diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/67310-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/67310-0.txt | 12305 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 12305 deletions
diff --git a/old/67310-0.txt b/old/67310-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a36a803..0000000 --- a/old/67310-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12305 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of British Campaigns in Flanders -1690-1794, by John William Fortescue - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794 - Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army" - -Author: John William Fortescue - -Release Date: February 3, 2022 [eBook #67310] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, David Tipple and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS -1690-1794 *** - -Transcriber’s Notes: - - Underscores are used to enclose text in italics; the three words that - end this sentence _are in italics_. - - Equals signs are used to enclose text in bold face; the four words - that end this sentence =are in bold face=. - - The 291 footnotes in the source book have been changed into endnotes. - Each endnote is labelled by a copy of its marker which consists of a - number in square brackets. - - There are 439 sidenotes. Sidenotes are enclosed by black diamond - symbols, for example, ◆July 24./Aug. 3.◆. - - Many of the 439 sidenotes consist of two dates, separated by a dash; - the first date is taken from the Julian Calendar and the second from - the Gregorian Calendar. The dates in such a pair differ by 10 days - in the 17th century and by 11 days in the 18th century. - - - - - BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS - - - - - [Illustration] - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MADRAS - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO - DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - - BRITISH CAMPAIGNS - IN FLANDERS - 1690–1794 - - BEING EXTRACTS FROM - “A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY” - - BY - THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON - 1918 - - - - - COPYRIGHT - - - - - PREFACE - - -This volume consists simply of extracts reprinted from my _History of -the British Army_. It is published in order that the troops at the -front may, if they wish it, study the experiences of their forerunners -in the Low Countries in a book which is fairly portable and fairly -inexpensive, though neither so cheap nor so compendious as _The British -Soldiers’ Guide to Northern France and Flanders_. - - J. W. F. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - PAGE - WILLIAM III.’S CAMPAIGNS 1–37 - - MARLBOROUGH’S CAMPAIGNS— - - 1701–2 38 - - 1705 51 - - 1706 (RAMILLIES) 62 - - 1707–8 (OUDENARDE) 77 - - 1709 (MALPLAQUET) 103 - - 1711 122 - - WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION— - - CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–5 (FONTENOY) 133 - - CAMPAIGNS OF 1746–7 (LAUFFELD, ROUCOUX) 158 - - WAR OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 177 - - CAMPAIGN OF 1793 (LINSELLES) 207 - - PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794 261 - - CAMPAIGN OF 1794 (VILLERS-EN-CAUCHIES, - BEAUMONT, WILLEMS, TOURCOING) 295 - - CAMPAIGN OF 1794 (_Continued_) 343 - - END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794 366 - - - - - MAPS AND PLANS - - - PAGE - Steenkirk, 23rd July (3rd Aug.) 1692 13 - - Landen, 19th (29th) July 1693 27 - - Lines of the Geete, 7th (18th) July 1705 55 - - Ramillies, 12th (23rd) May 1706 67 - - Oudenarde, 30th June (11th July) 1708 85 - - Malplaquet, 31st Aug. (11th Sept.) 1709 111 - - The Campaign of 1711 125 - - Fontenoy, 30th April (11th May) 1745 143 - - Roucoux, 30th Sept, (11th Oct.) 1746 163 - - Lauffeld, 21st June (2nd July) 1747 171 - - Attack of the Allies on the Camp of Famars, 23rd May 1793 217 - - Dunkirk and Environs, showing the Position of the Allies - from 24th Aug. to 6th Sept. 1793 237 - - Campaign of April 1794 299 - - Avesnes-le-Sec, 12th Sept. 1793; Villers-en-Cauchies, - 24th April 1794; Beaumont, 26th April 1794 303 - - Willems, 10th May 1794 319 - - The Netherlands in the 18th Century _At end_ - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER II - - -I pass now to Flanders, which is about to become for the second time -the training ground of the British Army. The judicious help sent by -Lewis the Fourteenth to Ireland had practically diverted the entire -strength of William to that quarter for two whole campaigns; and -though, as has been seen, there were English in Flanders in 1689 and -1690, the contingents which they furnished were too small and the -operations too trifling to warrant description in detail. After the -battle of the Boyne the case was somewhat altered, for, though a large -force was still required in Ireland for Ginkell’s final pacification -of 1691, William was none the less at liberty to take the field in -Flanders in person. ◆1690. October.◆ Moreover, Parliament with great -good-will had voted seventy thousand men for the ensuing year, of which -fully fifty thousand were British,[1] so that England was about to -put forth her strength in Europe on a scale unknown since the loss of -Calais. - -But first a short space must be devoted to the theatre of war, where -England was to meet and break down the overweening power of France. -Few studies are more difficult, even to the professed student, than -that of the old campaigns in Flanders, and still fewer more hopeless of -simplification to the ordinary reader. Nevertheless, however desperate -the task, an effort must be made once for all to give a broad idea of -the scene of innumerable great actions. - -Taking his stand on the northern frontier of France and looking -northward, the reader will note three great rivers running through the -country before him in, roughly speaking, three parallel semicircles, -from south-east to north-west. These are, from east to west, the -Moselle, which is merged in the Rhine at Coblentz, the Meuse, and the -Scheldt, all three of which discharge themselves into the great delta -whereof the southern key is Antwerp. But for the present let the reader -narrow the field from the Meuse in the east to the sea in the west, -and let him devote his attention first to the Meuse. He will see that, -a little to the north of the French frontier, it picks up a large -tributary from the south-west, the Sambre, which runs past Maubeuge and -Charleroi and joins the Meuse at Namur. Thence the united rivers flow -on past the fortified towns of Huy, Liège, and Maestricht to the sea. -But let the reader’s northern boundary on the Meuse for the present be -Maestricht, and let him note another river which rises a little to the -west of Maestricht and runs almost due west past Arschot and Mechlin to -the sea at Antwerp. Let this river, the Demer, be his northern, and the -Meuse from Maestricht to Namur his eastern, boundary. - -Returning to the south, let him note a river rising immediately to the -west of Charleroi, the Haine, which joins the Scheldt at Tournay, and -let him draw a line from Tournay westward through Lille and Ypres to -the sea at Dunkirk. Let this line from Dunkirk to Charleroi be carried -eastward to Namur; and there is his southern boundary. His western -boundary is, of course, the sea. Within this quadrilateral, Antwerp (or -more strictly speaking the mouth of the Scheldt), Dunkirk, Namur, and -Maestricht, lies the most famous fighting-ground of Europe. - -Glancing at it on the map, the reader will see that this quadrilateral -is cut by a number of rivers running parallel to each other from south -to north, and flowing into the main streams of the Demer and the -Scheldt. The first of these, beginning from the east, are the Great and -Little Geete, which become one before they join the main stream. It is -worth while to pause for a moment over this little slip of land between -the Geete and the Meuse. We shall see much of Namur, Huy, Liège, and -Maestricht, which command the navigation of the greater river, but we -shall see still more of the Geete, and of two smaller streams, the -Jaar and the Mehaigne, which rise almost in the same table-land with -it. On the Lower Jaar, close to Maestricht, stands the village of -Lauffeld, which shall be better known to us fifty years hence. On the -Little Geete, just above its junction with its greater namesake, are -the villages of Neerwinden and Landen. In the small space between the -heads of the Geete and the Mehaigne lies the village of Ramillies. For -this network of streams is the protection against an enemy that would -threaten the navigation of the Meuse from the north and west, and the -barrier of Spanish Flanders against invasion from the east; and the -ground is rich with the corpses and fat with the blood of men. - -The next stream to westward is the Dyle, which flows past Louvain to -the Demer, and gives its name, after the junction, to that river. The -next in order is the Senne, which flows past Park and Hal and Brussels -to the same main stream. At the head of the Senne stands the village of -Steenkirk; midway between the Dyle and Senne are the forest of Soignies -and the field of Waterloo. - -Here the tributaries of the Demer come to an end, but the row of -parallel streams is continued by the tributaries of another system, -that of the Scheldt. Easternmost of these, and next in order to the -Senne, is the Dender, which rises near Leuse and flows past Ath and -Alost to the Scheldt at Dendermond. Next comes the Scheldt itself, -with the Scarpe and the Haine, its tributaries, which it carries past -Tournay and Oudenarde to Ghent, and to the sea at Antwerp. Westernmost -of all, the Lys runs past St. Venant, where in Cromwell’s time we -saw Sir Thomas Morgan and his immortal six thousand, past Menin and -Courtrai, and is merged in the Scheldt at Ghent. - -The whole extent of the quadrilateral is about one hundred miles long -by fifty broad, with a great waterway to the west, a second to the -east, and a third, whereof the key is Ghent, roughly speaking midway -between them. The earth, fruitful by nature and enriched by art, bears -food for man and beast; the waterways provide transport for stores and -ammunition. It was a country where men could kill each other without -being starved, and hence for centuries the cockpit of Europe. - -A glance at any old map of Flanders shows how thickly studded was this -country with walled towns of less or greater strength, and explains why -a war in Flanders should generally have been a war of sieges. Every one -of these little towns, of course, had its garrison; and the manœuvres -of contending forces were governed very greatly by the effort, on one -side, to release these garrisons for active service in the field, and, -on the other, to keep them confined within their walls for as long -as possible. Hence it is obvious that an invading army necessarily -enjoyed a great advantage, since it menaced the fortresses of the enemy -while its own were unthreatened. Thus ten thousand men on the Upper -Lys could paralyse thrice their number in Ghent and Bruges and the -adjacent towns. On the other hand, if an invading general contemplated -the siege of an important town, he manœuvred to entice the garrison -into the field before he laid siege in form. Still, once set down to a -great siege, an army was stationary, and the bare fact was sufficient -to liberate hostile garrisons all over the country; and hence arose the -necessity of a second army to cover the besieging force. The skill and -subtlety manifested by great generals to compass these different ends -is unfortunately only to be apprehended by closer study than can be -expected of any but the military student. - -A second cause contributed not a little to increase the taste for a -war of sieges, namely, the example of France, then the first military -nation in Europe.[2] The Court of Versailles was particularly fond of -a siege, since it could attend the ceremony in state and take nominal -charge of the operations with much glory and little discomfort or -danger. The French passion for rule and formula also found a happy -outlet in the conduct of a siege, for, while there is no nation more -brilliant or more original, particularly in military affairs, there is -also none that is more conceited or pedantic. The craving for sieges -among the French was so great that the King took pains, by the grant of -extra pay and rations, to render this species of warfare popular with -his soldiers.[3] - -Again, it must be remembered that the object of a campaign in those -days was not necessarily to seek out an enemy and beat him. There -were two alternatives prescribed by the best authorities, namely, -to fight at an advantage or to subsist comfortably.[4] Comfortable -subsistence meant at its best subsistence at an enemy’s expense. A -campaign wherein an army lived on the enemy’s country and destroyed -all that it could not consume was eminently successful, even though -not a shot was fired. To force an enemy to consume his own supplies -was much, to compel him to supply his opponent was more, to take up -winter-quarters in his territory was very much more. Thus to enter an -enemy’s borders and keep him marching backwards and forwards for weeks -without giving him a chance of striking a blow, was in itself no small -success, and success of a kind which galled inferior generals, such as -William of Orange, to desperation and so to disaster. The tendency to -these negative campaigns was heightened once more by French example. -The French ministry of war interfered with its generals to an extent -that was always dangerous, and eventually proved calamitous. Nominally -the marshal commanding-in-chief in the field was supreme; but the -intendant or head of the administrative service, though he received his -orders from the marshal, was instructed by the King to forward those -orders at once by special messenger to Louvois, and not to execute -them without the royal authority. Great commanders such as Luxemburg -had the strength from time to time to kick themselves free from this -bondage, but the rest, embarrassed by the surveillance of an inferior -officer, preferred to live as long as possible in an enemy’s country -without risking a general action. It was left to Marlborough to advance -triumphant in one magnificent campaign from the Meuse to the sea. - -Next, a glance must be thrown at the contending parties. The defenders -of the Spanish Netherlands, for they cannot be called the assailants -of France, were confederate allies from a number of independent -states—England, Holland, Spain, the Empire, sundry states of Germany, -and Denmark, all somewhat selfish, few very efficient, and none, except -the first, very punctual. From such a heterogeneous collection swift, -secret, and united action was not to be expected. King William held the -command-in-chief, and, from his position as the soul of the alliance, -was undoubtedly the fittest for the post. But though he had carefully -studied the art of war, and though his phlegmatic temperament found its -only genuine pleasure in the excitement of the battlefield, he was not -a great general. He could form good plans, and up to a certain point -could execute them, but up to a certain point only. It should seem that -his physical weakness debarred him from steady and sustained effort. -He was strangely incapable of conducting a campaign with equal ability -throughout; he would manœuvre admirably for weeks, and forfeit all the -advantage that he had gained by the carelessness of a single day. In -a general action, of which he was fonder than most commanders of his -time, he never shone except in virtue of conspicuous personal bravery. -He lacked tactical instinct, and above all he lacked patience; in a -word, to use a modern phrase, he was a very clever amateur. - -France, on the other hand, possessed the finest and strongest army in -Europe,—well equipped, well trained, well organised, and inured to -work by countless campaigns. She had a single man in supreme control -of affairs, King Lewis the Fourteenth; a great war-minister, Louvois; -one really great general, Luxemburg; and one with flashes of genius, -Boufflers. Moreover, she possessed a line of posts in Spanish Flanders -extending from Dunkirk to the Meuse. On the Lys she had Aire and -Menin; on the Scarpe, Douay; on the Upper Scheldt, Cambray, Bouchain, -Valenciennes, and Condé; on the Sambre, Maubeuge; between Sambre and -Meuse, Philippeville and Marienburg; and on the Meuse, Dinant. Further, -in the one space where the frontier was not covered by a friendly -river, between the sea and the Scheldt, the French had constructed -fortified lines from the sea to Menin and from thence to the Scheldt -at Espierre. Thus with their frontier covered, with a place of arms on -every river, with secrecy and with unity of purpose, the French enjoyed -the approximate certainty of being able to take the field in every -campaign before the Allies could be collected to oppose them. - -◆1691.◆ - -The campaign of 1691 happily typifies the relative positions of the -combatants in almost every respect. The French concentrated ten -thousand men on the Lys. This was sufficient to paralyse all the -garrisons of the Allies on and about the river. They posted another -corps on the Moselle, which threatened the territory of Cleves. Now -Cleves was the property of the Elector of Brandenburg, and it was -not to be expected that he should allow his contingent of troops to -join King William at the general rendezvous at Brussels, and suffer -the French to play havoc among his possessions. Thus the Prussian -contingent likewise was paralysed. So while William was still ordering -his troops to concentrate at Brussels, Boufflers, who had been making -preparations all the winter, suddenly marched up from Maubeuge and, -before William was aware that he was in motion, had besieged Mons. The -fortress presently surrendered after a feeble resistance, and the line -of the Allies’ frontier between the Scheldt and Sambre was broken. -William moved down from Brussels across the Sambre in the hope of -recovering the lost town, outmanœuvred Luxemburg, who was opposed to -him, and for three days held the recapture of Mons in the hollow of -his hand. He wasted those three days in an aimless halt; Luxemburg -recovered himself by an extraordinary march; and William, finding that -there was no alternative before him but to retire to Brussels and -remain inactive, handed over the command to an incompetent officer and -returned to England. Luxemburg then closed the campaign by a brilliant -action of cavalry, which scattered the horse of the Allies to the four -winds. As no British troops except the Life Guards were present, and as -they at any rate did not disgrace themselves, it is unnecessary to say -more of the combat of Leuse. It had, however, one remarkable effect: -it increased William’s dread of the French cavalry, already morbidly -strong, to such a pitch as to lead him subsequently to a disastrous -military blunder. - -The campaign of 1691 was therefore decidedly unfavourable to the -Allies, but there was ground for hope that all might be set right -in 1692. The Treasurer, Godolphin, was nervously apprehensive that -Parliament might be unwilling to vote money for an English army in -Flanders; but the Commons cheerfully granted a total of sixty-six -thousand men, British and foreign; which, after deduction of garrisons -for the safety of the British Isles, left forty thousand free to cross -the German Ocean. - -◆1692.◆ - -Of these, twenty-three thousand were British, the most important -force that England had sent to the Continent since the days of King -Henry the Eighth. The organisation was remarkably like that of the -New Model. William was, of course, Commander-in-Chief, and under him -were a general of horse and a general of foot, with a due allowance -of lieutenant-generals, major-generals, and brigadiers. There is, -however, no sign of an officer in command of artillery or engineers, -nor any of a commissary in charge of the transport.[5] The one -strangely conspicuous functionary is the Secretary-at-War, who in -this and the following campaigns for the last time accompanied the -Commander-in-Chief on active service. But the most significant feature -in the list of the staff is the omission of the name of Marlborough. -Originally included among the generals for Flanders, he had been struck -off the roll, and dismissed from all public employment, in disgrace, -before the opening of the campaign. Though this dismissal did not want -justification, it was perhaps of all William’s blunders the greatest. - -As usual, the French were beforehand with the Allies in opening the -campaign. They had already broken the line of the defending fortresses -by the capture of Mons; they now designed to make the breach still -wider. All through the winter a vast siege-train was collecting on the -Scheldt and Meuse, with Vauban, first of living engineers, in charge -of it. ◆May.◆ In May all was ready. Marshal Joyeuse, with one corps, -was on the Moselle, as in the previous year, to hold the Brandenburgers -in check. Boufflers, with eighteen thousand men, lay on the right bank -of the Meuse, near Dinant; Luxemburg, with one hundred and fifteen -thousand more, stood in rear of the river Haine. ◆May 10/20.◆ On the -20th of May, King Lewis in person reviewed the grand army; ◆May 13/23.◆ -on the 23rd it marched for Namur; ◆May 16/26.◆ and on the 26th it had -wound itself round two sides of the town, while Boufflers, moving up -from Dinant, completed the circuit on the third side. Thus Namur was -completely invested; unless William could save it, the line of the -Sambre and one of the most important fortresses on the Meuse were lost -to the Allies. - -William, to do him justice, had strained every nerve to spur his -indolent allies to be first in the field. The contingents, awaked -by the sudden stroke at Namur, came in fast to Brussels; but it was -too late. The French had destroyed all forage and supplies on the -direct route to Namur, and William’s only way to the city lay across -the Mehaigne. Behind the Mehaigne lay Luxemburg, the ablest of the -French generals. The best of luck was essential to William’s success, -and instead of the best came the worst. Heavy rain swelled the -narrow stream into a broad flood, and the building of bridges became -impossible. There was beautiful fencing, skilful feint, and more -skilful parry, between the two generals, but William could not get -under Luxemburg’s guard. ◆May 26./June 5.◆ On the 5th of June, after a -discreditably short defence, Namur fell, almost before William’s eyes, -into the hands of the French. - -Then Luxemburg thought it time to draw the enemy away from the vicinity -of the captured city; so recrossing the Sambre, and keeping Boufflers -always between himself and that river, he marched for the Senne as if -to threaten Brussels. William followed, as in duty bound; and French -and Allies pursued a parallel course to the Senne, William on the north -and Luxemburg on the south. ◆July 23./Aug. 2.◆ The 2nd of August found -both armies across the Senne, William at Hal, facing west with the -river in his rear, and Luxemburg some five miles south of him with his -right at Steenkirk, and his centre between Hoves and Enghien, while -Boufflers lay at Manny St. Jean, seven miles in his rear. - -The terrible state of the roads owing to heavy rain had induced -Luxemburg to leave most of his artillery at Mons; and, as he had -designed merely to tempt the Allies away from Namur, the principal -object left to him was to take up a strong position wherein his worn -and harassed army could watch the enemy without fear of attack. Such -a position he thought that he had found at Steenkirk.[6] The country -at this point is more broken and rugged than is usual in Belgium. The -camp lay on high ground, with its right resting on the river Sennette -and its fight front covered by a ravine, which gradually fades away -northward into a high plateau of about a mile in extent. Beyond the -ravine was a network of wooded defiles, through which Luxemburg seems -to have hoped that no enemy could fall upon him in force unawares. It -so happened, however, that one of his most useful spies was detected, -in his true character, in William’s camp at Hal; and this was an -opportunity not to be lost. A pistol was held to the spy’s head, and -he was ordered to write a letter to Luxemburg, announcing that large -bodies of the enemy would be in motion next morning, but that nothing -more serious was contemplated than a foraging expedition. This done, -William laid his plans to surprise his enemy on the morrow. - -[Illustration: - - STEENKIRK - July 24rd./Aug. 3rd. 1692. - -_Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆July 24./Aug. 3.◆ - -An hour before daybreak the advanced guard of William’s army fell -silently into its ranks, together with a strong force of pioneers to -clear the way for a march through the woods. This force consisted of -the First Guards, the Royal Scots, the Twenty-first, Fitzpatrick’s -regiment of Fusiliers, and two Danish regiments of great reputation, -the whole under the command of the Duke of Würtemberg. Presently they -moved away, and, as the sun rose, the whole army followed them in two -columns, without sound of drum or trumpet, towards Steenkirk. French -patrols scouring the country in the direction of Tubise saw the two -long lines of scarlet and white and blue wind away into the woods, and -reported what they had witnessed at headquarters; but Luxemburg, sickly -of constitution, and, in spite of his occasional energy, indolent -of temperament, rejoiced to think that, as his spy had told him, it -was no more than a foraging party. Another patrol presently sent in -another message that a large force of cavalry was advancing towards the -Sennette. Once more Luxemburg lulled himself into security with the -same comfort. - -Meanwhile the allied army was trailing through narrow defiles and -cramped close ground, till at last it emerged from the stifling woods -into an open space. Here it halted, as the straitness of the ground -demanded, in dense, heavy masses. But the advanced guard moved on -steadily till it reached the woods over against Steenkirk, where -Würtemberg disposed it for the coming attack. On his left the Bois de -Feuilly covered a spur of the same plateau as that occupied by the -French right, and there he stationed the English Guards and the two -battalions of Danes. To the right of these, but separated from them by -a ravine, he placed the three remaining British battalions in the Bois -de Zoulmont. His guns he posted, some between the two woods, and the -remainder on the right of his division. These dispositions complete, -the advanced party awaited orders to open the attack. - -It was now eleven o’clock. Luxemburg had left his bed and had ridden -out to a commanding height on his extreme right, when a third letter -was brought to him that the Allies were certainly advancing in force. -He read it, and looking to his front, saw the red coats of the Guards -moving through the wood before him, while beyond them he caught a -glimpse of the dense masses of the main body. Instantly he saw the -danger, and divined that William’s attack was designed against his -right. His own camp was formed, according to rule, with the cavalry on -the wings; and there was nothing in position to check the Allies but -a single brigade of infantry, famous under the name of Bourbonnois, -which was quartered in advance of the cavalry’s camp on his extreme -right. Moreover, nothing was ready, not a horse was bridled, not a man -standing to his arms. He despatched a messenger to summon Boufflers -to his aid, and in a few minutes was flying through the camp with his -staff, energetic but perfectly self-possessed, to set his force in -order of battle. The two battalions of Bourbonnois fell in hastily -before their camp, with a battery of six guns before them. The dragoons -of the right wing dismounted and hastened to seal up the space between -Bourbonnois and the Sennette. The horse of the right was collected, -and some of it sent off in hot speed to the left to bring the infantry -up behind them on their horses’ croups. All along the line the alarm -was given, drums were beating, men snatching hastily at their arms and -falling into their ranks ready to file away to the right. Such was the -haste, that there was no time to think of regimental precedence, a very -serious matter in the French army, and each successive brigade hurried -into the place where it was most needed, as it happened to come up. - -Meanwhile Würtemberg’s batteries had opened fire, and a cunning officer -of the Royal Scots was laying his guns with admirable precision. French -batteries hastened into position to reply to them with as deadly an -aim, and for an hour and a half the rival guns thundered against each -other unceasingly. All this time the French battalions kept massing -themselves thicker and thicker on Luxemburg’s right, and the front line -was working with desperate haste, felling trees, making breastworks, -and lining the hedges and copses while yet they might. But still -Würtemberg’s division remained unsupported, and the precious minutes -flew fast. William, or his staff for him, had made a serious blunder. -Intent though he was on fighting a battle with his infantry only, he -had put all the cavalry of one wing of his army before them on the -march, so that there was no room for the infantry to pass. Fortunately -six battalions had been intermixed with the squadrons of this wing, -and these were now with some difficulty disentangled and sent forward. -Cutts’s, Mackay’s, Lauder’s, and the Twenty-sixth formed up on -Würtemberg’s right, with the Sixth and Twenty-fifth in support; and at -last, at half-past twelve, Würtemberg gave the order to attack. - -His little force shook itself up and pressed forward with eagerness. -The Guards and Danes on the extreme left, being on the same ridge with -the enemy, were the first that came into action. Pushing on under a -terrible fire at point-blank range from the French batteries, they fell -upon Bourbonnois and the dragoons, beat them back, captured their guns, -and turned them against the enemy. On their right the Royal Scots, -Twenty-first, and Fitzpatrick’s plunged down into the ravine into -closer and more difficult ground, past copses and hedges and thickets, -until a single thick fence alone divided them from the enemy. Through -this they fired at each other furiously for a time, till the Scots -burst through the fence with their Colonel at their head, and swept the -French before them. Still further to the right, the remaining regiments -came also into action; muzzle met muzzle among the branches, and the -slaughter was terrible. Young Angus, still not yet of age, dropped -dead at the head of the Cameronians, and the veteran Mackay found the -death which he had missed at Killiecrankie. He had before the attack -sent word to General Count Solmes, that the contemplated assault could -lead only to waste of life; and he had been answered with the order to -advance. “God’s will be done,” he said calmly, and he was among the -first that fell. - -Still the British, in spite of all losses, pressed furiously on; and -famous French regiments, spoiled children of victory, wavered and gave -way before them. Bourbonnois, unable to face the Guards and Danes, -doubled its left battalion in rear of its right; Chartres, which -stood next to them, also gave way and doubled itself in rear of its -neighbour Orléans. A wide gap was thus torn in the first French line, -but not a regiment of the second line would step into it. The colonel -of the brigade in rear of it ordered, entreated, implored his men to -come forward, but they would not follow him into that terrible fire. -Suddenly the wild voice ceased, and the gesticulating figure fell in -a heap to the ground: the colonel had been shot dead, and the gap was -still unfilled. - -The first French line was broken; the second and third were dismayed -and paralysed: a little more and the British would carry the French -camp. Luxemburg perceived that this was a moment when only his best -troops could save him. In the fourth line stood the flower of his -infantry, the seven battalions of French and Swiss Guards. These -were now ordered forward to the gap; the princes of the blood placed -themselves at their head, and without firing a shot they charged down -the slope upon the British and Danes. The English Guards, thinned to -half their numbers, faced the huge columns of the Swiss and stood -up to them undaunted, till by sheer weight they were slowly rolled -back. On their right the Royal Scots also were forced back, fighting -desperately from hedge to hedge and contesting every inch of ground. -Once, the French made a dash through a fence and carried off one of -their colours. The Colonel, Sir Robert Douglas, instantly turned back -alone through the fence, recaptured the colour, and was returning with -it when he was struck by a bullet. He flung the flag over to his men -and fell to the ground dead. - -Slowly the twelve battalions retired, still fighting furiously at every -step. So fierce had been their onslaught that five lines of infantry -backed by two more of cavalry[7] had hardly sufficed to stop them, -and with but a little support they might have won the day. But that -support was not forthcoming. Message after message had been sent to -the Dutch general, Count Solmes, for reinforcements, but there came -not a man. The main body, as has been told, was all clubbed together -a mile and a half from the scene of action, with the infantry in the -rear; and Solmes, with almost criminal folly, instead of endeavouring -to extricate the foot, had ordered forward the horse. William rectified -the error as soon as he could; but the correction led to further delay -and to the increased confusion which is the inevitable result of -contradictory orders. The English infantry in rear, mad with impatience -to rescue their comrades, ran forward in disorder, probably with loud -curses on the Dutchman who had kept them back so long; and some time -was lost before they could be re-formed. Discipline was evidently a -little at fault. Solmes lost both his head and his temper. “Damn the -English,” he growled; “if they are so fond of fighting, let them have -a bellyful”; and he sent forward not a man. Fortunately junior officers -took matters into their own hands; and it was time, for Boufflers -had now arrived on the field to throw additional weight into the -French scale. The English Horse-grenadiers, the Fourth Dragoons, and -a regiment of Dutch dragoons rode forward and, dismounting, covered -the retreat of the Guards and Danes by a brilliant counter-attack. The -Buffs and Tenth advanced farther to the right, and holding their fire -till within point-blank range, poured in a volley which gave time for -the rest of Würtemberg’s division to withdraw. A demonstration against -the French left made a further diversion, and the shattered fragments -of the attacking force, grimed with sweat and smoke, fell back to the -open ground in rear of the woods, repulsed but unbeaten, and furious -with rage. - -William, it is said, could not repress a cry of anguish when he -saw them; but there was no time for emotion. Some Dutch and Danish -infantry was sent forward to check further advance of the enemy, and -preparations were made for immediate retreat. Once again the hardest -of the work was entrusted to the British; and when the columns were -formed, the grenadiers of the British regiments brought up the rear, -halting and turning about continually, until failing light put an -end to what was at worst but a half-hearted pursuit. The retreat was -conducted with admirable order; but it was not until the chill, dead -hour that precedes the dawn that the Allies regained their camp, worn -out with the fatigue of the past four-and-twenty hours. - -The action was set down at the time as the severest ever fought by -infantry, and the losses on both sides were very heavy. The Allies -lost about three thousand killed and the same number wounded, besides -thirteen hundred prisoners, nearly all of whom were wounded. Ten guns -were abandoned, the horses being too weary to draw them; the English -battalions lost two colours, and the foreign three or four more. The -British, having borne the brunt of the action, suffered most heavily of -all, the Guards, Cutts’s, and the Sixth being terribly punished. The -total French loss was about equal to that of the Allies, but the list -of the officers that fell tells a more significant tale. On the side -of the Allies four hundred and fifty officers were killed and wounded, -no fewer than seventy lieutenants in the ten battalions of Churchill’s -British brigade being killed outright. The French on their side lost -no fewer than six hundred and twenty officers killed and wounded, a -noble testimony to their self-sacrifice, but sad evidence of their -difficulty in making their men stand. In truth, with proper management -William must have won a brilliant victory; but he was a general by -book and not by instinct. Würtemberg’s advanced guard could almost -have done the work by itself but for the mistake of a long preliminary -cannonade; his attack could have been supported earlier but for the -pedantry that gave the horse precedence of the foot in the march to -the field; the foot could have pierced the French position in a dozen -different columns but for the pedantry which caused it to be first -deployed. Finally, William’s knowledge of the ground was imperfect, and -Solmes, his general of foot, was incompetent. The plan was admirably -designed and abominably executed. Nevertheless, British troops have -never fought a finer action than Steenkirk. Luxemburg thought himself -lucky to have escaped destruction; his troops were much shaken; and he -crossed the Scheldt and marched away to his winter-quarters as quietly -as possible. So ended the campaign of 1692. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK V. CHAPTER III - - -◆1692. Nov.◆ - -In November the English Parliament met, heartened indeed by the naval -victory of La Hogue, but not a little grieved over the failure of -Steenkirk. Again, the financial aspect was extremely discouraging; and -Sir Stephen Fox announced that there was not another day’s subsistence -for the Army in the treasury. The prevailing discontent found vent in -furious denunciations of Count Solmes, and a cry that English soldiers -ought to be commanded by English officers. The debate waxed hot. -The hardest of hard words were used about the Dutch generals, and a -vast deal of nonsense was talked about military matters. There were, -however, a great number of officers in the House of Commons, many of -whom had been present at the action. With much modesty and good sense -they refused to join in the outcry against the Dutch, and contrived so -to compose matters that the House committed itself to no very foolish -resolution. The votes for the Army were passed; and no difficulty was -made over the preparations for the next campaign. Finally, two new -regiments of cavalry were raised—Lord Macclesfield’s Horse, which was -disbanded twenty years later; and Conyngham’s Irish Dragoons, which -still abides with us as the Eighth, King’s Royal Irish, Hussars. - -◆1693.◆ - -Meanwhile the French military system had suffered an irreparable loss -in Louvois’s death, the source of woes unnumbered to France in the -years that were soon to come. Nevertheless, the traditions of his rule -were strong, and the French once more were first in the field, with, -as usual, a vast siege-train massed on the Meuse and on the Scheldt. -But a late spring and incessant rain delayed the opening of the -campaign till the beginning of May, when Luxemburg assembled seventy -thousand men in rear of the Haine by Mons, and Boufflers forty-eight -thousand more on the Scheldt at Tournay. The French king was with the -troops in person; and the original design was, as usual, to carry on -a war of sieges on the Meuse, Boufflers reducing the fortresses while -Luxemburg shielded him with a covering army. Lewis, however, finding -that the towns which he had intended to invest were likely to make an -inconveniently stubborn defence, presently returned home, and after -detaching thirty thousand men to the war in Germany, left Luxemburg to -do as he would. It had been better for William if the Grand Monarch had -remained in Flanders. - -The English king, on his side, assembled sixty thousand men at Brussels -as soon as the French began to move, and led them with desperate -haste to the Senne, where he took up an impregnable position at Park. -Luxemburg marched up to a position over against him, and then came -one of those deadlocks which were so common in the old campaigns. The -two armies stood looking at each other for a whole month, neither -venturing to move, neither daring to attack, both ill-supplied, -both discontented, and as a natural consequence both losing scores, -hundreds, and even thousands of men through desertion. - -◆June 26./July 6.◆ - -At last the position became insupportable, and on the 6th of -July Luxemburg moved eastward as if to resume the original plan -of operations on the Meuse. William thereupon resolved to create -a diversion by detaching a force to attack the French lines of -the Scheldt and Lys, a project which was brilliantly executed by -Würtemberg, thanks not a little to three British regiments—the Tenth, -Argyll’s, and Castleton’s—which formed part of his division. But -meanwhile Luxemburg, quite ignorant of the diversion, advanced to -the Meuse and laid siege to Huy, in the hope of forcing William to -come to its relief. He judged rightly. William left his impregnable -camp at Park and hurried to the rescue. But he came too late, and Huy -fell after a trifling resistance. Luxemburg then made great seeming -preparations for the siege of Liège, and William, trembling for the -safety of that city and of Maestricht, detached eight thousand men to -reinforce those garrisons, and then withdrew to the line of the Geete. -Luxemburg watched the whole proceeding with grim delight. Würtemberg’s -success was no doubt annoying, but William had weakened his army by -detaching this force to the Lys, and had been beguiled into weakening -it still further by reinforcing the garrison on the Meuse. This was -exactly what Luxemburg wanted. If he could bring the Allies to action -forthwith, he could reasonably hope for success. - -The ground occupied by William was a triangular space enclosed between -the Little Geete and a stream called the Landen Beck, which joins -it at Leuw. The position was not without features of strength. The -camp, which faced almost due south, was pitched on a gentle ridge -rising out of a vast plain.[8] This ridge runs parallel to the Little -Geete and has that river in its rear. The left flank was protected by -marshy ground and by the Landen Beck itself, while the villages of -Neerlanden and Rumsdorp, one on either side of the Beck and the latter -well forward on the plain, offered the further security of advanced -posts. The right rested on a little stream which runs at right angles -to the Geete and joins it at Elixheim, and on the villages of Laer -and Neerwinden which stand on its banks. From Neerlanden on the left -to Neerwinden on the right the position measured close on four miles; -and to guard this extent, besides supplying strong garrisons for the -villages, William had little more than fifty thousand men. Here then -was one signal defect: the front was too long to permit troops to be -readily moved from flank to flank, or to be withdrawn without serious -risk from the centre. But this was not all. The depth of the position -was less than half of its frontage, and thus allowed no space for the -action of cavalry. This William ignored: he was afraid of the French -horse, and was anxious that the action should be fought by infantry -only. Finally, retreat was barred by the Geete, which was unfordable -and insufficiently bridged; and therefore the forcing of the allied -right must inevitably drive the whole army into a pinfold, as Leslie’s -had been driven at the battle of Dunbar. - -Luxemburg, who knew every inch of the ground, was now anxious only lest -William should retire before he could catch him. ◆July 18/28.◆ On the -28th of July, by a great effort and a magnificent march, he brought the -whole of his army, eighty thousand strong, before William’s position. -He was now sure of his game, but he need not have been anxious, for -William, charmed with the notion of excluding the French cavalry from -all share in the action, was resolved to stand his ground Many officers -urged him to cross the Geete while yet he might; but he would not -listen. Fifteen hundred men were told off to entrench the open ground -between Neerwinden and Neerlanden. The hedges, mud-walls, and natural -defences of Neerwinden and Laer were improved to the uttermost, and the -ditches surrounding them were enlarged. Till late into the night the -King rode backward and forward, ordering matters under his own eyes, -and after a few hours’ rest began very early in the morning to make his -dispositions. - -The key of the position was the village of Neerwinden with the -adjoining hamlet of Laer, and here accordingly he stationed the best -of his troops. The defence of Laer was entrusted to Brigadier Ramsey -with the Scots Brigade, namely, the Twenty-first, Twenty-fifth, -Twenty-sixth, Mackay’s and Lauder’s regiments, reinforced by the Buffs -and the Fourth Foot. Between Laer and Neerwinden stood six battalions -of Brandenburgers, troops already of great and deserved reputation, -of whom we shall see more in the years before us. Neerwinden itself -was committed to the Hanoverians, the Dutch Guards, a battalion of the -First and a battalion of the Scots Guards. Immediately to the north or -left of the village the entrenchment was lined by the two remaining -battalions of the First and Scots Guards, the Coldstream Guards, a -battalion of the Royal Scots, and the Seventh Fusiliers. On the extreme -left of the position Neerlanden was held by the other battalion of -the Royal Scots, the Second Queen’s, and two Danish regiments, while -Rumsdorp was occupied by the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, and -Collingwood’s regiments. In a word, every important post was committed -to the British. The remainder of the infantry, with one hundred guns, -was ranged along the entrenchment, and in rear of them stood the -cavalry, powerless to act outside the trench, and too much cramped for -space to manœuvre within it. - -[Illustration: - - LANDEN - July 19th/29th 1693 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Luxemburg also was early astir, and was amazed to find how far the -front of the position had been strengthened during the night. His -centre he formed in eight lines over against the Allies’ entrenchments -between Oberwinden and Landen, every line except the second and fourth -being composed of cavalry. For the attack on Neerlanden and Rumsdorp he -detailed fifteen thousand foot and two thousand five hundred dismounted -dragoons. For the principal assault on Neerwinden he told off eighteen -thousand foot, supported by a reserve of two thousand more and by -eight thousand cavalry; while seventy guns were brought into position -to answer the artillery of the Allies. - -◆July 19/29.◆ - -Shortly after sunrise William’s cannon opened fire against the heavy -masses of the French centre; and at eight o’clock Luxemburg moved the -whole of his left to the attack of Neerwinden. Six battalions, backed -by dragoons and cavalry, were directed against Laer, and three columns, -counting in all seven brigades, were launched against Neerwinden. The -centre column, under the Duke of Berwick, was the first to come into -action. Withholding their fire till they reached the village, the -French carried the outer defences with a rush, and then meeting the -Hanoverians and the First Guards, they began the fight in earnest. It -was hedge-fighting, as at Steenkirk, muzzle to muzzle and hand to hand. -Every step was contested; the combat swayed backwards and forwards -within the village; and the carnage was frightful. The remaining French -columns came up, met with the like resistance, and made little way. -Fresh regiments were poured by the French into the fight, and at last -the First Guards, completely broken by its losses, gave way. But it -was only for a moment. They rallied on the Scots Guards; the Dutch -and Hanoverians rallied behind them, and, though the enemy had been -again reinforced, they resumed the unequal fight, nine battalions -against twenty-six, with unshaken tenacity. At Laer, on the extreme -right, the fight was equally sharp. Ramsey for a time was driven out -of the village, and the French cavalry actually forced its way into -the Allies’ position. There, however, it was charged in flank by -the Elector of Bavaria, and driven out with great slaughter. Ramsey -seized the moment to rally his brigade. The French columns, despite -their success, still remained isolated and detached, and presented no -united front. The King placed himself at the head of the Guards and -Hanoverians, and with one charge British, Dutch, and Germans fell upon -the Frenchmen and swept them out of both villages. - -The first attack on Neerwinden had failed, and a similar attack on the -allied left had been little more successful. At Neerlanden the First -and Second Foot had successfully held their own against four French -battalions until reinforcements enabled them to drive them back. -At Rumsdorp the British, being but three thousand against thirteen -thousand, were pushed out of the village, but being reinforced, -recovered a part of it and stood successfully at bay. Luxemburg, -however, was not easily discouraged. The broken troops in the left were -rallied, fresh regiments were brought forward, and a second effort was -made to carry Neerwinden. Again French impetuosity bore all before it, -and again the British and Germans, weakened and weary though they were, -rallied when all seemed lost, and hurled the enemy back, not merely -repulsed, but in confused and disorderly retreat. - -On the failure of the second attack the majority of the French officers -urged Luxemburg to retire; but the marshal was not to be turned from -his purpose. The fourteen thousand men of the Allies in Laer and -Neerwinden had lost more than a third of their numbers, while he -himself had still a considerable force of infantry interlined with the -cavalry in the centre. Twelve thousand of them, including the French -and Swiss Guards, were now drawn off to the left for a third attack. -When they were clear of the cavalry, the whole six lines of horse, -which had stood heroically for hours motionless under a heavy fire, -moved forward at a trot to the edge of the entrenchments;[9] but the -demonstration, for such it seems to have been, cost them dear, for they -were very roughly handled and compelled to retire. But now the French -reinforcements, supported by the defeated battalions, drew near, and a -third attack was delivered on Neerwinden. British and Dutch still made -a gallant fight, but the odds against their weakened battalions were -too great, and ammunition began to fail. They fought on indomitably -till the last cartridge was expended before they gave way, but they -were forced back, and Neerwinden was lost. Five French brigades then -assailed the central entrenchment at its junction with Neerwinden, -where stood the Coldstream Guards and the Seventh Fusiliers. Wholly -unmoved by the overwhelming numbers in their front and the fire from -Neerwinden on their flank, the two regiments stood firm and drove their -assailants back over the breastwork. Even when the French Household -Cavalry came spurring through Neerwinden and fell upon their flank, -they fought on undismayed, and the Coldstreamers not only repelled the -charge but captured a colour. - -Such fighting, however, could not continue for long. William, on -observing Luxemburg’s preparations for the final assault, had ordered -nine battalions from his left to reinforce his right. These never -reached their destination. The Marquis of Feuquières, an officer -even more celebrated for his acuteness as a military critic than for -his skill in the field, watched them as they moved, and suddenly led -his cavalry forward to the weakest point of the entrenchment. The -battalions hesitated, halted, and then turned about to meet this new -danger, but too late to save the forcing of the entrenchment. The -battle was now virtually over. Neerwinden was carried, Ramsey after -a superb defence had been driven out of Laer, the Brandenburgers had -perforce retreated with him, the infantry that lined the centre of the -entrenchment had forsaken it, and the French cavalry was pouring in and -cutting down the fugitives by scores. William, who had galloped away -in desperation to the left, now returned at headlong speed with six -regiments of English cavalry,[10] which delivered charge after charge -with splendid gallantry, to cover the retreat of the foot. On the left -Tolmach and Bellasys by great exertion brought off their infantry in -good order, but on the right the confusion was terrible. The rout -was complete, the few bridges were choked by a heaving mass of guns, -waggons, pack-animals, and men, and thousands of fugitives were cut -down, drowned, or trampled to death. William did all that a gallant -man could do to save the day, but in vain. His troops had done heroic -things to redeem his bad generalship; and against any living man but -Marlborough or Luxemburg they would probably have held their own. It -was the general, not the soldiers that failed. - -The losses on both sides were very severe. That of the French was about -eight thousand men; that of the Allies about twelve thousand, killed, -wounded, and prisoners, and among the dead was Count Solmes, the hated -Solmes of Steenkirk. The nineteen British battalions present lost -one hundred and thirty-five officers killed, wounded, and taken. The -French captured eighty guns and a vast quantity of colours, but the -Allies, although beaten, could also show fifty-six French flags. And, -indeed, though Luxemburg won, and deserved to win a great victory, yet -the action was not such as to make the allied troops afraid to meet the -French. They had stood up, fifty thousand against eighty thousand, and -if they were beaten they had at any rate dismayed ever Frenchman on the -field but Luxemburg. In another ten years their turn was to come, and -they were to take a part of their revenge on the very ground over which -many of them had fled. - -The campaign closed with the surrender of Charleroi, and the gain by -the French of the whole line of the Sambre. William came home to meet -the House of Commons and recommend an augmentation of the Army by -eight regiments of horse, four of dragoons, and twenty-five of foot. -The House reduced this list by the whole of the regiments of horse and -fifteen of foot, but even so it brought the total establishment up to -eighty-three thousand men. There is, however, but one new regiment of -which note need be taken in the campaign of 1694, namely, the Seventh -Dragoons, now known as the Seventh Hussars, which, raised in 1689–90 -in Scotland, now for the first time took its place on the English -establishment and its turn of service in the war of Flanders. - -◆1694.◆ - -I shall not dwell on the campaign of 1694, which is memorable only for -a marvellous march by which Luxemburg upset William’s entire plan of -campaign. Nor shall I speak at length of the abortive descent on Brest, -which is remembered mainly for the indelible stain which it has left on -the memory of Marlborough. It is only necessary to say that the French, -by Marlborough’s information, though not on Marlborough’s information -only, had full warning of an expedition which had been planned as a -surprise, and that Tolmach,[11] who was in command, unfortunately, -though most pardonably, lacked the moral courage to abandon an attack -which, unless executed as a surprise, had no chance of success. He was -repulsed with heavy loss, and died of wounds received in the action—a -hard fate for a good soldier and a gallant man. But it is unjust to -lay his death at Marlborough’s door. For the failure of the expedition -Marlborough was undoubtedly responsible, and that is quite bad enough; -but Tolmach alone was to blame for attempting an enterprise which he -knew to be hopeless. Marlborough cannot have calculated that he would -deliberately essay to do impossibilities and perish in the effort, so -cannot be held guilty of poor Tolmach’s blunders. - -◆1695.◆ - -Before the new campaign could be opened there had come changes of vital -importance to France. The vast expense of the war had told heavily on -the country, and the King’s ministers were at their wit’s end to raise -money. Moreover, the War Department had deteriorated rapidly since the -death of Louvois; and ◆January.◆ to this misfortune was now added the -death of Luxemburg, a loss which was absolutely irreparable. Lastly, -with the object of maintaining the position which they had won on the -Sambre, the French had extended their system of fortified lines from -Namur to the sea. Works so important could not be left unguarded, so -that a considerable force was locked up behind these entrenchments, -and was for all offensive purposes useless. We shall see before long -how a really great commander could laugh at these lines, and how, in -consequence, it became an open question whether they were not rather -an encumbrance than an advantage. The subject is one which is still of -interest; and it is remarkable that the French still seem to cling to -their old principles, if they may be judged by the works which they -have constructed for defence against a German invasion. - -His enemy being practically restricted to the defensive, William did -not neglect the opportunity of initiating aggressive operations. -Masking his design by a series of feints, he marched swiftly to the -Meuse and invested Namur. This fortress, more famous through its -connection with the immortal Uncle Toby even than as the masterpiece -of Cohorn, carried to yet higher perfection by Vauban, stands at the -junction of the Sambre and the Meuse, the citadel lying in the angle -between the two rivers, and the town with its defences on the left bank -of the Meuse. To the northward of the town outworks had been thrown up -on the heights of Bouge by both of these famous engineers; and it was -against these outworks that William directed his first attack. - -◆June 23./July 3.◆ - -◆June 26./July 6.◆ - -Ground was broken on the 3rd of July, and three days later an assault -was delivered on the lines of Bouge. As usual, the hardest of the work -was given to the British, and the post of greatest danger was made -over, as their high reputation demanded, to the Brigade of Guards. On -this occasion the Guards surpassed themselves alike by the coolness -of their valour and by the ardour of their attack. They marched under -a heavy fire up to the French palisades, thrust their muskets between -them, poured in one terrible volley, the first shot that they had yet -fired, and charged forthwith. In spite of a stout resistance they -swept the French out of the first work, pursued them to the second, -swept them out of that, and gathering impetus with success, drove them -from stronghold to stronghold, far beyond the original design of the -engineers, and actually to the gates of the town. In another quarter -the Royal Scots and the Seventh Fusiliers gained not less brilliant -success; and in fact it was the most creditable action that William had -fought during the whole war. It cost the Allies two thousand men killed -and wounded, the three battalions of Guards alone losing thirty-two -officers. The British were to fight many such bloody combats during the -next twenty years—combats forgotten since they were merely incidents -in the history of a siege, and so frequent that they were hardly -chronicled, and are not to be restored to memory now. I mention this, -the first of such actions, only as a type of many more to come. - -The outworks captured, the trenches were opened against the town -itself, and the next assault was directed against the counterguard of -St. Nicholas gate. This again was carried by the British, with a loss -of eight hundred men. Then came the famous attack on the counterscarp -before the gate itself, where Captain Tobias Shandy received his -memorable wound. This gave William the possession of the town. Then -came the siege of the citadel, wherein the British had the honour of -marching to the assault over half a mile of open ground, a trial which -proved too much even for them. Nevertheless, it was they who eventually -stormed a breach from which another of the assaulting columns had been -repulsed, and ensured the surrender of the citadel a few days later. -For their service on this occasion the Eighteenth Foot were made the -Royal Irish; and a Latin inscription on their colours still records -that this was the reward of their valour at Namur. - -Thus William on his return to England could for the first time show -his Parliament a solid success due to the British red-coats; and the -House of Commons gladly voted once more a total force of eighty-seven -thousand men. But the war need be followed no further. The campaign -of 1696 was interrupted by a futile attempt of the French to invade -England, and in 1697 France, reduced to utter exhaustion, gladly -concluded the Peace of Ryswick. So ended, not without honour, the -first stage of the great conflict with King Lewis the Fourteenth. The -position of the two protagonists, England and France, was not wholly -unlike that which they occupied a century later at the Peace of Amiens. -The British, though they had not reaped great victories, had made -their presence felt, and terribly felt, on the battlefield; and, as -the French in the Peninsula remembered that the British had fought -them with a tenacity which they had not found in other nations, not -only in Egypt, but even earlier at Tournay and Linselles, so, too, -after Blenheim and Ramillies they looked back to the furious attack -at Steenkirk and the indomitable defence of Neerwinden. “Without the -concurrence of the valour and power of England,” said William to the -Parliament at the close of 1695, “it were impossible to put a stop to -the ambition and greatness of France.” So it was then, and so it was a -century later, for though none know better the superlative qualities -of the French as a fighting people, yet the English are the one nation -that has never been afraid to meet them. With the Peace of Ryswick the -’prentice years of the standing Army are ended, and within five years -the old spirit, which has carried it through the bitter schooling -under King William, will break forth with overwhelming power under the -guiding genius of Marlborough. - -AUTHORITIES.—The leading authority for William’s campaigns on the -English side is D’Auvergne, and on the French side the compilation, -with its superb series of maps, by Beaurain. Supplementary on one -side are Tindal’s History, Carleton’s Memoirs, and Sterne’s _Tristram -Shandy_; and on the other the _Mémoires_ of Berwick and St. Simon, -Quincy’s _Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV_, and in particular the -_Mémoires_ of Feuquières. Many details as to Steenkirk, in particular, -respecting the casualties, are drawn from _Present State of Europe, -or Monthly Mercury_, August 1692, and as to Landen from the official -relation of the battle, published by authority, 1693. Beautiful -plans of both actions are in Beaurain, rougher plans in Quincy and -Feuquières. All details as to the establishment voted are from the -Journals of the House of Commons. Very elaborate details of the -operations are given in Colonel Clifford Walton’s _History of the -British Standing Army_. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER I - - -A European quarrel over the succession to the Spanish throne,[12] -on the death of the imbecile King Charles the Second, had long been -foreseen by William, and had been provided against, as he hoped, by a -Partition Treaty in the year 1698. The arrangement then made had been -upset by the death of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, and had been -superseded by a second Partition Treaty in March 1700. In November of -the same year King Charles the Second died, leaving a will wherein -Philip, Duke of Anjou, and second son of the Dauphin, was named heir -to the whole Empire of Spain. Hereupon the second Partition Treaty -went for naught. Lewis the Fourteenth, after a becoming interval of -hesitation, accepted the Spanish crown for the Duke of Anjou under the -title of King Philip the Fifth. - -◆1701.◆ - -The Emperor at once entered a protest against the will, and Lewis -prepared without delay for a campaign in Italy. William, however, for -the present merely postponed his recognition of Philip the Fifth; and -his example was followed by the United Provinces. Lewis, ever ready -and prompt, at once took measures to quicken the States to a decision. -Several towns[13] in Spanish Flanders were garrisoned, under previous -treaties, by Dutch troops. Lewis by a swift movement surrounded the -whole of them, and, having thus secured fifteen thousand of the best -men in the Dutch army, could dictate what terms he pleased. William -expected that the House of Commons would be roused to indignation by -this aggressive step, but the House was far too busy with its own -factious quarrels. When, however, the States appealed to England for -the six thousand four hundred men, which under the treaty of 1668[14] -she was bound to furnish, both Houses prepared faithfully to fulfil the -obligation. - -Then, as invariably happens in England, the work which Parliament -had undone required to be done again. Twelve battalions were ordered -to the Low Countries from Ireland, and directions were issued for -the levying of ten thousand recruits in England to take their place. -But, immediately after, came bad news from the West Indies, and -it was thought necessary to despatch thither four more battalions -from Ireland. Three regiments[15] were hastily brought up to a -joint strength of two thousand men, and shipped off. Thus, within -fifteen months of the disbandment of 1699, the garrison of Ireland -had been depleted by fifteen battalions out of twenty-one; and four -new battalions required to be raised immediately. Of these, two, -namely Brudenell’s and Mountjoy’s, were afterwards disbanded, but two -more, Lord Charlemont’s and Lord Donegal’s, are still with us as the -Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth of the Line. - -In June the twelve battalions[16] were shipped off to Holland, under -the command of John, Earl of Marlborough. Since 1698 he had been -restored to the King’s favour and was to fill his place as head of -the European coalition and General of the confederate armies in a -fashion that no man had yet dreamed of. He was full fifty years of age; -so long had the ablest man in Europe waited for work that was worthy -of his powers; and now his time was come at last. His first duties, -however, were diplomatic; and during the summer and autumn of 1701 he -was engaged in negotiations with Sweden, Prussia, and the Empire for -the formation of a Grand Alliance against France and Spain. Needless to -say he brought all to a successful issue by his inexhaustible charm, -patience, and tact. - -◆Sept.◆ - -Still the attitude of the English people towards the contest remained -doubtful, until, on the death of King James the Second, Lewis made -the fatal mistake of recognising and proclaiming his son as King -of England. Then the smouldering animosity against France leaped -instantly into flame. William seized the opportunity to dissolve -Parliament, and was rewarded by the election of a House of Commons -more nearly resembling that which had carried him through the first -war to the Peace of Ryswick. He did not fail to rouse its patriotism -and self-respect by a stirring speech from the throne, and obtained -the ratification of his agreement with the Allies, that England should -furnish a contingent of forty thousand men, eighteen thousand of -them to be British and the remainder foreigners. So the country was -committed to the War of the Spanish Succession. - -It was soon decided that all regiments in pay must be increased at -once to war-strength, and that six more battalions, together with five -regiments of horse and three of dragoons, should be sent to join the -troops already in Holland. Then, as usual, there was a rush to do in -a hurry what should have been done at leisure; and it is significant -of the results of the late ill-treatment of the Army that, though the -country was full of unemployed soldiers, it was necessary to offer -three pounds, or thrice the usual amount of levy-money, to obtain -recruits. The next step was to raise fifteen new regiments—Meredith’s, -Coote’s, Huntingdon’s, Farrington’s, Gibson’s, Lucas’s, Mohun’s, -Temple’s, and Stringer’s of foot; Fox’s, Saunderson’s, Villiers’, -Shannon’s, Mordaunt’s and Holt’s of marines. Of the foot, Gibson’s and -Farrington’s had been raised in 1694, but the officers of Farrington’s, -if not of both regiments, had been retained on half-pay, and, returning -in a body, continued the life of the regiment without interruption. -Both are still with us as the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth of the -Line. Huntingdon’s and Lucas’s also survive as the Thirty-third and -Thirty-fourth, and Meredith’s and Coote’s, which were raised in -Ireland, as the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-ninth, while the remainder -were disbanded at the close of the war. Of the marines, Saunderson’s -had originally been raised in 1694, and eventually passed into the -Line as the Thirtieth Foot, followed by Fox’s and Villiers’ as the -Thirty-first and Thirty-second. Nothing now remained but to pass the -Mutiny Act, which was speedily done; and on the 5th of May, just two -months after the death of King William, the great work of his life was -continued by a formal declaration of war. - -The field of operations, which will chiefly concern us, is mainly the -same as that wherein we followed the campaigns of King William. The -eastern boundary of the cock-pit must for a time be extended from -the Meuse to the Rhine, the northern from the Demer to the Waal, -and the southern limit must be carried from Dunkirk beyond Namur -to Bonn. But the reader should bear in mind that, in consequence of -the Spanish alliance, Spanish Flanders was no longer hostile, but -friendly, to France, so that the French frontier, for all practical -purposes, extended to the boundary of Dutch Brabant. Moreover, the -French, besides the seizure, already related, of the barrier-towns, had -contrived to occupy every stronghold on the Meuse except Maestricht, -from Namur to Venloo, so that practically they were masters so far of -the whole line of the river. - -A few leagues below Venloo stands the fortified town of Grave, and -beyond Grave, on the parallel branch of the Waal, stands the fortified -city of Nimeguen. A little to the east of Nimeguen, at a point where -the Rhine formerly forked into two streams, stood Fort Schenck, a -stronghold famous in the wars of Morgan and of Vere. These three -fortresses were the three eastern gates of the Dutch Netherlands, -commanding the two great waterways, doubly important in those days of -bad roads, which lead into the heart of the United Provinces. - -◆1702.◆ - -It is here that we must watch the opening of the campaign of 1702. -There were detachments of the French and of the Allies opposed to each -other on the Upper Rhine, on the Lower Rhine, and on the Lower Scheldt; -but the French grand army of sixty thousand men was designed to operate -on the Meuse, and the presence of a Prince of the blood, the Duke of -Burgundy, with old Marshal Boufflers to instruct him, sufficiently -showed that this was the quarter in which France designed to strike -her grand blow. Marlborough being still kept from the field by other -business, the command of the Allied army on the Meuse was entrusted -to Lord Athlone, better known as that Ginkell who had completed the -pacification of Ireland in 1691. His force consisted of twenty-five -thousand men, with which he lay near Cleve, in the centre of the -crescent formed by Grave, Nimeguen, and Fort Schenck, watching under -shelter of these three fortresses the army of Boufflers, which was -encamped some twenty miles to south-east of him at Uden and Xanten. -◆May 30./June 10.◆ On the 10th of June Boufflers made a sudden dash to -cut off Athlone from Nimeguen and Grave, a catastrophe which Athlone -barely averted by an almost discreditably precipitate retreat. Having -reached Nimeguen Athlone withdrew to the north of the Waal, while -all Holland trembled over the danger which had thus been so narrowly -escaped. - -Such was the position when Marlborough at last took the field, after -long grappling at the Hague with the difficulties which were fated to -dog him throughout the war. In England his position was comparatively -easy, for though Prince George of Denmark, the consort of Queen -Anne, was nominally generalissimo of all forces by sea and land, -yet Marlborough was Captain-General of all the English forces at -home and in Holland, and in addition Master-General of the Ordnance. -But it was only after considerable dispute that he was appointed -Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, and then not without provoking -much dissatisfaction among the Dutch generals, and much jealousy in -the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrück and in Athlone, both of whom aspired to -the office. These obstacles overcome, there came the question of the -plan of campaign. Here again endless obstruction was raised. The Dutch, -after their recent fright, were nervously apprehensive for the safety -of Nimeguen, the King of Prussia was much disturbed over his territory -of Cleve, and all parties who had not interests of their own to put -forward made it their business to thwart the Commander-in-Chief. -◆June 21./July 2.◆ With infinite patience Marlborough soothed them, -and at last, on the 2nd of July, he left the Hague for Nimeguen, -accompanied by two Dutch deputies, civilians, whose duty it was to see -that he did nothing imprudent. Arrived there he concentrated sixty -thousand men, of which twelve thousand were British,[17] recrossed -the Waal and encamped at Ober-Hasselt over against Grave, within two -leagues of the French. ◆July 15/26.◆ Then once more the obstruction of -his colleagues caused delay, and it was not until the 26th of July that -he could cross to the left bank of the Meuse. “Now,” he said to the -Dutch deputies, as he pointed to the French camp, “I shall soon rid you -of these troublesome neighbours.” - -Five swift marches due south brought his army over the Spanish frontier -by Hamont. Boufflers thereupon in alarm broke up his camp, summoned -Marshal Tallard from the Rhine to his assistance, crossed the Meuse -with all haste at Venloo, and pushed on at nervous speed for the Demer. -◆July 22./Aug. 2.◆ On the 2nd of August he lay between Peer and Bray, -his camping-ground ill-chosen, and his army worn out by a week of -desperate marching. Within easy striking distance, a mile or two to the -northward, lay Marlborough, his army fresh, ready, and confident. He -held the game in his hand; for an immediate attack would have dealt the -French as rude a buffet as they were to receive later at Ramillies. But -the Dutch deputies interposed; these Dogberries were content to thank -God that they were rid of a rogue. So Boufflers was allowed to cross -the Demer safely at Diest, and a first great opportunity was lost. - -Marlborough, having drawn the French away from the Meuse, was now at -liberty to add the garrison of Maestricht to his field-force, and to -besiege the fortresses on the river. Boufflers, however, emboldened -by his escape, again advanced north in the hope of cutting off a -convoy of stores that was on its way to join the Allies. Marlborough -therefore perforce moved back to Hamont and picked up his convoy. -Then, before Boufflers could divine his purpose, he had moved swiftly -south, and thrown himself across the line of the French retreat to -the Demer. ◆Aug. 11/22.◆ The French marshal hurried southward with -all possible haste, and came blundering through the defiles before -Hochtel on the road to Hasselt, only to find Marlborough waiting ready -for him at Helchteren. Once again the game was in the Englishman’s -hand. The French were in great disorder, their left in particular -being hopelessly entangled in marshy and difficult ground. Marlborough -instantly gave the order to advance, and by three o’clock the artillery -of the two armies was exchanging fire. At five Marlborough directed the -whole of his right to fall on the French left; but to his surprise and -dismay, the right did not move. A surly Dutchman, General Opdam, was -in command of the troops in question and, for no greater object than -to annoy the Commander-in-Chief, refused to execute his orders. So a -second great opportunity was lost. - -◆Aug. 12/23.◆ - -Still much might yet be won by a general attack on the next day; and -for this accordingly Marlborough at once made his preparations. But, -when the time came, the Dutch deputies interposed, entreating him -to defer the attack till the morrow morning. “By to-morrow morning -they will be gone,” answered Marlborough; but all remonstrance was -unavailing. The attack was perforce deferred; the French slipped -away in the night; and, though it was still possible to cut up their -rearguard with cavalry, a third great opportunity was lost. - -Marlborough was deeply chagrined; but although with unconquerable -patience and tact he excused Opdam’s conduct in his public despatches, -he could not deceive the troops, who were loud in their indignation -against both deputies and generals. There was now nothing left but -to reduce the fortresses on the Meuse, a part of the army being -detached for the siege while the remainder covered the operations -under the command of Marlborough. Even over their favourite pastime -of a siege, however, the Dutch were dilatory beyond measure. “England -is famous for negligence,” wrote Marlborough, “but if Englishmen were -half as negligent as the people here, they would be torn to pieces -by Parliament.”[18] ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Venloo was at length invested on -the 29th of August,[19] and after a siege of eighteen days compelled -to capitulate. The English distinguished themselves after their own -peculiar fashion. In the assault on the principal defence General -Cutts, who from his love of a hot fire was known as the Salamander, -gave orders that the attacking force, if it carried the covered way, -should not stop there but rush forward and carry as much more as it -could. It was a mad design, criminally so in the opinion of officers -who took part in it,[20] but it was madly executed, with the result -that the whole fort was captured out of hand. - -◆Sept. 26./Oct. 7.◆ - -The reduction of Stevenswaert, Maseyck, and Ruremond quickly followed; -and the French now became alarmed lest Marlborough should transfer -operations to the Rhine. Tallard was therefore sent back with a large -force to Cologne and Bonn, while Boufflers, much weakened by this and -by other detachments, lay helpless at Tongres. But the season was now -far advanced, and Marlborough had no intention of leaving Boufflers for -the winter in a position from which he might at any moment move out and -bombard Maestricht. No sooner, therefore, were his troops released by -the capture of Ruremond than he prepared to oust Boufflers. The French, -according to their usual practice, had barred the eastern entrance to -Brabant by fortified lines, which followed the line of the Geete to its -head-waters, and were thence carried across to that of the Mehaigne. -In his position at Tongres Boufflers lay midway between these lines -and Liège, in the hope of covering both; but after the fall of so many -fortresses on the Meuse he became specially anxious for Liège, and -resolved to post himself under its walls. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ He accordingly -examined the defences, selected his camping-ground, and on the 12th of -October marched up with his army to occupy it. Quite unconscious of any -danger he arrived within cannon-shot of his chosen position; and there -stood Marlborough, calmly awaiting him with a superior force. For the -fourth time Marlborough held his enemy within his grasp, but the Dutch -deputies, as usual, interposed to forbid an attack; and Boufflers, -a fourth time delivered, hurried away in the night to his lines at -Landen. Had he thrown himself into Liège Marlborough would have made -him equally uncomfortable by marching on the lines; as things were, the -French marshal perforce left the city to its fate. - -The town of Liège, which was unfortified, at once opened its gates to -the Allies; and within a week Marlborough’s batteries were playing -on the citadel. ◆Oct. 12/23.◆ On the 23rd of October the citadel was -stormed, the English being first in the breach, and a few days later -Liège, with the whole line of the Meuse, had passed into the hands of -the Allies. Thus brilliantly, in spite of four great opportunities -marred by the Dutch, ended Marlborough’s first campaign. Athlone, like -an honest man, confessed that as second in command he had opposed every -one of Marlborough’s projects, and that the success was due entirely to -his incomparable chief. He at any rate had an inkling that in Turenne’s -handsome Englishman there had arisen one of the great captains of all -time. - -Nevertheless the French had not been without their consolations in -other quarters. Towards the end of the campaign the Elector of Bavaria -had declared himself for France against the Empire, and, surprising the -all-important position of Ulm on the Danube, had opened communication -with the French force on the Upper Rhine. Villars, who commanded in -that quarter, had seconded him by defeating his opponent, Prince -Lewis of Baden, at Friedlingen, and had cleared the passages of the -Black Forest; while Tallard had, almost without an effort, possessed -himself of Trèves and Trarbach on the Moselle. The rival competitors -for the crown of Spain were France and the Empire, and the centre of -the struggle, as no one saw more clearly than Marlborough, was for the -present moving steadily towards the territory of the Empire. - -While Marlborough was engaged in his operations on the Meuse, ten -thousand English and Dutch, under the Duke of Ormonde and Admiral -Sir George Rooke, had been despatched to make a descent upon Cadiz. -The expedition was so complete a failure that there is no object in -dwelling on it. Rooke would not support Ormonde, and Ormonde was not -strong enough to master Rooke; landsmen quarrelled with seamen, and -English with Dutch. No discipline was maintained, and after some weeks -of feeble operations and shameful scenes of indiscipline and pillage, -the commanders found that they could do no more than return to England. -They were fortunate enough, however, on their way, to fall in with -the plate-fleet at Vigo, of which they captured twenty-five galleons -containing treasure worth a million sterling. Comforted by this good -fortune Rooke and Ormonde sailed homeward, and dropped anchor safely in -Portsmouth harbour. - -Meanwhile a mishap, which Marlborough called an accident, had gone near -to neutralise all the success of the past campaign. At the close of -operations the Earl, together with the Dutch deputies, had taken ship -down the Meuse, with a guard of twenty-five men on board and an escort -of fifty horse on the bank. In the night the horse lost their way, -and the boat was surprised and overpowered by a French partisan with -a following of marauders. The Dutch deputies produced French passes, -but Marlborough had none and was therefore a prisoner. Fortunately -his servant slipped into his hand an old pass that had been made out -for his brother Charles Churchill. With perfect serenity Marlborough -presented it as genuine, and was allowed to go on his way, the French -contenting themselves with the capture of the guard and the plunder of -the vessel, and never dreaming of the prize that they had let slip. The -news of his escape reached the Hague, where on his arrival rich and -poor came out to welcome him, men and women weeping for joy over his -safety. So deep was the fascination exerted on all of his kind by this -extraordinary man. - -A few days later he returned to England, where a new Parliament had -already congratulated Queen Anne on the retrieving of England’s honour -by the success of his arms. The word retrieving was warmly resented, -but though doubtless suggested by unworthy and factious animosity -against the memory of William, it was strictly true. The nation felt -that it was not in the fitness of things that Englishmen should be -beaten by Frenchmen, and they rejoiced to see the wrong set right. -Nevertheless party spirit found a still meaner level when Parliament -extended to Rooke and Ormonde the same vote of thanks that they -tendered to Marlborough. This precious pair owed even this honour -to the wisdom and good sense of their far greater comrade, for they -would have carried their quarrel over the expedition within the walls -of Parliament, had not Marlborough told them gently that the whole -of their operations were indefensible and that the less they called -attention to themselves the better. The Queen, with more discernment, -created Marlborough a Duke and settled on him a pension of £5000 a year. