was then -besieged with the captured cannon, and by the 9th of March Dumouriez was -prepared to essay the passage of the Hollandsdiep. ◆March 9.◆ But here -his course was stayed, for his activity had stirred his enemies on every -side. - -◆Feb. 20.◆ - -On the 20th of February the seven battalions of British Guards were -suddenly paraded before the Horse Guards; and the Duke of York, -announcing that the first battalions of the three regiments were ordered -to proceed on active service, called for volunteers from the others to -bring them up to strength. The whole brigade thereupon stepped forward -as one man; and five days later three battalions, numbering under two -thousand men of all ranks and denominations, marched to Greenwich amid -the cheers, and something more than the cheers, of an enormous and -enthusiastic crowd.[104] By nightfall the whole were embarked upon -vessels too small to carry more than two-thirds of their number in -safety, without medicines or medical appliances, without the slightest -reserve of ammunition, and of course without transport of any -description. Their commander was Colonel Gerard Lake of the First -Guards, and he was ordered on no account to move his men above -twenty-four hours’ distance from Helvoetsluis, so as to be able to -return on the shortest notice. ◆March 1.◆ By the mercy of Heaven these -troops safely reached that port, narrowly escaping a gale which would -probably have condemned them either to drowning or asphyxiation; and -four days later they proceeded to Dort to oppose Dumouriez’s passage of -the Hollandsdiep. ◆March 5.◆ About the same time a flotilla of Dutch -gunboats arrived in the Meuse, many of them manned by British sailors -and flying British colours. Auckland, by threatening to take command in -Holland himself, had at last compelled the miserable Stadtholder to -issue orders for the defence of his country.[105] - -But the obstacles which were multiplying in Dumouriez’s front were as -nothing to the storm that suddenly broke upon his flank. ◆Feb. 20.◆ -Miranda had duly moved up to the siege of Maastricht with a force -inadequate to the task and, moreover, dangerously dispersed; but the -Austrians, declaring themselves too weak to move, still remained torpid -in their cantonments, perhaps the more stubbornly because the Prussian -Agent at the Austrian headquarters was perpetually urging them to -action. ◆Feb. 26.◆ At last, however, Coburg on the 26th began to -concentrate his forty thousand men and to pass them in five columns -across the river; ◆March 1.◆ and on the 1st of March, to the great -surprise of the French, he burst upon their cantonments on the Meuse, -and for four days drove them in utter rout before him. Coburg himself -and the left wing halted before Liège, but on the right the Archduke -Charles, with the impetuosity of twenty-one years and the instinct of a -born soldier, followed up the disorderly rabble from Maastricht -southward upon Tongres, boldly attacking wherever he met the enemy. -Such of the French as had been in action fled in all directions, -abandoning everything; ten thousand deserters hurried across the -frontier into France; and a small remnant took refuge behind the canal -at Louvain, where it was joined by such French divisions as had not been -engaged. Had Coburg pursued his advantage and advanced instantly with -all his forces, he could have ended the campaign at once, for the -people, furious at the exactions of the Jacobins, and, above all, at the -theft of the plate from their churches, had turned savagely upon the -retreating French. ◆March 5.◆ Instead of this he halted on the 5th, and -wasted ten whole days in cantonments between Maastricht and Tongres. The -Convention now ordered Dumouriez at once to proceed to Louvain and -◆March 9.◆ assume command, which he did with a very bad grace, leaving -General Flers to take his place in Holland. His presence did much to -restore confidence in the French army, and he was not a little helped by -Coburg’s inaction. Nevertheless the news that reached him was singularly -disquieting. Fresh regiments were embarking from England for -Helvoetsluis; two reinforcing columns of Austrians were advancing from -the Rhine upon Namur; ◆March 11.◆ and eight thousand Prussians, under -the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, had arrived at Bois-le-Duc on the 11th, and -were moving with five thousand British and Dutch upon Breda, to cut off -the troops on the Hollandsdiep from France and Dumouriez’s own soldiers -from Antwerp. In so desperate a situation there was no choice but to -take the offensive. - -◆March 15.◆ - -On the 15th Coburg at last resumed his advance with forty-two thousand -men; and on the 16th Dumouriez marched with forty-eight thousand to meet -him. ◆March 18.◆ On the 18th the decisive action was fought at -Neerwinden, when the French were totally defeated, with a loss of five -thousand men and three guns. The volunteers and the National Guards were -the troops that failed in the battle; and after it the men broke up and -fled by whole battalions. Ten thousand deserted in the ten days -following the action, and Dumouriez was fain to form a rearguard out of -his artillery and his few battalions of the Line, and to fall back on -Louvain. Coburg, who had lost about three thousand men, made little -attempt at pursuit, keeping his main body halted at Tirlemont until the -22nd, but exhorting the Duke of Brunswick-Oels to hasten from -Bois-le-Duc to Malines to cut off Dumouriez’s retreat to Antwerp. The -Duke, who had already permitted Flers to withdraw with impunity the bulk -of his forces to Antwerp, was evidently not disposed to second Austrian -operations with Prussian troops, for he refused to move. ◆Mar. 23–24.◆ -However, the advance of the Austrians compelled Dumouriez to evacuate -first Louvain and then Brussels; ◆March 25.◆ and on the 25th, finding -himself obliged to abandon Namur also, he opened negotiations with -Coburg. He had quarrelled with the Convention beyond hope of -reconciliation over the iniquity of its rule in Belgium; and he now -proposed that the French should retreat from the whole country, and that -he should march to Paris to re-establish the monarchy, the Allies -meanwhile halting on the frontier and receiving the fortress of Condé as -a guarantee. ◆March 27.◆ An agreement to this effect was duly made with -the Chief of the Austrian Staff on the 27th, and a circular was issued -from the Austrian headquarters, suggesting a conference of the -representatives of the powers to decide as to the measures to be next -taken. - -There is no need to tell at length the story of Dumouriez’s adventures -during the following days. ◆April 5.◆ It must suffice that he was driven -from the midst of his army, and on the 5th of April was fain to take -refuge with the Austrians. Fragments of several corps and one complete -regiment of Hussars followed him, unwilling to part with their beloved -General; but several thousand French troops in Belgium and Holland, -which might have been cut off to a man, were allowed to retire in peace -to the frontier. None the less the fact remained that even a dilatory -commander at the head of a force of discordant Allies had sufficed to -drive the armies of the Revolution in shameful disorder from the -Austrian Netherlands. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IV - - -◆1793.◆ - -◆March 5.◆ - -On the 5th of March it was resolved to send the Fourteenth, -Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Foot, completed by drafts from the new -independent companies, to join the Duke as a brigade under Major-general -Ralph Abercromby. These regiments, however, were subject to the same -instructions as the Guards, namely, to remain within immediate reach of -their transports in case their services should be required elsewhere. -Their quality was such that the Adjutant-general felt constrained to -apologise for them both to Abercromby and to the Duke of York. “I am -afraid,” he wrote to the Duke, “that you will not reap the advantage -that you might have expected from the brigade of the Line just sent over -to you, as so considerable a part of it is composed of nothing but -undisciplined and raw recruits; and how they are to be disposed of until -they can be taught their business I am at a loss to imagine.... I was -not consulted upon the subject until it was too late to remedy the evil, -but I hope that my remonstrances will be of some use in the modelling of -troops for the Continent in future.” ◆April 1.◆ It need hardly be added -that, on their arrival in Holland, two out of the three battalions were -found utterly unfit for service, the new recruits being old men and -weakly boys, worse than the worst that had been accepted even at the -period of greatest exhaustion during the American War. To send them on -active service was, therefore, simply waste of money.[106] - -But this was only one of the evils which ensued because an extremely -ignorant civilian was too vain to consult his military advisers before -giving military orders. Any soldier at the War Office could have -told him that the method of raising independent companies to recruit -existing regiments had been found wasteful and unsatisfactory in the -past; and, indeed, at this very time the Chief Secretary Cooke wrote -to him from Ireland a strong protest against the whole system. It -was expensive, because it meant the provision of half-pay for their -officers as soon as the men had been drafted out; it was unfair to old -subalterns, because they were passed over by boys who by good fortune -had raised recruits cheaply. It produced a bad class of recruit, -because these young officers were poor judges of men; and finally it -encouraged desertion, for the crimps, so long as they poured a certain -number of recruits into the depots by a certain time, cared not the -least whether they deserted afterwards. Nor was Cooke content only to -criticise, for he produced an alternative plan for allowing each of the -fourteen battalions in Ireland to raise two additional companies of one -hundred men apiece, and for granting to the commanding officers the -privilege of recommending officers for them. The scheme was approved -and was found to be most successful; but it was not introduced into -England, where, on the contrary, the number of independent companies -was still further increased.[107] - -Again, the Adjutant-general, if consulted, could have warned Dundas -to be chary of his battalions, since some of them would certainly -be required for the Fleet. The King’s Navy was labouring under the -grievances which in four years were to drive the seamen to mutiny; and -as a natural consequence men were hardly to be obtained by any means. -◆Feb. 7.◆ On the very day when the declaration of war was received, -the Fleet swallowed up two battalions; and by the end of March it had -absorbed so many men that only three regiments of the Line were to be -found south of the Tweed. In fact the Horse Guards did not know where -to turn for another battalion. This, however, did not prevent Dundas -from presently sending another emissary to Jamaica, to commit England -still more deeply to operations in the most leeward sphere of the West -Indies. Yet he had no reserve of any description to rely upon, except -fourteen thousand Hanoverians and eight thousand Hessians, which, -pursuant to the time-honoured practice, were taken into British pay; -and of these the latter only, being mercenaries pure and simple, could -be counted upon for service beyond sea.[108] - -Since the kingdom was thus stripped of regular troops, it was necessary -to raise other forces for its security; but this also was done as -foolishly as possible. Early in February it was rightly and wisely -decided to call out nineteen thousand additional Militia; but in the -execution precisely the same mistake was made as in France. Personal -service was not insisted upon; there arose a great demand for -substitutes; and the Militia, instead of gaining a substantial increase, -simply cut off from the Army the sources of its supply of recruits. In -Scotland, which as yet had no Militia, recourse was made to the raising -of Fencible regiments, that is to say, of regular troops enlisted for -home-service and for the duration of the war only. This system had so -far been applied only on a small scale, the regiments of Fencibles -during the Seven Years’ War and the American War of Independence having -been but few;[109] but it now received great and sudden expansion. On -the 2nd of March authority was issued for the raising of seven regiments -of Fencible Infantry in Scotland at a stroke; besides one already -authorised for the Isle of Man ◆Feb. 20.◆, and another, added in April, -for the Orkney Islands.[110] With the leading magnates of Scotland at -their head, these new corps were speedily completed; but there was one -Scottish nobleman who went further than his peers, and raised a regiment -in the Highlands for general service. This was Thomas Humberstone -Mackenzie, afterwards the last Earl of Seaforth; and his regiment -remains with us, still known by his name, but yet more famous under its -number of the Seventy-eighth. The reader should take note of the -Fencible regiments, for in the years before us we shall see them -increased and multiplied in all three kingdoms. Meanwhile, he should -remark that within a month of the declaration of war there were already -three distinct forces, the Army, the Fencibles, and the Militia, all -bidding against each other for the recruits which only the Regular Army -could turn to efficient account. - -It is not difficult to perceive the lurking possibilities of disaster in -Dundas’s military policy; but until April it showed at any rate a -certain consistency. The despatch of troops to the Continent was treated -as a temporary measure, designed for the protection of Holland only; -and, though the Prince of Coburg had called upon the Duke of York to -co-operate in his great sweeping movement from north-east to south-west, -the Duke had complied only so far as his instructions and, it may be -added, his lack of transport permitted.[111] But much, besides the -expulsion of the French from Holland and Belgium, had occurred in March, -all tending to embarrass England in the principal object of her -Continental policy, the securing of a strong barrier between France and -Holland. The fatal question of indemnity, first brought forward by the -King of Prussia, had aroused the cupidity of his brother potentate in -Austria, who valued the recovery of Belgium chiefly in order that he -might exchange it for Bavaria. Pitt had for a moment been willing to -consent to the Bavarian exchange (as it was called) for the sake of -peace; but upon the outbreak of war he reverted to absolute rejection of -it; and, in an evil hour, ◆March 2.◆ the British Ambassador at Vienna, -Sir Morton Eden, put forward a suggestion that Austria should be bribed -to retain Belgium by the promise of an extension of her frontiers on the -side of France. ◆April 3.◆ Realising that Austria refused to act -disinterestedly, Grenville reluctantly accepted the proposal; and at the -same time the British Government seems to have taken it for granted that -it must give the Emperor some assistance towards the conquest of the new -barrier.[112] - -◆March 21–April 2.◆ - -Accordingly, since no more infantry was to be spared from England, -eleven regiments of cavalry were ordered to prepare for service on -the Continent, though their numbers were so weak that they could not -between them muster more than twenty-three squadrons, or about two -thousand five hundred of all ranks, fit for service. But, at the same -time, the British Ministers shrank from supplying British troops for -the advantage of other nations without gaining some equivalent to -satisfy the electors of England; wherefore they decided, apparently -at the instance of Grenville’s elder brother, Lord Buckingham, to -claim Dunkirk as Great Britain’s indemnity for the war. The choice, -viewed from the standpoint of the party-politician, was a good one. -Dunkirk, having been taken by Cromwell, sold by Charles the Second, and -dismantled under the conditions imposed by the sword of Marlborough, -possessed sentimental attractions to the public at large and to the -Whigs in particular; while, as a nest of privateers, its extirpation -could not but be welcome not only to every merchant in England, but -especially to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. No scheme of operations -had yet been concerted with Austria, for, indeed, Coburg had advanced -from the Roer before nearly all his forces had been collected; but Pitt -seems to have thought that, while the Austrian reinforcements were -on their way to the front, the mixed force of British, Hanoverians, -Hessians, and Dutch might very well master Dunkirk in the course of -April, afterwards leaving the Austrians in sufficient strength to -pursue their operations in Flanders alone, while the British struck -at some other part of France. Thus Pitt was not true even to his own -plan of ruining his enemy by the destruction of her colonial trade. -Moreover, it is difficult to define what he meant by some other part -of France. The old Marquis of Bouillé, knowing that the heart of the -Revolution could be pierced at Paris, had suggested a descent upon -Havre with thirty thousand men; and there was by this time another -vulnerable point—namely, La Vendée—in the west of France. But why it -should have been necessary to seek out a new point of attack, when -troops were already massed or massing on the French frontier within -twelve days’ march of the capital, and with only a demoralised enemy -before them, was a question which seems never to have occurred either -to Pitt or to Dundas. There can be no doubt that they fell into a -common pitfall of the British politician. They gave so much thought to -the treaty which they should lay before Parliament at the close of the -war, that they omitted to consider the means of bringing the war itself -to a close.[113] - -It was in such inauspicious circumstances that the representatives of -the various powers met in conference at Antwerp. ◆April 5.◆ Coburg, who -loathed the war and had hoped to end it by an agreement with Dumouriez, -had issued a proclamation declaring himself to be the ally of all -friends of order, and abjuring all projects of conquest in the Emperor’s -name. Instantly Austrians, Prussians, and English with one voice -required him to withdraw it, and to publish a new declaration that he -would prosecute the war vigorously. He did so, but with great -reluctance; indeed, so bitter was his opposition to the new policy that -he tried to open further negotiations with the Convention, and even -furnished it with information which he ought to have kept to -himself.[114] Meanwhile Lord Auckland announced that England, as well as -the other powers, would expect an indemnity for her share in the war; -whereupon the Dutch representative announced that, as every one else was -taking compensation, he hoped that Holland’s claims would not be -forgotten.[115] The sharing of the lion’s skin having thus been -determined, the next thing was to decide upon a plan of operations for -slaying the lion. A vague project was drawn out for the attack of the -frontier-fortresses, in which Coburg reckoned upon the co-operation of -over twenty thousand men, that is to say, of thirteen thousand -Hanoverians and seven thousand five hundred British, in British pay, -besides fifteen thousand Dutch. Dundas was staggered; for he had not yet -the slightest idea what were the ultimate designs of either of the -German powers, who, as he justly complained, were very backward to give -an explicit account of their views either as to the conduct of the war -or the termination of it. “We cannot advise the King,” he wrote, “to -give a blind co-operation to measures not distinctly explained.” But he -hinted that if the Austrians would spare a detachment to help the -British to capture Dunkirk at once, England might make fewer -difficulties about lending her troops for subsequent operations. The -English, he explained, were prejudiced against Continental enterprises; -wherefore it was important to convince the nation early that its troops -in Holland were employed for an object intimately connected with the -interests of Great Britain and the security of her commerce. “The early -capture of Dunkirk by a Prince of the blood,” he added, “would give much -éclat to the commencement of the war.” In other words, Dundas was ready -to employ British troops in the Low Countries only for a political -campaign, and not for the military purposes of the war—to use them, in -fact, primarily to win votes rather than battles. The attitude is but -too characteristic of British Ministers for War.[116] - -Meanwhile the Allies on the frontiers of France remained inactive; the -Austrians, indeed, blockading Condé, where the French kept them engaged -with incessant affairs of outposts, but the British contingent still -awaiting the orders which Dundas hesitated to give. In the third week -of April the chief of the British staff reported that a considerable -force of French was entrenched about Dunkirk, too strong to be attacked -by the Duke of York’s troops, and that there was no operation on which -the latter could be employed except in support of the Austrians.[117] -We shall presently recognise the unseen hand which had been working -at Dunkirk. ◆May 1.◆ Ten days more of uncertainty passed away, and at -last, on the 1st of May, Coburg produced a plan of operations. By the -middle of May he hoped to have about ninety-two thousand men,[118] to -which by the beginning of June would be added thirteen thousand more. -He proposed, therefore, to hasten the fall of Condé by a bombardment, -and then to advance with fifty-two thousand men to the siege of -Valenciennes, leaving a cordon of some forty thousand to cover every -imaginable point along a front of some fifty miles from Maubeuge on the -Sambre to Ostend on the sea. Valenciennes might be expected to fall -at the end of July, and then ten thousand men could be left to mask -Lille, while fifty thousand marched to the siege of Dunkirk. If this -plan were accepted, Coburg pledged himself to the Duke of York to lend -his best good-will to the attack on Dunkirk. On this assurance the -Duke recommended the plan to which at last Dundas gave his consent, -on the understanding that the other powers in general and Austria in -particular should give an immediate explanation of their ulterior -views. England, he repeated, could not allow so large a force in her -pay to be employed on operations whose object was undefined; and he -emphasised the statement by an inquiry as to the security of Ostend, -which so far had been the British port of disembarkation, evidently as -a hint that England reserved her right to withdraw her troops at any -moment. - -This is a good instance of the manner in which British Ministers evade -their responsibility. The British General had, nearly three weeks -before, laid before Dundas the following issue. “There is no use for -British troops in the Netherlands except to act in support of the -Austrians. Their commander has submitted a plan based on the active -co-operation of all our troops, present and expected. We think the plan -a good one. Are we to act with him, or are we not?” Upon this it was -for the Ministry to say at once to Austria, “Our Generals favour your -plan of campaign, but until we know your ultimate intentions we cannot -take part in it. Unless you come to a definite understanding with us by -a certain day, we shall order our troops on the spot to re-embark, and -meanwhile we have suspended the march of our reinforcements.” Instead -of this they said in effect, “We approve the plan of campaign, and -thereby commit our troops to it; but we reserve to ourselves the right -to withdraw them, or, in other words, to wreck the operations, whenever -we think proper.” If, therefore, the enemy should in the meantime -take the offensive and press the Austrians hard, which, as shall be -seen, was what actually happened, the responsibility for granting or -withholding British assistance was thrown entirely upon the General. - -It remains to say a word of the plan itself, and of the troops and -commanders who were appointed to carry it out. The enormous front -along which Coburg proposed to disperse his force is an example of the -system known as the cordon-system, which was in particular favour with -the Austrians at this time. It consisted in covering every possible -access to a theatre of war with some small body of troops, and had -been formulated by Marshal Lacy upon the experience of the war of -the Bavarian Succession in 1778, when he had held a front of fifty -miles in the labyrinthine country of the Upper Elbe, and reduced the -campaign to a mere scuffle of foraging parties. Well calculated to -exclude the plague or contraband goods from a country, it was, of -course, ridiculous against the invasion of an enemy; for it meant -weakness at all points and strength at none, and in fact simply -invited the destruction of the army in detail by a force of inferior -strength. Nevertheless it was in high favour with all armies of Europe, -excepting the British, at that time; and it was a matter of rule that, -wherever the enemy stationed a battalion or a company, a countervailing -battalion or company must be posted over against it. The Austrians had -suffered much from this system in their recent war with the Turks; but -their commanders, of whom Coburg had been one, had learned little from -the experience. Apart from his adherence to this new and utterly false -fashion, which precluded the concentration of troops for a vigorous -offensive, Coburg was a sound, slow, cautious commander of the old -Austrian type, more intent upon preserving his own army than destroying -the enemy’s, and, perhaps, happiest when firmly set down to conduct a -siege in form according to the most scientific principles. Withal he -was a sensible and honourable gentleman, and extremely popular with -his troops. The chief of his staff, and, by common report, the virtual -Commander-in-Chief, was the unfortunate Mack, then a colonel forty -years of age, who enjoyed the reputation of being the most scientific -officer in Europe. The theory of war, as then understood in many -quarters, assigned as the first object not the annihilation of the -enemy’s force in the field, but the possession of certain geographical -points, which were called Strategic Objects. At this game of maps -and coloured labels Mack excelled; and, when called upon to fight an -action, he so elaborated his plans for the overwhelming of his enemies -by the simultaneous onslaught of a number of converging columns that, -if everything went right and every column reached exactly the appointed -place at exactly the appointed time, he assured to himself not only -victory but conquest. But, since he made no allowance for the possible -failure of any one of his combinations through unforeseen contingencies -or accidents of any description, Mack’s actions were rarely successful -and always unduly hazardous. He seems to have been an honest man, of -real though misdirected ability; while his character gained for him a -confidence and respect which the British in the field accorded to no -other foreign officer. But though, as shall be seen, his methods by no -means commended themselves to all British commanders, they nevertheless -made a fatally favourable impression upon the British Ministry. - -To judge with the wisdom that comes after the event, it may be -said that the Allied Army was tactically deficient in two principal -respects, namely, in the numerical weakness of its light infantry and -in the faulty organisation of its artillery. Light infantry and light -cavalry at this time were still treated mainly as accessories, useful -for the “little war” (to use the French expression) of outposts and -reconnaissance, but as something apart from the “great war,” which was -reserved for the more solid squadrons and battalions that enjoyed the -dignity of a place in the formal Order of Battle. In fact, the work -of outposts was supposed to fall wholly upon the light corps, while -the regular troops husbanded their strength in security behind them. -Hostilities with any nation which is driven back on primitive methods -of self-defence, and which neither knows nor respects the contemporary -usage of civilised warfare, invariably upset any such arrangement; and -the British, after the experience of America, should have been awake to -this truth. Indeed, in justice to the officers, many of them were alive -to it; but Pitt, since 1783, had been more solicitous for the reduction -than the training of the Army. In the matter of artillery the practice -of all the nations was the same. Each battalion possessed its two guns, -three-pounders or six-pounders, and the remainder of the ordnance was -massed into a park, with or without an inner distribution into brigades -or batteries. The handling of the artillery by the Count of Bückeburg -at Minden had not yet found sufficient appreciation to be made the -foundation of a system.[119] - -The Austrian troops, in spite of the exhaustion of the long Turkish -war, were for the most part worthy of their high reputation, and -aroused at first the greatest admiration among British officers. They -included, however, a certain number of irregular corps, both horse -and foot, chiefly Slavs, which were simply savage banditti of the -most dangerous type. They would murder or plunder any one, friend or -foe, even to the vedettes of their own army; and no Austrian general -would trust himself among them without an escort. The quality of the -higher officers was, however, unworthy of that of the men, many of -them being old, supine, and narrow-minded; and the corps of officers -at large was sharply divided between two factions, which espoused the -two opposite schools of Loudon and Lacy. The organisation also was -imperfect, for, though the army was indeed distributed into brigades -and divisions, these were not kept together, but all detachments were -formed of squadrons and battalions arbitrarily collected and entrusted -to a general as arbitrarily chosen, who knew no more of the men than -they knew of him. In the matter of tactics the Austrians had made no -progress since the Seven Years’ War. Cavalry and infantry alike were -still formed in three ranks, and the art of handling large bodies of -cavalry had been nearly, though not wholly, forgotten. - -The Prussians still enjoyed the fame which they had won under Frederick -the Great, but they had not been improved by the false training -observed by Cornwallis at their manœuvres; while their commander, von -Knobelsdorf, though full of zeal, was also full of years, having -passed his seventieth birthday. Superior to them were the Hessians, -the majority of whom had served in America, where they had learned to -manœuvre rapidly and to fight in dispersed order, though the lesson -had never been practised since their return to their own land.[120] -The Hessian Jäger were particularly good light troops, and were -armed with rifles. The whole corps, moreover, was the more effective -since it was equipped with regimental transport upon a lavish scale, -and was therefore mobile and self-dependent.[121] On the whole, the -Hessians seem to have been the most valuable fighting men in the army, -though they were not exempt from the love of plunder, a failing which -mercenary veterans are apt to judge more leniently, at certain times, -than other troops. The Hanoverians were then, as always, fine soldiers, -but without the advantage of the Hessians in experience and training. -The Dutch, being hastily raised, were ill organised, disciplined, -trained, and equipped. - -The British, with the exception of the Guards, were, in the opinion -of foreign critics, very deficient in training and discipline, for -precisely the same reason as the Dutch, namely, persistent neglect. -The cavalry was of better material than the infantry, and was very -well mounted; but both officers and men were so ignorant of their work -that, at first, they could not even throw out vedettes and outposts -without instruction from foreigners. The field-guns were inferior to -those of the rest of the Allies; the ammunition-waggons were heavy and -unwieldy; and the horses were harnessed one before the other instead -of abreast, which made them difficult to drive, and took up much room -on the road. The models of both harness and waggons were, in fact, of -Marlborough’s time; while the medical arrangements, or what passed for -such, were those of a still remoter age. Discipline for the most part -was bad, especially among the officers, who were subject rather to -political than military authority, and, though there were still among -their infantry good men who had learned their business in America, far -too many were absolutely ignorant as well as neglectful of their duty. -Hard drinking in all ranks accounted for much both of the indiscipline -and the neglect. To the men, of course, drunkenness brought a flogging -at the halberts, but to the officers, unfortunately, it did not -necessarily mean punishment; nor was it possible that it should, when -respectful consideration was shown to both Prime Minister and Secretary -of State for War if they appeared incapably drunk at the House of -Commons, because the leaders of the Opposition drank even harder than -they. This vice of drunkenness was the most formidable with which good -officers had to contend throughout the twenty years of the war, simply -because it was a fashion set in high places.[122] - -It was no easy task to command such a force as the British, Hanoverians -and Hessians, under the orders of such a man as Dundas, and the -immediate direction of such generals as Coburg and Mack. Frederick, -Duke of York, second son of King George the Third, was in 1793 thirty -years old. At the age of sixteen he had been sent to Berlin to study -the profession of arms under the eye of Frederick the Great himself, -and had returned with a practical knowledge which made him later an -admirable Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, but also with an -undue preference for the weaker points of the stiff and formal Prussian -system. In 1791 he had become Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, in -which post he had at first shown himself enough of a martinet to -excite discontent;[123] and, though he had wisely changed his ways -after a year’s experience, he was not at this time popular with his -men, while his officers, who had been taught to look for preferment -from politicians, resented his authority whether for good or ill. -In this respect he was hampered by the same disadvantages as had -beset Lord Stair in 1743; and, unfortunately, he did not possess the -qualifications to gain the confidence of his troops in the field. -He had the cool personal bravery which belongs to his race, but -not the higher moral courage which gives constancy and patience in -difficulty or misfortune; and hence he was at once sanguine and easily -discouraged. He had learned his work, so far as it could be acquired by -the industry of a mediocre intellect, but he was slow of apprehension, -without sagacity, penetration or width of view, and with so little -imagination or resource that an unforeseen emergency confounded him. -On the other hand, his dutiful loyalty and submission, in most trying -circumstances, towards Coburg on the one hand, and the Cabinet on the -other, were beyond all praise. The Ministry had some just doubts as -to his fitness to command, but the King had set his heart upon the -appointment; and indeed, where so many Serene Highnesses were gathered -together, the superior rank of the Duke was a decided advantage. It was -hoped, therefore, to make good his deficiencies by joining to him Sir -James Murray, better known by the name which he afterwards assumed as -Sir James Pulteney, nominally as Adjutant-general, but really as Chief -of the Staff and something more; for it was to his correspondence that -the Government looked for information and advice. - -Murray was a singular character. He had served in the Seven Years’ -War; he had distinguished himself in the West Indies during the -American War of Independence; and he had trained an intellect, which -was of no common order, not only by shrewd observation of the world -but by solid and extensive study. His knowledge was great, his grasp -and outlook wide, his judgment cool and accurate, his indifference to -danger and hardship absolute; but he was shy, awkward and diffident, -with a dreamy indolence which led him too readily to surrender his -own correct opinion, and to amuse himself with speculation upon the -incorrect opinions of others.[124] When roused he could sum up a -situation with an insight, terseness and vigour which showed how close -was his hold upon facts; but he was not the helpmate who could make -good the defects of the Duke of York. The situation, indeed, demanded -a Marlborough, with the insight to see the one thing that was needed, -and the tact and ascendency to bring cautious commanders, intriguing -Ministers, narrow-minded potentates and irresolute Cabinets into line, -for the one true object,—an immediate march on Paris. - -Such a march could undoubtedly not have been made without risk, owing to -the dearth of food in France; yet the opportunity was favourable, and -the hazard was slight compared with the certain danger of delay. -◆Feb. 19.◆ Already in February the Republic had wantonly made a fresh -enemy by declaring war upon Spain; and the campaign in Belgium had -produced results for which the most sanguine of her enemies could -hardly have hoped. ◆March 8.◆ On the first news of the Austrian -successes, the Convention instantly formed a special tribunal for the -trial of traitors and conspirators against France, and summoned two -of the defeated generals to appear before it. This done, it proceeded -to take measures for hastening the levy of the three hundred thousand -men, decreed a fortnight before. The scenes of ridiculous enthusiasm, -which had become usual in Paris, followed as a matter of course; but -the multitude of men who, for various reasons, claimed exemption, was -astonishing, and the rascality of many who were enrolled was flagrant. -A great many of these rogues made a trade of fraudulent enlistment, -receiving a bounty from several corps and selling the arms and clothing -received from each of them; while the number of women, who claimed -allowances for the removal of their husbands to the army, sufficed to -warrant the belief that every recruit was a polygamist. ◆March 10.◆ In -the provinces, both north and south, there was violent resistance to -the levy; and on the 10th of March, at Saint Florent le Vieil on the -Loire, the peasants turned upon the troops which had been brought up -to enforce the ballot, and, though armed only with cudgels, dispersed -them and drove them from the town. That evening the alarm-bell rang in -every church of the surrounding parishes; and five days later bands -of peasants drove the National Guards from Chollet, some twenty miles -south of Saint Florent, and took that town also. This was the first -manifestation of a great counter-revolutionary movement, famous in -history as the revolt of La Vendée. - -The Convention, however, did not at first realise the importance of this -outbreak, in the critical state of things in the north. An attempt to -reinforce Dumouriez at Louvain, by calling out ten thousand of the -National Guards of the northern provinces, provided only a few worn-out -men and boys,[125] whom the General contemptuously dismissed to their -homes. Then came the defection of Dumouriez himself, which was well-nigh -fatal to all military improvement. The General had disparaged the -election of officers by their men; he had urged that the volunteers -should be incorporated in the Line; he had tried to enforce discipline -upon all; and, finally, he had turned traitor and taken some of his -regular troops with him. It was therefore plain that discipline was an -abomination, that all his recommendations were vicious, that the regular -troops were not to be trusted, and that volunteers only were to be -accounted faithful. Never was the regular army of France so near to -total dissolution at the hands of its countrymen as at this moment of -supreme military peril. ◆April 6.◆ Beurnonville, having tried to abolish -abuses, was driven from the War Office; a good Jacobin, Bouchotte, with -a still better Jacobin, Vincent, at his elbow, was installed in -Beurnonville’s place, and the whole of Pache’s vile following returned -with them to office.[126] A camp was ordered to be formed at Peronne, -and in it were assembled, not with disgrace but with honour, all the -soldiers who had been imprisoned by Dumouriez for misconduct, all the -deserters, the cowards and the skulkers, who had fled from the army of -Belgium. Further, it was resolved that representatives of the people, -with absolute powers, should be sent to rally and reorganise the -northern forces, and to set the fortresses in order. If ever a nation -seemed bent upon compassing its own destruction by piling madness upon -madness, it was the French at this moment. - -Yet, amid all the confusion, there appeared the first sign of the -powers which by terrible means were to reduce France and, through -France, the whole Continent of Europe to discipline and order. On the -6th of April the Convention chose nine of its members, renewable by -monthly election, to wield the Dictatorship of France, with the title -of the Committee of Public Safety. ◆April 10.◆ On the 10th of April a -rough Alsatian officer, Kellerman by name, whose gallantry had raised -him from the ranks to a commission during the Seven Years’ War, came -forward with a scheme which preserved the famous regiments of the -French Line. Finally, among the six representatives despatched to -save the wreck of Dumouriez’s army was Captain Lazare Carnot of the -Engineers; by birth a younger son in a respectable family of Burgundy, -by repute well known in Europe as an original thinker upon military -matters in general, and upon the defence of fortresses in particular. -Though now forty years of age and of twenty years’ standing in the -army, he was still a captain, for his military opinions had given -offence in high quarters under the Monarchy; and it was as a simple -captain that he was to appoint generals, and to organise victory under -the Republic. Deeply read in theology and history, a passionate devotee -of mathematics and of science, he had framed for himself high ideals, -which, as he thought, the Revolution was appointed to fulfil; and he -upheld its principles through good report and evil report, not with the -Gallic effervescence that is bred of self-consciousness, but with the -austere fanaticism of a Scot who takes his stand upon the Covenant. -He believed; and in his faith he had buried all thought of self. Rank, -wealth, fame alike were indifferent to this spare, stern, ascetic -soldier. To give all that lay in him for the cause, to render faithful -account of every trust reposed in him for the cause, to forward all -that would further it, to combat all that could impede it—such were -the principles that governed his conduct. With these motives to -inspire him, with great natural gifts, and with every faculty of mind -and body trained to the highest point, it is not surprising that his -intellectual grasp was wide, his insight clear, his energy infectious, -his industry indefatigable. Such was the man who in the early days of -April hurried to the north, his brain teeming with thoughts, long since -conceived, as to the training best suited to the French soldier, with -his natural aptitude for attack. Five years before, while advocating -a scheme of short service, he had written that it is war and not a -lifetime in the barrack-yard that makes the old soldier.[127] To -General Dampierre, who had been appointed on his recommendation to -succeed Dumouriez, Carnot left it to apply this precept, while he -himself, with ominous directness, hastened northward to repair the -half-ruined fortress of Dunkirk. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER V - - -◆1793.◆ - -The effect of Carnot’s arrival at Dunkirk in overthrowing Pitt’s -original plan has already been told. There can be no doubt that the -French had full information of the Minister’s designs, for it became -a proverb that the most secret projects of the British War Office -were always well known to the enemy and to everybody in England.[128] -Nevertheless, if the British Cabinet had thereupon frankly abandoned -any attempt upon Dunkirk, Carnot’s labours might have been turned -to naught. The French army was only slowly assembled during April, -and even at the end of the month was of inferior force and scattered -over a wide front; for the French were not free from the vices of the -cordon-system, nor were likely to be, so long as civilians interfered -with their military dispositions. ◆April.◆ Apart from the garrisons of -Quesnoy, Valenciennes, Condé, Lille and Dunkirk, Dampierre kept ten -thousand men on his right, under General Harville, between Maubeuge and -Philippeville: ten thousand more, under General Lamarlière, lay on his -left, in an entrenched camp thrown up by Carnot at Cassel and at other -points between Lille and Dunkirk: and five thousand at Nomain, Orchies, -and Hasnon, covered the interval between Lille and the main army. This -last, consisting of thirty thousand men under Dampierre’s immediate -command, lay in an entrenched camp at Famars, a little to the south of -Valenciennes, with a detachment in another fortified position at Anzin, -to the north-west of that town. In all, therefore, he had about fifty -thousand men at hand for service in the field. - -◆April 23.◆ - -Meanwhile the Allies, who were still below their full strength, -occupied the following positions. On their right, that is to say, -to westward, six thousand Dutch and about three thousand Imperial -troops, under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, lay at Furnes, Ypres -and Menin; next to them two thousand five hundred British and about -the same number of Austrians and Prussians, under the Duke of York, -occupied Tournai; next to the Duke of York, Knobelsdorf, with about -eight thousand Prussians, held the line of Maulde, Lecelles and Saint -Amand on the Scarpe; next to Knobelsdorf, Clerfaye, with about twelve -thousand men at Vicoigne and Raismes, and at Bruay and Fresnes, on -the Scheldt, encompassed Condé on the south, while the Prince of -Würtemberg with about five thousand men blockaded it on the north. At -Onnaing, due south of Condé, lay the principal army, about fifteen -thousand strong, with the advance guard at Saint Saulve; and to the -east of the main army General Latour with about six thousand men -occupied Bettignies, in observation of Maubeuge, with a detachment at -Bavai to preserve communication between Bettignies and Onnaing. The -total force of the Allies may thus be taken, roughly, at over sixty -thousand men, not including thirty thousand Imperial troops under the -Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirschberg, which were uselessly detained at Namur, -Trèves and Luxemburg. The English cavalry, the Hanoverians and the -Hessians, had not yet arrived, though the first detachments of the two -former were drawing near to the front; but none the less the Allies -were actually superior to the French in numbers, and very far superior -in quality. The whole of their multitudinous posts were strongly -entrenched; but it will be observed that, besides the essential defect -of the enormous extension of their front, their line was cut in two by -the river Scheldt, which gave the greater opportunity for a successful -attack upon one or other of their wings. The general distribution of -the Allies corresponded in the main with their lines of retreat, that -of the British lying west to the sea, that of the Dutch north-east upon -Antwerp, that of the Austrians east upon Namur; so that a successful -attack upon the British would probably lay bare the Austrian right, -and a decided defeat of the Austrians must certainly uncover the -British left. With their usual jealousy for supreme control, the -Austrians mixed a contingent of their own troops with the Allies in -every section of the army, an arrangement which gave rise to infinite -confusion, since it made even small detachments dependent on two or -three different sources of supply. For each nation made provision for -its own troops in its own way, and, owing to diversities of system and -of differences in calibre of muskets and cannon, it was impossible to -enforce any effort towards uniformity. - -Still, the inactivity of Coburg during April was marvellous. It never -occurred to him to overwhelm any one of Dampierre’s isolated divisions -of untrained men by concentrating a superior force upon it. He never -reflected that, even if both sides adhered to the cordon-system, the -French could bring up the whole manhood of their country to make their -cordon stronger than his own at every point. He allowed Dampierre to -school his troops with impunity by perpetual affairs of outposts, -without remembering that the French could more easily replace two men -than he could replace one. Finally (but this may be pardoned to him) he -did not guess that, while he was wasting a campaign over formal sieges, -the French would evolve from the experience of many skirmishes a new -system of tactics—that they would abandon the old formal training, and, -turning to account the indiscipline which springs from the principle -of equality, would grant independence of action to the born fighting -men, and trust to the national impetuosity to carry the rest forward in -dense masses to the attack. - -It is a shameful reproach to the Allies that, overmatched though he was -in every respect, the French General took the initiative and made the -first move of the campaign. ◆May 1.◆ On the 1st of May he assailed the -whole line of the Allies from Saint Saulve to St. Amand; but, the -attacks being unintelligent and incoherent, he was beaten back at every -point with a loss of two thousand men and several guns. ◆May 8.◆ Urged -by the Convention to save Condé, he on the 8th essayed a second attempt, -and on this occasion confined himself to demonstrations only upon the -flanks of the Allies, concentrating a larger proportion of his force -against Clerfaye’s position in the centre. These sounder principles -brought him within an ace of success. He himself directed a frontal -attack from Anzin against Raismes and Vicoigne, and after four -successive repulses carried the position of Raismes, excepting the -village. Lamarlière meanwhile with little difficulty made his way -towards St. Amand, while one of his divisions, crossing the Scarpe, -pressed on unseen through the forest of Vicoigne, nearly to the road -which leads from St. Amand to Valenciennes. There this division began to -throw up a redoubt and batteries to cannonade Clerfaye’s defences of -Vicoigne, so as to cut off communication between him and Knobelsdorf, -and to ensure a junction with the garrison of Valenciennes. The -situation was critical, for, if the French succeeded in holding -possession of the road, the post at Vicoigne was lost, and the whole -line of the Allies was broken. Fortunately the Duke of York had moved -three battalions of Guards to Nivelle, a little to the north of St. -Amand, having promised Knobelsdorf help in case of need; and at five -o’clock in the evening the brigade came upon the scene, just as the -French were gaining the upper hand of the Prussians. The country to -north and west of Valenciennes is a level plain, broken only by the -three forests which bear the names of Marchiennes, Vicoigne, and -Raismes, so that the Duke could see little or nothing of what was going -forward until his troops were actually on the scene of action. The -Coldstream, being first for duty, by Knobelsdorf’s order entered the -wood, and quickly driving the French back, followed them up to their -entrenchments. There, however, they were met by musketry in front and a -fierce fire of grape from a masked battery in flank; when, finding -themselves unsupported by the Prussians, they fell back in good order -with a loss of over seventy killed and wounded. Seeing, however, by the -appearance of the red coats, that Knobelsdorf had been reinforced, -Lamarlière’s division made no further effort to advance; and Dampierre, -while leading a last desperate assault upon Vicoigne from the front, was -mortally wounded by a cannon-shot. ◆May 9.◆ This decided the fate of the -day: his successor stopped the attack, and on the following morning -retreated. On the next day Clerfaye and Knobelsdorf stormed the enemy’s -newly-built batteries and captured their garrison of six hundred men, -but failed to take the guns, which, according to the French custom of -the time, had been withdrawn and kept limbered up for the night, in -readiness for escape.[129] The loss of Clerfaye’s and Knobelsdorf’s -corps in the two days was little short of eight hundred officers and -men; that of the French was far heavier, and was aggravated by the death -of Dampierre. It speaks highly for the man that with troops so raw he -should have made so fine a fight against some of the best soldiers in -Europe. - -The losses suffered by the Coldstream Guards on the 8th were made the -subject of much complaint both against Knobelsdorf and the Duke of -York, and did not promote good feeling among the Allies in the field. -The battalion was, in fact, lucky to escape annihilation. Murray -blamed Lieutenant-colonel Pennington, who was in command; but it -seems that Knobelsdorf simply told him to enter the wood, which was -full of dense undergrowth, without saying a word of the batteries or -entrenchments hidden within it, though both an Austrian and a Prussian -battalion had already suffered severely in an attempt to carry them. -The Duke of York, who had never contemplated so foolhardy an attack, -wisely thought it best to make no complaint. The battalion itself, to -judge by a letter from one of the officers to Lord Buckingham, was -very indignant with the Duke; and there is every probability that its -complaints reached the ear of Pitt. I mention this, because, though the -matter is in itself a small one, it gives conclusive evidence of the -incessant friction which arose from the indiscipline of the British -officers and from the mistrust which the Allies felt for each other. -It is safe to conjecture that this uninformed criticism of generals -by their subordinate officers continued throughout the campaign; and -the preservation of the letter above mentioned among Lord Grenville’s -papers is proof that such criticism was not disregarded by their -powerful patrons at home. Unfortunately there is too much reason to -fear that this evil even now is not unknown in our Army.[130] - -During the following days the Allies were considerably strengthened by -the arrival of successive detachments of Hanoverians and of one brigade -of British cavalry under General Ralph Dundas;[131] but already Murray, -with his American experience, had awoke to his weakness in light -troops, and was recommending the acceptance of two offers to raise -corps of foreign riflemen and Polish Uhlans.[132] The primitive tactics -of the French were beginning to tell. The raw levies understood war to -signify the killing of the enemy—even of one man rather than none at -all—and the saving of themselves. When therefore a mass of them was set -in motion, the bravest men advanced, taking advantage of every shelter -afforded by the ground, and did their utmost to shoot their opponents -down; while the rest ran away or remained at a safe distance, to return -in a fierce tumultuous swarm if the enemy showed signs of wavering, but -not otherwise. ◆May 21.◆ However, on the 21st, Coburg, much rejoiced -by the reinforcement of British and Hanoverians, judged himself strong -enough to pursue his plan of campaign, and decided to drive the -French from their camp at Famars preliminarily to the investment of -Valenciennes. Meanwhile, to the general regret, Mack resigned his post -on Coburg’s staff, owing partly to ill-health, partly to his sense -of Thugut’s antagonism to him;[133] and the Prince of Hohenlohe, a -veteran of seventy-one, was called from Luxemburg to take his place. It -was, however, enough at that time that the attack should be designed by -an Austrian General to ensure that it should be repugnant to all good -sense. - -The entrenched camp of Famars embraced two broad parallel plateaux, -divided by the little river Rhonelle, which lie immediately to the -south of Valenciennes. The western plateau, that of Famars, has a -length of about four miles, and abuts on the village of Artres; the -eastern, which is broader and less clearly defined than the other, has -a length of about three and a half miles, and terminates at the village -of Préseau. Both are practically flat upon the summit, unenclosed, and -were covered with crops. The ascent to them is steepest from the west -and south, and the valley dug between them by the Rhonelle, though not -deep, plunges down so abruptly as to present sides of sharp though -short declivity. The ridge of Famars was protected by a series of -detached flêches and redoubts placed on every commanding point on the -northern, western, and southern sides. The passages over the Rhonelle -at Artres, and at Maresches, a mile and a half above it, were defended -by strong entrenchments and batteries, and all the fords on this narrow -but deep and sluggish stream had been destroyed. The eastern ridge was -fortified by a continuous entrenchment with three redoubts, which was -carried for nearly a mile along the length of the summit. The force at -hand for its defence was about twenty-five thousand men, besides which -five thousand men held the fortified position of Anzin; while a small -detachment due west of it at Aubry maintained communication with the -post of Hasnon, still further to north and west. - -The attack of the main position was assigned to two principal columns, -of which the left or southern was placed under command of the Duke of -York, with orders to assemble his force on the heights between Préseau -and Maresches, and to assail the right flank of the position. This -column was made up of sixteen battalions, eighteen squadrons, and -thirty-eight reserve-guns,[134] of which the brigade of Guards[135] -and the eight squadrons of Dundas’s brigade were British. The second -principal column consisted of twelve battalions, of which three -were the English of Abercromby’s brigade,[136] twelve squadrons and -twenty-three reserve-guns, with five pontoons, under the Austrian -General Ferraris. His orders were to assemble between Saultain and -Curgies, a little to the north-east of Préseau, to drive the enemy from -their positions east of the Rhonelle, and to cross the river itself, -or at least feint to do so. Besides these, a third column under Count -Colloredo was to observe Valenciennes from between Estreux and Onnaing, -and to protect Ferraris’s right flank; a fourth, further to the right, -under Clerfaye, was to attack the entrenched camp of Anzin; a fifth -still further to the right under Knobelsdorf was to march from St. -Amand against Hasnon; and a sixth and seventh under the Crown Prince -and Prince Frederick of Orange were to move respectively from Tournai -upon Orchies, and from Menin upon Tourcoing. Finally, on the extreme -left or western flank, there were an eighth column, under General Otto, -to protect the Duke of York’s left by an advance by Villerspol upon -Quesnoy, and a ninth to disquiet the French on the Sambre from Bavai. -The scheme was typically Austrian; that is to say, too full of science -to leave room for sense. - -[Illustration: - - Attack of the Allies - on the - CAMP OF FAMARS - 23 May, 1793. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆May 23.◆ - -The morning broke in dense fog, so that the main attack did not begin -until near seven o’clock, when the Duke of York’s column, after marching -most of the night, made its way with little resistance to Artres. There -failing to force the passage of the river, which was defended by five -batteries, the Duke left his heavy guns with about a third of his force -to engage the French artillery, and proceeded with the rest higher up -the stream to Maresches, where a ford was found, and the passage was -with some trouble and delay accomplished. Meanwhile Ferraris attacked -the long entrenchment on the eastern ridge, opening fire from three -batteries, while Abercromby on the right and four Austrian battalions on -the left advanced to the assault, and carried the works with little -difficulty, capturing seven guns and over one hundred prisoners. Two -French regiments of cavalry, which tried to turn the scale against the -assaulting columns, were most gallantly charged by the Austrian Hussars -and the Hanoverian Life Guards, and actually defeated, notwithstanding -that the victorious troops had all the disadvantage of a steep ascent -against them. Coburg then halted Ferraris’s column, until further news -should come of the Duke of York’s advance. But the Duke, after making a -wide turning movement by Querenaing and driving the French from their -outlying defences, found himself at sunset at the foot of the most -formidable ascent in the whole position, crowned at different points by -four redoubts which flanked each other. Thereupon, since his men had -been on foot for eighteen hours, he decided to defer the attack till -next morning. Elsewhere, the success of the various columns was -indifferent. Knobelsdorf could win no more than the outworks of Hasnon; -Clerfaye failed to take the camp of Anzin; and, though the Prince of -Orange drove the French from Orchies, his brother, Prince Frederick of -Orange, was foiled before Tourcoing. ◆May 24.◆ Coburg gave orders for -renewal of the attack on the entrenchments of Famars and Anzin at -daybreak of the 24th; but it was found that the French, after -reinforcing the garrison of Valenciennes, had evacuated all their -positions and retired to Bouchain. The trophies of the Allies were -seventeen guns, captured at various points, and three hundred prisoners; -and the further loss of the French was set down, doubtless with -exaggeration, at three thousand killed and wounded. Even so the results -of the day were unsatisfactory. The Austrians, of course, blamed the -Duke of York; and Murray, without specifying who was in fault, wrote -privately that a great deal more might have been done.[137] But, in -truth, no one except an Austrian of that period could have looked for -great results from so feeble and faulty a plan of attack. - -However, the ground was now clear for the siege of Valenciennes; and -Coburg, as a compliment to the Duke of York, offered him the command of -the besieging force, including fourteen thousand Austrians. There was -much division in the British Cabinet over this piece of politeness, for -Ministers were still in the dark as to Austria’s general intentions; and -some of them feared that the troops under the Duke of York might be so -much crippled by the siege of Valenciennes as to be unfit for the -subsequent siege of Dunkirk. However, notwithstanding their suspicions -of some sinister design on Austria’s part, the Duke received permission -to accept the command; though Coburg was careful to attach General -Ferraris to his staff with secret orders to take the entire direction of -the operations upon himself.[138] The chief of the English Engineers, -Colonel Moncrieff, was urgent for storming the town without further ado, -and was confident that, if his plans were followed, the place could be -taken within twelve days; but, though Murray was wholly of Moncrieffs -opinion, Ferraris would not hear of it. ◆June 13.◆ A fortnight was -therefore spent in collecting heavy artillery, after which ground was -duly broken on the 13th of June, before a greater and a lesser horn-work -on the east side of the town. About twenty-five thousand men were -actually employed on the siege, while the remainder, about thirty -thousand men, formed the covering army; and, practically speaking, -active operations upon both sides ceased except round the walls of the -beleaguered fortress. - -Yet, far away to westward, there had been a movement disquieting to -the British. On the 29th of May forty transports, conveying the second -brigade of British cavalry,[139] came into Ostend; whereupon Captain -Carnot, knowing the slackness of the Dutch garrisons at Furnes and -Nieuport, which covered that place, determined to surprise them from -Dunkirk, and then by a swift march forward to seize and burn the -British shipping. ◆May 30.◆ Moving out accordingly on the night of the -30th, he reached Furnes at daybreak, drove the Dutch headlong from the -town, and was hoping to follow them up to Nieuport, when the whole of -his troops with one accord fell to the plunder of the town, heedless -of their officers, and in a short time were reeling or lying in all -directions, hopelessly drunk. Far from seizing Ostend, he was thankful -that the Dutch did not return and cut his helpless battalions to -pieces.[140] - -Nevertheless, the movement fulfilled the useful purpose of frightening -the British Cabinet. Dundas was possessed by a kind of superstition -respecting Ostend, having apparently some idea that it might be held -as the gate of the Austrian Netherlands from the sea, even if the rest -of the country were evacuated. Though the place itself was part of the -Austrian dominions, the guardianship of the whole of the coast, and -indeed of the right flank of the Allied army, was entrusted to the -Dutch; and in spite of all protests the Dutch declined to do anything -for its defence. Ostend was in fact indefensible, being divided by -an unbridged estuary which cut it in two at every flood tide, and -was safe from a French attack only for so long as Menin, Ypres, -and Nieuport were held by the Allies. The Duke of York and Murray -therefore regarded it as of no military value, though of some temporary -convenience, looking upon Antwerp and the Scheldt as their true base -and channel of communication with England. Nothing, however, would -convince Dundas of Ostend’s insignificance. He took the place under -his own control, sent heavy ordnance to be mounted for its defence, -appointed a special officer, General Ainslie, to take command of it, -and plagued Murray so incessantly to fortify it that the Duke of York, -for the sake of peace, consented to raise a few entrenchments on a -small scale. The Duke had hardly done so, however, before he received -a rebuke from Dundas for spending too much money; whereupon he, of -course, suspended the work, being, as Murray said, at a loss to know -how to proceed. This was the beginning of a more minute and persistent -interference of Dundas with the conduct of the operations, with its -inevitable consequence of strained relations between him and the -General in the field.[141] - -Meanwhile the siege of Valenciennes went forward slowly and -methodically, much more so, indeed, than seemed necessary either to -Murray or to Moncrieff, though bad weather was accountable in some -measure for the delay. ◆July 10.◆ At length, on the 10th of July, Condé -surrendered after a severe bombardment, and was occupied in the name of -the Emperor Francis. ◆July 22.◆ Twelve days later Mainz opened its gates -to the Prussians, though the garrison was twenty thousand strong, and -had still bread and wine to last for some days. ◆July 26.◆ Finally, on -the 26th, an assault was delivered in three columns upon the two -horn-works of Valenciennes, one column being led by a storming party of -the Guards, and supported by part of Abercromby’s brigade. The attacks -of all three succeeded with little loss, and Murray, after a strong -altercation with the Austrian engineer, insisted, in defiance of -Ferraris’s orders, upon making a lodgment in the greater horn-work.[142] -◆July 28.◆ Thereupon, on the 28th of July, the French General, Ferrand, -capitulated. The place was taken over, like Condé, in the Emperor’s -name, amid the loud applause not only of the citizens but of the -garrison, who trampled the tricolour under foot and hailed the Duke of -York as King of France. All three of the captured garrisons were -permitted to return to their own place, on condition that they should -not fight against the Allies during the remainder of the war. - -Unfortunately, after the fall of Valenciennes the Allies in Flanders, -far from pressing their advantage, fell to debating what they should -do next. It had been already agreed that the Austrians should give -up ten thousand men to the Duke of York for the siege of Dunkirk; -but Coburg, seeing the danger of the plan, made a last effort to -avert it by submitting a new scheme for taking the offensive in -concert with Prussia; he himself to move south-east upon Maubeuge -from Valenciennes, while the Prussians should advance south-west from -Mainz upon Sarrelouis. King Frederick William gladly assented, but -the Duke of York protested, as under his instructions he was bound -to do; and he was upheld by a messenger who arrived from Vienna at -Coburg’s headquarters on the 6th of August. Thugut had been at work -on one of his usual subtilties. He had soothed Pitt by renouncing the -exchange of Belgium for Bavaria, but had begged that Prussia might not -be informed of the renunciation; for he was still secretly bent on -obtaining Bavaria by some means, and had resolved to purchase it by the -cession of Alsace. Hence it was his wish that the King of Prussia, and -particularly the Austrian troops under General Wurmser who were serving -with him, should move south into Alsace, and that Coburg should pursue -the plan, already agreed upon, of besieging Quesnoy, while the Duke of -York invested Dunkirk. Coburg thereupon gave way, though with no very -good grace; and it was resolved that, before his army was separated -from the Duke’s, a general action should be fought, as an essential -preliminary to the subsequent operations.[143] - -The position of the French under General Kilmain was known as that -of Caesar’s Camp, which lies on the left bank of the Scheldt about -two miles above Bouchain; but in reality it formed an irregular -quadrilateral, of which a part of Villars’s famous lines of La Bassée -formed the northern side. Facing due east, Kilmain’s front was covered -by the Scheldt from Bouchain to Cambrai, his rear by the river Agache, -which runs into the Sensée a little to the south of Arleux, his right -by the Sensée, and his left by the wood and heights of Bourlon from -Cambrai to Marquion. All passages over the Scheldt were closed by -entrenchments, and the valley itself was flooded; all passages over -the Sensée were equally defended, while the right from Cambrai to -Agache was strengthened by field-works and abatis. Such a position, -held by sixty thousand men, was formidable, and Coburg accordingly -resolved to turn it by the south. The turning column, consisting of -fourteen thousand men under the Duke of York, was to assemble about -Villers-en-Cauchies and Saint Aubert, and to cross the Scheldt at -Masnières and Crevecœur, about five miles south of Cambrai. A second -column of about nine thousand men under the Austrian General Colloredo, -and a third of about twelve thousand under General Clerfaye, were to -force the passage of the Scheldt in the front of the position. The -remainder of the army, little less than half of it, was uselessly -frittered away in posts of observation. - -Murray, foreseeing that the French would retire as soon as they -perceived the turning movement, begged persistently that more cavalry -should be given to the Duke of York, in order to inflict some -punishment on them. His request was refused, and the result was -exactly that which he had expected. ◆Aug. 7.◆ The Duke, after a march -of eleven hours on a day of extraordinary heat, found his troops too -much exhausted to pass the river at Masnières; and Kilmain, withdrawing -quietly in the night, made good his retreat upon Arras with little -loss, though the British cavalry made a few prisoners. The Austrians, -of course, blamed the Duke of York, though Coburg had sent Hohenlohe -with him for the express purpose of superintending his operations; but -the arrangements of the day opened Murray’s eyes to the essential vices -of the Austrian tactics. “We were not in force to attack the enemy,” -he wrote; “the Duke’s column was a long way from support, and between -ourselves we were not sorry to see them go off.” It was only after long -schooling by disaster that the Austrians at last abandoned a system of -which the rottenness was clear to the much despised Briton.[144] - -After the engagement, Coburg pressed the Duke of York to remain with him -for yet another fortnight, in order to renew the attack on the French -army or to take Cambrai, the last fortress that blocked the way into -France. But the Duke could only obey his instructions as to Dunkirk, -which had lately been reiterated by Dundas;[145] and the two armies -accordingly parted. Coburg, weakened by the withdrawal of nine thousand -Prussian troops, and not yet compensated by the restoration of fourteen -thousand Austrians from the Rhine, resolved to besiege Quesnoy, and -meanwhile spread his force in several detachments from Denain to -Bettignies. ◆Aug. 13.◆ The Duke assembled his whole force of about -thirty-seven thousand men[146] at Marchiennes on the Scarpe on the 13th -of August, and on the 15th marched in two columns north-west by Baisieux -and Tourcoing upon Menin. From Baisieux the route lay across the front -of the great fortress of Lille, and of the French fortified posts -extending from that city to Dunkirk; ◆Aug. 18.◆ and on the morning of -the 18th, soon after the advanced guard of the southern column had moved -from Tourcoing, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Linselles, -about two miles to the west of that place. The Prince of Orange, for -reasons best known to himself, had seized the opportunity to sally out -from Menin, and surprise the French posts of Blaton and Linselles, which -being accomplished, he left two weak battalions to hold them, and -retired. About mid-day the French returned with five thousand men and -drove out the Dutch; and an hour or two later an aide-de-camp came -galloping into Menin to ask for help. The Duke of York at once ordered -out the brigade of Guards, which had just arrived at Menin after a -severe march, with a few guns, under General Lake. The three battalions, -without their flank companies, and therefore little over eleven hundred -strong, at once turned out, and traversed the six miles to Linselles in -little more than an hour, but, on reaching it, found not a Dutchman -there. They were, however, saluted by a heavy fire of grape from -batteries which they had supposed to be in possession of the Dutch; and -thereupon Lake determined to attack at once. - -The hill, on which the village of Linselles stands, is fairly steep on -its northern face, and was further strengthened by two redoubts before -the village itself and by a barrier of palisades on the road, while its -flanks were secured by woods and ditches. Lake at once deployed into -line under a heavy fire of grape, and, after firing three or four -volleys, charged with the bayonet and drove the French from the redoubts -and village. He then halted and re-formed on the southern side of the -hill, not without apprehensions lest the enemy should rally and make a -counter attack while he was still unsupported. Fortunately, however, -the French were not equal to the attempt, being still of the inferior -quality which was inevitable under the foolish administration of the -Jacobins, and so puny in stature that the Guards cuffed and jostled them -like a London mob, without condescending to kill them.[147] Lake was -therefore left unmolested on his ground, until at nightfall six -battalions of Hessians arrived, in reply to his urgent messages for -reinforcement, to relieve him. His trophies were twelve guns, seventy -prisoners, and a colour, but his losses amounted to one hundred and -eighty-seven officers and men killed and wounded; and no real object -whatever was gained. The action was undoubtedly most brilliant, and the -conduct of the men beyond all praise; while Lake’s swift decision to -escape from a most dangerous situation by an immediate attack stamps him -as a ready commander. But it is a grave reflection upon the Duke of York -that he should so thoughtlessly have exposed some of his best troops to -needless danger, leaving them isolated and unsupported for several -hours. It is still less to his credit that, when he finally relieved -them by a detachment of Hessians, he actually left these also isolated -and unsupported within striking distance of a superior enemy during the -whole night, for no better purpose than to rase some paltry French -earthworks which a few hours would suffice to throw up again. Because -the Prince of Orange was guilty of one act of signal foolishness, there -was no occasion to outdo him by another. - -At Menin the army was parted into two divisions. The first, consisting -of the Hanoverians, ten British squadrons and foreign troops, or about -fourteen thousand five hundred men, under the Hanoverian Marshal -Freytag, was to form the covering army; the other, of nearly twenty-two -thousand men, including the rest of the British troops, under the Duke -in person, was appointed to besiege Dunkirk. ◆Aug. 19.◆ On the 19th, -Freytag marched from Menin by Ypres upon Poperinghe, which he occupied -with his main body on the ◆Aug. 20.◆ 20th, at the same time pushing his -advanced guard further north-west to Rousbrugge on the Yser. ◆Aug. 21.◆ -On the following day a detachment of Hessians, with great skill and at -small cost to themselves, drove the French from Oost Capel and Rexpoede -into the fortress of Bergues, with the loss of eleven guns and some four -hundred men; and Freytag then took up his line of posts to cover the -besieging army. His left was stationed at Poperinghe, covered by the -fortress of Ypres; and from thence the chain ran north-west to Proven on -the Yser, and westward up that stream by Bambecque to Wylder, where it -turned north, and passing midway between Bergues and Rexpoede rested its -right on a point called the White House, hard by the canal that runs -from Bergues ◆Aug. 23, 24.◆ to Furnes. On the 23rd and 24th Freytag -drove the French from Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque with the loss of -nineteen guns, and surrounded Bergues by detachments at Warhem to east, -Coudekerque to north, Sainte Quaedypre to south, and Steene to -west. From this last an outer chain of posts was extended southward to -Esquelbecque, and thence east by Wormhoudt and Herzeele to the Upper -Yser at Houtkerque. The whole circuit thus embraced measured about -twenty-one miles; from which it will be concluded that Freytag was a -believer in the cordon-system. - -◆Aug. 20.◆ - -Meanwhile the Duke of York marched on the 20th to Furnes; ◆Aug. 22.◆ and -on the 22nd, moving thence parallel with the strand, he drove in the -enemy’s advanced posts upon the entrenched camp of Ghyvelde, which the -French abandoned in the night. ◆Aug. 24.◆ On the 24th, after several -hours of sharp fighting, which cost the Allies nearly four hundred -men,[148] the French were forced back from the suburb of Rosendahl into -the town; whereupon the Duke entrenched himself in his chosen position, -with his right resting on the sea and his left at Tetteghem, facing full -upon the eastern side of the town and about two miles distant from the -walls. - -The field of operations for the Duke’s army may be described roughly as -a quadrilateral, of which the sea forms the northern side, the canal -from Dunkirk to Bergues the west, the canal from Bergues to Furnes the -south, and a line drawn from Furnes to the sea the east. From east to -west the ground thus enclosed was divided roughly into two parallel -strips; the northern half consisting of the sandhills known as the -Dunes, together with a narrow plain of level sandy ground within them; -and the southern half of a huge morass called the Great Moor, which -consisted partly of standing water, partly of swamp, but was all open to -inundation by admitting the tidal water from the sluices of Dunkirk. -Tetteghem, which formed the left of the Duke’s position, rested upon -this swamp, and commanded the only road that led across it to the White -House, and so to Freytag’s army. The position itself was in many -respects disadvantageous. It was much broken up by innumerable little -ditches, hedges, and patches of brushwood, all of which the troops had -to clear away with their side-arms for want of better tools; it was -wholly destitute of drinking water, that in the canals being brackish, -and that found in the wells unpalatable; and, finally, it lay open to -the minutest inspection from the tower of Dunkirk Cathedral. But this -was not the worst. The Duke had looked for a fleet to cover his right -flank, which had suffered from the enemy’s gunboats during the march -upon Ghyvelde, and for transports bringing heavy artillery and other -materials for the siege; and so far there was not a sign of them. “The -principal object is to have what is wanted and to have it in time,” -Murray had written to Dundas in July; and Dundas had replied that he was -preparing artillery for Dunkirk, but was in great want of gunners.[149] -◆Aug. 27.◆ At last, on the 27th, the transports came with gunners, but -without guns; ◆Aug. 29.◆ on the 29th a frigate, the _Brilliant_, and a -few armed cutters appeared off the coast; ◆Aug. 30.◆ and on the 30th -Admiral Macbride arrived to concert operations, but without his fleet. - -By an arrangement, which was repeated at least once more during the -war, Macbride’s squadron, being intended to act with the Army, had been -removed from the control of the Admiralty and placed under the orders -of Dundas, so that he alone was responsible for this miscarriage.[150] -“Why did you not earlier suggest to me naval co-operation at Dunkirk?” -he wrote angrily to Murray on the 29th. “I had always a conceit in -my own mind as to its usefulness, but I had no authority to quote -for it.” This is an instructive example of Dundas’s methods as a War -Minister. The project of besieging Dunkirk emanated from himself and -his colleagues in the Cabinet, and from them alone. No military man -approved it, though the Duke of York, out of loyalty to his masters, -dutifully upheld it; and Dundas never quoted any authority but his -own for undertaking it, nor for his constant interference with the -conduct of the operations that preceded it. He had indeed a good -many conceits in his own mind, the most fatal of which was that he -understood how to conduct a campaign; and he had privately made vague -inquiries of Murray, as to the need for naval co-operation, so far back -as in April.[151] But the point was not one to be decided off-hand by -a General, for the question was not whether a fleet would be useful, -but whether it would be able to act in all weathers; and this purely -naval matter appears never to have been considered at all. On the -15th of August, when the army was not yet committed to the siege, -General Ainslie, the commandant at Ostend, warned Dundas that he had -not realised the difficulties which might be raised by adverse weather -at Dunkirk; and, as a matter of fact, the _Brilliant_ and her little -flotilla had not been on the coast three days before they were blown -away from their station. It was doubtless owing to the uncertainty of -naval assistance that Murray gave the apparently astounding opinion, -that he regarded a squadron as useful though not very material to the -siege. But, apart from this, Dundas had so often pressed the Duke -of York to spare his eight thousand Hessians, which formed almost -one-third of the force under his command, for another service, that it -was impossible for the Duke to divine whether Ministers really intended -to pursue their design against Dunkirk or not. If they did, he had a -right to look to them for a siege-train and for the necessary naval -assistance, neither of which were forthcoming, partly because Dundas -did not know his own mind, partly because he had committed himself -to a multiplicity of operations beyond the power, after ten years of -steady neglect,[152] of either Army or Navy to execute. However, as -a substitute for the much-needed ships and guns, he sent to Murray a -plan for the siege of Dunkirk, drawn up by no less skilled a hand than -that of Lord Chancellor Loughborough, possibly with some hope that the -deficiencies of Downing Street might be made good by the wisdom of -the woolsack. There are times when the conceit of British politicians -becomes touchingly ridiculous. - -Very different was the change that had come over military administration -in France during the same month of August. ◆Aug. 10.◆ Upon the -re-election of the Committee of Public Safety, which took place on the -10th, Barrère, who was a member, approached Prieur of the Côte d’Or with -the words, “We none of us understand military matters. You are an -officer of Engineers; will you join us?” “There is only one man in the -Convention for the place,” answered Prieur, “and that is Carnot; and I -will be his second.” ◆Aug. 14.◆ Accordingly, on the 14th of August two -new members were added to the Committee, namely, Carnot, who assumed -control of the formation, training, and movements of the armies, and -Prieur, who took charge of arms, ammunition, and hospitals. These, -together with Robert Lindet, formed the most remarkable group in one of -the most remarkable administrative bodies which has ever existed. Three -of the members, Barrère, Billaud Varennes, and Collot d’Herbois, were -known as the Revolutionaries, their business being to guide and inspire -political emotions; three more, Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint Just, -were concerned with legislative proposals, police, and the revolutionary -tribunal, and bore the ominous name of the High Hands; but the last -three, Carnot, Prieur, and Lindet, were known simply as the Workers, a -title which no men have ever more worthily earned. - -Carnot’s advent showed itself in prompt and energetic action. ◆Aug. 16.◆ -On the 16th of August a decree was passed for a levy _en masse_, which, -it was estimated, would add four hundred and fifty thousand men to the -army; and, since all exemptions and substitutes were disallowed, the -cream of the nation began for the first time to flow into the ranks. -◆Aug. 29.◆ Moreover, on the 29th of August, the old white coats of the -Monarchy were abolished and the blue coat of the National Guard made -uniform for the entire host, a significant hint that henceforth there -were to be no further distinctions between regular troops and -volunteers, but a single National Army. Prieur, on his side, set up -manufactories of arms and gunpowder in Paris, and stimulated the search -for saltpetre in all directions. The result of these measures lay hid in -the future; but immediate and important movements were made on the -northern frontier. Carnot, with true insight, had divined that England -was in reality the most dangerous member of the Coalition, and that to -foil her before Dunkirk would, from its political results, be the most -telling of all military operations.[153] ◆Aug. 24.◆ Withdrawing -therefore several thousand troops from Coburg’s front and from the army -of the Moselle, he massed them to westward, until, on the 24th of -August, there were, apart from the eight thousand men in Dunkirk itself, -some twenty-three thousand in the entrenched camp at Cassel, four -thousand about Lille, and twelve to fifteen thousand more from the -Moselle within a few days’ march. Kilmain had been recalled after the -retreat from Cæsar’s camp, and replaced by General Houchard in supreme -command. Among Houchard’s subordinate generals was Jourdan. Dunkirk -itself had for commandant General Souham, an energetic officer whose -fame was soon to spread wide; and one of Souham’s battalions was -commanded by Lazare Hoche. - -Thus new men and a new principle of war, which were to crush the -cordon-system out of existence, hung like an angry cloud to the south of -Dunkirk; but the Generals of the Allies took no heed. Murray, indeed, -had heard with anxiety of the increase of the French force in his front, -and had begged Coburg for reinforcements, which, however, could not be -spared.[154] On the east Coburg was busy besieging Quesnoy, with corps -of observation thrown out to east and west. He had called up eight -thousand men under General Beaulieu from Namur to strengthen his weak -cordon about Bouvines and Orchies; but to west of Beaulieu the space -from Lannoy to Menin was guarded by some thirteen thousand -Dutch—spiritless, disaffected troops, whose leader, the Prince of -Orange, was half inclined to give up the contest because he could obtain -no assurance as to his indemnity. West of the Dutch was the gossamer -line of Freytag, and behind it lay the Duke of York, conscious, first, -that Souham had opened the sluices, and that the steady rise of the -inundation would shortly sever his communication with Freytag; secondly, -that his right flank was under perpetual menace from the French -gunboats; and thirdly, that his rear was insecure, since there was -nothing to hinder the French from moving troops by sea. In this -situation he was trying to take a fortress, which he was not strong -enough to invest and which the enemy could consequently reinforce at any -moment, by attacking it upon one side only without heavy artillery. He -endeavoured to protect his flanks by throwing up entrenchments in the -Dunes, but found that they filled with water at the depth of two feet; -and he was fain to disarm a frigate at Nieuport and bring up her heavy -guns to the front, in order to arm batteries, not only against the town, -but towards the sea, to drive away the French gunboats. Thus at the -beginning of September he was able to open fire; ◆Aug. 27.◆ but -meanwhile Houchard had not been idle, for on the 27th he fell in force -upon the posts of Beaulieu and the Prince of Orange at Cysoing and -Tourcoing. He was beaten back by Beaulieu with the loss of four guns; -but the Dutch abandoned Tourcoing with suspicious alacrity, and would -have retired to Tournai and Courtrai had not Murray sent a detachment to -support them. “There is ill-will and disinclination to favour our -present operations,” wrote Murray; and indeed the fact is hardly -surprising.[155] The marvel is that he and the Duke of York should have -remained in so dangerous a position, when a successful attack by the -enemy upon the Dutch and a bold push forward would have carried the -French to Furnes, and cut off the whole of the army about Dunkirk beyond -rescue. Indeed, though they knew it not, this operation had actually -been projected at the French headquarters.[156] - -[Illustration: - - DUNKIRK AND ENVIRONS - showing - THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES - from 24 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1793. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -With the arrival of his last reinforcements from the Moselle, Houchard -resolved to attack the scattered posts of Freytag, the nearest of which -lay little more than five miles from Cassel. ◆Sept. 6.◆ Assembling -thirty thousand men, he led them forward early in the morning of the 6th -of September in five columns, under Generals Vandamme, Hédouville, -Colland, Jourdan, and himself, the three first against Poperinghe, -Proven, and Rousbrugge, the two last against Wormhoudt, Herzeele, and -Houtkerke. Though outnumbered by ten to one, the Hanoverians and -Hessians fought most obstinately, and the troops opposed to Houchard and -Jourdan would have held their own behind the Yser at Bambecque, had not -the French already penetrated to Rexpoede in their rear. The fighting -lasted all day, the garrison of Dunkirk at the same time keeping the -besieging army employed by a sortie; and at night Freytag retired upon -Hondschoote, ordering General Walmoden, who commanded the posts about -Bergues, to withdraw all his troops to the same place. Taking the road -by Rexpoede, in ignorance that it was actually occupied by the French, -Freytag blundered into the midst of a French picquet, and was, with the -young Prince Adolphus (afterwards Duke of Cambridge), wounded and taken. -The Prince was rescued, but the Field-Marshal was secured, and would -have remained a prisoner, had not General Walmoden, guessing that his -chief might have fallen into a trap, marched at once upon Rexpoede, -stormed it then and there, and delivered him. Walmoden then assumed -command, and, resuming the retreat, took up a convex position before -Hondschoote, with his right leaning on the Bergues canal, his centre -just in advance of Hondschoote itself, and his left resting on the -village of Leysele. The whole of his front was covered by a maze of -small ditches and hedges, through which the only access was a single -dyke leading into Hondschoote; but this broken ground, however valuable -for defence, deprived the Allies of the use of their cavalry, which was -the arm in which above all they overmatched the French. From thence -Walmoden sent urgent messages to the Duke of York for reinforcements; -and it is significant that, owing to the inundation, no troops could -reach him except by way of Bergues. There was therefore no reason why -Freytag’s corps should not have been concentrated about Hondschoote, -where it would have covered the besiegers quite as efficiently and with -infinitely less risk. The British Commander-in-Chief cannot be acquitted -of neglect herein, though Freytag must bear part of the blame for -extreme dispersion of his force. - -◆Sept. 7.◆ - -Houchard tried to follow up his success on the following day by a -renewed attack, but his soldiers would not follow him; and Walmoden, -though he took the precaution to send his heavy baggage to Furnes, -repulsed him without difficulty. ◆Sept. 8.◆ On the 8th, however, -Houchard advanced with fresh troops to the assault, himself leading -twenty battalions, covered by several guns, to the principal attack by -the dyke; while a second column on his left, under General Leclerc, -tried to force its way along the canal, and a third, under Colland -and Hédouville, moved up from Rousbrugge against Leysele. The plan of -attack was faulty, for by holding Walmoden in front and pushing the -main force round his left flank, which stood in the air at Leysele, -Houchard must have compelled him to retire or to be driven into the -swamp of the Great Moor. The new French tactics, however, made good -the General’s shortcomings. Taking cover cunningly behind every hedge, -ditch, or bush, the French sharp-shooters poured a deadly fire into -the Hanoverians and Hessians, who stood exposed in their array of -three ranks deep, discharging their volleys by platoons with perfect -discipline, and pressing forward with the bayonet when the French -ventured too near to them. But the volleys did little injury to -dispersed and hidden skirmishers, and the charge with the bayonet was -hardly more effective over such intricate ground; for the French did -not await it, but ran back to the nearest hedge and resumed their fire -from behind it. For four hours Walmoden’s brave men held their own with -the greatest gallantry in spite of heavy losses, until at noon their -last reserves of ammunition were exhausted, when, their left flank -being seriously threatened by Hédouville, the General gave the order -to retire in two columns upon Furnes. A battalion of Hessians covered -the retreat with splendid tenacity; and the wreck of the force took -up a position between the two canals just to the south of Furnes. The -infantry had lost at least a third of its numbers, perhaps even more; -and the Hanoverians, by the confession of their own officers, were -no longer to be depended upon.[157] It was no reproach to them that -this should have been so, for no troops in the world can endure heavy -punishment during consecutive days of unsuccessful fighting, and remain -unshaken. Their losses had been very great, and their behaviour, by the -admission both of friend and foe, most admirable. - -On this same day the garrison of Dunkirk made a sally against the -besiegers in the village of Rosendahl, but was repulsed, though not -without loss to the Allies; and in the afternoon came the news of -Walmoden’s defeat. At four o’clock orders were given for the heavy -baggage to be sent back to Fumes, and at eight a Council of War was -held. The Duke of York hoped to carry off his siege-guns, but the -French, having control of the sluices, had shut off the water from the -canal, so that it was no longer of use for transport; and it was -represented that delay might mean the overpowering of Walmoden’s army -and the cutting off of the Duke’s retreat by Furnes. At midnight -therefore the besieging army retired in two columns, with a confusion -which shows the inefficiency of the Duke’s staff. Transport being -scarce, the waggons were so much overloaded that the animals could -hardly drag them, and the troops were constantly checked by fallen -horses and overturned vehicles. Further, no orders for the retreat were -sent to the two battalions in Tetteghem, and the whole of one column was -delayed until they could join it. Sept. 9.◆ It was thus ten o’clock on -the morning of the 9th before the entire force reached the camp at -Furnes, fortunately without the least molestation from the enemy.[158] -There the Duke effected his junction with Walmoden, but took the -precaution to send his heavy baggage to Ostend. He had been fortunate in -escaping from a most dangerous position with no greater loss than that -of his thirty-two heavy guns; but incessant fighting, a swampy -encampment, bad drinking-water and fever had grievously thinned the -ranks of his army. It was reported at the time that the siege of Dunkirk -had cost the Allies from one cause and another nearly ten thousand -men;[159] and I am disposed to think that this estimate is not -exaggerated. “Our whole enterprise is defeated and our situation -embarrassing in the extreme,” wrote Murray. “It is uncertain whether we -can maintain ourselves behind Furnes; at all events I think we shall -hold good behind the canal at Nieuport.” ◆Sept. 11.◆ This letter reached -Downing Street on the 11th; and on that same day Macbride’s fleet -appeared before Nieuport, three weeks too late. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER VI - - -◆1793.◆ - -During August and the first week of September the results of the -Government’s incoherent enterprises began to crowd one upon another with -rapidity enough to bewilder a clearer head than that of Dundas. The -forces that he had set in motion in the Colonies seemed at first to -promise great results at small cost. ◆April 12.◆ On the 12th of April -General Cuyler, obedient to his instructions, embarked a force of about -five hundred men[160] at Barbados, and sailed under convoy of -Vice-admiral Sir John Laforey’s squadron to Tobago. The enemy was -prepared for his coming, for, as was usual with Dundas’s secret -expeditions, the whole island of Barbados was apprised of the project as -early as the General;[161] ◆April 14.◆ but none the less Cuyler landed -on the 14th at Courland Bay, stormed on the same night the French fort -that crowns the hill above Scarborough, and captured the island with -trifling loss. The news of this success reached London on the 1st of -June, and was followed a month later by that of the bloodless capture of -St. Pierre and Miquelon by a small force sent from Halifax; ◆May 14.◆ -but the next intelligence from the west was less satisfactory. Though by -no means over-trustful of the representations of the refugees from -Martinique, whom Dundas had recommended to him, and who assured him that -eight hundred men would suffice to take the island, June 10.◆ General -Bruce embarked about eleven hundred troops at Barbados on the 10th of -June,[162] and sailed for the island with Admiral Gardner’s squadron. -◆June 16.◆ After concerting operations with the French Royalists, he -landed his troops on the 16th at Case Navire, for an attack on St. -Pierre; but a panic, which set in among the Royalist levies on the -morning fixed for the action, convinced him that it would be hopeless to -trust them, and he accordingly re-embarked on the 21st for Barbados, -carrying his pusillanimous allies away with him. ◆June 21.◆ Here, -therefore, was an initial failure on the part of the monarchical party, -which had promised such easy possession of the French West Indies; and -Bruce did not hesitate to add that, since the Republicans had admitted -all black men to rights of government in Martinique, any further attack -would be hopeless unless undertaken by a considerable force. - -◆Aug. 13.◆ - -The news of this abortive expedition reached London on the 13th of -August; and shortly afterwards came a letter from a gentleman in Tobago, -warning the Government that French emissaries were busy all over the -West Indies, and that there was great danger of a general rising of the -negroes for the expulsion of the white proprietors from all the -islands.[163] Here was information important enough to make Pitt think -twice before he pursued his policy of cutting off the financial -resources of the Revolution by ruining French West Indian trade, to say -nothing of the fact that the said trade was already practically ruined -by civil war in the French islands. There were other weak points in the -French armour besides the West Indies, so many indeed that Ministers -might be excused for finding it difficult to determine which of them -they should assail. ◆Aug. 29.◆ The only method of overcoming that -difficulty was that they should clearly define to themselves their -object in making war. - -First then, there was the counter-revolution in the south of France; -where Lyons still defied the forces of the Convention, and where it was -hoped that Sardinia, in return for the two hundred thousand pounds given -her by the recent treaty, would intervene effectively, with Austria at -her side. Next,[164] from this same quarter there came the very -important but unexpected news that commissioners from Toulon, after some -parley with Lord Hood, had agreed to declare for the Monarchy and the -Constitution of 1791, and to give up to him the shipping, forts and -arsenal, to be held in trust for King Lewis the Seventeenth until the -end of the war. In return for this, however, they made the natural but -very significant request that troops should be landed for their -protection. Here, therefore, was the Government committed, though by no -act of its own, to serious operations by land on the side of the -Mediterranean. The responsibility assumed by Hood was very grave; and -for a time he hesitated to incur it. “At present,” he wrote, two days -after issuing his public reply to the offers of the commissioners, “I -have not troops sufficient to defend the works. Had I five or six -thousand good troops I should soon end the war.”[165] He therefore -anchored at Hyères and, mindful of the British alliances with the -Mediterranean powers, wrote to the British Ambassador at Naples for such -forces as could be spared, at the same time asking help of the Spanish -Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, who was lying with his squadron off the -coast of Roussillon. ◆Aug. 28.◆ Before, however, these reinforcements -could arrive, he was so far satisfied by the assurances of the French -that he sailed into Toulon harbour and, landing fifteen hundred marines -and soldiers who were acting as such, occupied the principal forts that -defended the outer harbour. While thus engaged he was joined by Langara -with the greater part of his squadron, who announced that he had one -thousand troops ready to disembark at once, and had left four ships -behind to bring three thousand more from the army in Roussillon. Full of -gratitude, Hood gave Langara effusive thanks, and appointed Admiral -Gravina, the Spanish officer next senior to Langara, to be commandant of -Toulon. - -All this was known to the Government by the 15th of September, by which -time, as shall presently be told, more reassuring news had arrived -from Flanders, to the effect that the French had been checked, and -that Coburg’s army had been liberated for action by the surrender -of Quesnoy. It therefore behoved Ministers seriously to reconsider -their military policy, and to make up their minds definitely whether -their object in the war was to be, as they professed, resistance to -unprovoked aggression and the overthrow of the Convention, or simple -annexation of French possessions. In Flanders their great enterprise, -undertaken with no military knowledge and for no military purpose, -had failed; they were as much as ever in the dark as to the ultimate -designs of Austria, and they could not but be sensible that remarkably -little had been accomplished by the Allies on the Rhine. As a matter -of fact Frederick William, having discovered a glaring instance of -Thugut’s duplicity in the matter of the Bavarian exchange, had at the -end of August practically decided to withdraw from the Coalition. This -was as yet unknown to the British Ministers, for their ambassador at -Vienna, Sir Morton Eden, was completely duped by Thugut; but they were -conscious of an increasing coolness on the part of Prussia towards -the war against the Revolution. In such circumstances, although -the northern frontier of France was, from its proximity, the most -convenient sphere of operations for a British army, they might well -consider the advisability of removing all their forces from that -quarter in order to concentrate them at Toulon, which Lord Hood’s -negotiations had already engaged them to protect. French successes -in the north could be only temporary and unprofitable if the Allies, -by assisting the counter-revolution in the south, should deprive -the Convention of the richest provinces of France. A French force at -Antwerp itself would signify little, if the Allies could rally the -party of order from Bordeaux to Marseilles to put down the tyranny at -Paris. - -On the other hand, it was no light task to hold Toulon against all the -host that the Convention might turn upon it. Sir Charles Grey, when -consulted by Pitt as to the force that would be required, declared -that fifty thousand good soldiers would be no more than adequate; upon -which Pitt dismissed him with the remark that he hoped that a smaller -body would suffice.[166] Probably he rested his opinion on Lord Hood’s -phrase about ending the war with six thousand men, which was of course -nonsense, and nonsense of a kind which naval officers at that period -were far too ready to talk and Ministers to hear. Mallet du Pan, the -clearest head in Europe, was urgent for making the counter-revolution -in the south the centre of attack upon the Convention; but American -experience had shown that the support of a disloyal faction is the -most unstable of all foundations upon which to build the conduct of -a war. Men of the same nation will fight each other like devils, -but, when foreigners are called into the contest, all parties tend -to combine against them. Moreover, the southern provinces were by no -means unfavourable to the Revolution at large. On the contrary, they -had enthusiastically acclaimed and supported it, until threatened with -the massacre and pillage which had disgraced Paris in September 1792. -It was therefore essential that the Allies should enter France in such -strength as to be independent of all help from French forces in the -field. It was certain that the worthless brothers of King Lewis the -Sixteenth and their parasites would claim to place themselves at the -head of any counter-revolution; and their presence alone might suffice -first to paralyse and then to subvert it. - -Again, it was doubtful whether any efficient force of the Allies, other -than British, could be collected in the south. Sardinia was perfectly -ready to advance at once to the rescue of Lyons if Austria would join -her; and the Austrian General De Vins, being of the school of Loudoun, -was anxious to show his superiority to his rivals Coburg and Clerfaye -of the school of Lacy. But here again the mischievous rapacity of -Thugut neutralised all action, for he would allow no Austrian troops -to move from Italy unless Sardinia consented to concede the Novarese -to Austria, indemnifying herself at the expense of France. The British -Ministers were aware of this dispute about the Novarese, for Mulgrave -had reported it,[167] and they had sufficient experience of the -Imperial Court to divine that it would not quickly be settled. Apart -from Austria and Sardinia, troops could be obtained from Naples and -from Spain; but the assistance of two courts so effete and so corrupt -was not likely to be efficient. In any case, it was certain that, if -any real advantage was to be gained from the possession of Toulon, -every British soldier must be withdrawn from other operations, and that -the whole of England’s military force must be assembled at that point. -If this were impossible, it were best to instruct Hood to make sure of -the French fleet, destroy the arsenal, and carry away the inhabitants -who had yielded the place into his hands. - -Then, besides Flanders and Toulon, there was La Vendée, where the -contemptible ruffians whom the Jacobins had appointed to be generals -were suffering defeat upon defeat. If by the help of the insurgents -Nantes could be seized as a base, it was no very long march from Angers -or Tours or Orléans to Paris; but here again it was not a small force -that was required, but every British battalion that could be spared. - -Lastly, if the Ministers wanted to secure indemnities only, the West -Indies lay open to them. No doubt it would be of advantage to possess -the famous harbour of St. Lucia, to deliver Dominica from the menace of -Martinique, her neighbour to windward, and to master Guadeloupe, with -the nest of privateers which preyed upon all British commerce in those -seas. Above all, the capture of Haiti would ensure at once the security -of Jamaica, the possession of a country whose wealth, though more than -half destroyed, was still appreciable, and the transfer to a British -garrison of St. Nicholas Mole, which, being the gate of the Windward -Passage and the Gibraltar of the West Indies, would give safe transit -for the trade of the archipelago to England. Such an enterprise, -however, would equally demand the entire land-force of the British -Isles. It would be necessary not only to take the islands but to hold -them, and to hold them not only, as heretofore, against the climate and -against the fleet and armies of France, but against the entire negro -population, which the Revolution had summoned to its aid. There was, -as there still is, abundance of records of former attacks upon all -those islands, showing that at the best of times each British battalion -in the West Indies required to be renewed in its entirety every two -years, and at the worst of times might be completely extinguished -by a single hot season. Of all plans, therefore, this would be the -most difficult, the most perilous, the most costly in execution and -maintenance, and the least damaging to France; not to mention the fact -that the overthrow of the Convention, which had authorised the equality -of the black man with the white, was really essential to its permanent -success. Thus it should at least have been obvious to the Government -that out of the four spheres of operations it could hope to act with -effect in one alone; and then only by throwing into the chosen sphere -every trained soldier that it could muster. - -Blind to all such considerations, Ministers decided not to select one, -or at most two, of these spheres, but to fritter away their handful of -forces between all four. ◆Sept. 11.◆ Indeed, Dundas’s orders between the -11th and 18th of September form a notable specimen of his ideas of -carrying on war. The news of the failure at Dunkirk had at first -completely unnerved him; but, on realising how critical was the position -of affairs in that quarter, he directed eight battalions[168] to embark -for Ostend, as a temporary measure. Then he warned the Duke of York that -five thousand of his Hessians must be held ready to sail to Toulon as -soon as this reinforcement reached him, and that the eight battalions -themselves would be required elsewhere at the beginning of October. On -the same day he wrote to Lord Hood that everything must give way to the -importance of holding Toulon; that he had appealed to Austria for -troops; and that he would send Hood the five thousand Hessians -aforesaid, as well as two battalions out of the five stationed at -Gibraltar. Four days later he warned General Bruce to be ready to -receive at Barbados fifteen battalions, which were under orders for -active service in the West Indies. Lastly, at the same time or very -little later, he framed a design for a descent upon St. Malo and for the -occupation of the Isle D’Yeu, off the coast of La Vendée.[169] It is now -time to return to Flanders, and to follow in detail the reaction of -Dundas’s genius upon the operations in that quarter. - -In the first peril of the retreat from Dunkirk the British commanders -seem to have entertained serious thoughts of re-embarkation;[170] but -were reassured when Houchard did not follow up his stroke upon the force -of Walmoden. For this the French general has been much blamed; and -indeed his failure to destroy the Duke of York’s army was made the -excuse for bringing him shortly afterwards to the guillotine. But in -truth Houchard had lost his true opportunity through the unskilfulness -of his attack upon Walmoden, wherein his troops, already half starved -and less than half disciplined, had been seriously shaken by their -losses. He therefore reinforced the garrisons of Bergues and Dunkirk, -and, in the hope of relieving Quesnoy, fell with thirty thousand men -upon the flank of the Dutch cordon from Poperinghe and upon its front -from Lille. ◆Sept. 12, 13.◆ His success was at first encouraging, for he -defeated his opponents completely with the loss of forty guns and three -thousand men, and captured Menin. General Beaulieu, who had been -despatched with over four thousand Austrians to the assistance of the -Dutch, for some reason refused to act with them, but checked the advance -of the French beyond Menin, and occupied Courtrai. The Dutch fled in -disorder to Bruges and Ghent; and for the moment it seemed as though -communication between the Duke of York and Coburg was hopelessly -severed. ◆Sept. 12.◆ The Duke, after leaving a detachment under -Abercromby at Furnes, had withdrawn to the rear of the canal between -Nieuport and Dixmuyde, in order to secure his retreat to Ostend; ◆Sept. -14.◆ but he now ordered Abercromby back to Nieuport, and marched with -the bulk of his force eastward to Thorout, where he was joined by two -battalions[171] from England. ◆Sept. 15.◆ From thence on the 15th he -moved southward to Roulers; and on that day the situation underwent a -total change. - -Beaulieu, being attacked by Houchard before Courtrai, waited only for a -reinforcement which the Duke had hurried forward to him, when, taking -the offensive, he utterly routed the French, who fled in the wildest -confusion, and, pursuing them to Menin, recaptured the town. ◆Sept. 16.◆ -The Duke entered Menin on the following day, where he received letters -from Coburg who was already at Cysoing, not more than eighteen miles to -the south, reporting that since the fall of Quesnoy he had gained a -brilliant victory over one of Houchard’s divisions at Avesnes-le-Sec. -◆Sept. 12.◆ This action, which, though almost unknown to Englishmen, -still remains one of the greatest achievements in the history of -cavalry, was not only most glorious to the Austrians in itself, but was -important as showing that the new tactics of the undisciplined French -army were inapplicable to any but a strongly enclosed country. Nine -Austrian squadrons, counting some two thousand men, without a single -gun, had utterly dispersed seven thousand French, chiefly infantry, cut -down two thousand of them, captured two thousand more, and taken twenty -guns, all with a loss to themselves of sixty-nine men. These successes -effectually checked the advance of the French. Houchard, after the -defeat at Menin, had already given the order to retreat; and the French -retired to their former positions before Cassel, Lille, and Maubeuge. - -Then arose the question what should be done next. The season was -advancing, but events had marched rapidly in Paris since the revolt of -Toulon. Following hard upon the news of Houchard’s reverse came tidings -that the Duke of Brunswick had defeated the French with a loss of four -thousand men at Pirmasens, on the northern frontier of Alsace; and this -succession of disasters stirred the Jacobins to the ferocity of panic. -◆Sept. 17.◆ On the 17th two savage laws were passed, which practically -placed all lives and all property at the arbitrary disposal of the -reigning faction; and then the demagogues turned with fury upon the -generals. Loudest among them was Robespierre, who, profoundly jealous -of any man who could do what he could not, was suspicious above all of -soldiers. ◆Sept. 21.◆ Thanks to his denunciations, Houchard and his -staff were recalled under accusation of treason; and thereby another -blow was added to the many already struck at the army. The troops -were greatly demoralised by the continual change of commanders,[172] -whom the Commissioners of the Convention promoted or deposed at their -arbitrary pleasure; and the commanders themselves were not less -demoralised by the certain prospect of death if they failed to achieve -the impossible with troops that were neither fed, nor clothed, nor -paid, nor disciplined. The Allies, therefore, could still reasonably -look for success from a concentration of their whole army and a -vigorous offensive. - -Dundas, since the failure at Dunkirk, had become suddenly an advocate -for keeping the whole of the forces together, and for making an attack -upon the enemy before undertaking any further enterprise;[173] but -with what precise object a general action was to be fought he did -not say, for the very sufficient reason that he did not know. The -British Ministers, so far as they favoured any operations at all in -Flanders, would have preferred a second attempt upon Dunkirk; but they -gave, or professed to give, a free hand to the commanders, flattering -themselves that, if the attempt were abandoned, the British troops -would be the sooner released for service at Toulon and, above all, in -the West Indies. Coburg, on the other hand, had already put forward -what was at any rate a definite plan, though upon the old lines. He -wished to besiege Maubeuge, which was certainly an important point, -since it formed the chief link in the communications between the -French armies of the north about Lille, and of the Ardennes about -Givet and Philippeville, while its entrenched camp made it a point for -a formidable concentration of the French forces at large. Moreover, -it obstructed the passage of the Austrian troops from east to west, -compelling all reinforcements from Luxemburg to fetch a compass by -Namur and Charleroi before they could join the army of Flanders. The -Dutch agreed to come forward again to further the operations; and -before the British Government, upon Murray’s representation, could -finally make up its mind to co-operate with the Austrians, Coburg had -crossed the Sambre with forty thousand men and invested Maubeuge.[174] - -Thereupon there followed the usual distribution of troops into a -cordon. The besieging force numbered fourteen thousand, the covering -army, including twelve thousand Dutch, twenty-six thousand men; and to -the Duke of York was entrusted the task of protecting Flanders along -a front of some forty-five miles, from Cysoing to Nieuport. For this -purpose Coburg gave him about sixteen thousand Austrian troops in -addition to those in the pay of Britain; but, owing to the vagaries -of the British Minister for War, the corps was exposed to the most -dangerous risk. Hardly had the eight reinforcing battalions from -England joined the army in Flanders, before Dundas ordered four of them -to return at once, and the remainder as soon as possible. Further, -not content even with this, he gave Murray to understand that the -embarkation of the Hessian corps from Flanders was only deferred, and -hinted that a part of his artillerymen might also be spared for Toulon. -Now Dundas knew perfectly well that the troops had passed through a -very severe campaign, had fought several actions and had suffered -heavy losses; he knew perfectly well that no adequate steps had been -taken for filling up the gaps in the ranks; he could hardly have been -ignorant that winter was approaching; and Murray had twice warned him -that the French were rapidly increasing their forces between Lille and -the sea. Yet the Minister, though he had given the generals nominally -a free hand, calmly withdrew battalion after battalion, until at last -Murray told him plainly of the danger of the situation. The state of -the army was most distressing: the force in British pay was reduced -to twelve thousand fighting men, or less than half of its original -numbers; the sick and wounded of the whole army under the Duke’s -command numbered at least nine thousand, or more than one-fourth; the -troops were dangerously dispersed along a very wide front; and, though -Murray did not mention this, the Austrian Government had deprecated -all field-fortification, on account of the damage that might ensue to -meadows and the banks of canals.[175] Finally, he gave warning that, if -the enemy made an attack, the Duke would be obliged to abandon Ostend. -Dundas’s reply to this was very characteristic. Without a word to -Murray he ordered the Commandant at Ostend to retain the second batch -of four battalions which, by his own order, had been sent there for -re-embarkation to England; and he wrote an angry letter to Abercromby, -a subordinate officer, first expressing horror at the idea of -abandoning Ostend, and then regretting that attempts had been made to -keep those same four battalions in Flanders. “It would be impossible,” -he wrote, “to restrain the just indignation of the country, if, for the -sake of feeding an army under a Prince of the blood, so substantial an -interest to this country as that of the French West Indies had been -sacrificed.”[176] - -Apart from the fact that such language, especially when addressed to a -subordinate concerning his chief, was utterly unbecoming a Minister and -a gentleman, it was not obvious why an army should be starved, whether -in the matter of empty ranks or of empty stomachs, simply because it -happened to be commanded by a Prince of the blood. If its presence in -Flanders were an embarrassment to the Government, the simple remedy -was to withdraw it altogether, rather than leave it so weak as to be -in peril of destruction; for there was no lack of employment for the -troops elsewhere. This amazing outburst is no solitary instance of -Dundas’s bad taste, much less an unique example of his incapacity. - -Meanwhile Murray’s apprehensions increased; and events soon came to -justify them. Jourdan, on Carnot’s recommendation, had succeeded -Houchard in command of the army of the north; and, with Carnot himself -at his back, ◆Oct. 7.◆ he now concentrated forty-five thousand men at -Guise for the relief of Maubeuge, leaving the remainder of his troops, -some sixty thousand men, extended in a long line to the sea. Coburg -sent pressing entreaties for reinforcements to the Duke of York, who at -once moved about nine thousand men to Cysoing, ◆Oct. 10.◆ and leaving -half of them there, proceeded with the rest—chiefly the wreck of the -British troops—to join hands with the Austrian advanced corps a little -to the south of Quesnoy at Englefontaine. ◆Oct. 15, 16.◆ It was, -however, to no purpose, for Jourdan, having increased his force to sixty -thousand men, attacked Coburg furiously on the 15th and 16th at -Wattignies, and, despite very heavy loss to himself both in men and in -guns, compelled him to raise the siege of Maubeuge. The Dutch, who had -not behaved well in the action, retired to Mons; but Coburg moved his -headquarters to no greater distance than Bavai. He was there meditating -further attacks upon the French, when the Committee of Public Safety, -intoxicated with the success at Wattignies, ◆Oct. 18.◆ ordered Jourdan -peremptorily to take the offensive and to drive the hordes of the tyrant -into the Sambre, which river, it may be observed, at that moment flowed -between the opposing armies. ◆Oct. 22.◆ A second and still more -ludicrous order bade him keep his force together, menace several remote -points simultaneously, operate in two divisions against Mons and -Tournai, and withal act with prudence. Jourdan, however, not daring to -attempt the passage of the Sambre, sent on the 20th one division to -assail Marchiennes, and another under Souham against all the Allied -posts from Cysoing to Werwicq, which last was held by six thousand men -under Count Erbach. Both attacks were successful, though Marchiennes was -retaken on the 24th; ◆Oct. 22.◆ and on the 22nd Erbach was forced to -fall back to Tournai and Courtrai, abandoning even Menin. On the 22nd -likewise a division from Cassel attacked Ypres, while another from -Dunkirk under Vandamme captured Furnes, and, pressing northward with -twelve thousand men, ◆Oct. 24.◆ opened on the 24th the bombardment of -Nieuport. The town had been but hastily fortified, and the garrison -consisted of only two weak Hessian battalions, a few dragoons, and the -British Fifty-third Regiment, in all fewer than thirteen hundred men. -For the moment it seemed certain that the British would be cut off from -their base. - -Murray, foreseeing this, had ordered all stores, beyond what was -necessary for the moment, to be removed from Ostend. The Commandant -disembarked some of the four battalions which, pursuant to Dundas’s -order, were about to sail to England; and Dundas, on hearing of the -situation, at once sent Major-general Grey, the appointed Commander -of the West Indian expedition, with four more battalions[177] to take -charge of the troops at Ostend, giving him full liberty to defend it -or to bring away the whole of the eight battalions, as he might think -best, without reference to the Duke of York. Meanwhile he clamoured -for reports as to the intentions of Coburg, and for explanation of the -reasons for the possible abandonment of Ostend; for it had not yet -occurred to him that the French, by attacking in overwhelming force, -might compel the Commander of the Allies to conform to their plan of -operations instead of pursuing his own.[178] - -However, matters soon righted themselves. ◆Oct. 24.◆ The French were -driven back with heavy loss from Cysoing and Orchies. The garrison of -Nieuport held its own gallantly, being reinforced on the 27th by another -battalion of Hessians and by a few gunners from Ostend; and meanwhile -the Duke of York was hastening back from Englefontaine and Tournai, -while Coburg followed him westward with half of his army as far as -Solesmes, midway between Cambrai and Landrecies. ◆Oct. 28.◆ On the -evening of the 28th Grey arrived at Ostend, and at once sent the -Forty-second and four companies of Light Infantry to the help of -Nieuport. On the same evening the Duke of York having reached Camphin, a -few miles east of Cysoing, detached Abercromby with four battalions and -two squadrons[179] northward against the French post at Lannoy. The -place was captured with little loss, and the British Light Dragoons did -terrible execution in the pursuit of the flying enemy. ◆Oct. 29.◆ On the -following night another division, under the Austrian General Kray, made -a brilliant attack upon the post of Marchiennes, driving out the French -with a loss of nearly two thousand men and twelve guns, at a cost to -itself of fewer than one hundred casualties. ◆Oct. 30.◆ Meanwhile the -French, on hearing of the Duke of York’s advance upon their flank, had -retired from Menin and Ypres; and early on the next morning Vandamme, -fearing to be cut off, retreated from before Nieuport, leaving four guns -and a quantity of ammunition behind him. So easy was it to change the -whole face of affairs by concentrating a compact force against one point -and rolling up a cordon from end to end. It is almost comical to observe -how at first both sides used the cordon-system; how the French, after -abandoning it with success, relapsed into it once more; and finally how -the Allies, also abandoning it under British direction, in their turn -gained the upper hand. - -Throughout this anxious period the interference of Dundas with the -operations had been incessant, and his tone by no means the most -courteous. The incoherence and folly of his orders may best be judged -from a summary of the reply which Murray at length found time to -write on the 20th of October. “Let me point out to you,” he wrote, -in effect, “that the same messenger brought to me from you, first, -advice to besiege St. Quentin; secondly, orders to keep a body of -troops at Ostend; and, thirdly, strong exhortations against division -or detachment of our force. As to Ostend, if Nieuport holds out, it is -safe for the winter; and I see no reason why Nieuport should not hold -out. As to St. Quentin, this means taking a train of artillery there -in the month of November. It means also that twenty thousand out of -Coburg’s twenty-five thousand men must be detached, while the remaining -five thousand remain quietly between three fortified towns and a -forest, from which fifty thousand men may attack them from all sides at -any time. Further, the detached force must draw its subsistence from -a distance of forty miles across the whole French army without any -other protection than that of those five thousand men.” “I beg pardon,” -he continued, “for taking up your time with this kind of argument, -which it was not your intention to enter into, but I think it is right -to show that, perhaps, people in England are not more infallible in -their judgments than those upon the Continent.” Irony so keen sped -home even through the dense armour of Dundas’s conceit. “You have -not sufficiently weighed the feeling of this country,” he answered, -taking refuge in bluster, “if you think that any successes could have -counterbalanced the loss of Ostend.” Murray hastened to soothe him by -pointing out that the Duke of York, though against his own military -judgment, had strictly obeyed the Cabinet’s instructions as to the -protection of Ostend, and that it was not Grey who had saved it but -the Duke himself, who, before he knew of Grey’s arrival, had forced -Vandamme to retire by threatening his communications.[180] - -This sharp passage of arms silenced Dundas for the time, though, as -will be seen, it taught him little wisdom for the future. Meanwhile, -after a few small affairs of outposts, the campaign came to an end. -The Emperor of Austria sent orders to Coburg to fight a general -action, for no particular object; and the Committee of Public Safety -gave the like instructions to Jourdan, in the hope that he might be -able to advance to Namur and so to threaten the Austrian line of -communication. But neither was in a position to obey. The campaign had -been most arduous, as a war of posts must always be, not only from the -innumerable minor actions, but from the strain imposed on the troops -by constant vigilance and by endless marching to and fro to reinforce -the threatened points of the cordon. The losses on the side of the -Allies had been great: those of the French had been enormous, not only -in men but in material, for the Allies had taken from them over two -hundred guns. In brief, both armies were thoroughly exhausted; and -yet the Allies had accomplished comparatively little, owing partly to -the false plan imposed by England, partly to the false tactics of the -Austrian commanders, still more to the misunderstandings and jealousy -that make coherent action so difficult in an army composed of many -nations. On the Rhine likewise little had been effected. Soon after -the victory of Pirmasens the King of Prussia left his army for Posen; -◆Oct. 13.◆ and, though the Austrian General Wurmser drove the French -in utter confusion from the lines of Weissenburg, yet, in consequence -of faulty dispositions and of the half-hearted co-operation of the -Prussian troops, an advantage which might have been decisive was turned -to little account. Prussia, in truth, was not anxious to aid Austria -in gaining Alsace; while the Polish question, as always, kept the two -powers in an attitude of mutual suspicion and mistrust. There was -nothing, therefore, left to the Allies but to take up cantonments for -the winter, which they accordingly did, while Grey and the whole of the -eight battalions with him returned to England. The Allies had missed -their chance in Flanders; and the chance was gone for ever. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IX - - -◆1793.◆ - -It is now necessary to sum up the relative conditions of France and the -Allies at the close of 1793. The British enterprises against the French -at Dunkirk, in La Vendée, and at Toulon had one and all failed; but the -tale of disaster was even then not fully told. Upon arrogating to itself -the appointment of Generals in the field, the Committee of Public Safety -had appointed ◆Oct.–Nov.◆ Pichegru and Hoche to command respectively the -armies of the Rhine and Moselle. Pichegru had been a non-commissioned -officer of artillery before the Revolution, had since obtained command -of a battalion of volunteers, and, by assiduous courting of the Jacobin -leaders, had become a Lieutenant-general without seeing a shot fired. -Hoche, as we have seen, had risen from the ranks of the French Guards, -had distinguished himself in high command at Dunkirk, and, above all, -had attracted Carnot’s attention by a memorandum condemning the -dispersion of troops after the Austrian manner, and advocating -everywhere concentration and a vigorous offensive. “This young fellow -will go far,” said Carnot, as he handed the document to Robespierre. “A -very dangerous man!” objected the other, who dreaded the success of any -man except himself. The task prescribed to Hoche was to relieve Landau, -then blockaded by the Prussians; but he found his army in such ill -condition that he hesitated to attempt anything until strengthened by -Pichegru, when he made a general attack upon the Prussians under the -Duke of Brunswick at Kaiserslautern, and was beaten back with heavy -loss. ◆Nov. 28–30.◆ Thanks to Carnot’s influence, however, his failure -was forgiven to him; and his new project, that he should reinforce -Pichegru with two-thirds of his troops and fall upon the Austrians under -General Wurmser at Hagenau, was approved. Wurmser perceived the -gathering storm, and appealed to Brunswick for help; but King Frederick -William had expressly forbidden the Duke to engage himself in any -important operations, and the Prussians did not move until too late. -◆Dec. 23.◆ On the 23rd of December Hoche opened his attack with great -skill and success, and would have annihilated Wurmser, had not Brunswick -interfered at the last moment to check the pursuit of the French. -◆Dec. 26.◆ The Austrian commander, furious because Brunswick had not -supported him from the first, then returned to the eastern bank of the -Rhine, thus uncovering the Prussian left, and obliging them likewise to -abandon the greater part of the Palatinate, and to content themselves -with protecting the neighbourhood of Mainz. Landau, therefore, was -recaptured by the French; the eastern frontier of France was purged of -the enemy; and, above all, the ill-feeling between Austria and Prussia -was more than ever embittered. Broadly speaking, the French by the close -of the year had contended successfully alike with the Coalition and with -internal foes, having lost ground only in the Eastern Pyrenees to Spain, -the enemy from which it could be most easily recovered. - -Nevertheless the authority of the Committee of Public Safety was by no -means yet fully assured. The Commune of Paris, representing the most -infamous of the population, had been jealous of it from the first; and -the useful service of the little band of Workers had been accomplished -only with great difficulty and by constant concessions to the party of -violence. Representatives of the people vested with arbitrary powers -still accompanied the armies, interfering with the operations, punishing -by summary execution the slightest fault or failure, whether realised or -merely suspected, levying barbarous and oppressive requisitions, and -thus driving officers, men, and civil population alike to despair. In no -army was this policy of terror more ruthlessly pursued than in that of -the Rhine, where unlimited powers were exercised by the representatives -Lebas and St. Just, of whom the latter, a young man of twenty-six, gave -himself the airs of omnipotent Jove, with a guillotine for thunderbolt. -A campaign, however, cannot be won solely by decapitation of one’s own -troops; and in the winter of 1793–1794 this fact began to impress -itself, in respect not only of the army but of France at large, upon -some of the ruling men in Paris. But it was no easy matter to convince -the unspeakable rogues of the Commune of Paris that terror, which had -brought to them personally enormous profit, was, as a national policy, a -failure. Early in December 1793 the Committee of Public Safety took -several measures to abridge the powers of the Commune; and some of the -men who had in earlier days been most violent favoured the reaction -towards a milder rule; but none the less Collot d’Herbois, who had been -the author of most atrocious cruelties at Lyons since the recapture of -the city, continued to obtain official approval of his conduct. Dread of -summary restoration of order by some victorious General continually -haunted the minds of many of the leaders, and notably of Robespierre; -◆Dec. 25.◆ and, since the only idea of this last was to support -whichever party was at the moment the stronger, he upheld Collot, and -sought popularity by proposing the execution of another batch of -Generals. Thus the opening of the new year witnessed a complete revival -of the system of terror. - -Immediate mischief was the inevitable result. Carnot had wished after -the victory of Savenay to institute a policy of conciliation in La -Vendée; but, on the contrary, a ruffianly soldier named Turreau was let -loose upon the district with his “infernal columns,” as if to -exterminate a herd of wild beasts. The country was laid waste, the -villages were burned, and such victims as could not escape the soldiery -were swept into Nantes, to be murdered after such manner as might please -the still greater ruffian, Carrier. Thereupon the people at once took up -arms again. A smuggler bearing the nickname of Chouan[181] organised a -band of his fellows for revenge, and was soon imitated by others. -Charette and Stofflet again came forward as leaders; and there began a -desultory guerilla war, fraught with constant disaster to the Republican -troops, which gnawed deeply into the heart of France. At the same time, -as if to increase the difficulties of its capable commanders in the -field, the Convention lent a ready ear to all complaints against them. -The Representatives attached to the armies, with the true instinct of -politicians of all times and nations, were careful to take to themselves -the credit for every victory, and to impute to the military the blame -for every reverse; ◆1794 Jan. 1.◆ and a savage decree was passed that -any General condemned to death should be executed in front of his own -troops. Successful commanders ran as great a risk as unsuccessful. -Kléber, Marceau, Lapoype, and Bonaparte were one and all denounced in -the spring of 1794 by the civilians who had aspired to direct them in -the field; and it was only by much labour and cunning that Carnot was -able to save their lives. - -Nevertheless, despite all drawbacks, there was progress towards -improvement in the French army. True, there was still shameful rascality -on the part of contractors,[182] which was countenanced by Bouchotte -under the protection of Robespierre, and which caused much suffering and -desertion. The levy _en masse_ again had proved a failure; but, on the -other hand, compulsion to personal service, without exemption of any -kind, had forced a better class of recruit into the ranks; -◆1793 Nov. 22◆ and it was wisely determined to incorporate these new -levies with the battalions at the front, which possessed officers and -non-commissioned officers of experience to train them. Finally, the -reorganisation of the army into demi-brigades, consisting each of two -battalions of volunteers and one battalion of regulars, was, after long -delay, decreed and gradually brought about. ◆1794 Jan. 8.◆ Innumerable -useless corps were swept away; the establishments of existing corps were -increased; and the law as to election of officers was practically, -though tacitly, ignored.[183] ◆Feb. 12.◆ At the same time a succession -of decrees forbade the attendance of deputations from regiments upon the -Convention, strove to check abuses and waste in the matter of -requisitions, and made a new regulation that no soldier should rise to -any grade of command—from corporal to general—who could not read and -write. ◆Feb 15.◆ All this wrought for discipline and efficiency, for -many of the Colonels and Generals appointed by the Jacobins, being -unable to read a map or even a letter, had brought about great confusion -at the War Office and frequent disaster in the field.[184] At the same -time, strenuous efforts were made to improve the cavalry, which had -hitherto been absolutely useless; and its establishment was fixed at -twenty-nine regiments of heavy and fifty-four of light cavalry, or -ninety-six thousand men in all. The horse-artillery also, after but a -single year of existence, was augmented to eight thousand men, and the -field-artillery, including detachments for battalion guns, to twenty-six -thousand men. The whole force of France at the beginning of 1794 reached -six hundred thousand effective men, or about half of the figure which, -from motives of policy or conceit, was invariably assigned to it by the -orators of Paris. - -Moreover, to turn military improvements to the best advantage, events -conspired to throw power more and more into the hands of the Committee -of Public Safety. ◆1793 Dec. 22.◆ By a clever decree, the Committee -contrived to disarm the hired ruffians who supported the Commune, and to -make over their weapons to the army; and this blow was followed three -months later by the accusation and execution of the leaders of the -Commune itself, including Hébert, the supreme ruffian, and Ronsin and -Vincent, two of the greatest scoundrels in the War Office. -◆1794 March 29.◆ The next attack was directed against Danton and others, -who had recognised the failure of the policy of terror, and wished to -end it; and accordingly he and his followers went to the guillotine on -the 5th of April. ◆April 5.◆ This was the work of Robespierre, who at -one time had been the firm ally of both of these factions, but was now -seeking supreme power in order to carry out certain ideas of his own for -the social regeneration of France. Being an absolutely mediocre man, of -the type which small provincial journals delight to honour with the -title of “our talented townsman,” he was wholly lacking in the ability -and experience required for the business of administration; and he seems -to have agreed, without knowing what he did, to the abolition of -Ministers for departments and the substitution of boards, responsible to -the Committee of Public Safety, in their place. Hereby the little knot -of Workers, who had real capacity as well as boundless industry, gained -an affluence of power, and the military service an increase of -efficiency; for their labours were too high for the control of a petty -lawyer who possessed no gift but that of composing bad essays, and knew -no resource but that of cutting off heads. Nor was the activity of the -Workers confined to France alone. Revolutionary agents had been busy all -over Europe with persuasive tongues and still more persuasive purses. -They had bribed high officials to second Carnot’s military projects by -conspiracies at Turin, Naples, Florence, and Genoa; they had met with -much encouragement in Holland, and counted on further success in -Switzerland; they had made some impression upon Denmark, had half gained -Sweden, and had spared no expense to rouse the Turk against Austria. The -cost of these negotiations was enormous, but the Government of France -was playing for high stakes, knowing well that without victory in all -quarters in the coming campaign, bankruptcy and starvation must -inevitably bring down the Revolution with a crash. - -On the military side Carnot had decided to strike at important points -only, and elsewhere to stand on the defensive. In the south he -designed to invade Italy, hoping that treachery at Turin would make -the work easy; but the principal struggle, as he knew, must be fought -out in Belgium. He did not, however, confine his schemes of aggression -to that quarter only. He recognised with true insight that Britain -was France’s most formidable enemy; and he had actually projected -and prepared for an invasion of England, with the help of the Brest -fleet, and for a march upon London. The plan was bold, indeed wild -in its extravagance, being founded on a false idea that disaffection -in England was as deeply seated and as widely spread in action as it -was noisy and inflated in speech. None the less the bare menace of -invasion served a useful purpose—to scare and disconcert the British -Government.[185] - -◆Jan. 21.◆ In truth it must have been with no very pleasant feelings -that Ministers met Parliament in January 1794, having no better news -to lay before the Houses than a tale of failure in all quarters. Pitt -had, at least, the consolation that a section of the Whigs, headed -by the Duke of Portland, in the same month announced to him their -intention of separating themselves from Fox, and of giving the Ministry -an independent support. It was, however, felt that such an arrangement -could neither be satisfactory nor of long continuance, since, as Sir -Gilbert Elliot put it, Portland’s party would be no more than “a -detached auxiliary force, to act on one occasion, to retire on another, -and to be a perpetual object of anxiety to those whom they meant to -serve, of hope to the enemy and of speculation to the rest of the -world.”[186] Moreover, there were members of it, most notably William -Windham, who were extremely dissatisfied with the military policy, or -want of policy, initiated by Dundas.[187] Negotiations were, therefore, -set on foot for the inclusion of Portland and some of his friends in -the Cabinet; and, after six full months spent in bargaining, it was -finally arranged, on the 11th of July 1794, that Portland should become -Second Secretary of State, Lord Fitzwilliam Lord President, and Lord -Spencer Lord Privy Seal, while Windham displaced the incompetent and -corrupt Sir George Yonge as Secretary at War. It may be well to add -at once that in December Lord Spencer exchanged the Privy Seal for -the Admiralty with the capable but indolent Lord Chatham, while Lord -Mansfield took over the Presidency of the Council, and Lord Fitzwilliam -accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland. - -But these changes were accompanied by a reform of the greatest -importance in the history of our military administration. Pitt was -resolute in refusing to permit the War Department to lie in the Duke of -Portland’s hands; wherein he was probably right, for the Duke, though -he carried with him votes in the House of Commons, brought nothing -to the Council Board beyond a certain ponderous irresolution. Pitt -thereupon arranged, though with some difficulty, that Portland should -administer the Home Department, including the Colonies, but should have -no authority over naval and military business, for control of which -he created a third and new Secretariat of State for War. In itself -this measure was valuable and sound, but it was absolutely vitiated -by the selection of Henry Dundas to fill the new post. In the face of -the shameful blunders of the past eighteen months this appointment -was almost criminal; but Pitt’s ignorance of war was unfortunately -surpassed only by his infatuated trust in his friend. Thus Henry Dundas -became the First Secretary of State for War, the very worst man that -could possibly have been chosen to found the traditions of such an -office. His methods have found faithful imitation by all too many of -his successors.[188] - -So much may be said by anticipation of events which, though not -actually accomplished, were practically assured at the opening of the -session of 1794. But the secession of Portland’s following by no means -left the Opposition without keen critics of the conduct of military -affairs. Tarleton the guerilla-leader of the American war, though -a vain and shallow man, knew enough to hit the many weak points of -Henry Dundas’s enterprises, and he was backed by one abler and more -solid than himself, Major Thomas Maitland, of the Sixty-second Foot, a -brother of the extreme radical, Lord Lauderdale. We shall see more of -Maitland, who is still remembered at Malta as “King Tom,” in the years -before us. Fox also, though as usual guilty of opposition which was -purely factious, rightly pressed home upon the Government the duty of -defining to themselves what was their true object. If, he argued, the -purpose of the war were to substitute some form of government for the -present tyranny in France, then Toulon was worth more than the West -Indies; if on the other hand it was to obtain permanent possessions, -then the West Indies were worth more than Toulon. To this the -Government answered by the mouth of Jenkinson, that their end was to -destroy the existing government in France; but both he and Pitt added -that Toulon was not to be considered of such importance as to justify -a sacrifice of the opportunity for acquiring the French West Indies. -Plainer evidence could not have been given of the utter unfitness of -both to direct a formidable war.[189] - -But the Government’s measures for the augmentation of the regular Army -at the close of 1793, though not yet criticised in Parliament, were -still more questionable than its military policy. In the first place, -from blind assurance of an easy triumph, no sufficient provision had -been made in time for raising additional men; and the result was -that in October 1793 it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to -furnish a draft of one hundred men to stop the gaps in Abercromby’s -brigade in Flanders.