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER IV - - -◆1704.◆ - -Meanwhile Parliament had met on the 29th of the previous October, full -of congratulations to the Queen on the triumphs of the past campaign. -There were not wanting, of course, men who, in the madness of faction, -doubted whether Blenheim were really a victory, for the very remarkable -reason that Marlborough had won it, but they were soon silenced by -the retort that the King of France at any rate had no doubts on the -point.[21] The plans for the next campaign were designed on a large -scale, and were likely to strain the resources of the Army to the -uttermost. The West Indies demanded six battalions and Gibraltar three -battalions for garrison; Portugal claimed ten thousand men, Flanders -from twenty to twenty-five thousand; while besides this a design was on -foot, as shall presently be seen, for the further relief of Portugal by -a diversion in Catalonia. ◆1705.◆ Five millions were cheerfully voted -for the support of the war, and six new battalions were raised, namely, -Wynne’s, Bretton’s, Lepell’s, Saomes’s, Sir Charles Hotham’s, and -Lillingston’s, the last of which alone has survived to our day with the -rank of the Thirty-eighth of the Line.[22] - -Marlborough’s plan of campaign had been sufficiently foreshadowed at -the close of the previous year, namely, to advance on the line of -the Moselle and carry the war into Lorraine. The Emperor and all the -German Princes promised to be in the field early, the Dutch were with -infinite difficulty persuaded to give their consent, and after much -vexatious delay Marlborough joined his army at Trèves on the 26th of -May. ◆May 15/26.◆ Here he waited until the 17th of June for the arrival -of the German and Imperial troops. ◆June 6/17.◆ Not a man nor a horse -appeared. In deep chagrin he broke up his camp and returned to the -Meuse, having lost, as he said, one of the fairest opportunities in the -world, through the faithlessness of his allies.[23] - -His presence was sorely needed on the Meuse. Villeroy, who commanded -the French in Flanders, finding no occasion for his presence on the -Moselle, had moved out of his lines, captured Huy, and then marching -on to Liège had invested the citadel. ◆May 21.◆ The States-General -in a panic of fright urged Marlborough to return without delay, and -Overkirk, who commanded the Dutch on the Meuse, added his entreaties -to theirs. Marlborough, when once he had made up his mind to move, -never moved slowly, and by the 25th of June he was at Düren, to the -eastward of Aix-la-Chapelle. ◆June 14/25.◆ Here he was still the best -part of forty miles from the Meuse, but that distance was too near for -Villeroy, who at once abandoned Liège and fell back on Tongres. -◆June 21./July 2.◆ Marlborough, continuing his advance, crossed the -Meuse at Visé on the 2nd of July, and on the same day united his army -with Overkirk’s at Haneff on the Upper Jaar. Villeroy thereupon retired -ignominiously within his fortified lines. - -These lines, which had been making during the past three years, -were now complete. They started from the Meuse a little to the east -of Namur, passed from thence to the Mehaigne and the Little Geete, -followed the Little Geete along its left bank to Leuw, the Great Geete -from Leuw to the Demer, and the Demer itself as far as Arschot, from -which point a new line of entrenchments carried the barrier through -Lierre to Antwerp. Near Antwerp Marlborough had already had to do with -these lines in 1703, but hitherto he had made no attempt to force them. -Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria now lay before him with seventy -thousand men, a force superior to his own, but necessarily spread over -a wide front for the protection of the entrenchments. The marshal’s -headquarters were at Meerdorp, in the space between the Geete and the -Mehaigne, which he probably regarded as a weak point. Marlborough -posted himself over against him at Lens-les-Beguines, detaching a small -force to recapture Huy, while Overkirk with the Dutch army covered the -siege from Vignamont. Thus, as if daring the French to take advantage -of the dispersion of his troops, he quietly laid his plans for forcing -the lines. - -The point that he selected was on the Little Geete between Elixheim and -Neerhespen, exactly in rear of the battlefield of Landen. The abrupt -and slippery banks of the river, which the English knew but too well, -together with the entrenchments beyond it, presented extraordinary -difficulties; but the lines were on that account the less likely to be -well guarded at that particular point. Marlborough had already obtained -the leave of the States-General for the project, but he had now the far -more difficult task of gaining the consent of the Dutch generals at a -Council of War. Slangenberg and others opposed the scheme vehemently, -but were overruled; and the Duke was at length at liberty to fall to -work. - -◆June 30./July 11.◆ - -Huy fell on the 11th of July, but to the general surprise the besieging -force was not recalled. Six days later Overkirk and the covering army -crossed the Mehaigne from Vignamont, and pushed forward detachments to -the very edge of the lines between Meffle and Namur. ◆July.◆ Villeroy -fell into the trap, withdrew troops from all parts of the lines and -concentrated forty thousand men at Meerdorp. Marlborough then recalled -the troops from Huy, and made them up to a total of about eight -thousand men, both cavalry and infantry,[24] the whole being under the -command of the Count of Noyelles. The utmost secrecy was observed in -every particular. The corps composing the detachment knew nothing of -each other, and nothing of the work before them; and, lest the sight -of fascines should suggest an attack on entrenchments, these were -dispensed with, the troopers only at the last moment receiving orders -to carry each a truss of forage on the saddle before them. - -◆July 6/17.◆ - -At tattoo the detachment fell in silently before the camp of the right -wing, and at nine o’clock moved off without a sound in two columns, -the one upon Neerhespen, the other upon the Castle of Wanghe before -Elixheim. An hour later the rest of the army followed, while at the -same time Overkirk, under cover of the darkness, crossed the Mehaigne -at Tourines and joined his van to the rear of Marlborough’s army. The -distance to be traversed was from ten to fifteen miles; the night -though dry was dark; and the guides, frequently at fault, were fain to -direct themselves by the trusses dropped on the way by the advanced -detachment. ◆July 6–7/17–18.◆ Twelve years before to the very day, a -French army had toiled along the same route, wearied out and stifled by -the sun, and only kept to its task by an ugly little hunch-backed man -whom it had reverenced as Marshal Luxemburg. Now English and Dutch were -blundering on to take revenge for Luxemburg’s victory at the close of -that march. The hours fled on, the light began to break, and the army -found itself on the field of Landen, William’s entrenchment grass-grown -before it, Neerwinden and Laer lying silent to the left, and before the -villages the mound that hid the corpses of the dead. Then some at least -of the soldiers knew the work that lay before them. - -[Illustration: - - LINES OF THE - GEETE. - July 7/18 1705 - - Scale of 1/2 mile - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆July 7/18.◆ - -At four o’clock the heads of the columns halted within a mile of the -Geete, wrapped in a thick mist and hidden from the eye of the enemy. -The advanced detachment quickly cleared the villages by the river, -seized the bridge before the Castle of Wanghe, which had not been -broken down, and drove out the garrison of the Castle itself. Then the -pontoniers came forward to lay their bridges; but the infantry would -not wait for them. They scrambled impatiently through hedges and over -bogs, down one steep bank of the river and up the other, into the ditch -beyond, and finally, breathless and dripping, over the rampart into the -lines. So numerous were the hot-heads who thus went forward that they -forced three regiments of French dragoons to retire before them without -attempting resistance. Then the cavalry of the detachment began to -file rapidly over the pontoon-bridges; but meanwhile the alarm had been -given, and, before the main army could cross, the French came down in -force from the north, some twenty battalions and forty squadrons, in -all close upon fifteen thousand men, with a battery of eight guns. - -The enemy advanced rapidly, their cavalry leading, until checked by a -hollow way which lay between them and the Allies, when they halted to -deploy. Marlborough took in the whole situation at a glance. Forming -his thirty-eight squadrons into two lines, with the first line composed -entirely of British, he led them across the hollow way and charged the -French sword in hand. They answered by a feeble fire from the saddle -and broke in confusion, but, presently rallying, fell in counter-attack -upon the British and broke them in their turn. Marlborough, who was -riding on the flank, was cut off and left isolated with his trumpeter -and groom. A Frenchman galloped up and aimed at him so furious a blow -that, striking the air, he fell from his horse and was captured by the -trumpeter. Then the allied squadrons rallied, and charging the French -once more broke them past all reforming, and captured the guns. The -French infantry now retired very steadily in square, and the Duke sent -urgent messages for his own foot. But by some mistake the battalions -had been halted after crossing the Geete, so that the French were able -to make good their retreat. - -By this time Villeroy, who had spent the night in anxious expectation -of an attack at Meerdorp, had hurried up with his cavalry, only to -find that the Duke was master of the lines. Hastily giving orders -for his scattered troops to pass the Geete at Judoigne, he began his -retreat upon Louvain. Presently up came Marlborough’s infantry at an -extraordinary pace, the men as fresh and lively after fifteen hours -of fatigue as if they had just left camp. The Duke was anxious to -follow up his success forthwith, a movement which the French had good -reason to dread, but the Dutch generals opposed him, and Marlborough -was reluctantly constrained to yield. The loss of the French seems to -have been about two thousand men, most of them prisoners, a score of -standards and colours, of which the Fifth Dragoon Guards claimed four -as their own, and eighteen guns, eight of which were triple-barrelled -and were sent across the Channel to be copied in England.[25] - -◆July 8/19.◆ - -The Allies halted for the night at Tirlemont, and advancing next day -upon Louvain struck against the rear of the French columns and captured -fifteen hundred prisoners. That night they encamped a mile to the east -of Louvain, while the French, once again distributing their force -along a wider front, lined the left bank of the Dyle from the Demer -to the Yssche, with their centre at Louvain. Marlborough had hoped to -push on at once, but was stopped by heavy rains that rendered the Dyle -impassable; and it was not until ten days later that, after infinite -trouble with the Dutch, he was able to pursue his design. - -◆July 18/29.◆ - -The operations for the passage of the Dyle were conducted in much -the same way as in the forcing of the lines. An advanced detachment -was sent forward from each wing of the army, that from the right or -English[26] flank being appointed to cross the river under the Duke of -Würtemberg at Corbeek Dyle, that from the left under General Heukelom -to pass it at Neeryssche. The detachments fell in at five in the -evening, reached their appointed destination at ten, and effected their -passage with perfect success. The main bodies started at midnight, -and went somewhat astray in the darkness, though by three o’clock the -Dutch army was within supporting distance of its detachment and the -British rapidly approaching it. The river had been in fact forced, when -suddenly the Dutch generals halted their main body. Marlborough rode up -to inquire the cause, and was at once taken aside by Slangenberg. “For -God’s sake, my Lord—” began the Dutchman vehemently, and continued to -protest with violent gesticulations. No sooner was Marlborough’s back -turned than the Dutch generals, like a parcel of naughty schoolboys, -recalled Heukelom’s detachment. Thus the passage won with so much skill -was for no cause whatever abandoned, without loss indeed, but also not -without mischievous encouragement to the French, who boasted loudly -that they had repulsed their redoubtable adversary. - -Deeply hurt and annoyed though he was, the Duke, with miraculous -patience, excused in his public despatches the treachery and imbecility -which had thwarted him, and prepared to effect his purpose in another -way. His movements were hastened by news that French reinforcements, -set free by the culpable inaction of Prince Lewis of Baden, were on -their way from Alsace. ◆Aug. 5/16.◆ Unable to pass the Dyle he turned -its head-waters at Genappe, and wheeling north towards the forest of -Soignies encamped between La Hulpe and Braine l’Alleud.[27] The French -promptly took the alarm and posted themselves behind the river Yssche, -with their left at Neeryssche, and their right at Overyssche resting -on the forest of Soignies. Marlborough at once resolved to force the -passage of the river. ◆Aug. 6/17.◆ On the evening of the 17th of -August he detached his brother Charles Churchill with ten thousand -foot and two thousand horse to advance through the forest and turn -the French right; while he himself marched away at daybreak with the -rest of the army and emerged into the plain between the Yssche and the -Lasne. ◆Aug. 7/18.◆ The Duke quickly found two assailable points, and -choosing that of Overyssche, halted the army pending the arrival of the -artillery. The guns were long in arriving, Slangenberg having insisted, -despite the Duke’s express instructions, on forcing his own baggage -into the column for the express purpose of causing delay. At last about -noon the artillery appeared, and Marlborough asked formal permission of -the Dutch deputies to attack. To his surprise, although Overkirk had -already consented, they claimed to consult their generals. Slangenberg -with every mark of insolence condemned the project as murder and -massacre, the rest solemnly debated the matter for another two hours, -the auspicious moment passed away exactly as they had intended, and -another great opportunity was lost. The French reinforcements arrived, -and having been the weaker became the stronger force. Nothing more -could be done for the rest of the campaign, but to level the French -lines from the Demer to the Mehaigne. - -Thus for the third time a brilliant campaign was spoilt by the Dutch -generals and deputies. Fortunately the public indignation both in -England and in Holland was too strong for them, and Slangenberg, though -not indeed hanged as he deserved, was deprived of all further command. -Jealousy, timidity, ignorance, treachery, and flat imbecility seem -to have been the motives that inspired these men, whose conduct has -never been reprobated according to its demerit. It was they who were -responsible for the prolongation of the war, for the burden that it -laid on England, and for the untold misery that it wrought in France. -Left to himself Marlborough would have forced the French to peace in -three campaigns, and the war would not have been ended in shame and -disgrace by the Treaty of Utrecht.[28] - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER V - - -◆1706.◆ - -It is now time to revert to England and to the preparations for the -campaign of 1706. Marlborough, as usual, directly that the military -operations were concluded, had been deputed to visit the courts of -Vienna and of sundry German states in order to keep the Allies up to -the necessary pitch of unity and energy. These duties detained him in -Germany and at the Hague until January 1706, when he was at last able -to return to England. There he encountered far less obstruction than in -former years, but found, nevertheless, an increasing burden of work. -The vast extension of operations in the Peninsula, and the general -sickliness of the troops in that quarter, demanded the enlistment of an -unusually large number of recruits. One new regiment of dragoons and -eleven new battalions of foot were formed in the course of the spring, -to which it was necessary to add yet another battalion before the -close of the year.[29] Again the epidemic sickness among the horses in -Flanders had caused an extraordinary demand for them. The Dutch, after -their wonted manner, had actually taken pains to prevent the supply -of these animals to the British,[30] though, even if they had not, -the Duke had a prejudice in favour of English horses, as of English -men, as superior to any other. Finally, the stores of the Ordnance -were unequal to the constant drain of small arms, and it was necessary -to make good the deficiency by purchases from abroad. All these -difficulties and a thousand more were of course referred for solution -to Marlborough. - -◆April 14/25.◆ - -When in April he crossed once more to the Hague he found a most -discouraging state of affairs. The Dutch were backward in their -preparations; Prussia and Hanover were recalcitrant over the furnishing -of their contingents; Prince Lewis of Baden was sulking within his -lines, refusing to communicate a word of his intentions to any one; and -everybody was ready with a separate plan of campaign. The Emperor of -course desired further operations on the Moselle for his own relief; -but, after the experience of the last campaign, the Duke had wisely -resolved never again to move eastward to co-operate with the forces -of the Empire. The Dutch for their part wished to keep Marlborough in -Flanders, where he should be under the control of their deputies; but -the imbecile caprice of these worthies was little more to his taste -than the sullen jealousy of Baden. Marlborough himself was anxious -to lead a force to the help of Eugene in Italy, a scheme which, if -executed, would have carried the British to a great fighting ground -with which they are unfamiliar, the plains of Lombardy. He had almost -persuaded the States-General to approve of this plan, when all was -changed by Marshal Villars, who surprised Prince Lewis of Baden in his -lines on the Motter, and captured two important magazines. The Dutch at -once took fright and, in their anxiety to keep Marlborough for their -own defence, agreed to appoint deputies who should receive rather than -issue orders. So to the Duke’s great disappointment it was settled that -the main theatre of war should once again be Flanders. - -Villeroy meanwhile lay safely entrenched in his position of the -preceding year behind the Dyle, from which Marlborough saw little -hope of enticing him. It is said that an agent was employed to rouse -Villeroy by telling him that the Duke, knowing that the French were -afraid to leave their entrenchments, would take advantage of their -inaction to capture Namur.[31] Be that as it may, Villeroy resolved to -quit the Dyle. He knew that the Prussian and Hanoverian contingents had -not yet joined Marlborough, and that the Danish cavalry had refused -to march to him until their wages were paid; so that interest as well -as injured pride prompted the hazard of a general action. ◆May 8/19.◆ -On the 19th of May, therefore, he left his lines for Tirlemont on the -Great Geete. Marlborough, who was at Maestricht, saw with delight -that the end, for which he had not dared to hope, was accomplished. -Hastily making arrangements for the payment of the Danish troops, he -concentrated the Dutch and British at Bilsen on the Upper Demer, and -moved southward to Borchloen. ◆May 9/20.◆ Here the arrival of the Danes -raised his total force to sixty thousand men, a number but little -inferior to that of the enemy. ◆May 11/22.◆ On the very same day came -the intelligence that Villeroy had crossed the Great Geete and was -moving on Judoigne. The Duke resolved to advance forthwith and attack -him there. - -◆May 12/23.◆ - -At one o’clock in the morning of Whitsunday the 23rd of May, -Quartermaster-general Cadogan rode forward from the headquarters at -Corswarem with six hundred horse and the camp-colours towards the head -of the Great Geete, to mark out a camp by the village of Ramillies. The -morning was wet and foggy, and it was not until eight o’clock that, -on ascending the heights of Merdorp, the party dimly descried troops -in motion on the rolling ground before them. The Allied army had not -marched until two hours later than Cadogan, but Marlborough, who had -ridden on in advance of it, presently came up and pushed the cavalry -forward through the mist. Then at ten o’clock the clouds rolled away, -revealing the whole of the French army in full march towards them. - -Villeroy’s eyes were rudely opened, for he had not expected Marlborough -before the following day; but he knew the ground well, for he had been -over it before with Luxemburg, and he proceeded to take up a position -which he had seen Luxemburg deliberately reject. The table-land whereon -he stood is the highest point in the plains of Brabant. To his right -flowed the Mehaigne; in his rear ran the Great Geete; across his centre -and left the Little Geete rose and crept away sluggishly in marsh and -swamp.[32] In his front lay four villages: Taviers on the Mehaigne to -his right, Ramillies, less advanced than Taviers, on the source of the -Little Geete to his right centre, Offus, parallel to Ramillies but -lower down the stream, to his left centre, Autréglise or Anderkirch, -between two branches of the Little Geete and parallel to Taviers, to -his left. Along the concave line formed by these villages Villeroy drew -up his army in two lines facing due east. - -The Mehaigne, on which his right rested, is at ordinary times a rapid -stream little more than twelve feet wide, with a muddy bottom, but is -bordered by swampy meadows on both sides, which are flooded after heavy -rain. From this stream the ground rises northward in a steady wave -for about half a mile, sinks gradually and rises into a higher wave -at Ramillies, sinks once more to northward of that village and rolls -downward in a gentler undulation to Autréglise. Between the Mehaigne -and Ramillies, a distance of about a mile and a half, the ground east -and west is broken by sundry hollows of sufficient inclination to offer -decided advantage or disadvantage in a combat of cavalry. A single -high knoll rises in the midst of these hollows, offering a place of -vantage from which Marlborough must almost certainly have reconnoitred -the disposition of the French right. The access to Ramillies itself is -steep and broken both to north and south; but on the eastern front the -ground rises to it for half a mile in a gentle, unbroken slope, which -modern rifles would make impassable by the bravest troops. In rear, -or to westward of the French position, the table-land is clear and -unbroken, and to the right rear or south-west stands a mound or barrow -called the tomb of Ottomond, still conspicuous and still valuable as a -key to the actions of the day.[33] The full extent of the French front -from Taviers to Autréglise covered something over four miles. - -[Illustration: - - RAMILLIES - May 12/23 1706. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Having chosen his position, Villeroy lost no time in setting his troops -in order. His left, consisting of infantry backed by cavalry,[34] -extended from Autréglise to Offus, both of which villages were strongly -occupied. His centre from Offus to Ramillies was likewise composed of -infantry. On his right, in the expanse of sound ground which stretches -for a mile and a half from the marshes of the Geete at Ramillies to -those of the Mehaigne, were massed more than one hundred and twenty -squadrons of cavalry with some battalions of infantry interlined with -them, the famous French Household Cavalry (Maison du Roi) being in the -first line. The left flank of this expanse was covered by the village -of Ramillies, which was surrounded by a ditch and defended by twenty -battalions and twenty-four guns. On the right flank not only Taviers -but Franquinay, a village still further in advance, were occupied by -detachments of infantry, while Taviers was further defended by cannon. - -Marlborough quickly perceived the defects of Villeroy’s dispositions, -which were not unlike those of Tallard at Blenheim. Taviers was too -remote from Ramillies for the maintenance of a cross-fire of artillery. -Again, the cavalry of the French left was doubtless secure against -attack behind the marshes of the Geete, but for this very reason it was -incapable of aggressive action. The French right could therefore be -turned, provided that it were not further reinforced; and accordingly -the Duke opened his manœuvres by a demonstration against the French -left. - -Presently the infantry of the Allied right moved forward in two lines -towards Offus and Autréglise, marching in all the pomp and circumstance -of war, Dutch, Germans, and British, with the red-coats conspicuous on -the extreme right flank. Striding forward to the river they halted and -seemed to be very busy in laying their pontoons. Villeroy marked the -mass of scarlet, and remembering its usual place in the battlefield, -instantly began to withdraw several battalions from his right and -centre to his left. Marlborough watched the white coats streaming -away to their new positions, and after a time ordered the infantry of -his right to fall back to some heights in their rear. The two lines -faced about and retired accordingly over the height until the first -line was out of sight. Then the second line halted and faced about once -more, crowning the ascent with the well-known scarlet, while the first -marched away with all speed, under cover of the hill and unseen by the -French, to the opposite flank. Many British battalions[35] stood on -that height all day without moving a step or firing a shot, but none -the less paralysing the French left wing. - -About half-past one the guns of both armies opened fire, and shortly -afterwards four Dutch battalions were ordered forward to carry -Franquinay and Taviers, and twelve more to attack Ramillies, while -Overkirk advanced slowly on the left with the cavalry. Franquinay was -soon cleared; Taviers resisted stoutly for a time, but was carried; -and a strong reinforcement on its way to the village was intercepted -and cut to pieces. Then Overkirk, his left flank being now cleared, -pushed forward his horse and charged. The Dutch routed the first -French line, but were driven back in confusion by the second; and the -victorious French were only checked by the advance of fresh squadrons -under Marlborough himself. Even so the Allies were at a decided -disadvantage; and Marlborough, after despatching messengers to bring -up every squadron, except the British, to the left, plunged into the -thick of the mêlée to rally the broken horse. He was recognised by -some French dragoons, who left their ranks to surround him, and in the -general confusion he was borne to the ground and in imminent danger of -capture. His aide-de-camp, Captain Molesworth, dismounted at once, and -giving him his own horse enabled him to escape. The cavalry, however, -encouraged by the Duke’s example, recovered themselves, and Marlborough -took the opportunity to shift from Molesworth’s horse to his own. -Colonel Bringfield, his equerry, held the stirrup while he mounted, -but Marlborough was hardly in the saddle before the hand that held the -stirrup relaxed its grasp, and the equerry fell to the ground, his head -carried away by a round shot.[36] - -Meanwhile the attack of the infantry on Ramillies was fully developed, -and relieved the horse from the fire of the village. Twenty fresh -squadrons came galloping up at the top of their speed and ranged -themselves in rear of the re-forming lines. But before they could come -into action the Duke of Würtemberg pushed his Danish horse along the -Mehaigne upon the right flank of the French, while the Dutch guards -advanced still further so as to fall upon their rear. These last now -emerged upon the table-land by the tomb of Ottomond, and the rest of -the Allied horse dashed themselves once against the French front. The -famous Maison du Roi after a hard fight was cut to pieces, and the -whole of the French horse, despite Villeroy’s efforts to stay them, -were driven in headlong flight across the rear of their line of battle, -leaving the battalions of infantry helpless and alone, to be ridden -over and trampled out of existence. - -Villeroy made frantic efforts to bring forward the cavalry of his left -to cover their retreat, but the ground was encumbered by his baggage, -which he had carelessly posted too close in his rear. The French troops -in Ramillies now gave way, and Marlborough ordered the whole of the -infantry that was massed before the village to advance across the -morass upon Offus, with the Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards in support. -The French broke and fled at their approach; and meanwhile the Buffs -and Twenty-first, which had so far remained inactive on the right, -forced their way through the swamps before them, and taking Autréglise -in rear swept away the last vestige of the French line on the left. -Five British squadrons followed them up and captured the entire King’s -Regiment (Régiment du Roi). The Third and Sixth Dragoon Guards also -pressed on, and coming upon the Spanish and Bavarian horse-guards, who -were striving to cover the retreat of the French artillery, charged -them and swept them away, only narrowly missing the capture of the -Elector himself, who was at their head.[37] On this the whole French -army, which so far had struggled to effect an orderly retreat, broke up -in panic and fled in all directions. - -The mass of the fugitives made for Judoigne; but the ways were blocked -by broken-down baggage-waggons and abandoned guns, and the crush and -confusion was appalling. The British cavalry, being quite fresh, -quickly took up the pursuit over the table-land. The guns and baggage -fell an easy prey, but these were left to others, while the red-coated -troopers, not without memories of Landen, pressed on, like hounds -running for blood, after the beaten enemy. The chase lay northwards -to Judoigne and beyond it towards the refuge of Louvain. Not until -two o’clock in the morning did the cavalry pause, having by that time -reached Meldert, fifteen miles from the battlefield; nay, even then -Lord Orkney with some few squadrons spurred on to Louvain itself, -rekindled the panic and set the unhappy French once more in flight -across the Dyle. - -◆May 13/24.◆ - -Nor was the main army far behind the horse. Marching far into the -night, the men slept under arms for two or three hours, started again -at three o’clock, and before the next noon had also reached Meldert and -were preparing to force the passage of the Dyle. Marlborough, who had -been in the saddle with little intermission for nearly twenty-eight -hours, here wrote to the Queen that he intended to march again that -same night; but, through the desertion of the lines of the Dyle by the -French, the army gained some respite. ◆May 14/25.◆ The next day he -crossed the Dyle at Louvain and encamped at Betlehem, ◆May 15/26.◆ the -next he advanced to Dieghem, a few miles north of Brussels, the next he - passed the Senne at Vilvorde and encamped at Grimberghen, ◆May 16/27.◆ -and here at last, after six days of incessant marching, the Duke -granted his weary troops a halt, while the French, hopelessly beaten -and demoralised, retired with all haste to Ghent. - -So ended the fight and pursuit of Ramillies, which effectually -disposed of the taunt levelled at Marlborough after Blenheim, that -he did not know how to improve a victory. The loss of the French in -killed, wounded, and prisoners was thirteen thousand men, swelled by -desertion during the pursuit to full two thousand more. The trophies -of the victors were eighty standards and colours, fifty guns, and a -vast quantity of baggage. The loss of the Allies was from four to five -thousand killed and wounded, which fell almost entirely on the Dutch -and Danes, the British, owing to their position on the extreme right, -being but little engaged until the close of the day. The chief service -of the British, therefore, was rendered in the pursuit, which they -carried forward with relentless thoroughness and vigour. The Dutch were -delighted that their troops should have done the heaviest of the work -in such an action, and the British could console themselves with the -performance of their cavalry, and above all, with the reflection that -the whole of the success was due to their incomparable chief. - -◆May–June.◆ - -The effect of the victory and of the rapid advance that followed -it was instantaneous. Louvain and the whole line of Dyle fell into -Marlborough’s hands on the day after the battle; Brussels, Malines, -and Lierre surrendered before the first halt, and gave him the line -of the Senne and the key of the French entrenchments about Antwerp; -and one day later, the surrender of Alost delivered to him one of the -strongholds on the Dender. Never pausing for a moment, he sent forward -a party to lay bridges on the Scheldt below Oudenarde in order to cut -off the French retreat into France, a movement which obliged Villeroy -forthwith to abandon the lines about Ghent and to retire up the Lys to -Courtrai. Ghent, Bruges, and Damme thereupon surrendered on the spot; -Oudenarde followed them, and after a few days Antwerp itself. Thus -within a fortnight after the victory the whole of Flanders and Brabant, -with the exception of Dendermond and one or two places of minor -importance, had succumbed to the Allies, and the French had fallen back -to their own frontier. - -◆June.◆ - -Nor was even this all. A contribution of two million livres levied in -French Flanders brought home to the Grand Monarch that the war was -now knocking at his own gates. Villars, with the greater part of his -army, was recalled from the Rhine to the Lys, and a number of French -troops were withdrawn to the same quarter from Italy. Baden had thus -the game in his own hand on the Rhine, and though he was too sulky and -incapable to turn the advantage to account, yet his inaction was no -fault of Marlborough’s. We are hardly surprised to find that in the -middle of this fortnight the Duke made urgent request for fresh stores -of champagne; he may well have needed the stimulant amid such pressure -of work and fatigue.[38] - -He now detached Overkirk to besiege Ostend and another party to -blockade Dendermond, at the same time sending off five British -battalions, which we shall presently meet again, for a descent on the -Charente which was then contemplated in England. This done he took post -with the rest of the Army at Roulers, to westward of the Lys, whence -he could at once cover the siege of Ostend and menace Menin and Ypres. -The operations at Ostend were delayed for some time through want of -artillery and the necessity of waiting for the co-operation of the -Fleet; ◆June 6/17.◆ but the trenches were finally opened on the 17th of -June, and a few weeks later the town surrendered. - -◆June 27./July 8.◆ - -Three days after this the army was reassembled for the siege of Menin. -This fortress was of peculiar strength, being esteemed one of Vauban’s -masterpieces, and was garrisoned by five thousand men. Moreover, -the French, being in command of the upper sluices of the Lys, were -able greatly to impede the operations by cutting off the water from -the lower stream, and thus rendering it less useful for purposes of -transport, But all this availed it little; for three weeks after the -opening of the trenches Menin surrendered. ◆Aug. 11/22.◆ The British -battalions[39] which had been kept inactive at Ramillies took a leading -share in the work, and some of them suffered very heavily; but they had -the satisfaction of recapturing four of the British guns that had been -taken at Landen. - -◆Aug. 25./Sept. 5.◆ - -A few days later Dendermond was attacked in earnest and was likewise -taken, after which Marlborough ◆Sept. 12/23.◆ fell back across the -Scheldt to secure the whole line of the Dender by the capture of -Ath. ◆Sept. 21./Oct. 2.◆ Ten days sufficed for the work, after which -Ath also fell into the hands of the Allies. The apathy of the French -throughout these operations sufficiently show their discouragement. -Owing to the supineness of Prince Lewis of Baden, Villars had been -able to bring up thirty-five thousand men to the assistance of -Marshal Vendôme, who had now superseded Villeroy; but even with this -reinforcement the two commanders only looked on helplessly while -Marlborough reduced fortress after fortress before their eyes. They -were, indeed, more anxious to strengthen the defences of Mons and -Charleroi, lest the Duke should break into France by that line, than -to approach him in the field. Nor were they not wholly unreasonable in -their anxiety, for Marlborough’s next move was upon the Sambre; but -incessant rain and tempestuous weather forbade any further operations, -so that Ath proved to be the last conquest of the year. Thus ended the -campaign of Ramillies, one of the most brilliant in the annals of war, -wherein Marlborough in a single month carried his arms triumphant from -the Meuse to the sea. - - - - - VOL. I BOOK VI. CHAPTER VII - - -◆1707.◆ - -Almanza was a bad opening for the new year, but worse was to follow. -Throughout the winter Marlborough had, as usual, been employed in -diplomatic negotiations, which nothing but his skill and fascination -could have carried to a successful issue. But on one most important -point the Duke was foiled by the treachery of the Emperor, who, to -further his own selfish designs on Naples, secretly concluded a treaty -with France for the neutrality of Italy, and thus enabled the whole of -the French garrisons in Italy to be withdrawn unmolested. The forces -thus liberated were at once brought up to the scene of action on the -Rhine and in Flanders, and the French were enabled to lead a superior -force in the field against Marlborough. Again, the Duke had hoped -to save Spain by an invasion of France from the side of Savoy, but -this project had been deferred until too late, owing to the Emperor’s -cupidity for the possession of Naples. Finally, though Prince Lewis of -Baden had died during the winter, he had been replaced on the Rhine by -a still more incompetent prince, the Margrave of Baireuth, who, far -from making any diversion in the Duke’s favour, never ceased pestering -him to come to his assistance. So flagrant was this deplorable person’s -incapacity that he too was superseded before the close of the campaign, -though too late for any effective purpose. His successor, however, -deserves particular notice, being none other than the Elector of -Hanover, afterwards our own King George the First, no genius in the -field, but, as shall be seen in due time, an extremely sensible and -clear-headed soldier. - -The result of these complications was that Marlborough spent the -greater part of the summer encamped, in the face of a superior -French force, at Meldert, on a branch of the Great Geete, to cover -his conquests in Flanders and Brabant. At last the Emperor, having -accomplished his desires in Naples, made a diversion towards Provence, -which drew away a part of the French force to that quarter and -enabled the Duke to move. But then bad weather intervened to prevent -any successful operations. Twice Marlborough was within an ace of -surprising Vendôme, who had superseded Villeroy in Flanders, and twice -the marshal decamped in haste and confusion only just in time to save -his army. Even so the Duke would have struck one heavy blow but for the -intervention of the Dutch deputies. But fortune favoured the French; -the rain came down in torrents, and the country was poached into such a -quagmire by the cavalry that many of the infantry were fairly swallowed -up and lost.[40] Thus tamely ended the campaign which should have -continued the work of Ramillies.[41] - -Returning home in November Marlborough found difficulties almost as -great as he had left behind him in Flanders. There were quarrels in -the Cabinet, already foreboding the time when the Queen and the people -should turn against him. The Court of France was reverting to its old -methods and endeavouring to divide England by providing the Pretender -with a force for invasion. Again the hardships of the campaign in -Flanders and the defeat of Almanza had not only created discontent, but -had enormously increased the demand for recruits. The evil work of the -Dutch deputies and the incorrigible selfishness and jealousy of the -Empire had already prolonged the war beyond the limit assigned by the -short patience of the English people. - -Happily Parliament was for the present still loyal to the war, and -voted not only the usual supplies but money for an additional ten -thousand men. Five new battalions[42] were raised, and three more of -the old establishment were detailed for service in Flanders.[43] But -far more satisfactory was the fact that in 1708 all regiments took the -field with new colours, bearing the cross of St. Andrew blended with -that of St. George, pursuant to the first article of the Treaty of -Union, passed in the previous year, between England and Scotland. - -◆1708.◆ - -The early spring of 1708 was wasted by the French in a futile endeavour -to set the Pretender afoot in Scotland with a French force at his -back; nor was it until the 9th of April that Marlborough sailed for -the Hague, where Eugene was already awaiting him. ◆Mar. 29./April 9.◆ -There the two agreed that the Duke should as usual command in Flanders, -while Eugene should take charge of an army on the Moselle, nominally -for operations on that river, but in reality to unite with Marlborough -by a rapid march and give battle to the French before they could call -in their remoter detachments. There was a considerable difficulty with -the Elector of Hanover, who was to command on the Rhine, owing to -his jealousy of Eugene; but this trouble was satisfactorily settled, -as were all troubles of the time, by the intervention of Marlborough. -Thereupon the Electoral Prince, true to the quarrelsome traditions of -his family, at once insisted on taking service with Eugene, simply -for the sake of annoying his father; thus adding one more to the many -causes of friction which, but for Marlborough, would soon have brought -the Grand Alliance to a standstill. This Electoral Prince will become -better known to us as King George the Second. - -The French on their part had made extraordinary exertions in the -hope of a successful campaign. Since Ramillies they had drawn troops -from all quarters to Flanders; and from thenceforth the tendency in -every succeeding year grew stronger for all operations to centre in -that familiar battle-ground. On the Rhine the Elector of Bavaria -held command, with Berwick, much exalted since Almanza, to help him. -The French main army in Flanders numbered little less than a hundred -thousand men, and was under the orders of Vendôme, with the Duke of -Burgundy in supreme command. The presence of the heir to the throne, of -his brother the Duke of Berry, and of the Chevalier de St. George, as -the Pretender called himself, all portended an unusual effort. - -◆May.◆ - -Marching up at the end of May from their rendezvous on the south of -the Haine, the French army moved north to the forest of Soignies. -Marlborough thereupon at once concentrated at Hal and summoned Eugene -to him with all haste. His own army numbered but eighty thousand -men, and, though as usual he showed a bold front, he knew that such -disparity of numbers was serious. The French then manœuvred towards -Waterloo as if to threaten Louvain, a movement which the Duke met by -a forced march to Park on the Dyle. ◆May 24./June 4. to June 24./July -5.◆ Here he remained perforce inactive for a whole month, waiting for -Eugene, who was delayed by some petty formalities which were judged by -the Imperial Court to be far more important than military operations. -◆June 23./July 4.◆ Suddenly, on the night of the 4th of July, the -French broke up their camp, marched westward to cross the Senne at Hal -and detached small corps against Bruges and Ghent. Unable to meet the -Allies with the sword, the French had substituted gold for steel and -had for some time been tampering with the new authorities in these -towns. The gold had done its work. Within twenty-four hours Ghent and -Bruges had opened their gates, and the keys to the navigation of the -Scheldt and Lys were lost. - -◆June 24./July 5.◆ - -Marlborough, who was quite ready for a march, was up and after the -French army immediately. At two o’clock in the morning his army was in -motion, streaming off to pass the Senne at Anderlecht. The march was -long and severe, the roads being in so bad a state that the right wing -did not reach its halting-ground until six o’clock in the evening, nor -the left wing till two o’clock on the following morning; but this great -effort brought the Allies almost within reach of the French army. -◆June 25./July 6.◆ In the night, intelligence was brought to -Marlborough that the enemy was turning back to fight him. He was in the -saddle at once, to form his line of battle; but the news was false. -The French in reality were making off as fast as they could; and, -before the truth could reach Marlborough, they were across the Dender. -Marlborough’s cavalry was instantly on their track, but could do no -more than capture a few hundred prisoners, together with most of the -French baggage. That same day came definite information of the loss -of Ghent and Bruges, and of the investment of the citadel of Ghent. -Brussels took the alarm at once. The French, as they feared, had for -once got the better of the Duke. The French army was encamped at Alost, -where, like a king between two pieces at draughts, it threatened both -the citadel of Ghent and Brussels; and all was panic in the capital. -The Duke was fain to move on to Assche, midway between Alost and -Brussels, to restore the confidence of the fearful city. - -Here Eugene joined him. Finding it hopeless to arrive in time with -his army, the Prince had pushed on alone; nor could he have arrived -more opportunely, for Marlborough was so much weakened by an attack of -fever that he was hardly fit for duty. It was indeed a trying moment. -The next design of the French was evidently aimed at Oudenarde for -the recovery of the line of the Scheldt. They were already across -the Dender and ahead of Marlborough on the road to it, and moreover -had broken down the bridges behind them; yet the Duke dared not move -lest he should expose Brussels. He sent orders to the Governor of -Ath to collect as many troops as possible, and to throw himself into -Oudenarde, which that officer punctually did; and then there was -nothing to be done but to wait. Two days sufficed to place the citadel -of Ghent in the hands of the French, and to set their army free for -further operations. ◆June 28./July 9.◆ Accordingly on the 9th of July -Vendôme sent forward detachments to invest Oudenarde, and moved with -the main army up the Dender to Lessines, from which point he intended -to cover the siege. Great was his astonishment on approaching the town -on the following day to find that Marlborough had arrived there before -him, and was not only within reach of Oudenarde, but interposed between -him and his own frontier. - -For at two o’clock on the morning of the 9th of July the Allied army -had marched off in beautiful order in five columns, and by noon had -covered fifteen miles to Herfelingen on the road to the Dender. Four -hours later Cadogan was sent forward with eight battalions and as many -squadrons to occupy Lessines and throw bridges over the Dender; and, -when tattoo beat that night, the army silently entered on a march of -thirteen further miles to the same point. ◆June 29./July 10.◆ Before -dawn came the welcome intelligence that Cadogan had reached his -destination at midnight, laid his bridges, and made his dispositions to -cover the passage of the troops. The army tramped on, always in perfect -order, crossed the river and was taking up its camping-ground, when the -heads of the enemy’s columns appeared on the distant heights and were -seen first to halt and then to retire. Marlborough on the curve of the -arc had outmarched Vendôme on the chord. - -The French, finding the whole of their plans disconcerted, now -wheeled about north-westward towards Gavre on the Scheldt, to shelter -themselves behind the river and bar the advance of the Allies on -Bruges. But the Duke had no intention to let them off so easily. -Burgundy and Vendôme were not on good terms; their differences had -already caused considerable confusion in the army; and Marlborough was -fully aware of the fact. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ At dawn on the morning of -the 11th the unwearied Cadogan started off with some eleven thousand -men[44] and twenty-four guns, to prepare the roads, construct bridges, -and make dispositions to cover the passage of the Scheldt below -Oudenarde. By half-past ten he had reached the river, just above the -village of Eyne, and on ascending the low heights above the stream -and looking westward he saw before him a kind of shallow basin or -amphitheatre, seamed by little ditches and rivulets, and broken by -hedges and enclosures. To the south the rising ground on which he -stood swept round almost to the glacis of Oudenarde, thence curved -westward from the village of Bevere into another broad hill, called the -Boser Couter, to the village of Oycke and beyond, turned from thence -northward across the valley of the river Norken to Huysse, from which -point trending still to northward it died away in the marshes of the -Scheldt. Near Oycke two small streams rise which, after pursuing for -some way a parallel course, unite to run down into the Scheldt at Eyne; -beyond them the Norken flows beneath the heights of Huysse in a line -parallel to the Scheldt. - -[Illustration: - - OUDENARDE - June 30th/July 11th 1708 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Presently parties of French horse appeared on the ground to the north. -Vendôme’s advanced-guard, under the Marquis of Biron, had crossed the -Scheldt leisurely at Gavre, six miles farther down the river, and was -now moving across his front with foragers out, in happy unconsciousness -of the presence of an enemy. A dash of Cadogan’s squadrons upon the -foragers quickly brought Biron to Eyne and beyond it, where he caught -sight of Cadogan’s detachment of scarlet and blue battalions guarding -the bridge, and presently of a body of cavalry in the act of crossing; -for Marlborough, uneasy while his advanced-guard was still in the air, -had caught up a column of Prussian horse and galloped forward with it -in all haste. Biron at once reported what he had seen to Vendôme, who, -perceiving that the mass of the Allied army was still on the wrong -side of the Scheldt, gave orders to take up a position parallel to the -river; the line to rest its left on the village of Heurne and extend -by Eyne and Beveren to Mooregem on the right. In pursuance of his -design he directed seven battalions to occupy Heurne forthwith; but -at this point the Duke of Burgundy interposed. The heights of Huysse -in rear of the Norken from Asper to Wannegem formed in his judgment a -preferable position; and there, two miles from the Scheldt, he should -form his line of battle, facing south-east. So the army was guided to -the left bank of the Norken, while the seven battalions, obeying what -they conceived to be their orders, marched down to the village not of -Heurne but of Eyne, and backed by a few squadrons, took up the position -assigned to them by Vendôme. - -Meanwhile, responding to urgent messages from Marlborough, the main -body of the Allies was hurrying forward, and by two o’clock the head -of the infantry had reached the Scheldt. Part of the cavalry passed -through Oudenarde to take advantage of the town bridge; the foot began -to cross by the pontoons, and Cadogan, who had marked the march of the -French into Eyne, at once summoned the whole of his advanced-guard -across to the left bank. Sabine’s brigade, supported by the other two, -crossed the rivulet against Eyne, while the Hanoverian cavalry moved up -to the rear of the village and cut off all hope of retreat. Presently -Sabine’s British were hotly engaged; but the French made only a poor -resistance. It is the weakness of the French soldier that he apprehends -too quickly when his officers have not given him a fair chance. Three -battalions out of the seven were captured entire, the remaining four -were killed or taken piecemeal in their flight. The cavalry, flushed -by their success, then advanced under Prince George against the few -French squadrons in rear of the village, charged them, routed them, and -drove them across the Norken. The Prince had his horse shot under him -in this encounter, for his family has never wanted for courage, and he -remembered the day of Oudenarde to the end of his life. - -The Duke of Burgundy now determined upon a general action, and made -every preparation for defence of the position behind the Norken. -But when four o’clock came and the Allied army was not yet in order -of battle, he changed his plan, pushed a body of cavalry from his -right across the stream, and set the whole of his centre and right -in motion to advance likewise. Marlborough, perceiving the movement, -judged that the attack would be directed against his left, in the -hope that Cadogan’s battalions about Eyne would be left isolated and -open to be crushed by an advance of the French left. Two of Cadogan’s -regiments, Prussians, which had been pushed forward half a mile beyond -Eyne to Groenewald, were at once reinforced by twelve more of the -advanced-guard; the British cavalry was formed up on the heights at -Bevere, and the Prussian horse further to the Allied right near Heurne. -No more could be done until the rest of the army should gradually cross -the river which divided it from the battlefield. - -At length about five o’clock thirty French battalions debouched upon -Groenewald, which was as yet held only by Cadogan’s two advanced -regiments, and began the attack. The Prussians stuck to their post -gallantly and held their own among the hedges, until presently -Cadogan’s reinforcement, and later on twenty more battalions under the -Duke of Argyll,[45] came up to their assistance. Forming in succession -on the left of the Prussians as they reached the fighting line, these -regiments extended the field of action as far south as Schaerken; and -the combat was carried on with great spirit. The ground was so strongly -enclosed that the fight resolved itself into duels of battalions, the -cream of the infantry on both sides being engaged. At one moment the -French outflanked the left of the Allies and drove them back, but -fresh battalions of Marlborough’s army kept constantly streaming into -action, which recovered the lost ground and prolonged the line of fire -always further to the south. - -Marlborough and Eugene, who had hitherto remained together, now parted, -and the Duke handing over eighteen battalions to the Prince entrusted -him with the command of the right. This accession of strength enabled -Eugene to relieve Cadogan’s corps, which had yielded ground somewhat -before Groenewald, and even to pierce through the first line of the -enemy’s infantry. General Natzmar thereupon seized the moment to throw -the Prussian cavalry against the second line. His squadrons were -received with a biting fire from the hedges as they advanced; and the -French Household Cavalry, watching the favourable moment for a charge, -drove back the Prussians with very heavy loss. - -Meanwhile Marlborough with the Hanoverian and Dutch infantry was -pressing forward slowly on his left, the French fighting with great -stubbornness and gallantry, and contesting every inch of ground from -hedge to hedge. At last the enemy, being forced back to Diepenbeck, -a few hundred yards in rear of Schaerken, stood fast, and refused, -despite all the Duke’s efforts, to give way another foot. But -Marlborough had still twenty battalions of Dutch and Danes with almost -the entire cavalry of the left at his disposal, and he had noticed -that the French right flank rested on the air. He now directed Marshal -Overkirk to lead these troops under cover of the Boser Couter round the -French right and to fall with them upon the enemy’s rear. The gallant -old Dutchman, though infirm and sick unto death, joyfully obeyed. Two -brigades were thrown at once on the flank of the troops that were so -stoutly opposing Marlborough; while the cavalry advanced quickly on -the reverse slope of the Boser Couter,[46] and then wheeling to the -right, fell on the rear of the unsuspecting French. A part of the -Household Cavalry and some squadrons of dragoons tried bravely to stand -their ground, but they were borne back and swept away. Overkirk’s -troops pressed rapidly on; and the French right was fairly surrounded -on all sides. - -Now at last an effort was made to bring forward the French left, which, -through Burgundy’s perversity or for some inscrutable reason, had -been left motionless on the other side of the Norken; but it was too -late. The infantry, though led by Vendôme himself, failed to make the -slightest impression, and the cavalry dared not advance. The ground -before them was intricate and swampy, and the whole of the British -cavalry, withdrawn from their first position by Eugene, stood waiting -to plunge down upon them directly they should move. The daylight faded -and the night came on, but the musketry flashed out incessantly in an -ever-narrowing girdle of fire, as the Allies wound themselves closer -and closer round the enveloped French right. At length at nine o’clock -Marlborough and Eugene, fearful lest their own troops should engage -each other in the darkness, with some difficulty enforced the order to -halt and cease firing. Vast numbers of the French seized the moment to -escape, but presently all the drums of the Allies began with one accord -to beat the French retreat, while the Huguenot officers shouted “À moi, -Picardie! À moi, Roussillon!” to gather the relics of the scattered -regiments of the enemy around them. In this way some thousands of -prisoners were gleaned, though the harvest which would have been reaped -in another hour of daylight was lost. In the French army all was -confusion. Vendôme tried in vain to keep the troops together till the -morning, but Burgundy gave the word for retreat; and the whole mass -ran off in disorder towards Ghent. - -So ended the battle of Oudenarde, presenting on one side a feature -rare in these days, namely, a general engagement without an order -of battle.[47] It was undoubtedly the most hazardous action that -Marlborough ever fought. His troops were much harassed by forced -marches. They had started at two o’clock on Monday morning and had -covered fifty miles, including the passage of two rivers, when they -came into action at two o’clock on Wednesday afternoon. It would be -reckoned no small feat in these days to move eighty thousand men -over fifty miles in sixty hours, but in those days of bad roads and -heavy packs the effort must have been enormous. Finally, the army had -to pass the Scheldt in the face of the enemy, and ran no small risk -of being destroyed in detail. Yet the hazard was probably less than -it now seems to us, and generals in our own day have not hesitated -to risk similar peril with success. The French commanders were at -variance; the less competent of them, being heir-apparent, was likely -to be toadied by officers and supported by them against their better -judgment; and, finally, the entire French army was very much afraid -of Marlborough. Notwithstanding their slight success in Ghent and -Bruges, their elation had evaporated speedily when they found the -Duke before them at Lessines. All this Marlborough knew well; and -he knew also that, if an impromptu action (if one may use the term) -must be fought, there was not a man on the French side who had an -eye for a battlefield comparable to Eugene’s or his own. The event -justified his calculations; for the victory was one of men who knew -their own minds over men who did not. Another hour of daylight, so -Marlborough declared, would have enabled him to finish the war. The -total loss of the Allies in the battle was about three thousand killed -and wounded, the British infantry, though early engaged, suffering -but little, while the British cavalry, being employed to watch the -inactive French left, hardly suffered at all.[48] The French lost -six thousand killed and wounded and nine thousand prisoners only, -but they were thoroughly shaken and demoralised for the remainder of -the campaign. The wearied army of the Allies lay on its arms on the -battlefield, while Marlborough and Eugene waited impatiently for the -dawn. As soon as it was light, forty squadrons, for the most part -British, were sent forward in pursuit, while Eugene returned to his -own army to hasten its march and to collect material for a siege. -◆July 1/12.◆ The main army halted to rest for two days where it lay, -during which time the intelligence came that Berwick ad been summoned -with his army from the Moselle, and was marching with all haste to -occupy certain lines constructed by the French to cover their frontier -from Ypres to the Lys. ◆July 2–3/13–14.◆ At midnight fifty squadrons -and thirty battalions under Count Lottum, a distinguished Prussian -officer, started for these lines; the whole army followed at daybreak, -and, while on the march, the Duke received the satisfactory news that -Lottum had captured the lines without difficulty. Next day the whole of -Marlborough’s army was camped along the Lys between Menin and Commines, -within the actual territory of France. - -Detached columns were at once sent out to forage and levy -contributions. The suburbs of Arras were burnt, and no effort was -spared to bring home to the French that war was hammering at their -own gates. But the Allies were still doubtful as to the operations -that they should next undertake. So long as the French held Bruges and -Ghent they held also the navigation of the Scheldt and Lys, so that -it was of vital importance to tempt Vendôme, if possible, to evacuate -those towns. The British Government was preparing a force[49] under -General Erle for a descent upon Normandy by sea, and Marlborough was -for co-operating with this expedition, masking the fortress of Lille, -and penetrating straight into France—a plan which the reader should, if -possible, bear in mind. But the proposal was too adventurous to meet -with the approval of the Dutch, and was judged impracticable even by -Eugene unless Lille were first captured as a place of arms. Ultimately -it was decided, notwithstanding the closing of the Scheldt and Lys, -to undertake the siege of Lille; and all the energies of the Allies -were turned to the collection of sixteen thousand horses to haul the -siege-train overland from Brussels. - -During the enforced inaction of the army for the next few weeks, the -monotony was broken only by the arrival of a distinguished visitor, -Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, together -with one of his three hundred and sixty-four bastards, a little boy of -twelve named Maurice, who had run away from school to join the army. -We shall meet with this boy again as a man of fifty, under the name of -Marshal Saxe, at a village some twenty miles distant called Fontenoy. - -At length the preparations for the siege were complete, and the huge -convoy set out from Brussels for its long march. Now, if ever, was -the time for the French to strike a blow. Vendôme in the north at -Ghent and Berwick in the south at Douay had, between them, one hundred -and ten thousand men: the distance to be traversed by the convoy -was seventy-five miles, and the way was barred by the Dender and -the Scheldt. Such, however, was the skill with which the march was -conducted that the French never succeeded even in threatening the vast, -unwieldy columns, which duly reached their destination without the -loss even of a single waggon. ◆Aug. 1/12.◆ Of all the achievements of -Marlborough and Eugene, this seems to have been judged by contemporary -military men to be the greatest.[50] - -Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was one of the early conquests -of Lewis the Fourteenth, and, if the expression may be allowed, the -darling town of the Court of Versailles. Situated in a swampy plain -and watered by two rivers, the Deule and Marque, its natural position -presented difficulties of no ordinary kind to a besieging force; and, -in addition, it had been fortified by Vauban with his utmost skill. The -garrison, which had been strengthened by Berwick, amounted to fifteen -thousand men, under the command of brave old Marshal Boufflers, who -had solicited the honour of defending the fortress. To the north, as -we have seen, lay Vendôme, and to the south Berwick, with a joint -force now amounting to about ninety-four thousand men.[51] It was -for Marlborough and Eugene with an inferior strength of eighty-four -thousand men[52] to hold them at bay and to take one of the strongest -fortresses in the world before their eyes. - -A detailed account even of so famous a siege would be wearisome, the -more so since the proportion of British troops detailed for regular -work in the trenches was but five battalions,[53] but there are a few -salient features which cannot be omitted. The point selected for attack -was the north side, the first advance to which was opened by a single -English soldier, Sergeant Littler of the First Guards,[54] who swam -across the Marquette to a French post, which commanded the passage -of the stream, and let down the drawbridge. ◆Aug. 2/13.◆ Two days -later the town was fully invested, and Marlborough took post with the -covering army at Helchin on the Scheldt. - -The investment had not been accomplished for more than a fortnight, -when the Duke was informed that Berwick and Vendôme were advancing -towards the Dender to unite their forces at Lessines. After manœuvring -at first to hinder the junction Marlborough finally decided to let it -come to pass, being satisfied that, if the French designed to relieve -Lille, they could not penetrate to it in the face of his army on the -east side, but must go round and approach the city from the south. -In this case, as both armies would move in concentric circles around -Lille as a centre, Marlborough, being nearer to that centre, could be -certain of reaching any given point on the way to it before the French. -Moreover, the removal of the enemy from the east to the south would -free the convoys from Brussels from all annoyance on their march to the -siege. - -◆Aug. 22./Sept. 2.◆ - -As he had expected, the French moved south to Tournay, and then -wheeling northward entered the plain of Lille, where they found -Marlborough and Eugene drawn up ready to receive them.[55] Vendôme -and Berwick had positive orders to risk a battle; and there had been -much big talk of annihilating the Allies. Yet face to face with their -redoubtable enemies they hesitated. Finally, after a week’s delay, -which enabled Marlborough greatly to strengthen his position by -entrenchment, they advanced as if to attack in earnest, but withdrew -ignominiously after a useless cannonade, without accepting battle. Had -not Marlborough and Eugene been restrained by the Dutch deputies, the -marshals would have had a battle forced on them whether they liked it -or not, but, as things were, they were permitted to retire. To such -depth of humiliation had Marlborough reduced the proud and gallant -French army. - -◆Aug. 27–28./Sept. 7–8.◆ - -The retreat left Eugene free to press the siege with vigour; but a -great assault, which cost him three thousand men,[56] failed to give -him the advantage for which he had hoped; and a week later Marlborough -was called in from the covering army to give assistance. ◆Sept. -19–20./30–31.◆ For the next attack, on the counterscarp, the Duke lent -the Prince five thousand English, and it is said that English and -French never fought more worthily of their reputation than on that -day; but the assault was thrice repelled, and it was only through -the exertions of Eugene himself that a portion of the works was at -last captured, after a desperate effort and at frightful expense of -life. Altogether the siege was not going well. The engineers had made -blunders; a vast number of men had been thrown away to no purpose; and -ammunition and stores were beginning to run short. Lastly, Boufflers -maintained always a very grand and extremely able defence. - -Vendôme and Berwick could now think of no better expedient than to -throw themselves into strong positions along the Scarpe and Scheldt, -from Douay to Ghent, in order to cut off all convoys from Brussels. -But Marlborough was prepared for this, and had not captured Ostend -after Ramillies for nothing. England held command of the sea; and -Erle’s expedition, which had effected little or nothing on the coast -of Normandy, was at hand to help in the transport of supplies from the -new base. Erle, who had considerable talent for organisation, soon -set Ostend in order, seized two passages over the Nieuport Canal at -Leffinghe and Oudenburg, and prepared to send off his first convoy. As -its arrival was of vital importance to the maintenance of the siege, -the French were as anxious ◆Sept. 16/27.◆ to intercept as the English -to forward it. Vendôme accordingly sent off Count de la Mothe with -twenty-two thousand men to attack it on its way, while Marlborough -despatched twelve battalions and fifteen hundred horse to Ostend -itself, twelve battalions more under General Webb to Thourout, and -eighteen squadrons under Cadogan to Roulers, at two different points on -the road, to help it to its destination. - -◆Sept. 17/28.◆ - -The convoy started at night, and in the morning Cadogan sent forward -Count Lottum with a hundred and fifty horse to meet it. At noon Lottum -returned to Thourout with the intelligence that he had struck against -the advanced guard of a French force at Ichtegem, two miles beyond -Wynendale and some four miles from Thourout, on the road to Ostend. -Webb at once collected every battalion within his reach, twenty-two in -all, and marched with all speed for Ichtegem, with Lottum’s squadron in -advance. The horse, however, on emerging from the defile of Wynendale, -found the enemy advancing towards them into the plains that lay beyond -it. Lottum retired slowly, skirmishing, while Webb pushed on and -posted his men in two lines at the entrance to the defile. The strait -was bounded on either hand by a wood, and in each of these woods Webb -stationed a battalion of Germans to take the French in flank. The -dispositions were hardly complete when the enemy came up and opened -fire from nineteen pieces of artillery. Lottum and his handful of horse -then retired, while just in the nick of time three more battalions -reached Webb from the rear and formed his third line. - -The French cannonade was prolonged for nearly two hours, but with -little effect, for Webb had ordered his men to lie down. At length at -five o’clock the French advanced in four lines of infantry, backed -by as many of horse and dragoons. They came on with great steadiness -and entered the space between the two woods, with their flanks almost -brushing the covert as they passed, serenely unconscious of the peril -that awaited them. Then from right and left a staggering volley crashed -into them from the battalions concealed among the trees. Both flanks -shrank back from the fire, and huddled themselves in confusion upon -their centre. De la Mothe sent forward some dragoons in support; -and the foot, recovering themselves, pressed on against the lines -before them. So vigorous was their attack that they broke through two -battalions of the first line; but, the gap being instantly filled -from the second, they were forced back. Again they struggled forward, -trusting by the sheer weight of eight lines against two to sweep their -enemy away. But the eternal fire on front and flank became unendurable, -and, notwithstanding the blows and entreaties of their officers, the -eight lines broke up in confusion, while Webb’s battalions, coolly -advancing by platoons “as if they were at exercise,” poured volley -after volley into them as they retired. Cadogan, who had hastened up -with a few squadrons to the sound of the firing, was anxious to charge -the broken troops, but his force was considered too weak; and thus -after two hours of hot conflict ended the combat of Wynendale. The -French engaged therein numbered almost double of the Allies, and lost -close on three thousand men, while the Allies lost rather less than a -thousand of all ranks. The signal incapacity displayed by the French -commander did not lessen the credit of Webb, and Wynendale was reckoned -one of the most brilliant little affairs of the whole war.[57] - -The safe arrival of the convoy before Lille raised the hope of the -besiegers; and Vendôme, now fully alive to the importance of cutting -off communication with Ostend, marched towards that side with a -considerable force, and opening the dykes laid the whole country under -water. Marlborough went quickly after him, but the marshal would not -await his coming; and the Duke, by means of high-wheeled vehicles -and punts, contrived to overcome the difficulties caused by the -inundation. ◆Oct. 11/22.◆ At last, after a siege of sixty days the town -capitulated; and the garrison retired into the citadel, where Eugene -proceeded to beleaguer it anew. - -While the new siege was going forward, the Elector of Bavaria arrived -on the scene from the Rhine, from whence the apathy of the Elector of -Hanover had most unpardonably allowed him to withdraw, and laid siege -to Brussels with fifteen thousand men. ◆Nov. 13/24.◆ This was an -entirely new complication; and, since the French held the line of the -Scheldt in force, it was difficult to see how Marlborough could parry -the blow. Fortunately the garrison defended itself with great spirit, -the English regiments[58] setting a fine example; and the Duke, in no -wise dismayed, laid his plans with his usual secrecy and decision. -◆Nov. 15/26.◆ Spreading reports, which he confirmed by feint -movements, that he was about to place his troops in cantonments, he -marched suddenly and silently eastward on the night of the 26th of -November, crossed the Scheldt at two different points before the enemy -knew that he was near them, took a thousand prisoners, and then -remitting the bulk of his force to the siege of Lille, pushed on with -a detachment of cavalry and two battalions of English Guards to -Alost. ◆Nov. 17/28.◆ On his arrival he learned that the Elector had -raised the siege of Brussels and marched off with precipitation. The -bare name of Marlborough had been sufficient to scare him away. - -Meanwhile Eugene’s preparations before the citadel of Lille were in -rapid progress, and Marlborough was already maturing plans for a -further design before the close of the campaign. It had been the -earnest desire of both commanders to reduce Boufflers to unconditional -surrender; but time was an object, so on the 9th of December the -gallant old marshal and his heroic garrison marched out with the -honours of war. ◆Nov. 28./Dec. 9.◆ So ended the memorable siege of -Lille. It had cost the garrison eight thousand men, or more than half -of its numbers, and the Allies no fewer than fourteen thousand -men. The honours of the struggle rested decidedly with Boufflers, and -were paid to him by none more ungrudgingly than Marlborough and -Eugene. Yet as an operation of war, conducted under extraordinary -difficulties in respect of transport, under the eyes of a superior -force and subject to diversions, such as that of the Elector of -Bavaria, this siege remains one of the highest examples of consummate -military skill. - -The fall of Lille was a heavy blow for France, but it was not the last -of the campaign. Within eight days Marlborough and Eugene had invested -Ghent, which after a brief resistance surrendered with the honours of -war. The capitulation of Bruges quickly followed, and the navigation of -the Scheldt and Lys having been regained, the two commanders at last -sent their troops into winter quarters. - -But even this did not close the sum of English successes for 1708. -From the Mediterranean had come news of another conquest, due to the -far-seeing eye and far-reaching hand of Marlborough. Early in the year -Galway had withdrawn from Catalonia to Lisbon, and the command in -Catalonia had been given at Marlborough’s instance to Field-Marshal -von Staremberg, an Imperial officer of much experience and deservedly -high reputation. Staremberg, however, could do little with but ten -thousand men against the Bourbon’s army of twice his strength; so by -Marlborough’s advice the troops were used to second the operations of -the Mediterranean squadron. Sardinia, the first point aimed at, was -captured almost without resistance; and the fleet then sailed for -Minorca. Here somewhat more opposition was encountered; but after less -than a fortnight’s work, creditably managed by Major-general Stanhope, -the Island was taken at a trifling cost of life.[59] ◆Sept. 13/24.◆ -Thus the English gained their first port in the Mediterranean; and the -news of the capture of Minorca reached London on the same day as that -of the fall of Lille. - -NOTE.—I have been unable to discover any Order of Battle for the -campaign of 1708. The regiments that bear the name of Oudenarde on -their appointments are the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards, -the 2nd Dragoons, 5th Lancers, Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, -1st, 3rd, 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 37th -Foot. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER VIII - - -◆1708.◆ - -The successes of the past campaign were sufficient to put the British -Parliament in good humour, and to prompt it to vote a further increase -of ten thousand German mercenaries for the following year. Nevertheless -political troubles were increasing, and there were already signs that -the rule of Godolphin and Marlborough was in danger. The death of the -Prince Consort had been a heavy blow to the Duke. Prince George may -have deserved Lord Macaulay’s character for impenetrable stupidity, but -there can be little doubt that his heavy phlegmatic character was of -infinite service to steady the weak and unstable Queen Anne. - -◆1709.◆ - -In the spring of 1709, however, it seemed reasonable to hope that -peace, which would have set all matters right, was well-nigh assured. -France, already at the last gasp through the exhaustion caused by the -war, was weakened still further by a severe winter which had added -famine to all her other troubles; and Lewis sought anxiously, even -at the price of humiliation, for peace. He approached Marlborough, -reputed the most avaricious and corruptible of men, with a gigantic -bribe to obtain good terms, but was unhesitatingly rebuffed. The Duke -stated the conditions which might be acceptable to England; and, had -the negotiations been trusted to him, there can be little doubt but -that he would have obtained the honourable peace which he above all -men most earnestly desired. He was, however, overruled by instructions -from home, imposing terms which Lewis could not be expected to grant; -the war was continued; and Marlborough, who had striven his hardest to -bring it to an end, was of course accused of prolonging it deliberately -for his own selfish ends. - -The French, now menaced by an invasion and a march of the Allies to -Paris, had strengthened their army enormously by withdrawing troops -from all quarters to Flanders, and had set in command their only -fortunate general, that very able soldier and incomparable liar, -Marshal Villars. To cover Arras, the north-eastern gate of France, -Villars had thrown up a strong line of entrenchments from the Scarpe -at Douay to the Lys, which were generally known, after the name of his -headquarters, as the lines of La Bassée. There he lay, entrenched to -the teeth, while Marlborough and Eugene, after long delay owing to the -lateness of the spring, encamped with one hundred and ten thousand men -to the south-east of Lille,◆ between two villages, with which the -reader will in due time make closer acquaintance, called Linselles and -Fontenoy. ◆June. Thence they moved south straight upon Villars’s -lines, with every apparent preparation for a direct attack upon them -and for forcing their way into France at that point. The heavy -artillery was sent to Menin on the Lys; report was everywhere rife of -the coming assault, and Villars lost no time in summoning the garrison -of Tournay to his assistance. ◆June 15/26.◆ On the 26th of June, at -seven in the evening, Marlborough issued his orders to strike tents -and march; and the whole army made up its mind for a bloody action -before the lines at dawn. To the general surprise, after advancing -some time in the direction of the French, the columns received orders -to change direction to the left. After some hours’ march eastward they -crossed a river, but the men did not know that the bridge lay over the -Marque and that it led them towards the battlefield of Bouvines; nor -was it until dawn that they saw the gray walls and the four spires of -Tournay before them, and discovered that they had invested the city. - -Tournay had been fortified by Vauban and was one of the strongest -fortresses in France,[60] but its garrison had been weakened by the -unsuspecting Villars, and there was little hope for it. The heavy -artillery of the Allies, which had been sent to Menin, went down the -Lys to Ghent and up the Scheldt to the besieged city, the trenches -were opened on the 7th of July, ◆June 26./July 7.◆ and after three -weeks, despite of the demonstrations of Villars and incessant heavy -rain, Tournay was reduced to surrender.[61] ◆July 19/28.◆ Then -followed the siege of the citadel, the most desperate enterprise yet -undertaken by the Allied troops, inasmuch as the subterraneous works -were more numerous and formidable than those above ground. The -operations were, therefore, conducted by mine and countermine, with -destructive explosions and confused combats in the darkness, which -tried the nerves of the soldiers almost beyond endurance. The men did -not object to be shot, but they dreaded to be buried alive by the -hundred together through the springing of a single mine.[62] Four -English regiments[63] bore their share in this work and suffered -heavily in the course of it, until on the 3rd of September the citadel -capitulated. ◆Aug. 23./Sept. 3.◆ - -Before the close of the siege Marlborough and Eugene, leaving a -sufficient force before Tournay, had moved back with the main army -before the lines at Douay. They had long decided that the lines were -far too formidable to be forced, but they saw no reason for -communicating this opinion to Villars. ◆Aug. 20/31.◆ On the 31st of -August Lord Orkney, with twenty squadrons and the whole of the -grenadiers of the army, marched away silently and swiftly eastward -towards St. Ghislain on the Haine. ◆Aug. 23./Sept. 3.◆ Three days -later, immediately after the capitulation of the citadel of Tournay, -the Prince of Hessen-Cassel started at four o’clock in the afternoon -in the same direction; at nine o’clock Cadogan followed him with forty -squadrons more, and at midnight the whole army broke up its camp and -marched after them. Twenty-six battalions alone were left before -Tournay to superintend the evacuation and to level the siege-works, -with orders to watch Villars carefully and not to move until he did. - -The Prince of Hessen-Cassel soon overtook Orkney, from whom he learned -that St. Ghislain was too strongly held to be carried by his small -force. The Prince therefore at once pushed on. Rain was falling in -torrents, and the roads were like rivers, but he continued his advance -eastward, behind the woods that line the Haine, almost without a halt, -till at length at two o’clock on the morning of the 6th of September -he wheeled to the right and crossed the river at Obourg three miles to -the north-east of Mons. ◆Aug. 26./Sept. 6.