[190] In August, however, Alan Cameron of Erracht -after much importunity had received permission to raise a regiment of -Highlanders without levy-money, and with a special stipulation that the -men should not be drafted; and thus was created the Seventy-ninth or -Cameron Highlanders. In September 1793, new regiments began to follow -each other more rapidly. First came a battalion formed by Lord Paget, -whom we shall know better as a leader of cavalry under the successive -titles of Lord Uxbridge and Marquis of Anglesey. The commission -which he received to command it was the first that he ever held in -the Army; and the regiment took, and still keeps, the number of the -Eightieth. Then came in succession Colonel John Doyle’s regiment, now -the Eighty-seventh; Colonel Albemarle Bertie’s, now the Eighty-first; -Colonel Thomas De Burgh’s, recruited chiefly in Connaught and still -known as the Eighty-eighth Connaught Rangers; Major-general Leigh’s, -now the Eighty-second; and finally three Scottish battalions raised -by Colonels Ferrier, Halkett, and Cunninghame, who had left the Scots -Brigade of Holland during the American War and now tried to make a -new brigade for their own land. Thus after a separation of over a -century the old comrades of the Buffs rejoined them in Great Britain. -In November other regiments were added, namely, General Bernard’s, -now the Eighty-fourth; General Cuyler’s, now the Eighty-sixth; -Colonel Nugent’s, recruited by Lord Buckingham among his tenants -at Stowe, now the Eighty-fifth; Colonel Fitch’s, formed chiefly of -recruits from Dublin, now the Eighty-third; and Colonel Crosbie’s, -now the Eighty-ninth.[191] From January to October 1794, there was a -deluge of new battalions, of which it must suffice to mention here a -second battalion of the Seventy-eighth, and three which began life -in February, namely, that raised by Mr. Thomas Graham, the volunteer -of Toulon, which was and still is the Ninetieth, and two Highland -corps formed by Colonel Duncan Campbell and Lord Huntly, which though -originally distinguished by other numbers[192] are known to us as the -Ninety-first and Ninety-second Highlanders. Five regiments of Light -Dragoons raised in February and March must also be mentioned, since we -shall meet with them not unfrequently, namely, Beaumont’s, Fielding’s, -Fullarton’s, Loftus’s, and Gwyn’s, which were raised without expense to -the Government, and bore the numbers Twenty-one to Twenty-five. Lastly, -attention must be called to ◆March 7.◆ a notable new departure in the -formation of a Corps of Waggoners in five companies, with a total -strength of six hundred non-commissioned officers and men, one-tenth of -them artificers. This was the first attempt at a military organisation -of the transport-service. - -It was reckoned that, in one way and another, at least thirty thousand -men were enlisted for the regular Army between November 1793 and March -1794,[193] and the number was the more astonishing since Fencibles and -substitutes for the Militia had absorbed a large number of recruits. -It would, however, be a fallacy to suppose that Ministers had yet -thought out any regular plan for continual filling of the ranks; on -the contrary, they had resorted to a variety of hasty expedients -founded upon no fixed principle, and therefore unfitted to meet more -than a temporary emergency. Such procedure is invariably wasteful -and extravagant in the highest degree; but Yonge and Dundas honestly -believed themselves to have found true economy in a clever and specious -scheme put forward by one of the Generals in Ireland, for defraying -the cost of new levies by the sale of commissions.[194] The experiment -was tried on a grand scale and with high hopes, not unmingled with -misgiving, on the part of officers; and indeed the prospect of raising -a large number of men without charge to the country was sufficiently -alluring. None the less the scheme failed completely,[195] as is the -common fate of all projects which aspire to obtain a costly article at -a trifling outlay. - -Beyond this experiment the Government could think of no better plan -for augmenting the Army than to encourage young men of means to raise -men for rank, or in other words to offer them rank in the Army in -proportion to the number of recruits that they could produce. This -was an old system which hitherto had been confined chiefly to the -raising of independent companies, and had therefore led to no higher -rank than that of Captain. Even then it had been vicious and had been -repeatedly condemned; and it was no good sign that in 1793 a Lieutenant -had advertised in the London papers, offering two thousand guineas -to any one who could raise him one hundred recruits in six weeks, -and get them passed at Chatham.[196] But it was now extended to the -raising of a multitude of battalions, which, for the most part, were -no sooner formed than they were disbanded, and drafted into other -corps. Thereby of course the men were easily absorbed, but not so the -officers, to whom the Government had pledged itself to give half-pay; -and thus it was possible for a young man to obtain a pension for life -from his country on investing a sufficient sum to raise a few score of -recruits.[197] But this was the least of the evils of the system. There -was instantly a rush to obtain letters of service; and commissions -became a drug in the market. It was said that over one hundred -commissions were signed in a single day,[198] while the Gazette could -not keep pace with the incessant promotions. The Army-brokers, who in -the days of purchase negotiated for officers the sale of commissions, -exchanges, and the like, carried on openly a most scandalous traffic. -“In a few weeks,” to use the indignant language of an officer of the -Guards, “they would dance any beardless youth, who would come up to -their price, from one newly raised corps to another, and for a greater -douceur, by an exchange into an old regiment, would procure him a -permanent situation in the standing Army.” The evils that flowed from -this system were incredible. Officers who had been driven to sell out -of the Army by their debts or their misconduct, were able after a -lucky turn at play to purchase reinstatement for themselves with the -rank of Lieutenant-colonel. Undesirable characters, such as keepers -of gambling-houses, contrived to buy for their sons the command of -regiments; and mere children were exalted in the course of a few weeks -to the dignity of field-officers. One proud parent, indeed, requested -leave of absence for one of these infant Lieutenant-colonels, on the -ground that he was not yet fit to be taken from school. It must be -noted, too, that, thanks to the Army-brokers, these evils were not -confined to the new regiments, but were spread, by means of exchange, -all over the Army; and, since the great majority of the regiments were -abroad on active service, the old officers, who were daily facing -danger and death, suddenly found themselves inferior in rank to men -undistinguished by birth or intellect, and without the smallest -pretension to military ability. - -Little less dangerous was the enormous encouragement given to crimping -by the sudden demand from all quarters for recruits. The Navy, as has -been seen, was unable to find its complement of men for the fleet, -despite the fact that the Common Council of London in January 1793 -had offered an additional bounty of two pounds to seamen;[199] and -now there was thrown into competition with the press-gang a race of -greedy, unscrupulous scoundrels, some of them holding and disgracing -the King’s commission, who made profit out of every boy or man that -they could lay hold of by fair means or foul. Thus the ranks were -filled, as Tarleton phrased it, with infancy and dotage; recruiting -became a mere matter of gambling; and the price of men rose to thirty -pounds a head.[200] So large a sum set a premium on every description -of rascality in the trepanning of recruits by violence or by guile; -and the ordinary Englishman does not lightly bear with oppression of -this kind. At length, on one day in August, an unfortunate lunatic, who -had been enlisted by a sergeant and locked up in a brothel—the synonym -for a recruiting-house—in London, hurled himself out of a window in -the third story, into the street. Instantly a mob assembled, which -delivered a succession of riotous attacks upon all houses of this -description, and was only suppressed, after several days of disorder, -by the calling out of the Guards and six regiments of cavalry.[201] -Pitt defended the system on the ground that the Navy as well as the -Army would be manned, by the turning over of soldiers to reinforce the -marines; but this is only another instance of Pitt’s callous ignorance -and self-deception. The truth is that while doing nothing, and probably -worse than nothing, for the Navy, it destroyed the efficiency of the -Army for a time, and but for the timely interposition of a capable -soldier would have destroyed it permanently. Who was responsible for -the introduction of the system it is not easy to say, for there were -so many disgraceful circumstances attending it that the whole subject -was hushed up, and is now extremely obscure; but assuredly it was not -Lord Amherst, nor is it credible that it can have been any soldier. It -is safe to assert that it was the work of civilians; and if we seek -among the civilians at the War Office for the two men of tried conceit, -unwisdom, and incapacity, we can find them at once in Sir George Yonge -and Henry Dundas.[202] - -Meanwhile new levies, even when raised under these false conditions, -were not to be produced in a moment; and thirty thousand recruits -were not to be reckoned, even by the most sanguine of Ministers, -as equivalent to the same number of old soldiers. The Government, -therefore, renewed its contract for the hire of Hanoverians and -Hessians on a greater scale, raising the total number of them to -close upon thirty-four thousand men. To these were added five foreign -corps, which were intended to supplement the dearth of light troops -from which the British contingent had suffered so much during the -campaign of 1793. As early as in May of that year, one Captain George -Ramsay had offered to raise a small body of foreign riflemen, and had -after some delay been permitted to enlist also a corps of Uhlans. Thus -originated three corps which, in honour of the Commander-in-Chief in -Flanders, were called by the name of York Chasseurs, York Rangers, -and York Hussars. The formation of the remaining two, the Prince of -Salm’s Hussars and Hompesch’s Hussars, was only authorised in February -1794, and consequently they were not ready for service at the opening -of the campaign. No effort had been made to provide British soldiers -for the work of light infantry, except by raising eight additional -light companies for the Brigade of Guards, the men of which were -distinguished by round hats with large green feathers, trousers instead -of breeches and gaiters, and fusils instead of muskets. But with these -details of dress their qualifications as light troops were exhausted; -for they received no sufficient instruction in their peculiar duty.[203] - -The Light Dragoons likewise continued to belie their name, being -trained in reality simply as cavalry of the line of battle; but for -this, probably, the civil rather than the military authorities of the -Army were responsible, for at this period it was literally impossible -to obtain officers for the mounted troops. It will be remembered that -before the outbreak of the war the Adjutant-general had constantly, but -in vain, endeavoured to obtain an increase of the wholly inadequate -pittance of pay meted out to subalterns of dragoons. Even in peace -the burdens laid upon them were too heavy to be borne, and to these -were now added inadequate compensation for losses in the field, only -eighteen pounds being granted to replace a charger which had cost -thirty-five. The consequences became immediately apparent. The Duke of -York was obliged to beg that the cornetcies of regiments serving in the -Low Countries might be given away, since purchasers for them could not -be found.[204] Thus the Light Dragoons were untaught, because there -were no officers to teach them; patrols and advanced detachments lacked -the daring and adventurous leading of youth; and one of the highest -schools for the training of subalterns was wholly neglected. It is -hardly possible to estimate the evil consequences of Pitt’s misdirected -parsimony, in devoting to the hire of mercenaries the money which -should have been spent in the improvement of the British Army. - -So much must be said of the regular forces; but the year 1794 was not -less remarkable for an enormous increase in the number of the Fencible -regiments, Militia and Volunteers, all due to Carnot’s menace of -invasion. The estimate for the Fencible Cavalry provided in March 1794 -for forty troops; by May this figure had already risen to ninety-two -troops, and was still rising. Next, the number of the embodied Militia -for England was augmented to thirty-six thousand; while by an Act of the -Irish Parliament, passed in 1793, sixteen thousand additional Militia -were levied in Ireland. This latter was an entirely new departure; and -it need hardly be said that the first ballots drawn on the west of St. -George’s Channel led to serious rioting.[205] Provision was also made in -the estimates, and a Bill was introduced for the raising of six thousand -Militia in Scotland; but this measure was for the moment deferred, in -order that familiarity might ultimately facilitate its passing. The -formation of the Scottish Militia, however, appears to have been begun -in anticipation,[206] and men were enlisted who, later in the year, -◆Oct. 15–Nov. 20.◆ were formed into over twenty battalions of Fencible -infantry. The extension of the ballot throughout the three kingdoms, -though not actually completed until the passing of the Scottish Militia -Act in 1797, must be regarded as the most important military step taken -since the passing of the Militia Act of 1757 by the elder Pitt; and due -credit should be allowed to the Government for it. - -Meanwhile, to augment the English Militia to the prescribed figure, -an Act was passed, after the model of that of 1778, empowering the -Lord-Lieutenants to enrol volunteers, to be added to the Militia, -and to be entitled to the same bounty, subsistence, and clothing. -Finally, in April, was passed an Act, limited to the duration of the -war, authorising the formation of district corps or companies of -Volunteers, to be entitled to pay and subject to military discipline -if called out for invasion or in aid of the civil power. This was the -first attempt to summon the manhood of the kingdom to arms; for though -Shelburne in the peril of 1782 had sent a circular to all the Mayors -and Lord-Lieutenants in England with the object of forming a levy _en -masse_, yet the hastening of the peace, by Rodney’s victory of the -Saints and by the relief of Gibraltar, had rendered any elaboration -of the plan unnecessary. Now, however, there sprang up an infinity -of Volunteer corps, infantry, artillery, and light horse or Yeomanry -Cavalry, first in single companies and troops, but very soon in -battalions and regiments. The first of the Volunteer corps appears -to have been the five Associated Companies of St. George’s, Hanover -Square, which was formed in anticipation of the Act;[207] the first -of the Yeomanry was Lord Winchelsea’s three troops of “Gentlemen and -Yeomanry,” raised by the County of Rutland.[208] The rapidity with -which these Volunteers were raised would be flattering to the national -vanity were it not susceptible of a commonplace explanation. By a -certain clause in the Act Volunteers were exempted from service in the -Militia, upon producing a certificate that they had attended exercise -punctually during six weeks previously to the hearing of appeals -against the Militia list. This dissociation of the Volunteers from -the Militia was a great and disastrous blunder, which has never yet -been thoroughly repaired. It is, however, sufficient to note for the -present that the Government had deliberately set up three different -descriptions of auxiliary forces, Militia, Fencibles, and Volunteers, -all competing with each other and with the regular Army. The number -of regular troops provided for in the estimates of 1794 (reckoning -the Irish establishment at fourteen thousand) was one hundred and -seventy-five thousand men, besides thirty-four thousand foreign -troops, four thousand Fencibles, and fifty-two thousand Militia; or, -say, two hundred and sixty-five thousand men in all. - -Simultaneously with these efforts at home, Pitt worked strenuously -to restore unity and vigour to the Coalition. The relations of the -coalesced powers at the close of 1793 were in the highest degree -unsatisfactory. The Empress Catherine, still insatiable, despite -the deterioration of her forces and the exhaustion of her treasury, -had resumed her old designs upon Turkey, and had set a large force -in motion towards Constantinople. The Emperor Francis, still under -the guidance of Thugut and full of vague plans for increasing his -territory, was drawing closer to the Empress in the hope of obtaining -her countenance to the annexation of Venice by Austria, if indemnity in -France should fail, and of sharing with her the ultimate partition of -Turkey. Both were bitterly incensed against Prussia: Catherine because -King Frederick William had diverted his troops from the invasion of -France to the strengthening of his position in Poland; Francis from -jealousy that his rival should have enlarged his boundaries, when he -himself had not. Frederick William, as has been seen, had practically -withdrawn his forces from active operations on the Rhine; and -accordingly in December 1793 Pitt had sent Lord Malmesbury to Berlin to -ascertain (if, indeed, anything could be ascertained in such a centre -of intrigue and falsehood) what might be Prussia’s motive for retiring -from the struggle. In reply to Malmesbury, Frederick William, having -obtained his desire in Poland, declared himself eager to continue the -contest against the Jacobins, but absolutely prevented by lack of -money. ◆Feb. 5.◆ Thereupon Pitt proposed to give Prussia a subsidy of -two millions sterling, of which England should pay three-fifths, and -Holland and Austria each one-fifth. This was a liberal offer; and, -since it was certain that Holland would raise no objection, it lay -practically with Austria to give effect to it. It was well known that -Austria was in financial straits, that Hungary was full of unrest and -the Belgic Provinces much cooled in their loyalty, and that, apart -from these troubles at home, the Emperor had contrived to quarrel -with Sardinia abroad. Hence it was beyond question that Austria could -not carry on the war without Prussia’s assistance; and, forasmuch as -Francis had already despatched emissaries to Berlin to discuss the -operations to be undertaken in the spring, the natural presumption was -that he would gladly close with Pitt’s proposal. - -The British Government thereupon bestirred itself to frame its projects -for the coming campaign. The Duke of York left Belgium for London on the -6th of February; ◆Feb. 12.◆ and a few days later Mack, now advanced to -the rank of Major-general, arrived there likewise to concert plans with -the Ministers. The Austrian genius had shortly before submitted[209] a -scheme calculated for a force of three hundred and forty thousand men, -which had been received with great satisfaction by the British Cabinet -and the Duke of York; but, since there was no earthly possibility that -the Coalition could put that number of men into the field, the whole of -this elaborate creation was valueless. Both Mack and Coburg, however, -pressed for a concentration of forces and a march on Paris, though -neither of them could conceive the feasibility of taking the offensive -without leaving one hundred and twenty thousand men behind them to guard -the frontier from the Meuse to the sea. The prime question, therefore, -was one of men, and Pitt on his side promised his utmost endeavour to -increase the British contingent to a figure which should ensure a -genuine total of forty thousand fighting soldiers. As to the means -whereby this force should be produced, Pitt was remarkably vague, being -clear only that he could not spare the few thousand men under Lord -Moira’s command, since he wished to hold them ready to sail to any part -of the British coast which might be threatened by a French invasion. -Moira, therefore, though one of the ablest officers in the Army and -adored by the men, was kept inactive, while his troops sickened and died -of gaol-fever in overcrowded transports at Jersey.[210] However, Pitt -made up his forty thousand men to his own satisfaction by naming various -reinforcements, which he hoped to pour into Flanders during the summer -and autumn; for it was one of the delusions of this gifted man, as also -of his friend Dundas, that an army of twenty thousand men, supplemented -by monthly driblets of two thousand men during ten months, is the same -thing as an army of forty thousand men ready for the field at the -opening of the campaign. - -The next requisite was that the Austrian, Prussian, and British -contingents should each of them possess a siege-train, since, according -to Mack, it was essential for the Allies to master every fortress on -the French frontier from the Meuse to the sea. Pitt promised this also, -on behalf of the British; and then arose the question of commanders. -Though well aware that the King’s assent would be wrung from him only -by extreme pressure, the Ministers were for recalling the Duke of York -and appointing Lord Cornwallis, who had just returned from India, in -his place. Herein they were undoubtedly right, for, after all allowance -made for the extreme difficulty of his position, the Duke did not shine -in the field. The Ministers, however, blamed him especially for the -failure before Dunkirk, wherein they themselves were chiefly in fault; -and Mack, prompted apparently by the King, found little difficulty in -making excuses for the Duke, who from the first had condemned the idea -of attacking Dunkirk at all. It was finally arranged that he should -retain command of the British contingent, but that he should be kept -always in the neighbourhood of the principal army, with a few thousand -Austrians attached to his own corps, so as to subordinate him the more -completely to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. This compromise bears -so clearly the mark of the British politician that its origin cannot -be doubtful. It is of a kind that may serve for the construction -of a Cabinet, but it is not suitable for war, and was particularly -ill-fitted to the projected campaign. For the rest, Pitt declared -himself satisfied that the command should remain with Coburg, who was -deservedly most popular among the Austrian troops; and Mack rejoiced -the heart of the British Cabinet by announcing that the Emperor would -direct the operations as Generalissimo in person. Altogether the -results of the conference were considered to be so satisfactory that -the King presented Mack with a jewelled sword as a reward for his good -service.[211] - -The British Government’s satisfaction was soon proved to be premature. -The discussion of future operations with the Court of Berlin was, in -fact, only a trick of Thugut to keep as many Prussian troops as possible -on the French frontier; and the whole intent of the Emperor’s taking -personal command was that Coburg and other honest men in his army, who -profoundly distrusted his chief adviser, should be kept under proper -restraint. Thugut now declared, in answer to Pitt’s proposals, that -Austria would not advance a penny towards the subsidies for the Prussian -army, being well able to dispense with every part of it beyond the -twenty thousand men which formed its contribution towards the forces of -the Empire. ◆March 11.◆ In fact, he was so madly jealous and fearful of -Prussia at this time that he secretly proposed to Russia a scheme for a -joint attack upon her. On learning the Emperor’s decision, King -Frederick William ordered Marshal Möllendorf to begin the withdrawal of -his troops from the Rhine. Coburg was in consternation, for he knew -that, without Prussian help, the execution of the approved plan of -campaign would be impossible. He therefore asked the Duke of York to -join him in requesting Möllendorf to delay his retirement, and -despatched letter after letter to Vienna, adjuring the Emperor in terms -of touching devotion and patriotism to send every man that he could -raise to Flanders, and to work loyally with Prussia to crush the -terrible power of the Revolution while there was yet time. Möllendorf -courteously acceded to his desire; but the Prince’s protests fell on -deaf ears in the Imperial capital. There were over sixty thousand men -ready for service at Vienna, but from his insane dread of Prussian -aggression, Thugut would not part with one of them; and Coburg’s only -reward for his faithful and disinterested counsel was rude and -ungracious rebuke. Just at the critical moment, however, Lord Malmesbury -checked the further withdrawal of the Prussian troops, by threatening to -break off all negotiation for a subsidy unless they remained on the -Rhine until he could receive further instructions from London. This -brought the impecunious King to reason, for without English money he was -lost. Shortly afterwards the parley was, with Pitt’s sanction, resumed; -and there was much haggling over the sphere wherein the Prussian troops -should be employed, Frederick William declaring that for operations on -the Rhine he would furnish eighty thousand men, but for Belgium not more -than fifty thousand. ◆April 19.◆ Finally, Malmesbury succeeded in -compromising matters; and a treaty was signed at the Hague on the 19th -of April, whereby Prussia, in consideration of a lump sum of £300,000 -and a subsidy of £50,000 a month, engaged herself to provide sixty-two -thousand men, to be employed wherever Great Britain and Holland, their -paymasters, should think fit. ◆April 30.◆ Ten days later Fox in the -House of Commons predicted that this would be a useless waste of money; -and it will be seen that he was a true prophet.[212] - -Meanwhile Coburg was doing his utmost to prepare his army for the heavy -work that lay before it; but the Austrian forces had not improved since -the previous year. Heavy losses had brought many young soldiers into the -ranks; and, owing to the extreme extension of his line of cantonments, -the troops had gained little rest during the winter. The French -delivered as many as forty-five petty attacks between the 6th of January -and the 26th of March, each one of which meant the setting of many -detachments in motion for long and harassing matches. Moreover, owing to -the decay of the Emperor’s popularity in Belgium, the people would do -little or nothing for the troops; and, Coburg being unwilling to take -from the inhabitants what they refused to give, the men suffered greatly -from want of food, fuel, and shelter. Money would, of course, have -overcome all difficulties, but, though the Prince begged piteously for -it, he could obtain none from Vienna; and the consequences were most -cruel. “Some regiments,” he wrote in February, “have been without bread -for several days, and two contractors have been driven to suicide.” On -the other hand, taking a true measure of his enemy, Coburg had issued -instructions that the French must be attacked at all times and in all -circumstances, and that, even in the defence of a position, at least a -third of the men should be kept ready for a counter-attack. But there -was one clause in his orders which seems to give the key to many an -Austrian defeat. “Men defending entrenchments will sit in the banquette, -arms in hand, until the enemy comes within three hundred paces, or even -somewhat nearer, and then open a heavy fire.” British troops were -accustomed to hold their fire until the enemy was within thirty paces; -and hence it was that the French Army of Italy, when they met them in -Egypt, found the red coats tougher adversaries than the white.[213] - -Among the rest of the Allies matters were little better than with -the Austrians. The Hessians in Flanders were far below their proper -strength, sickness and constant skirmishes having swallowed up the -additional recruits furnished during the winter; while the brigade -which had been attached to Moira’s force left one hundred dead and -two hundred and fifty invalided in the Isle of Wight, over and above -five hundred sick men whom they carried with them to Ostend.[214] As -to the British, everything was, as usual, behindhand, though the Duke -of York had now a more energetic Chief of Staff than Murray in Colonel -James Craig, whom we saw last at Wilmington in 1781. Recognising from -his American experience how serious was the Duke’s deficiency in light -troops, Craig tried to hire some from Prussia, but without success. -There was a difficulty about the British siege-train, for it was -discovered, some weeks after the Duke had made requisition for it, that -the application had been mislaid at the Office of Ordnance. Though -Dundas made profuse promises of British drafts and reinforcements, to -the number of five thousand men, not one thousand of these had arrived -by the middle of March, and Abercromby’s brigade was quite unfit to -take the field. The remount-horses were discovered to be very bad. -Artillery-drivers, moreover, the dearth of which had been represented -by the Duke for quite six months, were found to be so scarce in England -that the Master-General was fain to seek them, though without success, -in Hanover. A fresh disappointment arose in the matter of foreign -troops, for it proved impossible to obtain three thousand Brunswickers, -whom Dundas had counted upon taking over from the Dutch into the -British service. Rapidly the forty thousand soldiers promised by Pitt -dwindled away; and Craig resigned himself to the inevitable fact that -the deficiency would amount to at least ten thousand men. But this -was not, to his thinking, the most formidable danger. With a boldness -which must have shocked Pitt and Dundas, he wrote to the War Office a -very strong and damaging criticism of the cordon-system, and predicted -that nothing but misfortune could attend Generals who upon principle -preferred dispersion to concentration.[215] - -So the month of March passed away, the unhappy Coburg waiting in -anxious suspense to know first, when the troops that composed his -heterogeneous army would be ready; secondly, what their numbers might -be when they were ready; and thirdly, what the Emperor would expect -him to do with them when it should please him to honour headquarters -with his presence. Meanwhile Coburg had even in February given orders -for the contraction of his cantonments; and at the beginning of April, -after much shifting, his force occupied the following positions. - -The Right or western Wing of the Allied Army, covering maritime -Flanders, was entrusted to Clerfaye with a force of Austrians, -Hessians, and Hanoverians, who thus occupied the ground formerly -entrusted to the British and Dutch. His headquarters were at Tournai, -where an entrenched camp had been thrown up. In his front also Orchies -and Marchiennes had been strengthened by field-works; and on his right -efforts had been made to restore the defences of Menin, Ypres, and -Nieuport, though, except in the case of Ypres, with little result. The -effective strength of Clerfaye’s army in the field, after deduction of -garrisons for the strong places, was about twenty-four thousand men. - -On Clerfaye’s left, and connected with it by a detachment of five -thousand men under General Wurmb at Denain on the Scheldt, stood the -Centre or principal army, consisting of about twenty-two thousand men -under the Duke of York, about forty-three thousand men under Coburg -himself, and of about nineteen thousand Dutch under the Prince of -Orange. The Duke occupied the right with headquarters at St. Amand, -Coburg the centre with headquarters at Valenciennes, and the Prince of -Orange the left with headquarters at Bavai. It was reckoned that, after -providing for garrisons, Coburg could spare sixty-five thousand men for -active operations. - -The Left Wing consisted of twenty-seven thousand Dutch and Austrians -under Count Kaunitz, which were stretched over the space from -Bettignies, a little to the north of Maubeuge, to Dinant on the Meuse. - -To these must be added fifteen thousand more Austrians under General -Beaulieu, cantoned between Namur and Tréves, bringing the grand total -of the Allied force to something over one hundred and sixty thousand -men, of which at the very most one hundred and twenty thousand were -free for work in the field.[216] - -It will be noticed that the corps of Clerfaye and of the Duke of York -had exchanged the places which they had occupied during the previous -year, pursuant to the design of the British Ministers that the Duke of -York should be kept under the immediate eye of Coburg. The first result -of this interference was to spoil Clerfaye’s temper for the whole -campaign; for he judged his force too weak for its task of defending -the maritime provinces; and indeed it was only by the positive orders -of Coburg that he consented to hold the command.[217] The whole -arrangement, in fact, was calculated to cause confusion. It was bad -enough that the lines of retreat for the British and Austrians should -be in exactly opposite directions; and the obvious course, upon the -change of the Duke of York’s station, would have been to have shifted -his base to Antwerp. But far from this, not only was his base continued -at Ostend, but, to make matters worse, a brigade of British was placed -under Clerfaye’s command, and a respectable number of Austrians under -the Duke of York’s; so that in case of mishap, not only must the lines -of retreat for the right and right centre intersect each other, but -neither corps could retire upon its base without leading several of its -regiments in the wrong direction. - -Meanwhile on the French side Carnot had girded himself for a supreme -effort. “We must finish matters this year,” he wrote to Pichegru on the -11th of February; “unless we make rapid progress and annihilate the -enemy to the last man within three months, all is lost. To begin again -next year would mean for us to perish of hunger and exhaustion.” He -therefore decided to combine the armies of the North, of the Ardennes -and of the Moselle, and to mass two hundred and fifty thousand men -along the line from Dunkirk to the Meuse. Of these about one hundred -thousand were to move upon Ypres, march thence upon Ghent, master -maritime Flanders, and then wheel eastward upon Brussels; while at -the same time another hundred thousand were to advance upon Namur and -Liège, and sever communication with Luxemburg. In other words, he -designed to turn and envelop both flanks of the Allied Army, leaving -about fifty thousand men to stand on the defensive in the intermediate -space between Bouchain and Maubeuge. - -Of the many eminent critics who have passed judgment upon this -plan, there is not one who has failed to point out and condemn its -defects; and indeed it is obvious that if the Allies, neglecting small -detachments, should fall with their full strength upon either wing -of the enemy, they might annihilate it. An advance of the French in -overwhelming strength upon the communications of the Allies about Namur -would have been equally effective and far less hazardous. Yet Carnot -prescribed the invasion of the maritime provinces as the first object, -partly no doubt with a view to the ultimate invasion of England, but -chiefly, as I conceive, with the political object of threatening the -retreat of the British and thus overawing the most formidable power -in the Coalition. It is worth while to recall that in 1815 Wellington -looked for Napoleon to turn the western flank of the Allies and cut -the British off from the sea, and that he dreaded such a movement so -much that he made his dispositions at Waterloo with a view to prevent -it. Wellington’s action has been as sharply criticised as Carnot’s; -and yet, when two such men agree upon such a point, their opinion is -at least worth serious consideration. In any case, the threatening of -the lines of communication both east and west was quite sufficient -to distract the councils of the Allies, to set them quarrelling as -to which among themselves should be sacrificed to the others, and -so perhaps to bring about political discord and the rupture of the -Coalition. - -At the end of March Pichegru gave the strength of the army of the -North at two hundred and six thousand, and of the army of the Ardennes -at thirty-seven thousand men, making a total of two hundred and -forty-three thousand present under arms, of which one hundred and -eighty-three thousand were free for service in the field. The army of -the North at the beginning of April was thus distributed. The Left -Wing, seventy-one thousand men, extended from Dunkirk by Cassel and -Lille to Pont-à-Marque; the Centre, forty-seven thousand men, from -Arleux (near Douai) by Cambrai, Bouchain, and Bohain to Étreux, a -little to the north of Guise; the Right Wing, thirty-six thousand men, -from Avesnes by Cerfontaine, St. Rémy, and St. Waast to Maubeuge. This -made a total of one hundred and fifty-four thousand men ready for the -field; one half of them, under such leaders as Moreau and Souham, -standing on the frontier of maritime Flanders. As early as on the 11th -of March Carnot ordered Pichegru to begin the advance on Ypres; but the -General, though willing to train his troops by countless skirmishes, -made no movement until the 29th of March, when he attacked the Austrian -advanced posts at Le Cateau with thirty thousand men, and was beaten -back with the loss of twelve hundred killed and wounded and four guns. -“It is dangerous,” he reported, “to match our young troops against the -enemy so soon”; and therewith his operations incontinently ceased. - -Meanwhile Coburg, still awaiting his orders, made no attempt to -overwhelm any one of the scattered French divisions. ◆April 2.◆ At last -on the 2nd of April the Emperor quitted Vienna, reached Brussels in -company with his brothers, the Archdukes Charles and Joseph on the 9th, -and on the 14th joined Coburg at Valenciennes. ◆April 14.◆ The Prince -then laid before him the danger of the Allied position, with both wings -too weak to take the offensive against an enemy which was reported to be -three hundred thousand strong; and followed this up by recommending the -advance of the centre to the siege of Landrecies, for which Mack had -prepared one of his usual elaborate schemes. Thus the Austrians reverted -once more to a war of petty sieges, which could produce no decisive -result. Indeed the only thing to be said for operations in the selected -quarter was that the country was open and well suited to cavalry, in -which arm the Allies were far superior both in quantity and quality to -the French. The Emperor approved the plan; and the troops were set in -motion forthwith, nominally for a great review to be held in the -Emperor’s honour near Le Cateau. Thus, despite all Carnot’s efforts to -take the initiative, it fell to the Allies to open the new campaign. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER X - - -◆1794.◆ - -◆April 16.◆ - -On the 16th of April, as had been arranged, the whole of the main army -was inspected by the Emperor on the heights of Cateau. The British -infantry was represented, as in the last campaign, by three battalions -of Guards, with a fourth battalion formed out of their flank-companies, -and by Abercromby’s brigade of the Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and -Fifty-third. These last had at length received their first instalment -of recruits to make good their losses during 1793, in the shape of a -draft which was described as “much resembling Falstaff’s men, and as -lightly clad as any Carmagnole battalion”[218] of the French Army. -The cavalry numbered twenty-eight squadrons, drawn from fourteen -regiments[219] and organised into four brigades, three of heavy and one -of light dragoons, the last being supplemented by a picked squadron -of the Carbineers under the command of Captain Stapleton Cotton, a -lad of twenty, who in later years was to earn the title of Viscount -Combermere. The review over, the Emperor took up his quarters in Le -Cateau, whither the commanders forthwith repaired to him for orders. - -◆April 17.◆ - -The French troops under Pichegru in the immediate front of the Emperor -consisted of three divisions, with an average strength of twelve -thousand men each, extended along an entrenched position some eighteen -miles long, on the wooded heights of Bohain and Nouvion. Of these -Fromentin’s division held Catillon on the Sambre, a village rather -over four miles east and south of Le Cateau; westward of Fromentin, -Ballaud’s division lay astride the road from Le Cateau to Guise, at -Arbre de Guise and Ribeauville; and, still further to west and south, -Goguet’s division held the ground about Vaux, Prémont, and Bohain. The -nearest French troops beyond these to westward were fifteen thousand -men under Chappuis about Cambrai; while to eastward three divisions of -the French right wing, numbering some thirty thousand men, lined the -Sambre from St. Waast to Maubeuge. - -There was therefore an opportunity of overwhelming one or other of -these isolated bodies; but the Austrians clung religiously to their -old methods. The force was divided into eight columns, three of which -were directed to move north-westward toward Cambrai, so as to check -any movement from that side. These need trouble us no more. Of the -remaining five, two on the left were ordered to drive the enemy out of -Catillon, cross the Sambre, and after clearing the forest of Nouvion -to push forward their light troops. One column in the centre, under -Coburg’s personal command, was designed to move by Ribeauville upon -Wassigny to master the heights further to southward; while two more -on the right, under the Duke of York and Sir William Erskine, were -to advance, the former upon Vaux, the latter upon Prémont, to drive -the enemy from their entrenched positions there and at Bohain, and -to press their light troops forward upon Le Catelet. All commanders -were expressly ordered to halt the main portion of their troops on the -captured ground, so that there was no intention of pursuing the enemy -in the event of success. - -It would be tedious to describe so feeble an operation. The scene of -the engagement is a country much broken by ravines and hollow roads, -so that the heavy artillery of some of the columns was with difficulty -brought forward; but the French, being in a manner surprised, were -manœuvred out of their positions with little trouble or loss. The -Duke of York’s and Erskine’s columns alone encountered resistance -worth mentioning, but they found little difficulty in turning the -French entrenchments, while the Austrian Hussars and a squadron of -the Sixteenth Light Dragoons succeeded in cutting down great numbers -of the retreating enemy. Altogether the Allies lost fewer than seven -hundred killed and wounded, while the action was reckoned to have cost -the French over two thousand men, besides from twenty to thirty guns, -of which eleven were captured by the British columns. Beyond this the -French were little molested in their retreat to Guise, and the trifling -success of the day was marred by disgraceful plundering and burning on -the part of the Allied troops after the engagement. The British had -already shown tendencies in this direction, but had been checked by the -Duke of York, who had hanged two offenders, caught red-handed, on the -spot, without even the form of a drumhead court-martial. Now, however, -the Austrians led the way in misconduct, either led astray by some of -their savage auxiliaries, or in aimless revenge for their starvation -during the winter; and the British were only too ready to follow the -example.[220] - -[Illustration: - - CAMPAIGN OF APRIL, 1794. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆April 18.◆ - -On the following day the army halted between Nouvion and Prémont, -pushing its outposts further to southward, while detachments of -Austrians were posted also at Prisches, a few miles north of Nouvion, -and at La Capelle, Fontenelle, and Garmouset to eastward, so as to -cover the left flank and rear of the army. Thereupon the Prince of -Orange, whose troops had been advanced towards Cambrai on the 17th, -countermarched to Le Cateau, and assembling his force at Forest, about -three miles to the north of it, ◆April 20.◆ on the 20th fell upon the -enemy’s posts over against Landrecies on the left bank of the Sambre. -After a hard struggle, which cost him one thousand men and the French -twice as many, he carried the French position, and at once opened the -trenches before the town. ◆April 21.◆ On the following day Pichegru -delivered feeble and incoherent assaults upon the positions of Prisches -and Nouvion, and upon the heights to the south of Wassigny, all of -which were beaten off with the loss to him of many men and four guns. -◆April 22.◆ Further desultory fighting at the advanced posts on the -next day was equally unfavourable to Pichegru, as indeed he deserved -for his folly in not concentrating the thirty thousand men, who lay -ready to his hand at Maubeuge, for an overwhelming attack. - -Coburg then judged it safe to proceed with the siege in earnest, -and, withdrawing the covering army to the north, formed it in a huge -semicircle around the besieging force. His left wing curved round from -the heights that lie to eastward of Landrecies, and between it and the -village of Maroilles, southward to Prisches, thence south-east across -the Rivierette to Le Sart, and thence by Fesmy to the Sambre, the -whole line being strongly entrenched, with several bridges thrown over -the Rivierette. The force allotted for the defence of this tract was -thirty-two battalions, fifty squadrons, and twenty-six light companies, -the left under General Alvintzy, the right under General Kinsky. On the -western bank of the Sambre the right wing completed the semicircle, -with a total of twenty-six battalions and seventy-six squadrons. The -first section of the defences on this side ran westward of Catillon -to the Selle, from which stream the Duke of York’s army carried the -line north-westward to the road from Le Cateau to Cambrai. This, a -broad paved way, runs straight as an arrow over the long waves of -rolling ground that lie between the two towns, the undulations rising -to their highest at the village of Inchy, upon which the Duke rested -his right. The position thus occupied by the Allies was over twenty -miles in extent, following a chain of hills of easy slope but seamed to -east of Catillon by deep watercourses and hollows, and broken by small -copses and enclosures in the neighbourhood of the villages. Westward -from Catillon, however, towards Cambrai the hills subside into a broad -plain, not unlike Salisbury Plain, except that the undulations are far -longer and the acclivities therefore less severe. Covered with crops -but unenclosed, its gentle slopes and unseen folds present an ideal -field for the action and manœuvres of cavalry. - -◆April 23.◆ - -On the 23rd intelligence reached the Allies that fifteen thousand -of the enemy had moved out from Cambrai in three columns towards -the north-east, were driving in the outposts along the lower Selle, -and had even crossed that river, apparently with the object of -intercepting the Emperor Francis, who was returning from a visit to -Brussels, to rejoin the headquarters of the army. The Austrian General -Otto, receiving information of these movements from Major-general -Sentheresky at St. Hilaire, between four and five miles north-west -of Inchy, at once joined him there; and reconnoitring further north -he found the enemy, apparently about ten thousand strong, near the -village of Villers-en-Cauchies. Having with him only two squadrons -of the Fifteenth Light Dragoons and as many of the Austrian Leopold -Hussars, making together little more than three hundred sabres, Otto -fell back to St. Hilaire, and sent a message to the Duke of York for -reinforcements. Late at night he was joined by the Eleventh Light -Dragoons, two squadrons of the Austrian Zeschwitz Cuirassiers, and -Mansel’s brigade of the Blues, Royals, and Third Dragoon Guards, the -whole numbering ten squadrons. - -◆April 24.◆ - -Early on the following morning he again moved northward down the valley -of the Selle, keeping the Fifteenth and Leopold Hussars in advance and -the remainder in support; and at about seven o’clock the four advanced -squadrons came upon a force of French light cavalry of twice or thrice -their strength in a long belt of dwarf coppice, near the village of -Montrecourt, and about two miles east of Villers-en-Cauchies. Being -attacked on their left flank the French horsemen at once retreated with -precipitation for a quarter of a mile, when they rallied, and then -retired steadily westward, covered by a cloud of skirmishers. Finally -they re-formed between Villers-en-Cauchies and Avesnes-le-Sec, fronting -to eastward, and masking a force of unknown strength in their rear. -Otto appears to have followed up this cavalry with great speed, for, -on looking round for his supports, he could nowhere discover them. He -halted the advanced squadrons, but, perceiving that he had already -committed them too deeply, he assembled the officers and told them -briefly that there was nothing for it but to attack. The English and -Austrian officers then crossed swords in pledge that they would charge -home; and it was agreed that the British should attack in front, and -the Austrians on the enemy’s left flank towards Avesnes-le-Sec, which -was already a name of good omen in the annals of the Austrian cavalry. - -[Illustration: - - AVESNES-LE-SEC, 12 Sep, 1793 - - VILLERS-EN-CAUCHIES - 24 April, 1794 - - BEAUMONT, 26 April, 1794. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -The Fifteenth led by Captain Aylett now advanced at a rapid trot, -breaking into a gallop at one hundred and fifty yards from the French -cavalry. These did not await the shock but wheeled outwards, right and -left, and retired at speed, unmasking a line of French skirmishers -and guns, which opened fire before their front was clear and killed -several of their own soldiers. In rear of the artillery six French -battalions, or about three thousand men, were massed together in -quadrate formation of oblong shape,[221] with the front rank kneeling. -A volley from the eastern face of this square, together with a -discharge of grape from the guns, checked the attack for a moment; but, -cheered on by their officers, the Fifteenth swept through the battery -and dashed straight upon the bayonets. The French infantry seems to -have stood till the last moment, for Aylett fell with a deep thrust -through the body, and four other officers had their horses wounded -under them; but the onset of the Dragoons was irresistible. One half of -the square was dispersed instantly; and the other half, after firing a -volley, broke up likewise before the charge of the Fifteenth, and fled -in wild disorder. In rear of the square were more French squadrons, -upon which those that retired from the front had been re-formed; -but these had given way before the impetuous attack of the Austrian -Hussars, and for half a mile the sabres of both Austrians and British -dealt terrible havoc among the flying Frenchmen.[222] - -Leaving, however, the Austrians to pursue the infantry towards -Cambrai, the Fifteenth, now commanded by Captain Pocklington, passed -on to the road from Villers-en-Cauchies to Bouchain, dispersed a long -line of fifty guns and ammunition-waggons, which were retiring to -the north-west, and continued the chase until the guns of Bouchain -itself opened fire upon them, and a relieving force came out to save -the convoy. Meanwhile not a sign appeared of the supporting squadrons -which might have ensured the capture of the artillery; and Pocklington, -observing other forces of the enemy closing in upon him from every -side, rallied his men and retired at a trot. The blue uniform of the -Light Dragoons, however, caused the French to mistake them for friends; -and it was not until they were close to Villers-en-Cauchies that -Pocklington perceived that he was cut off. The enemy was, in fact, -established in his front, blocking the road with infantry and artillery -at a point where a causeway carried it across a valley, though to the -south of the village there were visible the scarlet coats of Mansel’s -brigade. Wheeling about, therefore, for a short time, Pocklington -checked the pursuers that were following him from Bouchain, and then, -wheeling once more to his proper front, he galloped through the French -amid a heavy fire of grape and musketry with little loss, and safely -rejoined his comrades. - -Things, however, had not gone well with Mansel and his brigade. Whether -it was by Otto’s fault or by his own that he had gone astray, and -whether he attempted and failed in an attack upon the French who were -obstructing Pocklington’s retreat, is a mystery. We know only that -Craig reported, with great regret, that the brigade had behaved ill; -that he attributed the fault mainly to Mansel, whom after the action -of the 17th he had already reported as an incompetent officer; but -that the troops also were to blame, though the Royals had immediately -recovered themselves and protected the retreat of the other two -regiments. More curious still, the list of casualties shows that the -Third Dragoon Guards suffered the very heavy loss of thirty-eight men -and forty-six horses killed, besides nine more men wounded and missing, -though the casualties of the Royals and the Blues were trifling.[223] -From this I infer that Mansel led his brigade to the sound of the guns, -and, being ordered to attack the fresh division of the enemy that had -come upon the ground, contrived by irresolution and mismanagement to -bring the Third Dragoon Guards under enfilading fire of the French -cannon, and to throw the whole of the six squadrons into confusion. In -any case it is certain that the brilliant attack of the Fifteenth was -insufficiently supported, and that Mansel and his brigade, justly or -unjustly, lay under reproach, until two days later they redeemed their -good name beyond all chance of cavil. The casualties of the French in -this action were eight hundred men killed and four hundred wounded, -besides three guns taken; while the Fifteenth escaped with a loss of -thirty-one men and thirty-seven horses killed and wounded, and the -Leopold Hussars with a loss of ten men and eleven horses killed and -wounded and the same number missing. The Emperor of Austria conferred -on the officers of the Fifteenth a gold medal and the much-coveted -order of Maria Theresa; and the regiment still bears on its -appointments the name of Villers-en-Cauchies. With a little more luck, -or, it may be, a little better management, Otto would have achieved one -of the greatest successes ever recorded of cavalry against infantry, -and annihilated the whole of the force that had moved out from Cambrai. - -As matters stood, however, the reverse to the French produced little -effect on Pichegru. Successive reinforcements had more than made good -his losses; and on the 24th of April the combined strength of the -armies of the North and of the Ardennes, not counting fifty thousand -men employed as garrisons, was little short of two hundred thousand men -free for service in the field, or nearly two to one of Coburg’s force. -Relying upon this numerical superiority the French General started for -Lille, in order from thence to direct operations against Clerfaye. At -the same time, however, he set his troops in motion to raise the siege -of Landrecies, directing General Charbonnier with thirty thousand men -of the army of the Ardennes to attack Kaunitz on the extreme left wing -of the Allies, while at the same time General Ferrand with forty-five -thousand from Guise should fall on the covering army on the east and -south, and General Chappuis with thirty thousand men from Cambrai -should assail the Duke of York on the west. - -◆April 26.◆ - -Accordingly, early in the morning of the 26th the French engaged -the covering army simultaneously at all points. On the east General -Fromentin with twenty-two thousand men assailed Maroilles and Prisches, -and after a long and severe struggle captured the latter position, -severing for the time communications between Alvintzy and Kinsky. -Alvintzy himself was disabled by two wounds, and the situation was -for a time most critical until the Archduke Charles, who had succeeded -to the command of Alvintzy’s troops, by a final and skilful effort -recovered the lost ground and drove the French over the Little Helpe. -This enabled him to reinforce the centre under General Bellegarde, -who with some difficulty was defending the line from Oisy to Nouvion -against twenty-three thousand men. Thereupon Bellegarde instantly took -the offensive, completely defeated the French, and captured from them -nine guns. - -But far more brilliant was the success of the Allies on the west, where -Chappuis led one column along the high-road from Cambrai to Le Cateau, -while a second column of four thousand men advanced upon the same -point by a parallel course through the villages of Ligny and Bertry, a -little farther to the south. Favoured by a dense fog the two columns -succeeded in driving the advanced posts of the Allies from the villages -of Inchy and Beaumont on the high-road, and of Troisvilles, Bertry, -and Maurois immediately to south of them; which done, they proceeded -to form behind the ridge on which these villages stand, for the main -attack. Before the formation was complete the fog cleared; and the -Duke, observing that Chappuis’s left flank was in the air, made a great -demonstration with his artillery against the French front, sent a few -light troops to engage their right, and calling all his cavalry to his -own right, formed them unseen in a fold in the ground between Inchy and -Bethencourt, a village a little to westward of it.[224] The squadrons -were drawn up in three lines, the six squadrons of the Austrian -Cuirassiers of Zeschwitz forming the first line under Colonel Prince -Schwarzenberg, Mansel’s brigade the second line, and the First and -Fifth Dragoon Guards and Sixteenth Light Dragoons the third, the whole -of the nineteen squadrons being under command of General Otto.[225] - -In this order they moved off, Otto advancing with great caution, -and skilfully taking advantage of every dip and hollow to conceal -his movements. A body of French cavalry was first encountered and -immediately overthrown, General Chappuis, who was with them, being -taken prisoner. Then the last ridge was passed and the squadrons saw -their prey before them—over twenty thousand French infantry drawn -up with their guns in order of battle, serenely facing eastward -without thought of the storm that was bursting on them from the -north. There was no hesitation, for Schwarzenberg was an impetuous -leader, and the Cuirassiers had been disappointed of distinction at -Villers-en-Cauchies; the Blues, Royals, and Third Dragoon Guards had a -stain to wipe away; the King’s and Fifth Dragoon Guards were eager for -opportunity to show their mettle; and the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, -being the only Light Dragoons present, were anxious to prove that they -could do as well as the Fifteenth. The trumpets rang out, and with -wild cheering white coats, red coats, and blue coats whirled down -upon the left flank and rear of the French. The French guns, hastily -wheeled round, opened a furious fire of grape, while the infantry -began as furious a fire of musketry; but the charging squadrons took -no heed. Mansel, stung by the imputation of cowardice, which had been -thrown out to account for his mishap on the 24th, had vowed that he -would not come back alive, and dashing far ahead of his men into the -thick of the enemy went down at once; but Colonel Vyse, of the King’s -Dragoon Guards, taking command of both brigades, led them as straight -as Mansel. In a very few minutes the whole mass of the French was -broken up and flying southward in wild disorder, with the sabres hewing -mercilessly among them. - -The misfortunes of the enemy did not end here, for one of their -detachments, which had been pushed forward to Troisvilles, was driven -back by a couple of British guns under Colonel Congreve, and joined -the rest in flight. Meanwhile Chappuis’s second column had advanced -a little beyond Maurois with its guns, when the appearance of the -fugitives warned them to retire; but in this quarter, too, there was -a vigilant Austrian officer, Major Stepheicz, with two squadrons of -the Archduke Ferdinand’s Hussars and four of the Seventh and Eleventh -British Light Dragoons. Following up the French column he drove its -rearguard in upon the main body a little to westward of Maretz, and -a few miles further on fell upon the main body also, dispersed it -utterly, and captured ten guns. Twelve hundred Frenchmen were killed -in this part of the field alone, so terrible was the Austrian hussar -in pursuit; two thousand more had fallen under the sabres of Otto’s -division, which likewise captured twenty-two guns and three hundred and -fifty prisoners. The shattered fragments of the French infantry fled by -a wide detour to Cambrai; and Pichegru’s attack on this side was not -merely beaten off, but his troops were literally hunted from the field. - -So ended the greatest day in the annals of the British horse, perhaps -the greater since the glory of it was shared with the most renowned -cavalry in Europe. The loss of the Austrians was nine officers, two -hundred and twenty-eight men, and two hundred and eight horses; that -of the British, six officers, one hundred and fifty-six men, and two -hundred and eighty-nine horses, killed, wounded, and missing. The -British regiments that suffered most heavily were the Blues and the -Third Dragoon Guards, each of which had sixteen men and twenty-five -horses killed outright; and the determination of the Third to prove -that the harsh criticism of their comrades on the 24th was unjust, is -shown by the fact that five out of the six officers injured in the -charge belonged to them. Mansel, the Brigadier, who was also their -Colonel, died as has been told. Of the Captains one, his own son, was -overpowered and taken in a desperate effort to extricate his father, -and another was wounded. Of the Lieutenants one was killed and another, -if not two more, wounded. The Major in command, however, had the good -fortune not only to escape unhurt but to receive the sword of General -Chappuis. The total loss of the covering army was just under fifteen -hundred men; that of the French was reckoned, probably with less -exaggeration than usual, at seven thousand, while the guns taken from -them numbered forty-one. - -◆April 27.◆ - -On the following day the Emperor ordered his army to devote itself to -singing a _Te Deum_ and to solemn thanksgiving, which was very right -and proper, but might well have been deferred for forty-eight hours -until the full fruits of the victory had been gathered. For although -there were four fortresses, Avesnes, Guise, Cambrai, and Maubeuge, -within easy distance as a refuge for fugitives, another day’s pursuit -would assuredly have swept up many hundred stragglers, while the mere -sight of the Allied troops would probably have sufficed to set the -French levies running once more. There was, however, better excuse than -usual for inaction, for among General Chappuis’s papers had been found -evidence that a most formidable stroke was about to fall, if it had -not already fallen, upon Flanders. It is now necessary to narrate the -course of events in that quarter, namely, on the right or western wing -of the Allies. - -◆April 23.◆ - -On the 23rd of April a force from Cambrai, acting in concert with that -which was beaten on the 24th at Villers-en-Cauchies, had moved northward -against Wurmb’s corps of communication at Denain, and, but for the -arrival of Clerfaye with some eight thousand men from Tournai, would -have driven it across the Scheldt. ◆April 24.◆ On the 24th, 26th, and -27th the harassing of the advanced posts of the Allies about Denain -continued, and meanwhile the true attack was developed, pursuant to -Carnot’s plans, on the extreme left of the French line. On the 24th -Michaud’s division of twelve thousand men marched from Dunkirk, part of -it towards Nieuport on the north, the rest upon Ypres to south-east, -sweeping back the feeble posts between the two places. Simultaneously -Moreau’s division of twenty-one thousand men moved eastward from Cassel -upon Ypres, and drove all the outlying detachments on that side to take -shelter under the ramparts. ◆April 25–27.◆ Then, leaving some of -Michaud’s division at Messines to watch the fortress from the south, -Moreau pursued his way eastward against Menin, and surrounded that -fortress upon all sides. At the same time Souham’s division of thirty -thousand men, under the personal direction of Pichegru, advanced from -Lille north-eastward upon Mouscron, drove back upon Dottignies the weak -detachment that defended it, and captured Courtrai, ◆April 26.◆ which -was practically without a garrison. ◆April 28.◆ General Oynhausen, -however, restored matters somewhat by collecting troops from Tournai at -Dottignies and retaking the position of Mouscron, where reinforcements -arrived in the nick of time to strengthen him. - -The papers found upon Chappuis gave Coburg the key to all these -movements; and on the evening of the 26th he sent twelve battalions -and ten squadrons under General Erskine from his own army to St. -Amand, bidding Clerfaye to recall at once to their proper stations the -reinforcements which he had imprudently hurried to Denain. Clerfaye -accordingly hastened by forced marches through Tournai to Mouscron, -which he reached on the 28th, raising the garrison of that place to -ten thousand men, exclusive of about two thousand more in the detached -posts of Coyghem and Dottignies. The relief of Menin was his first -and most urgent object, and he had fully resolved to attempt it on -the 30th; but Pichegru was too quick for him. ◆April 29.◆ On the 29th -the two columns under Generals Souham and Bertin fell, the one upon -Clerfaye’s front, the other upon his left flank and rear, with a -superiority of three to one, and after a hard struggle forced him from -his position. The Austrian General seems to have begun his retreat in -good order, but the movement speedily degenerated into a flight; and -when he rallied his beaten troops at Dottignies he was the weaker by -two thousand men killed and wounded and twenty-three guns. Happily six -of the battalions sent from the army before Landrecies had by that time -reached Dottignies, and, with these to hearten his demoralised force, -he retired eastward to Espierres, on the western bank of the Scheldt. - -This defeat decided the fate of Menin. The garrison consisted of -rather more than two thousand men, chiefly Hanoverians, but in part -French Emigrants, which latter if captured could expect nothing but -the guillotine. The commandant, Count Hammerstein, therefore decided -to cut his way out through the besiegers, and with the fortune that -favours the brave, ◆April 30.◆ succeeded during the night of the 30th -in forcing his passage northward to Thourout and thence to Bruges. -Thus Menin and Courtrai, the two gates of the Lys, were lost, and a -gap was broken in the long cordon of the Allies. Along the whole of -the right wing there was something like a panic, and the roads were -choked with long trains of supplies and stores flying northward to -Brussels and Ghent. At Ostend there had lately arrived the Eighth Light -Dragoons and the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fifth Foot, sadly belated, -since the infantry, with Dundas’s usual wisdom, had been embarked at -Bristol; but General Stewart, the commandant at Ostend, did not think -it prudent after Clerfaye’s defeat to send them down country.[226] -Happily Pichegru did not pursue his advantage as he ought. ◆May 3.◆ He -did indeed push a detachment northward from Menin upon Roulers, which -was attacked and defeated with a loss of two hundred men and three -guns by three squadrons of the Allied cavalry;[227] but there his -activity ceased; and he solemnly sat himself down about Moorseele on -the left bank of the Lys, with one flank resting on Menin and the other -on Courtrai, as if to allow time for Coburg’s army to come up in his -front.[228] - -Coburg meanwhile had passed through no enviable days. ◆April 28.◆ On the -28th news reached him that Kaunitz on his left wing had been forced back -by overwhelming numbers to the Sambre, while on his right wing Pichegru -had made his way to Courtrai; but, however serious the outlook, he was -still tied for the present to the miserable and useless fortress of -Landrecies. By a strange irony Mack on that very day submitted a plan of -future operations, whereby Bouchain, Cambrai, Avesnes, and Maubeuge were -in succession to be besieged;[229] but circumstances on the occasion -were too strong for pedantry. ◆April 30.◆ Landrecies fortunately fell on -the 30th, and Coburg on the same day ordered the Duke of York to lead -the rest of his force with all speed to Clerfaye’s assistance, and to -drive the French from Flanders. - -Heavy rain, however, delayed the Duke’s progress; ◆May 3.◆ and it was -not until the 3rd of May that he reached Tournai, where he reunited -Erskine’s force with his own and pushed forward a strong detachment -three miles westward to Marquain and Lamain, releasing five thousand -men, which had hitherto held those points, to join Clerfaye. The front -thus occupied by the Allies, from Tournai in the south to Espierres in -the north, was from seven to eight miles long and faced due west, their -objective being the right flank and communications of the French left -wing. The British brigade at Ostend, namely the Twelfth, Thirty-eighth, -and Fifty-fifth under Major-general Whyte, and the Eighth Light -Dragoons, were by this time on their way to Clerfaye’s army; and the -united force of Clerfaye and the Duke of York was now reckoned at about -forty thousand men.[230] Pichegru, on the other hand, had from forty to -fifty thousand between Menin and Courtrai, and twenty thousand more -under General Bonnaud (who had succeeded Chappuis) at Sainghin, about -five miles south-east of Lille, to act as a reserve. At Clerfaye’s -proposal it was agreed that on the 5th of May he himself should cross -the Lys a little below Courtrai and fall upon that place from the north, -while simultaneously the Duke of York should move eastward to cut it off -from Lille. After all, however, Clerfaye, whether from diffidence or -mere frowardness, would not venture on the attempt. ◆May 8–9.◆ Appeal -was made to the Emperor Francis to give him positive orders to attack, -but meanwhile Bonnaud concentrated over twenty-five thousand men between -Bouvines and Anstaing, a little to the west of Marquain, as if to -threaten the Duke’s left. When the Emperor’s orders at last reached -Clerfaye, he first wasted four days in reconnoitring, and at last made -but a feeble attack on the 10th, contenting himself with the capture of -the outermost fringe of Courtrai. - -◆May 10.◆ - -Pichegru seems to have had good information of Clerfaye’s movements and -possibly even of his intentions, for he left Moreau’s division alone -to deal with him; and, having moved Souham’s division to the -east bank of the Lys, himself on the same day attacked the line of the -Allies in force. Souham advanced against the Hanoverians on the Allied -right, but, though he forced the posts of Dottignies and Coyghem, was -repulsed from Espierres. On the left of the Allies thirty thousand -French moved out in two columns against the Duke of York’s entrenched -position between Lamain and Hertain; the stronger column of the two, -which included five thousand cavalry, following the main road from -Lille to Tournai, the other turning south-east from Bouvines by Cysoing -upon Bachy, as if to turn the Duke’s left flank. This latter column was -checked by a couple of battalions and three squadrons under command of -an Austrian officer at Bachy, and was unable to penetrate further. The -other and more formidable body carried the advanced posts of Baisieux -upon the main road, and of Camphin about a mile to south of it, and -forming on the plain between these two villages opened a furious -cannonade from howitzers and heavy guns. Thereupon the Duke, perceiving -a gap in the enemy’s line, whereby the right of their main body was -uncovered, ordered sixteen squadrons of British Dragoons and two of -Austrian Hussars to advance into the plain of Cysoing by the low ground -that lies south of the heights of Lamain, and from thence to attack. - -The cavalry obeyed with alacrity; but the ground on the plain, -though perfectly level and unenclosed, was much broken by patches of -cole-seed, grown in trenches after the manner of celery, which checked -the progress of the heavy dragoons. Moreover the French infantry, for -the first time since the Revolution, threw themselves into squares and -faced the galloping horsemen with admirable firmness. Nine regiments of -cavalry in succession charged up to the bayonets, but with insufficient -speed, and fell back baffled.[231] Nevertheless they followed the -French up the plain from south to north, until, a little to westward of -Camphin, their left came under the fire of some French heavy batteries, -established on the gently rising ground before the village of Gruson. -The Duke then ordered a brigade of British infantry to move forward -between that village and Baisieux, at the same time sending down four -battalions along the track which the cavalry had taken, to support -their attack. The French infantry thereupon retreated from Camphin in -a northerly direction towards the village of Willems, their cavalry -covering the movement; while the British cavalry, now reinforced by six -more squadrons, hovered about them watching for their opportunity to -attack. At length they fell upon the French horsemen on both flanks, -and utterly overthrew them, after which they renewed their attempt upon -the infantry, but again without success. At last, however, a little to -the south of Willems, the battalion-guns of the British infantry came -up and opened fire, when the French, after receiving a few shots, began -to waver. The squadrons again charged, and an officer of the Greys, -galloping straight at the largest of the squares, knocked down three -men as he rode into it, wheeled his horse round and overthrew six more, -and thus made a gap for the entry of his men. The sight of one square -broken and dispersed demoralised the remainder of the French. Two more -squares were ridden down, and for the third time the British sabres had -free play among the French infantry. Over four hundred prisoners were -taken, thirteen guns were captured, and it was reckoned that from one -to two thousand men were cut down. The loss of the British was thirty -men killed, six officers and seventy-seven men wounded, ninety horses -killed and one hundred and forty wounded and missing, the Sixth Dragoon -Guards being the regiment that suffered most heavily. It is hardly -necessary to call attention to the arm which was lacking on this day, -or to point out that a single battery of horse-artillery would have -enabled the cavalry to break the squares at the first onset, would -greatly have increased the enemy’s losses, and would have made the -day’s operations more decisive. Not for eighteen years was the British -cavalry destined again to ride over French battalions as they rode on -this day; and then Stapleton Cotton was fated once more to be present, -leading not a squadron of Carbineers, but a whole division of horse to -the charge at Salamanca. But the 10th of May 1794 is chiefly memorable -as marking the date on which the new French infantry showed itself not -unworthy of the old.[232] - -[Illustration: - - WILLEMS - 10 May 1794. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆May 11.◆ After the action the French main body retired once more across -the Lys to its old camp between Menin and Courtrai; ◆May 12.◆ but on the -11th Souham attacked Clerfaye in his position at Lendelede, about four -miles north of Courtrai, and after an obstinate engagement forced him to -retire still further northward to Thielt, with the loss of fifteen -hundred men and two guns. Meanwhile the Duke of York, in spite of his -success on the 10th, became anxious as to his position in presence of -numbers so overwhelmingly superior, and pressed Coburg to send him -reinforcements. At the Emperor’s headquarters, however, there was some -hesitation whether the principal army should move eastward to the -assistance of Kaunitz on the Sambre, or westward for the salvation of -Flanders. The first idea was to make a demonstration towards Cambrai -with a part of the force; the next to make a rapid march and invest -Avesnes, also with only a part of the force, in order to take pressure -off Kaunitz. The idea of moving with the whole army to any given point -seems to have occurred to none of the Austrian Generals. ◆May 11.◆ Then -came the Duke of York’s application for help, whereupon General Kinsky -was ordered with some six thousand horse and foot to Denain, to enable -Wurmb’s detachment at that place to join the Duke of York at Tournai. -◆May 12.◆ One day later arrived news from Kaunitz that he had been -compelled to fall back still further northward from the Sambre, and was -attacked on all sides; the fact being that Carnot on the 30th of April -had directed fifteen thousand men from the army of the Rhine to join the -army of the Ardennes, so as to ensure decisive superiority on the -Sambre. Upon this, Coburg determined that the subdivision of the army -into fragments must cease, and called upon the Emperor to choose between -the Sambre and Flanders, as the sphere of action for the entire force. -Intelligence of a successful engagement fought by Kaunitz and of -Clerfaye’s retreat to Thielt inclined the Emperor to Flanders; and -though, even then, Austrian pedantry insisted that some eight thousand -men under the Prince of Orange must remain in the vicinity of -Landrecies, ◆May 14.◆ yet the bulk of the army on the 14th commenced its -march westward. - -This movement, however, was by no means to the taste of some of the -Emperor’s advisers; and it becomes necessary at this point to turn for a -moment from the western to the eastern centre of European disturbance, -and to glance at the influence which events in Poland had exerted upon -the Imperial Cabinet. It has already been said that Thugut’s only object -in persuading the Emperor to take personal command in the field, was -that the operations might subserve his own policy. With this view the -Minister prepared to remove to Valenciennes, which was to be the -political headquarters of the Empire during the Emperor’s stay in the -Netherlands; but before he could leave Vienna he was startled by the -news of a general rising in Poland. ◆March 25.◆ This insurrection under -the leadership of Kosciusko broke out on the 25th of March, and spread -with a rapidity and success which left the Russians absolutely helpless. -Catherine, greedy for the partition of Turkey, had already moved the -best of her troops southwards; and the only force of any kind upon the -spot was that of Prussia, which fact in itself was enough to kindle -Thugut’s jealousy. ◆April 20.◆ On the 20th of April Kosciusko, after two -days’ fighting, captured Warsaw; ◆April 25.◆ and five days later -Catherine, while asking the Emperor for the troops due to her by treaty, -mentioned also how greatly she needed the help of the Prussians, from -whom likewise she had claimed assistance. Meanwhile King Frederick -William, growing nervous lest the rebellion should infect also his own -Polish provinces, after some hesitation decided to throw the Treaty of -the Hague to the winds; wherefore, withdrawing twenty thousand of his -troops from the Rhine, he left Berlin on the 14th of May to take -personal command of his army in Poland. - -All this was gall and wormwood to Thugut, and the more so because -Kosciusko had expressed a wish to place Austrian troops in occupation -of Poland rather than yield it to the Prussians. He became more and -more anxious to have done with France, if possible by a separate -peace with the Republic, and to devote all Austria’s energies to the -thwarting of Prussia in the East. The embitterment of his hostility -towards Prussia brought him more than ever in conflict with Coburg -and Mack, who desired above all things a good understanding with -the second great power of Germany; but, unfortunately, he found two -officers of like sentiments with himself in the Prince of Waldeck, who -held a high position on the Staff, and General Rollin, who of all men -possessed greatest influence with the Emperor. It was therefore with -profound dissatisfaction that Thugut’s ignoble clique saw the mass of -the Austrian troops drawn nearer to France and further from Poland; -and though outwardly they swallowed their ill-humour, yet they had -every intention of compassing their own ends, even by means the most -infamous.[233] - -◆May 15.◆ - -On the 15th of May the Emperor joined the Duke of York at Tournai, -and the Archduke Charles brought the Austrian army from Landrecies -to St. Amand, eleven miles to south of it. The field, on which the -decisive action was to be fought, was one that had drunk deep of human -blood. It may be described as the parallelogram enclosed by a line -drawn south-eastward from Courtrai to Tournai, thence south-westward -to Pont-à-Marque, thence north-westward through Lille to Wervicq, and -thence north-eastward back to Courtrai. To east it is bounded by the -Scheldt, to north by the Lys; and through the midst of it, flowing -first from south to north past Pont-à-Marque and Cysoing to Lannoy, and -thence westward into the Deule and so to the Lys, runs the Marque, a -stream impassable except by bridges, owing to soft bottom and swampy -banks. The principal bridges were those of Pont-à-Marque on the great -road to Paris, and Pont-à-Tressin on the road from Tournai to Lille; -but there were others on by-roads at Louvil, Bouvines, Gruson, Tressin, -L’Hempenpont, Pont-à-Breug and Marque, most of them fortified and -strongly held by the French. Two smaller streams of the same character -as the Marque, but running from west to east, form also important -obstacles within this arena, namely, the Espierres brook, which has -its source close to Roubaix and flows into the Scheldt at Espierres, -and the Baisieux brook, which rising near Hertain joins the Scheldt -at Pont-à-Chin. The ground is mostly level, with the exception of the -undulating heights that rise from the Lys, the low ridge upon which -stood the villages of Roubaix and Lannoy, and the group of hills about -Tournai itself; but it was thickly studded with villages, linked -together by chains of innumerable cottages and farm-houses, which were -all of them enclosed by hedges. The fields were cut up by swampy brooks -and by a ramification of wide drains, which, with other enclosures, -practically forbade the movements of troops except by road. The roads, -however, even then were many; and the principal highways were nearly -broad enough to permit an advance in column of half-companies;[234] but -all of them, as well as the waterways, were lined with trees, making -it extremely difficult to see the movements of troops from a distance. -Thus it was and is a country unfit for cavalry, and far better -adapted in that day to the tactics of the French than of the Allied -infantry.[235] - -Within the parallelogram the French were somewhat widely scattered. -Osten’s division of ten thousand men lay at Pont-à-Marque. To the -left or northward of it the bulk of Bonnaud’s division of twenty -thousand men was encamped at Sainghin, with detachments occupying also -Pont-à-Tressin and Lannoy, further north upon the Marque. Souham’s -division of twenty-eight thousand, and Moreau’s of twenty-two thousand -men lay on the south bank of the Lys between Courtrai and Aelbeke, -a village nearly four miles south of it, with Thierry’s brigade at -Mouscron, and Compère’s brigade at Tourcoing to preserve communication -with Bonnaud. In all, the French army numbered eighty-two thousand men. - -Against this force Coburg could pit sixty-two thousand, twelve -thousand of them cavalry. Of the Allied army, fourteen thousand under -the Archduke Charles were at St. Amand; seventeen thousand under the -Duke of York at Tournai; nine thousand under Kinsky at Marquain; four -thousand Hanoverians under General von dem Bussche at Warcoing, on -the Scheldt; and, lastly, sixteen thousand men under Clerfaye were at -Oyghem, about five miles north and east of Courtrai on the north bank -of the Lys. The whole of these troops, excepting Clerfaye’s corps, -could easily be concentrated within twelve hours at Tournai, from -which a swift and resolute attack upon the southern flank of Souham -and Moreau, by Roubaix, Mouveaux and Bondues, might have cut them off -from Lille, driven them into the arms of Clerfaye and overwhelmed them. -The Austrians, however, were not to be weaned from their own methods, -and accordingly on the 16th Mack prepared an elaborate plan, which he -designed, and even declared, to be a plan of annihilation. - -◆May 16.◆ - -The army was as usual to be divided. The first column, of four -thousand Hanoverians under Bussche, was to march by Dottignies upon -Mouscron, detaching a third of its strength northward on the high -road from Tournai to Courtrai, and, having captured Mouscron, was -to open communication with the second column. The second column, -of twelve battalions and ten squadrons, or about ten thousand men, -under Field-Marshal Otto, was to advance by Leers and Wattrelos upon -Tourcoing. The third column, of twelve battalions and ten squadrons -under the Duke of York, was to move by Lannoy against Mouveaux, sixteen -British squadrons being held in reserve at Hertain under General -Erskine. The fourth column, of ten battalions and sixteen squadrons -under Count Kinsky, was to be employed partly in covering the Duke’s -left flank; but the bulk of it was to advance on Bouvines and there -force the passage of the Marque. The fifth column, of seventeen -battalions and thirty-two squadrons under the Archduke Charles, was -to march to Pont-à-Marque, sending a small detachment northward by -Templeuve to preserve communication with the fourth column. Having -gained the passage of the Marque the Archduke was to attack the enemy -on the western side of the river, and, after leaving detachments to -guard the bridges, to wheel northward, unite forces with Kinsky and -move up with him to join the Duke of York at Mouveaux. Finally the -sixth column under Clerfaye was to march from Oyghem on the left bank -of the Lys, force the passage of the river above Menin on the morning -of the 17th, and manœuvre in rear of the enemy about Mouscron and -Tourcoing. Thus the design was to attack the enemy’s front with half -the army, turn both their flanks with the remainder, and destroy the -French irremediably; but whether the surest way of attaining this -object was to disperse the troops in isolated columns over a front -of twenty miles in a blind and strongly enclosed country—this was a -question over which Craig, at any rate, shook his head. - -◆May 17.◆ - -Miscarriages of the great plan began early. Clerfaye did not receive -his orders for the movement towards Menin until late on the morning -of the 16th, and did not march until the evening. His progress was -much delayed by the heavy sandy roads, and, consequently, it was the -afternoon of the 17th before his corps reached Wervicq, and attempted -to cross the Lys by the bridge. The French, however, had covered it -by entrenchments which blocked his passage; and, when the pontoons -were asked for, it was found that by some mistake they had been left -behind. Several hours were wasted while they were coming up, and the -pontoon-bridge was consequently not laid until late at night, when -a few battalions only crossed the river, the remainder of the force -bivouacking on the left bank. The general result was that Clerfaye’s -corps, one-fourth of the whole army, counted for nothing in the first -day’s operations.[236] - -The march of the remaining columns was begun in a thick fog which -rendered concerted movements difficult, and the Austrian Staff seems -to have made no allowance for the varying distances to be covered by -the columns; Kinsky having little more than seven miles to traverse -from Froidmont to Bouvines, whereas the Archduke Charles had fully -fifteen miles from St. Amand to Pont-à-Marque. Bussche concentrated -at St. Leger, a little to west of Warcoing, in the night, advanced -upon Mouscron, and captured it, but was driven out again with very -heavy loss, and forced back to Dottignies. For this misfortune Mack -was chiefly responsible, by directing the detachment of so large -a proportion of this column on a perfectly aimless errand towards -Courtrai. Otto, on Bussche’s left, fared better, driving Compère’s -troops from Leers, Wattrelos, and Tourcoing; but, unfortunately, -with no further result than to join them to Thierry’s brigade behind -Mouscron, to the greater discomfiture of the unfortunate Hanoverians. - -To the left and south of Otto the Duke of York with about ten thousand -men[237] advanced by Templeuve upon Lannoy which, after a sharp -cannonade, he attacked with the brigade of Guards in front while the -Light Dragoons turned it by the left; but the enemy beat so hasty -a retreat that they escaped with little loss. Leaving two Hessian -battalions in Lannoy, the Duke pushed on to Roubaix, where the enemy -stood, with greater force both of infantry and artillery, in an -entrenched position; but, in spite of a very obstinate resistance, the -Guards carried this post also with the bayonet. Having no intelligence -of the columns on his right and left, the Duke rightly decided to -leave his advanced guard at Roubaix, and to fall back with his main -body to Lannoy; when to his dismay he received a positive command from -the Emperor himself, who with the Headquarters Staff had accompanied -the rear of his column, to push on to the attack of Mouveaux. This -order was sheer folly, unless indeed it were dictated by wanton and -deliberate wickedness;[238] but it was reiterated in spite of all -protests, and though the evening was falling and the troops were weary -with a long and harassing day’s work under a burning sun, the Duke -reluctantly obeyed. The French position at Mouveaux was enclosed by -palisades and entrenchments and flanked by redoubts; but for the third -time the brigade of Guards drove the enemy out brilliantly with the -bayonet. The Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons under Abercromby’s -personal direction at once pressed forward in pursuit, and galloping -round the village, which had been kindled by the flying French, -overtook the fugitives, and cut down three hundred of them. Three guns -were captured; and one small party of the Fifteenth actually rode into -the French camp at Bondues,[239] nearly two miles to west of Mouveaux, -and set the troops there running in every direction. The main body of -the Duke’s column then bivouacked astride of the road between Mouveaux -and Roubaix. - -With the two columns south of the Duke, however, affairs had gone but -indifferently. Kinsky’s advance from Froidmont was delayed by a message -from the Archduke Charles, to the effect that his force could not -possibly reach the Marque at the appointed hour of six in the morning; -but in due time Kinsky moved forward to Bouvines, and drove the French -from their entrenchments. The enemy, however, broke down the bridge -over the Marque as they retired, and, until the advance of the Archduke -began to make itself felt, Kinsky was unable to repair it, since the -passage was commanded by a battery of heavy guns. The Archduke’s column -had meanwhile left St. Amand at ten o’clock on the evening of the 16th, -and after driving back the French advanced posts at Templeuve[240] and -Cappelle, a little to east of Pont-à-Marque, finally succeeded in -forcing the passage of the river at that point. But it was not till -two o’clock in the afternoon, instead of six in the morning of the -17th, that his army had passed to the west bank of the Marque; and his -soldiers were too much exhausted to move further than Lesquin, a little -east of the road between Pont-à-Marque and Lille. There he bivouacked -on the heights between Lesquin and Peronne, a village about three miles -to south-east of it; his men having been on foot for twenty-two hours, -marched more than twenty miles over bad roads, and fought a sharp -action for the passage of the river. His advance, however, had forced -the enemy to evacuate Sainghin, and thus enabled Kinsky to repair the -bridge at Bouvines; but none the less Kinsky, with excess of caution, -would not cross the river, and encamped for the night on the right -bank, which was for him the wrong bank, of the Marque. - -At the beginning of this day the French commanders had no information -of any movements of the Allies beyond the march of Clerfaye; and, -accordingly, the divisions of Souham and Moreau, together with -Vandamme’s brigade, had crossed to the left bank of the Lys. The -advance of the Allies from the east and the combats about Tourcoing, -however, soon undeceived them. Pichegru being, as Soult said, -fortunately absent, Generals Souham, Moreau, Macdonald, and Reynier -met in council at Menin; and on the evening of the 17th they decided -to make new dispositions and to set their troops at once in motion. -Vandamme’s brigade alone was left on the north bank of the Lys to -watch Clerfaye, and the remainder of the troops on that site crossed -the river to take up their appointed stations. Malbrancq’s brigade -was posted between Roncq and Blancfour, villages lying from three to -four miles due south from Menin on the road to Lille; to the left of -Malbrancq, Macdonald’s brigade crowned the heights of Mount Halluin; -the rest of Souham’s division, under Generals Daendels and Jardon, -lay some three miles away to the east of Macdonald, occupying a line -between Aelbeke and Belleghem, a village lying a little to the south -of Courtrai; and the gap between Macdonald and these troops was filled -by the brigades of Compère and Thierry about Mouscron. Thus the -formation of the French left wing was that of a double echelon; the -three divisions being arranged at the three angles of an isosceles -triangle, with the van at the apex, Mouscron, and the rear before Menin -and Courtrai. The right wing, consisting of Bonnaud’s and Osten’s -divisions, some thirty thousand strong, was assembled about Flers, two -miles and a half to the east of Lille; where orders arrived on the -evening of the 17th from Souham that a general attack was designed for -the morrow, in which the duty of Bonnaud’s division would be to march -upon Lannoy and Roubaix. - -It was not without anxiety that the reports from the various columns -of the Allies were awaited on the evening of the 17th at the Austrian -headquarters at Templeuve. The failures of Bussche to capture Mouscron, -and of the Archduke Charles to reach the point assigned to him, had -sufficed to mar Mack’s plans; and of Clerfaye there was no news -whatever. ◆May 17–18.◆ Orders were therefore sent at three o’clock -next morning to the Archduke Charles to march at once with his own -and Kinsky’s corps upon Lannoy; while the Duke of York and Otto were -directed to attack Mouscron at noon, in the hope that before that time -something would have been heard of Clerfaye. But it seems to have -occurred to none of the Austrian Staff that the disposition of the -Allied army, as prescribed by Mack, positively invited the French to -take the offensive. On this night Bussche lay at Dottignies and Coyghem -with his weakened corps of Hanoverians. On his left the main body of -Otto’s column, seven and a half battalions and three squadrons, was -at Tourcoing, with detachments of two battalions at Wattrelos, and -of three battalions and three squadrons at Leers, on the line of his -retreat. Thus his force was distributed in isolated patches along a -length of five miles, with its right flank not only unprotected, but -actually threatened by a superior force of the enemy, lying within -three miles both of Tourcoing and Wattrelos. - -On Otto’s left the Duke of York’s column was as dangerously -dispersed. The Guards, with the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons, -under Abercromby, were at Mouveaux; four Austrian battalions and -the Sixteenth Light Dragoons were at Roubaix; the Fourteenth, -Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third were on the road between Roubaix and -Lille, in order to repel any attack from the garrison of the latter -place; two Hessian battalions lay at Lannoy, and four squadrons of -Austrian hussars were engaged in patrolling. The Duke’s right was -indeed covered, but his left was exposed to attack not only by the -garrison of Lille but by Bonnaud’s superior force about Flers; and -thus both his column and Otto’s practically passed the night pent in -on three sides by forces of thrice their strength. To the left, or -southward, there was a gap of four miles between the Duke’s troops and -the nearest of Kinsky’s detachments, which lay at Pont-à-Tressin and -Chereng, with the main body still further south at Bouvines; while the -Archduke Charles, with nearly one-fourth of the whole army, lay over -against him at Sainghin on the other side of the Marque, with advanced -detachments pushed far to the south-west at Seclin. Finally, Clerfaye, -with rather more than a fourth of the entire Allied force, was still on -the western side of the Lys at Wervicq. Certainly the dispositions lent -themselves to a plan of annihilation. - -◆May 18.◆ - -At three o’clock on the morning of the 18th, while Coburg was signing -the orders for his troops, the French army began its march to the -attack. On the south Osten’s division was left about Flers and -Lezennes, to watch the Archduke Charles and Kinsky; while Bonnaud, -dividing his eighteen thousand men into two columns, directed -them northward, the one by L’Hempenpont upon Lannoy, the other by -Pont-à-Breug upon Roubaix. Simultaneously Malbrancq’s brigade marched -south from Roncq upon Mouveaux; Macdonald’s from Mount Halluin upon the -western front of Turcoing; Compère’s from Mouscron upon the northern -front; Thierry’s, also from Mouscron, together with Daendels’s from -Aelbeke, upon Wattrelos; while Jardon’s brigade moved from Belleghem -towards Dottignies to hold the Hanoverians in check. Excluding this -last brigade, sixty thousand men in all were thus turned upon the six -posts in which the eighteen thousand men under Otto and the Duke of -York were dispersed. - -Otto’s force, being nearer to the enemy, was the first to feel -the weight of the attack. General Montfrault, who commanded at -Tourcoing, perceiving the overwhelming strength of the enemy, begged -reinforcements from the Duke of York, who sent him two Austrian -battalions from Roubaix, but with strict orders that they should return -in the event of their arriving too late to save the town. As a matter -of fact they did arrive too late, for the garrison had already been -driven from Tourcoing; but none the less they attached themselves, -as was perhaps natural, to Montfrault, who stood fast on the eastern -skirts of the town and held back the enemy for a time, until a -French battery unlimbering on ground to the north of him, forced him -to retire. Seeing himself threatened by large bodies of cavalry, -Montfrault formed his troops into a large square, with four battalions -and light artillery in front, one battalion on each flank, and the -cavalry in the rear. In this order he fell back, his heavy artillery -and waggons being enclosed in the centre of the square, and his light -troops skirmishing on all four sides. It was about half-past eight when -he began his retrograde movement; but already Wattrelos, the first -post on his rear, was in possession of the enemy. The garrison, two -Hessian battalions, had manfully resisted an attack of six times their -number until eight o’clock, when, finding themselves in danger of being -surrounded, they retired, and, with the help of two companies sent -forward by General Otto, withdrew successfully to Leers. Montfrault -thereupon found himself compelled to leave the main road for a by-way, -which ran between Wattrelos and Roubaix, in order to continue his -retreat. - -Between six and seven o’clock, rather later than the opening of the -attack on Tourcoing and Wattrelos, Bonnaud’s two columns came up from -the south upon Lannoy and Roubaix; and shortly afterwards Malbrancq’s -brigade from the north fell upon Mouveaux, while a part of the French -force that had captured Tourcoing appeared also on the north of -Roubaix. The Duke of York despatched urgent messages to recall the -two Austrian battalions which he had sent to Otto, but of course in -vain; and meanwhile he made such head as he could with his handful of -troops against overwhelming odds. The troops at Mouveaux were disposed -in two sides of a square, the left showing a front towards the east -at Mouveaux, the guns stationed in the angle at the northern end of -the village, and the right thrown back to the hamlet of Le Fresnoy. To -the south, the British brigade of the Line under Major-general Fox, -near Croix, sought to bar the way against part of Bonnaud’s division -from Lille; but to defend the rest of the ground there were but three -Austrian battalions. Of these half a battalion was stationed in Roubaix -itself, and the remainder echeloned to the right rear of Fox’s brigade -behind the sources of the Espierres brook, which ran along the southern -skirts of the village. These Austrian battalions seem to have been -the first to give way, and one of them, by Craig’s account, did not -behave as it ought; but they were pressed hard both in front and on -their right flank, which, owing to the absence of the two battalions -sent to Otto, was wholly uncovered. One brigade of Bonnaud’s division -therefore succeeded in forcing its way between Mouveaux and Roubaix -to Le Fresnoy; and the Duke thus saw Abercromby and the brigade of -Guards absolutely cut off from him. Moreover, though he knew it not, -the victorious French of Thierry’s and Daendels’s brigades were coming -down from Wattrelos upon his rear. Seldom has a General found himself, -through no fault of his own, in a more extraordinary position. He had -been assured that the Archduke Charles would join him from the south, -and he had therefore ordered Abercromby to defend Mouveaux to the -last extremity; but not a sign of an Austrian was to be seen whether -to south or north. His first instinct was to ride to the Guards at -Mouveaux; but this was seen to be out of the question. He then tried -to make his way to Fox’s brigade, but found that the French were in -possession of the suburbs of Roubaix, and that he was cut off from -this brigade also. Realising then that, his Austrian battalions being -dispersed, he had not a man left to him except two squadrons of the -Sixteenth Light Dragoons, he took a small escort from them and rode to -Wattrelos, hoping to obtain from Otto the means for extricating the -Guards. Meanwhile he sent orders to Abercromby to retire to the heights -on the east side of Roubaix. - -Montfrault, however, had fared ill in his attempt to withdraw. Until he -reached the ground between Wattrelos and Roubaix, his square preserved -good order; but being attacked at that point by overpowering numbers -from the south as well as from north and west, it was broken up, and -fled in disorder towards Leers. Meanwhile General Fox, finding himself -absolutely isolated, at length gave the order for his brigade, which so -far had held its own, to retire. The retreat began in perfect order, -and the brigade, having successfully fought its way to the road at -Lannoy, followed it for some distance, under incessant fire from all -sides, until checked by a battery covered by an abatis, which the -French had thrown up on the road. The first shots from this battery -struck down several men, and Fox for the moment feared that surrender -would be inevitable; but fortunately in the ranks of the Fourteenth was -a French emigrant who knew the district well, and undertook to lead the -brigade across country. It pursued its retreat therefore under constant -fire of artillery and musketry in front and on both flanks, and with -cavalry constantly threatening its rear; but it kept its assailants -at bay, and at one moment made so sharp a counter-attack as to take -temporary possession of some French guns. Thus partly by good luck, -partly by good conduct, partly by the misconduct and mismanagement of -the enemy, the three battalions contrived to reach Leers, with the loss -of all their battalion-guns excepting one, and of nine officers and -five hundred and twenty-five men out of eleven hundred and twenty. The -greatest credit was given to General Fox for the coolness, skill, and -patience with which he extricated his brigade. - -Abercromby appears to have begun his retreat from Mouveaux at about -nine o’clock, but of necessity very slowly, having with him a -considerable number of guns. The retirement was conducted in perfect -order as far as Roubaix, the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons -covering the rear with great gallantry. At Roubaix the French, though -in occupation of the suburbs, were not in possession of the little -walled town, which was still held by a dismounted squadron of the -Sixteenth Light Dragoons. The place consisted of a single long street, -the direct continuation of which led to Wattrelos, while, just outside -the eastern gate, the road to Lannoy turned sharply to the right, being -bordered on one side by a deep ditch and on the other by the Espierres -brook. To defile through the town took necessarily much time, but the -guns emerged safely and the Guards also. Next to the Guards were the -Austrian Hussars, still in the street; then in rear of them a party of -the Fifteenth; next to this party were the Sixteenth, who were formed -up in the market-place; and in rear of all were the remainder of the -Fifteenth, holding the pursuing French in check. All was still in order -when a French gun posted on the Wattrelos branch of the street suddenly -opened fire from the edge of the town, sending shot after shot among -the Austrian Hussars. The ordeal would have been a severe one for any -troops, and presently the Hussars dismounted and tried to find a way -out among the houses, but in vain. The trial became unendurable as the -French pressed on and opened fire on all sides upon the horsemen thus -pent in for slaughter; and at last the whole body remounted, galloped -wildly down the road, swung round the corner, where the French infantry -thrust vainly at them with their bayonets, and raced onward for three -or four hundred yards, when the foremost troopers suddenly found -the way blocked by horseless guns. The French had brought a second -gun to enfilade the road to Lannoy, and the drivers of the British -cannon had fled. The shock of this mass of galloping horsemen suddenly -checked was appalling. In an instant the ground was strewn with men -and horses, kicking and struggling in frantic confusion, while a -number of bât-horses dashed into the ranks of the Guards, plunging -and lashing out, with their loads hanging under their bellies. For -a short time the disorder appears to have been beyond remedy, for a -belt of wood surrounding the town gave excellent shelter to the French -sharpshooters, who had a very easy target in the mass of struggling -men and animals. Very soon, however, the Guards recovered themselves, -and cleared a way for the cavalry to pass on beyond the wood to open -ground. There the Light Dragoons rallied, the rear-guard was re-formed, -and the retreat, always under heavy fire, was resumed towards Lannoy. - -That village, which was enclosed by a low earthen rampart and a shallow -ditch, had likewise been attacked early by one of Bonnaud’s brigades -from Lille, but had been defended with the greatest gallantry by -two battalions of Hessians, who were apparently still in possession -when the British troops approached it, though surrounded on the -west side, and indeed nearly on all sides, by the French.[241] The -British officers, however, could see no sign of a friendly garrison, -and Colonel Congreve was actually wheeling his cannon round to open -fire on the place, when there galloped up to them some blue-coated -horsemen, who, being mistaken for Hessians, were allowed to approach -without molestation, and succeeded in cutting the traces of some of -the guns before they were discovered. The Guards then perceiving -their retreat to be cut off, faced about against their pursuers, and, -leaving the high road, made their way across country as best they could -south-eastward to Marquain. The Hessians in Lannoy, either before or -shortly after this, were forced to evacuate the village, and, finding -the road to Leers blocked by the enemy, were likewise obliged to make -their way across country in disorder, losing out of nine hundred -officers and men some three hundred and thirty, of whom two hundred -were cut off and captured in Lannoy itself. - -Meanwhile the Duke of York, conspicuous by the star on his breast, -had been hunted all over the country by the enemy’s dragoons, and -had escaped, as he frankly owned, only by the speed of his horse. On -reaching Wattrelos he found it in the hands of the French, but passing -beyond it under constant fire he came upon a gallant little party of -Hessians still holding the bridge of the Espierres brook. These by a -final attack with the bayonet gained a little respite for him, but -were presently swept away from the bridge, and escaped only by fording -the brook neck-deep. The Duke, thinking apparently that the bridge -was lost, or not knowing of its existence, spurred his horse into the -brook; but the animal rearing up and refusing to enter the water, he -dismounted, scrambled over on foot, and taking a horse from one of -his aide-de-camps, at last succeeded in finding Otto. About Leers and -Nechin the fragments of Otto’s force, together with some of the Duke -of York’s men, rallied upon the few battalions that held these places. -The French did not press their advantage, and at half-past four the -action came to an end. The loss of the Allies was about three thousand -men killed, wounded, and missing, which was relatively slight, for, -with proper management and conduct on the part of the French, not a man -of the Duke’s and Otto’s columns would have escaped alive. The Brigade -of Guards lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and men killed, -wounded, and missing, the flank-companies being the heaviest sufferers; -while the Seventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who by -general admission behaved admirably, lost fifty-two men and ninety-two -horses. The total loss of the British of all ranks was nine hundred -and thirty, besides which nineteen out of their twenty-eight guns were -captured. - -It may be asked what the rest of the army was doing on this day, while -these two columns, together less than one-third of the whole, were -in process of annihilation. The answer is that, for some reason, it -observed a conspiracy of inaction. Bussche sat still at Dottignies -exchanging occasional shots with Jardon’s brigade. Clerfaye crossed -the Lys near Wervicq at seven o’clock in the morning, and turning -eastward advanced between Bousbecque and Linselles, where he was met -by Vandamme’s brigade, which numbered eight thousand men against his -sixteen thousand. He engaged the French, overthrew their right wing, -took eight guns, and then remained stationary; until, being informed -of the approach of more French troops about Bondues, he withdrew to -the Lys, which he recrossed on the next day, and thence retreated -northward. The behaviour of Kinsky and of the Archduke Charles was -still more extraordinary. Kinsky, on being asked by one of his officers -for orders at six o’clock in the morning, replied that he was sick -and no longer in command. The Archduke Charles received at five in -the morning the order to move at once upon Lannoy, a distance of six -miles, so that his troops might well have come upon the scene of action -between eight and nine. He did not march till noon, though within sound -of the guns, nor did he strike the road from Tournai to Lille until -three, when he received orders to return to Tournai. The military -renown justly earned later by the Archduke forbids us to believe that -this delay was due to ignorance; and the fact that, though the Duke of -York had early informed the Emperor of his danger, not a word was sent -to hasten the Archduke or Kinsky, shows clearly that their torpidity -was not unexpected nor disapproved at headquarters. Jealousy of the -Duke of York and of Mack are among the reasons assigned to account -for the general paralysis of the Austrian commanders; but possibly -the true reason was that Thugut was sick of the war in Belgium, and -wished the English to sicken of it also. Why he should have chosen the -slaughter of several hundred British and Austrians as the best means -of forwarding his purpose, and how he persuaded Austrian officers to -second him therein, are matters which only an Austrian can determine. -For us it must suffice that the decisive battle of the campaign was -lost by the deliberate design of the Imperial Generals. Before long -they were to learn that those who court defeat for dishonest ends may, -when they least desire it, find defeat thrust upon them.[242] - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XI - - -◆1794.◆ - -◆May 19.◆ - -The entire army of the Allies, with the exception of Clerfaye’s corps, -was gathered into camp about Tournai in the course of the 19th, the -Emperor being received in silence when he rode into the town, while the -Duke of York was loudly cheered by the inhabitants.[243] The condition -of the army was very far from satisfactory. The troops themselves, or at -any rate the British, were not seriously shaken by the rout of the -previous day; but the Emperor and the Austrian commanders were much -discouraged, and the animosity of the various nations towards each other -was dangerously embittered. The British, above all, were furious against -the Austrians for leaving them to be overwhelmed without so much as an -attempt to assist them. “It is impossible,” wrote Craig to the War -Office, “to bring the Austrians to act except in small corps. I lament -that we should be destined as victims of their folly and ignorance. Do -not be surprised at the word ignorance: I am every day more and more -convinced that they have not an officer among them.” These were hard -words, but they were true and just, though the Archduke Charles in later -days redeemed himself from this reproach. ◆May 20.◆ However, for the -moment the commanders laid aside their differences and agreed that the -attack should be renewed, this time with united forces, upon Mouscron; -and meanwhile Coburg dispersed the whole army in a semicircle around -Tournai; the advanced posts running from Camphin on the south by -Baisieux, Willems, Nechin, Leers, Estaimpuis, and St. Legers to -Espierres, while the inner circle of entrenchments ran from the Scheldt -on the north by Froyennes, Marquain, and Lamain to the suburb of St. -Martin and the citadel of Tournai itself. - -The French Generals, as already narrated, made no effort to follow up -their victory of the 18th, but awaited the return of Pichegru, who, -on the news of the victory, hastened from the Sambre to turn it to -account. On the 22nd, after a consultation with his officers, Pichegru -decided to make a general attack upon Coburg’s position, and directed -that Souham with four brigades,[244] numbering from thirty to forty -thousand men, should assail it on the right or northern half of its -front from Espierres to Leers, while Bonnaud’s division should fall -upon its left about Templeuve, and Osten’s division should make a -demonstration still further to the south about Baisieux. May 23.◆ On -the following day between six and seven o’clock in the morning the -action began; and after long and hard fighting the Allies were finally -driven from three important points, namely, Blandain and the hill of La -Croisette immediately adjacent to it, a little to the west of Tournai, -and Pont-à-Chin upon the Scheldt, a little below the city. To abandon -to the enemy these posts, particularly Pont-à-Chin, which lay on the -direct road from Courtrai to Tournai and commanded the navigation of -the Scheldt, was impossible; and Coburg decided that they must be -recovered at any cost. Throughout this long day’s fighting the troops -that had borne the brunt of the work on the 18th had been held in -reserve; but at about six o’clock in the evening Fox’s brigade of the -British Line was called out to recover Pont-à-Chin which had already -been taken and retaken three or four times. The brigade went into -this action with fewer than six hundred men, having lost half of its -numbers just four days before; but the three gallant regiments, though -unsupported, carried the village unhesitatingly with the bayonet, -pressed on to the low heights to south of it, swept everything before -them, so far as their front extended, and captured seven cannon. -◆ May 22.◆ The day ended, after a severe struggle of fifteen hours, -in the retreat of the French, with the loss of some six thousand men -and seven guns; the fire, both of musketry and artillery, having been -the heaviest ever remembered by the oldest soldiers present. Both -sides, however, fought for the most part in dispersed formation, and -inflicted, comparatively speaking, little damage upon each other. The -one exception was Fox’s brigade. “Had their order of attack,” wrote -Calvert, “been adopted by the Allies in general, the day would probably -have ended in the ruin of the French.” But the losses of the brigade -amounted to one hundred and twenty killed, wounded, and missing; and -there are few troops that can be trusted, after losing half their -numbers on Sunday, to storm a position held by a superior force and -lose one-fifth of their remnant on Thursday. Some indeed claim that -but for this handful of British soldiers the day would have been lost -to the Allies;[245] but whether this be true or not, the 22nd of May -should be a great anniversary for the Fourteenth, Thirty-Seventh, and -Fifty-Third. - -It was directly after this action that the course of events in Poland -began to tell upon the councils of the Imperial Headquarters at Tournai. -◆May 23.◆ On the 23rd, Mack, disgusted by the failure of his elaborate -plans, resigned his post as Chief of the Staff, and, having first -expressed his opinion that the reconquest of Belgium was hopeless, -retired for the time into private life. His successor, Waldeck, being a -fellow-conspirator with Thugut, was still more eager for the evacuation -of the Netherlands; and the Emperor was easily tempted to share their -views. ◆May 24.◆ On the 24th a Council of War was held for form’s sake, -wherein the Emperor set forth the situation in such a light as to gain a -ready vote from his Generals that further efforts in the Netherlands -were useless. The Duke of York alone pleaded earnestly for a renewal of -the attack upon Flanders; and, as fate ordained it, his representations -were seconded by unexpected successes of the Allies on the Sambre and in -the Palatinate. On the 24th Marshal Möllendorf and the Prussians -surprised the French about Kaiserslautern and drove them back with a -loss of three thousand men and twenty guns; and on the same day Count -Kaunitz gained a still more important victory on the Sambre. The fact -was that serious differences had arisen at Paris between Carnot on the -one side and Robespierre and St. Just on the other, because Carnot -insisted on keeping the direction of the military operations in his own -hands. Robespierre, to whom the art of war was as incomprehensible as a -Chinese manuscript, was furious with jealousy and rage. “At the first -reverse, Carnot’s head shall fall,” cried the despicable creature, -galled by the cold contempt with which his inflexible colleague rebuffed -his attempts at interference; and to re-establish civil influence at the -seat of war, St. Just, Lebas, and five more Commissioners set out on the -2nd of May for the army of the Sambre. There they introduced the rule of -terror in its worst form, and with it, of course, confusion unspeakable. -They fought with the Generals, they fought among themselves; and in the -midst of this chaos St. Just took upon himself the supreme direction of -the operations whereby the Austrians were to be crushed. ◆May 18, 20, -22, 24.◆ Four several times he ordered the army to pass the Sambre, -wasting the lives of his troops with obstinate imbecility. ◆May 24.◆ -Finally he gave Kaunitz the opportunity for a counter-attack, in which, -with inconsiderable loss to themselves, the Austrians routed the French -completely, killing and wounding two thousand men, and capturing three -thousand more, besides fifty pieces of cannon. - -This heavy blow to the French right wing offered a fair occasion for -the Allies to renew the offensive in Western Flanders; and the Duke -of York urged this step upon his colleagues with all his might. The -British Government too, reckoning that the troops, promised by Prussia -in return for a British subsidy, must be nearly ready, decided to -send out Lord Cornwallis to concert operations with Möllendorf, and -directed him also to consult the Emperor and the Duke of York on his -way to the Prussian Headquarters. But, as has already been told, King -Frederick William was occupied rather with Poland than France at the -moment; and he had also been much irritated by certain dispositions -which had been proposed for his army by Mack in the middle of May. “I -am astonished at the fashion in which Mack thinks to make use of my -troops,” wrote the King. “Does Mack imagine that we can live on air?” -echoed Möllendorf;[246] both of them being secretly delighted with so -good an excuse for remaining inactive. ◆May 29.◆ Then suddenly, on the -29th of May, the Allied Camp at Tournai was thrown into consternation -by the announcement that the Emperor was about to return to Vienna. -Aided by the defeat of the 18th, Thugut had succeeded in persuading his -imperial master to abandon the Austrian Netherlands; and even Mack, the -unpopular Quartermaster-general, had supported him by recommending not -only the evacuation of the country but the conclusion of peace with -France. - -The truth was that jealousy of Prussia had prevailed over all other -considerations, and that the Emperor had decided to offer help to -the Empress Catherine in quelling the Polish insurrection. He hoped, -however, at the same time to delude Prussia into keeping thirty -thousand men upon the Rhine, and England into furnishing a subsidy for -the ostensible prosecution of the war with France; and it was therefore -imperative upon him to conceal his intentions. He accordingly gave -out that the object of his departure was to hasten the recruiting of -his forces; and in his final letter to Coburg, who very unwillingly -retained the command, he gave him only vague instructions to adapt his -action to the exigencies of the campaign and to save his troops as much -as possible. But this duplicity deceived no one, and the less because -Waldeck, before he had succeeded Mack as Chief of the Staff, had openly -declared that the war in Belgium must be ended. The Austrian troops -were profoundly discouraged, and two-thirds of the officers asked -permission to retire. They can hardly be blamed, for the succession -of murderous actions fought by the Allies against the French on the -northern frontier of France, between the 17th of April and the 22nd -of May 1794, has few parallels in the history of war. For a month -Austrians, British, and Germans had contended almost unceasingly -against superior numbers, slaying or taking, not without heavy loss to -themselves, French soldiers by the ten thousand, and capturing French -cannon by the score. Yet all had been to no purpose, partly because -the leaders had deliberately chosen a foolish plan of operations, -partly because they had steadily refused to follow up their successes, -partly because on the 18th of May they had held two-thirds of the -army inactive within sound of the guns which were overwhelming their -comrades. The bravest men will not fight upon such terms. They will not -be butchered to serve the intrigues of politicians whose dishonesty -would disgrace a sergeant, and of potentates whose incapacity would -disqualify a corporal. In days to come Austria ◆May 29.◆ was to pay -dearly in Italy for the 29th of May 1794.[247] - -Immediately before the Emperor’s departure came news from Kaunitz that -the French had again crossed the Sambre in force; which compelled -Coburg to send him large reinforcements, and thus to weaken the right -and centre of the Allies in order to strengthen their left. At the -same time, for the sake of keeping the Dutch in good humour, Coburg -was obliged to give the supreme command in that quarter to the Crown -Prince of Orange, to the natural disgust of Kaunitz, who had shown much -ability and achieved great successes. The great safeguard, however, -to eastward was that St. Just insisted upon controlling the French -operations; and it need not be said that against such an adversary -even the Prince of Orange was victorious. But far more serious were -the movements of the French on the western flank. Apprised of Coburg’s -detachment of troops to the Sambre, hoping still to further Carnot’s -projects for invasion of England, and above all conscious of the -advantage offered to French tactics by the enclosed country of Western -Flanders, Pichegru determined to prosecute his operations on that -side. Accordingly, leaving between thirty and forty thousand men in -positions about Mouscron and Menin to hold Coburg in check, he marched -with about the same number on Ypres. ◆June 1.◆ On the 1st of June -about fifteen thousand men surrounded the fortress on the west and -south, and opened their first parallel; while some twenty thousand -more under Souham took post about Passchendaele, about six miles to -the north-east, to cover the siege from Clerfaye, who was lying at -Thielt. On that same day, by a curious irony, Lord Howe defeated the -Brest fleet, taking eight French ships and sinking two more. This -action, in which the regiments on the fleet, and particularly the -Sixty-Ninth,[248] played no inconspicuous part, closed for the present -all Carnot’s projects of an invasion. - -The event, however, in no way disturbed the plans of Pichegru. ◆June 4.◆ -On the 4th of June Clerfaye contrived to pass two battalions into Ypres -to strengthen the garrison; but he declared himself unable, with the -fifteen thousand men that remained to him, to relieve the place unless -he were reinforced. By express command of the Emperor, who had lingered -at Brussels on his homeward journey, Coburg sent him some ten thousand -men in two detachments, reckoning that, after the recent victory on the -Sambre, he could safely draw a few troops from that quarter. Clerfaye, -however, continued to display the sluggishness which had characterised -his conduct from the beginning of the campaign. ◆June 6.◆ On the 6th, -before his reinforcements had reached him, he made a feeble advance -against Souham in four columns, and was of course unsuccessful; ◆June -10.◆ and on the 10th, when his force had been raised to over twenty -thousand men, he was assailed and defeated with loss by Souham before he -could make up his mind to act. On that same day Coburg had designed to -make a diversion in Clerfaye’s favour, by an attack on Mouscron, upon a -plan calculated so exactly to expose the Duke of York’s column to -destruction, as on the 18th of May, that the Duke refused to accept it -until it was altered. This, however, was of small importance, for the -French, having perfect information of the intended movements, appeared -in every direction in such force that the enterprise was abandoned. The -state of things at the Austrian headquarters was indeed almost beyond -belief. Insensible to all ideas of duty and discipline, the young -staff-officers, described by Craig as “in general the most contemptible -of puppies,” had talked openly of the projected movement in the -coffee-houses at noon, though the Duke of York received no information -of it until ten hours later, nor any orders until four o’clock on the -next morning. “Mack used to keep these gentry in order,” wrote Craig, -“and, had he been here, the prison would have been full of them next -day; but indeed it would never have happened.” ◆June 12.◆ Meanwhile -Clerfaye remained so incurably supine that the Duke of York more than -once entreated Coburg to entrust the relief of Ypres to himself, but in -vain. ◆June 13.◆ Roused by repeated orders to attack, Clerfaye at last -moved against Souham in five columns, gained some advantage at first, -captured ten guns, and then as usual sat still until Souham had gathered -troops sufficient for a counter attack, when he immediately retired to -his old position at Thielt. - -This sealed the fate of Ypres, the key of maritime Flanders, the chief -support of the right flank of the Allies, the bulwark which protected -the British communications with Ostend. The Duke of York pleaded hard -for a last effort to save it, by a march of the whole army to join -Clerfaye; but without success. “The truth is,” wrote Craig, “that the -Austrian army is incapable of further action. The men are disheartened -and the officers disgusted and disunited.” It was finally decided that, -to cover Ostend and the Dutch frontier, Clerfaye should take up a -position between the Lys and the Scheldt about Deynse, some ten miles -to the south-west of Ghent; keeping half of his force between Bruges -and Ostend, and sending the Eighth Light Dragoons, Thirty-eighth and -Fifty-fifth, which had formed part of his force, to Ostend. “We are -too weak by ten thousand men to hold this defensive position,” wrote -Craig; “if the French see their chance and push Clerfaye, they will -force us to abandon this position about Tournai and will pass the -Scheldt in spite of us; and then ten to one we shall find ourselves -separated from him and beaten in detail.... Sooner than hold the -defensive position I would concentrate the whole army, eighty thousand -men, march to the Sambre, attack them at any risk and march back -again.... You may expect to hear from us soon in Holland.” Clearly -there was one among the despised British officers who could have taught -the Austrians a lesson.[249] - -The situation was indeed a desperate one. The Austrians, having taken no -pains to restore the fortifications of Tournai, had thrown up an -entrenched camp for its protection on the western side. These lines -extended from the city southward along the Scheldt to Maulde, and -required so many men for their defence that few could be spared for -active operations. Some seven thousand Frenchmen at Mons-en-Pévèle kept -the left of the Allies in continual alarm for the safety of Orchies, -which was the key of Maulde and of the passage of the Scheldt at -Mortagne; for if that passage were forced, the communication between -Coburg and the army of the Sambre would be endangered. A little to the -north of Mons-en-Pévèle was the entire garrison of Lille, and still -further to the north, between Lille and Menin, stood from twenty to -thirty thousand more French troops. Behind this screen to westward, from -fifty thousand to sixty thousand of the enemy were engaged as the -besieging and covering armies at Ypres; and far beyond them to the north -lay the right wing of the Allies under Clerfaye, stretched in a weak -attenuated line from Ostend to the Lys, and only maintaining -communication with Tournai by the circuitous route of the Scheldt. On -the eastern flank the French had now some seventy-five thousand men on -the Sambre, with a capable leader in Jourdan, albeit one still hampered -by the interference of St. Just; and this was the only quarter in which -recent events had gone favourably for the Allies. Such a situation could -not last long, and the strain upon Coburg must have been cruelly severe. -◆June 16.◆ On the 16th, however, there came a gleam of hope. The French -on that day again passed the Sambre, but for the fifth time were driven -back with heavy loss; ◆June 18.◆ and Coburg, having summoned four -battalions from that quarter, determined on the 18th to march and join -with Clerfaye in a final attempt to relieve Ypres. The troops were -already in motion, when in the evening the news came that the French had -crossed the Sambre for the sixth time, and successfully invested -Charleroi. Thereupon the enterprise was abandoned. ◆June 19.◆ On the -following day Ypres surrendered, and thus Carnot’s original plan of -turning both flanks of the Allies began, after two months of murderous -fighting, to accomplish itself. - -Enabled by the fall of Ypres to turn the whole of his attention to -eastward, Coburg at once proposed that he should march with all the -Austrian troops to Charleroi, and leave the Duke of York to guard the -line of the Scheldt from Tournai to Condé. The Duke answered that -his instructions were to keep the whole of the troops in British pay -together, but that, if ordered, he would gladly lead the whole of them -with Coburg to the Sambre. Since, however, his force was absolutely -inadequate to guard the line of the Scheldt, he insisted that, if it -were left behind, an Austrian garrison should remain at Tournai, and -that he himself should take up a position on the eastern bank of the -Scheldt between that city and Oudenarde, so as to ensure his retreat in -case of mishap. - -The offer to march to the Sambre was fair, and it is difficult to -understand why Coburg did not embrace it; for, if the battle on the -Sambre were lost, it would obviously be impossible for the Duke’s -troops to remain isolated in Flanders. Coburg did, however, reject -it, though he consented to station about five thousand Austrians -under General Kray between Denain and Orchies, promising that, if he -succeeded in forcing back the enemy on the Sambre, he would return -without delay, but that, in the event of his failure, he should not -expect the Duke of York to maintain his position on the Scheldt. He -also took the significant step of transferring the Austrian hospitals -and stores at Valenciennes, as well as the magazines about Tournai, -to Brussels and Antwerp; the removal of the stores at Brussels having -begun some time ◆June 21.◆ before.[250] Finally, on the 21st, he -marched away; and the Duke, since the corps in British pay had now -shrunk to seven thousand men, contracted his quarters, and took up a -new position closer to Tournai. - -But meanwhile the news that Ostend was in danger had, as usual, stirred -Dundas to unwonted exertion in England. He still made a fetish of the -place, and his original intention seems to have been to defend it, -without any particular reference to the Duke of York’s operations. On -the 17th of June, therefore, he ordered Lord Moira’s force in the Isle -of Wight and the Channel Islands to sail for Ostend at once, together -with drafts of recruits and three fresh regiments from Ireland, making -in all a reinforcement of about ten thousand men. On the 20th Moira’s -troops embarked, and on the 21st the Eighth, the Forty-fourth, and the -recruits arrived at Ostend. The drafts, it must be remarked, arrived -without arms or military appointments of any kind; and it was only a fog -at sea that prevented a whole regiment, the Ninetieth, from being also -landed there without either arms or clothing, Dundas having ordered it -to embark without enquiry as to these details.[251] But Pichegru -meanwhile did not remain idle, and leaving Ypres on the 20th marched -upon Clerfaye’s position at Deynse. ◆June 23.◆ The Austrian General, -after a short defence of his entrenchments, retired, with the loss of -not a few men and three guns, first to Ghent, and then beyond it, -finally taking up a position on the north side of the canal that runs -from Ghent to Sluys, ◆June 24.◆ where he was presently joined by his -detachments from Bruges. ◆June 25.◆ On the 25th of June there arrived at -Ostend, after a voyage of nineteen days from Cork, one squadron of the -Fourteenth Light Dragoons and the Thirty-third regiment, the latter -under the command of an officer whose name it still bears, but who was -then an impecunious younger son of five-and-twenty, possessed indeed of -some skill in playing the violin, but still distinguished by no higher -title than that of Colonel Arthur Wellesley. ◆June 26.◆ On the morrow -Moira with the last of the reinforcements[252] also reached Ostend, -where he found an advanced guard of the French within four miles of the -town, a large force of several thousand men close behind it, and the -Commandant very wisely embarking his garrison with a view to retreat. -The whole district was in a state of panic; but Moira promptly landed -the whole of his men, and having observed the difficulties of defending -Ostend, and the military worthlessness of the place, quietly selected -his fighting ground outside it. “I am not at all satisfied with my -position,” he wrote calmly to Dundas, “but since you appear to attach -importance to the town I will do my best to maintain it.” “The defences -are so detestable,” he added cheerfully to Nepean, “that I shall go into -the open field if we must come to blows. If you are to lose everything -it does not signify if you are beaten into the bargain.”[253] It is -dangerous for a General, be he even so able as Moira, to address an -English Minister of War in this strain; for, in the event of mishap, the -words may be brought up as evidence against him in Parliament to prove -that he was reckless, careless, neglectful, or despondent. - -During these days the Duke of York remained in painful suspense at -Tournai, until the news of Clerfaye’s defeat on the 23rd warned him to -move northward without delay. As Craig had perceived, the French by -crossing the Scheldt at Oudenarde could prevent the Duke of York from -joining Clerfaye, crush both armies in detail, and then, passing -eastward, could annihilate Coburg. ◆June 24.◆ The Duke therefore called -in Kray’s Austrians for the defence of Tournai, and marched -north-eastward on the right bank of the Scheldt to Renaix, where he -learned that on the same day a French corps had summoned Oudenarde. -◆June 25.◆ On the morrow Pichegru crossed the Lys at Deynse with the -main body of his army, and striking south from thence encamped on the -27th at Huysse, ◆June 27.◆ between four and five miles north of -Oudenarde. On that same night came a message from Coburg to the Duke of -York that on the previous day he had made his attack on the French about -Charleroi and had failed. ◆June 26.◆ This was the battle of Fleurus, -which had been suddenly broken off by the Austrian commander before -decisive advantage had been gained by either side; and it is still a -question whether Coburg’s action was dictated by the requirements of -Thugut’s policy or by his own military judgment. ◆June 27.◆ However that -may be, he retreated in good order upon Brussels, halting on the 27th in -a position running from Soignies on the west through Braine L’Alleud to -Gembloux on the east. This movement uncovered the Duke of York’s left -rear, and placed him in a most dangerous position. He had with him -barely ten thousand men, nearly half of them cavalry, which in so close -a country were of little service; and from the church-tower at Oudenarde -he could see thirty thousand of the enemy in his front. The French, by -passing the Scheldt, could at any time cut off his retreat to the north, -in which case his only line of safety lay eastward towards Grammont; and -this in its turn would be closed if Coburg should continue his -retrograde movement towards Namur, which was his first stage on the road -to Vienna. - -◆June 28.◆ - -On the morning of the 28th the enemy appeared in force before -Oudenarde, showing every sign of making the dreaded movement across -the river; and the Duke despatched orders to Moira to join Clerfaye -immediately. For two days Pichegru continued his menaces on the -Scheldt, and then suddenly on the evening of the 30th he retired, -having received orders from Paris to occupy Nieuport, Ostend, and the -island of Walcheren in force, with a view to the invasion of England. -◆June 30.◆ Ostend, which, together with Nieuport, Henry Dundas had kept -under his own orders, was evacuated in good time, while directions to -that purport were still on their way from England. Moira’s instructions -extended no further than to the defence of Ostend, but, in the critical -circumstances of the case, he proposed to join his force to Clerfaye, -and to act with him against the French left. Clerfaye at first welcomed -the offer, but, on hearing of the misfortune of Fleurus, declared -that he could make no engagement with the British whatever. This was -unpleasant for Moira, who had counted on the help of the Austrians in -protecting the transport of his camp-equipage on the canal from Bruges -to Ghent. The situation was dangerous, for the French were in force at -three different places within two hours’ march of the canal, bent upon -preventing his junction with Clerfaye. Without a moment’s hesitation -Moira sent his baggage northward to Sluys, and by a rapid march made -his way to Ghent, just in time to anticipate a movement made by the -French to intercept him. Thus a valuable reinforcement was secured to -the Allies; and three more perilous days were passed without mishap, -thanks rather to the Committee of Safety at Paris than to the Austrian -commanders in the field.[254] - -◆June 30.◆ - -On the evening of the 30th the Duke of York rode over from Renaix to -Braine L’Alleud to consult Coburg; and it was then agreed that -Clerfaye’s force should change places with the Duke’s, so as to bring -the Austrian corps nearer to its own main army, and the British -contingent nearer to the sea. At the actual conference both Coburg and -the Archduke Charles declared that, having no orders from the Emperor to -evacuate the Austrian Netherlands, they felt bound in honour to defend -them. Waldeck indeed opposed even a withdrawal from the line of the -Scheldt. ◆July 2.◆ All this, however, was mere trifling, for two days -later Coburg wrote that his right wing had been driven back from -Soignies, and that the Duke would do well to retire to a position -appointed him between Brussels and Antwerp. The fall of Mons on the 1st -of July having also laid bare the Duke’s left flank and rear, he took -the hint, and while protesting against the desertion of the country, -gave his orders for retreat in the morning by way of Grammont and thence -upon Alost. Tournai, through the courtesy of the French, was peaceably -evacuated by the Austrians, though Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecies, and -Quesnoy were held. The line of the Scheldt was abandoned, and the Duke -of York’s troops were withdrawn from every garrison except Nieuport. -◆July 2.◆ As to this last the Duke, as in duty bound, asked for Dundas’s -orders, saying that, if the Government wished to reconquer Flanders, the -place should be kept; otherwise the garrison, which included five -hundred French emigrants, should not for pity’s sake be exposed to the -risk of capture. - -Then followed a miserable tragedy. Dundas, apparently before -the receipt of this letter, wrote on the 3rd of July to General -Diepenbrock, the Commandant at Nieuport, promising to send transports -for the embarkation of the garrison, if necessary, but adding that the -Government attached great importance to the retention of the place. -Within two days the French had broken ground before the miserable -little port, where the water was so shallow that ships could not -come near the shore; ◆July 16.◆ and less than a fortnight later -the unfortunate garrison, which included a few British troops, was -compelled to surrender. Forthwith the French massed the emigrants -in the ditch of the fort and played upon them with grape-shot until -the whole of them were destroyed. It was well known that this would -inevitably be the fate of those unhappy men if they fell into the hands -of the Republicans; and German authors have not hesitated to censure -the Duke of York because, according to the current, though unjust, -opinion, he neglected to order the evacuation of Nieuport while there -was yet time. It were, indeed, devoutly to be wished that the Duke -had respected Dundas less, and had withdrawn the garrison without -consulting him, though it is manifest that he would thereby have drawn -upon himself the censure of the Government. The blame, therefore, for -this shameful business must remain with Dundas; and it was a very great -misfortune for England that he was not called to account for it.[255] - -Meanwhile the Duke continued his retreat northward down the river -Dendre, reaching Lombeek Ste. Catherine, about eight miles west of -Brussels, on the ◆July 5.◆ 4th of July. On the morrow the leaders of the -coalesced armies again met in conference at Waterloo, when it was -decided that Clerfaye’s force should pass eastwards towards Brussels, -and that the army of the Allies should ultimately occupy a line from -Antwerp, by Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux, to Namur, but that until the -7th, at any rate, the line in advance of Brussels, extending from Alost -by Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to Sombref, should be maintained. Ghent -had already been evacuated; and accordingly on the next day Clerfaye’s -force began its march to join Coburg, while Moira moved to Alost and -brought his troops for the first time under the Duke’s personal command. -◆July 6.◆ But Jourdan meanwhile was not inactive. On the 6th he attacked -the whole line of the Austrians from Braine-le-Comte to Gembloux; and, -though repulsed after hard fighting on the east, where a concentrated -attack might have given him possession of the Austrian line of -communications, he succeeded in pushing Coburg’s right wing back from -Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to Waterloo. Thereupon Coburg warned the -Duke of York that he must retire eastward and cancel the agreement made -on the 5th. The Duke answered with cold sarcasm that it was a new thing -for the Austrians to retire before thirty thousand Frenchmen, and -appealed to the Archduke Charles to keep Coburg to his engagements; but -received from him only a sad reply that orders must be obeyed. On the -7th and 8th Jourdan renewed his attacks, directing the best of his -strength against the Austrian left, which he forced back to the -battlefield of Ramillies. ◆July 7.◆ He then immediately invested Namur; -upon which Coburg, fearing to be cut off from the Meuse, ordered the -whole of his army to retire upon Tirlemont. - -The Duke meanwhile, since his left was uncovered by the retreat of the -Austrians, withdrew, at Coburg’s request, very slowly northward to -Assche, and thence struck north-eastward to the Dyle, which he crossed -at Malines, fixing his headquarters at Contich, some eight miles north -of that city. A new line of defence was then taken up, which -sufficiently showed the divided counsels of the Allies. ◆July.◆ On the -right the British contingent, now numbering some thirty thousand men, -was posted on the Dyle from Antwerp to Malines. On its left the Prince -of Orange with the Dutch troops and from two to three thousand Austrians -covered the line from Malines to Louvain; and from Louvain the rest of -the Austrian army, between forty-five and fifty thousand men, was -extended in a south-easterly direction by Tirlemont, Landen, and Waremme -to the Meuse, with a detachment of four thousand more on the eastern -bank of that river, and between it and the Ourthe. Thus the British and -Dutch, who desired to defend Holland, could be deserted at any moment -which the Emperor should select for the pursuit of his own particular -object, namely, to carry his army away to share the plunder of Poland. -Craig, for his part, felt no doubt whatever that the British and Dutch -would very soon be left to their own resources.[256] - -The reader may have felt surprised that, with a force of nearly one -hundred and fifty thousand men, the French should not have pressed the -Allies harder, and made an end of them long before. The fact was that -the Committee of Public Safety had interfered with the Generals on the -4th of July, by an order that the recapture of Valenciennes, Condé, -Landrecies, and Quesnoy should take precedence of any further -operations; and accordingly the army in Belgium had been weakened to -provide for this service. This was the work of Robespierre, who at the -time was inclined towards peace; and indeed peace appears to have been a -common topic of conversation between the French and Austrian outposts -from the beginning of July.[257] Thirty thousand French soldiers were -accordingly withdrawn to Valenciennes, as many more were wasted in -occupying ports of embarkation for England, and the remainder were -ordered to push the Allies completely out of Belgium, and then to occupy -a cordon from Antwerp to Namur. ◆July 12.◆ Pichegru, therefore, took -command in person of the left wing, and on the 12th moved with eighteen -thousand men against Malines, while Jourdan on the right simultaneously -advanced against Louvain, Jodoigne, and Huy on the Meuse. On the evening -of the 12th Pichegru drove the Duke of York’s advanced posts into -Malines, where they were promptly reinforced; ◆July 15.◆ but the -fortifications of the town were in ruins, and, on renewing the attack on -the 15th, the French captured the place with little difficulty. The -troops charged with the defence were Hessians and Dutch; and it appears -certain that the conduct of one or the other of them was not -irreproachable, though there are indications also that the Duke himself -was partly responsible for the mishap. - -The Duke then threw his left back along the line of the Nethe from -Lierre to Duffel; ◆July 15.◆ but meanwhile Jourdan had on the same day -mastered Louvain, and in the course of the two following days Jodoigne -and Namur also. The Dutch troops about Louvain, upon the loss of that -town, fell back northward across the Demer, while the Austrians retired -eastward; and thus the line of the Allies was fairly broken owing to -their own divergent plans. ◆July 18.◆ The Duke of York had already in -these days concerted operations with the Prince of Orange for the -recapture of Malines on the 18th,[258] when he received a letter from -Coburg saying that, owing to the loss of that place and of Louvain, he -had ordered the troops formerly stationed at the latter city to fall -back to Diest, and was himself withdrawing from Tirlemont to Landen. The -Duke begged him before doing so to essay a general forward movement, but -received only a vague and unsatisfactory reply; ◆July 20.◆ and on the -morning of the 20th a staff-officer, while inspecting the left of the -Dutch position, discovered that the Austrians at Diest were already -retreating south-eastward on Hasselt, Coburg having given them orders to -this effect without saying a word of his intentions to the Duke of York. -◆July 22.◆ With his left flank thus again laid bare, the Duke was -obliged to evacuate Antwerp and retire due north from it across the -Dutch frontier to Rozendahl. ◆July 24.◆ Coburg likewise fell back to -eastward, crossed the Meuse at Maastricht, and took up a position about -seven miles south and east of that fortress at Fouron le Comte. Thus the -British and Austrians were finally parted. - -It cannot be said that either of them was sorry to take leave of the -other. Even in 1793 their relations had not been too cordial, for the -Austrians, in their jealousy, would never allow foreign troops to -pass through their fortified towns, even during a forced march; and -thus the British were frequently condemned to make long and fatiguing -detours.[259] But the betrayal of the Duke of York’s column on the -18th of May, and the subsequent operations, deliberately contrived to -hasten the evacuation of the Netherlands, converted the dislike of -the British for the Austrians into the bitterest hatred and contempt. -At headquarters, again, the presence of a soldier such as Craig, with -ideas far more enlightened than those of the Austrians, and with some -means of insisting upon them through the medium of the Duke of York, -can hardly have contributed to harmony. It may be added that the -Austrian troops were as severe in their criticism of their chiefs, -and particularly of Waldeck, as were any of the British, proclaiming -loudly that the abandonment of Belgium was due to French gold.[260] In -fact the Austrian army, between heavy losses and deep distrust of its -leaders, was utterly demoralised; nor is it surprising that this should -have been so. It is indeed more than probable that, if Coburg had -wished to make a stand after the action of Fleurus, his men would not -have supported him. Of course Coburg had to bear the responsibility for -all this, and to digest as best he might some very bitter reproaches -from the Duke of York; yet it seems that in truth he was the person -the least to blame. Though as a commander in the field he was slow, -unenterprising, enamoured of vicious methods, and possessed of no -military quality except that of looking carefully to the wants of -his troops, yet he did not lack insight, sound sense, imperturbable -calm, and the instinct of honesty and straightforwardness. His name is -forgotten in England, though his portrait is still occasionally to be -found in English print-shops, showing that at one time he had gained -a certain fame, which was destined speedily to perish. It can only be -said of him that he was beloved by his men, that he bore the sins of -others without complaining, and that he was a loyal servant to an -unfaithful master. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XII - -◆1794.◆ - -While the Allies in the Netherlands were thus giving way on all sides -during the months of June and July, the British Government naturally -bethought itself of the sixty thousand men which it had agreed to hire -from Prussia for operations in that quarter. The Ministers had reckoned -that these troops would be ready by the end of May; and accordingly, -as has been told, Lord Cornwallis was sent from England to arrange -with Marshal Möllendorf as to the part to be taken by the Prussians in -the campaign. Visiting the Duke of York on the way, Cornwallis agreed -with him that the protection of West Flanders, and, if possible, the -siege of Lille, were the matters of most urgent importance; and he -formulated his request to Möllendorf accordingly. ◆June 20.◆ He soon -discovered that he had been sent upon a fool’s errand. Möllendorf, -instead of sixty thousand, had but forty thousand men, deficient in -stores and supplies and absolutely wanting in transport, which he -declared himself unable to furnish without ready money from England. -The real difficulty was that the Allies were all at variance as to the -use that should be made of the Prussian troops. England wanted them to -aid in recovering West Flanders. Holland would at first have preferred -them to remain upon the Rhine, but presently yielded to the demands of -England. The Emperor of Austria not only raised strong objections to -the march of Prussian troops to Belgium, but claimed thirty thousand -of the sixty thousand men for the protection of the Empire, declaring -that their removal from the Rhine would expose all Germany to the -ravages of the French. Between these conflicting claims Möllendorf -found little difficulty in sitting still and doing nothing, which was -precisely what the advisers of King Frederick William most desired. By -the 18th of June Cornwallis had made up his mind that scanty help was -to be expected from Prussia, at any rate during the present campaign; -and neither he nor Lord Malmesbury was slow to express very decided -opinions as to the ill-faith of the Prussian Court.[261] - -This was the situation when the failure of the Austrian attack -at Fleurus determined the Emperor to evacuate the Low Countries. -That potentate thereupon reversed his language as to the Prussian -contingent, and urged that Möllendorf should advance into Belgium; -nor did he hesitate, on the 15th of July, to order Coburg still to -defend the Austrian Netherlands, though he said nothing about sending -reinforcements to enable him to do so. This despicable lying and -trickery had, of course, but one object, that of drawing more money -from England under false pretences. The English Government, however, -though it had learned that no reliance was to be placed on Thugut’s -statements or promises, ◆July 19.◆ decided in the middle of July to -send Lord Spencer and Thomas Grenville to Vienna, to urge once more the -renewal of the offensive in Belgium. So far, therefore, the Emperor -seemed likely to gain his point; and since the King of Prussia had -shown remarkable weakness in dealing with the insurrection in Poland, -Francis had every reason to hope that decisive action in that country -would be delayed, until his own and the Russian armies could appear -there in sufficient force to dictate the final settlement according to -their own desires. The Prussian Ministers, on the other hand, when they -learned of the despatch of Spencer and Grenville to Vienna, became -nervous lest England should transfer the promised subsidy from her to -Austria; and they began to turn their thoughts to the negotiations of a -separate peace with France.[262] - -◆July 2–13.◆ - -Meanwhile, through the energy of Carnot, reinforcements had been found -for the French army of the Rhine, which, after a fortnight’s hard -fighting on the heights about Kaiserslautern, forced Möllendorf to -retire under the cannon of Mainz with a loss of two thousand men and -sixteen guns. The Austrian troops on the Rhine thereupon withdrew from -the left bank of the river; and the miscarriage of a plan, concerted a -fortnight later for recovery of the lost ground, set the Generals of the -two nations quarrelling more bitterly than ever. ◆July 28.◆ The end of -July brought yet another stroke of good luck to France in the overthrow -of Robespierre and the execution of himself, St. Just, and other of his -principal colleagues. Robespierre’s latest achievement as a military -administrator had been to decree that no quarter should be shown to -British or Hanoverians in the field, an order which was disobeyed by the -French troops and laughed at by the British. The supreme imbecility, -apart from all other faults, of his rule had brought France to the last -stage of exhaustion; and, indeed, if the Allies had succeeded in keeping -the French armies out of Belgium, the latter must have perished of -starvation.[263] Robespierre’s death marked the close of the Terror and -the beginning of a return to common sense in the matter of -administration. The man, however, had lived long enough to waste the -energies of the armies of the North in the recovery of the four captured -fortresses in the frontier, when they should have been scattering the -Allies to the four winds; and thus it came about that the Duke of York -enjoyed a few weeks’ respite for the formation of new plans. - -It was fortunate for him that it was so, for he now found himself -in serious trouble with his army. This was the result of the insane -system, allowed by Dundas, of raising men for rank. The regiments -despatched to Holland contained only a very few old soldiers mixed -with great numbers of recruits, who were utterly without training -and discipline. “Many of them do not know one end of a fire-lock -from the other,” wrote Craig, “and will never know it.” Six of the -battalions had been deprived of their flank-companies, that is to -say, of their best men, to make up General Grey’s force in the West -Indies; and no sooner did the new levies find themselves released from -the crimping-house and the gaol for active service, than they fell to -plundering in all directions. The Duke was obliged to issue a very -severe order on the 27th of July[264] to call the army to its senses; -but, with such officers as had been obtained under Dundas’s scheme, -it was impossible to expect the slightest obedience. In the first -place the army was lamentably deficient in Brigadiers and Generals -of division. Moira had only accepted the command of his force on -the condition that he should not serve in Flanders; and though, in -view of the perilous condition of the Allies when he landed, he had -waived his objections for the time, yet there was another obstacle -not so easily to be overcome. Albeit enjoying an independent command -of eight thousand men, Moira was almost the junior Major-general of -the army. Major-general Crosbie, who was with him, also held a more -important command than his seniors, such as Ralph Abercromby and David -Dundas, the latter of whom joined the Duke of York at the end of July. -Both Moira and Crosbie, therefore, went home, from delicacy towards -the feelings of their superiors; and the loss of Moira was bitterly -regretted as that of a very able officer who was idolised by his men. - -The British troops now consisted of four brigades of cavalry and seven -of infantry,[265] making altogether some twenty-five thousand men; but -for all these there were, after the departure of Moira and Crosbie, -only four Generals—David Dundas, Stewart, Abercromby, and Fox, the -last of whom was fully employed as Quartermaster-general. This was the -more serious because the commanders of the new battalions, who had -been juggled into seniority by the Government and the army-brokers, -were not fit to command a company, much less a brigade. Some of them -were boys of twenty-one who knew nothing of their simplest duties. -Though they went cheerfully into action, they looked upon the whole -campaign as an elaborate picnic, for which they did not fail to provide -themselves with abundance of comforts; and thus the baggage-columns -were filled with private waggons under the charge of insubordinate -drivers. The junior officers, who were so scarce that few regiments -had as many subalterns as companies, appear in many cases to have been -worse than the senior, as is always to be expected when commissions -are to be obtained for the asking; nor with bad examples before them -were they likely to improve. Thrust into the Army to satisfy the claims -of dependents, constituents, importunate creditors, and discarded -concubines, many of these young men were at once a disgrace and an -encumbrance to the force. Hard drinking, which was the fashion then -in all classes from highest to lowest, was, of course, sedulously -cultivated by these aspirants to the rank of gentleman; and it was no -uncommon thing for regiments to start on the march under charge of the -Adjutant and Sergeant-major only, while the officers stayed behind, -to come galloping up several hours later, full of wine, careless -where they rode, careless of the confusion into which they threw the -columns, careless of everything but the place appointed for the end of -the march, if by chance they were sober enough to have remembered it. -These evils, too, were extremely difficult to check, for in 1794, as -in 1744, political interest rather than meritorious service was the -road to promotion. While the shameful traffic of the army-brokers and -the raising of endless new regiments continued, every officer who could -command money or interest was sure of obtaining advancement at home -without the knowledge of his chief in the field, and had, therefore, -not only no encouragement to do his duty, but an actual reason for -avoiding it. Thus the men were very imperfectly disciplined; there -were no efficient company-officers to look after them; no efficient -Colonels to look after the company-officers; no Generals to look after -the Colonels. Craig sought a remedy in begging for more Generals. “We -cannot get on,” he wrote, on the 5th of August, “without a good supply -and a supply of good. The evil to the discipline of the army increases -every day, and is likely to become very serious.”[267] - -But the Duke’s difficulties did not end with the defects of his -officers and men. It had lately become the practice in time of peace -to issue to each regiment the materials for its clothing, to be made -up by the regiment itself, a system which had probably been designed -to obtain for the Colonels the largest possible profit. Nor must the -Colonels be blamed herein, for they were expected to make that profit, -which in those days was practically the only emolument open to general -officers. It was, of course, impossible for troops in the field to -spend three or four months in making up their clothes; and the result -was that; the Duke’s army was left almost naked. Moreover, in the hurry -of raising innumerable new corps, the responsibility for such details -as clothing, accounts, musters, and so forth had been overlooked; the -new officers knew nothing of the extremely complex methods of military -finance;[268] and the sudden vast increase of business thrown upon -agents and officials was greater than they could immediately bear. -Finally, quite apart from these failings in respect of the raiment of -entire battalions, no effort whatever was made to clothe the recruits -who were sent out to fill up the gaps in the various corps. These -unfortunate men, on being drafted into the depots in England, received -what was called slop-clothing, which signified a linen jacket and -trousers; and it is an actual fact that many of them were sent on -active service in this dress, without waistcoat, drawers, or stockings. -The result was that the Duke of York’s corps was in a worse state in -respect of clothing than had been hitherto recorded of any British -army.[269] - -Another great difficulty, of which Craig had complained again and -again, was the want of drivers for the artillery. Lord Moira had -brought with him guns but no drivers; and there were but two captains -(not enough, as Craig said, to do a fortieth part of the work) at -disposal for the superintendence of a huge mass of horses. Thus a new -train of artillery, which had been sent out to replace the cannon -lost at Tourcoing, became a positive embarrassment. The Commissariat -also, as used so often to happen with British armies, was in a very -bad state. The men of the new corps of Royal Waggoners had been -recruited in London, and were the worst refuse of the population. -They were known, in fact, as the “Newgate Blues.” “A greater set of -scoundrels never disgraced an army,” wrote Craig, in his usual pithy -style. “I believe it to be true that half of them, if not taken from -the hulks, have at times visited them.... They have committed every -species of villainy, and treat their horses badly.” But the very worst -department of all was that of the hospitals, wherein the abuses were -so terrible that men hardly liked to speak of them. In December 1793 -the inhabitants of one of the English ports had been stupefied by the -arrival of one hundred invalid soldiers from Ostend in indescribable -distress. They had been on board ship for a week in the bitter wintry -weather, without so much as straw to lie upon. Some of them were -dead; others died on being carried ashore. No provision had been made -for their comfort on landing, and, but for the compassion of the -gentry who subscribed money for their relief, the poor fellows might -well have perished.[270] Nothing was done to amend this state of -things. Dundas’s idea of putting an army in the field was to land raw -men on a foreign shore, and to expect discipline, arms, ammunition, -clothing, victuals, medical stores, and medical treatment to descend -on them from Heaven. Some kind of a medical staff was improvised out -of drunken apothecaries, broken-down practitioners, and rogues of -every description, who were provided under some cheap contract; the -charges of respectable members of the medical profession being deemed -exorbitant. “The dreadful mismanagement of the hospital is beyond -description,” wrote Craig, “and the remedy beyond my power. Every -branch and every fibre of every branch draws a contrary way. I really -doubt if there will be any way to get any good from this department but -by tying them all together and sending them to you to be changed for a -new set.”[271] - -Such was the composition of the force with which the Duke of York -now undertook, in concert with the Dutch, to protect Holland, -or, in other words, to conduct that most delicate and trying of -operations—manœuvring with inferior numbers over a wide front to hold -a superior force in check. The first difficulty arose with the Dutch, -for the Prince of Orange, apparently enamoured of the Austrian methods, -was eager to scatter the troops over a multitude of different points; -but this the Duke, with Craig at his back, steadily refused to do. The -Prince then urged that the Dutch fortresses should be garrisoned by -British troops; but the said fortresses were all in bad condition, and -were repairing only with that incredible slowness which was peculiar -to the Dutch Government. The Duke, therefore, refused this also; -feeling tolerably sure that, if he consented, his battalions would -be sacrificed piecemeal for the defence of Holland, while the Dutch -looked on without raising a man to help them. The two gates of Holland -on the south were Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, and on the east Grave and -Nimeguen, with the fortress of Bois-le-Duc midway between Breda and -Nimeguen. The two eastern gates were safe so long as the Austrians -retained Maastricht and their position on the Meuse; but the Austrians -were not to be trusted. Accordingly, the Duke resolved to garrison -Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, and, if possible, Bois-le-Duc with Dutch troops; -himself taking up a position on the north bank of the river Aa, with -his right resting on Bois-le-Duc and his left on the great morass -called the Peel. From this central point he judged that he could move -to the help of any of the Dutch fortresses to southward, cover the -province of Gelderland, and keep Grave and Nimeguen within reach in -case of mishap on that side. - -He was about to march thither from Rozendahl when the news came that -Moreau, who was advancing northward along the coast after the capture of -Nieuport, had driven back the Dutch posts and had besieged Sluys. The -Prince of Orange thereupon besought the Duke to stand fast, producing a -letter from Coburg which contained not only an assurance of his ability -to hold the passage of the Meuse, but even a hint of possible offensive -movements. After some hesitation the Duke consented to a compromise by -moving to Osterhout, a little to the north-east of Breda, so as to give -some countenance both to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. ◆July 31.◆ He -marched, accordingly, on the 31st of July, unmolested by the enemy, who -were in force around Antwerp; and the Prince of Orange then came to the -wise but rather belated decision to evacuate all the Dutch fortresses to -the south of the Scheldt. ◆Aug. 8.◆ The Duke, therefore, lent him a -strong detachment of his men to hold the communications between Breda -and Bergen-op-Zoom, so as to release Dutch troops to cover the retreat -of these garrisons and to relieve Sluys.[272] - -Just at this moment Henry Dundas, hearing of Moreau’s advance, and -having by chance a few troops unemployed, decided to send a naval -armament to Flushing, together with five battalions under Lord Mulgrave, -for the defence of the Dutch territories in that quarter. As was his -rule in such cases, Dundas kept Mulgrave under his own immediate -command, but withal instructed him not to go against any order of the -Duke of York,—an arrangement admirably calculated to paralyse the force -and to raise discord between the commanders. ◆Aug. 17.◆ Mulgrave, who -had started apart from his troops, reached Flushing on the 17th, and -finding that none of them had arrived, occupied himself in examining the -situation. He was soon satisfied that the French had no further designs -for the campaign than to take Sluys and Flushing, as ports from which to -ship the harvest of the Austrian Netherlands to France. Meanwhile, the -Dutch no sooner heard of his coming than they suspended their operations -for the relief of Sluys, in the hope that Mulgrave would do the work for -them; and the French, having also full intelligence of everything, -increased their force at Sluys to twenty-five thousand men, which made -the relief practically impossible. Dundas, meanwhile, wrote with the -greatest confidence of the success of that operation, which his own -interference had condemned to failure; announcing also that Mulgrave’s -force, which had not yet even arrived at Flushing, would be required -elsewhere in a month. ◆Aug. 26.◆ At length the five battalions sailed -into Flushing on the 26th, nominally thirty-two hundred strong, and -actually with the following qualifications for immediate service in the -field. The Thirty-first[273] was composed chiefly of recruits, of whom -two hundred and forty were unarmed. The Seventy-ninth had but one -officer to each company, and but eight rounds of ball-ammunition a man. -The Eighty-fourth had twenty rounds a man, but, the regiment having -never ceased marching from quarter to quarter ever since it had been -raised, the men were wholly untrained. The Eighty-fifth had thirty -rounds a man, but half of the soldiers had never had arms in their -hands. The Thirty-fourth alone appears to have been fit and ready for -work. Fortunately there was no work for them to do, for Sluys -surrendered on the very day of their arrival; and Mulgrave, after -landing them at Flushing to learn the elements of their business, -suggested that at least two of the battalions had better remain there -and be made into soldiers, instead of sailing to certain annihilation in -the West Indies. To this Dundas agreed, for he purposed to take from the -Duke of York ten of Moira’s battalions, and was well content to leave -him inferior troops in their place. Meanwhile, as a specimen of utter -imbecility, this despatch of Mulgrave’s detachment has few equals even -in English military annals. The mere promise of help was sufficient to -relax the exertions of the Dutch. The troops were embarked so late as to -miss the object of the expedition, and, even if they had been embarked -in time, they were of quality too poor to have accomplished it. In -brief, the whole enterprise bears the unmistakable mark of Henry -Dundas.[274] - -Meanwhile Spencer and Grenville had throughout August pursued their -negotiations at Vienna with very indifferent success. One point Thugut -was ready to concede, namely, the recall of Coburg, who indeed resigned -on the 9th of August, being worn down in body and mind, and thoroughly -disgusted with his command. But Thugut absolutely refused to order -troops from the Rhine to Belgium, and demanded the guarantee of a loan -of three millions for the present campaign besides a new subsidy for the -next. It was necessary to refer these pretensions to the Cabinet in -London; ◆Aug. 12, 14.◆ and long before the reference had even been made, -the Austrian Council of War ordered Clerfaye, who was to succeed Coburg, -to devote all his efforts to the defence not of Belgium but of -Luxemburg, Mainz, and Mannheim. But though the Allies were idle, the -French were not; and, thanks in part to a threat of the Committee of -Public Safety to massacre the garrisons unless the fortresses were -delivered, they had recovered both Quesnoy and Landrecies by the 15th of -August. ◆Aug. 27.◆ The fall of Sluys, and the recall of the troops -detached to Walcheren also enabled Pichegru to begin a forward movement, -and on the 27th he advanced from Antwerp north-eastward to Hoogstraeten, -driving in all the Dutch posts, and seeming to threaten the turning of -the Duke of York’s left. ◆Aug. 30.◆ The Duke, thereupon, on the advice -of a Council of War, retired on the 30th to his chosen position between -Bois-le-Duc and the Peel, while Pichegru sent a strong detachment -eastward to occupy Einhoven in force.[275] - -Meanwhile a message had reached the Duke of York from Clerfaye, -suggesting a general forward movement to save the beleaguered cities of -Valenciennes and Condé; ◆Sept. 1.◆ and on the 1st of September a -conference was held between the Allied commanders at Bois-le-Duc to -consider the proposal. It was not yet known to them, apparently, that -Valenciennes had already surrendered to the French on the 29th of -August, and that Condé was at the last gasp; and there was some talk -among them of an advance of the British to recapture Antwerp, while the -Austrians on the Meuse protected their rear. The news that both -fortresses had fallen, and that the French forces thus liberated for the -field were hastening to the front, naturally deranged this plan; and -though the Duke was anxious still to make the attempt, Craig perceived -little hope of success, chiefly because he could not trust the Austrians -to give hearty co-operation. In truth, the Allies had let slip the -favourable moment through their own dissensions, and the opportunity was -not to recur again. ◆Sept. 4.◆ On the 4th of September Pichegru marched -northward from Hoogstraeten to Meerle, as if to threaten Breda, but on -the 10th turned eastward, after leaving a detachment before that place, -and on the 12th reached Oosterwyk. ◆Sept. 13.◆ On the following day he -attacked the Duke’s advanced posts at Bokstel, and on the 14th captured -them, making two battalions of Darmstadt-Hessians prisoners. This was an -unpleasant mishap, for these troops had hitherto always behaved -admirably; but, though they complained of the Duke for not supporting -them, the Duke in his secret report declared them to have been -panic-stricken. ◆Sept. 15.◆ Alive, however, to the importance of -regaining this post and the line of the Dommel, the Duke ordered -Abercromby forward next day with ten battalions and as many squadrons of -British, to recover the lost ground. The movement was very nearly -disastrous, for Abercromby only just missed falling into the midst of -Pichegru’s main army, which was on march to the eastward; but quickly -apprehending the situation, he withdrew his troops in excellent order -with the loss of about ninety men, two-thirds of them prisoners. This -skirmish is notable both because it brought Colonel Arthur Wellesley of -the Thirty-third under fire for the first time, and because it led to -the trial of four officers, three of them belonging to a most -distinguished regiment, for cowardice. This was a healthy sign, for it -showed that the older officers were bent on ridding the Army at the -earliest possible moment of the worthless comrades imposed on them by -Dundas.[276] - -On the same day the Duke received information that this demonstration -against Bokstel was but a feint, the main force of the enemy, reported -to be eighty thousand strong, being in motion to turn his left. His -intelligence seems to have been extremely vague and imperfect at this -time; but being dissatisfied with his position, to which, owing to dry -weather, neither the Peel nor the Aa afforded adequate protection, he -decided that the retention of it was not worth the risk of being cut -off from his retreat to the Maas. ◆Sept. 16.◆ He therefore retired on -the next day to that river, crossed it at Grave and took up a position -on the north bank, with his headquarters at Wychen, a few miles to the -north of Grave. It then remained for him to make his dispositions to -defend the line of the river, the unprotected portion of which extended -for some seventy-five miles from Fort Loevestein, at the western end -of the Bommeler Waert[277] on to the west, to Venloo on the east. Any -effective defence with the forces at his disposal was impossible, and -the Duke therefore arranged that all troops in British pay should be -sent to him from West Flanders, and that the Dutch, who were sitting -inactive behind their fortresses, should send men to repair and to -defend Crevecoeur and Bommel. - -The Duke’s next effort was to concert offensive operations with -Clerfaye, who lay on his left; and he had the greater hopes of a -favourable issue, since the new Secretary at War, William Windham, -was already on his way to that officer on a mission from London. But -the Austrian Commander also had been unfortunate. ◆Sept. 17–18.◆ -On the 17th and 18th General Latour’s corps of seven thousand men, -which guarded his left on the Ourthe, was driven back by a greatly -superior force of Jourdan’s right wing under General Schérer; whereupon -Clerfaye, who had watched the whole process without moving one soldier -of his forty thousand to save Latour, immediately retired behind the -Roer, leaving eight thousand men as a garrison for Maastricht. The -Austrian General therefore rejected all idea of the offensive as -impossible, but consented to maintain communication with the Duke if he -would extend his left to Venloo, which, like all the Dutch fortresses, -was in miserable repair and without a sufficient garrison. The Duke -agreed, and so the matter was arranged; Clerfaye, however, giving the -Duke clearly to understand that if his right were turned he should -cross the Rhine.[278] - -The Duke thereupon made his plans for protecting a line of from -seventy-five to ninety-five miles of river with a force of thirty -thousand soldiers of all ranks, the sick list having by this time -claimed close upon seven thousand men of his army. His right from the -Bommeler Waert to Grave was held by about five thousand Hessians, their -main body being stationed at Alfen, a little to the east of the island; -Grave was held by two Dutch battalions; east of Grave four brigades of -infantry and two of cavalry lay about Mook; Abercromby, with two more -brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, stood higher up the river at -Gennep; and six thousand Hanoverians under Walmoden prolonged the line -from Gennep to Venloo, with their main body at Well. Craig, however, -did not deceive himself as to the inevitable issue, being firmly -convinced that there was an understanding between the Austrians and -French; wherein he appears to have been correct.[279] “We shall have to -fall back behind the Waal,” he wrote; “depend on it, this will happen in -a few days ... and in a fortnight the Austrians will be behind the -Rhine.” Jourdan followed up the Austrians, leaving Kléber to invest -Maastricht; whereupon Clerfaye, who had sixty thousand men behind the -Roer, forthwith called loudly on the Duke of York to relieve that -fortress. Grenville at the Foreign Office, anticipating something of the -kind, had already despatched urgent representations to Vienna requiring -the concurrence of the Austrians in this operation, but of course to no -purpose. The Duke, by advice of Abercromby and Walmoden, sent Craig to -stir up Clerfaye, and, that the Austrians might have no pretext for -complaint, moved sixteen thousand men at great risk towards Venloo. -◆Oct. 2.◆ But all was perfectly useless, for Clerfaye declined to budge. -An attack of the French on his position on the 2nd of October gave him -the excuse that he wanted; and he immediately retreated across the -Rhine.[280] - -◆Sept. 22.◆ - -Pichegru meanwhile, on the 22nd of September, had completely invested -Bois-le-Duc, and sent two divisions forward to line the Maas over -against the Duke of York’s position. The French were now in the greatest -distress from want of provisions, which had to be brought from Antwerp -in waggons, and that by long detours in order to circumvent the Dutch -fortresses. It was therefore imperative for Pichegru to possess -Bois-le-Duc as an advanced base; and the place was the more difficult -for him to master since he had no siege-artillery. Unfortunately the -cowardice of the Dutch delivered to him all that he wanted. ◆Sept. 24.◆ -On the 24th he opened a feeble bombardment with his fieldpieces upon -Fort Crevecoeur, which guarded the passage into the Isle of Bommel from -the south; ◆Sept. 28.◆ and on the 28th, the place, though amply -provisioned and in a good state of defence, was yielded up by the Dutch -Commandant. Thereby Pichegru gained not only forty-two heavy guns, but -the command of the sluices whereby the inundation of Bois-le-Duc could -be let flow or drawn off. ◆Sept. 30.◆ The loss of Crevecoeur did not -improve the good feeling of the British towards the Dutch, who, from the -first entry of the Duke of York into their country, had showed the -bitterest animosity against his men. ◆Oct. 3.◆ Intelligence now reached -the Duke that a general insurrection of the French party in the United -Provinces was imminent; and three days later the retreat of Clerfaye -compelled him to retire northward across the Waal, over which he had -already thrown a bridge of boats. The movement was conducted with some -confusion owing to the mismanagement of the Duke’s Staff; but Pichegru -suffered the Allies to shuffle themselves without the slightest -molestation into their appointed positions. The Hessians held the -Bommeler Waert on the south bank of the Waal, and the line of the Linge -over against it on the north bank. At the village of Geldermalsen on the -Linge the right of the British joined the left of the Hessians, -extending from thence eastward along the Waal to the road from Nimeguen -to Arnheim; where the Hanoverians carried the line to its end at the -parting of the Waal and the Leek, maintaining communication with -Clerfaye’s Austrians at Emmerick. Nimeguen, though ill fortified and -provided for, was also held on the southern bank of the Waal. - -By this time even the long-suffering Cabinet in England was growing -weary of paying subsidies to Austria and Prussia for service which -they never rendered. ◆Oct. 4.◆ On the 4th of October Dundas advised -the Duke of York that the Government had resolved to give them no -more money, and ordered him to cut off the allowance hitherto paid to -Clerfaye unless he agreed to active concert of operations. Thugut, -however, had in many respects gained his point. The British Government, -thinking that a bad ally was better than none, had consented on the -14th of September to guarantee to Austria a loan of three millions -in consideration of her services during the first campaign; at the -same time renouncing a project which had been put forward for placing -Clerfaye’s force, together with the Duke of York’s, under the supreme -command of Cornwallis. Thugut was jubilant; for everything was -going as he wished. In Poland, Suvorof was rapidly putting down the -insurrection, in stemming which the Prussian Generals had shown the -greatest feebleness; Belgium was already abandoned, as he had desired; -and the Cabinet of London had rewarded Austria for her treachery by -financial assistance. In the circumstances he could not do less than -give promises of effectual help in the defence of Holland, though of -course without the slightest intention to fulfil them. - -Meanwhile the behaviour of the Dutch grew more and more suspicious. -◆Oct. 10.◆ Bois-le-Duc was disgracefully surrendered on the 10th of -October by the Commandant; and a regiment of French emigrants, which -formed part of the garrison, having been denied permission to cut its -way through the besiegers, was massacred in cold blood. On the same day, -by a curious coincidence, the British Government warned the Dutch that, -unless they exerted themselves, the British army should be withdrawn; at -the same time proposing to put the Duke of Brunswick in command of the -British and Dutch forces in order to keep them together. ◆Oct. 18.◆ Then -a week later, as if to bribe the Stadtholder to compliance, Dundas -authorised the payment of one hundred thousand pounds to the Dutch, -which was simply so much money wasted; for the Prince of Orange would do -nothing for the defence of the country, and wished to employ the British -for the repression of his own rebellious subjects. How, in the face of -the Duke of York’s letters, the British Ministers in London hesitated to -order the immediate withdrawal of the army is incomprehensible, except -on the supposition that they still trusted to the proved ill-faith of -the Emperor Francis.[281] - -The French, meanwhile, continued to follow up their advantages. -◆Oct. 6.◆ Jourdan, on the east, after leaving detachments to besiege -Venloo and Maastricht, had occupied Cologne on the 6th of October, and -drawn up his army in face of Clerfaye’s main body, which was extended -along the Rhine from Duisburg to Bonn and beyond. Moreau, who had taken -over the command owing to Pichegru’s illness, also pushed forward seven -thousand men in front of Grave, posted thirty thousand between Ravestein -(a little to west of Grave) and Bois-le-Duc, and ten thousand men -opposite the Bommeler Waert. ◆Oct. 18.◆ On the 18th he began to lay a -bridge of boats over the Meuse at Alfen, and, being allowed by -scandalous carelessness on the part of the Allies to complete it, passed -a considerable force over the river. ◆Oct. 19.◆ On the 19th he attacked -the posts at Apeltern and Druten, to east and north-east of Alfen, -carried them after a very obstinate resistance from the Thirty-seventh -and Rohan’s Emigrants, and succeeded in capturing the greater number of -the Thirty-seventh,[282] who had mistaken a party of French Hussars for -the Emigrant cavalry in the British service. At the same time -intelligence came that a strong French detachment had passed the Meuse -between Roermond and Venloo, and was heading for Cleve, thus threatening -to turn the Duke’s left. Accordingly, in his public despatch, the Duke -announced that he was about to draw the whole army to the north of the -Waal; but privately he reported that he could not do so, since the -Dutch, in spite of many promises, had made no effort to put Nimeguen in -a state of defence. ◆Oct. 20.◆ On the 20th the French threw a permanent -bridge across the Meuse a little to the north-west of Ravestein at -Batenburg, and two days later began a new series of attacks upon the -advanced posts, at the same time making demonstrations about St. Andries -on the Bommeler Waert. ◆Oct. 27.◆ By the 27th the troops round Nimeguen -had been driven into the outskirts of the town, and the Duke, who had -transferred his headquarters to Arnheim, called all of them except -fourteen battalions to the north bank of the Waal. The French main body -then took up a position between Grave and Nimeguen, threatening to seize -the two eastern keys of Holland. - -◆Oct. 28.◆ - -At this critical moment Clerfaye paid a visit to the Duke at Arnheim, -and promised that by the 3rd of November a corps of some seven thousand -Austrians under General Werneck should arrive to assist in an offensive -movement from Nimeguen. At the same time some effort was made to -persuade Möllendorf to move to the Rhine about Bonn, and to support -Clerfaye’s left. But the British Government had recently, though none -too soon, cut off the subsidy to the Prussians; and Möllendorf’s answer -was that his orders were to send twenty thousand of his men to South -Prussia and fifteen thousand men to Westphalia, so that evidently -nothing was to be expected from that quarter. ◆Nov. 1.◆ On the 1st -of November the French broke ground before Nimeguen, and on the same -day Werneck announced that his corps could not arrive before the 7th. -Meanwhile the French erected batteries a little above Nimeguen at Ooi, -which, though silenced for a time by the guns of the Allies on the -opposite bank, so seriously damaged the bridge of boats that General -Walmoden, who was in command, thought it prudent to withdraw the -greater part of the garrison to the northern bank. ◆Nov. 4.◆ On the -4th, however, he made a sortie with the troops that remained, including -six British battalions, supported by seventeen squadrons of British -and Hanoverian cavalry.[283] The British, advancing under a very heavy -fire, swept the enemy out of their trenches without drawing a trigger, -and the cavalry pursuing the fugitives inflicted on them heavy loss. -The casualties of the Allies in this affair were over three hundred -killed and wounded; but, though the sortie checked the progress of -the French for the time, yet by the 7th they had not only repaired -the batteries destroyed by the Allies, but had erected another which -brought a cross fire to bear on the bridge of boats. Moreover, a letter -arrived from Werneck that his arrival at Nimeguen, which he had fixed -for the 7th, would be impossible until the 16th—a message which the -Duke rightly interpreted to signify that he would not come at all. - -◆Nov. 7.◆ - -On the night of the 7th, therefore, the bridge was repaired -sufficiently to enable the garrison to evacuate the place; and the -troops filed across the river. Two Dutch battalions were the last to -leave the place under the Dutch General Haak, who, most improperly, -was the first man of his nation to set foot on the bridge. As he did -so, a shot struck one of the pontoons with some effect, whereupon he -immediately ran across the bridge crying out that all was lost, and -reported with shameless mendacity that all his troops had passed over -except the rear-guard. Upon this the pontoon-bridge was immediately -fired, since a flying bridge had already been prepared for the passage -of the rear-guard. As luck would have it, however, a shot from the -French batteries cut the hawser; the flying bridge began to swing -round; and, to save it from running foul of the kindled boats, the -sailors dropped the anchor and so brought it up. When the burning -pontoons had floated away, some British seamen, who were employed on -the bridge, were for cutting it adrift, but the Dutchmen would not -allow them to do so, preferring certain capture to the risk of a few -cannon-shot. Thus eleven hundred of them were taken, either through -their own cowardice or through that of Haak—a lamentable occurrence in -an army which in the past had approved itself to be of incomparable -steadfastness and valour.[284] - -The Duke, therefore, now held the line of the Waal including the -Bommeler Waert, and might well hope to hold it, if the Dutch did their -duty, until the army went into winter quarters. He had already put -most of his cavalry into cantonments across the Yssel, but the Dutch -threw every possible obstacle in the way of providing for the comfort -of the troops. The weather too grew wintry, and the men, miserably -clothed and housed in open barns, began to fall down very fast from -cold and typhus fever. None of them had greatcoats except some of the -Guards, Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third, who had received -those which had been provided by public subscription in 1793, and -which were now worn out. Flannel waistcoats had been supplied to the -rest by their officers, who had subscribed over a thousand pounds -for the purpose; and it appears that, without exaggeration, they had -little other clothing. Sheer nakedness, in fact, had been the cause -of much, though not of all, of the plundering that had disgraced the -army; and this evil had been aggravated by the bitter hostility of -the inhabitants towards the British. Not content with resenting real -outrages, which were far too abundant, they never ceased flying to -the Duke with frivolous and groundless complaints; and so disobliging -were the authorities that Lord St. Helens, Ambassador at the Hague, -tried for two months in vain to find places where the British might be -allowed to establish additional hospitals. ◆Nov. 27.◆ On the 27th of -November the infantry in British pay numbered twenty-one thousand and -the sick nearly eleven thousand; and when a man was ordered to hospital -his comrades would exclaim, “Ah, poor fellow, we shall see thee no -more, for thou art under orders for the shambles.” On one occasion five -hundred invalids were embarked from Arnheim in barges under charge of -a single surgeon’s mate, without sufficient provisions, without even -sufficient straw, and brought to Rhenen, where they were left on board -for want of sufficient space to admit them to the hospital. A Dutch -gentleman counted at one time the bodies of forty-two men who had thus -perished of neglect in the barges and had been thrown out dead on to -the bank. Meanwhile the rascals who bore the name of surgeon’s mates -charged forty thousand pounds for wine for the sick, and, not content -with robbing the State by themselves drinking what was supplied, -actually plundered the helpless patients committed to their care. Such -was the economy of Dundas’s military administration—to obtain recruits -by the offer of lavish bounties, to break down their health by giving -them insufficient clothing, and to contract with scoundrels so to -maltreat them, medically, that they should not recover.[285] - -Fortunately for himself the Duke of York was summoned home on the 27th -of November to hold personal communication[286] with Ministers; and -indeed it seemed as if the campaign were ended. Upon his departure -he placed the British troops under Lieutenant-general Harcourt, and -the foreign troops in British pay under Lieutenant-general Walmoden, -apparently dividing the supreme command between the two. This -arrangement was evidently due to the Duke’s unwillingness to subject -the British to the Hanoverian Walmoden, who was senior to Harcourt; -but, even so, it seems to be absolutely indefensible. The French, being -exhausted by the campaign, went into temporary cantonments, Moreau’s -division on the west bank of the Rhine over against the line from -Wesel to Emmerick, Souham’s in and about Nimeguen, Bonnaud’s between -the Meuse and the Waal, and the remainder about Bois-le-Duc and Grave. -The Allies were distributed along the north bank of the Waal from Tiel -eastward to the Pannarden Canal, which connects the Waal with the Leck -(as the Rhine from Arnheim downward is called), the Dutch taking charge -of the Bommeler Waert. Eastward from the Pannarden Canal to Wesel -the Allied left was to be covered by thirty thousand Austrians under -General Alvintzy, which Clerfaye, on the instance of Henry Dundas, -agreed to furnish for a payment of one hundred thousand pounds a month. - -The Allies’ line of defence seems to have been wrongly chosen, for, -owing to the Pannarden Canal, the mass of the waters of the Waal was -returned into the Leck, from which cause the Leck was less liable to -be frozen. Harcourt had endeavoured to establish a second bridge over -the Rhine besides that of the Arnheim, but the Dutch, from malice or -negligence, obstructed the forwarding of the materials, as indeed -they obstructed everything that might help the British. Altogether the -situation was not a happy one, for, though rain had fallen continuously -from the beginning of November, there was no saying when a frost might -set in and turn the rivers into stable ice. Moreover, Moreau, roused -by orders from Paris, became active again. ◆Dec. 11.◆ On the 11th of -December the French crossed the Waal in boats at several different -points to the attack of the Allied posts, and, though beaten back, left -behind them an unpleasant sense of insecurity.[287] - -On the 16th Pichegru returned and resumed the command, ◆Dec. 18.◆ and -on the 18th the weather changed from rain to a severe frost. In a very -few days the Maas and Waal were full of floating ice, which began to -pack together, threatening to cover the whole breadth of their streams; -while on the Leck the rapidity of the current swept away the bridge of -boats at Arnheim. Harcourt, foreseeing that before long the ice on the -Waal would become passable by the enemy, prepared to retreat northward. -Just at this most critical moment, moreover, there arrived orders from -Dundas that seven British battalions of his army were required for -service elsewhere; that of these seven the Fortieth, Forty-fourth, and -Sixty-third must march to Helvoetsluys at once; and that Alvintzy, who -so far had thrown every possible difficulty in the way of co-operation -with the Allies, must find troops to take their place. Further, it -was now ascertained that the Dutch had gone far in negotiation with -the French, and there were strong rumours that an armistice had been -concluded between them. Meanwhile the cold increased; sentries were -frozen at their posts; and the ice on the Waal, in front of the Allies, -became strong enough to give passage to the French, while that on -the Leck in their rear, though thick enough to prevent the passage -of boats, was too thin to bear cavalry or artillery. Harcourt’s -anxiety was extreme; and he begged Dundas urgently for some further -instructions as to the duty expected of him, since the order to weaken -the force by sending home seven battalions was not in itself of any -great assistance. - -◆Dec. 27.◆ - -Affairs were in this condition when, on the 27th, the French crossed the -Meuse on the ice to the Bommeler Waert, surprised the Dutch posts there, -and pushed on by Bommel over the frozen Waal to Tuil. The Dutch at this -place fled instantly without firing a shot, some of the fugitives -running on even to Utrecht. At Meteren, a few miles north of Tuil, the -French were checked by the Hessians; but, with their right flank exposed -by the flight of the Dutch, it was doubtful whether these could maintain -their position. ◆Dec. 28.◆ Their commander, however, General Dalwig, -decided to stand fast, and ascertained by reconnaissance next day that -the French did not exceed two thousand men; whereupon Walmoden ordered -ten battalions and six squadrons of British and Emigrants under David -Dundas to Geldermalsen, a short distance north of Meteren, in the hope -of annihilating this foolhardy French detachment. ◆Dec. 30.◆ -Accordingly, at one o’clock on the morning of the 30th, the force moved -out from Meteren in three columns, two of them to move direct upon Tuil -from the north and north-east, while the third, under Lord Cathcart, -fetched a compass to close in upon the enemy from the west. Cathcart’s -column unfortunately found the roads impassable and never came into -action; but Dundas nevertheless attacked without him, and drove the -French, after a sharp fight, from their entrenchments and across the -Waal, with the loss of four guns and many killed and wounded, while his -own casualties did not exceed fifty. This checked the ardour of the -enemy for the moment, and during a few days there was peace upon the -Waal.[288] - -Walmoden now reinforced his right about Tuil, for the news had reached -him that the fortresses of Gertruydenburg ◆1795.◆ and Heusden, on the -extreme right of the Allied line, were in serious danger; ◆Jan. 3.◆ and -on the 3rd of January 1795 he shifted his quarters to Amerongen, due -north of Tiel, and on the north bank of the Leck. Grave at this same -time capitulated, and released a large number of French troops for the -field. Moreau’s division therefore took up cantonments over against -Alvintzy’s corps from Xanten down the Rhine to the Pannarden Canal. -Souham’s division, now transferred to Macdonald, occupied the space -between the Meuse and Waal as far as the point opposite to Tiel; two -more divisions were in the Bommeler Waert, and yet two more about -Gertruydenburg and Breda. On the 3rd of January the weather again became -intensely cold, Jan. 4.◆ and at noon on the 4th two French detachments -from the Bommeler Waert marched over the ice, drove in the posts before -Tuil and at Hesselt, a little to the east of it, after hard fighting, -and thus gained a passage by which they could move westward on the north -bank of the Waal. ◆Jan. 5.◆ On the following day the French attacked -Tuil itself, whereupon the Dutch gunners at once fled from their -batteries on the river; but, advancing from thence against Geldermalsen, -the enemy was repulsed with some loss by the Thirty-third, Forty-second, -and Seventy-eighth, under the direction of General David Dundas. It was, -however, plain that these posts could not be held against a strong -attack so long as frost practically neutralised their natural defences; -and Walmoden recalled Dundas and all the troops in that quarter to the -north side of the Leck, in order to take up a new line of cantonments -extending from Arnheim on the east by Wageningen, Reenen, Amerongen, and -Wyk-by-Duurstede to Honswyk. - -◆Jan. 6.◆ - -A sudden thaw on the 6th offered hopes of re-establishing the old -position on the Waal, and orders were issued on the 7th for a -reconnaissance in force of the whole line of the French posts on the -following day; ◆Jan. 8.◆ but on the morning of the 8th the frost -abruptly set in again, though not before the troops were already in -motion beyond power of recall. On the right, Dundas succeeded in driving -the enemy from their posts on the Linge to the Waal, and in recovering -Buren and Tiel. The brunt of the work fell upon the Fourteenth, -Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth under Lord Cathcart; and these drove -the enemy in succession from the villages of Buurmalsen and Geldermalsen -and captured a gun, not, however, without a loss of one hundred and -thirty men to themselves. On the left the orders seem to have -miscarried, probably through the confusion due to divided command. -◆Jan. 10.◆ Before the operation could be carried any further, Pichegru, -finding that the ice on the Waal was stronger than ever, on the 10th -fell upon the Allied line in great force at three different points -between the Pannarden Canal and Tiel. The attack was repulsed upon the -right, but the Austrians were forced back on the left flank, and -Walmoden ordered the whole force to withdraw once more behind the Leck. -This was effected with little loss; Colonel Coote’s brigade of the -Fortieth, Fiftieth, and Seventy-ninth being the only British forces -severely engaged. Walmoden had fully intended to continue the retreat -eastward across the Yssel; but Lord St. Helens, at the Hague, -unfortunately protested against this, and another thaw enabled Walmoden -to acquiesce. On the night of the 12th frost again set in more severely -than ever, and on the 14th the French attacked along the whole line from -Arnheim to Reenen. ◆Jan. 15.◆ They were beaten back with heavy loss; but -Walmoden, feeling that he was unable to hold his ground, on the -following morning gave the order for a further retreat. - -The days that followed are amongst the most tragical in the history of -the Army. During November and December the discipline of the troops in -Holland had greatly improved, but with the coming of the frost and the -hardships that attended the constant alarms and marches on the Waal, -it had once more broken down completely. Certain regiments of French -emigrants, which had joined the army late in the year, were the worst -offenders; but it seems certain that some of the British were not -far behind them. The country to the north of Arnheim is at the best -of times an inhospitable waste, and there were few dwellings and few -trees to give shelter or fuel after a dreary march through dense and -chilling mist over snow twice thawed and refrozen. Marauders from the -regiments of every nationality swarmed round the columns; the drivers -of the waggons freed themselves from all control, and the line of march -was disorderly beyond description. When the day was ended, the troops -of different nations fought for such scanty comforts as were to be -found; and once there was a pitched battle between the Guards and the -Hessians, who had been on bad terms with each other from the beginning -of the campaign. Day after day the cold steadily increased; and those -of the army that woke on the morning of the 17th of January saw about -them such a sight as they never forgot. Far as the eye could reach over -the whitened plain were scattered gun-limbers, waggons full of baggage, -of stores, or of sick men, sutlers’ carts and private carriages. -Beside them lay the horses, dead; around them scores and hundreds of -soldiers, dead; here a straggler who had staggered on to the bivouac -and dropped to sleep in the arms of the frost; there a group of British -and Germans round an empty rum-cask; here forty English Guardsmen -huddled together about a plundered waggon; there a pack-horse with a -woman lying alongside it, and a baby, swathed in rags, peeping out of -the pack, with its mother’s milk turned to ice upon its lips,—one and -all stark, frozen, dead. Had the retreat lasted but three or four days -longer, not a man would have escaped; and the catastrophe would have -found a place in history side by side with the destruction of the host -of Sennacherib and with the still more terrible disaster of the retreat -from Moscow.[289] - -◆Jan. 19.◆ - -By the 19th the surviving fragments of the battalions reached their -destination on the Yssel, where they were cantoned on the west side of -the river from Zutphen to the sea. But there was no hope of long repose -for them there. Harcourt perceived clearly that the re-embarkation of -his force was now the only resource left to him, and that the place -of embarkation must be on the Weser, since the lack of supplies and -the incapacity of his commissariat-officers would inevitably forbid -him to remain long on the Ems. Within a week, want of victuals and the -hostility of the inhabitants compelled him to continue his retreat -from the Yssel; ◆Jan. 27–29.◆ and on the 27th the march eastward was -resumed, the main body of the British retiring towards Osnabrück, the -Germans upon Münster. One detachment of British,[290] however, was sent -northward under Lord Cathcart’s command to fetch a compass through West -Friesland and along the borders of Groningen, in order to ascertain -whether the people of these provinces were as ill-affected as their -fellows towards the House of Orange. By whose orders this isolated -force was despatched upon such an errand is uncertain; it is only -known that the column was followed up and incessantly harassed by the -enemy, and that it was not very successful in discovering friendly -sentiments among the Dutch. Upon reaching the Ems, the army halted, -and on the 5th February took up cantonments on the western bank of -the river, Cathcart on the extreme north guarding the passes of the -Bourtanger Moor from the Dollart southward, while Abercromby fixed his -headquarters further to south and west of the river at Bentheim, and -the Hanoverians retired to Münster. - -The state of the troops by this time was worse than ever, for thousands -of sick had perforce been left behind on the Yssel. “Your army is -destroyed,” wrote Walmoden to the Duke of York; “the officers, their -carriages, and a large train are safe, but the men are destroyed. -The army has now no more than six thousand fighting men, but it has -all the drawbacks of thirty-three battalions, and consumes a vast -quantity of forage.” A more terrible reproach was never yet levelled -against any force; nevertheless it was rather the politicians than the -military commanders who had made such a reproach possible, by flinging -commissions broadcast to any man or even child who could afford to -satisfy the crimps. Upon entering German territory the men met with -kindlier treatment from the inhabitants; but the infamous conduct of -the French Emigrant Corps threatened to turn the Germans also into -enemies. It now became abundantly clear that most of these regiments -were simply frauds, imposed upon the English Ministers by a band of -unscrupulous adventurers. But the English army, of course, had to bear -the burden of their sins; and the Hanoverians and Hessians, naturally -espousing the cause of their countrymen, turned upon the British with -a bitterness which destroyed all cohesion between the nations of the -Allies.[291] - -Meanwhile the French, after leaving their opponents to retreat -unmolested from the Leck, resumed their advance, and at the end of -January occupied Kampen and Zwolle on the Yssel. They made, however, no -attempt to hinder the further retirement of the Allies; and their -movements for the next fortnight were of the most leisurely description. -Then arrived rumours of a French understanding with Prussia, of the -neutralisation of North Germany, and of a line of demarcation to be -drawn according to the actual territory occupied by the opposing armies. -The French at once woke to the importance of gaining immediate -possession of Groningen and East Friesland, and General Macdonald’s -corps was detached to invade Groningen, while those of Moreau and -Vandamme remained in observation on the Yssel. ◆Feb. 27.◆ On the 19th of -February Macdonald occupied the town of Groningen, and thence turning -eastward he, on the 27th, attacked Cathcart’s fortified posts at -Winschoten. He was repulsed; ◆March 1.◆ but two days later the attack -was renewed with success by General Reynier, and Cathcart was forced to -retreat, which he did with great dexterity, crossing the Ems upon the -3rd. ◆March 3.◆ The entire British force then fell back to the east bank -of the Ems to hold the line from Emden to Rheine, headquarters being -fixed at Osnabrück. - -Five days later the British Cabinet at last decided to withdraw its -troops from the Continent, ◆March 11.◆ and on the 11th Harcourt, to his -infinite relief, received intimation that transports for twenty-three -thousand men were on their way to him. The Hanoverians were in -consternation over the danger to which Hanover was exposed by this -measure, but there was no help for it. ◆March 16.◆ A few days later -Prussian troops arrived to hold the line of the Ems, and on the 22nd the -British began their march to Bremen for embarkation. The Prussians did -their utmost by obstruction, discourtesy, and insolence to disoblige -them on their passage through the country; but this was natural, for -they had always professed contempt for the British as a nation of -traders, and a tradesman is never so despicable to a dishonest customer -as when he refuses to grant him further credit. ◆April 14.◆ Finally, on -the 14th of April, the infantry and part of the artillery took ship for -England, leaving the remainder of the artillery and the whole of the -cavalry behind them under Lord Cathcart and David Dundas. The number -embarked was nearly fifteen thousand, some proportion of the sick having -been recovered; so that the losses after the retreat from the Leck must -have amounted to about six thousand men, of which not a tithe were -killed or wounded in action. Thus disgracefully ended the first -expedition of Pitt and Dundas to the Low Countries. - -AUTHORITIES.—The British despatches relating to the expeditions -to Flanders will be found in _W.O. Orig. Corresp._ 46–48, and in -Entry Book No. 11. The number of private letters included in this -collection makes it of unusual value. For the campaigns at large -the best accounts known to me are in Ditfurth’s _Die Hessen in den -Feldzügen, 1793, 1794, und 1795_ (Kassel, 1839), and in Witzleben’s -_Prinz Friedrich Josias von Coburg-Saalfeld_ (Berlin, 1859), which is -not a little built upon Ditfurth, but contains much that is valuable -of its own and a superb atlas of maps. On the French side the short -memoir of David and the life of Pichegru are of little worth compared -with the narrative of Jomini. Marshal Macdonald’s _Mémoires_ are -disappointing at this period. Of English printed accounts the most -important is Jones’s _Historical Journal of the British Campaign -in 1794_. The _Journal_ of Corporal James Brown of the Coldstream -Guards supplies a few interesting details. Sir H. Calvert’s _Journal -and Correspondence_ is often of value; and there is a great deal of -most useful information in the foot-notes to the miserable doggerel -called the _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_. Unfortunately the -author, like Brown and Calvert, was a Coldstreamer, for which reason -all three confine themselves chiefly to the doings of the brigade of -Guards. The regimental histories of the 14th Foot and 15th Hussars -have occasionally interesting material, but, taken altogether, the -regimental records are disappointing. - - - THE END - - - _Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_. - - - - -[Illustration: - - THE NETHERLANDS in the 18th Century. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - - - - - By the Hon. J. W. 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Fcap. 4to. 6s. net. - -MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. - - - - - FOOTNOTES - -[1] Four troops of life guards, ten regiments of horse, five of -dragoons, forty-seven battalions of foot. - -[2] I had almost written that France was then, as always, the first -military nation; and though Prussia wrested the position from her under -Frederick the Great and again in 1870, the lesson of history seems to -teach that she is as truly the first military, as England is the first -naval, nation. - -[3] Belhomme, p. 153. - -[4] Feuquières. - -[5] That is to say, of land-transport. After the sad experience of the -Irish war the marine transport was entrusted to an officer specially -established for the purpose.—_Commons Journals._ - -[6] I spell the village according to the popular fashion in England, -and according to the Flemish pronunciation. So many names in Flanders -seem to halt between the Flemish and the French that it is difficult to -know how to set them down. - -[7] Fifty-three battalions of infantry and seven regiments of -dragoons.—_Beaurain._ - -[8] No battlefield can be taken in more readily at a glance than that -of Landen. On the path alongside the railway from Landen Station is a -mound formed of earth thrown out of a cutting, from the top of which -the whole position can be seen. - -[9] St. Simon. With the exception of one hollow, which might hold three -or four squadrons in double rank in line, there is not the slightest -shelter in the plain wherein the French horse could find protection. - -[10] Life Guards, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th Dragoon Guards, Galway’s Horse. - -[11] This is, of course, the Talmash of _Tristram Shandy_ and of -Macaulay’s History. He signed his name, however, as I spell it here, -and I use his own spelling the more readily since it is more easily -identified with the Tollemache of to-day. - -[12] Philip III., d. 1621. - | - +-------+---------------------+ - | | - Philip IV., d. 1665. Mary Anne, m. Ferdinand III., - | | Emperor. - +-------+------+--------------+ | - | | | (1) | (3) - Charles II., Maria Theresa, Margaret, m. Leopold I., m. Eleonora - d. 1700. m. Louis XIV. | Emperor, | Magdalena, - | | d. 1705. | of Neuburg. - | | +---+ - | Maria Antonia, | - Louis, m. Max. II., Archduke Charles - Dauphin, d. 1711. Elector of Bavaria. (Charles III.). - | | - Philip of Anjou Joseph, - (Philip V.). Electoral Prince, - d. 1699. - -[13] Namur, Luxemburg, Mons, Charleroi, Ath, Oudenarde, Nieuport, -Ostend. - -[14] By the defensive alliance concluded between England and Holland -early in 1668, it was laid down that either party, on being attacked, -had the right to require from the other the aid of a fixed proportion -of forces both naval and military. This treaty was arranged by Sir -William Temple shortly after the Treaty of Breda had brought to a close -the Dutch War of 1665–1667; it was known as the Triple Alliance, Sweden -being the third signatory. - -[15] 12th, 22nd, 27th. - -[16] 1st batt. First Guards, 1st Royals (2 batts.), 8th, 9th, 10th, -13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th. The Guards had been -substituted (after careful explanation to Parliament) by William’s own -direction for the 9th Foot. - -[17] Seven regiments of horse and dragoons, fourteen battalions of -foot, fifty-six guns. - -[18] Coxe, vol. i. p. 182. - -[19] So Quincy. Coxe gives August 25–September 5 as the date, but the -difference depends merely on the interpretation of the word investment. - -[20] See the description in Kane. - -[21] St. Simon gives a curious account of Lewis’s difficulty in -arriving at the truth, owing to the general unwillingness to tell him -bad news. - -[22] It is stated in _Records and Badges of the Army_ that -Lillingston’s was formed in 1702. But Narcissus Luttrell, Millar, and -the Military Entry Books all give the date as 25th March (New Year’s -Day) 1705. - -[23] Quincy’s account of this portion of the campaign is, so far as -concerns Marlborough, full of falsehoods. - -[24] Four British regiments were of this detachment. Two battalions of -the 1st Royals, the 3rd Buffs, and the 10th Foot. - -[25] Narcissus Luttrell. - -[26] It is worth noting that this was the first campaign in which -Marlborough and the British took the post of honour at the extreme -right of the Allied order of battle. - -[27] His camp thus lay across the whole of Wellington’s position at -Waterloo, from east to west and considerably beyond it to westward, but -fronted in the reverse direction. - -[28] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1705. - - Right. - RIGHT WING ONLY. - 1st Line. - Scots Greys, 3 squadrons. - 5th Dragoons, 3 squadrons. - - 1st Dragoon Guards, 3 squadrons. - 5th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - 7th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - 6th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - 3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 18th Royal Irish. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - 28th Foot. - Stringer’s Foot. - 26th Cameronians. - 16th Foot. - - 3rd Buffs. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - 37th Foot. - Macartney’s Foot. - Evans’s Foot. - 24th Foot. - 15th Foot. - - Foreign Troops. - - 2nd Line. - Foreign Troops. - - Extreme Right of Centre. - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 10th Foot. - Temple’s Foot. - 29th Foot. - 8th Foot - Left. - _Newspaper._ - -[29] Peterborough’s Dragoons; Mark Kerr’s, Stanwix’s, Lovelace’s, -Townsend’s, Tunbridge’s, Bradshaw’s, Sybourg’s, Price’s Foot. Sybourg’s -was made up of Huguenots. - -[30] Marlborough’s _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 262. - -[31] This is the story told in Lamberti. - -[32] The ground, though now drained, is still very wet. - -[33] I have described the field at some length, since the map given by -Coxe is most misleading. - -[34] Coxe, by a singular error, makes the left consist exclusively of -infantry, in face of Quincy, Feuquières, the _London Gazette_ and other -authorities, thereby missing almost unaccountably an important feature -in the action. - -[35] Apparently the whole of Meredith’s brigade, viz.: 1st, 18th, 29th, -37th, 24th, and 10th regiments. The place is still easily identifiable. - -[36] Molesworth escaped and was rewarded four years later, at the age -of twenty-two, with a regiment of foot. - -[37] ORDER OF BATTLE. RAMILLIES, 12TH–23RD MAY 1706. - - Right. - RIGHT WING ONLY. - 1st Line. - Scots Greys. - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons. - - 1st Dragoon Guards. - 5th Dragoon Guards. - 7th Dragoon Guards. - 6th Dragoon Guards. - 3rd Dragoon Guards. - Eighteen Dutch Squadrons. - - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 16th Foot. - 26th Cameronians. - 28th Foot. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - 8th Foot. - - 3rd Buffs. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - Evans’s Foot. - Macartney’s Foot. - Stringer’s Foot. - 15th Foot. - - Foreign Infantry. - - 2nd Line. - Foreign Cavalry. - - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 18th Royal Irish. - 29th Foot. - 37th Foot. - 24th Foot. - 10th Foot. - - Foreign Infantry. - Left. - - From Kane’s _Campaigns_. - -[38] _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 554. - -[39] The British regiments regularly employed in the besieging army -were the 8th, 10th, and 18th, and Evans’s Foot; the Scots Greys, 3rd -and 6th Dragoon Guards. The total loss of the Allies was 32 officers -and 551 men killed, 83 officers and 1941 men wounded. The 18th Royal -Irish alone lost 15 officers, and in one attack over 100 men in half an -hour. - -[40] Parker. - -[41] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1707. - - Right. - RIGHT WING ONLY - 1st Line. - Stair’s Brigade. - Scots Greys. - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons. - - Palmer’s Brigade - 1st Dragoon Guards. - 5th Dragoon Guards. - 7th Dragoon Guards. - 6st Dragoon Guards. - 3rd Dragoon Guards. - - Orrery’s Foot. - Evans’s Foot. - - Foreign horse. - - Meredith’s Brigade. - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 16th Foot. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - 8th Foot. - - Temple’s Brigade - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 18th Royal Irish. - Temple’s Foot. - 24th Foot. - 10th Foot. - - Lord North and Grey’s Brigade. - 3rd Buffs. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - 37th Foot. - 26th Cameronians. - 15th Foot. - Gore’s Foot. - - No British in the Second Line. - Left. - - _Postboy_ 26th June 1707. - -[42] Slane’s, Brazier’s, Delaune’s, Jones’s, Carles’s, all raised in -September. - -[43] Mixed battalion of Guards, 19th Foot, Prendergast’s (late -Orrery’s). - -[44] 16 battalions and 30 squadrons. In these were included the -brigades of Sabine, viz., 8th, 18th, 23rd, 37th; of Evans, viz., -Orrery’s, Evans’s, and two foreign battalions; and of Plattenberg, -which included the Scottish regiments in the Dutch service. - -[45] Among them the Royal Scots and Buffs. - -[46] That is to say, on the western side of the road from Oudenarde to -Deynze. - -[47] The ground, though drained and built over about Bevere, seems to -have lost little of its original character, and is worth a visit. - -[48] British losses: 4 officers and 49 men killed, 17 officers and 160 -men wounded. - -[49] The force consisted of detachments of the 3rd and 4th Dragoons -(now Hussars), 12th, 29th, Hamilton’s, Dormer’s, Johnson’s, Moore’s, -Caulfield’s, Townsend’s, Wynne’s Foot. - -[50] See, for instance, the commendations of Feuquières. - -[51] 135 battalions, 260 squadrons. - -[52] 122 battalions, 230 squadrons. - -[53] These were, according to a contemporary plan (Fricx), the 16th, -18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th Foot. - -[54] He is claimed as a Guardsman by General Hamilton (_Hist. Grenadier -Guards_), though Millner assigns him to the 16th Foot. This is the -only name of a man below the rank of a commissioned officer that I -have encountered in any of the books on the wars of Marlborough, -not excluding the works of Sergeants Deane and Millner. Littler was -deservedly rewarded with a commission. - -[55] The Allied order of battle was peculiar. The artillery was all -drawn up in front, in rear of it came a first line of 100 squadrons, -then a second line of 80 squadrons, then a third line of 104 -battalions, with wings of 14 squadrons more thrown out to the right and -left rear. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708. - -[56] The five English regiments lost about 350 killed and wounded in -this assault. This would mean probably from a fifth to a sixth of their -numbers. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708. - -[57] I have failed, in spite of much search, to identify the British -regiments present, excepting one battalion of the 1st Royals. -Marlborough, as Thackeray has reminded us by a famous scene in -_Esmond_, attributed the credit of the action in his first despatch -to Cadogan. Another letter, however, which appeared in the _Gazette_ -three days later (23rd September), does full justice to Webb, as does -also a letter from the Duke to Lord Sunderland of 18th–29th September -(_Despatches_, vol. iv. p. 243). Webb’s own version of the affair -appeared in the _Gazette_ of 9th October, but does not mention the -regiments engaged. Webb became a celebrated bore with his stories of -Wynendale, but the story of his grievance against Marlborough would -have been forgotten but for Thackeray, who either ignored or was -unaware of the second despatch. - -[58] Notably Prendergast’s. _Gazette_, 25th November. - -[59] The British troops employed were the 6th Foot, 600 marines, and a -battalion of seamen. - -[60] There are still some remains of the old walls of Tournay on the -south side of the town, and the ruins of Vauban’s citadel close by, -from which the extent of the works may be judged. - -[61] The British regiments employed in the siege were the 1st Royals (2 -battalions), 3rd Buffs, 37th, Temple’s, Evans’s and Prendergast’s Foot. - -[62] The following description written from the trenches gives some -idea of the work: “Now as to our fighting underground, blowing up like -kites in the air, not being sure of a foot of ground we stand on while -in the trenches. Our miners and the enemy very often meet each other, -when they have sharp combats till one side gives way. We have got into -three or four of the enemy’s great galleries, which are thirty or -forty feet underground and lead to several of their chambers; and in -these we fight in armour by lanthorn and candle, they disputing every -inch of the gallery with us to hinder our finding out their great -mines. Yesternight we found one which was placed just under our bomb -batteries, in which were eighteen hundredweight of powder besides many -bombs: and if we had not been so lucky as to find it, in a very few -hours our batteries and some hundreds of men had taken a flight into -the air.”—_Daily Courant_, 20th August. - -[63] 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th. - -[64] Parker. - -[65] A nominal list in the _Postboy_ of 1st October gives 36 officers -killed and 46 wounded. An earlier list of 17th September gives 40 -officers and 511 men killed, 66 officers and 1020 men wounded; but this -is admittedly imperfect. - -[66] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1709. - - RIGHT WING ONLY - Right. - 1st Line - Sybourg’s Brigade. - Scots Greys, 3 squadrons. - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons, 2 squadrons. - - Kelburn’s Brigade - 1st Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - 5th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - 7th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - 6th Dragoon Guards, 1 Squadron. - 3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - - Orrery’s Brigade - 26th Cameronians. - Two foreign battalions. - Prendergast’s Foot. - - Two Foreign Brigadiers. - Twenty-seven squadrons of foreign dragoons. - - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Coldstream Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 37th Foot. - 10th Foot. - - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - Orrery’s Foot. - - 3rd Buffs. - Temple’s Foot - Evans’s Foot. - 16th Foot. - - 8th Foot. - 24th Foot. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - 18th Royal Irish. - - No British troops in the second line; but the 15th and 19th Foot - were also present at the action of Malplaquet. - Left. - -[67] 11th, 37th, Kane’s, Clayton’s, and one foreign battalion of foot. -The losses of the expedition were 29 officers and 676 men drowned. - -[68] Honey wood to Carteret, Jan. 7/18; Ligonier to Carteret, March -21/April 1, 1744. - -[69] Ligonier to Carteret, April 29/May 10. - -[70] Wade to Carteret, May 30/June 10, June 25/July 6. - -[71] Carteret to Wade, May 25/June 5. - -[72] Carteret to Wade, July 13/24, 17/28. - -[73] Carteret to Wade, July 31/Aug. 11, Aug. 14/25, 17/28. - -[74] Wade to Carteret, Aug. 26/Sept. 6. - -[75] _Ibid._, Aug. 19/30, Aug. 25/Sept. 5, Sept. 16/27, Sept. 22/Oct. -3, Oct. 1/12, 10/21 - -[76] Ligonier to Carteret, July 31/Aug. 11, 1744. - -[77] Ligonier to Harrington, Jan. 29/Feb. 9, Feb. 6/17, 1745. - -[78] _Gazette_, Feb. 23/March 6, March 1/12, 1745. - -[79] Cumberland to Harrington, April 1/12, 12/23. - -[80] The ground immediately before Fontenoy presents for fully eight -hundred yards a gentle and unbroken slope. An officer, who went over -the ground with me, assured me that St. Privat itself does not offer a -more perfect natural glacis for modern rifle-fire. - -[81] Every one knows the legend of “Messieurs les Gardes Françaises, -tirez les premiers.” “Non, messieurs, nous ne tirons jamais les -premiers.” But every English account agrees that the French fired -first, long before the question had been raised, and I take the -authority of Ligonier (who drew up the official account) as final. He -says distinctly, “We received their fire.” - -[82] _Campagnes des Pays Bas._ - -[83] Ligonier to Harrington, May 5/16. Cumberland to Harrington, May -11/22. - -[84] Fawkener to Harrington, July 19/30. - -[85] General Bligh to Cumberland, June 28/July 9. - -[86] Cumberland to Harrington, July 2/13. - -[87] Cumberland to Harrington, July 14/25. - -[88] Ligonier to Harrington, July 14/25. - -[89] Harrington to Cumberland, Sept. 4/15; Oct. 1/12, 19/30. - -[90] Dunmore to Harrington, Jan. 20/31, Jan. 27/Feb. 7, Feb. 12/23. - -[91] Ligonier to Harrington, July 1/12, 1746. - -[92] Ligonier to Harrington, July 9/20, 13/24, 16/27. - -[93] _Ibid._, July 23/Aug. 3, Aug. 2/13. - -[94] Ligonier to Harrington, Aug. 9/20, 19/30, Aug. 26/Sept. 6, Sept. -4/15. - -[95] Ligomer to Harrington, Sept. 24/Oct. 5, Sept. 28/Oct. 9. - -[96] Ligonier to Harrington, Sept. 28/Oct. 9, Oct. 20/31. - -[97] 1st, 15th, 28th, 30th, 39th, and 42nd Foot. - -[98] Cumberland to Harrington, Feb. 6/17, March 20/31, March 24/April 4. - -[99] Cumberland to Chesterfield, May 1/12, 9/20. - -[100] Cumberland blamed the Austrian General, Baroney, and his -irregulars for supine negligence on the march. Cumberland to -Chesterfield, July 6/17, 1747. - -[101] The regiments present at Lauffeld were the Greys, 4th Hussars, -Inniskillings, 7th Hussars, and Cumberland’s dragoons, one battalion -each of the 1st and 3rd Guards, 3rd, 4th, 13th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, -32nd, 33rd, 36th, 37th, 48th Foot. The two last had no casualties. - -[102] Cumberland to Newcastle, March 18/29, March 22/April 2, March -26/April 6. - -[103] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 21st and 25th January; -14th and 15th February. _F.O. Holland_, 16th February 1793. And see -_Auckland Correspondence_ and _Dropmore Papers_ generally, November -1792 to February 1793. - -[104] The head of the column was able to keep sober; the rear, under -the endearments of the populace, subsided dead drunk on the road and -was brought on in carts. _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards._ - -[105] Lake to Dundas, 2nd March 1793. Lake’s Instructions, 23rd -February. Grenville to Auckland, 20th February 1793. _F.O. Holland_, -Auckland to Grenville, 4th March 1793. - -[106] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 5th and 13th March -1793. _S.C.L.B._ 5th March; Abercromby’s instructions, 9th March; -Dundas to York, 15th March 1793; _C.C.L.B._ 2nd March; Adj.-gen. to -York, 27th March, 12th April 1793. Calvert, pp. 53, 67. - -[107] _S.P. Ireland_, Cooke to Hobart, 23rd April; Westmoreland to -Hobart, 27th April; Dundas to Westmoreland, 16th May, 31st July 1793; -_S.C.L.B._ 18th May 1793. - -[108] _S.C.L.B._ 7th February. _C.C.L.B._ Adj.-gen. to Duke of York, -2nd and 12th April 1793. Dundas to Williamson, 4th April 1793. - -[109] Duke of Argyll’s and Earl of Sutherland’s, 1759; Lord Fred. -Campbell’s, 1778; Earl of Sutherland’s, Fauconberg’s (Yorkshire), -North’s (Cinque Ports), 1779. - -[110] Athol’s or the Manx, Sir J. Grant’s, Gower’s (or Wemyss’s), -Eglinton’s (or Montgomery’s), Breadalbane’s, Argyll’s, Duke of -Gordon’s, Hopetoun’s, Balfour’s (Orkney). Their strength was 650 of all -ranks, except the Manx, which were 323 strong. - -[111] Murray to Dundas, 26th March 1793. - -[112] Sybel, ii. 230; Grenville to Auckland, 3rd April 1793. - -[113] _S.C.L.B._ 21st March, 2nd April; _C.C.L.B._ 25th March 1793. -_Dropmore Papers_, ii. 360, 387–89. Buckingham to Grenville, 20th -January; the King to Grenville, 29th March; Pitt to Grenville, 1st -April 1793. Auckland to Grenville, 31st May 1793. - -[114] Sybel, ii. 142. - -[115] The insisting upon an indemnity must have been the work of Pitt, -probably under the influence of Dundas. Grenville trembled at the word -indemnity. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 392. - -[116] Protocol of conference of 7th April. Dundas to Auckland and to -Murray, 16th April Auckland to Grenville, 19th April 1793. - -[117] Murray to Dundas, 22nd April 1793. - -[118] Prussians, 8000, of which 1800 cavalry; Austrians, 55,000, -of which 10,000 cavalry; Dutch, 15,000, of which 2500 cavalry; -Hanoverians, 12,000, of which 3000 cavalry; Hessians, 8000, of which -1500 cavalry; British, 7200, of which 3000 cavalry. Total, 105,200, of -which 27,200 in the pay of England. About 5000 of the Austrians and the -8000 Hessians were not expected till June. Witzleben, ii. 117, 181–186. -Coburg to York, 1st and 3rd May; Murray to Dundas, 5th May; Dundas to -Murray, 10th May 1793. - -[119] The authorities for this and the next paragraph are Ditfurth, i. -29, 35, 36; Witzleben, ii. 59; Calvert, p. 83; Sybel, ii. 154. - -[120] Ditfurth, i. 48. - -[121] 231 horses, draught and pack, and 116 drivers, etc., per -battalion of 1100 men, of which 82 horses and 34 men were for the -officers. Each company had one four-horse waggon, and each battalion -one pair-horse hospital-waggon. - -[122] Ditfurth, i. 33; Witzleben, ii. 66. York to Dundas, 25th January -1794. Vol. iii. of this _History_, pp. 524, 525. - -[123] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 349. - -[124] Bunbury, _Great War with France_, p. 46. - -[125] Poisson, ii. 239, 240. - -[126] Rousset, p. 183. - -[127] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 138. - -[128] “The squadron of men of war and transports was collected, the -commodore’s flag hoisted, and the expedition sailed with _most secret_ -orders, which as usual were as well known to the enemy and everybody -in England as to those by whom they were given” (Marryat, _The King’s -Own_, ch. vii. _ad init._). Marryat attributes this failing to the -multitude of counsellors that compose a Cabinet. He may be right, but -those who are acquainted with the scandalous carelessness with which -Ministers treat confidential military documents, find no difficulty -in accounting for it otherwise. This evil still continues, and will -continue until Cabinet Ministers are subjected to the same penalties -for abuse of trust as other servants of the King. - -[129] Calvert, p. 72. - -[130] _Dropmore MSS._ Lieut.-colonel Freemantle to Buckingham, 13th -May 1793. Calvert, p. 79. _Narrative by an Officer of the Guards_, -i. 29–31. Murray to Dundas, 10th May (private) 1793. There are some -significant omissions from his public letter of the same date as -published in the Gazette. _Auckland Correspondence_, iii. 58. - -[131] 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons. - -[132] Murray to Dundas, 15th and 17th May 1793. - -[133] Witzleben, ii. 194. - -[134] That is to say, guns not allotted to the infantry as -battalion-guns. - -[135] The brigade was reckoned at four battalions, the flank companies -being massed into a fourth battalion. - -[136] The Fourteenth and Fifty-third, with the flank companies of these -two regiments and of the Thirty-seventh, massed into a third battalion. -Witzleben (ii. 199) gives a larger number of British troops, calling -all squadrons and battalions in British pay by the name English. - -[137] Murray to Dundas, 24th May 1793. - -[138] Witzleben, ii. 210–211. This author states that the Duke of York -asked for the command of the siege, which I believe to be absolutely -incorrect, and indeed incredible. See Murray to Dundas, 26th and 29th -May; Dundas to Murray, 30th and 31st May 1793. - -[139] Blues, Royals, Greys, Inniskillings. - -[140] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 321, _sq._ - -[141] Dundas to Murray, 29th May, 14th June, 12th July; Murray to -Dundas, 18th June and 16th July 1793. - -[142] Murray to Dundas, 25th July. - -[143] Sybel, ii. 370–373. - -[144] Ditfurth, i. 69. Witzleben, ii. 263–64. Murray to Dundas -(private), 9th August 1793. - -[145] Witzleben, ii. 264, 370. Dundas to Murray, 1st August 1793. - -[146] Ditfurth, i. 73. 47½ battalions, 58 squadrons. British, 5200 -infantry, 1300 cavalry; Austrians, 10,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry; -Hanoverians, 9000 infantry, 1600 cavalry; Hessians, 5500 infantry, 1500 -cavalry. Total, 29,700 infantry, 5400 cavalry, 1900 artillery. - -[147] Hamilton, _History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 285. - -[148] The British engaged were the flank companies of the Guards and -Line, and Royal Artillery. Casualties, seventy-eight killed and wounded. - -[149] Murray to Dundas, 16th July; Dundas to Murray, 19th July 1793. - -[150] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 444. Dundas to Grenville, 12th October -1793. - -[151] Dundas to Murray, 16th April 1793. - -[152] Calvert, vi. 118; Murray to Dundas, 3rd September. - -[153] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 394. - -[154] Murray to Dundas, 28th and 31st August 1793. - -[155] Murray to Dundas, 31st August 1793. - -[156] Sybel, ii. 417. - -[157] Murray to Dundas (private), 9th September 1793. - -[158] _Narrative of an Officer_, pp. 91–92; Ditfurth, i. 127–128. - -[159] _Ibid._ pp. 91–93, and see Ditfurth, i. 126. - -[160] Flank companies 9th, nine companies 4/60th, 50 artillery. - -[161] Cuyler to Dundas, 22nd March 1793. - -[162] Battalion companies of the 21st; flank companies (apparently) of -the 9th, 15th, 21st, 45th, 48th, 3/60th, 4/60th, 67th. Bruce speaks of -eighteen flank companies, perhaps including details of the 25th and -29th, which were serving on the fleet as marines. - -[163] Mr. Balfour to Dundas, 20th July 1793. - -[164] The official despatch reached the Government on 13th September, -but the fact was known to Pitt on the 7th. _Dropmore Papers_, i. 422. - -[165] Hood to Dundas, 25th August 1793. - -[166] Brenton’s _Naval History_, i. 101. - -[167] Mulgrave to Dundas, 1st September 1793. - -[168] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th. - -[169] Dundas to Murray, 11th, 14th September; to Hood, 14th September; -to Bruce, 18th September 1793; Pitt to Grenville, _Dropmore Papers_, -ii. 43 (the conjectural date of September attached to this last is -wrong, and should be changed to October). - -[170] _Narrative of an Officer_, i. 92. - -[171] 19th, 57th, three companies of the 42nd. - -[172] Poisson, ii. 525–526. - -[173] Dundas to Murray, 13th September 1793. - -[174] Dundas to Murray, 13th, 14th, and 28th September; 14th October. -Murray to Dundas, 14th and 15th October 1793. - -[175] Ditfurth, i. 147. - -[176] Murray to Dundas, 6th October. Dundas to Ainslie, 12th October; -to Abercromby, 13th October 1793. - -[177] 3rd, 28th, 54th, 59th. They had already made one voyage to Ostend -and back. - -[178] Murray to Dundas, 18th October; Ainslie to Dundas, 23rd October; -Dundas to Grey, 26th October; to Murray, 27th October 1793. - -[179] Two Austrian battalions, 3rd Guards, flank battalion of Guards, -one squadron 7th L.D., and one squadron 15th L.D. - -[180] Murray to Dundas, 30th October and 12th November; Dundas to -Murray, 8th November 1793. - -[181] _Chat huant._ - -[182] Poisson, iii. 139 _seq._ - -[183] _Ibid._ 239–248; Rousset, pp. 293, 299. - -[184] Rousset, 123–124, 236, 249; also generally, pp. 78–148. - -[185] Sybel, iii. 26–27; _Vie de Carnot_, i. 470; _Dropmore Papers_, -ii. 501. - -[186] _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 383. - -[187] “I think, if you see Dundas, it may not be amiss to urge the -danger of running after distant objects while the great object lies -still—of hunting the sheep till you have killed the dog. The most fatal -error will be, I apprehend, the seeking to preserve the popularity of -the war by feeding the avarice of the nation with conquests.”—Windham -to Mr. Elliot, December 1793. _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 196. - -[188] Pitt to Grenville, 5th and 7th July 1794. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. -595, 597. - -[189] _Parliamentary History_, vol. xxxi.; Debates of 21st January, 3rd -February, 10th April 1794. - -[190] Adj.-gen. to the Duke of York, _C.C.L.B._ 31st October 1793. - -[191] These regiments are arranged according to the dates of their -letters of service. - -[192] Campbell’s was originally numbered 98th; Huntly’s 100th. - -[193] Adj.-gen. to Prince Edward, _C.C.L.B._ 17th March 1794. - -[194] _C.C.L.B._, Adj.-gen. to Lieut.-gen. Cunninghame, 8th October -1793. - -Here is an example of the scheme as used for raising a regiment of 10 -companies each of 60 men. - - Proceeds of sale of 1 Lieut.-colonelcy, 1 Majority, - 1 Company, 1 Lieutenancy, 1 Ensigncy, - amount to £9250 - Cost of 600 men at £15 9000 - ---- - Balance £250 - ==== - -Another scheme for augmenting battalions of infantry. As soon as 450 -approved recruits have been raised, there shall be added to it a -Lieutenant-colonel, and a Major. - - The Major will pay for his Lieut.-colonelcy £600 - The senior Captain will pay for his senior Majority 700 - Another Captain will pay for his junior Majority 550 - Two Companies thus vacated will sell for 2800 - Levy-money of £5 granted by Government for 450 men 2250 - ---- - Total £6900 - - Cost of 450 men at £15 (£10 bounty and £5 levy-money) - would be 6750 - ---- - Balance £150 - ==== - -Thus the country is saved all expense but £5 a man levy-money. -_S.C.L.B._ 15th April, 1st and 12th November 1793; 20th January 1794. - -[195] _S.C.L.B._ 9th July 1794. - -[196] _Star_, 13th April 1793. - -[197] One Lieutenant drew half-pay for 80 years after the drafting -of the 104th (Royal Manchester Volunteers), which was one of these -ephemeral corps. _Records and Badges of the British Army_, p. 833. - -[198] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 26th April 1794. - -[199] _Public Advertiser_, 2nd February 1793. - -[200] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 19th July 1794. - -[201] _Ibid._ 19th August 1794. - -[202] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 76–79; Bunbury, -_Great War with France_, Introd. p. xx.; _St. James’s Chronicle_, 27th -January 1795 (debate on Army Estimates of 21st January); _Journal of -Sir Henry Calvert_, pp. 360, 384–85. The letters of Lady Sarah Lennox -(the mother of the Napiers) throw a curious light on the scramble for -promotion through the enlistment of recruits at this period. “Think -of my bad luck about recruits. If I had seen an officer one fortnight -sooner who is here, he would have sold me 20 at 11 guineas per man. -Is not that unfortunate; but they are now gone. My Dublin stock too, -which was 40, has been reduced to 26,” ii. 109, _and see also_ ii. -101. “Is there any chance of recruiting men of five feet four inches -for 10 guineas, and as much under as possible, in your neighbourhood.” -Evidently the wives of poor officers plunged into speculation to help -their husbands with recruits. - -[203] _S.C.L.B._ 15th April 1793. _Daily Chronicle_, 16th April 1793. - -[204] York to Dundas, January 1794. - -[205] _Chronicle_, June 1793. - -[206] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 24th and 26th July 1793. - -[207] _S.C.L.B._ 26th March 1794. - -[208] _Ibid._ 29th April 1794. - -[209] York to Dundas, 2nd February 1794 (with enclosures). - -[210] Dr. Hayes to Lord Cathcart, 1st February 1794; Monthly returns, -1st February to 1st May; Ditfurth, ii. 32. - -[211] Witzleben, iii. 64 _seq._ - -[212] Sybel, iii. 49–65; York to Dundas, 22nd March, 3rd April 1794; -Witzleben, iii. 70–84. - -[213] Witzleben, iii. 91, 62, 29; Ditfurth, ii. 10 _sqq._, 28. - -[214] Ditfurth, ii. 30, 31. - -[215] Craig to Nepean, 7th, 22nd, 31st March, 11th April; to York, 7th, -15th, 16th March; York to Dundas, 9th, 22nd, 26th March, 1794. - -[216] Ditfurth (ii. 43) reckons the field force at from 120,000 to -130,000, but he includes British troops which were not on the spot, and -reckons the strength of those present at too high a rate. - -[217] Witzleben, iii. 94. - -[218] Calvert, p. 187. - -[219] Three squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Guards, two squadrons each of -the Blues, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royals, 2nd Greys, -6th Inniskilling Dragoons, 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons. The -8th and 14th Light Dragoons were embarked or embarking to join the -army. It has been a matter of much difficulty to discover how these -regiments were brigaded. - -_Harcourt’s Brigade._ (?) 1st, 5th, 6th D.G. = 7 squadrons. - -_Mansel’s Brigade._ (?) Blues, 3rd D.G., Royals = 6 squadrons. - -_Laurie’s Brigade._ (certainly), Bays, Greys, Inniskillings = 6 -squadrons. - -_Ralph Dundas’s Brigade._ 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons, 1st -squadron of the Carbineers = 9 squadrons. - -After the death of Mansel on the 26th of April, Dundas took over his -brigade, and Colonel Vyse took Dundas’s. But the regiments seem to have -been much shifted from one brigade to another. - -Calvert, pp. 197, 204. _Cannon’s Records_, Royal Horse Guards, p. 102. - -[220] Ditfurth, ii. 54. Craig to Nepean, 18th April 1794. - -[221] So say the records of the 15th Hussars. I suspect that there were -two squares with the guns between them, as at Avesnes-le-Sec on 12th -September 1793. Two squares side by side would give an appearance of -oblong shape to the formation. - -[222] The records of the 15th Hussars for some reason seek to excuse -the slaughter of the fugitives, by mentioning that the National -Convention had decreed that no quarter should be given to the English; -and this mistake has been copied by Sir Evelyn Wood in his excellent -account of the action in _Achievements of Cavalry_. As a matter of fact -the decree was not made until the 26th of May; and three hundred men -need no excuse for taking no prisoners when attacking five thousand. - -[223] In _Cannon’s Records_ of the 3rd Dragoon guards these casualties -are ascribed to the action of the 26th of April. Whether the mistake be -due to accident or to design, it is to be regretted. - -[224] Going over the ground, my companion and myself fixed upon a -hollow about half a mile to west of Inchy, and on the north side of the -road, as the spot where Otto concentrated his squadrons out of sight -of the French. The left flank of the French infantry, upon which the -attack was opened, we reckoned to have stood in a hollow about half a -mile south-east of Inchy. After very careful study of the ground, I put -forward these conjectures with some confidence. - -[225] The establishment of an Austrian Cuirassier Regiment was six -squadrons; the British regiments, as originally organised in 1793, -should have made thirteen squadrons; but I imagine that losses had -reduced one or other of them to a single squadron, for both Witzleben -(iii. 132) and Ditfurth (ii. 57) give the number as six Austrian and -twelve British squadrons. - -[226] Stewart to Dundas, 30th April; Craig to Nepean, 25th April; -Adjutant-general to Duke of York, 22nd April, 1794. These two -unfortunate battalions spent three weeks on the passage. - -[227] York to Dundas, 6th May 1794. - -[228] It is curious to note that Jomini’s account makes the French -force front to the south, whereas Craig conceived of it as facing to -the north; so that evidently it was prepared to face either way. - -[229] Witzleben, ii. 167. Memorandum of the 28th of April in _W.O. -Corres._ - -[230] Clerfaye (including the reinforcements from Ostend), nineteen -thousand; Walmoden at Warcoing, six thousand; Duke of York at Tournai, -eighteen thousand (Craig to Dundas, 6th May 1794). Witzleben, however, -reckons the united force at thirty thousand men only (iii. 143), and -Ditfurth gives but four thousand men to Walmoden. - -[231] _Life of Lord Combermere_, i. 38. - -[232] The regiments engaged were the Blues, Second, Third, Sixth -Dragoon Guards; First, Second, Sixth Dragoons; Seventh, Eleventh, -Fifteenth, Sixteenth Light Dragoons. Which were engaged throughout and -which came up as reinforcements, I have been unable to discover. The -account of the action is drawn chiefly from Calvert, _Journal_, pp. -203–205. _Narrative of an Officer_, ii. 41. Ditfurth, ii. 75. _Life of -Lord Combermere_, i. 38–39. The first is the most important. - -[233] Sybel, iii. 118–120. Witzleben, iii. 157–167. - -[234] Ditfurth, ii. 90. He says actually that there was nearly room for -the full width of a company, of course in triple rank. - -[235] Great part of the battle-field is now built over. Lille alone -covers a vast extent of it, and Roubaix and Lannoy are to all intent -part and parcel of Lille. But the general character of the ground, and -in particular its blindness, remains unchanged. - -[236] Witzleben (iii. 197–198) considers the slowness both of Clerfaye -and the Archduke Charles on this day to have been inexcusable. - -[237] Brigade of Guards (4 battalions); 14th, 37th, 53rd Foot, 2 -Hessian and 5 Austrian battalions; 7th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons (6 -squadrons); 4 squadrons of Austrian Hussars. - -[238] Hamilton (_History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 304) says, -I know not on what authority, that the pretext for this order was -that Clerfaye required assistance. It is certain that the Austrian -Headquarters had heard nothing and knew nothing of Clerfaye’s situation -at this time, so that, if General Hamilton’s story be more than mere -gossip, the order was probably urged by Waldeck or some other of -Mack’s enemies, with the object of bringing his elaborate combinations -into contempt. The fact that the British would be the chief sufferers -in case of mishap, would rather have encouraged this faction in the -Austrian Staff to the measure. - -[239] The _Gazette_ prints this place as Bouderes; and the mistake -has been copied into many regimental histories. It is only one among -innumerable instances of the slovenliness of the clerks of the War -Office at that time. - -[240] Not to be confounded with the village of the same name further -north, on the road from Tournai to Lannoy. - -[241] The evidence upon this point is very conflicting. All the -English accounts state that, when the British reached Lannoy on their -retreat, the place was in possession of the French. Ditfurth, on the -other hand (ii. 133, 137 _seq._), is very positive that it was held by -the Hessians until 1 p.m., which, in his opinion, was long after the -British would have reached it; and the evidence which he adduces is -very strong. Against this, it is certain that the British would have -been only too thankful to rally at Lannoy if they could, and that they -were greatly disappointed to find themselves cut off from it. It is -also to be noted that Ditfurth rakes up everything that he can to the -discredit of the English, but was not at the pains to read a single -English account of the action, except the Duke of York’s letter as -published in the _Gazette_, and that his account of their movements is -consequently full of errors. I incline to the opinion that the Hessians -were still in Lannoy, but that the French around them were so numerous -as to cut the British off from it—in fact, that the French practically -held it invested, with a covering force powerful enough to keep the -British at a distance. The same was the case at Roubaix, which the -Sixteenth Light Dragoons contrived to hold till Abercromby retreated, -though the Austrians, the Duke of York, and Abercromby himself all -believed it to be in the hands of the French. It still remains to -be explained why the Hessians made no sign of their presence when -Abercromby’s column approached, for the British artillerymen actually -began to lay their guns upon it in the assurance that it was in the -enemy’s hands. - -[242] There are few actions which I have found so difficult to describe -as this of the 18th of May. I have drawn my account from Witzleben, -iii. 201–230; Ditfurth, ii. 130–157; Jomini; _Narrative of an Officer_, -ii. 47–51; Cannon’s _Records of the Seventh and Fifteenth Hussars and -Sixteenth Lancers_; Calvert’s _Journal_; and Craig’s letters to Nepean -of 19th May 1794 (Record Office). - -[243] Calvert, p. 269. - -[244] The French brigades at this period were of the strength of -divisions. - -[245] Jones, _Campaign of 1794_. The author was a captain in the -Fourteenth. - -[246] Witzleben, iii. 168–169. - -[247] Sybel, iii. 120–125. York to Dundas, 26th May 1794 (with -enclosures). - -[248] Captain William Parker to the Admiralty, 3rd June 1794. - -[249] Duke of York to Dundas, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Craig to -Nepean, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Calvert, pp. 238–253. - -[250] Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 171–172. - -[251] Calvert, 277. _Life of Lord Lynedoch_, 91. - -[252] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 40th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th, 63rd, 87th, -89th. - -[253] Moira to Dundas and to Nepean, 26th June 1794. - -[254] Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June, 2nd July; Craig to Nepean, -27th June; Moira to Dundas, 28th and 29th June, 1st July 1794. - -[255] York to Dundas, 2nd and 3rd July; Dundas to Diepenbrock, 3rd and -7th July; Diepenbrock to Dundas, 5th July 1794. - -[256] Coburg to York, 7th and 8th July; York to Coburg, 7th July; to -Dundas, 7th and 10th July; Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794. - -[257] Sybel, iii. 150–152, 171. Craig to Nepean, 4th July 1794. - -[258] York to Dundas, 15th, 19th, 20th, 23rd July 1794. - -[259] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 35. - -[260] Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794. - -[261] Cornwallis to Dundas, 8th and 18th June 1794, and see _Cornwallis -Correspondence_, ii. 239–255; _Malmesbury Correspondence_; _Dropmore -Papers_, ii. 564–566, 577, 592, 594. - -[262] Sybel, iii. 240–243. - -[263] Poisson, iv. 262. - -[264] Ditfurth, iii. 217. - -[265] - - CAVALRY— - _David Dundas’s Brigade_—2nd, 6th D.G.; 2nd, 6th D. - _Ralph Dundas’s Brigade_—Blues; 3rd, 5th D.G.; 1st D. - _Laurie’s Brigade_—7th, 11th, 15th, 16th L.D. - _Vyse’s Brigade_—1st D.G.; 8th, 14th L.D. - _Foreign Troops_— - Uhlans Britanniques, Irving’s Hussars, Choiseul’s Hussars. - - INFANTRY— - _First Brigade_—3rd, 88th, 63rd. - _Second Brigade_—8th,[266] 44th,[266] 33rd.[266] - _Third Brigade_—12th,[266] 55th,[266] 38th. - _Fourth Brigade_—14th, 53rd, 37th. - _Fifth Brigade_—19th, 54th, 42nd. - _Sixth Brigade_—27th, 89th, 28th. - _Seventh Brigade_—40th,[266] 57th, 59th, 87th. - _Foreign Troops_— - Loyal Emigrants, York Rangers, Rohan’s Regiment. - -[266] The flank companies of these battalions were in the West Indies. - - Officers N.C.O.’s and men. - British Cavalry, 165 4,350 - Hanoverians } - and Hessians } 168 2,939 - --- ----- - Total Cavalry 333 7,289 - British Infantry, 583 21,170 - Hanoverians } - and Hessians } 322 8,722 - ---- ------ - Total 1,238 37,181 - ===== ====== - -Total of all arms, including artillery, etc., say, 1300 officers, -40,000 N.C.O.’s and men. - -[267] Craig to Nepean, 5th August 1794; Ditfurth, ii. 213 _seq._; -Memorandum of the Duke of York, 23rd December 1794; Calvert, pp. -385–386; see vol. ii. of this _History_, p. 88. - -[268] No officer could hope to master these mysteries without the help -of two fat little duodecimo volumes called _The Regimental Companion_, -and a third and slighter volume entitled _Military Finance_. - -[269] Craig to Nepean, 31st August; Craig’s Memorandum of 23rd December -1794. - -[270] _Sunday Reformer_, 29th December 1793. - -[271] Craig to Nepean, 12th and 31st August, 5th and 8th September -1794. The class of medical officer obtained by Government is described -in _Autobiography of Sir J. M’Grigor_, pp. 93, 94. - -[272] York to Dundas, 25th, 27th, 30th July, 1st and 6th August; Craig -to Nepean, 25th July 1794. - -[273] Its flank companies, and those of the 34th, were detained for the -West Indies. - -[274] Dundas to Mulgrave, 7th and 13th August; Mulgrave to Dundas, -17th, 19th, 26th, 30th August, 3rd September; Dundas to York, 22nd -August 1794. - -[275] On the 29th of August the Duke reorganised his force as follows: - - _First Brigade_—Maj.-gen. Stewart, 3rd, 40th, 55th, 59th, 89th. - _Second Brigade_— 8th, 27th, 28th, 57th. - _Third Brigade_— 12th, 33rd, 42nd, 44th. - _Fourth Brigade_—Maj.-gen. Fox, 14th, 37th, 38th, 63rd. - _Fifth Brigade_— 19th, 53rd, 54th, 88th. - - -[276] Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794. - -[277] The Bommeler Waert is the triangular tongue of land enclosed -between the Waal and the Meuse immediately to the east of Gorkum. It -is very nearly an island, the entrance to it from the east being very -narrow and defended by a fort, then, as now, called Fort St. Andries. - -[278] York to Dundas, 19th, 21st, 22nd September (enclosing -correspondence with Clerfaye); Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794. - -[279] Craig to Nepean, 20th September 1794. Sybel, iii. 432 _note_. -From this it appears that all documentary evidence of the agreement -has been carefully destroyed, but that there is a hint of secret -negotiations actually proceeding on the 18th of September 1794. - -[280] York to Dundas, 25th and 29th September, 1st and 3rd October; -Craig to Nepean, 1st October; Grenville to York, 25th September 1794. - -[281] Dundas to York, 10th, 12th, 16th, 18th October; York to Dundas, -16th, 18th, 23rd October 1794. - -[282] Craig explained that this was owing chiefly to the inexperience -of a young Colonel. Thus the army-brokers had contrived to lift -children to the command even of regiments that had been eighteen months -on active service. - -[283] The troops engaged were the 15th Light Dragoons, 8th, 27th, 28th, -55th, 63rd, 78th. The last-named regiment, together with the 80th, had -arrived at Flushing at the end of September, when Dundas intended to -withdraw some of the older regiments for service in the West Indies. - -[284] York to Dundas, 7th and 11th November; Craig to Nepean, 10th -November 1794. - -[285] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 89–91; York to -Dundas, 27th November 1794; Harcourt to York, 15th December 1794. - -[286] Ditfurth, who never loses an opportunity of abusing the English, -of course puts a discreditable construction upon the Duke’s departure, -not knowing that he was sent for by Ministers (ii. 313). - -[287] York to Dundas, 27th and 29th November; Harcourt to York 11th and -15th December 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 310. - -[288] Dundas to Harcourt, 13th and 24th December; Harcourt to Dundas, -23rd December; to York, 25th and 29th December; Walmoden to York, 22nd, -25th, 29th December 1794, 1st January 1795. The regiments engaged in -the action were the 19th, 33rd, 42nd, 78th, 80th. - -[289] Jones, _Campaign of 1794_, pp. 171–175; Ditfurth, ii. 362 _sq._; -_Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 100–104. - -[290] 15th Light Dragoons; 27th, 28th, 80th, and 84th Foot. - -[291] Walmoden to York, 3rd February; Harcourt to York (three letters), -11th February 1795. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS -1690-1794 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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- text-align: left; -} - - -.ob3 { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: left; - margin-left: 4em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -.ob4 { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: left; - margin-left: 5em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -.ob5 { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: left; - margin-left: 4em; - margin-top: -1.0em; -} - -.ob6 { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: left; - margin-left: 3em; -} - -.ob7 { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: left; - margin-left: 4em; -} - -.ob8 { - text-indent: 2.9em; - text-align: left; - margin-bottom: 0.75em; -} - -.ob9 { - margin-top: 0.25em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnotes { - background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.25em; - margin-bottom:3em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; -} - -.lspace { - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -ul.trans1 { - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -/* For notes in thn text */ -.tnote { - background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:0.75em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; -} - -/*----------------------------------------------------------------------- - Advertisements ------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#adverts { - background-color: #d5efe7; - border: dashed 1px; - color: #000; - margin-top: 0.5em; - margin-bottom:1em; - padding: 0.75em; - text-indent: 0em; - font-size: 100%; - page-break-before: always; -} - -.advauthor { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - margin-top: 0.5em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; - width: 80%; - margin-left:10%; - margin-right: 10%; - font-size: 120%; - word-spacing: 0.2em; -} - -.advhistory { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - margin-top: 0.0em; - margin-bottom: 0.25em; - font-size: 160%; - font-weight: bold; -} - -.advmaps { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - margin-top: 0.0em; - font-size: 80%; - font-weight: bold; - line-height: 2.0; -} - -.advhitem { - text-indent: -4em; - text-align: left; - font-size: 100%; - margin-bottom: 0.2em; - margin-left: 4em; -} - -.advx { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - font-size: 90%; - margin-top: -0.2em; - margin-bottom: 0.15em; -} - -.advpress { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - font-weight: bold; - margin-top: 1.0em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -.advvols { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - font-size: 90%; - margin-top: 0.5em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} - -.advmacm { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - margin-top: 0.5em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; - word-spacing: 0.2em; -} - -.advitem { - text-indent: -2em; - text-align: left; - font-size: 100%; - margin-top: 0.75em; - margin-bottom: 0.4em; - margin-left: 2em; - word-spacing: 0.2em; - line-height: 1.0; -} - -.advyp { - text-indent: 0em; - text-align: center; - font-style: italic; - word-spacing: 0.2em; - margin-top: 1.0em; - margin-bottom: 0.5em; -} -</style> - -</head> - -<body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794, by John William Fortescue</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em;'>Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: John William Fortescue</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: February 3, 2022 [eBook #67310]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Brian Coe, David Tipple and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS 1690-1794 ***</div> - -<div class="transnotes"> - -<p class="skip4"> -Transcriber’s Notes: -</p> - -<ul class="trans1"> -<li class="lspace"> -A small number of obvious typos have been corrected. Except for -these corrections, the spelling and punctuation of the book have -not been changed. -</li> - -<li class="lspace">The 291 footnotes in the source book have been -changed into endnotes. -</li> - -<li class="lspace"> -If your device supports it, then tapping or clicking on any of the maps -will open a larger version. -</li> - -<li class="lspace"> -Many of the 439 sidenotes consist of two dates, separated by a dash; -the first date is taken from the Julian Calendar and the second -from the Gregorian Calendar. The dates in such a pair differ by 10 days -in the 17th century and by 11 days in the 18th century. -</li> -</ul> -</div> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p class="bastard">BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="figcenter"> - <img src="images/logo.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p class="macm1 fsize90"> -MACMILLAN AND CO., <span class="smcap">Limited</span> -</p> - -<p class="center fsize75"> -LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MADRAS<br /> -MELBOURNE -</p> - -<p class="macm2 fsize90"> - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY -</p> - -<p class="center fsize75"> -NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO<br /> -DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO -</p> - -<p class="macm2 fsize90"> - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span> -</p> - -<p class="center fsize75"> - TORONTO -</p> - -<hr class="page" /> - -<h1> -BRITISH CAMPAIGNS<br /> -IN FLANDERS<br /> -1690–1794 -</h1> - -<p class="subtitle"> -BEING EXTRACTS FROM<br /> -<span class="fsize120">“A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY</span>” -</p> - -<p class="center fsize75"> - BY -</p> - -<p class="author"> -The Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE -</p> - -<p class="macm3"> -MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED<br /> -ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON<br /> -1918 -</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p class="center">COPYRIGHT</p> -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak fsize150">PREFACE</h2> -</div> - -<p class="preface"> -This volume consists simply of extracts reprinted from my -<i>History of the British Army.</i> -It is published in order that the troops at the front may, if they wish -it, study the experiences of their forerunners in the Low Countries in a -book which is fairly portable and fairly inexpensive, though neither so -cheap nor so compendious as <i>The British Soldiers’ Guide to Northern -France and Flanders</i>. -</p> - -<p class="jwf"> -J. W. F. -</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak fsize150" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table class="contents" summary="Table of Contents"> - <thead> - <tr> - <td></td><td class="tdr">PAGE</td> - </tr> - </thead> - <tbody> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsc">William III.’s Campaigns</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#will3">1–37</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsc">Marlborough’s Campaigns—</td> - <td class="tdr"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">1701–2</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#mal1701">38</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">1705</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#mal1705">51</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">1706 (Ramillies)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#mal1706">62</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">1707–8 (Oudenarde)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#mal1707">77</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">1709 (Malplaquet)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#mal1709">103</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">1711</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#mal1711">122</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsc">War of The Austrian Succession—</td> - <td class="tdr"></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">Campaigns of 1744–5 (Fontenoy)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#camp1744">133</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">Campaigns of 1746–7 (Lauffeld, Roucoux)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#camp1746">158</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsc">War of the French Revolution</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#frevn">177</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">Campaign of 1793 (Linselles)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#camp1793">207</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">Preparations for the Campaign of 1794</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#prep1794">261</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">Campaign of 1794 (Villers-en-Cauchies, - Beaumont, Willems, Tourcoing)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#camp1794">295</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">Campaign of 1794 - (<span class="itnorm">Continued</span>)</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#cont1794">343</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlsci">End of the Campaign of 1794</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#end1794">366</a></td> - </tr> - </tbody> -</table> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak fsize150" id="MAPS_AND_PLANS">MAPS AND PLANS</h2> -</div> - -<table class="contents" summary="Table of Maps"> - <thead> - <tr> - <td></td><td class="tdr fsize60">PAGE</td> - </tr> - </thead> - <tbody> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Steenkirk">Steenkirk</a>, - 23rd July (3rd Aug.) 1692</td> - <td class="tdr">13</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Landen">Landen</a>, - 19th (29th) July 1693</td> - <td class="tdr">27</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Geete">Lines of the Geete</a>, - 7th (18th) July 1705</td> - <td class="tdr">55</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Ramillies">Ramillies</a>, - 12th (23rd) May 1706</td> - <td class="tdr">67</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Oudenarde">Oudenarde</a>, - 30th June (11th July) 1708</td> - <td class="tdr">85</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Malplaquet">Malplaquet</a>, - 31st Aug. (11th Sept.) 1709</td> - <td class="tdr">111</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Campaign of <a href="#Camp1711">1711</a></td> - <td class="tdr">125</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Fontenoy">Fontenoy</a>, - 30th April (11th May) 1745</td> - <td class="tdr">143</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Roucoux">Roucoux</a>, - 30th Sept, (11th Oct.) 1746</td> - <td class="tdr">163</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Lauffeld">Lauffeld</a>, - 21st June (2nd July) 1747</td> - <td class="tdr">171</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Attack of the Allies on the Camp of - <a href="#Famars">Famars</a>, 23rd May 1793</td> - <td class="tdr">217</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Dunkirk">Dunkirk</a> and Environs, showing - the Position of the Allies from 24th Aug. to 6th Sept. 1793 - </td><td class="tdr">237</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Campaign of <a href="#Map1794">April 1794</a></td> - <td class="tdr">299</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Avesnes">Avesnes-le-Sec</a>, 12th Sept. 1793; - Villers-en-Cauchies, 24th April 1794; Beaumont, 26th April 1794 - </td> - <td class="tdr">303</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Willems">Willems</a>, 10th May 1794</td> - <td class="tdr">319</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><a href="#Netherlands">The Netherlands</a> - in the 18th Century</td> - <td class="tdend"><i>At end</i></td> - </tr> - </tbody> -</table> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="will3"> - VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER II -</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent"> -I pass now to Flanders, which is about to become for -the second time the training ground of the British Army. -The judicious help sent by Lewis the Fourteenth to -Ireland had practically diverted the entire strength of -William to that quarter for two whole campaigns; and -though, as has been seen, there were English in Flanders -in 1689 and 1690, the contingents which they furnished -were too small and the operations too trifling to warrant -description in detail. After the battle of the Boyne the -case was somewhat altered, for, though a large force was -still required in Ireland for Ginkell’s final pacification of -1691, William was none the less at liberty to take the -field in Flanders in person. Moreover, Parliament with -<span class="sni">1690. October.</span> -great good-will had voted seventy thousand men for the -ensuing year, of which fully fifty thousand were -British,<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -so that England was about to put forth her strength in -Europe on a scale unknown since the loss of Calais. -</p> - -<p> -But first a short space must be devoted to the -theatre of war, where England was to meet and break -down the overweening power of France. Few studies -are more difficult, even to the professed student, than -that of the old campaigns in Flanders, and still fewer -more hopeless of simplification to the ordinary reader. -Nevertheless, however desperate the task, an effort -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</span> -must be made once for all to give a broad idea of the -scene of innumerable great actions. -</p> - -<p> -Taking his stand on the northern frontier of France -and looking northward, the reader will note three great -rivers running through the country before him in, -roughly speaking, three parallel semicircles, from -south-east to north-west. These are, from east to -west, the Moselle, which is merged in the Rhine at -Coblentz, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, all three of -which discharge themselves into the great delta -whereof the southern key is Antwerp. But for the -present let the reader narrow the field from the Meuse -in the east to the sea in the west, and let him devote -his attention first to the Meuse. He will see that, a -little to the north of the French frontier, it picks up -a large tributary from the south-west, the Sambre, -which runs past Maubeuge and Charleroi and joins -the Meuse at Namur. Thence the united rivers -flow on past the fortified towns of Huy, Liège, and -Maestricht to the sea. But let the reader’s northern -boundary on the Meuse for the present be Maestricht, -and let him note another river which rises a little to -the west of Maestricht and runs almost due west -past Arschot and Mechlin to the sea at Antwerp. Let -this river, the Demer, be his northern, and the Meuse -from Maestricht to Namur his eastern, boundary. -</p> - -<p> -Returning to the south, let him note a river rising -immediately to the west of Charleroi, the Haine, which -joins the Scheldt at Tournay, and let him draw a line -from Tournay westward through Lille and Ypres to -the sea at Dunkirk. Let this line from Dunkirk to -Charleroi be carried eastward to Namur; and there is -his southern boundary. His western boundary is, of -course, the sea. Within this quadrilateral, Antwerp -(or more strictly speaking the mouth of the Scheldt), -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</span> -Dunkirk, Namur, and Maestricht, lies the most famous -fighting-ground of Europe. -</p> - -<p> -Glancing at it on the map, the reader will see that -this quadrilateral is cut by a number of rivers running -parallel to each other from south to north, and flowing -into the main streams of the Demer and the Scheldt. -The first of these, beginning from the east, are the -Great and Little Geete, which become one before they -join the main stream. It is worth while to pause for a -moment over this little slip of land between the Geete -and the Meuse. We shall see much of Namur, Huy, -Liège, and Maestricht, which command the navigation -of the greater river, but we shall see still more of the -Geete, and of two smaller streams, the Jaar and the -Mehaigne, which rise almost in the same table-land with -it. On the Lower Jaar, close to Maestricht, stands the -village of Lauffeld, which shall be better known to -us fifty years hence. On the Little Geete, just above -its junction with its greater namesake, are the villages -of Neerwinden and Landen. In the small space -between the heads of the Geete and the Mehaigne lies -the village of Ramillies. For this network of streams -is the protection against an enemy that would threaten -the navigation of the Meuse from the north and west, -and the barrier of Spanish Flanders against invasion -from the east; and the ground is rich with the corpses -and fat with the blood of men. -</p> - -<p> -The next stream to westward is the Dyle, which -flows past Louvain to the Demer, and gives its name, -after the junction, to that river. The next in order is -the Senne, which flows past Park and Hal and Brussels -to the same main stream. At the head of the Senne -stands the village of Steenkirk; midway between the -Dyle and Senne are the forest of Soignies and the field -of Waterloo.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</span></p> - -<p> -Here the tributaries of the Demer come to an end, -but the row of parallel streams is continued by the -tributaries of another system, that of the Scheldt. -Easternmost of these, and next in order to the Senne, -is the Dender, which rises near Leuse and flows past -Ath and Alost to the Scheldt at Dendermond. Next -comes the Scheldt itself, with the Scarpe and the -Haine, its tributaries, which it carries past Tournay -and Oudenarde to Ghent, and to the sea at Antwerp. -Westernmost of all, the Lys runs past St. Venant, -where in Cromwell’s time we saw Sir Thomas Morgan -and his immortal six thousand, past Menin and Courtrai, -and is merged in the Scheldt at Ghent. -</p> - -<p> -The whole extent of the quadrilateral is about one -hundred miles long by fifty broad, with a great waterway -to the west, a second to the east, and a third, -whereof the key is Ghent, roughly speaking midway -between them. The earth, fruitful by nature and -enriched by art, bears food for man and beast; the -waterways provide transport for stores and ammunition. -It was a country where men could kill each -other without being starved, and hence for centuries -the cockpit of Europe. -</p> - -<p> -A glance at any old map of Flanders shows how -thickly studded was this country with walled towns of -less or greater strength, and explains why a war in -Flanders should generally have been a war of sieges. -Every one of these little towns, of course, had its -garrison; and the manœuvres of contending forces -were governed very greatly by the effort, on one side, -to release these garrisons for active service in the field, -and, on the other, to keep them confined within their -walls for as long as possible. Hence it is obvious that -an invading army necessarily enjoyed a great advantage, -since it menaced the fortresses of the enemy -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</span> -while its own were unthreatened. Thus ten thousand -men on the Upper Lys could paralyse thrice their -number in Ghent and Bruges and the adjacent towns. -On the other hand, if an invading general contemplated -the siege of an important town, he manœuvred to -entice the garrison into the field before he laid siege -in form. Still, once set down to a great siege, an army -was stationary, and the bare fact was sufficient to -liberate hostile garrisons all over the country; and -hence arose the necessity of a second army to cover -the besieging force. The skill and subtlety manifested -by great generals to compass these different ends is -unfortunately only to be apprehended by closer study -than can be expected of any but the military student. -</p> - -<p> -A second cause contributed not a little to increase -the taste for a war of sieges, namely, the example of -France, then the first military nation in Europe.<a -id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -The Court of Versailles was particularly fond of a siege, -since it could attend the ceremony in state and take -nominal charge of the operations with much glory and -little discomfort or danger. The French passion for -rule and formula also found a happy outlet in the -conduct of a siege, for, while there is no nation more -brilliant or more original, particularly in military -affairs, there is also none that is more conceited or -pedantic. The craving for sieges among the French -was so great that the King took pains, by the grant of -extra pay and rations, to render this species of warfare -popular with his soldiers.<a id="FNanchor_3" -href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -</p> - -<p> -Again, it must be remembered that the object of a -campaign in those days was not necessarily to seek out -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</span> -an enemy and beat him. There were two alternatives -prescribed by the best authorities, namely, to fight at -an advantage or to subsist comfortably.<a id="FNanchor_4" -href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Comfortable -subsistence meant at its best subsistence at an enemy’s -expense. A campaign wherein an army lived on the -enemy’s country and destroyed all that it could not -consume was eminently successful, even though not a -shot was fired. To force an enemy to consume his -own supplies was much, to compel him to supply his -opponent was more, to take up winter-quarters in his -territory was very much more. Thus to enter an -enemy’s borders and keep him marching backwards -and forwards for weeks without giving him a chance of -striking a blow, was in itself no small success, and -success of a kind which galled inferior generals, such -as William of Orange, to desperation and so to disaster. -The tendency to these negative campaigns -was heightened once more by French example. The -French ministry of war interfered with its generals to -an extent that was always dangerous, and eventually -proved calamitous. Nominally the marshal commanding-in-chief -in the field was supreme; but the -intendant or head of the administrative service, though -he received his orders from the marshal, was instructed -by the King to forward those orders at once by special -messenger to Louvois, and not to execute them without -the royal authority. Great commanders such as -Luxemburg had the strength from time to time to -kick themselves free from this bondage, but the rest, -embarrassed by the surveillance of an inferior officer, -preferred to live as long as possible in an enemy’s -country without risking a general action. It was left -to Marlborough to advance triumphant in one magnificent -campaign from the Meuse to the sea. -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</span></p> - -<p> -Next, a glance must be thrown at the contending -parties. The defenders of the Spanish Netherlands, -for they cannot be called the assailants of France, were -confederate allies from a number of independent states—England, -Holland, Spain, the Empire, sundry states -of Germany, and Denmark, all somewhat selfish, few -very efficient, and none, except the first, very punctual. -From such a heterogeneous collection swift, secret, and -united action was not to be expected. King William -held the command-in-chief, and, from his position as -the soul of the alliance, was undoubtedly the fittest -for the post. But though he had carefully studied the -art of war, and though his phlegmatic temperament -found its only genuine pleasure in the excitement of -the battlefield, he was not a great general. He could -form good plans, and up to a certain point could -execute them, but up to a certain point only. It -should seem that his physical weakness debarred him -from steady and sustained effort. He was strangely -incapable of conducting a campaign with equal ability -throughout; he would manœuvre admirably for weeks, -and forfeit all the advantage that he had gained by the -carelessness of a single day. In a general action, of -which he was fonder than most commanders of his -time, he never shone except in virtue of conspicuous -personal bravery. He lacked tactical instinct, and -above all he lacked patience; in a word, to use a -modern phrase, he was a very clever amateur. -</p> - -<p> -France, on the other hand, possessed the finest -and strongest army in Europe,—well equipped, well -trained, well organised, and inured to work by countless -campaigns. She had a single man in supreme -control of affairs, King Lewis the Fourteenth; a great -war-minister, Louvois; one really great general, -Luxemburg; and one with flashes of genius, Boufflers. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</span> -Moreover, she possessed a line of posts in Spanish -Flanders extending from Dunkirk to the Meuse. On -the Lys she had Aire and Menin; on the Scarpe, -Douay; on the Upper Scheldt, Cambray, Bouchain, -Valenciennes, and Condé; on the Sambre, Maubeuge; -between Sambre and Meuse, Philippeville and Marienburg; -and on the Meuse, Dinant. Further, in the one -space where the frontier was not covered by a friendly -river, between the sea and the Scheldt, the French had -constructed fortified lines from the sea to Menin and -from thence to the Scheldt at Espierre. Thus with -their frontier covered, with a place of arms on every -river, with secrecy and with unity of purpose, the -French enjoyed the approximate certainty of being -able to take the field in every campaign before the -Allies could be collected to oppose them. -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1691.</div> -<p> -The campaign of 1691 happily typifies the relative -positions of the combatants in almost every respect. -The French concentrated ten thousand men on the -Lys. This was sufficient to paralyse all the garrisons -of the Allies on and about the river. They posted -another corps on the Moselle, which threatened the -territory of Cleves. Now Cleves was the property of -the Elector of Brandenburg, and it was not to be -expected that he should allow his contingent of troops -to join King William at the general rendezvous at -Brussels, and suffer the French to play havoc among -his possessions. Thus the Prussian contingent likewise -was paralysed. So while William was still -ordering his troops to concentrate at Brussels, Boufflers, -who had been making preparations all the winter, -suddenly marched up from Maubeuge and, before -William was aware that he was in motion, had besieged -Mons. The fortress presently surrendered after a -feeble resistance, and the line of the Allies’ frontier -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</span> -between the Scheldt and Sambre was broken. William -moved down from Brussels across the Sambre in the -hope of recovering the lost town, outmanœuvred -Luxemburg, who was opposed to him, and for three -days held the recapture of Mons in the hollow of his -hand. He wasted those three days in an aimless halt; -Luxemburg recovered himself by an extraordinary -march; and William, finding that there was no alternative -before him but to retire to Brussels and remain -inactive, handed over the command to an incompetent -officer and returned to England. Luxemburg then -closed the campaign by a brilliant action of cavalry, -which scattered the horse of the Allies to the four -winds. As no British troops except the Life Guards -were present, and as they at any rate did not disgrace -themselves, it is unnecessary to say more of the combat -of Leuse. It had, however, one remarkable effect: it -increased William’s dread of the French cavalry, already -morbidly strong, to such a pitch as to lead him subsequently -to a disastrous military blunder. -</p> - -<p> -The campaign of 1691 was therefore decidedly -unfavourable to the Allies, but there was ground for -hope that all might be set right in 1692. The Treasurer, -Godolphin, was nervously apprehensive that Parliament -might be unwilling to vote money for an English army -in Flanders; but the Commons cheerfully granted a -total of sixty-six thousand men, British and foreign; -which, after deduction of garrisons for the safety of -the British Isles, left forty thousand free to cross the -German Ocean. -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1692.</div> -<p> -Of these, twenty-three thousand were British, the -most important force that England had sent to the -Continent since the days of King Henry the Eighth. -The organisation was remarkably like that of the New -Model. William was, of course, Commander-in-Chief, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</span> -and under him were a general of horse and a general of -foot, with a due allowance of lieutenant-generals, -major-generals, and brigadiers. There is, however, no -sign of an officer in command of artillery or engineers, -nor any of a commissary in charge of the transport.<a -id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -The one strangely conspicuous functionary is the -Secretary-at-War, who in this and the following -campaigns for the last time accompanied the Commander-in-Chief -on active service. But the most -significant feature in the list of the staff is the omission -of the name of Marlborough. Originally included -among the generals for Flanders, he had been struck -off the roll, and dismissed from all public employment, -in disgrace, before the opening of the campaign. -Though this dismissal did not want justification, -it was perhaps of all William’s blunders the -greatest. -</p> - -<p> -As usual, the French were beforehand with the -Allies in opening the campaign. They had already -broken the line of the defending fortresses by the -capture of Mons; they now designed to make the -breach still wider. All through the winter a vast -siege-train was collecting on the Scheldt and Meuse, -with Vauban, first of living engineers, in charge of it. -<span class="sni">May.</span> -In May all was ready. Marshal Joyeuse, with one -corps, was on the Moselle, as in the previous year, to -hold the Brandenburgers in check. Boufflers, with -eighteen thousand men, lay on the right bank of the -Meuse, near Dinant; Luxemburg, with one hundred -and fifteen thousand more, stood in rear of the river -Haine. On the 20th of May, King Lewis in person -<span class="sni">May 10/20.<br />May 13/23.<br />May 16/26.</span> -reviewed the grand army; on the 23rd it marched for -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</span> -Namur; and on the 26th it had wound itself round -two sides of the town, while Boufflers, moving up from -Dinant, completed the circuit on the third side. Thus -Namur was completely invested; unless William could -save it, the line of the Sambre and one of the most -important fortresses on the Meuse were lost to the -Allies. -</p> - -<p> -William, to do him justice, had strained every nerve -to spur his indolent allies to be first in the field. The -contingents, awaked by the sudden stroke at Namur, -came in fast to Brussels; but it was too late. The -French had destroyed all forage and supplies on the -direct route to Namur, and William’s only way to the -city lay across the Mehaigne. Behind the Mehaigne -lay Luxemburg, the ablest of the French generals. -The best of luck was essential to William’s success, and -instead of the best came the worst. Heavy rain -swelled the narrow stream into a broad flood, and the -building of bridges became impossible. There was -beautiful fencing, skilful feint, and more skilful parry, -between the two generals, but William could not get -<span class="sni">May 26./June 5.</span> -under Luxemburg’s guard. On the 5th of June, after -a discreditably short defence, Namur fell, almost before -William’s eyes, into the hands of the French. -</p> - -<p> -Then Luxemburg thought it time to draw the -enemy away from the vicinity of the captured city; so -recrossing the Sambre, and keeping Boufflers always -between himself and that river, he marched for the -Senne as if to threaten Brussels. William followed, as -in duty bound; and French and Allies pursued a -parallel course to the Senne, William on the north and -<span class="sni">July 23./Aug. 2.</span> -Luxemburg on the south. The 2nd of August found -both armies across the Senne, William at Hal, facing -west with the river in his rear, and Luxemburg some -five miles south of him with his right at Steenkirk, and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</span> -his centre between Hoves and Enghien, while Boufflers -lay at Manny St. Jean, seven miles in his rear. -</p> - -<p> -The terrible state of the roads owing to heavy rain -had induced Luxemburg to leave most of his artillery -at Mons; and, as he had designed merely to tempt the -Allies away from Namur, the principal object left to him -was to take up a strong position wherein his worn and -harassed army could watch the enemy without fear of -attack. Such a position he thought that he had found -at Steenkirk.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" -class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The country at this point is more -broken and rugged than is usual in Belgium. The -camp lay on high ground, with its right resting on -the river Sennette and its fight front covered by a -ravine, which gradually fades away northward into -a high plateau of about a mile in extent. Beyond the -ravine was a network of wooded defiles, through -which Luxemburg seems to have hoped that no enemy -could fall upon him in force unawares. It so happened, -however, that one of his most useful spies was detected, -in his true character, in William’s camp at Hal; and -this was an opportunity not to be lost. A pistol was -held to the spy’s head, and he was ordered to write a -letter to Luxemburg, announcing that large bodies of -the enemy would be in motion next morning, but -that nothing more serious was contemplated than a -foraging expedition. This done, William laid his -plans to surprise his enemy on the morrow. -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Steenkirk"> - <a href="images/steenkirkxx.jpg" id="Steenkirkback"> - <img class="double" src="images/steenkirk.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Steenkirk, - July 24<sup>th</sup> / Aug 3<sup>rd</sup> 1692.</p> -</div> -<div class="tnote center"> - The Old Style date on the map is incorrect. -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 24./Aug. 3.</div> -<p> -An hour before daybreak the advanced guard of -William’s army fell silently into its ranks, together -with a strong force of pioneers to clear the way for a -march through the woods. This force consisted of -the First Guards, the Royal Scots, the Twenty-first, -Fitzpatrick’s regiment of Fusiliers, and two Danish -regiments of great reputation, the whole under the -command of the Duke of Würtemberg. Presently -they moved away, and, as the sun rose, the whole -army followed them in two columns, without sound -of drum or trumpet, towards Steenkirk. French -patrols scouring the country in the direction of Tubise -saw the two long lines of scarlet and white and blue -wind away into the woods, and reported what they -had witnessed at headquarters; but Luxemburg, -sickly of constitution, and, in spite of his occasional -energy, indolent of temperament, rejoiced to think -that, as his spy had told him, it was no more than -a foraging party. Another patrol presently sent -in another message that a large force of cavalry -was advancing towards the Sennette. Once more -Luxemburg lulled himself into security with the same -comfort.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the allied army was trailing through -narrow defiles and cramped close ground, till at last -it emerged from the stifling woods into an open space. -Here it halted, as the straitness of the ground -demanded, in dense, heavy masses. But the advanced -guard moved on steadily till it reached the woods over -against Steenkirk, where Würtemberg disposed it for -the coming attack. On his left the Bois de Feuilly -covered a spur of the same plateau as that occupied -by the French right, and there he stationed the English -Guards and the two battalions of Danes. To the -right of these, but separated from them by a ravine, -he placed the three remaining British battalions in -the Bois de Zoulmont. His guns he posted, some -between the two woods, and the remainder on the right -of his division. These dispositions complete, the -advanced party awaited orders to open the attack.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</span></p> - -<p>It was now eleven o’clock. Luxemburg had left -his bed and had ridden out to a commanding height -on his extreme right, when a third letter was brought -to him that the Allies were certainly advancing in force. -He read it, and looking to his front, saw the red coats -of the Guards moving through the wood before him, -while beyond them he caught a glimpse of the dense -masses of the main body. Instantly he saw the danger, -and divined that William’s attack was designed -against his right. His own camp was formed, according -to rule, with the cavalry on the wings; and there -was nothing in position to check the Allies but a -single brigade of infantry, famous under the name of -Bourbonnois, which was quartered in advance of the -cavalry’s camp on his extreme right. Moreover, -nothing was ready, not a horse was bridled, not a -man standing to his arms. He despatched a messenger -to summon Boufflers to his aid, and in a few minutes -was flying through the camp with his staff, energetic -but perfectly self-possessed, to set his force in order -of battle. The two battalions of Bourbonnois fell in -hastily before their camp, with a battery of six guns -before them. The dragoons of the right wing dismounted -and hastened to seal up the space between -Bourbonnois and the Sennette. The horse of the -right was collected, and some of it sent off in hot -speed to the left to bring the infantry up behind them -on their horses’ croups. All along the line the alarm -was given, drums were beating, men snatching hastily -at their arms and falling into their ranks ready to file -away to the right. Such was the haste, that there was -no time to think of regimental precedence, a very -serious matter in the French army, and each successive -brigade hurried into the place where it was most -needed, as it happened to come up.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile Würtemberg’s batteries had opened -fire, and a cunning officer of the Royal Scots was -laying his guns with admirable precision. French -batteries hastened into position to reply to them with -as deadly an aim, and for an hour and a half the rival -guns thundered against each other unceasingly. All -this time the French battalions kept massing themselves -thicker and thicker on Luxemburg’s right, and -the front line was working with desperate haste, -felling trees, making breastworks, and lining the -hedges and copses while yet they might. But still -Würtemberg’s division remained unsupported, and -the precious minutes flew fast. William, or his staff -for him, had made a serious blunder. Intent though -he was on fighting a battle with his infantry only, he -had put all the cavalry of one wing of his army before -them on the march, so that there was no room for the -infantry to pass. Fortunately six battalions had -been intermixed with the squadrons of this wing, and -these were now with some difficulty disentangled and -sent forward. Cutts’s, Mackay’s, Lauder’s, and the -Twenty-sixth formed up on Würtemberg’s right, with -the Sixth and Twenty-fifth in support; and at last, -at half-past twelve, Würtemberg gave the order to -attack.