◆ Before him lay the river -Trouille curving round to the south by Mons, and in rear of it a line -of entrenchments, thrown up during the last war, from Mons to the -Sambre, to cover the province of Hainault. A short survey showed him -that the lines were weakly guarded; and before noon he had passed them -without opposition. His force, notwithstanding the weather and the -state of the roads, had traversed the fifty miles to Obourg in -fifty-six hours. - -Too late Villars discovered that for the second time he had been duped, -and that Marlborough had no intention of forcing his way into France -through the lines of La Bassée and the wet swampy country beyond them, -when he could pass the lines of the Trouille without loss of a man. -He was in a difficult position, for Mons was slenderly garrisoned -and difficult of access, though, if captured, it would be a valuable -acquisition to the Allies. The approach to it from the westward was -practically shut off by a kind of natural barrier of forest, running, -roughly speaking, from St. Ghislain on the Haine to the north to -Maubeuge on the Sambre to the south. In this barrier there were but -two openings, the Trouée de Boussut between the village of that name -and the Haine, and the Trouées d’Aulnois and de Louvière, which are -practically the same, some miles further to the south. These will be -more readily remembered, the northern entrance by the name of Jemappes, -the southern by the name of Malplaquet. ◆Aug. 27./Sept. 7.◆ Villars no -sooner knew what was going forward than he pushed forward a detachment -with all speed upon the northern entrance, which was the nearer to him. -The detachment came too late. The Prince of Hessen-Cassel was already -astride of the opening, his right at Jemappes, his left at Ciply. The -French thereupon fell back to await the approach of the main army of -the Allies. - -◆Aug. 26./Sept. 6.◆ - -Meanwhile that army had toiled through a sea of mud on the northern -bank of the Haine, and crossing the river had by evening invested Mons -on the eastern side. ◆Aug. 27./Sept. 7.◆ On the following day Villars -and his whole army also arrived on the scene and encamped a couple of -miles to westward of the forest-barrier, from Montreuil to Athis. -Here he was joined by old Marshal Boufflers, who had volunteered his -services at a time of such peril to France. The arrival of the gallant -veteran caused such a tumult of rejoicing in the French camp that -Marlborough and Eugene, not knowing what the clamour might portend, -withdrew all but a fraction of the investing force from the town, and, -advancing westward into the plain of Mons, caused the army to bivouac -between Ciply and Quévy in order of battle. - -◆Aug. 28./Sept. 8.◆ - -Villars meanwhile had not moved, being adroit enough to threaten -both passages and keep the Allies in doubt as to which he should -select. While, therefore, the mass of the Allied army was moved -towards the Trouée d’Aulnois, a strong detachment was sent up to watch -the Trouée de Boussut. ◆Aug. 29./Sept. 9.◆ That night Villars sent -detachments forward to occupy the southern passage, and by mid-day -of the morrow his whole army was taking up its position across the -opening. Marlborough at once moved his army forward, approaching so -close that his left wing exchanged cannon-shot with Villars’s right. -Everything pointed to an immediate attack on the French before they -should have time to entrench themselves. Whether the Dutch deputies -intervened to stay further movements is uncertain. All that is known -is that a council of war was held by the commanders of the Allies, and -that, after much debate, it was resolved to await the arrival of the -detachment from the Trouée de Boussut and of the troops that had been -left behind at Tournay, to turn the siege of Mons into a blockade, -and in the meanwhile to send eighteen battalions north to capture St. -Ghislain. Evidently in some quarter there was reluctance to hazard a -general action. - -Villars now set himself with immense energy to strengthen his -position; and, when Marlborough and Eugene surveyed the defences at -daybreak of the following morning, they were astonished at the -formidable appearance of the entrenchments. ◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆ -Marlborough was once more for attacking without further delay, but he -was opposed by the Dutch deputies and even by Eugene. The attack was -therefore fixed for the morrow; and another day was lost which Villars -did not fail to turn to excellent account. - -The entrance from the westward to the Trouée d’Aulnois or southern -entrance to the plain of Mons was marked by the two villages of Campe -du Hamlet on the north and Malplaquet on the south. About a mile in -advance of these villages the ground rose to its highest elevation, the -opening being about three thousand paces wide, and the ground broken -and hollowed to right and left by small rivulets. This was the point -selected by Villars for his position. It was bounded on his right by -the forest of Laignières, the greatest length of which ran parallel -to the Trouée, and on the left by a forest, known at different points -by the names of Taisnières, Sart and Blangies, the greatest length of -which ran at right angles to the Trouée. Villars occupied the forest -of Laignières with his extreme right, his battalions strengthening -the natural obstacles of a thick and tangled covert by means of -abatis. From the edge of the wood he constructed a triple line of -entrenchments, which ran across the opening for full a third of its -width, when they gave way to a line of nine redans. These redans in -turn yielded place to a swamp backed by more entrenchments, which -carried the defences across to the wood of Taisnières. Several cannon -were mounted on the entrenchments, and a battery of twenty guns before -the redans. On Villars’s left the forests of Taisnières and Sart -projected before the general front, forming a salient and re-entering -angle. Entrenchments and abatis were constructed in accordance with -this configuration, and two more batteries were erected on this side, -in addition to several guns at various points along the line, to -enfilade an advancing enemy. Feeling even thus insecure, Villars threw -up more entrenchments at the villages of Malplaquet and Chaussée du -Bois in rear of the wood of Sart, and was still hard at work on them -to the last possible moment before the action. Finally in rear of all -stood his cavalry, drawn up in several lines. The whole of his force -amounted to ninety-five thousand men. - -[Illustration: - - MALPLAQUET - Aug. 31st./Sept. 11th 1709 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -The position was most formidable, but it had its defects. In the first -place the open space before the entrenchments was broken at about -half a mile’s distance by a small coppice, called the wood of Tiry, -which could serve to mask the movements of the Allied centre. In the -second place the forest of Sart ran out beyond the fortified angle in a -long tongue, which would effectually conceal any troops that might be -directed against the extreme left flank. Finally the French cavalry, -being massed in rear of the entrenchments, could take no part in the -action until the defences were forced, and was therefore incapable -of delivering any counterstroke. Marlborough and Eugene accordingly -decided to make a feint attack on the French right and a true attack on -their left front and flank. Villars would then be obliged to reinforce -his left from his centre, which would enable the defences across the -open to be carried, and the whole of the allied cavalry to charge -forward and cut the French line in twain. - -◆Aug. 31./Sept. 11.◆ - -The dawn of the 11th of September broke in dense heavy mist which -completely veiled the combatants from each other. At three o’clock -prayers were said in the Allied camp, and then the artillery was -moved into position. Forty pieces were massed in a single battery -on the open ground against the French left, and were covered with -an epaulment for defence against enfilading fire; twenty-eight more -were stationed against the French right, and the lighter pieces were -distributed, as usual, among the different brigades. Then the columns -of attack were formed. Twenty-eight battalions under Count Lottum were -directed against the eastern face of the salient angle of the forest -of Taisnières, and forty battalions of Eugene’s army under General -Schulemberg against the northern face, while a little to the right of -Schulemberg two thousand men under General Gauvain were to press on the -French left flank in rear of their entrenchments. Behind Schulemberg -fifteen British battalions under Lord Orkney were drawn up in a single -line on the open ground, ready to advance against the centre as soon -as Schulemberg and Lottum should have done their work. Far away beyond -Gauvain, General Withers with five British and fourteen foreign -battalions and six squadrons was to turn the extreme French left at the -village of La Folie. - -For the feint against the French right, thirty-one battalions, chiefly -Dutch, were massed together under the Prince of Orange. The cavalry was -detailed in different divisions to support the infantry. The Prince -of Orange was backed by twenty-one Dutch squadrons under the Prince -of Hesse, Orkney by thirty more under Auvergne, Lottum by the British -and Hanoverian cavalry, and Schulemberg by Eugene’s horse. The orders -given to the cavalry were to sustain the foot as closely as possible -without advancing into range of grape-shot, and, as soon as the -central entrenchments were forced, to press forward, form before the -entrenchments and drive the French army from the field. The whole force -of the Allies was, as near as may be, equal to that of the French. - -At half-past seven the fog lifted, and the guns of both armies opened -fire. Eugene and Marlborough thereupon parted, the former taking -charge of the right, the latter of the left of the army. Then the -divisions of Orange and of Lottum advanced in two dense columns up the -glade. Presently the Dutch halted, just beyond range of grape-shot, -while Lottum’s column pushed on under a terrific fire to the rear -of the forty-gun battery and deployed to the right in three lines. -Then the fire of the cannon slackened for a time, till about nine -o’clock a salvo of the forty guns gave the signal for attack. Lottum’s -and Schulemberg’s divisions thereupon advanced perpendicularly to -each other, each in three lines, Gauvain’s men crept into the wood -unperceived, and Orkney extended his scarlet battalions across the -glade. - -Entering the wood, Schulemberg’s Austrians made the best of their way -through marshes and streams and fallen trees, nearer and nearer to -the French entrenchments. The enemy suffered them to approach within -pistol-shot, only to deliver a volley which sent them staggering back; -and, though the Austrians extended their line till it joined Gauvain’s -detachment, yet they could make little way against the French fire. -Lottum’s attack was hardly more successful. Heedless of the tempest of -shot in their front and flank the Germans pressed steadily on, passed -a swamp and a stream under a galling fire, and fell fiercely upon the -breastwork beyond; but, being disordered by the ground and thinned by -heavy losses, they were forced to fall back. Schulemberg then resumed -the attack with his second line, but with all his exertions could -not carry the face of the angle opposed to him. Picardie, the senior -regiment of the French Line, held this post and would not yield it to -the fiercest assault. The utmost that Schulemberg could accomplish was -to sweep away the regiments in the wood, and so to uncover its flank. - -Lottum, too, extended his front and attacked once more, Orkney -detaching three British battalions, the Buffs, Sixteenth, and -Temple’s, to his assistance, while Marlborough took personal command -of Auvergne’s cavalry in support. The Buffs on Lottum’s extreme -left found a swamp between them and the entrenchments, so deep as -to be almost impassable. In they plunged, notwithstanding, and were -struggling through it when a French officer drew out twelve battalions -and moved them down straight upon their left flank. The British brigade -would have been in a sorry plight had not Villars caught sight of -Marlborough at the head of Auvergne’s horse and instantly recalled -his troops. So the red-coats scrambled on, and, turning the flank of -the entrenchment while Lottum’s men attacked the front, at length with -desperate fighting and heavy loss forced the French back into the wood. -Thus exposed to the double attack of Lottum and Schulemberg, Picardie -at last fell back, but joined itself to Champagne, the next regiment -in seniority; and the two gallant corps, finding a rallying-point -behind an abatis, turned and stood once more. Their comrades gave way -in disorder, but the wood was so dense that the troops on both sides -became disjointed, and the opposing lines broke up into a succession of -small parties, fighting desperately from tree to tree with no further -guidance than their own fury. - -The entrenchments on the French left had been forced; and Villars sent -urgent messages to his right for reinforcements. But Boufflers could -spare him none. After Schulemberg and Lottum had been engaged for half -an hour, the Prince of Orange lost patience and, without waiting for -orders, opened not a false but a real attack against the French right. -On the extreme left of Orange’s division were two Highland regiments of -the Dutch service, Tullibardine’s and Hepburn’s, and next to them King -William’s favourite Blue Guards. These were to attack the defences in -the forest of Laignières, while the rest fell upon the entrenchments -in the open; and it was at the head of the Highlanders and of the Blue -Guards that Orange took his place. A tremendous fire of grape and -musketry saluted them as they advanced, and within the first few yards -most of the Prince’s staff were struck dead by his side. His own horse -was killed beneath him, but he disentangled himself and continued to -lead the advance on foot. A few minutes more brought his battalions -under the fire of a French battery on their left flank. Whole ranks -were swept away, but still the Prince was to be seen waving his hat in -front of his troops; and Highlanders and Dutchmen pressing steadily on -carried the first entrenchment with a rush. They then halted to deploy, -but, before they could advance further, Boufflers had rallied his men, -and charging down upon his assailants drove them back headlong. On -Orange’s right, success as short-lived was bought at as dear a price. -The Prince still exerted himself with the utmost gallantry, but his -attack was beaten back at all points. The loss of the Dutch amounted to -six thousand killed and wounded; the Blue Guards had been annihilated, -and the Hanoverian battalions, which had supported them, had suffered -little less severely. In fact, the Prince’s precipitation had brought -about little less than a disaster. - -The confusion in this part of the field called both Marlborough and -Eugene to the Allied left to restore order. Further useless sacrifice -of life was checked, for enough and more than enough had been done -to prevent Boufflers from detaching troops to Villars. But soon came -an urgent message requiring the presence of the Duke and the Prince -once more on the right. Schulemberg and Lottum had continued to push -their attack as best they could; and red-coated English, blue-coated -Prussians, and white-coated Austrians were struggling forward from tree -to tree, tripping over felled trunks, bursting through tangled foliage, -panting through quagmires, loading and firing and cursing, guided only -by the flashes before them in the cloud of foul blinding smoke. But now -on the extreme right Withers was steadily advancing; and his turning -movement, though the Duke and Eugene knew it not, was gradually forcing -the French out of the wood. Villars, seeing the danger, called the -Irish Brigade and other regiments from the centre, and launched them -full upon the British and Prussians. Such was the impetuosity of the -Irish that they forced their opponents back some way, until their own -formation was broken by the density of the forest. Eugene hastened -to the spot to rally the retreating battalions and, though struck by -a musket ball in the head, refused to leave the field. Then up came -Withers, just when he was wanted. The Eighteenth Royal Irish met the -French Royal Regiment of Ireland, crushed it with two volleys by sheer -superiority of fire, drove it back in disorder, and pressed on.[64] -Eugene also advanced and was met by Villars, who at this critical -moment was bringing forward his reinforcements in person. A musket -shot struck the Marshal above the knee. Totally unmoved, the gallant -man called for a chair from which to continue to direct his troops, -but presently fainting from pain was carried insensible from the -field. The French, notwithstanding his fall, still barred the advance -of the Allies, but they had been driven from their entrenchments and -from the wood on the left, and only held their own by the help of the -troops that had been withdrawn from the centre. The moment for which -Marlborough had waited was now come. - -The forty-gun battery was moved forward, and Orkney leading his British -battalions against the redans captured them, though not without -considerable loss, at the first rush. Two Hanoverian battalions on -their left turned the flank of the adjoining entrenchments; and -Orange, renewing his attack, cleared the whole of the defences in -the glade. The Allied cavalry followed close behind him. Auvergne’s -Dutch were the first to pass the entrenchments, and, though charged -by the French while in the act of deploying, succeeded in repelling -the first attack. But now Boufflers came up at the head of the French -Gendarmerie, and drove Auvergne’s men back irresistibly to the edge of -the entrenchments. Here, however, the French were checked, for Orkney -had lined the parapet with his British; and, though the Gendarmerie -thrice strove gallantly to make an end of the Dutch, they were every -time driven back by the fire of the infantry. Meanwhile the central -battery, which had been parted right and left into two divisions, -advanced and supported the infantry by a cross-fire, and Marlborough, -coming up with the British and Prussian horse, charged the Gendarmerie -in their turn. Boufflers, however, was again ready with fresh troops, -and falling upon Marlborough with the French Household Cavalry crashed -through his two leading lines and threw even the third into disorder. -Then Eugene advancing at the head of the Imperial horse threw the last -reserves into the mêlée and drove the French back. Simultaneously the -Prince of Hesse hurled his squadrons against the infantry of the French -right, and, with the help of the Dutch foot, isolated it still further -from the centre. Boufflers now saw that the day was lost and ordered a -general retreat to Bavay, while he could yet keep his troops together. -The movement was conducted in admirable order, for the French, though -beaten, were not routed, while the Allies were too much exhausted to -pursue. So Boufflers retired unmolested, though it was not yet three -o’clock, honoured alike by friend and foe for his bravery and his skill. - -Thus ended the battle of Malplaquet, one of the bloodiest ever fought -by mortal men. Little is known of the details of the fighting, these -being swallowed up in the shade of the forest of Taisnières, where -no man could see what was going forward. All that is certain is that -neither side gave quarter, and that the combat was not only fierce but -savage. The loss of the French was about twelve thousand men, and the -trophies taken from them, against which they could show trophies of -their own, were five hundred prisoners, fifty standards and colours and -sixteen guns. The loss of the Allies was not less than twenty thousand -men killed and wounded, due chiefly to the mad onset of the Prince of -Orange. The Dutch infantry out of thirty battalions lost eight thousand -men, or more than half of their number; the British out of twenty -battalions lost nineteen hundred men,[65] the heaviest sufferers being -the Coldstream Guards, Buffs, Orrery’s and Temple’s.[66] - -The more closely the battle is studied, the more the conviction grows -that no action of Marlborough’s was fought less in accordance with his -own plans. We have seen that he would have preferred to fight it on -either of the two preceding days, and that he yielded to Eugene against -his own judgment in suffering it to be postponed. Then again there was -the almost criminal folly of the Prince of Orange, which upset all -preconcerted arrangements, threw away thousands of lives to no purpose, -and not only permitted the French to retreat unharmed at the close of -the day, but seriously imperilled the success of the action at its -beginning. Nevertheless there are still not wanting men to believe the -slanders of the contemptible faction then rising to power in England, -that Marlborough fought the battle from pure lust of slaughter. - -Notwithstanding all blunders, which were none of Marlborough’s making, -Malplaquet was a very grand action. The French were equal in number to -the Allies, and occupied a position which was described at the time as -a fortified citadel. They were commanded by an able general, whom they -liked and trusted, they were in good heart, and they looked forward -confidently to victory. Yet they were driven back and obliged to leave -Mons to its fate; and though Villars with his usual bluster described -the victory as more disastrous than defeat, yet French officers could -not help asking themselves whether resistance to Marlborough and Eugene -were not hopeless. Luxemburg with seventy-five thousand men against -fifty thousand had only with difficulty succeeded in forcing the faulty -position of Landen; yet the French had failed to hold the far more -formidable lines of Malplaquet against an army no stronger than their -own. Say Villars what he might, and beyond all doubt he fought a fine -fight, the inference could not be encouraging to France. - -It was not until the third day after the fight that the Allies -returned to the investment of Mons. Eugene was wounded, and -Marlborough not only worn out by fatigue but deeply distressed over -the enormous sacrifice of life. The siege was retarded by the marshy -nature of the ground and by heavy rain; but on the 9th of October the -garrison capitulated, and therewith the campaign came to an end. -◆Sept. 28./Oct. 9.◆ Tournay had given the Allies firm foothold on the -Upper Scheldt, and Mons was of great value to cover the captured towns -in Flanders and Brabant. The season’s operations had not been without -good fruit, despite the heavy losses at Malplaquet. - - - - - VOL. I. BOOK VI. CHAPTER X - - -◆1711.◆ - -The French, fully aware of the political changes in England, had during -the winter made extraordinary exertions to prolong the war for yet one -more campaign, and to that end had covered the northern frontier with -a fortified barrier on a gigantic scale. Starting from the coast of -Picardy the lines followed the course of the river Canche almost to its -source. From thence across to the Gy, or southern fork of the Upper -Scarpe, ran a line of earthworks, extending from Oppy to Montenancourt. -From the latter point the Gy and the Scarpe were dammed so as to form -inundations as far as Biache, at which place a canal led the line of -defence from the Scarpe to the Sensée. Here more inundations between -the two rivers carried the barrier to Bouchain, whence it followed -the Scheldt to Valenciennes. From thence more earthworks prolonged the -lines to the Sambre, which carried them at last to their end at Namur. - -This was a formidable obstacle to the advance of the Allies, but no -lines had sufficed to stop Marlborough yet; and with Eugene by his -side the Duke did not despair. Before he could start for the campaign, -however, the news came that the Emperor Joseph was dead of smallpox, -an event which signified the almost certain accession of the Archduke -Charles to the Imperial crown and the consequent withdrawal of his -candidature for the throne of Spain. Eugene was consequently detained -at home; and, worse than this, a fine opportunity was afforded -for making a breach in the Grand Alliance. To render the Duke’s -difficulties still greater, though his force was already weakened -by the necessity of finding garrisons for the towns captured in the -previous year, the English Government had withdrawn from him five -battalions[67] for an useless expedition to Newfoundland under the -command of Mrs. Masham’s brother, General Hill; an expedition which may -be dismissed for the present without further mention than that it was -dogged by misfortune from first to last, suffered heavy loss through -shipwreck, and accomplished literally nothing. - -Nevertheless the Imperial army was present, though without Eugene. The -whole of the forces were assembled a little to the south of Lille at -Orchies; ◆April 20./May 1.◆ and on the 1st of May Marlborough moved -forward to a position parallel to that of Villars, who lay in rear of -the river Sensée with his left at Oisy and his right at Bouchain. -There both armies remained stationary and inactive for six -weeks. Eugene came, but presently received orders to return and to -bring his troops with him. ◆June 3/14.◆ On the 14th of June -Marlborough moved away one march westward to the plain of Lens in -order to conceal this enforced diminution of his strength. The -position invited a battle, but Villars only moved down within his -lines, parallel to the Duke; and once more both armies remained -inactive for five weeks. After the departure of Eugene the French -commander detached a portion of his troops to the Rhine, but even so -he had one hundred and thirty-one battalions against ninety-four, and -one hundred and eighty-seven squadrons against one hundred and -forty-five of the Allies. - -We now approach what is perhaps the most remarkable and certainly the -most entertaining feat of the Duke during the whole war. Villars, -bound by his instructions, would not come out and fight; his lines -could not be forced by an army of inferior strength, and they could -therefore be passed only by stratagem. The inundation on the Sensée -between Arras and Bouchain could be traversed only by two causeways, -the larger of which was defended by a strong fort at Arleux, while the -other was covered by a redoubt at Aubigny, half a mile below -it. Marlborough knew that he could take the fort at Arleux at any time -and demolish it, but he knew also that Villars would certainly retake -it and rebuild as soon as his back was turned. He therefore set -himself to induce Villars to demolish it himself. ◆June 25./July 6.◆ -With this view he detached a strong force under General Rantzau to -capture the fort, which was done without difficulty. The Duke then -gave orders that the captured works should be greatly strengthened, -and, for their further protection, posted a large force under the -Prussian General Hompesch on the glacis of Douay, some six miles -distant from the fort. - -[Illustration: - - THE CAMPAIGN OF 1711. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -As fate ordained it, Hompesch, thinking himself secure under the guns -of Douay, neglected his outposts and even his sentries, and was -surprised two days later by a sudden attack from Villars, which was -only repulsed with considerable difficulty and not a little -shame. ◆June 28./July 9.◆ Villars was in ecstasies over his success, -and Marlborough displayed considerable annoyance. However, the Duke -reinforced Hompesch, as if to show the value which he attached to -Arleux, and pushed forward the new works with the greatest vigour. -Finally, when all was completed, he threw a weak garrison into the -fort and led the rest of the army away two marches westward, encamping -opposite the lines between the Canche and the Scarpe. ◆July 10/21.◆ -Villars likewise moved westward parallel to him, and took up a -position between Oppy and Montenancourt; but, before he started, he -detached a force to attack Arleux. The commander of the fort sent a -message to Marlborough that he could not possibly hold it, and the -Duke at once despatched Cadogan with a strong force to relieve it. It -was noticed, however, that Cadogan made no such haste as the urgency -of the occasion would have seemed to require; and indeed, before he -had gone half-way, he returned with the intelligence that Arleux had -surrendered. - -Villars was elated beyond measure; and Marlborough for the first time -in his life seemed to be greatly distressed and cast down. Throwing -off his usual serenity, he proclaimed in public with much passion that -he would be even with Villars yet, and would attack him, come what -might of it, where he lay. Then came the news that Villars had razed -the entire works of Arleux, over which Marlborough had spent such -pains, entirely to the ground. This increased the Duke’s -ill-temper. He declared that he would avenge this insult to his army, -and renewed his menace of a direct attack on the entrenchments. -◆July 15/26.◆ Villars now detached a force to make a diversion in -Brabant; and this step seemed to drive Marlborough distracted. Vowing -that he would check the march of this detachment, he sent off ten -thousand men under Lord Albemarle to Béthune, and the whole of his -baggage and heavy artillery to Douay. ◆July 17/28.◆ Having thus -weakened an army already inferior to that of the French, he repaired -the roads that led towards the enemy’s entrenchments, and on the 1st -of August, with much display of vindictiveness, sulkiness, and general -vexation, advanced one march nearer to the lines, encamping between -Houdain and St. Pol. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ His army watched his -proceedings with amazement, for it had never expected such behaviour -from Corporal John. - -Villars meanwhile was in a transport of delight. He drew every man, -not only from all parts of the lines but also from the neighbouring -garrisons, towards the threatened point, and asked nothing better than -that Marlborough should attack. In the height of exultation he -actually wrote to Versailles that he had brought the Duke to his _ne -plus ultra_. Marlborough’s strange manner still remained the -same. ◆July 22./August 2.◆ On the 2nd of August he advanced to within -a league of the lines, his left being opposite to Aubigny on the Upper -Scarpe; and during that day and the next set the whole of his cavalry -to work to collect fascines. ◆July 23./August 3.◆ At nightfall of the -3rd he sent away all his light artillery, together with every wheeled -vehicle, under escort of a strong detachment, and next morning rode -forward with most of his generals to reconnoitre the eastern end of -the lines. ◆July 24./August 4.◆ Captain Parker of the Eighteenth Royal -Irish, who had obtained permission to ride with the Staff, was amazed -at the Duke’s demeanour. Marlborough had now thrown off all his -ill-temper and was calm and cool as usual, indicating this point and -that to his officers. “Your brigade, General, will attack here, such -and such brigades will be on your right and left, such another in -support, and you will be careful of this, that, and other.” The -generals listened and stared; they understood the instructions clearly -enough, but they could not help regarding them as madness. So the -reconnaissance proceeded, drearily enough, and was just concluding -when General Cadogan turned his horse, unnoticed, out of the crowd, -struck in his spurs and galloped back to camp at the top of his -speed. Presently the Duke also turned, and, riding back very slowly, -issued orders to prepare for a general attack on the morrow. - -At this all ranks of the army, from the general to the drummer, fell -into the deepest depression. Not a man could fail to see that direct -assault of the lines was a hopeless enterprise at the best of times, -and doubly hopeless now that half of the army and the whole of the -artillery had been detached for other service. Again the violent and -unprecedented outburst of surliness and ill-temper was difficult to -explain; and the only possible explanation was that the Duke, rendered -desperate by failure and misfortunes, had thrown prudence to the winds -and cared not what he did. A few only clung faintly to the hope that -the chief, who had led them so often to victory, might still have some -surprise in store for them; but the most part gave themselves up for -lost, and lamented loudly that they should ever have lived to see such -a change come over the Old Corporal. - -So passed the afternoon among the tents of the Allies; but meanwhile -Cadogan with forty hussars at his heels had long started from the camp -and was galloping hard across the plain of Lens to Douay, five leagues -away. There he found Hompesch ready with his garrison, now strengthened -by detachments from Béthune and elsewhere to twelve thousand foot and -two thousand horse, and told him that the time was come. Hompesch -thereupon issued his orders for the troops to be ready to march that -night. Still the main army under Marlborough knew nothing of this, and -passed the day in dismal apprehension till the sun went down, and the -drummers came forward to beat tattoo. Then a column of cavalry trotted -out westward, attracting every French eye and stirring every French -brain with curiosity as to the purport of the movement. The drums began -to roll; and the order ran quietly down the line to strike tents and -prepare to march immediately. - -Never was command more welcome. Within an hour all was ready and the -army was formed into four columns. The cavalry, having done their work -of distracting French vigilance to the wrong quarter, returned unseen -by the enemy; and at nine o’clock the whole army faced to its left and -marched off eastward in utter silence, with Marlborough himself at the -head of the vanguard. - -◆July 24–25./August 4–5.◆ - -The night was fine, and under the radiant moonlight the men swung -forward bravely hour after hour over the plain of Lens. The moon -paled; the dawn crept up into the east throwing its ghastly light on -the host of weary, sleepless faces; and presently the columns reached -the Scarpe at Vitry. So far the march had lasted eight hours, and -fifteen miles had been passed. Pontoon-bridges were already laid -across the river, and on the further bank, punctual to appointment, -stood Brigadier Sutton with the field-artillery. The river was passed, -and presently a messenger came spurring from the east with a despatch -for the Duke of Marlborough. ◆July 25./August 5.◆ He read it; and -words were passed down the columns of march which filled them with new -life. “Generals Cadogan and Hompesch” (such was their purport) -“crossed the causeway at Arleux unopposed at three o’clock this -morning, and are in possession of the enemy’s lines. The Duke desires -that the infantry will step out.” The right wing of horse halted to -form the rearguard and bring up stragglers, while a cloud of dust in -the van told that the Duke and fifty squadrons with him were pushing -forward at the trot. Then the infantry shook themselves up and stepped -out with a will. - -◆July 25./August 5.◆ - -Villars had received intelligence of Marlborough’s march only two hours -after he had started, but he was so thoroughly bewildered by the Duke’s -intricate manœvres that he did not awake to the true position until -three hours later. Then, quite distracted, he put himself at the head -of the Household Cavalry and galloped off at full speed. So furiously -rode he that he wore down all but a hundred of his troopers and -pushed on with these alone. But even so Marlborough was before him. -At eight o’clock he crossed the lower causeway at Aubanchœuil-au-bac -and passing his cavalry over the Sensée barred the road from the west -by the village of Oisy. Presently Villars, advancing reckless of all -precautions, blundered into the middle of the outposts. Before he could -retire, his whole escort was captured, and he himself only by miracle -escaped the same fate. - -The Marshal now looked anxiously for the arrival of his main body of -horse; but the Allied infantry had caught sight of the French on the -other side of the Sensée, and, weary though they were, had braced -themselves to race them for the goal. Nevertheless the severity of the -march and the burden of their packs began to tell heavily on the foot. -Hundreds dropped down unconscious, and many died there and then, but -they were left where they lay to await the arrival of the rearguard; -for no halt was called, and each regiment pushed on as cheerfully as -possible with such men as still survived. Thus they were still ahead -of the French when they turned off to the causeway at Arleux, and, -Marlborough having thrown additional bridges over the Sensée, they came -quickly into their positions. The right wing of infantry crossed the -river about four o’clock in the afternoon, having covered close upon -forty miles in eighteen hours; and by five o’clock the whole force -was drawn up between Oisy and the Scheldt within striking distance of -Arras, Cambrai, and Bouchain. So vanished the ne plus ultra of Villars, -a warning to all generals who put their sole trust in fortified lines. - -Marlborough halted for the next day to give his troops rest and to -allow the stragglers to come in. Fully half the men of the infantry had -fallen out, and there were many who did not rejoin the army until the -third day. Villars on his side moved forward and offered Marlborough -battle under the walls of Cambrai; but the Duke would not accept it, -though the Dutch deputies, perverse and treacherous to the last, tried -hard to persuade him. Had the deputies marched in the ranks of the -infantry with muskets on their shoulders and a kit of fifty pounds’ -weight on their backs, they would have been less eager for the fray. -Marlborough’s own design, long matured in his own mind, was the -capture of Bouchain, and his only fear was lest Villars should cross -the Scheldt before him and prevent it. The deputies, however, who -had been so anxious to hurry the army into an engagement under every -possible disadvantage, shrank from the peril of a siege carried on by -an inferior under the eyes of a superior force. But Marlborough, even -if he had not been able to adduce Lille as a precedent, was determined -to have his own way, and carried his point. ◆July 27./August 7.◆ At -noon on the 7th of August he marched down almost within cannon-shot -of Cambrai, ready to fall on Villars should he attempt to pass the -Scheldt, halted until his pontoon-bridges had been laid a few miles -further down the stream, and then gradually withdrawing his troops -threw the whole of them across the river unmolested. - -It is hardly credible that a vast number of foolish civilians, Dutch, -Austrian, and even English, blamed Marlborough for declining battle -before Cambrai, and that he was actually obliged to explain why he -refused to sacrifice the fruit of his manœvres by attacking a superior -force in a strong position with an army not only smaller in numbers at -its best, but much thinned by a forced march and exhausted by fatigue. -“I despair of being ever able to please all men,” he wrote. “Those who -are capable of judging will be satisfied with my endeavours: others -I leave to their own reflections, and go on with the discharge of my -duty.” - -It is possible that Villars only refrained from hindering -Marlborough’s passage of the Scheldt in deference to orders from -Versailles, of which the Duke was as well aware as himself; but it is -more than doubtful whether he ever intended the British to capture -Bouchain. Though inferior in numbers, however, Marlborough covered -himself so skilfully with entrenchments that Villars could not hinder -him, while all attempts at diversion were met so readily that not one -of them succeeded. ◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Finally, the garrison surrendered as -prisoners of war under the very eyes of Villars. The Duke would have -followed up his success by the siege of Quesnoi, the town before which -English troops first came under the fire of cannon in the year of -Crecy; but by this time Lewis, with the help of the contemptible -Harley, had succeeded in detaching England from the Grand Alliance. -Though, therefore, the English ministers continued to encourage -Marlborough in his operations, in order to conceal their own infamous -conduct from the Allies, yet they took good care that those operations -should proceed no further. So with the capture of Bouchain the last -and not the least remarkable of Marlborough’s campaigns came, always -victoriously, to an end. - - - - - CAMPAIGNS OF 1744–1748 - - - - - VOL. II. BOOK VII. CHAPTER V - - -However fortunate might be the issue of Dettingen, it served at least -its purpose in preventing the despatch of French reinforcements to the -Danube and to Bohemia; and the campaign of 1743 closed with the utter -collapse of Belleisle’s great schemes and with the expulsion of the -French from Germany. It was now clear that the war would be carried on -in the familiar cockpit of the Austrian Netherlands. Such a theatre -was convenient for France, since it lay close to her own borders, and -convenient for the Allies, because the Dutch had at last been persuaded -to join them, and because the British would be brought nearer to their -base at Ostend. Marshal Saxe, whose fine talent had hitherto been -wasted under incompetent French Generals in Bohemia, was appointed to -the chief command of the French in Flanders; and every effort was made -to give him a numerous and well-equipped army, and to enable him to -open his campaign in good time. - -◆1744.◆ - -In England the preparations by no means corresponded with the -necessities of the position. The estimates indeed provided for a force -of twenty-one thousand British in Flanders in 1744 as against sixteen -thousand in the previous year, but only at the cost of depleting the -weak garrison left in England; for the actual number of men voted -for the two years was the same. All British officers of experience -strongly urged upon the Government the importance of being first -in the field,[68] but, when an army was to be made up in different -proportions of English, Dutch, Germans and Austrians, it needed a -Marlborough to bring the discordant Courts into harmony as well as to -make ready the troops for an early campaign. By the beginning of April -eighty thousand French soldiers had marched from their winter quarters, -and were concentrated on the frontier between the Scheldt and the -Sambre, while the Allies were still scattered about in cantonments, -not exceeding even then a total strength of fifty-live thousand men. -Wade, the English commander, delayed first by confusion at home and -next by contrary winds, was still in England while the French were -concentrating, and not a single English recruit, to repair the losses -of the past campaign, had arrived in Flanders. Then arose disputes -as to the disposition of the Allied forces, both Austrians and Dutch -being nervously apprehensive of leaving their towns on the frontier -without garrisons. When in the second week in May the Allied Army was -at last collected close to Brussels, it was still weaker by twenty -thousand men than it should have been, and found itself confronted -with the task of holding Flanders, Brabant, Hainault, and the Sambre -against a superior force of French.[69] May passed away and June came, -but the Allies remained helpless and motionless in their camp, while -Saxe, after a short march westward, turned north and advanced steadily -between the Scheldt and the Lys. His principal object was not very -difficult to divine. By the middle of June his detachments had seized -Ypres and Fort Knock, which commanded the canal from Nieuport to Ypres, -thus cutting off the British from one of their bases on the coast. It -remained to be seen whether he would aim next at Ostend, where the -whole of the British stores of ordnance were accumulated, or whether he -would attempt Bruges and Ghent in order to secure the navigation of the -Bruges Canal as well as of the Scheldt and Lys. Again, it was always -open to him, if he pleased, to besiege Tournay, a fortress which the -Allies would not willingly lose. Thus the problem set to the Allies -was not easy of solution; but of all solutions they chose the worst. -The Dutch and Austrians could not bear the notion of forsaking any one -of their darling strongholds, and insisted that the strength of the -army should be frittered away in providing weak garrisons for the -defence of all.[70] Wade, to do him justice, was for keeping all the -troops together, crossing the Scheldt, and taking up a strong position -to cover Ghent; but the Austrians would not consent, lest they should -expose Brussels.[71] Wade was certainly not a strong man, but he must -not be too hardly judged. Marlborough had spent the most anxious days -of all his campaigns in distraction between the safety of Ghent and of -Brussels, and had only extricated himself by the march that preceded -the battle of Oudenarde. - -Meanwhile King George had been exerting himself with great energy, -though two months too late, to provide Wade with additional troops, -both British and Dutch, and had begged that Prince Charles of Lorraine -might cross the Rhine with his whole army, and direct the operations -in Flanders as Commander-in-Chief of all the Allies. It was a wise -step in every way, since the Prince’s relationship to Queen Maria -Theresa assured to him the seniority in rank which was needed to hold -so heterogeneous a host in coherence. ◆July.◆ Prince Charles did his -share of the work admirably, forcing his passage across the Rhine with -great skill in the face of the French, and taking up a strong position -on the frontier of Alsace. A few days later the British reinforcements -reached Wade, and King George issued positive orders to him to take -the offensive and “commence hostilities of all kinds.”[72] - -It seemed, indeed, as if the time were come for pressing home upon -the French; but just at this critical moment Frederick of Prussia -intervened in favour of France, and, by a threat to invade Bohemia, -brought Prince Charles back quickly over the Rhine. None the less -Wade and his fellows held a council of war and resolved to bring Saxe -to action if possible. ◆July 20/31.◆ King George gave his gracious -approval to their plan, and on the 31st of July the Allies turned -westward and crossed the Scheldt. It still remained to be seen, -however, whether Saxe would allow an action to be forced on him; for -he lay now, entrenched to the teeth, on the Lys between Menin and -Courtrai, which was a pretty clear indication that he would not. At -this moment Lord Stair, who had followed the course of operations -carefully from England, came forward, like a true pupil of Marlborough, -with a new plan of campaign. His advice was that the Allies should turn -Saxe’s tactics against himself. They should march south to Orchies, -between Lille and Tournay, and there encamp, where they would be within -reach of half-a-dozen French fortified towns. The French would not dare -to leave the fortresses defenceless; and the garrisons necessary to -render them secure would absorb the whole of their force in the field. -Then the Allies could send detachments into France and lay Picardy -under contribution, or possibly carry out the plan, rejected two years -before, of a march to the Seine. The King of Prussia’s action only made -some bold stroke of the kind the more imperative.[73] - -Stair had gained over the Austrian general D’Arenberg to this project -in 1742; but it was hardly likely to be accepted by him now. Carteret, -in forwarding Stair’s memorandum to Wade, gave him no positive orders -except at least to do something; but poor Wade found it impossible to -make the Austrians do anything. The Allies having crossed the Scheldt -halted inactive for weeks, and no persuasion could induce D’Arenberg -to move. At last the army did march down to the plains of Lille, but -without its artillery, so that it could not be said seriously to -threaten the French fortresses. The Dutch and Austrians had undertaken -to furnish a siege-train, but had taken no step to procure one of the -ten thousand horses that were required to transport it. After a short -sojourn in the south the Allies marched helplessly northward once -more. August passed away and September came, but even in the fourth -month of the campaign the Dutch and Austrians were still without their -artillery.[74] Wade boldly proposed to force Saxe’s lines on the -Lys: the Austrians refused. He proposed to pounce on a detachment of -fourteen thousand men, which Saxe had imprudently isolated from his -main army: D’Arenberg carefully sent a weak body of cavalry to reveal -to the detachment the danger of its position. Finally, in the first -week of October the Allies retired into winter-quarters, which was -precisely the object for which D’Arenberg had been working from the -first. Despite of the English subsidies, he had no money with which to -pay his troops, and he wished to spare the Austrian Netherlands the -burden of furnishing forage and contributions. Wade, sick in body and -distressed in mind, at once resigned his command. He had had enough of -the Austrian alliance, and King George before long was to have enough -of it also.[75] - -◆1745.◆ - -Once again, despite the endless length to which the war was dragging -on, the establishment of the British forces remained virtually -unaugmented for the year 1745. The troops allotted for service in -Flanders were indeed raised to a strength of twenty-five thousand men, -but this was effected only by reducing the garrison of Great -Britain to fifteen thousand, which, as events were to prove before the -year’s end, created a situation of perilous weakness. Moreover, the -past campaign had revealed a failing in one of the confederated powers -which was hardly less serious than the impecuniosity and selfishness -of Austria. The Dutch army, which under Marlborough had done such -brilliant service, was become hopelessly inefficient. The competition -of rival demagogues for popular favour had reduced it to such weakness -in numbers, that it hardly sufficed to find efficient garrisons for the -fortified towns. Concurrently its discipline had suffered; and General -Ligonier had already complained that the Dutch troops which served -with the Allies in 1744 were intolerably insubordinate and disorderly, -setting a bad example to the whole army.[76] In February 1745 Ligonier -again brought the matter to the notice of the English Government. The -Dutch, he said, would probably keep all their men in garrison, and, if -the Allies were so weak that they could only find garrisons for the -fortresses on the frontier, the French would be free to go where they -pleased. It would be far better, therefore, to make a great effort, -collect a hundred thousand men, take the offensive, and end the war -in a single campaign. Ten thousand men would be required to guard the -line of the Bruges Canal, and the remainder should besiege Maubeuge -and Landrecies and enter France by the line of the Sambre, making the -Meuse the main line of communication, as open alike to the passage -of reinforcements from England, from Holland, and from Germany.[77] -Such counsel was not likely to find acceptance with the men who had -mismanaged the war so far. One important change, however, was made by -the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland to be Commander-in-Chief in -Flanders, and also in Great Britain.[78] The Duke at the time of this -promotion still wanted a month to complete his twenty-fifth year, but -he had from his boyhood been an enthusiastic soldier, he had studied -his profession, he had shown bravery at Dettingen, and, young though -he might be, he was older than Condé had been when he first gained -military fame. Finally, it was an immense advantage that a Prince of -a reigning family should preside over so motley an army as that of -the Allies, since there would be the less disposition to cavil at his -authority. - -Cumberland entered upon his work energetically enough, crossed over to -Flanders early in April, made all his arrangements for concentration at -Brussels on the 2nd of May, and actually began his march southward on -the following day.[79] ◆April 22./May 3.◆ Even so, however, Marshal Saxe -had taken the field before him, assembling his troops in Hainault, as in -the previous year, so that it was impossible to divine which of the -fortresses of the barrier he might intend to attack. After a feint which -pointed to the siege of Mons, he marched rapidly upon Tournay and -invested it on the 30th of April, ◆Apr. 19/30.◆ screening his movements -so skilfully with his cavalry that not a word as to his operations -reached Cumberland until nearly a week later. Cumberland, after leaving -Soignies on the 3rd of May, moved slowly south-westward by Cambron, -Maulbay, and Leuse, and arrived on the evening of the 9th at Brissoel, -within sight of Saxe’s army. ◆April 28./May 9.◆ The ground immediately -in front of the Allies was broken by little copses, woods, and -enclosures, all of them crammed with mercenary irregular -troops—Pandours, Grassins, and the like—which, imitated first from the -Austrians, had by this time become a necessary part of the French as of -every army. Beyond this broken ground a wide plain swept in a gentle, -almost unbroken slope to the village of Fontenoy, which formed the -centre of Saxe’s position. The advanced parties of irregulars, together -with twelve squadrons drawn up on the slope before Fontenoy, forbade -Cumberland’s further advance for that day, and the Allies encamped for -the night. Headquarters were fixed at Maubray, a village in full sight -of Fontenoy, and a bare mile and a half to the south-eastward of the -French camp. - -◆April 29./May 10.◆ - -On the next day the French advanced posts were pushed out of the -copses, and Cumberland, together with the Prince of Waldeck and -the Count of Königseck, who commanded the Dutch and the Austrians -respectively, went forward to reconnoitre the position. Saxe’s army -occupied the crest of the slope, lying astride of the two roads that -lead from Condé and from Leuse to Tournay. His right rested on the -village of Anthoin and on the Scheldt, the tower of Anthoin Castle -marking the western boundary of his position with clearness enough. -From thence his line extended due east along the crest of the height -for about a mile to the village of Fontenoy. A few hundred yards -before Fontenoy stands the hamlet of Bourgeon, but this was now -veiled in smoke and flame, having been fired by the Pandours as they -retired. From Anthoin to Fontenoy Saxe’s front faced due south, but -eastward from Fontenoy it turned back almost at right angles to the -forest of Barry and the village of Ramecroix, fronting considerably -to eastward of south. The village of Vezon, however, which lies in -the same straight line with Fontenoy, due east of Anthoin, was also -occupied by the French as an advanced post. This was quickly cleared -by Cumberland’s troops, and the Allied Generals completed their -reconnaissance. Saxe’s position was undoubtedly strong by nature and -had been strengthened still further by art. Beyond Anthoin the French -right flank was secured by a battery erected on the western bank of -the Scheldt, while the village itself was entrenched, and held by -two brigades. Between Anthoin and Fontenoy three redoubts had been -constructed, and the space was defended by three brigades of infantry -backed by eight squadrons of horse. Fontenoy itself had been fortified -with works and cannon, and made as strong as possible; and from -Fontenoy to the forest of Barry ran a double line of entrenchments, -the first line held by nine and the second by eleven battalions of -infantry. At the edge of the forest of Barry were two more redoubts, -the foremost of them called the Redoubt d’Eu, both armed with cannon to -sweep the open space between the forest and Fontenoy; in rear of the -forest were posted nine more battalions, and in rear of all two strong -lines of cavalry. The flower of the French army, both horse and foot, -was stationed in this space on Saxe’s left, for the English had the -right of the line in the Allied Army, and Saxe knew the reputation of -the red-coats. - -The Allied Generals decided to attack on the following day. Königseck, -it is said, was for harassing Saxe’s communications and compelling -him to raise the siege of Tournay; but, finding himself overruled -by Cumberland and by Waldeck, he gave way. Cumberland’s force was -decidedly inferior in numbers, being less than fifty thousand against -fifty-six thousand men, but he was young and impetuous, and had -been strongly impressed by the disastrous inaction of the preceding -campaign. It was agreed that the Dutch and Austrians should assail the -French centre and right, the Dutch in particular being responsible -for Fontenoy, while the British attacked the French left between that -village and the forest of Barry. - -[Illustration: - - FONTENOY - April 30th/May 11th 1745 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆April 30./May 11.◆ - -At two o’clock on the following morning the British began to move out -of their camp upon Vezon, the cavalry leading. The advance took much -time, for there were many narrow lanes to be traversed before the force -could debouch upon the slope, and, when the slope was passed, it was -still necessary to defile through the village of Vezon. Cumberland’s -order of attack was simple. Brigadier Ingoldsby, with the Twelfth and -Thirteenth Foot, the Forty-second Highlanders, a Hanoverian battalion, -and three six-pounder cannon, was to assault the Redoubt d’Eu on the -right flank of the line of the British advance, and to carry it with -the bayonet. The remainder of the infantry was simply to march up -across the thousand yards of open ground between it and Fontenoy and -sweep the enemy out of their entrenchments. - -Before five o’clock the advanced squadrons of the British horse, -fifteen in all, under General Campbell, had passed through Vezon and -deployed in the plain beyond, to cover the formation of the infantry -for the attack. The French batteries in Fontenoy and the redoubt at -once opened fire on them, but the cavalry endured the fire for an -hour unmoved, until at length a shot carried away General Campbell’s -leg. The gallant veteran, who had fought at Malplaquet and was now -seventy-eight years of age, was carried dying from the field, full of -lamentation that he could take no further part in the action. No one -but himself seems to have known for what purpose his squadrons had been -brought forward, and accordingly after his fall they were withdrawn. -The infantry then moved up to the front, where General Ligonier -proceeded to form them in two lines, without further interruption, -to use his own simple words, than a lively and murderous cannonade -from the French. Cumberland meanwhile ordered up seven six-pounders -to the right of the British front, which quickly came into action. -Conspicuous before the French front rode an officer on a white horse, -and the English gunners at once began to lay wagers who should kill -him. The second or third shot brought the white charger to the ground, -and his rider was carried, shattered and dying, to the rear. He was -Count Grammont, the gallant but thoughtless officer who had spoiled -the combinations of Noailles at Dettingen. Then, turning to their more -legitimate work, the gunners quickly made their presence felt among -the French field-batteries; but the round shot never ceased to plough -into the scarlet ranks of the British from Fontenoy and from the -Redoubt d’Eu. Ligonier’s two lines of infantry were soon formed, with -the cavalry in two more lines in their rear; and the General presently -sent word to Cumberland that he was ready to advance as soon as Waldeck -should lead his Dutch against Fontenoy. The name of the aide-de-camp -who carried this message should not be omitted, for he was Captain -Jeffery Amherst of the First Guards. - -Thereupon the Dutch and Austrians, in the centre and left, advanced -against Fontenoy and Anthoin, but flinching from the fire in front, -and above all from that in their flank from the battery on the other -side of the Scheldt, soon shrank back under cover and could not be -induced to move forward again.[80] Worst of all, the Dutch cavalry was -smitten with panic, galloped back on to the top of some of the British -squadrons, and fled away wildly to Hal crying out that all was lost. -Things therefore went ill on the Allied left; and meanwhile on the -right there was enacted a blunder still more fatal. For Ingoldsby, -misconceiving his instructions, hesitated to make his attack on the -Redoubt d’Eu, and despite repeated orders from Cumberland never -delivered it at all. Cumberland, however, was impatient. Without -further delay he placed himself at the head of the British, who were -standing as Ligonier had arrayed them, in most beautiful order. In the -first line, counting from right to left, stood a battalion of the First -Guards, another of the Scots Guards, and another of the Coldstream, -the First, Twenty-first, Thirty-first, Eighth, Twenty-fifth, -Thirty-third, and Nineteenth; in the second line the Buffs occupied the -post of honour on the right, and next to them came in succession the -Twenty-third, Thirty-second, Eleventh, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fourth, -and Twentieth. Certain Hanoverian battalions joined them on the extreme -left. The drums beat, the men shouldered arms, and the detachments -harnessed themselves to the two light field-guns that accompanied -each battalion. Ingoldsby saw what was going forward and aligned his -battalions with them on the right. Then the word was given to advance, -and the two lines moved off with the slow and measured step for which -they were famous in Europe. - -Forward tramped the ranks of scarlet, silent and stately as if -on parade. Full half a mile of ground was to be traversed before -they could close with the invisible enemy that awaited them in the -entrenchments over the crest of the slope, and the way was marked -clearly by the red flashes and puffs of white smoke that leaped from -Fontenoy and the Redoubt d’Eu on either flank. The shot plunged -fiercely and more fiercely into the serried lines as they advanced into -that murderous cross-fire, but the gaping ranks were quietly closed, -the perfect order was never lost, the stately step was never hurried. -Only the Hanoverians in the second line, finding that they were cramped -for space, dropped back quietly and decorously, and marched on in third -line behind the British. Silent and inexorable the scarlet lines strode -on. They came abreast of village and redoubt, and the shot which had -hitherto swept away files now swept away ranks. Then the first line -passed beyond redoubt and village, and the French cannon took it in -reverse. The gaps grew wider and more frequent, the front grew narrower -as the men closed up, but still the proud battalions advanced, strewing -the sward behind them with scarlet, like some mass of red blossom that -floats down a lazy stream and sheds its petals as it goes. - -At last the crest of the ridge was gained and the ranks of the French -battalions came suddenly into view little more than a hundred yards -distant, their coats alone visible behind the breastwork. Next to the -forest of Barry, and exposed to the extreme right of the British, a -line of red showed the presence of the Swiss Guards; next to them stood -a line of blue, the four battalions of the French Guards, and next to -the Guards a line of white, the regiments of Courtin, Aubeterre, and of -the King, the choicest battalions of the French Army. Closer and closer -came the British, still with arms shouldered, always silent, always -with the same slow, measured tread, till they had advanced to within -fifty yards of the French. Then at length Lord Charles Hay of the First -Guards stepped forward with flask in hand, and doffing his hat drank -politely to his enemies. “I hope, gentlemen,” he shouted, “that you are -going to wait for us to-day and not swim the Scheldt as you swam the -Main at Dettingen. Men of the King’s company,” he continued, turning -round to his own people, “these are the French Guards, and I hope you -are going to beat them to-day”; and the English Guards answered with a -cheer. The French officers hurried to the front, for the appearance of -the British was a surprise to them, and called for a cheer in reply. -But only a half-hearted murmur came from the French ranks, which -quickly died away and gave place to a few sharp words of command; -for the British were now within thirty yards. “For what we are about -to receive may the Lord make us truly thankful,” murmured an English -Guardsman as he looked down the barrels of the French muskets, but -before his comrades round him had done laughing the French Guards had -fired; and the turn of the British had come at last.[81] - -For despite of that deadly march through the cross-fire of the French -batteries to the muzzles of the French muskets, the scarlet ranks still -glared unbroken through the smoke; and now the British muskets, so -long shouldered, were levelled, and with crash upon crash the volleys -rang out from end to end of the line, first the First Guards, then the -Coldstreams, then the Scots, and so through brigade after brigade, -two battalions loading while the third fired, a ceaseless, rolling, -infernal fire. Down dropped the whole of the French front rank, blue -coats, red coats and white, before the storm. Nineteen officers and six -hundred men of the French and Swiss Guards fell at the first discharge; -regiment Courtin was crushed out of existence; regiment Aubeterre, -striving hard to stem the tide, was swept aside by a single imperious -volley which laid half of its men on the ground. The British infantry -were perfectly in hand; their officers could be seen coolly tapping -the muskets of the men with their canes so that every discharge might -be low and deadly; while the battalion-guns also poured in round after -round of grape with terrible effect. The first French line was utterly -shattered and broken. Even while the British were advancing, Saxe had -brought up additional troops to meet them and had posted regiments -Couronne and Soissonois in rear of the King’s regiment, and the Brigade -Royal in rear of the French Guards; but all alike went down before the -irresistible volleys. The red-coats continued their triumphant advance -for full three hundred yards into the heart of the French camp, and old -Ligonier’s heart leaped within him, for he thought that the battle was -won. - -Saxe for his part thought little differently from Ligonier; but -though half dead with dropsy, reduced to suck a bullet to assuage his -intolerable thirst, so weak that he could not ride but was carried -about the field in a wicker litter, the gallant German never for a -moment lost his head. Sending a message to the French King, who with -the Dauphin was watching the action from a windmill in the rear, -to retire across the Scheldt without delay, he strove to gain time -to rally his infantry. On the first repulse of the French Guards -Cumberland had detached two battalions to help the Dutch by a flanking -attack on Fontenoy. Seeing that this movement must be checked at -all hazards, Saxe headed these troops back by a charge of cavalry; -whereupon one of the battalions extended itself along the left flank -of the British. Partly in this way, partly owing to the incessant -play of the French artillery on both flanks, the two British lines -assumed the form of two huge oblong columns which gradually became -welded into one. The change was not untimely, for now the first line -of the French cavalry, which had been posted in rear of the forest of -Barry, came down upon the British at full gallop, only to reel back -shivered to fragments by the same terrible fire. Then the second line -tried its fortune, but met with no better fate. Finally, the Household -Cavalry, the famous Maison du Roi, burning with all the ardour of -Dettingen unavenged, was launched against the scarlet columns, and -like its predecessors, came flying back, a mob of riderless horses -and uncontrollable men, decimated, shattered and repulsed by the -never-ending fire. “It was like charging two flaming fortresses rather -than two columns of infantry.”[82] - -Nevertheless some time was hereby gained for the broken French infantry -to re-form. The British, once arrived within the French camp, came to -a halt, and looked at last to see how the Dutch were faring on their -left. As has already been told, Waldeck’s attack had been a total -failure, and the British, unsupported and always under a cross-fire of -artillery, fell back to the crest of the ridge and were re-formed for a -second attack. Waldeck undertook to make another attempt on Fontenoy, -and Cumberland, in reliance upon his help, again advanced at the head -of the British. But meanwhile Saxe had brought forward his reserves -from Ramecroix, and among them the Irish brigade, to meet him, while -artillery had also been brought up from the French right to play upon -the British front. The French Guards and the rest of the troops of the -French first line had also been rallied, and the task of the British -was well-nigh desperate. The Irish brigade, which consisted of six -battalions, was made up not of Irish only but of Scots and English -also, desperate characters who went into action with a rope round -their necks, and would fight like devils. Yet, even in this second -attack the British carried their advance as far as in the first, the -perfection of their fire-discipline enabling them to beat back even the -Irish brigade for a time. But their losses had been frightfully heavy; -the Dutch would not move one foot to the attack of Fontenoy, and the -cannonade in front added to that in the flanks became unendurable. The -French infantry likewise closed round on them in superior numbers on -both flanks, and it became apparent that there was nothing for it but a -retreat. - -Ligonier sent back two battalions to secure the roads leading through -Vezon, and the retreat then began in perfectly good order. The French -Household Cavalry made a furious charge upon the rear of the column -as it faced about, but found to its cost that the infernal fire was -not yet quenched. The three battalions of Guards and a battalion of -Hanoverians turned sternly about to meet them, and gave them a few -parting volleys, which wholly extinguished one regiment and brought -down every officer of another. A few British squadrons, the Blues -conspicuous among them, pushed forward, in spite of heavy losses, -through the cross-fire to lend what help they could, and the remnant -of the heroic battalions retired, facing about in succession at every -hundred yards, as steadily and proudly as they had advanced. - -Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of the fifteen -thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore -themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand were -killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions just -exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth -and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men, -the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather fewer than three -hundred men apiece, and the three battalions of Guards, which lost -each of them about two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot, -Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of -the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed -or wounded. Many regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in -particular the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the -British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The -loss of the French was never made public, but was certainly at least -equal to that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no -great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. As an example of the -prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel -in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of artillery, -remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly for half a -mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched up to within -pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their volley before they -discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions to pieces, -repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry, halted under a heavy -cannonade, retired for some distance and re-formed under a cross-fire, -advanced again with both artillery and musketry playing on front and -flanks, made the bravest brigade in the French service recoil, repelled -another desperate attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly -under a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the British -commanders it was Ingoldsby’s misunderstanding of his orders and his -failure to capture the Redoubt d’Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby -was duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however, -acquitted of all but an error in judgment; and indeed there was no -question of cowardice, for he accompanied the remainder of the infantry -in its advance with his own detachment and was severely wounded. It is -customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head against a wall in -attempting such an attack; and no doubt he was guilty of a tactical -blunder in assaulting a re-entrant angle before the salient had been -carried. But he could hardly have been expected to count on such bad -luck as the failure of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on -the other. The sheer audacity of his advance went near to give him -the victory. Saxe owned that he never dreamed that any General would -attempt such a stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland -is blamed also for not attacking either the Redoubt d’Eu or Fontenoy -after he had penetrated into the French camp. This charge is less -easy to rebut, for the French always know when they are beaten, and -seeing their left rolled up and troops advancing on Fontenoy in -flank and rear would probably have given up the game for lost, and -that the more readily since their ammunition in Fontenoy was for the -moment nearly exhausted. Even so, however, Saxe’s reserves were always -at hand at Ramecroix, and would have required to be held in check. -Another puzzling question, namely, why Cumberland did not make greater -use of his artillery in the action, is answered by the fact that the -contractors for the horsing of the guns ran off with the horses early -in the day. Such an occurrence was by no means unusual, and yet it -never happened to Marlborough, not even at Malplaquet. Altogether, the -conclusion seems to be that Cumberland stumbled on to a brilliant feat -of arms by mistake, and, though seconded by his troops with bravery -equal to his own, was not a General of sufficient capacity to turn his -success to account. - -At the close of the action Cumberland retreated to Ath and encamped -under the guns of that fortress, leaving his wounded to the mercy of -the French, who, by a strange perversion of their usual chivalry, -treated them with shameful barbarity. Among the wounded, strangely -enough, were a few of the new sect of Methodists founded by John -Wesley, who faced death and wounds with the stern exultation that had -once inspired the troopers of Cromwell. One of them wrote to Wesley -that, even after a bullet in each arm had forced him to retire from the -field, he hardly knew whether he was on earth or in heaven, such was -the sweetness of the day. This man and a few more of his kind probably -helped their fellow-sufferers through the misery of the days following -the battle, until Cumberland’s furious remonstrances with Saxe procured -for them better treatment. - -From Ath Cumberland fell back to Lessines and drew out such British -corps as were in garrison in Flanders, to replace those which had -suffered most heavily in the action. Meanwhile Tournay, very shortly -after the battle, fell by treachery into the hands of the French; and -Saxe’s field-army being thus raised to a force nearly double that of -the Allies, Cumberland was reduced to utter helplessness. The mischief -of Fontenoy lay not in the repulse and the loss of men, for the -British did not consider themselves to have been beaten, but in the -destruction of all confidence in the Dutch troops. The troubles which -had harassed Wade to despair now reappeared. Cumberland, -notwithstanding his inferiority in strength, was expected somehow to -defend Flanders, Brabant, and above all Brussels, and yet -simultaneously to keep an active army in the field. Worse than this, -he attempted to fulfil the expectation. Against his better judgment he -weakened his force still further by detaching a force for the garrison -of Mons,[83] after which, instead of taking up a strong position on -the Scheldt to cover Ghent at all hazards, he yielded to the pressure -of the Austrians and crossed the Dender to protect Brussels.[84] -Halting too long between two opinions he at last sent off a detachment -for the defence of Ghent, half of which was cut off and driven back -with heavy loss, while the other half, after enduring much rough usage -on the march, entered Ghent only to see the town surprised by the -French on the following day. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ Four British -regiments took part in this unlucky enterprise and suffered severely, -while the Royal Scots and the Twenty-third, which had been despatched -to Ghent after Fontenoy, of course became prisoners.[85] Moreover, a -vast quantity of British military stores were captured in Ghent, -although Cumberland had a week before ordered that they should be -removed.[86] After this blow Cumberland retired to Vilvorde, a little -to the north of Brussels, still hoping to cover both that city and -Antwerp, and so to preserve his communications both with Germany and -with the sea. Here again he sacrificed his better judgment to the -clamour of the Austrians, for he would much have preferred to secure -Antwerp only. His position was in fact most critical, and he was -keenly alive to it.[87] Just when his anxiety was greatest there came -a letter from the Secretary of State, announcing that invasion of -England was imminent, and hoping that troops could be spared from -Flanders without prejudice to his operations. “What!” answered -Ligonier indignantly; “are you aware that the enemy has seventy -thousand men against our thirty thousand, and that they can place a -superior force on the canal before us and send another army round -between us and Antwerp, to cut off our supplies and force us to fight -at a disadvantage? ◆August.◆ This is our position, and this is the -result of providing His Royal Highness with insufficient troops; and -yet you speak of our having a corps to spare to defend England!”[88] - -Saxe’s plan for reducing the Allies was in fact uniformly the same -throughout the whole of the war, namely to cut off their -communications with the sea on one side and with Germany on the -other. Even before he began to press Cumberland northward toward -Antwerp, he had detached a force to lay siege to Ostend, which was the -English base. Cumberland, on his side, had advised that the dykes -should be broken down and the country inundated in order to preserve -it, and both Dutch and Austrians had promised that this should be -done; but as usual it was not done, and before the end of August -Ostend had surrendered to the French. ◆Aug. 13/24.◆ The English base -was then perforce shifted to Antwerp. But by this time the requests -for the return of troops to England had become urgent and imperative -orders. ◆Sept.–Oct.◆ First ten battalions were recalled, then the rest -of the foot, and at last practically the whole of the army, including -Cumberland himself.[89] The cause was the Jacobite rebellion which was -stamped out by the victory of Culloden in April 1746. - -AUTHORITIES.—The official account of Fontenoy was drawn up by -Ligonier in French and translated into English, with some omissions, -for publication. The French version is far the better and will be -found in the State Papers. The account in the _Life of the Duke of -Cumberland_ is poor, though valuable as having been drawn up from the -reports of the English Generals. Of the French accounts Voltaire’s is -the best known, and, as might be expected from such a hand, admirably -spirited. More valuable are the accounts in the _Conquête des Pays -Bas_, in the _Mémoires du Maréchal de Saxe_, where Saxe’s own report -may be read, in the _Campagnes des Pays Bas_, and in Espagnac. The -newspapers furnish a few picturesque incidents of some value. - - - - - VOL. II BOOK VII. CHAPTER VII - - -◆1746.◆ - -The virtual evacuation of the Low Countries by the British, in -consequence of the Jacobite Rebellion, was an advantage too obvious to -be overlooked by the French. At the end of January, though -winter-quarters were not yet broken up, they severed the communication -between Antwerp and Brussels, and a week later took the town of -Brussels itself by escalade. The citadel, after defending itself for a -fortnight, went the way of the town, and the capital of the Spanish -Netherlands was turned into a French place of arms.[90] The -consternation in Holland was great, and was increased when the French -presently besieged and captured Antwerp. ◆May 20/31.◆ Meanwhile the -British Commander, Lord Dunmore, who had been left in the Netherlands -with a few squadrons of cavalry, could only look on in absolute -helplessness. It was not until June that the Hessian troops in British -pay and a few British battalions could be embarked, together with -General Ligonier to command them, from England; and it was not until -July, owing to foul winds, that they were finally landed at -Williamstadt. The change of base was significant in itself, for, since -the capture of Ostend and Antwerp, there was no haven for British -ships except in the United Provinces. Even after the disembarkation -these forces were found to be still unready to take the field. The -Hessians had not a grain of powder among them, and there were neither -horses for the artillery nor waggons for the baggage. Again, to add -small difficulties to great, the Austrian General, Batthyany, having -no British officer as his peer in command, denied to the British -troops the place of honour at the right of the line. It was a trifling -matter, but yet sufficient to embarrass counsel, destroy harmony, and -delay operations.[91] - -While the Allies were thus painfully drawing their forces together, the -activity of the French never ceased. ◆June 30./July 11.◆ The Prince of -Conti was detached with a considerable force to the Haine, where he -quickly reduced Mons and St. Ghislain, thus throwing down almost the -last relics of the Austrian barrier in the south. ◆July 13/24.◆ Thence -moving to the Sambre, Conti laid siege to Charleroi. It was now -sufficiently clear that the plan of the French campaign was to operate -on the line of the Meuse for the invasion of Holland. Maestricht once -taken, the rest would be easy, for most of the Dutch army were prisoners -in the hands of the French; and, with the possession of the line of the -Meuse, communication between the Allied forces of England and of Austria -would be cut off. But before Maestricht could be touched, Namur must -first be captured; and the campaign of 1746 accordingly centred about -Namur. - -For the first fortnight of July the Allies remained at Terheyden, a -little to the north of Breda, Saxe’s army lying some thirty miles -south-westward of them about Antwerp. ◆July 6/17.◆ On the 17th of July -the Allies at last got on the march, still with some faint hopes of -saving Charleroi, and proceeded south-eastward, a movement which Saxe at -once parried by marching parallel with them to the Dyle between Arschot -and Louvain. Pushing forward, despite endless difficulties of transport -and forage, through a wretched barren country, the Allies, now under -command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, reached Peer, turned southward -across the Denier at Hasselt, and by the 27th of July were at Borchloen. -◆July 16/27.◆ They were thus actually on the eastern side of the French -main army, within reach of the Mehaigne and not without good hope of -saving Namur if not Charleroi. ◆July 21./Aug. 1.◆ On the 1st of August -they crossed the Mehaigne, only to learn to their bitter disappointment -that Charleroi had surrendered that very morning. Saxe meanwhile, with -the principal part of his army, still lay entrenched at Louvain, with -detachments pushed forward to Tirlemont and Gembloux. The Allies -continued their march before the eyes of these detachments to Masy on -the Orneau, and there took up a position between that river and the -head-waters of the Mehaigne, fronting to the north-east. This was the -line approved through many generations of war as the best for the -protection of Namur.[92] - -Saxe now drew nearer to them, and the two armies lay opposite to each -other, in many places not more than a musket-shot apart, both entrenched -to the teeth. The Allies so far had decidedly gained a success, but they -were outnumbered by the French by three to two, and they were confined -within a narrow space wherein subsistence was extremely difficult; -while, if they moved, Namur was lost. Ligonier, who was most uneasy over -the situation, longed for five thousand cavalry with which to make a -dash at Malines and so to call the enemy back in haste to defend -Brussels and Antwerp.[93] Prince Charles, however, was averse from -operations of such a nature. His hope was that Saxe would offer him -battle on the historic plain of Ramillies, where, notwithstanding the -disparity of numbers, he trusted that the quality of his troops and the -traditions of victory would enable him to prevail. But Saxe had no -intention of doing anything of the kind. He did indeed shift his -position farther to the north and east, with the field of Ramillies in -his rear, but it was not to offer battle. ◆Aug. 18/29.◆ Pushing out -detachments to eastward he captured Huy, and cutting off the Allies’ -communications with Liège and Maestricht forced them to cross the Meuse -and to fall back on Maestricht from the other side of the river. Cross -the Meuse the Allies accordingly did, unmolested, to Ligonier’s great -relief, by twenty thousand French who were stationed on the eastern bank -of the stream. They then opened communication with Maestricht, five -leagues away, while Saxe extended his army comfortably with its face to -the eastward along the line of the Jaar from Warem to Tongres, waiting -till want of forage should compel the Allies to recross the Meuse. -◆Sept. 2/13.◆ Back they came over the river within a fortnight, as he -had expected, and the Marshal, without attempting to dispute the -passage, retreated quietly for a few miles, knowing full well that his -enemy could not follow him from lack of bread. Ligonier never in his -life longed so intensely for the end of a campaign.[94] - -On the 17th of September the Allies advanced upon the French and -offered battle. ◆Sept. 6/17.◆ Saxe answered by retiring to an -impregnable position between Tongres and the Demer. There was no -occasion for him to fight, when his enemies were short of provisions -and their cavalry was going to ruin from want of forage. So there the -two armies remained once more, within sight of each other but -unwilling to fight, because an attack on the entrenchments of either -host would have led to the certain destruction of the attacking -force.◆Aug. 30./Sept. 10.◆ But meanwhile the trenches had been opened -before Namur by a French corps under the Prince of Clermont, and -within nine days the town had fallen. Ligonier again urged his design, -for which he had prepared the necessary magazines, to upset Saxe’s -plans by a dash upon Antwerp, but he could find no support in the -council of war; so there was nothing for the Allies to do but to wait -until some further French success should compel them to move. Such a -success was not long in coming. The castle of Namur surrendered after -a miserable defence of but eleven days; Clermont’s corps was released -for operations in the field, and the Allies were forced to fall back -for the protection of Liège. ◆Sept. 27./Oct. 7.◆ Accordingly, on the -7th of October they crossed the Jaar, not without annoyance from the -enemy, and took up a new position, which gave them indeed possession -of Liège, but placed them between the Meuse in their rear, and an army -of nearly twice their strength on the Jaar before their front.[95] - -[Illustration: - - ROUCOUX - Sep. 30th/Oct. 11th 1746 -] - -◆Sept. 29./Oct. 10.◆ - -Now at last Saxe resolved to strike a blow. On the 10th of October he -crossed the Jaar with evident intention of an attack, and the Allied -army received orders to be ready for action before the following dawn. -The Allies’ position faced very nearly due west, the army being drawn -up astride of the two paved roads leading into Liège from Tongres and -St. Trond. Their extreme right rested on the Jaar and was covered by -the villages of Slins, Fexhe, and Enick, all of which were strongly -entrenched and occupied by the Austrians. South of Enick extended an -open plain from that village to the village of Liers, and in this -plain was posted the Hanoverian infantry and four British battalions, -the Eighth, Nineteenth, Thirty-third, and Forty-third Foot, with the -Hessian infantry on their left, in rear of Liers. The Hanoverian -cavalry prolonged the line southward to the village of Varoux, and the -Sixth and Seventh Dragoons and Scots Greys continued it to the village -of Roucoux, from which point Dutch troops carried it on to the village -of Ance, which formed the extreme left of the position. Ligonier did -not like the situation, for he did not see how the turning of the left -flank could be prevented if, as would certainly be the case, the French -should seriously attempt it. Prince Charles, knowing that, if his right -were turned, his retreat to Maestricht would be cut off, had taken -care to hold the right flank in real strength and dared not weaken it; -but the position, with the Meuse in its rear, was perilously shallow, -while the convergence of two ravines from the Jaar and Mehaigne into -its centre allowed of but one narrow way of communication between the -right and the left of the army. The defects of the Allies’ dispositions -were in fact not unlike those which had proved fatal to King William -at Landen; and Ligonier’s anxiety was proved to rest on all too good -foundation. - -◆Sept. 30./Oct. 11.◆ - -The morning of the 11th of October opened with bad news for the Allies. -The French had been admitted into Liège by the inhabitants behind the -backs of the Dutch, so that the Prince of Waldeck, who commanded on the -left, was obliged to withdraw eight battalions from Roucoux and post -them _en potence_ on his left flank, with his cavalry in support. Thus -the defence of Roucoux, as well as of Liers and Varoux, was left to -eight battalions of British, Hanoverians, and Hessians only. This made -the outlook for the Allied left the worse, since it was evident that -the brunt of the French attack would fall upon it. Saxe gave Prince -Charles little time for reflection. He had one hundred and twenty -thousand men against eighty thousand, and he knew that of the eighty -thousand at least one-third were tied to the Austrian entrenchments -about the Jaar. He opened the action by a furious assault upon the -Dutch on the left wing, his infantry being formed in dense columns, -so that the attack could be renewed continually by fresh troops. -Simultaneously fifty-five battalions in three similar columns were -launched upon Liers, Varoux, and Roucoux. Outmatched though they were, -Dutch, Germans, and British all fought splendidly and repelled more -than one attack. But, to use Ligonier’s words, as soon as two French -brigades had been repulsed in each village, a third brigade ran in; -and the eight battalions, though they still held Liers, were forced -to withdraw both from Roucoux and Varoux. Being rallied, however, by -Ligonier, they advanced again and recaptured both villages; and the -Nineteenth and Forty-third took up a position in a hollow road which -they held to the last. The Dutch now began to retire across the rear -of the position from the left, in good order despite of heavy losses, -while Ligonier checked the enemy in the plain with the British cavalry. -When the Dutch had passed, he ordered his own men to retreat in the -same direction, still covering the movement with the cavalry and with -the Thirteenth and Twenty-sixth Foot, which had been sent to the field -from the garrison of Maestricht. The Austrians formed a rear-guard in -turn when the British and their German comrades had passed; and thus -the whole army filed off, unpursued and in perfect order, and crossed -the Meuse in safety on the following morning. - -The action may be looked upon as a fortunate escape for the Allies, -since it was impossible, humanly speaking, that it could have issued -favourably for them. Prince Charles, in seeking to cover both Liège -and Maestricht, had attempted too much. His army thus occupied too -wide a front, the villages in the centre were too weakly held, there -was hardly anywhere a second line of infantry, and the left flank -could not be sustained against so superior an enemy. The total loss of -the Allies was about five thousand men, which was sufficiently severe -considering that but a third of the army was engaged. The casualties of -the British were three hundred and fifty killed and wounded, of whom -no fewer than two hundred belonged to the Forty-third. The French lost -as many men as the Allies, or more, and gained little by the action -except eight guns captured from the British, Hanoverians, and Hessians. -Had not the Allied troops been far better in quality and discipline -than the French, they must have been lost during their retreat with -superior numbers both in flank and rear. Both armies presently retired -into winter-quarters, and the campaign ended far less disastrously than -might have been feared for the Allies.[96] - -Unfortunately, however, it was not in Flanders only that discredit fell -upon the British arms. At the end of September a force of six -battalions[97] was sent, under command of General St. Clair, to the -coast of Brittany to attack Port L’Orient and destroy the stores of the -French East India Company there. ◆Sept. 20./Oct. 1.◆ The enterprise -was conducted with amazing feebleness. The troops landed at Ouimperle -Bay practically unopposed, but, being fired at on their march on the -following day, were turned loose to the plunder of a small town as a -punishment to the inhabitants for their resistance. On the following day -they reached L’Orient, which the Deputy Governor of the East India -Company offered to surrender on good terms. His overtures, however, were -rejected and a siege was begun in form; but, after a few days of firing -and the loss of about a hundred men killed and wounded, St. Clair -thought it prudent to retreat; and on the 12th of October the troops -re-embarked and returned to England. ◆Oct. 1/12.◆ Anything more -pointless than the design or more contemptible than the execution of -this project can hardly be conceived, for it simply employed regiments -which were badly needed in Flanders and America, in useless operations -which did not amount to a diversion. - -◆1747.◆ - -If the cause of Queen Maria Theresa was to be saved, it was evident -that great efforts were imperative in the coming campaign of 1747. -To meet the vast numbers brought into the field by the French the -Austrians promised to have sixty thousand men at Maseyck on the Meuse -by April; the British contributed four regiments of cavalry and -fourteen battalions of infantry; and it was hoped that the Allies would -take the field with a total strength of one hundred and ten battalions, -one hundred and sixty squadrons, and two hundred and twenty guns, -besides irregular troops, the whole to be under command of the Duke -of Cumberland.[98] Unfortunately the weather was adverse to an early -opening of the campaign; and the French, by the seizure of Cadsand -and Sluys, which were shamefully surrendered by the Dutch, closed the -southern mouth of the Scheldt below Antwerp. This was a sad blow to the -arrangements for the transport of the Allies, since it brought about -the necessity of hauling all the forage for the British overland from -Breda. Had Cumberland been in a position to open the campaign before -the French, he meant to have laid siege to Antwerp; as things were, he -was compelled, thanks chiefly to the apathy of the Dutch, to attempt -to bring Saxe to a general action. His last letter before beginning -operations has, however, an interest of another kind. It contained a -recommendation that Major James Wolfe might be permitted to purchase -a vacant lieutenant-colonelcy in the Eighth Foot, that officer having -served constantly and well during the past two years as a major of -brigade, and proved himself capable and desirous to do his duty.[99] - -The French being encamped between Malines and Louvain, Cumberland -collected his troops at Tilburg and advanced straight upon them, -encamping on the 26th of May on the Great Neth, a little to the east of -Antwerp, between Lierre and Herenthout. ◆May 15/26.◆ Saxe, entrenched as -usual to the teeth, remained immovable for three weeks, and Cumberland -despaired of bringing him to action. At length the news that a detached -corps of thirty thousand French, under the Prince of Clermont, was on -the old ground about Tongres, moved Cumberland to march to the Demer, in -the hope of overwhelming Clermont before Saxe could join him. ◆June -15/26.◆ Saxe, however, was on his guard, and on the 29th of June -prepared to concentrate the whole of his army at Tongres. ◆June 18/29.◆ -Cumberland thereupon decided to take up Saxe’s camp of the previous -year, from Bilsen, on the head-waters of the Demer, to Tongres. ◆June -19/30.◆ So sending forward Count Daun, afterwards well known as an -antagonist of Frederick the Great, with a corps of Austrians to occupy -Bilsen, he ordered the rest of the army to follow as quickly as possible -on the next day. ◆June 20./July 1.◆ Riding forward at daybreak of the -morrow, Cumberland was dismayed to see the French advancing in two -columns from Tongres, as if to fall upon the head of his own army. This -was a surprise. Cumberland knew that Saxe was in motion but had not -expected him so soon; and indeed Saxe had made a notable march, for his -army had not left Louvain until the 29th of June and had traversed -little less than fifty miles in two days. The Duke lost no time in -setting such troops as were on the spot in order of battle, and hurried -away to see if those on the march could be brought up in time to force -back the French, and to secure the position of his choice. But the -French cavalry was too quick for him, and, before Ligonier could bring -up the English horse, had occupied the centre of the ground which -Cumberland had intended for himself. Ligonier drew up his squadrons -before them to bar their farther advance, and the Allied infantry, as it -came up, was formed in order of battle, fronting, however, not to -eastward, as had been originally designed, but almost due south. In -fact, owing to Saxe’s unexpected arrival and to deficient arrangements -by the staff of the Allies, there seems to have been considerable delay -in putting the Allied army into any formation at all, or the French -might certainly have been forced back to Tongres. Saxe’s rear had not -yet come up and the men were fatigued by a long and harassing march; but -Cumberland was not the man to fight an action of the type of Oudenarde, -and the opportunity was lost.[100] - -The position now occupied by the Allies extended from some rising -ground known as the Commanderie, a little to the south-east of Bilsen, -along a chain of villages and low heights to the Jaar, a little to the -south of Maestricht. The Commanderie being the right of the line was -held by the Austrians, with a strong corps thrown back _en potence_ -to Bilsen to protect the right flank; for it was as important on this -field as on that of Roucoux that the retreat into Holland should not -be cut off. The ground possessed natural features of strength which -were turned to good account, so good account indeed that the Allied -right, like the French left at Ramillies, could neither attack nor -be attacked. Eastward from the Commanderie the Austrians occupied -the heights of Spaeven, together with the villages of Gross and Klein -Spaeven; next to them the Dutch formed the centre of the line, while -the Hanoverians and British held the villages of Val, or Vlytingen, and -Lauffeld, and prolonged the line to its extreme left at the village of -Kesselt. - -◆June 21./July 2.◆ - -There the Allies lay on their arms until nightfall, while Saxe’s weary -battalions tramped on till far into the night up to their bivouacs. At -daybreak the French were seen to be in motion, marching and -countermarching in a way that Cumberland did not quite understand; the -fact being that Saxe, as at Roucoux, was doubling the left wing of his -army in rear of the right, for the formation of those dense columns of -attack which he could handle with such consummate skill. After observing -them until nine o’clock, Cumberland came to the conclusion that the -Marshal meditated no immediate movement, and retired to the Commanderie -for breakfast. He had hardly sat down when an urgent message arrived -from Ligonier that the enemy was on the point of attacking. Cumberland -at once returned and moved the left of his line somewhat forward, -setting fire to the village of Vlytingen and occupying Lauffeld with -three British and two Hessian battalions. Lauffeld was a straggling -village a quarter of a mile long, covered by a multitude of small -enclosures with mud walls about six feet high, which were topped by -growing hedges. It was thus easily turned into a strong post for -infantry; and cannon were posted both in its front and flanks. The -remainder of the British were drawn up for the most part in rear of -Lauffeld in order to feed and relieve its garrison, the brigade of -Guards being posted in the hedges before Vlytingen. The British cavalry -stood on the right of the infantry and joined their line to that of the -Dutch. - -[Illustration: - - LAUFFELD - June 21st/July 2nd 1747 - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -Meanwhile Saxe, sending forward a cloud of irregular troops to mask -his movements, had despatched Count d’Estrées and the Count of Ségur -with a strong force of infantry and cavalry to seize the villages of -Montenaken and Wilre on the left flank of the Allies. This service was -performed with little loss. At the same time he directed the Marquis -of Salières, with six brigades of foot and twenty guns, to attack -Vlytingen, and launched five brigades, with as many guns, backed by a -large force of cavalry, against Lauffeld. The assault of the French -infantry upon Lauffeld was met by a furious resistance. It was just -such another struggle as that of Neerwinden, from hedge to hedge -and from wall to wall; and the French, for all their superiority of -numbers, were driven back headlong from the village with terrible loss. -Salières met with little better success against the brigade of Guards -in the hedges of Vlytingen; but with great readiness he turned half -of his guns to his right against Lauffeld and the remainder against a -ravine on his left, with most destructive effect. Cumberland, observing -the fury with which Saxe had concentrated his attack against these two -villages, asked the Austrians to relieve him by a diversion upon his -right; but the Austrian troops could not face the fire of Salières’s -guns, and it became clear that Vlytingen and Lauffeld must be held by -the British and Hanoverians alone. - -Saxe’s first attack had been brilliantly repulsed. He at once replaced -the beaten troops by two fresh brigades of infantry, with cavalry to -support them, and renewed the assault, but with no better success. The -British were driven back from the outer defences only to stand more -fiercely by those within, and Lauffeld remained unconquered. But Saxe -was not to be deterred from his purpose. Two more brigades, including -the six Irish battalions that had saved the day at Fontenoy, were -added to those already on the spot, and the whole of them launched -for a third attack against Lauffeld. They were met by the same -stubborn resistance and the same deadly fire; and the Irish brigade -lost no fewer than sixty officers in the struggle. Nevertheless Irish -impetuosity carried the rest of the troops forward; the British were -borne back to the rearmost edge of the village, and the French began -to swarm up the slope beyond it. Cumberland promptly ordered the whole -of his line of infantry to advance; and the French at once gave way -before them. The French cavalry was obliged to drive the foot forward -at the sword’s point, but Cumberland continued steadily to gain ground -despite their efforts. Then at an unlucky moment, some Dutch squadrons -in the centre were seized with panic and came galloping straight -into the British line, carried away the Hessians and one squadron of -the Greys and fell pell-mell upon the Twenty-first and Twenty-third -Fusiliers. The Twenty-first, anticipating the treatment of the Belgians -at Waterloo, gave the Dutchmen a volley and partly saved themselves, -but the Twenty-third suffered terribly, and the whole line was thrown -into confusion. Before order could be restored, Salières had thrown -three more brigades upon Lauffeld, which closed in round it, blocking -up a hollow road which formed the entrance into it from the rear, and -barring the way for all further reinforcements of the Allies. The few -troops that were left in the village were speedily overpowered, and -Lauffeld was lost. - -Some of Daun’s Austrians now advanced to Cumberland’s help from the -right; but three French brigades of cavalry, which were waiting before -Vlytingen, at once moved forward to check them, and charging boldly -into them succeeded in turning them back, though themselves roughly -handled when retiring from the charge. Meanwhile Saxe had brought up -ten guns to right and left of Lauffeld, and reinforcing the cavalry -of D’Estrées and Ségur extended it in one long line from Lauffeld to -Wilre, for a final crushing attack on the Allied left. Order had been -restored among the British infantry, who were now retreating with great -steadiness; but they were wholly unsupported. Ligonier, determined -to save them at any cost, caught up the Greys, Inniskillings, and -Cumberland’s dragoons, and led them straight against the masses of the -French cavalry. The gallant brigade charged home, crashed headlong -through the horse, and fell upon the infantry beyond, but being galled -by their fire and attacked in all quarters by other French squadrons, -was broken past all rallying and very heavily punished. Ligonier -himself was overthrown and taken prisoner. Cumberland, who had plunged -into the broken ranks to try to rally the British troopers, was cut off -by the French dragoons, and only with difficulty contrived to join the -remainder of his cavalry on the left. With these he covered the retreat -of the army, which was successfully effected in good order and with -little further loss. - -So ended the battle of Lauffeld, in which the British bore the brunt -with a firmness that extorted the praise even of Frenchmen, but of -which few Englishmen have ever heard. The troops, in Cumberland’s -words, behaved one and all so well that he could not commend any one -regiment without doing injustice to the rest. The total loss of the -five regiments of horse and fourteen battalions of foot was close upon -two thousand men.[101] The three devoted regiments which charged with -Ligonier were the worst sufferers, the Greys losing one hundred and -sixty men, the Inniskillings one hundred and twenty, and Cumberland’s -dragoons nearly one hundred. The loss of the whole of the Allies was -about six thousand men, that of the French decidedly greater, amounting -indeed, according to Saxe’s account, to not less than ten thousand -men. The British, moreover, had nine French colours and five French -standards as trophies for their consolation. Finally, the French failed -to accomplish the object of the action, which was to cut off the Allies -from Maestricht. - -After the battle the Allies crossed the Meuse and encamped at Heer, a -little to the east of Maestricht, while Saxe returned to his quarters -at Tongres. The French then detached a corps for the capture of -Bergen-op-Zoom; but the most important transactions of the war still -went forward on the Meuse, where constant negotiations were carried -on between Saxe and Cumberland. The campaign closed with the fall of -Bergen-op-Zoom and with the capture of most of the strong places in -Dutch Brabant. - -By this time King George and his people in England were thoroughly sick -of the war. The British had suffered severely in every action, but had -reaped no success except in the fortunate victory of Dettingen. The -Dutch had proved themselves useless and contemptible as Allies, their -Government feeble and corrupt in council, their troops unstable if not -dangerous in action. The Austrians, in spite of lavish subsidies, had -never furnished the troops that they had promised, and had invariably -obstructed operations through the obstinacy of their Generals and the -selfishness of their ends. ◆1748.◆ The opening of the campaign of 1748 -was even more unpromising for the Allies. Saxe, strong in the possession -of a superior force, kept Cumberland in suspense between apprehensions -for Breda and for Maestricht, and, when finally he laid siege to -Maestricht, could match one hundred and fifteen thousand men against -Cumberland’s five-and-thirty thousand. War on such terms against such a -master as Saxe was ridiculous. Moreover, the Dutch, despite of a recent -revolution, were more supine than ever; the Prince of Orange, who was -the new ruler, actually keeping two thousand of his troops from the -field that they might adorn the baptism of one of his babies. In the -face of such facts Cumberland pressed earnestly for peace;[102] and on -the 30th of April preliminaries were signed, which six months later were -expanded into the definite treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. ◆Apr. 19/30.◆ - -◆October.◆ - -The peace left matters practically as they had stood before the war, -with the significant exception that Frederick the Great retained -Silesia. Not a word was said as to the regulation of trade between -England and Spain, which had been the original ground of quarrel; -and, as between England and France, it was agreed that there should -be mutual restitution of all captures. Yet this could not set the two -countries in the same position as before the war. The French were -utterly exhausted; but the British, though not a little harassed by -the cost of maintaining armies and producing subsidies, had received a -military training which was to stand them in good stead for the great -struggle that lay before them. - -AUTHORITIES.—The official correspondence in the Record Office. _F.O. -Military Auxiliary Expeditions._ _Campagnes de Louis XV. Espagnac._ -_Life of the Duke of Cumberland._ Some useful details as to Lauffeld are -to be found in the _Gentleman’s Magazine_. - - - - - THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793–1794 - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER III - - -◆1793.◆ - -War was declared by the French Convention on the 1st of February 1793, -and Dumouriez was ordered to invade Holland forthwith. The Convention, -thirsting for the wealth of the Bank of Amsterdam, was anxious to make -sure of it before the Allies could put their strength into the field. -Two months earlier, when his troops were heartened by the victory of -Jemappe, no order could have been more welcome to Dumouriez than this; -and even now, though he had few men upon whom he could depend, he -resolved if possible to make good the defects of his army by swift and -sudden action. The French troops on the northern frontier were very -widely scattered, their cantonments extending north and south on the -lower Meuse from Roermond to Maastricht, and east and west from the -upper Rhine through Aachen to Liège and Namur. His original plan had -been to turn all the waterways and fortresses that bar the entrance -into Holland from the south, and to invade it by way of Nimeguen; but -time was so precious that he resolved to collect a small force of but -seventeen thousand men at Antwerp, and to march from thence with all -secrecy direct upon Amsterdam. At the same time he directed thirty -thousand men from the east under General Miranda to take the Dutch -fortresses of Maastricht and Venloo, and then to make for Nimeguen. -Speed, in his view, was everything, for the Austrians had already forty -thousand men cantoned to the east of the Rhine, and were shortly to be -reinforced. - -Meanwhile the Allies were still making up their plans for the next -campaign. Brunswick and Prince Frederick Josias of Coburg-Saalfeld, -who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army, met at -Frankfurt, and, after many conferences between the 6th and the 14th -of February, decided upon a scheme of operations, which by their own -showing required forty thousand more men than they had any expectation -of collecting. They saved themselves, however, by laying it down as a -cardinal principle that, until Mainz were recovered from the French, -the Allied forces must not attempt to pass from the east to the west -bank of the Meuse. Belgium (so argued the Austrians) had been eaten -up, and so long as the navigation of the Rhine was blocked at Mainz, -the subsistence of the Imperial troops on the west of the Meuse must -be difficult. Moreover, if the French should retire before an Austrian -advance, and mass all their forces on the Rhine, then they might beat -Brunswick, who, unless his retreat were assured by the possession of -Mainz, would be in danger of utter destruction. The reader should take -note of this decision, for not only is it the key to much that appears -puzzling in the coming campaign, but it is an excellent example of -the principle on which Coburg and Brunswick conducted war, namely, to -look at risks first and at objects afterwards. The immediate problem -of the defence of the Dutch provinces was left without so much as an -attempt at solution. Both Grenville in England and Auckland at the -Hague had long foreseen the certainty of a French attack upon them, and -had strained every nerve to stir the authorities to action. But the -Stadtholder was a man of almost inhuman dulness, apathy and stupidity; -and all popular energy was paralysed by the spirit of faction, which, -never inactive in Holland, had under the influence of French agents -become almost a spirit of revolution. The Dutch army was so defective -in training, equipment and discipline that it had ceased to exist as -an efficient force; and its few foreign corps, which alone deserved -the name of regiments, had been driven to mutiny by a reduction of -their pay below the rate fixed by their contract. Even in January and -February, Auckland wrote that the Stadtholder looked for British ships -and British troops to save him,[103] and that the French party was -derisively insinuating that England, nominally the faithful ally of -the Dutch Republic, was content to desert her in the hour of danger. -Finally, on the 15th of February he begged that the Duke of York might -be sent over with a few officers of experience, even if without troops, -to take command of the Dutch. “Men, commanders, ships and money,” -he wrote, “we could not ask for more if this country were a part of -Yorkshire, but I incline to think that it should be considered so for -the present; and if it is brought to a question whether we are to -conquer it and keep it, or whether Dumouriez is to do it, I have no -doubt as to the decision.” - -Still the British Government hesitated, for, thanks to its neglect of -the Army, it possessed but a handful of troops, and was unwilling to -move them to the Continent. ◆Feb. 16.◆ Then suddenly, on the 16th of -February, Dumouriez dashed out from Antwerp with his tiny force in four -columns. One small body instantly pushed northward towards Moerdyk, to -collect boats for the passage of the arm of the sea called the -Hollandsdiep; another marched upon Klundert and Willemstadt, a third -north-eastward to attack Breda, and a fourth to the north-west to -blockade Bergen-op-Zoom and Steenbergen. Everywhere his coming was -welcomed by the Dutch. Breda, with large stores of munitions of war, was -disgracefully surrendered on the 26th of February; ◆Feb. 26.◆ Klundert -and Gertruydenberg fell in quick succession; Willemstadt was then -besieged with the captured cannon, and by the 9th of March Dumouriez was -prepared to essay the passage of the Hollandsdiep. ◆March 9.◆ But here -his course was stayed, for his activity had stirred his enemies on every -side. - -◆Feb. 20.◆ - -On the 20th of February the seven battalions of British Guards were -suddenly paraded before the Horse Guards; and the Duke of York, -announcing that the first battalions of the three regiments were ordered -to proceed on active service, called for volunteers from the others to -bring them up to strength. The whole brigade thereupon stepped forward -as one man; and five days later three battalions, numbering under two -thousand men of all ranks and denominations, marched to Greenwich amid -the cheers, and something more than the cheers, of an enormous and -enthusiastic crowd.[104] By nightfall the whole were embarked upon -vessels too small to carry more than two-thirds of their number in -safety, without medicines or medical appliances, without the slightest -reserve of ammunition, and of course without transport of any -description. Their commander was Colonel Gerard Lake of the First -Guards, and he was ordered on no account to move his men above -twenty-four hours’ distance from Helvoetsluis, so as to be able to -return on the shortest notice. ◆March 1.◆ By the mercy of Heaven these -troops safely reached that port, narrowly escaping a gale which would -probably have condemned them either to drowning or asphyxiation; and -four days later they proceeded to Dort to oppose Dumouriez’s passage of -the Hollandsdiep. ◆March 5.◆ About the same time a flotilla of Dutch -gunboats arrived in the Meuse, many of them manned by British sailors -and flying British colours. Auckland, by threatening to take command in -Holland himself, had at last compelled the miserable Stadtholder to -issue orders for the defence of his country.[105] - -But the obstacles which were multiplying in Dumouriez’s front were as -nothing to the storm that suddenly broke upon his flank. ◆Feb. 20.◆ -Miranda had duly moved up to the siege of Maastricht with a force -inadequate to the task and, moreover, dangerously dispersed; but the -Austrians, declaring themselves too weak to move, still remained torpid -in their cantonments, perhaps the more stubbornly because the Prussian -Agent at the Austrian headquarters was perpetually urging them to -action. ◆Feb. 26.◆ At last, however, Coburg on the 26th began to -concentrate his forty thousand men and to pass them in five columns -across the river; ◆March 1.◆ and on the 1st of March, to the great -surprise of the French, he burst upon their cantonments on the Meuse, -and for four days drove them in utter rout before him. Coburg himself -and the left wing halted before Liège, but on the right the Archduke -Charles, with the impetuosity of twenty-one years and the instinct of a -born soldier, followed up the disorderly rabble from Maastricht -southward upon Tongres, boldly attacking wherever he met the enemy. -Such of the French as had been in action fled in all directions, -abandoning everything; ten thousand deserters hurried across the -frontier into France; and a small remnant took refuge behind the canal -at Louvain, where it was joined by such French divisions as had not been -engaged. Had Coburg pursued his advantage and advanced instantly with -all his forces, he could have ended the campaign at once, for the -people, furious at the exactions of the Jacobins, and, above all, at the -theft of the plate from their churches, had turned savagely upon the -retreating French. ◆March 5.◆ Instead of this he halted on the 5th, and -wasted ten whole days in cantonments between Maastricht and Tongres. The -Convention now ordered Dumouriez at once to proceed to Louvain and -◆March 9.◆ assume command, which he did with a very bad grace, leaving -General Flers to take his place in Holland. His presence did much to -restore confidence in the French army, and he was not a little helped by -Coburg’s inaction. Nevertheless the news that reached him was singularly -disquieting. Fresh regiments were embarking from England for -Helvoetsluis; two reinforcing columns of Austrians were advancing from -the Rhine upon Namur; ◆March 11.◆ and eight thousand Prussians, under -the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, had arrived at Bois-le-Duc on the 11th, and -were moving with five thousand British and Dutch upon Breda, to cut off -the troops on the Hollandsdiep from France and Dumouriez’s own soldiers -from Antwerp. In so desperate a situation there was no choice but to -take the offensive. - -◆March 15.◆ - -On the 15th Coburg at last resumed his advance with forty-two thousand -men; and on the 16th Dumouriez marched with forty-eight thousand to meet -him. ◆March 18.◆ On the 18th the decisive action was fought at -Neerwinden, when the French were totally defeated, with a loss of five -thousand men and three guns. The volunteers and the National Guards were -the troops that failed in the battle; and after it the men broke up and -fled by whole battalions. Ten thousand deserted in the ten days -following the action, and Dumouriez was fain to form a rearguard out of -his artillery and his few battalions of the Line, and to fall back on -Louvain. Coburg, who had lost about three thousand men, made little -attempt at pursuit, keeping his main body halted at Tirlemont until the -22nd, but exhorting the Duke of Brunswick-Oels to hasten from -Bois-le-Duc to Malines to cut off Dumouriez’s retreat to Antwerp. The -Duke, who had already permitted Flers to withdraw with impunity the bulk -of his forces to Antwerp, was evidently not disposed to second Austrian -operations with Prussian troops, for he refused to move. ◆Mar. 23–24.◆ -However, the advance of the Austrians compelled Dumouriez to evacuate -first Louvain and then Brussels; ◆March 25.◆ and on the 25th, finding -himself obliged to abandon Namur also, he opened negotiations with -Coburg. He had quarrelled with the Convention beyond hope of -reconciliation over the iniquity of its rule in Belgium; and he now -proposed that the French should retreat from the whole country, and that -he should march to Paris to re-establish the monarchy, the Allies -meanwhile halting on the frontier and receiving the fortress of Condé as -a guarantee. ◆March 27.◆ An agreement to this effect was duly made with -the Chief of the Austrian Staff on the 27th, and a circular was issued -from the Austrian headquarters, suggesting a conference of the -representatives of the powers to decide as to the measures to be next -taken. - -There is no need to tell at length the story of Dumouriez’s adventures -during the following days. ◆April 5.◆ It must suffice that he was driven -from the midst of his army, and on the 5th of April was fain to take -refuge with the Austrians. Fragments of several corps and one complete -regiment of Hussars followed him, unwilling to part with their beloved -General; but several thousand French troops in Belgium and Holland, -which might have been cut off to a man, were allowed to retire in peace -to the frontier. None the less the fact remained that even a dilatory -commander at the head of a force of discordant Allies had sufficed to -drive the armies of the Revolution in shameful disorder from the -Austrian Netherlands. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IV - - -◆1793.◆ - -◆March 5.◆ - -On the 5th of March it was resolved to send the Fourteenth, -Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third Foot, completed by drafts from the new -independent companies, to join the Duke as a brigade under Major-general -Ralph Abercromby. These regiments, however, were subject to the same -instructions as the Guards, namely, to remain within immediate reach of -their transports in case their services should be required elsewhere. -Their quality was such that the Adjutant-general felt constrained to -apologise for them both to Abercromby and to the Duke of York. “I am -afraid,” he wrote to the Duke, “that you will not reap the advantage -that you might have expected from the brigade of the Line just sent over -to you, as so considerable a part of it is composed of nothing but -undisciplined and raw recruits; and how they are to be disposed of until -they can be taught their business I am at a loss to imagine.... I was -not consulted upon the subject until it was too late to remedy the evil, -but I hope that my remonstrances will be of some use in the modelling of -troops for the Continent in future.” ◆April 1.◆ It need hardly be added -that, on their arrival in Holland, two out of the three battalions were -found utterly unfit for service, the new recruits being old men and -weakly boys, worse than the worst that had been accepted even at the -period of greatest exhaustion during the American War. To send them on -active service was, therefore, simply waste of money.[106] - -But this was only one of the evils which ensued because an extremely -ignorant civilian was too vain to consult his military advisers before -giving military orders. Any soldier at the War Office could have -told him that the method of raising independent companies to recruit -existing regiments had been found wasteful and unsatisfactory in the -past; and, indeed, at this very time the Chief Secretary Cooke wrote -to him from Ireland a strong protest against the whole system. It -was expensive, because it meant the provision of half-pay for their -officers as soon as the men had been drafted out; it was unfair to old -subalterns, because they were passed over by boys who by good fortune -had raised recruits cheaply. It produced a bad class of recruit, -because these young officers were poor judges of men; and finally it -encouraged desertion, for the crimps, so long as they poured a certain -number of recruits into the depots by a certain time, cared not the -least whether they deserted afterwards. Nor was Cooke content only to -criticise, for he produced an alternative plan for allowing each of the -fourteen battalions in Ireland to raise two additional companies of one -hundred men apiece, and for granting to the commanding officers the -privilege of recommending officers for them. The scheme was approved -and was found to be most successful; but it was not introduced into -England, where, on the contrary, the number of independent companies -was still further increased.[107] - -Again, the Adjutant-general, if consulted, could have warned Dundas -to be chary of his battalions, since some of them would certainly -be required for the Fleet. The King’s Navy was labouring under the -grievances which in four years were to drive the seamen to mutiny; and -as a natural consequence men were hardly to be obtained by any means. -◆Feb. 7.◆ On the very day when the declaration of war was received, -the Fleet swallowed up two battalions; and by the end of March it had -absorbed so many men that only three regiments of the Line were to be -found south of the Tweed. In fact the Horse Guards did not know where -to turn for another battalion. This, however, did not prevent Dundas -from presently sending another emissary to Jamaica, to commit England -still more deeply to operations in the most leeward sphere of the West -Indies. Yet he had no reserve of any description to rely upon, except -fourteen thousand Hanoverians and eight thousand Hessians, which, -pursuant to the time-honoured practice, were taken into British pay; -and of these the latter only, being mercenaries pure and simple, could -be counted upon for service beyond sea.[108] - -Since the kingdom was thus stripped of regular troops, it was necessary -to raise other forces for its security; but this also was done as -foolishly as possible. Early in February it was rightly and wisely -decided to call out nineteen thousand additional Militia; but in the -execution precisely the same mistake was made as in France. Personal -service was not insisted upon; there arose a great demand for -substitutes; and the Militia, instead of gaining a substantial increase, -simply cut off from the Army the sources of its supply of recruits. In -Scotland, which as yet had no Militia, recourse was made to the raising -of Fencible regiments, that is to say, of regular troops enlisted for -home-service and for the duration of the war only. This system had so -far been applied only on a small scale, the regiments of Fencibles -during the Seven Years’ War and the American War of Independence having -been but few;[109] but it now received great and sudden expansion. On -the 2nd of March authority was issued for the raising of seven regiments -of Fencible Infantry in Scotland at a stroke; besides one already -authorised for the Isle of Man ◆Feb. 20.◆, and another, added in April, -for the Orkney Islands.[110] With the leading magnates of Scotland at -their head, these new corps were speedily completed; but there was one -Scottish nobleman who went further than his peers, and raised a regiment -in the Highlands for general service. This was Thomas Humberstone -Mackenzie, afterwards the last Earl of Seaforth; and his regiment -remains with us, still known by his name, but yet more famous under its -number of the Seventy-eighth. The reader should take note of the -Fencible regiments, for in the years before us we shall see them -increased and multiplied in all three kingdoms. Meanwhile, he should -remark that within a month of the declaration of war there were already -three distinct forces, the Army, the Fencibles, and the Militia, all -bidding against each other for the recruits which only the Regular Army -could turn to efficient account. - -It is not difficult to perceive the lurking possibilities of disaster in -Dundas’s military policy; but until April it showed at any rate a -certain consistency. The despatch of troops to the Continent was treated -as a temporary measure, designed for the protection of Holland only; -and, though the Prince of Coburg had called upon the Duke of York to -co-operate in his great sweeping movement from north-east to south-west, -the Duke had complied only so far as his instructions and, it may be -added, his lack of transport permitted.[111] But much, besides the -expulsion of the French from Holland and Belgium, had occurred in March, -all tending to embarrass England in the principal object of her -Continental policy, the securing of a strong barrier between France and -Holland. The fatal question of indemnity, first brought forward by the -King of Prussia, had aroused the cupidity of his brother potentate in -Austria, who valued the recovery of Belgium chiefly in order that he -might exchange it for Bavaria. Pitt had for a moment been willing to -consent to the Bavarian exchange (as it was called) for the sake of -peace; but upon the outbreak of war he reverted to absolute rejection of -it; and, in an evil hour, ◆March 2.◆ the British Ambassador at Vienna, -Sir Morton Eden, put forward a suggestion that Austria should be bribed -to retain Belgium by the promise of an extension of her frontiers on the -side of France. ◆April 3.◆ Realising that Austria refused to act -disinterestedly, Grenville reluctantly accepted the proposal; and at the -same time the British Government seems to have taken it for granted that -it must give the Emperor some assistance towards the conquest of the new -barrier.[112] - -◆March 21–April 2.◆ - -Accordingly, since no more infantry was to be spared from England, -eleven regiments of cavalry were ordered to prepare for service on -the Continent, though their numbers were so weak that they could not -between them muster more than twenty-three squadrons, or about two -thousand five hundred of all ranks, fit for service. But, at the same -time, the British Ministers shrank from supplying British troops for -the advantage of other nations without gaining some equivalent to -satisfy the electors of England; wherefore they decided, apparently -at the instance of Grenville’s elder brother, Lord Buckingham, to -claim Dunkirk as Great Britain’s indemnity for the war. The choice, -viewed from the standpoint of the party-politician, was a good one. -Dunkirk, having been taken by Cromwell, sold by Charles the Second, and -dismantled under the conditions imposed by the sword of Marlborough, -possessed sentimental attractions to the public at large and to the -Whigs in particular; while, as a nest of privateers, its extirpation -could not but be welcome not only to every merchant in England, but -especially to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. No scheme of operations -had yet been concerted with Austria, for, indeed, Coburg had advanced -from the Roer before nearly all his forces had been collected; but Pitt -seems to have thought that, while the Austrian reinforcements were -on their way to the front, the mixed force of British, Hanoverians, -Hessians, and Dutch might very well master Dunkirk in the course of -April, afterwards leaving the Austrians in sufficient strength to -pursue their operations in Flanders alone, while the British struck -at some other part of France. Thus Pitt was not true even to his own -plan of ruining his enemy by the destruction of her colonial trade. -Moreover, it is difficult to define what he meant by some other part -of France. The old Marquis of Bouillé, knowing that the heart of the -Revolution could be pierced at Paris, had suggested a descent upon -Havre with thirty thousand men; and there was by this time another -vulnerable point—namely, La Vendée—in the west of France. But why it -should have been necessary to seek out a new point of attack, when -troops were already massed or massing on the French frontier within -twelve days’ march of the capital, and with only a demoralised enemy -before them, was a question which seems never to have occurred either -to Pitt or to Dundas. There can be no doubt that they fell into a -common pitfall of the British politician. They gave so much thought to -the treaty which they should lay before Parliament at the close of the -war, that they omitted to consider the means of bringing the war itself -to a close.[113] - -It was in such inauspicious circumstances that the representatives of -the various powers met in conference at Antwerp. ◆April 5.◆ Coburg, who -loathed the war and had hoped to end it by an agreement with Dumouriez, -had issued a proclamation declaring himself to be the ally of all -friends of order, and abjuring all projects of conquest in the Emperor’s -name. Instantly Austrians, Prussians, and English with one voice -required him to withdraw it, and to publish a new declaration that he -would prosecute the war vigorously. He did so, but with great -reluctance; indeed, so bitter was his opposition to the new policy that -he tried to open further negotiations with the Convention, and even -furnished it with information which he ought to have kept to -himself.[114] Meanwhile Lord Auckland announced that England, as well as -the other powers, would expect an indemnity for her share in the war; -whereupon the Dutch representative announced that, as every one else was -taking compensation, he hoped that Holland’s claims would not be -forgotten.[115] The sharing of the lion’s skin having thus been -determined, the next thing was to decide upon a plan of operations for -slaying the lion. A vague project was drawn out for the attack of the -frontier-fortresses, in which Coburg reckoned upon the co-operation of -over twenty thousand men, that is to say, of thirteen thousand -Hanoverians and seven thousand five hundred British, in British pay, -besides fifteen thousand Dutch. Dundas was staggered; for he had not yet -the slightest idea what were the ultimate designs of either of the -German powers, who, as he justly complained, were very backward to give -an explicit account of their views either as to the conduct of the war -or the termination of it. “We cannot advise the King,” he wrote, “to -give a blind co-operation to measures not distinctly explained.” But he -hinted that if the Austrians would spare a detachment to help the -British to capture Dunkirk at once, England might make fewer -difficulties about lending her troops for subsequent operations. The -English, he explained, were prejudiced against Continental enterprises; -wherefore it was important to convince the nation early that its troops -in Holland were employed for an object intimately connected with the -interests of Great Britain and the security of her commerce. “The early -capture of Dunkirk by a Prince of the blood,” he added, “would give much -éclat to the commencement of the war.” In other words, Dundas was ready -to employ British troops in the Low Countries only for a political -campaign, and not for the military purposes of the war—to use them, in -fact, primarily to win votes rather than battles. The attitude is but -too characteristic of British Ministers for War.[116] - -Meanwhile the Allies on the frontiers of France remained inactive; the -Austrians, indeed, blockading Condé, where the French kept them engaged -with incessant affairs of outposts, but the British contingent still -awaiting the orders which Dundas hesitated to give. In the third week -of April the chief of the British staff reported that a considerable -force of French was entrenched about Dunkirk, too strong to be attacked -by the Duke of York’s troops, and that there was no operation on which -the latter could be employed except in support of the Austrians.[117] -We shall presently recognise the unseen hand which had been working -at Dunkirk. ◆May 1.◆ Ten days more of uncertainty passed away, and at -last, on the 1st of May, Coburg produced a plan of operations. By the -middle of May he hoped to have about ninety-two thousand men,[118] to -which by the beginning of June would be added thirteen thousand more. -He proposed, therefore, to hasten the fall of Condé by a bombardment, -and then to advance with fifty-two thousand men to the siege of -Valenciennes, leaving a cordon of some forty thousand to cover every -imaginable point along a front of some fifty miles from Maubeuge on the -Sambre to Ostend on the sea. Valenciennes might be expected to fall -at the end of July, and then ten thousand men could be left to mask -Lille, while fifty thousand marched to the siege of Dunkirk. If this -plan were accepted, Coburg pledged himself to the Duke of York to lend -his best good-will to the attack on Dunkirk. On this assurance the -Duke recommended the plan to which at last Dundas gave his consent, -on the understanding that the other powers in general and Austria in -particular should give an immediate explanation of their ulterior -views. England, he repeated, could not allow so large a force in her -pay to be employed on operations whose object was undefined; and he -emphasised the statement by an inquiry as to the security of Ostend, -which so far had been the British port of disembarkation, evidently as -a hint that England reserved her right to withdraw her troops at any -moment. - -This is a good instance of the manner in which British Ministers evade -their responsibility. The British General had, nearly three weeks -before, laid before Dundas the following issue. “There is no use for -British troops in the Netherlands except to act in support of the -Austrians. Their commander has submitted a plan based on the active -co-operation of all our troops, present and expected. We think the plan -a good one. Are we to act with him, or are we not?” Upon this it was -for the Ministry to say at once to Austria, “Our Generals favour your -plan of campaign, but until we know your ultimate intentions we cannot -take part in it. Unless you come to a definite understanding with us by -a certain day, we shall order our troops on the spot to re-embark, and -meanwhile we have suspended the march of our reinforcements.” Instead -of this they said in effect, “We approve the plan of campaign, and -thereby commit our troops to it; but we reserve to ourselves the right -to withdraw them, or, in other words, to wreck the operations, whenever -we think proper.” If, therefore, the enemy should in the meantime -take the offensive and press the Austrians hard, which, as shall be -seen, was what actually happened, the responsibility for granting or -withholding British assistance was thrown entirely upon the General. - -It remains to say a word of the plan itself, and of the troops and -commanders who were appointed to carry it out. The enormous front -along which Coburg proposed to disperse his force is an example of the -system known as the cordon-system, which was in particular favour with -the Austrians at this time. It consisted in covering every possible -access to a theatre of war with some small body of troops, and had -been formulated by Marshal Lacy upon the experience of the war of -the Bavarian Succession in 1778, when he had held a front of fifty -miles in the labyrinthine country of the Upper Elbe, and reduced the -campaign to a mere scuffle of foraging parties. Well calculated to -exclude the plague or contraband goods from a country, it was, of -course, ridiculous against the invasion of an enemy; for it meant -weakness at all points and strength at none, and in fact simply -invited the destruction of the army in detail by a force of inferior -strength. Nevertheless it was in high favour with all armies of Europe, -excepting the British, at that time; and it was a matter of rule that, -wherever the enemy stationed a battalion or a company, a countervailing -battalion or company must be posted over against it. The Austrians had -suffered much from this system in their recent war with the Turks; but -their commanders, of whom Coburg had been one, had learned little from -the experience. Apart from his adherence to this new and utterly false -fashion, which precluded the concentration of troops for a vigorous -offensive, Coburg was a sound, slow, cautious commander of the old -Austrian type, more intent upon preserving his own army than destroying -the enemy’s, and, perhaps, happiest when firmly set down to conduct a -siege in form according to the most scientific principles. Withal he -was a sensible and honourable gentleman, and extremely popular with -his troops. The chief of his staff, and, by common report, the virtual -Commander-in-Chief, was the unfortunate Mack, then a colonel forty -years of age, who enjoyed the reputation of being the most scientific -officer in Europe. The theory of war, as then understood in many -quarters, assigned as the first object not the annihilation of the -enemy’s force in the field, but the possession of certain geographical -points, which were called Strategic Objects. At this game of maps -and coloured labels Mack excelled; and, when called upon to fight an -action, he so elaborated his plans for the overwhelming of his enemies -by the simultaneous onslaught of a number of converging columns that, -if everything went right and every column reached exactly the appointed -place at exactly the appointed time, he assured to himself not only -victory but conquest. But, since he made no allowance for the possible -failure of any one of his combinations through unforeseen contingencies -or accidents of any description, Mack’s actions were rarely successful -and always unduly hazardous. He seems to have been an honest man, of -real though misdirected ability; while his character gained for him a -confidence and respect which the British in the field accorded to no -other foreign officer. But though, as shall be seen, his methods by no -means commended themselves to all British commanders, they nevertheless -made a fatally favourable impression upon the British Ministry. - -To judge with the wisdom that comes after the event, it may be -said that the Allied Army was tactically deficient in two principal -respects, namely, in the numerical weakness of its light infantry and -in the faulty organisation of its artillery. Light infantry and light -cavalry at this time were still treated mainly as accessories, useful -for the “little war” (to use the French expression) of outposts and -reconnaissance, but as something apart from the “great war,” which was -reserved for the more solid squadrons and battalions that enjoyed the -dignity of a place in the formal Order of Battle. In fact, the work -of outposts was supposed to fall wholly upon the light corps, while -the regular troops husbanded their strength in security behind them. -Hostilities with any nation which is driven back on primitive methods -of self-defence, and which neither knows nor respects the contemporary -usage of civilised warfare, invariably upset any such arrangement; and -the British, after the experience of America, should have been awake to -this truth. Indeed, in justice to the officers, many of them were alive -to it; but Pitt, since 1783, had been more solicitous for the reduction -than the training of the Army. In the matter of artillery the practice -of all the nations was the same. Each battalion possessed its two guns, -three-pounders or six-pounders, and the remainder of the ordnance was -massed into a park, with or without an inner distribution into brigades -or batteries. The handling of the artillery by the Count of Bückeburg -at Minden had not yet found sufficient appreciation to be made the -foundation of a system.[119] - -The Austrian troops, in spite of the exhaustion of the long Turkish -war, were for the most part worthy of their high reputation, and -aroused at first the greatest admiration among British officers. They -included, however, a certain number of irregular corps, both horse -and foot, chiefly Slavs, which were simply savage banditti of the -most dangerous type. They would murder or plunder any one, friend or -foe, even to the vedettes of their own army; and no Austrian general -would trust himself among them without an escort. The quality of the -higher officers was, however, unworthy of that of the men, many of -them being old, supine, and narrow-minded; and the corps of officers -at large was sharply divided between two factions, which espoused the -two opposite schools of Loudon and Lacy. The organisation also was -imperfect, for, though the army was indeed distributed into brigades -and divisions, these were not kept together, but all detachments were -formed of squadrons and battalions arbitrarily collected and entrusted -to a general as arbitrarily chosen, who knew no more of the men than -they knew of him. In the matter of tactics the Austrians had made no -progress since the Seven Years’ War. Cavalry and infantry alike were -still formed in three ranks, and the art of handling large bodies of -cavalry had been nearly, though not wholly, forgotten. - -The Prussians still enjoyed the fame which they had won under Frederick -the Great, but they had not been improved by the false training -observed by Cornwallis at their manœuvres; while their commander, von -Knobelsdorf, though full of zeal, was also full of years, having -passed his seventieth birthday. Superior to them were the Hessians, -the majority of whom had served in America, where they had learned to -manœuvre rapidly and to fight in dispersed order, though the lesson -had never been practised since their return to their own land.[120] -The Hessian Jäger were particularly good light troops, and were -armed with rifles. The whole corps, moreover, was the more effective -since it was equipped with regimental transport upon a lavish scale, -and was therefore mobile and self-dependent.[121] On the whole, the -Hessians seem to have been the most valuable fighting men in the army, -though they were not exempt from the love of plunder, a failing which -mercenary veterans are apt to judge more leniently, at certain times, -than other troops. The Hanoverians were then, as always, fine soldiers, -but without the advantage of the Hessians in experience and training. -The Dutch, being hastily raised, were ill organised, disciplined, -trained, and equipped. - -The British, with the exception of the Guards, were, in the opinion -of foreign critics, very deficient in training and discipline, for -precisely the same reason as the Dutch, namely, persistent neglect. -The cavalry was of better material than the infantry, and was very -well mounted; but both officers and men were so ignorant of their work -that, at first, they could not even throw out vedettes and outposts -without instruction from foreigners. The field-guns were inferior to -those of the rest of the Allies; the ammunition-waggons were heavy and -unwieldy; and the horses were harnessed one before the other instead -of abreast, which made them difficult to drive, and took up much room -on the road. The models of both harness and waggons were, in fact, of -Marlborough’s time; while the medical arrangements, or what passed for -such, were those of a still remoter age. Discipline for the most part -was bad, especially among the officers, who were subject rather to -political than military authority, and, though there were still among -their infantry good men who had learned their business in America, far -too many were absolutely ignorant as well as neglectful of their duty. -Hard drinking in all ranks accounted for much both of the indiscipline -and the neglect. To the men, of course, drunkenness brought a flogging -at the halberts, but to the officers, unfortunately, it did not -necessarily mean punishment; nor was it possible that it should, when -respectful consideration was shown to both Prime Minister and Secretary -of State for War if they appeared incapably drunk at the House of -Commons, because the leaders of the Opposition drank even harder than -they. This vice of drunkenness was the most formidable with which good -officers had to contend throughout the twenty years of the war, simply -because it was a fashion set in high places.[122] - -It was no easy task to command such a force as the British, Hanoverians -and Hessians, under the orders of such a man as Dundas, and the -immediate direction of such generals as Coburg and Mack. Frederick, -Duke of York, second son of King George the Third, was in 1793 thirty -years old. At the age of sixteen he had been sent to Berlin to study -the profession of arms under the eye of Frederick the Great himself, -and had returned with a practical knowledge which made him later an -admirable Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, but also with an -undue preference for the weaker points of the stiff and formal Prussian -system. In 1791 he had become Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, in -which post he had at first shown himself enough of a martinet to -excite discontent;[123] and, though he had wisely changed his ways -after a year’s experience, he was not at this time popular with his -men, while his officers, who had been taught to look for preferment -from politicians, resented his authority whether for good or ill. -In this respect he was hampered by the same disadvantages as had -beset Lord Stair in 1743; and, unfortunately, he did not possess the -qualifications to gain the confidence of his troops in the field. -He had the cool personal bravery which belongs to his race, but -not the higher moral courage which gives constancy and patience in -difficulty or misfortune; and hence he was at once sanguine and easily -discouraged. He had learned his work, so far as it could be acquired by -the industry of a mediocre intellect, but he was slow of apprehension, -without sagacity, penetration or width of view, and with so little -imagination or resource that an unforeseen emergency confounded him. -On the other hand, his dutiful loyalty and submission, in most trying -circumstances, towards Coburg on the one hand, and the Cabinet on the -other, were beyond all praise. The Ministry had some just doubts as -to his fitness to command, but the King had set his heart upon the -appointment; and indeed, where so many Serene Highnesses were gathered -together, the superior rank of the Duke was a decided advantage. It was -hoped, therefore, to make good his deficiencies by joining to him Sir -James Murray, better known by the name which he afterwards assumed as -Sir James Pulteney, nominally as Adjutant-general, but really as Chief -of the Staff and something more; for it was to his correspondence that -the Government looked for information and advice. - -Murray was a singular character. He had served in the Seven Years’ -War; he had distinguished himself in the West Indies during the -American War of Independence; and he had trained an intellect, which -was of no common order, not only by shrewd observation of the world -but by solid and extensive study. His knowledge was great, his grasp -and outlook wide, his judgment cool and accurate, his indifference to -danger and hardship absolute; but he was shy, awkward and diffident, -with a dreamy indolence which led him too readily to surrender his -own correct opinion, and to amuse himself with speculation upon the -incorrect opinions of others.[124] When roused he could sum up a -situation with an insight, terseness and vigour which showed how close -was his hold upon facts; but he was not the helpmate who could make -good the defects of the Duke of York. The situation, indeed, demanded -a Marlborough, with the insight to see the one thing that was needed, -and the tact and ascendency to bring cautious commanders, intriguing -Ministers, narrow-minded potentates and irresolute Cabinets into line, -for the one true object,—an immediate march on Paris. - -Such a march could undoubtedly not have been made without risk, owing to -the dearth of food in France; yet the opportunity was favourable, and -the hazard was slight compared with the certain danger of delay. -◆Feb. 19.◆ Already in February the Republic had wantonly made a fresh -enemy by declaring war upon Spain; and the campaign in Belgium had -produced results for which the most sanguine of her enemies could -hardly have hoped. ◆March 8.◆ On the first news of the Austrian -successes, the Convention instantly formed a special tribunal for the -trial of traitors and conspirators against France, and summoned two -of the defeated generals to appear before it. This done, it proceeded -to take measures for hastening the levy of the three hundred thousand -men, decreed a fortnight before. The scenes of ridiculous enthusiasm, -which had become usual in Paris, followed as a matter of course; but -the multitude of men who, for various reasons, claimed exemption, was -astonishing, and the rascality of many who were enrolled was flagrant. -A great many of these rogues made a trade of fraudulent enlistment, -receiving a bounty from several corps and selling the arms and clothing -received from each of them; while the number of women, who claimed -allowances for the removal of their husbands to the army, sufficed to -warrant the belief that every recruit was a polygamist. ◆March 10.◆ In -the provinces, both north and south, there was violent resistance to -the levy; and on the 10th of March, at Saint Florent le Vieil on the -Loire, the peasants turned upon the troops which had been brought up -to enforce the ballot, and, though armed only with cudgels, dispersed -them and drove them from the town. That evening the alarm-bell rang in -every church of the surrounding parishes; and five days later bands -of peasants drove the National Guards from Chollet, some twenty miles -south of Saint Florent, and took that town also. This was the first -manifestation of a great counter-revolutionary movement, famous in -history as the revolt of La Vendée. - -The Convention, however, did not at first realise the importance of this -outbreak, in the critical state of things in the north. An attempt to -reinforce Dumouriez at Louvain, by calling out ten thousand of the -National Guards of the northern provinces, provided only a few worn-out -men and boys,[125] whom the General contemptuously dismissed to their -homes. Then came the defection of Dumouriez himself, which was well-nigh -fatal to all military improvement. The General had disparaged the -election of officers by their men; he had urged that the volunteers -should be incorporated in the Line; he had tried to enforce discipline -upon all; and, finally, he had turned traitor and taken some of his -regular troops with him. It was therefore plain that discipline was an -abomination, that all his recommendations were vicious, that the regular -troops were not to be trusted, and that volunteers only were to be -accounted faithful. Never was the regular army of France so near to -total dissolution at the hands of its countrymen as at this moment of -supreme military peril. ◆April 6.◆ Beurnonville, having tried to abolish -abuses, was driven from the War Office; a good Jacobin, Bouchotte, with -a still better Jacobin, Vincent, at his elbow, was installed in -Beurnonville’s place, and the whole of Pache’s vile following returned -with them to office.[126] A camp was ordered to be formed at Peronne, -and in it were assembled, not with disgrace but with honour, all the -soldiers who had been imprisoned by Dumouriez for misconduct, all the -deserters, the cowards and the skulkers, who had fled from the army of -Belgium. Further, it was resolved that representatives of the people, -with absolute powers, should be sent to rally and reorganise the -northern forces, and to set the fortresses in order. If ever a nation -seemed bent upon compassing its own destruction by piling madness upon -madness, it was the French at this moment. - -Yet, amid all the confusion, there appeared the first sign of the -powers which by terrible means were to reduce France and, through -France, the whole Continent of Europe to discipline and order. On the -6th of April the Convention chose nine of its members, renewable by -monthly election, to wield the Dictatorship of France, with the title -of the Committee of Public Safety. ◆April 10.◆ On the 10th of April a -rough Alsatian officer, Kellerman by name, whose gallantry had raised -him from the ranks to a commission during the Seven Years’ War, came -forward with a scheme which preserved the famous regiments of the -French Line. Finally, among the six representatives despatched to -save the wreck of Dumouriez’s army was Captain Lazare Carnot of the -Engineers; by birth a younger son in a respectable family of Burgundy, -by repute well known in Europe as an original thinker upon military -matters in general, and upon the defence of fortresses in particular. -Though now forty years of age and of twenty years’ standing in the -army, he was still a captain, for his military opinions had given -offence in high quarters under the Monarchy; and it was as a simple -captain that he was to appoint generals, and to organise victory under -the Republic. Deeply read in theology and history, a passionate devotee -of mathematics and of science, he had framed for himself high ideals, -which, as he thought, the Revolution was appointed to fulfil; and he -upheld its principles through good report and evil report, not with the -Gallic effervescence that is bred of self-consciousness, but with the -austere fanaticism of a Scot who takes his stand upon the Covenant. -He believed; and in his faith he had buried all thought of self. Rank, -wealth, fame alike were indifferent to this spare, stern, ascetic -soldier. To give all that lay in him for the cause, to render faithful -account of every trust reposed in him for the cause, to forward all -that would further it, to combat all that could impede it—such were -the principles that governed his conduct. With these motives to -inspire him, with great natural gifts, and with every faculty of mind -and body trained to the highest point, it is not surprising that his -intellectual grasp was wide, his insight clear, his energy infectious, -his industry indefatigable. Such was the man who in the early days of -April hurried to the north, his brain teeming with thoughts, long since -conceived, as to the training best suited to the French soldier, with -his natural aptitude for attack. Five years before, while advocating -a scheme of short service, he had written that it is war and not a -lifetime in the barrack-yard that makes the old soldier.[127] To -General Dampierre, who had been appointed on his recommendation to -succeed Dumouriez, Carnot left it to apply this precept, while he -himself, with ominous directness, hastened northward to repair the -half-ruined fortress of Dunkirk. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER V - - -◆1793.◆ - -The effect of Carnot’s arrival at Dunkirk in overthrowing Pitt’s -original plan has already been told. There can be no doubt that the -French had full information of the Minister’s designs, for it became -a proverb that the most secret projects of the British War Office -were always well known to the enemy and to everybody in England.[128] -Nevertheless, if the British Cabinet had thereupon frankly abandoned -any attempt upon Dunkirk, Carnot’s labours might have been turned -to naught. The French army was only slowly assembled during April, -and even at the end of the month was of inferior force and scattered -over a wide front; for the French were not free from the vices of the -cordon-system, nor were likely to be, so long as civilians interfered -with their military dispositions. ◆April.◆ Apart from the garrisons of -Quesnoy, Valenciennes, Condé, Lille and Dunkirk, Dampierre kept ten -thousand men on his right, under General Harville, between Maubeuge and -Philippeville: ten thousand more, under General Lamarlière, lay on his -left, in an entrenched camp thrown up by Carnot at Cassel and at other -points between Lille and Dunkirk: and five thousand at Nomain, Orchies, -and Hasnon, covered the interval between Lille and the main army. This -last, consisting of thirty thousand men under Dampierre’s immediate -command, lay in an entrenched camp at Famars, a little to the south of -Valenciennes, with a detachment in another fortified position at Anzin, -to the north-west of that town. In all, therefore, he had about fifty -thousand men at hand for service in the field. - -◆April 23.◆ - -Meanwhile the Allies, who were still below their full strength, -occupied the following positions. On their right, that is to say, -to westward, six thousand Dutch and about three thousand Imperial -troops, under the Hereditary Prince of Orange, lay at Furnes, Ypres -and Menin; next to them two thousand five hundred British and about -the same number of Austrians and Prussians, under the Duke of York, -occupied Tournai; next to the Duke of York, Knobelsdorf, with about -eight thousand Prussians, held the line of Maulde, Lecelles and Saint -Amand on the Scarpe; next to Knobelsdorf, Clerfaye, with about twelve -thousand men at Vicoigne and Raismes, and at Bruay and Fresnes, on -the Scheldt, encompassed Condé on the south, while the Prince of -Würtemberg with about five thousand men blockaded it on the north. At -Onnaing, due south of Condé, lay the principal army, about fifteen -thousand strong, with the advance guard at Saint Saulve; and to the -east of the main army General Latour with about six thousand men -occupied Bettignies, in observation of Maubeuge, with a detachment at -Bavai to preserve communication between Bettignies and Onnaing. The -total force of the Allies may thus be taken, roughly, at over sixty -thousand men, not including thirty thousand Imperial troops under the -Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirschberg, which were uselessly detained at Namur, -Trèves and Luxemburg. The English cavalry, the Hanoverians and the -Hessians, had not yet arrived, though the first detachments of the two -former were drawing near to the front; but none the less the Allies -were actually superior to the French in numbers, and very far superior -in quality. The whole of their multitudinous posts were strongly -entrenched; but it will be observed that, besides the essential defect -of the enormous extension of their front, their line was cut in two by -the river Scheldt, which gave the greater opportunity for a successful -attack upon one or other of their wings. The general distribution of -the Allies corresponded in the main with their lines of retreat, that -of the British lying west to the sea, that of the Dutch north-east upon -Antwerp, that of the Austrians east upon Namur; so that a successful -attack upon the British would probably lay bare the Austrian right, -and a decided defeat of the Austrians must certainly uncover the -British left. With their usual jealousy for supreme control, the -Austrians mixed a contingent of their own troops with the Allies in -every section of the army, an arrangement which gave rise to infinite -confusion, since it made even small detachments dependent on two or -three different sources of supply. For each nation made provision for -its own troops in its own way, and, owing to diversities of system and -of differences in calibre of muskets and cannon, it was impossible to -enforce any effort towards uniformity. - -Still, the inactivity of Coburg during April was marvellous. It never -occurred to him to overwhelm any one of Dampierre’s isolated divisions -of untrained men by concentrating a superior force upon it. He never -reflected that, even if both sides adhered to the cordon-system, the -French could bring up the whole manhood of their country to make their -cordon stronger than his own at every point. He allowed Dampierre to -school his troops with impunity by perpetual affairs of outposts, -without remembering that the French could more easily replace two men -than he could replace one. Finally (but this may be pardoned to him) he -did not guess that, while he was wasting a campaign over formal sieges, -the French would evolve from the experience of many skirmishes a new -system of tactics—that they would abandon the old formal training, and, -turning to account the indiscipline which springs from the principle -of equality, would grant independence of action to the born fighting -men, and trust to the national impetuosity to carry the rest forward in -dense masses to the attack. - -It is a shameful reproach to the Allies that, overmatched though he was -in every respect, the French General took the initiative and made the -first move of the campaign. ◆May 1.◆ On the 1st of May he assailed the -whole line of the Allies from Saint Saulve to St. Amand; but, the -attacks being unintelligent and incoherent, he was beaten back at every -point with a loss of two thousand men and several guns. ◆May 8.◆ Urged -by the Convention to save Condé, he on the 8th essayed a second attempt, -and on this occasion confined himself to demonstrations only upon the -flanks of the Allies, concentrating a larger proportion of his force -against Clerfaye’s position in the centre. These sounder principles -brought him within an ace of success. He himself directed a frontal -attack from Anzin against Raismes and Vicoigne, and after four -successive repulses carried the position of Raismes, excepting the -village. Lamarlière meanwhile with little difficulty made his way -towards St. Amand, while one of his divisions, crossing the Scarpe, -pressed on unseen through the forest of Vicoigne, nearly to the road -which leads from St. Amand to Valenciennes. There this division began to -throw up a redoubt and batteries to cannonade Clerfaye’s defences of -Vicoigne, so as to cut off communication between him and Knobelsdorf, -and to ensure a junction with the garrison of Valenciennes. The -situation was critical, for, if the French succeeded in holding -possession of the road, the post at Vicoigne was lost, and the whole -line of the Allies was broken. Fortunately the Duke of York had moved -three battalions of Guards to Nivelle, a little to the north of St. -Amand, having promised Knobelsdorf help in case of need; and at five -o’clock in the evening the brigade came upon the scene, just as the -French were gaining the upper hand of the Prussians. The country to -north and west of Valenciennes is a level plain, broken only by the -three forests which bear the names of Marchiennes, Vicoigne, and -Raismes, so that the Duke could see little or nothing of what was going -forward until his troops were actually on the scene of action. The -Coldstream, being first for duty, by Knobelsdorf’s order entered the -wood, and quickly driving the French back, followed them up to their -entrenchments. There, however, they were met by musketry in front and a -fierce fire of grape from a masked battery in flank; when, finding -themselves unsupported by the Prussians, they fell back in good order -with a loss of over seventy killed and wounded. Seeing, however, by the -appearance of the red coats, that Knobelsdorf had been reinforced, -Lamarlière’s division made no further effort to advance; and Dampierre, -while leading a last desperate assault upon Vicoigne from the front, was -mortally wounded by a cannon-shot. ◆May 9.◆ This decided the fate of the -day: his successor stopped the attack, and on the following morning -retreated. On the next day Clerfaye and Knobelsdorf stormed the enemy’s -newly-built batteries and captured their garrison of six hundred men, -but failed to take the guns, which, according to the French custom of -the time, had been withdrawn and kept limbered up for the night, in -readiness for escape.