</p> - -<p>His little force shook itself up and pressed forward -with eagerness. The Guards and Danes on the extreme -left, being on the same ridge with the enemy, were the -first that came into action. Pushing on under a -terrible fire at point-blank range from the French -batteries, they fell upon Bourbonnois and the dragoons, -beat them back, captured their guns, and turned them -against the enemy. On their right the Royal Scots, -Twenty-first, and Fitzpatrick’s plunged down into the -ravine into closer and more difficult ground, past -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</span> -copses and hedges and thickets, until a single thick -fence alone divided them from the enemy. Through -this they fired at each other furiously for a time, till -the Scots burst through the fence with their Colonel -at their head, and swept the French before them. -Still further to the right, the remaining regiments came -also into action; muzzle met muzzle among the -branches, and the slaughter was terrible. Young -Angus, still not yet of age, dropped dead at the head of -the Cameronians, and the veteran Mackay found the -death which he had missed at Killiecrankie. He had -before the attack sent word to General Count Solmes, -that the contemplated assault could lead only to -waste of life; and he had been answered with the -order to advance. “God’s will be done,” he said -calmly, and he was among the first that fell.</p> - -<p>Still the British, in spite of all losses, pressed -furiously on; and famous French regiments, spoiled -children of victory, wavered and gave way before them. -Bourbonnois, unable to face the Guards and Danes, -doubled its left battalion in rear of its right; Chartres, -which stood next to them, also gave way and doubled -itself in rear of its neighbour Orléans. A wide gap -was thus torn in the first French line, but not a -regiment of the second line would step into it. The -colonel of the brigade in rear of it ordered, entreated, -implored his men to come forward, but they would -not follow him into that terrible fire. Suddenly the -wild voice ceased, and the gesticulating figure fell in -a heap to the ground: the colonel had been shot dead, -and the gap was still unfilled.</p> - -<p>The first French line was broken; the second and -third were dismayed and paralysed: a little more and -the British would carry the French camp. Luxemburg -perceived that this was a moment when only his best -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</span> -troops could save him. In the fourth line stood the -flower of his infantry, the seven battalions of French -and Swiss Guards. These were now ordered forward -to the gap; the princes of the blood placed themselves -at their head, and without firing a shot they charged -down the slope upon the British and Danes. The -English Guards, thinned to half their numbers, faced -the huge columns of the Swiss and stood up to them -undaunted, till by sheer weight they were slowly rolled -back. On their right the Royal Scots also were forced -back, fighting desperately from hedge to hedge and -contesting every inch of ground. Once, the French -made a dash through a fence and carried off one of -their colours. The Colonel, Sir Robert Douglas, -instantly turned back alone through the fence, recaptured -the colour, and was returning with it when -he was struck by a bullet. He flung the flag over -to his men and fell to the ground dead.</p> - -<p>Slowly the twelve battalions retired, still fighting -furiously at every step. So fierce had been their -onslaught that five lines of infantry backed by two -more of cavalry<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" -class="fnanchor">[7]</a> had hardly sufficed to stop them, and -with but a little support they might have won the day. -But that support was not forthcoming. Message after -message had been sent to the Dutch general, Count -Solmes, for reinforcements, but there came not a man. -The main body, as has been told, was all clubbed -together a mile and a half from the scene of action, -with the infantry in the rear; and Solmes, with almost -criminal folly, instead of endeavouring to extricate -the foot, had ordered forward the horse. William -rectified the error as soon as he could; but the correction -led to further delay and to the increased confusion -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</span> -which is the inevitable result of contradictory orders. -The English infantry in rear, mad with impatience to -rescue their comrades, ran forward in disorder, probably -with loud curses on the Dutchman who had kept them -back so long; and some time was lost before they -could be re-formed. Discipline was evidently a little -at fault. Solmes lost both his head and his temper. -“Damn the English,” he growled; “if they are so -fond of fighting, let them have a bellyful”; and he -sent forward not a man. Fortunately junior officers -took matters into their own hands; and it was time, -for Boufflers had now arrived on the field to throw -additional weight into the French scale. The English -Horse-grenadiers, the Fourth Dragoons, and a regiment -of Dutch dragoons rode forward and, dismounting, -covered the retreat of the Guards and Danes by a -brilliant counter-attack. The Buffs and Tenth advanced -farther to the right, and holding their fire -till within point-blank range, poured in a volley which -gave time for the rest of Würtemberg’s division to -withdraw. A demonstration against the French left -made a further diversion, and the shattered fragments -of the attacking force, grimed with sweat and smoke, -fell back to the open ground in rear of the woods, -repulsed but unbeaten, and furious with rage.</p> - -<p>William, it is said, could not repress a cry of anguish -when he saw them; but there was no time for emotion. -Some Dutch and Danish infantry was sent forward to -check further advance of the enemy, and preparations -were made for immediate retreat. Once again the -hardest of the work was entrusted to the British; and -when the columns were formed, the grenadiers of the -British regiments brought up the rear, halting and -turning about continually, until failing light put an -end to what was at worst but a half-hearted pursuit. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</span> -The retreat was conducted with admirable order; -but it was not until the chill, dead hour that precedes -the dawn that the Allies regained their camp, worn -out with the fatigue of the past four-and-twenty hours.</p> - -<p>The action was set down at the time as the severest -ever fought by infantry, and the losses on both sides -were very heavy. The Allies lost about three thousand -killed and the same number wounded, besides thirteen -hundred prisoners, nearly all of whom were wounded. -Ten guns were abandoned, the horses being too weary -to draw them; the English battalions lost two colours, -and the foreign three or four more. The British, -having borne the brunt of the action, suffered most -heavily of all, the Guards, Cutts’s, and the Sixth being -terribly punished. The total French loss was about -equal to that of the Allies, but the list of the officers -that fell tells a more significant tale. On the side of -the Allies four hundred and fifty officers were killed -and wounded, no fewer than seventy lieutenants in -the ten battalions of Churchill’s British brigade being -killed outright. The French on their side lost no fewer -than six hundred and twenty officers killed and -wounded, a noble testimony to their self-sacrifice, -but sad evidence of their difficulty in making their -men stand. In truth, with proper management -William must have won a brilliant victory; but he -was a general by book and not by instinct. Würtemberg’s -advanced guard could almost have done the -work by itself but for the mistake of a long preliminary -cannonade; his attack could have been supported -earlier but for the pedantry that gave the horse precedence -of the foot in the march to the field; the foot -could have pierced the French position in a dozen -different columns but for the pedantry which caused -it to be first deployed. Finally, William’s knowledge -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</span> -of the ground was imperfect, and Solmes, his general -of foot, was incompetent. The plan was admirably -designed and abominably executed. Nevertheless, -British troops have never fought a finer action than -Steenkirk. Luxemburg thought himself lucky to -have escaped destruction; his troops were much -shaken; and he crossed the Scheldt and marched -away to his winter-quarters as quietly as possible. -So ended the campaign of 1692.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak">VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER III</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1692. Nov.</div> -<p> -In November the English Parliament met, heartened -indeed by the naval victory of La Hogue, but not a -little grieved over the failure of Steenkirk. Again, -the financial aspect was extremely discouraging; and -Sir Stephen Fox announced that there was not another -day’s subsistence for the Army in the treasury. The -prevailing discontent found vent in furious denunciations -of Count Solmes, and a cry that English soldiers -ought to be commanded by English officers. The -debate waxed hot. The hardest of hard words were -used about the Dutch generals, and a vast deal of -nonsense was talked about military matters. There -were, however, a great number of officers in the House -of Commons, many of whom had been present at the -action. With much modesty and good sense they -refused to join in the outcry against the Dutch, and -contrived so to compose matters that the House -committed itself to no very foolish resolution. The -votes for the Army were passed; and no difficulty -was made over the preparations for the next campaign. -Finally, two new regiments of cavalry were raised—Lord -Macclesfield’s Horse, which was disbanded -twenty years later; and Conyngham’s Irish Dragoons, -which still abides with us as the Eighth, King’s Royal -Irish, Hussars.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">1693.</div> -<p> -Meanwhile the French military system had suffered -an irreparable loss in Louvois’s death, the source of -woes unnumbered to France in the years that were -soon to come. Nevertheless, the traditions of his rule -were strong, and the French once more were first in -the field, with, as usual, a vast siege-train massed on -the Meuse and on the Scheldt. But a late spring and -incessant rain delayed the opening of the campaign -till the beginning of May, when Luxemburg assembled -seventy thousand men in rear of the Haine by Mons, -and Boufflers forty-eight thousand more on the Scheldt -at Tournay. The French king was with the troops in -person; and the original design was, as usual, to carry -on a war of sieges on the Meuse, Boufflers reducing -the fortresses while Luxemburg shielded him with a -covering army. Lewis, however, finding that the -towns which he had intended to invest were likely to -make an inconveniently stubborn defence, presently -returned home, and after detaching thirty thousand -men to the war in Germany, left Luxemburg to do -as he would. It had been better for William if the -Grand Monarch had remained in Flanders.</p> - -<p>The English king, on his side, assembled sixty -thousand men at Brussels as soon as the French began -to move, and led them with desperate haste to the -Senne, where he took up an impregnable position at -Park. Luxemburg marched up to a position over -against him, and then came one of those deadlocks -which were so common in the old campaigns. The -two armies stood looking at each other for a whole -month, neither venturing to move, neither daring to -attack, both ill-supplied, both discontented, and as a -natural consequence both losing scores, hundreds, and -even thousands of men through desertion.</p> - -<p>At last the position became insupportable, and on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</span> -<span class="sni">June 6./July 6.</span> -the 6th of July Luxemburg moved eastward as if to -resume the original plan of operations on the Meuse. -William thereupon resolved to create a diversion by -detaching a force to attack the French lines of the -Scheldt and Lys, a project which was brilliantly -executed by Würtemberg, thanks not a little to three -British regiments—the Tenth, Argyll’s, and Castleton’s—which -formed part of his division. But meanwhile -Luxemburg, quite ignorant of the diversion, advanced -to the Meuse and laid siege to Huy, in the hope of -forcing William to come to its relief. He judged -rightly. William left his impregnable camp at Park -and hurried to the rescue. But he came too late, and -Huy fell after a trifling resistance. Luxemburg then -made great seeming preparations for the siege of Liège, -and William, trembling for the safety of that city and -of Maestricht, detached eight thousand men to reinforce -those garrisons, and then withdrew to the line of the -Geete. Luxemburg watched the whole proceeding -with grim delight. Würtemberg’s success was no -doubt annoying, but William had weakened his army -by detaching this force to the Lys, and had been -beguiled into weakening it still further by reinforcing -the garrison on the Meuse. This was exactly what -Luxemburg wanted. If he could bring the Allies to -action forthwith, he could reasonably hope for success.</p> - -<p>The ground occupied by William was a triangular -space enclosed between the Little Geete and a stream -called the Landen Beck, which joins it at Leuw. The -position was not without features of strength. The -camp, which faced almost due south, was pitched on -a gentle ridge rising out of a vast plain.<a id="FNanchor_8" -href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> This ridge -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</span> -runs parallel to the Little Geete and has that river in -its rear. The left flank was protected by marshy -ground and by the Landen Beck itself, while the villages -of Neerlanden and Rumsdorp, one on either side of the -Beck and the latter well forward on the plain, offered -the further security of advanced posts. The right -rested on a little stream which runs at right angles to -the Geete and joins it at Elixheim, and on the villages -of Laer and Neerwinden which stand on its banks. -From Neerlanden on the left to Neerwinden on the -right the position measured close on four miles; and -to guard this extent, besides supplying strong garrisons -for the villages, William had little more than fifty -thousand men. Here then was one signal defect: the -front was too long to permit troops to be readily moved -from flank to flank, or to be withdrawn without serious -risk from the centre. But this was not all. The depth -of the position was less than half of its frontage, and -thus allowed no space for the action of cavalry. This -William ignored: he was afraid of the French horse, -and was anxious that the action should be fought by -infantry only. Finally, retreat was barred by the -Geete, which was unfordable and insufficiently bridged; -and therefore the forcing of the allied right must inevitably -drive the whole army into a pinfold, as Leslie’s -had been driven at the battle of Dunbar.</p> - -<p>Luxemburg, who knew every inch of the ground, -was now anxious only lest William should retire before -<span class="sni">July 18/28.</span> -he could catch him. On the 28th of July, by a great -effort and a magnificent march, he brought the whole -of his army, eighty thousand strong, before William’s -position. He was now sure of his game, but he need -not have been anxious, for William, charmed with the -notion of excluding the French cavalry from all share -in the action, was resolved to stand his ground Many -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</span> -officers urged him to cross the Geete while yet he might; -but he would not listen. Fifteen hundred men were -told off to entrench the open ground between Neerwinden -and Neerlanden. The hedges, mud-walls, and -natural defences of Neerwinden and Laer were improved -to the uttermost, and the ditches surrounding them were -enlarged. Till late into the night the King rode backward -and forward, ordering matters under his own eyes, -and after a few hours’ rest began very early in the -morning to make his dispositions.</p> - -<p>The key of the position was the village of Neerwinden -with the adjoining hamlet of Laer, and here -accordingly he stationed the best of his troops. The -defence of Laer was entrusted to Brigadier Ramsey -with the Scots Brigade, namely, the Twenty-first, -Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, Mackay’s and Lauder’s -regiments, reinforced by the Buffs and the Fourth Foot. -Between Laer and Neerwinden stood six battalions of -Brandenburgers, troops already of great and deserved -reputation, of whom we shall see more in the years -before us. Neerwinden itself was committed to the -Hanoverians, the Dutch Guards, a battalion of the -First and a battalion of the Scots Guards. Immediately -to the north or left of the village the entrenchment -was lined by the two remaining battalions of the First -and Scots Guards, the Coldstream Guards, a battalion -of the Royal Scots, and the Seventh Fusiliers. On the -extreme left of the position Neerlanden was held by the -other battalion of the Royal Scots, the Second Queen’s, -and two Danish regiments, while Rumsdorp was -occupied by the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, -and Collingwood’s regiments. In a word, every important -post was committed to the British. The -remainder of the infantry, with one hundred guns, was -ranged along the entrenchment, and in rear of them -stood the cavalry, powerless to act outside the trench, -and too much cramped for space to manœuvre within it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Landen"> - <a href="images/landenxx.jpg" id="Landenback"> - <img class="double" src="images/landen.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Landen, - July 19<sup>th</sup> / July 29<sup>th</sup> 1693.</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</span></p> - -<p>Luxemburg also was early astir, and was amazed -to find how far the front of the position had been -strengthened during the night. His centre he formed -in eight lines over against the Allies’ entrenchments -between Oberwinden and Landen, every line except -the second and fourth being composed of cavalry. For -the attack on Neerlanden and Rumsdorp he detailed -fifteen thousand foot and two thousand five hundred -dismounted dragoons. For the principal assault on -Neerwinden he told off eighteen thousand foot, supported -by a reserve of two thousand more and by -eight thousand cavalry; while seventy guns were -brought into position to answer the artillery of the -Allies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 19/29.</div> -<p> -Shortly after sunrise William’s cannon opened fire -against the heavy masses of the French centre; and at -eight o’clock Luxemburg moved the whole of his left -to the attack of Neerwinden. Six battalions, backed -by dragoons and cavalry, were directed against Laer, -and three columns, counting in all seven brigades, were -launched against Neerwinden. The centre column, -under the Duke of Berwick, was the first to come into -action. Withholding their fire till they reached the -village, the French carried the outer defences with a -rush, and then meeting the Hanoverians and the First -Guards, they began the fight in earnest. It was hedge-fighting, -as at Steenkirk, muzzle to muzzle and hand to -hand. Every step was contested; the combat swayed -backwards and forwards within the village; and the -carnage was frightful. The remaining French columns -came up, met with the like resistance, and made little -way. Fresh regiments were poured by the French into -the fight, and at last the First Guards, completely -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</span> -broken by its losses, gave way. But it was only for -a moment. They rallied on the Scots Guards; the -Dutch and Hanoverians rallied behind them, and, -though the enemy had been again reinforced, they -resumed the unequal fight, nine battalions against -twenty-six, with unshaken tenacity. At Laer, on the -extreme right, the fight was equally sharp. Ramsey -for a time was driven out of the village, and the French -cavalry actually forced its way into the Allies’ position. -There, however, it was charged in flank by the Elector -of Bavaria, and driven out with great slaughter. -Ramsey seized the moment to rally his brigade. The -French columns, despite their success, still remained -isolated and detached, and presented no united front. -The King placed himself at the head of the Guards and -Hanoverians, and with one charge British, Dutch, and -Germans fell upon the Frenchmen and swept them out -of both villages.</p> - -<p>The first attack on Neerwinden had failed, and a -similar attack on the allied left had been little more -successful. At Neerlanden the First and Second Foot -had successfully held their own against four French -battalions until reinforcements enabled them to drive -them back. At Rumsdorp the British, being but three -thousand against thirteen thousand, were pushed out of -the village, but being reinforced, recovered a part of it -and stood successfully at bay. Luxemburg, however, -was not easily discouraged. The broken troops in the -left were rallied, fresh regiments were brought forward, -and a second effort was made to carry Neerwinden. -Again French impetuosity bore all before it, and again -the British and Germans, weakened and weary though -they were, rallied when all seemed lost, and hurled the -enemy back, not merely repulsed, but in confused and -disorderly retreat.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</span></p> - -<p>On the failure of the second attack the majority of -the French officers urged Luxemburg to retire; but -the marshal was not to be turned from his purpose. -The fourteen thousand men of the Allies in Laer and -Neerwinden had lost more than a third of their numbers, -while he himself had still a considerable force of infantry -interlined with the cavalry in the centre. Twelve -thousand of them, including the French and Swiss -Guards, were now drawn off to the left for a third -attack. When they were clear of the cavalry, the -whole six lines of horse, which had stood heroically for -hours motionless under a heavy fire, moved forward at -a trot to the edge of the entrenchments;<a id="FNanchor_9" -href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> but the -demonstration, for such it seems to have been, cost -them dear, for they were very roughly handled and -compelled to retire. But now the French reinforcements, -supported by the defeated battalions, drew -near, and a third attack was delivered on Neerwinden. -British and Dutch still made a gallant fight, but the -odds against their weakened battalions were too great, -and ammunition began to fail. They fought on indomitably -till the last cartridge was expended before -they gave way, but they were forced back, and Neerwinden -was lost. Five French brigades then assailed -the central entrenchment at its junction with Neerwinden, -where stood the Coldstream Guards and the -Seventh Fusiliers. Wholly unmoved by the overwhelming -numbers in their front and the fire from -Neerwinden on their flank, the two regiments stood -firm and drove their assailants back over the breastwork. -Even when the French Household Cavalry -came spurring through Neerwinden and fell upon their -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</span> -flank, they fought on undismayed, and the Coldstreamers -not only repelled the charge but captured a colour.</p> - -<p>Such fighting, however, could not continue for long. -William, on observing Luxemburg’s preparations for -the final assault, had ordered nine battalions from his -left to reinforce his right. These never reached their -destination. The Marquis of Feuquières, an officer -even more celebrated for his acuteness as a military -critic than for his skill in the field, watched them as they -moved, and suddenly led his cavalry forward to the -weakest point of the entrenchment. The battalions -hesitated, halted, and then turned about to meet this -new danger, but too late to save the forcing of the -entrenchment. The battle was now virtually over. -Neerwinden was carried, Ramsey after a superb defence -had been driven out of Laer, the Brandenburgers had -perforce retreated with him, the infantry that lined -the centre of the entrenchment had forsaken it, and the -French cavalry was pouring in and cutting down the -fugitives by scores. William, who had galloped away -in desperation to the left, now returned at headlong -speed with six regiments of English cavalry,<a -id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> which -delivered charge after charge with splendid gallantry, -to cover the retreat of the foot. On the left Tolmach -and Bellasys by great exertion brought off their infantry -in good order, but on the right the confusion was -terrible. The rout was complete, the few bridges were -choked by a heaving mass of guns, waggons, pack-animals, -and men, and thousands of fugitives were cut -down, drowned, or trampled to death. William did all -that a gallant man could do to save the day, but in -vain. His troops had done heroic things to redeem his -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</span> -bad generalship; and against any living man but -Marlborough or Luxemburg they would probably have -held their own. It was the general, not the soldiers -that failed.</p> - -<p>The losses on both sides were very severe. That -of the French was about eight thousand men; that -of the Allies about twelve thousand, killed, wounded, -and prisoners, and among the dead was Count Solmes, -the hated Solmes of Steenkirk. The nineteen British -battalions present lost one hundred and thirty-five -officers killed, wounded, and taken. The French -captured eighty guns and a vast quantity of colours, -but the Allies, although beaten, could also show fifty-six -French flags. And, indeed, though Luxemburg won, -and deserved to win a great victory, yet the action was -not such as to make the allied troops afraid to meet -the French. They had stood up, fifty thousand against -eighty thousand, and if they were beaten they had at -any rate dismayed ever Frenchman on the field but -Luxemburg. In another ten years their turn was to -come, and they were to take a part of their revenge -on the very ground over which many of them had fled.</p> - -<p>The campaign closed with the surrender of Charleroi, -and the gain by the French of the whole line of the -Sambre. William came home to meet the House of -Commons and recommend an augmentation of the Army -by eight regiments of horse, four of dragoons, and -twenty-five of foot. The House reduced this list by the -whole of the regiments of horse and fifteen of foot, but -even so it brought the total establishment up to eighty-three -thousand men. There is, however, but one new -regiment of which note need be taken in the campaign -of 1694, namely, the Seventh Dragoons, now known -as the Seventh Hussars, which, raised in 1689–90 in -Scotland, now for the first time took its place on the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</span> -English establishment and its turn of service in the -war of Flanders.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1694.</div> -<p> -I shall not dwell on the campaign of 1694, which -is memorable only for a marvellous march by which -Luxemburg upset William’s entire plan of campaign. -Nor shall I speak at length of the abortive descent on -Brest, which is remembered mainly for the indelible -stain which it has left on the memory of Marlborough. -It is only necessary to say that the French, by Marlborough’s -information, though not on Marlborough’s -information only, had full warning of an expedition -which had been planned as a surprise, and that Tolmach,<a -id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> -who was in command, unfortunately, though most -pardonably, lacked the moral courage to abandon an -attack which, unless executed as a surprise, had no -chance of success. He was repulsed with heavy loss, -and died of wounds received in the action—a hard fate -for a good soldier and a gallant man. But it is unjust -to lay his death at Marlborough’s door. For the -failure of the expedition Marlborough was undoubtedly -responsible, and that is quite bad enough; but Tolmach -alone was to blame for attempting an enterprise -which he knew to be hopeless. Marlborough cannot -have calculated that he would deliberately essay to -do impossibilities and perish in the effort, so cannot -be held guilty of poor Tolmach’s blunders.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1695.</div> -<p> -Before the new campaign could be opened there had -come changes of vital importance to France. The vast -expense of the war had told heavily on the country, -and the King’s ministers were at their wit’s end to -raise money. Moreover, the War Department had -deteriorated rapidly since the death of Louvois; and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</span> -<span class="sni">January.</span> -to this misfortune was now added the death of Luxemburg, -a loss which was absolutely irreparable. Lastly, -with the object of maintaining the position which they -had won on the Sambre, the French had extended their -system of fortified lines from Namur to the sea. Works -so important could not be left unguarded, so that a -considerable force was locked up behind these entrenchments, -and was for all offensive purposes useless. We -shall see before long how a really great commander -could laugh at these lines, and how, in consequence, it -became an open question whether they were not rather -an encumbrance than an advantage. The subject is -one which is still of interest; and it is remarkable that -the French still seem to cling to their old principles, if -they may be judged by the works which they have -constructed for defence against a German invasion.</p> - -<p>His enemy being practically restricted to the -defensive, William did not neglect the opportunity of -initiating aggressive operations. Masking his design -by a series of feints, he marched swiftly to the Meuse -and invested Namur. This fortress, more famous -through its connection with the immortal Uncle Toby -even than as the masterpiece of Cohorn, carried to yet -higher perfection by Vauban, stands at the junction of -the Sambre and the Meuse, the citadel lying in the -angle between the two rivers, and the town with its -defences on the left bank of the Meuse. To the northward -of the town outworks had been thrown up on -the heights of Bouge by both of these famous engineers; -and it was against these outworks that William directed -his first attack.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 23./July 3.</div> -<p> -Ground was broken on the 3rd of July, and three -days later an assault was delivered on the lines of -Bouge. As usual, the hardest of the work was given -to the British, and the post of greatest danger was -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</span> -made over, as their high reputation demanded, to -<span class="sni">June 26./July 6.</span> -the Brigade of Guards. On this occasion the Guards -surpassed themselves alike by the coolness of their -valour and by the ardour of their attack. They marched -under a heavy fire up to the French palisades, thrust -their muskets between them, poured in one terrible -volley, the first shot that they had yet fired, and -charged forthwith. In spite of a stout resistance they -swept the French out of the first work, pursued them -to the second, swept them out of that, and gathering -impetus with success, drove them from stronghold to -stronghold, far beyond the original design of the -engineers, and actually to the gates of the town. In -another quarter the Royal Scots and the Seventh -Fusiliers gained not less brilliant success; and in fact -it was the most creditable action that William had -fought during the whole war. It cost the Allies two -thousand men killed and wounded, the three battalions -of Guards alone losing thirty-two officers. The British -were to fight many such bloody combats during the -next twenty years—combats forgotten since they were -merely incidents in the history of a siege, and so frequent -that they were hardly chronicled, and are not to be -restored to memory now. I mention this, the first -of such actions, only as a type of many more to come.</p> - -<p>The outworks captured, the trenches were opened -against the town itself, and the next assault was directed -against the counterguard of St. Nicholas gate. This -again was carried by the British, with a loss of eight -hundred men. Then came the famous attack on the -counterscarp before the gate itself, where Captain -Tobias Shandy received his memorable wound. This -gave William the possession of the town. Then came -the siege of the citadel, wherein the British had the -honour of marching to the assault over half a mile of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</span> -open ground, a trial which proved too much even for -them. Nevertheless, it was they who eventually -stormed a breach from which another of the assaulting -columns had been repulsed, and ensured the surrender -of the citadel a few days later. For their service on -this occasion the Eighteenth Foot were made the Royal -Irish; and a Latin inscription on their colours still -records that this was the reward of their valour at -Namur.</p> - -<p>Thus William on his return to England could for -the first time show his Parliament a solid success due -to the British red-coats; and the House of Commons -gladly voted once more a total force of eighty-seven -thousand men. But the war need be followed no -further. The campaign of 1696 was interrupted by a -futile attempt of the French to invade England, and -in 1697 France, reduced to utter exhaustion, gladly -concluded the Peace of Ryswick. So ended, not without -honour, the first stage of the great conflict with -King Lewis the Fourteenth. The position of the two -protagonists, England and France, was not wholly -unlike that which they occupied a century later at -the Peace of Amiens. The British, though they had -not reaped great victories, had made their presence -felt, and terribly felt, on the battlefield; and, as the -French in the Peninsula remembered that the British -had fought them with a tenacity which they had not -found in other nations, not only in Egypt, but even -earlier at Tournay and Linselles, so, too, after Blenheim -and Ramillies they looked back to the furious attack -at Steenkirk and the indomitable defence of Neerwinden. -“Without the concurrence of the valour and -power of England,” said William to the Parliament at -the close of 1695, “it were impossible to put a stop -to the ambition and greatness of France.” So it was -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</span> -then, and so it was a century later, for though none -know better the superlative qualities of the French as -a fighting people, yet the English are the one nation -that has never been afraid to meet them. With the -Peace of Ryswick the ’prentice years of the standing -Army are ended, and within five years the old spirit, -which has carried it through the bitter schooling under -King William, will break forth with overwhelming -power under the guiding genius of Marlborough.</p> - -<p class="addendum"><span class="smcap">Authorities.</span>—The leading -authority for William’s campaigns on the English side is D’Auvergne, and -on the French side the compilation, with its superb series of maps, by -Beaurain. Supplementary on one side are Tindal’s History, Carleton’s -Memoirs, and Sterne’s <i>Tristram Shandy</i>; and on the other the -<i>Mémoires</i> of Berwick and St. Simon, Quincy’s <i>Histoire Militaire -de Louis XIV</i>, and in particular the <i>Mémoires</i> of Feuquières. -Many details as to Steenkirk, in particular, respecting the casualties, -are drawn from <i>Present State of Europe, or Monthly Mercury</i>, -August 1692, and as to Landen from the official relation of the battle, -published by authority, 1693. Beautiful plans of both actions are in -Beaurain, rougher plans in Quincy and Feuquières. All details as to the -establishment voted are from the Journals of the House of Commons. Very -elaborate details of the operations are given in Colonel Clifford -Walton’s <i>History of the British Standing Army</i>.</p> - - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="mal1701">VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER I</h2> -</div> - -<p>A European quarrel over the succession to the Spanish -throne,<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" -class="fnanchor">[12]</a> on the death of the imbecile King Charles the -Second, had long been foreseen by William, and had -been provided against, as he hoped, by a Partition -Treaty in the year 1698. The arrangement then made -had been upset by the death of the Electoral Prince of -Bavaria, and had been superseded by a second Partition -Treaty in March 1700. In November of the -same year King Charles the Second died, leaving a -will wherein Philip, Duke of Anjou, and second son -of the Dauphin, was named heir to the whole Empire -of Spain. Hereupon the second Partition Treaty -went for naught. Lewis the Fourteenth, after a -becoming interval of hesitation, accepted the Spanish -crown for the Duke of Anjou under the title of King -Philip the Fifth.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">1701.</div> -<p>The Emperor at once entered a protest against the -will, and Lewis prepared without delay for a campaign -in Italy. William, however, for the present merely -postponed his recognition of Philip the Fifth; and his -example was followed by the United Provinces. Lewis, -ever ready and prompt, at once took measures to -quicken the States to a decision. Several towns<a -id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> in -Spanish Flanders were garrisoned, under previous -treaties, by Dutch troops. Lewis by a swift movement -surrounded the whole of them, and, having thus secured -fifteen thousand of the best men in the Dutch army, -could dictate what terms he pleased. William expected -that the House of Commons would be roused to indignation -by this aggressive step, but the House was far -too busy with its own factious quarrels. When, -however, the States appealed to England for the six -thousand four hundred men, which under the treaty of -1668<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> -she was bound to furnish, both Houses prepared -faithfully to fulfil the obligation.</p> - -<p>Then, as invariably happens in England, the work -which Parliament had undone required to be done -again. Twelve battalions were ordered to the Low -Countries from Ireland, and directions were issued for -the levying of ten thousand recruits in England to take -their place. But, immediately after, came bad news -from the West Indies, and it was thought necessary to -despatch thither four more battalions from Ireland. -Three regiments<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" -class="fnanchor">[15]</a> were hastily brought up to a joint -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</span> -strength of two thousand men, and shipped off. Thus, -within fifteen months of the disbandment of 1699, -the garrison of Ireland had been depleted by fifteen -battalions out of twenty-one; and four new battalions -required to be raised immediately. Of these, two, -namely Brudenell’s and Mountjoy’s, were afterwards -disbanded, but two more, Lord Charlemont’s and Lord -Donegal’s, are still with us as the Thirty-fifth and -Thirty-sixth of the Line.</p> - -<p>In June the twelve battalions<a id="FNanchor_16" -href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> were shipped off to -Holland, under the command of John, Earl of Marlborough. -Since 1698 he had been restored to the -King’s favour and was to fill his place as head of the -European coalition and General of the confederate -armies in a fashion that no man had yet dreamed of. -He was full fifty years of age; so long had the ablest -man in Europe waited for work that was worthy of -his powers; and now his time was come at last. His -first duties, however, were diplomatic; and during the -summer and autumn of 1701 he was engaged in negotiations -with Sweden, Prussia, and the Empire for the -formation of a Grand Alliance against France and -Spain. Needless to say he brought all to a successful -issue by his inexhaustible charm, patience, and tact.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept.</div> -<p> -Still the attitude of the English people towards the -contest remained doubtful, until, on the death of King -James the Second, Lewis made the fatal mistake of -recognising and proclaiming his son as King of England. -Then the smouldering animosity against France leaped -instantly into flame. William seized the opportunity -to dissolve Parliament, and was rewarded by the -election of a House of Commons more nearly resembling -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</span> -that which had carried him through the first war to -the Peace of Ryswick. He did not fail to rouse its -patriotism and self-respect by a stirring speech from -the throne, and obtained the ratification of his agreement -with the Allies, that England should furnish a -contingent of forty thousand men, eighteen thousand -of them to be British and the remainder foreigners. -So the country was committed to the War of the -Spanish Succession.</p> - -<p>It was soon decided that all regiments in pay must -be increased at once to war-strength, and that six more -battalions, together with five regiments of horse and -three of dragoons, should be sent to join the troops -already in Holland. Then, as usual, there was a rush -to do in a hurry what should have been done at leisure; -and it is significant of the results of the late ill-treatment -of the Army that, though the country was full of -unemployed soldiers, it was necessary to offer three -pounds, or thrice the usual amount of levy-money, to -obtain recruits. The next step was to raise fifteen new -regiments—Meredith’s, Coote’s, Huntingdon’s, Farrington’s, -Gibson’s, Lucas’s, Mohun’s, Temple’s, and -Stringer’s of foot; Fox’s, Saunderson’s, Villiers’, -Shannon’s, Mordaunt’s and Holt’s of marines. Of the -foot, Gibson’s and Farrington’s had been raised in -1694, but the officers of Farrington’s, if not of both -regiments, had been retained on half-pay, and, returning -in a body, continued the life of the regiment without -interruption. Both are still with us as the Twenty-eighth -and Twenty-ninth of the Line. Huntingdon’s -and Lucas’s also survive as the Thirty-third and -Thirty-fourth, and Meredith’s and Coote’s, which were -raised in Ireland, as the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-ninth, -while the remainder were disbanded at the close -of the war. Of the marines, Saunderson’s had originally -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</span> -been raised in 1694, and eventually passed into the -Line as the Thirtieth Foot, followed by Fox’s and -Villiers’ as the Thirty-first and Thirty-second. Nothing -now remained but to pass the Mutiny Act, which was -speedily done; and on the 5th of May, just two months -after the death of King William, the great work of his -life was continued by a formal declaration of war.</p> - -<p>The field of operations, which will chiefly concern us, -is mainly the same as that wherein we followed the -campaigns of King William. The eastern boundary of -the cock-pit must for a time be extended from the -Meuse to the Rhine, the northern from the Demer to -the Waal, and the southern limit must be carried from -Dunkirk beyond Namur to Bonn. But the reader -should bear in mind that, in consequence of the Spanish -alliance, Spanish Flanders was no longer hostile, but -friendly, to France, so that the French frontier, for all -practical purposes, extended to the boundary of Dutch -Brabant. Moreover, the French, besides the seizure, -already related, of the barrier-towns, had contrived -to occupy every stronghold on the Meuse except -Maestricht, from Namur to Venloo, so that practically -they were masters so far of the whole line of the river.</p> - -<p>A few leagues below Venloo stands the fortified -town of Grave, and beyond Grave, on the parallel -branch of the Waal, stands the fortified city of Nimeguen. -A little to the east of Nimeguen, at a point -where the Rhine formerly forked into two streams, -stood Fort Schenck, a stronghold famous in the wars of -Morgan and of Vere. These three fortresses were the -three eastern gates of the Dutch Netherlands, commanding -the two great waterways, doubly important -in those days of bad roads, which lead into the heart -of the United Provinces.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1702.</div> -<p> -It is here that we must watch the opening of the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</span> -campaign of 1702. There were detachments of the -French and of the Allies opposed to each other on the -Upper Rhine, on the Lower Rhine, and on the Lower -Scheldt; but the French grand army of sixty thousand -men was designed to operate on the Meuse, and the -presence of a Prince of the blood, the Duke of Burgundy, -with old Marshal Boufflers to instruct him, sufficiently -showed that this was the quarter in which France -designed to strike her grand blow. Marlborough being -still kept from the field by other business, the command -of the Allied army on the Meuse was entrusted to -Lord Athlone, better known as that Ginkell who had -completed the pacification of Ireland in 1691. His -force consisted of twenty-five thousand men, with -which he lay near Cleve, in the centre of the crescent -formed by Grave, Nimeguen, and Fort Schenck, -watching under shelter of these three fortresses the -army of Boufflers, which was encamped some twenty -miles to south-east of him at Uden and Xanten. On -<span class="sni">May 30./June 10.</span> -the 10th of June Boufflers made a sudden dash to cut -off Athlone from Nimeguen and Grave, a catastrophe -which Athlone barely averted by an almost discreditably -precipitate retreat. Having reached Nimeguen -Athlone withdrew to the north of the Waal, while all -Holland trembled over the danger which had thus -been so narrowly escaped.</p> - -<p>Such was the position when Marlborough at last took the field, after -long grappling at the Hague with the difficulties which were fated to -dog him throughout the war. In England his position was comparatively -easy, for though Prince George of Denmark, the consort of Queen Anne, -was nominally generalissimo of all forces by sea and land, yet -Marlborough was Captain-General of all the English forces at home and in -Holland, and in addition Master-General of the <span class="pagenum" -id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</span> Ordnance. But it was only after considerable -dispute that he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, -and then not without provoking much dissatisfaction among the Dutch -generals, and much jealousy in the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrück and in -Athlone, both of whom aspired to the office. These obstacles overcome, -there came the question of the plan of campaign. Here again endless -obstruction was raised. The Dutch, after their recent fright, were -nervously apprehensive for the safety of Nimeguen, the King of Prussia -was much disturbed over his territory of Cleve, and all parties who had -not interests of their own to put forward made it their business to -thwart the Commander-in-Chief. With infinite patience Marlborough -soothed them, and at last, on -<span class="sni">June 21./July 2.</span> -the 2nd of July, he left the Hague for Nimeguen, accompanied -by two Dutch deputies, civilians, whose duty it was to see that he did -nothing imprudent. Arrived there he concentrated sixty thousand men, of -which twelve thousand were British,<a id="FNanchor_17" -href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> recrossed the Waal and -encamped at Ober-Hasselt over against Grave, within two leagues of the -French. Then once more the obstruction of his colleagues caused delay, -<span class="sni">July 15/26.</span> and it was not until the 26th -of July that he could cross to the left bank of the Meuse. “Now,” he -said to the Dutch deputies, as he pointed to the French camp, “I shall -soon rid you of these troublesome neighbours.”</p> - -<p>Five swift marches due south brought his army over the Spanish -frontier by Hamont. Boufflers thereupon in alarm broke up his camp, -summoned Marshal Tallard from the Rhine to his assistance, crossed the -Meuse with all haste at Venloo, and pushed -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</span> -<span class="sni">July 22./Aug. 2.</span> -on at nervous speed for the Demer. On the 2nd of August he lay -between Peer and Bray, his camping-ground ill-chosen, and his army worn -out by a week of desperate marching. Within easy striking distance, a -mile or two to the northward, lay Marlborough, his army fresh, ready, -and confident. He held the game in his hand; for an immediate attack -would have dealt the French as rude a buffet as they were to receive -later at Ramillies. But the Dutch deputies interposed; these Dogberries -were content to thank God that they were rid of a rogue. So Boufflers -was allowed to cross the Demer safely at Diest, and a first great -opportunity was lost.</p> - -<p>Marlborough, having drawn the French away from -the Meuse, was now at liberty to add the garrison of -Maestricht to his field-force, and to besiege the fortresses -on the river. Boufflers, however, emboldened by his -escape, again advanced north in the hope of cutting -off a convoy of stores that was on its way to join the -Allies. Marlborough therefore perforce moved back -to Hamont and picked up his convoy. Then, before -Boufflers could divine his purpose, he had moved -swiftly south, and thrown himself across the line of -<span class="sni">Aug. 11/22.</span> -the French retreat to the Demer. The French marshal -hurried southward with all possible haste, and came -blundering through the defiles before Hochtel on the -road to Hasselt, only to find Marlborough waiting -ready for him at Helchteren. Once again the game -was in the Englishman’s hand. The French were in -great disorder, their left in particular being hopelessly -entangled in marshy and difficult ground. Marlborough -instantly gave the order to advance, and by -three o’clock the artillery of the two armies was -exchanging fire. At five Marlborough directed the -whole of his right to fall on the French left; but to -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</span> -his surprise and dismay, the right did not move. A -surly Dutchman, General Opdam, was in command -of the troops in question and, for no greater object -than to annoy the Commander-in-Chief, refused to -execute his orders. So a second great opportunity -was lost.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 12/23.</div> -<p> -Still much might yet be won by a general attack -on the next day; and for this accordingly Marlborough -at once made his preparations. But, when the time -came, the Dutch deputies interposed, entreating him -to defer the attack till the morrow morning. “By -to-morrow morning they will be gone,” answered -Marlborough; but all remonstrance was unavailing. -The attack was perforce deferred; the French slipped -away in the night; and, though it was still possible -to cut up their rearguard with cavalry, a third great -opportunity was lost.</p> - -<p>Marlborough was deeply chagrined; but although -with unconquerable patience and tact he excused -Opdam’s conduct in his public despatches, he could -not deceive the troops, who were loud in their indignation -against both deputies and generals. There -was now nothing left but to reduce the fortresses on -the Meuse, a part of the army being detached for the -siege while the remainder covered the operations -under the command of Marlborough. Even over -their favourite pastime of a siege, however, the Dutch -were dilatory beyond measure. “England is famous -for negligence,” wrote Marlborough, “but if Englishmen -were half as negligent as the people here, they -would be torn to pieces by Parliament.”<a id="FNanchor_18" -href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Venloo -<span class="sni">Aug. 18/29.</span> -was at length invested on the 29th of August,<a -id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> -and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</span> -after a siege of eighteen days compelled to capitulate. -The English distinguished themselves after their own -peculiar fashion. In the assault on the principal -defence General Cutts, who from his love of a hot fire -was known as the Salamander, gave orders that the -attacking force, if it carried the covered way, should -not stop there but rush forward and carry as much -more as it could. It was a mad design, criminally so -in the opinion of officers who took part in it,<a -id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> -but it was madly executed, with the result that the whole -fort was captured out of hand.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 26./Oct. 7.</div> -<p> -The reduction of Stevenswaert, Maseyck, and Ruremond -quickly followed; and the French now became -alarmed lest Marlborough should transfer operations -to the Rhine. Tallard was therefore sent back with a -large force to Cologne and Bonn, while Boufflers, much -weakened by this and by other detachments, lay -helpless at Tongres. But the season was now far -advanced, and Marlborough had no intention of -leaving Boufflers for the winter in a position from -which he might at any moment move out and bombard -Maestricht. No sooner, therefore, were his troops -released by the capture of Ruremond than he prepared -to oust Boufflers. The French, according to their -usual practice, had barred the eastern entrance to -Brabant by fortified lines, which followed the line of -the Geete to its head-waters, and were thence carried -across to that of the Mehaigne. In his position at -Tongres Boufflers lay midway between these lines and -Liège, in the hope of covering both; but after the -fall of so many fortresses on the Meuse he became -specially anxious for Liège, and resolved to post -himself under its walls. He accordingly examined -the defences, selected his camping-ground, and on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</span> -<span class="sni">Oct. 1/12.</span> -the 12th of October marched up with his army to -occupy it. Quite unconscious of any danger he -arrived within cannon-shot of his chosen position; -and there stood Marlborough, calmly awaiting him -with a superior force. For the fourth time Marlborough -held his enemy within his grasp, but the Dutch deputies, -as usual, interposed to forbid an attack; and Boufflers, -a fourth time delivered, hurried away in the night to -his lines at Landen. Had he thrown himself into -Liège Marlborough would have made him equally uncomfortable -by marching on the lines; as things were, -the French marshal perforce left the city to its fate.</p> - -<p>The town of Liège, which was unfortified, at once -opened its gates to the Allies; and within a week -Marlborough’s batteries were playing on the citadel. -<span class="sni">Oct. 12/23.</span> -On the 23rd of October the citadel was stormed, the -English being first in the breach, and a few days later -Liège, with the whole line of the Meuse, had passed -into the hands of the Allies. Thus brilliantly, in -spite of four great opportunities marred by the Dutch, -ended Marlborough’s first campaign. Athlone, like -an honest man, confessed that as second in command -he had opposed every one of Marlborough’s projects, -and that the success was due entirely to his incomparable -chief. He at any rate had an inkling that in -Turenne’s handsome Englishman there had arisen one -of the great captains of all time.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless the French had not been without -their consolations in other quarters. Towards the -end of the campaign the Elector of Bavaria had -declared himself for France against the Empire, and, -surprising the all-important position of Ulm on the -Danube, had opened communication with the French -force on the Upper Rhine. Villars, who commanded -in that quarter, had seconded him by defeating his -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</span> -opponent, Prince Lewis of Baden, at Friedlingen, and -had cleared the passages of the Black Forest; while -Tallard had, almost without an effort, possessed -himself of Trèves and Trarbach on the Moselle. The -rival competitors for the crown of Spain were France and -the Empire, and the centre of the struggle, as no one -saw more clearly than Marlborough, was for the present -moving steadily towards the territory of the Empire.</p> - -<p>While Marlborough was engaged in his operations -on the Meuse, ten thousand English and Dutch, under -the Duke of Ormonde and Admiral Sir George Rooke, -had been despatched to make a descent upon Cadiz. -The expedition was so complete a failure that there is -no object in dwelling on it. Rooke would not support -Ormonde, and Ormonde was not strong enough to -master Rooke; landsmen quarrelled with seamen, -and English with Dutch. No discipline was maintained, -and after some weeks of feeble operations and -shameful scenes of indiscipline and pillage, the commanders -found that they could do no more than return -to England. They were fortunate enough, however, -on their way, to fall in with the plate-fleet at Vigo, -of which they captured twenty-five galleons containing -treasure worth a million sterling. Comforted by this -good fortune Rooke and Ormonde sailed homeward, -and dropped anchor safely in Portsmouth harbour.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile a mishap, which Marlborough called an -accident, had gone near to neutralise all the success -of the past campaign. At the close of operations the -Earl, together with the Dutch deputies, had taken -ship down the Meuse, with a guard of twenty-five -men on board and an escort of fifty horse on the bank. -In the night the horse lost their way, and the boat -was surprised and overpowered by a French partisan -with a following of marauders. The Dutch deputies -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</span> -produced French passes, but Marlborough had none -and was therefore a prisoner. Fortunately his servant -slipped into his hand an old pass that had been made -out for his brother Charles Churchill. With perfect -serenity Marlborough presented it as genuine, and -was allowed to go on his way, the French contenting -themselves with the capture of the guard and the -plunder of the vessel, and never dreaming of the prize -that they had let slip. The news of his escape reached -the Hague, where on his arrival rich and poor came -out to welcome him, men and women weeping for -joy over his safety. So deep was the fascination -exerted on all of his kind by this extraordinary man.</p> - -<p>A few days later he returned to England, where a -new Parliament had already congratulated Queen -Anne on the retrieving of England’s honour by the -success of his arms. The word retrieving was warmly -resented, but though doubtless suggested by unworthy -and factious animosity against the memory of William, -it was strictly true. The nation felt that it was not -in the fitness of things that Englishmen should be -beaten by Frenchmen, and they rejoiced to see the -wrong set right. Nevertheless party spirit found a -still meaner level when Parliament extended to Rooke -and Ormonde the same vote of thanks that they -tendered to Marlborough. This precious pair owed -even this honour to the wisdom and good sense of -their far greater comrade, for they would have carried -their quarrel over the expedition within the walls of -Parliament, had not Marlborough told them gently -that the whole of their operations were indefensible -and that the less they called attention to themselves -the better. The Queen, with more discernment, -created Marlborough a Duke and settled on him a -pension of £5000 a year.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="mal1705">VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER IV</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1704.</div> -<p> -Meanwhile Parliament had met on the 29th of the -previous October, full of congratulations to the Queen -on the triumphs of the past campaign. There were -not wanting, of course, men who, in the madness of -faction, doubted whether Blenheim were really a -victory, for the very remarkable reason that Marlborough -had won it, but they were soon silenced by -the retort that the King of France at any rate had no -doubts on the point.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" -class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The plans for the next campaign -were designed on a large scale, and were likely to strain -the resources of the Army to the uttermost. The West -Indies demanded six battalions and Gibraltar three -battalions for garrison; Portugal claimed ten thousand -men, Flanders from twenty to twenty-five thousand; -while besides this a design was on foot, as shall presently -be seen, for the further relief of Portugal by a diversion -<span class="sni">1705.</span> -in Catalonia. Five millions were cheerfully voted for -the support of the war, and six new battalions were -raised, namely, Wynne’s, Bretton’s, Lepell’s, Saomes’s, -Sir Charles Hotham’s, and Lillingston’s, the last of -which alone has survived to our day with the rank of -the Thirty-eighth of the Line.<a id="FNanchor_22" -href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</span></p> - -<p>Marlborough’s plan of campaign had been sufficiently -foreshadowed at the close of the previous year, -namely, to advance on the line of the Moselle and -carry the war into Lorraine. The Emperor and all the -German Princes promised to be in the field early, the -Dutch were with infinite difficulty persuaded to give -<span class="sni">May 15/26.<br />June 6/17.</span> -their consent, and after much vexatious delay Marlborough -joined his army at Trèves on the 26th of May. -Here he waited until the 17th of June for the arrival of -the German and Imperial troops. Not a man nor a -horse appeared. In deep chagrin he broke up his -camp and returned to the Meuse, having lost, as he -said, one of the fairest opportunities in the world, -through the faithlessness of his allies.<a id="FNanchor_23" -href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> - -<p>His presence was sorely needed on the Meuse. -Villeroy, who commanded the French in Flanders, -finding no occasion for his presence on the Moselle, -<span class="sni">May 21.</span> -had moved out of his lines, captured Huy, and then -marching on to Liège had invested the citadel. The -States-General in a panic of fright urged Marlborough -to return without delay, and Overkirk, who commanded -the Dutch on the Meuse, added his entreaties to theirs. -Marlborough, when once he had made up his mind to -<span class="sni">June 14/25.</span> -move, never moved slowly, and by the 25th of June he -was at Düren, to the eastward of Aix-la-Chapelle. -Here he was still the best part of forty miles from the -Meuse, but that distance was too near for Villeroy, who -at once abandoned Liège and fell back on Tongres. -<span class="sni">June 21./July 2.</span> -Marlborough, continuing his advance, crossed the -Meuse at Visé on the 2nd of July, and on the same day -united his army with Overkirk’s at Haneff on the -Upper Jaar. Villeroy thereupon retired ignominiously -within his fortified lines.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</span></p> - -<p>These lines, which had been making during the past -three years, were now complete. They started from -the Meuse a little to the east of Namur, passed from -thence to the Mehaigne and the Little Geete, followed -the Little Geete along its left bank to Leuw, the Great -Geete from Leuw to the Demer, and the Demer itself -as far as Arschot, from which point a new line of -entrenchments carried the barrier through Lierre to -Antwerp. Near Antwerp Marlborough had already -had to do with these lines in 1703, but hitherto he had -made no attempt to force them. Villeroy and the -Elector of Bavaria now lay before him with seventy -thousand men, a force superior to his own, but necessarily -spread over a wide front for the protection of the -entrenchments. The marshal’s headquarters were at -Meerdorp, in the space between the Geete and the -Mehaigne, which he probably regarded as a weak -point. Marlborough posted himself over against him -at Lens-les-Beguines, detaching a small force to recapture -Huy, while Overkirk with the Dutch army -covered the siege from Vignamont. Thus, as if daring -the French to take advantage of the dispersion of his -troops, he quietly laid his plans for forcing the lines.</p> - -<p>The point that he selected was on the Little Geete -between Elixheim and Neerhespen, exactly in rear of -the battlefield of Landen. The abrupt and slippery -banks of the river, which the English knew but too -well, together with the entrenchments beyond it, presented -extraordinary difficulties; but the lines were on -that account the less likely to be well guarded at that -particular point. Marlborough had already obtained -the leave of the States-General for the project, but he -had now the far more difficult task of gaining the -consent of the Dutch generals at a Council of War. -Slangenberg and others opposed the scheme -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</span> -vehemently, but were overruled; and the Duke was at -length at liberty to fall to work.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 30./July 11.</div> -<p> -Huy fell on the 11th of July, but to the general -surprise the besieging force was not recalled. Six days -later Overkirk and the covering army crossed the -Mehaigne from Vignamont, and pushed forward detachments -to the very edge of the lines between -<span class="sni">July.</span> -Meffle and Namur. Villeroy fell into the trap, withdrew -troops from all parts of the lines and concentrated -forty thousand men at Meerdorp. Marlborough then -recalled the troops from Huy, and made them up to a -total of about eight thousand men, both cavalry and -infantry,<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" -class="fnanchor">[24]</a> the whole being under the command of the -Count of Noyelles. The utmost secrecy was observed -in every particular. The corps composing the detachment -knew nothing of each other, and nothing of the -work before them; and, lest the sight of fascines should -suggest an attack on entrenchments, these were dispensed -with, the troopers only at the last moment -receiving orders to carry each a truss of forage on the -saddle before them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 6/17.</div> -<p> -At tattoo the detachment fell in silently before the -camp of the right wing, and at nine o’clock moved off -without a sound in two columns, the one upon Neerhespen, -the other upon the Castle of Wanghe before -Elixheim. An hour later the rest of the army followed, -while at the same time Overkirk, under cover of the -darkness, crossed the Mehaigne at Tourines and joined -his van to the rear of Marlborough’s army. The -distance to be traversed was from ten to fifteen miles; -the night though dry was dark; and the guides, -frequently at fault, were fain to direct themselves by -the trusses dropped on the way by the advanced -<span class="sni">July 6–7/<br />17–18.</span> -detachment. Twelve years before to the very day, a -French army had toiled along the same route, wearied -out and stifled by the sun, and only kept to its task by -an ugly little hunch-backed man whom it had reverenced -as Marshal Luxemburg. Now English and -Dutch were blundering on to take revenge for Luxemburg’s -victory at the close of that march. The hours -fled on, the light began to break, and the army found -itself on the field of Landen, William’s entrenchment -grass-grown before it, Neerwinden and Laer lying -silent to the left, and before the villages the mound -that hid the corpses of the dead. Then some at least -of the soldiers knew the work that lay before them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Geete"> - <a href="images/geetexx.jpg" id="Geeteback"> - <img class="double" src="images/geete.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Lines of the Geete - July 7/18 1705.</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 7/18.</div> -<p> -At four o’clock the heads of the columns halted -within a mile of the Geete, wrapped in a thick mist and -hidden from the eye of the enemy. The advanced -detachment quickly cleared the villages by the river, -seized the bridge before the Castle of Wanghe, which -had not been broken down, and drove out the garrison -of the Castle itself. Then the pontoniers came forward -to lay their bridges; but the infantry would not wait -for them. They scrambled impatiently through hedges -and over bogs, down one steep bank of the river and -up the other, into the ditch beyond, and finally, breathless -and dripping, over the rampart into the lines. So -numerous were the hot-heads who thus went forward -that they forced three regiments of French dragoons -to retire before them without attempting resistance. -Then the cavalry of the detachment began to file -rapidly over the pontoon-bridges; but meanwhile the -alarm had been given, and, before the main army could -cross, the French came down in force from the north, -some twenty battalions and forty squadrons, in all close -upon fifteen thousand men, with a battery of eight guns.</p> - -<p>The enemy advanced rapidly, their cavalry leading, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</span> -until checked by a hollow way which lay between them -and the Allies, when they halted to deploy. Marlborough -took in the whole situation at a glance. -Forming his thirty-eight squadrons into two lines, -with the first line composed entirely of British, he led -them across the hollow way and charged the French -sword in hand. They answered by a feeble fire from the -saddle and broke in confusion, but, presently rallying, -fell in counter-attack upon the British and broke them -in their turn. Marlborough, who was riding on the -flank, was cut off and left isolated with his trumpeter -and groom. A Frenchman galloped up and aimed at -him so furious a blow that, striking the air, he fell -from his horse and was captured by the trumpeter. -Then the allied squadrons rallied, and charging the -French once more broke them past all reforming, and -captured the guns. The French infantry now retired -very steadily in square, and the Duke sent urgent -messages for his own foot. But by some mistake the -battalions had been halted after crossing the Geete, so -that the French were able to make good their retreat.</p> - -<p>By this time Villeroy, who had spent the night in -anxious expectation of an attack at Meerdorp, had -hurried up with his cavalry, only to find that the Duke -was master of the lines. Hastily giving orders for his -scattered troops to pass the Geete at Judoigne, he began -his retreat upon Louvain. Presently up came Marlborough’s -infantry at an extraordinary pace, the men -as fresh and lively after fifteen hours of fatigue as if -they had just left camp. The Duke was anxious to -follow up his success forthwith, a movement which -the French had good reason to dread, but the Dutch -generals opposed him, and Marlborough was reluctantly -constrained to yield. The loss of the French seems to -have been about two thousand men, most of them -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</span> -prisoners, a score of standards and colours, of which -the Fifth Dragoon Guards claimed four as their own, -and eighteen guns, eight of which were triple-barrelled -and were sent across the Channel to be copied in -England.<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" -class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 8/19.</div> -<p> -The Allies halted for the night at Tirlemont, and -advancing next day upon Louvain struck against the -rear of the French columns and captured fifteen hundred -prisoners. That night they encamped a mile to the -east of Louvain, while the French, once again distributing -their force along a wider front, lined the left -bank of the Dyle from the Demer to the Yssche, with -their centre at Louvain. Marlborough had hoped to -push on at once, but was stopped by heavy rains that -rendered the Dyle impassable; and it was not until -ten days later that, after infinite trouble with the -Dutch, he was able to pursue his design.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 18/29.</div> -<p> -The operations for the passage of the Dyle were -conducted in much the same way as in the forcing of -the lines. An advanced detachment was sent forward -from each wing of the army, that from the right or -English<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> -flank being appointed to cross the river under -the Duke of Würtemberg at Corbeek Dyle, that -from the left under General Heukelom to pass it at -Neeryssche. The detachments fell in at five in the -evening, reached their appointed destination at ten, -and effected their passage with perfect success. The -main bodies started at midnight, and went somewhat -astray in the darkness, though by three o’clock the -Dutch army was within supporting distance of its -detachment and the British rapidly approaching it. -The river had been in fact forced, when suddenly the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</span> -Dutch generals halted their main body. Marlborough -rode up to inquire the cause, and was at once taken -aside by Slangenberg. “For God’s sake, my Lord—” -began the Dutchman vehemently, and continued to -protest with violent gesticulations. No sooner was -Marlborough’s back turned than the Dutch generals, -like a parcel of naughty schoolboys, recalled Heukelom’s -detachment. Thus the passage won with so -much skill was for no cause whatever abandoned, -without loss indeed, but also not without mischievous -encouragement to the French, who boasted -loudly that they had repulsed their redoubtable -adversary.</p> - -<p>Deeply hurt and annoyed though he was, the -Duke, with miraculous patience, excused in his public -despatches the treachery and imbecility which had -thwarted him, and prepared to effect his purpose in -another way. His movements were hastened by news -that French reinforcements, set free by the culpable -inaction of Prince Lewis of Baden, were on their way -<span class="sni">Aug. 5/16.</span> -from Alsace. Unable to pass the Dyle he turned its -head-waters at Genappe, and wheeling north towards -the forest of Soignies encamped between La Hulpe and -Braine l’Alleud.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" -class="fnanchor">[27]</a> The French promptly took the -alarm and posted themselves behind the river Yssche, -with their left at Neeryssche, and their right at Overyssche -resting on the forest of Soignies. Marlborough -at once resolved to force the passage of the river. On -<span class="sni">Aug. 6/17.</span> -the evening of the 17th of August he detached his -brother Charles Churchill with ten thousand foot and -two thousand horse to advance through the forest and -turn the French right; while he himself marched away -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</span> -<span class="sni">Aug. 7/18.</span> -at daybreak with the rest of the army and emerged -into the plain between the Yssche and the Lasne. The -Duke quickly found two assailable points, and choosing -that of Overyssche, halted the army pending the -arrival of the artillery. The guns were long in arriving, -Slangenberg having insisted, despite the Duke’s express -instructions, on forcing his own baggage into the -column for the express purpose of causing delay. At -last about noon the artillery appeared, and Marlborough -asked formal permission of the Dutch deputies -to attack. To his surprise, although Overkirk had -already consented, they claimed to consult their generals. -Slangenberg with every mark of insolence condemned -the project as murder and massacre, the rest solemnly -debated the matter for another two hours, the auspicious -moment passed away exactly as they had intended, and -another great opportunity was lost. The French reinforcements -arrived, and having been the weaker became -the stronger force. Nothing more could be done for -the rest of the campaign, but to level the French lines -from the Demer to the Mehaigne.</p> - -<p>Thus for the third time a brilliant campaign was -spoilt by the Dutch generals and deputies. Fortunately -the public indignation both in England and in Holland -was too strong for them, and Slangenberg, though -not indeed hanged as he deserved, was deprived of -all further command. Jealousy, timidity, ignorance, -treachery, and flat imbecility seem to have been the -motives that inspired these men, whose conduct has -never been reprobated according to its demerit. It -was they who were responsible for the prolongation of -the war, for the burden that it laid on England, and -for the untold misery that it wrought in France. Left -to himself Marlborough would have forced the French -to peace in three campaigns, and the war would not -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</span> -have been ended in shame and disgrace by the Treaty -of Utrecht.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="mal1706">VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER V</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1706.</div> -<p> -It is now time to revert to England and to the preparations -for the campaign of 1706. Marlborough, -as usual, directly that the military operations were -concluded, had been deputed to visit the courts of -Vienna and of sundry German states in order to keep -the Allies up to the necessary pitch of unity and -energy. These duties detained him in Germany and -at the Hague until January 1706, when he was at -last able to return to England. There he encountered -far less obstruction than in former years, but found, -nevertheless, an increasing burden of work. The -vast extension of operations in the Peninsula, and -the general sickliness of the troops in that quarter, -demanded the enlistment of an unusually large number -of recruits. One new regiment of dragoons and eleven -new battalions of foot were formed in the course of -the spring, to which it was necessary to add yet another -battalion before the close of the year.<a id="FNanchor_29" -href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Again the -epidemic sickness among the horses in Flanders had -caused an extraordinary demand for them. The -Dutch, after their wonted manner, had actually taken -pains to prevent the supply of these animals to the -British,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" -class="fnanchor">[30]</a> though, even if they had not, the Duke had -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</span> -a prejudice in favour of English horses, as of English -men, as superior to any other. Finally, the stores of -the Ordnance were unequal to the constant drain of -small arms, and it was necessary to make good the -deficiency by purchases from abroad. All these -difficulties and a thousand more were of course referred -for solution to Marlborough.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 14/25.</div> -<p> -When in April he crossed once more to the Hague -he found a most discouraging state of affairs. The -Dutch were backward in their preparations; Prussia -and Hanover were recalcitrant over the furnishing of -their contingents; Prince Lewis of Baden was sulking -within his lines, refusing to communicate a word of -his intentions to any one; and everybody was ready -with a separate plan of campaign. The Emperor of -course desired further operations on the Moselle for -his own relief; but, after the experience of the last -campaign, the Duke had wisely resolved never again -to move eastward to co-operate with the forces of the -Empire. The Dutch for their part wished to keep -Marlborough in Flanders, where he should be under -the control of their deputies; but the imbecile caprice -of these worthies was little more to his taste than -the sullen jealousy of Baden. Marlborough himself -was anxious to lead a force to the help of Eugene in -Italy, a scheme which, if executed, would have carried -the British to a great fighting ground with which they -are unfamiliar, the plains of Lombardy. He had -almost persuaded the States-General to approve of -this plan, when all was changed by Marshal Villars, -who surprised Prince Lewis of Baden in his lines on -the Motter, and captured two important magazines. -The Dutch at once took fright and, in their anxiety -to keep Marlborough for their own defence, agreed to -appoint deputies who should receive rather than issue -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</span> -orders. So to the Duke’s great disappointment it -was settled that the main theatre of war should once -again be Flanders.</p> - -<p>Villeroy meanwhile lay safely entrenched in his -position of the preceding year behind the Dyle, from -which Marlborough saw little hope of enticing him. -It is said that an agent was employed to rouse Villeroy -by telling him that the Duke, knowing that the French -were afraid to leave their entrenchments, would take -advantage of their inaction to capture Namur.<a -id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Be -that as it may, Villeroy resolved to quit the Dyle. He -knew that the Prussian and Hanoverian contingents -had not yet joined Marlborough, and that the Danish -cavalry had refused to march to him until their wages -were paid; so that interest as well as injured pride -<span class="sni">May 8/19.</span> -prompted the hazard of a general action. On the 19th -of May, therefore, he left his lines for Tirlemont on -the Great Geete. Marlborough, who was at Maestricht, -saw with delight that the end, for which he had not -dared to hope, was accomplished. Hastily making -arrangements for the payment of the Danish troops, -<span class="sni">May 9/20.</span> -he concentrated the Dutch and British at Bilsen on -the Upper Demer, and moved southward to Borchloen. -Here the arrival of the Danes raised his total force to -<span class="sni">May 11/22.</span> -sixty thousand men, a number but little inferior to -that of the enemy. On the very same day came the -intelligence that Villeroy had crossed the Great Geete -and was moving on Judoigne. The Duke resolved to -advance forthwith and attack him there.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 12/23.</div> -<p> -At one o’clock in the morning of Whitsunday the -23rd of May, Quartermaster-general Cadogan rode -forward from the headquarters at Corswarem with six -hundred horse and the camp-colours towards the head -of the Great Geete, to mark out a camp by the village -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</span> -of Ramillies. The morning was wet and foggy, and -it was not until eight o’clock that, on ascending the -heights of Merdorp, the party dimly descried troops in -motion on the rolling ground before them. The Allied -army had not marched until two hours later than -Cadogan, but Marlborough, who had ridden on in -advance of it, presently came up and pushed the -cavalry forward through the mist. Then at ten -o’clock the clouds rolled away, revealing the whole of -the French army in full march towards them.</p> - -<p>Villeroy’s eyes were rudely opened, for he had not -expected Marlborough before the following day; but -he knew the ground well, for he had been over it -before with Luxemburg, and he proceeded to take up -a position which he had seen Luxemburg deliberately -reject. The table-land whereon he stood is the highest -point in the plains of Brabant. To his right flowed -the Mehaigne; in his rear ran the Great Geete; across -his centre and left the Little Geete rose and crept -away sluggishly in marsh and swamp.<a id="FNanchor_32" -href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> In his front -lay four villages: Taviers on the Mehaigne to his -right, Ramillies, less advanced than Taviers, on the -source of the Little Geete to his right centre, Offus, -parallel to Ramillies but lower down the stream, to -his left centre, Autréglise or Anderkirch, between -two branches of the Little Geete and parallel to Taviers, -to his left. Along the concave line formed by these -villages Villeroy drew up his army in two lines facing -due east.</p> - -<p>The Mehaigne, on which his right rested, is at -ordinary times a rapid stream little more than twelve -feet wide, with a muddy bottom, but is bordered by -swampy meadows on both sides, which are flooded -after heavy rain. From this stream the ground rises -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</span> -northward in a steady wave for about half a mile, -sinks gradually and rises into a higher wave at -Ramillies, sinks once more to northward of that village -and rolls downward in a gentler undulation to Autréglise. -Between the Mehaigne and Ramillies, a distance -of about a mile and a half, the ground east and west -is broken by sundry hollows of sufficient inclination -to offer decided advantage or disadvantage in a combat -of cavalry. A single high knoll rises in the midst of -these hollows, offering a place of vantage from which -Marlborough must almost certainly have reconnoitred -the disposition of the French right. The access to -Ramillies itself is steep and broken both to north and -south; but on the eastern front the ground rises to it -for half a mile in a gentle, unbroken slope, which -modern rifles would make impassable by the bravest -troops. In rear, or to westward of the French position, -the table-land is clear and unbroken, and to the right -rear or south-west stands a mound or barrow called -the tomb of Ottomond, still conspicuous and still -valuable as a key to the actions of the day.<a -id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> The -full extent of the French front from Taviers to Autréglise -covered something over four miles.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Ramillies"> - <a href="images/ramilliesxx.jpg" id="Ramillesback"> - <img class="double" src="images/ramillies.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Ramillies, - May 12/23 1706.</p> -</div> - -<p>Having chosen his position, Villeroy lost no time -in setting his troops in order. His left, consisting of -infantry backed by cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_34" -href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> extended from Autréglise -to Offus, both of which villages were strongly occupied. -His centre from Offus to Ramillies was likewise composed -of infantry. On his right, in the expanse of -sound ground which stretches for a mile and a half -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</span> -from the marshes of the Geete at Ramillies to those -of the Mehaigne, were massed more than one hundred -and twenty squadrons of cavalry with some battalions -of infantry interlined with them, the famous French -Household Cavalry (Maison du Roi) being in the first -line. The left flank of this expanse was covered by -the village of Ramillies, which was surrounded by a -ditch and defended by twenty battalions and twenty-four -guns. On the right flank not only Taviers but -Franquinay, a village still further in advance, were -occupied by detachments of infantry, while Taviers -was further defended by cannon.</p> - -<p>Marlborough quickly perceived the defects of -Villeroy’s dispositions, which were not unlike those -of Tallard at Blenheim. Taviers was too remote -from Ramillies for the maintenance of a cross-fire of -artillery. Again, the cavalry of the French left was -doubtless secure against attack behind the marshes -of the Geete, but for this very reason it was incapable -of aggressive action. The French right could therefore -be turned, provided that it were not further reinforced; -and accordingly the Duke opened his manœuvres by -a demonstration against the French left.</p> - -<p>Presently the infantry of the Allied right moved -forward in two lines towards Offus and Autréglise, -marching in all the pomp and circumstance of war, -Dutch, Germans, and British, with the red-coats conspicuous -on the extreme right flank. Striding forward -to the river they halted and seemed to be very busy -in laying their pontoons. Villeroy marked the mass -of scarlet, and remembering its usual place in the -battlefield, instantly began to withdraw several -battalions from his right and centre to his left. Marlborough -watched the white coats streaming away to -their new positions, and after a time ordered the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</span> -infantry of his right to fall back to some heights in -their rear. The two lines faced about and retired -accordingly over the height until the first line was out -of sight. Then the second line halted and faced about -once more, crowning the ascent with the well-known -scarlet, while the first marched away with all speed, -under cover of the hill and unseen by the French, to -the opposite flank. Many British battalions<a -id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> stood -on that height all day without moving a step or firing -a shot, but none the less paralysing the French left -wing.</p> - -<p>About half-past one the guns of both armies opened -fire, and shortly afterwards four Dutch battalions -were ordered forward to carry Franquinay and Taviers, -and twelve more to attack Ramillies, while Overkirk -advanced slowly on the left with the cavalry. Franquinay -was soon cleared; Taviers resisted stoutly -for a time, but was carried; and a strong reinforcement -on its way to the village was intercepted and cut to -pieces. Then Overkirk, his left flank being now -cleared, pushed forward his horse and charged. The -Dutch routed the first French line, but were driven -back in confusion by the second; and the victorious -French were only checked by the advance of fresh -squadrons under Marlborough himself. Even so the -Allies were at a decided disadvantage; and Marlborough, -after despatching messengers to bring up -every squadron, except the British, to the left, plunged -into the thick of the mêlée to rally the broken horse. -He was recognised by some French dragoons, who left -their ranks to surround him, and in the general confusion -he was borne to the ground and in imminent -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</span> -danger of capture. His aide-de-camp, Captain Molesworth, -dismounted at once, and giving him his own -horse enabled him to escape. The cavalry, however, -encouraged by the Duke’s example, recovered themselves, -and Marlborough took the opportunity to -shift from Molesworth’s horse to his own. Colonel -Bringfield, his equerry, held the stirrup while he -mounted, but Marlborough was hardly in the saddle -before the hand that held the stirrup relaxed its grasp, -and the equerry fell to the ground, his head carried -away by a round shot.<a id="FNanchor_36" -href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the attack of the infantry on Ramillies -was fully developed, and relieved the horse from the -fire of the village. Twenty fresh squadrons came -galloping up at the top of their speed and ranged themselves -in rear of the re-forming lines. But before they -could come into action the Duke of Würtemberg -pushed his Danish horse along the Mehaigne upon the -right flank of the French, while the Dutch guards -advanced still further so as to fall upon their rear. -These last now emerged upon the table-land by the -tomb of Ottomond, and the rest of the Allied horse -dashed themselves once against the French front. -The famous Maison du Roi after a hard fight was cut -to pieces, and the whole of the French horse, despite -Villeroy’s efforts to stay them, were driven in headlong -flight across the rear of their line of battle, leaving the -battalions of infantry helpless and alone, to be ridden -over and trampled out of existence.</p> - -<p>Villeroy made frantic efforts to bring forward -the cavalry of his left to cover their retreat, but the -ground was encumbered by his baggage, which he had -carelessly posted too close in his rear. The French -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</span> -troops in Ramillies now gave way, and Marlborough -ordered the whole of the infantry that was massed -before the village to advance across the morass upon -Offus, with the Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards in -support. The French broke and fled at their approach; -and meanwhile the Buffs and Twenty-first, which had -so far remained inactive on the right, forced their way -through the swamps before them, and taking Autréglise -in rear swept away the last vestige of the French line -on the left. Five British squadrons followed them -up and captured the entire King’s Regiment (Régiment -du Roi). The Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards also -pressed on, and coming upon the Spanish and Bavarian -horse-guards, who were striving to cover the retreat -of the French artillery, charged them and swept -them away, only narrowly missing the capture of the -Elector himself, who was at their head.<a -id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> -On this the whole French army, which so far had struggled to -effect an orderly retreat, broke up in panic and fled -in all directions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</span></p> - -<p>The mass of the fugitives made for Judoigne; but -the ways were blocked by broken-down baggage-waggons -and abandoned guns, and the crush and -confusion was appalling. The British cavalry, being -quite fresh, quickly took up the pursuit over the table-land. -The guns and baggage fell an easy prey, but -these were left to others, while the red-coated troopers, -not without memories of Landen, pressed on, like -hounds running for blood, after the beaten enemy. -The chase lay northwards to Judoigne and beyond -it towards the refuge of Louvain. Not until two -o’clock in the morning did the cavalry pause, having -by that time reached Meldert, fifteen miles from the -battlefield; nay, even then Lord Orkney with some -few squadrons spurred on to Louvain itself, rekindled -the panic and set the unhappy French once more in -flight across the Dyle.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 13/24.</div> -<p> -Nor was the main army far behind the horse. -Marching far into the night, the men slept under arms -for two or three hours, started again at three o’clock, -and before the next noon had also reached Meldert and -were preparing to force the passage of the Dyle. -Marlborough, who had been in the saddle with little -intermission for nearly twenty-eight hours, here wrote -to the Queen that he intended to march again that -same night; but, through the desertion of the lines of -<span class="sni">May 14/25.<br />May 15/26.<br />May 16/17.</span> -the Dyle by the French, the army gained some respite. -The next day he crossed the Dyle at Louvain and -encamped at Betlehem, the next he advanced to -Dieghem, a few miles north of Brussels, the next he -passed the Senne at Vilvorde and encamped at Grimberghen, -and here at last, after six days of incessant -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</span> -marching, the Duke granted his weary troops a halt, -while the French, hopelessly beaten and demoralised, -retired with all haste to Ghent.</p> - -<p>So ended the fight and pursuit of Ramillies, which -effectually disposed of the taunt levelled at Marlborough -after Blenheim, that he did not know how to improve -a victory. The loss of the French in killed, wounded, -and prisoners was thirteen thousand men, swelled by -desertion during the pursuit to full two thousand more. -The trophies of the victors were eighty standards and -colours, fifty guns, and a vast quantity of baggage. -The loss of the Allies was from four to five thousand -killed and wounded, which fell almost entirely on the -Dutch and Danes, the British, owing to their position -on the extreme right, being but little engaged until -the close of the day. The chief service of the British, -therefore, was rendered in the pursuit, which they -carried forward with relentless thoroughness and -vigour. The Dutch were delighted that their troops -should have done the heaviest of the work in such an -action, and the British could console themselves with -the performance of their cavalry, and above all, with -the reflection that the whole of the success was due -to their incomparable chief.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May–June.</div> -<p> -The effect of the victory and of the rapid advance -that followed it was instantaneous. Louvain and the -whole line of Dyle fell into Marlborough’s hands on -the day after the battle; Brussels, Malines, and Lierre -surrendered before the first halt, and gave him the line -of the Senne and the key of the French entrenchments -about Antwerp; and one day later, the surrender of -Alost delivered to him one of the strongholds on the -Dender. Never pausing for a moment, he sent forward -a party to lay bridges on the Scheldt below Oudenarde -in order to cut off the French retreat into France, a -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</span> -movement which obliged Villeroy forthwith to abandon -the lines about Ghent and to retire up the Lys to -Courtrai. Ghent, Bruges, and Damme thereupon -surrendered on the spot; Oudenarde followed them, -and after a few days Antwerp itself. Thus within a -fortnight after the victory the whole of Flanders and -Brabant, with the exception of Dendermond and one -or two places of minor importance, had succumbed -to the Allies, and the French had fallen back to their -own frontier.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June.</div> -<p> -Nor was even this all. A contribution of two -million livres levied in French Flanders brought -home to the Grand Monarch that the war was now -knocking at his own gates. Villars, with the greater -part of his army, was recalled from the Rhine to the -Lys, and a number of French troops were withdrawn -to the same quarter from Italy. Baden had thus -the game in his own hand on the Rhine, and though -he was too sulky and incapable to turn the advantage -to account, yet his inaction was no fault of Marlborough’s. -We are hardly surprised to find that in -the middle of this fortnight the Duke made urgent -request for fresh stores of champagne; he may well -have needed the stimulant amid such pressure of work -and fatigue.<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> - -<p>He now detached Overkirk to besiege Ostend and -another party to blockade Dendermond, at the same -time sending off five British battalions, which we shall -presently meet again, for a descent on the Charente -which was then contemplated in England. This done -he took post with the rest of the Army at Roulers, to -westward of the Lys, whence he could at once cover -the siege of Ostend and menace Menin and Ypres. -The operations at Ostend were delayed for some time -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</span> -through want of artillery and the necessity of waiting -<span class="sni">June 6/17.</span> -for the co-operation of the Fleet; but the trenches -were finally opened on the 17th of June, and a few -weeks later the town surrendered.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 27./July 8.</div> -<p> -Three days after this the army was reassembled for -the siege of Menin. This fortress was of peculiar -strength, being esteemed one of Vauban’s masterpieces, -and was garrisoned by five thousand men. Moreover, -the French, being in command of the upper sluices of -the Lys, were able greatly to impede the operations -by cutting off the water from the lower stream, and -thus rendering it less useful for purposes of transport, -But all this availed it little; for three weeks after -<span class="sni">Aug. 11/22.</span> -the opening of the trenches Menin surrendered. The -British battalions<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" -class="fnanchor">[39]</a> which had been kept inactive at -Ramillies took a leading share in the work, and some -of them suffered very heavily; but they had the -satisfaction of recapturing four of the British guns -that had been taken at Landen.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 25./Sept. 5.</div> -<p> -A few days later Dendermond was attacked in -earnest and was likewise taken, after which Marlborough -fell back across the Scheldt to secure the -whole line of the Dender by the capture of Ath. Ten -days sufficed for the work, after which Ath also fell -into the hands of the Allies. The apathy of the -<span class="sni">Sept. 12/23.<br />Sept. 21./Oct. 2.</span> -French throughout these operations sufficiently show -their discouragement. Owing to the supineness of -Prince Lewis of Baden, Villars had been able to bring -up thirty-five thousand men to the assistance of -Marshal Vendôme, who had now superseded Villeroy; -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</span> -but even with this reinforcement the two commanders -only looked on helplessly while Marlborough reduced -fortress after fortress before their eyes. They were, -indeed, more anxious to strengthen the defences of -Mons and Charleroi, lest the Duke should break into -France by that line, than to approach him in the field. -Nor were they not wholly unreasonable in their anxiety, -for Marlborough’s next move was upon the Sambre; -but incessant rain and tempestuous weather forbade -any further operations, so that Ath proved to be the -last conquest of the year. Thus ended the campaign -of Ramillies, one of the most brilliant in the annals -of war, wherein Marlborough in a single month carried -his arms triumphant from the Meuse to the sea.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="mal1707">VOL. I BOOK VI. CHAPTER VII</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1707.</div> -<p> -Almanza was a bad opening for the new year, but -worse was to follow. Throughout the winter Marlborough -had, as usual, been employed in diplomatic -negotiations, which nothing but his skill and fascination -could have carried to a successful issue. But on one -most important point the Duke was foiled by the -treachery of the Emperor, who, to further his own -selfish designs on Naples, secretly concluded a treaty -with France for the neutrality of Italy, and thus -enabled the whole of the French garrisons in Italy to -be withdrawn unmolested. The forces thus liberated -were at once brought up to the scene of action on the -Rhine and in Flanders, and the French were enabled -to lead a superior force in the field against Marlborough. -Again, the Duke had hoped to save Spain by an invasion -of France from the side of Savoy, but this project -had been deferred until too late, owing to the Emperor’s -cupidity for the possession of Naples. Finally, though -Prince Lewis of Baden had died during the winter, he -had been replaced on the Rhine by a still more incompetent -prince, the Margrave of Baireuth, who, far from -making any diversion in the Duke’s favour, never ceased -pestering him to come to his assistance. So flagrant -was this deplorable person’s incapacity that he too was -superseded before the close of the campaign, though too -late for any effective purpose. His successor, however, -deserves particular notice, being none other than the -Elector of Hanover, afterwards our own King George -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</span> -the First, no genius in the field, but, as shall be seen in -due time, an extremely sensible and clear-headed soldier.</p> - -<p>The result of these complications was that Marlborough -spent the greater part of the summer encamped, -in the face of a superior French force, at -Meldert, on a branch of the Great Geete, to cover -his conquests in Flanders and Brabant. At last the -Emperor, having accomplished his desires in Naples, -made a diversion towards Provence, which drew away -a part of the French force to that quarter and enabled -the Duke to move. But then bad weather intervened -to prevent any successful operations. Twice Marlborough -was within an ace of surprising Vendôme, -who had superseded Villeroy in Flanders, and twice -the marshal decamped in haste and confusion only -just in time to save his army. Even so the Duke -would have struck one heavy blow but for the intervention -of the Dutch deputies. But fortune favoured -the French; the rain came down in torrents, and the -country was poached into such a quagmire by the -cavalry that many of the infantry were fairly swallowed -up and lost.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" -class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Thus tamely ended the campaign which -should have continued the work of Ramillies.<a -id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</span> -Returning home in November Marlborough found -difficulties almost as great as he had left behind him -in Flanders. There were quarrels in the Cabinet, -already foreboding the time when the Queen and the -people should turn against him. The Court of France -was reverting to its old methods and endeavouring to -divide England by providing the Pretender with a -force for invasion. Again the hardships of the campaign -in Flanders and the defeat of Almanza had not -only created discontent, but had enormously increased -the demand for recruits. The evil work of the Dutch -deputies and the incorrigible selfishness and jealousy of -the Empire had already prolonged the war beyond the -limit assigned by the short patience of the English -people.</p> - -<p>Happily Parliament was for the present still loyal -to the war, and voted not only the usual supplies but -money for an additional ten thousand men. Five new -battalions<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" -class="fnanchor">[42]</a> were raised, and three more of the old -establishment were detailed for service in Flanders.<a -id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> -But far more satisfactory was the fact that in 1708 -all regiments took the field with new colours, bearing -the cross of St. Andrew blended with that of St. George, -pursuant to the first article of the Treaty of Union, -passed in the previous year, between England and -Scotland.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1708.</div> -<p> -The early spring of 1708 was wasted by the French -in a futile endeavour to set the Pretender afoot in -Scotland with a French force at his back; nor was -<span class="sni">Mar. 29./April 9.</span> -it until the 9th of April that Marlborough sailed for -the Hague, where Eugene was already awaiting him. -There the two agreed that the Duke should as usual -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</span> -command in Flanders, while Eugene should take -charge of an army on the Moselle, nominally for -operations on that river, but in reality to unite with -Marlborough by a rapid march and give battle to the -French before they could call in their remoter detachments. -There was a considerable difficulty with the -Elector of Hanover, who was to command on the -Rhine, owing to his jealousy of Eugene; but this -trouble was satisfactorily settled, as were all troubles -of the time, by the intervention of Marlborough. -Thereupon the Electoral Prince, true to the quarrelsome -traditions of his family, at once insisted on -taking service with Eugene, simply for the sake of -annoying his father; thus adding one more to the -many causes of friction which, but for Marlborough, -would soon have brought the Grand Alliance to a -standstill. This Electoral Prince will become better -known to us as King George the Second.</p> - -<p>The French on their part had made extraordinary -exertions in the hope of a successful campaign. Since -Ramillies they had drawn troops from all quarters to -Flanders; and from thenceforth the tendency in every -succeeding year grew stronger for all operations to -centre in that familiar battle-ground. On the Rhine -the Elector of Bavaria held command, with Berwick, -much exalted since Almanza, to help him. The French -main army in Flanders numbered little less than a -hundred thousand men, and was under the orders of -Vendôme, with the Duke of Burgundy in supreme -command. The presence of the heir to the throne, -of his brother the Duke of Berry, and of the Chevalier -de St. George, as the Pretender called himself, all -portended an unusual effort.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May.</div> -<p> -Marching up at the end of May from their rendezvous -on the south of the Haine, the French army moved -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</span> -north to the forest of Soignies. Marlborough thereupon -at once concentrated at Hal and summoned Eugene -to him with all haste. His own army numbered but -eighty thousand men, and, though as usual he showed -a bold front, he knew that such disparity of numbers -was serious. The French then manœuvred towards -Waterloo as if to threaten Louvain, a movement which -the Duke met by a forced march to Park on the Dyle. -<span class="sni">May 24./June 4.<br /> -to<br /> -June 24./July 5.<br /><br /> -June 23./July 4.</span> -Here he remained perforce inactive for a whole month, -waiting for Eugene, who was delayed by some petty -formalities which were judged by the Imperial Court -to be far more important than military operations. -Suddenly, on the night of the 4th of July, the French -broke up their camp, marched westward to cross the - -Senne at Hal and detached small corps against Bruges -and Ghent. Unable to meet the Allies with the sword, -the French had substituted gold for steel and had for -some time been tampering with the new authorities -in these towns. The gold had done its work. Within -twenty-four hours Ghent and Bruges had opened their -gates, and the keys to the navigation of the Scheldt -and Lys were lost.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 24./July 5.</div> -<p> -Marlborough, who was quite ready for a march, was -up and after the French army immediately. At two -o’clock in the morning his army was in motion, streaming -off to pass the Senne at Anderlecht. The march -was long and severe, the roads being in so bad a state -that the right wing did not reach its halting-ground -until six o’clock in the evening, nor the left wing till -two o’clock on the following morning; but this great -effort brought the Allies almost within reach of the -<span class="sni">June 25./July 6.</span> -French army. In the night, intelligence was brought -to Marlborough that the enemy was turning back to -fight him. He was in the saddle at once, to form his -line of battle; but the news was false. The French in -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</span> -reality were making off as fast as they could; and, -before the truth could reach Marlborough, they were -across the Dender. Marlborough’s cavalry was instantly -on their track, but could do no more than -capture a few hundred prisoners, together with most -of the French baggage. That same day came definite -information of the loss of Ghent and Bruges, and of the -investment of the citadel of Ghent. Brussels took the -alarm at once. The French, as they feared, had for -once got the better of the Duke. The French army -was encamped at Alost, where, like a king between -two pieces at draughts, it threatened both the citadel -of Ghent and Brussels; and all was panic in the -capital. The Duke was fain to move on to Assche, -midway between Alost and Brussels, to restore the -confidence of the fearful city.</p> - -<p>Here Eugene joined him. Finding it hopeless to -arrive in time with his army, the Prince had pushed -on alone; nor could he have arrived more opportunely, -for Marlborough was so much weakened by an attack -of fever that he was hardly fit for duty. It was indeed -a trying moment. The next design of the French was -evidently aimed at Oudenarde for the recovery of the -line of the Scheldt. They were already across the -Dender and ahead of Marlborough on the road to it, -and moreover had broken down the bridges behind -them; yet the Duke dared not move lest he should -expose Brussels. He sent orders to the Governor of -Ath to collect as many troops as possible, and to throw -himself into Oudenarde, which that officer punctually -did; and then there was nothing to be done but to -wait. Two days sufficed to place the citadel of Ghent -in the hands of the French, and to set their army free -<span class="sni">June 28./July 9.</span> -for further operations. Accordingly on the 9th of -July Vendôme sent forward detachments to invest -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</span> -Oudenarde, and moved with the main army up the -Dender to Lessines, from which point he intended to -cover the siege. Great was his astonishment on -approaching the town on the following day to find that -Marlborough had arrived there before him, and was -not only within reach of Oudenarde, but interposed -between him and his own frontier.</p> - -<p>For at two o’clock on the morning of the 9th of -July the Allied army had marched off in beautiful order -in five columns, and by noon had covered fifteen miles -to Herfelingen on the road to the Dender. Four hours -later Cadogan was sent forward with eight battalions -and as many squadrons to occupy Lessines and throw -bridges over the Dender; and, when tattoo beat that -night, the army silently entered on a march of thirteen -<span class="sni">June 29./July 10.</span> -further miles to the same point. Before dawn came -the welcome intelligence that Cadogan had reached his -destination at midnight, laid his bridges, and made his -dispositions to cover the passage of the troops. The -army tramped on, always in perfect order, crossed the -river and was taking up its camping-ground, when the -heads of the enemy’s columns appeared on the distant -heights and were seen first to halt and then to retire. -Marlborough on the curve of the arc had outmarched -Vendôme on the chord.</p> - -<p>The French, finding the whole of their plans disconcerted, -now wheeled about north-westward towards -Gavre on the Scheldt, to shelter themselves behind the -river and bar the advance of the Allies on Bruges. But -the Duke had no intention to let them off so easily. -Burgundy and Vendôme were not on good terms; -their differences had already caused considerable confusion -in the army; and Marlborough was fully aware -<span class="sni">June 30./July 11.</span> -of the fact. At dawn on the morning of the 11th the -unwearied Cadogan started off with some eleven -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</span> -thousand men<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" -class="fnanchor">[44]</a> and twenty-four guns, to prepare the -roads, construct bridges, and make dispositions to -cover the passage of the Scheldt below Oudenarde. -By half-past ten he had reached the river, just above -the village of Eyne, and on ascending the low heights -above the stream and looking westward he saw before -him a kind of shallow basin or amphitheatre, seamed -by little ditches and rivulets, and broken by hedges -and enclosures. To the south the rising ground on -which he stood swept round almost to the glacis of -Oudenarde, thence curved westward from the village -of Bevere into another broad hill, called the Boser -Couter, to the village of Oycke and beyond, turned -from thence northward across the valley of the river -Norken to Huysse, from which point trending still to -northward it died away in the marshes of the Scheldt. -Near Oycke two small streams rise which, after pursuing -for some way a parallel course, unite to run down -into the Scheldt at Eyne; beyond them the Norken -flows beneath the heights of Huysse in a line parallel -to the Scheldt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Oudenarde"> - <a href="images/oudenardexx.jpg" id="Oudenardeback"> - <img class="double" src="images/oudenarde.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Oudenarde, - June 30<sup>th</sup> / July 11<sup>th</sup> 1708</p> -</div> - -<p>Presently parties of French horse appeared on the -ground to the north. Vendôme’s advanced-guard, -under the Marquis of Biron, had crossed the Scheldt -leisurely at Gavre, six miles farther down the river, and -was now moving across his front with foragers out, in -happy unconsciousness of the presence of an enemy. -A dash of Cadogan’s squadrons upon the foragers -quickly brought Biron to Eyne and beyond it, where -he caught sight of Cadogan’s detachment of scarlet and -blue battalions guarding the bridge, and presently of a -body of cavalry in the act of crossing; for Marlborough, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</span> -uneasy while his advanced-guard was still in the air, -had caught up a column of Prussian horse and galloped -forward with it in all haste. Biron at once reported -what he had seen to Vendôme, who, perceiving that the -mass of the Allied army was still on the wrong side of -the Scheldt, gave orders to take up a position parallel -to the river; the line to rest its left on the village of -Heurne and extend by Eyne and Beveren to Mooregem -on the right. In pursuance of his design he directed -seven battalions to occupy Heurne forthwith; but at -this point the Duke of Burgundy interposed. The -heights of Huysse in rear of the Norken from Asper -to Wannegem formed in his judgment a preferable -position; and there, two miles from the Scheldt, he -should form his line of battle, facing south-east. So -the army was guided to the left bank of the Norken, -while the seven battalions, obeying what they conceived -to be their orders, marched down to the village -not of Heurne but of Eyne, and backed by a few -squadrons, took up the position assigned to them by -Vendôme.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, responding to urgent messages from -Marlborough, the main body of the Allies was hurrying -forward, and by two o’clock the head of the infantry -had reached the Scheldt. Part of the cavalry passed -through Oudenarde to take advantage of the town -bridge; the foot began to cross by the pontoons, and -Cadogan, who had marked the march of the French -into Eyne, at once summoned the whole of his advanced-guard -across to the left bank. Sabine’s brigade, supported -by the other two, crossed the rivulet against -Eyne, while the Hanoverian cavalry moved up to the -rear of the village and cut off all hope of retreat. -Presently Sabine’s British were hotly engaged; but -the French made only a poor resistance. It is the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</span> -weakness of the French soldier that he apprehends too -quickly when his officers have not given him a fair -chance. Three battalions out of the seven were captured -entire, the remaining four were killed or taken piecemeal -in their flight. The cavalry, flushed by their -success, then advanced under Prince George against -the few French squadrons in rear of the village, charged -them, routed them, and drove them across the Norken. -The Prince had his horse shot under him in this -encounter, for his family has never wanted for courage, -and he remembered the day of Oudenarde to the end -of his life.</p> - -<p>The Duke of Burgundy now determined upon a -general action, and made every preparation for defence -of the position behind the Norken. But when four -o’clock came and the Allied army was not yet in order -of battle, he changed his plan, pushed a body of cavalry -from his right across the stream, and set the whole of -his centre and right in motion to advance likewise. -Marlborough, perceiving the movement, judged that -the attack would be directed against his left, in the -hope that Cadogan’s battalions about Eyne would be -left isolated and open to be crushed by an advance of -the French left. Two of Cadogan’s regiments, Prussians, -which had been pushed forward half a mile beyond -Eyne to Groenewald, were at once reinforced by twelve -more of the advanced-guard; the British cavalry was -formed up on the heights at Bevere, and the Prussian -horse further to the Allied right near Heurne. No -more could be done until the rest of the army should -gradually cross the river which divided it from the -battlefield.</p> - -<p>At length about five o’clock thirty French battalions -debouched upon Groenewald, which was as yet held -only by Cadogan’s two advanced regiments, and began -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</span> -the attack. The Prussians stuck to their post gallantly -and held their own among the hedges, until presently -Cadogan’s reinforcement, and later on twenty more -battalions under the Duke of Argyll,<a id="FNanchor_45" -href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> came up to their -assistance. Forming in succession on the left of the -Prussians as they reached the fighting line, these regiments -extended the field of action as far south as -Schaerken; and the combat was carried on with great -spirit. The ground was so strongly enclosed that the -fight resolved itself into duels of battalions, the cream -of the infantry on both sides being engaged. At one -moment the French outflanked the left of the Allies -and drove them back, but fresh battalions of Marlborough’s -army kept constantly streaming into action, -which recovered the lost ground and prolonged the line -of fire always further to the south.</p> - -<p>Marlborough and Eugene, who had hitherto remained -together, now parted, and the Duke handing -over eighteen battalions to the Prince entrusted him -with the command of the right. This accession of -strength enabled Eugene to relieve Cadogan’s corps, -which had yielded ground somewhat before Groenewald, -and even to pierce through the first line of the -enemy’s infantry. General Natzmar thereupon seized -the moment to throw the Prussian cavalry against the -second line. His squadrons were received with a biting -fire from the hedges as they advanced; and the French -Household Cavalry, watching the favourable moment -for a charge, drove back the Prussians with very heavy -loss.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Marlborough with the Hanoverian and -Dutch infantry was pressing forward slowly on his left, -the French fighting with great stubbornness and -gallantry, and contesting every inch of ground from -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</span> -hedge to hedge. At last the enemy, being forced back -to Diepenbeck, a few hundred yards in rear of Schaerken, -stood fast, and refused, despite all the Duke’s efforts, -to give way another foot. But Marlborough had still -twenty battalions of Dutch and Danes with almost -the entire cavalry of the left at his disposal, and he had -noticed that the French right flank rested on the air. -He now directed Marshal Overkirk to lead these troops -under cover of the Boser Couter round the French -right and to fall with them upon the enemy’s rear. -The gallant old Dutchman, though infirm and sick unto -death, joyfully obeyed. Two brigades were thrown -at once on the flank of the troops that were so stoutly -opposing Marlborough; while the cavalry advanced -quickly on the reverse slope of the Boser Couter,<a -id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> and -then wheeling to the right, fell on the rear of the unsuspecting -French. A part of the Household Cavalry -and some squadrons of dragoons tried bravely to stand -their ground, but they were borne back and swept -away. Overkirk’s troops pressed rapidly on; and the -French right was fairly surrounded on all sides.</p> - -<p>Now at last an effort was made to bring forward the -French left, which, through Burgundy’s perversity or -for some inscrutable reason, had been left motionless -on the other side of the Norken; but it was too late. -The infantry, though led by Vendôme himself, failed to -make the slightest impression, and the cavalry dared -not advance. The ground before them was intricate -and swampy, and the whole of the British cavalry, withdrawn -from their first position by Eugene, stood waiting -to plunge down upon them directly they should move. -The daylight faded and the night came on, but the -musketry flashed out incessantly in an ever-narrowing -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</span> -girdle of fire, as the Allies wound themselves closer and -closer round the enveloped French right. At length -at nine o’clock Marlborough and Eugene, fearful lest -their own troops should engage each other in the darkness, -with some difficulty enforced the order to halt and -cease firing. Vast numbers of the French seized the -moment to escape, but presently all the drums of the -Allies began with one accord to beat the French retreat, -while the Huguenot officers shouted “À moi, Picardie! -À moi, Roussillon!” to gather the relics of the scattered -regiments of the enemy around them. In this way -some thousands of prisoners were gleaned, though the -harvest which would have been reaped in another hour -of daylight was lost. In the French army all was -confusion. Vendôme tried in vain to keep the troops -together till the morning, but Burgundy gave the word -for retreat; and the whole mass ran off in disorder -towards Ghent.</p> - -<p>So ended the battle of Oudenarde, presenting on -one side a feature rare in these days, namely, a general -engagement without an order of battle.<a id="FNanchor_47" -href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> It was undoubtedly -the most hazardous action that Marlborough -ever fought. His troops were much harassed by forced -marches. They had started at two o’clock on Monday -morning and had covered fifty miles, including the -passage of two rivers, when they came into action at -two o’clock on Wednesday afternoon. It would be -reckoned no small feat in these days to move eighty -thousand men over fifty miles in sixty hours, but in -those days of bad roads and heavy packs the effort -must have been enormous. Finally, the army had to -pass the Scheldt in the face of the enemy, and ran no -small risk of being destroyed in detail. Yet the hazard -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</span> -was probably less than it now seems to us, and generals -in our own day have not hesitated to risk similar peril -with success. The French commanders were at variance; -the less competent of them, being heir-apparent, -was likely to be toadied by officers and supported by -them against their better judgment; and, finally, the -entire French army was very much afraid of Marlborough. -Notwithstanding their slight success in -Ghent and Bruges, their elation had evaporated speedily -when they found the Duke before them at Lessines. -All this Marlborough knew well; and he knew also -that, if an impromptu action (if one may use the term) -must be fought, there was not a man on the French side -who had an eye for a battlefield comparable to Eugene’s -or his own. The event justified his calculations; for -the victory was one of men who knew their own minds -over men who did not. Another hour of daylight, so -Marlborough declared, would have enabled him to -finish the war. The total loss of the Allies in the -battle was about three thousand killed and wounded, -the British infantry, though early engaged, suffering -but little, while the British cavalry, being employed to -watch the inactive French left, hardly suffered at all.<a -id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> -The French lost six thousand killed and wounded and -nine thousand prisoners only, but they were thoroughly -shaken and demoralised for the remainder of the -campaign. The wearied army of the Allies lay on its -arms on the battlefield, while Marlborough and Eugene -waited impatiently for the dawn. As soon as it was -light, forty squadrons, for the most part British, were -sent forward in pursuit, while Eugene returned to his -own army to hasten its march and to collect material -for a siege. The main army halted to rest for two days -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</span> -<span class="sni">July 1/12.</span> -where it lay, during which time the intelligence came -that Berwick ad been summoned with his army from -the Moselle, and was marching with all haste to occupy -certain lines constructed by the French to cover their -<span class="sni">July 2–3/<br />13–14.</span> -frontier from Ypres to the Lys. At midnight fifty -squadrons and thirty battalions under Count Lottum, -a distinguished Prussian officer, started for these lines; -the whole army followed at daybreak, and, while on the -march, the Duke received the satisfactory news that -Lottum had captured the lines without difficulty. -Next day the whole of Marlborough’s army was camped -along the Lys between Menin and Commines, within -the actual territory of France.</p> - -<p>Detached columns were at once sent out to forage -and levy contributions. The suburbs of Arras were -burnt, and no effort was spared to bring home to the -French that war was hammering at their own gates. -But the Allies were still doubtful as to the operations -that they should next undertake. So long as the -French held Bruges and Ghent they held also the -navigation of the Scheldt and Lys, so that it was of -vital importance to tempt Vendôme, if possible, to -evacuate those towns. The British Government was -preparing a force<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" -class="fnanchor">[49]</a> under General Erle for a descent -upon Normandy by sea, and Marlborough was for -co-operating with this expedition, masking the fortress -of Lille, and penetrating straight into France—a plan -which the reader should, if possible, bear in mind. -But the proposal was too adventurous to meet with -the approval of the Dutch, and was judged impracticable -even by Eugene unless Lille were first captured -as a place of arms. Ultimately it was decided, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</span> -notwithstanding the closing of the Scheldt and Lys, to -undertake the siege of Lille; and all the energies of -the Allies were turned to the collection of sixteen -thousand horses to haul the siege-train overland from -Brussels.</p> - -<p>During the enforced inaction of the army for the -next few weeks, the monotony was broken only by the -arrival of a distinguished visitor, Augustus the Strong, -Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, together with -one of his three hundred and sixty-four bastards, a -little boy of twelve named Maurice, who had run away -from school to join the army. We shall meet with -this boy again as a man of fifty, under the name of -Marshal Saxe, at a village some twenty miles distant -called Fontenoy.</p> - -<p>At length the preparations for the siege were complete, -and the huge convoy set out from Brussels for -its long march. Now, if ever, was the time for the -French to strike a blow. Vendôme in the north at -Ghent and Berwick in the south at Douay had, between -them, one hundred and ten thousand men: the distance -to be traversed by the convoy was seventy-five miles, -and the way was barred by the Dender and the Scheldt. -Such, however, was the skill with which the march was -conducted that the French never succeeded even in -threatening the vast, unwieldy columns, which duly -<span class="sni">Aug. 1/12.</span> -reached their destination without the loss even of a -single waggon. Of all the achievements of Marlborough -and Eugene, this seems to have been judged -by contemporary military men to be the greatest.<a -id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> - -<p>Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was one of the -early conquests of Lewis the Fourteenth, and, if the -expression may be allowed, the darling town of the -Court of Versailles. Situated in a swampy plain and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</span> -watered by two rivers, the Deule and Marque, its -natural position presented difficulties of no ordinary -kind to a besieging force; and, in addition, it had been -fortified by Vauban with his utmost skill. The -garrison, which had been strengthened by Berwick, -amounted to fifteen thousand men, under the command -of brave old Marshal Boufflers, who had solicited the -honour of defending the fortress. To the north, as -we have seen, lay Vendôme, and to the south Berwick, -with a joint force now amounting to about ninety-four -thousand men.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" -class="fnanchor">[51]</a> It was for Marlborough and Eugene -with an inferior strength of eighty-four thousand men<a -id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> -to hold them at bay and to take one of the strongest -fortresses in the world before their eyes.</p> - -<p>A detailed account even of so famous a siege would -be wearisome, the more so since the proportion of -British troops detailed for regular work in the trenches -was but five battalions,<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" -class="fnanchor">[53]</a> but there are a few salient -features which cannot be omitted. The point selected -for attack was the north side, the first advance to -which was opened by a single English soldier, Sergeant -Littler of the First Guards,<a id="FNanchor_54" -href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> who swam across the -Marquette to a French post, which commanded the -passage of the stream, and let down the drawbridge. -<span class="sni">Aug. 2/13.</span> -Two days later the town was fully invested, and Marlborough -took post with the covering army at Helchin -on the Scheldt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</span></p> - -<p>The investment had not been accomplished for -more than a fortnight, when the Duke was informed -that Berwick and Vendôme were advancing towards -the Dender to unite their forces at Lessines. After -manœuvring at first to hinder the junction Marlborough -finally decided to let it come to pass, being satisfied -that, if the French designed to relieve Lille, they -could not penetrate to it in the face of his army on the -east side, but must go round and approach the city -from the south. In this case, as both armies would -move in concentric circles around Lille as a centre, -Marlborough, being nearer to that centre, could be -certain of reaching any given point on the way to it -before the French. Moreover, the removal of the -enemy from the east to the south would free the convoys -from Brussels from all annoyance on their march to -the siege.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 22./Sept. 2.</div> -<p> -As he had expected, the French moved south to -Tournay, and then wheeling northward entered the -plain of Lille, where they found Marlborough and -Eugene drawn up ready to receive them.<a -id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> Vendôme -and Berwick had positive orders to risk a battle; and -there had been much big talk of annihilating the -Allies. Yet face to face with their redoubtable enemies -they hesitated. Finally, after a week’s delay, which -enabled Marlborough greatly to strengthen his position -by entrenchment, they advanced as if to attack in -earnest, but withdrew ignominiously after a useless -cannonade, without accepting battle. Had not Marlborough -and Eugene been restrained by the Dutch -deputies, the marshals would have had a battle forced -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</span> -on them whether they liked it or not, but, as things -were, they were permitted to retire. To such depth -of humiliation had Marlborough reduced the proud -and gallant French army.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 7–28./<br />Sept. 7–8.</div> -<p> -The retreat left Eugene free to press the siege with -vigour; but a great assault, which cost him three -thousand men,<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" -class="fnanchor">[56]</a> failed to give him the advantage for -which he had hoped; and a week later Marlborough -was called in from the covering army to give assistance. -<span class="sni">Sept. 19–20./<br />30–31.</span> -For the next attack, on the counterscarp, the Duke -lent the Prince five thousand English, and it is said -that English and French never fought more worthily -of their reputation than on that day; but the assault -was thrice repelled, and it was only through the -exertions of Eugene himself that a portion of the -works was at last captured, after a desperate effort and -at frightful expense of life. Altogether the siege was -not going well. The engineers had made blunders; a -vast number of men had been thrown away to no -purpose; and ammunition and stores were beginning -to run short. Lastly, Boufflers maintained always a -very grand and extremely able defence.</p> - -<p>Vendôme and Berwick could now think of no -better expedient than to throw themselves into strong -positions along the Scarpe and Scheldt, from Douay to -Ghent, in order to cut off all convoys from Brussels. -But Marlborough was prepared for this, and had not -captured Ostend after Ramillies for nothing. England -held command of the sea; and Erle’s expedition, -which had effected little or nothing on the coast of -Normandy, was at hand to help in the transport of -supplies from the new base. Erle, who had considerable -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</span> -talent for organisation, soon set Ostend in order, -seized two passages over the Nieuport Canal at Leffinghe -and Oudenburg, and prepared to send off his first -convoy. As its arrival was of vital importance to the -maintenance of the siege, the French were as anxious -<span class="sni">Sept. 16/27.</span> -to intercept as the English to forward it. Vendôme -accordingly sent off Count de la Mothe with twenty-two -thousand men to attack it on its way, while -Marlborough despatched twelve battalions and -fifteen hundred horse to Ostend itself, twelve battalions -more under General Webb to Thourout, -and eighteen squadrons under Cadogan to Roulers, -at two different points on the road, to help it to its -destination.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 17/28.</div> -<p> -The convoy started at night, and in the morning -Cadogan sent forward Count Lottum with a hundred -and fifty horse to meet it. At noon Lottum returned -to Thourout with the intelligence that he had struck -against the advanced guard of a French force at -Ichtegem, two miles beyond Wynendale and some -four miles from Thourout, on the road to Ostend. -Webb at once collected every battalion within his -reach, twenty-two in all, and marched with all -speed for Ichtegem, with Lottum’s squadron in -advance. The horse, however, on emerging from -the defile of Wynendale, found the enemy advancing -towards them into the plains that lay beyond -it. Lottum retired slowly, skirmishing, while Webb -pushed on and posted his men in two lines at the -entrance to the defile. The strait was bounded on -either hand by a wood, and in each of these woods -Webb stationed a battalion of Germans to take the -French in flank. The dispositions were hardly complete -when the enemy came up and opened fire from -nineteen pieces of artillery. Lottum and his handful -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</span> -of horse then retired, while just in the nick of time -three more battalions reached Webb from the rear -and formed his third line.</p> - -<p>The French cannonade was prolonged for nearly -two hours, but with little effect, for Webb had ordered -his men to lie down. At length at five o’clock the -French advanced in four lines of infantry, backed by as -many of horse and dragoons. They came on with -great steadiness and entered the space between the two -woods, with their flanks almost brushing the covert as -they passed, serenely unconscious of the peril that -awaited them. Then from right and left a staggering -volley crashed into them from the battalions concealed -among the trees. Both flanks shrank back from the -fire, and huddled themselves in confusion upon their -centre. De la Mothe sent forward some dragoons in -support; and the foot, recovering themselves, pressed -on against the lines before them. So vigorous was -their attack that they broke through two battalions -of the first line; but, the gap being instantly filled -from the second, they were forced back. Again they -struggled forward, trusting by the sheer weight of eight -lines against two to sweep their enemy away. But -the eternal fire on front and flank became unendurable, -and, notwithstanding the blows and entreaties of their -officers, the eight lines broke up in confusion, while -Webb’s battalions, coolly advancing by platoons “as -if they were at exercise,” poured volley after volley -into them as they retired. Cadogan, who had hastened -up with a few squadrons to the sound of the firing, was -anxious to charge the broken troops, but his force was -considered too weak; and thus after two hours of hot -conflict ended the combat of Wynendale. The French -engaged therein numbered almost double of the Allies, -and lost close on three thousand men, while the Allies -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</span> -lost rather less than a thousand of all ranks. The -signal incapacity displayed by the French commander -did not lessen the credit of Webb, and Wynendale was -reckoned one of the most brilliant little affairs of the -whole war.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" -class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> - -<p>The safe arrival of the convoy before Lille raised -the hope of the besiegers; and Vendôme, now fully -alive to the importance of cutting off communication -with Ostend, marched towards that side with a considerable -force, and opening the dykes laid the whole -country under water. Marlborough went quickly after -him, but the marshal would not await his coming; and -the Duke, by means of high-wheeled vehicles and punts, -contrived to overcome the difficulties caused by the -<span class="sni">Oct. 11/22.</span> -inundation. At last, after a siege of sixty days the -town capitulated; and the garrison retired into the -citadel, where Eugene proceeded to beleaguer it -anew.</p> - -<p>While the new siege was going forward, the Elector -of Bavaria arrived on the scene from the Rhine, from -whence the apathy of the Elector of Hanover had most -<span class="sni">Nov. 13/24.</span> -unpardonably allowed him to withdraw, and laid siege -to Brussels with fifteen thousand men. This was an -entirely new complication; and, since the French held -the line of the Scheldt in force, it was difficult to see -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</span> -how Marlborough could parry the blow. Fortunately -the garrison defended itself with great spirit, the English -regiments<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" -class="fnanchor">[58]</a> setting a fine example; and the Duke, in no -wise dismayed, laid his plans with his usual secrecy and -decision. Spreading reports, which he confirmed by -feint movements, that he was about to place his troops -in cantonments, he marched suddenly and silently eastward -<span class="sni">Nov. 15/26.</span> -on the night of the 26th of November, crossed -the Scheldt at two different points before the enemy -knew that he was near them, took a thousand prisoners, -and then remitting the bulk of his force to the siege of -Lille, pushed on with a detachment of cavalry and two -<span class="sni">Nov. 17/28.</span> -battalions of English Guards to Alost. On his arrival -he learned that the Elector had raised the siege of -Brussels and marched off with precipitation. The bare -name of Marlborough had been sufficient to scare him -away.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Eugene’s preparations before the citadel -of Lille were in rapid progress, and Marlborough was -already maturing plans for a further design before the -close of the campaign. It had been the earnest desire -of both commanders to reduce Boufflers to unconditional -surrender; but time was an object, so on the -<span class="sni">Nov. 28./Dec. 9.</span> -9th of December the gallant old marshal and his heroic -garrison marched out with the honours of war. So -ended the memorable siege of Lille. It had cost the -garrison eight thousand men, or more than half of its -numbers, and the Allies no fewer than fourteen thousand -men. The honours of the struggle rested decidedly -with Boufflers, and were paid to him by none more -ungrudgingly than Marlborough and Eugene. Yet as -an operation of war, conducted under extraordinary -difficulties in respect of transport, under the eyes -of a superior force and subject to diversions, such -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</span> -as that of the Elector of Bavaria, this siege remains -one of the highest examples of consummate military -skill.</p> - -<p>The fall of Lille was a heavy blow for France, but it -was not the last of the campaign. Within eight days -Marlborough and Eugene had invested Ghent, which -after a brief resistance surrendered with the honours of -war. The capitulation of Bruges quickly followed, and -the navigation of the Scheldt and Lys having been -regained, the two commanders at last sent their troops -into winter quarters.</p> - -<p>But even this did not close the sum of English -successes for 1708. From the Mediterranean had come -news of another conquest, due to the far-seeing eye -and far-reaching hand of Marlborough. Early in the -year Galway had withdrawn from Catalonia to Lisbon, -and the command in Catalonia had been given at -Marlborough’s instance to Field-Marshal von Staremberg, -an Imperial officer of much experience and -deservedly high reputation. Staremberg, however, -could do little with but ten thousand men against the -Bourbon’s army of twice his strength; so by Marlborough’s -advice the troops were used to second the -operations of the Mediterranean squadron. Sardinia, -the first point aimed at, was captured almost without -resistance; and the fleet then sailed for Minorca. -Here somewhat more opposition was encountered; but -after less than a fortnight’s work, creditably managed -by Major-general Stanhope, the Island was taken at a -<span class="sni">Sept. 13/24.</span> -trifling cost of life.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" -class="fnanchor">[59]</a> Thus the English gained their -first port in the Mediterranean; and the news of the -capture of Minorca reached London on the same day -as that of the fall of Lille.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</span></p> - -<p class="addendum"><span class="smcap">Note.</span>—I have been unable -to discover any Order of Battle for the campaign of 1708. The regiments -that bear the name of Oudenarde on their appointments are the 1st, 3rd, -5th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards, the 2nd Dragoons, 5th Lancers, -Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, 1st, 3rd, 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th, -18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 37th Foot.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="mal1709">VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER VIII</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1708.</div> -<p> -The successes of the past campaign were sufficient to -put the British Parliament in good humour, and to -prompt it to vote a further increase of ten thousand -German mercenaries for the following year. Nevertheless -political troubles were increasing, and there were -already signs that the rule of Godolphin and Marlborough -was in danger. The death of the Prince -Consort had been a heavy blow to the Duke. Prince -George may have deserved Lord Macaulay’s character -for impenetrable stupidity, but there can be little -doubt that his heavy phlegmatic character was of -infinite service to steady the weak and unstable Queen -Anne.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1709.</div> -<p> -In the spring of 1709, however, it seemed reasonable -to hope that peace, which would have set all matters -right, was well-nigh assured. France, already at the -last gasp through the exhaustion caused by the war, -was weakened still further by a severe winter which -had added famine to all her other troubles; and Lewis -sought anxiously, even at the price of humiliation, for -peace. He approached Marlborough, reputed the most -avaricious and corruptible of men, with a gigantic bribe -to obtain good terms, but was unhesitatingly rebuffed. -The Duke stated the conditions which might be acceptable -to England; and, had the negotiations been trusted -to him, there can be little doubt but that he would have -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</span> -obtained the honourable peace which he above all men -most earnestly desired. He was, however, overruled -by instructions from home, imposing terms which Lewis -could not be expected to grant; the war was continued; -and Marlborough, who had striven his hardest to bring -it to an end, was of course accused of prolonging it -deliberately for his own selfish ends.</p> - -<p>The French, now menaced by an invasion and a -march of the Allies to Paris, had strengthened their -army enormously by withdrawing troops from all -quarters to Flanders, and had set in command their -only fortunate general, that very able soldier and -incomparable liar, Marshal Villars. To cover Arras, -the north-eastern gate of France, Villars had thrown -up a strong line of entrenchments from the Scarpe at -Douay to the Lys, which were generally known, after -the name of his headquarters, as the lines of La Bassée. -There he lay, entrenched to the teeth, while Marlborough -and Eugene, after long delay owing to the -lateness of the spring, encamped with one hundred -and ten thousand men to the south-east of Lille, -<span class="sni">June.</span> -between two villages, with which the reader will in -due time make closer acquaintance, called Linselles -and Fontenoy. Thence they moved south straight -upon Villars’s lines, with every apparent preparation -for a direct attack upon them and for forcing their -way into France at that point. The heavy artillery -was sent to Menin on the Lys; report was everywhere -rife of the coming assault, and Villars lost no time in -summoning the garrison of Tournay to his assistance. -<span class="sni">June 15/26.</span> -On the 26th of June, at seven in the evening, Marlborough -issued his orders to strike tents and march; -and the whole army made up its mind for a bloody -action before the lines at dawn. To the general -surprise, after advancing some time in the direction -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</span> -of the French, the columns received orders to change -direction to the left. After some hours’ march eastward -they crossed a river, but the men did not know -that the bridge lay over the Marque and that it led -them towards the battlefield of Bouvines; nor was it -until dawn that they saw the gray walls and the four -spires of Tournay before them, and discovered that -they had invested the city.</p> - -<p>Tournay had been fortified by Vauban and was one -of the strongest fortresses in France,<a id="FNanchor_60" -href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> but its garrison -had been weakened by the unsuspecting Villars, and -there was little hope for it. The heavy artillery of -the Allies, which had been sent to Menin, went down -the Lys to Ghent and up the Scheldt to the besieged -<span class="sni">June 26./July 7.</span> -city, the trenches were opened on the 7th of July, -and after three weeks, despite of the demonstrations -of Villars and incessant heavy rain, Tournay was -<span class="sni">July 19/28.</span> -reduced to surrender.