[129] The loss of Clerfaye’s and Knobelsdorf’s -corps in the two days was little short of eight hundred officers and -men; that of the French was far heavier, and was aggravated by the death -of Dampierre. It speaks highly for the man that with troops so raw he -should have made so fine a fight against some of the best soldiers in -Europe. - -The losses suffered by the Coldstream Guards on the 8th were made the -subject of much complaint both against Knobelsdorf and the Duke of -York, and did not promote good feeling among the Allies in the field. -The battalion was, in fact, lucky to escape annihilation. Murray -blamed Lieutenant-colonel Pennington, who was in command; but it -seems that Knobelsdorf simply told him to enter the wood, which was -full of dense undergrowth, without saying a word of the batteries or -entrenchments hidden within it, though both an Austrian and a Prussian -battalion had already suffered severely in an attempt to carry them. -The Duke of York, who had never contemplated so foolhardy an attack, -wisely thought it best to make no complaint. The battalion itself, to -judge by a letter from one of the officers to Lord Buckingham, was -very indignant with the Duke; and there is every probability that its -complaints reached the ear of Pitt. I mention this, because, though the -matter is in itself a small one, it gives conclusive evidence of the -incessant friction which arose from the indiscipline of the British -officers and from the mistrust which the Allies felt for each other. -It is safe to conjecture that this uninformed criticism of generals -by their subordinate officers continued throughout the campaign; and -the preservation of the letter above mentioned among Lord Grenville’s -papers is proof that such criticism was not disregarded by their -powerful patrons at home. Unfortunately there is too much reason to -fear that this evil even now is not unknown in our Army.[130] - -During the following days the Allies were considerably strengthened by -the arrival of successive detachments of Hanoverians and of one brigade -of British cavalry under General Ralph Dundas;[131] but already Murray, -with his American experience, had awoke to his weakness in light -troops, and was recommending the acceptance of two offers to raise -corps of foreign riflemen and Polish Uhlans.[132] The primitive tactics -of the French were beginning to tell. The raw levies understood war to -signify the killing of the enemy—even of one man rather than none at -all—and the saving of themselves. When therefore a mass of them was set -in motion, the bravest men advanced, taking advantage of every shelter -afforded by the ground, and did their utmost to shoot their opponents -down; while the rest ran away or remained at a safe distance, to return -in a fierce tumultuous swarm if the enemy showed signs of wavering, but -not otherwise. ◆May 21.◆ However, on the 21st, Coburg, much rejoiced -by the reinforcement of British and Hanoverians, judged himself strong -enough to pursue his plan of campaign, and decided to drive the -French from their camp at Famars preliminarily to the investment of -Valenciennes. Meanwhile, to the general regret, Mack resigned his post -on Coburg’s staff, owing partly to ill-health, partly to his sense -of Thugut’s antagonism to him;[133] and the Prince of Hohenlohe, a -veteran of seventy-one, was called from Luxemburg to take his place. It -was, however, enough at that time that the attack should be designed by -an Austrian General to ensure that it should be repugnant to all good -sense. - -The entrenched camp of Famars embraced two broad parallel plateaux, -divided by the little river Rhonelle, which lie immediately to the -south of Valenciennes. The western plateau, that of Famars, has a -length of about four miles, and abuts on the village of Artres; the -eastern, which is broader and less clearly defined than the other, has -a length of about three and a half miles, and terminates at the village -of Préseau. Both are practically flat upon the summit, unenclosed, and -were covered with crops. The ascent to them is steepest from the west -and south, and the valley dug between them by the Rhonelle, though not -deep, plunges down so abruptly as to present sides of sharp though -short declivity. The ridge of Famars was protected by a series of -detached flêches and redoubts placed on every commanding point on the -northern, western, and southern sides. The passages over the Rhonelle -at Artres, and at Maresches, a mile and a half above it, were defended -by strong entrenchments and batteries, and all the fords on this narrow -but deep and sluggish stream had been destroyed. The eastern ridge was -fortified by a continuous entrenchment with three redoubts, which was -carried for nearly a mile along the length of the summit. The force at -hand for its defence was about twenty-five thousand men, besides which -five thousand men held the fortified position of Anzin; while a small -detachment due west of it at Aubry maintained communication with the -post of Hasnon, still further to north and west. - -The attack of the main position was assigned to two principal columns, -of which the left or southern was placed under command of the Duke of -York, with orders to assemble his force on the heights between Préseau -and Maresches, and to assail the right flank of the position. This -column was made up of sixteen battalions, eighteen squadrons, and -thirty-eight reserve-guns,[134] of which the brigade of Guards[135] -and the eight squadrons of Dundas’s brigade were British. The second -principal column consisted of twelve battalions, of which three -were the English of Abercromby’s brigade,[136] twelve squadrons and -twenty-three reserve-guns, with five pontoons, under the Austrian -General Ferraris. His orders were to assemble between Saultain and -Curgies, a little to the north-east of Préseau, to drive the enemy from -their positions east of the Rhonelle, and to cross the river itself, -or at least feint to do so. Besides these, a third column under Count -Colloredo was to observe Valenciennes from between Estreux and Onnaing, -and to protect Ferraris’s right flank; a fourth, further to the right, -under Clerfaye, was to attack the entrenched camp of Anzin; a fifth -still further to the right under Knobelsdorf was to march from St. -Amand against Hasnon; and a sixth and seventh under the Crown Prince -and Prince Frederick of Orange were to move respectively from Tournai -upon Orchies, and from Menin upon Tourcoing. Finally, on the extreme -left or western flank, there were an eighth column, under General Otto, -to protect the Duke of York’s left by an advance by Villerspol upon -Quesnoy, and a ninth to disquiet the French on the Sambre from Bavai. -The scheme was typically Austrian; that is to say, too full of science -to leave room for sense. - -[Illustration: - - Attack of the Allies - on the - CAMP OF FAMARS - 23 May, 1793. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆May 23.◆ - -The morning broke in dense fog, so that the main attack did not begin -until near seven o’clock, when the Duke of York’s column, after marching -most of the night, made its way with little resistance to Artres. There -failing to force the passage of the river, which was defended by five -batteries, the Duke left his heavy guns with about a third of his force -to engage the French artillery, and proceeded with the rest higher up -the stream to Maresches, where a ford was found, and the passage was -with some trouble and delay accomplished. Meanwhile Ferraris attacked -the long entrenchment on the eastern ridge, opening fire from three -batteries, while Abercromby on the right and four Austrian battalions on -the left advanced to the assault, and carried the works with little -difficulty, capturing seven guns and over one hundred prisoners. Two -French regiments of cavalry, which tried to turn the scale against the -assaulting columns, were most gallantly charged by the Austrian Hussars -and the Hanoverian Life Guards, and actually defeated, notwithstanding -that the victorious troops had all the disadvantage of a steep ascent -against them. Coburg then halted Ferraris’s column, until further news -should come of the Duke of York’s advance. But the Duke, after making a -wide turning movement by Querenaing and driving the French from their -outlying defences, found himself at sunset at the foot of the most -formidable ascent in the whole position, crowned at different points by -four redoubts which flanked each other. Thereupon, since his men had -been on foot for eighteen hours, he decided to defer the attack till -next morning. Elsewhere, the success of the various columns was -indifferent. Knobelsdorf could win no more than the outworks of Hasnon; -Clerfaye failed to take the camp of Anzin; and, though the Prince of -Orange drove the French from Orchies, his brother, Prince Frederick of -Orange, was foiled before Tourcoing. ◆May 24.◆ Coburg gave orders for -renewal of the attack on the entrenchments of Famars and Anzin at -daybreak of the 24th; but it was found that the French, after -reinforcing the garrison of Valenciennes, had evacuated all their -positions and retired to Bouchain. The trophies of the Allies were -seventeen guns, captured at various points, and three hundred prisoners; -and the further loss of the French was set down, doubtless with -exaggeration, at three thousand killed and wounded. Even so the results -of the day were unsatisfactory. The Austrians, of course, blamed the -Duke of York; and Murray, without specifying who was in fault, wrote -privately that a great deal more might have been done.[137] But, in -truth, no one except an Austrian of that period could have looked for -great results from so feeble and faulty a plan of attack. - -However, the ground was now clear for the siege of Valenciennes; and -Coburg, as a compliment to the Duke of York, offered him the command of -the besieging force, including fourteen thousand Austrians. There was -much division in the British Cabinet over this piece of politeness, for -Ministers were still in the dark as to Austria’s general intentions; and -some of them feared that the troops under the Duke of York might be so -much crippled by the siege of Valenciennes as to be unfit for the -subsequent siege of Dunkirk. However, notwithstanding their suspicions -of some sinister design on Austria’s part, the Duke received permission -to accept the command; though Coburg was careful to attach General -Ferraris to his staff with secret orders to take the entire direction of -the operations upon himself.[138] The chief of the English Engineers, -Colonel Moncrieff, was urgent for storming the town without further ado, -and was confident that, if his plans were followed, the place could be -taken within twelve days; but, though Murray was wholly of Moncrieffs -opinion, Ferraris would not hear of it. ◆June 13.◆ A fortnight was -therefore spent in collecting heavy artillery, after which ground was -duly broken on the 13th of June, before a greater and a lesser horn-work -on the east side of the town. About twenty-five thousand men were -actually employed on the siege, while the remainder, about thirty -thousand men, formed the covering army; and, practically speaking, -active operations upon both sides ceased except round the walls of the -beleaguered fortress. - -Yet, far away to westward, there had been a movement disquieting to -the British. On the 29th of May forty transports, conveying the second -brigade of British cavalry,[139] came into Ostend; whereupon Captain -Carnot, knowing the slackness of the Dutch garrisons at Furnes and -Nieuport, which covered that place, determined to surprise them from -Dunkirk, and then by a swift march forward to seize and burn the -British shipping. ◆May 30.◆ Moving out accordingly on the night of the -30th, he reached Furnes at daybreak, drove the Dutch headlong from the -town, and was hoping to follow them up to Nieuport, when the whole of -his troops with one accord fell to the plunder of the town, heedless -of their officers, and in a short time were reeling or lying in all -directions, hopelessly drunk. Far from seizing Ostend, he was thankful -that the Dutch did not return and cut his helpless battalions to -pieces.[140] - -Nevertheless, the movement fulfilled the useful purpose of frightening -the British Cabinet. Dundas was possessed by a kind of superstition -respecting Ostend, having apparently some idea that it might be held -as the gate of the Austrian Netherlands from the sea, even if the rest -of the country were evacuated. Though the place itself was part of the -Austrian dominions, the guardianship of the whole of the coast, and -indeed of the right flank of the Allied army, was entrusted to the -Dutch; and in spite of all protests the Dutch declined to do anything -for its defence. Ostend was in fact indefensible, being divided by -an unbridged estuary which cut it in two at every flood tide, and -was safe from a French attack only for so long as Menin, Ypres, -and Nieuport were held by the Allies. The Duke of York and Murray -therefore regarded it as of no military value, though of some temporary -convenience, looking upon Antwerp and the Scheldt as their true base -and channel of communication with England. Nothing, however, would -convince Dundas of Ostend’s insignificance. He took the place under -his own control, sent heavy ordnance to be mounted for its defence, -appointed a special officer, General Ainslie, to take command of it, -and plagued Murray so incessantly to fortify it that the Duke of York, -for the sake of peace, consented to raise a few entrenchments on a -small scale. The Duke had hardly done so, however, before he received -a rebuke from Dundas for spending too much money; whereupon he, of -course, suspended the work, being, as Murray said, at a loss to know -how to proceed. This was the beginning of a more minute and persistent -interference of Dundas with the conduct of the operations, with its -inevitable consequence of strained relations between him and the -General in the field.[141] - -Meanwhile the siege of Valenciennes went forward slowly and -methodically, much more so, indeed, than seemed necessary either to -Murray or to Moncrieff, though bad weather was accountable in some -measure for the delay. ◆July 10.◆ At length, on the 10th of July, Condé -surrendered after a severe bombardment, and was occupied in the name of -the Emperor Francis. ◆July 22.◆ Twelve days later Mainz opened its gates -to the Prussians, though the garrison was twenty thousand strong, and -had still bread and wine to last for some days. ◆July 26.◆ Finally, on -the 26th, an assault was delivered in three columns upon the two -horn-works of Valenciennes, one column being led by a storming party of -the Guards, and supported by part of Abercromby’s brigade. The attacks -of all three succeeded with little loss, and Murray, after a strong -altercation with the Austrian engineer, insisted, in defiance of -Ferraris’s orders, upon making a lodgment in the greater horn-work.[142] -◆July 28.◆ Thereupon, on the 28th of July, the French General, Ferrand, -capitulated. The place was taken over, like Condé, in the Emperor’s -name, amid the loud applause not only of the citizens but of the -garrison, who trampled the tricolour under foot and hailed the Duke of -York as King of France. All three of the captured garrisons were -permitted to return to their own place, on condition that they should -not fight against the Allies during the remainder of the war. - -Unfortunately, after the fall of Valenciennes the Allies in Flanders, -far from pressing their advantage, fell to debating what they should -do next. It had been already agreed that the Austrians should give -up ten thousand men to the Duke of York for the siege of Dunkirk; -but Coburg, seeing the danger of the plan, made a last effort to -avert it by submitting a new scheme for taking the offensive in -concert with Prussia; he himself to move south-east upon Maubeuge -from Valenciennes, while the Prussians should advance south-west from -Mainz upon Sarrelouis. King Frederick William gladly assented, but -the Duke of York protested, as under his instructions he was bound -to do; and he was upheld by a messenger who arrived from Vienna at -Coburg’s headquarters on the 6th of August. Thugut had been at work -on one of his usual subtilties. He had soothed Pitt by renouncing the -exchange of Belgium for Bavaria, but had begged that Prussia might not -be informed of the renunciation; for he was still secretly bent on -obtaining Bavaria by some means, and had resolved to purchase it by the -cession of Alsace. Hence it was his wish that the King of Prussia, and -particularly the Austrian troops under General Wurmser who were serving -with him, should move south into Alsace, and that Coburg should pursue -the plan, already agreed upon, of besieging Quesnoy, while the Duke of -York invested Dunkirk. Coburg thereupon gave way, though with no very -good grace; and it was resolved that, before his army was separated -from the Duke’s, a general action should be fought, as an essential -preliminary to the subsequent operations.[143] - -The position of the French under General Kilmain was known as that -of Caesar’s Camp, which lies on the left bank of the Scheldt about -two miles above Bouchain; but in reality it formed an irregular -quadrilateral, of which a part of Villars’s famous lines of La Bassée -formed the northern side. Facing due east, Kilmain’s front was covered -by the Scheldt from Bouchain to Cambrai, his rear by the river Agache, -which runs into the Sensée a little to the south of Arleux, his right -by the Sensée, and his left by the wood and heights of Bourlon from -Cambrai to Marquion. All passages over the Scheldt were closed by -entrenchments, and the valley itself was flooded; all passages over -the Sensée were equally defended, while the right from Cambrai to -Agache was strengthened by field-works and abatis. Such a position, -held by sixty thousand men, was formidable, and Coburg accordingly -resolved to turn it by the south. The turning column, consisting of -fourteen thousand men under the Duke of York, was to assemble about -Villers-en-Cauchies and Saint Aubert, and to cross the Scheldt at -Masnières and Crevecœur, about five miles south of Cambrai. A second -column of about nine thousand men under the Austrian General Colloredo, -and a third of about twelve thousand under General Clerfaye, were to -force the passage of the Scheldt in the front of the position. The -remainder of the army, little less than half of it, was uselessly -frittered away in posts of observation. - -Murray, foreseeing that the French would retire as soon as they -perceived the turning movement, begged persistently that more cavalry -should be given to the Duke of York, in order to inflict some -punishment on them. His request was refused, and the result was -exactly that which he had expected. ◆Aug. 7.◆ The Duke, after a march -of eleven hours on a day of extraordinary heat, found his troops too -much exhausted to pass the river at Masnières; and Kilmain, withdrawing -quietly in the night, made good his retreat upon Arras with little -loss, though the British cavalry made a few prisoners. The Austrians, -of course, blamed the Duke of York, though Coburg had sent Hohenlohe -with him for the express purpose of superintending his operations; but -the arrangements of the day opened Murray’s eyes to the essential vices -of the Austrian tactics. “We were not in force to attack the enemy,” -he wrote; “the Duke’s column was a long way from support, and between -ourselves we were not sorry to see them go off.” It was only after long -schooling by disaster that the Austrians at last abandoned a system of -which the rottenness was clear to the much despised Briton.[144] - -After the engagement, Coburg pressed the Duke of York to remain with him -for yet another fortnight, in order to renew the attack on the French -army or to take Cambrai, the last fortress that blocked the way into -France. But the Duke could only obey his instructions as to Dunkirk, -which had lately been reiterated by Dundas;[145] and the two armies -accordingly parted. Coburg, weakened by the withdrawal of nine thousand -Prussian troops, and not yet compensated by the restoration of fourteen -thousand Austrians from the Rhine, resolved to besiege Quesnoy, and -meanwhile spread his force in several detachments from Denain to -Bettignies. ◆Aug. 13.◆ The Duke assembled his whole force of about -thirty-seven thousand men[146] at Marchiennes on the Scarpe on the 13th -of August, and on the 15th marched in two columns north-west by Baisieux -and Tourcoing upon Menin. From Baisieux the route lay across the front -of the great fortress of Lille, and of the French fortified posts -extending from that city to Dunkirk; ◆Aug. 18.◆ and on the morning of -the 18th, soon after the advanced guard of the southern column had moved -from Tourcoing, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Linselles, -about two miles to the west of that place. The Prince of Orange, for -reasons best known to himself, had seized the opportunity to sally out -from Menin, and surprise the French posts of Blaton and Linselles, which -being accomplished, he left two weak battalions to hold them, and -retired. About mid-day the French returned with five thousand men and -drove out the Dutch; and an hour or two later an aide-de-camp came -galloping into Menin to ask for help. The Duke of York at once ordered -out the brigade of Guards, which had just arrived at Menin after a -severe march, with a few guns, under General Lake. The three battalions, -without their flank companies, and therefore little over eleven hundred -strong, at once turned out, and traversed the six miles to Linselles in -little more than an hour, but, on reaching it, found not a Dutchman -there. They were, however, saluted by a heavy fire of grape from -batteries which they had supposed to be in possession of the Dutch; and -thereupon Lake determined to attack at once. - -The hill, on which the village of Linselles stands, is fairly steep on -its northern face, and was further strengthened by two redoubts before -the village itself and by a barrier of palisades on the road, while its -flanks were secured by woods and ditches. Lake at once deployed into -line under a heavy fire of grape, and, after firing three or four -volleys, charged with the bayonet and drove the French from the redoubts -and village. He then halted and re-formed on the southern side of the -hill, not without apprehensions lest the enemy should rally and make a -counter attack while he was still unsupported. Fortunately, however, -the French were not equal to the attempt, being still of the inferior -quality which was inevitable under the foolish administration of the -Jacobins, and so puny in stature that the Guards cuffed and jostled them -like a London mob, without condescending to kill them.[147] Lake was -therefore left unmolested on his ground, until at nightfall six -battalions of Hessians arrived, in reply to his urgent messages for -reinforcement, to relieve him. His trophies were twelve guns, seventy -prisoners, and a colour, but his losses amounted to one hundred and -eighty-seven officers and men killed and wounded; and no real object -whatever was gained. The action was undoubtedly most brilliant, and the -conduct of the men beyond all praise; while Lake’s swift decision to -escape from a most dangerous situation by an immediate attack stamps him -as a ready commander. But it is a grave reflection upon the Duke of York -that he should so thoughtlessly have exposed some of his best troops to -needless danger, leaving them isolated and unsupported for several -hours. It is still less to his credit that, when he finally relieved -them by a detachment of Hessians, he actually left these also isolated -and unsupported within striking distance of a superior enemy during the -whole night, for no better purpose than to rase some paltry French -earthworks which a few hours would suffice to throw up again. Because -the Prince of Orange was guilty of one act of signal foolishness, there -was no occasion to outdo him by another. - -At Menin the army was parted into two divisions. The first, consisting -of the Hanoverians, ten British squadrons and foreign troops, or about -fourteen thousand five hundred men, under the Hanoverian Marshal -Freytag, was to form the covering army; the other, of nearly twenty-two -thousand men, including the rest of the British troops, under the Duke -in person, was appointed to besiege Dunkirk. ◆Aug. 19.◆ On the 19th, -Freytag marched from Menin by Ypres upon Poperinghe, which he occupied -with his main body on the ◆Aug. 20.◆ 20th, at the same time pushing his -advanced guard further north-west to Rousbrugge on the Yser. ◆Aug. 21.◆ -On the following day a detachment of Hessians, with great skill and at -small cost to themselves, drove the French from Oost Capel and Rexpoede -into the fortress of Bergues, with the loss of eleven guns and some four -hundred men; and Freytag then took up his line of posts to cover the -besieging army. His left was stationed at Poperinghe, covered by the -fortress of Ypres; and from thence the chain ran north-west to Proven on -the Yser, and westward up that stream by Bambecque to Wylder, where it -turned north, and passing midway between Bergues and Rexpoede rested its -right on a point called the White House, hard by the canal that runs -from Bergues ◆Aug. 23, 24.◆ to Furnes. On the 23rd and 24th Freytag -drove the French from Wormhoudt and Esquelbecque with the loss of -nineteen guns, and surrounded Bergues by detachments at Warhem to east, -Coudekerque to north, Sainte Quaedypre to south, and Steene to -west. From this last an outer chain of posts was extended southward to -Esquelbecque, and thence east by Wormhoudt and Herzeele to the Upper -Yser at Houtkerque. The whole circuit thus embraced measured about -twenty-one miles; from which it will be concluded that Freytag was a -believer in the cordon-system. - -◆Aug. 20.◆ - -Meanwhile the Duke of York marched on the 20th to Furnes; ◆Aug. 22.◆ and -on the 22nd, moving thence parallel with the strand, he drove in the -enemy’s advanced posts upon the entrenched camp of Ghyvelde, which the -French abandoned in the night. ◆Aug. 24.◆ On the 24th, after several -hours of sharp fighting, which cost the Allies nearly four hundred -men,[148] the French were forced back from the suburb of Rosendahl into -the town; whereupon the Duke entrenched himself in his chosen position, -with his right resting on the sea and his left at Tetteghem, facing full -upon the eastern side of the town and about two miles distant from the -walls. - -The field of operations for the Duke’s army may be described roughly as -a quadrilateral, of which the sea forms the northern side, the canal -from Dunkirk to Bergues the west, the canal from Bergues to Furnes the -south, and a line drawn from Furnes to the sea the east. From east to -west the ground thus enclosed was divided roughly into two parallel -strips; the northern half consisting of the sandhills known as the -Dunes, together with a narrow plain of level sandy ground within them; -and the southern half of a huge morass called the Great Moor, which -consisted partly of standing water, partly of swamp, but was all open to -inundation by admitting the tidal water from the sluices of Dunkirk. -Tetteghem, which formed the left of the Duke’s position, rested upon -this swamp, and commanded the only road that led across it to the White -House, and so to Freytag’s army. The position itself was in many -respects disadvantageous. It was much broken up by innumerable little -ditches, hedges, and patches of brushwood, all of which the troops had -to clear away with their side-arms for want of better tools; it was -wholly destitute of drinking water, that in the canals being brackish, -and that found in the wells unpalatable; and, finally, it lay open to -the minutest inspection from the tower of Dunkirk Cathedral. But this -was not the worst. The Duke had looked for a fleet to cover his right -flank, which had suffered from the enemy’s gunboats during the march -upon Ghyvelde, and for transports bringing heavy artillery and other -materials for the siege; and so far there was not a sign of them. “The -principal object is to have what is wanted and to have it in time,” -Murray had written to Dundas in July; and Dundas had replied that he was -preparing artillery for Dunkirk, but was in great want of gunners.[149] -◆Aug. 27.◆ At last, on the 27th, the transports came with gunners, but -without guns; ◆Aug. 29.◆ on the 29th a frigate, the _Brilliant_, and a -few armed cutters appeared off the coast; ◆Aug. 30.◆ and on the 30th -Admiral Macbride arrived to concert operations, but without his fleet. - -By an arrangement, which was repeated at least once more during the -war, Macbride’s squadron, being intended to act with the Army, had been -removed from the control of the Admiralty and placed under the orders -of Dundas, so that he alone was responsible for this miscarriage.[150] -“Why did you not earlier suggest to me naval co-operation at Dunkirk?” -he wrote angrily to Murray on the 29th. “I had always a conceit in -my own mind as to its usefulness, but I had no authority to quote -for it.” This is an instructive example of Dundas’s methods as a War -Minister. The project of besieging Dunkirk emanated from himself and -his colleagues in the Cabinet, and from them alone. No military man -approved it, though the Duke of York, out of loyalty to his masters, -dutifully upheld it; and Dundas never quoted any authority but his -own for undertaking it, nor for his constant interference with the -conduct of the operations that preceded it. He had indeed a good -many conceits in his own mind, the most fatal of which was that he -understood how to conduct a campaign; and he had privately made vague -inquiries of Murray, as to the need for naval co-operation, so far back -as in April.[151] But the point was not one to be decided off-hand by -a General, for the question was not whether a fleet would be useful, -but whether it would be able to act in all weathers; and this purely -naval matter appears never to have been considered at all. On the -15th of August, when the army was not yet committed to the siege, -General Ainslie, the commandant at Ostend, warned Dundas that he had -not realised the difficulties which might be raised by adverse weather -at Dunkirk; and, as a matter of fact, the _Brilliant_ and her little -flotilla had not been on the coast three days before they were blown -away from their station. It was doubtless owing to the uncertainty of -naval assistance that Murray gave the apparently astounding opinion, -that he regarded a squadron as useful though not very material to the -siege. But, apart from this, Dundas had so often pressed the Duke -of York to spare his eight thousand Hessians, which formed almost -one-third of the force under his command, for another service, that it -was impossible for the Duke to divine whether Ministers really intended -to pursue their design against Dunkirk or not. If they did, he had a -right to look to them for a siege-train and for the necessary naval -assistance, neither of which were forthcoming, partly because Dundas -did not know his own mind, partly because he had committed himself -to a multiplicity of operations beyond the power, after ten years of -steady neglect,[152] of either Army or Navy to execute. However, as -a substitute for the much-needed ships and guns, he sent to Murray a -plan for the siege of Dunkirk, drawn up by no less skilled a hand than -that of Lord Chancellor Loughborough, possibly with some hope that the -deficiencies of Downing Street might be made good by the wisdom of -the woolsack. There are times when the conceit of British politicians -becomes touchingly ridiculous. - -Very different was the change that had come over military administration -in France during the same month of August. ◆Aug. 10.◆ Upon the -re-election of the Committee of Public Safety, which took place on the -10th, Barrère, who was a member, approached Prieur of the Côte d’Or with -the words, “We none of us understand military matters. You are an -officer of Engineers; will you join us?” “There is only one man in the -Convention for the place,” answered Prieur, “and that is Carnot; and I -will be his second.” ◆Aug. 14.◆ Accordingly, on the 14th of August two -new members were added to the Committee, namely, Carnot, who assumed -control of the formation, training, and movements of the armies, and -Prieur, who took charge of arms, ammunition, and hospitals. These, -together with Robert Lindet, formed the most remarkable group in one of -the most remarkable administrative bodies which has ever existed. Three -of the members, Barrère, Billaud Varennes, and Collot d’Herbois, were -known as the Revolutionaries, their business being to guide and inspire -political emotions; three more, Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint Just, -were concerned with legislative proposals, police, and the revolutionary -tribunal, and bore the ominous name of the High Hands; but the last -three, Carnot, Prieur, and Lindet, were known simply as the Workers, a -title which no men have ever more worthily earned. - -Carnot’s advent showed itself in prompt and energetic action. ◆Aug. 16.◆ -On the 16th of August a decree was passed for a levy _en masse_, which, -it was estimated, would add four hundred and fifty thousand men to the -army; and, since all exemptions and substitutes were disallowed, the -cream of the nation began for the first time to flow into the ranks. -◆Aug. 29.◆ Moreover, on the 29th of August, the old white coats of the -Monarchy were abolished and the blue coat of the National Guard made -uniform for the entire host, a significant hint that henceforth there -were to be no further distinctions between regular troops and -volunteers, but a single National Army. Prieur, on his side, set up -manufactories of arms and gunpowder in Paris, and stimulated the search -for saltpetre in all directions. The result of these measures lay hid in -the future; but immediate and important movements were made on the -northern frontier. Carnot, with true insight, had divined that England -was in reality the most dangerous member of the Coalition, and that to -foil her before Dunkirk would, from its political results, be the most -telling of all military operations.[153] ◆Aug. 24.◆ Withdrawing -therefore several thousand troops from Coburg’s front and from the army -of the Moselle, he massed them to westward, until, on the 24th of -August, there were, apart from the eight thousand men in Dunkirk itself, -some twenty-three thousand in the entrenched camp at Cassel, four -thousand about Lille, and twelve to fifteen thousand more from the -Moselle within a few days’ march. Kilmain had been recalled after the -retreat from Cæsar’s camp, and replaced by General Houchard in supreme -command. Among Houchard’s subordinate generals was Jourdan. Dunkirk -itself had for commandant General Souham, an energetic officer whose -fame was soon to spread wide; and one of Souham’s battalions was -commanded by Lazare Hoche. - -Thus new men and a new principle of war, which were to crush the -cordon-system out of existence, hung like an angry cloud to the south of -Dunkirk; but the Generals of the Allies took no heed. Murray, indeed, -had heard with anxiety of the increase of the French force in his front, -and had begged Coburg for reinforcements, which, however, could not be -spared.[154] On the east Coburg was busy besieging Quesnoy, with corps -of observation thrown out to east and west. He had called up eight -thousand men under General Beaulieu from Namur to strengthen his weak -cordon about Bouvines and Orchies; but to west of Beaulieu the space -from Lannoy to Menin was guarded by some thirteen thousand -Dutch—spiritless, disaffected troops, whose leader, the Prince of -Orange, was half inclined to give up the contest because he could obtain -no assurance as to his indemnity. West of the Dutch was the gossamer -line of Freytag, and behind it lay the Duke of York, conscious, first, -that Souham had opened the sluices, and that the steady rise of the -inundation would shortly sever his communication with Freytag; secondly, -that his right flank was under perpetual menace from the French -gunboats; and thirdly, that his rear was insecure, since there was -nothing to hinder the French from moving troops by sea. In this -situation he was trying to take a fortress, which he was not strong -enough to invest and which the enemy could consequently reinforce at any -moment, by attacking it upon one side only without heavy artillery. He -endeavoured to protect his flanks by throwing up entrenchments in the -Dunes, but found that they filled with water at the depth of two feet; -and he was fain to disarm a frigate at Nieuport and bring up her heavy -guns to the front, in order to arm batteries, not only against the town, -but towards the sea, to drive away the French gunboats. Thus at the -beginning of September he was able to open fire; ◆Aug. 27.◆ but -meanwhile Houchard had not been idle, for on the 27th he fell in force -upon the posts of Beaulieu and the Prince of Orange at Cysoing and -Tourcoing. He was beaten back by Beaulieu with the loss of four guns; -but the Dutch abandoned Tourcoing with suspicious alacrity, and would -have retired to Tournai and Courtrai had not Murray sent a detachment to -support them. “There is ill-will and disinclination to favour our -present operations,” wrote Murray; and indeed the fact is hardly -surprising.[155] The marvel is that he and the Duke of York should have -remained in so dangerous a position, when a successful attack by the -enemy upon the Dutch and a bold push forward would have carried the -French to Furnes, and cut off the whole of the army about Dunkirk beyond -rescue. Indeed, though they knew it not, this operation had actually -been projected at the French headquarters.[156] - -[Illustration: - - DUNKIRK AND ENVIRONS - showing - THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES - from 24 Aug. to 6 Sept. 1793. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -With the arrival of his last reinforcements from the Moselle, Houchard -resolved to attack the scattered posts of Freytag, the nearest of which -lay little more than five miles from Cassel. ◆Sept. 6.◆ Assembling -thirty thousand men, he led them forward early in the morning of the 6th -of September in five columns, under Generals Vandamme, Hédouville, -Colland, Jourdan, and himself, the three first against Poperinghe, -Proven, and Rousbrugge, the two last against Wormhoudt, Herzeele, and -Houtkerke. Though outnumbered by ten to one, the Hanoverians and -Hessians fought most obstinately, and the troops opposed to Houchard and -Jourdan would have held their own behind the Yser at Bambecque, had not -the French already penetrated to Rexpoede in their rear. The fighting -lasted all day, the garrison of Dunkirk at the same time keeping the -besieging army employed by a sortie; and at night Freytag retired upon -Hondschoote, ordering General Walmoden, who commanded the posts about -Bergues, to withdraw all his troops to the same place. Taking the road -by Rexpoede, in ignorance that it was actually occupied by the French, -Freytag blundered into the midst of a French picquet, and was, with the -young Prince Adolphus (afterwards Duke of Cambridge), wounded and taken. -The Prince was rescued, but the Field-Marshal was secured, and would -have remained a prisoner, had not General Walmoden, guessing that his -chief might have fallen into a trap, marched at once upon Rexpoede, -stormed it then and there, and delivered him. Walmoden then assumed -command, and, resuming the retreat, took up a convex position before -Hondschoote, with his right leaning on the Bergues canal, his centre -just in advance of Hondschoote itself, and his left resting on the -village of Leysele. The whole of his front was covered by a maze of -small ditches and hedges, through which the only access was a single -dyke leading into Hondschoote; but this broken ground, however valuable -for defence, deprived the Allies of the use of their cavalry, which was -the arm in which above all they overmatched the French. From thence -Walmoden sent urgent messages to the Duke of York for reinforcements; -and it is significant that, owing to the inundation, no troops could -reach him except by way of Bergues. There was therefore no reason why -Freytag’s corps should not have been concentrated about Hondschoote, -where it would have covered the besiegers quite as efficiently and with -infinitely less risk. The British Commander-in-Chief cannot be acquitted -of neglect herein, though Freytag must bear part of the blame for -extreme dispersion of his force. - -◆Sept. 7.◆ - -Houchard tried to follow up his success on the following day by a -renewed attack, but his soldiers would not follow him; and Walmoden, -though he took the precaution to send his heavy baggage to Furnes, -repulsed him without difficulty. ◆Sept. 8.◆ On the 8th, however, -Houchard advanced with fresh troops to the assault, himself leading -twenty battalions, covered by several guns, to the principal attack by -the dyke; while a second column on his left, under General Leclerc, -tried to force its way along the canal, and a third, under Colland -and Hédouville, moved up from Rousbrugge against Leysele. The plan of -attack was faulty, for by holding Walmoden in front and pushing the -main force round his left flank, which stood in the air at Leysele, -Houchard must have compelled him to retire or to be driven into the -swamp of the Great Moor. The new French tactics, however, made good -the General’s shortcomings. Taking cover cunningly behind every hedge, -ditch, or bush, the French sharp-shooters poured a deadly fire into -the Hanoverians and Hessians, who stood exposed in their array of -three ranks deep, discharging their volleys by platoons with perfect -discipline, and pressing forward with the bayonet when the French -ventured too near to them. But the volleys did little injury to -dispersed and hidden skirmishers, and the charge with the bayonet was -hardly more effective over such intricate ground; for the French did -not await it, but ran back to the nearest hedge and resumed their fire -from behind it. For four hours Walmoden’s brave men held their own with -the greatest gallantry in spite of heavy losses, until at noon their -last reserves of ammunition were exhausted, when, their left flank -being seriously threatened by Hédouville, the General gave the order -to retire in two columns upon Furnes. A battalion of Hessians covered -the retreat with splendid tenacity; and the wreck of the force took -up a position between the two canals just to the south of Furnes. The -infantry had lost at least a third of its numbers, perhaps even more; -and the Hanoverians, by the confession of their own officers, were -no longer to be depended upon.[157] It was no reproach to them that -this should have been so, for no troops in the world can endure heavy -punishment during consecutive days of unsuccessful fighting, and remain -unshaken. Their losses had been very great, and their behaviour, by the -admission both of friend and foe, most admirable. - -On this same day the garrison of Dunkirk made a sally against the -besiegers in the village of Rosendahl, but was repulsed, though not -without loss to the Allies; and in the afternoon came the news of -Walmoden’s defeat. At four o’clock orders were given for the heavy -baggage to be sent back to Fumes, and at eight a Council of War was -held. The Duke of York hoped to carry off his siege-guns, but the -French, having control of the sluices, had shut off the water from the -canal, so that it was no longer of use for transport; and it was -represented that delay might mean the overpowering of Walmoden’s army -and the cutting off of the Duke’s retreat by Furnes. At midnight -therefore the besieging army retired in two columns, with a confusion -which shows the inefficiency of the Duke’s staff. Transport being -scarce, the waggons were so much overloaded that the animals could -hardly drag them, and the troops were constantly checked by fallen -horses and overturned vehicles. Further, no orders for the retreat were -sent to the two battalions in Tetteghem, and the whole of one column was -delayed until they could join it. Sept. 9.◆ It was thus ten o’clock on -the morning of the 9th before the entire force reached the camp at -Furnes, fortunately without the least molestation from the enemy.[158] -There the Duke effected his junction with Walmoden, but took the -precaution to send his heavy baggage to Ostend. He had been fortunate in -escaping from a most dangerous position with no greater loss than that -of his thirty-two heavy guns; but incessant fighting, a swampy -encampment, bad drinking-water and fever had grievously thinned the -ranks of his army. It was reported at the time that the siege of Dunkirk -had cost the Allies from one cause and another nearly ten thousand -men;[159] and I am disposed to think that this estimate is not -exaggerated. “Our whole enterprise is defeated and our situation -embarrassing in the extreme,” wrote Murray. “It is uncertain whether we -can maintain ourselves behind Furnes; at all events I think we shall -hold good behind the canal at Nieuport.” ◆Sept. 11.◆ This letter reached -Downing Street on the 11th; and on that same day Macbride’s fleet -appeared before Nieuport, three weeks too late. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER VI - - -◆1793.◆ - -During August and the first week of September the results of the -Government’s incoherent enterprises began to crowd one upon another with -rapidity enough to bewilder a clearer head than that of Dundas. The -forces that he had set in motion in the Colonies seemed at first to -promise great results at small cost. ◆April 12.◆ On the 12th of April -General Cuyler, obedient to his instructions, embarked a force of about -five hundred men[160] at Barbados, and sailed under convoy of -Vice-admiral Sir John Laforey’s squadron to Tobago. The enemy was -prepared for his coming, for, as was usual with Dundas’s secret -expeditions, the whole island of Barbados was apprised of the project as -early as the General;[161] ◆April 14.◆ but none the less Cuyler landed -on the 14th at Courland Bay, stormed on the same night the French fort -that crowns the hill above Scarborough, and captured the island with -trifling loss. The news of this success reached London on the 1st of -June, and was followed a month later by that of the bloodless capture of -St. Pierre and Miquelon by a small force sent from Halifax; ◆May 14.◆ -but the next intelligence from the west was less satisfactory. Though by -no means over-trustful of the representations of the refugees from -Martinique, whom Dundas had recommended to him, and who assured him that -eight hundred men would suffice to take the island, June 10.◆ General -Bruce embarked about eleven hundred troops at Barbados on the 10th of -June,[162] and sailed for the island with Admiral Gardner’s squadron. -◆June 16.◆ After concerting operations with the French Royalists, he -landed his troops on the 16th at Case Navire, for an attack on St. -Pierre; but a panic, which set in among the Royalist levies on the -morning fixed for the action, convinced him that it would be hopeless to -trust them, and he accordingly re-embarked on the 21st for Barbados, -carrying his pusillanimous allies away with him. ◆June 21.◆ Here, -therefore, was an initial failure on the part of the monarchical party, -which had promised such easy possession of the French West Indies; and -Bruce did not hesitate to add that, since the Republicans had admitted -all black men to rights of government in Martinique, any further attack -would be hopeless unless undertaken by a considerable force. - -◆Aug. 13.◆ - -The news of this abortive expedition reached London on the 13th of -August; and shortly afterwards came a letter from a gentleman in Tobago, -warning the Government that French emissaries were busy all over the -West Indies, and that there was great danger of a general rising of the -negroes for the expulsion of the white proprietors from all the -islands.[163] Here was information important enough to make Pitt think -twice before he pursued his policy of cutting off the financial -resources of the Revolution by ruining French West Indian trade, to say -nothing of the fact that the said trade was already practically ruined -by civil war in the French islands. There were other weak points in the -French armour besides the West Indies, so many indeed that Ministers -might be excused for finding it difficult to determine which of them -they should assail. ◆Aug. 29.◆ The only method of overcoming that -difficulty was that they should clearly define to themselves their -object in making war. - -First then, there was the counter-revolution in the south of France; -where Lyons still defied the forces of the Convention, and where it was -hoped that Sardinia, in return for the two hundred thousand pounds given -her by the recent treaty, would intervene effectively, with Austria at -her side. Next,[164] from this same quarter there came the very -important but unexpected news that commissioners from Toulon, after some -parley with Lord Hood, had agreed to declare for the Monarchy and the -Constitution of 1791, and to give up to him the shipping, forts and -arsenal, to be held in trust for King Lewis the Seventeenth until the -end of the war. In return for this, however, they made the natural but -very significant request that troops should be landed for their -protection. Here, therefore, was the Government committed, though by no -act of its own, to serious operations by land on the side of the -Mediterranean. The responsibility assumed by Hood was very grave; and -for a time he hesitated to incur it. “At present,” he wrote, two days -after issuing his public reply to the offers of the commissioners, “I -have not troops sufficient to defend the works. Had I five or six -thousand good troops I should soon end the war.”[165] He therefore -anchored at Hyères and, mindful of the British alliances with the -Mediterranean powers, wrote to the British Ambassador at Naples for such -forces as could be spared, at the same time asking help of the Spanish -Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, who was lying with his squadron off the -coast of Roussillon. ◆Aug. 28.◆ Before, however, these reinforcements -could arrive, he was so far satisfied by the assurances of the French -that he sailed into Toulon harbour and, landing fifteen hundred marines -and soldiers who were acting as such, occupied the principal forts that -defended the outer harbour. While thus engaged he was joined by Langara -with the greater part of his squadron, who announced that he had one -thousand troops ready to disembark at once, and had left four ships -behind to bring three thousand more from the army in Roussillon. Full of -gratitude, Hood gave Langara effusive thanks, and appointed Admiral -Gravina, the Spanish officer next senior to Langara, to be commandant of -Toulon. - -All this was known to the Government by the 15th of September, by which -time, as shall presently be told, more reassuring news had arrived -from Flanders, to the effect that the French had been checked, and -that Coburg’s army had been liberated for action by the surrender -of Quesnoy. It therefore behoved Ministers seriously to reconsider -their military policy, and to make up their minds definitely whether -their object in the war was to be, as they professed, resistance to -unprovoked aggression and the overthrow of the Convention, or simple -annexation of French possessions. In Flanders their great enterprise, -undertaken with no military knowledge and for no military purpose, -had failed; they were as much as ever in the dark as to the ultimate -designs of Austria, and they could not but be sensible that remarkably -little had been accomplished by the Allies on the Rhine. As a matter -of fact Frederick William, having discovered a glaring instance of -Thugut’s duplicity in the matter of the Bavarian exchange, had at the -end of August practically decided to withdraw from the Coalition. This -was as yet unknown to the British Ministers, for their ambassador at -Vienna, Sir Morton Eden, was completely duped by Thugut; but they were -conscious of an increasing coolness on the part of Prussia towards -the war against the Revolution. In such circumstances, although -the northern frontier of France was, from its proximity, the most -convenient sphere of operations for a British army, they might well -consider the advisability of removing all their forces from that -quarter in order to concentrate them at Toulon, which Lord Hood’s -negotiations had already engaged them to protect. French successes -in the north could be only temporary and unprofitable if the Allies, -by assisting the counter-revolution in the south, should deprive -the Convention of the richest provinces of France. A French force at -Antwerp itself would signify little, if the Allies could rally the -party of order from Bordeaux to Marseilles to put down the tyranny at -Paris. - -On the other hand, it was no light task to hold Toulon against all the -host that the Convention might turn upon it. Sir Charles Grey, when -consulted by Pitt as to the force that would be required, declared -that fifty thousand good soldiers would be no more than adequate; upon -which Pitt dismissed him with the remark that he hoped that a smaller -body would suffice.[166] Probably he rested his opinion on Lord Hood’s -phrase about ending the war with six thousand men, which was of course -nonsense, and nonsense of a kind which naval officers at that period -were far too ready to talk and Ministers to hear. Mallet du Pan, the -clearest head in Europe, was urgent for making the counter-revolution -in the south the centre of attack upon the Convention; but American -experience had shown that the support of a disloyal faction is the -most unstable of all foundations upon which to build the conduct of -a war. Men of the same nation will fight each other like devils, -but, when foreigners are called into the contest, all parties tend -to combine against them. Moreover, the southern provinces were by no -means unfavourable to the Revolution at large. On the contrary, they -had enthusiastically acclaimed and supported it, until threatened with -the massacre and pillage which had disgraced Paris in September 1792. -It was therefore essential that the Allies should enter France in such -strength as to be independent of all help from French forces in the -field. It was certain that the worthless brothers of King Lewis the -Sixteenth and their parasites would claim to place themselves at the -head of any counter-revolution; and their presence alone might suffice -first to paralyse and then to subvert it. - -Again, it was doubtful whether any efficient force of the Allies, other -than British, could be collected in the south. Sardinia was perfectly -ready to advance at once to the rescue of Lyons if Austria would join -her; and the Austrian General De Vins, being of the school of Loudoun, -was anxious to show his superiority to his rivals Coburg and Clerfaye -of the school of Lacy. But here again the mischievous rapacity of -Thugut neutralised all action, for he would allow no Austrian troops -to move from Italy unless Sardinia consented to concede the Novarese -to Austria, indemnifying herself at the expense of France. The British -Ministers were aware of this dispute about the Novarese, for Mulgrave -had reported it,[167] and they had sufficient experience of the -Imperial Court to divine that it would not quickly be settled. Apart -from Austria and Sardinia, troops could be obtained from Naples and -from Spain; but the assistance of two courts so effete and so corrupt -was not likely to be efficient. In any case, it was certain that, if -any real advantage was to be gained from the possession of Toulon, -every British soldier must be withdrawn from other operations, and that -the whole of England’s military force must be assembled at that point. -If this were impossible, it were best to instruct Hood to make sure of -the French fleet, destroy the arsenal, and carry away the inhabitants -who had yielded the place into his hands. - -Then, besides Flanders and Toulon, there was La Vendée, where the -contemptible ruffians whom the Jacobins had appointed to be generals -were suffering defeat upon defeat. If by the help of the insurgents -Nantes could be seized as a base, it was no very long march from Angers -or Tours or Orléans to Paris; but here again it was not a small force -that was required, but every British battalion that could be spared. - -Lastly, if the Ministers wanted to secure indemnities only, the West -Indies lay open to them. No doubt it would be of advantage to possess -the famous harbour of St. Lucia, to deliver Dominica from the menace of -Martinique, her neighbour to windward, and to master Guadeloupe, with -the nest of privateers which preyed upon all British commerce in those -seas. Above all, the capture of Haiti would ensure at once the security -of Jamaica, the possession of a country whose wealth, though more than -half destroyed, was still appreciable, and the transfer to a British -garrison of St. Nicholas Mole, which, being the gate of the Windward -Passage and the Gibraltar of the West Indies, would give safe transit -for the trade of the archipelago to England. Such an enterprise, -however, would equally demand the entire land-force of the British -Isles. It would be necessary not only to take the islands but to hold -them, and to hold them not only, as heretofore, against the climate and -against the fleet and armies of France, but against the entire negro -population, which the Revolution had summoned to its aid. There was, -as there still is, abundance of records of former attacks upon all -those islands, showing that at the best of times each British battalion -in the West Indies required to be renewed in its entirety every two -years, and at the worst of times might be completely extinguished -by a single hot season. Of all plans, therefore, this would be the -most difficult, the most perilous, the most costly in execution and -maintenance, and the least damaging to France; not to mention the fact -that the overthrow of the Convention, which had authorised the equality -of the black man with the white, was really essential to its permanent -success. Thus it should at least have been obvious to the Government -that out of the four spheres of operations it could hope to act with -effect in one alone; and then only by throwing into the chosen sphere -every trained soldier that it could muster. - -Blind to all such considerations, Ministers decided not to select one, -or at most two, of these spheres, but to fritter away their handful of -forces between all four. ◆Sept. 11.◆ Indeed, Dundas’s orders between the -11th and 18th of September form a notable specimen of his ideas of -carrying on war. The news of the failure at Dunkirk had at first -completely unnerved him; but, on realising how critical was the position -of affairs in that quarter, he directed eight battalions[168] to embark -for Ostend, as a temporary measure. Then he warned the Duke of York that -five thousand of his Hessians must be held ready to sail to Toulon as -soon as this reinforcement reached him, and that the eight battalions -themselves would be required elsewhere at the beginning of October. On -the same day he wrote to Lord Hood that everything must give way to the -importance of holding Toulon; that he had appealed to Austria for -troops; and that he would send Hood the five thousand Hessians -aforesaid, as well as two battalions out of the five stationed at -Gibraltar. Four days later he warned General Bruce to be ready to -receive at Barbados fifteen battalions, which were under orders for -active service in the West Indies. Lastly, at the same time or very -little later, he framed a design for a descent upon St. Malo and for the -occupation of the Isle D’Yeu, off the coast of La Vendée.[169] It is now -time to return to Flanders, and to follow in detail the reaction of -Dundas’s genius upon the operations in that quarter. - -In the first peril of the retreat from Dunkirk the British commanders -seem to have entertained serious thoughts of re-embarkation;[170] but -were reassured when Houchard did not follow up his stroke upon the force -of Walmoden. For this the French general has been much blamed; and -indeed his failure to destroy the Duke of York’s army was made the -excuse for bringing him shortly afterwards to the guillotine. But in -truth Houchard had lost his true opportunity through the unskilfulness -of his attack upon Walmoden, wherein his troops, already half starved -and less than half disciplined, had been seriously shaken by their -losses. He therefore reinforced the garrisons of Bergues and Dunkirk, -and, in the hope of relieving Quesnoy, fell with thirty thousand men -upon the flank of the Dutch cordon from Poperinghe and upon its front -from Lille. ◆Sept. 12, 13.◆ His success was at first encouraging, for he -defeated his opponents completely with the loss of forty guns and three -thousand men, and captured Menin. General Beaulieu, who had been -despatched with over four thousand Austrians to the assistance of the -Dutch, for some reason refused to act with them, but checked the advance -of the French beyond Menin, and occupied Courtrai. The Dutch fled in -disorder to Bruges and Ghent; and for the moment it seemed as though -communication between the Duke of York and Coburg was hopelessly -severed. ◆Sept. 12.◆ The Duke, after leaving a detachment under -Abercromby at Furnes, had withdrawn to the rear of the canal between -Nieuport and Dixmuyde, in order to secure his retreat to Ostend; ◆Sept. -14.◆ but he now ordered Abercromby back to Nieuport, and marched with -the bulk of his force eastward to Thorout, where he was joined by two -battalions[171] from England. ◆Sept. 15.◆ From thence on the 15th he -moved southward to Roulers; and on that day the situation underwent a -total change. - -Beaulieu, being attacked by Houchard before Courtrai, waited only for a -reinforcement which the Duke had hurried forward to him, when, taking -the offensive, he utterly routed the French, who fled in the wildest -confusion, and, pursuing them to Menin, recaptured the town. ◆Sept. 16.◆ -The Duke entered Menin on the following day, where he received letters -from Coburg who was already at Cysoing, not more than eighteen miles to -the south, reporting that since the fall of Quesnoy he had gained a -brilliant victory over one of Houchard’s divisions at Avesnes-le-Sec. -◆Sept. 12.◆ This action, which, though almost unknown to Englishmen, -still remains one of the greatest achievements in the history of -cavalry, was not only most glorious to the Austrians in itself, but was -important as showing that the new tactics of the undisciplined French -army were inapplicable to any but a strongly enclosed country. Nine -Austrian squadrons, counting some two thousand men, without a single -gun, had utterly dispersed seven thousand French, chiefly infantry, cut -down two thousand of them, captured two thousand more, and taken twenty -guns, all with a loss to themselves of sixty-nine men. These successes -effectually checked the advance of the French. Houchard, after the -defeat at Menin, had already given the order to retreat; and the French -retired to their former positions before Cassel, Lille, and Maubeuge. - -Then arose the question what should be done next. The season was -advancing, but events had marched rapidly in Paris since the revolt of -Toulon. Following hard upon the news of Houchard’s reverse came tidings -that the Duke of Brunswick had defeated the French with a loss of four -thousand men at Pirmasens, on the northern frontier of Alsace; and this -succession of disasters stirred the Jacobins to the ferocity of panic. -◆Sept. 17.◆ On the 17th two savage laws were passed, which practically -placed all lives and all property at the arbitrary disposal of the -reigning faction; and then the demagogues turned with fury upon the -generals. Loudest among them was Robespierre, who, profoundly jealous -of any man who could do what he could not, was suspicious above all of -soldiers. ◆Sept. 21.◆ Thanks to his denunciations, Houchard and his -staff were recalled under accusation of treason; and thereby another -blow was added to the many already struck at the army. The troops -were greatly demoralised by the continual change of commanders,[172] -whom the Commissioners of the Convention promoted or deposed at their -arbitrary pleasure; and the commanders themselves were not less -demoralised by the certain prospect of death if they failed to achieve -the impossible with troops that were neither fed, nor clothed, nor -paid, nor disciplined. The Allies, therefore, could still reasonably -look for success from a concentration of their whole army and a -vigorous offensive. - -Dundas, since the failure at Dunkirk, had become suddenly an advocate -for keeping the whole of the forces together, and for making an attack -upon the enemy before undertaking any further enterprise;[173] but -with what precise object a general action was to be fought he did -not say, for the very sufficient reason that he did not know. The -British Ministers, so far as they favoured any operations at all in -Flanders, would have preferred a second attempt upon Dunkirk; but they -gave, or professed to give, a free hand to the commanders, flattering -themselves that, if the attempt were abandoned, the British troops -would be the sooner released for service at Toulon and, above all, in -the West Indies. Coburg, on the other hand, had already put forward -what was at any rate a definite plan, though upon the old lines. He -wished to besiege Maubeuge, which was certainly an important point, -since it formed the chief link in the communications between the -French armies of the north about Lille, and of the Ardennes about -Givet and Philippeville, while its entrenched camp made it a point for -a formidable concentration of the French forces at large. Moreover, -it obstructed the passage of the Austrian troops from east to west, -compelling all reinforcements from Luxemburg to fetch a compass by -Namur and Charleroi before they could join the army of Flanders. The -Dutch agreed to come forward again to further the operations; and -before the British Government, upon Murray’s representation, could -finally make up its mind to co-operate with the Austrians, Coburg had -crossed the Sambre with forty thousand men and invested Maubeuge.[174] - -Thereupon there followed the usual distribution of troops into a -cordon. The besieging force numbered fourteen thousand, the covering -army, including twelve thousand Dutch, twenty-six thousand men; and to -the Duke of York was entrusted the task of protecting Flanders along -a front of some forty-five miles, from Cysoing to Nieuport. For this -purpose Coburg gave him about sixteen thousand Austrian troops in -addition to those in the pay of Britain; but, owing to the vagaries -of the British Minister for War, the corps was exposed to the most -dangerous risk. Hardly had the eight reinforcing battalions from -England joined the army in Flanders, before Dundas ordered four of them -to return at once, and the remainder as soon as possible. Further, -not content even with this, he gave Murray to understand that the -embarkation of the Hessian corps from Flanders was only deferred, and -hinted that a part of his artillerymen might also be spared for Toulon. -Now Dundas knew perfectly well that the troops had passed through a -very severe campaign, had fought several actions and had suffered -heavy losses; he knew perfectly well that no adequate steps had been -taken for filling up the gaps in the ranks; he could hardly have been -ignorant that winter was approaching; and Murray had twice warned him -that the French were rapidly increasing their forces between Lille and -the sea. Yet the Minister, though he had given the generals nominally -a free hand, calmly withdrew battalion after battalion, until at last -Murray told him plainly of the danger of the situation. The state of -the army was most distressing: the force in British pay was reduced -to twelve thousand fighting men, or less than half of its original -numbers; the sick and wounded of the whole army under the Duke’s -command numbered at least nine thousand, or more than one-fourth; the -troops were dangerously dispersed along a very wide front; and, though -Murray did not mention this, the Austrian Government had deprecated -all field-fortification, on account of the damage that might ensue to -meadows and the banks of canals.[175] Finally, he gave warning that, if -the enemy made an attack, the Duke would be obliged to abandon Ostend. -Dundas’s reply to this was very characteristic. Without a word to -Murray he ordered the Commandant at Ostend to retain the second batch -of four battalions which, by his own order, had been sent there for -re-embarkation to England; and he wrote an angry letter to Abercromby, -a subordinate officer, first expressing horror at the idea of -abandoning Ostend, and then regretting that attempts had been made to -keep those same four battalions in Flanders. “It would be impossible,” -he wrote, “to restrain the just indignation of the country, if, for the -sake of feeding an army under a Prince of the blood, so substantial an -interest to this country as that of the French West Indies had been -sacrificed.”[176] - -Apart from the fact that such language, especially when addressed to a -subordinate concerning his chief, was utterly unbecoming a Minister and -a gentleman, it was not obvious why an army should be starved, whether -in the matter of empty ranks or of empty stomachs, simply because it -happened to be commanded by a Prince of the blood. If its presence in -Flanders were an embarrassment to the Government, the simple remedy -was to withdraw it altogether, rather than leave it so weak as to be -in peril of destruction; for there was no lack of employment for the -troops elsewhere. This amazing outburst is no solitary instance of -Dundas’s bad taste, much less an unique example of his incapacity. - -Meanwhile Murray’s apprehensions increased; and events soon came to -justify them. Jourdan, on Carnot’s recommendation, had succeeded -Houchard in command of the army of the north; and, with Carnot himself -at his back, ◆Oct. 7.◆ he now concentrated forty-five thousand men at -Guise for the relief of Maubeuge, leaving the remainder of his troops, -some sixty thousand men, extended in a long line to the sea. Coburg -sent pressing entreaties for reinforcements to the Duke of York, who at -once moved about nine thousand men to Cysoing, ◆Oct. 10.◆ and leaving -half of them there, proceeded with the rest—chiefly the wreck of the -British troops—to join hands with the Austrian advanced corps a little -to the south of Quesnoy at Englefontaine. ◆Oct. 15, 16.◆ It was, -however, to no purpose, for Jourdan, having increased his force to sixty -thousand men, attacked Coburg furiously on the 15th and 16th at -Wattignies, and, despite very heavy loss to himself both in men and in -guns, compelled him to raise the siege of Maubeuge. The Dutch, who had -not behaved well in the action, retired to Mons; but Coburg moved his -headquarters to no greater distance than Bavai. He was there meditating -further attacks upon the French, when the Committee of Public Safety, -intoxicated with the success at Wattignies, ◆Oct. 18.◆ ordered Jourdan -peremptorily to take the offensive and to drive the hordes of the tyrant -into the Sambre, which river, it may be observed, at that moment flowed -between the opposing armies. ◆Oct. 22.◆ A second and still more -ludicrous order bade him keep his force together, menace several remote -points simultaneously, operate in two divisions against Mons and -Tournai, and withal act with prudence. Jourdan, however, not daring to -attempt the passage of the Sambre, sent on the 20th one division to -assail Marchiennes, and another under Souham against all the Allied -posts from Cysoing to Werwicq, which last was held by six thousand men -under Count Erbach. Both attacks were successful, though Marchiennes was -retaken on the 24th; ◆Oct. 22.◆ and on the 22nd Erbach was forced to -fall back to Tournai and Courtrai, abandoning even Menin. On the 22nd -likewise a division from Cassel attacked Ypres, while another from -Dunkirk under Vandamme captured Furnes, and, pressing northward with -twelve thousand men, ◆Oct. 24.◆ opened on the 24th the bombardment of -Nieuport. The town had been but hastily fortified, and the garrison -consisted of only two weak Hessian battalions, a few dragoons, and the -British Fifty-third Regiment, in all fewer than thirteen hundred men. -For the moment it seemed certain that the British would be cut off from -their base. - -Murray, foreseeing this, had ordered all stores, beyond what was -necessary for the moment, to be removed from Ostend. The Commandant -disembarked some of the four battalions which, pursuant to Dundas’s -order, were about to sail to England; and Dundas, on hearing of the -situation, at once sent Major-general Grey, the appointed Commander -of the West Indian expedition, with four more battalions[177] to take -charge of the troops at Ostend, giving him full liberty to defend it -or to bring away the whole of the eight battalions, as he might think -best, without reference to the Duke of York. Meanwhile he clamoured -for reports as to the intentions of Coburg, and for explanation of the -reasons for the possible abandonment of Ostend; for it had not yet -occurred to him that the French, by attacking in overwhelming force, -might compel the Commander of the Allies to conform to their plan of -operations instead of pursuing his own.[178] - -However, matters soon righted themselves. ◆Oct. 24.◆ The French were -driven back with heavy loss from Cysoing and Orchies. The garrison of -Nieuport held its own gallantly, being reinforced on the 27th by another -battalion of Hessians and by a few gunners from Ostend; and meanwhile -the Duke of York was hastening back from Englefontaine and Tournai, -while Coburg followed him westward with half of his army as far as -Solesmes, midway between Cambrai and Landrecies. ◆Oct. 28.◆ On the -evening of the 28th Grey arrived at Ostend, and at once sent the -Forty-second and four companies of Light Infantry to the help of -Nieuport. On the same evening the Duke of York having reached Camphin, a -few miles east of Cysoing, detached Abercromby with four battalions and -two squadrons[179] northward against the French post at Lannoy. The -place was captured with little loss, and the British Light Dragoons did -terrible execution in the pursuit of the flying enemy. ◆Oct. 29.◆ On the -following night another division, under the Austrian General Kray, made -a brilliant attack upon the post of Marchiennes, driving out the French -with a loss of nearly two thousand men and twelve guns, at a cost to -itself of fewer than one hundred casualties. ◆Oct. 30.◆ Meanwhile the -French, on hearing of the Duke of York’s advance upon their flank, had -retired from Menin and Ypres; and early on the next morning Vandamme, -fearing to be cut off, retreated from before Nieuport, leaving four guns -and a quantity of ammunition behind him. So easy was it to change the -whole face of affairs by concentrating a compact force against one point -and rolling up a cordon from end to end. It is almost comical to observe -how at first both sides used the cordon-system; how the French, after -abandoning it with success, relapsed into it once more; and finally how -the Allies, also abandoning it under British direction, in their turn -gained the upper hand. - -Throughout this anxious period the interference of Dundas with the -operations had been incessant, and his tone by no means the most -courteous. The incoherence and folly of his orders may best be judged -from a summary of the reply which Murray at length found time to -write on the 20th of October. “Let me point out to you,” he wrote, -in effect, “that the same messenger brought to me from you, first, -advice to besiege St. Quentin; secondly, orders to keep a body of -troops at Ostend; and, thirdly, strong exhortations against division -or detachment of our force. As to Ostend, if Nieuport holds out, it is -safe for the winter; and I see no reason why Nieuport should not hold -out. As to St. Quentin, this means taking a train of artillery there -in the month of November. It means also that twenty thousand out of -Coburg’s twenty-five thousand men must be detached, while the remaining -five thousand remain quietly between three fortified towns and a -forest, from which fifty thousand men may attack them from all sides at -any time. Further, the detached force must draw its subsistence from -a distance of forty miles across the whole French army without any -other protection than that of those five thousand men.” “I beg pardon,” -he continued, “for taking up your time with this kind of argument, -which it was not your intention to enter into, but I think it is right -to show that, perhaps, people in England are not more infallible in -their judgments than those upon the Continent.” Irony so keen sped -home even through the dense armour of Dundas’s conceit. “You have -not sufficiently weighed the feeling of this country,” he answered, -taking refuge in bluster, “if you think that any successes could have -counterbalanced the loss of Ostend.” Murray hastened to soothe him by -pointing out that the Duke of York, though against his own military -judgment, had strictly obeyed the Cabinet’s instructions as to the -protection of Ostend, and that it was not Grey who had saved it but -the Duke himself, who, before he knew of Grey’s arrival, had forced -Vandamme to retire by threatening his communications.[180] - -This sharp passage of arms silenced Dundas for the time, though, as -will be seen, it taught him little wisdom for the future. Meanwhile, -after a few small affairs of outposts, the campaign came to an end. -The Emperor of Austria sent orders to Coburg to fight a general -action, for no particular object; and the Committee of Public Safety -gave the like instructions to Jourdan, in the hope that he might be -able to advance to Namur and so to threaten the Austrian line of -communication. But neither was in a position to obey. The campaign had -been most arduous, as a war of posts must always be, not only from the -innumerable minor actions, but from the strain imposed on the troops -by constant vigilance and by endless marching to and fro to reinforce -the threatened points of the cordon. The losses on the side of the -Allies had been great: those of the French had been enormous, not only -in men but in material, for the Allies had taken from them over two -hundred guns. In brief, both armies were thoroughly exhausted; and -yet the Allies had accomplished comparatively little, owing partly to -the false plan imposed by England, partly to the false tactics of the -Austrian commanders, still more to the misunderstandings and jealousy -that make coherent action so difficult in an army composed of many -nations. On the Rhine likewise little had been effected. Soon after -the victory of Pirmasens the King of Prussia left his army for Posen; -◆Oct. 13.◆ and, though the Austrian General Wurmser drove the French -in utter confusion from the lines of Weissenburg, yet, in consequence -of faulty dispositions and of the half-hearted co-operation of the -Prussian troops, an advantage which might have been decisive was turned -to little account. Prussia, in truth, was not anxious to aid Austria -in gaining Alsace; while the Polish question, as always, kept the two -powers in an attitude of mutual suspicion and mistrust. There was -nothing, therefore, left to the Allies but to take up cantonments for -the winter, which they accordingly did, while Grey and the whole of the -eight battalions with him returned to England. The Allies had missed -their chance in Flanders; and the chance was gone for ever. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER IX - - -◆1793.◆ - -It is now necessary to sum up the relative conditions of France and the -Allies at the close of 1793. The British enterprises against the French -at Dunkirk, in La Vendée, and at Toulon had one and all failed; but the -tale of disaster was even then not fully told. Upon arrogating to itself -the appointment of Generals in the field, the Committee of Public Safety -had appointed ◆Oct.–Nov.◆ Pichegru and Hoche to command respectively the -armies of the Rhine and Moselle. Pichegru had been a non-commissioned -officer of artillery before the Revolution, had since obtained command -of a battalion of volunteers, and, by assiduous courting of the Jacobin -leaders, had become a Lieutenant-general without seeing a shot fired. -Hoche, as we have seen, had risen from the ranks of the French Guards, -had distinguished himself in high command at Dunkirk, and, above all, -had attracted Carnot’s attention by a memorandum condemning the -dispersion of troops after the Austrian manner, and advocating -everywhere concentration and a vigorous offensive. “This young fellow -will go far,” said Carnot, as he handed the document to Robespierre. “A -very dangerous man!” objected the other, who dreaded the success of any -man except himself. The task prescribed to Hoche was to relieve Landau, -then blockaded by the Prussians; but he found his army in such ill -condition that he hesitated to attempt anything until strengthened by -Pichegru, when he made a general attack upon the Prussians under the -Duke of Brunswick at Kaiserslautern, and was beaten back with heavy -loss. ◆Nov. 28–30.◆ Thanks to Carnot’s influence, however, his failure -was forgiven to him; and his new project, that he should reinforce -Pichegru with two-thirds of his troops and fall upon the Austrians under -General Wurmser at Hagenau, was approved. Wurmser perceived the -gathering storm, and appealed to Brunswick for help; but King Frederick -William had expressly forbidden the Duke to engage himself in any -important operations, and the Prussians did not move until too late. -◆Dec. 23.◆ On the 23rd of December Hoche opened his attack with great -skill and success, and would have annihilated Wurmser, had not Brunswick -interfered at the last moment to check the pursuit of the French. -◆Dec. 26.◆ The Austrian commander, furious because Brunswick had not -supported him from the first, then returned to the eastern bank of the -Rhine, thus uncovering the Prussian left, and obliging them likewise to -abandon the greater part of the Palatinate, and to content themselves -with protecting the neighbourhood of Mainz. Landau, therefore, was -recaptured by the French; the eastern frontier of France was purged of -the enemy; and, above all, the ill-feeling between Austria and Prussia -was more than ever embittered. Broadly speaking, the French by the close -of the year had contended successfully alike with the Coalition and with -internal foes, having lost ground only in the Eastern Pyrenees to Spain, -the enemy from which it could be most easily recovered. - -Nevertheless the authority of the Committee of Public Safety was by no -means yet fully assured. The Commune of Paris, representing the most -infamous of the population, had been jealous of it from the first; and -the useful service of the little band of Workers had been accomplished -only with great difficulty and by constant concessions to the party of -violence. Representatives of the people vested with arbitrary powers -still accompanied the armies, interfering with the operations, punishing -by summary execution the slightest fault or failure, whether realised or -merely suspected, levying barbarous and oppressive requisitions, and -thus driving officers, men, and civil population alike to despair. In no -army was this policy of terror more ruthlessly pursued than in that of -the Rhine, where unlimited powers were exercised by the representatives -Lebas and St. Just, of whom the latter, a young man of twenty-six, gave -himself the airs of omnipotent Jove, with a guillotine for thunderbolt. -A campaign, however, cannot be won solely by decapitation of one’s own -troops; and in the winter of 1793–1794 this fact began to impress -itself, in respect not only of the army but of France at large, upon -some of the ruling men in Paris. But it was no easy matter to convince -the unspeakable rogues of the Commune of Paris that terror, which had -brought to them personally enormous profit, was, as a national policy, a -failure. Early in December 1793 the Committee of Public Safety took -several measures to abridge the powers of the Commune; and some of the -men who had in earlier days been most violent favoured the reaction -towards a milder rule; but none the less Collot d’Herbois, who had been -the author of most atrocious cruelties at Lyons since the recapture of -the city, continued to obtain official approval of his conduct. Dread of -summary restoration of order by some victorious General continually -haunted the minds of many of the leaders, and notably of Robespierre; -◆Dec. 25.◆ and, since the only idea of this last was to support -whichever party was at the moment the stronger, he upheld Collot, and -sought popularity by proposing the execution of another batch of -Generals. Thus the opening of the new year witnessed a complete revival -of the system of terror. - -Immediate mischief was the inevitable result. Carnot had wished after -the victory of Savenay to institute a policy of conciliation in La -Vendée; but, on the contrary, a ruffianly soldier named Turreau was let -loose upon the district with his “infernal columns,” as if to -exterminate a herd of wild beasts. The country was laid waste, the -villages were burned, and such victims as could not escape the soldiery -were swept into Nantes, to be murdered after such manner as might please -the still greater ruffian, Carrier. Thereupon the people at once took up -arms again. A smuggler bearing the nickname of Chouan[181] organised a -band of his fellows for revenge, and was soon imitated by others. -Charette and Stofflet again came forward as leaders; and there began a -desultory guerilla war, fraught with constant disaster to the Republican -troops, which gnawed deeply into the heart of France. At the same time, -as if to increase the difficulties of its capable commanders in the -field, the Convention lent a ready ear to all complaints against them. -The Representatives attached to the armies, with the true instinct of -politicians of all times and nations, were careful to take to themselves -the credit for every victory, and to impute to the military the blame -for every reverse; ◆1794 Jan. 1.◆ and a savage decree was passed that -any General condemned to death should be executed in front of his own -troops. Successful commanders ran as great a risk as unsuccessful. -Kléber, Marceau, Lapoype, and Bonaparte were one and all denounced in -the spring of 1794 by the civilians who had aspired to direct them in -the field; and it was only by much labour and cunning that Carnot was -able to save their lives. - -Nevertheless, despite all drawbacks, there was progress towards -improvement in the French army. True, there was still shameful rascality -on the part of contractors,[182] which was countenanced by Bouchotte -under the protection of Robespierre, and which caused much suffering and -desertion. The levy _en masse_ again had proved a failure; but, on the -other hand, compulsion to personal service, without exemption of any -kind, had forced a better class of recruit into the ranks; -◆1793 Nov. 22◆ and it was wisely determined to incorporate these new -levies with the battalions at the front, which possessed officers and -non-commissioned officers of experience to train them. Finally, the -reorganisation of the army into demi-brigades, consisting each of two -battalions of volunteers and one battalion of regulars, was, after long -delay, decreed and gradually brought about. ◆1794 Jan. 8.◆ Innumerable -useless corps were swept away; the establishments of existing corps were -increased; and the law as to election of officers was practically, -though tacitly, ignored.[183] ◆Feb. 12.◆ At the same time a succession -of decrees forbade the attendance of deputations from regiments upon the -Convention, strove to check abuses and waste in the matter of -requisitions, and made a new regulation that no soldier should rise to -any grade of command—from corporal to general—who could not read and -write. ◆Feb 15.◆ All this wrought for discipline and efficiency, for -many of the Colonels and Generals appointed by the Jacobins, being -unable to read a map or even a letter, had brought about great confusion -at the War Office and frequent disaster in the field.[184] At the same -time, strenuous efforts were made to improve the cavalry, which had -hitherto been absolutely useless; and its establishment was fixed at -twenty-nine regiments of heavy and fifty-four of light cavalry, or -ninety-six thousand men in all. The horse-artillery also, after but a -single year of existence, was augmented to eight thousand men, and the -field-artillery, including detachments for battalion guns, to twenty-six -thousand men. The whole force of France at the beginning of 1794 reached -six hundred thousand effective men, or about half of the figure which, -from motives of policy or conceit, was invariably assigned to it by the -orators of Paris. - -Moreover, to turn military improvements to the best advantage, events -conspired to throw power more and more into the hands of the Committee -of Public Safety. ◆1793 Dec. 22.◆ By a clever decree, the Committee -contrived to disarm the hired ruffians who supported the Commune, and to -make over their weapons to the army; and this blow was followed three -months later by the accusation and execution of the leaders of the -Commune itself, including Hébert, the supreme ruffian, and Ronsin and -Vincent, two of the greatest scoundrels in the War Office. -◆1794 March 29.◆ The next attack was directed against Danton and others, -who had recognised the failure of the policy of terror, and wished to -end it; and accordingly he and his followers went to the guillotine on -the 5th of April. ◆April 5.◆ This was the work of Robespierre, who at -one time had been the firm ally of both of these factions, but was now -seeking supreme power in order to carry out certain ideas of his own for -the social regeneration of France. Being an absolutely mediocre man, of -the type which small provincial journals delight to honour with the -title of “our talented townsman,” he was wholly lacking in the ability -and experience required for the business of administration; and he seems -to have agreed, without knowing what he did, to the abolition of -Ministers for departments and the substitution of boards, responsible to -the Committee of Public Safety, in their place. Hereby the little knot -of Workers, who had real capacity as well as boundless industry, gained -an affluence of power, and the military service an increase of -efficiency; for their labours were too high for the control of a petty -lawyer who possessed no gift but that of composing bad essays, and knew -no resource but that of cutting off heads. Nor was the activity of the -Workers confined to France alone. Revolutionary agents had been busy all -over Europe with persuasive tongues and still more persuasive purses. -They had bribed high officials to second Carnot’s military projects by -conspiracies at Turin, Naples, Florence, and Genoa; they had met with -much encouragement in Holland, and counted on further success in -Switzerland; they had made some impression upon Denmark, had half gained -Sweden, and had spared no expense to rouse the Turk against Austria. The -cost of these negotiations was enormous, but the Government of France -was playing for high stakes, knowing well that without victory in all -quarters in the coming campaign, bankruptcy and starvation must -inevitably bring down the Revolution with a crash. - -On the military side Carnot had decided to strike at important points -only, and elsewhere to stand on the defensive. In the south he -designed to invade Italy, hoping that treachery at Turin would make -the work easy; but the principal struggle, as he knew, must be fought -out in Belgium. He did not, however, confine his schemes of aggression -to that quarter only. He recognised with true insight that Britain -was France’s most formidable enemy; and he had actually projected -and prepared for an invasion of England, with the help of the Brest -fleet, and for a march upon London. The plan was bold, indeed wild -in its extravagance, being founded on a false idea that disaffection -in England was as deeply seated and as widely spread in action as it -was noisy and inflated in speech. None the less the bare menace of -invasion served a useful purpose—to scare and disconcert the British -Government.[185] - -◆Jan. 21.◆ In truth it must have been with no very pleasant feelings -that Ministers met Parliament in January 1794, having no better news -to lay before the Houses than a tale of failure in all quarters. Pitt -had, at least, the consolation that a section of the Whigs, headed -by the Duke of Portland, in the same month announced to him their -intention of separating themselves from Fox, and of giving the Ministry -an independent support. It was, however, felt that such an arrangement -could neither be satisfactory nor of long continuance, since, as Sir -Gilbert Elliot put it, Portland’s party would be no more than “a -detached auxiliary force, to act on one occasion, to retire on another, -and to be a perpetual object of anxiety to those whom they meant to -serve, of hope to the enemy and of speculation to the rest of the -world.”[186] Moreover, there were members of it, most notably William -Windham, who were extremely dissatisfied with the military policy, or -want of policy, initiated by Dundas.[187] Negotiations were, therefore, -set on foot for the inclusion of Portland and some of his friends in -the Cabinet; and, after six full months spent in bargaining, it was -finally arranged, on the 11th of July 1794, that Portland should become -Second Secretary of State, Lord Fitzwilliam Lord President, and Lord -Spencer Lord Privy Seal, while Windham displaced the incompetent and -corrupt Sir George Yonge as Secretary at War. It may be well to add -at once that in December Lord Spencer exchanged the Privy Seal for -the Admiralty with the capable but indolent Lord Chatham, while Lord -Mansfield took over the Presidency of the Council, and Lord Fitzwilliam -accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland. - -But these changes were accompanied by a reform of the greatest -importance in the history of our military administration. Pitt was -resolute in refusing to permit the War Department to lie in the Duke of -Portland’s hands; wherein he was probably right, for the Duke, though -he carried with him votes in the House of Commons, brought nothing -to the Council Board beyond a certain ponderous irresolution. Pitt -thereupon arranged, though with some difficulty, that Portland should -administer the Home Department, including the Colonies, but should have -no authority over naval and military business, for control of which -he created a third and new Secretariat of State for War. In itself -this measure was valuable and sound, but it was absolutely vitiated -by the selection of Henry Dundas to fill the new post. In the face of -the shameful blunders of the past eighteen months this appointment -was almost criminal; but Pitt’s ignorance of war was unfortunately -surpassed only by his infatuated trust in his friend. Thus Henry Dundas -became the First Secretary of State for War, the very worst man that -could possibly have been chosen to found the traditions of such an -office. His methods have found faithful imitation by all too many of -his successors.[188] - -So much may be said by anticipation of events which, though not -actually accomplished, were practically assured at the opening of the -session of 1794. But the secession of Portland’s following by no means -left the Opposition without keen critics of the conduct of military -affairs. Tarleton the guerilla-leader of the American war, though -a vain and shallow man, knew enough to hit the many weak points of -Henry Dundas’s enterprises, and he was backed by one abler and more -solid than himself, Major Thomas Maitland, of the Sixty-second Foot, a -brother of the extreme radical, Lord Lauderdale. We shall see more of -Maitland, who is still remembered at Malta as “King Tom,” in the years -before us. Fox also, though as usual guilty of opposition which was -purely factious, rightly pressed home upon the Government the duty of -defining to themselves what was their true object. If, he argued, the -purpose of the war were to substitute some form of government for the -present tyranny in France, then Toulon was worth more than the West -Indies; if on the other hand it was to obtain permanent possessions, -then the West Indies were worth more than Toulon. To this the -Government answered by the mouth of Jenkinson, that their end was to -destroy the existing government in France; but both he and Pitt added -that Toulon was not to be considered of such importance as to justify -a sacrifice of the opportunity for acquiring the French West Indies. -Plainer evidence could not have been given of the utter unfitness of -both to direct a formidable war.[189] - -But the Government’s measures for the augmentation of the regular Army -at the close of 1793, though not yet criticised in Parliament, were -still more questionable than its military policy. In the first place, -from blind assurance of an easy triumph, no sufficient provision had -been made in time for raising additional men; and the result was -that in October 1793 it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to -furnish a draft of one hundred men to stop the gaps in Abercromby’s -brigade in Flanders.[190] In August, however, Alan Cameron of Erracht -after much importunity had received permission to raise a regiment of -Highlanders without levy-money, and with a special stipulation that the -men should not be drafted; and thus was created the Seventy-ninth or -Cameron Highlanders. In September 1793, new regiments began to follow -each other more rapidly. First came a battalion formed by Lord Paget, -whom we shall know better as a leader of cavalry under the successive -titles of Lord Uxbridge and Marquis of Anglesey. The commission -which he received to command it was the first that he ever held in -the Army; and the regiment took, and still keeps, the number of the -Eightieth. Then came in succession Colonel John Doyle’s regiment, now -the Eighty-seventh; Colonel Albemarle Bertie’s, now the Eighty-first; -Colonel Thomas De Burgh’s, recruited chiefly in Connaught and still -known as the Eighty-eighth Connaught Rangers; Major-general Leigh’s, -now the Eighty-second; and finally three Scottish battalions raised -by Colonels Ferrier, Halkett, and Cunninghame, who had left the Scots -Brigade of Holland during the American War and now tried to make a -new brigade for their own land. Thus after a separation of over a -century the old comrades of the Buffs rejoined them in Great Britain. -In November other regiments were added, namely, General Bernard’s, -now the Eighty-fourth; General Cuyler’s, now the Eighty-sixth; -Colonel Nugent’s, recruited by Lord Buckingham among his tenants -at Stowe, now the Eighty-fifth; Colonel Fitch’s, formed chiefly of -recruits from Dublin, now the Eighty-third; and Colonel Crosbie’s, -now the Eighty-ninth.[191] From January to October 1794, there was a -deluge of new battalions, of which it must suffice to mention here a -second battalion of the Seventy-eighth, and three which began life -in February, namely, that raised by Mr. Thomas Graham, the volunteer -of Toulon, which was and still is the Ninetieth, and two Highland -corps formed by Colonel Duncan Campbell and Lord Huntly, which though -originally distinguished by other numbers[192] are known to us as the -Ninety-first and Ninety-second Highlanders. Five regiments of Light -Dragoons raised in February and March must also be mentioned, since we -shall meet with them not unfrequently, namely, Beaumont’s, Fielding’s, -Fullarton’s, Loftus’s, and Gwyn’s, which were raised without expense to -the Government, and bore the numbers Twenty-one to Twenty-five. Lastly, -attention must be called to ◆March 7.◆ a notable new departure in the -formation of a Corps of Waggoners in five companies, with a total -strength of six hundred non-commissioned officers and men, one-tenth of -them artificers. This was the first attempt at a military organisation -of the transport-service. - -It was reckoned that, in one way and another, at least thirty thousand -men were enlisted for the regular Army between November 1793 and March -1794,[193] and the number was the more astonishing since Fencibles and -substitutes for the Militia had absorbed a large number of recruits. -It would, however, be a fallacy to suppose that Ministers had yet -thought out any regular plan for continual filling of the ranks; on -the contrary, they had resorted to a variety of hasty expedients -founded upon no fixed principle, and therefore unfitted to meet more -than a temporary emergency. Such procedure is invariably wasteful -and extravagant in the highest degree; but Yonge and Dundas honestly -believed themselves to have found true economy in a clever and specious -scheme put forward by one of the Generals in Ireland, for defraying -the cost of new levies by the sale of commissions.[194] The experiment -was tried on a grand scale and with high hopes, not unmingled with -misgiving, on the part of officers; and indeed the prospect of raising -a large number of men without charge to the country was sufficiently -alluring. None the less the scheme failed completely,[195] as is the -common fate of all projects which aspire to obtain a costly article at -a trifling outlay. - -Beyond this experiment the Government could think of no better plan -for augmenting the Army than to encourage young men of means to raise -men for rank, or in other words to offer them rank in the Army in -proportion to the number of recruits that they could produce. This -was an old system which hitherto had been confined chiefly to the -raising of independent companies, and had therefore led to no higher -rank than that of Captain. Even then it had been vicious and had been -repeatedly condemned; and it was no good sign that in 1793 a Lieutenant -had advertised in the London papers, offering two thousand guineas -to any one who could raise him one hundred recruits in six weeks, -and get them passed at Chatham.[196] But it was now extended to the -raising of a multitude of battalions, which, for the most part, were -no sooner formed than they were disbanded, and drafted into other -corps. Thereby of course the men were easily absorbed, but not so the -officers, to whom the Government had pledged itself to give half-pay; -and thus it was possible for a young man to obtain a pension for life -from his country on investing a sufficient sum to raise a few score of -recruits.[197] But this was the least of the evils of the system. There -was instantly a rush to obtain letters of service; and commissions -became a drug in the market. It was said that over one hundred -commissions were signed in a single day,[198] while the Gazette could -not keep pace with the incessant promotions. The Army-brokers, who in -the days of purchase negotiated for officers the sale of commissions, -exchanges, and the like, carried on openly a most scandalous traffic. -“In a few weeks,” to use the indignant language of an officer of the -Guards, “they would dance any beardless youth, who would come up to -their price, from one newly raised corps to another, and for a greater -douceur, by an exchange into an old regiment, would procure him a -permanent situation in the standing Army.” The evils that flowed from -this system were incredible. Officers who had been driven to sell out -of the Army by their debts or their misconduct, were able after a -lucky turn at play to purchase reinstatement for themselves with the -rank of Lieutenant-colonel. Undesirable characters, such as keepers -of gambling-houses, contrived to buy for their sons the command of -regiments; and mere children were exalted in the course of a few weeks -to the dignity of field-officers. One proud parent, indeed, requested -leave of absence for one of these infant Lieutenant-colonels, on the -ground that he was not yet fit to be taken from school. It must be -noted, too, that, thanks to the Army-brokers, these evils were not -confined to the new regiments, but were spread, by means of exchange, -all over the Army; and, since the great majority of the regiments were -abroad on active service, the old officers, who were daily facing -danger and death, suddenly found themselves inferior in rank to men -undistinguished by birth or intellect, and without the smallest -pretension to military ability. - -Little less dangerous was the enormous encouragement given to crimping -by the sudden demand from all quarters for recruits. The Navy, as has -been seen, was unable to find its complement of men for the fleet, -despite the fact that the Common Council of London in January 1793 -had offered an additional bounty of two pounds to seamen;[199] and -now there was thrown into competition with the press-gang a race of -greedy, unscrupulous scoundrels, some of them holding and disgracing -the King’s commission, who made profit out of every boy or man that -they could lay hold of by fair means or foul. Thus the ranks were -filled, as Tarleton phrased it, with infancy and dotage; recruiting -became a mere matter of gambling; and the price of men rose to thirty -pounds a head.[200] So large a sum set a premium on every description -of rascality in the trepanning of recruits by violence or by guile; -and the ordinary Englishman does not lightly bear with oppression of -this kind. At length, on one day in August, an unfortunate lunatic, who -had been enlisted by a sergeant and locked up in a brothel—the synonym -for a recruiting-house—in London, hurled himself out of a window in -the third story, into the street. Instantly a mob assembled, which -delivered a succession of riotous attacks upon all houses of this -description, and was only suppressed, after several days of disorder, -by the calling out of the Guards and six regiments of cavalry.[201] -Pitt defended the system on the ground that the Navy as well as the -Army would be manned, by the turning over of soldiers to reinforce the -marines; but this is only another instance of Pitt’s callous ignorance -and self-deception. The truth is that while doing nothing, and probably -worse than nothing, for the Navy, it destroyed the efficiency of the -Army for a time, and but for the timely interposition of a capable -soldier would have destroyed it permanently. Who was responsible for -the introduction of the system it is not easy to say, for there were -so many disgraceful circumstances attending it that the whole subject -was hushed up, and is now extremely obscure; but assuredly it was not -Lord Amherst, nor is it credible that it can have been any soldier. It -is safe to assert that it was the work of civilians; and if we seek -among the civilians at the War Office for the two men of tried conceit, -unwisdom, and incapacity, we can find them at once in Sir George Yonge -and Henry Dundas.[202] - -Meanwhile new levies, even when raised under these false conditions, -were not to be produced in a moment; and thirty thousand recruits -were not to be reckoned, even by the most sanguine of Ministers, -as equivalent to the same number of old soldiers. The Government, -therefore, renewed its contract for the hire of Hanoverians and -Hessians on a greater scale, raising the total number of them to -close upon thirty-four thousand men. To these were added five foreign -corps, which were intended to supplement the dearth of light troops -from which the British contingent had suffered so much during the -campaign of 1793. As early as in May of that year, one Captain George -Ramsay had offered to raise a small body of foreign riflemen, and had -after some delay been permitted to enlist also a corps of Uhlans. Thus -originated three corps which, in honour of the Commander-in-Chief in -Flanders, were called by the name of York Chasseurs, York Rangers, -and York Hussars. The formation of the remaining two, the Prince of -Salm’s Hussars and Hompesch’s Hussars, was only authorised in February -1794, and consequently they were not ready for service at the opening -of the campaign. No effort had been made to provide British soldiers -for the work of light infantry, except by raising eight additional -light companies for the Brigade of Guards, the men of which were -distinguished by round hats with large green feathers, trousers instead -of breeches and gaiters, and fusils instead of muskets. But with these -details of dress their qualifications as light troops were exhausted; -for they received no sufficient instruction in their peculiar duty.[203] - -The Light Dragoons likewise continued to belie their name, being -trained in reality simply as cavalry of the line of battle; but for -this, probably, the civil rather than the military authorities of the -Army were responsible, for at this period it was literally impossible -to obtain officers for the mounted troops. It will be remembered that -before the outbreak of the war the Adjutant-general had constantly, but -in vain, endeavoured to obtain an increase of the wholly inadequate -pittance of pay meted out to subalterns of dragoons. Even in peace -the burdens laid upon them were too heavy to be borne, and to these -were now added inadequate compensation for losses in the field, only -eighteen pounds being granted to replace a charger which had cost -thirty-five. The consequences became immediately apparent. The Duke of -York was obliged to beg that the cornetcies of regiments serving in the -Low Countries might be given away, since purchasers for them could not -be found.[204] Thus the Light Dragoons were untaught, because there -were no officers to teach them; patrols and advanced detachments lacked -the daring and adventurous leading of youth; and one of the highest -schools for the training of subalterns was wholly neglected. It is -hardly possible to estimate the evil consequences of Pitt’s misdirected -parsimony, in devoting to the hire of mercenaries the money which -should have been spent in the improvement of the British Army. - -So much must be said of the regular forces; but the year 1794 was not -less remarkable for an enormous increase in the number of the Fencible -regiments, Militia and Volunteers, all due to Carnot’s menace of -invasion. The estimate for the Fencible Cavalry provided in March 1794 -for forty troops; by May this figure had already risen to ninety-two -troops, and was still rising. Next, the number of the embodied Militia -for England was augmented to thirty-six thousand; while by an Act of the -Irish Parliament, passed in 1793, sixteen thousand additional Militia -were levied in Ireland. This latter was an entirely new departure; and -it need hardly be said that the first ballots drawn on the west of St. -George’s Channel led to serious rioting.[205] Provision was also made in -the estimates, and a Bill was introduced for the raising of six thousand -Militia in Scotland; but this measure was for the moment deferred, in -order that familiarity might ultimately facilitate its passing. The -formation of the Scottish Militia, however, appears to have been begun -in anticipation,[206] and men were enlisted who, later in the year, -◆Oct. 15–Nov. 20.◆ were formed into over twenty battalions of Fencible -infantry. The extension of the ballot throughout the three kingdoms, -though not actually completed until the passing of the Scottish Militia -Act in 1797, must be regarded as the most important military step taken -since the passing of the Militia Act of 1757 by the elder Pitt; and due -credit should be allowed to the Government for it. - -Meanwhile, to augment the English Militia to the prescribed figure, -an Act was passed, after the model of that of 1778, empowering the -Lord-Lieutenants to enrol volunteers, to be added to the Militia, -and to be entitled to the same bounty, subsistence, and clothing. -Finally, in April, was passed an Act, limited to the duration of the -war, authorising the formation of district corps or companies of -Volunteers, to be entitled to pay and subject to military discipline -if called out for invasion or in aid of the civil power. This was the -first attempt to summon the manhood of the kingdom to arms; for though -Shelburne in the peril of 1782 had sent a circular to all the Mayors -and Lord-Lieutenants in England with the object of forming a levy _en -masse_, yet the hastening of the peace, by Rodney’s victory of the -Saints and by the relief of Gibraltar, had rendered any elaboration -of the plan unnecessary. Now, however, there sprang up an infinity -of Volunteer corps, infantry, artillery, and light horse or Yeomanry -Cavalry, first in single companies and troops, but very soon in -battalions and regiments. The first of the Volunteer corps appears -to have been the five Associated Companies of St. George’s, Hanover -Square, which was formed in anticipation of the Act;[207] the first -of the Yeomanry was Lord Winchelsea’s three troops of “Gentlemen and -Yeomanry,” raised by the County of Rutland.[208] The rapidity with -which these Volunteers were raised would be flattering to the national -vanity were it not susceptible of a commonplace explanation. By a -certain clause in the Act Volunteers were exempted from service in the -Militia, upon producing a certificate that they had attended exercise -punctually during six weeks previously to the hearing of appeals -against the Militia list. This dissociation of the Volunteers from -the Militia was a great and disastrous blunder, which has never yet -been thoroughly repaired. It is, however, sufficient to note for the -present that the Government had deliberately set up three different -descriptions of auxiliary forces, Militia, Fencibles, and Volunteers, -all competing with each other and with the regular Army. The number -of regular troops provided for in the estimates of 1794 (reckoning -the Irish establishment at fourteen thousand) was one hundred and -seventy-five thousand men, besides thirty-four thousand foreign -troops, four thousand Fencibles, and fifty-two thousand Militia; or, -say, two hundred and sixty-five thousand men in all. - -Simultaneously with these efforts at home, Pitt worked strenuously -to restore unity and vigour to the Coalition. The relations of the -coalesced powers at the close of 1793 were in the highest degree -unsatisfactory. The Empress Catherine, still insatiable, despite -the deterioration of her forces and the exhaustion of her treasury, -had resumed her old designs upon Turkey, and had set a large force -in motion towards Constantinople. The Emperor Francis, still under -the guidance of Thugut and full of vague plans for increasing his -territory, was drawing closer to the Empress in the hope of obtaining -her countenance to the annexation of Venice by Austria, if indemnity in -France should fail, and of sharing with her the ultimate partition of -Turkey. Both were bitterly incensed against Prussia: Catherine because -King Frederick William had diverted his troops from the invasion of -France to the strengthening of his position in Poland; Francis from -jealousy that his rival should have enlarged his boundaries, when he -himself had not. Frederick William, as has been seen, had practically -withdrawn his forces from active operations on the Rhine; and -accordingly in December 1793 Pitt had sent Lord Malmesbury to Berlin to -ascertain (if, indeed, anything could be ascertained in such a centre -of intrigue and falsehood) what might be Prussia’s motive for retiring -from the struggle. In reply to Malmesbury, Frederick William, having -obtained his desire in Poland, declared himself eager to continue the -contest against the Jacobins, but absolutely prevented by lack of -money. ◆Feb. 5.◆ Thereupon Pitt proposed to give Prussia a subsidy of -two millions sterling, of which England should pay three-fifths, and -Holland and Austria each one-fifth. This was a liberal offer; and, -since it was certain that Holland would raise no objection, it lay -practically with Austria to give effect to it. It was well known that -Austria was in financial straits, that Hungary was full of unrest and -the Belgic Provinces much cooled in their loyalty, and that, apart -from these troubles at home, the Emperor had contrived to quarrel -with Sardinia abroad. Hence it was beyond question that Austria could -not carry on the war without Prussia’s assistance; and, forasmuch as -Francis had already despatched emissaries to Berlin to discuss the -operations to be undertaken in the spring, the natural presumption was -that he would gladly close with Pitt’s proposal. - -The British Government thereupon bestirred itself to frame its projects -for the coming campaign. The Duke of York left Belgium for London on the -6th of February; ◆Feb. 12.◆ and a few days later Mack, now advanced to -the rank of Major-general, arrived there likewise to concert plans with -the Ministers. The Austrian genius had shortly before submitted[209] a -scheme calculated for a force of three hundred and forty thousand men, -which had been received with great satisfaction by the British Cabinet -and the Duke of York; but, since there was no earthly possibility that -the Coalition could put that number of men into the field, the whole of -this elaborate creation was valueless. Both Mack and Coburg, however, -pressed for a concentration of forces and a march on Paris, though -neither of them could conceive the feasibility of taking the offensive -without leaving one hundred and twenty thousand men behind them to guard -the frontier from the Meuse to the sea. The prime question, therefore, -was one of men, and Pitt on his side promised his utmost endeavour to -increase the British contingent to a figure which should ensure a -genuine total of forty thousand fighting soldiers. As to the means -whereby this force should be produced, Pitt was remarkably vague, being -clear only that he could not spare the few thousand men under Lord -Moira’s command, since he wished to hold them ready to sail to any part -of the British coast which might be threatened by a French invasion. -Moira, therefore, though one of the ablest officers in the Army and -adored by the men, was kept inactive, while his troops sickened and died -of gaol-fever in overcrowded transports at Jersey.[210] However, Pitt -made up his forty thousand men to his own satisfaction by naming various -reinforcements, which he hoped to pour into Flanders during the summer -and autumn; for it was one of the delusions of this gifted man, as also -of his friend Dundas, that an army of twenty thousand men, supplemented -by monthly driblets of two thousand men during ten months, is the same -thing as an army of forty thousand men ready for the field at the -opening of the campaign. - -The next requisite was that the Austrian, Prussian, and British -contingents should each of them possess a siege-train, since, according -to Mack, it was essential for the Allies to master every fortress on -the French frontier from the Meuse to the sea. Pitt promised this also, -on behalf of the British; and then arose the question of commanders. -Though well aware that the King’s assent would be wrung from him only -by extreme pressure, the Ministers were for recalling the Duke of York -and appointing Lord Cornwallis, who had just returned from India, in -his place. Herein they were undoubtedly right, for, after all allowance -made for the extreme difficulty of his position, the Duke did not shine -in the field. The Ministers, however, blamed him especially for the -failure before Dunkirk, wherein they themselves were chiefly in fault; -and Mack, prompted apparently by the King, found little difficulty in -making excuses for the Duke, who from the first had condemned the idea -of attacking Dunkirk at all. It was finally arranged that he should -retain command of the British contingent, but that he should be kept -always in the neighbourhood of the principal army, with a few thousand -Austrians attached to his own corps, so as to subordinate him the more -completely to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. This compromise bears -so clearly the mark of the British politician that its origin cannot -be doubtful. It is of a kind that may serve for the construction -of a Cabinet, but it is not suitable for war, and was particularly -ill-fitted to the projected campaign. For the rest, Pitt declared -himself satisfied that the command should remain with Coburg, who was -deservedly most popular among the Austrian troops; and Mack rejoiced -the heart of the British Cabinet by announcing that the Emperor would -direct the operations as Generalissimo in person. Altogether the -results of the conference were considered to be so satisfactory that -the King presented Mack with a jewelled sword as a reward for his good -service.[211] - -The British Government’s satisfaction was soon proved to be premature. -The discussion of future operations with the Court of Berlin was, in -fact, only a trick of Thugut to keep as many Prussian troops as possible -on the French frontier; and the whole intent of the Emperor’s taking -personal command was that Coburg and other honest men in his army, who -profoundly distrusted his chief adviser, should be kept under proper -restraint. Thugut now declared, in answer to Pitt’s proposals, that -Austria would not advance a penny towards the subsidies for the Prussian -army, being well able to dispense with every part of it beyond the -twenty thousand men which formed its contribution towards the forces of -the Empire. ◆March 11.◆ In fact, he was so madly jealous and fearful of -Prussia at this time that he secretly proposed to Russia a scheme for a -joint attack upon her. On learning the Emperor’s decision, King -Frederick William ordered Marshal Möllendorf to begin the withdrawal of -his troops from the Rhine. Coburg was in consternation, for he knew -that, without Prussian help, the execution of the approved plan of -campaign would be impossible. He therefore asked the Duke of York to -join him in requesting Möllendorf to delay his retirement, and -despatched letter after letter to Vienna, adjuring the Emperor in terms -of touching devotion and patriotism to send every man that he could -raise to Flanders, and to work loyally with Prussia to crush the -terrible power of the Revolution while there was yet time. Möllendorf -courteously acceded to his desire; but the Prince’s protests fell on -deaf ears in the Imperial capital. There were over sixty thousand men -ready for service at Vienna, but from his insane dread of Prussian -aggression, Thugut would not part with one of them; and Coburg’s only -reward for his faithful and disinterested counsel was rude and -ungracious rebuke. Just at the critical moment, however, Lord Malmesbury -checked the further withdrawal of the Prussian troops, by threatening to -break off all negotiation for a subsidy unless they remained on the -Rhine until he could receive further instructions from London. This -brought the impecunious King to reason, for without English money he was -lost. Shortly afterwards the parley was, with Pitt’s sanction, resumed; -and there was much haggling over the sphere wherein the Prussian troops -should be employed, Frederick William declaring that for operations on -the Rhine he would furnish eighty thousand men, but for Belgium not more -than fifty thousand. ◆April 19.◆ Finally, Malmesbury succeeded in -compromising matters; and a treaty was signed at the Hague on the 19th -of April, whereby Prussia, in consideration of a lump sum of £300,000 -and a subsidy of £50,000 a month, engaged herself to provide sixty-two -thousand men, to be employed wherever Great Britain and Holland, their -paymasters, should think fit. ◆April 30.◆ Ten days later Fox in the -House of Commons predicted that this would be a useless waste of money; -and it will be seen that he was a true prophet.[212] - -Meanwhile Coburg was doing his utmost to prepare his army for the heavy -work that lay before it; but the Austrian forces had not improved since -the previous year. Heavy losses had brought many young soldiers into the -ranks; and, owing to the extreme extension of his line of cantonments, -the troops had gained little rest during the winter. The French -delivered as many as forty-five petty attacks between the 6th of January -and the 26th of March, each one of which meant the setting of many -detachments in motion for long and harassing matches. Moreover, owing to -the decay of the Emperor’s popularity in Belgium, the people would do -little or nothing for the troops; and, Coburg being unwilling to take -from the inhabitants what they refused to give, the men suffered greatly -from want of food, fuel, and shelter. Money would, of course, have -overcome all difficulties, but, though the Prince begged piteously for -it, he could obtain none from Vienna; and the consequences were most -cruel. “Some regiments,” he wrote in February, “have been without bread -for several days, and two contractors have been driven to suicide.” On -the other hand, taking a true measure of his enemy, Coburg had issued -instructions that the French must be attacked at all times and in all -circumstances, and that, even in the defence of a position, at least a -third of the men should be kept ready for a counter-attack. But there -was one clause in his orders which seems to give the key to many an -Austrian defeat. “Men defending entrenchments will sit in the banquette, -arms in hand, until the enemy comes within three hundred paces, or even -somewhat nearer, and then open a heavy fire.” British troops were -accustomed to hold their fire until the enemy was within thirty paces; -and hence it was that the French Army of Italy, when they met them in -Egypt, found the red coats tougher adversaries than the white.[213] - -Among the rest of the Allies matters were little better than with -the Austrians. The Hessians in Flanders were far below their proper -strength, sickness and constant skirmishes having swallowed up the -additional recruits furnished during the winter; while the brigade -which had been attached to Moira’s force left one hundred dead and -two hundred and fifty invalided in the Isle of Wight, over and above -five hundred sick men whom they carried with them to Ostend.[214] As -to the British, everything was, as usual, behindhand, though the Duke -of York had now a more energetic Chief of Staff than Murray in Colonel -James Craig, whom we saw last at Wilmington in 1781. Recognising from -his American experience how serious was the Duke’s deficiency in light -troops, Craig tried to hire some from Prussia, but without success. -There was a difficulty about the British siege-train, for it was -discovered, some weeks after the Duke had made requisition for it, that -the application had been mislaid at the Office of Ordnance. Though -Dundas made profuse promises of British drafts and reinforcements, to -the number of five thousand men, not one thousand of these had arrived -by the middle of March, and Abercromby’s brigade was quite unfit to -take the field. The remount-horses were discovered to be very bad. -Artillery-drivers, moreover, the dearth of which had been represented -by the Duke for quite six months, were found to be so scarce in England -that the Master-General was fain to seek them, though without success, -in Hanover. A fresh disappointment arose in the matter of foreign -troops, for it proved impossible to obtain three thousand Brunswickers, -whom Dundas had counted upon taking over from the Dutch into the -British service. Rapidly the forty thousand soldiers promised by Pitt -dwindled away; and Craig resigned himself to the inevitable fact that -the deficiency would amount to at least ten thousand men. But this -was not, to his thinking, the most formidable danger. With a boldness -which must have shocked Pitt and Dundas, he wrote to the War Office a -very strong and damaging criticism of the cordon-system, and predicted -that nothing but misfortune could attend Generals who upon principle -preferred dispersion to concentration.[215] - -So the month of March passed away, the unhappy Coburg waiting in -anxious suspense to know first, when the troops that composed his -heterogeneous army would be ready; secondly, what their numbers might -be when they were ready; and thirdly, what the Emperor would expect -him to do with them when it should please him to honour headquarters -with his presence. Meanwhile Coburg had even in February given orders -for the contraction of his cantonments; and at the beginning of April, -after much shifting, his force occupied the following positions. - -The Right or western Wing of the Allied Army, covering maritime -Flanders, was entrusted to Clerfaye with a force of Austrians, -Hessians, and Hanoverians, who thus occupied the ground formerly -entrusted to the British and Dutch. His headquarters were at Tournai, -where an entrenched camp had been thrown up. In his front also Orchies -and Marchiennes had been strengthened by field-works; and on his right -efforts had been made to restore the defences of Menin, Ypres, and -Nieuport, though, except in the case of Ypres, with little result. The -effective strength of Clerfaye’s army in the field, after deduction of -garrisons for the strong places, was about twenty-four thousand men. - -On Clerfaye’s left, and connected with it by a detachment of five -thousand men under General Wurmb at Denain on the Scheldt, stood the -Centre or principal army, consisting of about twenty-two thousand men -under the Duke of York, about forty-three thousand men under Coburg -himself, and of about nineteen thousand Dutch under the Prince of -Orange. The Duke occupied the right with headquarters at St. Amand, -Coburg the centre with headquarters at Valenciennes, and the Prince of -Orange the left with headquarters at Bavai. It was reckoned that, after -providing for garrisons, Coburg could spare sixty-five thousand men for -active operations. - -The Left Wing consisted of twenty-seven thousand Dutch and Austrians -under Count Kaunitz, which were stretched over the space from -Bettignies, a little to the north of Maubeuge, to Dinant on the Meuse. - -To these must be added fifteen thousand more Austrians under General -Beaulieu, cantoned between Namur and Tréves, bringing the grand total -of the Allied force to something over one hundred and sixty thousand -men, of which at the very most one hundred and twenty thousand were -free for work in the field.[216] - -It will be noticed that the corps of Clerfaye and of the Duke of York -had exchanged the places which they had occupied during the previous -year, pursuant to the design of the British Ministers that the Duke of -York should be kept under the immediate eye of Coburg. The first result -of this interference was to spoil Clerfaye’s temper for the whole -campaign; for he judged his force too weak for its task of defending -the maritime provinces; and indeed it was only by the positive orders -of Coburg that he consented to hold the command.[217] The whole -arrangement, in fact, was calculated to cause confusion. It was bad -enough that the lines of retreat for the British and Austrians should -be in exactly opposite directions; and the obvious course, upon the -change of the Duke of York’s station, would have been to have shifted -his base to Antwerp. But far from this, not only was his base continued -at Ostend, but, to make matters worse, a brigade of British was placed -under Clerfaye’s command, and a respectable number of Austrians under -the Duke of York’s; so that in case of mishap, not only must the lines -of retreat for the right and right centre intersect each other, but -neither corps could retire upon its base without leading several of its -regiments in the wrong direction. - -Meanwhile on the French side Carnot had girded himself for a supreme -effort. “We must finish matters this year,” he wrote to Pichegru on the -11th of February; “unless we make rapid progress and annihilate the -enemy to the last man within three months, all is lost. To begin again -next year would mean for us to perish of hunger and exhaustion.” He -therefore decided to combine the armies of the North, of the Ardennes -and of the Moselle, and to mass two hundred and fifty thousand men -along the line from Dunkirk to the Meuse. Of these about one hundred -thousand were to move upon Ypres, march thence upon Ghent, master -maritime Flanders, and then wheel eastward upon Brussels; while at -the same time another hundred thousand were to advance upon Namur and -Liège, and sever communication with Luxemburg. In other words, he -designed to turn and envelop both flanks of the Allied Army, leaving -about fifty thousand men to stand on the defensive in the intermediate -space between Bouchain and Maubeuge. - -Of the many eminent critics who have passed judgment upon this -plan, there is not one who has failed to point out and condemn its -defects; and indeed it is obvious that if the Allies, neglecting small -detachments, should fall with their full strength upon either wing -of the enemy, they might annihilate it. An advance of the French in -overwhelming strength upon the communications of the Allies about Namur -would have been equally effective and far less hazardous. Yet Carnot -prescribed the invasion of the maritime provinces as the first object, -partly no doubt with a view to the ultimate invasion of England, but -chiefly, as I conceive, with the political object of threatening the -retreat of the British and thus overawing the most formidable power -in the Coalition. It is worth while to recall that in 1815 Wellington -looked for Napoleon to turn the western flank of the Allies and cut -the British off from the sea, and that he dreaded such a movement so -much that he made his dispositions at Waterloo with a view to prevent -it. Wellington’s action has been as sharply criticised as Carnot’s; -and yet, when two such men agree upon such a point, their opinion is -at least worth serious consideration. In any case, the threatening of -the lines of communication both east and west was quite sufficient -to distract the councils of the Allies, to set them quarrelling as -to which among themselves should be sacrificed to the others, and -so perhaps to bring about political discord and the rupture of the -Coalition. - -At the end of March Pichegru gave the strength of the army of the -North at two hundred and six thousand, and of the army of the Ardennes -at thirty-seven thousand men, making a total of two hundred and -forty-three thousand present under arms, of which one hundred and -eighty-three thousand were free for service in the field. The army of -the North at the beginning of April was thus distributed. The Left -Wing, seventy-one thousand men, extended from Dunkirk by Cassel and -Lille to Pont-à-Marque; the Centre, forty-seven thousand men, from -Arleux (near Douai) by Cambrai, Bouchain, and Bohain to Étreux, a -little to the north of Guise; the Right Wing, thirty-six thousand men, -from Avesnes by Cerfontaine, St. Rémy, and St. Waast to Maubeuge. This -made a total of one hundred and fifty-four thousand men ready for the -field; one half of them, under such leaders as Moreau and Souham, -standing on the frontier of maritime Flanders. As early as on the 11th -of March Carnot ordered Pichegru to begin the advance on Ypres; but the -General, though willing to train his troops by countless skirmishes, -made no movement until the 29th of March, when he attacked the Austrian -advanced posts at Le Cateau with thirty thousand men, and was beaten -back with the loss of twelve hundred killed and wounded and four guns. -“It is dangerous,” he reported, “to match our young troops against the -enemy so soon”; and therewith his operations incontinently ceased. - -Meanwhile Coburg, still awaiting his orders, made no attempt to -overwhelm any one of the scattered French divisions. ◆April 2.◆ At last -on the 2nd of April the Emperor quitted Vienna, reached Brussels in -company with his brothers, the Archdukes Charles and Joseph on the 9th, -and on the 14th joined Coburg at Valenciennes. ◆April 14.◆ The Prince -then laid before him the danger of the Allied position, with both wings -too weak to take the offensive against an enemy which was reported to be -three hundred thousand strong; and followed this up by recommending the -advance of the centre to the siege of Landrecies, for which Mack had -prepared one of his usual elaborate schemes. Thus the Austrians reverted -once more to a war of petty sieges, which could produce no decisive -result. Indeed the only thing to be said for operations in the selected -quarter was that the country was open and well suited to cavalry, in -which arm the Allies were far superior both in quantity and quality to -the French. The Emperor approved the plan; and the troops were set in -motion forthwith, nominally for a great review to be held in the -Emperor’s honour near Le Cateau. Thus, despite all Carnot’s efforts to -take the initiative, it fell to the Allies to open the new campaign. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER X - - -◆1794.◆ - -◆April 16.◆ - -On the 16th of April, as had been arranged, the whole of the main army -was inspected by the Emperor on the heights of Cateau. The British -infantry was represented, as in the last campaign, by three battalions -of Guards, with a fourth battalion formed out of their flank-companies, -and by Abercromby’s brigade of the Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and -Fifty-third. These last had at length received their first instalment -of recruits to make good their losses during 1793, in the shape of a -draft which was described as “much resembling Falstaff’s men, and as -lightly clad as any Carmagnole battalion”[218] of the French Army. -The cavalry numbered twenty-eight squadrons, drawn from fourteen -regiments[219] and organised into four brigades, three of heavy and one -of light dragoons, the last being supplemented by a picked squadron -of the Carbineers under the command of Captain Stapleton Cotton, a -lad of twenty, who in later years was to earn the title of Viscount -Combermere. The review over, the Emperor took up his quarters in Le -Cateau, whither the commanders forthwith repaired to him for orders. - -◆April 17.◆ - -The French troops under Pichegru in the immediate front of the Emperor -consisted of three divisions, with an average strength of twelve -thousand men each, extended along an entrenched position some eighteen -miles long, on the wooded heights of Bohain and Nouvion. Of these -Fromentin’s division held Catillon on the Sambre, a village rather -over four miles east and south of Le Cateau; westward of Fromentin, -Ballaud’s division lay astride the road from Le Cateau to Guise, at -Arbre de Guise and Ribeauville; and, still further to west and south, -Goguet’s division held the ground about Vaux, Prémont, and Bohain. The -nearest French troops beyond these to westward were fifteen thousand -men under Chappuis about Cambrai; while to eastward three divisions of -the French right wing, numbering some thirty thousand men, lined the -Sambre from St. Waast to Maubeuge. - -There was therefore an opportunity of overwhelming one or other of -these isolated bodies; but the Austrians clung religiously to their -old methods. The force was divided into eight columns, three of which -were directed to move north-westward toward Cambrai, so as to check -any movement from that side. These need trouble us no more. Of the -remaining five, two on the left were ordered to drive the enemy out of -Catillon, cross the Sambre, and after clearing the forest of Nouvion -to push forward their light troops. One column in the centre, under -Coburg’s personal command, was designed to move by Ribeauville upon -Wassigny to master the heights further to southward; while two more -on the right, under the Duke of York and Sir William Erskine, were -to advance, the former upon Vaux, the latter upon Prémont, to drive -the enemy from their entrenched positions there and at Bohain, and -to press their light troops forward upon Le Catelet. All commanders -were expressly ordered to halt the main portion of their troops on the -captured ground, so that there was no intention of pursuing the enemy -in the event of success. - -It would be tedious to describe so feeble an operation. The scene of -the engagement is a country much broken by ravines and hollow roads, -so that the heavy artillery of some of the columns was with difficulty -brought forward; but the French, being in a manner surprised, were -manœuvred out of their positions with little trouble or loss. The -Duke of York’s and Erskine’s columns alone encountered resistance -worth mentioning, but they found little difficulty in turning the -French entrenchments, while the Austrian Hussars and a squadron of -the Sixteenth Light Dragoons succeeded in cutting down great numbers -of the retreating enemy. Altogether the Allies lost fewer than seven -hundred killed and wounded, while the action was reckoned to have cost -the French over two thousand men, besides from twenty to thirty guns, -of which eleven were captured by the British columns. Beyond this the -French were little molested in their retreat to Guise, and the trifling -success of the day was marred by disgraceful plundering and burning on -the part of the Allied troops after the engagement. The British had -already shown tendencies in this direction, but had been checked by the -Duke of York, who had hanged two offenders, caught red-handed, on the -spot, without even the form of a drumhead court-martial. Now, however, -the Austrians led the way in misconduct, either led astray by some of -their savage auxiliaries, or in aimless revenge for their starvation -during the winter; and the British were only too ready to follow the -example.[220] - -[Illustration: - - CAMPAIGN OF APRIL, 1794. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆April 18.◆ - -On the following day the army halted between Nouvion and Prémont, -pushing its outposts further to southward, while detachments of -Austrians were posted also at Prisches, a few miles north of Nouvion, -and at La Capelle, Fontenelle, and Garmouset to eastward, so as to -cover the left flank and rear of the army. Thereupon the Prince of -Orange, whose troops had been advanced towards Cambrai on the 17th, -countermarched to Le Cateau, and assembling his force at Forest, about -three miles to the north of it, ◆April 20.◆ on the 20th fell upon the -enemy’s posts over against Landrecies on the left bank of the Sambre. -After a hard struggle, which cost him one thousand men and the French -twice as many, he carried the French position, and at once opened the -trenches before the town. ◆April 21.◆ On the following day Pichegru -delivered feeble and incoherent assaults upon the positions of Prisches -and Nouvion, and upon the heights to the south of Wassigny, all of -which were beaten off with the loss to him of many men and four guns. -◆April 22.◆ Further desultory fighting at the advanced posts on the -next day was equally unfavourable to Pichegru, as indeed he deserved -for his folly in not concentrating the thirty thousand men, who lay -ready to his hand at Maubeuge, for an overwhelming attack. - -Coburg then judged it safe to proceed with the siege in earnest, -and, withdrawing the covering army to the north, formed it in a huge -semicircle around the besieging force. His left wing curved round from -the heights that lie to eastward of Landrecies, and between it and the -village of Maroilles, southward to Prisches, thence south-east across -the Rivierette to Le Sart, and thence by Fesmy to the Sambre, the -whole line being strongly entrenched, with several bridges thrown over -the Rivierette. The force allotted for the defence of this tract was -thirty-two battalions, fifty squadrons, and twenty-six light companies, -the left under General Alvintzy, the right under General Kinsky. On the -western bank of the Sambre the right wing completed the semicircle, -with a total of twenty-six battalions and seventy-six squadrons. The -first section of the defences on this side ran westward of Catillon -to the Selle, from which stream the Duke of York’s army carried the -line north-westward to the road from Le Cateau to Cambrai. This, a -broad paved way, runs straight as an arrow over the long waves of -rolling ground that lie between the two towns, the undulations rising -to their highest at the village of Inchy, upon which the Duke rested -his right. The position thus occupied by the Allies was over twenty -miles in extent, following a chain of hills of easy slope but seamed to -east of Catillon by deep watercourses and hollows, and broken by small -copses and enclosures in the neighbourhood of the villages. Westward -from Catillon, however, towards Cambrai the hills subside into a broad -plain, not unlike Salisbury Plain, except that the undulations are far -longer and the acclivities therefore less severe. Covered with crops -but unenclosed, its gentle slopes and unseen folds present an ideal -field for the action and manœuvres of cavalry. - -◆April 23.◆ - -On the 23rd intelligence reached the Allies that fifteen thousand -of the enemy had moved out from Cambrai in three columns towards -the north-east, were driving in the outposts along the lower Selle, -and had even crossed that river, apparently with the object of -intercepting the Emperor Francis, who was returning from a visit to -Brussels, to rejoin the headquarters of the army. The Austrian General -Otto, receiving information of these movements from Major-general -Sentheresky at St. Hilaire, between four and five miles north-west -of Inchy, at once joined him there; and reconnoitring further north -he found the enemy, apparently about ten thousand strong, near the -village of Villers-en-Cauchies. Having with him only two squadrons -of the Fifteenth Light Dragoons and as many of the Austrian Leopold -Hussars, making together little more than three hundred sabres, Otto -fell back to St. Hilaire, and sent a message to the Duke of York for -reinforcements. Late at night he was joined by the Eleventh Light -Dragoons, two squadrons of the Austrian Zeschwitz Cuirassiers, and -Mansel’s brigade of the Blues, Royals, and Third Dragoon Guards, the -whole numbering ten squadrons. - -◆April 24.◆ - -Early on the following morning he again moved northward down the valley -of the Selle, keeping the Fifteenth and Leopold Hussars in advance and -the remainder in support; and at about seven o’clock the four advanced -squadrons came upon a force of French light cavalry of twice or thrice -their strength in a long belt of dwarf coppice, near the village of -Montrecourt, and about two miles east of Villers-en-Cauchies. Being -attacked on their left flank the French horsemen at once retreated with -precipitation for a quarter of a mile, when they rallied, and then -retired steadily westward, covered by a cloud of skirmishers. Finally -they re-formed between Villers-en-Cauchies and Avesnes-le-Sec, fronting -to eastward, and masking a force of unknown strength in their rear. -Otto appears to have followed up this cavalry with great speed, for, -on looking round for his supports, he could nowhere discover them. He -halted the advanced squadrons, but, perceiving that he had already -committed them too deeply, he assembled the officers and told them -briefly that there was nothing for it but to attack. The English and -Austrian officers then crossed swords in pledge that they would charge -home; and it was agreed that the British should attack in front, and -the Austrians on the enemy’s left flank towards Avesnes-le-Sec, which -was already a name of good omen in the annals of the Austrian cavalry. - -[Illustration: - - AVESNES-LE-SEC, 12 Sep, 1793 - - VILLERS-EN-CAUCHIES - 24 April, 1794 - - BEAUMONT, 26 April, 1794. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -The Fifteenth led by Captain Aylett now advanced at a rapid trot, -breaking into a gallop at one hundred and fifty yards from the French -cavalry. These did not await the shock but wheeled outwards, right and -left, and retired at speed, unmasking a line of French skirmishers -and guns, which opened fire before their front was clear and killed -several of their own soldiers. In rear of the artillery six French -battalions, or about three thousand men, were massed together in -quadrate formation of oblong shape,[221] with the front rank kneeling. -A volley from the eastern face of this square, together with a -discharge of grape from the guns, checked the attack for a moment; but, -cheered on by their officers, the Fifteenth swept through the battery -and dashed straight upon the bayonets. The French infantry seems to -have stood till the last moment, for Aylett fell with a deep thrust -through the body, and four other officers had their horses wounded -under them; but the onset of the Dragoons was irresistible. One half of -the square was dispersed instantly; and the other half, after firing a -volley, broke up likewise before the charge of the Fifteenth, and fled -in wild disorder. In rear of the square were more French squadrons, -upon which those that retired from the front had been re-formed; -but these had given way before the impetuous attack of the Austrian -Hussars, and for half a mile the sabres of both Austrians and British -dealt terrible havoc among the flying Frenchmen.[222] - -Leaving, however, the Austrians to pursue the infantry towards -Cambrai, the Fifteenth, now commanded by Captain Pocklington, passed -on to the road from Villers-en-Cauchies to Bouchain, dispersed a long -line of fifty guns and ammunition-waggons, which were retiring to -the north-west, and continued the chase until the guns of Bouchain -itself opened fire upon them, and a relieving force came out to save -the convoy. Meanwhile not a sign appeared of the supporting squadrons -which might have ensured the capture of the artillery; and Pocklington, -observing other forces of the enemy closing in upon him from every -side, rallied his men and retired at a trot. The blue uniform of the -Light Dragoons, however, caused the French to mistake them for friends; -and it was not until they were close to Villers-en-Cauchies that -Pocklington perceived that he was cut off. The enemy was, in fact, -established in his front, blocking the road with infantry and artillery -at a point where a causeway carried it across a valley, though to the -south of the village there were visible the scarlet coats of Mansel’s -brigade. Wheeling about, therefore, for a short time, Pocklington -checked the pursuers that were following him from Bouchain, and then, -wheeling once more to his proper front, he galloped through the French -amid a heavy fire of grape and musketry with little loss, and safely -rejoined his comrades. - -Things, however, had not gone well with Mansel and his brigade. Whether -it was by Otto’s fault or by his own that he had gone astray, and -whether he attempted and failed in an attack upon the French who were -obstructing Pocklington’s retreat, is a mystery. We know only that -Craig reported, with great regret, that the brigade had behaved ill; -that he attributed the fault mainly to Mansel, whom after the action -of the 17th he had already reported as an incompetent officer; but -that the troops also were to blame, though the Royals had immediately -recovered themselves and protected the retreat of the other two -regiments. More curious still, the list of casualties shows that the -Third Dragoon Guards suffered the very heavy loss of thirty-eight men -and forty-six horses killed, besides nine more men wounded and missing, -though the casualties of the Royals and the Blues were trifling.[223] -From this I infer that Mansel led his brigade to the sound of the guns, -and, being ordered to attack the fresh division of the enemy that had -come upon the ground, contrived by irresolution and mismanagement to -bring the Third Dragoon Guards under enfilading fire of the French -cannon, and to throw the whole of the six squadrons into confusion. In -any case it is certain that the brilliant attack of the Fifteenth was -insufficiently supported, and that Mansel and his brigade, justly or -unjustly, lay under reproach, until two days later they redeemed their -good name beyond all chance of cavil. The casualties of the French in -this action were eight hundred men killed and four hundred wounded, -besides three guns taken; while the Fifteenth escaped with a loss of -thirty-one men and thirty-seven horses killed and wounded, and the -Leopold Hussars with a loss of ten men and eleven horses killed and -wounded and the same number missing. The Emperor of Austria conferred -on the officers of the Fifteenth a gold medal and the much-coveted -order of Maria Theresa; and the regiment still bears on its -appointments the name of Villers-en-Cauchies. With a little more luck, -or, it may be, a little better management, Otto would have achieved one -of the greatest successes ever recorded of cavalry against infantry, -and annihilated the whole of the force that had moved out from Cambrai. - -As matters stood, however, the reverse to the French produced little -effect on Pichegru. Successive reinforcements had more than made good -his losses; and on the 24th of April the combined strength of the -armies of the North and of the Ardennes, not counting fifty thousand -men employed as garrisons, was little short of two hundred thousand men -free for service in the field, or nearly two to one of Coburg’s force. -Relying upon this numerical superiority the French General started for -Lille, in order from thence to direct operations against Clerfaye. At -the same time, however, he set his troops in motion to raise the siege -of Landrecies, directing General Charbonnier with thirty thousand men -of the army of the Ardennes to attack Kaunitz on the extreme left wing -of the Allies, while at the same time General Ferrand with forty-five -thousand from Guise should fall on the covering army on the east and -south, and General Chappuis with thirty thousand men from Cambrai -should assail the Duke of York on the west. - -◆April 26.◆ - -Accordingly, early in the morning of the 26th the French engaged -the covering army simultaneously at all points. On the east General -Fromentin with twenty-two thousand men assailed Maroilles and Prisches, -and after a long and severe struggle captured the latter position, -severing for the time communications between Alvintzy and Kinsky. -Alvintzy himself was disabled by two wounds, and the situation was -for a time most critical until the Archduke Charles, who had succeeded -to the command of Alvintzy’s troops, by a final and skilful effort -recovered the lost ground and drove the French over the Little Helpe. -This enabled him to reinforce the centre under General Bellegarde, -who with some difficulty was defending the line from Oisy to Nouvion -against twenty-three thousand men. Thereupon Bellegarde instantly took -the offensive, completely defeated the French, and captured from them -nine guns. - -But far more brilliant was the success of the Allies on the west, where -Chappuis led one column along the high-road from Cambrai to Le Cateau, -while a second column of four thousand men advanced upon the same -point by a parallel course through the villages of Ligny and Bertry, a -little farther to the south. Favoured by a dense fog the two columns -succeeded in driving the advanced posts of the Allies from the villages -of Inchy and Beaumont on the high-road, and of Troisvilles, Bertry, -and Maurois immediately to south of them; which done, they proceeded -to form behind the ridge on which these villages stand, for the main -attack. Before the formation was complete the fog cleared; and the -Duke, observing that Chappuis’s left flank was in the air, made a great -demonstration with his artillery against the French front, sent a few -light troops to engage their right, and calling all his cavalry to his -own right, formed them unseen in a fold in the ground between Inchy and -Bethencourt, a village a little to westward of it.[224] The squadrons -were drawn up in three lines, the six squadrons of the Austrian -Cuirassiers of Zeschwitz forming the first line under Colonel Prince -Schwarzenberg, Mansel’s brigade the second line, and the First and -Fifth Dragoon Guards and Sixteenth Light Dragoons the third, the whole -of the nineteen squadrons being under command of General Otto.[225] - -In this order they moved off, Otto advancing with great caution, -and skilfully taking advantage of every dip and hollow to conceal -his movements. A body of French cavalry was first encountered and -immediately overthrown, General Chappuis, who was with them, being -taken prisoner. Then the last ridge was passed and the squadrons saw -their prey before them—over twenty thousand French infantry drawn -up with their guns in order of battle, serenely facing eastward -without thought of the storm that was bursting on them from the -north. There was no hesitation, for Schwarzenberg was an impetuous -leader, and the Cuirassiers had been disappointed of distinction at -Villers-en-Cauchies; the Blues, Royals, and Third Dragoon Guards had a -stain to wipe away; the King’s and Fifth Dragoon Guards were eager for -opportunity to show their mettle; and the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, -being the only Light Dragoons present, were anxious to prove that they -could do as well as the Fifteenth. The trumpets rang out, and with -wild cheering white coats, red coats, and blue coats whirled down -upon the left flank and rear of the French. The French guns, hastily -wheeled round, opened a furious fire of grape, while the infantry -began as furious a fire of musketry; but the charging squadrons took -no heed. Mansel, stung by the imputation of cowardice, which had been -thrown out to account for his mishap on the 24th, had vowed that he -would not come back alive, and dashing far ahead of his men into the -thick of the enemy went down at once; but Colonel Vyse, of the King’s -Dragoon Guards, taking command of both brigades, led them as straight -as Mansel. In a very few minutes the whole mass of the French was -broken up and flying southward in wild disorder, with the sabres hewing -mercilessly among them. - -The misfortunes of the enemy did not end here, for one of their -detachments, which had been pushed forward to Troisvilles, was driven -back by a couple of British guns under Colonel Congreve, and joined -the rest in flight. Meanwhile Chappuis’s second column had advanced -a little beyond Maurois with its guns, when the appearance of the -fugitives warned them to retire; but in this quarter, too, there was -a vigilant Austrian officer, Major Stepheicz, with two squadrons of -the Archduke Ferdinand’s Hussars and four of the Seventh and Eleventh -British Light Dragoons. Following up the French column he drove its -rearguard in upon the main body a little to westward of Maretz, and -a few miles further on fell upon the main body also, dispersed it -utterly, and captured ten guns. Twelve hundred Frenchmen were killed -in this part of the field alone, so terrible was the Austrian hussar -in pursuit; two thousand more had fallen under the sabres of Otto’s -division, which likewise captured twenty-two guns and three hundred and -fifty prisoners. The shattered fragments of the French infantry fled by -a wide detour to Cambrai; and Pichegru’s attack on this side was not -merely beaten off, but his troops were literally hunted from the field. - -So ended the greatest day in the annals of the British horse, perhaps -the greater since the glory of it was shared with the most renowned -cavalry in Europe. The loss of the Austrians was nine officers, two -hundred and twenty-eight men, and two hundred and eight horses; that -of the British, six officers, one hundred and fifty-six men, and two -hundred and eighty-nine horses, killed, wounded, and missing. The -British regiments that suffered most heavily were the Blues and the -Third Dragoon Guards, each of which had sixteen men and twenty-five -horses killed outright; and the determination of the Third to prove -that the harsh criticism of their comrades on the 24th was unjust, is -shown by the fact that five out of the six officers injured in the -charge belonged to them. Mansel, the Brigadier, who was also their -Colonel, died as has been told. Of the Captains one, his own son, was -overpowered and taken in a desperate effort to extricate his father, -and another was wounded. Of the Lieutenants one was killed and another, -if not two more, wounded. The Major in command, however, had the good -fortune not only to escape unhurt but to receive the sword of General -Chappuis. The total loss of the covering army was just under fifteen -hundred men; that of the French was reckoned, probably with less -exaggeration than usual, at seven thousand, while the guns taken from -them numbered forty-one. - -◆April 27.◆ - -On the following day the Emperor ordered his army to devote itself to -singing a _Te Deum_ and to solemn thanksgiving, which was very right -and proper, but might well have been deferred for forty-eight hours -until the full fruits of the victory had been gathered. For although -there were four fortresses, Avesnes, Guise, Cambrai, and Maubeuge, -within easy distance as a refuge for fugitives, another day’s pursuit -would assuredly have swept up many hundred stragglers, while the mere -sight of the Allied troops would probably have sufficed to set the -French levies running once more. There was, however, better excuse than -usual for inaction, for among General Chappuis’s papers had been found -evidence that a most formidable stroke was about to fall, if it had -not already fallen, upon Flanders. It is now necessary to narrate the -course of events in that quarter, namely, on the right or western wing -of the Allies. - -◆April 23.◆ - -On the 23rd of April a force from Cambrai, acting in concert with that -which was beaten on the 24th at Villers-en-Cauchies, had moved northward -against Wurmb’s corps of communication at Denain, and, but for the -arrival of Clerfaye with some eight thousand men from Tournai, would -have driven it across the Scheldt. ◆April 24.◆ On the 24th, 26th, and -27th the harassing of the advanced posts of the Allies about Denain -continued, and meanwhile the true attack was developed, pursuant to -Carnot’s plans, on the extreme left of the French line. On the 24th -Michaud’s division of twelve thousand men marched from Dunkirk, part of -it towards Nieuport on the north, the rest upon Ypres to south-east, -sweeping back the feeble posts between the two places. Simultaneously -Moreau’s division of twenty-one thousand men moved eastward from Cassel -upon Ypres, and drove all the outlying detachments on that side to take -shelter under the ramparts. ◆April 25–27.◆ Then, leaving some of -Michaud’s division at Messines to watch the fortress from the south, -Moreau pursued his way eastward against Menin, and surrounded that -fortress upon all sides. At the same time Souham’s division of thirty -thousand men, under the personal direction of Pichegru, advanced from -Lille north-eastward upon Mouscron, drove back upon Dottignies the weak -detachment that defended it, and captured Courtrai, ◆April 26.◆ which -was practically without a garrison. ◆April 28.◆ General Oynhausen, -however, restored matters somewhat by collecting troops from Tournai at -Dottignies and retaking the position of Mouscron, where reinforcements -arrived in the nick of time to strengthen him. - -The papers found upon Chappuis gave Coburg the key to all these -movements; and on the evening of the 26th he sent twelve battalions -and ten squadrons under General Erskine from his own army to St. -Amand, bidding Clerfaye to recall at once to their proper stations the -reinforcements which he had imprudently hurried to Denain. Clerfaye -accordingly hastened by forced marches through Tournai to Mouscron, -which he reached on the 28th, raising the garrison of that place to -ten thousand men, exclusive of about two thousand more in the detached -posts of Coyghem and Dottignies. The relief of Menin was his first -and most urgent object, and he had fully resolved to attempt it on -the 30th; but Pichegru was too quick for him. ◆April 29.◆ On the 29th -the two columns under Generals Souham and Bertin fell, the one upon -Clerfaye’s front, the other upon his left flank and rear, with a -superiority of three to one, and after a hard struggle forced him from -his position. The Austrian General seems to have begun his retreat in -good order, but the movement speedily degenerated into a flight; and -when he rallied his beaten troops at Dottignies he was the weaker by -two thousand men killed and wounded and twenty-three guns. Happily six -of the battalions sent from the army before Landrecies had by that time -reached Dottignies, and, with these to hearten his demoralised force, -he retired eastward to Espierres, on the western bank of the Scheldt. - -This defeat decided the fate of Menin. The garrison consisted of -rather more than two thousand men, chiefly Hanoverians, but in part -French Emigrants, which latter if captured could expect nothing but -the guillotine. The commandant, Count Hammerstein, therefore decided -to cut his way out through the besiegers, and with the fortune that -favours the brave, ◆April 30.◆ succeeded during the night of the 30th -in forcing his passage northward to Thourout and thence to Bruges. -Thus Menin and Courtrai, the two gates of the Lys, were lost, and a -gap was broken in the long cordon of the Allies. Along the whole of -the right wing there was something like a panic, and the roads were -choked with long trains of supplies and stores flying northward to -Brussels and Ghent. At Ostend there had lately arrived the Eighth Light -Dragoons and the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fifth Foot, sadly belated, -since the infantry, with Dundas’s usual wisdom, had been embarked at -Bristol; but General Stewart, the commandant at Ostend, did not think -it prudent after Clerfaye’s defeat to send them down country.[226] -Happily Pichegru did not pursue his advantage as he ought. ◆May 3.◆ He -did indeed push a detachment northward from Menin upon Roulers, which -was attacked and defeated with a loss of two hundred men and three -guns by three squadrons of the Allied cavalry;[227] but there his -activity ceased; and he solemnly sat himself down about Moorseele on -the left bank of the Lys, with one flank resting on Menin and the other -on Courtrai, as if to allow time for Coburg’s army to come up in his -front.[228] - -Coburg meanwhile had passed through no enviable days. ◆April 28.◆ On the -28th news reached him that Kaunitz on his left wing had been forced back -by overwhelming numbers to the Sambre, while on his right wing Pichegru -had made his way to Courtrai; but, however serious the outlook, he was -still tied for the present to the miserable and useless fortress of -Landrecies. By a strange irony Mack on that very day submitted a plan of -future operations, whereby Bouchain, Cambrai, Avesnes, and Maubeuge were -in succession to be besieged;[229] but circumstances on the occasion -were too strong for pedantry. ◆April 30.◆ Landrecies fortunately fell on -the 30th, and Coburg on the same day ordered the Duke of York to lead -the rest of his force with all speed to Clerfaye’s assistance, and to -drive the French from Flanders. - -Heavy rain, however, delayed the Duke’s progress; ◆May 3.◆ and it was -not until the 3rd of May that he reached Tournai, where he reunited -Erskine’s force with his own and pushed forward a strong detachment -three miles westward to Marquain and Lamain, releasing five thousand -men, which had hitherto held those points, to join Clerfaye. The front -thus occupied by the Allies, from Tournai in the south to Espierres in -the north, was from seven to eight miles long and faced due west, their -objective being the right flank and communications of the French left -wing. The British brigade at Ostend, namely the Twelfth, Thirty-eighth, -and Fifty-fifth under Major-general Whyte, and the Eighth Light -Dragoons, were by this time on their way to Clerfaye’s army; and the -united force of Clerfaye and the Duke of York was now reckoned at about -forty thousand men.[230] Pichegru, on the other hand, had from forty to -fifty thousand between Menin and Courtrai, and twenty thousand more -under General Bonnaud (who had succeeded Chappuis) at Sainghin, about -five miles south-east of Lille, to act as a reserve. At Clerfaye’s -proposal it was agreed that on the 5th of May he himself should cross -the Lys a little below Courtrai and fall upon that place from the north, -while simultaneously the Duke of York should move eastward to cut it off -from Lille. After all, however, Clerfaye, whether from diffidence or -mere frowardness, would not venture on the attempt. ◆May 8–9.◆ Appeal -was made to the Emperor Francis to give him positive orders to attack, -but meanwhile Bonnaud concentrated over twenty-five thousand men between -Bouvines and Anstaing, a little to the west of Marquain, as if to -threaten the Duke’s left. When the Emperor’s orders at last reached -Clerfaye, he first wasted four days in reconnoitring, and at last made -but a feeble attack on the 10th, contenting himself with the capture of -the outermost fringe of Courtrai. - -◆May 10.◆ - -Pichegru seems to have had good information of Clerfaye’s movements and -possibly even of his intentions, for he left Moreau’s division alone -to deal with him; and, having moved Souham’s division to the -east bank of the Lys, himself on the same day attacked the line of the -Allies in force. Souham advanced against the Hanoverians on the Allied -right, but, though he forced the posts of Dottignies and Coyghem, was -repulsed from Espierres. On the left of the Allies thirty thousand -French moved out in two columns against the Duke of York’s entrenched -position between Lamain and Hertain; the stronger column of the two, -which included five thousand cavalry, following the main road from -Lille to Tournai, the other turning south-east from Bouvines by Cysoing -upon Bachy, as if to turn the Duke’s left flank. This latter column was -checked by a couple of battalions and three squadrons under command of -an Austrian officer at Bachy, and was unable to penetrate further. The -other and more formidable body carried the advanced posts of Baisieux -upon the main road, and of Camphin about a mile to south of it, and -forming on the plain between these two villages opened a furious -cannonade from howitzers and heavy guns. Thereupon the Duke, perceiving -a gap in the enemy’s line, whereby the right of their main body was -uncovered, ordered sixteen squadrons of British Dragoons and two of -Austrian Hussars to advance into the plain of Cysoing by the low ground -that lies south of the heights of Lamain, and from thence to attack. - -The cavalry obeyed with alacrity; but the ground on the plain, -though perfectly level and unenclosed, was much broken by patches of -cole-seed, grown in trenches after the manner of celery, which checked -the progress of the heavy dragoons. Moreover the French infantry, for -the first time since the Revolution, threw themselves into squares and -faced the galloping horsemen with admirable firmness. Nine regiments of -cavalry in succession charged up to the bayonets, but with insufficient -speed, and fell back baffled.