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" -class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Then followed the siege of -the citadel, the most desperate enterprise yet undertaken -by the Allied troops, inasmuch as the subterraneous -works were more numerous and formidable -than those above ground. The operations were, -therefore, conducted by mine and countermine, with -destructive explosions and confused combats in the -darkness, which tried the nerves of the soldiers almost -beyond endurance. The men did not object to be shot, -but they dreaded to be buried alive by the hundred -together through the springing of a single mine.<a -id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> Four -English regiments<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" -class="fnanchor">[63]</a> bore their share in this work -and suffered heavily in the course of it, until on the -<span class="sni">Aug. 23./Sept. 3.</span> -3rd of September the citadel capitulated.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</span></p> - -<p>Before the close of the siege Marlborough and -Eugene, leaving a sufficient force before Tournay, -had moved back with the main army before the lines -at Douay. They had long decided that the lines -were far too formidable to be forced, but they saw -no reason for communicating this opinion to Villars. -<span class="sni">Aug. 20/31.</span> -On the 31st of August Lord Orkney, with twenty -squadrons and the whole of the grenadiers of the army, -marched away silently and swiftly eastward towards -<span class="sni">Aug. 23./Sept. 3.</span> -St. Ghislain on the Haine. Three days later, immediately -after the capitulation of the citadel of -Tournay, the Prince of Hessen-Cassel started at four -o’clock in the afternoon in the same direction; at -nine o’clock Cadogan followed him with forty squadrons -more, and at midnight the whole army broke up its -camp and marched after them. Twenty-six battalions -alone were left before Tournay to superintend the -evacuation and to level the siege-works, with orders -to watch Villars carefully and not to move until he did.</p> - -<p>The Prince of Hessen-Cassel soon overtook Orkney, -from whom he learned that St. Ghislain was too -strongly held to be carried by his small force. The -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</span> -Prince therefore at once pushed on. Rain was falling -in torrents, and the roads were like rivers, but he -continued his advance eastward, behind the woods -that line the Haine, almost without a halt, till at -<span class="sni">Aug. 26./Sept. 6.</span> -length at two o’clock on the morning of the 6th of -September he wheeled to the right and crossed the -river at Obourg three miles to the north-east of Mons. -Before him lay the river Trouille curving round to -the south by Mons, and in rear of it a line of entrenchments, -thrown up during the last war, from Mons -to the Sambre, to cover the province of Hainault. A -short survey showed him that the lines were weakly -guarded; and before noon he had passed them without -opposition. His force, notwithstanding the weather -and the state of the roads, had traversed the fifty miles -to Obourg in fifty-six hours.</p> - -<p>Too late Villars discovered that for the second time -he had been duped, and that Marlborough had no -intention of forcing his way into France through the -lines of La Bassée and the wet swampy country beyond -them, when he could pass the lines of the Trouille -without loss of a man. He was in a difficult position, -for Mons was slenderly garrisoned and difficult of -access, though, if captured, it would be a valuable -acquisition to the Allies. The approach to it from the -westward was practically shut off by a kind of natural -barrier of forest, running, roughly speaking, from St. -Ghislain on the Haine to the north to Maubeuge on -the Sambre to the south. In this barrier there were -but two openings, the Trouée de Boussut between the -village of that name and the Haine, and the Trouées -d’Aulnois and de Louvière, which are practically the -same, some miles further to the south. These will be -more readily remembered, the northern entrance by -the name of Jemappes, the southern by the name of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</span> -Malplaquet. Villars no sooner knew what was going -forward than he pushed forward a detachment with -<span class="sni">Aug. 27./Sept. 7.</span> -all speed upon the northern entrance, which was the -nearer to him. The detachment came too late. The -Prince of Hessen-Cassel was already astride of the -opening, his right at Jemappes, his left at Ciply. The -French thereupon fell back to await the approach of -the main army of the Allies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 26./Sept. 6.</div> -<p> -Meanwhile that army had toiled through a sea of -mud on the northern bank of the Haine, and crossing -the river had by evening invested Mons on the eastern -side. On the following day Villars and his whole army -<span class="sni">Aug. 27./Sept. 7.</span> -also arrived on the scene and encamped a couple of -miles to westward of the forest-barrier, from Montreuil -to Athis. Here he was joined by old Marshal -Boufflers, who had volunteered his services at a time -of such peril to France. The arrival of the gallant -veteran caused such a tumult of rejoicing in the French -camp that Marlborough and Eugene, not knowing -what the clamour might portend, withdrew all but a -fraction of the investing force from the town, and, -advancing westward into the plain of Mons, caused -the army to bivouac between Ciply and Quévy in -order of battle.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 28./Sept. 8.</div> -<p> -Villars meanwhile had not moved, being adroit -enough to threaten both passages and keep the Allies -in doubt as to which he should select. While, therefore, -the mass of the Allied army was moved towards -the Trouée d’Aulnois, a strong detachment was sent -up to watch the Trouée de Boussut. That night -Villars sent detachments forward to occupy the -<span class="sni">Aug. 29./Sept. 9.</span> -southern passage, and by mid-day of the morrow his -whole army was taking up its position across the -opening. Marlborough at once moved his army -forward, approaching so close that his left wing exchanged -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</span> -cannon-shot with Villars’s right. Everything -pointed to an immediate attack on the French before -they should have time to entrench themselves. -Whether the Dutch deputies intervened to stay -further movements is uncertain. All that is known -is that a council of war was held by the commanders -of the Allies, and that, after much debate, it was -resolved to await the arrival of the detachment from -the Trouée de Boussut and of the troops that had -been left behind at Tournay, to turn the siege of -Mons into a blockade, and in the meanwhile to send -eighteen battalions north to capture St. Ghislain. -Evidently in some quarter there was reluctance to -hazard a general action.</p> - -<p>Villars now set himself with immense energy to -strengthen his position; and, when Marlborough and -Eugene surveyed the defences at daybreak of the -<span class="sni">Aug. 30./Sept. 10.</span> -following morning, they were astonished at the formidable -appearance of the entrenchments. Marlborough -was once more for attacking without further delay, -but he was opposed by the Dutch deputies and even -by Eugene. The attack was therefore fixed for the -morrow; and another day was lost which Villars did -not fail to turn to excellent account.</p> - -<p>The entrance from the westward to the Trouée -d’Aulnois or southern entrance to the plain of Mons -was marked by the two villages of Campe du Hamlet -on the north and Malplaquet on the south. About -a mile in advance of these villages the ground rose to -its highest elevation, the opening being about three -thousand paces wide, and the ground broken and -hollowed to right and left by small rivulets. This was -the point selected by Villars for his position. It was -bounded on his right by the forest of Laignières, the -greatest length of which ran parallel to the Trouée, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</span> -and on the left by a forest, known at different points -by the names of Taisnières, Sart and Blangies, the -greatest length of which ran at right angles to the -Trouée. Villars occupied the forest of Laignières -with his extreme right, his battalions strengthening -the natural obstacles of a thick and tangled covert -by means of abatis. From the edge of the wood he -constructed a triple line of entrenchments, which ran -across the opening for full a third of its width, when -they gave way to a line of nine redans. These redans -in turn yielded place to a swamp backed by more -entrenchments, which carried the defences across to -the wood of Taisnières. Several cannon were mounted -on the entrenchments, and a battery of twenty guns -before the redans. On Villars’s left the forests of -Taisnières and Sart projected before the general front, -forming a salient and re-entering angle. Entrenchments -and abatis were constructed in accordance with -this configuration, and two more batteries were erected -on this side, in addition to several guns at various -points along the line, to enfilade an advancing enemy. -Feeling even thus insecure, Villars threw up more -entrenchments at the villages of Malplaquet and -Chaussée du Bois in rear of the wood of Sart, and -was still hard at work on them to the last possible -moment before the action. Finally in rear of all stood -his cavalry, drawn up in several lines. The whole of -his force amounted to ninety-five thousand men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Malplaquet"> - <a href="images/malplaquetxx.jpg" id="Malplaquetback"> - <img class="double" src="images/malplaquet.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Malplaquet, -Aug. 31<sup>st</sup> / Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> 1709</p> -</div> - -<p>The position was most formidable, but it had its -defects. In the first place the open space before the -entrenchments was broken at about half a mile’s -distance by a small coppice, called the wood of Tiry, -which could serve to mask the movements of the -Allied centre. In the second place the forest of Sart -ran out beyond the fortified angle in a long tongue, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</span> -which would effectually conceal any troops that might -be directed against the extreme left flank. Finally -the French cavalry, being massed in rear of the entrenchments, -could take no part in the action until -the defences were forced, and was therefore incapable -of delivering any counterstroke. Marlborough and -Eugene accordingly decided to make a feint attack on -the French right and a true attack on their left front -and flank. Villars would then be obliged to reinforce -his left from his centre, which would enable the defences -across the open to be carried, and the whole of the -allied cavalry to charge forward and cut the French -line in twain.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 31./Sept. 11.</div> -<p> -The dawn of the 11th of September broke in dense -heavy mist which completely veiled the combatants -from each other. At three o’clock prayers were said -in the Allied camp, and then the artillery was moved -into position. Forty pieces were massed in a single -battery on the open ground against the French left, -and were covered with an epaulment for defence -against enfilading fire; twenty-eight more were -stationed against the French right, and the lighter -pieces were distributed, as usual, among the different -brigades. Then the columns of attack were formed. -Twenty-eight battalions under Count Lottum were -directed against the eastern face of the salient angle -of the forest of Taisnières, and forty battalions of -Eugene’s army under General Schulemberg against -the northern face, while a little to the right of Schulemberg -two thousand men under General Gauvain were -to press on the French left flank in rear of their -entrenchments. Behind Schulemberg fifteen British -battalions under Lord Orkney were drawn up in a -single line on the open ground, ready to advance -against the centre as soon as Schulemberg and Lottum -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</span> -should have done their work. Far away beyond -Gauvain, General Withers with five British and fourteen -foreign battalions and six squadrons was to turn the -extreme French left at the village of La Folie.</p> - -<p>For the feint against the French right, thirty-one -battalions, chiefly Dutch, were massed together under -the Prince of Orange. The cavalry was detailed in -different divisions to support the infantry. The -Prince of Orange was backed by twenty-one Dutch -squadrons under the Prince of Hesse, Orkney by thirty -more under Auvergne, Lottum by the British and -Hanoverian cavalry, and Schulemberg by Eugene’s -horse. The orders given to the cavalry were to sustain -the foot as closely as possible without advancing into -range of grape-shot, and, as soon as the central entrenchments -were forced, to press forward, form -before the entrenchments and drive the French army -from the field. The whole force of the Allies was, as -near as may be, equal to that of the French.</p> - -<p>At half-past seven the fog lifted, and the guns of -both armies opened fire. Eugene and Marlborough -thereupon parted, the former taking charge of the -right, the latter of the left of the army. Then the -divisions of Orange and of Lottum advanced in two -dense columns up the glade. Presently the Dutch -halted, just beyond range of grape-shot, while Lottum’s -column pushed on under a terrific fire to the rear of -the forty-gun battery and deployed to the right in -three lines. Then the fire of the cannon slackened -for a time, till about nine o’clock a salvo of the forty -guns gave the signal for attack. Lottum’s and -Schulemberg’s divisions thereupon advanced perpendicularly -to each other, each in three lines, Gauvain’s -men crept into the wood unperceived, and Orkney -extended his scarlet battalions across the glade.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</span></p> - -<p>Entering the wood, Schulemberg’s Austrians made -the best of their way through marshes and streams -and fallen trees, nearer and nearer to the French -entrenchments. The enemy suffered them to approach -within pistol-shot, only to deliver a volley which sent -them staggering back; and, though the Austrians -extended their line till it joined Gauvain’s detachment, -yet they could make little way against the French -fire. Lottum’s attack was hardly more successful. -Heedless of the tempest of shot in their front and flank -the Germans pressed steadily on, passed a swamp -and a stream under a galling fire, and fell fiercely upon -the breastwork beyond; but, being disordered by the -ground and thinned by heavy losses, they were forced -to fall back. Schulemberg then resumed the attack -with his second line, but with all his exertions could -not carry the face of the angle opposed to him. -Picardie, the senior regiment of the French Line, -held this post and would not yield it to the fiercest -assault. The utmost that Schulemberg could accomplish -was to sweep away the regiments in the wood, -and so to uncover its flank.</p> - -<p>Lottum, too, extended his front and attacked once -more, Orkney detaching three British battalions, the -Buffs, Sixteenth, and Temple’s, to his assistance, while -Marlborough took personal command of Auvergne’s -cavalry in support. The Buffs on Lottum’s extreme -left found a swamp between them and the entrenchments, -so deep as to be almost impassable. In they -plunged, notwithstanding, and were struggling through -it when a French officer drew out twelve battalions -and moved them down straight upon their left flank. -The British brigade would have been in a sorry plight -had not Villars caught sight of Marlborough at the -head of Auvergne’s horse and instantly recalled his -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</span> -troops. So the red-coats scrambled on, and, turning -the flank of the entrenchment while Lottum’s men -attacked the front, at length with desperate fighting -and heavy loss forced the French back into the wood. -Thus exposed to the double attack of Lottum and -Schulemberg, Picardie at last fell back, but joined -itself to Champagne, the next regiment in seniority; -and the two gallant corps, finding a rallying-point -behind an abatis, turned and stood once more. Their -comrades gave way in disorder, but the wood was so -dense that the troops on both sides became disjointed, -and the opposing lines broke up into a succession of -small parties, fighting desperately from tree to tree -with no further guidance than their own fury.</p> - -<p>The entrenchments on the French left had been -forced; and Villars sent urgent messages to his right -for reinforcements. But Boufflers could spare him -none. After Schulemberg and Lottum had been -engaged for half an hour, the Prince of Orange lost -patience and, without waiting for orders, opened not a -false but a real attack against the French right. On -the extreme left of Orange’s division were two Highland -regiments of the Dutch service, Tullibardine’s and -Hepburn’s, and next to them King William’s favourite -Blue Guards. These were to attack the defences in the -forest of Laignières, while the rest fell upon the entrenchments -in the open; and it was at the head of the -Highlanders and of the Blue Guards that Orange took -his place. A tremendous fire of grape and musketry -saluted them as they advanced, and within the first few -yards most of the Prince’s staff were struck dead by his -side. His own horse was killed beneath him, but he -disentangled himself and continued to lead the advance -on foot. A few minutes more brought his battalions -under the fire of a French battery on their left flank. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</span> -Whole ranks were swept away, but still the Prince was -to be seen waving his hat in front of his troops; and -Highlanders and Dutchmen pressing steadily on carried -the first entrenchment with a rush. They then halted -to deploy, but, before they could advance further, -Boufflers had rallied his men, and charging down upon -his assailants drove them back headlong. On Orange’s -right, success as short-lived was bought at as dear a -price. The Prince still exerted himself with the utmost -gallantry, but his attack was beaten back at all points. -The loss of the Dutch amounted to six thousand killed -and wounded; the Blue Guards had been annihilated, -and the Hanoverian battalions, which had supported -them, had suffered little less severely. In fact, the -Prince’s precipitation had brought about little less than -a disaster.</p> - -<p>The confusion in this part of the field called both -Marlborough and Eugene to the Allied left to restore -order. Further useless sacrifice of life was checked, for -enough and more than enough had been done to prevent -Boufflers from detaching troops to Villars. But soon -came an urgent message requiring the presence of the -Duke and the Prince once more on the right. Schulemberg -and Lottum had continued to push their attack as -best they could; and red-coated English, blue-coated -Prussians, and white-coated Austrians were struggling -forward from tree to tree, tripping over felled trunks, -bursting through tangled foliage, panting through -quagmires, loading and firing and cursing, guided only -by the flashes before them in the cloud of foul blinding -smoke. But now on the extreme right Withers was -steadily advancing; and his turning movement, though -the Duke and Eugene knew it not, was gradually -forcing the French out of the wood. Villars, seeing -the danger, called the Irish Brigade and other regiments -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</span> -from the centre, and launched them full upon the -British and Prussians. Such was the impetuosity of -the Irish that they forced their opponents back some -way, until their own formation was broken by the -density of the forest. Eugene hastened to the spot to -rally the retreating battalions and, though struck by a -musket ball in the head, refused to leave the field. -Then up came Withers, just when he was wanted. -The Eighteenth Royal Irish met the French Royal -Regiment of Ireland, crushed it with two volleys by -sheer superiority of fire, drove it back in disorder, and -pressed on.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" -class="fnanchor">[64]</a> Eugene also advanced and was met by -Villars, who at this critical moment was bringing -forward his reinforcements in person. A musket shot -struck the Marshal above the knee. Totally unmoved, -the gallant man called for a chair from which to continue -to direct his troops, but presently fainting from -pain was carried insensible from the field. The French, -notwithstanding his fall, still barred the advance of the -Allies, but they had been driven from their entrenchments -and from the wood on the left, and only held -their own by the help of the troops that had been withdrawn -from the centre. The moment for which Marlborough -had waited was now come.</p> - -<p>The forty-gun battery was moved forward, and -Orkney leading his British battalions against the redans -captured them, though not without considerable loss, at -the first rush. Two Hanoverian battalions on their -left turned the flank of the adjoining entrenchments; -and Orange, renewing his attack, cleared the whole of -the defences in the glade. The Allied cavalry followed -close behind him. Auvergne’s Dutch were the first to -pass the entrenchments, and, though charged by the -French while in the act of deploying, succeeded in -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</span> -repelling the first attack. But now Boufflers came up -at the head of the French Gendarmerie, and drove -Auvergne’s men back irresistibly to the edge of the -entrenchments. Here, however, the French were -checked, for Orkney had lined the parapet with his -British; and, though the Gendarmerie thrice strove -gallantly to make an end of the Dutch, they were every -time driven back by the fire of the infantry. Meanwhile -the central battery, which had been parted right -and left into two divisions, advanced and supported -the infantry by a cross-fire, and Marlborough, coming -up with the British and Prussian horse, charged the -Gendarmerie in their turn. Boufflers, however, was -again ready with fresh troops, and falling upon Marlborough -with the French Household Cavalry crashed -through his two leading lines and threw even the third -into disorder. Then Eugene advancing at the head of -the Imperial horse threw the last reserves into the -mêlée and drove the French back. Simultaneously -the Prince of Hesse hurled his squadrons against the -infantry of the French right, and, with the help of the -Dutch foot, isolated it still further from the centre. -Boufflers now saw that the day was lost and ordered a -general retreat to Bavay, while he could yet keep his -troops together. The movement was conducted in -admirable order, for the French, though beaten, were -not routed, while the Allies were too much exhausted -to pursue. So Boufflers retired unmolested, though -it was not yet three o’clock, honoured alike by friend -and foe for his bravery and his skill.</p> - -<p>Thus ended the battle of Malplaquet, one of the -bloodiest ever fought by mortal men. Little is known -of the details of the fighting, these being swallowed up -in the shade of the forest of Taisnières, where no man -could see what was going forward. All that is certain -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</span> -is that neither side gave quarter, and that the combat -was not only fierce but savage. The loss of the French -was about twelve thousand men, and the trophies taken -from them, against which they could show trophies of -their own, were five hundred prisoners, fifty standards -and colours and sixteen guns. The loss of the Allies -was not less than twenty thousand men killed and -wounded, due chiefly to the mad onset of the Prince -of Orange. The Dutch infantry out of thirty battalions -lost eight thousand men, or more than half of their -number; the British out of twenty battalions lost -nineteen hundred men,<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" -class="fnanchor">[65]</a> the heaviest sufferers being the -Coldstream Guards, Buffs, Orrery’s and Temple’s.<a -id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</span></p> - -<p>The more closely the battle is studied, the more the -conviction grows that no action of Marlborough’s was -fought less in accordance with his own plans. We -have seen that he would have preferred to fight it on -either of the two preceding days, and that he yielded -to Eugene against his own judgment in suffering it to -be postponed. Then again there was the almost -criminal folly of the Prince of Orange, which upset all -preconcerted arrangements, threw away thousands of -lives to no purpose, and not only permitted the French -to retreat unharmed at the close of the day, but seriously -imperilled the success of the action at its beginning. -Nevertheless there are still not wanting men to -believe the slanders of the contemptible faction then -rising to power in England, that Marlborough fought -the battle from pure lust of slaughter.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding all blunders, which were none of -Marlborough’s making, Malplaquet was a very grand -action. The French were equal in number to the -Allies, and occupied a position which was described at -the time as a fortified citadel. They were commanded -by an able general, whom they liked and trusted, they -were in good heart, and they looked forward confidently -to victory. Yet they were driven back and obliged to -leave Mons to its fate; and though Villars with his -usual bluster described the victory as more disastrous -than defeat, yet French officers could not help asking -themselves whether resistance to Marlborough and -Eugene were not hopeless. Luxemburg with seventy-five -thousand men against fifty thousand had only with -difficulty succeeded in forcing the faulty position of -Landen; yet the French had failed to hold the far -more formidable lines of Malplaquet against an army -no stronger than their own. Say Villars what he -might, and beyond all doubt he fought a fine fight, the -inference could not be encouraging to France.</p> - -<p>It was not until the third day after the fight that the -Allies returned to the investment of Mons. Eugene -was wounded, and Marlborough not only worn out by -fatigue but deeply distressed over the enormous -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</span> -sacrifice of life. The siege was retarded by the marshy -nature of the ground and by heavy rain; but on the -<span class="sni">Sept. 28./Oct. 9.</span> -9th of October the garrison capitulated, and therewith -the campaign came to an end. Tournay had given the -Allies firm foothold on the Upper Scheldt, and Mons -was of great value to cover the captured towns in -Flanders and Brabant. The season’s operations had -not been without good fruit, despite the heavy losses -at Malplaquet.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="mal1711">VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER X</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1711.</div> -<p> -The French, fully aware of the political changes in -England, had during the winter made extraordinary -exertions to prolong the war for yet one more campaign, -and to that end had covered the northern frontier with -a fortified barrier on a gigantic scale. Starting from -the coast of Picardy the lines followed the course of the -river Canche almost to its source. From thence across -to the Gy, or southern fork of the Upper Scarpe, ran a -line of earthworks, extending from Oppy to Montenancourt. -From the latter point the Gy and the Scarpe -were dammed so as to form inundations as far as Biache, -at which place a canal led the line of defence from the -Scarpe to the Sensée. Here more inundations between -the two rivers carried the barrier to Bouchain, whence -it followed the Scheldt to Valenciennes. From thence -more earthworks prolonged the lines to the Sambre, -which carried them at last to their end at Namur.</p> - -<p>This was a formidable obstacle to the advance of the -Allies, but no lines had sufficed to stop Marlborough -yet; and with Eugene by his side the Duke did not -despair. Before he could start for the campaign, however, -the news came that the Emperor Joseph was dead -of smallpox, an event which signified the almost certain -accession of the Archduke Charles to the Imperial -crown and the consequent withdrawal of his candidature -for the throne of Spain. Eugene was consequently -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</span> -detained at home; and, worse than this, a fine opportunity -was afforded for making a breach in the Grand -Alliance. To render the Duke’s difficulties still greater, -though his force was already weakened by the necessity -of finding garrisons for the towns captured in the -previous year, the English Government had withdrawn -from him five battalions<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" -class="fnanchor">[67]</a> for an useless expedition to -Newfoundland under the command of Mrs. Masham’s -brother, General Hill; an expedition which may be -dismissed for the present without further mention than -that it was dogged by misfortune from first to last, -suffered heavy loss through shipwreck, and accomplished -literally nothing.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless the Imperial army was present, though -without Eugene. The whole of the forces were -assembled a little to the south of Lille at Orchies; and -<span class="sni">April 20./May 1.</span> -on the 1st of May Marlborough moved forward to a -position parallel to that of Villars, who lay in rear of -the river Sensée with his left at Oisy and his right at -Bouchain. There both armies remained stationary -and inactive for six weeks. Eugene came, but presently -received orders to return and to bring his troops -<span class="sni">June 3/14.</span> -with him. On the 14th of June Marlborough moved -away one march westward to the plain of Lens in order -to conceal this enforced diminution of his strength. -The position invited a battle, but Villars only moved -down within his lines, parallel to the Duke; and once -more both armies remained inactive for five weeks. -After the departure of Eugene the French commander -detached a portion of his troops to the Rhine, but even -so he had one hundred and thirty-one battalions -against ninety-four, and one hundred and eighty-seven -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</span> -squadrons against one hundred and forty-five of the -Allies.</p> - -<p>We now approach what is perhaps the most remarkable -and certainly the most entertaining feat of the -Duke during the whole war. Villars, bound by his -instructions, would not come out and fight; his lines -could not be forced by an army of inferior strength, -and they could therefore be passed only by stratagem. -The inundation on the Sensée between Arras and -Bouchain could be traversed only by two causeways, -the larger of which was defended by a strong fort at -Arleux, while the other was covered by a redoubt at -Aubigny, half a mile below it. Marlborough knew that -he could take the fort at Arleux at any time and demolish -it, but he knew also that Villars would certainly -retake it and rebuild as soon as his back was turned. -He therefore set himself to induce Villars to demolish -it himself. With this view he detached a strong force -<span class="sni">June 25./July 6.</span> -under General Rantzau to capture the fort, which was -done without difficulty. The Duke then gave orders -that the captured works should be greatly strengthened, -and, for their further protection, posted a large force -under the Prussian General Hompesch on the glacis -of Douay, some six miles distant from the fort.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Camp1711"> - <a href="images/camp1711xx.jpg" id="Camp1711back"> - <img class="double" src="images/camp1711.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">The Campaign of 1711.</p> -</div> - -<p>As fate ordained it, Hompesch, thinking himself -secure under the guns of Douay, neglected his outposts -and even his sentries, and was surprised two days later -<span class="sni">June 28./July 9.</span> -by a sudden attack from Villars, which was only repulsed -with considerable difficulty and not a little -shame. Villars was in ecstasies over his success, and -Marlborough displayed considerable annoyance. However, -the Duke reinforced Hompesch, as if to show the -value which he attached to Arleux, and pushed forward -the new works with the greatest vigour. Finally, when -all was completed, he threw a weak garrison into the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</span> -fort and led the rest of the army away two marches -westward, encamping opposite the lines between the -<span class="sni">July 10/21.</span> -Canche and the Scarpe. Villars likewise moved westward -parallel to him, and took up a position between -Oppy and Montenancourt; but, before he started, he -detached a force to attack Arleux. The commander of -the fort sent a message to Marlborough that he could -not possibly hold it, and the Duke at once despatched -Cadogan with a strong force to relieve it. It was -noticed, however, that Cadogan made no such haste as -the urgency of the occasion would have seemed to -require; and indeed, before he had gone half-way, -he returned with the intelligence that Arleux had -surrendered.</p> - -<p>Villars was elated beyond measure; and Marlborough -for the first time in his life seemed to be greatly -distressed and cast down. Throwing off his usual -serenity, he proclaimed in public with much passion -that he would be even with Villars yet, and would attack -him, come what might of it, where he lay. Then came -the news that Villars had razed the entire works of -Arleux, over which Marlborough had spent such pains, -entirely to the ground. This increased the Duke’s -ill-temper. He declared that he would avenge this -insult to his army, and renewed his menace of a direct -attack on the entrenchments. Villars now detached -<span class="sni">July 15/26.</span> -a force to make a diversion in Brabant; and this step -seemed to drive Marlborough distracted. Vowing that -he would check the march of this detachment, he sent -off ten thousand men under Lord Albemarle to Béthune, -<span class="sni">July 17/28.</span> -and the whole of his baggage and heavy artillery to -Douay. Having thus weakened an army already -inferior to that of the French, he repaired the roads -that led towards the enemy’s entrenchments, and on -the 1st of August, with much display of vindictiveness, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</span> -sulkiness, and general vexation, advanced one march -<span class="sni">July 21./Aug. 1.</span> -nearer to the lines, encamping between Houdain and -St. Pol. His army watched his proceedings with -amazement, for it had never expected such behaviour -from Corporal John.</p> - -<p>Villars meanwhile was in a transport of delight. -He drew every man, not only from all parts of the lines -but also from the neighbouring garrisons, towards the -threatened point, and asked nothing better than that -Marlborough should attack. In the height of exultation -he actually wrote to Versailles that he had brought -the Duke to his <i>ne plus ultra</i>. Marlborough’s strange -manner still remained the same. On the 2nd of August -<span class="sni">July 22./August 2.</span> -he advanced to within a league of the lines, his left -being opposite to Aubigny on the Upper Scarpe; and -during that day and the next set the whole of his -<span class="sni">July 23./August 3.</span> -cavalry to work to collect fascines. At nightfall of the -3rd he sent away all his light artillery, together with -every wheeled vehicle, under escort of a strong detachment, -and next morning rode forward with most of his -<span class="sni">July 24./August 4.</span> -generals to reconnoitre the eastern end of the lines. -Captain Parker of the Eighteenth Royal Irish, who had -obtained permission to ride with the Staff, was amazed -at the Duke’s demeanour. Marlborough had now -thrown off all his ill-temper and was calm and cool as -usual, indicating this point and that to his officers. -“Your brigade, General, will attack here, such and such -brigades will be on your right and left, such another in -support, and you will be careful of this, that, and -other.” The generals listened and stared; they understood -the instructions clearly enough, but they could not -help regarding them as madness. So the reconnaissance -proceeded, drearily enough, and was just concluding -when General Cadogan turned his horse, unnoticed, -out of the crowd, struck in his spurs and galloped -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</span> -back to camp at the top of his speed. Presently the -Duke also turned, and, riding back very slowly, issued -orders to prepare for a general attack on the morrow.</p> - -<p>At this all ranks of the army, from the general to -the drummer, fell into the deepest depression. Not a -man could fail to see that direct assault of the lines was -a hopeless enterprise at the best of times, and doubly -hopeless now that half of the army and the whole of the -artillery had been detached for other service. Again -the violent and unprecedented outburst of surliness and -ill-temper was difficult to explain; and the only possible -explanation was that the Duke, rendered desperate by -failure and misfortunes, had thrown prudence to the -winds and cared not what he did. A few only clung -faintly to the hope that the chief, who had led them so -often to victory, might still have some surprise in store -for them; but the most part gave themselves up for -lost, and lamented loudly that they should ever have -lived to see such a change come over the Old Corporal.</p> - -<p>So passed the afternoon among the tents of the -Allies; but meanwhile Cadogan with forty hussars at -his heels had long started from the camp and was -galloping hard across the plain of Lens to Douay, five -leagues away. There he found Hompesch ready with -his garrison, now strengthened by detachments from -Béthune and elsewhere to twelve thousand foot and -two thousand horse, and told him that the time was -come. Hompesch thereupon issued his orders for the -troops to be ready to march that night. Still the main -army under Marlborough knew nothing of this, and -passed the day in dismal apprehension till the sun -went down, and the drummers came forward to beat -tattoo. Then a column of cavalry trotted out westward, -attracting every French eye and stirring every French -brain with curiosity as to the purport of the movement. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</span> -The drums began to roll; and the order ran quietly -down the line to strike tents and prepare to march immediately.</p> - -<p>Never was command more welcome. Within an -hour all was ready and the army was formed into four -columns. The cavalry, having done their work of -distracting French vigilance to the wrong quarter, -returned unseen by the enemy; and at nine o’clock -the whole army faced to its left and marched off eastward -in utter silence, with Marlborough himself at the -head of the vanguard.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">July 24–25./August 4–5.</div> -<p> - The night was fine, and under the radiant moonlight -the men swung forward bravely hour after hour over -the plain of Lens. The moon paled; the dawn crept -up into the east throwing its ghastly light on the host -of weary, sleepless faces; and presently the columns -reached the Scarpe at Vitry. So far the march had -lasted eight hours, and fifteen miles had been passed. -Pontoon-bridges were already laid across the river, -and on the further bank, punctual to appointment, -stood Brigadier Sutton with the field-artillery. The -river was passed, and presently a messenger came -spurring from the east with a despatch for the Duke -of Marlborough. He read it; and words were passed -down the columns of march which filled them with -<span class="sni">July 25./August 5.</span> -new life. “Generals Cadogan and Hompesch” (such -was their purport) “crossed the causeway at Arleux -unopposed at three o’clock this morning, and are in -possession of the enemy’s lines. The Duke desires that -the infantry will step out.” The right wing of horse -halted to form the rearguard and bring up stragglers, -while a cloud of dust in the van told that the Duke -and fifty squadrons with him were pushing forward at -the trot. Then the infantry shook themselves up and -stepped out with a will.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</span></p> - -<p>Villars had received intelligence of Marlborough’s -march only two hours after he had started, but he was -so thoroughly bewildered by the Duke’s intricate -manœvres that he did not awake to the true position -until three hours later. Then, quite distracted, he put -himself at the head of the Household Cavalry and -galloped off at full speed. So furiously rode he that -he wore down all but a hundred of his troopers and -pushed on with these alone. But even so Marlborough -was before him. At eight o’clock he crossed the lower -causeway at Aubanchœuil-au-bac and passing his -cavalry over the Sensée barred the road from the west -by the village of Oisy. Presently Villars, advancing -reckless of all precautions, blundered into the middle -of the outposts. Before he could retire, his whole -escort was captured, and he himself only by miracle -escaped the same fate.</p> - -<p>The Marshal now looked anxiously for the arrival -of his main body of horse; but the Allied infantry had -caught sight of the French on the other side of the -Sensée, and, weary though they were, had braced -themselves to race them for the goal. Nevertheless -the severity of the march and the burden of their packs -began to tell heavily on the foot. Hundreds dropped -down unconscious, and many died there and then, but -they were left where they lay to await the arrival of the -rearguard; for no halt was called, and each regiment -pushed on as cheerfully as possible with such men as -still survived. Thus they were still ahead of the -French when they turned off to the causeway at Arleux, -and, Marlborough having thrown additional bridges -over the Sensée, they came quickly into their positions. -The right wing of infantry crossed the river about four -o’clock in the afternoon, having covered close upon -forty miles in eighteen hours; and by five o’clock the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</span> -whole force was drawn up between Oisy and the Scheldt -within striking distance of Arras, Cambrai, and Bouchain. -So vanished the ne plus ultra of Villars, a -warning to all generals who put their sole trust in -fortified lines.</p> - -<p>Marlborough halted for the next day to give his -troops rest and to allow the stragglers to come in. -Fully half the men of the infantry had fallen out, and -there were many who did not rejoin the army until the -third day. Villars on his side moved forward and -offered Marlborough battle under the walls of Cambrai; -but the Duke would not accept it, though the Dutch -deputies, perverse and treacherous to the last, tried -hard to persuade him. Had the deputies marched in -the ranks of the infantry with muskets on their shoulders -and a kit of fifty pounds’ weight on their backs, they -would have been less eager for the fray. Marlborough’s -own design, long matured in his own mind, was the -capture of Bouchain, and his only fear was lest Villars -should cross the Scheldt before him and prevent it. -The deputies, however, who had been so anxious to -hurry the army into an engagement under every possible -disadvantage, shrank from the peril of a siege carried -on by an inferior under the eyes of a superior force. -But Marlborough, even if he had not been able to -adduce Lille as a precedent, was determined to have -his own way, and carried his point. At noon on the -<span class="sni">July 27./August 7.</span> -7th of August he marched down almost within cannon-shot -of Cambrai, ready to fall on Villars should he -attempt to pass the Scheldt, halted until his pontoon-bridges -had been laid a few miles further down the -stream, and then gradually withdrawing his troops -threw the whole of them across the river unmolested.</p> - -<p>It is hardly credible that a vast number of foolish -civilians, Dutch, Austrian, and even English, blamed -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</span> -Marlborough for declining battle before Cambrai, and -that he was actually obliged to explain why he refused -to sacrifice the fruit of his manœvres by attacking a -superior force in a strong position with an army not -only smaller in numbers at its best, but much thinned -by a forced march and exhausted by fatigue. “I -despair of being ever able to please all men,” he wrote. -“Those who are capable of judging will be satisfied -with my endeavours: others I leave to their own -reflections, and go on with the discharge of my duty.”</p> - -<p>It is possible that Villars only refrained from -hindering Marlborough’s passage of the Scheldt in -deference to orders from Versailles, of which the Duke -was as well aware as himself; but it is more than doubtful -whether he ever intended the British to capture -Bouchain. Though inferior in numbers, however, -Marlborough covered himself so skilfully with entrenchments -that Villars could not hinder him, while all -attempts at diversion were met so readily that not one -<span class="sni">Sept. 2/13.</span> -of them succeeded. Finally, the garrison surrendered -as prisoners of war under the very eyes of Villars. The -Duke would have followed up his success by the siege -of Quesnoi, the town before which English troops first -came under the fire of cannon in the year of Crecy; but -by this time Lewis, with the help of the contemptible -Harley, had succeeded in detaching England from -the Grand Alliance. Though, therefore, the English -ministers continued to encourage Marlborough in his -operations, in order to conceal their own infamous -conduct from the Allies, yet they took good care that -those operations should proceed no further. So with -the capture of Bouchain the last and not the least -remarkable of Marlborough’s campaigns came, always -victoriously, to an end.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="camp1744"> -CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–1748<br /> -VOL. II. BOOK VII. CHAPTER V</h2> -</div> - -<p class="noindent">However fortunate might be the issue of Dettingen, -it served at least its purpose in preventing the despatch of French -reinforcements to the Danube and to Bohemia; and the campaign of 1743 -closed with the utter collapse of Belleisle’s great schemes and with the -expulsion of the French from Germany. It was now clear that the war -would be carried on in the familiar cockpit of the Austrian Netherlands. -Such a theatre was convenient for France, since it lay close to her own -borders, and convenient for the Allies, because the Dutch had at last -been persuaded to join them, and because the British would be brought -nearer to their base at Ostend. Marshal Saxe, whose fine talent had -hitherto been wasted under incompetent French Generals in Bohemia, was -appointed to the chief command of the French in Flanders; and every -effort was made to give him a numerous and well-equipped army, and to -enable him to open his campaign in good time.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1744.</div> -<p> -In England the preparations by no means corresponded -with the necessities of the position. The -estimates indeed provided for a force of twenty-one -thousand British in Flanders in 1744 as against sixteen -thousand in the previous year, but only at the cost of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</span> -depleting the weak garrison left in England; for the -actual number of men voted for the two years was -the same. All British officers of experience strongly -urged upon the Government the importance of being -first in the field,<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" -class="fnanchor">[68]</a> but, when an army was to be made -up in different proportions of English, Dutch, Germans -and Austrians, it needed a Marlborough to bring the -discordant Courts into harmony as well as to make -ready the troops for an early campaign. By the -beginning of April eighty thousand French soldiers -had marched from their winter quarters, and were -concentrated on the frontier between the Scheldt and -the Sambre, while the Allies were still scattered about -in cantonments, not exceeding even then a total -strength of fifty-live thousand men. Wade, the English -commander, delayed first by confusion at home and -next by contrary winds, was still in England while -the French were concentrating, and not a single -English recruit, to repair the losses of the past campaign, -had arrived in Flanders. Then arose disputes -as to the disposition of the Allied forces, both Austrians -and Dutch being nervously apprehensive of leaving -their towns on the frontier without garrisons. When -in the second week in May the Allied Army was at -last collected close to Brussels, it was still weaker by -twenty thousand men than it should have been, and -found itself confronted with the task of holding -Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and the Sambre against -a superior force of French.<a id="FNanchor_69" -href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> May passed away and -June came, but the Allies remained helpless and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</span> -motionless in their camp, while Saxe, after a short -march westward, turned north and advanced steadily -between the Scheldt and the Lys. His principal -object was not very difficult to divine. By the middle -of June his detachments had seized Ypres and Fort -Knock, which commanded the canal from Nieuport -to Ypres, thus cutting off the British from one of their -bases on the coast. It remained to be seen whether -he would aim next at Ostend, where the whole of the -British stores of ordnance were accumulated, or -whether he would attempt Bruges and Ghent in -order to secure the navigation of the Bruges Canal -as well as of the Scheldt and Lys. Again, it was -always open to him, if he pleased, to besiege Tournay, -a fortress which the Allies would not willingly lose. -Thus the problem set to the Allies was not easy of -solution; but of all solutions they chose the worst. -The Dutch and Austrians could not bear the notion -of forsaking any one of their darling strongholds, -and insisted that the strength of the army should -be frittered away in providing weak garrisons for -the defence of all.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" -class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Wade, to do him justice, was -for keeping all the troops together, crossing the Scheldt, -and taking up a strong position to cover Ghent; -but the Austrians would not consent, lest they should -expose Brussels.<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" -class="fnanchor">[71]</a> Wade was certainly not a strong -man, but he must not be too hardly judged. Marlborough -had spent the most anxious days of all his -campaigns in distraction between the safety of Ghent -and of Brussels, and had only extricated himself by -the march that preceded the battle of Oudenarde.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</span></p> - -<p>Meanwhile King George had been exerting himself -with great energy, though two months too late, to -provide Wade with additional troops, both British -and Dutch, and had begged that Prince Charles of -Lorraine might cross the Rhine with his whole army, -and direct the operations in Flanders as Commander-in-Chief -of all the Allies. It was a wise step in every -way, since the Prince’s relationship to Queen Maria -Theresa assured to him the seniority in rank which -was needed to hold so heterogeneous a host in coherence. -Prince Charles did his share of the work -<span class="sni">July.</span> -admirably, forcing his passage across the Rhine with -great skill in the face of the French, and taking up -a strong position on the frontier of Alsace. A few -days later the British reinforcements reached Wade, -and King George issued positive orders to him to take -the offensive and “commence hostilities of all kinds.”<a -id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> - -<p>It seemed, indeed, as if the time were come for -pressing home upon the French; but just at this -critical moment Frederick of Prussia intervened in -favour of France, and, by a threat to invade Bohemia, -brought Prince Charles back quickly over the Rhine. -None the less Wade and his fellows held a council of -war and resolved to bring Saxe to action if possible. -<span class="sni">July 20/31.</span> -King George gave his gracious approval to their plan, -and on the 31st of July the Allies turned westward -and crossed the Scheldt. It still remained to be seen, -however, whether Saxe would allow an action to be -forced on him; for he lay now, entrenched to the -teeth, on the Lys between Menin and Courtrai, which -was a pretty clear indication that he would not. At -this moment Lord Stair, who had followed the course -of operations carefully from England, came forward, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</span> -like a true pupil of Marlborough, with a new plan of -campaign. His advice was that the Allies should -turn Saxe’s tactics against himself. They should -march south to Orchies, between Lille and Tournay, -and there encamp, where they would be within reach -of half-a-dozen French fortified towns. The French -would not dare to leave the fortresses defenceless; -and the garrisons necessary to render them secure -would absorb the whole of their force in the field. -Then the Allies could send detachments into France -and lay Picardy under contribution, or possibly carry -out the plan, rejected two years before, of a march to -the Seine. The King of Prussia’s action only made -some bold stroke of the kind the more imperative.<a -id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> - -<p>Stair had gained over the Austrian general D’Arenberg -to this project in 1742; but it was hardly likely -to be accepted by him now. Carteret, in forwarding -Stair’s memorandum to Wade, gave him no positive -orders except at least to do something; but poor -Wade found it impossible to make the Austrians do -anything. The Allies having crossed the Scheldt -halted inactive for weeks, and no persuasion could -induce D’Arenberg to move. At last the army did -march down to the plains of Lille, but without its -artillery, so that it could not be said seriously to -threaten the French fortresses. The Dutch and Austrians -had undertaken to furnish a siege-train, but -had taken no step to procure one of the ten thousand -horses that were required to transport it. After a -short sojourn in the south the Allies marched helplessly -northward once more. August passed away and -September came, but even in the fourth month of the -campaign the Dutch and Austrians were still without -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</span> -their artillery.<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" -class="fnanchor">[74]</a> Wade boldly proposed to force -Saxe’s lines on the Lys: the Austrians refused. He -proposed to pounce on a detachment of fourteen -thousand men, which Saxe had imprudently isolated -from his main army: D’Arenberg carefully sent a -weak body of cavalry to reveal to the detachment the -danger of its position. Finally, in the first week of -October the Allies retired into winter-quarters, which -was precisely the object for which D’Arenberg had -been working from the first. Despite of the English -subsidies, he had no money with which to pay his -troops, and he wished to spare the Austrian Netherlands -the burden of furnishing forage and contributions. -Wade, sick in body and distressed in mind, at once -resigned his command. He had had enough of the -Austrian alliance, and King George before long was -to have enough of it also.<a id="FNanchor_75" -href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p> - -<p>Once again, despite the endless length to which -the war was dragging on, the establishment of the -British forces remained virtually unaugmented for -the year 1745. The troops allotted for service in -Flanders were indeed raised to a strength of twenty-five -thousand men, but this was effected only by -<span class="sni">1745.</span> -reducing the garrison of Great Britain to fifteen -thousand, which, as events were to prove before the -year’s end, created a situation of perilous weakness. -Moreover, the past campaign had revealed a failing -in one of the confederated powers which was hardly -less serious than the impecuniosity and selfishness of -Austria. The Dutch army, which under Marlborough -had done such brilliant service, was become hopelessly -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</span> -inefficient. The competition of rival demagogues -for popular favour had reduced it to such weakness -in numbers, that it hardly sufficed to find efficient -garrisons for the fortified towns. Concurrently its -discipline had suffered; and General Ligonier had -already complained that the Dutch troops which -served with the Allies in 1744 were intolerably insubordinate -and disorderly, setting a bad example to the -whole army.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" -class="fnanchor">[76]</a> In February 1745 Ligonier again -brought the matter to the notice of the English -Government. The Dutch, he said, would probably -keep all their men in garrison, and, if the Allies were -so weak that they could only find garrisons for the -fortresses on the frontier, the French would be free -to go where they pleased. It would be far better, -therefore, to make a great effort, collect a hundred -thousand men, take the offensive, and end the war -in a single campaign. Ten thousand men would be -required to guard the line of the Bruges Canal, and -the remainder should besiege Maubeuge and Landrecies -and enter France by the line of the Sambre, making -the Meuse the main line of communication, as open -alike to the passage of reinforcements from England, -from Holland, and from Germany.<a id="FNanchor_77" -href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> Such counsel -was not likely to find acceptance with the men who -had mismanaged the war so far. One important -change, however, was made by the appointment of -the Duke of Cumberland to be Commander-in-Chief -in Flanders, and also in Great Britain.<a id="FNanchor_78" -href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> The Duke -at the time of this promotion still wanted a month -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</span> -to complete his twenty-fifth year, but he had from -his boyhood been an enthusiastic soldier, he had -studied his profession, he had shown bravery at Dettingen, -and, young though he might be, he was older -than Condé had been when he first gained military -fame. Finally, it was an immense advantage that a -Prince of a reigning family should preside over so -motley an army as that of the Allies, since there would -be the less disposition to cavil at his authority.</p> - -<p>Cumberland entered upon his work energetically -enough, crossed over to Flanders early in April, made -all his arrangements for concentration at Brussels on -the 2nd of May, and actually began his march southward -<span class="sni">April 22./May 3.</span> -on the following day.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" -class="fnanchor">[79]</a> Even so, however, -Marshal Saxe had taken the field before him, assembling -his troops in Hainault, as in the previous year, -so that it was impossible to divine which of the fortresses -of the barrier he might intend to attack. After -a feint which pointed to the siege of Mons, he marched -<span class="sni">Apr. 19/30.</span> -rapidly upon Tournay and invested it on the 30th of -April, screening his movements so skilfully with his -cavalry that not a word as to his operations reached -Cumberland until nearly a week later. Cumberland, -after leaving Soignies on the 3rd of May, moved slowly -south-westward by Cambron, Maulbay, and Leuse, -<span class="sni">April 28./May 9.</span> -and arrived on the evening of the 9th at Brissoel, -within sight of Saxe’s army. The ground immediately -in front of the Allies was broken by little copses, -woods, and enclosures, all of them crammed with -mercenary irregular troops—Pandours, Grassins, and -the like—which, imitated first from the Austrians, -had by this time become a necessary part of the French -as of every army. Beyond this broken ground a -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</span> -wide plain swept in a gentle, almost unbroken slope -to the village of Fontenoy, which formed the centre -of Saxe’s position. The advanced parties of irregulars, -together with twelve squadrons drawn up on the -slope before Fontenoy, forbade Cumberland’s further -advance for that day, and the Allies encamped for -the night. Headquarters were fixed at Maubray, a -village in full sight of Fontenoy, and a bare mile and a -half to the south-eastward of the French camp.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 29./May 10.</div> -<p> -On the next day the French advanced posts were -pushed out of the copses, and Cumberland, together -with the Prince of Waldeck and the Count of -Königseck, who commanded the Dutch and the -Austrians respectively, went forward to reconnoitre -the position. Saxe’s army occupied the crest of the -slope, lying astride of the two roads that lead from -Condé and from Leuse to Tournay. His right rested -on the village of Anthoin and on the Scheldt, the -tower of Anthoin Castle marking the western boundary -of his position with clearness enough. From thence -his line extended due east along the crest of the height -for about a mile to the village of Fontenoy. A few -hundred yards before Fontenoy stands the hamlet -of Bourgeon, but this was now veiled in smoke and -flame, having been fired by the Pandours as they retired. -From Anthoin to Fontenoy Saxe’s front faced -due south, but eastward from Fontenoy it turned back -almost at right angles to the forest of Barry and the -village of Ramecroix, fronting considerably to eastward -of south. The village of Vezon, however, which -lies in the same straight line with Fontenoy, due east -of Anthoin, was also occupied by the French as an -advanced post. This was quickly cleared by Cumberland’s -troops, and the Allied Generals completed -their reconnaissance. Saxe’s position was undoubtedly -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</span> -strong by nature and had been strengthened still -further by art. Beyond Anthoin the French right -flank was secured by a battery erected on the western -bank of the Scheldt, while the village itself was entrenched, -and held by two brigades. Between Anthoin -and Fontenoy three redoubts had been constructed, -and the space was defended by three brigades of -infantry backed by eight squadrons of horse. Fontenoy -itself had been fortified with works and cannon, and -made as strong as possible; and from Fontenoy to -the forest of Barry ran a double line of entrenchments, -the first line held by nine and the second by -eleven battalions of infantry. At the edge of the -forest of Barry were two more redoubts, the foremost -of them called the Redoubt d’Eu, both armed -with cannon to sweep the open space between the -forest and Fontenoy; in rear of the forest were posted -nine more battalions, and in rear of all two strong -lines of cavalry. The flower of the French army, -both horse and foot, was stationed in this space on -Saxe’s left, for the English had the right of the line -in the Allied Army, and Saxe knew the reputation of -the red-coats.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</span></p> - -<p>The Allied Generals decided to attack on the following -day. Königseck, it is said, was for harassing -Saxe’s communications and compelling him to raise -the siege of Tournay; but, finding himself overruled -by Cumberland and by Waldeck, he gave way. -Cumberland’s force was decidedly inferior in numbers, -being less than fifty thousand against fifty-six thousand -men, but he was young and impetuous, and -had been strongly impressed by the disastrous inaction -of the preceding campaign. It was agreed that the -Dutch and Austrians should assail the French centre -and right, the Dutch in particular being responsible -for Fontenoy, while the British attacked the French -left between that village and the forest of Barry.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Fontenoy"> - <a href="images/fontenoyxx.jpg" id="Fontenoyback"> - <img class="double" src="images/fontenoy.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Fontenoy, -April 30<sup>th</sup> / May 11<sup>th</sup> 1745</p> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">April 30./May 11.</div> -<p> -At two o’clock on the following morning the -British began to move out of their camp upon Vezon, -the cavalry leading. The advance took much time, -for there were many narrow lanes to be traversed before -the force could debouch upon the slope, and, when the -slope was passed, it was still necessary to defile through -the village of Vezon. Cumberland’s order of attack -was simple. Brigadier Ingoldsby, with the Twelfth -and Thirteenth Foot, the Forty-second Highlanders, -a Hanoverian battalion, and three six-pounder cannon, -was to assault the Redoubt d’Eu on the right flank -of the line of the British advance, and to carry it with -the bayonet. The remainder of the infantry was -simply to march up across the thousand yards of open -ground between it and Fontenoy and sweep the enemy -out of their entrenchments.</p> - -<p>Before five o’clock the advanced squadrons of the -British horse, fifteen in all, under General Campbell, -had passed through Vezon and deployed in the plain -beyond, to cover the formation of the infantry for the -attack. The French batteries in Fontenoy and the -redoubt at once opened fire on them, but the cavalry -endured the fire for an hour unmoved, until at length -a shot carried away General Campbell’s leg. The -gallant veteran, who had fought at Malplaquet and -was now seventy-eight years of age, was carried dying -from the field, full of lamentation that he could take -no further part in the action. No one but himself -seems to have known for what purpose his squadrons -had been brought forward, and accordingly after his -fall they were withdrawn. The infantry then moved -up to the front, where General Ligonier proceeded to -form them in two lines, without further interruption, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</span> -to use his own simple words, than a lively and murderous -cannonade from the French. Cumberland -meanwhile ordered up seven six-pounders to the right -of the British front, which quickly came into action. -Conspicuous before the French front rode an officer -on a white horse, and the English gunners at once -began to lay wagers who should kill him. The second -or third shot brought the white charger to the ground, -and his rider was carried, shattered and dying, to the -rear. He was Count Grammont, the gallant but -thoughtless officer who had spoiled the combinations -of Noailles at Dettingen. Then, turning to their -more legitimate work, the gunners quickly made -their presence felt among the French field-batteries; -but the round shot never ceased to plough into the -scarlet ranks of the British from Fontenoy and from -the Redoubt d’Eu. Ligonier’s two lines of infantry -were soon formed, with the cavalry in two more lines -in their rear; and the General presently sent word -to Cumberland that he was ready to advance as soon -as Waldeck should lead his Dutch against Fontenoy. -The name of the aide-de-camp who carried this message -should not be omitted, for he was Captain Jeffery -Amherst of the First Guards.</p> - -<p>Thereupon the Dutch and Austrians, in the centre -and left, advanced against Fontenoy and Anthoin, but -flinching from the fire in front, and above all from that -in their flank from the battery on the other side of the -Scheldt, soon shrank back under cover and could not -be induced to move forward again.<a id="FNanchor_80" -href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> Worst of all, -the Dutch cavalry was smitten with panic, galloped -back on to the top of some of the British squadrons, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</span> -and fled away wildly to Hal crying out that all was -lost. Things therefore went ill on the Allied left; -and meanwhile on the right there was enacted a blunder -still more fatal. For Ingoldsby, misconceiving his -instructions, hesitated to make his attack on the -Redoubt d’Eu, and despite repeated orders from -Cumberland never delivered it at all. Cumberland, -however, was impatient. Without further delay he -placed himself at the head of the British, who were -standing as Ligonier had arrayed them, in most beautiful -order. In the first line, counting from right to -left, stood a battalion of the First Guards, another -of the Scots Guards, and another of the Coldstream, -the First, Twenty-first, Thirty-first, Eighth, Twenty-fifth, -Thirty-third, and Nineteenth; in the second -line the Buffs occupied the post of honour on the -right, and next to them came in succession the Twenty-third, -Thirty-second, Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth, -and Twentieth. Certain Hanoverian battalions -joined them on the extreme left. The drums beat, -the men shouldered arms, and the detachments harnessed -themselves to the two light field-guns that -accompanied each battalion. Ingoldsby saw what -was going forward and aligned his battalions with -them on the right. Then the word was given to -advance, and the two lines moved off with the slow -and measured step for which they were famous in -Europe.</p> - -<p>Forward tramped the ranks of scarlet, silent and -stately as if on parade. Full half a mile of ground was -to be traversed before they could close with the invisible -enemy that awaited them in the entrenchments -over the crest of the slope, and the way was marked -clearly by the red flashes and puffs of white smoke that -leaped from Fontenoy and the Redoubt d’Eu on either -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</span> -flank. The shot plunged fiercely and more fiercely -into the serried lines as they advanced into that -murderous cross-fire, but the gaping ranks were quietly -closed, the perfect order was never lost, the stately -step was never hurried. Only the Hanoverians in -the second line, finding that they were cramped for -space, dropped back quietly and decorously, and -marched on in third line behind the British. Silent -and inexorable the scarlet lines strode on. They came -abreast of village and redoubt, and the shot which had -hitherto swept away files now swept away ranks. -Then the first line passed beyond redoubt and village, -and the French cannon took it in reverse. The gaps -grew wider and more frequent, the front grew narrower -as the men closed up, but still the proud battalions -advanced, strewing the sward behind them with -scarlet, like some mass of red blossom that floats -down a lazy stream and sheds its petals as it goes.</p> - -<p>At last the crest of the ridge was gained and the -ranks of the French battalions came suddenly into view -little more than a hundred yards distant, their coats -alone visible behind the breastwork. Next to the -forest of Barry, and exposed to the extreme right of -the British, a line of red showed the presence of the -Swiss Guards; next to them stood a line of blue, the -four battalions of the French Guards, and next to the -Guards a line of white, the regiments of Courtin, -Aubeterre, and of the King, the choicest battalions -of the French Army. Closer and closer came the -British, still with arms shouldered, always silent, -always with the same slow, measured tread, till they -had advanced to within fifty yards of the French. -Then at length Lord Charles Hay of the First Guards -stepped forward with flask in hand, and doffing his -hat drank politely to his enemies. “I hope, gentlemen,” -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</span> -he shouted, “that you are going to wait for -us to-day and not swim the Scheldt as you swam the -Main at Dettingen. Men of the King’s company,” -he continued, turning round to his own people, “these -are the French Guards, and I hope you are going to -beat them to-day”; and the English Guards answered -with a cheer. The French officers hurried to the front, -for the appearance of the British was a surprise to -them, and called for a cheer in reply. But only a -half-hearted murmur came from the French ranks, which -quickly died away and gave place to a few sharp -words of command; for the British were now within -thirty yards. “For what we are about to receive may -the Lord make us truly thankful,” murmured an -English Guardsman as he looked down the barrels of -the French muskets, but before his comrades round -him had done laughing the French Guards had fired; -and the turn of the British had come at last.<a -id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a></p> - -<p>For despite of that deadly march through the cross-fire -of the French batteries to the muzzles of the French -muskets, the scarlet ranks still glared unbroken through -the smoke; and now the British muskets, so long -shouldered, were levelled, and with crash upon crash -the volleys rang out from end to end of the line, first -the First Guards, then the Coldstreams, then the Scots, -and so through brigade after brigade, two battalions -loading while the third fired, a ceaseless, rolling, infernal -fire. Down dropped the whole of the French front -rank, blue coats, red coats and white, before the storm. -Nineteen officers and six hundred men of the French -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</span> -and Swiss Guards fell at the first discharge; regiment -Courtin was crushed out of existence; regiment -Aubeterre, striving hard to stem the tide, was swept -aside by a single imperious volley which laid half of its -men on the ground. The British infantry were perfectly -in hand; their officers could be seen coolly -tapping the muskets of the men with their canes so -that every discharge might be low and deadly; while -the battalion-guns also poured in round after round -of grape with terrible effect. The first French line -was utterly shattered and broken. Even while the -British were advancing, Saxe had brought up additional -troops to meet them and had posted regiments -Couronne and Soissonois in rear of the King’s regiment, -and the Brigade Royal in rear of the French Guards; -but all alike went down before the irresistible volleys. -The red-coats continued their triumphant advance for -full three hundred yards into the heart of the French -camp, and old Ligonier’s heart leaped within him, for -he thought that the battle was won.</p> - -<p>Saxe for his part thought little differently from -Ligonier; but though half dead with dropsy, reduced -to suck a bullet to assuage his intolerable thirst, so -weak that he could not ride but was carried about the -field in a wicker litter, the gallant German never for a -moment lost his head. Sending a message to the -French King, who with the Dauphin was watching the -action from a windmill in the rear, to retire across the -Scheldt without delay, he strove to gain time to rally -his infantry. On the first repulse of the French Guards -Cumberland had detached two battalions to help the -Dutch by a flanking attack on Fontenoy. Seeing that -this movement must be checked at all hazards, Saxe -headed these troops back by a charge of cavalry; -whereupon one of the battalions extended itself along -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</span> -the left flank of the British. Partly in this way, partly -owing to the incessant play of the French artillery on -both flanks, the two British lines assumed the form of -two huge oblong columns which gradually became -welded into one. The change was not untimely, for -now the first line of the French cavalry, which had -been posted in rear of the forest of Barry, came down -upon the British at full gallop, only to reel back -shivered to fragments by the same terrible fire. Then -the second line tried its fortune, but met with no better -fate. Finally, the Household Cavalry, the famous -Maison du Roi, burning with all the ardour of Dettingen -unavenged, was launched against the scarlet columns, -and like its predecessors, came flying back, a mob of -riderless horses and uncontrollable men, decimated, -shattered and repulsed by the never-ending fire. “It -was like charging two flaming fortresses rather than -two columns of infantry.”<a id="FNanchor_82" -href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> - -<p>Nevertheless some time was hereby gained for the -broken French infantry to re-form. The British, once -arrived within the French camp, came to a halt, and -looked at last to see how the Dutch were faring on -their left. As has already been told, Waldeck’s attack -had been a total failure, and the British, unsupported -and always under a cross-fire of artillery, fell back to -the crest of the ridge and were re-formed for a second -attack. Waldeck undertook to make another attempt -on Fontenoy, and Cumberland, in reliance upon his -help, again advanced at the head of the British. But -meanwhile Saxe had brought forward his reserves from -Ramecroix, and among them the Irish brigade, to meet -him, while artillery had also been brought up from -the French right to play upon the British front. The -French Guards and the rest of the troops of the French -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</span> -first line had also been rallied, and the task of the -British was well-nigh desperate. The Irish brigade, -which consisted of six battalions, was made up not of -Irish only but of Scots and English also, desperate -characters who went into action with a rope round -their necks, and would fight like devils. Yet, even -in this second attack the British carried their advance -as far as in the first, the perfection of their fire-discipline -enabling them to beat back even the Irish brigade for -a time. But their losses had been frightfully heavy; -the Dutch would not move one foot to the attack of -Fontenoy, and the cannonade in front added to that -in the flanks became unendurable. The French -infantry likewise closed round on them in superior -numbers on both flanks, and it became apparent that -there was nothing for it but a retreat.</p> - -<p>Ligonier sent back two battalions to secure the -roads leading through Vezon, and the retreat then -began in perfectly good order. The French Household -Cavalry made a furious charge upon the rear of the -column as it faced about, but found to its cost that -the infernal fire was not yet quenched. The three -battalions of Guards and a battalion of Hanoverians -turned sternly about to meet them, and gave them a -few parting volleys, which wholly extinguished one -regiment and brought down every officer of another. -A few British squadrons, the Blues conspicuous among -them, pushed forward, in spite of heavy losses, through -the cross-fire to lend what help they could, and the -remnant of the heroic battalions retired, facing about -in succession at every hundred yards, as steadily and -proudly as they had advanced.</p> - -<p>Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of -the fifteen thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, -for the Hanoverians bore themselves not less nobly -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</span> -than their Allies, nearly six thousand were killed or -wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions -just exceeding four thousand men. The -heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth and Twenty-third -regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men, -the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather -fewer than three hundred men apiece, and the three -battalions of Guards, which lost each of them about -two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot, -Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though -in the hottest of the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of -the rest were either killed or wounded. Many regiments -of cavalry also suffered not a little, in particular -the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of -the British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and -six hundred horses. The loss of the French was never -made public, but was certainly at least equal to that -of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, -with no great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. -As an example of the prowess of British infantry, -Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel in its -history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of -artillery, remained halted under the same fire, advanced -slowly for half a mile in perfect order under the same -fire, and marched up to within pistol-shot of the -French infantry to receive their volley before they -discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions -to pieces, repulsed three separate attacks of -cavalry, halted under a heavy cannonade, retired for -some distance and re-formed under a cross-fire, advanced -again with both artillery and musketry playing -on front and flanks, made the bravest brigade in the -French service recoil, repelled another desperate -attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly under -a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</span> -British commanders it was Ingoldsby’s misunderstanding -of his orders and his failure to capture the -Redoubt d’Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby was -duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He -was, however, acquitted of all but an error in judgment; -and indeed there was no question of cowardice, for he -accompanied the remainder of the infantry in its -advance with his own detachment and was severely -wounded. It is customary to blame Cumberland for -dashing his head against a wall in attempting such an -attack; and no doubt he was guilty of a tactical -blunder in assaulting a re-entrant angle before the -salient had been carried. But he could hardly have -been expected to count on such bad luck as the failure -of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on the -other. The sheer audacity of his advance went near -to give him the victory. Saxe owned that he never -dreamed that any General would attempt such a stroke, -or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland is -blamed also for not attacking either the Redoubt d’Eu -or Fontenoy after he had penetrated into the French -camp. This charge is less easy to rebut, for the French -always know when they are beaten, and seeing their -left rolled up and troops advancing on Fontenoy in -flank and rear would probably have given up the game -for lost, and that the more readily since their ammunition -in Fontenoy was for the moment nearly exhausted. -Even so, however, Saxe’s reserves were always at hand -at Ramecroix, and would have required to be held in -check. Another puzzling question, namely, why Cumberland -did not make greater use of his artillery in the -action, is answered by the fact that the contractors for -the horsing of the guns ran off with the horses early in -the day. Such an occurrence was by no means unusual, -and yet it never happened to Marlborough, not -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</span> -even at Malplaquet. Altogether, the conclusion seems -to be that Cumberland stumbled on to a brilliant feat -of arms by mistake, and, though seconded by his -troops with bravery equal to his own, was not a -General of sufficient capacity to turn his success to -account.</p> - -<p>At the close of the action Cumberland retreated to -Ath and encamped under the guns of that fortress, -leaving his wounded to the mercy of the French, who, -by a strange perversion of their usual chivalry, treated -them with shameful barbarity. Among the wounded, -strangely enough, were a few of the new sect of -Methodists founded by John Wesley, who faced death -and wounds with the stern exultation that had once -inspired the troopers of Cromwell. One of them wrote -to Wesley that, even after a bullet in each arm had -forced him to retire from the field, he hardly knew -whether he was on earth or in heaven, such was the -sweetness of the day. This man and a few more of -his kind probably helped their fellow-sufferers through -the misery of the days following the battle, until -Cumberland’s furious remonstrances with Saxe procured -for them better treatment.</p> - -<p>From Ath Cumberland fell back to Lessines and -drew out such British corps as were in garrison in -Flanders, to replace those which had suffered most -heavily in the action. Meanwhile Tournay, very -shortly after the battle, fell by treachery into the -hands of the French; and Saxe’s field-army being -thus raised to a force nearly double that of the Allies, -Cumberland was reduced to utter helplessness. The -mischief of Fontenoy lay not in the repulse and the -loss of men, for the British did not consider themselves -to have been beaten, but in the destruction of all -confidence in the Dutch troops. The troubles which -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</span> -had harassed Wade to despair now reappeared. Cumberland, -notwithstanding his inferiority in strength, -was expected somehow to defend Flanders, Brabant, -and above all Brussels, and yet simultaneously to -keep an active army in the field. Worse than this, he -attempted to fulfil the expectation. Against his better -judgment he weakened his force still further by detaching -a force for the garrison of Mons,<a id="FNanchor_83" -href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> after which, -instead of taking up a strong position on the Scheldt -to cover Ghent at all hazards, he yielded to the pressure -of the Austrians and crossed the Dender to protect -Brussels.<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" -class="fnanchor">[84]</a> Halting too long between two opinions he -at last sent off a detachment for the defence of Ghent, -half of which was cut off and driven back with heavy -loss, while the other half, after enduring much rough -usage on the march, entered Ghent only to see the town -<span class="sni">June 30./July 11.</span> -surprised by the French on the following day. Four -British regiments took part in this unlucky enterprise -and suffered severely, while the Royal Scots and the -Twenty-third, which had been despatched to Ghent -after Fontenoy, of course became prisoners.<a -id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> -Moreover, a vast quantity of British military stores were -captured in Ghent, although Cumberland had a week -before ordered that they should be removed.<a -id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> After -this blow Cumberland retired to Vilvorde, a little to -the north of Brussels, still hoping to cover both that -city and Antwerp, and so to preserve his communications -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</span> -both with Germany and with the sea. Here again -he sacrificed his better judgment to the clamour of the -Austrians, for he would much have preferred to secure -Antwerp only. His position was in fact most critical, -and he was keenly alive to it.<a id="FNanchor_87" -href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> Just when his anxiety -was greatest there came a letter from the Secretary -of State, announcing that invasion of England was -imminent, and hoping that troops could be spared from -Flanders without prejudice to his operations. “What!” -answered Ligonier indignantly; “are you aware that -the enemy has seventy thousand men against our -thirty thousand, and that they can place a superior -force on the canal before us and send another army -round between us and Antwerp, to cut off our supplies -and force us to fight at a disadvantage? This is our -<span class="sni">August.</span> -position, and this is the result of providing His Royal -Highness with insufficient troops; and yet you speak -of our having a corps to spare to defend England!” -<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> -</p> - -<p>Saxe’s plan for reducing the Allies was in fact -uniformly the same throughout the whole of the war, -namely to cut off their communications with the sea on -one side and with Germany on the other. Even before -he began to press Cumberland northward toward -Antwerp, he had detached a force to lay siege to -Ostend, which was the English base. Cumberland, on -his side, had advised that the dykes should be broken -down and the country inundated in order to preserve -it, and both Dutch and Austrians had promised that -this should be done; but as usual it was not done, -<span class="sni">Aug. 13/24.</span> -and before the end of August Ostend had surrendered -to the French. The English base was then perforce -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</span> -shifted to Antwerp. But by this time the requests -for the return of troops to England had become urgent -and imperative orders. First ten battalions were -<span class="sni">Sept.–Oct.</span> -recalled, then the rest of the foot, and at last practically -the whole of the army, including Cumberland himself.<a -id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a> -The cause was the Jacobite rebellion which was -stamped out by the victory of Culloden in April 1746.</p> - -<p class="addendum"><span class="smcap">Authorities.</span>—The official -account of Fontenoy was drawn up by Ligonier in French and translated -into English, with some omissions, for publication. The French version -is far the better and will be found in the State Papers. The account in -the <i>Life of the Duke of Cumberland</i> is poor, though valuable as -having been drawn up from the reports of the English Generals. Of the -French accounts Voltaire’s is the best known, and, as might be expected -from such a hand, admirably spirited. More valuable are the accounts in -the <i>Conquête des Pays Bas</i>, in the <i>Mémoires du Maréchal de -Saxe</i>, where Saxe’s own report may be read, in the <i>Campagnes des -Pays Bas</i>, and in Espagnac. The newspapers furnish a few picturesque -incidents of some value.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="camp1746">VOL. II BOOK VII. CHAPTER VII</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1746.</div> -<p> -The virtual evacuation of the Low Countries by the -British, in consequence of the Jacobite Rebellion, was -an advantage too obvious to be overlooked by the -French. At the end of January, though winter-quarters -were not yet broken up, they severed the -communication between Antwerp and Brussels, and a -week later took the town of Brussels itself by escalade. -The citadel, after defending itself for a fortnight, -went the way of the town, and the capital of the -Spanish Netherlands was turned into a French place -of arms.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" -class="fnanchor">[90]</a> The consternation in Holland was great, -and was increased when the French presently besieged -<span class="sni">May 20/31.</span> -and captured Antwerp. Meanwhile the British Commander, -Lord Dunmore, who had been left in the -Netherlands with a few squadrons of cavalry, could -only look on in absolute helplessness. It was not -until June that the Hessian troops in British pay and -a few British battalions could be embarked, together -with General Ligonier to command them, from England; -and it was not until July, owing to foul winds, that -they were finally landed at Williamstadt. The change -of base was significant in itself, for, since the capture -of Ostend and Antwerp, there was no haven for British -ships except in the United Provinces. Even after -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</span> -the disembarkation these forces were found to be still -unready to take the field. The Hessians had not a -grain of powder among them, and there were neither -horses for the artillery nor waggons for the baggage. -Again, to add small difficulties to great, the Austrian -General, Batthyany, having no British officer as his -peer in command, denied to the British troops the place -of honour at the right of the line. It was a trifling -matter, but yet sufficient to embarrass counsel, destroy -harmony, and delay operations.<a id="FNanchor_91" -href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> - -<p>While the Allies were thus painfully drawing their -forces together, the activity of the French never ceased. -The Prince of Conti was detached with a considerable -<span class="sni">June 30./July 11.</span> -force to the Haine, where he quickly reduced Mons -and St. Ghislain, thus throwing down almost the last -<span class="sni">July 13/24.</span> -relics of the Austrian barrier in the south. Thence -moving to the Sambre, Conti laid siege to Charleroi. -It was now sufficiently clear that the plan of the French -campaign was to operate on the line of the Meuse for -the invasion of Holland. Maestricht once taken, the -rest would be easy, for most of the Dutch army were -prisoners in the hands of the French; and, with the -possession of the line of the Meuse, communication -between the Allied forces of England and of Austria -would be cut off. But before Maestricht could be -touched, Namur must first be captured; and the -campaign of 1746 accordingly centred about Namur.</p> - -<p>For the first fortnight of July the Allies remained -at Terheyden, a little to the north of Breda, Saxe’s -army lying some thirty miles south-westward of them -about Antwerp. On the 17th of July the Allies at -<span class="sni">July 6/17.</span> -last got on the march, still with some faint hopes of -saving Charleroi, and proceeded south-eastward, a -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</span> -movement which Saxe at once parried by marching -parallel with them to the Dyle between Arschot and -Louvain. Pushing forward, despite endless difficulties -of transport and forage, through a wretched barren -country, the Allies, now under command of Prince -Charles of Lorraine, reached Peer, turned southward -<span class="sni">July 16/27.</span> -across the Denier at Hasselt, and by the 27th of July -were at Borchloen. They were thus actually on the -eastern side of the French main army, within reach of -the Mehaigne and not without good hope of saving -<span class="sni">July 21./Aug. 1.</span> -Namur if not Charleroi. On the 1st of August they -crossed the Mehaigne, only to learn to their bitter -disappointment that Charleroi had surrendered that -very morning. Saxe meanwhile, with the principal -part of his army, still lay entrenched at Louvain, -with detachments pushed forward to Tirlemont and -Gembloux. The Allies continued their march before -the eyes of these detachments to Masy on the Orneau, -and there took up a position between that river and -the head-waters of the Mehaigne, fronting to the -north-east. This was the line approved through many -generations of war as the best for the protection of -Namur.<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" -class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> - -<p>Saxe now drew nearer to them, and the two armies -lay opposite to each other, in many places not more -than a musket-shot apart, both entrenched to the -teeth. The Allies so far had decidedly gained a -success, but they were outnumbered by the French by -three to two, and they were confined within a narrow -space wherein subsistence was extremely difficult; -while, if they moved, Namur was lost. Ligonier, -who was most uneasy over the situation, longed for -five thousand cavalry with which to make a dash at -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</span> -Malines and so to call the enemy back in haste to -defend Brussels and Antwerp.<a id="FNanchor_93" -href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> Prince Charles, however, -was averse from operations of such a nature. -His hope was that Saxe would offer him battle on the -historic plain of Ramillies, where, notwithstanding -the disparity of numbers, he trusted that the quality -of his troops and the traditions of victory would -enable him to prevail. But Saxe had no intention of -doing anything of the kind. He did indeed shift his -position farther to the north and east, with the field -of Ramillies in his rear, but it was not to offer battle. -Pushing out detachments to eastward he captured -<span class="sni">Aug. 18/29.</span> -Huy, and cutting off the Allies’ communications with -Liège and Maestricht forced them to cross the Meuse -and to fall back on Maestricht from the other side of -the river. Cross the Meuse the Allies accordingly -did, unmolested, to Ligonier’s great relief, by twenty -thousand French who were stationed on the eastern -bank of the stream. They then opened communication -with Maestricht, five leagues away, while Saxe extended -his army comfortably with its face to the eastward -along the line of the Jaar from Warem to Tongres, -<span class="sni">Sept. 2/13.</span> -waiting till want of forage should compel the Allies -to recross the Meuse. Back they came over the river -within a fortnight, as he had expected, and the Marshal, -without attempting to dispute the passage, retreated -quietly for a few miles, knowing full well that his -enemy could not follow him from lack of bread. -Ligonier never in his life longed so intensely for the -end of a campaign.<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" -class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 6/17.</div> -<p> -On the 17th of September the Allies advanced upon -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</span> -the French and offered battle. Saxe answered by -retiring to an impregnable position between Tongres -and the Demer. There was no occasion for him to -fight, when his enemies were short of provisions and -their cavalry was going to ruin from want of forage. -So there the two armies remained once more, within -sight of each other but unwilling to fight, because -an attack on the entrenchments of either host would -have led to the certain destruction of the attacking -force. But meanwhile the trenches had been opened -<span class="sni">Aug. 30./Sept. 10.</span> -before Namur by a French corps under the Prince of -Clermont, and within nine days the town had fallen. -Ligonier again urged his design, for which he had -prepared the necessary magazines, to upset Saxe’s -plans by a dash upon Antwerp, but he could find no -support in the council of war; so there was nothing -for the Allies to do but to wait until some further French -success should compel them to move. Such a success -was not long in coming. The castle of Namur surrendered -after a miserable defence of but eleven days; -Clermont’s corps was released for operations in the -field, and the Allies were forced to fall back for the -<span class="sni">Sept. 27./Oct. 7.</span> -protection of Liège. Accordingly, on the 7th of -October they crossed the Jaar, not without annoyance -from the enemy, and took up a new position, which -gave them indeed possession of Liège, but placed them -between the Meuse in their rear, and an army of -nearly twice their strength on the Jaar before their -front.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" -class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Roucoux"> - <a href="images/roucouxxx.jpg" id="Roucouxback"> - <img class="double" src="images/roucoux.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="caption">Roucoux, -Sep. 30<sup>th</sup> / Oct. 11<sup>th</sup> 1746</p> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 29./Oct. 10.</div> -<p> -Now at last Saxe resolved to strike a blow. On -the 10th of October he crossed the Jaar with evident -intention of an attack, and the Allied army received -orders to be ready for action before the following dawn. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</span> -The Allies’ position faced very nearly due west, the -army being drawn up astride of the two paved roads -leading into Liège from Tongres and St. Trond. Their -extreme right rested on the Jaar and was covered by -the villages of Slins, Fexhe, and Enick, all of which -were strongly entrenched and occupied by the Austrians. -South of Enick extended an open plain from that -village to the village of Liers, and in this plain was -posted the Hanoverian infantry and four British -battalions, the Eighth, Nineteenth, Thirty-third, and -Forty-third Foot, with the Hessian infantry on their -left, in rear of Liers. The Hanoverian cavalry prolonged -the line southward to the village of Varoux, -and the Sixth and Seventh Dragoons and Scots Greys -continued it to the village of Roucoux, from which -point Dutch troops carried it on to the village of Ance, -which formed the extreme left of the position. Ligonier -did not like the situation, for he did not see how the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</span> -turning of the left flank could be prevented if, as -would certainly be the case, the French should seriously -attempt it. Prince Charles, knowing that, if his right -were turned, his retreat to Maestricht would be cut off, -had taken care to hold the right flank in real strength -and dared not weaken it; but the position, with the -Meuse in its rear, was perilously shallow, while the -convergence of two ravines from the Jaar and Mehaigne -into its centre allowed of but one narrow way of communication -between the right and the left of the army. -The defects of the Allies’ dispositions were in fact not -unlike those which had proved fatal to King William -at Landen; and Ligonier’s anxiety was proved to -rest on all too good foundation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 30./Oct. 11.</div> -<p> -The morning of the 11th of October opened with -bad news for the Allies. The French had been admitted -into Liège by the inhabitants behind the backs -of the Dutch, so that the Prince of Waldeck, who -commanded on the left, was obliged to withdraw eight -battalions from Roucoux and post them <i>en potence</i> on -his left flank, with his cavalry in support. Thus the -defence of Roucoux, as well as of Liers and Varoux, -was left to eight battalions of British, Hanoverians, -and Hessians only. This made the outlook for the -Allied left the worse, since it was evident that the -brunt of the French attack would fall upon it. Saxe -gave Prince Charles little time for reflection. He had -one hundred and twenty thousand men against eighty -thousand, and he knew that of the eighty thousand -at least one-third were tied to the Austrian entrenchments -about the Jaar. He opened the action by a -furious assault upon the Dutch on the left wing, his -infantry being formed in dense columns, so that the -attack could be renewed continually by fresh troops. -Simultaneously fifty-five battalions in three similar -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</span> -columns were launched upon Liers, Varoux, and -Roucoux. Outmatched though they were, Dutch, -Germans, and British all fought splendidly and repelled -more than one attack. But, to use Ligonier’s words, -as soon as two French brigades had been repulsed in -each village, a third brigade ran in; and the eight -battalions, though they still held Liers, were forced to -withdraw both from Roucoux and Varoux. Being -rallied, however, by Ligonier, they advanced again -and recaptured both villages; and the Nineteenth -and Forty-third took up a position in a hollow road -which they held to the last. The Dutch now began -to retire across the rear of the position from the left, -in good order despite of heavy losses, while Ligonier -checked the enemy in the plain with the British -cavalry. When the Dutch had passed, he ordered his -own men to retreat in the same direction, still covering -the movement with the cavalry and with the Thirteenth -and Twenty-sixth Foot, which had been sent to the -field from the garrison of Maestricht. The Austrians -formed a rear-guard in turn when the British and their -German comrades had passed; and thus the whole -army filed off, unpursued and in perfect order, and -crossed the Meuse in safety on the following morning.</p> - -<p>The action may be looked upon as a fortunate -escape for the Allies, since it was impossible, humanly -speaking, that it could have issued favourably for them. -Prince Charles, in seeking to cover both Liège and -Maestricht, had attempted too much. His army thus -occupied too wide a front, the villages in the centre -were too weakly held, there was hardly anywhere a -second line of infantry, and the left flank could not be -sustained against so superior an enemy. The total -loss of the Allies was about five thousand men, which -was sufficiently severe considering that but a third -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</span> -of the army was engaged. The casualties of the British -were three hundred and fifty killed and wounded, of -whom no fewer than two hundred belonged to the -Forty-third. The French lost as many men as the -Allies, or more, and gained little by the action except -eight guns captured from the British, Hanoverians, -and Hessians. Had not the Allied troops been far -better in quality and discipline than the French, they -must have been lost during their retreat with superior -numbers both in flank and rear. Both armies presently -retired into winter-quarters, and the campaign -ended far less disastrously than might have been -feared for the Allies.<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" -class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p> - -<p>Unfortunately, however, it was not in Flanders only -that discredit fell upon the British arms. At the end -of September a force of six battalions<a id="FNanchor_97" -href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> was sent, -under command of General St. Clair, to the coast of -Brittany to attack Port L’Orient and destroy the -stores of the French East India Company there. The -<span class="sni">Sept. 20./Oct. 1.</span> -enterprise was conducted with amazing feebleness. -The troops landed at Ouimperle Bay practically -unopposed, but, being fired at on their march on the -following day, were turned loose to the plunder of a -small town as a punishment to the inhabitants for -their resistance. On the following day they reached -L’Orient, which the Deputy Governor of the East -India Company offered to surrender on good terms. -His overtures, however, were rejected and a siege was -begun in form; but, after a few days of firing and -the loss of about a hundred men killed and wounded, -St. Clair thought it prudent to retreat; and on the -<span class="sni">Oct. 1/12.</span> -12th of October the troops re-embarked and returned -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</span> -to England. Anything more pointless than the design -or more contemptible than the execution of this project -can hardly be conceived, for it simply employed -regiments which were badly needed in Flanders and -America, in useless operations which did not amount -to a diversion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">1747.</div> -<p> -If the cause of Queen Maria Theresa was to be -saved, it was evident that great efforts were imperative -in the coming campaign of 1747. To meet the vast -numbers brought into the field by the French the -Austrians promised to have sixty thousand men at -Maseyck on the Meuse by April; the British contributed -four regiments of cavalry and fourteen -battalions of infantry; and it was hoped that the -Allies would take the field with a total strength of one -hundred and ten battalions, one hundred and sixty -squadrons, and two hundred and twenty guns, besides -irregular troops, the whole to be under command of -the Duke of Cumberland.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" -class="fnanchor">[98]</a> Unfortunately the weather -was adverse to an early opening of the campaign; and -the French, by the seizure of Cadsand and Sluys, -which were shamefully surrendered by the Dutch, -closed the southern mouth of the Scheldt below Antwerp. -This was a sad blow to the arrangements for -the transport of the Allies, since it brought about -the necessity of hauling all the forage for the British -overland from Breda. Had Cumberland been in a -position to open the campaign before the French, he -meant to have laid siege to Antwerp; as things were, -he was compelled, thanks chiefly to the apathy of the -Dutch, to attempt to bring Saxe to a general action. -His last letter before beginning operations has, however, -an interest of another kind. It contained a -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</span> -recommendation that Major James Wolfe might be permitted -to purchase a vacant lieutenant-colonelcy in the Eighth -Foot, that officer having served constantly and well -during the past two years as a major of brigade, and -proved himself capable and desirous to do his duty.<a -id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> - -<p>The French being encamped between Malines and -Louvain, Cumberland collected his troops at Tilburg -and advanced straight upon them, encamping on the -<span class="sni">May 15/26.</span> -26th of May on the Great Neth, a little to the east of -Antwerp, between Lierre and Herenthout. Saxe, entrenched -as usual to the teeth, remained immovable -for three weeks, and Cumberland despaired of bringing -him to action. At length the news that a detached -corps of thirty thousand French, under the Prince of -Clermont, was on the old ground about Tongres, moved -Cumberland to march to the Demer, in the hope of -<span class="sni">June 15/26.</span> -overwhelming Clermont before Saxe could join him. -Saxe, however, was on his guard, and on the 29th of -<span class="sni">June 18/29</span> -June prepared to concentrate the whole of his army at -Tongres. Cumberland thereupon decided to take up -Saxe’s camp of the previous year, from Bilsen, on the -head-waters of the Demer, to Tongres. So sending -<span class="sni">June 19/30.</span> -forward Count Daun, afterwards well known as an -antagonist of Frederick the Great, with a corps of -Austrians to occupy Bilsen, he ordered the rest of the -<span class="sni">June 20./July 1.</span> -army to follow as quickly as possible on the next day. -Riding forward at daybreak of the morrow, Cumberland -was dismayed to see the French advancing in two -columns from Tongres, as if to fall upon the head of his -own army. This was a surprise. Cumberland knew -that Saxe was in motion but had not expected him so -soon; and indeed Saxe had made a notable march, for -his army had not left Louvain until the 29th of June -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</span> -and had traversed little less than fifty miles in two days. -The Duke lost no time in setting such troops as were -on the spot in order of battle, and hurried away to see -if those on the march could be brought up in time to -force back the French, and to secure the position of his -choice. But the French cavalry was too quick for him, -and, before Ligonier could bring up the English horse, -had occupied the centre of the ground which Cumberland -had intended for himself. Ligonier drew up his -squadrons before them to bar their farther advance, -and the Allied infantry, as it came up, was formed in -order of battle, fronting, however, not to eastward, as -had been originally designed, but almost due south. -In fact, owing to Saxe’s unexpected arrival and to -deficient arrangements by the staff of the Allies, there -seems to have been considerable delay in putting the -Allied army into any formation at all, or the French -might certainly have been forced back to Tongres. -Saxe’s rear had not yet come up and the men were -fatigued by a long and harassing march; but Cumberland -was not the man to fight an action of the type of -Oudenarde, and the opportunity was lost.<a -id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> - -<p>The position now occupied by the Allies extended -from some rising ground known as the Commanderie, -a little to the south-east of Bilsen, along a chain of -villages and low heights to the Jaar, a little to the south -of Maestricht. The Commanderie being the right of -the line was held by the Austrians, with a strong corps -thrown back <i>en potence</i> to Bilsen to protect the right -flank; for it was as important on this field as on that -of Roucoux that the retreat into Holland should not -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</span> -be cut off. The ground possessed natural features of -strength which were turned to good account, so good -account indeed that the Allied right, like the French -left at Ramillies, could neither attack nor be attacked. -Eastward from the Commanderie the Austrians occupied -the heights of Spaeven, together with the villages of -Gross and Klein Spaeven; next to them the Dutch -formed the centre of the line, while the Hanoverians -and British held the villages of Val, or Vlytingen, and -Lauffeld, and prolonged the line to its extreme left at -the village of Kesselt.</p> - -<p>There the Allies lay on their arms until nightfall, -while Saxe’s weary battalions tramped on till far into -<span class="sni">June 21./July 2.</span> -the night up to their bivouacs. At daybreak the -French were seen to be in motion, marching and -countermarching in a way that Cumberland did not -quite understand; the fact being that Saxe, as at -Roucoux, was doubling the left wing of his army in -rear of the right, for the formation of those dense -columns of attack which he could handle with such -consummate skill. After observing them until nine -o’clock, Cumberland came to the conclusion that the -Marshal meditated no immediate movement, and retired -to the Commanderie for breakfast. He had -hardly sat down when an urgent message arrived from -Ligonier that the enemy was on the point of attacking. -Cumberland at once returned and moved the left of his -line somewhat forward, setting fire to the village of -Vlytingen and occupying Lauffeld with three British -and two Hessian battalions. Lauffeld was a straggling -village a quarter of a mile long, covered by a multitude -of small enclosures with mud walls about six feet high, -which were topped by growing hedges. It was thus -easily turned into a strong post for infantry; and cannon -were posted both in its front and flanks. The remainder -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</span> -of the British were drawn up for the most part in rear -of Lauffeld in order to feed and relieve its garrison, the -brigade of Guards being posted in the hedges before -Vlytingen. The British cavalry stood on the right of -the infantry and joined their line to that of the Dutch.</p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Lauffeld"> - <a href="images/lauffeldxx.jpg" id="Lauffeldback"> - <img class="double" src="images/lauffeld.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Lauffeld, - June 21<sup>st</sup> / July 2<sup>nd</sup> 1747</p> -</div> - -<p>Meanwhile Saxe, sending forward a cloud of irregular -troops to mask his movements, had despatched -Count d’Estrées and the Count of Ségur with a strong -force of infantry and cavalry to seize the villages of -Montenaken and Wilre on the left flank of the Allies. -This service was performed with little loss. At the -same time he directed the Marquis of Salières, with six -brigades of foot and twenty guns, to attack Vlytingen, -and launched five brigades, with as many guns, backed -by a large force of cavalry, against Lauffeld. The -assault of the French infantry upon Lauffeld was met by -a furious resistance. It was just such another struggle -as that of Neerwinden, from hedge to hedge and from -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</span> -wall to wall; and the French, for all their superiority -of numbers, were driven back headlong from the village -with terrible loss. Salières met with little better -success against the brigade of Guards in the hedges of -Vlytingen; but with great readiness he turned half -of his guns to his right against Lauffeld and the remainder -against a ravine on his left, with most destructive -effect. Cumberland, observing the fury with -which Saxe had concentrated his attack against these -two villages, asked the Austrians to relieve him by a -diversion upon his right; but the Austrian troops could -not face the fire of Salières’s guns, and it became clear -that Vlytingen and Lauffeld must be held by the British -and Hanoverians alone.</p> - -<p>Saxe’s first attack had been brilliantly repulsed. -He at once replaced the beaten troops by two fresh -brigades of infantry, with cavalry to support them, and -renewed the assault, but with no better success. The -British were driven back from the outer defences only -to stand more fiercely by those within, and Lauffeld -remained unconquered. But Saxe was not to be -deterred from his purpose. Two more brigades, including -the six Irish battalions that had saved the day -at Fontenoy, were added to those already on the spot, -and the whole of them launched for a third attack -against Lauffeld. They were met by the same stubborn -resistance and the same deadly fire; and the Irish -brigade lost no fewer than sixty officers in the struggle. -Nevertheless Irish impetuosity carried the rest of the -troops forward; the British were borne back to the -rearmost edge of the village, and the French began to -swarm up the slope beyond it. Cumberland promptly -ordered the whole of his line of infantry to advance; -and the French at once gave way before them. The -French cavalry was obliged to drive the foot forward -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</span> -at the sword’s point, but Cumberland continued steadily -to gain ground despite their efforts. Then at an unlucky -moment, some Dutch squadrons in the centre -were seized with panic and came galloping straight -into the British line, carried away the Hessians and -one squadron of the Greys and fell pell-mell upon the -Twenty-first and Twenty-third Fusiliers. The Twenty-first, -anticipating the treatment of the Belgians at -Waterloo, gave the Dutchmen a volley and partly -saved themselves, but the Twenty-third suffered -terribly, and the whole line was thrown into confusion. -Before order could be restored, Salières had thrown -three more brigades upon Lauffeld, which closed in -round it, blocking up a hollow road which formed the -entrance into it from the rear, and barring the way for -all further reinforcements of the Allies. The few troops -that were left in the village were speedily overpowered, -and Lauffeld was lost.</p> - -<p>Some of Daun’s Austrians now advanced to Cumberland’s -help from the right; but three French brigades -of cavalry, which were waiting before Vlytingen, at -once moved forward to check them, and charging boldly -into them succeeded in turning them back, though -themselves roughly handled when retiring from the -charge. Meanwhile Saxe had brought up ten guns -to right and left of Lauffeld, and reinforcing the cavalry -of D’Estrées and Ségur extended it in one long line -from Lauffeld to Wilre, for a final crushing attack on -the Allied left. Order had been restored among the -British infantry, who were now retreating with great -steadiness; but they were wholly unsupported. -Ligonier, determined to save them at any cost, caught -up the Greys, Inniskillings, and Cumberland’s dragoons, -and led them straight against the masses of the French -cavalry. The gallant brigade charged home, crashed -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</span> -headlong through the horse, and fell upon the infantry -beyond, but being galled by their fire and attacked in -all quarters by other French squadrons, was broken -past all rallying and very heavily punished. Ligonier -himself was overthrown and taken prisoner. Cumberland, -who had plunged into the broken ranks to try to -rally the British troopers, was cut off by the French -dragoons, and only with difficulty contrived to join the -remainder of his cavalry on the left. With these he -covered the retreat of the army, which was successfully -effected in good order and with little further loss.</p> - -<p>So ended the battle of Lauffeld, in which the British -bore the brunt with a firmness that extorted the praise -even of Frenchmen, but of which few Englishmen -have ever heard. The troops, in Cumberland’s words, -behaved one and all so well that he could not commend -any one regiment without doing injustice to the rest. -The total loss of the five regiments of horse and fourteen -battalions of foot was close upon two thousand men.<a -id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> -The three devoted regiments which charged with -Ligonier were the worst sufferers, the Greys losing one -hundred and sixty men, the Inniskillings one hundred -and twenty, and Cumberland’s dragoons nearly one -hundred. The loss of the whole of the Allies was about -six thousand men, that of the French decidedly greater, -amounting indeed, according to Saxe’s account, to not -less than ten thousand men. The British, moreover, -had nine French colours and five French standards as -trophies for their consolation. Finally, the French -failed to accomplish the object of the action, which -was to cut off the Allies from Maestricht.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</span></p> -<p>After the battle the Allies crossed the Meuse and -encamped at Heer, a little to the east of Maestricht, -while Saxe returned to his quarters at Tongres. The -French then detached a corps for the capture of Bergen-op-Zoom; -but the most important transactions of the -war still went forward on the Meuse, where constant -negotiations were carried on between Saxe and Cumberland. -The campaign closed with the fall of Bergen-op-Zoom -and with the capture of most of the strong places -in Dutch Brabant.</p> - -<p>By this time King George and his people in England -were thoroughly sick of the war. The British had -suffered severely in every action, but had reaped no -success except in the fortunate victory of Dettingen. -The Dutch had proved themselves useless and contemptible -as Allies, their Government feeble and corrupt -in council, their troops unstable if not dangerous in -action. The Austrians, in spite of lavish subsidies, -had never furnished the troops that they had promised, -and had invariably obstructed operations through the -obstinacy of their Generals and the selfishness of their -<span class="sni">1748.</span> -ends. The opening of the campaign of 1748 was even -more unpromising for the Allies. Saxe, strong in the -possession of a superior force, kept Cumberland in -suspense between apprehensions for Breda and for -Maestricht, and, when finally he laid siege to Maestricht, -could match one hundred and fifteen thousand men -against Cumberland’s five-and-thirty thousand. War -on such terms against such a master as Saxe was -ridiculous. Moreover, the Dutch, despite of a recent -revolution, were more supine than ever; the Prince -of Orange, who was the new ruler, actually keeping -two thousand of his troops from the field that they -might adorn the baptism of one of his babies. In the -face of such facts Cumberland pressed earnestly for -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</span> -<span class="sni">Apr. 19/30.</span> -peace;<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> -and on the 30th of April preliminaries were -signed, which six months later were expanded into the -definite treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">October.</div> -<p> -The peace left matters practically as they had stood -before the war, with the significant exception that -Frederick the Great retained Silesia. Not a word was -said as to the regulation of trade between England and -Spain, which had been the original ground of quarrel; -and, as between England and France, it was agreed that -there should be mutual restitution of all captures. Yet -this could not set the two countries in the same position -as before the war. The French were utterly exhausted; -but the British, though not a little harassed by the cost -of maintaining armies and producing subsidies, had -received a military training which was to stand them in -good stead for the great struggle that lay before them.</p> - -<p class="addendum"><span class="smcap">Authorities.</span>—The official -correspondence in the Record Office. <i>F.O. Military Auxiliary -Expeditions.</i> <i>Campagnes de Louis XV. Espagnac.</i> <i>Life of the -Duke of Cumberland.</i> Some useful details as to Lauffeld are to be -found in the <i>Gentleman’s Magazine</i>.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</span></p> - <h2 class="nobreak" id="frevn"> - THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793–1794<br /> - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER III</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1793.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -War was declared by the French Convention on -the 1st of February 1793, and Dumouriez was ordered -to invade Holland forthwith. The Convention, -thirsting for the wealth of the Bank of Amsterdam, -was anxious to make sure of it before the Allies could -put their strength into the field. Two months earlier, -when his troops were heartened by the victory of -Jemappe, no order could have been more welcome to -Dumouriez than this; and even now, though he had -few men upon whom he could depend, he resolved if -possible to make good the defects of his army by swift -and sudden action. The French troops on the northern -frontier were very widely scattered, their cantonments -extending north and south on the lower Meuse -from Roermond to Maastricht, and east and west from -the upper Rhine through Aachen to Liège and Namur. -His original plan had been to turn all the waterways -and fortresses that bar the entrance into Holland from -the south, and to invade it by way of Nimeguen; but -time was so precious that he resolved to collect a small -force of but seventeen thousand men at Antwerp, and -to march from thence with all secrecy direct upon -Amsterdam. At the same time he directed thirty -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</span> -thousand men from the east under General Miranda to -take the Dutch fortresses of Maastricht and Venloo, -and then to make for Nimeguen. Speed, in his view, -was everything, for the Austrians had already forty -thousand men cantoned to the east of the Rhine, and -were shortly to be reinforced.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Allies were still making up their -plans for the next campaign. Brunswick and Prince -Frederick Josias of Coburg-Saalfeld, who had been -appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army, -met at Frankfurt, and, after many conferences between -the 6th and the 14th of February, decided upon a -scheme of operations, which by their own showing -required forty thousand more men than they had any -expectation of collecting. They saved themselves, -however, by laying it down as a cardinal principle -that, until Mainz were recovered from the French, the -Allied forces must not attempt to pass from the east -to the west bank of the Meuse. Belgium (so argued -the Austrians) had been eaten up, and so long as the -navigation of the Rhine was blocked at Mainz, the -subsistence of the Imperial troops on the west of the -Meuse must be difficult. Moreover, if the French -should retire before an Austrian advance, and mass -all their forces on the Rhine, then they might beat -Brunswick, who, unless his retreat were assured by the -possession of Mainz, would be in danger of utter -destruction. The reader should take note of this -decision, for not only is it the key to much that appears -puzzling in the coming campaign, but it is an excellent -example of the principle on which Coburg and Brunswick -conducted war, namely, to look at risks first -and at objects afterwards. The immediate problem -of the defence of the Dutch provinces was left without -so much as an attempt at solution. Both Grenville -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</span> -in England and Auckland at the Hague had long -foreseen the certainty of a French attack upon them, -and had strained every nerve to stir the authorities to -action. But the Stadtholder was a man of almost -inhuman dulness, apathy and stupidity; and all -popular energy was paralysed by the spirit of faction, -which, never inactive in Holland, had under the influence -of French agents become almost a spirit of revolution. -The Dutch army was so defective in training, -equipment and discipline that it had ceased to exist -as an efficient force; and its few foreign corps, which -alone deserved the name of regiments, had been driven -to mutiny by a reduction of their pay below the rate -fixed by their contract. Even in January and -February, Auckland wrote that the Stadtholder looked -for British ships and British troops to save him,<a -id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a> and -that the French party was derisively insinuating that -England, nominally the faithful ally of the Dutch Republic, -was content to desert her in the hour of danger. -Finally, on the 15th of February he begged that the -Duke of York might be sent over with a few officers of -experience, even if without troops, to take command -of the Dutch. “Men, commanders, ships and money,” -he wrote, “we could not ask for more if this country -were a part of Yorkshire, but I incline to think that it -should be considered so for the present; and if it is -brought to a question whether we are to conquer it -and keep it, or whether Dumouriez is to do it, I have -no doubt as to the decision.”</p> - -<p>Still the British Government hesitated, for, thanks -to its neglect of the Army, it possessed but a handful -of troops, and was unwilling to move them to the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</span> -Continent. Then suddenly, on the 16th of February, -<span class="sni">Feb. 16.</span> -Dumouriez dashed out from Antwerp with his tiny -force in four columns. One small body instantly -pushed northward towards Moerdyk, to collect boats -for the passage of the arm of the sea called the -Hollandsdiep; another marched upon Klundert and -Willemstadt, a third north-eastward to attack Breda, -and a fourth to the north-west to blockade Bergen-op-Zoom -and Steenbergen. Everywhere his coming was -welcomed by the Dutch. Breda, with large stores -of munitions of war, was disgracefully surrendered -<span class="sni">Feb. 26.</span> -on the 26th of February; Klundert and Gertruydenberg -fell in quick succession; Willemstadt was then -besieged with the captured cannon, and by the 9th of -<span class="sni">March 9.</span> -March Dumouriez was prepared to essay the passage -of the Hollandsdiep. But here his course was stayed, -for his activity had stirred his enemies on every side.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Feb. 20.</div> -<p> -On the 20th of February the seven battalions of -British Guards were suddenly paraded before the Horse -Guards; and the Duke of York, announcing that the -first battalions of the three regiments were ordered to -proceed on active service, called for volunteers from -the others to bring them up to strength. The whole -brigade thereupon stepped forward as one man; and -five days later three battalions, numbering under two -thousand men of all ranks and denominations, marched -to Greenwich amid the cheers, and something more -than the cheers, of an enormous and enthusiastic -crowd.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" -class="fnanchor">[104]</a> By nightfall the whole were embarked upon -vessels too small to carry more than two-thirds of -their number in safety, without medicines or medical -appliances, without the slightest reserve of ammunition, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</span> -and of course without transport of any description. -Their commander was Colonel Gerard Lake -of the First Guards, and he was ordered on no account -to move his men above twenty-four hours’ distance -from Helvoetsluis, so as to be able to return on the -<span class="sni">March 1.</span> -shortest notice. By the mercy of Heaven these -troops safely reached that port, narrowly escaping a -gale which would probably have condemned them either -to drowning or asphyxiation; and four days later they -<span class="sni">March 5.</span> -proceeded to Dort to oppose Dumouriez’s passage of -the Hollandsdiep. About the same time a flotilla of -Dutch gunboats arrived in the Meuse, many of them -manned by British sailors and flying British colours. -Auckland, by threatening to take command in Holland -himself, had at last compelled the miserable Stadtholder -to issue orders for the defence of his country.<a -id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p> - -<p>But the obstacles which were multiplying in -Dumouriez’s front were as nothing to the storm that -<span class="sni">Feb. 20.</span> -suddenly broke upon his flank. Miranda had duly -moved up to the siege of Maastricht with a force -inadequate to the task and, moreover, dangerously -dispersed; but the Austrians, declaring themselves -too weak to move, still remained torpid in their cantonments, -perhaps the more stubbornly because the -Prussian Agent at the Austrian headquarters was -perpetually urging them to action. At last, however, -<span class="sni">Feb. 26.<br />March 1.</span> -Coburg on the 26th began to concentrate his forty -thousand men and to pass them in five columns across -the river; and on the 1st of March, to the great surprise -of the French, he burst upon their cantonments -on the Meuse, and for four days drove them in utter -rout before him. Coburg himself and the left wing -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</span> -halted before Liège, but on the right the Archduke -Charles, with the impetuosity of twenty-one years -and the instinct of a born soldier, followed up the disorderly -rabble from Maastricht southward upon -Tongres, boldly attacking wherever he met the enemy. -Such of the French as had been in action fled in all -directions, abandoning everything; ten thousand -deserters hurried across the frontier into France; -and a small remnant took refuge behind the canal at -Louvain, where it was joined by such French divisions -as had not been engaged. Had Coburg pursued his -advantage and advanced instantly with all his forces, -he could have ended the campaign at once, for the -people, furious at the exactions of the Jacobins, and, -above all, at the theft of the plate from their churches, -<span class="sni">March 5.</span> -had turned savagely upon the retreating French. -Instead of this he halted on the 5th, and wasted ten -whole days in cantonments between Maastricht and -Tongres. The Convention now ordered Dumouriez -at once to proceed to Louvain and assume command, -which he did with a very bad grace, leaving General -<span class="sni">March 9.</span> -Flers to take his place in Holland. His presence did -much to restore confidence in the French army, and -he was not a little helped by Coburg’s inaction. Nevertheless -the news that reached him was singularly -disquieting. Fresh regiments were embarking from -England for Helvoetsluis; two reinforcing columns -of Austrians were advancing from the Rhine upon -Namur; and eight thousand Prussians, under the -Duke of Brunswick-Oels, had arrived at Bois-le-Duc -<span class="sni">March 11.</span> -on the 11th, and were moving with five thousand -British and Dutch upon Breda, to cut off the troops -on the Hollandsdiep from France and Dumouriez’s own -soldiers from Antwerp. In so desperate a situation -there was no choice but to take the offensive.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">March 15.</div> -<p> -On the 15th Coburg at last resumed his advance -with forty-two thousand men; and on the 16th -Dumouriez marched with forty-eight thousand to -<span class="sni">March 18.</span> -meet him. On the 18th the decisive action was -fought at Neerwinden, when the French were totally -defeated, with a loss of five thousand men and three -guns. The volunteers and the National Guards were -the troops that failed in the battle; and after it the -men broke up and fled by whole battalions. Ten -thousand deserted in the ten days following the -action, and Dumouriez was fain to form a rearguard -out of his artillery and his few battalions of the Line, -and to fall back on Louvain. Coburg, who had lost -about three thousand men, made little attempt at -pursuit, keeping his main body halted at Tirlemont -until the 22nd, but exhorting the Duke of Brunswick-Oels -to hasten from Bois-le-Duc to Malines to cut -off Dumouriez’s retreat to Antwerp. The Duke, -who had already permitted Flers to withdraw with -impunity the bulk of his forces to Antwerp, was evidently -not disposed to second Austrian operations -with Prussian troops, for he refused to move. However, -<span class="sni">Mar. 23–24.<br />March 25.</span> -the advance of the Austrians compelled -Dumouriez to evacuate first Louvain and then -Brussels; and on the 25th, finding himself obliged -to abandon Namur also, he opened negotiations with -Coburg. He had quarrelled with the Convention -beyond hope of reconciliation over the iniquity of -its rule in Belgium; and he now proposed that the -French should retreat from the whole country, and -that he should march to Paris to re-establish the -monarchy, the Allies meanwhile halting on the frontier -and receiving the fortress of Condé as a guarantee. -An agreement to this effect was duly made with the -<span class="sni">March 27.</span> -Chief of the Austrian Staff on the 27th, and a circular -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</span> -was issued from the Austrian headquarters, suggesting -a conference of the representatives of the powers -to decide as to the measures to be next taken.</p> - -<p>There is no need to tell at length the story of -Dumouriez’s adventures during the following days. -It must suffice that he was driven from the midst of -<span class="sni">April 5.</span> -his army, and on the 5th of April was fain to take -refuge with the Austrians. Fragments of several corps -and one complete regiment of Hussars followed him, -unwilling to part with their beloved General; but -several thousand French troops in Belgium and Holland, -which might have been cut off to a man, were allowed -to retire in peace to the frontier. None the less the -fact remained that even a dilatory commander at the -head of a force of discordant Allies had sufficed to -drive the armies of the Revolution in shameful disorder -from the Austrian Netherlands.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IV</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1793.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -On the 5th of March it was resolved to send the -Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Foot, -<span class="sni">March 5.</span> -completed by drafts from the new independent companies, -to join the Duke as a brigade under Major-general -Ralph Abercromby. These regiments, however, -were subject to the same instructions as the -Guards, namely, to remain within immediate reach of -their transports in case their services should be required -elsewhere. Their quality was such that the Adjutant-general -felt constrained to apologise for them both -to Abercromby and to the Duke of York. “I am -afraid,” he wrote to the Duke, “that you will not reap -the advantage that you might have expected from -the brigade of the Line just sent over to you, as so -considerable a part of it is composed of nothing but -undisciplined and raw recruits; and how they are to -be disposed of until they can be taught their business I -am at a loss to imagine.... I was not consulted upon -the subject until it was too late to remedy the evil, but -I hope that my remonstrances will be of some use in -the modelling of troops for the Continent in future.” It -<span class="sni">April 1.</span> -need hardly be added that, on their arrival in Holland, -two out of the three battalions were found utterly unfit -for service, the new recruits being old men and weakly -boys, worse than the worst that had been accepted -even at the period of greatest exhaustion during the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</span> -American War. To send them on active service was, -therefore, simply waste of money.<a id="FNanchor_106" -href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<p>But this was only one of the evils which ensued -because an extremely ignorant civilian was too vain -to consult his military advisers before giving military -orders. Any soldier at the War Office could have told -him that the method of raising independent companies -to recruit existing regiments had been found wasteful -and unsatisfactory in the past; and, indeed, at this -very time the Chief Secretary Cooke wrote to him -from Ireland a strong protest against the whole system. -It was expensive, because it meant the provision of -half-pay for their officers as soon as the men had been -drafted out; it was unfair to old subalterns, because -they were passed over by boys who by good fortune -had raised recruits cheaply. It produced a bad class of -recruit, because these young officers were poor judges -of men; and finally it encouraged desertion, for the -crimps, so long as they poured a certain number of -recruits into the depots by a certain time, cared not -the least whether they deserted afterwards. Nor was -Cooke content only to criticise, for he produced an -alternative plan for allowing each of the fourteen -battalions in Ireland to raise two additional companies -of one hundred men apiece, and for granting to the -commanding officers the privilege of recommending -officers for them. The scheme was approved and was -found to be most successful; but it was not introduced -into England, where, on the contrary, the number of -independent companies was still further increased. -<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</span></p> - -<p>Again, the Adjutant-general, if consulted, could -have warned Dundas to be chary of his battalions, -since some of them would certainly be required for -the Fleet. The King’s Navy was labouring under -the grievances which in four years were to drive the -seamen to mutiny; and as a natural consequence -men were hardly to be obtained by any means. On -<span class="sni">Feb. 7.</span> -the very day when the declaration of war was received, -the Fleet swallowed up two battalions; and by the -end of March it had absorbed so many men that only -three regiments of the Line were to be found south -of the Tweed. In fact the Horse Guards did not know -where to turn for another battalion. This, however, -did not prevent Dundas from presently sending another -emissary to Jamaica, to commit England still more -deeply to operations in the most leeward sphere of the -West Indies. Yet he had no reserve of any description -to rely upon, except fourteen thousand Hanoverians -and eight thousand Hessians, which, pursuant to the -time-honoured practice, were taken into British pay; -and of these the latter only, being mercenaries pure -and simple, could be counted upon for service beyond -sea.<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" -class="fnanchor">[108]</a></p> - -<p>Since the kingdom was thus stripped of regular -troops, it was necessary to raise other forces for its -security; but this also was done as foolishly as possible. -Early in February it was rightly and wisely decided to -call out nineteen thousand additional Militia; but in -the execution precisely the same mistake was made as -in France. Personal service was not insisted upon; -there arose a great demand for substitutes; and the -Militia, instead of gaining a substantial increase, simply -cut off from the Army the sources of its supply of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</span> -recruits. In Scotland, which as yet had no Militia, -recourse was made to the raising of Fencible regiments, -that is to say, of regular troops enlisted for home-service -and for the duration of the war only. This -system had so far been applied only on a small scale, -the regiments of Fencibles during the Seven Years’ -War and the American War of Independence having -been but few;<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" -class="fnanchor">[109]</a> but it now received great and sudden -expansion. On the 2nd of March authority was issued -for the raising of seven regiments of Fencible Infantry -in Scotland at a stroke; besides one already authorised -<span class="sni">Feb. 20.</span> -for the Isle of Man, and another, added in April, for -the Orkney Islands.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" -class="fnanchor">[110]</a> With the leading magnates of -Scotland at their head, these new corps were speedily -completed; but there was one Scottish nobleman who -went further than his peers, and raised a regiment in -the Highlands for general service. This was Thomas -Humberstone Mackenzie, afterwards the last Earl of -Seaforth; and his regiment remains with us, still -known by his name, but yet more famous under its -number of the Seventy-eighth. The reader should -take note of the Fencible regiments, for in the years -before us we shall see them increased and multiplied -in all three kingdoms. Meanwhile, he should remark -that within a month of the declaration of war there -were already three distinct forces, the Army, the -Fencibles, and the Militia, all bidding against each -other for the recruits which only the Regular Army -could turn to efficient account.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</span></p> - -<p> -It is not difficult to perceive the lurking possibilities -of disaster in Dundas’s military policy; but until -April it showed at any rate a certain consistency. -The despatch of troops to the Continent was treated -as a temporary measure, designed for the protection -of Holland only; and, though the Prince of Coburg -had called upon the Duke of York to co-operate in his -great sweeping movement from north-east to south-west, -the Duke had complied only so far as his instructions -and, it may be added, his lack of transport permitted. -<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> -But much, besides the expulsion of the -French from Holland and Belgium, had occurred in -March, all tending to embarrass England in the principal -object of her Continental policy, the securing of -a strong barrier between France and Holland. The fatal -question of indemnity, first brought forward by the -King of Prussia, had aroused the cupidity of his brother -potentate in Austria, who valued the recovery of -Belgium chiefly in order that he might exchange it -for Bavaria. Pitt had for a moment been willing to -consent to the Bavarian exchange (as it was called) -for the sake of peace; but upon the outbreak of war -he reverted to absolute rejection of it; and, in an evil -<span class="sni">March 2.</span> -hour, the British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Morton -Eden, put forward a suggestion that Austria should -be bribed to retain Belgium by the promise of an -extension of her frontiers on the side of France. Realising -<span class="sni">April 3.</span> -that Austria refused to act disinterestedly, Grenville -reluctantly accepted the proposal; and at the same -time the British Government seems to have taken it -for granted that it must give the Emperor some assistance -towards the conquest of the new barrier.<a id="FNanchor_112" -href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">March 21–April 2.</div> -<p> -Accordingly, since no more infantry was to be -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</span> -spared from England, eleven regiments of cavalry were -ordered to prepare for service on the Continent, though -their numbers were so weak that they could not between -them muster more than twenty-three squadrons, or -about two thousand five hundred of all ranks, fit for -service. But, at the same time, the British Ministers -shrank from supplying British troops for the advantage -of other nations without gaining some equivalent -to satisfy the electors of England; wherefore they -decided, apparently at the instance of Grenville’s elder -brother, Lord Buckingham, to claim Dunkirk as Great -Britain’s indemnity for the war. The choice, viewed -from the standpoint of the party-politician, was a -good one. Dunkirk, having been taken by Cromwell, -sold by Charles the Second, and dismantled under the -conditions imposed by the sword of Marlborough, -possessed sentimental attractions to the public at -large and to the Whigs in particular; while, as a -nest of privateers, its extirpation could not but be -welcome not only to every merchant in England, but -especially to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. No -scheme of operations had yet been concerted with -Austria, for, indeed, Coburg had advanced from the -Roer before nearly all his forces had been collected; -but Pitt seems to have thought that, while the Austrian -reinforcements were on their way to the front, the -mixed force of British, Hanoverians, Hessians, and -Dutch might very well master Dunkirk in the course -of April, afterwards leaving the Austrians in sufficient -strength to pursue their operations in Flanders alone, -while the British struck at some other part of France. -Thus Pitt was not true even to his own plan of ruining -his enemy by the destruction of her colonial trade. -Moreover, it is difficult to define what he meant by -some other part of France. The old Marquis of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</span> -Bouillé, knowing that the heart of the Revolution -could be pierced at Paris, had suggested a descent upon -Havre with thirty thousand men; and there was by this -time another vulnerable point—namely, La Vendée—in -the west of France. But why it should have been -necessary to seek out a new point of attack, when -troops were already massed or massing on the French -frontier within twelve days’ march of the capital, and -with only a demoralised enemy before them, was a -question which seems never to have occurred either -to Pitt or to Dundas. There can be no doubt that -they fell into a common pitfall of the British politician. -They gave so much thought to the treaty which they -should lay before Parliament at the close of the war, -that they omitted to consider the means of bringing -the war itself to a close.<a id="FNanchor_113" -href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a></p> - -<p>It was in such inauspicious circumstances that the -representatives of the various powers met in conference -at Antwerp. Coburg, who loathed the war and had -hoped to end it by an agreement with Dumouriez, -<span class="sni">April 5.</span> -had issued a proclamation declaring himself to be the -ally of all friends of order, and abjuring all projects of -conquest in the Emperor’s name. Instantly Austrians, -Prussians, and English with one voice required him to -withdraw it, and to publish a new declaration that he -would prosecute the war vigorously. He did so, but -with great reluctance; indeed, so bitter was his -opposition to the new policy that he tried to open -further negotiations with the Convention, and even -furnished it with information which he ought to -have kept to himself.