[231] Nevertheless they followed the -French up the plain from south to north, until, a little to westward of -Camphin, their left came under the fire of some French heavy batteries, -established on the gently rising ground before the village of Gruson. -The Duke then ordered a brigade of British infantry to move forward -between that village and Baisieux, at the same time sending down four -battalions along the track which the cavalry had taken, to support -their attack. The French infantry thereupon retreated from Camphin in -a northerly direction towards the village of Willems, their cavalry -covering the movement; while the British cavalry, now reinforced by six -more squadrons, hovered about them watching for their opportunity to -attack. At length they fell upon the French horsemen on both flanks, -and utterly overthrew them, after which they renewed their attempt upon -the infantry, but again without success. At last, however, a little to -the south of Willems, the battalion-guns of the British infantry came -up and opened fire, when the French, after receiving a few shots, began -to waver. The squadrons again charged, and an officer of the Greys, -galloping straight at the largest of the squares, knocked down three -men as he rode into it, wheeled his horse round and overthrew six more, -and thus made a gap for the entry of his men. The sight of one square -broken and dispersed demoralised the remainder of the French. Two more -squares were ridden down, and for the third time the British sabres had -free play among the French infantry. Over four hundred prisoners were -taken, thirteen guns were captured, and it was reckoned that from one -to two thousand men were cut down. The loss of the British was thirty -men killed, six officers and seventy-seven men wounded, ninety horses -killed and one hundred and forty wounded and missing, the Sixth Dragoon -Guards being the regiment that suffered most heavily. It is hardly -necessary to call attention to the arm which was lacking on this day, -or to point out that a single battery of horse-artillery would have -enabled the cavalry to break the squares at the first onset, would -greatly have increased the enemy’s losses, and would have made the -day’s operations more decisive. Not for eighteen years was the British -cavalry destined again to ride over French battalions as they rode on -this day; and then Stapleton Cotton was fated once more to be present, -leading not a squadron of Carbineers, but a whole division of horse to -the charge at Salamanca. But the 10th of May 1794 is chiefly memorable -as marking the date on which the new French infantry showed itself not -unworthy of the old.[232] - -[Illustration: - - WILLEMS - 10 May 1794. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - -◆May 11.◆ After the action the French main body retired once more across -the Lys to its old camp between Menin and Courtrai; ◆May 12.◆ but on the -11th Souham attacked Clerfaye in his position at Lendelede, about four -miles north of Courtrai, and after an obstinate engagement forced him to -retire still further northward to Thielt, with the loss of fifteen -hundred men and two guns. Meanwhile the Duke of York, in spite of his -success on the 10th, became anxious as to his position in presence of -numbers so overwhelmingly superior, and pressed Coburg to send him -reinforcements. At the Emperor’s headquarters, however, there was some -hesitation whether the principal army should move eastward to the -assistance of Kaunitz on the Sambre, or westward for the salvation of -Flanders. The first idea was to make a demonstration towards Cambrai -with a part of the force; the next to make a rapid march and invest -Avesnes, also with only a part of the force, in order to take pressure -off Kaunitz. The idea of moving with the whole army to any given point -seems to have occurred to none of the Austrian Generals. ◆May 11.◆ Then -came the Duke of York’s application for help, whereupon General Kinsky -was ordered with some six thousand horse and foot to Denain, to enable -Wurmb’s detachment at that place to join the Duke of York at Tournai. -◆May 12.◆ One day later arrived news from Kaunitz that he had been -compelled to fall back still further northward from the Sambre, and was -attacked on all sides; the fact being that Carnot on the 30th of April -had directed fifteen thousand men from the army of the Rhine to join the -army of the Ardennes, so as to ensure decisive superiority on the -Sambre. Upon this, Coburg determined that the subdivision of the army -into fragments must cease, and called upon the Emperor to choose between -the Sambre and Flanders, as the sphere of action for the entire force. -Intelligence of a successful engagement fought by Kaunitz and of -Clerfaye’s retreat to Thielt inclined the Emperor to Flanders; and -though, even then, Austrian pedantry insisted that some eight thousand -men under the Prince of Orange must remain in the vicinity of -Landrecies, ◆May 14.◆ yet the bulk of the army on the 14th commenced its -march westward. - -This movement, however, was by no means to the taste of some of the -Emperor’s advisers; and it becomes necessary at this point to turn for a -moment from the western to the eastern centre of European disturbance, -and to glance at the influence which events in Poland had exerted upon -the Imperial Cabinet. It has already been said that Thugut’s only object -in persuading the Emperor to take personal command in the field, was -that the operations might subserve his own policy. With this view the -Minister prepared to remove to Valenciennes, which was to be the -political headquarters of the Empire during the Emperor’s stay in the -Netherlands; but before he could leave Vienna he was startled by the -news of a general rising in Poland. ◆March 25.◆ This insurrection under -the leadership of Kosciusko broke out on the 25th of March, and spread -with a rapidity and success which left the Russians absolutely helpless. -Catherine, greedy for the partition of Turkey, had already moved the -best of her troops southwards; and the only force of any kind upon the -spot was that of Prussia, which fact in itself was enough to kindle -Thugut’s jealousy. ◆April 20.◆ On the 20th of April Kosciusko, after two -days’ fighting, captured Warsaw; ◆April 25.◆ and five days later -Catherine, while asking the Emperor for the troops due to her by treaty, -mentioned also how greatly she needed the help of the Prussians, from -whom likewise she had claimed assistance. Meanwhile King Frederick -William, growing nervous lest the rebellion should infect also his own -Polish provinces, after some hesitation decided to throw the Treaty of -the Hague to the winds; wherefore, withdrawing twenty thousand of his -troops from the Rhine, he left Berlin on the 14th of May to take -personal command of his army in Poland. - -All this was gall and wormwood to Thugut, and the more so because -Kosciusko had expressed a wish to place Austrian troops in occupation -of Poland rather than yield it to the Prussians. He became more and -more anxious to have done with France, if possible by a separate -peace with the Republic, and to devote all Austria’s energies to the -thwarting of Prussia in the East. The embitterment of his hostility -towards Prussia brought him more than ever in conflict with Coburg -and Mack, who desired above all things a good understanding with -the second great power of Germany; but, unfortunately, he found two -officers of like sentiments with himself in the Prince of Waldeck, who -held a high position on the Staff, and General Rollin, who of all men -possessed greatest influence with the Emperor. It was therefore with -profound dissatisfaction that Thugut’s ignoble clique saw the mass of -the Austrian troops drawn nearer to France and further from Poland; -and though outwardly they swallowed their ill-humour, yet they had -every intention of compassing their own ends, even by means the most -infamous.[233] - -◆May 15.◆ - -On the 15th of May the Emperor joined the Duke of York at Tournai, -and the Archduke Charles brought the Austrian army from Landrecies -to St. Amand, eleven miles to south of it. The field, on which the -decisive action was to be fought, was one that had drunk deep of human -blood. It may be described as the parallelogram enclosed by a line -drawn south-eastward from Courtrai to Tournai, thence south-westward -to Pont-à-Marque, thence north-westward through Lille to Wervicq, and -thence north-eastward back to Courtrai. To east it is bounded by the -Scheldt, to north by the Lys; and through the midst of it, flowing -first from south to north past Pont-à-Marque and Cysoing to Lannoy, and -thence westward into the Deule and so to the Lys, runs the Marque, a -stream impassable except by bridges, owing to soft bottom and swampy -banks. The principal bridges were those of Pont-à-Marque on the great -road to Paris, and Pont-à-Tressin on the road from Tournai to Lille; -but there were others on by-roads at Louvil, Bouvines, Gruson, Tressin, -L’Hempenpont, Pont-à-Breug and Marque, most of them fortified and -strongly held by the French. Two smaller streams of the same character -as the Marque, but running from west to east, form also important -obstacles within this arena, namely, the Espierres brook, which has -its source close to Roubaix and flows into the Scheldt at Espierres, -and the Baisieux brook, which rising near Hertain joins the Scheldt -at Pont-à-Chin. The ground is mostly level, with the exception of the -undulating heights that rise from the Lys, the low ridge upon which -stood the villages of Roubaix and Lannoy, and the group of hills about -Tournai itself; but it was thickly studded with villages, linked -together by chains of innumerable cottages and farm-houses, which were -all of them enclosed by hedges. The fields were cut up by swampy brooks -and by a ramification of wide drains, which, with other enclosures, -practically forbade the movements of troops except by road. The roads, -however, even then were many; and the principal highways were nearly -broad enough to permit an advance in column of half-companies;[234] but -all of them, as well as the waterways, were lined with trees, making -it extremely difficult to see the movements of troops from a distance. -Thus it was and is a country unfit for cavalry, and far better -adapted in that day to the tactics of the French than of the Allied -infantry.[235] - -Within the parallelogram the French were somewhat widely scattered. -Osten’s division of ten thousand men lay at Pont-à-Marque. To the -left or northward of it the bulk of Bonnaud’s division of twenty -thousand men was encamped at Sainghin, with detachments occupying also -Pont-à-Tressin and Lannoy, further north upon the Marque. Souham’s -division of twenty-eight thousand, and Moreau’s of twenty-two thousand -men lay on the south bank of the Lys between Courtrai and Aelbeke, -a village nearly four miles south of it, with Thierry’s brigade at -Mouscron, and Compère’s brigade at Tourcoing to preserve communication -with Bonnaud. In all, the French army numbered eighty-two thousand men. - -Against this force Coburg could pit sixty-two thousand, twelve -thousand of them cavalry. Of the Allied army, fourteen thousand under -the Archduke Charles were at St. Amand; seventeen thousand under the -Duke of York at Tournai; nine thousand under Kinsky at Marquain; four -thousand Hanoverians under General von dem Bussche at Warcoing, on -the Scheldt; and, lastly, sixteen thousand men under Clerfaye were at -Oyghem, about five miles north and east of Courtrai on the north bank -of the Lys. The whole of these troops, excepting Clerfaye’s corps, -could easily be concentrated within twelve hours at Tournai, from -which a swift and resolute attack upon the southern flank of Souham -and Moreau, by Roubaix, Mouveaux and Bondues, might have cut them off -from Lille, driven them into the arms of Clerfaye and overwhelmed them. -The Austrians, however, were not to be weaned from their own methods, -and accordingly on the 16th Mack prepared an elaborate plan, which he -designed, and even declared, to be a plan of annihilation. - -◆May 16.◆ - -The army was as usual to be divided. The first column, of four -thousand Hanoverians under Bussche, was to march by Dottignies upon -Mouscron, detaching a third of its strength northward on the high -road from Tournai to Courtrai, and, having captured Mouscron, was -to open communication with the second column. The second column, -of twelve battalions and ten squadrons, or about ten thousand men, -under Field-Marshal Otto, was to advance by Leers and Wattrelos upon -Tourcoing. The third column, of twelve battalions and ten squadrons -under the Duke of York, was to move by Lannoy against Mouveaux, sixteen -British squadrons being held in reserve at Hertain under General -Erskine. The fourth column, of ten battalions and sixteen squadrons -under Count Kinsky, was to be employed partly in covering the Duke’s -left flank; but the bulk of it was to advance on Bouvines and there -force the passage of the Marque. The fifth column, of seventeen -battalions and thirty-two squadrons under the Archduke Charles, was -to march to Pont-à-Marque, sending a small detachment northward by -Templeuve to preserve communication with the fourth column. Having -gained the passage of the Marque the Archduke was to attack the enemy -on the western side of the river, and, after leaving detachments to -guard the bridges, to wheel northward, unite forces with Kinsky and -move up with him to join the Duke of York at Mouveaux. Finally the -sixth column under Clerfaye was to march from Oyghem on the left bank -of the Lys, force the passage of the river above Menin on the morning -of the 17th, and manœuvre in rear of the enemy about Mouscron and -Tourcoing. Thus the design was to attack the enemy’s front with half -the army, turn both their flanks with the remainder, and destroy the -French irremediably; but whether the surest way of attaining this -object was to disperse the troops in isolated columns over a front -of twenty miles in a blind and strongly enclosed country—this was a -question over which Craig, at any rate, shook his head. - -◆May 17.◆ - -Miscarriages of the great plan began early. Clerfaye did not receive -his orders for the movement towards Menin until late on the morning -of the 16th, and did not march until the evening. His progress was -much delayed by the heavy sandy roads, and, consequently, it was the -afternoon of the 17th before his corps reached Wervicq, and attempted -to cross the Lys by the bridge. The French, however, had covered it -by entrenchments which blocked his passage; and, when the pontoons -were asked for, it was found that by some mistake they had been left -behind. Several hours were wasted while they were coming up, and the -pontoon-bridge was consequently not laid until late at night, when -a few battalions only crossed the river, the remainder of the force -bivouacking on the left bank. The general result was that Clerfaye’s -corps, one-fourth of the whole army, counted for nothing in the first -day’s operations.[236] - -The march of the remaining columns was begun in a thick fog which -rendered concerted movements difficult, and the Austrian Staff seems -to have made no allowance for the varying distances to be covered by -the columns; Kinsky having little more than seven miles to traverse -from Froidmont to Bouvines, whereas the Archduke Charles had fully -fifteen miles from St. Amand to Pont-à-Marque. Bussche concentrated -at St. Leger, a little to west of Warcoing, in the night, advanced -upon Mouscron, and captured it, but was driven out again with very -heavy loss, and forced back to Dottignies. For this misfortune Mack -was chiefly responsible, by directing the detachment of so large -a proportion of this column on a perfectly aimless errand towards -Courtrai. Otto, on Bussche’s left, fared better, driving Compère’s -troops from Leers, Wattrelos, and Tourcoing; but, unfortunately, -with no further result than to join them to Thierry’s brigade behind -Mouscron, to the greater discomfiture of the unfortunate Hanoverians. - -To the left and south of Otto the Duke of York with about ten thousand -men[237] advanced by Templeuve upon Lannoy which, after a sharp -cannonade, he attacked with the brigade of Guards in front while the -Light Dragoons turned it by the left; but the enemy beat so hasty -a retreat that they escaped with little loss. Leaving two Hessian -battalions in Lannoy, the Duke pushed on to Roubaix, where the enemy -stood, with greater force both of infantry and artillery, in an -entrenched position; but, in spite of a very obstinate resistance, the -Guards carried this post also with the bayonet. Having no intelligence -of the columns on his right and left, the Duke rightly decided to -leave his advanced guard at Roubaix, and to fall back with his main -body to Lannoy; when to his dismay he received a positive command from -the Emperor himself, who with the Headquarters Staff had accompanied -the rear of his column, to push on to the attack of Mouveaux. This -order was sheer folly, unless indeed it were dictated by wanton and -deliberate wickedness;[238] but it was reiterated in spite of all -protests, and though the evening was falling and the troops were weary -with a long and harassing day’s work under a burning sun, the Duke -reluctantly obeyed. The French position at Mouveaux was enclosed by -palisades and entrenchments and flanked by redoubts; but for the third -time the brigade of Guards drove the enemy out brilliantly with the -bayonet. The Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons under Abercromby’s -personal direction at once pressed forward in pursuit, and galloping -round the village, which had been kindled by the flying French, -overtook the fugitives, and cut down three hundred of them. Three guns -were captured; and one small party of the Fifteenth actually rode into -the French camp at Bondues,[239] nearly two miles to west of Mouveaux, -and set the troops there running in every direction. The main body of -the Duke’s column then bivouacked astride of the road between Mouveaux -and Roubaix. - -With the two columns south of the Duke, however, affairs had gone but -indifferently. Kinsky’s advance from Froidmont was delayed by a message -from the Archduke Charles, to the effect that his force could not -possibly reach the Marque at the appointed hour of six in the morning; -but in due time Kinsky moved forward to Bouvines, and drove the French -from their entrenchments. The enemy, however, broke down the bridge -over the Marque as they retired, and, until the advance of the Archduke -began to make itself felt, Kinsky was unable to repair it, since the -passage was commanded by a battery of heavy guns. The Archduke’s column -had meanwhile left St. Amand at ten o’clock on the evening of the 16th, -and after driving back the French advanced posts at Templeuve[240] and -Cappelle, a little to east of Pont-à-Marque, finally succeeded in -forcing the passage of the river at that point. But it was not till -two o’clock in the afternoon, instead of six in the morning of the -17th, that his army had passed to the west bank of the Marque; and his -soldiers were too much exhausted to move further than Lesquin, a little -east of the road between Pont-à-Marque and Lille. There he bivouacked -on the heights between Lesquin and Peronne, a village about three miles -to south-east of it; his men having been on foot for twenty-two hours, -marched more than twenty miles over bad roads, and fought a sharp -action for the passage of the river. His advance, however, had forced -the enemy to evacuate Sainghin, and thus enabled Kinsky to repair the -bridge at Bouvines; but none the less Kinsky, with excess of caution, -would not cross the river, and encamped for the night on the right -bank, which was for him the wrong bank, of the Marque. - -At the beginning of this day the French commanders had no information -of any movements of the Allies beyond the march of Clerfaye; and, -accordingly, the divisions of Souham and Moreau, together with -Vandamme’s brigade, had crossed to the left bank of the Lys. The -advance of the Allies from the east and the combats about Tourcoing, -however, soon undeceived them. Pichegru being, as Soult said, -fortunately absent, Generals Souham, Moreau, Macdonald, and Reynier -met in council at Menin; and on the evening of the 17th they decided -to make new dispositions and to set their troops at once in motion. -Vandamme’s brigade alone was left on the north bank of the Lys to -watch Clerfaye, and the remainder of the troops on that site crossed -the river to take up their appointed stations. Malbrancq’s brigade -was posted between Roncq and Blancfour, villages lying from three to -four miles due south from Menin on the road to Lille; to the left of -Malbrancq, Macdonald’s brigade crowned the heights of Mount Halluin; -the rest of Souham’s division, under Generals Daendels and Jardon, -lay some three miles away to the east of Macdonald, occupying a line -between Aelbeke and Belleghem, a village lying a little to the south -of Courtrai; and the gap between Macdonald and these troops was filled -by the brigades of Compère and Thierry about Mouscron. Thus the -formation of the French left wing was that of a double echelon; the -three divisions being arranged at the three angles of an isosceles -triangle, with the van at the apex, Mouscron, and the rear before Menin -and Courtrai. The right wing, consisting of Bonnaud’s and Osten’s -divisions, some thirty thousand strong, was assembled about Flers, two -miles and a half to the east of Lille; where orders arrived on the -evening of the 17th from Souham that a general attack was designed for -the morrow, in which the duty of Bonnaud’s division would be to march -upon Lannoy and Roubaix. - -It was not without anxiety that the reports from the various columns -of the Allies were awaited on the evening of the 17th at the Austrian -headquarters at Templeuve. The failures of Bussche to capture Mouscron, -and of the Archduke Charles to reach the point assigned to him, had -sufficed to mar Mack’s plans; and of Clerfaye there was no news -whatever. ◆May 17–18.◆ Orders were therefore sent at three o’clock -next morning to the Archduke Charles to march at once with his own -and Kinsky’s corps upon Lannoy; while the Duke of York and Otto were -directed to attack Mouscron at noon, in the hope that before that time -something would have been heard of Clerfaye. But it seems to have -occurred to none of the Austrian Staff that the disposition of the -Allied army, as prescribed by Mack, positively invited the French to -take the offensive. On this night Bussche lay at Dottignies and Coyghem -with his weakened corps of Hanoverians. On his left the main body of -Otto’s column, seven and a half battalions and three squadrons, was -at Tourcoing, with detachments of two battalions at Wattrelos, and -of three battalions and three squadrons at Leers, on the line of his -retreat. Thus his force was distributed in isolated patches along a -length of five miles, with its right flank not only unprotected, but -actually threatened by a superior force of the enemy, lying within -three miles both of Tourcoing and Wattrelos. - -On Otto’s left the Duke of York’s column was as dangerously -dispersed. The Guards, with the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons, -under Abercromby, were at Mouveaux; four Austrian battalions and -the Sixteenth Light Dragoons were at Roubaix; the Fourteenth, -Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third were on the road between Roubaix and -Lille, in order to repel any attack from the garrison of the latter -place; two Hessian battalions lay at Lannoy, and four squadrons of -Austrian hussars were engaged in patrolling. The Duke’s right was -indeed covered, but his left was exposed to attack not only by the -garrison of Lille but by Bonnaud’s superior force about Flers; and -thus both his column and Otto’s practically passed the night pent in -on three sides by forces of thrice their strength. To the left, or -southward, there was a gap of four miles between the Duke’s troops and -the nearest of Kinsky’s detachments, which lay at Pont-à-Tressin and -Chereng, with the main body still further south at Bouvines; while the -Archduke Charles, with nearly one-fourth of the whole army, lay over -against him at Sainghin on the other side of the Marque, with advanced -detachments pushed far to the south-west at Seclin. Finally, Clerfaye, -with rather more than a fourth of the entire Allied force, was still on -the western side of the Lys at Wervicq. Certainly the dispositions lent -themselves to a plan of annihilation. - -◆May 18.◆ - -At three o’clock on the morning of the 18th, while Coburg was signing -the orders for his troops, the French army began its march to the -attack. On the south Osten’s division was left about Flers and -Lezennes, to watch the Archduke Charles and Kinsky; while Bonnaud, -dividing his eighteen thousand men into two columns, directed -them northward, the one by L’Hempenpont upon Lannoy, the other by -Pont-à-Breug upon Roubaix. Simultaneously Malbrancq’s brigade marched -south from Roncq upon Mouveaux; Macdonald’s from Mount Halluin upon the -western front of Turcoing; Compère’s from Mouscron upon the northern -front; Thierry’s, also from Mouscron, together with Daendels’s from -Aelbeke, upon Wattrelos; while Jardon’s brigade moved from Belleghem -towards Dottignies to hold the Hanoverians in check. Excluding this -last brigade, sixty thousand men in all were thus turned upon the six -posts in which the eighteen thousand men under Otto and the Duke of -York were dispersed. - -Otto’s force, being nearer to the enemy, was the first to feel -the weight of the attack. General Montfrault, who commanded at -Tourcoing, perceiving the overwhelming strength of the enemy, begged -reinforcements from the Duke of York, who sent him two Austrian -battalions from Roubaix, but with strict orders that they should return -in the event of their arriving too late to save the town. As a matter -of fact they did arrive too late, for the garrison had already been -driven from Tourcoing; but none the less they attached themselves, -as was perhaps natural, to Montfrault, who stood fast on the eastern -skirts of the town and held back the enemy for a time, until a -French battery unlimbering on ground to the north of him, forced him -to retire. Seeing himself threatened by large bodies of cavalry, -Montfrault formed his troops into a large square, with four battalions -and light artillery in front, one battalion on each flank, and the -cavalry in the rear. In this order he fell back, his heavy artillery -and waggons being enclosed in the centre of the square, and his light -troops skirmishing on all four sides. It was about half-past eight when -he began his retrograde movement; but already Wattrelos, the first -post on his rear, was in possession of the enemy. The garrison, two -Hessian battalions, had manfully resisted an attack of six times their -number until eight o’clock, when, finding themselves in danger of being -surrounded, they retired, and, with the help of two companies sent -forward by General Otto, withdrew successfully to Leers. Montfrault -thereupon found himself compelled to leave the main road for a by-way, -which ran between Wattrelos and Roubaix, in order to continue his -retreat. - -Between six and seven o’clock, rather later than the opening of the -attack on Tourcoing and Wattrelos, Bonnaud’s two columns came up from -the south upon Lannoy and Roubaix; and shortly afterwards Malbrancq’s -brigade from the north fell upon Mouveaux, while a part of the French -force that had captured Tourcoing appeared also on the north of -Roubaix. The Duke of York despatched urgent messages to recall the -two Austrian battalions which he had sent to Otto, but of course in -vain; and meanwhile he made such head as he could with his handful of -troops against overwhelming odds. The troops at Mouveaux were disposed -in two sides of a square, the left showing a front towards the east -at Mouveaux, the guns stationed in the angle at the northern end of -the village, and the right thrown back to the hamlet of Le Fresnoy. To -the south, the British brigade of the Line under Major-general Fox, -near Croix, sought to bar the way against part of Bonnaud’s division -from Lille; but to defend the rest of the ground there were but three -Austrian battalions. Of these half a battalion was stationed in Roubaix -itself, and the remainder echeloned to the right rear of Fox’s brigade -behind the sources of the Espierres brook, which ran along the southern -skirts of the village. These Austrian battalions seem to have been -the first to give way, and one of them, by Craig’s account, did not -behave as it ought; but they were pressed hard both in front and on -their right flank, which, owing to the absence of the two battalions -sent to Otto, was wholly uncovered. One brigade of Bonnaud’s division -therefore succeeded in forcing its way between Mouveaux and Roubaix -to Le Fresnoy; and the Duke thus saw Abercromby and the brigade of -Guards absolutely cut off from him. Moreover, though he knew it not, -the victorious French of Thierry’s and Daendels’s brigades were coming -down from Wattrelos upon his rear. Seldom has a General found himself, -through no fault of his own, in a more extraordinary position. He had -been assured that the Archduke Charles would join him from the south, -and he had therefore ordered Abercromby to defend Mouveaux to the -last extremity; but not a sign of an Austrian was to be seen whether -to south or north. His first instinct was to ride to the Guards at -Mouveaux; but this was seen to be out of the question. He then tried -to make his way to Fox’s brigade, but found that the French were in -possession of the suburbs of Roubaix, and that he was cut off from -this brigade also. Realising then that, his Austrian battalions being -dispersed, he had not a man left to him except two squadrons of the -Sixteenth Light Dragoons, he took a small escort from them and rode to -Wattrelos, hoping to obtain from Otto the means for extricating the -Guards. Meanwhile he sent orders to Abercromby to retire to the heights -on the east side of Roubaix. - -Montfrault, however, had fared ill in his attempt to withdraw. Until he -reached the ground between Wattrelos and Roubaix, his square preserved -good order; but being attacked at that point by overpowering numbers -from the south as well as from north and west, it was broken up, and -fled in disorder towards Leers. Meanwhile General Fox, finding himself -absolutely isolated, at length gave the order for his brigade, which so -far had held its own, to retire. The retreat began in perfect order, -and the brigade, having successfully fought its way to the road at -Lannoy, followed it for some distance, under incessant fire from all -sides, until checked by a battery covered by an abatis, which the -French had thrown up on the road. The first shots from this battery -struck down several men, and Fox for the moment feared that surrender -would be inevitable; but fortunately in the ranks of the Fourteenth was -a French emigrant who knew the district well, and undertook to lead the -brigade across country. It pursued its retreat therefore under constant -fire of artillery and musketry in front and on both flanks, and with -cavalry constantly threatening its rear; but it kept its assailants -at bay, and at one moment made so sharp a counter-attack as to take -temporary possession of some French guns. Thus partly by good luck, -partly by good conduct, partly by the misconduct and mismanagement of -the enemy, the three battalions contrived to reach Leers, with the loss -of all their battalion-guns excepting one, and of nine officers and -five hundred and twenty-five men out of eleven hundred and twenty. The -greatest credit was given to General Fox for the coolness, skill, and -patience with which he extricated his brigade. - -Abercromby appears to have begun his retreat from Mouveaux at about -nine o’clock, but of necessity very slowly, having with him a -considerable number of guns. The retirement was conducted in perfect -order as far as Roubaix, the Seventh and Fifteenth Light Dragoons -covering the rear with great gallantry. At Roubaix the French, though -in occupation of the suburbs, were not in possession of the little -walled town, which was still held by a dismounted squadron of the -Sixteenth Light Dragoons. The place consisted of a single long street, -the direct continuation of which led to Wattrelos, while, just outside -the eastern gate, the road to Lannoy turned sharply to the right, being -bordered on one side by a deep ditch and on the other by the Espierres -brook. To defile through the town took necessarily much time, but the -guns emerged safely and the Guards also. Next to the Guards were the -Austrian Hussars, still in the street; then in rear of them a party of -the Fifteenth; next to this party were the Sixteenth, who were formed -up in the market-place; and in rear of all were the remainder of the -Fifteenth, holding the pursuing French in check. All was still in order -when a French gun posted on the Wattrelos branch of the street suddenly -opened fire from the edge of the town, sending shot after shot among -the Austrian Hussars. The ordeal would have been a severe one for any -troops, and presently the Hussars dismounted and tried to find a way -out among the houses, but in vain. The trial became unendurable as the -French pressed on and opened fire on all sides upon the horsemen thus -pent in for slaughter; and at last the whole body remounted, galloped -wildly down the road, swung round the corner, where the French infantry -thrust vainly at them with their bayonets, and raced onward for three -or four hundred yards, when the foremost troopers suddenly found -the way blocked by horseless guns. The French had brought a second -gun to enfilade the road to Lannoy, and the drivers of the British -cannon had fled. The shock of this mass of galloping horsemen suddenly -checked was appalling. In an instant the ground was strewn with men -and horses, kicking and struggling in frantic confusion, while a -number of bât-horses dashed into the ranks of the Guards, plunging -and lashing out, with their loads hanging under their bellies. For -a short time the disorder appears to have been beyond remedy, for a -belt of wood surrounding the town gave excellent shelter to the French -sharpshooters, who had a very easy target in the mass of struggling -men and animals. Very soon, however, the Guards recovered themselves, -and cleared a way for the cavalry to pass on beyond the wood to open -ground. There the Light Dragoons rallied, the rear-guard was re-formed, -and the retreat, always under heavy fire, was resumed towards Lannoy. - -That village, which was enclosed by a low earthen rampart and a shallow -ditch, had likewise been attacked early by one of Bonnaud’s brigades -from Lille, but had been defended with the greatest gallantry by -two battalions of Hessians, who were apparently still in possession -when the British troops approached it, though surrounded on the -west side, and indeed nearly on all sides, by the French.[241] The -British officers, however, could see no sign of a friendly garrison, -and Colonel Congreve was actually wheeling his cannon round to open -fire on the place, when there galloped up to them some blue-coated -horsemen, who, being mistaken for Hessians, were allowed to approach -without molestation, and succeeded in cutting the traces of some of -the guns before they were discovered. The Guards then perceiving -their retreat to be cut off, faced about against their pursuers, and, -leaving the high road, made their way across country as best they could -south-eastward to Marquain. The Hessians in Lannoy, either before or -shortly after this, were forced to evacuate the village, and, finding -the road to Leers blocked by the enemy, were likewise obliged to make -their way across country in disorder, losing out of nine hundred -officers and men some three hundred and thirty, of whom two hundred -were cut off and captured in Lannoy itself. - -Meanwhile the Duke of York, conspicuous by the star on his breast, -had been hunted all over the country by the enemy’s dragoons, and -had escaped, as he frankly owned, only by the speed of his horse. On -reaching Wattrelos he found it in the hands of the French, but passing -beyond it under constant fire he came upon a gallant little party of -Hessians still holding the bridge of the Espierres brook. These by a -final attack with the bayonet gained a little respite for him, but -were presently swept away from the bridge, and escaped only by fording -the brook neck-deep. The Duke, thinking apparently that the bridge -was lost, or not knowing of its existence, spurred his horse into the -brook; but the animal rearing up and refusing to enter the water, he -dismounted, scrambled over on foot, and taking a horse from one of -his aide-de-camps, at last succeeded in finding Otto. About Leers and -Nechin the fragments of Otto’s force, together with some of the Duke -of York’s men, rallied upon the few battalions that held these places. -The French did not press their advantage, and at half-past four the -action came to an end. The loss of the Allies was about three thousand -men killed, wounded, and missing, which was relatively slight, for, -with proper management and conduct on the part of the French, not a man -of the Duke’s and Otto’s columns would have escaped alive. The Brigade -of Guards lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and men killed, -wounded, and missing, the flank-companies being the heaviest sufferers; -while the Seventh, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who by -general admission behaved admirably, lost fifty-two men and ninety-two -horses. The total loss of the British of all ranks was nine hundred -and thirty, besides which nineteen out of their twenty-eight guns were -captured. - -It may be asked what the rest of the army was doing on this day, while -these two columns, together less than one-third of the whole, were -in process of annihilation. The answer is that, for some reason, it -observed a conspiracy of inaction. Bussche sat still at Dottignies -exchanging occasional shots with Jardon’s brigade. Clerfaye crossed -the Lys near Wervicq at seven o’clock in the morning, and turning -eastward advanced between Bousbecque and Linselles, where he was met -by Vandamme’s brigade, which numbered eight thousand men against his -sixteen thousand. He engaged the French, overthrew their right wing, -took eight guns, and then remained stationary; until, being informed -of the approach of more French troops about Bondues, he withdrew to -the Lys, which he recrossed on the next day, and thence retreated -northward. The behaviour of Kinsky and of the Archduke Charles was -still more extraordinary. Kinsky, on being asked by one of his officers -for orders at six o’clock in the morning, replied that he was sick -and no longer in command. The Archduke Charles received at five in -the morning the order to move at once upon Lannoy, a distance of six -miles, so that his troops might well have come upon the scene of action -between eight and nine. He did not march till noon, though within sound -of the guns, nor did he strike the road from Tournai to Lille until -three, when he received orders to return to Tournai. The military -renown justly earned later by the Archduke forbids us to believe that -this delay was due to ignorance; and the fact that, though the Duke of -York had early informed the Emperor of his danger, not a word was sent -to hasten the Archduke or Kinsky, shows clearly that their torpidity -was not unexpected nor disapproved at headquarters. Jealousy of the -Duke of York and of Mack are among the reasons assigned to account -for the general paralysis of the Austrian commanders; but possibly -the true reason was that Thugut was sick of the war in Belgium, and -wished the English to sicken of it also. Why he should have chosen the -slaughter of several hundred British and Austrians as the best means -of forwarding his purpose, and how he persuaded Austrian officers to -second him therein, are matters which only an Austrian can determine. -For us it must suffice that the decisive battle of the campaign was -lost by the deliberate design of the Imperial Generals. Before long -they were to learn that those who court defeat for dishonest ends may, -when they least desire it, find defeat thrust upon them.[242] - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XI - - -◆1794.◆ - -◆May 19.◆ - -The entire army of the Allies, with the exception of Clerfaye’s corps, -was gathered into camp about Tournai in the course of the 19th, the -Emperor being received in silence when he rode into the town, while the -Duke of York was loudly cheered by the inhabitants.[243] The condition -of the army was very far from satisfactory. The troops themselves, or at -any rate the British, were not seriously shaken by the rout of the -previous day; but the Emperor and the Austrian commanders were much -discouraged, and the animosity of the various nations towards each other -was dangerously embittered. The British, above all, were furious against -the Austrians for leaving them to be overwhelmed without so much as an -attempt to assist them. “It is impossible,” wrote Craig to the War -Office, “to bring the Austrians to act except in small corps. I lament -that we should be destined as victims of their folly and ignorance. Do -not be surprised at the word ignorance: I am every day more and more -convinced that they have not an officer among them.” These were hard -words, but they were true and just, though the Archduke Charles in later -days redeemed himself from this reproach. ◆May 20.◆ However, for the -moment the commanders laid aside their differences and agreed that the -attack should be renewed, this time with united forces, upon Mouscron; -and meanwhile Coburg dispersed the whole army in a semicircle around -Tournai; the advanced posts running from Camphin on the south by -Baisieux, Willems, Nechin, Leers, Estaimpuis, and St. Legers to -Espierres, while the inner circle of entrenchments ran from the Scheldt -on the north by Froyennes, Marquain, and Lamain to the suburb of St. -Martin and the citadel of Tournai itself. - -The French Generals, as already narrated, made no effort to follow up -their victory of the 18th, but awaited the return of Pichegru, who, -on the news of the victory, hastened from the Sambre to turn it to -account. On the 22nd, after a consultation with his officers, Pichegru -decided to make a general attack upon Coburg’s position, and directed -that Souham with four brigades,[244] numbering from thirty to forty -thousand men, should assail it on the right or northern half of its -front from Espierres to Leers, while Bonnaud’s division should fall -upon its left about Templeuve, and Osten’s division should make a -demonstration still further to the south about Baisieux. May 23.◆ On -the following day between six and seven o’clock in the morning the -action began; and after long and hard fighting the Allies were finally -driven from three important points, namely, Blandain and the hill of La -Croisette immediately adjacent to it, a little to the west of Tournai, -and Pont-à-Chin upon the Scheldt, a little below the city. To abandon -to the enemy these posts, particularly Pont-à-Chin, which lay on the -direct road from Courtrai to Tournai and commanded the navigation of -the Scheldt, was impossible; and Coburg decided that they must be -recovered at any cost. Throughout this long day’s fighting the troops -that had borne the brunt of the work on the 18th had been held in -reserve; but at about six o’clock in the evening Fox’s brigade of the -British Line was called out to recover Pont-à-Chin which had already -been taken and retaken three or four times. The brigade went into -this action with fewer than six hundred men, having lost half of its -numbers just four days before; but the three gallant regiments, though -unsupported, carried the village unhesitatingly with the bayonet, -pressed on to the low heights to south of it, swept everything before -them, so far as their front extended, and captured seven cannon. -◆ May 22.◆ The day ended, after a severe struggle of fifteen hours, -in the retreat of the French, with the loss of some six thousand men -and seven guns; the fire, both of musketry and artillery, having been -the heaviest ever remembered by the oldest soldiers present. Both -sides, however, fought for the most part in dispersed formation, and -inflicted, comparatively speaking, little damage upon each other. The -one exception was Fox’s brigade. “Had their order of attack,” wrote -Calvert, “been adopted by the Allies in general, the day would probably -have ended in the ruin of the French.” But the losses of the brigade -amounted to one hundred and twenty killed, wounded, and missing; and -there are few troops that can be trusted, after losing half their -numbers on Sunday, to storm a position held by a superior force and -lose one-fifth of their remnant on Thursday. Some indeed claim that -but for this handful of British soldiers the day would have been lost -to the Allies;[245] but whether this be true or not, the 22nd of May -should be a great anniversary for the Fourteenth, Thirty-Seventh, and -Fifty-Third. - -It was directly after this action that the course of events in Poland -began to tell upon the councils of the Imperial Headquarters at Tournai. -◆May 23.◆ On the 23rd, Mack, disgusted by the failure of his elaborate -plans, resigned his post as Chief of the Staff, and, having first -expressed his opinion that the reconquest of Belgium was hopeless, -retired for the time into private life. His successor, Waldeck, being a -fellow-conspirator with Thugut, was still more eager for the evacuation -of the Netherlands; and the Emperor was easily tempted to share their -views. ◆May 24.◆ On the 24th a Council of War was held for form’s sake, -wherein the Emperor set forth the situation in such a light as to gain a -ready vote from his Generals that further efforts in the Netherlands -were useless. The Duke of York alone pleaded earnestly for a renewal of -the attack upon Flanders; and, as fate ordained it, his representations -were seconded by unexpected successes of the Allies on the Sambre and in -the Palatinate. On the 24th Marshal Möllendorf and the Prussians -surprised the French about Kaiserslautern and drove them back with a -loss of three thousand men and twenty guns; and on the same day Count -Kaunitz gained a still more important victory on the Sambre. The fact -was that serious differences had arisen at Paris between Carnot on the -one side and Robespierre and St. Just on the other, because Carnot -insisted on keeping the direction of the military operations in his own -hands. Robespierre, to whom the art of war was as incomprehensible as a -Chinese manuscript, was furious with jealousy and rage. “At the first -reverse, Carnot’s head shall fall,” cried the despicable creature, -galled by the cold contempt with which his inflexible colleague rebuffed -his attempts at interference; and to re-establish civil influence at the -seat of war, St. Just, Lebas, and five more Commissioners set out on the -2nd of May for the army of the Sambre. There they introduced the rule of -terror in its worst form, and with it, of course, confusion unspeakable. -They fought with the Generals, they fought among themselves; and in the -midst of this chaos St. Just took upon himself the supreme direction of -the operations whereby the Austrians were to be crushed. ◆May 18, 20, -22, 24.◆ Four several times he ordered the army to pass the Sambre, -wasting the lives of his troops with obstinate imbecility. ◆May 24.◆ -Finally he gave Kaunitz the opportunity for a counter-attack, in which, -with inconsiderable loss to themselves, the Austrians routed the French -completely, killing and wounding two thousand men, and capturing three -thousand more, besides fifty pieces of cannon. - -This heavy blow to the French right wing offered a fair occasion for -the Allies to renew the offensive in Western Flanders; and the Duke -of York urged this step upon his colleagues with all his might. The -British Government too, reckoning that the troops, promised by Prussia -in return for a British subsidy, must be nearly ready, decided to -send out Lord Cornwallis to concert operations with Möllendorf, and -directed him also to consult the Emperor and the Duke of York on his -way to the Prussian Headquarters. But, as has already been told, King -Frederick William was occupied rather with Poland than France at the -moment; and he had also been much irritated by certain dispositions -which had been proposed for his army by Mack in the middle of May. “I -am astonished at the fashion in which Mack thinks to make use of my -troops,” wrote the King. “Does Mack imagine that we can live on air?” -echoed Möllendorf;[246] both of them being secretly delighted with so -good an excuse for remaining inactive. ◆May 29.◆ Then suddenly, on the -29th of May, the Allied Camp at Tournai was thrown into consternation -by the announcement that the Emperor was about to return to Vienna. -Aided by the defeat of the 18th, Thugut had succeeded in persuading his -imperial master to abandon the Austrian Netherlands; and even Mack, the -unpopular Quartermaster-general, had supported him by recommending not -only the evacuation of the country but the conclusion of peace with -France. - -The truth was that jealousy of Prussia had prevailed over all other -considerations, and that the Emperor had decided to offer help to -the Empress Catherine in quelling the Polish insurrection. He hoped, -however, at the same time to delude Prussia into keeping thirty -thousand men upon the Rhine, and England into furnishing a subsidy for -the ostensible prosecution of the war with France; and it was therefore -imperative upon him to conceal his intentions. He accordingly gave -out that the object of his departure was to hasten the recruiting of -his forces; and in his final letter to Coburg, who very unwillingly -retained the command, he gave him only vague instructions to adapt his -action to the exigencies of the campaign and to save his troops as much -as possible. But this duplicity deceived no one, and the less because -Waldeck, before he had succeeded Mack as Chief of the Staff, had openly -declared that the war in Belgium must be ended. The Austrian troops -were profoundly discouraged, and two-thirds of the officers asked -permission to retire. They can hardly be blamed, for the succession -of murderous actions fought by the Allies against the French on the -northern frontier of France, between the 17th of April and the 22nd -of May 1794, has few parallels in the history of war. For a month -Austrians, British, and Germans had contended almost unceasingly -against superior numbers, slaying or taking, not without heavy loss to -themselves, French soldiers by the ten thousand, and capturing French -cannon by the score. Yet all had been to no purpose, partly because -the leaders had deliberately chosen a foolish plan of operations, -partly because they had steadily refused to follow up their successes, -partly because on the 18th of May they had held two-thirds of the -army inactive within sound of the guns which were overwhelming their -comrades. The bravest men will not fight upon such terms. They will not -be butchered to serve the intrigues of politicians whose dishonesty -would disgrace a sergeant, and of potentates whose incapacity would -disqualify a corporal. In days to come Austria ◆May 29.◆ was to pay -dearly in Italy for the 29th of May 1794.[247] - -Immediately before the Emperor’s departure came news from Kaunitz that -the French had again crossed the Sambre in force; which compelled -Coburg to send him large reinforcements, and thus to weaken the right -and centre of the Allies in order to strengthen their left. At the -same time, for the sake of keeping the Dutch in good humour, Coburg -was obliged to give the supreme command in that quarter to the Crown -Prince of Orange, to the natural disgust of Kaunitz, who had shown much -ability and achieved great successes. The great safeguard, however, -to eastward was that St. Just insisted upon controlling the French -operations; and it need not be said that against such an adversary -even the Prince of Orange was victorious. But far more serious were -the movements of the French on the western flank. Apprised of Coburg’s -detachment of troops to the Sambre, hoping still to further Carnot’s -projects for invasion of England, and above all conscious of the -advantage offered to French tactics by the enclosed country of Western -Flanders, Pichegru determined to prosecute his operations on that -side. Accordingly, leaving between thirty and forty thousand men in -positions about Mouscron and Menin to hold Coburg in check, he marched -with about the same number on Ypres. ◆June 1.◆ On the 1st of June -about fifteen thousand men surrounded the fortress on the west and -south, and opened their first parallel; while some twenty thousand -more under Souham took post about Passchendaele, about six miles to -the north-east, to cover the siege from Clerfaye, who was lying at -Thielt. On that same day, by a curious irony, Lord Howe defeated the -Brest fleet, taking eight French ships and sinking two more. This -action, in which the regiments on the fleet, and particularly the -Sixty-Ninth,[248] played no inconspicuous part, closed for the present -all Carnot’s projects of an invasion. - -The event, however, in no way disturbed the plans of Pichegru. ◆June 4.◆ -On the 4th of June Clerfaye contrived to pass two battalions into Ypres -to strengthen the garrison; but he declared himself unable, with the -fifteen thousand men that remained to him, to relieve the place unless -he were reinforced. By express command of the Emperor, who had lingered -at Brussels on his homeward journey, Coburg sent him some ten thousand -men in two detachments, reckoning that, after the recent victory on the -Sambre, he could safely draw a few troops from that quarter. Clerfaye, -however, continued to display the sluggishness which had characterised -his conduct from the beginning of the campaign. ◆June 6.◆ On the 6th, -before his reinforcements had reached him, he made a feeble advance -against Souham in four columns, and was of course unsuccessful; ◆June -10.◆ and on the 10th, when his force had been raised to over twenty -thousand men, he was assailed and defeated with loss by Souham before he -could make up his mind to act. On that same day Coburg had designed to -make a diversion in Clerfaye’s favour, by an attack on Mouscron, upon a -plan calculated so exactly to expose the Duke of York’s column to -destruction, as on the 18th of May, that the Duke refused to accept it -until it was altered. This, however, was of small importance, for the -French, having perfect information of the intended movements, appeared -in every direction in such force that the enterprise was abandoned. The -state of things at the Austrian headquarters was indeed almost beyond -belief. Insensible to all ideas of duty and discipline, the young -staff-officers, described by Craig as “in general the most contemptible -of puppies,” had talked openly of the projected movement in the -coffee-houses at noon, though the Duke of York received no information -of it until ten hours later, nor any orders until four o’clock on the -next morning. “Mack used to keep these gentry in order,” wrote Craig, -“and, had he been here, the prison would have been full of them next -day; but indeed it would never have happened.” ◆June 12.◆ Meanwhile -Clerfaye remained so incurably supine that the Duke of York more than -once entreated Coburg to entrust the relief of Ypres to himself, but in -vain. ◆June 13.◆ Roused by repeated orders to attack, Clerfaye at last -moved against Souham in five columns, gained some advantage at first, -captured ten guns, and then as usual sat still until Souham had gathered -troops sufficient for a counter attack, when he immediately retired to -his old position at Thielt. - -This sealed the fate of Ypres, the key of maritime Flanders, the chief -support of the right flank of the Allies, the bulwark which protected -the British communications with Ostend. The Duke of York pleaded hard -for a last effort to save it, by a march of the whole army to join -Clerfaye; but without success. “The truth is,” wrote Craig, “that the -Austrian army is incapable of further action. The men are disheartened -and the officers disgusted and disunited.” It was finally decided that, -to cover Ostend and the Dutch frontier, Clerfaye should take up a -position between the Lys and the Scheldt about Deynse, some ten miles -to the south-west of Ghent; keeping half of his force between Bruges -and Ostend, and sending the Eighth Light Dragoons, Thirty-eighth and -Fifty-fifth, which had formed part of his force, to Ostend. “We are -too weak by ten thousand men to hold this defensive position,” wrote -Craig; “if the French see their chance and push Clerfaye, they will -force us to abandon this position about Tournai and will pass the -Scheldt in spite of us; and then ten to one we shall find ourselves -separated from him and beaten in detail.... Sooner than hold the -defensive position I would concentrate the whole army, eighty thousand -men, march to the Sambre, attack them at any risk and march back -again.... You may expect to hear from us soon in Holland.” Clearly -there was one among the despised British officers who could have taught -the Austrians a lesson.[249] - -The situation was indeed a desperate one. The Austrians, having taken no -pains to restore the fortifications of Tournai, had thrown up an -entrenched camp for its protection on the western side. These lines -extended from the city southward along the Scheldt to Maulde, and -required so many men for their defence that few could be spared for -active operations. Some seven thousand Frenchmen at Mons-en-Pévèle kept -the left of the Allies in continual alarm for the safety of Orchies, -which was the key of Maulde and of the passage of the Scheldt at -Mortagne; for if that passage were forced, the communication between -Coburg and the army of the Sambre would be endangered. A little to the -north of Mons-en-Pévèle was the entire garrison of Lille, and still -further to the north, between Lille and Menin, stood from twenty to -thirty thousand more French troops. Behind this screen to westward, from -fifty thousand to sixty thousand of the enemy were engaged as the -besieging and covering armies at Ypres; and far beyond them to the north -lay the right wing of the Allies under Clerfaye, stretched in a weak -attenuated line from Ostend to the Lys, and only maintaining -communication with Tournai by the circuitous route of the Scheldt. On -the eastern flank the French had now some seventy-five thousand men on -the Sambre, with a capable leader in Jourdan, albeit one still hampered -by the interference of St. Just; and this was the only quarter in which -recent events had gone favourably for the Allies. Such a situation could -not last long, and the strain upon Coburg must have been cruelly severe. -◆June 16.◆ On the 16th, however, there came a gleam of hope. The French -on that day again passed the Sambre, but for the fifth time were driven -back with heavy loss; ◆June 18.◆ and Coburg, having summoned four -battalions from that quarter, determined on the 18th to march and join -with Clerfaye in a final attempt to relieve Ypres. The troops were -already in motion, when in the evening the news came that the French had -crossed the Sambre for the sixth time, and successfully invested -Charleroi. Thereupon the enterprise was abandoned. ◆June 19.◆ On the -following day Ypres surrendered, and thus Carnot’s original plan of -turning both flanks of the Allies began, after two months of murderous -fighting, to accomplish itself. - -Enabled by the fall of Ypres to turn the whole of his attention to -eastward, Coburg at once proposed that he should march with all the -Austrian troops to Charleroi, and leave the Duke of York to guard the -line of the Scheldt from Tournai to Condé. The Duke answered that -his instructions were to keep the whole of the troops in British pay -together, but that, if ordered, he would gladly lead the whole of them -with Coburg to the Sambre. Since, however, his force was absolutely -inadequate to guard the line of the Scheldt, he insisted that, if it -were left behind, an Austrian garrison should remain at Tournai, and -that he himself should take up a position on the eastern bank of the -Scheldt between that city and Oudenarde, so as to ensure his retreat in -case of mishap. - -The offer to march to the Sambre was fair, and it is difficult to -understand why Coburg did not embrace it; for, if the battle on the -Sambre were lost, it would obviously be impossible for the Duke’s -troops to remain isolated in Flanders. Coburg did, however, reject -it, though he consented to station about five thousand Austrians -under General Kray between Denain and Orchies, promising that, if he -succeeded in forcing back the enemy on the Sambre, he would return -without delay, but that, in the event of his failure, he should not -expect the Duke of York to maintain his position on the Scheldt. He -also took the significant step of transferring the Austrian hospitals -and stores at Valenciennes, as well as the magazines about Tournai, -to Brussels and Antwerp; the removal of the stores at Brussels having -begun some time ◆June 21.◆ before.[250] Finally, on the 21st, he -marched away; and the Duke, since the corps in British pay had now -shrunk to seven thousand men, contracted his quarters, and took up a -new position closer to Tournai. - -But meanwhile the news that Ostend was in danger had, as usual, stirred -Dundas to unwonted exertion in England. He still made a fetish of the -place, and his original intention seems to have been to defend it, -without any particular reference to the Duke of York’s operations. On -the 17th of June, therefore, he ordered Lord Moira’s force in the Isle -of Wight and the Channel Islands to sail for Ostend at once, together -with drafts of recruits and three fresh regiments from Ireland, making -in all a reinforcement of about ten thousand men. On the 20th Moira’s -troops embarked, and on the 21st the Eighth, the Forty-fourth, and the -recruits arrived at Ostend. The drafts, it must be remarked, arrived -without arms or military appointments of any kind; and it was only a fog -at sea that prevented a whole regiment, the Ninetieth, from being also -landed there without either arms or clothing, Dundas having ordered it -to embark without enquiry as to these details.[251] But Pichegru -meanwhile did not remain idle, and leaving Ypres on the 20th marched -upon Clerfaye’s position at Deynse. ◆June 23.◆ The Austrian General, -after a short defence of his entrenchments, retired, with the loss of -not a few men and three guns, first to Ghent, and then beyond it, -finally taking up a position on the north side of the canal that runs -from Ghent to Sluys, ◆June 24.◆ where he was presently joined by his -detachments from Bruges. ◆June 25.◆ On the 25th of June there arrived at -Ostend, after a voyage of nineteen days from Cork, one squadron of the -Fourteenth Light Dragoons and the Thirty-third regiment, the latter -under the command of an officer whose name it still bears, but who was -then an impecunious younger son of five-and-twenty, possessed indeed of -some skill in playing the violin, but still distinguished by no higher -title than that of Colonel Arthur Wellesley. ◆June 26.◆ On the morrow -Moira with the last of the reinforcements[252] also reached Ostend, -where he found an advanced guard of the French within four miles of the -town, a large force of several thousand men close behind it, and the -Commandant very wisely embarking his garrison with a view to retreat. -The whole district was in a state of panic; but Moira promptly landed -the whole of his men, and having observed the difficulties of defending -Ostend, and the military worthlessness of the place, quietly selected -his fighting ground outside it. “I am not at all satisfied with my -position,” he wrote calmly to Dundas, “but since you appear to attach -importance to the town I will do my best to maintain it.” “The defences -are so detestable,” he added cheerfully to Nepean, “that I shall go into -the open field if we must come to blows. If you are to lose everything -it does not signify if you are beaten into the bargain.”[253] It is -dangerous for a General, be he even so able as Moira, to address an -English Minister of War in this strain; for, in the event of mishap, the -words may be brought up as evidence against him in Parliament to prove -that he was reckless, careless, neglectful, or despondent. - -During these days the Duke of York remained in painful suspense at -Tournai, until the news of Clerfaye’s defeat on the 23rd warned him to -move northward without delay. As Craig had perceived, the French by -crossing the Scheldt at Oudenarde could prevent the Duke of York from -joining Clerfaye, crush both armies in detail, and then, passing -eastward, could annihilate Coburg. ◆June 24.◆ The Duke therefore called -in Kray’s Austrians for the defence of Tournai, and marched -north-eastward on the right bank of the Scheldt to Renaix, where he -learned that on the same day a French corps had summoned Oudenarde. -◆June 25.◆ On the morrow Pichegru crossed the Lys at Deynse with the -main body of his army, and striking south from thence encamped on the -27th at Huysse, ◆June 27.◆ between four and five miles north of -Oudenarde. On that same night came a message from Coburg to the Duke of -York that on the previous day he had made his attack on the French about -Charleroi and had failed. ◆June 26.◆ This was the battle of Fleurus, -which had been suddenly broken off by the Austrian commander before -decisive advantage had been gained by either side; and it is still a -question whether Coburg’s action was dictated by the requirements of -Thugut’s policy or by his own military judgment. ◆June 27.◆ However that -may be, he retreated in good order upon Brussels, halting on the 27th in -a position running from Soignies on the west through Braine L’Alleud to -Gembloux on the east. This movement uncovered the Duke of York’s left -rear, and placed him in a most dangerous position. He had with him -barely ten thousand men, nearly half of them cavalry, which in so close -a country were of little service; and from the church-tower at Oudenarde -he could see thirty thousand of the enemy in his front. The French, by -passing the Scheldt, could at any time cut off his retreat to the north, -in which case his only line of safety lay eastward towards Grammont; and -this in its turn would be closed if Coburg should continue his -retrograde movement towards Namur, which was his first stage on the road -to Vienna. - -◆June 28.◆ - -On the morning of the 28th the enemy appeared in force before -Oudenarde, showing every sign of making the dreaded movement across -the river; and the Duke despatched orders to Moira to join Clerfaye -immediately. For two days Pichegru continued his menaces on the -Scheldt, and then suddenly on the evening of the 30th he retired, -having received orders from Paris to occupy Nieuport, Ostend, and the -island of Walcheren in force, with a view to the invasion of England. -◆June 30.◆ Ostend, which, together with Nieuport, Henry Dundas had kept -under his own orders, was evacuated in good time, while directions to -that purport were still on their way from England. Moira’s instructions -extended no further than to the defence of Ostend, but, in the critical -circumstances of the case, he proposed to join his force to Clerfaye, -and to act with him against the French left. Clerfaye at first welcomed -the offer, but, on hearing of the misfortune of Fleurus, declared -that he could make no engagement with the British whatever. This was -unpleasant for Moira, who had counted on the help of the Austrians in -protecting the transport of his camp-equipage on the canal from Bruges -to Ghent. The situation was dangerous, for the French were in force at -three different places within two hours’ march of the canal, bent upon -preventing his junction with Clerfaye. Without a moment’s hesitation -Moira sent his baggage northward to Sluys, and by a rapid march made -his way to Ghent, just in time to anticipate a movement made by the -French to intercept him. Thus a valuable reinforcement was secured to -the Allies; and three more perilous days were passed without mishap, -thanks rather to the Committee of Safety at Paris than to the Austrian -commanders in the field.[254] - -◆June 30.◆ - -On the evening of the 30th the Duke of York rode over from Renaix to -Braine L’Alleud to consult Coburg; and it was then agreed that -Clerfaye’s force should change places with the Duke’s, so as to bring -the Austrian corps nearer to its own main army, and the British -contingent nearer to the sea. At the actual conference both Coburg and -the Archduke Charles declared that, having no orders from the Emperor to -evacuate the Austrian Netherlands, they felt bound in honour to defend -them. Waldeck indeed opposed even a withdrawal from the line of the -Scheldt. ◆July 2.◆ All this, however, was mere trifling, for two days -later Coburg wrote that his right wing had been driven back from -Soignies, and that the Duke would do well to retire to a position -appointed him between Brussels and Antwerp. The fall of Mons on the 1st -of July having also laid bare the Duke’s left flank and rear, he took -the hint, and while protesting against the desertion of the country, -gave his orders for retreat in the morning by way of Grammont and thence -upon Alost. Tournai, through the courtesy of the French, was peaceably -evacuated by the Austrians, though Condé, Valenciennes, Landrecies, and -Quesnoy were held. The line of the Scheldt was abandoned, and the Duke -of York’s troops were withdrawn from every garrison except Nieuport. -◆July 2.◆ As to this last the Duke, as in duty bound, asked for Dundas’s -orders, saying that, if the Government wished to reconquer Flanders, the -place should be kept; otherwise the garrison, which included five -hundred French emigrants, should not for pity’s sake be exposed to the -risk of capture. - -Then followed a miserable tragedy. Dundas, apparently before -the receipt of this letter, wrote on the 3rd of July to General -Diepenbrock, the Commandant at Nieuport, promising to send transports -for the embarkation of the garrison, if necessary, but adding that the -Government attached great importance to the retention of the place. -Within two days the French had broken ground before the miserable -little port, where the water was so shallow that ships could not -come near the shore; ◆July 16.◆ and less than a fortnight later -the unfortunate garrison, which included a few British troops, was -compelled to surrender. Forthwith the French massed the emigrants -in the ditch of the fort and played upon them with grape-shot until -the whole of them were destroyed. It was well known that this would -inevitably be the fate of those unhappy men if they fell into the hands -of the Republicans; and German authors have not hesitated to censure -the Duke of York because, according to the current, though unjust, -opinion, he neglected to order the evacuation of Nieuport while there -was yet time. It were, indeed, devoutly to be wished that the Duke -had respected Dundas less, and had withdrawn the garrison without -consulting him, though it is manifest that he would thereby have drawn -upon himself the censure of the Government. The blame, therefore, for -this shameful business must remain with Dundas; and it was a very great -misfortune for England that he was not called to account for it.[255] - -Meanwhile the Duke continued his retreat northward down the river -Dendre, reaching Lombeek Ste. Catherine, about eight miles west of -Brussels, on the ◆July 5.◆ 4th of July. On the morrow the leaders of the -coalesced armies again met in conference at Waterloo, when it was -decided that Clerfaye’s force should pass eastwards towards Brussels, -and that the army of the Allies should ultimately occupy a line from -Antwerp, by Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux, to Namur, but that until the -7th, at any rate, the line in advance of Brussels, extending from Alost -by Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to Sombref, should be maintained. Ghent -had already been evacuated; and accordingly on the next day Clerfaye’s -force began its march to join Coburg, while Moira moved to Alost and -brought his troops for the first time under the Duke’s personal command. -◆July 6.◆ But Jourdan meanwhile was not inactive. On the 6th he attacked -the whole line of the Austrians from Braine-le-Comte to Gembloux; and, -though repulsed after hard fighting on the east, where a concentrated -attack might have given him possession of the Austrian line of -communications, he succeeded in pushing Coburg’s right wing back from -Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles to Waterloo. Thereupon Coburg warned the -Duke of York that he must retire eastward and cancel the agreement made -on the 5th. The Duke answered with cold sarcasm that it was a new thing -for the Austrians to retire before thirty thousand Frenchmen, and -appealed to the Archduke Charles to keep Coburg to his engagements; but -received from him only a sad reply that orders must be obeyed. On the -7th and 8th Jourdan renewed his attacks, directing the best of his -strength against the Austrian left, which he forced back to the -battlefield of Ramillies. ◆July 7.◆ He then immediately invested Namur; -upon which Coburg, fearing to be cut off from the Meuse, ordered the -whole of his army to retire upon Tirlemont. - -The Duke meanwhile, since his left was uncovered by the retreat of the -Austrians, withdrew, at Coburg’s request, very slowly northward to -Assche, and thence struck north-eastward to the Dyle, which he crossed -at Malines, fixing his headquarters at Contich, some eight miles north -of that city. A new line of defence was then taken up, which -sufficiently showed the divided counsels of the Allies. ◆July.◆ On the -right the British contingent, now numbering some thirty thousand men, -was posted on the Dyle from Antwerp to Malines. On its left the Prince -of Orange with the Dutch troops and from two to three thousand Austrians -covered the line from Malines to Louvain; and from Louvain the rest of -the Austrian army, between forty-five and fifty thousand men, was -extended in a south-easterly direction by Tirlemont, Landen, and Waremme -to the Meuse, with a detachment of four thousand more on the eastern -bank of that river, and between it and the Ourthe. Thus the British and -Dutch, who desired to defend Holland, could be deserted at any moment -which the Emperor should select for the pursuit of his own particular -object, namely, to carry his army away to share the plunder of Poland. -Craig, for his part, felt no doubt whatever that the British and Dutch -would very soon be left to their own resources.[256] - -The reader may have felt surprised that, with a force of nearly one -hundred and fifty thousand men, the French should not have pressed the -Allies harder, and made an end of them long before. The fact was that -the Committee of Public Safety had interfered with the Generals on the -4th of July, by an order that the recapture of Valenciennes, Condé, -Landrecies, and Quesnoy should take precedence of any further -operations; and accordingly the army in Belgium had been weakened to -provide for this service. This was the work of Robespierre, who at the -time was inclined towards peace; and indeed peace appears to have been a -common topic of conversation between the French and Austrian outposts -from the beginning of July.[257] Thirty thousand French soldiers were -accordingly withdrawn to Valenciennes, as many more were wasted in -occupying ports of embarkation for England, and the remainder were -ordered to push the Allies completely out of Belgium, and then to occupy -a cordon from Antwerp to Namur. ◆July 12.◆ Pichegru, therefore, took -command in person of the left wing, and on the 12th moved with eighteen -thousand men against Malines, while Jourdan on the right simultaneously -advanced against Louvain, Jodoigne, and Huy on the Meuse. On the evening -of the 12th Pichegru drove the Duke of York’s advanced posts into -Malines, where they were promptly reinforced; ◆July 15.◆ but the -fortifications of the town were in ruins, and, on renewing the attack on -the 15th, the French captured the place with little difficulty. The -troops charged with the defence were Hessians and Dutch; and it appears -certain that the conduct of one or the other of them was not -irreproachable, though there are indications also that the Duke himself -was partly responsible for the mishap. - -The Duke then threw his left back along the line of the Nethe from -Lierre to Duffel; ◆July 15.◆ but meanwhile Jourdan had on the same day -mastered Louvain, and in the course of the two following days Jodoigne -and Namur also. The Dutch troops about Louvain, upon the loss of that -town, fell back northward across the Demer, while the Austrians retired -eastward; and thus the line of the Allies was fairly broken owing to -their own divergent plans. ◆July 18.◆ The Duke of York had already in -these days concerted operations with the Prince of Orange for the -recapture of Malines on the 18th,[258] when he received a letter from -Coburg saying that, owing to the loss of that place and of Louvain, he -had ordered the troops formerly stationed at the latter city to fall -back to Diest, and was himself withdrawing from Tirlemont to Landen. The -Duke begged him before doing so to essay a general forward movement, but -received only a vague and unsatisfactory reply; ◆July 20.◆ and on the -morning of the 20th a staff-officer, while inspecting the left of the -Dutch position, discovered that the Austrians at Diest were already -retreating south-eastward on Hasselt, Coburg having given them orders to -this effect without saying a word of his intentions to the Duke of York. -◆July 22.◆ With his left flank thus again laid bare, the Duke was -obliged to evacuate Antwerp and retire due north from it across the -Dutch frontier to Rozendahl. ◆July 24.◆ Coburg likewise fell back to -eastward, crossed the Meuse at Maastricht, and took up a position about -seven miles south and east of that fortress at Fouron le Comte. Thus the -British and Austrians were finally parted. - -It cannot be said that either of them was sorry to take leave of the -other. Even in 1793 their relations had not been too cordial, for the -Austrians, in their jealousy, would never allow foreign troops to -pass through their fortified towns, even during a forced march; and -thus the British were frequently condemned to make long and fatiguing -detours.[259] But the betrayal of the Duke of York’s column on the -18th of May, and the subsequent operations, deliberately contrived to -hasten the evacuation of the Netherlands, converted the dislike of -the British for the Austrians into the bitterest hatred and contempt. -At headquarters, again, the presence of a soldier such as Craig, with -ideas far more enlightened than those of the Austrians, and with some -means of insisting upon them through the medium of the Duke of York, -can hardly have contributed to harmony. It may be added that the -Austrian troops were as severe in their criticism of their chiefs, -and particularly of Waldeck, as were any of the British, proclaiming -loudly that the abandonment of Belgium was due to French gold.[260] In -fact the Austrian army, between heavy losses and deep distrust of its -leaders, was utterly demoralised; nor is it surprising that this should -have been so. It is indeed more than probable that, if Coburg had -wished to make a stand after the action of Fleurus, his men would not -have supported him. Of course Coburg had to bear the responsibility for -all this, and to digest as best he might some very bitter reproaches -from the Duke of York; yet it seems that in truth he was the person -the least to blame. Though as a commander in the field he was slow, -unenterprising, enamoured of vicious methods, and possessed of no -military quality except that of looking carefully to the wants of -his troops, yet he did not lack insight, sound sense, imperturbable -calm, and the instinct of honesty and straightforwardness. His name is -forgotten in England, though his portrait is still occasionally to be -found in English print-shops, showing that at one time he had gained -a certain fame, which was destined speedily to perish. It can only be -said of him that he was beloved by his men, that he bore the sins of -others without complaining, and that he was a loyal servant to an -unfaithful master. - - - - - VOL. IV. BOOK XII. CHAPTER XII - -◆1794.◆ - -While the Allies in the Netherlands were thus giving way on all sides -during the months of June and July, the British Government naturally -bethought itself of the sixty thousand men which it had agreed to hire -from Prussia for operations in that quarter. The Ministers had reckoned -that these troops would be ready by the end of May; and accordingly, -as has been told, Lord Cornwallis was sent from England to arrange -with Marshal Möllendorf as to the part to be taken by the Prussians in -the campaign. Visiting the Duke of York on the way, Cornwallis agreed -with him that the protection of West Flanders, and, if possible, the -siege of Lille, were the matters of most urgent importance; and he -formulated his request to Möllendorf accordingly. ◆June 20.◆ He soon -discovered that he had been sent upon a fool’s errand. Möllendorf, -instead of sixty thousand, had but forty thousand men, deficient in -stores and supplies and absolutely wanting in transport, which he -declared himself unable to furnish without ready money from England. -The real difficulty was that the Allies were all at variance as to the -use that should be made of the Prussian troops. England wanted them to -aid in recovering West Flanders. Holland would at first have preferred -them to remain upon the Rhine, but presently yielded to the demands of -England. The Emperor of Austria not only raised strong objections to -the march of Prussian troops to Belgium, but claimed thirty thousand -of the sixty thousand men for the protection of the Empire, declaring -that their removal from the Rhine would expose all Germany to the -ravages of the French. Between these conflicting claims Möllendorf -found little difficulty in sitting still and doing nothing, which was -precisely what the advisers of King Frederick William most desired. By -the 18th of June Cornwallis had made up his mind that scanty help was -to be expected from Prussia, at any rate during the present campaign; -and neither he nor Lord Malmesbury was slow to express very decided -opinions as to the ill-faith of the Prussian Court.[261] - -This was the situation when the failure of the Austrian attack -at Fleurus determined the Emperor to evacuate the Low Countries. -That potentate thereupon reversed his language as to the Prussian -contingent, and urged that Möllendorf should advance into Belgium; -nor did he hesitate, on the 15th of July, to order Coburg still to -defend the Austrian Netherlands, though he said nothing about sending -reinforcements to enable him to do so. This despicable lying and -trickery had, of course, but one object, that of drawing more money -from England under false pretences. The English Government, however, -though it had learned that no reliance was to be placed on Thugut’s -statements or promises, ◆July 19.◆ decided in the middle of July to -send Lord Spencer and Thomas Grenville to Vienna, to urge once more the -renewal of the offensive in Belgium. So far, therefore, the Emperor -seemed likely to gain his point; and since the King of Prussia had -shown remarkable weakness in dealing with the insurrection in Poland, -Francis had every reason to hope that decisive action in that country -would be delayed, until his own and the Russian armies could appear -there in sufficient force to dictate the final settlement according to -their own desires. The Prussian Ministers, on the other hand, when they -learned of the despatch of Spencer and Grenville to Vienna, became -nervous lest England should transfer the promised subsidy from her to -Austria; and they began to turn their thoughts to the negotiations of a -separate peace with France.