<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" -class="fnanchor">[114]</a> Meanwhile Lord Auckland -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</span> -announced that England, as well as the other powers, -would expect an indemnity for her share in the war; -whereupon the Dutch representative announced that, -as every one else was taking compensation, he hoped -that Holland’s claims would not be forgotten.<a -id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> -The sharing of the lion’s skin having thus been determined, -the next thing was to decide upon a plan of operations -for slaying the lion. A vague project was drawn out -for the attack of the frontier-fortresses, in which -Coburg reckoned upon the co-operation of over twenty -thousand men, that is to say, of thirteen thousand -Hanoverians and seven thousand five hundred British, -in British pay, besides fifteen thousand Dutch. -Dundas was staggered; for he had not yet the slightest -idea what were the ultimate designs of either of the -German powers, who, as he justly complained, were -very backward to give an explicit account of their -views either as to the conduct of the war or the termination -of it. “We cannot advise the King,” he wrote, -“to give a blind co-operation to measures not distinctly -explained.” But he hinted that if the Austrians -would spare a detachment to help the British to -capture Dunkirk at once, England might make fewer -difficulties about lending her troops for subsequent -operations. The English, he explained, were prejudiced -against Continental enterprises; wherefore it was -important to convince the nation early that its troops -in Holland were employed for an object intimately -connected with the interests of Great Britain and the -security of her commerce. “The early capture of -Dunkirk by a Prince of the blood,” he added, “would -give much éclat to the commencement of the war.” -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</span> -In other words, Dundas was ready to employ British -troops in the Low Countries only for a political campaign, -and not for the military purposes of the war—to -use them, in fact, primarily to win votes rather -than battles. The attitude is but too characteristic -of British Ministers for War.<a id="FNanchor_116" -href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Allies on the frontiers of France -remained inactive; the Austrians, indeed, blockading -Condé, where the French kept them engaged with -incessant affairs of outposts, but the British contingent -still awaiting the orders which Dundas hesitated to -give. In the third week of April the chief of the British -staff reported that a considerable force of French was -entrenched about Dunkirk, too strong to be attacked -by the Duke of York’s troops, and that there was no -operation on which the latter could be employed except -in support of the Austrians.<a id="FNanchor_117" -href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> -We shall presently recognise the unseen hand which -had been working at Dunkirk. Ten days more of uncertainty passed -<span class="sni">May 1.</span> -away, and at last, on the 1st of May, Coburg produced -a plan of operations. By the middle of May he hoped -to have about ninety-two thousand men,<a id="FNanchor_118" -href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> to which -by the beginning of June would be added thirteen -thousand more. He proposed, therefore, to hasten -the fall of Condé by a bombardment, and then to -advance with fifty-two thousand men to the siege of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</span> -Valenciennes, leaving a cordon of some forty thousand -to cover every imaginable point along a front of some -fifty miles from Maubeuge on the Sambre to Ostend -on the sea. Valenciennes might be expected to fall -at the end of July, and then ten thousand men could -be left to mask Lille, while fifty thousand marched -to the siege of Dunkirk. If this plan were accepted, -Coburg pledged himself to the Duke of York to lend -his best good-will to the attack on Dunkirk. On this -assurance the Duke recommended the plan to which -at last Dundas gave his consent, on the understanding -that the other powers in general and Austria in particular -should give an immediate explanation of their -ulterior views. England, he repeated, could not -allow so large a force in her pay to be employed -on operations whose object was undefined; and he -emphasised the statement by an inquiry as to the -security of Ostend, which so far had been the British -port of disembarkation, evidently as a hint that -England reserved her right to withdraw her troops -at any moment.</p> - -<p>This is a good instance of the manner in which -British Ministers evade their responsibility. The -British General had, nearly three weeks before, laid -before Dundas the following issue. “There is no use -for British troops in the Netherlands except to act -in support of the Austrians. Their commander has -submitted a plan based on the active co-operation of -all our troops, present and expected. We think the -plan a good one. Are we to act with him, or are we -not?” Upon this it was for the Ministry to say at -once to Austria, “Our Generals favour your plan of -campaign, but until we know your ultimate intentions -we cannot take part in it. Unless you come to a -definite understanding with us by a certain day, we -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</span> -shall order our troops on the spot to re-embark, and -meanwhile we have suspended the march of our reinforcements.” -Instead of this they said in effect, -“We approve the plan of campaign, and thereby -commit our troops to it; but we reserve to ourselves -the right to withdraw them, or, in other words, to -wreck the operations, whenever we think proper.” -If, therefore, the enemy should in the meantime take -the offensive and press the Austrians hard, which, as -shall be seen, was what actually happened, the responsibility -for granting or withholding British assistance -was thrown entirely upon the General.</p> - -<p>It remains to say a word of the plan itself, and of -the troops and commanders who were appointed to -carry it out. The enormous front along which Coburg -proposed to disperse his force is an example of the -system known as the cordon-system, which was in -particular favour with the Austrians at this time. It -consisted in covering every possible access to a theatre -of war with some small body of troops, and had been -formulated by Marshal Lacy upon the experience of -the war of the Bavarian Succession in 1778, when he -had held a front of fifty miles in the labyrinthine -country of the Upper Elbe, and reduced the campaign -to a mere scuffle of foraging parties. Well calculated -to exclude the plague or contraband goods from a -country, it was, of course, ridiculous against the -invasion of an enemy; for it meant weakness at all -points and strength at none, and in fact simply invited -the destruction of the army in detail by a force of -inferior strength. Nevertheless it was in high favour -with all armies of Europe, excepting the British, at -that time; and it was a matter of rule that, wherever -the enemy stationed a battalion or a company, a -countervailing battalion or company must be posted -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</span> -over against it. The Austrians had suffered much -from this system in their recent war with the Turks; -but their commanders, of whom Coburg had been one, -had learned little from the experience. Apart from -his adherence to this new and utterly false fashion, -which precluded the concentration of troops for a -vigorous offensive, Coburg was a sound, slow, cautious -commander of the old Austrian type, more intent upon -preserving his own army than destroying the enemy’s, -and, perhaps, happiest when firmly set down to conduct -a siege in form according to the most scientific -principles. Withal he was a sensible and honourable -gentleman, and extremely popular with his troops. -The chief of his staff, and, by common report, the -virtual Commander-in-Chief, was the unfortunate -Mack, then a colonel forty years of age, who enjoyed -the reputation of being the most scientific officer in -Europe. The theory of war, as then understood in -many quarters, assigned as the first object not the -annihilation of the enemy’s force in the field, but the -possession of certain geographical points, which were -called Strategic Objects. At this game of maps and -coloured labels Mack excelled; and, when called upon -to fight an action, he so elaborated his plans for the -overwhelming of his enemies by the simultaneous -onslaught of a number of converging columns that, if -everything went right and every column reached -exactly the appointed place at exactly the appointed -time, he assured to himself not only victory but -conquest. But, since he made no allowance for the -possible failure of any one of his combinations through -unforeseen contingencies or accidents of any description, -Mack’s actions were rarely successful and always -unduly hazardous. He seems to have been an honest -man, of real though misdirected ability; while his -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</span> -character gained for him a confidence and respect -which the British in the field accorded to no other -foreign officer. But though, as shall be seen, his -methods by no means commended themselves to all -British commanders, they nevertheless made a fatally -favourable impression upon the British Ministry.</p> - -<p>To judge with the wisdom that comes after the -event, it may be said that the Allied Army was tactically -deficient in two principal respects, namely, in -the numerical weakness of its light infantry and -in the faulty organisation of its artillery. Light -infantry and light cavalry at this time were still -treated mainly as accessories, useful for the “little -war” (to use the French expression) of outposts and -reconnaissance, but as something apart from the “great -war,” which was reserved for the more solid squadrons -and battalions that enjoyed the dignity of a place in -the formal Order of Battle. In fact, the work of -outposts was supposed to fall wholly upon the light -corps, while the regular troops husbanded their strength -in security behind them. Hostilities with any nation -which is driven back on primitive methods of self-defence, -and which neither knows nor respects the -contemporary usage of civilised warfare, invariably -upset any such arrangement; and the British, after -the experience of America, should have been awake -to this truth. Indeed, in justice to the officers, many -of them were alive to it; but Pitt, since 1783, had -been more solicitous for the reduction than the training -of the Army. In the matter of artillery the practice -of all the nations was the same. Each battalion -possessed its two guns, three-pounders or six-pounders, -and the remainder of the ordnance was massed into -a park, with or without an inner distribution into -brigades or batteries. The handling of the artillery -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</span> -by the Count of Bückeburg at Minden had not yet -found sufficient appreciation to be made the foundation -of a system.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" -class="fnanchor">[119]</a></p> - -<p>The Austrian troops, in spite of the exhaustion of -the long Turkish war, were for the most part worthy -of their high reputation, and aroused at first the -greatest admiration among British officers. They -included, however, a certain number of irregular corps, -both horse and foot, chiefly Slavs, which were simply -savage banditti of the most dangerous type. They -would murder or plunder any one, friend or foe, even -to the vedettes of their own army; and no Austrian -general would trust himself among them without an -escort. The quality of the higher officers was, however, -unworthy of that of the men, many of them being old, -supine, and narrow-minded; and the corps of officers -at large was sharply divided between two factions, -which espoused the two opposite schools of Loudon -and Lacy. The organisation also was imperfect, for, -though the army was indeed distributed into brigades -and divisions, these were not kept together, but all -detachments were formed of squadrons and battalions -arbitrarily collected and entrusted to a general as -arbitrarily chosen, who knew no more of the men than -they knew of him. In the matter of tactics the -Austrians had made no progress since the Seven -Years’ War. Cavalry and infantry alike were still -formed in three ranks, and the art of handling large -bodies of cavalry had been nearly, though not wholly, -forgotten.</p> - -<p>The Prussians still enjoyed the fame which they had -won under Frederick the Great, but they had not been -improved by the false training observed by Cornwallis -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</span> -at their manœuvres; while their commander, von -Knobelsdorf, though full of zeal, was also full of years, -having passed his seventieth birthday. Superior to -them were the Hessians, the majority of whom had -served in America, where they had learned to manœuvre -rapidly and to fight in dispersed order, though the -lesson had never been practised since their return to -their own land.<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" -class="fnanchor">[120]</a> The Hessian Jäger were particularly -good light troops, and were armed with rifles. The -whole corps, moreover, was the more effective since it -was equipped with regimental transport upon a lavish -scale, and was therefore mobile and self-dependent.<a -id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a> -On the whole, the Hessians seem to have been the -most valuable fighting men in the army, though they -were not exempt from the love of plunder, a failing -which mercenary veterans are apt to judge more -leniently, at certain times, than other troops. The -Hanoverians were then, as always, fine soldiers, but -without the advantage of the Hessians in experience -and training. The Dutch, being hastily raised, were -ill organised, disciplined, trained, and equipped.</p> - -<p>The British, with the exception of the Guards, -were, in the opinion of foreign critics, very deficient in -training and discipline, for precisely the same reason -as the Dutch, namely, persistent neglect. The cavalry -was of better material than the infantry, and was -very well mounted; but both officers and men were -so ignorant of their work that, at first, they could not -even throw out vedettes and outposts without instruction -from foreigners. The field-guns were inferior to -those of the rest of the Allies; the ammunition-waggons -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</span> -were heavy and unwieldy; and the horses were -harnessed one before the other instead of abreast, -which made them difficult to drive, and took up much -room on the road. The models of both harness and -waggons were, in fact, of Marlborough’s time; while -the medical arrangements, or what passed for such, -were those of a still remoter age. Discipline for the -most part was bad, especially among the officers, who -were subject rather to political than military authority, -and, though there were still among their infantry good -men who had learned their business in America, far -too many were absolutely ignorant as well as neglectful -of their duty. Hard drinking in all ranks accounted -for much both of the indiscipline and the neglect. To -the men, of course, drunkenness brought a flogging -at the halberts, but to the officers, unfortunately, it -did not necessarily mean punishment; nor was it -possible that it should, when respectful consideration -was shown to both Prime Minister and Secretary of -State for War if they appeared incapably drunk at -the House of Commons, because the leaders of the -Opposition drank even harder than they. This vice -of drunkenness was the most formidable with which -good officers had to contend throughout the twenty -years of the war, simply because it was a fashion set -in high places.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" -class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> - -<p>It was no easy task to command such a force as the -British, Hanoverians and Hessians, under the orders -of such a man as Dundas, and the immediate direction -of such generals as Coburg and Mack. Frederick, -Duke of York, second son of King George the Third, -was in 1793 thirty years old. At the age of sixteen -he had been sent to Berlin to study the profession -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</span> -of arms under the eye of Frederick the Great himself, -and had returned with a practical knowledge which -made him later an admirable Commander-in-Chief -at the Horse Guards, but also with an undue preference -for the weaker points of the stiff and formal Prussian -system. In 1791 he had become Colonel of the Coldstream -Guards, in which post he had at first shown -himself enough of a martinet to excite discontent;<a -id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> -and, though he had wisely changed his ways after a -year’s experience, he was not at this time popular -with his men, while his officers, who had been taught -to look for preferment from politicians, resented his -authority whether for good or ill. In this respect he -was hampered by the same disadvantages as had beset -Lord Stair in 1743; and, unfortunately, he did not -possess the qualifications to gain the confidence of -his troops in the field. He had the cool personal -bravery which belongs to his race, but not the higher -moral courage which gives constancy and patience in -difficulty or misfortune; and hence he was at once -sanguine and easily discouraged. He had learned his -work, so far as it could be acquired by the industry of -a mediocre intellect, but he was slow of apprehension, -without sagacity, penetration or width of view, and -with so little imagination or resource that an unforeseen -emergency confounded him. On the other hand, his -dutiful loyalty and submission, in most trying circumstances, -towards Coburg on the one hand, and the -Cabinet on the other, were beyond all praise. The -Ministry had some just doubts as to his fitness to -command, but the King had set his heart upon the -appointment; and indeed, where so many Serene Highnesses -were gathered together, the superior rank of -the Duke was a decided advantage. It was hoped, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</span> -therefore, to make good his deficiencies by joining to -him Sir James Murray, better known by the name -which he afterwards assumed as Sir James Pulteney, -nominally as Adjutant-general, but really as Chief of -the Staff and something more; for it was to his correspondence -that the Government looked for information -and advice.</p> - -<p>Murray was a singular character. He had served -in the Seven Years’ War; he had distinguished himself -in the West Indies during the American War of Independence; -and he had trained an intellect, which was -of no common order, not only by shrewd observation -of the world but by solid and extensive study. His -knowledge was great, his grasp and outlook wide, his -judgment cool and accurate, his indifference to danger -and hardship absolute; but he was shy, awkward and -diffident, with a dreamy indolence which led him too -readily to surrender his own correct opinion, and to -amuse himself with speculation upon the incorrect -opinions of others.<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> -When roused he could sum up a -situation with an insight, terseness and vigour which -showed how close was his hold upon facts; but he was -not the helpmate who could make good the defects of -the Duke of York. The situation, indeed, demanded a -Marlborough, with the insight to see the one thing that -was needed, and the tact and ascendency to bring -cautious commanders, intriguing Ministers, narrow-minded -potentates and irresolute Cabinets into line, -for the one true object,—an immediate march on Paris.</p> - -<p>Such a march could undoubtedly not have been made -without risk, owing to the dearth of food in France; -yet the opportunity was favourable, and the hazard -was slight compared with the certain danger of delay. -<span class="sni">Feb. 19.</span> -Already in February the Republic had wantonly made -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</span> -a fresh enemy by declaring war upon Spain; and the -campaign in Belgium had produced results for which -the most sanguine of her enemies could hardly have -<span class="sni">March 8.</span> -hoped. On the first news of the Austrian successes, -the Convention instantly formed a special tribunal for -the trial of traitors and conspirators against France, -and summoned two of the defeated generals to appear -before it. This done, it proceeded to take measures -for hastening the levy of the three hundred thousand -men, decreed a fortnight before. The scenes of ridiculous -enthusiasm, which had become usual in Paris, -followed as a matter of course; but the multitude of -men who, for various reasons, claimed exemption, was -astonishing, and the rascality of many who were enrolled -was flagrant. A great many of these rogues -made a trade of fraudulent enlistment, receiving a -bounty from several corps and selling the arms and -clothing received from each of them; while the number -of women, who claimed allowances for the removal of -their husbands to the army, sufficed to warrant the -belief that every recruit was a polygamist. In the -provinces, both north and south, there was violent -<span class="sni">March 10.</span> -resistance to the levy; and on the 10th of March, at -Saint Florent le Vieil on the Loire, the peasants turned -upon the troops which had been brought up to enforce -the ballot, and, though armed only with cudgels, dispersed -them and drove them from the town. That -evening the alarm-bell rang in every church of the -surrounding parishes; and five days later bands of -peasants drove the National Guards from Chollet, some -twenty miles south of Saint Florent, and took that -town also. This was the first manifestation of a great -counter-revolutionary movement, famous in history as -the revolt of La Vendée.</p> - -<p>The Convention, however, did not at first realise the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</span> -importance of this outbreak, in the critical state of -things in the north. An attempt to reinforce Dumouriez -at Louvain, by calling out ten thousand of the National -Guards of the northern provinces, provided only a few -worn-out men and boys,<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" -class="fnanchor">[125]</a> whom the General contemptuously -dismissed to their homes. Then came the -defection of Dumouriez himself, which was well-nigh -fatal to all military improvement. The General had -disparaged the election of officers by their men; he had -urged that the volunteers should be incorporated in the -Line; he had tried to enforce discipline upon all; and, -finally, he had turned traitor and taken some of his -regular troops with him. It was therefore plain that -discipline was an abomination, that all his recommendations -were vicious, that the regular troops were not to -be trusted, and that volunteers only were to be accounted -faithful. Never was the regular army of France so -near to total dissolution at the hands of its countrymen -as at this moment of supreme military peril. Beurnonville, -having tried to abolish abuses, was driven from -the War Office; a good Jacobin, Bouchotte, with a -<span class="sni">April 6.</span> -still better Jacobin, Vincent, at his elbow, was installed -in Beurnonville’s place, and the whole of Pache’s vile -following returned with them to office.<a id="FNanchor_126" -href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> A camp was -ordered to be formed at Peronne, and in it were assembled, -not with disgrace but with honour, all the -soldiers who had been imprisoned by Dumouriez for -misconduct, all the deserters, the cowards and the -skulkers, who had fled from the army of Belgium. -Further, it was resolved that representatives of the -people, with absolute powers, should be sent to rally -and reorganise the northern forces, and to set the -fortresses in order. If ever a nation seemed bent upon -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</span> -compassing its own destruction by piling madness upon -madness, it was the French at this moment.</p> - -<p>Yet, amid all the confusion, there appeared the first -sign of the powers which by terrible means were to -reduce France and, through France, the whole Continent -of Europe to discipline and order. On the 6th of April -the Convention chose nine of its members, renewable -by monthly election, to wield the Dictatorship of -France, with the title of the Committee of Public Safety. -<span class="sni">April 10.</span> -On the 10th of April a rough Alsatian officer, Kellerman -by name, whose gallantry had raised him from the -ranks to a commission during the Seven Years’ War, -came forward with a scheme which preserved the famous -regiments of the French Line. Finally, among the -six representatives despatched to save the wreck of -Dumouriez’s army was Captain Lazare Carnot of the -Engineers; by birth a younger son in a respectable -family of Burgundy, by repute well known in Europe -as an original thinker upon military matters in general, -and upon the defence of fortresses in particular. -Though now forty years of age and of twenty years’ -standing in the army, he was still a captain, for his -military opinions had given offence in high quarters -under the Monarchy; and it was as a simple captain -that he was to appoint generals, and to organise victory -under the Republic. Deeply read in theology and -history, a passionate devotee of mathematics and of -science, he had framed for himself high ideals, which, -as he thought, the Revolution was appointed to fulfil; -and he upheld its principles through good report and -evil report, not with the Gallic effervescence that is -bred of self-consciousness, but with the austere fanaticism -of a Scot who takes his stand upon the Covenant. -He believed; and in his faith he had buried all thought -of self. Rank, wealth, fame alike were indifferent -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</span> -to this spare, stern, ascetic soldier. To give all that -lay in him for the cause, to render faithful account of -every trust reposed in him for the cause, to forward -all that would further it, to combat all that could impede -it—such were the principles that governed his -conduct. With these motives to inspire him, with -great natural gifts, and with every faculty of mind and -body trained to the highest point, it is not surprising -that his intellectual grasp was wide, his insight clear, -his energy infectious, his industry indefatigable. Such -was the man who in the early days of April hurried to -the north, his brain teeming with thoughts, long since -conceived, as to the training best suited to the French -soldier, with his natural aptitude for attack. Five -years before, while advocating a scheme of short service, -he had written that it is war and not a lifetime in the -barrack-yard that makes the old soldier. -<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> -To General Dampierre, who had been appointed on his recommendation -to succeed Dumouriez, Carnot left it to -apply this precept, while he himself, with ominous -directness, hastened northward to repair the half-ruined -fortress of Dunkirk.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="camp1793">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER V</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1793.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -The effect of Carnot’s arrival at Dunkirk in overthrowing -Pitt’s original plan has already been told. -There can be no doubt that the French had full information -of the Minister’s designs, for it became a -proverb that the most secret projects of the British -War Office were always well known to the enemy and -to everybody in England.<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" -class="fnanchor">[128]</a> Nevertheless, if the British -Cabinet had thereupon frankly abandoned any attempt -upon Dunkirk, Carnot’s labours might have been turned -to naught. The French army was only slowly assembled -during April, and even at the end of the month -was of inferior force and scattered over a wide front; -for the French were not free from the vices of the -cordon-system, nor were likely to be, so long as civilians -interfered with their military dispositions. Apart from -the garrisons of Quesnoy, Valenciennes, Condé, Lille -and Dunkirk, Dampierre kept ten thousand men on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</span> -<span class="sni">April.</span> -his right, under General Harville, between Maubeuge -and Philippeville: ten thousand more, under General -Lamarlière, lay on his left, in an entrenched camp -thrown up by Carnot at Cassel and at other points -between Lille and Dunkirk: and five thousand at -Nomain, Orchies, and Hasnon, covered the interval -between Lille and the main army. This last, consisting -of thirty thousand men under Dampierre’s immediate -command, lay in an entrenched camp at Famars, a -little to the south of Valenciennes, with a detachment -in another fortified position at Anzin, to the north-west -of that town. In all, therefore, he had about fifty -thousand men at hand for service in the field.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 23.</div> -<p> -Meanwhile the Allies, who were still below their -full strength, occupied the following positions. On -their right, that is to say, to westward, six thousand -Dutch and about three thousand Imperial troops, -under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, lay at Furnes, -Ypres and Menin; next to them two thousand five -hundred British and about the same number of Austrians -and Prussians, under the Duke of York, occupied -Tournai; next to the Duke of York, Knobelsdorf, -with about eight thousand Prussians, held the line of -Maulde, Lecelles and Saint Amand on the Scarpe; -next to Knobelsdorf, Clerfaye, with about twelve -thousand men at Vicoigne and Raismes, and at Bruay -and Fresnes, on the Scheldt, encompassed Condé on -the south, while the Prince of Würtemberg with about -five thousand men blockaded it on the north. At -Onnaing, due south of Condé, lay the principal army, -about fifteen thousand strong, with the advance guard -at Saint Saulve; and to the east of the main army -General Latour with about six thousand men occupied -Bettignies, in observation of Maubeuge, with a detachment -at Bavai to preserve communication between -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</span> -Bettignies and Onnaing. The total force of the Allies -may thus be taken, roughly, at over sixty thousand -men, not including thirty thousand Imperial troops -under the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirschberg, which were -uselessly detained at Namur, Trèves and Luxemburg. -The English cavalry, the Hanoverians and the Hessians, -had not yet arrived, though the first detachments of -the two former were drawing near to the front; but -none the less the Allies were actually superior to the -French in numbers, and very far superior in quality. -The whole of their multitudinous posts were strongly -entrenched; but it will be observed that, besides the -essential defect of the enormous extension of their -front, their line was cut in two by the river Scheldt, -which gave the greater opportunity for a successful -attack upon one or other of their wings. The general -distribution of the Allies corresponded in the main with -their lines of retreat, that of the British lying west to -the sea, that of the Dutch north-east upon Antwerp, -that of the Austrians east upon Namur; so that a -successful attack upon the British would probably lay -bare the Austrian right, and a decided defeat of the -Austrians must certainly uncover the British left. -With their usual jealousy for supreme control, the -Austrians mixed a contingent of their own troops with -the Allies in every section of the army, an arrangement -which gave rise to infinite confusion, since it made even -small detachments dependent on two or three different -sources of supply. For each nation made provision -for its own troops in its own way, and, owing to diversities -of system and of differences in calibre of muskets -and cannon, it was impossible to enforce any effort -towards uniformity.</p> - -<p>Still, the inactivity of Coburg during April was -marvellous. It never occurred to him to overwhelm -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</span> -any one of Dampierre’s isolated divisions of untrained -men by concentrating a superior force upon it. He -never reflected that, even if both sides adhered to the -cordon-system, the French could bring up the whole -manhood of their country to make their cordon stronger -than his own at every point. He allowed Dampierre -to school his troops with impunity by perpetual affairs -of outposts, without remembering that the French -could more easily replace two men than he could replace -one. Finally (but this may be pardoned to him) he -did not guess that, while he was wasting a campaign -over formal sieges, the French would evolve from the -experience of many skirmishes a new system of tactics—that -they would abandon the old formal training, -and, turning to account the indiscipline which springs -from the principle of equality, would grant independence -of action to the born fighting men, and trust to -the national impetuosity to carry the rest forward in -dense masses to the attack.</p> - -<p>It is a shameful reproach to the Allies that, overmatched -though he was in every respect, the French -General took the initiative and made the first move of -<span class="sni">May 1.</span> -the campaign. On the 1st of May he assailed the -whole line of the Allies from Saint Saulve to St. Amand; -but, the attacks being unintelligent and incoherent, he -was beaten back at every point with a loss of two -thousand men and several guns. Urged by the Convention -<span class="sni">May 8.</span> -to save Condé, he on the 8th essayed a second -attempt, and on this occasion confined himself to -demonstrations only upon the flanks of the Allies, -concentrating a larger proportion of his force against -Clerfaye’s position in the centre. These sounder -principles brought him within an ace of success. He -himself directed a frontal attack from Anzin against -Raismes and Vicoigne, and after four successive -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</span> -repulses carried the position of Raismes, excepting -the village. Lamarlière meanwhile with little difficulty -made his way towards St. Amand, while one of his -divisions, crossing the Scarpe, pressed on unseen -through the forest of Vicoigne, nearly to the road -which leads from St. Amand to Valenciennes. There -this division began to throw up a redoubt and batteries -to cannonade Clerfaye’s defences of Vicoigne, so as to -cut off communication between him and Knobelsdorf, -and to ensure a junction with the garrison of Valenciennes. -The situation was critical, for, if the French -succeeded in holding possession of the road, the post -at Vicoigne was lost, and the whole line of the Allies -was broken. Fortunately the Duke of York had -moved three battalions of Guards to Nivelle, a little -to the north of St. Amand, having promised Knobelsdorf -help in case of need; and at five o’clock in the -evening the brigade came upon the scene, just as the -French were gaining the upper hand of the Prussians. -The country to north and west of Valenciennes is a -level plain, broken only by the three forests which -bear the names of Marchiennes, Vicoigne, and Raismes, -so that the Duke could see little or nothing of what -was going forward until his troops were actually on -the scene of action. The Coldstream, being first for -duty, by Knobelsdorf’s order entered the wood, and -quickly driving the French back, followed them up -to their entrenchments. There, however, they were -met by musketry in front and a fierce fire of grape -from a masked battery in flank; when, finding themselves -unsupported by the Prussians, they fell back -in good order with a loss of over seventy killed and -wounded. Seeing, however, by the appearance of the -red coats, that Knobelsdorf had been reinforced, -Lamarlière’s division made no further effort to advance; -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</span> -and Dampierre, while leading a last desperate assault -upon Vicoigne from the front, was mortally wounded -by a cannon-shot. This decided the fate of the day: -his successor stopped the attack, and on the following -<span class="sni">May 9.</span> -morning retreated. On the next day Clerfaye and -Knobelsdorf stormed the enemy’s newly-built batteries -and captured their garrison of six hundred men, but -failed to take the guns, which, according to the French -custom of the time, had been withdrawn and kept -limbered up for the night, in readiness for escape. -<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a> -The loss of Clerfaye’s and Knobelsdorf’s corps in the -two days was little short of eight hundred officers and -men; that of the French was far heavier, and was -aggravated by the death of Dampierre. It speaks -highly for the man that with troops so raw he should -have made so fine a fight against some of the best -soldiers in Europe.</p> - -<p>The losses suffered by the Coldstream Guards on -the 8th were made the subject of much complaint both -against Knobelsdorf and the Duke of York, and did -not promote good feeling among the Allies in the field. -The battalion was, in fact, lucky to escape annihilation. -Murray blamed Lieutenant-colonel Pennington, who -was in command; but it seems that Knobelsdorf simply -told him to enter the wood, which was full of dense -undergrowth, without saying a word of the batteries -or entrenchments hidden within it, though both an -Austrian and a Prussian battalion had already suffered -severely in an attempt to carry them. The Duke of -York, who had never contemplated so foolhardy an -attack, wisely thought it best to make no complaint. -The battalion itself, to judge by a letter from one of -the officers to Lord Buckingham, was very indignant -with the Duke; and there is every probability that -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</span> -its complaints reached the ear of Pitt. I mention -this, because, though the matter is in itself a small -one, it gives conclusive evidence of the incessant -friction which arose from the indiscipline of the British -officers and from the mistrust which the Allies felt for -each other. It is safe to conjecture that this uninformed -criticism of generals by their subordinate -officers continued throughout the campaign; and the -preservation of the letter above mentioned among -Lord Grenville’s papers is proof that such criticism -was not disregarded by their powerful patrons at home. -Unfortunately there is too much reason to fear that -this evil even now is not unknown in our Army.<a -id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a></p> - -<p>During the following days the Allies were considerably -strengthened by the arrival of successive detachments -of Hanoverians and of one brigade of British -cavalry under General Ralph Dundas;<a id="FNanchor_131" -href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> but already -Murray, with his American experience, had awoke to -his weakness in light troops, and was recommending -the acceptance of two offers to raise corps of foreign -riflemen and Polish Uhlans.<a id="FNanchor_132" -href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> The primitive tactics of -the French were beginning to tell. The raw levies -understood war to signify the killing of the enemy—even -of one man rather than none at all—and the -saving of themselves. When therefore a mass of them -was set in motion, the bravest men advanced, taking -advantage of every shelter afforded by the ground, -and did their utmost to shoot their opponents down; -while the rest ran away or remained at a safe distance, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</span> -to return in a fierce tumultuous swarm if the enemy -showed signs of wavering, but not otherwise. However, -<span class="sni">May 21.</span> -on the 21st, Coburg, much rejoiced by the reinforcement -of British and Hanoverians, judged himself -strong enough to pursue his plan of campaign, and -decided to drive the French from their camp at Famars -preliminarily to the investment of Valenciennes. Meanwhile, -to the general regret, Mack resigned his post -on Coburg’s staff, owing partly to ill-health, partly to -his sense of Thugut’s antagonism to him;<a id="FNanchor_133" -href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> and the -Prince of Hohenlohe, a veteran of seventy-one, was -called from Luxemburg to take his place. It was, -however, enough at that time that the attack should -be designed by an Austrian General to ensure that it -should be repugnant to all good sense.</p> - -<p>The entrenched camp of Famars embraced two -broad parallel plateaux, divided by the little river -Rhonelle, which lie immediately to the south of Valenciennes. -The western plateau, that of Famars, has a -length of about four miles, and abuts on the village -of Artres; the eastern, which is broader and less clearly -defined than the other, has a length of about three -and a half miles, and terminates at the village of -Préseau. Both are practically flat upon the summit, -unenclosed, and were covered with crops. The ascent -to them is steepest from the west and south, and the -valley dug between them by the Rhonelle, though not -deep, plunges down so abruptly as to present sides of -sharp though short declivity. The ridge of Famars -was protected by a series of detached flêches and redoubts -placed on every commanding point on the -northern, western, and southern sides. The passages -over the Rhonelle at Artres, and at Maresches, a mile -and a half above it, were defended by strong entrenchments -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</span> -and batteries, and all the fords on this narrow -but deep and sluggish stream had been destroyed. -The eastern ridge was fortified by a continuous entrenchment -with three redoubts, which was carried -for nearly a mile along the length of the summit. The -force at hand for its defence was about twenty-five -thousand men, besides which five thousand men held -the fortified position of Anzin; while a small detachment -due west of it at Aubry maintained communication -with the post of Hasnon, still further to north -and west.</p> - -<p>The attack of the main position was assigned to two -principal columns, of which the left or southern was -placed under command of the Duke of York, with -orders to assemble his force on the heights between -Préseau and Maresches, and to assail the right flank -of the position. This column was made up of sixteen -battalions, eighteen squadrons, and thirty-eight reserve-guns,<a -id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> -of which the brigade of Guards<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" -class="fnanchor">[135]</a> and the eight -squadrons of Dundas’s brigade were British. The -second principal column consisted of twelve battalions, -of which three were the English of Abercromby’s -brigade,<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" -class="fnanchor">[136]</a> twelve squadrons and twenty-three reserve-guns, -with five pontoons, under the Austrian General -Ferraris. His orders were to assemble between Saultain -and Curgies, a little to the north-east of Préseau, -to drive the enemy from their positions east of the -Rhonelle, and to cross the river itself, or at least feint -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</span> -to do so. Besides these, a third column under Count -Colloredo was to observe Valenciennes from between -Estreux and Onnaing, and to protect Ferraris’s right -flank; a fourth, further to the right, under Clerfaye, -was to attack the entrenched camp of Anzin; a fifth -still further to the right under Knobelsdorf was to -march from St. Amand against Hasnon; and a sixth -and seventh under the Crown Prince and Prince -Frederick of Orange were to move respectively from -Tournai upon Orchies, and from Menin upon Tourcoing. -Finally, on the extreme left or western flank, there -were an eighth column, under General Otto, to protect -the Duke of York’s left by an advance by Villerspol -upon Quesnoy, and a ninth to disquiet the French -on the Sambre from Bavai. The scheme was typically -Austrian; that is to say, too full of science to leave -room for sense.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Famars"> - <a href="images/famarsxx.jpg" id="Famarsback"> - <img class="double" src="images/famars.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">Attack of the Allies on the<br /> - CAMP OF FAMARS, 23 May, 1793.</p> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">May 23.</div> -<p> -The morning broke in dense fog, so that the main -attack did not begin until near seven o’clock, when the -Duke of York’s column, after marching most of the -night, made its way with little resistance to Artres. -There failing to force the passage of the river, which -was defended by five batteries, the Duke left his -heavy guns with about a third of his force to engage -the French artillery, and proceeded with the rest -higher up the stream to Maresches, where a ford was -found, and the passage was with some trouble and -delay accomplished. Meanwhile Ferraris attacked the -long entrenchment on the eastern ridge, opening fire -from three batteries, while Abercromby on the right -and four Austrian battalions on the left advanced to -the assault, and carried the works with little difficulty, -capturing seven guns and over one hundred prisoners. -Two French regiments of cavalry, which tried to turn -the scale against the assaulting columns, were most -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</span> -gallantly charged by the Austrian Hussars and the -Hanoverian Life Guards, and actually defeated, notwithstanding -that the victorious troops had all the -disadvantage of a steep ascent against them. Coburg -then halted Ferraris’s column, until further news -should come of the Duke of York’s advance. But the -Duke, after making a wide turning movement by -Querenaing and driving the French from their outlying -defences, found himself at sunset at the foot of the -most formidable ascent in the whole position, crowned -at different points by four redoubts which flanked each -other. Thereupon, since his men had been on foot -for eighteen hours, he decided to defer the attack till -next morning. Elsewhere, the success of the various -columns was indifferent. Knobelsdorf could win no -more than the outworks of Hasnon; Clerfaye failed -to take the camp of Anzin; and, though the Prince -of Orange drove the French from Orchies, his brother, -Prince Frederick of Orange, was foiled before Tourcoing. -Coburg gave orders for renewal of the attack on the -entrenchments of Famars and Anzin at daybreak of -<span class="sni">May 24.</span> -the 24th; but it was found that the French, after -reinforcing the garrison of Valenciennes, had evacuated -all their positions and retired to Bouchain. The -trophies of the Allies were seventeen guns, captured -at various points, and three hundred prisoners; and -the further loss of the French was set down, doubtless -with exaggeration, at three thousand killed and -wounded. Even so the results of the day were unsatisfactory. -The Austrians, of course, blamed the -Duke of York; and Murray, without specifying who -was in fault, wrote privately that a great deal more -might have been done.<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" -class="fnanchor">[137]</a> But, in truth, no one -except an Austrian of that period could have looked<span -class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</span> -for great results from so feeble and faulty a plan of -attack.</p> - -<p>However, the ground was now clear for the siege -of Valenciennes; and Coburg, as a compliment to the -Duke of York, offered him the command of the besieging -force, including fourteen thousand Austrians. There -was much division in the British Cabinet over this -piece of politeness, for Ministers were still in the dark -as to Austria’s general intentions; and some of them -feared that the troops under the Duke of York might -be so much crippled by the siege of Valenciennes as -to be unfit for the subsequent siege of Dunkirk. However, -notwithstanding their suspicions of some sinister -design on Austria’s part, the Duke received permission -to accept the command; though Coburg was careful to -attach General Ferraris to his staff with secret orders -to take the entire direction of the operations upon -himself.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" -class="fnanchor">[138]</a> The chief of the English Engineers, Colonel -Moncrieff, was urgent for storming the town without -further ado, and was confident that, if his plans were -followed, the place could be taken within twelve days; -but, though Murray was wholly of Moncrieffs opinion, -Ferraris would not hear of it. A fortnight was therefore -spent in collecting heavy artillery, after which -<span class="sni">June 13.</span> -ground was duly broken on the 13th of June, before -a greater and a lesser horn-work on the east side of the -town. About twenty-five thousand men were actually -employed on the siege, while the remainder, about -thirty thousand men, formed the covering army; and, -practically speaking, active operations upon both sides -ceased except round the walls of the beleaguered -fortress.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</span></p> - -<p>Yet, far away to westward, there had been a movement -disquieting to the British. On the 29th of May -forty transports, conveying the second brigade of -British cavalry,<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" -class="fnanchor">[139]</a> came into Ostend; whereupon -Captain Carnot, knowing the slackness of the Dutch -garrisons at Furnes and Nieuport, which covered that -place, determined to surprise them from Dunkirk, and -then by a swift march forward to seize and burn the -British shipping. Moving out accordingly on the night -<span class="sni">May 30.</span> -of the 30th, he reached Furnes at daybreak, drove the -Dutch headlong from the town, and was hoping to -follow them up to Nieuport, when the whole of his -troops with one accord fell to the plunder of the town, -heedless of their officers, and in a short time were -reeling or lying in all directions, hopelessly drunk. -Far from seizing Ostend, he was thankful that the -Dutch did not return and cut his helpless battalions -to pieces.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" -class="fnanchor">[140]</a></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the movement fulfilled the useful purpose -of frightening the British Cabinet. Dundas was -possessed by a kind of superstition respecting Ostend, -having apparently some idea that it might be held as -the gate of the Austrian Netherlands from the sea, even -if the rest of the country were evacuated. Though the -place itself was part of the Austrian dominions, the -guardianship of the whole of the coast, and indeed of -the right flank of the Allied army, was entrusted to the -Dutch; and in spite of all protests the Dutch declined -to do anything for its defence. Ostend was in fact -indefensible, being divided by an unbridged estuary -which cut it in two at every flood tide, and was safe -from a French attack only for so long as Menin, Ypres, -and Nieuport were held by the Allies. The Duke of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</span> -York and Murray therefore regarded it as of no military -value, though of some temporary convenience, looking -upon Antwerp and the Scheldt as their true base and -channel of communication with England. Nothing, -however, would convince Dundas of Ostend’s insignificance. -He took the place under his own control, sent -heavy ordnance to be mounted for its defence, appointed -a special officer, General Ainslie, to take command of -it, and plagued Murray so incessantly to fortify it that -the Duke of York, for the sake of peace, consented to -raise a few entrenchments on a small scale. The Duke -had hardly done so, however, before he received a -rebuke from Dundas for spending too much money; -whereupon he, of course, suspended the work, being, as -Murray said, at a loss to know how to proceed. This -was the beginning of a more minute and persistent -interference of Dundas with the conduct of the operations, -with its inevitable consequence of strained -relations between him and the General in the field.<a -id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the siege of Valenciennes went forward -slowly and methodically, much more so, indeed, than -seemed necessary either to Murray or to Moncrieff, -though bad weather was accountable in some measure -<span class="sni">July 10.</span> -for the delay. At length, on the 10th of July, Condé -surrendered after a severe bombardment, and was -occupied in the name of the Emperor Francis. Twelve -days later Mainz opened its gates to the Prussians, -<span class="sni">July 22.</span> -though the garrison was twenty thousand strong, and -had still bread and wine to last for some days. Finally, -on the 26th, an assault was delivered in three columns -<span class="sni">July 26.</span> -upon the two horn-works of Valenciennes, one column -being led by a storming party of the Guards, and supported -by part of Abercromby’s brigade. The attacks -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</span> -of all three succeeded with little loss, and Murray, -after a strong altercation with the Austrian engineer, -insisted, in defiance of Ferraris’s orders, upon making -a lodgment in the greater horn-work.<a id="FNanchor_142" -href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a> Thereupon, -<span class="sni">July 28.</span> -on the 28th of July, the French General, Ferrand, -capitulated. The place was taken over, like Condé, in -the Emperor’s name, amid the loud applause not only -of the citizens but of the garrison, who trampled the -tricolour under foot and hailed the Duke of York as -King of France. All three of the captured garrisons -were permitted to return to their own place, on condition -that they should not fight against the Allies -during the remainder of the war.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, after the fall of Valenciennes the -Allies in Flanders, far from pressing their advantage, -fell to debating what they should do next. It had -been already agreed that the Austrians should give -up ten thousand men to the Duke of York for the -siege of Dunkirk; but Coburg, seeing the danger of -the plan, made a last effort to avert it by submitting -a new scheme for taking the offensive in concert with -Prussia; he himself to move south-east upon Maubeuge -from Valenciennes, while the Prussians should advance -south-west from Mainz upon Sarrelouis. King -Frederick William gladly assented, but the Duke of -York protested, as under his instructions he was -bound to do; and he was upheld by a messenger who -arrived from Vienna at Coburg’s headquarters on the -6th of August. Thugut had been at work on one -of his usual subtilties. He had soothed Pitt by renouncing -the exchange of Belgium for Bavaria, but -had begged that Prussia might not be informed of -the renunciation; for he was still secretly bent on -obtaining Bavaria by some means, and had resolved -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</span> -to purchase it by the cession of Alsace. Hence it -was his wish that the King of Prussia, and particularly -the Austrian troops under General Wurmser -who were serving with him, should move south into -Alsace, and that Coburg should pursue the plan, already -agreed upon, of besieging Quesnoy, while the Duke -of York invested Dunkirk. Coburg thereupon gave -way, though with no very good grace; and it was -resolved that, before his army was separated from -the Duke’s, a general action should be fought, as an -essential preliminary to the subsequent operations.<a -id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a></p> - -<p>The position of the French under General Kilmain -was known as that of Caesar’s Camp, which lies on -the left bank of the Scheldt about two miles above -Bouchain; but in reality it formed an irregular quadrilateral, -of which a part of Villars’s famous lines of -La Bassée formed the northern side. Facing due -east, Kilmain’s front was covered by the Scheldt from -Bouchain to Cambrai, his rear by the river Agache, -which runs into the Sensée a little to the south of -Arleux, his right by the Sensée, and his left by the -wood and heights of Bourlon from Cambrai to Marquion. -All passages over the Scheldt were closed by -entrenchments, and the valley itself was flooded; all -passages over the Sensée were equally defended, while -the right from Cambrai to Agache was strengthened -by field-works and abatis. Such a position, held by -sixty thousand men, was formidable, and Coburg -accordingly resolved to turn it by the south. The -turning column, consisting of fourteen thousand men -under the Duke of York, was to assemble about -Villers-en-Cauchies and Saint Aubert, and to cross -the Scheldt at Masnières and Crevecœur, about five -miles south of Cambrai. A second column of about -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</span> -nine thousand men under the Austrian General -Colloredo, and a third of about twelve thousand under -General Clerfaye, were to force the passage of the -Scheldt in the front of the position. The remainder -of the army, little less than half of it, was uselessly -frittered away in posts of observation.</p> - -<p>Murray, foreseeing that the French would retire -as soon as they perceived the turning movement, -begged persistently that more cavalry should be given -to the Duke of York, in order to inflict some punishment -on them. His request was refused, and the -result was exactly that which he had expected. The -<span class="sni">Aug. 7.</span> -Duke, after a march of eleven hours on a day of extraordinary -heat, found his troops too much exhausted -to pass the river at Masnières; and Kilmain, withdrawing -quietly in the night, made good his retreat -upon Arras with little loss, though the British cavalry -made a few prisoners. The Austrians, of course, -blamed the Duke of York, though Coburg had sent -Hohenlohe with him for the express purpose of superintending -his operations; but the arrangements of -the day opened Murray’s eyes to the essential vices -of the Austrian tactics. “We were not in force to -attack the enemy,” he wrote; “the Duke’s column -was a long way from support, and between ourselves -we were not sorry to see them go off.” It was only -after long schooling by disaster that the Austrians at -last abandoned a system of which the rottenness was -clear to the much despised Briton.<a id="FNanchor_144" -href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a></p> - -<p>After the engagement, Coburg pressed the Duke -of York to remain with him for yet another fortnight, -in order to renew the attack on the French -army or to take Cambrai, the last fortress that blocked -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</span> -the way into France. But the Duke could only obey -his instructions as to Dunkirk, which had lately been -reiterated by Dundas;<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" -class="fnanchor">[145]</a> and the two armies accordingly -parted. Coburg, weakened by the withdrawal -of nine thousand Prussian troops, and not yet compensated -by the restoration of fourteen thousand -Austrians from the Rhine, resolved to besiege Quesnoy, -and meanwhile spread his force in several detachments -from Denain to Bettignies. The Duke assembled -his whole force of about thirty-seven thousand -<span class="sni">Aug. 13.</span> -men<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a> -at Marchiennes on the Scarpe on the 13th -of August, and on the 15th marched in two columns -north-west by Baisieux and Tourcoing upon Menin. -From Baisieux the route lay across the front of the -great fortress of Lille, and of the French fortified -posts extending from that city to Dunkirk; and on -<span class="sni">Aug. 18.</span> -the morning of the 18th, soon after the advanced -guard of the southern column had moved from Tourcoing, -heavy firing was heard in the direction of -Linselles, about two miles to the west of that place. -The Prince of Orange, for reasons best known to -himself, had seized the opportunity to sally out from -Menin, and surprise the French posts of Blaton and -Linselles, which being accomplished, he left two -weak battalions to hold them, and retired. About -mid-day the French returned with five thousand -men and drove out the Dutch; and an hour or two -later an aide-de-camp came galloping into Menin to -ask for help. The Duke of York at once ordered -out the brigade of Guards, which had just arrived at -Menin after a severe march, with a few guns, under -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</span> -General Lake. The three battalions, without their -flank companies, and therefore little over eleven -hundred strong, at once turned out, and traversed -the six miles to Linselles in little more than an hour, -but, on reaching it, found not a Dutchman there. -They were, however, saluted by a heavy fire of grape -from batteries which they had supposed to be in possession -of the Dutch; and thereupon Lake determined -to attack at once.</p> - -<p>The hill, on which the village of Linselles stands, -is fairly steep on its northern face, and was further -strengthened by two redoubts before the village itself -and by a barrier of palisades on the road, while its -flanks were secured by woods and ditches. Lake at -once deployed into line under a heavy fire of grape, -and, after firing three or four volleys, charged with -the bayonet and drove the French from the redoubts -and village. He then halted and re-formed on the -southern side of the hill, not without apprehensions -lest the enemy should rally and make a counter attack -while he was still unsupported. Fortunately, however, -the French were not equal to the attempt, being -still of the inferior quality which was inevitable under -the foolish administration of the Jacobins, and so -puny in stature that the Guards cuffed and jostled -them like a London mob, without condescending to -kill them.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" -class="fnanchor">[147]</a> Lake was therefore left unmolested on -his ground, until at nightfall six battalions of Hessians -arrived, in reply to his urgent messages for reinforcement, -to relieve him. His trophies were twelve -guns, seventy prisoners, and a colour, but his losses -amounted to one hundred and eighty-seven officers -and men killed and wounded; and no real object -whatever was gained. The action was undoubtedly -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</span> -most brilliant, and the conduct of the men beyond -all praise; while Lake’s swift decision to escape from -a most dangerous situation by an immediate attack -stamps him as a ready commander. But it is a grave -reflection upon the Duke of York that he should so -thoughtlessly have exposed some of his best troops -to needless danger, leaving them isolated and unsupported -for several hours. It is still less to his credit -that, when he finally relieved them by a detachment -of Hessians, he actually left these also isolated and -unsupported within striking distance of a superior -enemy during the whole night, for no better purpose -than to rase some paltry French earthworks which -a few hours would suffice to throw up again. Because -the Prince of Orange was guilty of one act of signal -foolishness, there was no occasion to outdo him by -another.</p> - -<p>At Menin the army was parted into two divisions. -The first, consisting of the Hanoverians, ten British -squadrons and foreign troops, or about fourteen thousand -five hundred men, under the Hanoverian Marshal -Freytag, was to form the covering army; the other, -of nearly twenty-two thousand men, including the -rest of the British troops, under the Duke in person, -was appointed to besiege Dunkirk. On the 19th, -<span class="sni">Aug. 19.<br />Aug. 20.</span> -Freytag marched from Menin by Ypres upon Poperinghe, -which he occupied with his main body on the -20th, at the same time pushing his advanced guard -further north-west to Rousbrugge on the Yser. On -the following day a detachment of Hessians, with -<span class="sni">Aug. 21.</span> -great skill and at small cost to themselves, drove the -French from Oost Capel and Rexpoede into the -fortress of Bergues, with the loss of eleven guns and -some four hundred men; and Freytag then took up -his line of posts to cover the besieging army. His -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</span> -left was stationed at Poperinghe, covered by the -fortress of Ypres; and from thence the chain ran -north-west to Proven on the Yser, and westward up -that stream by Bambecque to Wylder, where it turned -north, and passing midway between Bergues and -Rexpoede rested its right on a point called the White -House, hard by the canal that runs from Bergues -<span class="sni">Aug. 23, 24.</span> -to Furnes. On the 23rd and 24th Freytag drove the -French from Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque with -the loss of nineteen guns, and surrounded Bergues -by detachments at Warhem to east, Coudekerque to -north, Sainte Quaedypre to south, and Steene to -west. From this last an outer chain of posts was -extended southward to Esquelbecque, and thence -east by Wormhoudt and Herzeele to the Upper Yser -at Houtkerque. The whole circuit thus embraced -measured about twenty-one miles; from which it -will be concluded that Freytag was a believer in the -cordon-system.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 20.</div> -<p> -Meanwhile the Duke of York marched on the 20th -to Furnes; and on the 22nd, moving thence parallel -<span class="sni">Aug. 22.<br />Aug 24.</span> -with the strand, he drove in the enemy’s advanced -posts upon the entrenched camp of Ghyvelde, which -the French abandoned in the night. On the 24th, -after several hours of sharp fighting, which cost the -Allies nearly four hundred men,<a id="FNanchor_148" -href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> the French were -forced back from the suburb of Rosendahl into the -town; whereupon the Duke entrenched himself in -his chosen position, with his right resting on the sea -and his left at Tetteghem, facing full upon the eastern -side of the town and about two miles distant from the -walls.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</span></p> -<p>The field of operations for the Duke’s army may -be described roughly as a quadrilateral, of which the -sea forms the northern side, the canal from Dunkirk -to Bergues the west, the canal from Bergues to Furnes -the south, and a line drawn from Furnes to the sea -the east. From east to west the ground thus enclosed -was divided roughly into two parallel strips; the -northern half consisting of the sandhills known as -the Dunes, together with a narrow plain of level -sandy ground within them; and the southern half of -a huge morass called the Great Moor, which consisted -partly of standing water, partly of swamp, -but was all open to inundation by admitting the -tidal water from the sluices of Dunkirk. Tetteghem, -which formed the left of the Duke’s position, rested -upon this swamp, and commanded the only road -that led across it to the White House, and so to -Freytag’s army. The position itself was in many -respects disadvantageous. It was much broken up -by innumerable little ditches, hedges, and patches -of brushwood, all of which the troops had to clear -away with their side-arms for want of better tools; -it was wholly destitute of drinking water, that in the -canals being brackish, and that found in the wells -unpalatable; and, finally, it lay open to the minutest -inspection from the tower of Dunkirk Cathedral. -But this was not the worst. The Duke had looked -for a fleet to cover his right flank, which had suffered -from the enemy’s gunboats during the march upon -Ghyvelde, and for transports bringing heavy artillery -and other materials for the siege; and so far there -was not a sign of them. “The principal object is -to have what is wanted and to have it in time,” -Murray had written to Dundas in July; and Dundas -had replied that he was preparing artillery for Dunkirk, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</span> -but was in great want of gunners.<a id="FNanchor_149" -href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a> At last, -<span class="sni">Aug. 27.<br />Aug. 29.<br />Aug 30.</span> -on the 27th, the transports came with gunners, but -without guns; on the 29th a frigate, the <i>Brilliant</i>, -and a few armed cutters appeared off the coast; and -on the 30th Admiral Macbride arrived to concert -operations, but without his fleet.</p> - -<p>By an arrangement, which was repeated at least -once more during the war, Macbride’s squadron, -being intended to act with the Army, had been removed -from the control of the Admiralty and placed -under the orders of Dundas, so that he alone was -responsible for this miscarriage.<a id="FNanchor_150" -href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> “Why did you -not earlier suggest to me naval co-operation at Dunkirk?” -he wrote angrily to Murray on the 29th. -“I had always a conceit in my own mind as to its -usefulness, but I had no authority to quote for it.” -This is an instructive example of Dundas’s methods -as a War Minister. The project of besieging Dunkirk -emanated from himself and his colleagues in the -Cabinet, and from them alone. No military man approved -it, though the Duke of York, out of loyalty to -his masters, dutifully upheld it; and Dundas never -quoted any authority but his own for undertaking -it, nor for his constant interference with the conduct -of the operations that preceded it. He had indeed -a good many conceits in his own mind, the most fatal -of which was that he understood how to conduct a -campaign; and he had privately made vague inquiries -of Murray, as to the need for naval co-operation, -so far back as in April.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" -class="fnanchor">[151]</a> But the point was not one -to be decided off-hand by a General, for the question -was not whether a fleet would be useful, but whether -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[Pg 231] -</span>it would be able to act in all weathers; and this -purely naval matter appears never to have been considered -at all. On the 15th of August, when the army -was not yet committed to the siege, General Ainslie, -the commandant at Ostend, warned Dundas that -he had not realised the difficulties which might be -raised by adverse weather at Dunkirk; and, as a -matter of fact, the <i>Brilliant</i> and her little flotilla had -not been on the coast three days before they were -blown away from their station. It was doubtless -owing to the uncertainty of naval assistance that -Murray gave the apparently astounding opinion, that -he regarded a squadron as useful though not very -material to the siege. But, apart from this, Dundas -had so often pressed the Duke of York to spare his -eight thousand Hessians, which formed almost one-third -of the force under his command, for another -service, that it was impossible for the Duke to divine -whether Ministers really intended to pursue their -design against Dunkirk or not. If they did, he had -a right to look to them for a siege-train and for the -necessary naval assistance, neither of which were -forthcoming, partly because Dundas did not know -his own mind, partly because he had committed himself -to a multiplicity of operations beyond the power, -after ten years of steady neglect,<a id="FNanchor_152" -href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> of either Army or -Navy to execute. However, as a substitute for the -much-needed ships and guns, he sent to Murray a -plan for the siege of Dunkirk, drawn up by no less -skilled a hand than that of Lord Chancellor Loughborough, -possibly with some hope that the deficiencies -of Downing Street might be made good by the wisdom -of the woolsack. There are times when the conceit -of British politicians becomes touchingly ridiculous.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</span></p> - -<p>Very different was the change that had come over -military administration in France during the same -month of August. Upon the re-election of the Committee -of Public Safety, which took place on the -<span class="sni">Aug. 10.</span> -10th, Barrère, who was a member, approached Prieur -of the Côte d’Or with the words, “We none of us -understand military matters. You are an officer -of Engineers; will you join us?” “There is only -one man in the Convention for the place,” answered -Prieur, “and that is Carnot; and I will be his second.” -<span class="sni">Aug. 14.</span> -Accordingly, on the 14th of August two new members -were added to the Committee, namely, Carnot, who -assumed control of the formation, training, and movements -of the armies, and Prieur, who took charge of -arms, ammunition, and hospitals. These, together -with Robert Lindet, formed the most remarkable -group in one of the most remarkable administrative -bodies which has ever existed. Three of the members, -Barrère, Billaud Varennes, and Collot d’Herbois, were -known as the Revolutionaries, their business being -to guide and inspire political emotions; three more, -Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint Just, were concerned -with legislative proposals, police, and the revolutionary -tribunal, and bore the ominous name of -the High Hands; but the last three, Carnot, Prieur, -and Lindet, were known simply as the Workers, a -title which no men have ever more worthily earned.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 16.</div> -<p> -Carnot’s advent showed itself in prompt and energetic -action. On the 16th of August a decree was -passed for a levy <i>en masse</i>, which, it was estimated, -would add four hundred and fifty thousand men to -the army; and, since all exemptions and substitutes -were disallowed, the cream of the nation began for -the first time to flow into the ranks. Moreover, on -<span class="sni">Aug. 29.</span> -the 29th of August, the old white coats of the Monarchy -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</span> -were abolished and the blue coat of the National -Guard made uniform for the entire host, a significant -hint that henceforth there were to be no further distinctions -between regular troops and volunteers, but -a single National Army. Prieur, on his side, set up -manufactories of arms and gunpowder in Paris, and -stimulated the search for saltpetre in all directions. -The result of these measures lay hid in the future; but -immediate and important movements were made on -the northern frontier. Carnot, with true insight, -had divined that England was in reality the most -dangerous member of the Coalition, and that to foil -her before Dunkirk would, from its political results, -be the most telling of all military operations.<a -id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> -Withdrawing therefore several thousand troops from -Coburg’s front and from the army of the Moselle, he -<span class="sni">Aug. 24.</span> -massed them to westward, until, on the 24th of August, -there were, apart from the eight thousand men in -Dunkirk itself, some twenty-three thousand in the -entrenched camp at Cassel, four thousand about -Lille, and twelve to fifteen thousand more from the -Moselle within a few days’ march. Kilmain had been -recalled after the retreat from Cæsar’s camp, and -replaced by General Houchard in supreme command. -Among Houchard’s subordinate generals was Jourdan. -Dunkirk itself had for commandant General Souham, -an energetic officer whose fame was soon to spread -wide; and one of Souham’s battalions was commanded -by Lazare Hoche.</p> - -<p>Thus new men and a new principle of war, which -were to crush the cordon-system out of existence, -hung like an angry cloud to the south of Dunkirk; -but the Generals of the Allies took no heed. Murray, -indeed, had heard with anxiety of the increase of the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</span> -French force in his front, and had begged Coburg -for reinforcements, which, however, could not be -spared.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" -class="fnanchor">[154]</a> On the east Coburg was busy besieging -Quesnoy, with corps of observation thrown out to -east and west. He had called up eight thousand men -under General Beaulieu from Namur to strengthen -his weak cordon about Bouvines and Orchies; but -to west of Beaulieu the space from Lannoy to Menin -was guarded by some thirteen thousand Dutch—spiritless, -disaffected troops, whose leader, the Prince -of Orange, was half inclined to give up the contest -because he could obtain no assurance as to his indemnity. -West of the Dutch was the gossamer line -of Freytag, and behind it lay the Duke of York, conscious, -first, that Souham had opened the sluices, -and that the steady rise of the inundation would -shortly sever his communication with Freytag; -secondly, that his right flank was under perpetual -menace from the French gunboats; and thirdly, that -his rear was insecure, since there was nothing to -hinder the French from moving troops by sea. In -this situation he was trying to take a fortress, which -he was not strong enough to invest and which the -enemy could consequently reinforce at any moment, -by attacking it upon one side only without heavy -artillery. He endeavoured to protect his flanks by -throwing up entrenchments in the Dunes, but found -that they filled with water at the depth of two feet; -and he was fain to disarm a frigate at Nieuport and -bring up her heavy guns to the front, in order to arm -batteries, not only against the town, but towards the -sea, to drive away the French gunboats. Thus at -the beginning of September he was able to open fire; -but meanwhile Houchard had not been idle, for on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</span> -<span class="sni">Aug. 27.</span> -the 27th he fell in force upon the posts of Beaulieu -and the Prince of Orange at Cysoing and Tourcoing. -He was beaten back by Beaulieu with the loss of -four guns; but the Dutch abandoned Tourcoing with -suspicious alacrity, and would have retired to Tournai -and Courtrai had not Murray sent a detachment to -support them. “There is ill-will and disinclination -to favour our present operations,” wrote Murray; -and indeed the fact is hardly surprising.<a id="FNanchor_155" -href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a> The marvel -is that he and the Duke of York should have remained -in so dangerous a position, when a successful attack -by the enemy upon the Dutch and a bold push forward -would have carried the French to Furnes, and cut off -the whole of the army about Dunkirk beyond rescue. -Indeed, though they knew it not, this operation had -actually been projected at the French headquarters.<a -id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a></p> - - -<p>With the arrival of his last reinforcements from -the Moselle, Houchard resolved to attack the scattered -posts of Freytag, the nearest of which lay little more -than five miles from Cassel. Assembling thirty thousand -men, he led them forward early in the morning -<span class="sni">Sept. 6.</span> -of the 6th of September in five columns, under Generals -Vandamme, Hédouville, Colland, Jourdan, and himself, -the three first against Poperinghe, Proven, and -Rousbrugge, the two last against Wormhoudt, Herzeele, -and Houtkerke. Though outnumbered by ten to -one, the Hanoverians and Hessians fought most -obstinately, and the troops opposed to Houchard -and Jourdan would have held their own behind the -Yser at Bambecque, had not the French already -penetrated to Rexpoede in their rear. The fighting -lasted all day, the garrison of Dunkirk at the same -time keeping the besieging army employed by a sortie; -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</span> -and at night Freytag retired upon Hondschoote, -ordering General Walmoden, who commanded the -posts about Bergues, to withdraw all his troops to -the same place. Taking the road by Rexpoede, in -ignorance that it was actually occupied by the French, -Freytag blundered into the midst of a French picquet, -and was, with the young Prince Adolphus (afterwards -Duke of Cambridge), wounded and taken. -The Prince was rescued, but the Field-Marshal was -secured, and would have remained a prisoner, had -not General Walmoden, guessing that his chief might -have fallen into a trap, marched at once upon Rexpoede, -stormed it then and there, and delivered him. -Walmoden then assumed command, and, resuming -the retreat, took up a convex position before Hondschoote, -with his right leaning on the Bergues canal, -his centre just in advance of Hondschoote itself, and -his left resting on the village of Leysele. The whole -of his front was covered by a maze of small ditches -and hedges, through which the only access was a -single dyke leading into Hondschoote; but this -broken ground, however valuable for defence, deprived -the Allies of the use of their cavalry, which -was the arm in which above all they overmatched -the French. From thence Walmoden sent urgent -messages to the Duke of York for reinforcements; -and it is significant that, owing to the inundation, -no troops could reach him except by way of Bergues. -There was therefore no reason why Freytag’s corps -should not have been concentrated about Hondschoote, -where it would have covered the besiegers -quite as efficiently and with infinitely less risk. The -British Commander-in-Chief cannot be acquitted of -neglect herein, though Freytag must bear part of the -blame for extreme dispersion of his force. -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Dunkirk"> - <a href="images/dunkirkxx.jpg" id="Dunkirkback"> - <img class="double" src="images/dunkirk.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption"><span class="fsize120">DUNKIRK and ENVIRONS</span><br /> - showing<br /> - THE POSITION <span class="fsize75">OF THE</span> - ALLIES<br /> - from 24 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1793. - </p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 7.</div> -<p> -Houchard tried to follow up his success on the -following day by a renewed attack, but his soldiers -would not follow him; and Walmoden, though he -took the precaution to send his heavy baggage to -Furnes, repulsed him without difficulty. On the -<span class="sni">Sept. 8.</span> -8th, however, Houchard advanced with fresh troops -to the assault, himself leading twenty battalions, -covered by several guns, to the principal attack by -the dyke; while a second column on his left, under -General Leclerc, tried to force its way along the canal, -and a third, under Colland and Hédouville, moved -up from Rousbrugge against Leysele. The plan of -attack was faulty, for by holding Walmoden in front -and pushing the main force round his left flank, which -stood in the air at Leysele, Houchard must have -compelled him to retire or to be driven into the swamp -of the Great Moor. The new French tactics, however, -made good the General’s shortcomings. Taking -cover cunningly behind every hedge, ditch, or bush, -the French sharp-shooters poured a deadly fire into -the Hanoverians and Hessians, who stood exposed -in their array of three ranks deep, discharging their -volleys by platoons with perfect discipline, and pressing -forward with the bayonet when the French ventured -too near to them. But the volleys did little -injury to dispersed and hidden skirmishers, and the -charge with the bayonet was hardly more effective -over such intricate ground; for the French did not -await it, but ran back to the nearest hedge and resumed -their fire from behind it. For four hours -Walmoden’s brave men held their own with the greatest -gallantry in spite of heavy losses, until at noon their -last reserves of ammunition were exhausted, when, -their left flank being seriously threatened by Hédouville, -the General gave the order to retire in two -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</span> -columns upon Furnes. A battalion of Hessians covered -the retreat with splendid tenacity; and the wreck -of the force took up a position between the two canals -just to the south of Furnes. The infantry had lost -at least a third of its numbers, perhaps even more; -and the Hanoverians, by the confession of their own -officers, were no longer to be depended upon.<a -id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> It -was no reproach to them that this should have been -so, for no troops in the world can endure heavy punishment -during consecutive days of unsuccessful fighting, -and remain unshaken. Their losses had been very -great, and their behaviour, by the admission both of -friend and foe, most admirable.</p> - -<p>On this same day the garrison of Dunkirk made a -sally against the besiegers in the village of Rosendahl, -but was repulsed, though not without loss to the -Allies; and in the afternoon came the news of Walmoden’s -defeat. At four o’clock orders were given -for the heavy baggage to be sent back to Fumes, and -at eight a Council of War was held. The Duke of -York hoped to carry off his siege-guns, but the French, -having control of the sluices, had shut off the water -from the canal, so that it was no longer of use for -transport; and it was represented that delay might -mean the overpowering of Walmoden’s army and the -cutting off of the Duke’s retreat by Furnes. At -midnight therefore the besieging army retired in two -columns, with a confusion which shows the inefficiency -of the Duke’s staff. Transport being scarce, -the waggons were so much overloaded that the animals -could hardly drag them, and the troops were constantly -checked by fallen horses and overturned -vehicles. Further, no orders for the retreat were -sent to the two battalions in Tetteghem, and the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</span> -whole of one column was delayed until they could -join it. It was thus ten o’clock on the morning of -<span class="sni">Sept. 9.</span> -the 9th before the entire force reached the camp at -Furnes, fortunately without the least molestation from -the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" -class="fnanchor">[158]</a> There the Duke effected his junction -with Walmoden, but took the precaution to send his -heavy baggage to Ostend. He had been fortunate -in escaping from a most dangerous position with no -greater loss than that of his thirty-two heavy guns; -but incessant fighting, a swampy encampment, bad -drinking-water and fever had grievously thinned the -ranks of his army. It was reported at the time that -the siege of Dunkirk had cost the Allies from one -cause and another nearly ten thousand men;<a id="FNanchor_159" -href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> and -I am disposed to think that this estimate is not exaggerated. -“Our whole enterprise is defeated and -our situation embarrassing in the extreme,” wrote -Murray. “It is uncertain whether we can maintain -ourselves behind Furnes; at all events I think we -shall hold good behind the canal at Nieuport.” This -<span class="sni">Sept. 11.</span> -letter reached Downing Street on the 11th; and on -that same day Macbride’s fleet appeared before Nieuport, -three weeks too late.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER VI</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1793.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -During August and the first week of September the -results of the Government’s incoherent enterprises -began to crowd one upon another with rapidity enough -to bewilder a clearer head than that of Dundas. The -forces that he had set in motion in the Colonies seemed -at first to promise great results at small cost. On the -<span class="sni">April 12.</span> -12th of April General Cuyler, obedient to his instructions, -embarked a force of about five hundred men<a id="FNanchor_160" -href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a> at -Barbados, and sailed under convoy of Vice-admiral -Sir John Laforey’s squadron to Tobago. The enemy -was prepared for his coming, for, as was usual with -Dundas’s secret expeditions, the whole island of -Barbados was apprised of the project as early as the -<span class="sni">April 14.</span> -General;<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" -class="fnanchor">[161]</a> but none the less Cuyler landed on the 14th -at Courland Bay, stormed on the same night the French -fort that crowns the hill above Scarborough, and captured -the island with trifling loss. The news of this -success reached London on the 1st of June, and was -followed a month later by that of the bloodless capture -<span class="sni">May 14.</span> -of St. Pierre and Miquelon by a small force sent from -Halifax; but the next intelligence from the west was -less satisfactory. Though by no means over-trustful -of the representations of the refugees from Martinique, -whom Dundas had recommended to him, and who -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</span> -assured him that eight hundred men would suffice -to take the island, General Bruce embarked about -<span class="sni">June 10.</span> -eleven hundred troops at Barbados on the 10th of June, -<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> -and sailed for the island with Admiral Gardner’s -squadron. After concerting operations with the French -<span class="sni">June 16.</span> -Royalists, he landed his troops on the 16th at Case -Navire, for an attack on St. Pierre; but a panic, -which set in among the Royalist levies on the morning -fixed for the action, convinced him that it would be -hopeless to trust them, and he accordingly re-embarked -<span class="sni">June 21.</span> -on the 21st for Barbados, carrying his pusillanimous -allies away with him. Here, therefore, was an initial -failure on the part of the monarchical party, which -had promised such easy possession of the French West -Indies; and Bruce did not hesitate to add that, since -the Republicans had admitted all black men to rights -of government in Martinique, any further attack would -be hopeless unless undertaken by a considerable force.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Aug. 13.</div> -<p> -The news of this abortive expedition reached -London on the 13th of August; and shortly afterwards -came a letter from a gentleman in Tobago, warning -the Government that French emissaries were busy all -over the West Indies, and that there was great danger -of a general rising of the negroes for the expulsion of -the white proprietors from all the islands.<a id="FNanchor_163" -href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> Here was -information important enough to make Pitt think -twice before he pursued his policy of cutting off the -financial resources of the Revolution by ruining French -West Indian trade, to say nothing of the fact that the -said trade was already practically ruined by civil war -in the French islands. There were other weak points -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</span> -in the French armour besides the West Indies, so many -indeed that Ministers might be excused for finding it -<span class="sni">Aug. 29.</span> -difficult to determine which of them they should assail. -The only method of overcoming that difficulty was -that they should clearly define to themselves their -object in making war.</p> - -<p>First then, there was the counter-revolution in the -south of France; where Lyons still defied the forces -of the Convention, and where it was hoped that -Sardinia, in return for the two hundred thousand -pounds given her by the recent treaty, would intervene -effectively, with Austria at her side. Next,<a -id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> -from this same quarter there came the very important -but unexpected news that commissioners from Toulon, -after some parley with Lord Hood, had agreed to -declare for the Monarchy and the Constitution of 1791, -and to give up to him the shipping, forts and arsenal, -to be held in trust for King Lewis the Seventeenth -until the end of the war. In return for this, however, -they made the natural but very significant request that -troops should be landed for their protection. Here, -therefore, was the Government committed, though by -no act of its own, to serious operations by land on the -side of the Mediterranean. The responsibility assumed -by Hood was very grave; and for a time he hesitated -to incur it. “At present,” he wrote, two days after -issuing his public reply to the offers of the commissioners, -“I have not troops sufficient to defend the -works. Had I five or six thousand good troops I -should soon end the war.”<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" -class="fnanchor">[165]</a> He therefore anchored -at Hyères and, mindful of the British alliances with -the Mediterranean powers, wrote to the British -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</span> -Ambassador at Naples for such forces as could be spared, -at the same time asking help of the Spanish Admiral, -Don Juan de Langara, who was lying with his squadron -off the coast of Roussillon. Before, however, these -reinforcements could arrive, he was so far satisfied by -<span class="sni">Aug. 28.</span> -the assurances of the French that he sailed into Toulon -harbour and, landing fifteen hundred marines and -soldiers who were acting as such, occupied the principal -forts that defended the outer harbour. While thus -engaged he was joined by Langara with the greater -part of his squadron, who announced that he had one -thousand troops ready to disembark at once, and -had left four ships behind to bring three thousand -more from the army in Roussillon. Full of gratitude, -Hood gave Langara effusive thanks, and appointed -Admiral Gravina, the Spanish officer next senior to -Langara, to be commandant of Toulon.</p> - -<p>All this was known to the Government by the 15th -of September, by which time, as shall presently be -told, more reassuring news had arrived from Flanders, -to the effect that the French had been checked, and -that Coburg’s army had been liberated for action by -the surrender of Quesnoy. It therefore behoved -Ministers seriously to reconsider their military policy, -and to make up their minds definitely whether their -object in the war was to be, as they professed, resistance -to unprovoked aggression and the overthrow of the -Convention, or simple annexation of French possessions. -In Flanders their great enterprise, undertaken -with no military knowledge and for no military purpose, -had failed; they were as much as ever in the dark -as to the ultimate designs of Austria, and they could -not but be sensible that remarkably little had been -accomplished by the Allies on the Rhine. As a matter -of fact Frederick William, having discovered a glaring -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</span> -instance of Thugut’s duplicity in the matter of the -Bavarian exchange, had at the end of August practically -decided to withdraw from the Coalition. This was -as yet unknown to the British Ministers, for their -ambassador at Vienna, Sir Morton Eden, was completely -duped by Thugut; but they were conscious of -an increasing coolness on the part of Prussia towards -the war against the Revolution. In such circumstances, -although the northern frontier of France was, -from its proximity, the most convenient sphere of -operations for a British army, they might well consider -the advisability of removing all their forces from that -quarter in order to concentrate them at Toulon, which -Lord Hood’s negotiations had already engaged them -to protect. French successes in the north could be -only temporary and unprofitable if the Allies, by -assisting the counter-revolution in the south, should -deprive the Convention of the richest provinces of -France. A French force at Antwerp itself would -signify little, if the Allies could rally the party of order -from Bordeaux to Marseilles to put down the tyranny -at Paris.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it was no light task to hold -Toulon against all the host that the Convention might -turn upon it. Sir Charles Grey, when consulted by -Pitt as to the force that would be required, declared -that fifty thousand good soldiers would be no more -than adequate; upon which Pitt dismissed him with -the remark that he hoped that a smaller body would -suffice.<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" -class="fnanchor">[166]</a> Probably he rested his opinion on Lord -Hood’s phrase about ending the war with six thousand -men, which was of course nonsense, and nonsense of -a kind which naval officers at that period were far too -ready to talk and Ministers to hear. Mallet du Pan, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</span> -the clearest head in Europe, was urgent for making -the counter-revolution in the south the centre of attack -upon the Convention; but American experience had -shown that the support of a disloyal faction is the most -unstable of all foundations upon which to build the -conduct of a war. Men of the same nation will fight -each other like devils, but, when foreigners are called -into the contest, all parties tend to combine against -them. Moreover, the southern provinces were by no -means unfavourable to the Revolution at large. On -the contrary, they had enthusiastically acclaimed and -supported it, until threatened with the massacre and -pillage which had disgraced Paris in September 1792. -It was therefore essential that the Allies should enter -France in such strength as to be independent of all help -from French forces in the field. It was certain that the -worthless brothers of King Lewis the Sixteenth and their -parasites would claim to place themselves at the head -of any counter-revolution; and their presence alone -might suffice first to paralyse and then to subvert it.</p> - -<p>Again, it was doubtful whether any efficient force -of the Allies, other than British, could be collected in -the south. Sardinia was perfectly ready to advance -at once to the rescue of Lyons if Austria would join -her; and the Austrian General De Vins, being of the -school of Loudoun, was anxious to show his superiority -to his rivals Coburg and Clerfaye of the school of Lacy. -But here again the mischievous rapacity of Thugut -neutralised all action, for he would allow no Austrian -troops to move from Italy unless Sardinia consented -to concede the Novarese to Austria, indemnifying -herself at the expense of France. The British Ministers -were aware of this dispute about the Novarese, for -Mulgrave had reported it,<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" -class="fnanchor">[167]</a> and they had sufficient -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</span> -experience of the Imperial Court to divine that it -would not quickly be settled. Apart from Austria -and Sardinia, troops could be obtained from Naples -and from Spain; but the assistance of two courts so -effete and so corrupt was not likely to be efficient. -In any case, it was certain that, if any real advantage -was to be gained from the possession of Toulon, every -British soldier must be withdrawn from other operations, -and that the whole of England’s military force -must be assembled at that point. If this were impossible, -it were best to instruct Hood to make sure -of the French fleet, destroy the arsenal, and carry -away the inhabitants who had yielded the place into -his hands.</p> - -<p>Then, besides Flanders and Toulon, there was -La Vendée, where the contemptible ruffians whom the -Jacobins had appointed to be generals were suffering -defeat upon defeat. If by the help of the insurgents -Nantes could be seized as a base, it was no very long -march from Angers or Tours or Orléans to Paris; but -here again it was not a small force that was required, -but every British battalion that could be spared.</p> - -<p>Lastly, if the Ministers wanted to secure indemnities -only, the West Indies lay open to them. No doubt it -would be of advantage to possess the famous harbour -of St. Lucia, to deliver Dominica from the menace of -Martinique, her neighbour to windward, and to master -Guadeloupe, with the nest of privateers which preyed -upon all British commerce in those seas. Above all, -the capture of Haiti would ensure at once the security -of Jamaica, the possession of a country whose wealth, -though more than half destroyed, was still appreciable, -and the transfer to a British garrison of St. Nicholas -Mole, which, being the gate of the Windward Passage -and the Gibraltar of the West Indies, would give safe -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</span> -transit for the trade of the archipelago to England. -Such an enterprise, however, would equally demand -the entire land-force of the British Isles. It would be -necessary not only to take the islands but to hold them, -and to hold them not only, as heretofore, against the -climate and against the fleet and armies of France, -but against the entire negro population, which the -Revolution had summoned to its aid. There was, as -there still is, abundance of records of former attacks -upon all those islands, showing that at the best of times -each British battalion in the West Indies required to -be renewed in its entirety every two years, and at the -worst of times might be completely extinguished by -a single hot season. Of all plans, therefore, this would -be the most difficult, the most perilous, the most costly -in execution and maintenance, and the least damaging -to France; not to mention the fact that the overthrow -of the Convention, which had authorised the equality -of the black man with the white, was really essential -to its permanent success. Thus it should at least -have been obvious to the Government that out of the -four spheres of operations it could hope to act with -effect in one alone; and then only by throwing into -the chosen sphere every trained soldier that it could -muster.</p> - -<p>Blind to all such considerations, Ministers decided -not to select one, or at most two, of these spheres, -but to fritter away their handful of forces between all -four. Indeed, Dundas’s orders between the 11th and -18th of September form a notable specimen of his -<span class="sni">Sept. 11.</span> -ideas of carrying on war. The news of the failure at -Dunkirk had at first completely unnerved him; but, -on realising how critical was the position of affairs in -that quarter, he directed eight battalions<a id="FNanchor_168" -href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> to embark -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</span> -for Ostend, as a temporary measure. Then he warned -the Duke of York that five thousand of his Hessians -must be held ready to sail to Toulon as soon as this -reinforcement reached him, and that the eight battalions -themselves would be required elsewhere at the beginning -of October. On the same day he wrote to Lord -Hood that everything must give way to the importance -of holding Toulon; that he had appealed to Austria -for troops; and that he would send Hood the five -thousand Hessians aforesaid, as well as two battalions -out of the five stationed at Gibraltar. Four days later -he warned General Bruce to be ready to receive at -Barbados fifteen battalions, which were under orders -for active service in the West Indies. Lastly, at the -same time or very little later, he framed a design for -a descent upon St. Malo and for the occupation of the -Isle D’Yeu, off the coast of La Vendée.<a id="FNanchor_169" -href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> It is now -time to return to Flanders, and to follow in detail the -reaction of Dundas’s genius upon the operations in -that quarter.</p> - -<p>In the first peril of the retreat from Dunkirk the -British commanders seem to have entertained serious -thoughts of re-embarkation;<a id="FNanchor_170" -href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> but were reassured -when Houchard did not follow up his stroke upon the -force of Walmoden. For this the French general -has been much blamed; and indeed his failure to -destroy the Duke of York’s army was made the excuse -for bringing him shortly afterwards to the guillotine. -But in truth Houchard had lost his true opportunity -through the unskilfulness of his attack upon Walmoden, -wherein his troops, already half starved and less than -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</span> -half disciplined, had been seriously shaken by their -losses. He therefore reinforced the garrisons of -Bergues and Dunkirk, and, in the hope of relieving -Quesnoy, fell with thirty thousand men upon the flank -of the Dutch cordon from Poperinghe and upon its -front from Lille. His success was at first encouraging, -<span class="sni">Sept. 12, 13.</span> -for he defeated his opponents completely with the -loss of forty guns and three thousand men, and captured -Menin. General Beaulieu, who had been despatched -with over four thousand Austrians to the -assistance of the Dutch, for some reason refused to -act with them, but checked the advance of the French -beyond Menin, and occupied Courtrai. The Dutch -fled in disorder to Bruges and Ghent; and for the -moment it seemed as though communication between -the Duke of York and Coburg was hopelessly severed. -<span class="sni">Sept. 12.</span> -The Duke, after leaving a detachment under Abercromby -at Furnes, had withdrawn to the rear of the -canal between Nieuport and Dixmuyde, in order to -secure his retreat to Ostend; but he now ordered -<span class="sni">Sept. 14.</span> -Abercromby back to Nieuport, and marched with the -bulk of his force eastward to Thorout, where he was -joined by two battalions<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" -class="fnanchor">[171]</a> from England. From -<span class="sni">Sept. 15.</span> -thence on the 15th he moved southward to Roulers; -and on that day the situation underwent a total change.</p> - -<p>Beaulieu, being attacked by Houchard before Courtrai, -waited only for a reinforcement which the -Duke had hurried forward to him, when, taking the -offensive, he utterly routed the French, who fled in -the wildest confusion, and, pursuing them to Menin, -recaptured the town. The Duke entered Menin on -<span class="sni">Sept. 16.</span> -the following day, where he received letters from -Coburg who was already at Cysoing, not more than -eighteen miles to the south, reporting that since the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</span> -fall of Quesnoy he had gained a brilliant victory over -one of Houchard’s divisions at Avesnes-le-Sec. This -<span class="sni">Sept. 12.</span> -action, which, though almost unknown to Englishmen, -still remains one of the greatest achievements in the -history of cavalry, was not only most glorious to the -Austrians in itself, but was important as showing that -the new tactics of the undisciplined French army were -inapplicable to any but a strongly enclosed country. -Nine Austrian squadrons, counting some two thousand -men, without a single gun, had utterly dispersed seven -thousand French, chiefly infantry, cut down two -thousand of them, captured two thousand more, and -taken twenty guns, all with a loss to themselves of -sixty-nine men. These successes effectually checked -the advance of the French. Houchard, after the -defeat at Menin, had already given the order to retreat; -and the French retired to their former positions before -Cassel, Lille, and Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>Then arose the question what should be done next. -The season was advancing, but events had marched -rapidly in Paris since the revolt of Toulon. Following -hard upon the news of Houchard’s reverse came tidings -that the Duke of Brunswick had defeated the French -with a loss of four thousand men at Pirmasens, on the -northern frontier of Alsace; and this succession of disasters -stirred the Jacobins to the ferocity of panic. On -<span class="sni">Sept. 17.</span> -the 17th two savage laws were passed, which practically -placed all lives and all property at the arbitrary disposal -of the reigning faction; and then the demagogues -turned with fury upon the generals. Loudest among -them was Robespierre, who, profoundly jealous of any -man who could do what he could not, was suspicious -above all of soldiers. Thanks to his denunciations, -<span class="sni">Sept. 21.</span> -Houchard and his staff were recalled under accusation -of treason; and thereby another blow was added to -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</span> -the many already struck at the army. The troops -were greatly demoralised by the continual change of -commanders,<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" -class="fnanchor">[172]</a> whom the Commissioners of the Convention -promoted or deposed at their arbitrary pleasure; -and the commanders themselves were not less demoralised -by the certain prospect of death if they failed to -achieve the impossible with troops that were neither -fed, nor clothed, nor paid, nor disciplined. The Allies, -therefore, could still reasonably look for success from -a concentration of their whole army and a vigorous -offensive.</p> - -<p>Dundas, since the failure at Dunkirk, had become -suddenly an advocate for keeping the whole of the -forces together, and for making an attack upon the -enemy before undertaking any further enterprise;<a -id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> but -with what precise object a general action was to be -fought he did not say, for the very sufficient reason that -he did not know. The British Ministers, so far as they -favoured any operations at all in Flanders, would have -preferred a second attempt upon Dunkirk; but they -gave, or professed to give, a free hand to the commanders, -flattering themselves that, if the attempt -were abandoned, the British troops would be the sooner -released for service at Toulon and, above all, in the -West Indies. Coburg, on the other hand, had already -put forward what was at any rate a definite plan, though -upon the old lines. He wished to besiege Maubeuge, -which was certainly an important point, since it formed -the chief link in the communications between the French -armies of the north about Lille, and of the Ardennes -about Givet and Philippeville, while its entrenched -camp made it a point for a formidable concentration -of the French forces at large. Moreover, it obstructed -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</span> -the passage of the Austrian troops from east to west, -compelling all reinforcements from Luxemburg to -fetch a compass by Namur and Charleroi before they -could join the army of Flanders. The Dutch agreed -to come forward again to further the operations; and -before the British Government, upon Murray’s representation, -could finally make up its mind to co-operate -with the Austrians, Coburg had crossed the Sambre -with forty thousand men and invested Maubeuge.<a -id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> -</p> - -<p>Thereupon there followed the usual distribution of -troops into a cordon. The besieging force numbered -fourteen thousand, the covering army, including twelve -thousand Dutch, twenty-six thousand men; and to the -Duke of York was entrusted the task of protecting -Flanders along a front of some forty-five miles, from -Cysoing to Nieuport. For this purpose Coburg gave -him about sixteen thousand Austrian troops in addition -to those in the pay of Britain; but, owing to the -vagaries of the British Minister for War, the corps was -exposed to the most dangerous risk. Hardly had the -eight reinforcing battalions from England joined the -army in Flanders, before Dundas ordered four of them -to return at once, and the remainder as soon as possible. -Further, not content even with this, he gave Murray -to understand that the embarkation of the Hessian -corps from Flanders was only deferred, and hinted that -a part of his artillerymen might also be spared for -Toulon. Now Dundas knew perfectly well that the -troops had passed through a very severe campaign, -had fought several actions and had suffered heavy -losses; he knew perfectly well that no adequate steps -had been taken for filling up the gaps in the ranks; -he could hardly have been ignorant that winter was -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</span> -approaching; and Murray had twice warned him that -the French were rapidly increasing their forces between -Lille and the sea. Yet the Minister, though he had -given the generals nominally a free hand, calmly withdrew -battalion after battalion, until at last Murray -told him plainly of the danger of the situation. The -state of the army was most distressing: the force in -British pay was reduced to twelve thousand fighting -men, or less than half of its original numbers; the sick -and wounded of the whole army under the Duke’s -command numbered at least nine thousand, or more -than one-fourth; the troops were dangerously dispersed -along a very wide front; and, though Murray -did not mention this, the Austrian Government had -deprecated all field-fortification, on account of the -damage that might ensue to meadows and the banks -of canals.<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" -class="fnanchor">[175]</a> Finally, he gave warning that, if the -enemy made an attack, the Duke would be obliged -to abandon Ostend. Dundas’s reply to this was very -characteristic. Without a word to Murray he ordered -the Commandant at Ostend to retain the second batch -of four battalions which, by his own order, had been -sent there for re-embarkation to England; and he -wrote an angry letter to Abercromby, a subordinate -officer, first expressing horror at the idea of abandoning -Ostend, and then regretting that attempts had -been made to keep those same four battalions in -Flanders. “It would be impossible,” he wrote, “to -restrain the just indignation of the country, if, for the -sake of feeding an army under a Prince of the blood, -so substantial an interest to this country as that of -the French West Indies had been sacrificed.”<a -id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</span></p> - -<p>Apart from the fact that such language, especially -when addressed to a subordinate concerning his chief, -was utterly unbecoming a Minister and a gentleman, -it was not obvious why an army should be starved, -whether in the matter of empty ranks or of empty -stomachs, simply because it happened to be commanded -by a Prince of the blood. If its presence in Flanders -were an embarrassment to the Government, the simple -remedy was to withdraw it altogether, rather than leave -it so weak as to be in peril of destruction; for there was -no lack of employment for the troops elsewhere. This -amazing outburst is no solitary instance of Dundas’s -bad taste, much less an unique example of his incapacity.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Murray’s apprehensions increased; and -events soon came to justify them. Jourdan, on -Carnot’s recommendation, had succeeded Houchard -in command of the army of the north; and, with -Carnot himself at his back, he now concentrated forty-five -<span class="sni">Oct. 7.</span> -thousand men at Guise for the relief of Maubeuge, -leaving the remainder of his troops, some sixty thousand -men, extended in a long line to the sea. Coburg sent -pressing entreaties for reinforcements to the Duke of -York, who at once moved about nine thousand men -<span class="sni">Oct. 10.</span> -to Cysoing, and leaving half of them there, proceeded -with the rest—chiefly the wreck of the British troops—to -join hands with the Austrian advanced corps a little -to the south of Quesnoy at Englefontaine. It was, -however, to no purpose, for Jourdan, having increased -his force to sixty thousand men, attacked Coburg -<span class="sni">Oct. 15, 16.</span> -furiously on the 15th and 16th at Wattignies, and, -despite very heavy loss to himself both in men and in -guns, compelled him to raise the siege of Maubeuge. -The Dutch, who had not behaved well in the action, -retired to Mons; but Coburg moved his headquarters -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</span> -to no greater distance than Bavai. He was there -meditating further attacks upon the French, when -the Committee of Public Safety, intoxicated with the -<span class="sni">Oct. 18.</span> -success at Wattignies, ordered Jourdan peremptorily -to take the offensive and to drive the hordes of the -tyrant into the Sambre, which river, it may be observed, -at that moment flowed between the opposing armies. -<span class="sni">Oct. 22.</span> -A second and still more ludicrous order bade him keep -his force together, menace several remote points -simultaneously, operate in two divisions against Mons -and Tournai, and withal act with prudence. Jourdan, -however, not daring to attempt the passage of the -Sambre, sent on the 20th one division to assail Marchiennes, -and another under Souham against all the -Allied posts from Cysoing to Werwicq, which last was -held by six thousand men under Count Erbach. Both -attacks were successful, though Marchiennes was retaken -<span class="sni">Oct. 22.</span> -on the 24th; and on the 22nd Erbach was forced -to fall back to Tournai and Courtrai, abandoning even -Menin. On the 22nd likewise a division from Cassel -attacked Ypres, while another from Dunkirk under -Vandamme captured Furnes, and, pressing northward -<span class="sni">Oct. 24.</span> -with twelve thousand men, opened on the 24th the -bombardment of Nieuport. The town had been but -hastily fortified, and the garrison consisted of only two -weak Hessian battalions, a few dragoons, and the -British Fifty-third Regiment, in all fewer than thirteen -hundred men. For the moment it seemed certain that -the British would be cut off from their base.</p> - -<p>Murray, foreseeing this, had ordered all stores, beyond -what was necessary for the moment, to be removed -from Ostend. The Commandant disembarked some of -the four battalions which, pursuant to Dundas’s order, -were about to sail to England; and Dundas, on hearing -of the situation, at once sent Major-general Grey, the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</span> -appointed Commander of the West Indian expedition, -with four more battalions<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" -class="fnanchor">[177]</a> to take charge of the troops -at Ostend, giving him full liberty to defend it or to -bring away the whole of the eight battalions, as he -might think best, without reference to the Duke of -York. Meanwhile he clamoured for reports as to the -intentions of Coburg, and for explanation of the reasons -for the possible abandonment of Ostend; for it had -not yet occurred to him that the French, by attacking -in overwhelming force, might compel the Commander -of the Allies to conform to their plan of operations -instead of pursuing his own.<a id="FNanchor_178" -href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Oct. 24.</div> -<p> -However, matters soon righted themselves. The -French were driven back with heavy loss from Cysoing -and Orchies. The garrison of Nieuport held its own -gallantly, being reinforced on the 27th by another -battalion of Hessians and by a few gunners from -Ostend; and meanwhile the Duke of York was hastening -back from Englefontaine and Tournai, while Coburg -followed him westward with half of his army as far as -Solesmes, midway between Cambrai and Landrecies. -<span class="sni">Oct. 28.</span> -On the evening of the 28th Grey arrived at Ostend, -and at once sent the Forty-second and four companies -of Light Infantry to the help of Nieuport. On the -same evening the Duke of York having reached Camphin, -a few miles east of Cysoing, detached Abercromby -with four battalions and two squadrons<a id="FNanchor_179" -href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> northward -against the French post at Lannoy. The place was -captured with little loss, and the British Light Dragoons -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</span> -did terrible execution in the pursuit of the flying enemy. -<span class="sni">Oct. 29.</span> -On the following night another division, under the -Austrian General Kray, made a brilliant attack upon -the post of Marchiennes, driving out the French with -a loss of nearly two thousand men and twelve guns, -at a cost to itself of fewer than one hundred casualties. -Meanwhile the French, on hearing of the Duke of York’s -advance upon their flank, had retired from Menin and -<span class="sni">Oct. 30.</span> -Ypres; and early on the next morning Vandamme, -fearing to be cut off, retreated from before Nieuport, -leaving four guns and a quantity of ammunition behind -him. So easy was it to change the whole face of affairs -by concentrating a compact force against one point -and rolling up a cordon from end to end. It is almost -comical to observe how at first both sides used the -cordon-system; how the French, after abandoning it -with success, relapsed into it once more; and finally -how the Allies, also abandoning it under British -direction, in their turn gained the upper hand.</p> - -<p>Throughout this anxious period the interference of -Dundas with the operations had been incessant, and his -tone by no means the most courteous. The incoherence -and folly of his orders may best be judged from a -summary of the reply which Murray at length found -time to write on the 20th of October. “Let me point -out to you,” he wrote, in effect, “that the same -messenger brought to me from you, first, advice to -besiege St. Quentin; secondly, orders to keep a body of -troops at Ostend; and, thirdly, strong exhortations -against division or detachment of our force. As to -Ostend, if Nieuport holds out, it is safe for the winter; -and I see no reason why Nieuport should not hold out. -As to St. Quentin, this means taking a train of artillery -there in the month of November. It means also that -twenty thousand out of Coburg’s twenty-five thousand -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</span> -men must be detached, while the remaining five -thousand remain quietly between three fortified towns -and a forest, from which fifty thousand men may attack -them from all sides at any time. Further, the detached -force must draw its subsistence from a distance of -forty miles across the whole French army without any -other protection than that of those five thousand men.” -“I beg pardon,” he continued, “for taking up your -time with this kind of argument, which it was not your -intention to enter into, but I think it is right to show -that, perhaps, people in England are not more infallible -in their judgments than those upon the Continent.” -Irony so keen sped home even through the dense armour -of Dundas’s conceit. “You have not sufficiently -weighed the feeling of this country,” he answered, -taking refuge in bluster, “if you think that any successes -could have counterbalanced the loss of Ostend.” -Murray hastened to soothe him by pointing out that -the Duke of York, though against his own military -judgment, had strictly obeyed the Cabinet’s instructions -as to the protection of Ostend, and that it was -not Grey who had saved it but the Duke himself, who, -before he knew of Grey’s arrival, had forced Vandamme -to retire by threatening his communications.<a -id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a></p> - -<p>This sharp passage of arms silenced Dundas for the -time, though, as will be seen, it taught him little wisdom -for the future. Meanwhile, after a few small affairs of -outposts, the campaign came to an end. The Emperor -of Austria sent orders to Coburg to fight a general -action, for no particular object; and the Committee of -Public Safety gave the like instructions to Jourdan, in -the hope that he might be able to advance to Namur -and so to threaten the Austrian line of communication. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</span> -But neither was in a position to obey. The campaign -had been most arduous, as a war of posts must always -be, not only from the innumerable minor actions, but -from the strain imposed on the troops by constant -vigilance and by endless marching to and fro to reinforce -the threatened points of the cordon. The losses -on the side of the Allies had been great: those of the -French had been enormous, not only in men but in -material, for the Allies had taken from them over two -hundred guns. In brief, both armies were thoroughly -exhausted; and yet the Allies had accomplished comparatively -little, owing partly to the false plan imposed -by England, partly to the false tactics of the Austrian -commanders, still more to the misunderstandings and -jealousy that make coherent action so difficult in an -army composed of many nations. On the Rhine likewise -little had been effected. Soon after the victory of -Pirmasens the King of Prussia left his army for Posen; -<span class="sni">Oct. 13.</span> -and, though the Austrian General Wurmser drove the -French in utter confusion from the lines of Weissenburg, -yet, in consequence of faulty dispositions and of the -half-hearted co-operation of the Prussian troops, an -advantage which might have been decisive was turned -to little account. Prussia, in truth, was not anxious to -aid Austria in gaining Alsace; while the Polish question, -as always, kept the two powers in an attitude of mutual -suspicion and mistrust. There was nothing, therefore, -left to the Allies but to take up cantonments for the -winter, which they accordingly did, while Grey and -the whole of the eight battalions with him returned -to England. The Allies had missed their chance in -Flanders; and the chance was gone for ever.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="prep1794">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IX</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1793.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -It is now necessary to sum up the relative conditions -of France and the Allies at the close of 1793. The -British enterprises against the French at Dunkirk, in -La Vendée, and at Toulon had one and all failed; but -the tale of disaster was even then not fully told. Upon -arrogating to itself the appointment of Generals in the -field, the Committee of Public Safety had appointed -<span class="sni">Oct.-Nov.</span> -Pichegru and Hoche to command respectively the -armies of the Rhine and Moselle. Pichegru had been -a non-commissioned officer of artillery before the -Revolution, had since obtained command of a battalion -of volunteers, and, by assiduous courting of the Jacobin -leaders, had become a Lieutenant-general without seeing -a shot fired. Hoche, as we have seen, had risen from -the ranks of the French Guards, had distinguished -himself in high command at Dunkirk, and, above all, -had attracted Carnot’s attention by a memorandum -condemning the dispersion of troops after the Austrian -manner, and advocating everywhere concentration and -a vigorous offensive. “This young fellow will go far,” -said Carnot, as he handed the document to Robespierre. -“A very dangerous man!” objected the other, who -dreaded the success of any man except himself. The -task prescribed to Hoche was to relieve Landau, then -blockaded by the Prussians; but he found his army -in such ill condition that he hesitated to attempt -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</span> -anything until strengthened by Pichegru, when he made a -general attack upon the Prussians under the Duke of -Brunswick at Kaiserslautern, and was beaten back with -<span class="sni">Nov. 28–30.</span> -heavy loss. Thanks to Carnot’s influence, however, -his failure was forgiven to him; and his new project, -that he should reinforce Pichegru with two-thirds of -his troops and fall upon the Austrians under General -Wurmser at Hagenau, was approved. Wurmser perceived -the gathering storm, and appealed to Brunswick -for help; but King Frederick William had expressly -forbidden the Duke to engage himself in any important -operations, and the Prussians did not move until too -late. On the 23rd of December Hoche opened his -<span class="sni">Dec. 23.<br />Dec. 26</span> -attack with great skill and success, and would have -annihilated Wurmser, had not Brunswick interfered -at the last moment to check the pursuit of the French. -The Austrian commander, furious because Brunswick -had not supported him from the first, then returned -to the eastern bank of the Rhine, thus uncovering the -Prussian left, and obliging them likewise to abandon -the greater part of the Palatinate, and to content themselves -with protecting the neighbourhood of Mainz. -Landau, therefore, was recaptured by the French; -the eastern frontier of France was purged of the enemy; -and, above all, the ill-feeling between Austria and -Prussia was more than ever embittered. Broadly -speaking, the French by the close of the year had contended -successfully alike with the Coalition and with -internal foes, having lost ground only in the Eastern -Pyrenees to Spain, the enemy from which it could be -most easily recovered.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless the authority of the Committee of -Public Safety was by no means yet fully assured. The -Commune of Paris, representing the most infamous -of the population, had been jealous of it from the first; -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</span> -and the useful service of the little band of Workers -had been accomplished only with great difficulty and -by constant concessions to the party of violence. -Representatives of the people vested with arbitrary -powers still accompanied the armies, interfering with -the operations, punishing by summary execution the -slightest fault or failure, whether realised or merely -suspected, levying barbarous and oppressive requisitions, -and thus driving officers, men, and civil population -alike to despair. In no army was this policy of -terror more ruthlessly pursued than in that of the -Rhine, where unlimited powers were exercised by the -representatives Lebas and St. Just, of whom the latter, -a young man of twenty-six, gave himself the airs of -omnipotent Jove, with a guillotine for thunderbolt. -A campaign, however, cannot be won solely by decapitation -of one’s own troops; and in the winter of 1793-1794 -this fact began to impress itself, in respect not -only of the army but of France at large, upon some of -the ruling men in Paris. But it was no easy matter to -convince the unspeakable rogues of the Commune of -Paris that terror, which had brought to them personally -enormous profit, was, as a national policy, a failure. -Early in December 1793 the Committee of Public -Safety took several measures to abridge the powers of -the Commune; and some of the men who had in earlier -days been most violent favoured the reaction towards -a milder rule; but none the less Collot d’Herbois, who -had been the author of most atrocious cruelties at -Lyons since the recapture of the city, continued to -obtain official approval of his conduct. Dread of -summary restoration of order by some victorious -General continually haunted the minds of many of -the leaders, and notably of Robespierre; and, since -the only idea of this last was to support whichever -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</span> -party was at the moment the stronger, he upheld -<span class="sni">Dec. 25.</span> -Collot, and sought popularity by proposing the execution -of another batch of Generals. Thus the opening -of the new year witnessed a complete revival of the -system of terror.</p> - -<p>Immediate mischief was the inevitable result. -Carnot had wished after the victory of Savenay to -institute a policy of conciliation in La Vendée; but, -on the contrary, a ruffianly soldier named Turreau -was let loose upon the district with his “infernal -columns,” as if to exterminate a herd of wild beasts. -The country was laid waste, the villages were burned, -and such victims as could not escape the soldiery were -swept into Nantes, to be murdered after such manner -as might please the still greater ruffian, Carrier. -Thereupon the people at once took up arms again. A -smuggler bearing the nickname of Chouan<a id="FNanchor_181" -href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> organised -a band of his fellows for revenge, and was soon imitated -by others. Charette and Stofflet again came forward -as leaders; and there began a desultory guerilla war, -fraught with constant disaster to the Republican -troops, which gnawed deeply into the heart of France. -At the same time, as if to increase the difficulties of its -capable commanders in the field, the Convention lent -a ready ear to all complaints against them. The -Representatives attached to the armies, with the true -instinct of politicians of all times and nations, were -careful to take to themselves the credit for every victory, -and to impute to the military the blame for every -<span class="sni">1794.</span> -reverse; and a savage decree was passed that any -General condemned to death should be executed in -<span class="sni">Jan. 1.</span> -front of his own troops. Successful commanders ran -as great a risk as unsuccessful. Kléber, Marceau, -Lapoype, and Bonaparte were one and all denounced -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</span> -in the spring of 1794 by the civilians who had aspired -to direct them in the field; and it was only by much -labour and cunning that Carnot was able to save their -lives.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, despite all drawbacks, there was progress -towards improvement in the French army. -True, there was still shameful rascality on the part of -contractors,<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" -class="fnanchor">[182]</a> which was countenanced by Bouchotte -under the protection of Robespierre, and which caused -much suffering and desertion. The levy <i>en masse</i> -again had proved a failure; but, on the other hand, -compulsion to personal service, without exemption -of any kind, had forced a better class of recruit into -<span class="sni">1793. Nov. 22.</span> -the ranks; and it was wisely determined to incorporate -these new levies with the battalions at the front, which -possessed officers and non-commissioned officers of -experience to train them. Finally, the reorganisation -of the army into demi-brigades, consisting each of -two battalions of volunteers and one battalion of -regulars, was, after long delay, decreed and gradually -<span class="sni">1794. Jan. 8.</span> -brought about. Innumerable useless corps were swept -away; the establishments of existing corps were increased; -and the law as to election of officers was -practically, though tacitly, ignored.<a id="FNanchor_183" -href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a> At the same -time a succession of decrees forbade the attendance of -deputations from regiments upon the Convention, -strove to check abuses and waste in the matter of -<span class="sni">Feb. 12.</span> -requisitions, and made a new regulation that no soldier -should rise to any grade of command—from corporal -<span class="sni">Feb 15.</span> -to general—who could not read and write. All this -wrought for discipline and efficiency, for many of the -Colonels and Generals appointed by the Jacobins, -being unable to read a map or even a letter, had brought -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</span> -about great confusion at the War Office and frequent -disaster in the field.<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" -class="fnanchor">[184]</a> At the same time, strenuous -efforts were made to improve the cavalry, which had -hitherto been absolutely useless; and its establishment -was fixed at twenty-nine regiments of heavy and -fifty-four of light cavalry, or ninety-six thousand men -in all. The horse-artillery also, after but a single year -of existence, was augmented to eight thousand men, -and the field-artillery, including detachments for -battalion guns, to twenty-six thousand men. The -whole force of France at the beginning of 1794 reached -six hundred thousand effective men, or about half of -the figure which, from motives of policy or conceit, -was invariably assigned to it by the orators of Paris.</p> - -<p>Moreover, to turn military improvements to the -best advantage, events conspired to throw power more -and more into the hands of the Committee of Public -Safety. By a clever decree, the Committee contrived -to disarm the hired ruffians who supported the Commune, -<span class="sni">1793. Dec. 22.</span> -and to make over their weapons to the army; -and this blow was followed three months later by the -accusation and execution of the leaders of the Commune -itself, including Hébert, the supreme ruffian, -<span class="sni">1794. March 29.</span> -and Ronsin and Vincent, two of the greatest scoundrels -in the War Office. The next attack was directed -against Danton and others, who had recognised the -failure of the policy of terror, and wished to end it; -and accordingly he and his followers went to the -<span class="sni">April 5.</span> -guillotine on the 5th of April. This was the work of -Robespierre, who at one time had been the firm ally -of both of these factions, but was now seeking supreme -power in order to carry out certain ideas of his own -for the social regeneration of France. Being an -absolutely mediocre man, of the type which small -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</span> -provincial journals delight to honour with the title of -“our talented townsman,” he was wholly lacking in -the ability and experience required for the business of -administration; and he seems to have agreed, without -knowing what he did, to the abolition of Ministers for -departments and the substitution of boards, responsible -to the Committee of Public Safety, in their place. -Hereby the little knot of Workers, who had real capacity -as well as boundless industry, gained an affluence of -power, and the military service an increase of efficiency; -for their labours were too high for the control of a petty -lawyer who possessed no gift but that of composing -bad essays, and knew no resource but that of cutting -off heads. Nor was the activity of the Workers confined -to France alone. Revolutionary agents had been -busy all over Europe with persuasive tongues and still -more persuasive purses. They had bribed high officials -to second Carnot’s military projects by conspiracies -at Turin, Naples, Florence, and Genoa; they had met -with much encouragement in Holland, and counted on -further success in Switzerland; they had made some -impression upon Denmark, had half gained Sweden, -and had spared no expense to rouse the Turk against -Austria. The cost of these negotiations was enormous, -but the Government of France was playing for high -stakes, knowing well that without victory in all quarters -in the coming campaign, bankruptcy and starvation -must inevitably bring down the Revolution with a -crash.</p> - -<p>On the military side Carnot had decided to strike -at important points only, and elsewhere to stand on -the defensive. In the south he designed to invade -Italy, hoping that treachery at Turin would make the -work easy; but the principal struggle, as he knew, -must be fought out in Belgium. He did not, however, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</span> -confine his schemes of aggression to that quarter only. -He recognised with true insight that Britain was -France’s most formidable enemy; and he had actually -projected and prepared for an invasion of England, -with the help of the Brest fleet, and for a march upon -London. The plan was bold, indeed wild in its extravagance, -being founded on a false idea that disaffection -in England was as deeply seated and as widely spread -in action as it was noisy and inflated in speech. None -the less the bare menace of invasion served a useful -purpose—to scare and disconcert the British Government.<a -id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Jan. 21.</div> -<p> -In truth it must have been with no very pleasant -feelings that Ministers met Parliament in January 1794, -having no better news to lay before the Houses than a -tale of failure in all quarters. Pitt had, at least, the -consolation that a section of the Whigs, headed by -the Duke of Portland, in the same month announced -to him their intention of separating themselves from -Fox, and of giving the Ministry an independent support. -It was, however, felt that such an arrangement -could neither be satisfactory nor of long continuance, -since, as Sir Gilbert Elliot put it, Portland’s party would -be no more than “a detached auxiliary force, to act -on one occasion, to retire on another, and to be a perpetual -object of anxiety to those whom they meant -to serve, of hope to the enemy and of speculation to -the rest of the world.”<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" -class="fnanchor">[186]</a> Moreover, there were members -of it, most notably William Windham, who were extremely -dissatisfied with the military policy, or want -of policy, initiated by Dundas.<a id="FNanchor_187" -href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a> Negotiations were, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</span> -therefore, set on foot for the inclusion of Portland and -some of his friends in the Cabinet; and, after six full -months spent in bargaining, it was finally arranged, -on the 11th of July 1794, that Portland should become -Second Secretary of State, Lord Fitzwilliam Lord -President, and Lord Spencer Lord Privy Seal, while -Windham displaced the incompetent and corrupt Sir -George Yonge as Secretary at War. It may be well -to add at once that in December Lord Spencer exchanged -the Privy Seal for the Admiralty with the -capable but indolent Lord Chatham, while Lord Mansfield -took over the Presidency of the Council, and Lord -Fitzwilliam accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland.</p> - -<p>But these changes were accompanied by a reform -of the greatest importance in the history of our -military administration. Pitt was resolute in refusing -to permit the War Department to lie in the Duke -of Portland’s hands; wherein he was probably right, -for the Duke, though he carried with him votes in -the House of Commons, brought nothing to the -Council Board beyond a certain ponderous irresolution. -Pitt thereupon arranged, though with some -difficulty, that Portland should administer the Home -Department, including the Colonies, but should have -no authority over naval and military business, for -control of which he created a third and new Secretariat -of State for War. In itself this measure was valuable -and sound, but it was absolutely vitiated by the -selection of Henry Dundas to fill the new post. In -the face of the shameful blunders of the past eighteen -months this appointment was almost criminal; but -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</span> -Pitt’s ignorance of war was unfortunately surpassed -only by his infatuated trust in his friend. Thus -Henry Dundas became the First Secretary of State -for War, the very worst man that could possibly have -been chosen to found the traditions of such an office. -His methods have found faithful imitation by all too -many of his successors.<a id="FNanchor_188" -href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a> -</p> - -<p>So much may be said by anticipation of events -which, though not actually accomplished, were practically -assured at the opening of the session of 1794. -But the secession of Portland’s following by no means -left the Opposition without keen critics of the conduct -of military affairs. Tarleton the guerilla-leader -of the American war, though a vain and shallow man, -knew enough to hit the many weak points of Henry -Dundas’s enterprises, and he was backed by one abler -and more solid than himself, Major Thomas Maitland, -of the Sixty-second Foot, a brother of the extreme -radical, Lord Lauderdale. We shall see more of -Maitland, who is still remembered at Malta as “King -Tom,” in the years before us. Fox also, though as -usual guilty of opposition which was purely factious, -rightly pressed home upon the Government the duty -of defining to themselves what was their true object. -If, he argued, the purpose of the war were to substitute -some form of government for the present tyranny -in France, then Toulon was worth more than the -West Indies; if on the other hand it was to obtain -permanent possessions, then the West Indies were -worth more than Toulon. To this the Government -answered by the mouth of Jenkinson, that their end -was to destroy the existing government in France; -but both he and Pitt added that Toulon was not to -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</span> -be considered of such importance as to justify a sacrifice -of the opportunity for acquiring the French West -Indies. Plainer evidence could not have been given -of the utter unfitness of both to direct a formidable -war.<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" -class="fnanchor">[189]</a> -</p> - -<p>But the Government’s measures for the augmentation -of the regular Army at the close of 1793, though -not yet criticised in Parliament, were still more questionable -than its military policy. In the first place, -from blind assurance of an easy triumph, no sufficient -provision had been made in time for raising additional -men; and the result was that in October 1793 it -was a matter of the greatest difficulty to furnish a -draft of one hundred men to stop the gaps in Abercromby’s -brigade in Flanders.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" -class="fnanchor">[190]</a> In August, however, -Alan Cameron of Erracht after much importunity -had received permission to raise a regiment of Highlanders -without levy-money, and with a special -stipulation that the men should not be drafted; and -thus was created the Seventy-ninth or Cameron Highlanders. -In September 1793, new regiments began -to follow each other more rapidly. First came a -battalion formed by Lord Paget, whom we shall -know better as a leader of cavalry under the successive -titles of Lord Uxbridge and Marquis of Anglesey. -The commission which he received to command it -was the first that he ever held in the Army; and -the regiment took, and still keeps, the number of -the Eightieth. Then came in succession Colonel John -Doyle’s regiment, now the Eighty-seventh; Colonel -Albemarle Bertie’s, now the Eighty-first; Colonel -Thomas De Burgh’s, recruited chiefly in Connaught -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</span> -and still known as the Eighty-eighth Connaught -Rangers; Major-general Leigh’s, now the Eighty-second; -and finally three Scottish battalions raised -by Colonels Ferrier, Halkett, and Cunninghame, who -had left the Scots Brigade of Holland during the -American War and now tried to make a new brigade -for their own land. Thus after a separation of over a -century the old comrades of the Buffs rejoined them -in Great Britain. In November other regiments were -added, namely, General Bernard’s, now the Eighty-fourth; -General Cuyler’s, now the Eighty-sixth; -Colonel Nugent’s, recruited by Lord Buckingham -among his tenants at Stowe, now the Eighty-fifth; -Colonel Fitch’s, formed chiefly of recruits from Dublin, -now the Eighty-third; and Colonel Crosbie’s, now -the Eighty-ninth.<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" -class="fnanchor">[191]</a> From January to October 1794, -there was a deluge of new battalions, of which it -must suffice to mention here a second battalion of -the Seventy-eighth, and three which began life in -February, namely, that raised by Mr. Thomas Graham, -the volunteer of Toulon, which was and still is the -Ninetieth, and two Highland corps formed by Colonel -Duncan Campbell and Lord Huntly, which though -originally distinguished by other numbers<a id="FNanchor_192" -href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> are known -to us as the Ninety-first and Ninety-second Highlanders. -Five regiments of Light Dragoons raised -in February and March must also be mentioned, since -we shall meet with them not unfrequently, namely, -Beaumont’s, Fielding’s, Fullarton’s, Loftus’s, and -Gwyn’s, which were raised without expense to the -Government, and bore the numbers Twenty-one to -Twenty-five. Lastly, attention must be called to -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</span> -<span class="sni">March 7.</span> -a notable new departure in the formation of a Corps -of Waggoners in five companies, with a total strength -of six hundred non-commissioned officers and men, -one-tenth of them artificers. This was the first -attempt at a military organisation of the transport-service.</p> - -<p>It was reckoned that, in one way and another, at -least thirty thousand men were enlisted for the regular -Army between November 1793 and March 1794,<a -id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a> -and the number was the more astonishing since Fencibles -and substitutes for the Militia had absorbed a -large number of recruits. It would, however, be a -fallacy to suppose that Ministers had yet thought out -any regular plan for continual filling of the ranks; -on the contrary, they had resorted to a variety of -hasty expedients founded upon no fixed principle, -and therefore unfitted to meet more than a temporary -emergency. Such procedure is invariably wasteful -and extravagant in the highest degree; but Yonge -and Dundas honestly believed themselves to have -found true economy in a clever and specious scheme -put forward by one of the Generals in Ireland, for -defraying the cost of new levies by the sale of commissions.<a -id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> -The experiment was tried on a grand -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</span> -scale and with high hopes, not unmingled with misgiving, -on the part of officers; and indeed the prospect -of raising a large number of men without charge to -the country was sufficiently alluring. None the less -the scheme failed completely,<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" -class="fnanchor">[195]</a> as is the common fate -of all projects which aspire to obtain a costly article -at a trifling outlay.</p> - -<p>Beyond this experiment the Government could -think of no better plan for augmenting the Army than -to encourage young men of means to raise men for -rank, or in other words to offer them rank in the Army -in proportion to the number of recruits that they -could produce. This was an old system which hitherto -had been confined chiefly to the raising of independent -companies, and had therefore led to no higher -rank than that of Captain. Even then it had been -vicious and had been repeatedly condemned; and it -was no good sign that in 1793 a Lieutenant had -advertised in the London papers, offering two thousand -guineas to any one who could raise him one -hundred recruits in six weeks, and get them passed -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</span> -at Chatham.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" -class="fnanchor">[196]</a> But it was now extended to the raising -of a multitude of battalions, which, for the most part, -were no sooner formed than they were disbanded, -and drafted into other corps. Thereby of course the -men were easily absorbed, but not so the officers, to -whom the Government had pledged itself to give -half-pay; and thus it was possible for a young man -to obtain a pension for life from his country on investing -a sufficient sum to raise a few score of recruits.<a -id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> -But this was the least of the evils of the system. -There was instantly a rush to obtain letters of service; -and commissions became a drug in the market. It -was said that over one hundred commissions were -signed in a single day,<a id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" -class="fnanchor">[198]</a> while the Gazette could not -keep pace with the incessant promotions. The Army-brokers, -who in the days of purchase negotiated for -officers the sale of commissions, exchanges, and the -like, carried on openly a most scandalous traffic. -“In a few weeks,” to use the indignant language of -an officer of the Guards, “they would dance any -beardless youth, who would come up to their price, -from one newly raised corps to another, and for a -greater douceur, by an exchange into an old regiment, -would procure him a permanent situation in the -standing Army.” The evils that flowed from this -system were incredible. Officers who had been driven -to sell out of the Army by their debts or their misconduct, -were able after a lucky turn at play to purchase -reinstatement for themselves with the rank -of Lieutenant-colonel. Undesirable characters, such -as keepers of gambling-houses, contrived to buy for -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</span> -their sons the command of regiments; and mere -children were exalted in the course of a few weeks to -the dignity of field-officers. One proud parent, indeed, -requested leave of absence for one of these infant -Lieutenant-colonels, on the ground that he was not -yet fit to be taken from school. It must be noted, -too, that, thanks to the Army-brokers, these evils were -not confined to the new regiments, but were spread, -by means of exchange, all over the Army; and, since -the great majority of the regiments were abroad on -active service, the old officers, who were daily facing -danger and death, suddenly found themselves inferior -in rank to men undistinguished by birth or intellect, -and without the smallest pretension to military ability.</p> - -<p>Little less dangerous was the enormous encouragement -given to crimping by the sudden demand from -all quarters for recruits. The Navy, as has been seen, -was unable to find its complement of men for the fleet, -despite the fact that the Common Council of London -in January 1793 had offered an additional bounty of -two pounds to seamen;<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" -class="fnanchor">[199]</a> and now there was thrown -into competition with the press-gang a race of greedy, -unscrupulous scoundrels, some of them holding and -disgracing the King’s commission, who made profit -out of every boy or man that they could lay hold of -by fair means or foul. Thus the ranks were filled, -as Tarleton phrased it, with infancy and dotage; -recruiting became a mere matter of gambling; and -the price of men rose to thirty pounds a head.<a -id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> So -large a sum set a premium on every description of -rascality in the trepanning of recruits by violence or -by guile; and the ordinary Englishman does not -lightly bear with oppression of this kind. At length, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</span> -on one day in August, an unfortunate lunatic, who -had been enlisted by a sergeant and locked up in -a brothel—the synonym for a recruiting-house—in -London, hurled himself out of a window in the third -story, into the street. Instantly a mob assembled, -which delivered a succession of riotous attacks upon -all houses of this description, and was only suppressed, -after several days of disorder, by the calling out of -the Guards and six regiments of cavalry.<a id="FNanchor_201" -href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a> Pitt defended -the system on the ground that the Navy as -well as the Army would be manned, by the turning -over of soldiers to reinforce the marines; but this is -only another instance of Pitt’s callous ignorance and -self-deception. The truth is that while doing nothing, -and probably worse than nothing, for the Navy, it -destroyed the efficiency of the Army for a time, and -but for the timely interposition of a capable soldier -would have destroyed it permanently. Who was -responsible for the introduction of the system it is -not easy to say, for there were so many disgraceful -circumstances attending it that the whole subject -was hushed up, and is now extremely obscure; but -assuredly it was not Lord Amherst, nor is it credible -that it can have been any soldier. It is safe to assert -that it was the work of civilians; and if we seek -among the civilians at the War Office for the two men -of tried conceit, unwisdom, and incapacity, we can -find them at once in Sir George Yonge and Henry -Dundas.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</span><a -id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> -</p> - -<p>Meanwhile new levies, even when raised under these -false conditions, were not to be produced in a moment; -and thirty thousand recruits were not to be reckoned, -even by the most sanguine of Ministers, as equivalent -to the same number of old soldiers. The Government, -therefore, renewed its contract for the hire of Hanoverians -and Hessians on a greater scale, raising the -total number of them to close upon thirty-four thousand -men. To these were added five foreign corps, which -were intended to supplement the dearth of light troops -from which the British contingent had suffered so -much during the campaign of 1793. As early as in -May of that year, one Captain George Ramsay had -offered to raise a small body of foreign riflemen, and -had after some delay been permitted to enlist also a -corps of Uhlans. Thus originated three corps which, -in honour of the Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, were -called by the name of York Chasseurs, York Rangers, -and York Hussars. The formation of the remaining -two, the Prince of Salm’s Hussars and Hompesch’s -Hussars, was only authorised in February 1794, and -consequently they were not ready for service at the -opening of the campaign. No effort had been made -to provide British soldiers for the work of light infantry, -except by raising eight additional light companies for -the Brigade of Guards, the men of which were distinguished -by round hats with large green feathers, -trousers instead of breeches and gaiters, and fusils -instead of muskets. But with these details of dress -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</span> -their qualifications as light troops were exhausted; -for they received no sufficient instruction in their -peculiar duty.<a id="FNanchor_203" href="#Footnote_203" -class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> - -<p>The Light Dragoons likewise continued to belie -their name, being trained in reality simply as cavalry -of the line of battle; but for this, probably, the civil -rather than the military authorities of the Army were -responsible, for at this period it was literally impossible -to obtain officers for the mounted troops. It will -be remembered that before the outbreak of the war -the Adjutant-general had constantly, but in vain, -endeavoured to obtain an increase of the wholly -inadequate pittance of pay meted out to subalterns of -dragoons. Even in peace the burdens laid upon them -were too heavy to be borne, and to these were now -added inadequate compensation for losses in the field, -only eighteen pounds being granted to replace a charger -which had cost thirty-five. The consequences became -immediately apparent. The Duke of York was obliged -to beg that the cornetcies of regiments serving in the -Low Countries might be given away, since purchasers -for them could not be found.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" -class="fnanchor">[204]</a> Thus the Light Dragoons -were untaught, because there were no officers to teach -them; patrols and advanced detachments lacked the -daring and adventurous leading of youth; and one -of the highest schools for the training of subalterns was -wholly neglected. It is hardly possible to estimate the -evil consequences of Pitt’s misdirected parsimony, in -devoting to the hire of mercenaries the money which -should have been spent in the improvement of the -British Army.</p> - -<p>So much must be said of the regular forces; but -the year 1794 was not less remarkable for an enormous -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</span> -increase in the number of the Fencible regiments, -Militia and Volunteers, all due to Carnot’s menace of -invasion. The estimate for the Fencible Cavalry provided -in March 1794 for forty troops; by May this -figure had already risen to ninety-two troops, and was -still rising. Next, the number of the embodied Militia -for England was augmented to thirty-six thousand; -while by an Act of the Irish Parliament, passed in 1793, -sixteen thousand additional Militia were levied in -Ireland. This latter was an entirely new departure; -and it need hardly be said that the first ballots drawn -on the west of St. George’s Channel led to serious -rioting.<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a> -Provision was also made in the estimates, and -a Bill was introduced for the raising of six thousand -Militia in Scotland; but this measure was for the -moment deferred, in order that familiarity might ultimately -facilitate its passing. The formation of the -Scottish Militia, however, appears to have been begun -in anticipation,<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" -class="fnanchor">[206]</a> and men were enlisted who, later in -<span class="sni">Oct. 15–Nov. 20.</span> -the year, were formed into over twenty battalions of -Fencible infantry. The extension of the ballot throughout -the three kingdoms, though not actually completed -until the passing of the Scottish Militia Act in 1797, -must be regarded as the most important military step -taken since the passing of the Militia Act of 1757 by -the elder Pitt; and due credit should be allowed to -the Government for it.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, to augment the English Militia to the -prescribed figure, an Act was passed, after the model -of that of 1778, empowering the Lord-Lieutenants to -enrol volunteers, to be added to the Militia, and to be -entitled to the same bounty, subsistence, and clothing. -Finally, in April, was passed an Act, limited to the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</span> -duration of the war, authorising the formation of district -corps or companies of Volunteers, to be entitled to pay -and subject to military discipline if called out for invasion -or in aid of the civil power. This was the first -attempt to summon the manhood of the kingdom to -arms; for though Shelburne in the peril of 1782 had -sent a circular to all the Mayors and Lord-Lieutenants -in England with the object of forming a levy <i>en masse</i>, -yet the hastening of the peace, by Rodney’s victory -of the Saints and by the relief of Gibraltar, had rendered -any elaboration of the plan unnecessary. Now, however, -there sprang up an infinity of Volunteer corps, -infantry, artillery, and light horse or Yeomanry Cavalry, -first in single companies and troops, but very soon in -battalions and regiments. The first of the Volunteer -corps appears to have been the five Associated Companies -of St. George’s, Hanover Square, which was -formed in anticipation of the Act;<a id="FNanchor_207" -href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a> the first of the -Yeomanry was Lord Winchelsea’s three troops of -“Gentlemen and Yeomanry,” raised by the County -of Rutland.<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" -class="fnanchor">[208]</a> The rapidity with which these Volunteers -were raised would be flattering to the national vanity -were it not susceptible of a commonplace explanation. -By a certain clause in the Act Volunteers were exempted -from service in the Militia, upon producing a certificate -that they had attended exercise punctually during six -weeks previously to the hearing of appeals against the -Militia list. This dissociation of the Volunteers from -the Militia was a great and disastrous blunder, which -has never yet been thoroughly repaired. It is, however, -sufficient to note for the present that the Government -had deliberately set up three different descriptions of -auxiliary forces, Militia, Fencibles, and Volunteers, all -competing with each other and with the regular Army. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</span> -The number of regular troops provided for in the -estimates of 1794 (reckoning the Irish establishment -at fourteen thousand) was one hundred and seventy-five -thousand men, besides thirty-four thousand foreign -troops, four thousand Fencibles, and fifty-two thousand -Militia; or, say, two hundred and sixty-five thousand -men in all.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously with these efforts at home, Pitt -worked strenuously to restore unity and vigour to the -Coalition. The relations of the coalesced powers at -the close of 1793 were in the highest degree unsatisfactory. -The Empress Catherine, still insatiable, -despite the deterioration of her forces and the exhaustion -of her treasury, had resumed her old designs upon -Turkey, and had set a large force in motion towards -Constantinople. The Emperor Francis, still under the -guidance of Thugut and full of vague plans for increasing -his territory, was drawing closer to the Empress -in the hope of obtaining her countenance to the annexation -of Venice by Austria, if indemnity in France should -fail, and of sharing with her the ultimate partition of -Turkey. Both were bitterly incensed against Prussia: -Catherine because King Frederick William had diverted -his troops from the invasion of France to the strengthening -of his position in Poland; Francis from jealousy -that his rival should have enlarged his boundaries, when -he himself had not. Frederick William, as has been -seen, had practically withdrawn his forces from active -operations on the Rhine; and accordingly in December -1793 Pitt had sent Lord Malmesbury to Berlin to -ascertain (if, indeed, anything could be ascertained in -such a centre of intrigue and falsehood) what might -be Prussia’s motive for retiring from the struggle. -In reply to Malmesbury, Frederick William, having -obtained his desire in Poland, declared himself eager -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</span> -to continue the contest against the Jacobins, but -absolutely prevented by lack of money. Thereupon -<span class="sni">Feb. 5.</span> -Pitt proposed to give Prussia a subsidy of two millions -sterling, of which England should pay three-fifths, and -Holland and Austria each one-fifth. This was a liberal -offer; and, since it was certain that Holland would -raise no objection, it lay practically with Austria to -give effect to it. It was well known that Austria was -in financial straits, that Hungary was full of unrest and -the Belgic Provinces much cooled in their loyalty, and -that, apart from these troubles at home, the Emperor -had contrived to quarrel with Sardinia abroad. Hence -it was beyond question that Austria could not carry on -the war without Prussia’s assistance; and, forasmuch -as Francis had already despatched emissaries to Berlin -to discuss the operations to be undertaken in the spring, -the natural presumption was that he would gladly close -with Pitt’s proposal.</p> - -<p>The British Government thereupon bestirred itself -to frame its projects for the coming campaign. The -Duke of York left Belgium for London on the 6th of -<span class="sni">Feb. 12.</span> -February; and a few days later Mack, now advanced -to the rank of Major-general, arrived there likewise -to concert plans with the Ministers. The Austrian -genius had shortly before submitted<a id="FNanchor_209" -href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> a scheme calculated -for a force of three hundred and forty thousand -men, which had been received with great satisfaction -by the British Cabinet and the Duke of York; but, -since there was no earthly possibility that the Coalition -could put that number of men into the field, the whole -of this elaborate creation was valueless. Both Mack -and Coburg, however, pressed for a concentration of -forces and a march on Paris, though neither of them -could conceive the feasibility of taking the offensive -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</span> -without leaving one hundred and twenty thousand -men behind them to guard the frontier from the Meuse -to the sea. The prime question, therefore, was one of -men, and Pitt on his side promised his utmost endeavour -to increase the British contingent to a figure which -should ensure a genuine total of forty thousand fighting -soldiers. As to the means whereby this force should be -produced, Pitt was remarkably vague, being clear only -that he could not spare the few thousand men under -Lord Moira’s command, since he wished to hold them -ready to sail to any part of the British coast which -might be threatened by a French invasion. Moira, -therefore, though one of the ablest officers in the Army -and adored by the men, was kept inactive, while his -troops sickened and died of gaol-fever in overcrowded -transports at Jersey.<a id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" -class="fnanchor">[210]</a> However, Pitt made up his -forty thousand men to his own satisfaction by naming -various reinforcements, which he hoped to pour into -Flanders during the summer and autumn; for it was -one of the delusions of this gifted man, as also of his -friend Dundas, that an army of twenty thousand men, -supplemented by monthly driblets of two thousand -men during ten months, is the same thing as an army -of forty thousand men ready for the field at the opening -of the campaign.</p> - -<p>The next requisite was that the Austrian, Prussian, -and British contingents should each of them possess a -siege-train, since, according to Mack, it was essential -for the Allies to master every fortress on the French -frontier from the Meuse to the sea. Pitt promised -this also, on behalf of the British; and then arose the -question of commanders. Though well aware that the -King’s assent would be wrung from him only by extreme -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</span> -pressure, the Ministers were for recalling the Duke of -York and appointing Lord Cornwallis, who had just -returned from India, in his place. Herein they were -undoubtedly right, for, after all allowance made for -the extreme difficulty of his position, the Duke did not -shine in the field. The Ministers, however, blamed -him especially for the failure before Dunkirk, wherein -they themselves were chiefly in fault; and Mack, -prompted apparently by the King, found little difficulty -in making excuses for the Duke, who from the first -had condemned the idea of attacking Dunkirk at all. -It was finally arranged that he should retain command -of the British contingent, but that he should be kept -always in the neighbourhood of the principal army, -with a few thousand Austrians attached to his own -corps, so as to subordinate him the more completely -to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. This compromise -bears so clearly the mark of the British politician that -its origin cannot be doubtful. It is of a kind that may -serve for the construction of a Cabinet, but it is not -suitable for war, and was particularly ill-fitted to the -projected campaign. For the rest, Pitt declared himself -satisfied that the command should remain with -Coburg, who was deservedly most popular among the -Austrian troops; and Mack rejoiced the heart of the -British Cabinet by announcing that the Emperor would -direct the operations as Generalissimo in person. Altogether -the results of the conference were considered -to be so satisfactory that the King presented Mack -with a jewelled sword as a reward for his good service.<a -id="FNanchor_211" href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">[211]</a></p> - -<p>The British Government’s satisfaction was soon -proved to be premature. The discussion of future -operations with the Court of Berlin was, in fact, only a -trick of Thugut to keep as many Prussian troops as -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</span> -possible on the French frontier; and the whole intent -of the Emperor’s taking personal command was that -Coburg and other honest men in his army, who profoundly -distrusted his chief adviser, should be kept -under proper restraint. Thugut now declared, in -answer to Pitt’s proposals, that Austria would not -advance a penny towards the subsidies for the Prussian -army, being well able to dispense with every part of -it beyond the twenty thousand men which formed its -contribution towards the forces of the Empire. In -fact, he was so madly jealous and fearful of Prussia at -this time that he secretly proposed to Russia a scheme -<span class="sni">March 11.</span> -for a joint attack upon her. On learning the Emperor’s -decision, King Frederick William ordered Marshal -Möllendorf to begin the withdrawal of his troops from -the Rhine. Coburg was in consternation, for he knew -that, without Prussian help, the execution of the -approved plan of campaign would be impossible. He -therefore asked the Duke of York to join him in requesting -Möllendorf to delay his retirement, and -despatched letter after letter to Vienna, adjuring the -Emperor in terms of touching devotion and patriotism -to send every man that he could raise to Flanders, and -to work loyally with Prussia to crush the terrible power -of the Revolution while there was yet time. Möllendorf -courteously acceded to his desire; but the Prince’s -protests fell on deaf ears in the Imperial capital. There -were over sixty thousand men ready for service at -Vienna, but from his insane dread of Prussian aggression, -Thugut would not part with one of them; and Coburg’s -only reward for his faithful and disinterested counsel -was rude and ungracious rebuke. Just at the critical -moment, however, Lord Malmesbury checked the -further withdrawal of the Prussian troops, by threatening -to break off all negotiation for a subsidy unless they -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</span> -remained on the Rhine until he could receive further -instructions from London. This brought the impecunious -King to reason, for without English money -he was lost. Shortly afterwards the parley was, with -Pitt’s sanction, resumed; and there was much haggling -over the sphere wherein the Prussian troops should be -employed, Frederick William declaring that for operations -on the Rhine he would furnish eighty thousand -men, but for Belgium not more than fifty thousand. -Finally, Malmesbury succeeded in compromising -matters; and a treaty was signed at the Hague on -the 19th of April, whereby Prussia, in consideration -of a lump sum of £300,000 and a subsidy of £50,000 -<span class="sni">April 19.<br />April 30.</span> -a month, engaged herself to provide sixty-two thousand -men, to be employed wherever Great Britain and -Holland, their paymasters, should think fit. Ten days -later Fox in the House of Commons predicted that this -would be a useless waste of money; and it will be seen -that he was a true prophet.<a -id="FNanchor_212" href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">[212]</a> -</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Coburg was doing his utmost to prepare -his army for the heavy work that lay before it; but -the Austrian forces had not improved since the previous -year. Heavy losses had brought many young soldiers -into the ranks; and, owing to the extreme extension -of his line of cantonments, the troops had gained little -rest during the winter. The French delivered as many -as forty-five petty attacks between the 6th of January -and the 26th of March, each one of which meant the -setting of many detachments in motion for long and -harassing matches. Moreover, owing to the decay of -the Emperor’s popularity in Belgium, the people would -do little or nothing for the troops; and, Coburg being -unwilling to take from the inhabitants what they -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</span> -refused to give, the men suffered greatly from want of -food, fuel, and shelter. Money would, of course, have -overcome all difficulties, but, though the Prince begged -piteously for it, he could obtain none from Vienna; -and the consequences were most cruel. “Some regiments,” -he wrote in February, “have been without -bread for several days, and two contractors have been -driven to suicide.” On the other hand, taking a true -measure of his enemy, Coburg had issued instructions -that the French must be attacked at all times and in -all circumstances, and that, even in the defence of a -position, at least a third of the men should be kept -ready for a counter-attack. But there was one clause -in his orders which seems to give the key to many an -Austrian defeat. “Men defending entrenchments will -sit in the banquette, arms in hand, until the enemy -comes within three hundred paces, or even somewhat -nearer, and then open a heavy fire.” British troops -were accustomed to hold their fire until the enemy was -within thirty paces; and hence it was that the French -Army of Italy, when they met them in Egypt, found -the red coats tougher adversaries than the white.<a -id="FNanchor_213" href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">[213]</a> -</p> - -<p>Among the rest of the Allies matters were little -better than with the Austrians. The Hessians in -Flanders were far below their proper strength, sickness -and constant skirmishes having swallowed up the -additional recruits furnished during the winter; while -the brigade which had been attached to Moira’s force -left one hundred dead and two hundred and fifty invalided -in the Isle of Wight, over and above five hundred -sick men whom they carried with them to Ostend.<a -id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">[214]</a> -As to the British, everything was, as usual, behindhand, -though the Duke of York had now a more energetic -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</span> -Chief of Staff than Murray in Colonel James Craig, -whom we saw last at Wilmington in 1781. Recognising -from his American experience how serious was the -Duke’s deficiency in light troops, Craig tried to hire -some from Prussia, but without success. There was a -difficulty about the British siege-train, for it was -discovered, some weeks after the Duke had made requisition -for it, that the application had been mislaid -at the Office of Ordnance. Though Dundas made -profuse promises of British drafts and reinforcements, -to the number of five thousand men, not one thousand -of these had arrived by the middle of March, and -Abercromby’s brigade was quite unfit to take the field. -The remount-horses were discovered to be very bad. -Artillery-drivers, moreover, the dearth of which had -been represented by the Duke for quite six months, -were found to be so scarce in England that the Master-General -was fain to seek them, though without success, -in Hanover. A fresh disappointment arose in the -matter of foreign troops, for it proved impossible to -obtain three thousand Brunswickers, whom Dundas -had counted upon taking over from the Dutch into the -British service. Rapidly the forty thousand soldiers -promised by Pitt dwindled away; and Craig resigned -himself to the inevitable fact that the deficiency would -amount to at least ten thousand men. But this was -not, to his thinking, the most formidable danger. -With a boldness which must have shocked Pitt and -Dundas, he wrote to the War Office a very strong and -damaging criticism of the cordon-system, and predicted -that nothing but misfortune could attend Generals who -upon principle preferred dispersion to concentration.<a -id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">[215]</a> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</span></p> - -<p>So the month of March passed away, the unhappy -Coburg waiting in anxious suspense to know first, -when the troops that composed his heterogeneous army -would be ready; secondly, what their numbers might -be when they were ready; and thirdly, what the -Emperor would expect him to do with them when it -should please him to honour headquarters with his -presence. Meanwhile Coburg had even in February -given orders for the contraction of his cantonments; -and at the beginning of April, after much shifting, his -force occupied the following positions.</p> - -<p>The Right or western Wing of the Allied Army, -covering maritime Flanders, was entrusted to Clerfaye -with a force of Austrians, Hessians, and Hanoverians, -who thus occupied the ground formerly entrusted to -the British and Dutch. His headquarters were at -Tournai, where an entrenched camp had been thrown -up. In his front also Orchies and Marchiennes had -been strengthened by field-works; and on his right -efforts had been made to restore the defences of Menin, -Ypres, and Nieuport, though, except in the case of -Ypres, with little result. The effective strength of Clerfaye’s -army in the field, after deduction of garrisons for -the strong places, was about twenty-four thousand men.</p> - -<p>On Clerfaye’s left, and connected with it by a -detachment of five thousand men under General -Wurmb at Denain on the Scheldt, stood the Centre -or principal army, consisting of about twenty-two -thousand men under the Duke of York, about forty-three -thousand men under Coburg himself, and of about -nineteen thousand Dutch under the Prince of Orange. -The Duke occupied the right with headquarters at -St. Amand, Coburg the centre with headquarters at -Valenciennes, and the Prince of Orange the left with -headquarters at Bavai. It was reckoned that, after -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</span> -providing for garrisons, Coburg could spare sixty-five -thousand men for active operations.</p> - -<p>The Left Wing consisted of twenty-seven thousand -Dutch and Austrians under Count Kaunitz, which were -stretched over the space from Bettignies, a little to the -north of Maubeuge, to Dinant on the Meuse.</p> - -<p>To these must be added fifteen thousand more -Austrians under General Beaulieu, cantoned between -Namur and Tréves, bringing the grand total of the -Allied force to something over one hundred and sixty -thousand men, of which at the very most one hundred -and twenty thousand were free for work in the field.<a -id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">[216]</a> -</p> - -<p>It will be noticed that the corps of Clerfaye and of -the Duke of York had exchanged the places which they -had occupied during the previous year, pursuant to the -design of the British Ministers that the Duke of York -should be kept under the immediate eye of Coburg. -The first result of this interference was to spoil Clerfaye’s -temper for the whole campaign; for he judged his force -too weak for its task of defending the maritime provinces; -and indeed it was only by the positive orders -of Coburg that he consented to hold the command.<a -id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">[217]</a> -The whole arrangement, in fact, was calculated to cause -confusion. It was bad enough that the lines of retreat -for the British and Austrians should be in exactly -opposite directions; and the obvious course, upon the -change of the Duke of York’s station, would have been -to have shifted his base to Antwerp. But far from -this, not only was his base continued at Ostend, but, -to make matters worse, a brigade of British was placed -under Clerfaye’s command, and a respectable number -of Austrians under the Duke of York’s; so that in case -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</span> -of mishap, not only must the lines of retreat for the -right and right centre intersect each other, but neither -corps could retire upon its base without leading several -of its regiments in the wrong direction.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile on the French side Carnot had girded -himself for a supreme effort. “We must finish matters -this year,” he wrote to Pichegru on the 11th of -February; “unless we make rapid progress and -annihilate the enemy to the last man within three -months, all is lost. To begin again next year would -mean for us to perish of hunger and exhaustion.” He -therefore decided to combine the armies of the North, -of the Ardennes and of the Moselle, and to mass two -hundred and fifty thousand men along the line from -Dunkirk to the Meuse. Of these about one hundred -thousand were to move upon Ypres, march thence -upon Ghent, master maritime Flanders, and then wheel -eastward upon Brussels; while at the same time -another hundred thousand were to advance upon Namur -and Liège, and sever communication with Luxemburg. -In other words, he designed to turn and envelop both -flanks of the Allied Army, leaving about fifty thousand -men to stand on the defensive in the intermediate space -between Bouchain and Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>Of the many eminent critics who have passed judgment -upon this plan, there is not one who has failed -to point out and condemn its defects; and indeed it -is obvious that if the Allies, neglecting small detachments, -should fall with their full strength upon either -wing of the enemy, they might annihilate it. An -advance of the French in overwhelming strength upon -the communications of the Allies about Namur would -have been equally effective and far less hazardous. Yet -Carnot prescribed the invasion of the maritime provinces -as the first object, partly no doubt with a view to the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</span> -ultimate invasion of England, but chiefly, as I conceive, -with the political object of threatening the retreat of -the British and thus overawing the most formidable -power in the Coalition. It is worth while to recall that -in 1815 Wellington looked for Napoleon to turn the -western flank of the Allies and cut the British off from -the sea, and that he dreaded such a movement so much -that he made his dispositions at Waterloo with a view -to prevent it. Wellington’s action has been as sharply -criticised as Carnot’s; and yet, when two such men -agree upon such a point, their opinion is at least worth -serious consideration. In any case, the threatening of -the lines of communication both east and west was quite -sufficient to distract the councils of the Allies, to set -them quarrelling as to which among themselves should -be sacrificed to the others, and so perhaps to bring about -political discord and the rupture of the Coalition.</p> - -<p>At the end of March Pichegru gave the strength -of the army of the North at two hundred and six -thousand, and of the army of the Ardennes at thirty-seven -thousand men, making a total of two hundred -and forty-three thousand present under arms, of -which one hundred and eighty-three thousand were -free for service in the field. The army of the North -at the beginning of April was thus distributed. The -Left Wing, seventy-one thousand men, extended -from Dunkirk by Cassel and Lille to Pont-à-Marque; -the Centre, forty-seven thousand men, from Arleux -(near Douai) by Cambrai, Bouchain, and Bohain to -Étreux, a little to the north of Guise; the Right -Wing, thirty-six thousand men, from Avesnes by -Cerfontaine, St. Rémy, and St. Waast to Maubeuge. -This made a total of one hundred and fifty-four thousand -men ready for the field; one half of them, under -such leaders as Moreau and Souham, standing on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</span> -the frontier of maritime Flanders. As early as on -the 11th of March Carnot ordered Pichegru to begin -the advance on Ypres; but the General, though -willing to train his troops by countless skirmishes, -made no movement until the 29th of March, when -he attacked the Austrian advanced posts at Le Cateau -with thirty thousand men, and was beaten back -with the loss of twelve hundred killed and wounded -and four guns. “It is dangerous,” he reported, “to -match our young troops against the enemy so soon”; -and therewith his operations incontinently ceased.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Coburg, still awaiting his orders, made -no attempt to overwhelm any one of the scattered -<span class="sni">April 2.</span> -French divisions. At last on the 2nd of April the -Emperor quitted Vienna, reached Brussels in company -with his brothers, the Archdukes Charles and -<span class="sni">April 14.</span> -Joseph on the 9th, and on the 14th joined Coburg -at Valenciennes. The Prince then laid before him -the danger of the Allied position, with both wings too -weak to take the offensive against an enemy which -was reported to be three hundred thousand strong; -and followed this up by recommending the advance -of the centre to the siege of Landrecies, for which -Mack had prepared one of his usual elaborate schemes. -Thus the Austrians reverted once more to a war of -petty sieges, which could produce no decisive result. -Indeed the only thing to be said for operations in the -selected quarter was that the country was open and -well suited to cavalry, in which arm the Allies were -far superior both in quantity and quality to the -French. The Emperor approved the plan; and the -troops were set in motion forthwith, nominally for a -great review to be held in the Emperor’s honour near Le -Cateau. Thus, despite all Carnot’s efforts to take the -initiative, it fell to the Allies to open the new campaign.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="camp1794">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER X</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1794.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -On the 16th of April, as had been arranged, the whole -of the main army was inspected by the Emperor on -<span class="sni">April 16.</span> -the heights of Cateau. The British infantry was -represented, as in the last campaign, by three battalions -of Guards, with a fourth battalion formed out of -their flank-companies, and by Abercromby’s brigade -of the Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third. -These last had at length received their first instalment -of recruits to make good their losses during -1793, in the shape of a draft which was described -as “much resembling Falstaff’s men, and as -lightly clad as any Carmagnole battalion”<a id="FNanchor_218" -href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> of the -French Army. The cavalry numbered twenty-eight -squadrons, drawn from fourteen regiments<a id="FNanchor_219" -href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">[219]</a> and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</span> -organised into four brigades, three of heavy and one -of light dragoons, the last being supplemented by a -picked squadron of the Carbineers under the command -of Captain Stapleton Cotton, a lad of twenty, -who in later years was to earn the title of Viscount -Combermere. The review over, the Emperor took up -his quarters in Le Cateau, whither the commanders -forthwith repaired to him for orders.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 17.</div> -<p> -The French troops under Pichegru in the immediate -front of the Emperor consisted of three divisions, -with an average strength of twelve thousand men -each, extended along an entrenched position some -eighteen miles long, on the wooded heights of Bohain -and Nouvion. Of these Fromentin’s division held -Catillon on the Sambre, a village rather over four -miles east and south of Le Cateau; westward of -Fromentin, Ballaud’s division lay astride the road -from Le Cateau to Guise, at Arbre de Guise and Ribeauville; -and, still further to west and south, Goguet’s -division held the ground about Vaux, Prémont, and -Bohain. The nearest French troops beyond these to -westward were fifteen thousand men under Chappuis -about Cambrai; while to eastward three divisions -of the French right wing, numbering some thirty -thousand men, lined the Sambre from St. Waast to -Maubeuge.</p> - -<p>There was therefore an opportunity of overwhelming -one or other of these isolated bodies; but the -Austrians clung religiously to their old methods. -The force was divided into eight columns, three of -which were directed to move north-westward toward -Cambrai, so as to check any movement from that side. -These need trouble us no more. Of the remaining -five, two on the left were ordered to drive the enemy -out of Catillon, cross the Sambre, and after clearing -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</span> -the forest of Nouvion to push forward their light -troops. One column in the centre, under Coburg’s -personal command, was designed to move by Ribeauville -upon Wassigny to master the heights further -to southward; while two more on the right, under -the Duke of York and Sir William Erskine, were to -advance, the former upon Vaux, the latter upon -Prémont, to drive the enemy from their entrenched -positions there and at Bohain, and to press their -light troops forward upon Le Catelet. All commanders -were expressly ordered to halt the main -portion of their troops on the captured ground, so -that there was no intention of pursuing the enemy in -the event of success.</p> - -<p>It would be tedious to describe so feeble an operation. -The scene of the engagement is a country much -broken by ravines and hollow roads, so that the heavy -artillery of some of the columns was with difficulty -brought forward; but the French, being in a manner -surprised, were manœuvred out of their positions -with little trouble or loss. The Duke of York’s and -Erskine’s columns alone encountered resistance worth -mentioning, but they found little difficulty in turning -the French entrenchments, while the Austrian Hussars -and a squadron of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons -succeeded in cutting down great numbers of the retreating -enemy. Altogether the Allies lost fewer -than seven hundred killed and wounded, while the -action was reckoned to have cost the French over -two thousand men, besides from twenty to thirty -guns, of which eleven were captured by the British -columns. Beyond this the French were little molested -in their retreat to Guise, and the trifling success of the -day was marred by disgraceful plundering and burning -on the part of the Allied troops after the engagement. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</span> -The British had already shown tendencies in this -direction, but had been checked by the Duke of -York, who had hanged two offenders, caught red-handed, -on the spot, without even the form of a drumhead -court-martial. Now, however, the Austrians -led the way in misconduct, either led astray by some -of their savage auxiliaries, or in aimless revenge for -their starvation during the winter; and the British -were only too ready to follow the example.<a -id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">[220]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 18.</div> -<p> -On the following day the army halted between -Nouvion and Prémont, pushing its outposts further -to southward, while detachments of Austrians were -posted also at Prisches, a few miles north of Nouvion, -and at La Capelle, Fontenelle, and Garmouset to eastward, -so as to cover the left flank and rear of the -army. Thereupon the Prince of Orange, whose -troops had been advanced towards Cambrai on the -17th, countermarched to Le Cateau, and assembling -his force at Forest, about three miles to the north -<span class="sni">April 20.</span> -of it, on the 20th fell upon the enemy’s posts over -against Landrecies on the left bank of the Sambre. -After a hard struggle, which cost him one thousand -men and the French twice as many, he carried the -French position, and at once opened the trenches -<span class="sni">April 21.</span> -before the town. On the following day Pichegru -delivered feeble and incoherent assaults upon the -positions of Prisches and Nouvion, and upon the -heights to the south of Wassigny, all of which were -beaten off with the loss to him of many men and four -guns. Further desultory fighting at the advanced -<span class="sni">April 22.</span> -posts on the next day was equally unfavourable to -Pichegru, as indeed he deserved for his folly in not -concentrating the thirty thousand men, who lay ready -to his hand at Maubeuge, for an overwhelming attack. -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Map1794"> - <a href="images/camp1794xx.jpg" id="Map1794back"> - <img class="double" src="images/camp1794.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">CAMPAIGN <span class="fsize75">OF</span> - APRIL, 1794. - </p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</span></p> - -<p>Coburg then judged it safe to proceed with the -siege in earnest, and, withdrawing the covering army -to the north, formed it in a huge semicircle around -the besieging force. His left wing curved round -from the heights that lie to eastward of Landrecies, -and between it and the village of Maroilles, southward -to Prisches, thence south-east across the -Rivierette to Le Sart, and thence by Fesmy to the -Sambre, the whole line being strongly entrenched, -with several bridges thrown over the Rivierette. -The force allotted for the defence of this tract was -thirty-two battalions, fifty squadrons, and twenty-six -light companies, the left under General Alvintzy, -the right under General Kinsky. On the western -bank of the Sambre the right wing completed the -semicircle, with a total of twenty-six battalions and -seventy-six squadrons. The first section of the defences -on this side ran westward of Catillon to the -Selle, from which stream the Duke of York’s army -carried the line north-westward to the road from -Le Cateau to Cambrai. This, a broad paved way, -runs straight as an arrow over the long waves of -rolling ground that lie between the two towns, the -undulations rising to their highest at the village of -Inchy, upon which the Duke rested his right. The -position thus occupied by the Allies was over twenty -miles in extent, following a chain of hills of easy -slope but seamed to east of Catillon by deep watercourses -and hollows, and broken by small copses -and enclosures in the neighbourhood of the villages. -Westward from Catillon, however, towards Cambrai the -hills subside into a broad plain, not unlike Salisbury -Plain, except that the undulations are far longer and -the acclivities therefore less severe. Covered with crops -but unenclosed, its gentle slopes and unseen folds -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</span> -present an ideal field for the action and manœuvres -of cavalry.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 23.</div> -<p> -On the 23rd intelligence reached the Allies that -fifteen thousand of the enemy had moved out from -Cambrai in three columns towards the north-east, -were driving in the outposts along the lower Selle, -and had even crossed that river, apparently with the -object of intercepting the Emperor Francis, who was -returning from a visit to Brussels, to rejoin the headquarters -of the army. The Austrian General Otto, -receiving information of these movements from Major-general -Sentheresky at St. Hilaire, between four and -five miles north-west of Inchy, at once joined him -there; and reconnoitring further north he found the -enemy, apparently about ten thousand strong, near -the village of Villers-en-Cauchies. Having with him -only two squadrons of the Fifteenth Light Dragoons -and as many of the Austrian Leopold Hussars, making -together little more than three hundred sabres, Otto -fell back to St. Hilaire, and sent a message to the -Duke of York for reinforcements. Late at night he -was joined by the Eleventh Light Dragoons, two -squadrons of the Austrian Zeschwitz Cuirassiers, and -Mansel’s brigade of the Blues, Royals, and Third -Dragoon Guards, the whole numbering ten squadrons. -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 24.</div> -<p> -Early on the following morning he again moved -northward down the valley of the Selle, keeping the -Fifteenth and Leopold Hussars in advance and the -remainder in support; and at about seven o’clock -the four advanced squadrons came upon a force of -French light cavalry of twice or thrice their strength -in a long belt of dwarf coppice, near the village of -Montrecourt, and about two miles east of Villers-en-Cauchies. -Being attacked on their left flank the -French horsemen at once retreated with precipitation -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</span> -for a quarter of a mile, when they rallied, and then -retired steadily westward, covered by a cloud of -skirmishers. Finally they re-formed between Villers-en-Cauchies -and Avesnes-le-Sec, fronting to eastward, -and masking a force of unknown strength in their -rear. Otto appears to have followed up this cavalry -with great speed, for, on looking round for his supports, -he could nowhere discover them. He halted -the advanced squadrons, but, perceiving that he had -already committed them too deeply, he assembled -the officers and told them briefly that there was -nothing for it but to attack. The English and Austrian -officers then crossed swords in pledge that they would -charge home; and it was agreed that the British -should attack in front, and the Austrians on the -enemy’s left flank towards Avesnes-le-Sec, which was -already a name of good omen in the annals of the -Austrian cavalry. -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Avesnes"> - <a href="images/avesnesxx.jpg" id="Avesnesback"> - <img class="double" src="images/avesnes.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">AVESNES-<span class="fsize75">LE</span>-SEC, - 12 Sep, 1793<br /> - VILLERS-<span class="fsize75">EN</span>-CAUCHIES, 24 April, 1794<br /> - BEAUMONT, 26 April, 1794. - </p> -</div> - -<p>The Fifteenth led by Captain Aylett now advanced -at a rapid trot, breaking into a gallop at one hundred -and fifty yards from the French cavalry. These did -not await the shock but wheeled outwards, right and -left, and retired at speed, unmasking a line of French -skirmishers and guns, which opened fire before their -front was clear and killed several of their own soldiers. -In rear of the artillery six French battalions, or about -three thousand men, were massed together in quadrate -formation of oblong shape,<a id="FNanchor_221" href="#Footnote_221" -class="fnanchor">[221]</a> with the front rank kneeling. -A volley from the eastern face of this square, -together with a discharge of grape from the guns, -checked the attack for a moment; but, cheered on -by their officers, the Fifteenth swept through the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</span> -battery and dashed straight upon the bayonets. The -French infantry seems to have stood till the last -moment, for Aylett fell with a deep thrust through -the body, and four other officers had their horses -wounded under them; but the onset of the Dragoons -was irresistible. One half of the square was dispersed -instantly; and the other half, after firing a -volley, broke up likewise before the charge of the -Fifteenth, and fled in wild disorder. In rear of the -square were more French squadrons, upon which -those that retired from the front had been re-formed; -but these had given way before the impetuous attack -of the Austrian Hussars, and for half a mile the sabres -of both Austrians and British dealt terrible havoc -among the flying Frenchmen.<a -id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">[222]</a> -</p> - -<p>Leaving, however, the Austrians to pursue the -infantry towards Cambrai, the Fifteenth, now commanded -by Captain Pocklington, passed on to the -road from Villers-en-Cauchies to Bouchain, dispersed a -long line of fifty guns and ammunition-waggons, which -were retiring to the north-west, and continued the chase -until the guns of Bouchain itself opened fire upon -them, and a relieving force came out to save the convoy. -Meanwhile not a sign appeared of the supporting -squadrons which might have ensured the capture of -the artillery; and Pocklington, observing other forces -of the enemy closing in upon him from every side, -rallied his men and retired at a trot. The blue uniform -of the Light Dragoons, however, caused the French to -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</span> -mistake them for friends; and it was not until they -were close to Villers-en-Cauchies that Pocklington -perceived that he was cut off. The enemy was, in -fact, established in his front, blocking the road with -infantry and artillery at a point where a causeway -carried it across a valley, though to the south of the -village there were visible the scarlet coats of Mansel’s -brigade. Wheeling about, therefore, for a short time, -Pocklington checked the pursuers that were following -him from Bouchain, and then, wheeling once more to -his proper front, he galloped through the French amid -a heavy fire of grape and musketry with little loss, and -safely rejoined his comrades.</p> - -<p>Things, however, had not gone well with Mansel and -his brigade. Whether it was by Otto’s fault or by his -own that he had gone astray, and whether he attempted -and failed in an attack upon the French who were -obstructing Pocklington’s retreat, is a mystery. We -know only that Craig reported, with great regret, that -the brigade had behaved ill; that he attributed the -fault mainly to Mansel, whom after the action of the -17th he had already reported as an incompetent officer; -but that the troops also were to blame, though the -Royals had immediately recovered themselves and -protected the retreat of the other two regiments. -More curious still, the list of casualties shows that the -Third Dragoon Guards suffered the very heavy loss of -thirty-eight men and forty-six horses killed, besides -nine more men wounded and missing, though the -casualties of the Royals and the Blues were trifling.<a -id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">[223]</a> -From this I infer that Mansel led his brigade to the -sound of the guns, and, being ordered to attack the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</span> -fresh division of the enemy that had come upon the -ground, contrived by irresolution and mismanagement -to bring the Third Dragoon Guards under enfilading -fire of the French cannon, and to throw the whole of -the six squadrons into confusion. In any case it is -certain that the brilliant attack of the Fifteenth was -insufficiently supported, and that Mansel and his -brigade, justly or unjustly, lay under reproach, until -two days later they redeemed their good name beyond -all chance of cavil. The casualties of the French in -this action were eight hundred men killed and four -hundred wounded, besides three guns taken; while -the Fifteenth escaped with a loss of thirty-one men -and thirty-seven horses killed and wounded, and the -Leopold Hussars with a loss of ten men and eleven -horses killed and wounded and the same number -missing. The Emperor of Austria conferred on the -officers of the Fifteenth a gold medal and the much-coveted -order of Maria Theresa; and the regiment -still bears on its appointments the name of Villers-en-Cauchies. -With a little more luck, or, it may be, a -little better management, Otto would have achieved -one of the greatest successes ever recorded of cavalry -against infantry, and annihilated the whole of the -force that had moved out from Cambrai.</p> - -<p>As matters stood, however, the reverse to the French -produced little effect on Pichegru. Successive reinforcements -had more than made good his losses; and -on the 24th of April the combined strength of the -armies of the North and of the Ardennes, not counting -fifty thousand men employed as garrisons, was little -short of two hundred thousand men free for service -in the field, or nearly two to one of Coburg’s force. -Relying upon this numerical superiority the French -General started for Lille, in order from thence to direct -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</span> -operations against Clerfaye. At the same time, however, -he set his troops in motion to raise the siege of -Landrecies, directing General Charbonnier with thirty -thousand men of the army of the Ardennes to attack -Kaunitz on the extreme left wing of the Allies, while -at the same time General Ferrand with forty-five -thousand from Guise should fall on the covering army -on the east and south, and General Chappuis with -thirty thousand men from Cambrai should assail the -Duke of York on the west.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 26.</div> -<p> -Accordingly, early in the morning of the 26th the -French engaged the covering army simultaneously at all -points. On the east General Fromentin with twenty-two -thousand men assailed Maroilles and Prisches, and -after a long and severe struggle captured the latter -position, severing for the time communications between -Alvintzy and Kinsky. Alvintzy himself was disabled -by two wounds, and the situation was for a time most -critical until the Archduke Charles, who had succeeded -to the command of Alvintzy’s troops, by a final and -skilful effort recovered the lost ground and drove the -French over the Little Helpe. This enabled him to -reinforce the centre under General Bellegarde, who -with some difficulty was defending the line from Oisy -to Nouvion against twenty-three thousand men. -Thereupon Bellegarde instantly took the offensive, -completely defeated the French, and captured from -them nine guns.</p> - -<p>But far more brilliant was the success of the Allies -on the west, where Chappuis led one column along the -high-road from Cambrai to Le Cateau, while a second -column of four thousand men advanced upon the same -point by a parallel course through the villages of Ligny -and Bertry, a little farther to the south. Favoured by -a dense fog the two columns succeeded in driving the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</span> -advanced posts of the Allies from the villages of Inchy -and Beaumont on the high-road, and of Troisvilles, -Bertry, and Maurois immediately to south of them; -which done, they proceeded to form behind the ridge -on which these villages stand, for the main attack. -Before the formation was complete the fog cleared; and -the Duke, observing that Chappuis’s left flank was in -the air, made a great demonstration with his artillery -against the French front, sent a few light troops to -engage their right, and calling all his cavalry to his own -right, formed them unseen in a fold in the ground -between Inchy and Bethencourt, a village a little to -westward of it.<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224" -class="fnanchor">[224]</a> The squadrons were drawn up in -three lines, the six squadrons of the Austrian Cuirassiers -of Zeschwitz forming the first line under Colonel -Prince Schwarzenberg, Mansel’s brigade the second -line, and the First and Fifth Dragoon Guards and Sixteenth -Light Dragoons the third, the whole of the -nineteen squadrons being under command of General -Otto.<a id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" -class="fnanchor">[225]</a> -</p> - -<p>In this order they moved off, Otto advancing with -great caution, and skilfully taking advantage of every -dip and hollow to conceal his movements. A body -of French cavalry was first encountered and immediately -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</span> -overthrown, General Chappuis, who was with -them, being taken prisoner. Then the last ridge was -passed and the squadrons saw their prey before them—over -twenty thousand French infantry drawn up with -their guns in order of battle, serenely facing eastward -without thought of the storm that was bursting on -them from the north. There was no hesitation, for -Schwarzenberg was an impetuous leader, and the -Cuirassiers had been disappointed of distinction at -Villers-en-Cauchies; the Blues, Royals, and Third -Dragoon Guards had a stain to wipe away; the King’s -and Fifth Dragoon Guards were eager for opportunity to -show their mettle; and the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, -being the only Light Dragoons present, were anxious -to prove that they could do as well as the Fifteenth. -The trumpets rang out, and with wild cheering white -coats, red coats, and blue coats whirled down upon the -left flank and rear of the French. The French guns, -hastily wheeled round, opened a furious fire of grape, -while the infantry began as furious a fire of musketry; -but the charging squadrons took no heed. Mansel, -stung by the imputation of cowardice, which had been -thrown out to account for his mishap on the 24th, had -vowed that he would not come back alive, and dashing -far ahead of his men into the thick of the enemy went -down at once; but Colonel Vyse, of the King’s Dragoon -Guards, taking command of both brigades, led them as -straight as Mansel. In a very few minutes the whole -mass of the French was broken up and flying southward -in wild disorder, with the sabres hewing mercilessly -among them.</p> - -<p>The misfortunes of the enemy did not end here, for -one of their detachments, which had been pushed forward -to Troisvilles, was driven back by a couple of -British guns under Colonel Congreve, and joined the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</span> -rest in flight. Meanwhile Chappuis’s second column -had advanced a little beyond Maurois with its guns, -when the appearance of the fugitives warned them to -retire; but in this quarter, too, there was a vigilant -Austrian officer, Major Stepheicz, with two squadrons -of the Archduke Ferdinand’s Hussars and four of the -Seventh and Eleventh British Light Dragoons. Following -up the French column he drove its rearguard in -upon the main body a little to westward of Maretz, and -a few miles further on fell upon the main body also, -dispersed it utterly, and captured ten guns. Twelve -hundred Frenchmen were killed in this part of the field -alone, so terrible was the Austrian hussar in pursuit; -two thousand more had fallen under the sabres of Otto’s -division, which likewise captured twenty-two guns and -three hundred and fifty prisoners. The shattered fragments -of the French infantry fled by a wide detour to -Cambrai; and Pichegru’s attack on this side was not -merely beaten off, but his troops were literally hunted -from the field.</p> - -<p>So ended the greatest day in the annals of the -British horse, perhaps the greater since the glory of it -was shared with the most renowned cavalry in Europe. -The loss of the Austrians was nine officers, two hundred -and twenty-eight men, and two hundred and eight -horses; that of the British, six officers, one hundred -and fifty-six men, and two hundred and eighty-nine -horses, killed, wounded, and missing. The British -regiments that suffered most heavily were the Blues -and the Third Dragoon Guards, each of which had -sixteen men and twenty-five horses killed outright; -and the determination of the Third to prove that the -harsh criticism of their comrades on the 24th was unjust, -is shown by the fact that five out of the six officers -injured in the charge belonged to them. Mansel, the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</span> -Brigadier, who was also their Colonel, died as has been -told. Of the Captains one, his own son, was overpowered -and taken in a desperate effort to extricate his -father, and another was wounded. Of the Lieutenants -one was killed and another, if not two more, wounded. -The Major in command, however, had the good fortune -not only to escape unhurt but to receive the sword of -General Chappuis. The total loss of the covering army -was just under fifteen hundred men; that of the French -was reckoned, probably with less exaggeration than -usual, at seven thousand, while the guns taken from -them numbered forty-one.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 27.</div> -<p> -On the following day the Emperor ordered his army -to devote itself to singing a <i>Te Deum</i> and to solemn -thanksgiving, which was very right and proper, but -might well have been deferred for forty-eight hours -until the full fruits of the victory had been gathered. -For although there were four fortresses, Avesnes, Guise, -Cambrai, and Maubeuge, within easy distance as a -refuge for fugitives, another day’s pursuit would -assuredly have swept up many hundred stragglers, -while the mere sight of the Allied troops would probably -have sufficed to set the French levies running once -more. There was, however, better excuse than usual -for inaction, for among General Chappuis’s papers had -been found evidence that a most formidable stroke -was about to fall, if it had not already fallen, upon -Flanders. It is now necessary to narrate the course of -events in that quarter, namely, on the right or western -wing of the Allies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 23.</div> -<p> -On the 23rd of April a force from Cambrai, acting -in concert with that which was beaten on the 24th -at Villers-en-Cauchies, had moved northward against -Wurmb’s corps of communication at Denain, and, but -for the arrival of Clerfaye with some eight thousand -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</span> -men from Tournai, would have driven it across the -Scheldt. On the 24th, 26th, and 27th the harassing of -the advanced posts of the Allies about Denain continued, -and meanwhile the true attack was developed, -pursuant to Carnot’s plans, on the extreme left of the -<span class="sni">April 24.</span> -French line. On the 24th Michaud’s division of twelve -thousand men marched from Dunkirk, part of it -towards Nieuport on the north, the rest upon Ypres -to south-east, sweeping back the feeble posts between -the two places. Simultaneously Moreau’s division of -twenty-one thousand men moved eastward from Cassel -upon Ypres, and drove all the outlying detachments -on that side to take shelter under the ramparts. Then, -leaving some of Michaud’s division at Messines to watch -<span class="sni">April 25–27.</span> -the fortress from the south, Moreau pursued his way -eastward against Menin, and surrounded that fortress -upon all sides. At the same time Souham’s division -of thirty thousand men, under the personal direction -of Pichegru, advanced from Lille north-eastward upon -Mouscron, drove back upon Dottignies the weak detachment -that defended it, and captured Courtrai, which -<span class="sni">April 26.<br />April 28.</span> -was practically without a garrison. General Oynhausen, -however, restored matters somewhat by collecting -troops from Tournai at Dottignies and retaking the -position of Mouscron, where reinforcements arrived in -the nick of time to strengthen him.</p> - -<p>The papers found upon Chappuis gave Coburg the -key to all these movements; and on the evening of -the 26th he sent twelve battalions and ten squadrons -under General Erskine from his own army to St. -Amand, bidding Clerfaye to recall at once to their -proper stations the reinforcements which he had imprudently -hurried to Denain. Clerfaye accordingly -hastened by forced marches through Tournai to Mouscron, -which he reached on the 28th, raising the garrison -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</span> -of that place to ten thousand men, exclusive of -about two thousand more in the detached posts of -Coyghem and Dottignies. The relief of Menin was -his first and most urgent object, and he had fully -resolved to attempt it on the 30th; but Pichegru -<span class="sni">April 29.</span> -was too quick for him. On the 29th the two columns -under Generals Souham and Bertin fell, the one upon -Clerfaye’s front, the other upon his left flank and -rear, with a superiority of three to one, and after a -hard struggle forced him from his position. The -Austrian General seems to have begun his retreat in -good order, but the movement speedily degenerated -into a flight; and when he rallied his beaten troops -at Dottignies he was the weaker by two thousand -men killed and wounded and twenty-three guns. -Happily six of the battalions sent from the army -before Landrecies had by that time reached Dottignies, -and, with these to hearten his demoralised force, he -retired eastward to Espierres, on the western bank of -the Scheldt.</p> - -<p>This defeat decided the fate of Menin. The garrison -consisted of rather more than two thousand men, -chiefly Hanoverians, but in part French Emigrants, -which latter if captured could expect nothing but the -guillotine. The commandant, Count Hammerstein, -therefore decided to cut his way out through the -besiegers, and with the fortune that favours the brave, -<span class="sni">April 30.</span> -succeeded during the night of the 30th in forcing his -passage northward to Thourout and thence to Bruges. -Thus Menin and Courtrai, the two gates of the Lys, -were lost, and a gap was broken in the long cordon -of the Allies. Along the whole of the right wing -there was something like a panic, and the roads were -choked with long trains of supplies and stores flying -northward to Brussels and Ghent. At Ostend there -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</span> -had lately arrived the Eighth Light Dragoons and -the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fifth Foot, sadly belated, -since the infantry, with Dundas’s usual wisdom, had -been embarked at Bristol; but General Stewart, -the commandant at Ostend, did not think it prudent -after Clerfaye’s defeat to send them down country.<a -id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> -Happily Pichegru did not pursue his advantage as -<span class="sni">May 3.</span> -he ought. He did indeed push a detachment northward -from Menin upon Roulers, which was attacked -and defeated with a loss of two hundred men and -three guns by three squadrons of the Allied cavalry;<a -id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a> -but there his activity ceased; and he solemnly sat -himself down about Moorseele on the left bank of the -Lys, with one flank resting on Menin and the other on -Courtrai, as if to allow time for Coburg’s army to come -up in his front.<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228" -class="fnanchor">[228]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">April 28.</div> -<p> -Coburg meanwhile had passed through no enviable -days. On the 28th news reached him that Kaunitz -on his left wing had been forced back by overwhelming -numbers to the Sambre, while on his right wing -Pichegru had made his way to Courtrai; but, however -serious the outlook, he was still tied for the -present to the miserable and useless fortress of Landrecies. -By a strange irony Mack on that very day -submitted a plan of future operations, whereby -Bouchain, Cambrai, Avesnes, and Maubeuge were -in succession to be besieged;<a id="FNanchor_229" -href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">[229]</a> -but circumstances on -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</span> -<span class="sni">April 30.</span> -the occasion were too strong for pedantry. Landrecies -fortunately fell on the 30th, and Coburg on the -same day ordered the Duke of York to lead the rest -of his force with all speed to Clerfaye’s assistance, -and to drive the French from Flanders.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 3.</div> -<p> -Heavy rain, however, delayed the Duke’s progress; -and it was not until the 3rd of May that he reached -Tournai, where he reunited Erskine’s force with his -own and pushed forward a strong detachment three -miles westward to Marquain and Lamain, releasing -five thousand men, which had hitherto held those -points, to join Clerfaye. The front thus occupied -by the Allies, from Tournai in the south to Espierres -in the north, was from seven to eight miles long and -faced due west, their objective being the right flank -and communications of the French left wing. The -British brigade at Ostend, namely the Twelfth, Thirty-eighth, -and Fifty-fifth under Major-general Whyte, -and the Eighth Light Dragoons, were by this time -on their way to Clerfaye’s army; and the united -force of Clerfaye and the Duke of York was now -reckoned at about forty thousand men.<a -id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">[230]</a> -Pichegru, on the other hand, had from forty to fifty thousand -between Menin and Courtrai, and twenty thousand -more under General Bonnaud (who had succeeded -Chappuis) at Sainghin, about five miles south-east -of Lille, to act as a reserve. At Clerfaye’s proposal -it was agreed that on the 5th of May he himself should -cross the Lys a little below Courtrai and fall upon that -place from the north, while simultaneously the Duke -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</span> -of York should move eastward to cut it off from -Lille. After all, however, Clerfaye, whether from -diffidence or mere frowardness, would not venture on -the attempt. Appeal was made to the Emperor -Francis to give him positive orders to attack, but -meanwhile Bonnaud concentrated over twenty-five -<span class="sni">May 8–9.</span> -thousand men between Bouvines and Anstaing, a -little to the west of Marquain, as if to threaten the -Duke’s left. When the Emperor’s orders at last -reached Clerfaye, he first wasted four days in reconnoitring, -and at last made but a feeble attack on the -10th, contenting himself with the capture of the outermost -fringe of Courtrai.</p> - -<p>Pichegru seems to have had good information of -Clerfaye’s movements and possibly even of his intentions, -for he left Moreau’s division alone to deal with -him; and, having moved Souham’s division to the -<span class="sni">May 10.</span> -east bank of the Lys, himself on the same day attacked -the line of the Allies in force. Souham advanced -against the Hanoverians on the Allied right, but, -though he forced the posts of Dottignies and Coyghem, -was repulsed from Espierres. On the left of the -Allies thirty thousand French moved out in two -columns against the Duke of York’s entrenched position -between Lamain and Hertain; the stronger -column of the two, which included five thousand -cavalry, following the main road from Lille to Tournai, -the other turning south-east from Bouvines by Cysoing -upon Bachy, as if to turn the Duke’s left flank. This -latter column was checked by a couple of battalions -and three squadrons under command of an Austrian -officer at Bachy, and was unable to penetrate further. -The other and more formidable body carried the -advanced posts of Baisieux upon the main road, and -of Camphin about a mile to south of it, and forming -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</span> -on the plain between these two villages opened a -furious cannonade from howitzers and heavy guns. -Thereupon the Duke, perceiving a gap in the enemy’s -line, whereby the right of their main body was -uncovered, ordered sixteen squadrons of British -Dragoons and two of Austrian Hussars to advance -into the plain of Cysoing by the low ground that lies -south of the heights of Lamain, and from thence to -attack.</p> - -<p>The cavalry obeyed with alacrity; but the ground -on the plain, though perfectly level and unenclosed, -was much broken by patches of cole-seed, grown in -trenches after the manner of celery, which checked -the progress of the heavy dragoons. Moreover the -French infantry, for the first time since the Revolution, -threw themselves into squares and faced the -galloping horsemen with admirable firmness. Nine -regiments of cavalry in succession charged up to the -bayonets, but with insufficient speed, and fell back -baffled.<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231" -class="fnanchor">[231]</a> Nevertheless they followed the French up -the plain from south to north, until, a little to westward -of Camphin, their left came under the fire of -some French heavy batteries, established on the gently -rising ground before the village of Gruson. The -Duke then ordered a brigade of British infantry to -move forward between that village and Baisieux, at -the same time sending down four battalions along -the track which the cavalry had taken, to support their -attack. The French infantry thereupon retreated -from Camphin in a northerly direction towards the -village of Willems, their cavalry covering the movement; -while the British cavalry, now reinforced by -six more squadrons, hovered about them watching -for their opportunity to attack. At length they fell -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</span> -upon the French horsemen on both flanks, and utterly -overthrew them, after which they renewed their -attempt upon the infantry, but again without success. -At last, however, a little to the south of Willems, -the battalion-guns of the British infantry came up -and opened fire, when the French, after receiving a -few shots, began to waver. The squadrons again -charged, and an officer of the Greys, galloping straight -at the largest of the squares, knocked down three men -as he rode into it, wheeled his horse round and overthrew -six more, and thus made a gap for the entry of -his men. The sight of one square broken and dispersed -demoralised the remainder of the French. Two -more squares were ridden down, and for the third -time the British sabres had free play among the French -infantry. Over four hundred prisoners were taken, -thirteen guns were captured, and it was reckoned that -from one to two thousand men were cut down. The -loss of the British was thirty men killed, six officers -and seventy-seven men wounded, ninety horses killed -and one hundred and forty wounded and missing, -the Sixth Dragoon Guards being the regiment that -suffered most heavily. It is hardly necessary to call -attention to the arm which was lacking on this day, -or to point out that a single battery of horse-artillery -would have enabled the cavalry to break the squares -at the first onset, would greatly have increased the -enemy’s losses, and would have made the day’s operations -more decisive. Not for eighteen years was the -British cavalry destined again to ride over French -battalions as they rode on this day; and then Stapleton -Cotton was fated once more to be present, leading -not a squadron of Carbineers, but a whole division of -horse to the charge at Salamanca. But the 10th of -May 1794 is chiefly memorable as marking the date -on which the new French infantry showed itself not -unworthy of the old.<a id="FNanchor_232" -href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</span></p> - -<div class="image-center" id="Willems"> - <a href="images/willemsxx.jpg" id="Willemsback"> - <img class="double" src="images/willems.jpg" alt="" /></a> - <p class="fsize75 right italic">Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London.</p> - <p class="caption">WILLEMS, 10 May 1794.</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</span></p> - -<p>After the action the French main body retired -once more across the Lys to its old camp between -<span class="sni">May 11.</span> -Menin and Courtrai; but on the 11th Souham attacked -Clerfaye in his position at Lendelede, about -four miles north of Courtrai, and after an obstinate -<span class="sni">May 12.</span> -engagement forced him to retire still further northward -to Thielt, with the loss of fifteen hundred men -and two guns. Meanwhile the Duke of York, in -spite of his success on the 10th, became anxious as -to his position in presence of numbers so overwhelmingly -superior, and pressed Coburg to send him reinforcements. -At the Emperor’s headquarters, however, -there was some hesitation whether the principal -army should move eastward to the assistance of -Kaunitz on the Sambre, or westward for the salvation -of Flanders. The first idea was to make a demonstration -towards Cambrai with a part of the force; the -next to make a rapid march and invest Avesnes, also -with only a part of the force, in order to take pressure -off Kaunitz. The idea of moving with the whole -army to any given point seems to have occurred to -none of the Austrian Generals. Then came the Duke -<span class="sni">May 11.</span> -of York’s application for help, whereupon General -Kinsky was ordered with some six thousand horse -and foot to Denain, to enable Wurmb’s detachment -at that place to join the Duke of York at Tournai. -<span class="sni">May 12.</span> -One day later arrived news from Kaunitz that he had -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</span> -been compelled to fall back still further northward -from the Sambre, and was attacked on all sides; the -fact being that Carnot on the 30th of April had directed -fifteen thousand men from the army of the Rhine to -join the army of the Ardennes, so as to ensure decisive -superiority on the Sambre. Upon this, Coburg determined -that the subdivision of the army into fragments -must cease, and called upon the Emperor to -choose between the Sambre and Flanders, as the -sphere of action for the entire force. Intelligence of -a successful engagement fought by Kaunitz and of -Clerfaye’s retreat to Thielt inclined the Emperor to -Flanders; and though, even then, Austrian pedantry -insisted that some eight thousand men under the -Prince of Orange must remain in the vicinity of Landrecies, -<span class="sni">May 14.</span> -yet the bulk of the army on the 14th commenced -its march westward.</p> - -<p>This movement, however, was by no means to -the taste of some of the Emperor’s advisers; and it -becomes necessary at this point to turn for a moment -from the western to the eastern centre of European -disturbance, and to glance at the influence which -events in Poland had exerted upon the Imperial -Cabinet. It has already been said that Thugut’s -only object in persuading the Emperor to take personal -command in the field, was that the operations -might subserve his own policy. With this view the -Minister prepared to remove to Valenciennes, which -was to be the political headquarters of the Empire -during the Emperor’s stay in the Netherlands; but -before he could leave Vienna he was startled by the -news of a general rising in Poland. This insurrection -under the leadership of Kosciusko broke out on the -<span class="sni">March 25.</span> -25th of March, and spread with a rapidity and success -which left the Russians absolutely helpless. Catherine, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</span> -greedy for the partition of Turkey, had already moved -the best of her troops southwards; and the only force -of any kind upon the spot was that of Prussia, which -fact in itself was enough to kindle Thugut’s jealousy. -On the 20th of April Kosciusko, after two days’ fighting, -<span class="sni">April 20.<br />April 25.</span> -captured Warsaw; and five days later Catherine, -while asking the Emperor for the troops due to her -by treaty, mentioned also how greatly she needed -the help of the Prussians, from whom likewise she -had claimed assistance. Meanwhile King Frederick -William, growing nervous lest the rebellion should -infect also his own Polish provinces, after some hesitation -decided to throw the Treaty of the Hague to the -winds; wherefore, withdrawing twenty thousand of his -troops from the Rhine, he left Berlin on the 14th of -May to take personal command of his army in Poland.</p> - -<p>All this was gall and wormwood to Thugut, and -the more so because Kosciusko had expressed a wish -to place Austrian troops in occupation of Poland -rather than yield it to the Prussians. He became -more and more anxious to have done with France, if -possible by a separate peace with the Republic, and -to devote all Austria’s energies to the thwarting of -Prussia in the East. The embitterment of his hostility -towards Prussia brought him more than ever in conflict -with Coburg and Mack, who desired above all -things a good understanding with the second great -power of Germany; but, unfortunately, he found -two officers of like sentiments with himself in the -Prince of Waldeck, who held a high position on the -Staff, and General Rollin, who of all men possessed -greatest influence with the Emperor. It was therefore -with profound dissatisfaction that Thugut’s -ignoble clique saw the mass of the Austrian troops -drawn nearer to France and further from Poland; -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</span> -and though outwardly they swallowed their ill-humour, -yet they had every intention of compassing their own -ends, even by means the most infamous.<a id="FNanchor_233" -href="#Footnote_233" class="fnanchor">[233]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 15.</div> -<p> -On the 15th of May the Emperor joined the Duke -of York at Tournai, and the Archduke Charles brought -the Austrian army from Landrecies to St. Amand, -eleven miles to south of it. The field, on which the -decisive action was to be fought, was one that had -drunk deep of human blood. It may be described as -the parallelogram enclosed by a line drawn south-eastward -from Courtrai to Tournai, thence south-westward -to Pont-à-Marque, thence north-westward -through Lille to Wervicq, and thence north-eastward -back to Courtrai. To east it is bounded by the Scheldt, -to north by the Lys; and through the midst of it, -flowing first from south to north past Pont-à-Marque -and Cysoing to Lannoy, and thence westward into the -Deule and so to the Lys, runs the Marque, a stream -impassable except by bridges, owing to soft bottom and -swampy banks. The principal bridges were those of -Pont-à-Marque on the great road to Paris, and Pont-à-Tressin -on the road from Tournai to Lille; but there -were others on by-roads at Louvil, Bouvines, Gruson, -Tressin, L’Hempenpont, Pont-à-Breug and Marque, -most of them fortified and strongly held by the French. -Two smaller streams of the same character as the -Marque, but running from west to east, form also -important obstacles within this arena, namely, the -Espierres brook, which has its source close to Roubaix -and flows into the Scheldt at Espierres, and the Baisieux -brook, which rising near Hertain joins the Scheldt at -Pont-à-Chin. The ground is mostly level, with the -exception of the undulating heights that rise from the -Lys, the low ridge upon which stood the villages of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</span> -Roubaix and Lannoy, and the group of hills about -Tournai itself; but it was thickly studded with villages, -linked together by chains of innumerable cottages and -farm-houses, which were all of them enclosed by hedges. -The fields were cut up by swampy brooks and by a -ramification of wide drains, which, with other enclosures, -practically forbade the movements of troops except by -road. The roads, however, even then were many; -and the principal highways were nearly broad enough -to permit an advance in column of half-companies;<a -id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> -but all of them, as well as the waterways, were lined -with trees, making it extremely difficult to see the -movements of troops from a distance. Thus it was -and is a country unfit for cavalry, and far better adapted -in that day to the tactics of the French than of the -Allied infantry.<a -id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">[235]</a></p> - -<p>Within the parallelogram the French were somewhat -widely scattered. Osten’s division of ten thousand -men lay at Pont-à-Marque. To the left or northward -of it the bulk of Bonnaud’s division of twenty thousand -men was encamped at Sainghin, with detachments -occupying also Pont-à-Tressin and Lannoy, further -north upon the Marque. Souham’s division of twenty-eight -thousand, and Moreau’s of twenty-two thousand -men lay on the south bank of the Lys between Courtrai -and Aelbeke, a village nearly four miles south of it, -with Thierry’s brigade at Mouscron, and Compère’s -brigade at Tourcoing to preserve communication with -Bonnaud. In all, the French army numbered eighty-two -thousand men.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</span></p> - -<p>Against this force Coburg could pit sixty-two -thousand, twelve thousand of them cavalry. Of the -Allied army, fourteen thousand under the Archduke -Charles were at St. Amand; seventeen thousand under -the Duke of York at Tournai; nine thousand under -Kinsky at Marquain; four thousand Hanoverians -under General von dem Bussche at Warcoing, on the -Scheldt; and, lastly, sixteen thousand men under -Clerfaye were at Oyghem, about five miles north and -east of Courtrai on the north bank of the Lys. The -whole of these troops, excepting Clerfaye’s corps, could -easily be concentrated within twelve hours at Tournai, -from which a swift and resolute attack upon the -southern flank of Souham and Moreau, by Roubaix, -Mouveaux and Bondues, might have cut them off -from Lille, driven them into the arms of Clerfaye and -overwhelmed them. The Austrians, however, were -not to be weaned from their own methods, and accordingly -on the 16th Mack prepared an elaborate plan, -which he designed, and even declared, to be a plan of -annihilation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 16.</div> -<p> -The army was as usual to be divided. The first -column, of four thousand Hanoverians under Bussche, -was to march by Dottignies upon Mouscron, detaching -a third of its strength northward on the high road from -Tournai to Courtrai, and, having captured Mouscron, -was to open communication with the second column. -The second column, of twelve battalions and ten -squadrons, or about ten thousand men, under Field-Marshal -Otto, was to advance by Leers and Wattrelos -upon Tourcoing. The third column, of twelve battalions -and ten squadrons under the Duke of York, was to -move by Lannoy against Mouveaux, sixteen British -squadrons being held in reserve at Hertain under -General Erskine. The fourth column, of ten battalions -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</span> -and sixteen squadrons under Count Kinsky, was to be -employed partly in covering the Duke’s left flank; -but the bulk of it was to advance on Bouvines and -there force the passage of the Marque. The fifth -column, of seventeen battalions and thirty-two squadrons -under the Archduke Charles, was to march to -Pont-à-Marque, sending a small detachment northward -by Templeuve to preserve communication with the -fourth column. Having gained the passage of the -Marque the Archduke was to attack the enemy on the -western side of the river, and, after leaving detachments -to guard the bridges, to wheel northward, unite forces -with Kinsky and move up with him to join the Duke -of York at Mouveaux. Finally the sixth column under -Clerfaye was to march from Oyghem on the left bank -of the Lys, force the passage of the river above Menin -on the morning of the 17th, and manœuvre in rear of -the enemy about Mouscron and Tourcoing. Thus the -design was to attack the enemy’s front with half the -army, turn both their flanks with the remainder, and -destroy the French irremediably; but whether the -surest way of attaining this object was to disperse the -troops in isolated columns over a front of twenty miles -in a blind and strongly enclosed country—this was a -question over which Craig, at any rate, shook his head.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 17.</div> -<p> -Miscarriages of the great plan began early. Clerfaye -did not receive his orders for the movement towards -Menin until late on the morning of the 16th, and did -not march until the evening. His progress was much -delayed by the heavy sandy roads, and, consequently, -it was the afternoon of the 17th before his corps reached -Wervicq, and attempted to cross the Lys by the bridge. -The French, however, had covered it by entrenchments -which blocked his passage; and, when the pontoons -were asked for, it was found that by some mistake they -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</span> -had been left behind. Several hours were wasted -while they were coming up, and the pontoon-bridge -was consequently not laid until late at night, when a -few battalions only crossed the river, the remainder -of the force bivouacking on the left bank. The general -result was that Clerfaye’s corps, one-fourth of the -whole army, counted for nothing in the first day’s -operations.<a -id="FNanchor_236" href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a> -</p> - -<p>The march of the remaining columns was begun in a -thick fog which rendered concerted movements difficult, -and the Austrian Staff seems to have made no allowance -for the varying distances to be covered by the columns; -Kinsky having little more than seven miles to traverse -from Froidmont to Bouvines, whereas the Archduke -Charles had fully fifteen miles from St. Amand to -Pont-à-Marque. Bussche concentrated at St. Leger, a -little to west of Warcoing, in the night, advanced upon -Mouscron, and captured it, but was driven out again -with very heavy loss, and forced back to Dottignies. -For this misfortune Mack was chiefly responsible, by -directing the detachment of so large a proportion of -this column on a perfectly aimless errand towards -Courtrai. Otto, on Bussche’s left, fared better, driving -Compère’s troops from Leers, Wattrelos, and Tourcoing; -but, unfortunately, with no further result than to join -them to Thierry’s brigade behind Mouscron, to the -greater discomfiture of the unfortunate Hanoverians.</p> - -<p>To the left and south of Otto the Duke of York with -about ten thousand men<a id="FNanchor_237" href="#Footnote_237" -class="fnanchor">[237]</a> advanced by Templeuve -upon Lannoy which, after a sharp cannonade, he -attacked with the brigade of Guards in front while -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</span> -the Light Dragoons turned it by the left; but the -enemy beat so hasty a retreat that they escaped with -little loss. Leaving two Hessian battalions in Lannoy, -the Duke pushed on to Roubaix, where the enemy -stood, with greater force both of infantry and artillery, -in an entrenched position; but, in spite of a very -obstinate resistance, the Guards carried this post also -with the bayonet. Having no intelligence of the -columns on his right and left, the Duke rightly decided -to leave his advanced guard at Roubaix, and to fall -back with his main body to Lannoy; when to his dismay -he received a positive command from the Emperor -himself, who with the Headquarters Staff had accompanied -the rear of his column, to push on to the attack -of Mouveaux. This order was sheer folly, unless indeed -it were dictated by wanton and deliberate wickedness;<a -id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a> -but it was reiterated in spite of all protests, and -though the evening was falling and the troops were -weary with a long and harassing day’s work under a -burning sun, the Duke reluctantly obeyed. The French -position at Mouveaux was enclosed by palisades and -entrenchments and flanked by redoubts; but for the -third time the brigade of Guards drove the enemy -out brilliantly with the bayonet. The Seventh and -Fifteenth Light Dragoons under Abercromby’s personal -direction at once pressed forward in pursuit, and galloping -round the village, which had been kindled by the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</span> -flying French, overtook the fugitives, and cut down -three hundred of them. Three guns were captured; -and one small party of the Fifteenth actually rode into -the French camp at Bondues,<a id="FNanchor_239" href="#Footnote_239" -class="fnanchor">[239]</a> nearly two miles to west -of Mouveaux, and set the troops there running in every -direction. The main body of the Duke’s column then -bivouacked astride of the road between Mouveaux and -Roubaix.</p> - -<p>With the two columns south of the Duke, however, -affairs had gone but indifferently. Kinsky’s advance -from Froidmont was delayed by a message from the -Archduke Charles, to the effect that his force could not -possibly reach the Marque at the appointed hour of six -in the morning; but in due time Kinsky moved forward -to Bouvines, and drove the French from their entrenchments. -The enemy, however, broke down the bridge -over the Marque as they retired, and, until the advance -of the Archduke began to make itself felt, Kinsky was -unable to repair it, since the passage was commanded -by a battery of heavy guns. The Archduke’s column -had meanwhile left St. Amand at ten o’clock on the -evening of the 16th, and after driving back the French -advanced posts at Templeuve<a id="FNanchor_240" -href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> and Cappelle, a little to -east of Pont-à-Marque, finally succeeded in forcing the -passage of the river at that point. But it was not till -two o’clock in the afternoon, instead of six in the morning -of the 17th, that his army had passed to the west -bank of the Marque; and his soldiers were too much -exhausted to move further than Lesquin, a little east -of the road between Pont-à-Marque and Lille. There -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</span> -he bivouacked on the heights between Lesquin and -Peronne, a village about three miles to south-east of it; -his men having been on foot for twenty-two hours, -marched more than twenty miles over bad roads, and -fought a sharp action for the passage of the river. His -advance, however, had forced the enemy to evacuate -Sainghin, and thus enabled Kinsky to repair the bridge -at Bouvines; but none the less Kinsky, with excess of -caution, would not cross the river, and encamped for -the night on the right bank, which was for him the -wrong bank, of the Marque.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of this day the French commanders -had no information of any movements of the Allies -beyond the march of Clerfaye; and, accordingly, the -divisions of Souham and Moreau, together with Vandamme’s -brigade, had crossed to the left bank of the -Lys. The advance of the Allies from the east and the -combats about Tourcoing, however, soon undeceived -them. Pichegru being, as Soult said, fortunately -absent, Generals Souham, Moreau, Macdonald, and -Reynier met in council at Menin; and on the evening -of the 17th they decided to make new dispositions and -to set their troops at once in motion. Vandamme’s -brigade alone was left on the north bank of the Lys to -watch Clerfaye, and the remainder of the troops on that -site crossed the river to take up their appointed stations. -Malbrancq’s brigade was posted between Roncq and -Blancfour, villages lying from three to four miles due -south from Menin on the road to Lille; to the left of -Malbrancq, Macdonald’s brigade crowned the heights -of Mount Halluin; the rest of Souham’s division, -under Generals Daendels and Jardon, lay some three -miles away to the east of Macdonald, occupying a line -between Aelbeke and Belleghem, a village lying a -little to the south of Courtrai; and the gap between -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</span> -Macdonald and these troops was filled by the brigades -of Compère and Thierry about Mouscron. Thus the -formation of the French left wing was that of a double -echelon; the three divisions being arranged at the -three angles of an isosceles triangle, with the van at the -apex, Mouscron, and the rear before Menin and Courtrai. -The right wing, consisting of Bonnaud’s and Osten’s -divisions, some thirty thousand strong, was assembled -about Flers, two miles and a half to the east of Lille; -where orders arrived on the evening of the 17th from -Souham that a general attack was designed for the -morrow, in which the duty of Bonnaud’s division would -be to march upon Lannoy and Roubaix.</p> - -<p>It was not without anxiety that the reports from -the various columns of the Allies were awaited on -the evening of the 17th at the Austrian headquarters -at Templeuve. The failures of Bussche to capture -Mouscron, and of the Archduke Charles to reach the -point assigned to him, had sufficed to mar Mack’s -plans; and of Clerfaye there was no news whatever. -<span class="sni">May 17–18.</span> -Orders were therefore sent at three o’clock next morning -to the Archduke Charles to march at once with his -own and Kinsky’s corps upon Lannoy; while the Duke -of York and Otto were directed to attack Mouscron -at noon, in the hope that before that time something -would have been heard of Clerfaye. But it seems to -have occurred to none of the Austrian Staff that the -disposition of the Allied army, as prescribed by Mack, -positively invited the French to take the offensive. -On this night Bussche lay at Dottignies and Coyghem -with his weakened corps of Hanoverians. On his left -the main body of Otto’s column, seven and a half -battalions and three squadrons, was at Tourcoing, with -detachments of two battalions at Wattrelos, and of -three battalions and three squadrons at Leers, on the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</span> -line of his retreat. Thus his force was distributed in -isolated patches along a length of five miles, with -its right flank not only unprotected, but actually -threatened by a superior force of the enemy, lying -within three miles both of Tourcoing and Wattrelos.</p> - -<p>On Otto’s left the Duke of York’s column was as -dangerously dispersed. The Guards, with the Seventh -and Fifteenth Light Dragoons, under Abercromby, -were at Mouveaux; four Austrian battalions and -the Sixteenth Light Dragoons were at Roubaix; the -Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third were -on the road between Roubaix and Lille, in order to -repel any attack from the garrison of the latter place; -two Hessian battalions lay at Lannoy, and four -squadrons of Austrian hussars were engaged in patrolling. -The Duke’s right was indeed covered, but his -left was exposed to attack not only by the garrison of -Lille but by Bonnaud’s superior force about Flers; -and thus both his column and Otto’s practically -passed the night pent in on three sides by forces of -thrice their strength. To the left, or southward, -there was a gap of four miles between the Duke’s -troops and the nearest of Kinsky’s detachments, -which lay at Pont-à-Tressin and Chereng, with the -main body still further south at Bouvines; while -the Archduke Charles, with nearly one-fourth of the -whole army, lay over against him at Sainghin on the -other side of the Marque, with advanced detachments -pushed far to the south-west at Seclin. Finally, -Clerfaye, with rather more than a fourth of the entire -Allied force, was still on the western side of the Lys -at Wervicq. Certainly the dispositions lent themselves -to a plan of annihilation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">May 18.</div> -<p> -At three o’clock on the morning of the 18th, while -Coburg was signing the orders for his troops, the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</span> -French army began its march to the attack. On -the south Osten’s division was left about Flers and -Lezennes, to watch the Archduke Charles and Kinsky; -while Bonnaud, dividing his eighteen thousand men -into two columns, directed them northward, the -one by L’Hempenpont upon Lannoy, the other by -Pont-à-Breug upon Roubaix. Simultaneously Malbrancq’s -brigade marched south from Roncq upon -Mouveaux; Macdonald’s from Mount Halluin upon -the western front of Turcoing; Compère’s from -Mouscron upon the northern front; Thierry’s, also -from Mouscron, together with Daendels’s from Aelbeke, -upon Wattrelos; while Jardon’s brigade moved from -Belleghem towards Dottignies to hold the Hanoverians -in check. Excluding this last brigade, sixty -thousand men in all were thus turned upon the six -posts in which the eighteen thousand men under Otto -and the Duke of York were dispersed.</p> - -<p>Otto’s force, being nearer to the enemy, was the -first to feel the weight of the attack. General Montfrault, -who commanded at Tourcoing, perceiving the -overwhelming strength of the enemy, begged reinforcements -from the Duke of York, who sent him two -Austrian battalions from Roubaix, but with strict -orders that they should return in the event of their -arriving too late to save the town. As a matter of -fact they did arrive too late, for the garrison had -already been driven from Tourcoing; but none the -less they attached themselves, as was perhaps natural, -to Montfrault, who stood fast on the eastern skirts -of the town and held back the enemy for a time, until -a French battery unlimbering on ground to the north -of him, forced him to retire. Seeing himself threatened -by large bodies of cavalry, Montfrault formed his -troops into a large square, with four battalions and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</span> -light artillery in front, one battalion on each flank, -and the cavalry in the rear. In this order he fell -back, his heavy artillery and waggons being enclosed -in the centre of the square, and his light troops skirmishing -on all four sides. It was about half-past -eight when he began his retrograde movement; but -already Wattrelos, the first post on his rear, was in -possession of the enemy. The garrison, two Hessian -battalions, had manfully resisted an attack of six -times their number until eight o’clock, when, finding -themselves in danger of being surrounded, they retired, -and, with the help of two companies sent forward -by General Otto, withdrew successfully to Leers. -Montfrault thereupon found himself compelled to -leave the main road for a by-way, which ran between -Wattrelos and Roubaix, in order to continue his -retreat.</p> - -<p>Between six and seven o’clock, rather later than -the opening of the attack on Tourcoing and Wattrelos, -Bonnaud’s two columns came up from the south upon -Lannoy and Roubaix; and shortly afterwards Malbrancq’s -brigade from the north fell upon Mouveaux, -while a part of the French force that had captured -Tourcoing appeared also on the north of Roubaix. -The Duke of York despatched urgent messages to -recall the two Austrian battalions which he had sent -to Otto, but of course in vain; and meanwhile he -made such head as he could with his handful of troops -against overwhelming odds. The troops at Mouveaux -were disposed in two sides of a square, the left showing -a front towards the east at Mouveaux, the guns -stationed in the angle at the northern end of the -village, and the right thrown back to the hamlet of -Le Fresnoy. To the south, the British brigade of -the Line under Major-general Fox, near Croix, sought -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</span> -to bar the way against part of Bonnaud’s division -from Lille; but to defend the rest of the ground there -were but three Austrian battalions. Of these half a -battalion was stationed in Roubaix itself, and the -remainder echeloned to the right rear of Fox’s brigade -behind the sources of the Espierres brook, which ran -along the southern skirts of the village. These -Austrian battalions seem to have been the first to -give way, and one of them, by Craig’s account, did -not behave as it ought; but they were pressed hard -both in front and on their right flank, which, owing -to the absence of the two battalions sent to Otto, was -wholly uncovered. One brigade of Bonnaud’s division -therefore succeeded in forcing its way between Mouveaux -and Roubaix to Le Fresnoy; and the Duke -thus saw Abercromby and the brigade of Guards -absolutely cut off from him. Moreover, though he -knew it not, the victorious French of Thierry’s and -Daendels’s brigades were coming down from Wattrelos -upon his rear. Seldom has a General found himself, -through no fault of his own, in a more extraordinary -position. He had been assured that the Archduke -Charles would join him from the south, and he had -therefore ordered Abercromby to defend Mouveaux -to the last extremity; but not a sign of an Austrian -was to be seen whether to south or north. His first -instinct was to ride to the Guards at Mouveaux; -but this was seen to be out of the question. He then -tried to make his way to Fox’s brigade, but found -that the French were in possession of the suburbs of -Roubaix, and that he was cut off from this brigade -also. Realising then that, his Austrian battalions -being dispersed, he had not a man left to him except -two squadrons of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, he -took a small escort from them and rode to Wattrelos, -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</span> -hoping to obtain from Otto the means for extricating -the Guards. Meanwhile he sent orders to Abercromby -to retire to the heights on the east side of Roubaix.</p> - -<p>Montfrault, however, had fared ill in his attempt -to withdraw. Until he reached the ground between -Wattrelos and Roubaix, his square preserved good -order; but being attacked at that point by overpowering -numbers from the south as well as from -north and west, it was broken up, and fled in disorder -towards Leers. Meanwhile General Fox, finding -himself absolutely isolated, at length gave the order -for his brigade, which so far had held its own, to retire. -The retreat began in perfect order, and the brigade, -having successfully fought its way to the road at -Lannoy, followed it for some distance, under incessant -fire from all sides, until checked by a battery covered -by an abatis, which the French had thrown up on -the road. The first shots from this battery struck -down several men, and Fox for the moment feared -that surrender would be inevitable; but fortunately -in the ranks of the Fourteenth was a French emigrant -who knew the district well, and undertook to lead -the brigade across country. It pursued its retreat -therefore under constant fire of artillery and musketry -in front and on both flanks, and with cavalry constantly -threatening its rear; but it kept its assailants -at bay, and at one moment made so sharp a counter-attack -as to take temporary possession of some French -guns. Thus partly by good luck, partly by good -conduct, partly by the misconduct and mismanagement -of the enemy, the three battalions contrived to -reach Leers, with the loss of all their battalion-guns -excepting one, and of nine officers and five hundred -and twenty-five men out of eleven hundred and twenty. -The greatest credit was given to General Fox for the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</span> -coolness, skill, and patience with which he extricated -his brigade.</p> - -<p>Abercromby appears to have begun his retreat -from Mouveaux at about nine o’clock, but of necessity -very slowly, having with him a considerable -number of guns. The retirement was conducted in -perfect order as far as Roubaix, the Seventh and -Fifteenth Light Dragoons covering the rear with great -gallantry. At Roubaix the French, though in occupation -of the suburbs, were not in possession of the little -walled town, which was still held by a dismounted -squadron of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons. The -place consisted of a single long street, the direct continuation -of which led to Wattrelos, while, just outside -the eastern gate, the road to Lannoy turned sharply -to the right, being bordered on one side by a deep -ditch and on the other by the Espierres brook. To -defile through the town took necessarily much time, -but the guns emerged safely and the Guards also. -Next to the Guards were the Austrian Hussars, still -in the street; then in rear of them a party of the -Fifteenth; next to this party were the Sixteenth, -who were formed up in the market-place; and in -rear of all were the remainder of the Fifteenth, holding -the pursuing French in check. All was still in -order when a French gun posted on the Wattrelos -branch of the street suddenly opened fire from the -edge of the town, sending shot after shot among the -Austrian Hussars. The ordeal would have been a -severe one for any troops, and presently the Hussars -dismounted and tried to find a way out among the -houses, but in vain. The trial became unendurable -as the French pressed on and opened fire on all sides -upon the horsemen thus pent in for slaughter; and -at last the whole body remounted, galloped wildly -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</span> -down the road, swung round the corner, where the -French infantry thrust vainly at them with their -bayonets, and raced onward for three or four hundred -yards, when the foremost troopers suddenly found -the way blocked by horseless guns. The French -had brought a second gun to enfilade the road to -Lannoy, and the drivers of the British cannon had -fled. The shock of this mass of galloping horsemen -suddenly checked was appalling. In an instant the -ground was strewn with men and horses, kicking and -struggling in frantic confusion, while a number of -bât-horses dashed into the ranks of the Guards, plunging -and lashing out, with their loads hanging under -their bellies. For a short time the disorder appears -to have been beyond remedy, for a belt of wood surrounding -the town gave excellent shelter to the French -sharpshooters, who had a very easy target in the mass -of struggling men and animals. Very soon, however, -the Guards recovered themselves, and cleared a way -for the cavalry to pass on beyond the wood to open -ground. There the Light Dragoons rallied, the rear-guard -was re-formed, and the retreat, always under -heavy fire, was resumed towards Lannoy.</p> - -<p>That village, which was enclosed by a low earthen -rampart and a shallow ditch, had likewise been -attacked early by one of Bonnaud’s brigades from -Lille, but had been defended with the greatest gallantry -by two battalions of Hessians, who were apparently -still in possession when the British troops approached -it, though surrounded on the west side, and indeed -nearly on all sides, by the French.<a id="FNanchor_241" -href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">[241]</a> The British -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</span> -officers, however, could see no sign of a friendly garrison, -and Colonel Congreve was actually wheeling his -cannon round to open fire on the place, when there -galloped up to them some blue-coated horsemen, -who, being mistaken for Hessians, were allowed to -approach without molestation, and succeeded in -cutting the traces of some of the guns before they -were discovered. The Guards then perceiving their -retreat to be cut off, faced about against their pursuers, -and, leaving the high road, made their way -across country as best they could south-eastward to -Marquain. The Hessians in Lannoy, either before -or shortly after this, were forced to evacuate the -village, and, finding the road to Leers blocked by the -enemy, were likewise obliged to make their way across -country in disorder, losing out of nine hundred officers -and men some three hundred and thirty, of whom two -hundred were cut off and captured in Lannoy itself.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Duke of York, conspicuous by -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</span> -the star on his breast, had been hunted all over the -country by the enemy’s dragoons, and had escaped, -as he frankly owned, only by the speed of his horse. -On reaching Wattrelos he found it in the hands of -the French, but passing beyond it under constant fire -he came upon a gallant little party of Hessians still -holding the bridge of the Espierres brook. These by -a final attack with the bayonet gained a little respite -for him, but were presently swept away from the -bridge, and escaped only by fording the brook neck-deep. -The Duke, thinking apparently that the bridge -was lost, or not knowing of its existence, spurred -his horse into the brook; but the animal rearing up -and refusing to enter the water, he dismounted, -scrambled over on foot, and taking a horse from one -of his aide-de-camps, at last succeeded in finding -Otto. About Leers and Nechin the fragments of -Otto’s force, together with some of the Duke of York’s -men, rallied upon the few battalions that held these -places. The French did not press their advantage, -and at half-past four the action came to an end. The -loss of the Allies was about three thousand men killed, -wounded, and missing, which was relatively slight, -for, with proper management and conduct on the -part of the French, not a man of the Duke’s and Otto’s -columns would have escaped alive. The Brigade -of Guards lost one hundred and ninety-six officers -and men killed, wounded, and missing, the flank-companies -being the heaviest sufferers; while the -Seventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, -who by general admission behaved admirably, lost -fifty-two men and ninety-two horses. The total loss -of the British of all ranks was nine hundred and thirty, -besides which nineteen out of their twenty-eight guns -were captured.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</span></p> - -<p>It may be asked what the rest of the army was doing -on this day, while these two columns, together less than -one-third of the whole, were in process of annihilation. -The answer is that, for some reason, it observed a conspiracy -of inaction. Bussche sat still at Dottignies -exchanging occasional shots with Jardon’s brigade. -Clerfaye crossed the Lys near Wervicq at seven o’clock -in the morning, and turning eastward advanced between -Bousbecque and Linselles, where he was met by Vandamme’s -brigade, which numbered eight thousand men -against his sixteen thousand. He engaged the French, -overthrew their right wing, took eight guns, and then -remained stationary; until, being informed of the -approach of more French troops about Bondues, he -withdrew to the Lys, which he recrossed on the next -day, and thence retreated northward. The behaviour -of Kinsky and of the Archduke Charles was still more -extraordinary. Kinsky, on being asked by one of his -officers for orders at six o’clock in the morning, replied -that he was sick and no longer in command. The -Archduke Charles received at five in the morning the -order to move at once upon Lannoy, a distance of six -miles, so that his troops might well have come upon -the scene of action between eight and nine. He did -not march till noon, though within sound of the guns, -nor did he strike the road from Tournai to Lille until -three, when he received orders to return to Tournai. -The military renown justly earned later by the Archduke -forbids us to believe that this delay was due to -ignorance; and the fact that, though the Duke of York -had early informed the Emperor of his danger, not a -word was sent to hasten the Archduke or Kinsky, shows -clearly that their torpidity was not unexpected nor -disapproved at headquarters. Jealousy of the Duke -of York and of Mack are among the reasons assigned -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</span> -to account for the general paralysis of the Austrian -commanders; but possibly the true reason was that -Thugut was sick of the war in Belgium, and wished the -English to sicken of it also. Why he should have chosen -the slaughter of several hundred British and Austrians -as the best means of forwarding his purpose, and how -he persuaded Austrian officers to second him therein, -are matters which only an Austrian can determine. -For us it must suffice that the decisive battle of the -campaign was lost by the deliberate design of the -Imperial Generals. Before long they were to learn -that those who court defeat for dishonest ends may, -when they least desire it, find defeat thrust upon them.<a -id="FNanchor_242" href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">[242]</a> -</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="cont1794">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XI</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1794.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -The entire army of the Allies, with the exception of -Clerfaye’s corps, was gathered into camp about Tournai -<span class="sni">May 19.</span> -in the course of the 19th, the Emperor being received -in silence when he rode into the town, while the Duke -of York was loudly cheered by the inhabitants.<a -id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> The -condition of the army was very far from satisfactory. -The troops themselves, or at any rate the British, were -not seriously shaken by the rout of the previous day; -but the Emperor and the Austrian commanders were -much discouraged, and the animosity of the various -nations towards each other was dangerously embittered. -The British, above all, were furious against -the Austrians for leaving them to be overwhelmed -without so much as an attempt to assist them. “It -is impossible,” wrote Craig to the War Office, “to -bring the Austrians to act except in small corps. I -lament that we should be destined as victims of their -folly and ignorance. Do not be surprised at the word -ignorance: I am every day more and more convinced -that they have not an officer among them.” These -were hard words, but they were true and just, though -the Archduke Charles in later days redeemed himself -<span class="sni">May 20.</span> -from this reproach. However, for the moment the -commanders laid aside their differences and agreed -that the attack should be renewed, this time with united -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</span> -forces, upon Mouscron; and meanwhile Coburg dispersed -the whole army in a semicircle around Tournai; -the advanced posts running from Camphin on the south -by Baisieux, Willems, Nechin, Leers, Estaimpuis, and -St. Legers to Espierres, while the inner circle of entrenchments -ran from the Scheldt on the north by -Froyennes, Marquain, and Lamain to the suburb of St. -Martin and the citadel of Tournai itself.</p> - -<p>The French Generals, as already narrated, made no -effort to follow up their victory of the 18th, but awaited -the return of Pichegru, who, on the news of the victory, -hastened from the Sambre to turn it to account. On -the 22nd, after a consultation with his officers, Pichegru -decided to make a general attack upon Coburg’s position, -and directed that Souham with four brigades,<a -id="FNanchor_244" href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">[244]</a> -numbering from thirty to forty thousand men, should -assail it on the right or northern half of its front from -Espierres to Leers, while Bonnaud’s division should -fall upon its left about Templeuve, and Osten’s division -should make a demonstration still further to the south -<span class="sni">May 23.</span> -about Baisieux. On the following day between six -and seven o’clock in the morning the action began; -and after long and hard fighting the Allies were finally -driven from three important points, namely, Blandain -and the hill of La Croisette immediately adjacent to -it, a little to the west of Tournai, and Pont-à-Chin upon -the Scheldt, a little below the city. To abandon to -the enemy these posts, particularly Pont-à-Chin, which -lay on the direct road from Courtrai to Tournai and -commanded the navigation of the Scheldt, was impossible; -and Coburg decided that they must be -recovered at any cost. Throughout this long day’s -fighting the troops that had borne the brunt of the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</span> -work on the 18th had been held in reserve; but at -about six o’clock in the evening Fox’s brigade of the -British Line was called out to recover Pont-à-Chin -which had already been taken and retaken three or -four times. The brigade went into this action with -fewer than six hundred men, having lost half of its -numbers just four days before; but the three gallant -regiments, though unsupported, carried the village -unhesitatingly with the bayonet, pressed on to the low -heights to south of it, swept everything before them, -<span class="sni">May 22.</span> -so far as their front extended, and captured seven -cannon. The day ended, after a severe struggle of -fifteen hours, in the retreat of the French, with the -loss of some six thousand men and seven guns; the -fire, both of musketry and artillery, having been the -heaviest ever remembered by the oldest soldiers present. -Both sides, however, fought for the most part in dispersed -formation, and inflicted, comparatively speaking, -little damage upon each other. The one exception -was Fox’s brigade. “Had their order of attack,” -wrote Calvert, “been adopted by the Allies in general, -the day would probably have ended in the ruin of the -French.” But the losses of the brigade amounted -to one hundred and twenty killed, wounded, and missing; -and there are few troops that can be trusted, after -losing half their numbers on Sunday, to storm a position -held by a superior force and lose one-fifth of their -remnant on Thursday. Some indeed claim that but -for this handful of British soldiers the day would have -been lost to the Allies;<a id="FNanchor_245" href="#Footnote_245" -class="fnanchor">[245]</a> but whether this be true or -not, the 22nd of May should be a great anniversary for -the Fourteenth, Thirty-Seventh, and Fifty-Third.</p> - -<p>It was directly after this action that the course of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</span> -events in Poland began to tell upon the councils of the -<span class="sni">May 23.</span> -Imperial Headquarters at Tournai. On the 23rd, Mack, -disgusted by the failure of his elaborate plans, resigned -his post as Chief of the Staff, and, having first expressed -his opinion that the reconquest of Belgium was hopeless, -retired for the time into private life. His successor, -Waldeck, being a fellow-conspirator with Thugut, was -still more eager for the evacuation of the Netherlands; -and the Emperor was easily tempted to share their -<span class="sni">May 24.</span> -views. On the 24th a Council of War was held for -form’s sake, wherein the Emperor set forth the situation -in such a light as to gain a ready vote from his -Generals that further efforts in the Netherlands were -useless. The Duke of York alone pleaded earnestly -for a renewal of the attack upon Flanders; and, as -fate ordained it, his representations were seconded by -unexpected successes of the Allies on the Sambre and -in the Palatinate. On the 24th Marshal Möllendorf -and the Prussians surprised the French about Kaiserslautern -and drove them back with a loss of three thousand -men and twenty guns; and on the same day -Count Kaunitz gained a still more important victory -on the Sambre. The fact was that serious differences -had arisen at Paris between Carnot on the one side and -Robespierre and St. Just on the other, because Carnot -insisted on keeping the direction of the military operations -in his own hands. Robespierre, to whom the -art of war was as incomprehensible as a Chinese manuscript, -was furious with jealousy and rage. “At the -first reverse, Carnot’s head shall fall,” cried the despicable -creature, galled by the cold contempt with which -his inflexible colleague rebuffed his attempts at interference; -and to re-establish civil influence at the seat -of war, St. Just, Lebas, and five more Commissioners -set out on the 2nd of May for the army of the Sambre. -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</span> -There they introduced the rule of terror in its worst -form, and with it, of course, confusion unspeakable. -<span class="sni">May 18, 20,<br />22, 24.</span> -They fought with the Generals, they fought among -themselves; and in the midst of this chaos St. Just -took upon himself the supreme direction of the operations -whereby the Austrians were to be crushed. Four -several times he ordered the army to pass the Sambre, -wasting the lives of his troops with obstinate imbecility. -<span class="sni">May 24.</span> -Finally he gave Kaunitz the opportunity for a counter-attack, -in which, with inconsiderable loss to themselves, -the Austrians routed the French completely, killing -and wounding two thousand men, and capturing three -thousand more, besides fifty pieces of cannon.</p> - -<p>This heavy blow to the French right wing offered -a fair occasion for the Allies to renew the offensive in -Western Flanders; and the Duke of York urged this -step upon his colleagues with all his might. The -British Government too, reckoning that the troops, -promised by Prussia in return for a British subsidy, -must be nearly ready, decided to send out Lord Cornwallis -to concert operations with Möllendorf, and -directed him also to consult the Emperor and the Duke -of York on his way to the Prussian Headquarters. -But, as has already been told, King Frederick William -was occupied rather with Poland than France at the -moment; and he had also been much irritated by -certain dispositions which had been proposed for his -army by Mack in the middle of May. “I am astonished -at the fashion in which Mack thinks to make -use of my troops,” wrote the King. “Does Mack -imagine that we can live on air?” echoed Möllendorf;<a -id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246" class="fnanchor">[246]</a> -both of them being secretly delighted with so good an -excuse for remaining inactive. Then suddenly, on the -<span class="sni">May 29.</span> -29th of May, the Allied Camp at Tournai was thrown -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</span> -into consternation by the announcement that the -Emperor was about to return to Vienna. Aided by -the defeat of the 18th, Thugut had succeeded in persuading -his imperial master to abandon the Austrian -Netherlands; and even Mack, the unpopular Quartermaster-general, -had supported him by recommending -not only the evacuation of the country but the conclusion -of peace with France.</p> - -<p>The truth was that jealousy of Prussia had prevailed -over all other considerations, and that the Emperor -had decided to offer help to the Empress Catherine in -quelling the Polish insurrection. He hoped, however, -at the same time to delude Prussia into keeping thirty -thousand men upon the Rhine, and England into -furnishing a subsidy for the ostensible prosecution of -the war with France; and it was therefore imperative -upon him to conceal his intentions. He accordingly -gave out that the object of his departure was to hasten -the recruiting of his forces; and in his final letter to -Coburg, who very unwillingly retained the command, -he gave him only vague instructions to adapt his action -to the exigencies of the campaign and to save his troops -as much as possible. But this duplicity deceived no -one, and the less because Waldeck, before he had -succeeded Mack as Chief of the Staff, had openly -declared that the war in Belgium must be ended. The -Austrian troops were profoundly discouraged, and -two-thirds of the officers asked permission to retire. -They can hardly be blamed, for the succession of -murderous actions fought by the Allies against the -French on the northern frontier of France, between -the 17th of April and the 22nd of May 1794, has few -parallels in the history of war. For a month Austrians, -British, and Germans had contended almost unceasingly -against superior numbers, slaying or taking, not without -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</span> -heavy loss to themselves, French soldiers by the -ten thousand, and capturing French cannon by the -score. Yet all had been to no purpose, partly because -the leaders had deliberately chosen a foolish plan of -operations, partly because they had steadily refused -to follow up their successes, partly because on the 18th -of May they had held two-thirds of the army inactive -within sound of the guns which were overwhelming -their comrades. The bravest men will not fight upon -such terms. They will not be butchered to serve the -intrigues of politicians whose dishonesty would disgrace -a sergeant, and of potentates whose incapacity -would disqualify a corporal. In days to come Austria -<span class="sni">May 29.</span> -was to pay dearly in Italy for the 29th of May 1794.<a -id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> -</p> - -<p>Immediately before the Emperor’s departure came -news from Kaunitz that the French had again crossed -the Sambre in force; which compelled Coburg to send -him large reinforcements, and thus to weaken the right -and centre of the Allies in order to strengthen their -left. At the same time, for the sake of keeping the -Dutch in good humour, Coburg was obliged to give -the supreme command in that quarter to the Crown -Prince of Orange, to the natural disgust of Kaunitz, -who had shown much ability and achieved great successes. -The great safeguard, however, to eastward -was that St. Just insisted upon controlling the French -operations; and it need not be said that against such -an adversary even the Prince of Orange was victorious. -But far more serious were the movements of the French -on the western flank. Apprised of Coburg’s detachment -of troops to the Sambre, hoping still to further -Carnot’s projects for invasion of England, and above -all conscious of the advantage offered to French tactics -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</span> -by the enclosed country of Western Flanders, Pichegru -determined to prosecute his operations on that side. -Accordingly, leaving between thirty and forty thousand -men in positions about Mouscron and Menin to hold -Coburg in check, he marched with about the same -<span class="sni">June 1.</span> -number on Ypres. On the 1st of June about fifteen -thousand men surrounded the fortress on the west and -south, and opened their first parallel; while some -twenty thousand more under Souham took post about -Passchendaele, about six miles to the north-east, to -cover the siege from Clerfaye, who was lying at Thielt. -On that same day, by a curious irony, Lord Howe -defeated the Brest fleet, taking eight French ships and -sinking two more. This action, in which the regiments -on the fleet, and particularly the Sixty-Ninth,<a -id="FNanchor_248" href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">[248]</a> -played no inconspicuous part, closed for the present all Carnot’s -projects of an invasion.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 4.</div> -<p> -The event, however, in no way disturbed the plans -of Pichegru. On the 4th of June Clerfaye contrived -to pass two battalions into Ypres to strengthen the -garrison; but he declared himself unable, with the -fifteen thousand men that remained to him, to relieve -the place unless he were reinforced. By express command -of the Emperor, who had lingered at Brussels -on his homeward journey, Coburg sent him some -ten thousand men in two detachments, reckoning -that, after the recent victory on the Sambre, he could -safely draw a few troops from that quarter. Clerfaye, -however, continued to display the sluggishness which -had characterised his conduct from the beginning -<span class="sni">June 6.</span> -of the campaign. On the 6th, before his reinforcements -had reached him, he made a feeble advance -against Souham in four columns, and was of course -<span class="sni">June 10.</span> -unsuccessful; and on the 10th, when his force had -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</span> -been raised to over twenty thousand men, he was -assailed and defeated with loss by Souham before he -could make up his mind to act. On that same day -Coburg had designed to make a diversion in Clerfaye’s -favour, by an attack on Mouscron, upon a plan calculated -so exactly to expose the Duke of York’s column -to destruction, as on the 18th of May, that the Duke -refused to accept it until it was altered. This, however, -was of small importance, for the French, having -perfect information of the intended movements, -appeared in every direction in such force that the -enterprise was abandoned. The state of things at the -Austrian headquarters was indeed almost beyond -belief. Insensible to all ideas of duty and discipline, -the young staff-officers, described by Craig as “in -general the most contemptible of puppies,” had talked -openly of the projected movement in the coffee-houses -at noon, though the Duke of York received -no information of it until ten hours later, nor any -orders until four o’clock on the next morning. -“Mack used to keep these gentry in order,” wrote -Craig, “and, had he been here, the prison would have -been full of them next day; but indeed it would never -have happened.” Meanwhile Clerfaye remained so -incurably supine that the Duke of York more than -once entreated Coburg to entrust the relief of Ypres -<span class="sni">June 12.<br />June 13.</span> -to himself, but in vain. Roused by repeated orders -to attack, Clerfaye at last moved against Souham in -five columns, gained some advantage at first, captured -ten guns, and then as usual sat still until Souham -had gathered troops sufficient for a counter attack, -when he immediately retired to his old position at -Thielt.</p> - -<p>This sealed the fate of Ypres, the key of maritime -Flanders, the chief support of the right flank of the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</span> -Allies, the bulwark which protected the British communications -with Ostend. The Duke of York pleaded -hard for a last effort to save it, by a march of the -whole army to join Clerfaye; but without success. -“The truth is,” wrote Craig, “that the Austrian -army is incapable of further action. The men are -disheartened and the officers disgusted and disunited.” -It was finally decided that, to cover Ostend and the -Dutch frontier, Clerfaye should take up a position -between the Lys and the Scheldt about Deynse, some -ten miles to the south-west of Ghent; keeping half -of his force between Bruges and Ostend, and sending -the Eighth Light Dragoons, Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fifth, -which had formed part of his force, to Ostend. -“We are too weak by ten thousand men to hold this -defensive position,” wrote Craig; “if the French -see their chance and push Clerfaye, they will force -us to abandon this position about Tournai and will -pass the Scheldt in spite of us; and then ten to one -we shall find ourselves separated from him and beaten -in detail.... Sooner than hold the defensive position -I would concentrate the whole army, eighty thousand -men, march to the Sambre, attack them at any -risk and march back again.... You may expect to -hear from us soon in Holland.” Clearly there was -one among the despised British officers who could have -taught the Austrians a lesson.<a id="FNanchor_249" -href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> -</p> - -<p>The situation was indeed a desperate one. The -Austrians, having taken no pains to restore the fortifications -of Tournai, had thrown up an entrenched -camp for its protection on the western side. These -lines extended from the city southward along the -Scheldt to Maulde, and required so many men for -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</span> -their defence that few could be spared for active -operations. Some seven thousand Frenchmen at -Mons-en-Pévèle kept the left of the Allies in continual -alarm for the safety of Orchies, which was the -key of Maulde and of the passage of the Scheldt at -Mortagne; for if that passage were forced, the communication -between Coburg and the army of the -Sambre would be endangered. A little to the north -of Mons-en-Pévèle was the entire garrison of Lille, -and still further to the north, between Lille and Menin, -stood from twenty to thirty thousand more French -troops. Behind this screen to westward, from fifty -thousand to sixty thousand of the enemy were engaged -as the besieging and covering armies at Ypres; -and far beyond them to the north lay the right wing -of the Allies under Clerfaye, stretched in a weak -attenuated line from Ostend to the Lys, and only -maintaining communication with Tournai by the circuitous -route of the Scheldt. On the eastern flank -the French had now some seventy-five thousand men -on the Sambre, with a capable leader in Jourdan, -albeit one still hampered by the interference of St. -Just; and this was the only quarter in which recent -events had gone favourably for the Allies. Such a -situation could not last long, and the strain upon -<span class="sni">June 16.</span> -Coburg must have been cruelly severe. On the 16th, -however, there came a gleam of hope. The French -on that day again passed the Sambre, but for the -fifth time were driven back with heavy loss; and -Coburg, having summoned four battalions from that -<span class="sni">June 18.</span> -quarter, determined on the 18th to march and join -with Clerfaye in a final attempt to relieve Ypres. -The troops were already in motion, when in the evening -the news came that the French had crossed the -Sambre for the sixth time, and successfully invested -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</span> -Charleroi. Thereupon the enterprise was abandoned. -<span class="sni">June 19.</span> -On the following day Ypres surrendered, and thus -Carnot’s original plan of turning both flanks of the -Allies began, after two months of murderous fighting, -to accomplish itself.</p> - -<p>Enabled by the fall of Ypres to turn the whole of -his attention to eastward, Coburg at once proposed -that he should march with all the Austrian troops -to Charleroi, and leave the Duke of York to guard -the line of the Scheldt from Tournai to Condé. The -Duke answered that his instructions were to keep -the whole of the troops in British pay together, but -that, if ordered, he would gladly lead the whole of -them with Coburg to the Sambre. Since, however, -his force was absolutely inadequate to guard the line -of the Scheldt, he insisted that, if it were left behind, -an Austrian garrison should remain at Tournai, and -that he himself should take up a position on the eastern -bank of the Scheldt between that city and Oudenarde, -so as to ensure his retreat in case of mishap.</p> - -<p>The offer to march to the Sambre was fair, and it -is difficult to understand why Coburg did not embrace -it; for, if the battle on the Sambre were lost, it would -obviously be impossible for the Duke’s troops to remain -isolated in Flanders. Coburg did, however, -reject it, though he consented to station about five -thousand Austrians under General Kray between -Denain and Orchies, promising that, if he succeeded -in forcing back the enemy on the Sambre, he would -return without delay, but that, in the event of his -failure, he should not expect the Duke of York to -maintain his position on the Scheldt. He also took -the significant step of transferring the Austrian hospitals -and stores at Valenciennes, as well as the magazines -about Tournai, to Brussels and Antwerp; the removal -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</span> -of the stores at Brussels having begun some time -<span class="sni">June 21.</span> -before.<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250" -class="fnanchor">[250]</a> Finally, on the 21st, he marched away; -and the Duke, since the corps in British pay had now -shrunk to seven thousand men, contracted his quarters, -and took up a new position closer to Tournai.</p> - -<p>But meanwhile the news that Ostend was in danger -had, as usual, stirred Dundas to unwonted exertion -in England. He still made a fetish of the place, and -his original intention seems to have been to defend -it, without any particular reference to the Duke of -York’s operations. On the 17th of June, therefore, -he ordered Lord Moira’s force in the Isle of Wight -and the Channel Islands to sail for Ostend at once, -together with drafts of recruits and three fresh regiments -from Ireland, making in all a reinforcement -of about ten thousand men. On the 20th Moira’s -troops embarked, and on the 21st the Eighth, the -Forty-fourth, and the recruits arrived at Ostend. -The drafts, it must be remarked, arrived without arms -or military appointments of any kind; and it was -only a fog at sea that prevented a whole regiment, -the Ninetieth, from being also landed there without -either arms or clothing, Dundas having ordered it to -embark without enquiry as to these details.<a -id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">[251]</a> But -Pichegru meanwhile did not remain idle, and leaving -Ypres on the 20th marched upon Clerfaye’s position -at Deynse. The Austrian General, after a short -<span class="sni">June 23.</span> -defence of his entrenchments, retired, with the loss -of not a few men and three guns, first to Ghent, and -then beyond it, finally taking up a position on the -north side of the canal that runs from Ghent to Sluys, -<span class="sni">June 24.<br />June 25.</span> -where he was presently joined by his detachments -from Bruges. On the 25th of June there arrived at -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</span> -Ostend, after a voyage of nineteen days from Cork, -one squadron of the Fourteenth Light Dragoons and -the Thirty-third regiment, the latter under the command -of an officer whose name it still bears, but who -was then an impecunious younger son of five-and-twenty, -possessed indeed of some skill in playing the -violin, but still distinguished by no higher title than -<span class="sni">June 26.</span> -that of Colonel Arthur Wellesley. On the morrow -Moira with the last of the reinforcements<a id="FNanchor_252" -href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">[252]</a> also reached -Ostend, where he found an advanced guard of the -French within four miles of the town, a large force -of several thousand men close behind it, and the Commandant -very wisely embarking his garrison with a -view to retreat. The whole district was in a state of -panic; but Moira promptly landed the whole of his -men, and having observed the difficulties of defending -Ostend, and the military worthlessness of the place, -quietly selected his fighting ground outside it. “I -am not at all satisfied with my position,” he wrote -calmly to Dundas, “but since you appear to attach -importance to the town I will do my best to maintain -it.” “The defences are so detestable,” he added -cheerfully to Nepean, “that I shall go into the open -field if we must come to blows. If you are to lose -everything it does not signify if you are beaten into -the bargain.”<a id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" -class="fnanchor">[253]</a> It is dangerous for a General, be he -even so able as Moira, to address an English Minister -of War in this strain; for, in the event of mishap, the -words may be brought up as evidence against him in -Parliament to prove that he was reckless, careless, -neglectful, or despondent.</p> - -<p>During these days the Duke of York remained in -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</span> -painful suspense at Tournai, until the news of Clerfaye’s -defeat on the 23rd warned him to move northward -without delay. As Craig had perceived, the French -by crossing the Scheldt at Oudenarde could prevent -the Duke of York from joining Clerfaye, crush both -armies in detail, and then, passing eastward, could -annihilate Coburg. The Duke therefore called in -<span class="sni">June 24.</span> -Kray’s Austrians for the defence of Tournai, and -marched north-eastward on the right bank of the -Scheldt to Renaix, where he learned that on the same -day a French corps had summoned Oudenarde. On -<span class="sni">June 25.<br />June 27.</span> -the morrow Pichegru crossed the Lys at Deynse with -the main body of his army, and striking south from -thence encamped on the 27th at Huysse, between four -and five miles north of Oudenarde. On that same -night came a message from Coburg to the Duke of -York that on the previous day he had made his attack -on the French about Charleroi and had failed. This -<span class="sni">June 26.</span> -was the battle of Fleurus, which had been suddenly -broken off by the Austrian commander before decisive -advantage had been gained by either side; and it is -still a question whether Coburg’s action was dictated -by the requirements of Thugut’s policy or by his own -military judgment. However that may be, he retreated -in good order upon Brussels, halting on the -<span class="sni">June 27.</span> -27th in a position running from Soignies on the west -through Braine L’Alleud to Gembloux on the east. -This movement uncovered the Duke of York’s left -rear, and placed him in a most dangerous position. -He had with him barely ten thousand men, nearly -half of them cavalry, which in so close a country were -of little service; and from the church-tower at Oudenarde -he could see thirty thousand of the enemy in his -front. The French, by passing the Scheldt, could -at any time cut off his retreat to the north, in which -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</span> -case his only line of safety lay eastward towards -Grammont; and this in its turn would be closed if -Coburg should continue his retrograde movement -towards Namur, which was his first stage on the road -to Vienna.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 28.</div> -<p> -On the morning of the 28th the enemy appeared -in force before Oudenarde, showing every sign of -making the dreaded movement across the river; and -the Duke despatched orders to Moira to join Clerfaye -immediately. For two days Pichegru continued his -menaces on the Scheldt, and then suddenly on the -<span class="sni">June 30.</span> -evening of the 30th he retired, having received orders -from Paris to occupy Nieuport, Ostend, and the -island of Walcheren in force, with a view to the invasion -of England. Ostend, which, together with -Nieuport, Henry Dundas had kept under his own -orders, was evacuated in good time, while directions -to that purport were still on their way from England. -Moira’s instructions extended no further than to the -defence of Ostend, but, in the critical circumstances -of the case, he proposed to join his force to Clerfaye, -and to act with him against the French left. Clerfaye -at first welcomed the offer, but, on hearing of the -misfortune of Fleurus, declared that he could make -no engagement with the British whatever. This was -unpleasant for Moira, who had counted on the help -of the Austrians in protecting the transport of his -camp-equipage on the canal from Bruges to Ghent. -The situation was dangerous, for the French were in -force at three different places within two hours’ march -of the canal, bent upon preventing his junction with -Clerfaye. Without a moment’s hesitation Moira -sent his baggage northward to Sluys, and by a rapid -march made his way to Ghent, just in time to anticipate -a movement made by the French to intercept -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</span> -him. Thus a valuable reinforcement was secured to -the Allies; and three more perilous days were passed -without mishap, thanks rather to the Committee of -Safety at Paris than to the Austrian commanders in -the field.<a id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" -class="fnanchor">[254]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">June 30.</div> -<p> -On the evening of the 30th the Duke of York rode -over from Renaix to Braine L’Alleud to consult Coburg; -and it was then agreed that Clerfaye’s force should -change places with the Duke’s, so as to bring the -Austrian corps nearer to its own main army, and the -British contingent nearer to the sea. At the actual -conference both Coburg and the Archduke Charles -declared that, having no orders from the Emperor to -evacuate the Austrian Netherlands, they felt bound in -honour to defend them. Waldeck indeed opposed even -a withdrawal from the line of the Scheldt. All this, -<span class="sni">July 2.</span> -however, was mere trifling, for two days later Coburg -wrote that his right wing had been driven back from -Soignies, and that the Duke would do well to retire -to a position appointed him between Brussels and -Antwerp. The fall of Mons on the 1st of July having -also laid bare the Duke’s left flank and rear, he took -the hint, and while protesting against the desertion of -the country, gave his orders for retreat in the morning -by way of Grammont and thence upon Alost. Tournai, -through the courtesy of the French, was peaceably -evacuated by the Austrians, though Condé, Valenciennes, -Landrecies, and Quesnoy were held. The -line of the Scheldt was abandoned, and the Duke of -York’s troops were withdrawn from every garrison -except Nieuport. As to this last the Duke, as in duty -<span class="sni">July 2.</span> -bound, asked for Dundas’s orders, saying that, if the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</span> -Government wished to reconquer Flanders, the place -should be kept; otherwise the garrison, which included -five hundred French emigrants, should not for pity’s -sake be exposed to the risk of capture.</p> - -<p>Then followed a miserable tragedy. Dundas, apparently -before the receipt of this letter, wrote on the -3rd of July to General Diepenbrock, the Commandant -at Nieuport, promising to send transports for the -embarkation of the garrison, if necessary, but adding -that the Government attached great importance to -the retention of the place. Within two days the French -had broken ground before the miserable little port, -where the water was so shallow that ships could not -<span class="sni">July 16.</span> -come near the shore; and less than a fortnight later -the unfortunate garrison, which included a few British -troops, was compelled to surrender. Forthwith the -French massed the emigrants in the ditch of the fort -and played upon them with grape-shot until the whole -of them were destroyed. It was well known that this -would inevitably be the fate of those unhappy men if -they fell into the hands of the Republicans; and -German authors have not hesitated to censure the -Duke of York because, according to the current, though -unjust, opinion, he neglected to order the evacuation -of Nieuport while there was yet time. It were, indeed, -devoutly to be wished that the Duke had respected -Dundas less, and had withdrawn the garrison without -consulting him, though it is manifest that he would -thereby have drawn upon himself the censure of the -Government. The blame, therefore, for this shameful -business must remain with Dundas; and it was a very -great misfortune for England that he was not called to -account for it.<a id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" -class="fnanchor">[255]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</span></p> -<p>Meanwhile the Duke continued his retreat northward -down the river Dendre, reaching Lombeek Ste. -Catherine, about eight miles west of Brussels, on the -<span class="sni">July 5.</span> -4th of July. On the morrow the leaders of the coalesced -armies again met in conference at Waterloo, when it -was decided that Clerfaye’s force should pass eastwards -towards Brussels, and that the army of the Allies should -ultimately occupy a line from Antwerp, by Louvain, -Wavre, and Gembloux, to Namur, but that until the -7th, at any rate, the line in advance of Brussels, extending -from Alost by Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles -to Sombref, should be maintained. Ghent had already -been evacuated; and accordingly on the next day -Clerfaye’s force began its march to join Coburg, while -Moira moved to Alost and brought his troops for the -first time under the Duke’s personal command. But -<span class="sni">July 6.</span> -Jourdan meanwhile was not inactive. On the 6th he -attacked the whole line of the Austrians from Braine-le-Comte -to Gembloux; and, though repulsed after -hard fighting on the east, where a concentrated attack -might have given him possession of the Austrian line -of communications, he succeeded in pushing Coburg’s -right wing back from Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to -Waterloo. Thereupon Coburg warned the Duke of -York that he must retire eastward and cancel the agreement -made on the 5th. The Duke answered with cold -sarcasm that it was a new thing for the Austrians to -retire before thirty thousand Frenchmen, and appealed -to the Archduke Charles to keep Coburg to his engagements; -but received from him only a sad reply that -orders must be obeyed. On the 7th and 8th Jourdan -renewed his attacks, directing the best of his strength -against the Austrian left, which he forced back to the -battlefield of Ramillies. He then immediately invested -Namur; upon which Coburg, fearing to be cut off from -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</span> -<span class="sni">July 7.</span> -the Meuse, ordered the whole of his army to retire upon -Tirlemont.</p> - -<p>The Duke meanwhile, since his left was uncovered -by the retreat of the Austrians, withdrew, at Coburg’s -request, very slowly northward to Assche, and thence -struck north-eastward to the Dyle, which he crossed -at Malines, fixing his headquarters at Contich, some -eight miles north of that city. A new line of defence -was then taken up, which sufficiently showed -the divided counsels of the Allies. On the right the -<span class="sni">July.</span> -British contingent, now numbering some thirty thousand -men, was posted on the Dyle from Antwerp to -Malines. On its left the Prince of Orange with the -Dutch troops and from two to three thousand Austrians -covered the line from Malines to Louvain; and from -Louvain the rest of the Austrian army, between forty-five -and fifty thousand men, was extended in a south-easterly -direction by Tirlemont, Landen, and Waremme -to the Meuse, with a detachment of four thousand -more on the eastern bank of that river, and between it -and the Ourthe. Thus the British and Dutch, who -desired to defend Holland, could be deserted at any -moment which the Emperor should select for the pursuit -of his own particular object, namely, to carry his army -away to share the plunder of Poland. Craig, for his -part, felt no doubt whatever that the British and -Dutch would very soon be left to their own resources.<a -id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256" class="fnanchor">[256]</a></p> - -<p>The reader may have felt surprised that, with a force -of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men, the -French should not have pressed the Allies harder, and -made an end of them long before. The fact was that -the Committee of Public Safety had interfered with the -Generals on the 4th of July, by an order that the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</span> -recapture of Valenciennes, Condé, Landrecies, and -Quesnoy should take precedence of any further operations; -and accordingly the army in Belgium had been -weakened to provide for this service. This was the -work of Robespierre, who at the time was inclined -towards peace; and indeed peace appears to have been -a common topic of conversation between the French -and Austrian outposts from the beginning of July.<a -id="FNanchor_257" href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">[257]</a> -Thirty thousand French soldiers were accordingly withdrawn -to Valenciennes, as many more were wasted in -occupying ports of embarkation for England, and the -remainder were ordered to push the Allies completely -out of Belgium, and then to occupy a cordon from -Antwerp to Namur. Pichegru, therefore, took command -<span class="sni">July 12.</span> -in person of the left wing, and on the 12th moved -with eighteen thousand men against Malines, while -Jourdan on the right simultaneously advanced against -Louvain, Jodoigne, and Huy on the Meuse. On the -evening of the 12th Pichegru drove the Duke of York’s -advanced posts into Malines, where they were promptly -reinforced; but the fortifications of the town were in -<span class="sni">July 15.</span> -ruins, and, on renewing the attack on the 15th, the -French captured the place with little difficulty. The -troops charged with the defence were Hessians and -Dutch; and it appears certain that the conduct of one -or the other of them was not irreproachable, though -there are indications also that the Duke himself was -partly responsible for the mishap.</p> - -<p>The Duke then threw his left back along the line -of the Nethe from Lierre to Duffel; but meanwhile -Jourdan had on the same day mastered Louvain, and -<span class="sni">July 15.</span> -in the course of the two following days Jodoigne and -Namur also. The Dutch troops about Louvain, upon -the loss of that town, fell back northward across the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</span> -Demer, while the Austrians retired eastward; and thus -the line of the Allies was fairly broken owing to their -own divergent plans. The Duke of York had already -in these days concerted operations with the Prince of -<span class="sni">July 18.</span> -Orange for the recapture of Malines on the 18th,<a -id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> -when he received a letter from Coburg saying that, owing to -the loss of that place and of Louvain, he had ordered -the troops formerly stationed at the latter city to fall -back to Diest, and was himself withdrawing from -Tirlemont to Landen. The Duke begged him before -doing so to essay a general forward movement, but -received only a vague and unsatisfactory reply; and -<span class="sni">July 20.</span> -on the morning of the 20th a staff-officer, while inspecting -the left of the Dutch position, discovered that the -Austrians at Diest were already retreating south-eastward -on Hasselt, Coburg having given them orders to -this effect without saying a word of his intentions to the -<span class="sni">July 22.</span> -Duke of York. With his left flank thus again laid bare, -the Duke was obliged to evacuate Antwerp and retire -due north from it across the Dutch frontier to Rozendahl. -<span class="sni">July 24.</span> -Coburg likewise fell back to eastward, crossed the Meuse -at Maastricht, and took up a position about seven miles -south and east of that fortress at Fouron le Comte. -Thus the British and Austrians were finally parted.</p> - -<p>It cannot be said that either of them was sorry to -take leave of the other. Even in 1793 their relations -had not been too cordial, for the Austrians, in their -jealousy, would never allow foreign troops to pass -through their fortified towns, even during a forced -march; and thus the British were frequently condemned -to make long and fatiguing detours.<a id="FNanchor_259" -href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">[259]</a> But the -betrayal of the Duke of York’s column on the 18th of -May, and the subsequent operations, deliberately -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</span> -contrived to hasten the evacuation of the Netherlands, -converted the dislike of the British for the Austrians -into the bitterest hatred and contempt. At headquarters, -again, the presence of a soldier such as Craig, -with ideas far more enlightened than those of the -Austrians, and with some means of insisting upon them -through the medium of the Duke of York, can hardly -have contributed to harmony. It may be added that -the Austrian troops were as severe in their criticism of -their chiefs, and particularly of Waldeck, as were any of -the British, proclaiming loudly that the abandonment -of Belgium was due to French gold.<a id="FNanchor_260" -href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">[260]</a> In fact the -Austrian army, between heavy losses and deep distrust -of its leaders, was utterly demoralised; nor is it surprising -that this should have been so. It is indeed more -than probable that, if Coburg had wished to make a -stand after the action of Fleurus, his men would not -have supported him. Of course Coburg had to bear -the responsibility for all this, and to digest as best he -might some very bitter reproaches from the Duke of -York; yet it seems that in truth he was the person -the least to blame. Though as a commander in the -field he was slow, unenterprising, enamoured of vicious -methods, and possessed of no military quality except -that of looking carefully to the wants of his troops, yet -he did not lack insight, sound sense, imperturbable -calm, and the instinct of honesty and straightforwardness. -His name is forgotten in England, though his -portrait is still occasionally to be found in English -print-shops, showing that at one time he had gained a -certain fame, which was destined speedily to perish. It -can only be said of him that he was beloved by his men, -that he bore the sins of others without complaining, and -that he was a loyal servant to an unfaithful master.</p> - -<hr class="page x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</span></p> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="end1794">VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XII</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">1794.</div> -<p class="noindent"> -While the Allies in the Netherlands were thus giving -way on all sides during the months of June and July, -the British Government naturally bethought itself of -the sixty thousand men which it had agreed to hire -from Prussia for operations in that quarter. The -Ministers had reckoned that these troops would be -ready by the end of May; and accordingly, as has -been told, Lord Cornwallis was sent from England to -arrange with Marshal Möllendorf as to the part to be -taken by the Prussians in the campaign. Visiting the -Duke of York on the way, Cornwallis agreed with him -that the protection of West Flanders, and, if possible, -the siege of Lille, were the matters of most urgent -importance; and he formulated his request to Möllendorf -<span class="sni">June 20.</span> -accordingly. He soon discovered that he had -been sent upon a fool’s errand. Möllendorf, instead -of sixty thousand, had but forty thousand men, -deficient in stores and supplies and absolutely wanting -in transport, which he declared himself unable -to furnish without ready money from England. The -real difficulty was that the Allies were all at variance -as to the use that should be made of the Prussian -troops. England wanted them to aid in recovering -West Flanders. Holland would at first have preferred -them to remain upon the Rhine, but presently yielded -to the demands of England. The Emperor of Austria -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</span> -not only raised strong objections to the march of -Prussian troops to Belgium, but claimed thirty thousand -of the sixty thousand men for the protection of the -Empire, declaring that their removal from the Rhine -would expose all Germany to the ravages of the French. -Between these conflicting claims Möllendorf found -little difficulty in sitting still and doing nothing, which -was precisely what the advisers of King Frederick -William most desired. By the 18th of June Cornwallis -had made up his mind that scanty help was to be expected -from Prussia, at any rate during the present -campaign; and neither he nor Lord Malmesbury was -slow to express very decided opinions as to the ill-faith -of the Prussian Court.<a -id="FNanchor_261" href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">[261]</a> -</p> - -<p>This was the situation when the failure of the -Austrian attack at Fleurus determined the Emperor -to evacuate the Low Countries. That potentate -thereupon reversed his language as to the Prussian -contingent, and urged that Möllendorf should advance -into Belgium; nor did he hesitate, on the 15th of -July, to order Coburg still to defend the Austrian -Netherlands, though he said nothing about sending -reinforcements to enable him to do so. This despicable -lying and trickery had, of course, but one object, -that of drawing more money from England under -false pretences. The English Government, however, -though it had learned that no reliance was to be placed -on Thugut’s statements or promises, decided in the -<span class="sni">July 19.</span> -middle of July to send Lord Spencer and Thomas -Grenville to Vienna, to urge once more the renewal -of the offensive in Belgium. So far, therefore, the -Emperor seemed likely to gain his point; and since -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</span> -the King of Prussia had shown remarkable weakness -in dealing with the insurrection in Poland, Francis had -every reason to hope that decisive action in that -country would be delayed, until his own and the -Russian armies could appear there in sufficient force -to dictate the final settlement according to their own -desires. The Prussian Ministers, on the other hand, -when they learned of the despatch of Spencer and -Grenville to Vienna, became nervous lest England -should transfer the promised subsidy from her to -Austria; and they began to turn their thoughts to -the negotiations of a separate peace with France.<a -id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262" class="fnanchor">[262]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile, through the energy of Carnot, reinforcements -had been found for the French army of -<span class="sni">July 2–13.</span> -the Rhine, which, after a fortnight’s hard fighting -on the heights about Kaiserslautern, forced Möllendorf -to retire under the cannon of Mainz with a loss of -two thousand men and sixteen guns. The Austrian -troops on the Rhine thereupon withdrew from the -left bank of the river; and the miscarriage of a plan, -concerted a fortnight later for recovery of the lost -ground, set the Generals of the two nations quarrelling -<span class="sni">July 28.</span> -more bitterly than ever. The end of July brought -yet another stroke of good luck to France in the overthrow -of Robespierre and the execution of himself, St. -Just, and other of his principal colleagues. Robespierre’s -latest achievement as a military administrator -had been to decree that no quarter should be shown -to British or Hanoverians in the field, an order which -was disobeyed by the French troops and laughed at -by the British. The supreme imbecility, apart from -all other faults, of his rule had brought France to the -last stage of exhaustion; and, indeed, if the Allies -had succeeded in keeping the French armies out of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</span> -Belgium, the latter must have perished of starvation.<a -id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">[263]</a> -<span class="sni">July.</span> -Robespierre’s death marked the close of the Terror -and the beginning of a return to common sense in -the matter of administration. The man, however, had -lived long enough to waste the energies of the armies -of the North in the recovery of the four captured -fortresses in the frontier, when they should have -been scattering the Allies to the four winds; and -thus it came about that the Duke of York enjoyed -a few weeks’ respite for the formation of new plans.</p> - -<p>It was fortunate for him that it was so, for he now -found himself in serious trouble with his army. This -was the result of the insane system, allowed by Dundas, -of raising men for rank. The regiments despatched -to Holland contained only a very few old soldiers -mixed with great numbers of recruits, who were utterly -without training and discipline. “Many of them -do not know one end of a fire-lock from the other,” -wrote Craig, “and will never know it.” Six of the -battalions had been deprived of their flank-companies, -that is to say, of their best men, to make up General -Grey’s force in the West Indies; and no sooner did -the new levies find themselves released from the -crimping-house and the gaol for active service, than -they fell to plundering in all directions. The Duke -was obliged to issue a very severe order on the 27th -of July<a id="FNanchor_264" href="#Footnote_264" -class="fnanchor">[264]</a> to call the army to its senses; but, with -such officers as had been obtained under Dundas’s -scheme, it was impossible to expect the slightest -obedience. In the first place the army was lamentably -deficient in Brigadiers and Generals of division. -Moira had only accepted the command of his force -on the condition that he should not serve in Flanders; -and though, in view of the perilous condition of the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</span> -Allies when he landed, he had waived his objections -for the time, yet there was another obstacle not so -easily to be overcome. Albeit enjoying an independent -command of eight thousand men, Moira was -almost the junior Major-general of the army. Major-general -Crosbie, who was with him, also held a more -important command than his seniors, such as Ralph -Abercromby and David Dundas, the latter of whom -joined the Duke of York at the end of July. Both -Moira and Crosbie, therefore, went home, from delicacy -towards the feelings of their superiors; and the loss -of Moira was bitterly regretted as that of a very able -officer who was idolised by his men.</p> - -<p>The British troops now consisted of four brigades -of cavalry and seven of infantry,<a id="FNanchor_265" -href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">[265]</a> making altogether -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</span> -some twenty-five thousand men; but for all these -there were, after the departure of Moira and Crosbie, -only four Generals—David Dundas, Stewart, Abercromby, -and Fox, the last of whom was fully employed -as Quartermaster-general. This was the more serious -because the commanders of the new battalions, who -had been juggled into seniority by the Government -and the army-brokers, were not fit to command a -company, much less a brigade. Some of them were -boys of twenty-one who knew nothing of their simplest -duties. Though they went cheerfully into action, -they looked upon the whole campaign as an elaborate -picnic, for which they did not fail to provide themselves -with abundance of comforts; and thus the -baggage-columns were filled with private waggons -under the charge of insubordinate drivers. The -junior officers, who were so scarce that few regiments -had as many subalterns as companies, appear in many -cases to have been worse than the senior, as is always -to be expected when commissions are to be obtained -for the asking; nor with bad examples before them -were they likely to improve. Thrust into the Army -to satisfy the claims of dependents, constituents, -importunate creditors, and discarded concubines, -many of these young men were at once a disgrace -and an encumbrance to the force. Hard drinking, -which was the fashion then in all classes from highest -to lowest, was, of course, sedulously cultivated by -these aspirants to the rank of gentleman; and it was -no uncommon thing for regiments to start on the -march under charge of the Adjutant and Sergeant-major -only, while the officers stayed behind, to come -galloping up several hours later, full of wine, careless -where they rode, careless of the confusion into which -they threw the columns, careless of everything but -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</span> -the place appointed for the end of the march, if by -chance they were sober enough to have remembered -it. These evils, too, were extremely difficult to check, -for in 1794, as in 1744, political interest rather than -meritorious service was the road to promotion. While -the shameful traffic of the army-brokers and the -raising of endless new regiments continued, every -officer who could command money or interest was -sure of obtaining advancement at home without the -knowledge of his chief in the field, and had, therefore, -not only no encouragement to do his duty, but an -actual reason for avoiding it. Thus the men were -very imperfectly disciplined; there were no efficient -company-officers to look after them; no efficient -Colonels to look after the company-officers; no -Generals to look after the Colonels. Craig sought a -remedy in begging for more Generals. “We cannot -get on,” he wrote, on the 5th of August, “without a -good supply and a supply of good. The evil to the -discipline of the army increases every day, and is -likely to become very serious.”<a id="FNanchor_267" -href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">[267]</a> -</p> - -<p>But the Duke’s difficulties did not end with the -defects of his officers and men. It had lately become -the practice in time of peace to issue to each regiment -the materials for its clothing, to be made up by the -regiment itself, a system which had probably been -designed to obtain for the Colonels the largest possible -profit. Nor must the Colonels be blamed herein, -for they were expected to make that profit, which in -those days was practically the only emolument open -to general officers. It was, of course, impossible for -troops in the field to spend three or four months in -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</span> -making up their clothes; and the result was that; -the Duke’s army was left almost naked. Moreover, -in the hurry of raising innumerable new corps, the -responsibility for such details as clothing, accounts, -musters, and so forth had been overlooked; the new -officers knew nothing of the extremely complex methods -of military finance;<a id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" -class="fnanchor">[268]</a> and the sudden vast increase -of business thrown upon agents and officials was -greater than they could immediately bear. Finally, -quite apart from these failings in respect of the raiment -of entire battalions, no effort whatever was made to -clothe the recruits who were sent out to fill up the -gaps in the various corps. These unfortunate men, on -being drafted into the depots in England, received -what was called slop-clothing, which signified a linen -jacket and trousers; and it is an actual fact that -many of them were sent on active service in this -dress, without waistcoat, drawers, or stockings. The -result was that the Duke of York’s corps was in -a worse state in respect of clothing than had been -hitherto recorded of any British army.<a -id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269" class="fnanchor">[269]</a> -</p> - -<p>Another great difficulty, of which Craig had complained -again and again, was the want of drivers for -the artillery. Lord Moira had brought with him guns -but no drivers; and there were but two captains (not -enough, as Craig said, to do a fortieth part of the -work) at disposal for the superintendence of a huge -mass of horses. Thus a new train of artillery, which -had been sent out to replace the cannon lost at Tourcoing, -became a positive embarrassment. The Commissariat -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</span> -also, as used so often to happen with British -armies, was in a very bad state. The men of the -new corps of Royal Waggoners had been recruited in -London, and were the worst refuse of the population. -They were known, in fact, as the “Newgate Blues.” -“A greater set of scoundrels never disgraced an army,” -wrote Craig, in his usual pithy style. “I believe it -to be true that half of them, if not taken from the -hulks, have at times visited them.... They have -committed every species of villainy, and treat their -horses badly.” But the very worst department of all -was that of the hospitals, wherein the abuses were so -terrible that men hardly liked to speak of them. In -December 1793 the inhabitants of one of the English -ports had been stupefied by the arrival of one -hundred invalid soldiers from Ostend in indescribable -distress. They had been on board ship for a week -in the bitter wintry weather, without so much as -straw to lie upon. Some of them were dead; others -died on being carried ashore. No provision had been -made for their comfort on landing, and, but for the -compassion of the gentry who subscribed money for -their relief, the poor fellows might well have perished.<a -id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270" class="fnanchor">[270]</a> -Nothing was done to amend this state of things. -Dundas’s idea of putting an army in the field was -to land raw men on a foreign shore, and to expect -discipline, arms, ammunition, clothing, victuals, -medical stores, and medical treatment to descend on -them from Heaven. Some kind of a medical staff -was improvised out of drunken apothecaries, broken-down -practitioners, and rogues of every description, -who were provided under some cheap contract; the -charges of respectable members of the medical profession -being deemed exorbitant. “The dreadful -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</span> -mismanagement of the hospital is beyond description,” -wrote Craig, “and the remedy beyond my -power. Every branch and every fibre of every branch -draws a contrary way. I really doubt if there will -be any way to get any good from this department -but by tying them all together and sending them to -you to be changed for a new set.”<a -id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a> -</p> - -<p>Such was the composition of the force with which -the Duke of York now undertook, in concert with -the Dutch, to protect Holland, or, in other words, -to conduct that most delicate and trying of operations—manœuvring -with inferior numbers over a -wide front to hold a superior force in check. The -first difficulty arose with the Dutch, for the Prince -of Orange, apparently enamoured of the Austrian -methods, was eager to scatter the troops over a multitude -of different points; but this the Duke, with -Craig at his back, steadily refused to do. The Prince -then urged that the Dutch fortresses should be garrisoned -by British troops; but the said fortresses -were all in bad condition, and were repairing only -with that incredible slowness which was peculiar to -the Dutch Government. The Duke, therefore, refused -this also; feeling tolerably sure that, if he consented, -his battalions would be sacrificed piecemeal -for the defence of Holland, while the Dutch looked -on without raising a man to help them. The two -gates of Holland on the south were Bergen-op-Zoom -and Breda, and on the east Grave and Nimeguen, -with the fortress of Bois-le-Duc midway between -Breda and Nimeguen. The two eastern gates were -safe so long as the Austrians retained Maastricht and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</span> -their position on the Meuse; but the Austrians were -not to be trusted. Accordingly, the Duke resolved -to garrison Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, and, if possible, -Bois-le-Duc with Dutch troops; himself taking up -a position on the north bank of the river Aa, with -his right resting on Bois-le-Duc and his left on the -great morass called the Peel. From this central point -he judged that he could move to the help of any of -the Dutch fortresses to southward, cover the province -of Gelderland, and keep Grave and Nimeguen -within reach in case of mishap on that side.</p> - -<p>He was about to march thither from Rozendahl when -the news came that Moreau, who was advancing northward -along the coast after the capture of Nieuport, had -driven back the Dutch posts and had besieged Sluys. -The Prince of Orange thereupon besought the Duke -to stand fast, producing a letter from Coburg which -contained not only an assurance of his ability to hold -the passage of the Meuse, but even a hint of possible -offensive movements. After some hesitation the Duke -consented to a compromise by moving to Osterhout, a -little to the north-east of Breda, so as to give some -countenance both to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. He -<span class="sni">July 31.</span> -marched, accordingly, on the 31st of July, unmolested -by the enemy, who were in force around Antwerp; and -the Prince of Orange then came to the wise but rather -belated decision to evacuate all the Dutch fortresses -to the south of the Scheldt. The Duke, therefore, -<span class="sni">Aug. 8.</span> -lent him a strong detachment of his men to hold the -communications between Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom, -so as to release Dutch troops to cover the retreat of -these garrisons and to relieve Sluys.<a -id="FNanchor_272" href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">[272]</a> -</p> - -<p>Just at this moment Henry Dundas, hearing of -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</span> -Moreau’s advance, and having by chance a few troops -unemployed, decided to send a naval armament to -Flushing, together with five battalions under Lord -Mulgrave, for the defence of the Dutch territories in -that quarter. As was his rule in such cases, Dundas -kept Mulgrave under his own immediate command, -but withal instructed him not to go against any order -of the Duke of York,—an arrangement admirably -calculated to paralyse the force and to raise discord -between the commanders. Mulgrave, who had started -<span class="sni">Aug. 17.</span> -apart from his troops, reached Flushing on the 17th, -and finding that none of them had arrived, occupied -himself in examining the situation. He was soon -satisfied that the French had no further designs for -the campaign than to take Sluys and Flushing, as -ports from which to ship the harvest of the Austrian -Netherlands to France. Meanwhile, the Dutch no -sooner heard of his coming than they suspended their -operations for the relief of Sluys, in the hope that -Mulgrave would do the work for them; and the French, -having also full intelligence of everything, increased -their force at Sluys to twenty-five thousand men, -which made the relief practically impossible. Dundas, -meanwhile, wrote with the greatest confidence of the -success of that operation, which his own interference -had condemned to failure; announcing also that Mulgrave’s -force, which had not yet even arrived at Flushing, -would be required elsewhere in a month. At -length the five battalions sailed into Flushing on the -<span class="sni">Aug. 26.</span> -26th, nominally thirty-two hundred strong, and actually -with the following qualifications for immediate service -in the field. The Thirty-first<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273" -class="fnanchor">[273]</a> was composed chiefly -of recruits, of whom two hundred and forty were -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</span> -unarmed. The Seventy-ninth had but one officer to each -company, and but eight rounds of ball-ammunition -a man. The Eighty-fourth had twenty rounds a man, -but, the regiment having never ceased marching from -quarter to quarter ever since it had been raised, the -men were wholly untrained. The Eighty-fifth had -thirty rounds a man, but half of the soldiers had never -had arms in their hands. The Thirty-fourth alone -appears to have been fit and ready for work. Fortunately -there was no work for them to do, for Sluys -surrendered on the very day of their arrival; and -Mulgrave, after landing them at Flushing to learn the -elements of their business, suggested that at least two -of the battalions had better remain there and be made -into soldiers, instead of sailing to certain annihilation -in the West Indies. To this Dundas agreed, for he -purposed to take from the Duke of York ten of Moira’s -battalions, and was well content to leave him inferior -troops in their place. Meanwhile, as a specimen of -utter imbecility, this despatch of Mulgrave’s detachment -has few equals even in English military annals. -The mere promise of help was sufficient to relax the -exertions of the Dutch. The troops were embarked -so late as to miss the object of the expedition, and, -even if they had been embarked in time, they were of -quality too poor to have accomplished it. In brief, -the whole enterprise bears the unmistakable mark of -Henry Dundas.<a id="FNanchor_274" href="#Footnote_274" -class="fnanchor">[274]</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile Spencer and Grenville had throughout -August pursued their negotiations at Vienna with very -indifferent success. One point Thugut was ready to -concede, namely, the recall of Coburg, who indeed -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</span> -resigned on the 9th of August, being worn down in body -and mind, and thoroughly disgusted with his command. -But Thugut absolutely refused to order troops from -the Rhine to Belgium, and demanded the guarantee -of a loan of three millions for the present campaign -besides a new subsidy for the next. It was necessary -to refer these pretensions to the Cabinet in London; -and long before the reference had even been made, the -<span class="sni">Aug. 12, 14.</span> -Austrian Council of War ordered Clerfaye, who was -to succeed Coburg, to devote all his efforts to the -defence not of Belgium but of Luxemburg, Mainz, and -Mannheim. But though the Allies were idle, the -French were not; and, thanks in part to a threat of the -Committee of Public Safety to massacre the garrisons -unless the fortresses were delivered, they had recovered -both Quesnoy and Landrecies by the 15th of August. -The fall of Sluys, and the recall of the troops detached -to Walcheren also enabled Pichegru to begin a forward -<span class="sni">Aug. 27.</span> -movement, and on the 27th he advanced from Antwerp -north-eastward to Hoogstraeten, driving in all the -Dutch posts, and seeming to threaten the turning of -the Duke of York’s left. The Duke, thereupon, on -<span class="sni">Aug. 30.</span> -the advice of a Council of War, retired on the 30th to -his chosen position between Bois-le-Duc and the Peel, -while Pichegru sent a strong detachment eastward to -occupy Einhoven in force.<a id="FNanchor_275" -href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">[275]</a> -</p> - -<p>Meanwhile a message had reached the Duke of York -from Clerfaye, suggesting a general forward movement -to save the beleaguered cities of Valenciennes and -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</span> -Condé; and on the 1st of September a conference was -<span class="sni">Sept. 1.</span> -held between the Allied commanders at Bois-le-Duc -to consider the proposal. It was not yet known to -them, apparently, that Valenciennes had already -surrendered to the French on the 29th of August, and -that Condé was at the last gasp; and there was some -talk among them of an advance of the British to recapture -Antwerp, while the Austrians on the Meuse -protected their rear. The news that both fortresses -had fallen, and that the French forces thus liberated -for the field were hastening to the front, naturally -deranged this plan; and though the Duke was anxious -still to make the attempt, Craig perceived little hope -of success, chiefly because he could not trust the -Austrians to give hearty co-operation. In truth, the -Allies had let slip the favourable moment through -their own dissensions, and the opportunity was not -<span class="sni">Sept. 4.</span> -to recur again. On the 4th of September Pichegru -marched northward from Hoogstraeten to Meerle, as -if to threaten Breda, but on the 10th turned eastward, -after leaving a detachment before that place, and on -the 12th reached Oosterwyk. On the following day -<span class="sni">Sept. 13.</span> -he attacked the Duke’s advanced posts at Bokstel, -and on the 14th captured them, making two battalions -of Darmstadt-Hessians prisoners. This was an unpleasant -mishap, for these troops had hitherto always -behaved admirably; but, though they complained of -the Duke for not supporting them, the Duke in his -secret report declared them to have been panic-stricken. -Alive, however, to the importance of regaining this -post and the line of the Dommel, the Duke ordered -<span class="sni">Sept. 15.</span> -Abercromby forward next day with ten battalions and -as many squadrons of British, to recover the lost -ground. The movement was very nearly disastrous, -for Abercromby only just missed falling into the midst -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</span> -of Pichegru’s main army, which was on march to the -eastward; but quickly apprehending the situation, he -withdrew his troops in excellent order with the loss -of about ninety men, two-thirds of them prisoners. -This skirmish is notable both because it brought Colonel -Arthur Wellesley of the Thirty-third under fire for the -first time, and because it led to the trial of four officers, -three of them belonging to a most distinguished regiment, -for cowardice. This was a healthy sign, for it -showed that the older officers were bent on ridding -the Army at the earliest possible moment of the worthless -comrades imposed on them by Dundas.<a id="FNanchor_276" -href="#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> -</p> - -<p>On the same day the Duke received information that -this demonstration against Bokstel was but a feint, the -main force of the enemy, reported to be eighty thousand -strong, being in motion to turn his left. His intelligence -seems to have been extremely vague and imperfect -at this time; but being dissatisfied with his position, -to which, owing to dry weather, neither the Peel nor -the Aa afforded adequate protection, he decided that -the retention of it was not worth the risk of being cut -off from his retreat to the Maas. He therefore retired -<span class="sni">Sept. 16.</span> -on the next day to that river, crossed it at Grave and -took up a position on the north bank, with his headquarters -at Wychen, a few miles to the north of Grave. -It then remained for him to make his dispositions to -defend the line of the river, the unprotected portion of -which extended for some seventy-five miles from Fort -Loevestein, at the western end of the Bommeler Waert<a -id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">[277]</a> -on to the west, to Venloo on the east. Any effective -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</span> -defence with the forces at his disposal was impossible, -and the Duke therefore arranged that all troops in -British pay should be sent to him from West Flanders, -and that the Dutch, who were sitting inactive behind -their fortresses, should send men to repair and to defend -Crevecoeur and Bommel.</p> - -<p>The Duke’s next effort was to concert offensive -operations with Clerfaye, who lay on his left; and he -had the greater hopes of a favourable issue, since the -new Secretary at War, William Windham, was already -on his way to that officer on a mission from London. -But the Austrian Commander also had been unfortunate. -<span class="sni">Sept. 17–18.</span> -On the 17th and 18th General Latour’s corps -of seven thousand men, which guarded his left on the -Ourthe, was driven back by a greatly superior force of -Jourdan’s right wing under General Schérer; whereupon -Clerfaye, who had watched the whole process -without moving one soldier of his forty thousand to -save Latour, immediately retired behind the Roer, -leaving eight thousand men as a garrison for Maastricht. -The Austrian General therefore rejected all idea of the -offensive as impossible, but consented to maintain -communication with the Duke if he would extend his -left to Venloo, which, like all the Dutch fortresses, was -in miserable repair and without a sufficient garrison. -The Duke agreed, and so the matter was arranged; -Clerfaye, however, giving the Duke clearly to understand -that if his right were turned he should cross the -Rhine.<a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278" -class="fnanchor">[278]</a> -</p> - -<p>The Duke thereupon made his plans for protecting -a line of from seventy-five to ninety-five miles of river -with a force of thirty thousand soldiers of all ranks, -the sick list having by this time claimed close upon -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</span> -seven thousand men of his army. His right from the -Bommeler Waert to Grave was held by about five -thousand Hessians, their main body being stationed -at Alfen, a little to the east of the island; Grave was -held by two Dutch battalions; east of Grave four -brigades of infantry and two of cavalry lay about -Mook; Abercromby, with two more brigades of infantry -and one of cavalry, stood higher up the river at -Gennep; and six thousand Hanoverians under Walmoden -prolonged the line from Gennep to Venloo, with -their main body at Well. Craig, however, did not -deceive himself as to the inevitable issue, being firmly -convinced that there was an understanding between -the Austrians and French; wherein he appears to have -been correct.<a id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" -class="fnanchor">[279]</a> “We shall have to fall back behind -the Waal,” he wrote; “depend on it, this will happen -in a few days ... and in a fortnight the Austrians -will be behind the Rhine.” Jourdan followed up the -Austrians, leaving Kléber to invest Maastricht; whereupon -Clerfaye, who had sixty thousand men behind -the Roer, forthwith called loudly on the Duke of York -to relieve that fortress. Grenville at the Foreign Office, -anticipating something of the kind, had already despatched -urgent representations to Vienna requiring -the concurrence of the Austrians in this operation, but -of course to no purpose. The Duke, by advice of -Abercromby and Walmoden, sent Craig to stir up -Clerfaye, and, that the Austrians might have no pretext -for complaint, moved sixteen thousand men at great -<span class="sni">Oct. 2.</span> -risk towards Venloo. But all was perfectly useless, for -Clerfaye declined to budge. An attack of the French -on his position on the 2nd of October gave him the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</span> -excuse that he wanted; and he immediately retreated -across the Rhine.<a id="FNanchor_280" -href="#Footnote_280" class="fnanchor">[280]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sept. 22.</div> -<p> -Pichegru meanwhile, on the 22nd of September, had -completely invested Bois-le-Duc, and sent two divisions -forward to line the Maas over against the Duke of -York’s position. The French were now in the greatest -distress from want of provisions, which had to be -brought from Antwerp in waggons, and that by long -detours in order to circumvent the Dutch fortresses. -It was therefore imperative for Pichegru to possess -Bois-le-Duc as an advanced base; and the place was -the more difficult for him to master since he had no -siege-artillery. Unfortunately the cowardice of the -Dutch delivered to him all that he wanted. On the -<span class="sni">Sept. 24.<br />Sept. 28.</span> -24th he opened a feeble bombardment with his fieldpieces -upon Fort Crevecoeur, which guarded the -passage into the Isle of Bommel from the south; and -on the 28th, the place, though amply provisioned and -in a good state of defence, was yielded up by the Dutch -Commandant. Thereby Pichegru gained not only -forty-two heavy guns, but the command of the sluices -whereby the inundation of Bois-le-Duc could be let -flow or drawn off. The loss of Crevecoeur did not -improve the good feeling of the British towards the -Dutch, who, from the first entry of the Duke of York -into their country, had showed the bitterest animosity -against his men. Intelligence now reached the Duke -<span class="sni">Sept. 30.<br />Oct. 3.</span> -that a general insurrection of the French party in the -United Provinces was imminent; and three days later -the retreat of Clerfaye compelled him to retire northward -across the Waal, over which he had already -thrown a bridge of boats. The movement was conducted -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</span> -with some confusion owing to the mismanagement -of the Duke’s Staff; but Pichegru suffered the -Allies to shuffle themselves without the slightest -molestation into their appointed positions. The -Hessians held the Bommeler Waert on the south bank -of the Waal, and the line of the Linge over against it -on the north bank. At the village of Geldermalsen -on the Linge the right of the British joined the left -of the Hessians, extending from thence eastward along -the Waal to the road from Nimeguen to Arnheim; -where the Hanoverians carried the line to its end at the -parting of the Waal and the Leek, maintaining communication -with Clerfaye’s Austrians at Emmerick. -Nimeguen, though ill fortified and provided for, was -also held on the southern bank of the Waal.</p> - -<p>By this time even the long-suffering Cabinet in -England was growing weary of paying subsidies to -Austria and Prussia for service which they never -<span class="sni">Oct. 4.</span> -rendered. On the 4th of October Dundas advised -the Duke of York that the Government had resolved -to give them no more money, and ordered him to cut -off the allowance hitherto paid to Clerfaye unless he -agreed to active concert of operations. Thugut, however, -had in many respects gained his point. The -British Government, thinking that a bad ally was -better than none, had consented on the 14th of September -to guarantee to Austria a loan of three millions -in consideration of her services during the first campaign; -at the same time renouncing a project which -had been put forward for placing Clerfaye’s force, -together with the Duke of York’s, under the supreme -command of Cornwallis. Thugut was jubilant; for -everything was going as he wished. In Poland, -Suvorof was rapidly putting down the insurrection, -in stemming which the Prussian Generals had shown -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</span> -the greatest feebleness; Belgium was already abandoned, -as he had desired; and the Cabinet of London -had rewarded Austria for her treachery by financial -assistance. In the circumstances he could not do less -than give promises of effectual help in the defence of -Holland, though of course without the slightest intention -to fulfil them.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the behaviour of the Dutch grew more -and more suspicious. Bois-le-Duc was disgracefully -<span class="sni">Oct. 10.</span> -surrendered on the 10th of October by the Commandant; -and a regiment of French emigrants, which -formed part of the garrison, having been denied permission -to cut its way through the besiegers, was -massacred in cold blood. On the same day, by a -curious coincidence, the British Government warned -the Dutch that, unless they exerted themselves, the -British army should be withdrawn; at the same time -proposing to put the Duke of Brunswick in command -of the British and Dutch forces in order to keep them -<span class="sni">Oct. 18.</span> -together. Then a week later, as if to bribe the Stadtholder -to compliance, Dundas authorised the payment -of one hundred thousand pounds to the Dutch, -which was simply so much money wasted; for the -Prince of Orange would do nothing for the defence -of the country, and wished to employ the British -for the repression of his own rebellious subjects. -How, in the face of the Duke of York’s letters, the -British Ministers in London hesitated to order the -immediate withdrawal of the army is incomprehensible, -except on the supposition that they still trusted -to the proved ill-faith of the Emperor Francis.<a -id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a> -</p> - -<p>The French, meanwhile, continued to follow up -their advantages. Jourdan, on the east, after leaving -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</span> -detachments to besiege Venloo and Maastricht, had -<span class="sni">Oct. 6.</span> -occupied Cologne on the 6th of October, and drawn -up his army in face of Clerfaye’s main body, which -was extended along the Rhine from Duisburg to Bonn -and beyond. Moreau, who had taken over the command -owing to Pichegru’s illness, also pushed forward -seven thousand men in front of Grave, posted thirty -thousand between Ravestein (a little to west of Grave) -and Bois-le-Duc, and ten thousand men opposite the -<span class="sni">Oct. 18.</span> -Bommeler Waert. On the 18th he began to lay a -bridge of boats over the Meuse at Alfen, and, being -allowed by scandalous carelessness on the part of the -Allies to complete it, passed a considerable force -<span class="sni">Oct. 19.</span> -over the river. On the 19th he attacked the posts -at Apeltern and Druten, to east and north-east of -Alfen, carried them after a very obstinate resistance -from the Thirty-seventh and Rohan’s Emigrants, -and succeeded in capturing the greater number of -the Thirty-seventh,<a id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" -class="fnanchor">[282]</a> who had mistaken a party of -French Hussars for the Emigrant cavalry in the -British service. At the same time intelligence came -that a strong French detachment had passed the -Meuse between Roermond and Venloo, and was heading -for Cleve, thus threatening to turn the Duke’s -left. Accordingly, in his public despatch, the Duke -announced that he was about to draw the whole army -to the north of the Waal; but privately he reported -that he could not do so, since the Dutch, in spite of -many promises, had made no effort to put Nimeguen -<span class="sni">Oct. 20.</span> -in a state of defence. On the 20th the French threw -a permanent bridge across the Meuse a little to the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</span> -north-west of Ravestein at Batenburg, and two days -later began a new series of attacks upon the advanced -posts, at the same time making demonstrations about -<span class="sni">Oct. 27.</span> -St. Andries on the Bommeler Waert. By the 27th -the troops round Nimeguen had been driven into the -outskirts of the town, and the Duke, who had transferred -his headquarters to Arnheim, called all of -them except fourteen battalions to the north bank of -the Waal. The French main body then took up a -position between Grave and Nimeguen, threatening to -seize the two eastern keys of Holland.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Oct. 28.</div> -<p> -At this critical moment Clerfaye paid a visit to the -Duke at Arnheim, and promised that by the 3rd of -November a corps of some seven thousand Austrians -under General Werneck should arrive to assist in an -offensive movement from Nimeguen. At the same -time some effort was made to persuade Möllendorf to -move to the Rhine about Bonn, and to support Clerfaye’s -left. But the British Government had recently, -though none too soon, cut off the subsidy to the -Prussians; and Möllendorf’s answer was that his -orders were to send twenty thousand of his men to -South Prussia and fifteen thousand men to Westphalia, -so that evidently nothing was to be expected from that -<span class="sni">Nov. 1.</span> -quarter. On the 1st of November the French broke -ground before Nimeguen, and on the same day Werneck -announced that his corps could not arrive before the -7th. Meanwhile the French erected batteries a little -above Nimeguen at Ooi, which, though silenced for a -time by the guns of the Allies on the opposite bank, -so seriously damaged the bridge of boats that General -Walmoden, who was in command, thought it prudent -to withdraw the greater part of the garrison to the -<span class="sni">Nov. 4.</span> -northern bank. On the 4th, however, he made a -sortie with the troops that remained, including six -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</span> -British battalions, supported by seventeen squadrons -of British and Hanoverian cavalry.<a id="FNanchor_283" -href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">[283]</a> The British, advancing -under a very heavy fire, swept the enemy out -of their trenches without drawing a trigger, and the -cavalry pursuing the fugitives inflicted on them heavy -loss. The casualties of the Allies in this affair were -over three hundred killed and wounded; but, though -the sortie checked the progress of the French for the -time, yet by the 7th they had not only repaired the -batteries destroyed by the Allies, but had erected -another which brought a cross fire to bear on the -bridge of boats. Moreover, a letter arrived from -Werneck that his arrival at Nimeguen, which he had -fixed for the 7th, would be impossible until the 16th—a -message which the Duke rightly interpreted to -signify that he would not come at all.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Nov. 7.</div> -<p> -On the night of the 7th, therefore, the bridge was -repaired sufficiently to enable the garrison to evacuate -the place; and the troops filed across the river. Two -Dutch battalions were the last to leave the place under -the Dutch General Haak, who, most improperly, was -the first man of his nation to set foot on the bridge. -As he did so, a shot struck one of the pontoons with -some effect, whereupon he immediately ran across -the bridge crying out that all was lost, and reported -with shameless mendacity that all his troops had -passed over except the rear-guard. Upon this the -pontoon-bridge was immediately fired, since a flying -bridge had already been prepared for the passage of -the rear-guard. As luck would have it, however, a -shot from the French batteries cut the hawser; the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</span> -flying bridge began to swing round; and, to save it -from running foul of the kindled boats, the sailors -dropped the anchor and so brought it up. When the -burning pontoons had floated away, some British -seamen, who were employed on the bridge, were for -cutting it adrift, but the Dutchmen would not allow -them to do so, preferring certain capture to the -risk of a few cannon-shot. Thus eleven hundred of -them were taken, either through their own cowardice -or through that of Haak—a lamentable occurrence -in an army which in the past had approved itself to -be of incomparable steadfastness and valour.<a -id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">[284]</a> -</p> - -<p>The Duke, therefore, now held the line of the Waal -including the Bommeler Waert, and might well hope -to hold it, if the Dutch did their duty, until the army -went into winter quarters. He had already put most -of his cavalry into cantonments across the Yssel, but -the Dutch threw every possible obstacle in the way -of providing for the comfort of the troops. The -weather too grew wintry, and the men, miserably -clothed and housed in open barns, began to fall down -very fast from cold and typhus fever. None of them -had greatcoats except some of the Guards, Fourteenth, -Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third, who had -received those which had been provided by public -subscription in 1793, and which were now worn out. -Flannel waistcoats had been supplied to the rest by -their officers, who had subscribed over a thousand -pounds for the purpose; and it appears that, without -exaggeration, they had little other clothing. Sheer -nakedness, in fact, had been the cause of much, though -not of all, of the plundering that had disgraced the -army; and this evil had been aggravated by the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</span> -bitter hostility of the inhabitants towards the British. -Not content with resenting real outrages, which were -far too abundant, they never ceased flying to the -Duke with frivolous and groundless complaints; and -so disobliging were the authorities that Lord St. -Helens, Ambassador at the Hague, tried for two -months in vain to find places where the British might -be allowed to establish additional hospitals. On -<span class="sni">Nov. 27.</span> -the 27th of November the infantry in British pay -numbered twenty-one thousand and the sick nearly -eleven thousand; and when a man was ordered to -hospital his comrades would exclaim, “Ah, poor -fellow, we shall see thee no more, for thou art under -orders for the shambles.” On one occasion five -hundred invalids were embarked from Arnheim in -barges under charge of a single surgeon’s mate, without -sufficient provisions, without even sufficient straw, -and brought to Rhenen, where they were left on -board for want of sufficient space to admit them to -the hospital. A Dutch gentleman counted at one time -the bodies of forty-two men who had thus perished -of neglect in the barges and had been thrown out -dead on to the bank. Meanwhile the rascals who -bore the name of surgeon’s mates charged forty thousand -pounds for wine for the sick, and, not content -with robbing the State by themselves drinking what -was supplied, actually plundered the helpless patients -committed to their care. Such was the economy of -Dundas’s military administration—to obtain recruits -by the offer of lavish bounties, to break down their -health by giving them insufficient clothing, and to -contract with scoundrels so to maltreat them, medically, -that they should not recover.<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285" -class="fnanchor">[285]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</span></p> -<p>Fortunately for himself the Duke of York was -summoned home on the 27th of November to hold -personal communication<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286" -class="fnanchor">[286]</a> with Ministers; and indeed -it seemed as if the campaign were ended. Upon -his departure he placed the British troops under -Lieutenant-general Harcourt, and the foreign troops -in British pay under Lieutenant-general Walmoden, -apparently dividing the supreme command between -the two. This arrangement was evidently due to the -Duke’s unwillingness to subject the British to the -Hanoverian Walmoden, who was senior to Harcourt; -but, even so, it seems to be absolutely indefensible. -The French, being exhausted by the campaign, went -into temporary cantonments, Moreau’s division on -the west bank of the Rhine over against the line -from Wesel to Emmerick, Souham’s in and about -Nimeguen, Bonnaud’s between the Meuse and the -Waal, and the remainder about Bois-le-Duc and -Grave. The Allies were distributed along the north -bank of the Waal from Tiel eastward to the Pannarden -Canal, which connects the Waal with the Leck (as -the Rhine from Arnheim downward is called), the -Dutch taking charge of the Bommeler Waert. Eastward -from the Pannarden Canal to Wesel the Allied -left was to be covered by thirty thousand Austrians -under General Alvintzy, which Clerfaye, on the instance -of Henry Dundas, agreed to furnish for a payment -of one hundred thousand pounds a month.</p> - -<p>The Allies’ line of defence seems to have been -wrongly chosen, for, owing to the Pannarden Canal, -the mass of the waters of the Waal was returned into -the Leck, from which cause the Leck was less liable -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</span> -to be frozen. Harcourt had endeavoured to establish -a second bridge over the Rhine besides that of the -Arnheim, but the Dutch, from malice or negligence, -obstructed the forwarding of the materials, as indeed -they obstructed everything that might help the -British. Altogether the situation was not a happy -one, for, though rain had fallen continuously from -the beginning of November, there was no saying when -a frost might set in and turn the rivers into stable -ice. Moreover, Moreau, roused by orders from Paris, -<span class="sni">Dec. 11.</span> -became active again. On the 11th of December the -French crossed the Waal in boats at several different -points to the attack of the Allied posts, and, though -beaten back, left behind them an unpleasant sense of -insecurity.<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287" -class="fnanchor">[287]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Dec. 18.</div> -<p> -On the 16th Pichegru returned and resumed the -command, and on the 18th the weather changed from -rain to a severe frost. In a very few days the Maas -and Waal were full of floating ice, which began to -pack together, threatening to cover the whole breadth -of their streams; while on the Leck the rapidity of -the current swept away the bridge of boats at Arnheim. -Harcourt, foreseeing that before long the ice on the -Waal would become passable by the enemy, prepared -to retreat northward. Just at this most critical -moment, moreover, there arrived orders from Dundas -that seven British battalions of his army were required -for service elsewhere; that of these seven -the Fortieth, Forty-fourth, and Sixty-third must -march to Helvoetsluys at once; and that Alvintzy, -who so far had thrown every possible difficulty in -the way of co-operation with the Allies, must find -troops to take their place. Further, it was now -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</span> -ascertained that the Dutch had gone far in negotiation -with the French, and there were strong rumours -that an armistice had been concluded between them. -Meanwhile the cold increased; sentries were frozen -at their posts; and the ice on the Waal, in front of -the Allies, became strong enough to give passage to -the French, while that on the Leck in their rear, -though thick enough to prevent the passage of boats, -was too thin to bear cavalry or artillery. Harcourt’s -anxiety was extreme; and he begged Dundas urgently -for some further instructions as to the duty expected -of him, since the order to weaken the force by sending -home seven battalions was not in itself of any great -assistance.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Dec. 27.</div> -<p> -Affairs were in this condition when, on the 27th, the -French crossed the Meuse on the ice to the Bommeler -Waert, surprised the Dutch posts there, and pushed -on by Bommel over the frozen Waal to Tuil. The -Dutch at this place fled instantly without firing a shot, -some of the fugitives running on even to Utrecht. At -Meteren, a few miles north of Tuil, the French were -checked by the Hessians; but, with their right flank -exposed by the flight of the Dutch, it was doubtful -whether these could maintain their position. Their -commander, however, General Dalwig, decided to -stand fast, and ascertained by reconnaissance next -<span class="sni">Dec. 28.</span> -day that the French did not exceed two thousand men; -whereupon Walmoden ordered ten battalions and six -squadrons of British and Emigrants under David -Dundas to Geldermalsen, a short distance north of -Meteren, in the hope of annihilating this foolhardy -French detachment. Accordingly, at one o’clock on -<span class="sni">Dec. 30.</span> -the morning of the 30th, the force moved out from -Meteren in three columns, two of them to move direct -upon Tuil from the north and north-east, while the -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</span> -third, under Lord Cathcart, fetched a compass to close -in upon the enemy from the west. Cathcart’s column -unfortunately found the roads impassable and never -came into action; but Dundas nevertheless attacked -without him, and drove the French, after a sharp fight, -from their entrenchments and across the Waal, with the -loss of four guns and many killed and wounded, while -his own casualties did not exceed fifty. This checked -the ardour of the enemy for the moment, and during -a few days there was peace upon the Waal.<a id="FNanchor_288" -href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">[288]</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote">1795.</div> -<p> -Walmoden now reinforced his right about Tuil, for -the news had reached him that the fortresses of Gertruydenburg -and Heusden, on the extreme right of the -Allied line, were in serious danger; and on the 3rd of -<span class="sni">Jan. 3.</span> -January 1795 he shifted his quarters to Amerongen, -due north of Tiel, and on the north bank of the Leck. -Grave at this same time capitulated, and released a -large number of French troops for the field. Moreau’s -division therefore took up cantonments over against -Alvintzy’s corps from Xanten down the Rhine to the -Pannarden Canal. Souham’s division, now transferred -to Macdonald, occupied the space between the Meuse -and Waal as far as the point opposite to Tiel; two -more divisions were in the Bommeler Waert, and yet -two more about Gertruydenburg and Breda. On the -3rd of January the weather again became intensely -<span class="sni">Jan. 4.</span> -cold, and at noon on the 4th two French detachments -from the Bommeler Waert marched over the ice, drove -in the posts before Tuil and at Hesselt, a little to the -east of it, after hard fighting, and thus gained a passage -by which they could move westward on the north -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</span> -bank of the Waal. On the following day the French -<span class="sni">Jan. 5.</span> -attacked Tuil itself, whereupon the Dutch gunners at -once fled from their batteries on the river; but, advancing -from thence against Geldermalsen, the enemy was -repulsed with some loss by the Thirty-third, Forty-second, -and Seventy-eighth, under the direction of -General David Dundas. It was, however, plain that -these posts could not be held against a strong attack -so long as frost practically neutralised their natural -defences; and Walmoden recalled Dundas and all -the troops in that quarter to the north side of the Leck, -in order to take up a new line of cantonments extending -from Arnheim on the east by Wageningen, Reenen, -Amerongen, and Wyk-by-Duurstede to Honswyk.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Jan. 6.</div> -<p> -A sudden thaw on the 6th offered hopes of re-establishing -the old position on the Waal, and orders -were issued on the 7th for a reconnaissance in force -of the whole line of the French posts on the following -<span class="sni">Jan. 8.</span> -day; but on the morning of the 8th the frost abruptly -set in again, though not before the troops were already -in motion beyond power of recall. On the right, -Dundas succeeded in driving the enemy from their -posts on the Linge to the Waal, and in recovering Buren -and Tiel. The brunt of the work fell upon the Fourteenth, -Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth under -Lord Cathcart; and these drove the enemy in succession -from the villages of Buurmalsen and Geldermalsen -and captured a gun, not, however, without a loss of one -hundred and thirty men to themselves. On the left -the orders seem to have miscarried, probably through -the confusion due to divided command. Before the -operation could be carried any further, Pichegru, finding -that the ice on the Waal was stronger than ever, -<span class="sni">Jan. 10.</span> -on the 10th fell upon the Allied line in great force at -three different points between the Pannarden Canal -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</span> -and Tiel. The attack was repulsed upon the right, -but the Austrians were forced back on the left flank, -and Walmoden ordered the whole force to withdraw -once more behind the Leck. This was effected with -little loss; Colonel Coote’s brigade of the Fortieth, -Fiftieth, and Seventy-ninth being the only British -forces severely engaged. Walmoden had fully intended -to continue the retreat eastward across the -Yssel; but Lord St. Helens, at the Hague, unfortunately -protested against this, and another thaw enabled -Walmoden to acquiesce. On the night of the 12th -frost again set in more severely than ever, and on the -14th the French attacked along the whole line from -<span class="sni">Jan. 15.</span> -Arnheim to Reenen. They were beaten back with -heavy loss; but Walmoden, feeling that he was unable -to hold his ground, on the following morning gave the -order for a further retreat.</p> - -<p>The days that followed are amongst the most tragical -in the history of the Army. During November and -December the discipline of the troops in Holland had -greatly improved, but with the coming of the frost and -the hardships that attended the constant alarms and -marches on the Waal, it had once more broken down -completely. Certain regiments of French emigrants, -which had joined the army late in the year, were the -worst offenders; but it seems certain that some of the -British were not far behind them. The country to the -north of Arnheim is at the best of times an inhospitable -waste, and there were few dwellings and few trees to -give shelter or fuel after a dreary march through dense -and chilling mist over snow twice thawed and refrozen. -Marauders from the regiments of every nationality -swarmed round the columns; the drivers of the waggons -freed themselves from all control, and the line of march -was disorderly beyond description. When the day -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</span> -was ended, the troops of different nations fought for -such scanty comforts as were to be found; and once -there was a pitched battle between the Guards and the -Hessians, who had been on bad terms with each other -from the beginning of the campaign. Day after day -the cold steadily increased; and those of the army -that woke on the morning of the 17th of January saw -about them such a sight as they never forgot. Far -as the eye could reach over the whitened plain were -scattered gun-limbers, waggons full of baggage, of -stores, or of sick men, sutlers’ carts and private carriages. -Beside them lay the horses, dead; around -them scores and hundreds of soldiers, dead; here a -straggler who had staggered on to the bivouac and -dropped to sleep in the arms of the frost; there a -group of British and Germans round an empty rum-cask; -here forty English Guardsmen huddled together -about a plundered waggon; there a pack-horse with -a woman lying alongside it, and a baby, swathed in -rags, peeping out of the pack, with its mother’s milk -turned to ice upon its lips,—one and all stark, frozen, -dead. Had the retreat lasted but three or four days -longer, not a man would have escaped; and the catastrophe -would have found a place in history side by -side with the destruction of the host of Sennacherib -and with the still more terrible disaster of the retreat -from Moscow.<a id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" -class="fnanchor">[289]</a> -</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Jan. 19.</div> -<p> -By the 19th the surviving fragments of the battalions -reached their destination on the Yssel, where they were -cantoned on the west side of the river from Zutphen -to the sea. But there was no hope of long repose for -them there. Harcourt perceived clearly that the re-embarkation -of his force was now the only resource left -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</span> -to him, and that the place of embarkation must be on -the Weser, since the lack of supplies and the incapacity -of his commissariat-officers would inevitably forbid -him to remain long on the Ems. Within a week, want -of victuals and the hostility of the inhabitants compelled -him to continue his retreat from the Yssel; and -<span class="sni">Jan. 27–29.</span> -on the 27th the march eastward was resumed, the main -body of the British retiring towards Osnabrück, the -Germans upon Münster. One detachment of British,<a -id="FNanchor_290" href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">[290]</a> -however, was sent northward under Lord Cathcart’s -command to fetch a compass through West Friesland -and along the borders of Groningen, in order to ascertain -whether the people of these provinces were as ill-affected -as their fellows towards the House of Orange. -By whose orders this isolated force was despatched -upon such an errand is uncertain; it is only known -that the column was followed up and incessantly -harassed by the enemy, and that it was not very -successful in discovering friendly sentiments among -the Dutch. Upon reaching the Ems, the army halted, -and on the 5th February took up cantonments on the -western bank of the river, Cathcart on the extreme -north guarding the passes of the Bourtanger Moor -from the Dollart southward, while Abercromby fixed -his headquarters further to south and west of the river -at Bentheim, and the Hanoverians retired to Münster.</p> - -<p>The state of the troops by this time was worse than -ever, for thousands of sick had perforce been left -behind on the Yssel. “Your army is destroyed,” -wrote Walmoden to the Duke of York; “the officers, -their carriages, and a large train are safe, but the men -are destroyed. The army has now no more than six -thousand fighting men, but it has all the drawbacks of -thirty-three battalions, and consumes a vast quantity -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</span> -of forage.” A more terrible reproach was never yet -levelled against any force; nevertheless it was rather -the politicians than the military commanders who had -made such a reproach possible, by flinging commissions -broadcast to any man or even child who could afford -to satisfy the crimps. Upon entering German territory -the men met with kindlier treatment from the inhabitants; -but the infamous conduct of the French -Emigrant Corps threatened to turn the Germans also -into enemies. It now became abundantly clear that -most of these regiments were simply frauds, imposed -upon the English Ministers by a band of unscrupulous -adventurers. But the English army, of course, had to -bear the burden of their sins; and the Hanoverians -and Hessians, naturally espousing the cause of their -countrymen, turned upon the British with a bitterness -which destroyed all cohesion between the nations of the -Allies.<a id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">[291]</a> -</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the French, after leaving their opponents -to retreat unmolested from the Leck, resumed their -advance, and at the end of January occupied Kampen -and Zwolle on the Yssel. They made, however, no -attempt to hinder the further retirement of the Allies; -and their movements for the next fortnight were of -the most leisurely description. Then arrived rumours -of a French understanding with Prussia, of the neutralisation -of North Germany, and of a line of demarcation -to be drawn according to the actual territory occupied -by the opposing armies. The French at once woke -to the importance of gaining immediate possession of -Groningen and East Friesland, and General Macdonald’s -corps was detached to invade Groningen, while those -of Moreau and Vandamme remained in observation -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</span> -on the Yssel. On the 19th of February Macdonald -occupied the town of Groningen, and thence turning -eastward he, on the 27th, attacked Cathcart’s fortified -posts at Winschoten. He was repulsed; but two days -<span class="sni">Feb. 27.<br />March 1.<br />March 3.</span> -later the attack was renewed with success by General -Reynier, and Cathcart was forced to retreat, which he -did with great dexterity, crossing the Ems upon the -3rd. The entire British force then fell back to the -east bank of the Ems to hold the line from Emden to -Rheine, headquarters being fixed at Osnabrück.</p> - -<p>Five days later the British Cabinet at last decided -to withdraw its troops from the Continent, and on the -<span class="sni">March 11.</span> -11th Harcourt, to his infinite relief, received intimation -that transports for twenty-three thousand men were on -their way to him. The Hanoverians were in consternation -over the danger to which Hanover was exposed -by this measure, but there was no help for it. A few -<span class="sni">March 16.</span> -days later Prussian troops arrived to hold the line of -the Ems, and on the 22nd the British began their -march to Bremen for embarkation. The Prussians -did their utmost by obstruction, discourtesy, and insolence -to disoblige them on their passage through the -country; but this was natural, for they had always -professed contempt for the British as a nation of -traders, and a tradesman is never so despicable to a -dishonest customer as when he refuses to grant him -<span class="sni">April 14.</span> -further credit. Finally, on the 14th of April, the infantry -and part of the artillery took ship for England, -leaving the remainder of the artillery and the whole -of the cavalry behind them under Lord Cathcart and -David Dundas. The number embarked was nearly -fifteen thousand, some proportion of the sick having -been recovered; so that the losses after the retreat -from the Leck must have amounted to about six -thousand men, of which not a tithe were killed or -<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</span> -wounded in action. Thus disgracefully ended the first -expedition of Pitt and Dundas to the Low Countries.</p> - -<p class="addendum"><span class="smcap">Authorities.</span>—The British -despatches relating to the expeditions to Flanders will be found in -<i>W.O. Orig. Corresp.</i> 46–48, and in Entry Book No. 11. The number -of private letters included in this collection makes it of unusual -value. For the campaigns at large the best accounts known to me are in -Ditfurth’s <i>Die Hessen in den Feldzügen, 1793, 1794, und 1795</i> -(Kassel, 1839), and in Witzleben’s <i>Prinz Friedrich Josias von -Coburg-Saalfeld</i> (Berlin, 1859), which is not a little built upon -Ditfurth, but contains much that is valuable of its own and a superb -atlas of maps. On the French side the short memoir of David and the life -of Pichegru are of little worth compared with the narrative of Jomini. -Marshal Macdonald’s <i>Mémoires</i> are disappointing at this period. Of -English printed accounts the most important is Jones’s <i>Historical -Journal of the British Campaign in 1794</i>. The <i>Journal</i> of -Corporal James Brown of the Coldstream Guards supplies a few interesting -details. Sir H. Calvert’s <i>Journal and Correspondence</i> is often of -value; and there is a great deal of most useful information in the -foot-notes to the miserable doggerel called the <i>Narrative of an -Officer of the Guards</i>. Unfortunately the author, like Brown and -Calvert, was a Coldstreamer, for which reason all three confine -themselves chiefly to the doings of the brigade of Guards. The -regimental histories of the 14th Foot and 15th Hussars have occasionally -interesting material, but, taken altogether, the regimental records are -disappointing.</p> - -<p class="center skip1 fsize90">THE END</p> - - -<p class="center skip1 fsize75"><i>Printed by</i> - <span class="smcap">R. & R. 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After the sad experience of the Irish war the -marine transport was entrusted to an officer specially established for -the purpose.—<i>Commons Journals.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a> I spell -the village according to the popular fashion in England, and according -to the Flemish pronunciation. So many names in Flanders seem to halt -between the Flemish and the French that it is difficult to know how to -set them down.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a> -Fifty-three battalions of infantry and seven regiments of -dragoons.—<i>Beaurain.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a> No -battlefield can be taken in more readily at a glance than that of -Landen. On the path alongside the railway from Landen Station is a mound -formed of earth thrown out of a cutting, from the top of which the whole -position can be seen.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a> St. -Simon. With the exception of one hollow, which might hold three or four -squadrons in double rank in line, there is not the slightest shelter in -the plain wherein the French horse could find protection.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a> Life -Guards, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th Dragoon Guards, Galway’s Horse.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a> This -is, of course, the Talmash of <i>Tristram Shandy</i> and of Macaulay’s -History. He signed his name, however, as I spell it here, and I use his -own spelling the more readily since it is more easily identified with -the Tollemache of to-day.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> - <img src="images/succession.jpg" alt="" /> -</div> - -<p> </p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13">[13]</a> -Namur, Luxemburg, Mons, Charleroi, Ath, Oudenarde, Nieuport, Ostend.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14">[14]</a> By -the defensive alliance concluded between England and Holland early in -1668, it was laid down that either party, on being attacked, had the -right to require from the other the aid of a fixed proportion of forces -both naval and military. This treaty was arranged by Sir William Temple -shortly after the Treaty of Breda had brought to a close the Dutch War -of 1665–1667; it was known as the Triple Alliance, Sweden being the -third signatory.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15">[15]</a> 12th, -22nd, 27th.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16">[16]</a> 1st -batt. First Guards, 1st Royals (2 batts.), 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 15th, -16th, 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th. The Guards had been substituted (after -careful explanation to Parliament) by William’s own direction for the -9th Foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17">[17]</a> Seven -regiments of horse and dragoons, fourteen battalions of foot, fifty-six -guns.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18">[18]</a> Coxe, -vol. i. p. 182.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19">[19]</a> So -Quincy. Coxe gives August 25–September 5 as the date, but the difference -depends merely on the interpretation of the word investment.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20">[20]</a> See -the description in Kane.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21">[21]</a> St. -Simon gives a curious account of Lewis’s difficulty in arriving at the -truth, owing to the general unwillingness to tell him bad news.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22">[22]</a> It is -stated in <i>Records and Badges of the Army</i> that Lillingston’s was -formed in 1702. But Narcissus Luttrell, Millar, and the Military Entry -Books all give the date as 25th March (New Year’s Day) 1705.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23">[23]</a> -Quincy’s account of this portion of the campaign is, so far as concerns -Marlborough, full of falsehoods.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24">[24]</a> Four -British regiments were of this detachment. Two battalions of the 1st -Royals, the 3rd Buffs, and the 10th Foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25">[25]</a> -Narcissus Luttrell.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26">[26]</a> It is -worth noting that this was the first campaign in which Marlborough and -the British took the post of honour at the extreme right of the Allied -order of battle.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27">[27]</a> His -camp thus lay across the whole of Wellington’s position at Waterloo, -from east to west and considerably beyond it to westward, but fronted in -the reverse direction.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28">[28]</a> <span -class="smcap">Order of Battle. Campaign of 1705.</span></p> - -<p>Right.</p> - -<p class="ob1 smcap">Right Wing Only.</p> - -<p class="ob1">1st Line.</p> - -<p class="ob3">Scots Greys, 3 squadrons.<br /> -5th Dragoons, 3 squadrons.</p> - -<p class="ob3">1st Dragoon Guards, 3 squadrons.<br /> -5th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.<br /> -7th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.<br /> -6th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.<br /> -3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons.</p> - -<p class="ob3">1 Batt. 1st Guards.<br /> -1 Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> -18th Royal Irish.<br /> -23rd Royal Welsh.<br /> -28th Foot.<br /> -Stringer’s Foot.<br /> -26th Cameronians.<br /> -16th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob3">3rd Buffs.<br /> -21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.<br /> -37th Foot.<br /> -Macartney’s Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob3">Evans’s Foot.<br /> -24th Foot<br /> -15th Foot</p> - -<p class="ob3">Foreign Troops.</p> - -<p class="ob1">2nd Line.</p> - -<p class="ob3">Foreign Troops.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Extreme Right of Centre.</p> - -<p class="ob3">2nd Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> -10th Foot.<br /> -Temple’s Foot.<br /> -29th Foot.<br /> -8th Foot.</p> - -<p>Left.</p> - -<p class="right italic skip2">Newspaper.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29">[29]</a> -Peterborough’s Dragoons; Mark Kerr’s, Stanwix’s, Lovelace’s, Townsend’s, -Tunbridge’s, Bradshaw’s, Sybourg’s, Price’s Foot. Sybourg’s was made up -of Huguenots.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30">[30]</a> -Marlborough’s <i>Despatches</i>, vol. ii. p. 262.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31">[31]</a> This -is the story told in Lamberti.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32">[32]</a> The -ground, though now drained, is still very wet.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33">[33]</a> I -have described the field at some length, since the map given by Coxe is -most misleading.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34">[34]</a> Coxe, -by a singular error, makes the left consist exclusively of infantry, in -face of Quincy, Feuquières, the <i>London Gazette</i> and other -authorities, thereby missing almost unaccountably an important feature -in the action.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35">[35]</a> -Apparently the whole of Meredith’s brigade, viz.: 1st, 18th, 29th, 37th, -24th, and 10th regiments. The place is still easily identifiable.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36">[36]</a> -Molesworth escaped and was rewarded four years later, at the age of -twenty-two, with a regiment of foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37">[37]</a> <span -class="smcap">Order of Battle. Ramillies, 12th–23rd May 1706.</span></p> - -<p>Right.</p> - -<p class="ob1 smcap">Right Wing Only.</p> - -<p class="ob1">1st Line.</p> - -<p class="ob3">Scots Greys.<br /> -5th Royal Irish Dragoons.</p> - -<p class="ob3">1st Dragoon Guards.<br /> -5th Dragoon Guards.<br /> -7th Dragoon Guards.<br /> -6th Dragoon Guards.<br /> -3rd Dragoon Guards.<br /> -Eighteen Dutch Squadrons.</p> - -<p class="ob3">1 Batt. 1st Guards.<br /> -1 Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> -16th Foot.<br /> -26th Cameronians.<br /> -28th Foot.<br /> -23rd Royal Welsh.<br /> -8th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob3">3rd Buffs.<br /> -21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.<br /> -Evans’s Foot.<br /> -Macartney’s Foot.<br /> -Stringer’s Foot.<br /> -15th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob3">Foreign Infantry.</p> - -<p class="ob1">2nd Line.</p> - -<p class="ob3">Foreign Cavalry.</p> - -<p class="ob3">2nd Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> -18th Royal Irish.<br /> -29th Foot.<br /> -37th Foot.<br /> -24th Foot.<br /> -10th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Foreign Infantry.</p> - -<p>Left.</p> - -<p class="right skip2">From Kane’s <i>Campaigns</i>.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38">[38]</a> -<i>Despatches</i>, vol. ii. p. 554.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39">[39]</a> The -British regiments regularly employed in the besieging army were the 8th, -10th, and 18th, and Evans’s Foot; the Scots Greys, 3rd and 6th Dragoon -Guards. The total loss of the Allies was 32 officers and 551 men killed, -83 officers and 1941 men wounded. The 18th Royal Irish alone lost 15 -officers, and in one attack over 100 men in half an hour.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40">[40]</a> -Parker.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41">[41]</a> <span -class="smcap">Order of Battle. Campaign of 1707.</span></p> - -<p>Right.</p> - -<p class="ob1 smcap">Right Wing Only</p> - -<p class="ob1">1st Line.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Stair’s Brigade.</p> -<p class="ob4">Scots Greys.<br /> - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Palmer’s Brigade</p> -<p class="ob4">1st Dragoon Guards.<br /> - 5th Dragoon Guards.<br /> - 7th Dragoon Guards.<br /> - 6st Dragoon Guards.<br /> - 3rd Dragoon Guards.</p> - -<p class="ob4">Orrery’s Foot.<br /> -Evans’s Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob4">Foreign horse.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Meredith’s Brigade.</p> -<p class="ob4">1 Batt. 1st Guards.<br /> - 1 Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> - 16th Foot.<br /> - 23rd Royal Welsh.<br /> - 8th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Temple’s Brigade</p> -<p class="ob4"> 2nd Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> - 18th Royal Irish.<br /> - Temple’s Foot.<br /> - 24th Foot.<br /> - 10th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Lord North and Grey’s Brigade.</p> -<p class="ob4">3rd Buffs<br /> - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers<br /> - 37th Foot<br /> - 26th Cameronians<br /> - 15th Foot.<br /> - Gore’s Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob1">No British in the Second Line.</p> - -<p>Left.</p> - -<p class="right skip2"><i>Postboy</i> 26th June 1707.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42">[42]</a> -Slane’s, Brazier’s, Delaune’s, Jones’s, Carles’s, all raised in -September.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43">[43]</a> Mixed -battalion of Guards, 19th Foot, Prendergast’s (late Orrery’s).</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44">[44]</a> 16 -battalions and 30 squadrons. In these were included the brigades of -Sabine, viz., 8th, 18th, 23rd, 37th; of Evans, viz., Orrery’s, Evans’s, -and two foreign battalions; and of Plattenberg, which included the -Scottish regiments in the Dutch service.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45">[45]</a> Among -them the Royal Scots and Buffs.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46">[46]</a> That -is to say, on the western side of the road from Oudenarde to Deynze.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47">[47]</a> The -ground, though drained and built over about Bevere, seems to have lost -little of its original character, and is worth a visit.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48">[48]</a> -British losses: 4 officers and 49 men killed, 17 officers and 160 men -wounded.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49">[49]</a> The -force consisted of detachments of the 3rd and 4th Dragoons (now -Hussars), 12th, 29th, Hamilton’s, Dormer’s, Johnson’s, Moore’s, -Caulfield’s, Townsend’s, Wynne’s Foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50">[50]</a> See, -for instance, the commendations of Feuquières.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51">[51]</a> 135 -battalions, 260 squadrons.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52">[52]</a> 122 -battalions, 230 squadrons.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53">[53]</a> These -were, according to a contemporary plan (Fricx), the 16th, 18th, 21st, -23rd, 24th Foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54">[54]</a> He is -claimed as a Guardsman by General Hamilton (<i>Hist. Grenadier -Guards</i>), though Millner assigns him to the 16th Foot. This is the -only name of a man below the rank of a commissioned officer that I have -encountered in any of the books on the wars of Marlborough, not -excluding the works of Sergeants Deane and Millner. Littler was -deservedly rewarded with a commission.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55">[55]</a> The -Allied order of battle was peculiar. The artillery was all drawn up in -front, in rear of it came a first line of 100 squadrons, then a second -line of 80 squadrons, then a third line of 104 battalions, with wings of -14 squadrons more thrown out to the right and left rear. <i>Daily -Courant</i>, 6th September 1708.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56">[56]</a> The -five English regiments lost about 350 killed and wounded in this -assault. This would mean probably from a fifth to a sixth of their -numbers. <i>Daily Courant</i>, 6th September 1708.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57">[57]</a> I -have failed, in spite of much search, to identify the British regiments -present, excepting one battalion of the 1st Royals. Marlborough, as -Thackeray has reminded us by a famous scene in <i>Esmond</i>, attributed -the credit of the action in his first despatch to Cadogan. Another -letter, however, which appeared in the <i>Gazette</i> three days later -(23rd September), does full justice to Webb, as does also a letter from -the Duke to Lord Sunderland of 18th–29th September (<i>Despatches</i>, -vol. iv. p. 243). Webb’s own version of the affair appeared in the -<i>Gazette</i> of 9th October, but does not mention the regiments -engaged. Webb became a celebrated bore with his stories of Wynendale, -but the story of his grievance against Marlborough would have been -forgotten but for Thackeray, who either ignored or was unaware of the -second despatch.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58">[58]</a> -Notably Prendergast’s. <i>Gazette</i>, 25th November.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59">[59]</a> The -British troops employed were the 6th Foot, 600 marines, and a battalion -of seamen.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60">[60]</a> There -are still some remains of the old walls of Tournay on the south side of -the town, and the ruins of Vauban’s citadel close by, from which the -extent of the works may be judged.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61">[61]</a> The -British regiments employed in the siege were the 1st Royals (2 -battalions), 3rd Buffs, 37th, Temple’s, Evans’s and Prendergast’s -Foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62">[62]</a> The -following description written from the trenches gives some idea of the -work: “Now as to our fighting underground, blowing up like kites in the -air, not being sure of a foot of ground we stand on while in the -trenches. Our miners and the enemy very often meet each other, when they -have sharp combats till one side gives way. We have got into three or -four of the enemy’s great galleries, which are thirty or forty feet -underground and lead to several of their chambers; and in these we fight -in armour by lanthorn and candle, they disputing every inch of the -gallery with us to hinder our finding out their great mines. Yesternight -we found one which was placed just under our bomb batteries, in which -were eighteen hundredweight of powder besides many bombs: and if we had -not been so lucky as to find it, in a very few hours our batteries and -some hundreds of men had taken a flight into the air.”—<i>Daily -Courant</i>, 20th August.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63">[63]</a> 8th, -10th, 15th, 16th.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64">[64]</a> -Parker.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65">[65]</a> A -nominal list in the <i>Postboy</i> of 1st October gives 36 officers -killed and 46 wounded. An earlier list of 17th September gives 40 -officers and 511 men killed, 66 officers and 1020 men wounded; but this -is admittedly imperfect.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66">[66]</a> <span -class="smcap">Order of Battle. Campaign of 1709.</span></p> - -<p>Right.</p> - -<p class="ob1 smcap">Right Wing Only</p> - -<p class="ob1">1st Line.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Sybourg’s Brigade.</p> -<p class="ob4">Scots Greys, 3 squadrons.<br /> -5th Royal Irish Dragoons, 2 squadrons.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Kelburn’s Brigade</p> -<p class="ob4">1st Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.<br /> -5th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.<br /> -7th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.<br /> -6th Dragoon Guards, 1 Squadron.<br /> -3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Orrery’s Brigade</p> -<p class="ob4">26th Cameronians.<br /> -Two foreign battalions.<br /> -Prendergast’s Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob2">Two Foreign Brigadiers.</p> -<p class="ob4">Twenty-seven squadrons of foreign dragoons.</p> - -<p class="ob4">1 Batt. 1st Guards.<br /> -1 Batt. Coldstream Guards.<br /> -1 Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> -37th Foot.<br /> -10th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob4">2nd Batt. Royal Scots.<br /> -23rd Royal Welsh.<br /> -Orrery’s Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob4">3rd Buffs.<br /> -Temple’s Foot<br /> -Evans’s Foot.<br /> -16th Foot.</p> - -<p class="ob4">8th Foot.<br /> -24th Foot.<br /> -21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.<br /> -18th Royal Irish.</p> - -<p class="ob1">No British troops in the second line; but the 15th and -19th Foot were also present at the action of Malplaquet.</p> - -<p class="skip2">Left.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67">[67]</a> 11th, -37th, Kane’s, Clayton’s, and one foreign battalion of foot. The losses -of the expedition were 29 officers and 676 men drowned.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68">[68]</a> Honey -wood to Carteret, Jan. 7/18; Ligonier to Carteret, March 21/April 1, -1744.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69">[69]</a> -Ligonier to Carteret, April 29/May 10.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70">[70]</a> Wade -to Carteret, May 30/June 10, June 25/July 6.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71">[71]</a> -Carteret to Wade, May 25/June 5.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72">[72]</a> -Carteret to Wade, July 13/24, 17/28.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73">[73]</a> -Carteret to Wade, July 31/Aug. 11, Aug. 14/25, 17/28.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74">[74]</a> Wade -to Carteret, Aug. 26/Sept. 6.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75">[75]</a> -<i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 19/30, Aug. 25/Sept. 5, Sept. 16/27,<br /> Sept. -22/Oct. 3, Oct. 1/12, 10/21</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76">[76]</a> -Ligonier to Carteret, July 31/Aug. 11, 1744.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77">[77]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, Jan. 29/Feb. 9, Feb. 6/17, 1745.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78">[78]</a> -<i>Gazette</i>, Feb. 23/March 6, March 1/12, 1745.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79">[79]</a> -Cumberland to Harrington, April 1/12, 12/23.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80">[80]</a> The -ground immediately before Fontenoy presents for fully eight hundred -yards a gentle and unbroken slope. An officer, who went over the ground -with me, assured me that St. Privat itself does not offer a more perfect -natural glacis for modern rifle-fire.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81">[81]</a> Every -one knows the legend of “Messieurs les Gardes Françaises, tirez les -premiers.” “Non, messieurs, nous ne tirons jamais les premiers.” But -every English account agrees that the French fired first, long before -the question had been raised, and I take the authority of Ligonier (who -drew up the official account) as final. He says distinctly, “We received -their fire.”</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82">[82]</a> -<i>Campagnes des Pays Bas.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83">[83]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, May 5/16.<br />Cumberland to Harrington, May -11/22.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84">[84]</a> -Fawkener to Harrington, July 19/30.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85">[85]</a> -General Bligh to Cumberland, June 28/July 9.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86">[86]</a> -Cumberland to Harrington, July 2/13.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87">[87]</a> -Cumberland to Harrington, July 14/25.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88">[88]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, July 14/25.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89">[89]</a> -Harrington to Cumberland, Sept. 4/15; Oct. 1/12, 19/30.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90">[90]</a> -Dunmore to Harrington, Jan. 20/31, Jan. 27/Feb. 7, Feb. 12/23.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91">[91]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, July 1/12, 1746.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92">[92]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, July 9/20, 13/24, 16/27.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93">[93]</a> -<i>Ibid.</i>, July 23/Aug. 3, Aug. 2/13.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94">[94]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, Aug. 9/20, 19/30, Aug. 26/Sept. 6, Sept. -4/15.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95">[95]</a> -Ligomer to Harrington, Sept. 24/Oct. 5, Sept. 28/Oct. 9.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96">[96]</a> -Ligonier to Harrington, Sept. 28/Oct. 9, Oct. 20/31.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97">[97]</a> 1st, -15th, 28th, 30th, 39th, and 42nd Foot.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98">[98]</a> -Cumberland to Harrington, Feb. 6/17, March 20/31,<br /> March 24/April -4.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99">[99]</a> -Cumberland to Chesterfield, May 1/12, 9/20.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100">[100]</a> -Cumberland blamed the Austrian General, Baroney, and his irregulars for -supine negligence on the march.<br /> Cumberland to Chesterfield, July -6/17, 1747.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101">[101]</a> -The regiments present at Lauffeld were the Greys, 4th Hussars, -Inniskillings, 7th Hussars, and Cumberland’s dragoons, one -battalion each of the 1st and 3rd Guards, 3rd, 4th, 13th, 19th, -21st, 23rd, 25th, 32nd, 33rd, 36th, 37th, 48th Foot. The two last -had no casualties.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102">[102]</a> -Cumberland to Newcastle, March 18/29, March 22/April 2,<br /> March -26/April 6.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103">[103]</a> -<i>Dropmore Papers</i>, Auckland to Grenville, 21st and 25th January; -14th and 15th February. <i>F.O. Holland</i>, 16th February 1793. And see -<i>Auckland Correspondence</i> and <i>Dropmore Papers</i> generally, -November 1792 to February 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104">[104]</a> -The head of the column was able to keep sober; the rear, under the -endearments of the populace, subsided dead drunk on the road and was -brought on in carts. <i>Narrative of an Officer of the Guards.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105">[105]</a> -Lake to Dundas, 2nd March 1793. Lake’s Instructions, 23rd February. -Grenville to Auckland, 20th February 1793. <i>F.O. Holland</i>, Auckland -to Grenville, 4th March 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106">[106]</a> -<i>Dropmore Papers</i>, Auckland to Grenville, 5th and 13th March 1793. -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 5th March; Abercromby’s instructions, 9th March; Dundas -to York, 15th March 1793; <i>C.C.L.B.</i> 2nd March; Adj.-gen. to York, -27th March, 12th April 1793. Calvert, pp. 53, 67.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107">[107]</a> -<i>S.P. Ireland</i>, Cooke to Hobart, 23rd April; Westmoreland to -Hobart, 27th April; Dundas to Westmoreland, 16th May, 31st July 1793; -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 18th May 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108">[108]</a> -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 7th February. <i>C.C.L.B.</i> Adj.-gen. to Duke of York, -2nd and 12th April 1793. Dundas to Williamson, 4th April 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109">[109]</a> -Duke of Argyll’s and Earl of Sutherland’s, 1759; Lord Fred. Campbell’s, -1778; Earl of Sutherland’s, Fauconberg’s (Yorkshire), North’s (Cinque -Ports), 1779.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110">[110]</a> -Athol’s or the Manx, Sir J. Grant’s, Gower’s (or Wemyss’s), Eglinton’s -(or Montgomery’s), Breadalbane’s, Argyll’s, Duke of Gordon’s, -Hopetoun’s, Balfour’s (Orkney). Their strength was 650 of all ranks, -except the Manx, which were 323 strong.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111">[111]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 26th March 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112">[112]</a> -Sybel, ii. 230; Grenville to Auckland, 3rd April 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113">[113]</a> -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 21st March, 2nd April; <i>C.C.L.B.</i> 25th March 1793. -<i>Dropmore Papers</i>, ii. 360, 387–89. Buckingham to Grenville, 20th -January; the King to Grenville, 29th March; Pitt to Grenville, 1st April -1793. Auckland to Grenville, 31st May 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114">[114]</a> -Sybel, ii. 142.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115">[115]</a> -The insisting upon an indemnity must have been the work of Pitt, -probably under the influence of Dundas. Grenville trembled at the word -indemnity. <i>Dropmore Papers</i>, ii. 392.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116">[116]</a> -Protocol of conference of 7th April. Dundas to Auckland and to Murray, -16th April Auckland to Grenville, 19th April 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117">[117]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 22nd April 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118">[118]</a> -Prussians, 8000, of which 1800 cavalry; Austrians, 55,000, of which -10,000 cavalry; Dutch, 15,000, of which 2500 cavalry; Hanoverians, -12,000, of which 3000 cavalry; Hessians, 8000, of which 1500 cavalry; -British, 7200, of which 3000 cavalry. Total, 105,200, of which 27,200 in -the pay of England. About 5000 of the Austrians and the 8000 Hessians -were not expected till June. Witzleben, ii. 117, 181–186. Coburg to -York, 1st and 3rd May; Murray to Dundas, 5th May; Dundas to Murray, 10th -May 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119">[119]</a> -The authorities for this and the next paragraph are Ditfurth, i. 29, 35, -36; Witzleben, ii. 59; Calvert, p. 83; Sybel, ii. 154.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120">[120]</a> -Ditfurth, i. 48.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121">[121]</a> -231 horses, draught and pack, and 116 drivers, etc., per battalion of -1100 men, of which 82 horses and 34 men were for the officers. Each -company had one four-horse waggon, and each battalion one pair-horse -hospital-waggon.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122">[122]</a> -Ditfurth, i. 33; Witzleben, ii. 66. York to Dundas, 25th January 1794. -Vol. iii. of this <i>History</i>, pp. 524, 525.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123">[123]</a> -<i>Dropmore Papers</i>, ii. 349.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124">[124]</a> -Bunbury, <i>Great War with France</i>, p. 46.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125">[125]</a> -Poisson, ii. 239, 240.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126">[126]</a> -Rousset, p. 183.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127">[127]</a> -<i>Vie de Carnot</i>, i. 138.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128">[128]</a> -“The squadron of men of war and transports was collected, the -commodore’s flag hoisted, and the expedition sailed with <i>most -secret</i> orders, which as usual were as well known to the enemy and -everybody in England as to those by whom they were given” (Marryat, -<i>The King’s Own</i>, ch. vii. <i>ad init.</i>). Marryat attributes -this failing to the multitude of counsellors that compose a Cabinet. He -may be right, but those who are acquainted with the scandalous -carelessness with which Ministers treat confidential military documents, -find no difficulty in accounting for it otherwise. This evil still -continues, and will continue until Cabinet Ministers are subjected to -the same penalties for abuse of trust as other servants of the King.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129">[129]</a> -Calvert, p. 72.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130">[130]</a> -<i>Dropmore MSS.</i> Lieut.-colonel Freemantle to Buckingham, 13th May -1793. Calvert, p. 79. <i>Narrative by an Officer of the Guards</i>, i. -29–31. Murray to Dundas, 10th May (private) 1793. There are some -significant omissions from his public letter of the same date as -published in the Gazette. <i>Auckland Correspondence</i>, iii. 58.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131">[131]</a> -7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132">[132]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 15th and 17th May 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133">[133]</a> -Witzleben, ii. 194.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134">[134]</a> -That is to say, guns not allotted to the infantry as battalion-guns.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135">[135]</a> -The brigade was reckoned at four battalions, the flank companies being -massed into a fourth battalion.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136">[136]</a> -The Fourteenth and Fifty-third, with the flank companies of these two -regiments and of the Thirty-seventh, massed into a third battalion. -Witzleben (ii. 199) gives a larger number of British troops, calling all -squadrons and battalions in British pay by the name English.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137">[137]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 24th May 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138">[138]</a> -Witzleben, ii. 210–211. This author states that the Duke of York asked -for the command of the siege, which I believe to be absolutely -incorrect, and indeed incredible. See Murray to Dundas, 26th and 29th -May; Dundas to Murray, 30th and 31st May 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139">[139]</a> -Blues, Royals, Greys, Inniskillings.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140">[140]</a> -<i>Vie de Carnot</i>, i. 321, <i>sq.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141">[141]</a> -Dundas to Murray, 29th May, 14th June, 12th July; Murray to Dundas, -18th June and 16th July 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142">[142]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 25th July.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143">[143]</a> -Sybel, ii. 370–373.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144">[144]</a> -Ditfurth, i. 69. Witzleben, ii. 263–64. Murray to Dundas (private), -9th August 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145">[145]</a> -Witzleben, ii. 264, 370. Dundas to Murray, 1st August 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146">[146]</a> -Ditfurth, i. 73. 47½ battalions, 58 squadrons. British, 5200 infantry, -1300 cavalry; Austrians, 10,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry; Hanoverians, -9000 infantry, 1600 cavalry; Hessians, 5500 infantry, 1500 cavalry. -Total, 29,700 infantry, 5400 cavalry, 1900 artillery.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147">[147]</a> -Hamilton, <i>History of the Grenadier Guards</i>, ii. 285.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148">[148]</a> -The British engaged were the flank companies of the Guards and Line, and -Royal Artillery. Casualties, seventy-eight killed and wounded.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149">[149]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 16th July; Dundas to Murray, 19th July 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150">[150]</a> -<i>Dropmore Papers</i>, ii. 444. Dundas to Grenville, 12th October -1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151">[151]</a> -Dundas to Murray, 16th April 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152">[152]</a> -Calvert, vi. 118; Murray to Dundas, 3rd September.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153">[153]</a> -<i>Vie de Carnot</i>, i. 394.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154">[154]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 28th and 31st August 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155">[155]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 31st August 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156">[156]</a> -Sybel, ii. 417.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157">[157]</a> -Murray to Dundas (private), 9th September 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158">[158]</a> -<i>Narrative of an Officer</i>, pp. 91–92; Ditfurth, i. 127–128.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159">[159]</a> -<i>Ibid.</i> pp. 91–93, and see Ditfurth, i. 126.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160">[160]</a> -Flank companies 9th, nine companies 4/60th, 50 artillery.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161">[161]</a> -Cuyler to Dundas, 22nd March 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162">[162]</a> -Battalion companies of the 21st; flank companies (apparently) of the -9th, 15th, 21st, 45th, 48th, 3/60th, 4/60th, 67th. Bruce speaks of -eighteen flank companies, perhaps including details of the 25th and -29th, which were serving on the fleet as marines.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163">[163]</a> -Mr. Balfour to Dundas, 20th July 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164">[164]</a> -The official despatch reached the Government on 13th September, but the -fact was known to Pitt on the 7th. <i>Dropmore Papers</i>, i. 422.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165">[165]</a> -Hood to Dundas, 25th August 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166">[166]</a> -Brenton’s <i>Naval History</i>, i. 101.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167">[167]</a> -Mulgrave to Dundas, 1st September 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168">[168]</a> -3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169">[169]</a> -Dundas to Murray, 11th, 14th September; to Hood, 14th September; to -Bruce, 18th September 1793; Pitt to Grenville, <i>Dropmore Papers</i>, -ii. 43 (the conjectural date of September attached to this last is -wrong, and should be changed to October).</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170">[170]</a> -<i>Narrative of an Officer</i>, i. 92.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171">[171]</a> -19th, 57th, three companies of the 42nd.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172">[172]</a> -Poisson, ii. 525–526.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173">[173]</a> -Dundas to Murray, 13th September 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174">[174]</a> -Dundas to Murray, 13th, 14th, and 28th September; 14th October. Murray -to Dundas, 14th and 15th October 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175">[175]</a> -Ditfurth, i. 147.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176">[176]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 6th October. Dundas to Ainslie, 12th October; to -Abercromby, 13th October 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177">[177]</a> -3rd, 28th, 54th, 59th. They had already made one voyage to Ostend and -back.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178">[178]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 18th October; Ainslie to Dundas, 23rd October; Dundas -to Grey, 26th October; to Murray, 27th October 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179">[179]</a> -Two Austrian battalions, 3rd Guards, flank battalion of Guards, one -squadron 7th L.D., and one squadron 15th L.D.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180">[180]</a> -Murray to Dundas, 30th October and 12th November; Dundas to Murray, 8th -November 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181">[181]</a> -<i>Chat huant.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182">[182]</a> -Poisson, iii. 139 <i>seq.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183">[183]</a> -<i>Ibid.</i> 239–248; Rousset, pp. 293, 299.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184">[184]</a> -Rousset, 123–124, 236, 249; also generally, pp. 78–148.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185">[185]</a> -Sybel, iii. 26–27; <i>Vie de Carnot</i>, i. 470; <i>Dropmore Papers</i>, -ii. 501.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186">[186]</a> -<i>Life of Lord Minto</i>, ii. 383.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187">[187]</a> “I -think, if you see Dundas, it may not be amiss to urge the danger of -running after distant objects while the great object lies still—of -hunting the sheep till you have killed the dog. The most fatal error -will be, I apprehend, the seeking to preserve the popularity of the war -by feeding the avarice of the nation with conquests.”—Windham to Mr. -Elliot, December 1793. <i>Life of Lord Minto</i>, ii. 196.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188">[188]</a> -Pitt to Grenville, 5th and 7th July 1794. <i>Dropmore Papers</i>, ii. -595, 597.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189">[189]</a> -<i>Parliamentary History</i>, vol. xxxi.; Debates of 21st January, 3rd -February, 10th April 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190">[190]</a> -Adj.-gen. to the Duke of York, <i>C.C.L.B.</i> 31st October 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191">[191]</a> -These regiments are arranged according to the dates of their letters of -service.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192">[192]</a> -Campbell’s was originally numbered 98th; Huntly’s 100th.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193">[193]</a> -Adj.-gen. to Prince Edward, <i>C.C.L.B.</i> 17th March 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_194" href="#FNanchor_194">[194]</a> -<i>C.C.L.B.</i>, Adj.-gen. to Lieut.-gen. Cunninghame, 8th October -1793.</p> - -<p class="skip3">Here is an example of the scheme as used for raising a -regiment of 10 companies each of 60 men.</p> - -<table summary="Raising a Regiment"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Proceeds of sale of 1 Lieut.-colonelcy, 1 Majority,<br /> - 1 Company, 1 Lieutenancy, 1 Ensigncy, - amount to </td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdrb">£9250</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Cost of 600 men at £15</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">9000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">Balance</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">£250</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>Another scheme for augmenting battalions of infantry. As soon -as 450 approved recruits have been raised, there shall be added to -it a Lieutenant-colonel, and a Major.</p> - -<table summary="Augmenting Battalions of Infantry"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The Major will pay for his Lieut.-colonelcy</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">£600</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">The senior Captain will pay for his senior Majority</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">700</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Another Captain will pay for his junior Majority</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">550</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Two Companies thus vacated will sell for</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">2800</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Levy-money of £5 granted by Government for 450 men</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">2250</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">Total</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">£6900</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdlb">Cost of 450 men at £15 (£10 bounty and £5 levy-money) - would be</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdrb">6750</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">Balance</td> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr">£150</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p class="noindent">Thus the country is saved all expense but £5 a -man levy-money.</p> - -<p class="noindent skip2"><i>S.C.L.B.</i> 15th April, 1st and 12th -November 1793; 20th January 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_195" href="#FNanchor_195">[195]</a> -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 9th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_196" href="#FNanchor_196">[196]</a> -<i>Star</i>, 13th April 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_197" href="#FNanchor_197">[197]</a> -One Lieutenant drew half-pay for 80 years after the drafting of the -104th (Royal Manchester Volunteers), which was one of these ephemeral -corps. <i>Records and Badges of the British Army</i>, p. 833.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_198" href="#FNanchor_198">[198]</a> -<i>St. James’s Chronicle</i>, 26th April 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_199" href="#FNanchor_199">[199]</a> -<i>Public Advertiser</i>, 2nd February 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_200" href="#FNanchor_200">[200]</a> -<i>St. James’s Chronicle</i>, 19th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_201" href="#FNanchor_201">[201]</a> -<i>Ibid.</i> 19th August 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_202" href="#FNanchor_202">[202]</a> -<i>Narrative of an Officer of the Guards</i>, ii. 76–79; Bunbury, -<i>Great War with France</i>, Introd. p. xx.; <i>St. James’s -Chronicle</i>, 27th January 1795 (debate on Army Estimates of 21st -January); <i>Journal of Sir Henry Calvert</i>, pp. 360, 384–85. The -letters of Lady Sarah Lennox (the mother of the Napiers) throw a curious -light on the scramble for promotion through the enlistment of recruits -at this period. “Think of my bad luck about recruits. If I had seen an -officer one fortnight sooner who is here, he would have sold me 20 at 11 -guineas per man. Is not that unfortunate; but they are now gone. My -Dublin stock too, which was 40, has been reduced to 26,” ii. 109, <i>and -see also</i> ii. 101. “Is there any chance of recruiting men of five -feet four inches for 10 guineas, and as much under as possible, in your -neighbourhood.” Evidently the wives of poor officers plunged into -speculation to help their husbands with recruits.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_203" href="#FNanchor_203">[203]</a> -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 15th April 1793. <i>Daily Chronicle</i>, 16th April -1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_204" href="#FNanchor_204">[204]</a> -York to Dundas, January 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_205" href="#FNanchor_205">[205]</a> -<i>Chronicle</i>, June 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_206" href="#FNanchor_206">[206]</a> -<i>St. James’s Chronicle</i>, 24th and 26th July 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_207" href="#FNanchor_207">[207]</a> -<i>S.C.L.B.</i> 26th March 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_208" href="#FNanchor_208">[208]</a> -<i>Ibid.</i> 29th April 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_209" href="#FNanchor_209">[209]</a> -York to Dundas, 2nd February 1794 (with enclosures).</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_210" href="#FNanchor_210">[210]</a> -Dr. Hayes to Lord Cathcart, 1st February 1794; Monthly returns, 1st -February to 1st May; Ditfurth, ii. 32.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_211" href="#FNanchor_211">[211]</a> -Witzleben, iii. 64 <i>seq.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_212" href="#FNanchor_212">[212]</a> -Sybel, iii. 49–65; York to Dundas, 22nd March, 3rd April 1794; -Witzleben, iii. 70–84.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_213" href="#FNanchor_213">[213]</a> -Witzleben, iii. 91, 62, 29; Ditfurth, ii. 10 <i>sqq.</i>, 28.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_214" href="#FNanchor_214">[214]</a> -Ditfurth, ii. 30, 31.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_215" href="#FNanchor_215">[215]</a> -Craig to Nepean, 7th, 22nd, 31st March, 11th April; to York, 7th, 15th, -16th March; York to Dundas, 9th, 22nd, 26th March, 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_216" href="#FNanchor_216">[216]</a> -Ditfurth (ii. 43) reckons the field force at from 120,000 to 130,000, -but he includes British troops which were not on the spot, and reckons -the strength of those present at too high a rate.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_217" href="#FNanchor_217">[217]</a> -Witzleben, iii. 94.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_218" href="#FNanchor_218">[218]</a> -Calvert, p. 187.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_219" href="#FNanchor_219">[219]</a> -Three squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Guards, two squadrons each of the -Blues, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royals, 2nd Greys, 6th -Inniskilling Dragoons, 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons. The 8th and -14th Light Dragoons were embarked or embarking to join the army. It has -been a matter of much difficulty to discover how these regiments were -brigaded.</p> - -<p class="skip3"><i>Harcourt’s Brigade.</i> (?) 1st, 5th, 6th D.G. = -7 squadrons.</p> - -<p><i>Mansel’s Brigade.</i> (?) Blues, 3rd D.G., Royals = -6 squadrons.</p> - -<p><i>Laurie’s Brigade.</i> (certainly), Bays, Greys, Inniskillings = 6 -squadrons.</p> - -<p><i>Ralph Dundas’s Brigade.</i> 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons, -1st squadron of the Carbineers = 9 squadrons.</p> - -<p>After the death of Mansel on the 26th of April, Dundas took -over his brigade, and Colonel Vyse took Dundas’s. But the regiments -seem to have been much shifted from one brigade to another.</p> - -<p class="skip2">Calvert, pp. 197, 204. <i>Cannon’s Records</i>, Royal -Horse Guards, p. 102.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_220" href="#FNanchor_220">[220]</a> -Ditfurth, ii. 54. Craig to Nepean, 18th April 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_221" href="#FNanchor_221">[221]</a> So -say the records of the 15th Hussars. I suspect that there were two -squares with the guns between them, as at Avesnes-le-Sec on 12th -September 1793. Two squares side by side would give an appearance of -oblong shape to the formation.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_222" href="#FNanchor_222">[222]</a> -The records of the 15th Hussars for some reason seek to excuse the -slaughter of the fugitives, by mentioning that the National Convention -had decreed that no quarter should be given to the English; and this -mistake has been copied by Sir Evelyn Wood in his excellent account -of the action in <i>Achievements of Cavalry</i>. As a matter of fact the -decree was not made until the 26th of May; and three hundred men need no -excuse for taking no prisoners when attacking five thousand.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_223" href="#FNanchor_223">[223]</a> In -<i>Cannon’s Records</i> of the 3rd Dragoon guards these casualties are -ascribed to the action of the 26th of April. Whether the mistake be due -to accident or to design, it is to be regretted.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_224" href="#FNanchor_224">[224]</a> -Going over the ground, my companion and myself fixed upon a hollow about -half a mile to west of Inchy, and on the north side of the road, as the -spot where Otto concentrated his squadrons out of sight of the French. -The left flank of the French infantry, upon which the attack was opened, -we reckoned to have stood in a hollow about half a mile south-east of -Inchy. After very careful study of the ground, I put forward these -conjectures with some confidence.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_225" href="#FNanchor_225">[225]</a> -The establishment of an Austrian Cuirassier Regiment was six squadrons; -the British regiments, as originally organised in 1793, should have made -thirteen squadrons; but I imagine that losses had reduced one or other -of them to a single squadron, for both Witzleben (iii. 132) and Ditfurth -(ii. 57) give the number as six Austrian and twelve British -squadrons.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_226" href="#FNanchor_226">[226]</a> -Stewart to Dundas, 30th April; Craig to Nepean, 25th April; -Adjutant-general to Duke of York, 22nd April, 1794. These two -unfortunate battalions spent three weeks on the passage.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_227" href="#FNanchor_227">[227]</a> -York to Dundas, 6th May 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_228" href="#FNanchor_228">[228]</a> It -is curious to note that Jomini’s account makes the French force front to -the south, whereas Craig conceived of it as facing to the north; so that -evidently it was prepared to face either way.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_229" href="#FNanchor_229">[229]</a> -Witzleben, ii. 167. Memorandum of the 28th of April in <i>W.O. -Corres.</i></p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_230" href="#FNanchor_230">[230]</a> -Clerfaye (including the reinforcements from Ostend), nineteen thousand; -Walmoden at Warcoing, six thousand; Duke of York at Tournai, eighteen -thousand (Craig to Dundas, 6th May 1794). Witzleben, however, reckons -the united force at thirty thousand men only (iii. 143), and Ditfurth -gives but four thousand men to Walmoden.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_231" href="#FNanchor_231">[231]</a> -<i>Life of Lord Combermere</i>, i. 38.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_232" href="#FNanchor_232">[232]</a> -The regiments engaged were the Blues, Second, Third, Sixth Dragoon -Guards; First, Second, Sixth Dragoons; Seventh, Eleventh, Fifteenth, -Sixteenth Light Dragoons. Which were engaged throughout and which came -up as reinforcements, I have been unable to discover. The account of the -action is drawn chiefly from Calvert, <i>Journal</i>, pp. 203–205. -<i>Narrative of an Officer</i>, ii. 41. Ditfurth, ii. 75. <i>Life of -Lord Combermere</i>, i. 38–39. The first is the most important.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_233" href="#FNanchor_233">[233]</a> -Sybel, iii. 118–120. Witzleben, iii. 157–167.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_234" href="#FNanchor_234">[234]</a> -Ditfurth, ii. 90. He says actually that there was nearly room for the -full width of a company, of course in triple rank.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_235" href="#FNanchor_235">[235]</a> -Great part of the battle-field is now built over. Lille alone covers a -vast extent of it, and Roubaix and Lannoy are to all intent part and -parcel of Lille. But the general character of the ground, and in -particular its blindness, remains unchanged.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_236" href="#FNanchor_236">[236]</a> -Witzleben (iii. 197–198) considers the slowness both of Clerfaye and the -Archduke Charles on this day to have been inexcusable.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_237" href="#FNanchor_237">[237]</a> -Brigade of Guards (4 battalions); 14th, 37th, 53rd Foot, 2 Hessian and 5 -Austrian battalions; 7th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons (6 squadrons); 4 -squadrons of Austrian Hussars.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_238" href="#FNanchor_238">[238]</a> -Hamilton (<i>History of the Grenadier Guards</i>, ii. 304) says, I know -not on what authority, that the pretext for this order was that Clerfaye -required assistance. It is certain that the Austrian Headquarters had -heard nothing and knew nothing of Clerfaye’s situation at this time, so -that, if General Hamilton’s story be more than mere gossip, the order -was probably urged by Waldeck or some other of Mack’s enemies, with the -object of bringing his elaborate combinations into contempt. The fact -that the British would be the chief sufferers in case of mishap, would -rather have encouraged this faction in the Austrian Staff to the -measure.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_239" href="#FNanchor_239">[239]</a> -The <i>Gazette</i> prints this place as Bouderes; and the mistake has -been copied into many regimental histories. It is only one among -innumerable instances of the slovenliness of the clerks of the War -Office at that time.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_240" href="#FNanchor_240">[240]</a> -Not to be confounded with the village of the same name further north, on -the road from Tournai to Lannoy.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_241" href="#FNanchor_241">[241]</a> -The evidence upon this point is very conflicting. All the English -accounts state that, when the British reached Lannoy on their retreat, -the place was in possession of the French. Ditfurth, on the other hand -(ii. 133, 137 <i>seq.</i>), is very positive that it was held by the -Hessians until 1 p.m., which, in his opinion, was long after the British -would have reached it; and the evidence which he adduces is very strong. -Against this, it is certain that the British would have been only too -thankful to rally at Lannoy if they could, and that they were greatly -disappointed to find themselves cut off from it. It is also to be noted -that Ditfurth rakes up everything that he can to the discredit of the -English, but was not at the pains to read a single English account of -the action, except the Duke of York’s letter as published in the -<i>Gazette</i>, and that his account of their movements is consequently -full of errors. I incline to the opinion that the Hessians were still in -Lannoy, but that the French around them were so numerous as to cut the -British off from it—in fact, that the French practically held it -invested, with a covering force powerful enough to keep the British at a -distance. The same was the case at Roubaix, which the Sixteenth Light -Dragoons contrived to hold till Abercromby retreated, though the -Austrians, the Duke of York, and Abercromby himself all believed it to -be in the hands of the French. It still remains to be explained why the -Hessians made no sign of their presence when Abercromby’s column -approached, for the British artillerymen actually began to lay their -guns upon it in the assurance that it was in the enemy’s hands.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_242" href="#FNanchor_242">[242]</a> -There are few actions which I have found so difficult to describe as -this of the 18th of May. I have drawn my account from Witzleben, iii. -201–230; Ditfurth, ii. 130–157; Jomini; <i>Narrative of an Officer</i>, -ii. 47–51; Cannon’s <i>Records of the Seventh and Fifteenth Hussars and -Sixteenth Lancers</i>; Calvert’s <i>Journal</i>; and Craig’s letters to -Nepean of 19th May 1794 (Record Office).</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_243" href="#FNanchor_243">[243]</a> -Calvert, p. 269.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_244" href="#FNanchor_244">[244]</a> -The French brigades at this period were of the strength of -divisions.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_245" href="#FNanchor_245">[245]</a> -Jones, <i>Campaign of 1794</i>. The author was a captain in the -Fourteenth.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_246" href="#FNanchor_246">[246]</a> -Witzleben, iii. 168–169.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_247" href="#FNanchor_247">[247]</a> -Sybel, iii. 120–125. York to Dundas, 26th May 1794 (with -enclosures).</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_248" href="#FNanchor_248">[248]</a> -Captain William Parker to the Admiralty, 3rd June 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_249" href="#FNanchor_249">[249]</a> -Duke of York to Dundas, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Craig to Nepean, -10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Calvert, pp. 238–253.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_250" href="#FNanchor_250">[250]</a> -Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 171–172.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_251" href="#FNanchor_251">[251]</a> -Calvert, 277. <i>Life of Lord Lynedoch</i>, 91.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_252" href="#FNanchor_252">[252]</a> -3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 40th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th, 63rd, 87th, -89th.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_253" href="#FNanchor_253">[253]</a> -Moira to Dundas and to Nepean, 26th June 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_254" href="#FNanchor_254">[254]</a> -Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June, 2nd July; Craig to Nepean, 27th June; -Moira to Dundas, 28th and 29th June, 1st July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_255" href="#FNanchor_255">[255]</a> -York to Dundas, 2nd and 3rd July; Dundas to Diepenbrock, 3rd and 7th -July; Diepenbrock to Dundas, 5th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_256" href="#FNanchor_256">[256]</a> -Coburg to York, 7th and 8th July; York to Coburg, 7th July; to Dundas, -7th and 10th July; Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_257" href="#FNanchor_257">[257]</a> -Sybel, iii. 150–152, 171. Craig to Nepean, 4th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_258" href="#FNanchor_258">[258]</a> -York to Dundas, 15th, 19th, 20th, 23rd July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_259" href="#FNanchor_259">[259]</a> -<i>Narrative of an Officer of the Guards</i>, ii. 35.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_260" href="#FNanchor_260">[260]</a> -Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_261" href="#FNanchor_261">[261]</a> -Cornwallis to Dundas, 8th and 18th June 1794, and see <i>Cornwallis -Correspondence</i>, ii. 239–255; <i>Malmesbury Correspondence</i>; -<i>Dropmore Papers</i>, ii. 564–566, 577, 592, 594.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_262" href="#FNanchor_262">[262]</a> -Sybel, iii. 240–243.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_263" href="#FNanchor_263">[263]</a> -Poisson, iv. 262.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_264" href="#FNanchor_264">[264]</a> -Ditfurth, iii. 217.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_265" href="#FNanchor_265">[265]</a> -<span class="smcap"> Cavalry—</span></p> - -<p class="ob5"> -<i>David Dundas’s Brigade</i>—2nd, 6th D.G.; 2nd, 6th D.<br /> -<i>Ralph Dundas’s Brigade</i>—Blues; 3rd, 5th D.G.; 1st D.<br /> -<i>Laurie’s Brigade</i>—7th, 11th, 15th, 16th L.D.<br /> -<i>Vyse’s Brigade</i>—1st D.G.; 8th, 14th L.D.<br /> -</p> - -<p class="ob6 italic">Foreign Troops—</p> - -<p class="ob7">Uhlans Britanniques, Irving’s Hussars, Choiseul’s Hussars.</p> - -<p class="ob8 smcap">Infantry—</p> - -<p class="ob5"> -<i>First Brigade</i>—3rd, 88th, 63rd.<br /> -<i>Second Brigade</i>—8th,<span class="fnanchor">[266]</span> -44th,<span class="fnanchor">[266]</span> - 33rd.<span class="fnanchor">[266]</span><br /> -<i>Third Brigade</i>—12th,<span class="fnanchor">[266]</span> -55th,<span class="fnanchor">[266]</span> 38th.<br /> -<i>Fourth Brigade</i>—14th, 53rd, 37th.<br /> -<i>Fifth Brigade</i>—19th, 54th, 42nd.<br /> -<i>Sixth Brigade</i>—27th, 89th, 28th.<br /> -<i>Seventh Brigade</i>—40th,<span class="fnanchor">[266]</span> -57th, 59th, 87th. -</p> - -<p class="ob6 italic">Foreign Troops—</p> - -<p class="ob7"> -Loyal Emigrants, York Rangers, Rohan’s Regiment.</p> - -<p class="ob9">[266] The flank companies of these battalions were in -the West Indies.</p> - -<table summary="Order of battle 1793"> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td class="tdc">Officers</td> - <td class="tdc"> N.C.O.’s and men.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">British Cavalry</td> - <td class="tdr">165</td> - <td class="tdr">4,350</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Hanoverians and Hessians</td> - <td class= "tdr">168</td> - <td class="tdr">2,939</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Total Cavalry</td> - <td class="tdr">333</td> - <td class="tdr">7,289</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">British Infantry</td> - <td class="tdr">583</td> - <td class="tdr">21,170</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Hanoverians and Hessians</td> - <td class="tdr">322</td> - <td class="tdr">8,722</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl">Total</td> - <td class="tdr">1,238</td> - <td class="tdr">37,181</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p class="noindent skip2">Total of all arms, including artillery, etc., -say, 1300 officers, 40,000 N.C.O.’s and men.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_267" href="#FNanchor_267">[267]</a> -Craig to Nepean, 5th August 1794; Ditfurth, ii. 213 <i>seq.</i>; -Memorandum of the Duke of York, 23rd December 1794; Calvert, pp. -385–386; see vol. ii. of this <i>History</i>, p. 88.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_268" href="#FNanchor_268">[268]</a> No -officer could hope to master these mysteries without the help of two fat -little duodecimo volumes called <i>The Regimental Companion</i>, and a -third and slighter volume entitled <i>Military Finance</i>.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_269" href="#FNanchor_269">[269]</a> -Craig to Nepean, 31st August; Craig’s Memorandum of 23rd December -1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_270" href="#FNanchor_270">[270]</a> -<i>Sunday Reformer</i>, 29th December 1793.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_271" href="#FNanchor_271">[271]</a> -Craig to Nepean, 12th and 31st August, 5th and 8th September 1794. The -class of medical officer obtained by Government is described in -<i>Autobiography of Sir J. M’Grigor</i>, pp. 93, 94.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_272" href="#FNanchor_272">[272]</a> -York to Dundas, 25th, 27th, 30th July, 1st and 6th August; Craig to -Nepean, 25th July 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_273" href="#FNanchor_273">[273]</a> -Its flank companies, and those of the 34th, were detained for the West -Indies.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_274" href="#FNanchor_274">[274]</a> -Dundas to Mulgrave, 7th and 13th August; Mulgrave to Dundas, 17th, 19th, -26th, 30th August, 3rd September; Dundas to York, 22nd August 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_275" href="#FNanchor_275">[275]</a> On -the 29th of August the Duke reorganised his force as follows:</p> - -<table class="skip3" summary="The Duke's Reorganised Force"> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"> - <i>First Brigade</i>—Maj.-gen. Stewart, </td> - <td class="tdl">3rd, 40th, 55th, 59th, 89th.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><i>Second Brigade</i>—</td> - <td class="tdl">8th, 27th, 28th, 57th.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><i>Third Brigade</i>—</td> - <td class="tdl">12th, 33rd, 42nd, 44th.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><i>Fourth Brigade</i>—Maj.-gen. Fox,</td> - <td class="tdl">14th, 37th, 38th, 63rd.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl"><i>Fifth Brigade</i>—</td> - <td class="tdl">19th, 53rd, 54th, 88th.</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_276" href="#FNanchor_276">[276]</a> -Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_277" href="#FNanchor_277">[277]</a> -The Bommeler Waert is the triangular tongue of land enclosed between the -Waal and the Meuse immediately to the east of Gorkum. It is very nearly -an island, the entrance to it from the east being very narrow and -defended by a fort, then, as now, called Fort St. Andries.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_278" href="#FNanchor_278">[278]</a> -York to Dundas, 19th, 21st, 22nd September (enclosing correspondence -with Clerfaye); Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_279" href="#FNanchor_279">[279]</a> -Craig to Nepean, 20th September 1794. Sybel, iii. 432 <i>note</i>. From -this it appears that all documentary evidence of the agreement has been -carefully destroyed, but that there is a hint of secret negotiations -actually proceeding on the 18th of September 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_280" href="#FNanchor_280">[280]</a> -York to Dundas, 25th and 29th September, 1st and 3rd October; Craig to -Nepean, 1st October; Grenville to York, 25th September 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_281" href="#FNanchor_281">[281]</a> -Dundas to York, 10th, 12th, 16th, 18th October; York to Dundas, 16th, -18th, 23rd October 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_282" href="#FNanchor_282">[282]</a> -Craig explained that this was owing chiefly to the inexperience of a -young Colonel. Thus the army-brokers had contrived to lift children to -the command even of regiments that had been eighteen months on active -service.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_283" href="#FNanchor_283">[283]</a> -The troops engaged were the 15th Light Dragoons, 8th, 27th, 28th, 55th, -63rd, 78th. The last-named regiment, together with the 80th, had arrived -at Flushing at the end of September, when Dundas intended to withdraw -some of the older regiments for service in the West Indies.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_284" href="#FNanchor_284">[284]</a> -York to Dundas, 7th and 11th November; Craig to Nepean, 10th November -1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_285" href="#FNanchor_285">[285]</a> -<i>Narrative of an Officer of the Guards</i>, ii. 89–91; York to Dundas, -27th November 1794; Harcourt to York, 15th December 1794.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_286" href="#FNanchor_286">[286]</a> -Ditfurth, who never loses an opportunity of abusing the English, of -course puts a discreditable construction upon the Duke’s departure, not -knowing that he was sent for by Ministers (ii. 313).</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_287" href="#FNanchor_287">[287]</a> -York to Dundas, 27th and 29th November; Harcourt to York 11th and -15th December 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 310.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_288" href="#FNanchor_288">[288]</a> -Dundas to Harcourt, 13th and 24th December; Harcourt to Dundas, -23rd December; to York, 25th and 29th December; Walmoden to York, -22nd, 25th, 29th December 1794, 1st January 1795. The regiments -engaged in the action were the 19th, 33rd, 42nd, 78th, 80th.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_289" href="#FNanchor_289">[289]</a> -Jones, <i>Campaign of 1794</i>, pp. 171–175; Ditfurth, ii. 362 -<i>sq.</i>; <i>Narrative of an Officer of the Guards</i>, ii. -100–104.</p> - -<p class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_290" href="#FNanchor_290">[290]</a> -15th Light Dragoons; 27th, 28th, 80th, and 84th Foot.</p> <p -class="fnote"><a id="Footnote_291" href="#FNanchor_291">[291]</a> -Walmoden to York, 3rd February; Harcourt to York (three letters), -11th February 1795.</p> - -</div> <!-- End of footnotes --> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS 1690-1794 ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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