[262] - -◆July 2–13.◆ - -Meanwhile, through the energy of Carnot, reinforcements had been found -for the French army of the Rhine, which, after a fortnight’s hard -fighting on the heights about Kaiserslautern, forced Möllendorf to -retire under the cannon of Mainz with a loss of two thousand men and -sixteen guns. The Austrian troops on the Rhine thereupon withdrew from -the left bank of the river; and the miscarriage of a plan, concerted a -fortnight later for recovery of the lost ground, set the Generals of the -two nations quarrelling more bitterly than ever. ◆July 28.◆ The end of -July brought yet another stroke of good luck to France in the overthrow -of Robespierre and the execution of himself, St. Just, and other of his -principal colleagues. Robespierre’s latest achievement as a military -administrator had been to decree that no quarter should be shown to -British or Hanoverians in the field, an order which was disobeyed by the -French troops and laughed at by the British. The supreme imbecility, -apart from all other faults, of his rule had brought France to the last -stage of exhaustion; and, indeed, if the Allies had succeeded in keeping -the French armies out of Belgium, the latter must have perished of -starvation.[263] Robespierre’s death marked the close of the Terror and -the beginning of a return to common sense in the matter of -administration. The man, however, had lived long enough to waste the -energies of the armies of the North in the recovery of the four captured -fortresses in the frontier, when they should have been scattering the -Allies to the four winds; and thus it came about that the Duke of York -enjoyed a few weeks’ respite for the formation of new plans. - -It was fortunate for him that it was so, for he now found himself -in serious trouble with his army. This was the result of the insane -system, allowed by Dundas, of raising men for rank. The regiments -despatched to Holland contained only a very few old soldiers mixed -with great numbers of recruits, who were utterly without training -and discipline. “Many of them do not know one end of a fire-lock -from the other,” wrote Craig, “and will never know it.” Six of the -battalions had been deprived of their flank-companies, that is to -say, of their best men, to make up General Grey’s force in the West -Indies; and no sooner did the new levies find themselves released from -the crimping-house and the gaol for active service, than they fell to -plundering in all directions. The Duke was obliged to issue a very -severe order on the 27th of July[264] to call the army to its senses; -but, with such officers as had been obtained under Dundas’s scheme, -it was impossible to expect the slightest obedience. In the first -place the army was lamentably deficient in Brigadiers and Generals -of division. Moira had only accepted the command of his force on -the condition that he should not serve in Flanders; and though, in -view of the perilous condition of the Allies when he landed, he had -waived his objections for the time, yet there was another obstacle -not so easily to be overcome. Albeit enjoying an independent command -of eight thousand men, Moira was almost the junior Major-general of -the army. Major-general Crosbie, who was with him, also held a more -important command than his seniors, such as Ralph Abercromby and David -Dundas, the latter of whom joined the Duke of York at the end of July. -Both Moira and Crosbie, therefore, went home, from delicacy towards -the feelings of their superiors; and the loss of Moira was bitterly -regretted as that of a very able officer who was idolised by his men. - -The British troops now consisted of four brigades of cavalry and seven -of infantry,[265] making altogether some twenty-five thousand men; but -for all these there were, after the departure of Moira and Crosbie, -only four Generals—David Dundas, Stewart, Abercromby, and Fox, the -last of whom was fully employed as Quartermaster-general. This was the -more serious because the commanders of the new battalions, who had -been juggled into seniority by the Government and the army-brokers, -were not fit to command a company, much less a brigade. Some of them -were boys of twenty-one who knew nothing of their simplest duties. -Though they went cheerfully into action, they looked upon the whole -campaign as an elaborate picnic, for which they did not fail to provide -themselves with abundance of comforts; and thus the baggage-columns -were filled with private waggons under the charge of insubordinate -drivers. The junior officers, who were so scarce that few regiments -had as many subalterns as companies, appear in many cases to have been -worse than the senior, as is always to be expected when commissions -are to be obtained for the asking; nor with bad examples before them -were they likely to improve. Thrust into the Army to satisfy the claims -of dependents, constituents, importunate creditors, and discarded -concubines, many of these young men were at once a disgrace and an -encumbrance to the force. Hard drinking, which was the fashion then -in all classes from highest to lowest, was, of course, sedulously -cultivated by these aspirants to the rank of gentleman; and it was no -uncommon thing for regiments to start on the march under charge of the -Adjutant and Sergeant-major only, while the officers stayed behind, -to come galloping up several hours later, full of wine, careless -where they rode, careless of the confusion into which they threw the -columns, careless of everything but the place appointed for the end of -the march, if by chance they were sober enough to have remembered it. -These evils, too, were extremely difficult to check, for in 1794, as -in 1744, political interest rather than meritorious service was the -road to promotion. While the shameful traffic of the army-brokers and -the raising of endless new regiments continued, every officer who could -command money or interest was sure of obtaining advancement at home -without the knowledge of his chief in the field, and had, therefore, -not only no encouragement to do his duty, but an actual reason for -avoiding it. Thus the men were very imperfectly disciplined; there -were no efficient company-officers to look after them; no efficient -Colonels to look after the company-officers; no Generals to look after -the Colonels. Craig sought a remedy in begging for more Generals. “We -cannot get on,” he wrote, on the 5th of August, “without a good supply -and a supply of good. The evil to the discipline of the army increases -every day, and is likely to become very serious.”[267] - -But the Duke’s difficulties did not end with the defects of his -officers and men. It had lately become the practice in time of peace -to issue to each regiment the materials for its clothing, to be made -up by the regiment itself, a system which had probably been designed -to obtain for the Colonels the largest possible profit. Nor must the -Colonels be blamed herein, for they were expected to make that profit, -which in those days was practically the only emolument open to general -officers. It was, of course, impossible for troops in the field to -spend three or four months in making up their clothes; and the result -was that; the Duke’s army was left almost naked. Moreover, in the hurry -of raising innumerable new corps, the responsibility for such details -as clothing, accounts, musters, and so forth had been overlooked; the -new officers knew nothing of the extremely complex methods of military -finance;[268] and the sudden vast increase of business thrown upon -agents and officials was greater than they could immediately bear. -Finally, quite apart from these failings in respect of the raiment of -entire battalions, no effort whatever was made to clothe the recruits -who were sent out to fill up the gaps in the various corps. These -unfortunate men, on being drafted into the depots in England, received -what was called slop-clothing, which signified a linen jacket and -trousers; and it is an actual fact that many of them were sent on -active service in this dress, without waistcoat, drawers, or stockings. -The result was that the Duke of York’s corps was in a worse state in -respect of clothing than had been hitherto recorded of any British -army.[269] - -Another great difficulty, of which Craig had complained again and -again, was the want of drivers for the artillery. Lord Moira had -brought with him guns but no drivers; and there were but two captains -(not enough, as Craig said, to do a fortieth part of the work) at -disposal for the superintendence of a huge mass of horses. Thus a new -train of artillery, which had been sent out to replace the cannon -lost at Tourcoing, became a positive embarrassment. The Commissariat -also, as used so often to happen with British armies, was in a very -bad state. The men of the new corps of Royal Waggoners had been -recruited in London, and were the worst refuse of the population. -They were known, in fact, as the “Newgate Blues.” “A greater set of -scoundrels never disgraced an army,” wrote Craig, in his usual pithy -style. “I believe it to be true that half of them, if not taken from -the hulks, have at times visited them.... They have committed every -species of villainy, and treat their horses badly.” But the very worst -department of all was that of the hospitals, wherein the abuses were -so terrible that men hardly liked to speak of them. In December 1793 -the inhabitants of one of the English ports had been stupefied by the -arrival of one hundred invalid soldiers from Ostend in indescribable -distress. They had been on board ship for a week in the bitter wintry -weather, without so much as straw to lie upon. Some of them were -dead; others died on being carried ashore. No provision had been made -for their comfort on landing, and, but for the compassion of the -gentry who subscribed money for their relief, the poor fellows might -well have perished.[270] Nothing was done to amend this state of -things. Dundas’s idea of putting an army in the field was to land raw -men on a foreign shore, and to expect discipline, arms, ammunition, -clothing, victuals, medical stores, and medical treatment to descend -on them from Heaven. Some kind of a medical staff was improvised out -of drunken apothecaries, broken-down practitioners, and rogues of -every description, who were provided under some cheap contract; the -charges of respectable members of the medical profession being deemed -exorbitant. “The dreadful mismanagement of the hospital is beyond -description,” wrote Craig, “and the remedy beyond my power. Every -branch and every fibre of every branch draws a contrary way. I really -doubt if there will be any way to get any good from this department but -by tying them all together and sending them to you to be changed for a -new set.”[271] - -Such was the composition of the force with which the Duke of York -now undertook, in concert with the Dutch, to protect Holland, -or, in other words, to conduct that most delicate and trying of -operations—manœuvring with inferior numbers over a wide front to hold -a superior force in check. The first difficulty arose with the Dutch, -for the Prince of Orange, apparently enamoured of the Austrian methods, -was eager to scatter the troops over a multitude of different points; -but this the Duke, with Craig at his back, steadily refused to do. The -Prince then urged that the Dutch fortresses should be garrisoned by -British troops; but the said fortresses were all in bad condition, and -were repairing only with that incredible slowness which was peculiar -to the Dutch Government. The Duke, therefore, refused this also; -feeling tolerably sure that, if he consented, his battalions would -be sacrificed piecemeal for the defence of Holland, while the Dutch -looked on without raising a man to help them. The two gates of Holland -on the south were Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, and on the east Grave and -Nimeguen, with the fortress of Bois-le-Duc midway between Breda and -Nimeguen. The two eastern gates were safe so long as the Austrians -retained Maastricht and their position on the Meuse; but the Austrians -were not to be trusted. Accordingly, the Duke resolved to garrison -Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, and, if possible, Bois-le-Duc with Dutch troops; -himself taking up a position on the north bank of the river Aa, with -his right resting on Bois-le-Duc and his left on the great morass -called the Peel. From this central point he judged that he could move -to the help of any of the Dutch fortresses to southward, cover the -province of Gelderland, and keep Grave and Nimeguen within reach in -case of mishap on that side. - -He was about to march thither from Rozendahl when the news came that -Moreau, who was advancing northward along the coast after the capture of -Nieuport, had driven back the Dutch posts and had besieged Sluys. The -Prince of Orange thereupon besought the Duke to stand fast, producing a -letter from Coburg which contained not only an assurance of his ability -to hold the passage of the Meuse, but even a hint of possible offensive -movements. After some hesitation the Duke consented to a compromise by -moving to Osterhout, a little to the north-east of Breda, so as to give -some countenance both to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. ◆July 31.◆ He -marched, accordingly, on the 31st of July, unmolested by the enemy, who -were in force around Antwerp; and the Prince of Orange then came to the -wise but rather belated decision to evacuate all the Dutch fortresses to -the south of the Scheldt. ◆Aug. 8.◆ The Duke, therefore, lent him a -strong detachment of his men to hold the communications between Breda -and Bergen-op-Zoom, so as to release Dutch troops to cover the retreat -of these garrisons and to relieve Sluys.[272] - -Just at this moment Henry Dundas, hearing of Moreau’s advance, and -having by chance a few troops unemployed, decided to send a naval -armament to Flushing, together with five battalions under Lord Mulgrave, -for the defence of the Dutch territories in that quarter. As was his -rule in such cases, Dundas kept Mulgrave under his own immediate -command, but withal instructed him not to go against any order of the -Duke of York,—an arrangement admirably calculated to paralyse the force -and to raise discord between the commanders. ◆Aug. 17.◆ Mulgrave, who -had started apart from his troops, reached Flushing on the 17th, and -finding that none of them had arrived, occupied himself in examining the -situation. He was soon satisfied that the French had no further designs -for the campaign than to take Sluys and Flushing, as ports from which to -ship the harvest of the Austrian Netherlands to France. Meanwhile, the -Dutch no sooner heard of his coming than they suspended their operations -for the relief of Sluys, in the hope that Mulgrave would do the work for -them; and the French, having also full intelligence of everything, -increased their force at Sluys to twenty-five thousand men, which made -the relief practically impossible. Dundas, meanwhile, wrote with the -greatest confidence of the success of that operation, which his own -interference had condemned to failure; announcing also that Mulgrave’s -force, which had not yet even arrived at Flushing, would be required -elsewhere in a month. ◆Aug. 26.◆ At length the five battalions sailed -into Flushing on the 26th, nominally thirty-two hundred strong, and -actually with the following qualifications for immediate service in the -field. The Thirty-first[273] was composed chiefly of recruits, of whom -two hundred and forty were unarmed. The Seventy-ninth had but one -officer to each company, and but eight rounds of ball-ammunition a man. -The Eighty-fourth had twenty rounds a man, but, the regiment having -never ceased marching from quarter to quarter ever since it had been -raised, the men were wholly untrained. The Eighty-fifth had thirty -rounds a man, but half of the soldiers had never had arms in their -hands. The Thirty-fourth alone appears to have been fit and ready for -work. Fortunately there was no work for them to do, for Sluys -surrendered on the very day of their arrival; and Mulgrave, after -landing them at Flushing to learn the elements of their business, -suggested that at least two of the battalions had better remain there -and be made into soldiers, instead of sailing to certain annihilation in -the West Indies. To this Dundas agreed, for he purposed to take from the -Duke of York ten of Moira’s battalions, and was well content to leave -him inferior troops in their place. Meanwhile, as a specimen of utter -imbecility, this despatch of Mulgrave’s detachment has few equals even -in English military annals. The mere promise of help was sufficient to -relax the exertions of the Dutch. The troops were embarked so late as to -miss the object of the expedition, and, even if they had been embarked -in time, they were of quality too poor to have accomplished it. In -brief, the whole enterprise bears the unmistakable mark of Henry -Dundas.[274] - -Meanwhile Spencer and Grenville had throughout August pursued their -negotiations at Vienna with very indifferent success. One point Thugut -was ready to concede, namely, the recall of Coburg, who indeed resigned -on the 9th of August, being worn down in body and mind, and thoroughly -disgusted with his command. But Thugut absolutely refused to order -troops from the Rhine to Belgium, and demanded the guarantee of a loan -of three millions for the present campaign besides a new subsidy for the -next. It was necessary to refer these pretensions to the Cabinet in -London; ◆Aug. 12, 14.◆ and long before the reference had even been made, -the Austrian Council of War ordered Clerfaye, who was to succeed Coburg, -to devote all his efforts to the defence not of Belgium but of -Luxemburg, Mainz, and Mannheim. But though the Allies were idle, the -French were not; and, thanks in part to a threat of the Committee of -Public Safety to massacre the garrisons unless the fortresses were -delivered, they had recovered both Quesnoy and Landrecies by the 15th of -August. ◆Aug. 27.◆ The fall of Sluys, and the recall of the troops -detached to Walcheren also enabled Pichegru to begin a forward movement, -and on the 27th he advanced from Antwerp north-eastward to Hoogstraeten, -driving in all the Dutch posts, and seeming to threaten the turning of -the Duke of York’s left. ◆Aug. 30.◆ The Duke, thereupon, on the advice -of a Council of War, retired on the 30th to his chosen position between -Bois-le-Duc and the Peel, while Pichegru sent a strong detachment -eastward to occupy Einhoven in force.[275] - -Meanwhile a message had reached the Duke of York from Clerfaye, -suggesting a general forward movement to save the beleaguered cities of -Valenciennes and Condé; ◆Sept. 1.◆ and on the 1st of September a -conference was held between the Allied commanders at Bois-le-Duc to -consider the proposal. It was not yet known to them, apparently, that -Valenciennes had already surrendered to the French on the 29th of -August, and that Condé was at the last gasp; and there was some talk -among them of an advance of the British to recapture Antwerp, while the -Austrians on the Meuse protected their rear. The news that both -fortresses had fallen, and that the French forces thus liberated for the -field were hastening to the front, naturally deranged this plan; and -though the Duke was anxious still to make the attempt, Craig perceived -little hope of success, chiefly because he could not trust the Austrians -to give hearty co-operation. In truth, the Allies had let slip the -favourable moment through their own dissensions, and the opportunity was -not to recur again. ◆Sept. 4.◆ On the 4th of September Pichegru marched -northward from Hoogstraeten to Meerle, as if to threaten Breda, but on -the 10th turned eastward, after leaving a detachment before that place, -and on the 12th reached Oosterwyk. ◆Sept. 13.◆ On the following day he -attacked the Duke’s advanced posts at Bokstel, and on the 14th captured -them, making two battalions of Darmstadt-Hessians prisoners. This was an -unpleasant mishap, for these troops had hitherto always behaved -admirably; but, though they complained of the Duke for not supporting -them, the Duke in his secret report declared them to have been -panic-stricken. ◆Sept. 15.◆ Alive, however, to the importance of -regaining this post and the line of the Dommel, the Duke ordered -Abercromby forward next day with ten battalions and as many squadrons of -British, to recover the lost ground. The movement was very nearly -disastrous, for Abercromby only just missed falling into the midst of -Pichegru’s main army, which was on march to the eastward; but quickly -apprehending the situation, he withdrew his troops in excellent order -with the loss of about ninety men, two-thirds of them prisoners. This -skirmish is notable both because it brought Colonel Arthur Wellesley of -the Thirty-third under fire for the first time, and because it led to -the trial of four officers, three of them belonging to a most -distinguished regiment, for cowardice. This was a healthy sign, for it -showed that the older officers were bent on ridding the Army at the -earliest possible moment of the worthless comrades imposed on them by -Dundas.[276] - -On the same day the Duke received information that this demonstration -against Bokstel was but a feint, the main force of the enemy, reported -to be eighty thousand strong, being in motion to turn his left. His -intelligence seems to have been extremely vague and imperfect at this -time; but being dissatisfied with his position, to which, owing to dry -weather, neither the Peel nor the Aa afforded adequate protection, he -decided that the retention of it was not worth the risk of being cut -off from his retreat to the Maas. ◆Sept. 16.◆ He therefore retired on -the next day to that river, crossed it at Grave and took up a position -on the north bank, with his headquarters at Wychen, a few miles to the -north of Grave. It then remained for him to make his dispositions to -defend the line of the river, the unprotected portion of which extended -for some seventy-five miles from Fort Loevestein, at the western end -of the Bommeler Waert[277] on to the west, to Venloo on the east. Any -effective defence with the forces at his disposal was impossible, and -the Duke therefore arranged that all troops in British pay should be -sent to him from West Flanders, and that the Dutch, who were sitting -inactive behind their fortresses, should send men to repair and to -defend Crevecoeur and Bommel. - -The Duke’s next effort was to concert offensive operations with -Clerfaye, who lay on his left; and he had the greater hopes of a -favourable issue, since the new Secretary at War, William Windham, -was already on his way to that officer on a mission from London. But -the Austrian Commander also had been unfortunate. ◆Sept. 17–18.◆ -On the 17th and 18th General Latour’s corps of seven thousand men, -which guarded his left on the Ourthe, was driven back by a greatly -superior force of Jourdan’s right wing under General Schérer; whereupon -Clerfaye, who had watched the whole process without moving one soldier -of his forty thousand to save Latour, immediately retired behind the -Roer, leaving eight thousand men as a garrison for Maastricht. The -Austrian General therefore rejected all idea of the offensive as -impossible, but consented to maintain communication with the Duke if he -would extend his left to Venloo, which, like all the Dutch fortresses, -was in miserable repair and without a sufficient garrison. The Duke -agreed, and so the matter was arranged; Clerfaye, however, giving the -Duke clearly to understand that if his right were turned he should -cross the Rhine.[278] - -The Duke thereupon made his plans for protecting a line of from -seventy-five to ninety-five miles of river with a force of thirty -thousand soldiers of all ranks, the sick list having by this time -claimed close upon seven thousand men of his army. His right from the -Bommeler Waert to Grave was held by about five thousand Hessians, their -main body being stationed at Alfen, a little to the east of the island; -Grave was held by two Dutch battalions; east of Grave four brigades of -infantry and two of cavalry lay about Mook; Abercromby, with two more -brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, stood higher up the river at -Gennep; and six thousand Hanoverians under Walmoden prolonged the line -from Gennep to Venloo, with their main body at Well. Craig, however, -did not deceive himself as to the inevitable issue, being firmly -convinced that there was an understanding between the Austrians and -French; wherein he appears to have been correct.[279] “We shall have to -fall back behind the Waal,” he wrote; “depend on it, this will happen in -a few days ... and in a fortnight the Austrians will be behind the -Rhine.” Jourdan followed up the Austrians, leaving Kléber to invest -Maastricht; whereupon Clerfaye, who had sixty thousand men behind the -Roer, forthwith called loudly on the Duke of York to relieve that -fortress. Grenville at the Foreign Office, anticipating something of the -kind, had already despatched urgent representations to Vienna requiring -the concurrence of the Austrians in this operation, but of course to no -purpose. The Duke, by advice of Abercromby and Walmoden, sent Craig to -stir up Clerfaye, and, that the Austrians might have no pretext for -complaint, moved sixteen thousand men at great risk towards Venloo. -◆Oct. 2.◆ But all was perfectly useless, for Clerfaye declined to budge. -An attack of the French on his position on the 2nd of October gave him -the excuse that he wanted; and he immediately retreated across the -Rhine.[280] - -◆Sept. 22.◆ - -Pichegru meanwhile, on the 22nd of September, had completely invested -Bois-le-Duc, and sent two divisions forward to line the Maas over -against the Duke of York’s position. The French were now in the greatest -distress from want of provisions, which had to be brought from Antwerp -in waggons, and that by long detours in order to circumvent the Dutch -fortresses. It was therefore imperative for Pichegru to possess -Bois-le-Duc as an advanced base; and the place was the more difficult -for him to master since he had no siege-artillery. Unfortunately the -cowardice of the Dutch delivered to him all that he wanted. ◆Sept. 24.◆ -On the 24th he opened a feeble bombardment with his fieldpieces upon -Fort Crevecoeur, which guarded the passage into the Isle of Bommel from -the south; ◆Sept. 28.◆ and on the 28th, the place, though amply -provisioned and in a good state of defence, was yielded up by the Dutch -Commandant. Thereby Pichegru gained not only forty-two heavy guns, but -the command of the sluices whereby the inundation of Bois-le-Duc could -be let flow or drawn off. ◆Sept. 30.◆ The loss of Crevecoeur did not -improve the good feeling of the British towards the Dutch, who, from the -first entry of the Duke of York into their country, had showed the -bitterest animosity against his men. ◆Oct. 3.◆ Intelligence now reached -the Duke that a general insurrection of the French party in the United -Provinces was imminent; and three days later the retreat of Clerfaye -compelled him to retire northward across the Waal, over which he had -already thrown a bridge of boats. The movement was conducted with some -confusion owing to the mismanagement of the Duke’s Staff; but Pichegru -suffered the Allies to shuffle themselves without the slightest -molestation into their appointed positions. The Hessians held the -Bommeler Waert on the south bank of the Waal, and the line of the Linge -over against it on the north bank. At the village of Geldermalsen on the -Linge the right of the British joined the left of the Hessians, -extending from thence eastward along the Waal to the road from Nimeguen -to Arnheim; where the Hanoverians carried the line to its end at the -parting of the Waal and the Leek, maintaining communication with -Clerfaye’s Austrians at Emmerick. Nimeguen, though ill fortified and -provided for, was also held on the southern bank of the Waal. - -By this time even the long-suffering Cabinet in England was growing -weary of paying subsidies to Austria and Prussia for service which -they never rendered. ◆Oct. 4.◆ On the 4th of October Dundas advised -the Duke of York that the Government had resolved to give them no -more money, and ordered him to cut off the allowance hitherto paid to -Clerfaye unless he agreed to active concert of operations. Thugut, -however, had in many respects gained his point. The British Government, -thinking that a bad ally was better than none, had consented on the -14th of September to guarantee to Austria a loan of three millions -in consideration of her services during the first campaign; at the -same time renouncing a project which had been put forward for placing -Clerfaye’s force, together with the Duke of York’s, under the supreme -command of Cornwallis. Thugut was jubilant; for everything was -going as he wished. In Poland, Suvorof was rapidly putting down the -insurrection, in stemming which the Prussian Generals had shown the -greatest feebleness; Belgium was already abandoned, as he had desired; -and the Cabinet of London had rewarded Austria for her treachery by -financial assistance. In the circumstances he could not do less than -give promises of effectual help in the defence of Holland, though of -course without the slightest intention to fulfil them. - -Meanwhile the behaviour of the Dutch grew more and more suspicious. -◆Oct. 10.◆ Bois-le-Duc was disgracefully surrendered on the 10th of -October by the Commandant; and a regiment of French emigrants, which -formed part of the garrison, having been denied permission to cut its -way through the besiegers, was massacred in cold blood. On the same day, -by a curious coincidence, the British Government warned the Dutch that, -unless they exerted themselves, the British army should be withdrawn; at -the same time proposing to put the Duke of Brunswick in command of the -British and Dutch forces in order to keep them together. ◆Oct. 18.◆ Then -a week later, as if to bribe the Stadtholder to compliance, Dundas -authorised the payment of one hundred thousand pounds to the Dutch, -which was simply so much money wasted; for the Prince of Orange would do -nothing for the defence of the country, and wished to employ the British -for the repression of his own rebellious subjects. How, in the face of -the Duke of York’s letters, the British Ministers in London hesitated to -order the immediate withdrawal of the army is incomprehensible, except -on the supposition that they still trusted to the proved ill-faith of -the Emperor Francis.[281] - -The French, meanwhile, continued to follow up their advantages. -◆Oct. 6.◆ Jourdan, on the east, after leaving detachments to besiege -Venloo and Maastricht, had occupied Cologne on the 6th of October, and -drawn up his army in face of Clerfaye’s main body, which was extended -along the Rhine from Duisburg to Bonn and beyond. Moreau, who had taken -over the command owing to Pichegru’s illness, also pushed forward seven -thousand men in front of Grave, posted thirty thousand between Ravestein -(a little to west of Grave) and Bois-le-Duc, and ten thousand men -opposite the Bommeler Waert. ◆Oct. 18.◆ On the 18th he began to lay a -bridge of boats over the Meuse at Alfen, and, being allowed by -scandalous carelessness on the part of the Allies to complete it, passed -a considerable force over the river. ◆Oct. 19.◆ On the 19th he attacked -the posts at Apeltern and Druten, to east and north-east of Alfen, -carried them after a very obstinate resistance from the Thirty-seventh -and Rohan’s Emigrants, and succeeded in capturing the greater number of -the Thirty-seventh,[282] who had mistaken a party of French Hussars for -the Emigrant cavalry in the British service. At the same time -intelligence came that a strong French detachment had passed the Meuse -between Roermond and Venloo, and was heading for Cleve, thus threatening -to turn the Duke’s left. Accordingly, in his public despatch, the Duke -announced that he was about to draw the whole army to the north of the -Waal; but privately he reported that he could not do so, since the -Dutch, in spite of many promises, had made no effort to put Nimeguen in -a state of defence. ◆Oct. 20.◆ On the 20th the French threw a permanent -bridge across the Meuse a little to the north-west of Ravestein at -Batenburg, and two days later began a new series of attacks upon the -advanced posts, at the same time making demonstrations about St. Andries -on the Bommeler Waert. ◆Oct. 27.◆ By the 27th the troops round Nimeguen -had been driven into the outskirts of the town, and the Duke, who had -transferred his headquarters to Arnheim, called all of them except -fourteen battalions to the north bank of the Waal. The French main body -then took up a position between Grave and Nimeguen, threatening to seize -the two eastern keys of Holland. - -◆Oct. 28.◆ - -At this critical moment Clerfaye paid a visit to the Duke at Arnheim, -and promised that by the 3rd of November a corps of some seven thousand -Austrians under General Werneck should arrive to assist in an offensive -movement from Nimeguen. At the same time some effort was made to -persuade Möllendorf to move to the Rhine about Bonn, and to support -Clerfaye’s left. But the British Government had recently, though none -too soon, cut off the subsidy to the Prussians; and Möllendorf’s answer -was that his orders were to send twenty thousand of his men to South -Prussia and fifteen thousand men to Westphalia, so that evidently -nothing was to be expected from that quarter. ◆Nov. 1.◆ On the 1st -of November the French broke ground before Nimeguen, and on the same -day Werneck announced that his corps could not arrive before the 7th. -Meanwhile the French erected batteries a little above Nimeguen at Ooi, -which, though silenced for a time by the guns of the Allies on the -opposite bank, so seriously damaged the bridge of boats that General -Walmoden, who was in command, thought it prudent to withdraw the -greater part of the garrison to the northern bank. ◆Nov. 4.◆ On the -4th, however, he made a sortie with the troops that remained, including -six British battalions, supported by seventeen squadrons of British -and Hanoverian cavalry.[283] The British, advancing under a very heavy -fire, swept the enemy out of their trenches without drawing a trigger, -and the cavalry pursuing the fugitives inflicted on them heavy loss. -The casualties of the Allies in this affair were over three hundred -killed and wounded; but, though the sortie checked the progress of -the French for the time, yet by the 7th they had not only repaired -the batteries destroyed by the Allies, but had erected another which -brought a cross fire to bear on the bridge of boats. Moreover, a letter -arrived from Werneck that his arrival at Nimeguen, which he had fixed -for the 7th, would be impossible until the 16th—a message which the -Duke rightly interpreted to signify that he would not come at all. - -◆Nov. 7.◆ - -On the night of the 7th, therefore, the bridge was repaired -sufficiently to enable the garrison to evacuate the place; and the -troops filed across the river. Two Dutch battalions were the last to -leave the place under the Dutch General Haak, who, most improperly, -was the first man of his nation to set foot on the bridge. As he did -so, a shot struck one of the pontoons with some effect, whereupon he -immediately ran across the bridge crying out that all was lost, and -reported with shameless mendacity that all his troops had passed over -except the rear-guard. Upon this the pontoon-bridge was immediately -fired, since a flying bridge had already been prepared for the passage -of the rear-guard. As luck would have it, however, a shot from the -French batteries cut the hawser; the flying bridge began to swing -round; and, to save it from running foul of the kindled boats, the -sailors dropped the anchor and so brought it up. When the burning -pontoons had floated away, some British seamen, who were employed on -the bridge, were for cutting it adrift, but the Dutchmen would not -allow them to do so, preferring certain capture to the risk of a few -cannon-shot. Thus eleven hundred of them were taken, either through -their own cowardice or through that of Haak—a lamentable occurrence in -an army which in the past had approved itself to be of incomparable -steadfastness and valour.[284] - -The Duke, therefore, now held the line of the Waal including the -Bommeler Waert, and might well hope to hold it, if the Dutch did their -duty, until the army went into winter quarters. He had already put -most of his cavalry into cantonments across the Yssel, but the Dutch -threw every possible obstacle in the way of providing for the comfort -of the troops. The weather too grew wintry, and the men, miserably -clothed and housed in open barns, began to fall down very fast from -cold and typhus fever. None of them had greatcoats except some of the -Guards, Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-third, who had received -those which had been provided by public subscription in 1793, and -which were now worn out. Flannel waistcoats had been supplied to the -rest by their officers, who had subscribed over a thousand pounds -for the purpose; and it appears that, without exaggeration, they had -little other clothing. Sheer nakedness, in fact, had been the cause -of much, though not of all, of the plundering that had disgraced the -army; and this evil had been aggravated by the bitter hostility of -the inhabitants towards the British. Not content with resenting real -outrages, which were far too abundant, they never ceased flying to -the Duke with frivolous and groundless complaints; and so disobliging -were the authorities that Lord St. Helens, Ambassador at the Hague, -tried for two months in vain to find places where the British might be -allowed to establish additional hospitals. ◆Nov. 27.◆ On the 27th of -November the infantry in British pay numbered twenty-one thousand and -the sick nearly eleven thousand; and when a man was ordered to hospital -his comrades would exclaim, “Ah, poor fellow, we shall see thee no -more, for thou art under orders for the shambles.” On one occasion five -hundred invalids were embarked from Arnheim in barges under charge of -a single surgeon’s mate, without sufficient provisions, without even -sufficient straw, and brought to Rhenen, where they were left on board -for want of sufficient space to admit them to the hospital. A Dutch -gentleman counted at one time the bodies of forty-two men who had thus -perished of neglect in the barges and had been thrown out dead on to -the bank. Meanwhile the rascals who bore the name of surgeon’s mates -charged forty thousand pounds for wine for the sick, and, not content -with robbing the State by themselves drinking what was supplied, -actually plundered the helpless patients committed to their care. Such -was the economy of Dundas’s military administration—to obtain recruits -by the offer of lavish bounties, to break down their health by giving -them insufficient clothing, and to contract with scoundrels so to -maltreat them, medically, that they should not recover.[285] - -Fortunately for himself the Duke of York was summoned home on the 27th -of November to hold personal communication[286] with Ministers; and -indeed it seemed as if the campaign were ended. Upon his departure -he placed the British troops under Lieutenant-general Harcourt, and -the foreign troops in British pay under Lieutenant-general Walmoden, -apparently dividing the supreme command between the two. This -arrangement was evidently due to the Duke’s unwillingness to subject -the British to the Hanoverian Walmoden, who was senior to Harcourt; -but, even so, it seems to be absolutely indefensible. The French, being -exhausted by the campaign, went into temporary cantonments, Moreau’s -division on the west bank of the Rhine over against the line from -Wesel to Emmerick, Souham’s in and about Nimeguen, Bonnaud’s between -the Meuse and the Waal, and the remainder about Bois-le-Duc and Grave. -The Allies were distributed along the north bank of the Waal from Tiel -eastward to the Pannarden Canal, which connects the Waal with the Leck -(as the Rhine from Arnheim downward is called), the Dutch taking charge -of the Bommeler Waert. Eastward from the Pannarden Canal to Wesel -the Allied left was to be covered by thirty thousand Austrians under -General Alvintzy, which Clerfaye, on the instance of Henry Dundas, -agreed to furnish for a payment of one hundred thousand pounds a month. - -The Allies’ line of defence seems to have been wrongly chosen, for, -owing to the Pannarden Canal, the mass of the waters of the Waal was -returned into the Leck, from which cause the Leck was less liable to -be frozen. Harcourt had endeavoured to establish a second bridge over -the Rhine besides that of the Arnheim, but the Dutch, from malice or -negligence, obstructed the forwarding of the materials, as indeed -they obstructed everything that might help the British. Altogether the -situation was not a happy one, for, though rain had fallen continuously -from the beginning of November, there was no saying when a frost might -set in and turn the rivers into stable ice. Moreover, Moreau, roused -by orders from Paris, became active again. ◆Dec. 11.◆ On the 11th of -December the French crossed the Waal in boats at several different -points to the attack of the Allied posts, and, though beaten back, left -behind them an unpleasant sense of insecurity.[287] - -On the 16th Pichegru returned and resumed the command, ◆Dec. 18.◆ and -on the 18th the weather changed from rain to a severe frost. In a very -few days the Maas and Waal were full of floating ice, which began to -pack together, threatening to cover the whole breadth of their streams; -while on the Leck the rapidity of the current swept away the bridge of -boats at Arnheim. Harcourt, foreseeing that before long the ice on the -Waal would become passable by the enemy, prepared to retreat northward. -Just at this most critical moment, moreover, there arrived orders from -Dundas that seven British battalions of his army were required for -service elsewhere; that of these seven the Fortieth, Forty-fourth, and -Sixty-third must march to Helvoetsluys at once; and that Alvintzy, who -so far had thrown every possible difficulty in the way of co-operation -with the Allies, must find troops to take their place. Further, it -was now ascertained that the Dutch had gone far in negotiation with -the French, and there were strong rumours that an armistice had been -concluded between them. Meanwhile the cold increased; sentries were -frozen at their posts; and the ice on the Waal, in front of the Allies, -became strong enough to give passage to the French, while that on -the Leck in their rear, though thick enough to prevent the passage -of boats, was too thin to bear cavalry or artillery. Harcourt’s -anxiety was extreme; and he begged Dundas urgently for some further -instructions as to the duty expected of him, since the order to weaken -the force by sending home seven battalions was not in itself of any -great assistance. - -◆Dec. 27.◆ - -Affairs were in this condition when, on the 27th, the French crossed the -Meuse on the ice to the Bommeler Waert, surprised the Dutch posts there, -and pushed on by Bommel over the frozen Waal to Tuil. The Dutch at this -place fled instantly without firing a shot, some of the fugitives -running on even to Utrecht. At Meteren, a few miles north of Tuil, the -French were checked by the Hessians; but, with their right flank exposed -by the flight of the Dutch, it was doubtful whether these could maintain -their position. ◆Dec. 28.◆ Their commander, however, General Dalwig, -decided to stand fast, and ascertained by reconnaissance next day that -the French did not exceed two thousand men; whereupon Walmoden ordered -ten battalions and six squadrons of British and Emigrants under David -Dundas to Geldermalsen, a short distance north of Meteren, in the hope -of annihilating this foolhardy French detachment. ◆Dec. 30.◆ -Accordingly, at one o’clock on the morning of the 30th, the force moved -out from Meteren in three columns, two of them to move direct upon Tuil -from the north and north-east, while the third, under Lord Cathcart, -fetched a compass to close in upon the enemy from the west. Cathcart’s -column unfortunately found the roads impassable and never came into -action; but Dundas nevertheless attacked without him, and drove the -French, after a sharp fight, from their entrenchments and across the -Waal, with the loss of four guns and many killed and wounded, while his -own casualties did not exceed fifty. This checked the ardour of the -enemy for the moment, and during a few days there was peace upon the -Waal.[288] - -Walmoden now reinforced his right about Tuil, for the news had reached -him that the fortresses of Gertruydenburg ◆1795.◆ and Heusden, on the -extreme right of the Allied line, were in serious danger; ◆Jan. 3.◆ and -on the 3rd of January 1795 he shifted his quarters to Amerongen, due -north of Tiel, and on the north bank of the Leck. Grave at this same -time capitulated, and released a large number of French troops for the -field. Moreau’s division therefore took up cantonments over against -Alvintzy’s corps from Xanten down the Rhine to the Pannarden Canal. -Souham’s division, now transferred to Macdonald, occupied the space -between the Meuse and Waal as far as the point opposite to Tiel; two -more divisions were in the Bommeler Waert, and yet two more about -Gertruydenburg and Breda. On the 3rd of January the weather again became -intensely cold, Jan. 4.◆ and at noon on the 4th two French detachments -from the Bommeler Waert marched over the ice, drove in the posts before -Tuil and at Hesselt, a little to the east of it, after hard fighting, -and thus gained a passage by which they could move westward on the north -bank of the Waal. ◆Jan. 5.◆ On the following day the French attacked -Tuil itself, whereupon the Dutch gunners at once fled from their -batteries on the river; but, advancing from thence against Geldermalsen, -the enemy was repulsed with some loss by the Thirty-third, Forty-second, -and Seventy-eighth, under the direction of General David Dundas. It was, -however, plain that these posts could not be held against a strong -attack so long as frost practically neutralised their natural defences; -and Walmoden recalled Dundas and all the troops in that quarter to the -north side of the Leck, in order to take up a new line of cantonments -extending from Arnheim on the east by Wageningen, Reenen, Amerongen, and -Wyk-by-Duurstede to Honswyk. - -◆Jan. 6.◆ - -A sudden thaw on the 6th offered hopes of re-establishing the old -position on the Waal, and orders were issued on the 7th for a -reconnaissance in force of the whole line of the French posts on the -following day; ◆Jan. 8.◆ but on the morning of the 8th the frost -abruptly set in again, though not before the troops were already in -motion beyond power of recall. On the right, Dundas succeeded in driving -the enemy from their posts on the Linge to the Waal, and in recovering -Buren and Tiel. The brunt of the work fell upon the Fourteenth, -Twenty-seventh, and Twenty-eighth under Lord Cathcart; and these drove -the enemy in succession from the villages of Buurmalsen and Geldermalsen -and captured a gun, not, however, without a loss of one hundred and -thirty men to themselves. On the left the orders seem to have -miscarried, probably through the confusion due to divided command. -◆Jan. 10.◆ Before the operation could be carried any further, Pichegru, -finding that the ice on the Waal was stronger than ever, on the 10th -fell upon the Allied line in great force at three different points -between the Pannarden Canal and Tiel. The attack was repulsed upon the -right, but the Austrians were forced back on the left flank, and -Walmoden ordered the whole force to withdraw once more behind the Leck. -This was effected with little loss; Colonel Coote’s brigade of the -Fortieth, Fiftieth, and Seventy-ninth being the only British forces -severely engaged. Walmoden had fully intended to continue the retreat -eastward across the Yssel; but Lord St. Helens, at the Hague, -unfortunately protested against this, and another thaw enabled Walmoden -to acquiesce. On the night of the 12th frost again set in more severely -than ever, and on the 14th the French attacked along the whole line from -Arnheim to Reenen. ◆Jan. 15.◆ They were beaten back with heavy loss; but -Walmoden, feeling that he was unable to hold his ground, on the -following morning gave the order for a further retreat. - -The days that followed are amongst the most tragical in the history of -the Army. During November and December the discipline of the troops in -Holland had greatly improved, but with the coming of the frost and the -hardships that attended the constant alarms and marches on the Waal, -it had once more broken down completely. Certain regiments of French -emigrants, which had joined the army late in the year, were the worst -offenders; but it seems certain that some of the British were not -far behind them. The country to the north of Arnheim is at the best -of times an inhospitable waste, and there were few dwellings and few -trees to give shelter or fuel after a dreary march through dense and -chilling mist over snow twice thawed and refrozen. Marauders from the -regiments of every nationality swarmed round the columns; the drivers -of the waggons freed themselves from all control, and the line of march -was disorderly beyond description. When the day was ended, the troops -of different nations fought for such scanty comforts as were to be -found; and once there was a pitched battle between the Guards and the -Hessians, who had been on bad terms with each other from the beginning -of the campaign. Day after day the cold steadily increased; and those -of the army that woke on the morning of the 17th of January saw about -them such a sight as they never forgot. Far as the eye could reach over -the whitened plain were scattered gun-limbers, waggons full of baggage, -of stores, or of sick men, sutlers’ carts and private carriages. -Beside them lay the horses, dead; around them scores and hundreds of -soldiers, dead; here a straggler who had staggered on to the bivouac -and dropped to sleep in the arms of the frost; there a group of British -and Germans round an empty rum-cask; here forty English Guardsmen -huddled together about a plundered waggon; there a pack-horse with a -woman lying alongside it, and a baby, swathed in rags, peeping out of -the pack, with its mother’s milk turned to ice upon its lips,—one and -all stark, frozen, dead. Had the retreat lasted but three or four days -longer, not a man would have escaped; and the catastrophe would have -found a place in history side by side with the destruction of the host -of Sennacherib and with the still more terrible disaster of the retreat -from Moscow.[289] - -◆Jan. 19.◆ - -By the 19th the surviving fragments of the battalions reached their -destination on the Yssel, where they were cantoned on the west side of -the river from Zutphen to the sea. But there was no hope of long repose -for them there. Harcourt perceived clearly that the re-embarkation of -his force was now the only resource left to him, and that the place -of embarkation must be on the Weser, since the lack of supplies and -the incapacity of his commissariat-officers would inevitably forbid -him to remain long on the Ems. Within a week, want of victuals and the -hostility of the inhabitants compelled him to continue his retreat -from the Yssel; ◆Jan. 27–29.◆ and on the 27th the march eastward was -resumed, the main body of the British retiring towards Osnabrück, the -Germans upon Münster. One detachment of British,[290] however, was sent -northward under Lord Cathcart’s command to fetch a compass through West -Friesland and along the borders of Groningen, in order to ascertain -whether the people of these provinces were as ill-affected as their -fellows towards the House of Orange. By whose orders this isolated -force was despatched upon such an errand is uncertain; it is only -known that the column was followed up and incessantly harassed by the -enemy, and that it was not very successful in discovering friendly -sentiments among the Dutch. Upon reaching the Ems, the army halted, -and on the 5th February took up cantonments on the western bank of -the river, Cathcart on the extreme north guarding the passes of the -Bourtanger Moor from the Dollart southward, while Abercromby fixed his -headquarters further to south and west of the river at Bentheim, and -the Hanoverians retired to Münster. - -The state of the troops by this time was worse than ever, for thousands -of sick had perforce been left behind on the Yssel. “Your army is -destroyed,” wrote Walmoden to the Duke of York; “the officers, their -carriages, and a large train are safe, but the men are destroyed. -The army has now no more than six thousand fighting men, but it has -all the drawbacks of thirty-three battalions, and consumes a vast -quantity of forage.” A more terrible reproach was never yet levelled -against any force; nevertheless it was rather the politicians than the -military commanders who had made such a reproach possible, by flinging -commissions broadcast to any man or even child who could afford to -satisfy the crimps. Upon entering German territory the men met with -kindlier treatment from the inhabitants; but the infamous conduct of -the French Emigrant Corps threatened to turn the Germans also into -enemies. It now became abundantly clear that most of these regiments -were simply frauds, imposed upon the English Ministers by a band of -unscrupulous adventurers. But the English army, of course, had to bear -the burden of their sins; and the Hanoverians and Hessians, naturally -espousing the cause of their countrymen, turned upon the British with -a bitterness which destroyed all cohesion between the nations of the -Allies.[291] - -Meanwhile the French, after leaving their opponents to retreat -unmolested from the Leck, resumed their advance, and at the end of -January occupied Kampen and Zwolle on the Yssel. They made, however, no -attempt to hinder the further retirement of the Allies; and their -movements for the next fortnight were of the most leisurely description. -Then arrived rumours of a French understanding with Prussia, of the -neutralisation of North Germany, and of a line of demarcation to be -drawn according to the actual territory occupied by the opposing armies. -The French at once woke to the importance of gaining immediate -possession of Groningen and East Friesland, and General Macdonald’s -corps was detached to invade Groningen, while those of Moreau and -Vandamme remained in observation on the Yssel. ◆Feb. 27.◆ On the 19th of -February Macdonald occupied the town of Groningen, and thence turning -eastward he, on the 27th, attacked Cathcart’s fortified posts at -Winschoten. He was repulsed; ◆March 1.◆ but two days later the attack -was renewed with success by General Reynier, and Cathcart was forced to -retreat, which he did with great dexterity, crossing the Ems upon the -3rd. ◆March 3.◆ The entire British force then fell back to the east bank -of the Ems to hold the line from Emden to Rheine, headquarters being -fixed at Osnabrück. - -Five days later the British Cabinet at last decided to withdraw its -troops from the Continent, ◆March 11.◆ and on the 11th Harcourt, to his -infinite relief, received intimation that transports for twenty-three -thousand men were on their way to him. The Hanoverians were in -consternation over the danger to which Hanover was exposed by this -measure, but there was no help for it. ◆March 16.◆ A few days later -Prussian troops arrived to hold the line of the Ems, and on the 22nd the -British began their march to Bremen for embarkation. The Prussians did -their utmost by obstruction, discourtesy, and insolence to disoblige -them on their passage through the country; but this was natural, for -they had always professed contempt for the British as a nation of -traders, and a tradesman is never so despicable to a dishonest customer -as when he refuses to grant him further credit. ◆April 14.◆ Finally, on -the 14th of April, the infantry and part of the artillery took ship for -England, leaving the remainder of the artillery and the whole of the -cavalry behind them under Lord Cathcart and David Dundas. The number -embarked was nearly fifteen thousand, some proportion of the sick having -been recovered; so that the losses after the retreat from the Leck must -have amounted to about six thousand men, of which not a tithe were -killed or wounded in action. Thus disgracefully ended the first -expedition of Pitt and Dundas to the Low Countries. - -AUTHORITIES.—The British despatches relating to the expeditions -to Flanders will be found in _W.O. Orig. Corresp._ 46–48, and in -Entry Book No. 11. The number of private letters included in this -collection makes it of unusual value. For the campaigns at large -the best accounts known to me are in Ditfurth’s _Die Hessen in den -Feldzügen, 1793, 1794, und 1795_ (Kassel, 1839), and in Witzleben’s -_Prinz Friedrich Josias von Coburg-Saalfeld_ (Berlin, 1859), which is -not a little built upon Ditfurth, but contains much that is valuable -of its own and a superb atlas of maps. On the French side the short -memoir of David and the life of Pichegru are of little worth compared -with the narrative of Jomini. Marshal Macdonald’s _Mémoires_ are -disappointing at this period. Of English printed accounts the most -important is Jones’s _Historical Journal of the British Campaign -in 1794_. The _Journal_ of Corporal James Brown of the Coldstream -Guards supplies a few interesting details. Sir H. Calvert’s _Journal -and Correspondence_ is often of value; and there is a great deal of -most useful information in the foot-notes to the miserable doggerel -called the _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_. Unfortunately the -author, like Brown and Calvert, was a Coldstreamer, for which reason -all three confine themselves chiefly to the doings of the brigade of -Guards. The regimental histories of the 14th Foot and 15th Hussars -have occasionally interesting material, but, taken altogether, the -regimental records are disappointing. - - - THE END - - - _Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_. - - - - -[Illustration: - - THE NETHERLANDS in the 18th Century. - - _Stanford’s Geogl. Estabt., London._ -] - - - - - By the Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE - - A - HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY - - With numerous Maps and Plans. - - 8 vo. - -Vols I. and II. =To the Close of the Seven Years’ War.= 18s. net each. - -Vol. III. =To the Second Peace of Paris.= 18s. net. - -Vol. IV. =From the Fall of the Bastille to the Peace of Amiens.= - In Two Parts and a separate volume of Maps. 42s. net. - -Vol. V. =From the Renewal of the War to the Evacuation of Rio de la -Plata (1803–1807).= 18s. net. - -Vol. VI. =From the Expedition to Egypt, 1807, to the Battle of Coruña, -Jan. 1809.= 18s. net. - -Vol. VII. =1809–1810.= With a separate volume of Maps. 21s. net. - -Vol. VIII. =1811–1812.= With a separate volume of Maps. 30s. net. - - - SOME PRESS OPINIONS - - VOLUMES I. and II. - -_ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW._—“Mr. Fortescue has been the first to -construct a scholarly and connected story of the growth of our military -institutions and of the development of tactics as revealed in a -continuous series of wars. His style is lucid, and his descriptions of -battles are easy to follow. But his chief merit is a well-balanced -judgment.” - - VOLUME III. - -_TIMES._—“Whatever Mr. Fortescue may do in the future, he has already, -in his first three volumes, produced one of the most important military -works in the English language. It is sincerely to be hoped that they -will be read as widely as they deserve to be.” - - VOLUME IV. - -_TIMES._—“We are witnessing the birth of a military classic which is, -and will be for some generations to come, without a peer in the subject -to which it relates. The debt which the British Army owes to the writer -of this moving chronicle of its great achievements, its grandeurs, and -its miseries can only be repaid if every member of the Army endeavours -to assimilate for himself, and for the profit of his country, Mr. -Fortescue’s admirable and most instructive pages.” - - VOLUMES V. and VI. - -_SPECTATOR._—“The new volumes of _A History of the British Army_ are of -the same high quality as those which have gone before. We can give no -higher praise, for Mr. Fortescue can only be compared with himself. He -has no rivals as a student of military history, and we question whether -he has any living superior as an historian.” - - VOLUME VII. - -_BROAD ARROW._—“This is a worthy successor to the volumes which have -preceded it, and the whole forms a great work by a great, an impartial, -and a bold writer.” - -MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. - - - - - By the Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE - -=HISTORY OF THE 17TH LANCERS.= Royal 8vo. 25s. net. - -_PALL MALL GAZETTE._—“It is an admirable piece of work. For the most -part a regimental record is the driest kind of reading, but the author -has succeeded in illuminating the history of the 17th Lancers with -humour, with anecdote, and with restrained but appropriate pathos.” - -=THE COUNTY LIEUTENANCIES AND THE ARMY, 1803–1814.= 8vo. 10s. net. - -_TIMES._—“Mr. Fortescue has produced a volume which is not only a -valuable contribution to the military history of the first years of the -nineteenth century, but also an indispensable guide to those whose duty -it will be hereafter to build upon the foundations which Mr. Haldane -has laid.” - -=THE BRITISH ARMY, 1783–1802.= Four Lectures. 8vo. 4s. 6d. net. - -_UNITED SERVICE MAGAZINE._—“The author of the _History of the British -Army_ writes always up to a standard so high that few other military -writers can compete with him, either in excellence of the literary -style, or in the professional value of what is written.... No praise -... could exaggerate its real merits.” - -=NARRATIVE OF THE VISIT TO INDIA OF THEIR MAJESTIES KING GEORGE V. AND -QUEEN MARY AND OF THE CORONATION DURBAR.= Illustrated. 8vo. 10s. 6d. -net. - -_EVENING STANDARD._—“A fine literary achievement. It appears to omit -nothing of any consequence; the painting is full of colour, without -being overburdened by it; the appreciation is enthusiastic, and yet -when necessary is tempered with judicious criticism.” - -=DUNDONALD.= Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net. - _English Men of Action Series._ - - _BOOKS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE_ - -=THE STORY OF A RED DEER.= Pott 4to. 4s. 6d. _Pocket Classics._ Fcap. -8vo. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net. Leather, 3s. 6d. net. - -=THE DRUMMER’S COAT.= Illustrated. Pott 4to. 5s. - -=THE THREE PEARLS.= Illustrated. Fcap. 4to. 6s. net. - -MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. - - - - - FOOTNOTES - -[1] Four troops of life guards, ten regiments of horse, five of -dragoons, forty-seven battalions of foot. - -[2] I had almost written that France was then, as always, the first -military nation; and though Prussia wrested the position from her under -Frederick the Great and again in 1870, the lesson of history seems to -teach that she is as truly the first military, as England is the first -naval, nation. - -[3] Belhomme, p. 153. - -[4] Feuquières. - -[5] That is to say, of land-transport. After the sad experience of the -Irish war the marine transport was entrusted to an officer specially -established for the purpose.—_Commons Journals._ - -[6] I spell the village according to the popular fashion in England, -and according to the Flemish pronunciation. So many names in Flanders -seem to halt between the Flemish and the French that it is difficult to -know how to set them down. - -[7] Fifty-three battalions of infantry and seven regiments of -dragoons.—_Beaurain._ - -[8] No battlefield can be taken in more readily at a glance than that -of Landen. On the path alongside the railway from Landen Station is a -mound formed of earth thrown out of a cutting, from the top of which -the whole position can be seen. - -[9] St. Simon. With the exception of one hollow, which might hold three -or four squadrons in double rank in line, there is not the slightest -shelter in the plain wherein the French horse could find protection. - -[10] Life Guards, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th Dragoon Guards, Galway’s Horse. - -[11] This is, of course, the Talmash of _Tristram Shandy_ and of -Macaulay’s History. He signed his name, however, as I spell it here, -and I use his own spelling the more readily since it is more easily -identified with the Tollemache of to-day. - -[12] Philip III., d. 1621. - | - +-------+---------------------+ - | | - Philip IV., d. 1665. Mary Anne, m. Ferdinand III., - | | Emperor. - +-------+------+--------------+ | - | | | (1) | (3) - Charles II., Maria Theresa, Margaret, m. Leopold I., m. Eleonora - d. 1700. m. Louis XIV. | Emperor, | Magdalena, - | | d. 1705. | of Neuburg. - | | +---+ - | Maria Antonia, | - Louis, m. Max. II., Archduke Charles - Dauphin, d. 1711. Elector of Bavaria. (Charles III.). - | | - Philip of Anjou Joseph, - (Philip V.). Electoral Prince, - d. 1699. - -[13] Namur, Luxemburg, Mons, Charleroi, Ath, Oudenarde, Nieuport, -Ostend. - -[14] By the defensive alliance concluded between England and Holland -early in 1668, it was laid down that either party, on being attacked, -had the right to require from the other the aid of a fixed proportion -of forces both naval and military. This treaty was arranged by Sir -William Temple shortly after the Treaty of Breda had brought to a close -the Dutch War of 1665–1667; it was known as the Triple Alliance, Sweden -being the third signatory. - -[15] 12th, 22nd, 27th. - -[16] 1st batt. First Guards, 1st Royals (2 batts.), 8th, 9th, 10th, -13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 23rd, 24th. The Guards had been -substituted (after careful explanation to Parliament) by William’s own -direction for the 9th Foot. - -[17] Seven regiments of horse and dragoons, fourteen battalions of -foot, fifty-six guns. - -[18] Coxe, vol. i. p. 182. - -[19] So Quincy. Coxe gives August 25–September 5 as the date, but the -difference depends merely on the interpretation of the word investment. - -[20] See the description in Kane. - -[21] St. Simon gives a curious account of Lewis’s difficulty in -arriving at the truth, owing to the general unwillingness to tell him -bad news. - -[22] It is stated in _Records and Badges of the Army_ that -Lillingston’s was formed in 1702. But Narcissus Luttrell, Millar, and -the Military Entry Books all give the date as 25th March (New Year’s -Day) 1705. - -[23] Quincy’s account of this portion of the campaign is, so far as -concerns Marlborough, full of falsehoods. - -[24] Four British regiments were of this detachment. Two battalions of -the 1st Royals, the 3rd Buffs, and the 10th Foot. - -[25] Narcissus Luttrell. - -[26] It is worth noting that this was the first campaign in which -Marlborough and the British took the post of honour at the extreme -right of the Allied order of battle. - -[27] His camp thus lay across the whole of Wellington’s position at -Waterloo, from east to west and considerably beyond it to westward, but -fronted in the reverse direction. - -[28] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1705. - - Right. - RIGHT WING ONLY. - 1st Line. - Scots Greys, 3 squadrons. - 5th Dragoons, 3 squadrons. - - 1st Dragoon Guards, 3 squadrons. - 5th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - 7th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - 6th Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - 3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 squadrons. - - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 18th Royal Irish. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - 28th Foot. - Stringer’s Foot. - 26th Cameronians. - 16th Foot. - - 3rd Buffs. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - 37th Foot. - Macartney’s Foot. - Evans’s Foot. - 24th Foot. - 15th Foot. - - Foreign Troops. - - 2nd Line. - Foreign Troops. - - Extreme Right of Centre. - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 10th Foot. - Temple’s Foot. - 29th Foot. - 8th Foot - Left. - _Newspaper._ - -[29] Peterborough’s Dragoons; Mark Kerr’s, Stanwix’s, Lovelace’s, -Townsend’s, Tunbridge’s, Bradshaw’s, Sybourg’s, Price’s Foot. Sybourg’s -was made up of Huguenots. - -[30] Marlborough’s _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 262. - -[31] This is the story told in Lamberti. - -[32] The ground, though now drained, is still very wet. - -[33] I have described the field at some length, since the map given by -Coxe is most misleading. - -[34] Coxe, by a singular error, makes the left consist exclusively of -infantry, in face of Quincy, Feuquières, the _London Gazette_ and other -authorities, thereby missing almost unaccountably an important feature -in the action. - -[35] Apparently the whole of Meredith’s brigade, viz.: 1st, 18th, 29th, -37th, 24th, and 10th regiments. The place is still easily identifiable. - -[36] Molesworth escaped and was rewarded four years later, at the age -of twenty-two, with a regiment of foot. - -[37] ORDER OF BATTLE. RAMILLIES, 12TH–23RD MAY 1706. - - Right. - RIGHT WING ONLY. - 1st Line. - Scots Greys. - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons. - - 1st Dragoon Guards. - 5th Dragoon Guards. - 7th Dragoon Guards. - 6th Dragoon Guards. - 3rd Dragoon Guards. - Eighteen Dutch Squadrons. - - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 16th Foot. - 26th Cameronians. - 28th Foot. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - 8th Foot. - - 3rd Buffs. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - Evans’s Foot. - Macartney’s Foot. - Stringer’s Foot. - 15th Foot. - - Foreign Infantry. - - 2nd Line. - Foreign Cavalry. - - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 18th Royal Irish. - 29th Foot. - 37th Foot. - 24th Foot. - 10th Foot. - - Foreign Infantry. - Left. - - From Kane’s _Campaigns_. - -[38] _Despatches_, vol. ii. p. 554. - -[39] The British regiments regularly employed in the besieging army -were the 8th, 10th, and 18th, and Evans’s Foot; the Scots Greys, 3rd -and 6th Dragoon Guards. The total loss of the Allies was 32 officers -and 551 men killed, 83 officers and 1941 men wounded. The 18th Royal -Irish alone lost 15 officers, and in one attack over 100 men in half an -hour. - -[40] Parker. - -[41] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1707. - - Right. - RIGHT WING ONLY - 1st Line. - Stair’s Brigade. - Scots Greys. - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons. - - Palmer’s Brigade - 1st Dragoon Guards. - 5th Dragoon Guards. - 7th Dragoon Guards. - 6st Dragoon Guards. - 3rd Dragoon Guards. - - Orrery’s Foot. - Evans’s Foot. - - Foreign horse. - - Meredith’s Brigade. - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 16th Foot. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - 8th Foot. - - Temple’s Brigade - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 18th Royal Irish. - Temple’s Foot. - 24th Foot. - 10th Foot. - - Lord North and Grey’s Brigade. - 3rd Buffs. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - 37th Foot. - 26th Cameronians. - 15th Foot. - Gore’s Foot. - - No British in the Second Line. - Left. - - _Postboy_ 26th June 1707. - -[42] Slane’s, Brazier’s, Delaune’s, Jones’s, Carles’s, all raised in -September. - -[43] Mixed battalion of Guards, 19th Foot, Prendergast’s (late -Orrery’s). - -[44] 16 battalions and 30 squadrons. In these were included the -brigades of Sabine, viz., 8th, 18th, 23rd, 37th; of Evans, viz., -Orrery’s, Evans’s, and two foreign battalions; and of Plattenberg, -which included the Scottish regiments in the Dutch service. - -[45] Among them the Royal Scots and Buffs. - -[46] That is to say, on the western side of the road from Oudenarde to -Deynze. - -[47] The ground, though drained and built over about Bevere, seems to -have lost little of its original character, and is worth a visit. - -[48] British losses: 4 officers and 49 men killed, 17 officers and 160 -men wounded. - -[49] The force consisted of detachments of the 3rd and 4th Dragoons -(now Hussars), 12th, 29th, Hamilton’s, Dormer’s, Johnson’s, Moore’s, -Caulfield’s, Townsend’s, Wynne’s Foot. - -[50] See, for instance, the commendations of Feuquières. - -[51] 135 battalions, 260 squadrons. - -[52] 122 battalions, 230 squadrons. - -[53] These were, according to a contemporary plan (Fricx), the 16th, -18th, 21st, 23rd, 24th Foot. - -[54] He is claimed as a Guardsman by General Hamilton (_Hist. Grenadier -Guards_), though Millner assigns him to the 16th Foot. This is the -only name of a man below the rank of a commissioned officer that I -have encountered in any of the books on the wars of Marlborough, -not excluding the works of Sergeants Deane and Millner. Littler was -deservedly rewarded with a commission. - -[55] The Allied order of battle was peculiar. The artillery was all -drawn up in front, in rear of it came a first line of 100 squadrons, -then a second line of 80 squadrons, then a third line of 104 -battalions, with wings of 14 squadrons more thrown out to the right and -left rear. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708. - -[56] The five English regiments lost about 350 killed and wounded in -this assault. This would mean probably from a fifth to a sixth of their -numbers. _Daily Courant_, 6th September 1708. - -[57] I have failed, in spite of much search, to identify the British -regiments present, excepting one battalion of the 1st Royals. -Marlborough, as Thackeray has reminded us by a famous scene in -_Esmond_, attributed the credit of the action in his first despatch -to Cadogan. Another letter, however, which appeared in the _Gazette_ -three days later (23rd September), does full justice to Webb, as does -also a letter from the Duke to Lord Sunderland of 18th–29th September -(_Despatches_, vol. iv. p. 243). Webb’s own version of the affair -appeared in the _Gazette_ of 9th October, but does not mention the -regiments engaged. Webb became a celebrated bore with his stories of -Wynendale, but the story of his grievance against Marlborough would -have been forgotten but for Thackeray, who either ignored or was -unaware of the second despatch. - -[58] Notably Prendergast’s. _Gazette_, 25th November. - -[59] The British troops employed were the 6th Foot, 600 marines, and a -battalion of seamen. - -[60] There are still some remains of the old walls of Tournay on the -south side of the town, and the ruins of Vauban’s citadel close by, -from which the extent of the works may be judged. - -[61] The British regiments employed in the siege were the 1st Royals (2 -battalions), 3rd Buffs, 37th, Temple’s, Evans’s and Prendergast’s Foot. - -[62] The following description written from the trenches gives some -idea of the work: “Now as to our fighting underground, blowing up like -kites in the air, not being sure of a foot of ground we stand on while -in the trenches. Our miners and the enemy very often meet each other, -when they have sharp combats till one side gives way. We have got into -three or four of the enemy’s great galleries, which are thirty or -forty feet underground and lead to several of their chambers; and in -these we fight in armour by lanthorn and candle, they disputing every -inch of the gallery with us to hinder our finding out their great -mines. Yesternight we found one which was placed just under our bomb -batteries, in which were eighteen hundredweight of powder besides many -bombs: and if we had not been so lucky as to find it, in a very few -hours our batteries and some hundreds of men had taken a flight into -the air.”—_Daily Courant_, 20th August. - -[63] 8th, 10th, 15th, 16th. - -[64] Parker. - -[65] A nominal list in the _Postboy_ of 1st October gives 36 officers -killed and 46 wounded. An earlier list of 17th September gives 40 -officers and 511 men killed, 66 officers and 1020 men wounded; but this -is admittedly imperfect. - -[66] ORDER OF BATTLE. CAMPAIGN OF 1709. - - RIGHT WING ONLY - Right. - 1st Line - Sybourg’s Brigade. - Scots Greys, 3 squadrons. - 5th Royal Irish Dragoons, 2 squadrons. - - Kelburn’s Brigade - 1st Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - 5th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - 7th Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - 6th Dragoon Guards, 1 Squadron. - 3rd Dragoon Guards, 2 Squadrons. - - Orrery’s Brigade - 26th Cameronians. - Two foreign battalions. - Prendergast’s Foot. - - Two Foreign Brigadiers. - Twenty-seven squadrons of foreign dragoons. - - 1 Batt. 1st Guards. - 1 Batt. Coldstream Guards. - 1 Batt. Royal Scots. - 37th Foot. - 10th Foot. - - 2nd Batt. Royal Scots. - 23rd Royal Welsh. - Orrery’s Foot. - - 3rd Buffs. - Temple’s Foot - Evans’s Foot. - 16th Foot. - - 8th Foot. - 24th Foot. - 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers. - 18th Royal Irish. - - No British troops in the second line; but the 15th and 19th Foot - were also present at the action of Malplaquet. - Left. - -[67] 11th, 37th, Kane’s, Clayton’s, and one foreign battalion of foot. -The losses of the expedition were 29 officers and 676 men drowned. - -[68] Honey wood to Carteret, Jan. 7/18; Ligonier to Carteret, March -21/April 1, 1744. - -[69] Ligonier to Carteret, April 29/May 10. - -[70] Wade to Carteret, May 30/June 10, June 25/July 6. - -[71] Carteret to Wade, May 25/June 5. - -[72] Carteret to Wade, July 13/24, 17/28. - -[73] Carteret to Wade, July 31/Aug. 11, Aug. 14/25, 17/28. - -[74] Wade to Carteret, Aug. 26/Sept. 6. - -[75] _Ibid._, Aug. 19/30, Aug. 25/Sept. 5, Sept. 16/27, Sept. 22/Oct. -3, Oct. 1/12, 10/21 - -[76] Ligonier to Carteret, July 31/Aug. 11, 1744. - -[77] Ligonier to Harrington, Jan. 29/Feb. 9, Feb. 6/17, 1745. - -[78] _Gazette_, Feb. 23/March 6, March 1/12, 1745. - -[79] Cumberland to Harrington, April 1/12, 12/23. - -[80] The ground immediately before Fontenoy presents for fully eight -hundred yards a gentle and unbroken slope. An officer, who went over -the ground with me, assured me that St. Privat itself does not offer a -more perfect natural glacis for modern rifle-fire. - -[81] Every one knows the legend of “Messieurs les Gardes Françaises, -tirez les premiers.” “Non, messieurs, nous ne tirons jamais les -premiers.” But every English account agrees that the French fired -first, long before the question had been raised, and I take the -authority of Ligonier (who drew up the official account) as final. He -says distinctly, “We received their fire.” - -[82] _Campagnes des Pays Bas._ - -[83] Ligonier to Harrington, May 5/16. Cumberland to Harrington, May -11/22. - -[84] Fawkener to Harrington, July 19/30. - -[85] General Bligh to Cumberland, June 28/July 9. - -[86] Cumberland to Harrington, July 2/13. - -[87] Cumberland to Harrington, July 14/25. - -[88] Ligonier to Harrington, July 14/25. - -[89] Harrington to Cumberland, Sept. 4/15; Oct. 1/12, 19/30. - -[90] Dunmore to Harrington, Jan. 20/31, Jan. 27/Feb. 7, Feb. 12/23. - -[91] Ligonier to Harrington, July 1/12, 1746. - -[92] Ligonier to Harrington, July 9/20, 13/24, 16/27. - -[93] _Ibid._, July 23/Aug. 3, Aug. 2/13. - -[94] Ligonier to Harrington, Aug. 9/20, 19/30, Aug. 26/Sept. 6, Sept. -4/15. - -[95] Ligomer to Harrington, Sept. 24/Oct. 5, Sept. 28/Oct. 9. - -[96] Ligonier to Harrington, Sept. 28/Oct. 9, Oct. 20/31. - -[97] 1st, 15th, 28th, 30th, 39th, and 42nd Foot. - -[98] Cumberland to Harrington, Feb. 6/17, March 20/31, March 24/April 4. - -[99] Cumberland to Chesterfield, May 1/12, 9/20. - -[100] Cumberland blamed the Austrian General, Baroney, and his -irregulars for supine negligence on the march. Cumberland to -Chesterfield, July 6/17, 1747. - -[101] The regiments present at Lauffeld were the Greys, 4th Hussars, -Inniskillings, 7th Hussars, and Cumberland’s dragoons, one battalion -each of the 1st and 3rd Guards, 3rd, 4th, 13th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, -32nd, 33rd, 36th, 37th, 48th Foot. The two last had no casualties. - -[102] Cumberland to Newcastle, March 18/29, March 22/April 2, March -26/April 6. - -[103] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 21st and 25th January; -14th and 15th February. _F.O. Holland_, 16th February 1793. And see -_Auckland Correspondence_ and _Dropmore Papers_ generally, November -1792 to February 1793. - -[104] The head of the column was able to keep sober; the rear, under -the endearments of the populace, subsided dead drunk on the road and -was brought on in carts. _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards._ - -[105] Lake to Dundas, 2nd March 1793. Lake’s Instructions, 23rd -February. Grenville to Auckland, 20th February 1793. _F.O. Holland_, -Auckland to Grenville, 4th March 1793. - -[106] _Dropmore Papers_, Auckland to Grenville, 5th and 13th March -1793. _S.C.L.B._ 5th March; Abercromby’s instructions, 9th March; -Dundas to York, 15th March 1793; _C.C.L.B._ 2nd March; Adj.-gen. to -York, 27th March, 12th April 1793. Calvert, pp. 53, 67. - -[107] _S.P. Ireland_, Cooke to Hobart, 23rd April; Westmoreland to -Hobart, 27th April; Dundas to Westmoreland, 16th May, 31st July 1793; -_S.C.L.B._ 18th May 1793. - -[108] _S.C.L.B._ 7th February. _C.C.L.B._ Adj.-gen. to Duke of York, -2nd and 12th April 1793. Dundas to Williamson, 4th April 1793. - -[109] Duke of Argyll’s and Earl of Sutherland’s, 1759; Lord Fred. -Campbell’s, 1778; Earl of Sutherland’s, Fauconberg’s (Yorkshire), -North’s (Cinque Ports), 1779. - -[110] Athol’s or the Manx, Sir J. Grant’s, Gower’s (or Wemyss’s), -Eglinton’s (or Montgomery’s), Breadalbane’s, Argyll’s, Duke of -Gordon’s, Hopetoun’s, Balfour’s (Orkney). Their strength was 650 of all -ranks, except the Manx, which were 323 strong. - -[111] Murray to Dundas, 26th March 1793. - -[112] Sybel, ii. 230; Grenville to Auckland, 3rd April 1793. - -[113] _S.C.L.B._ 21st March, 2nd April; _C.C.L.B._ 25th March 1793. -_Dropmore Papers_, ii. 360, 387–89. Buckingham to Grenville, 20th -January; the King to Grenville, 29th March; Pitt to Grenville, 1st -April 1793. Auckland to Grenville, 31st May 1793. - -[114] Sybel, ii. 142. - -[115] The insisting upon an indemnity must have been the work of Pitt, -probably under the influence of Dundas. Grenville trembled at the word -indemnity. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 392. - -[116] Protocol of conference of 7th April. Dundas to Auckland and to -Murray, 16th April Auckland to Grenville, 19th April 1793. - -[117] Murray to Dundas, 22nd April 1793. - -[118] Prussians, 8000, of which 1800 cavalry; Austrians, 55,000, -of which 10,000 cavalry; Dutch, 15,000, of which 2500 cavalry; -Hanoverians, 12,000, of which 3000 cavalry; Hessians, 8000, of which -1500 cavalry; British, 7200, of which 3000 cavalry. Total, 105,200, of -which 27,200 in the pay of England. About 5000 of the Austrians and the -8000 Hessians were not expected till June. Witzleben, ii. 117, 181–186. -Coburg to York, 1st and 3rd May; Murray to Dundas, 5th May; Dundas to -Murray, 10th May 1793. - -[119] The authorities for this and the next paragraph are Ditfurth, i. -29, 35, 36; Witzleben, ii. 59; Calvert, p. 83; Sybel, ii. 154. - -[120] Ditfurth, i. 48. - -[121] 231 horses, draught and pack, and 116 drivers, etc., per -battalion of 1100 men, of which 82 horses and 34 men were for the -officers. Each company had one four-horse waggon, and each battalion -one pair-horse hospital-waggon. - -[122] Ditfurth, i. 33; Witzleben, ii. 66. York to Dundas, 25th January -1794. Vol. iii. of this _History_, pp. 524, 525. - -[123] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 349. - -[124] Bunbury, _Great War with France_, p. 46. - -[125] Poisson, ii. 239, 240. - -[126] Rousset, p. 183. - -[127] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 138. - -[128] “The squadron of men of war and transports was collected, the -commodore’s flag hoisted, and the expedition sailed with _most secret_ -orders, which as usual were as well known to the enemy and everybody -in England as to those by whom they were given” (Marryat, _The King’s -Own_, ch. vii. _ad init._). Marryat attributes this failing to the -multitude of counsellors that compose a Cabinet. He may be right, but -those who are acquainted with the scandalous carelessness with which -Ministers treat confidential military documents, find no difficulty -in accounting for it otherwise. This evil still continues, and will -continue until Cabinet Ministers are subjected to the same penalties -for abuse of trust as other servants of the King. - -[129] Calvert, p. 72. - -[130] _Dropmore MSS._ Lieut.-colonel Freemantle to Buckingham, 13th -May 1793. Calvert, p. 79. _Narrative by an Officer of the Guards_, -i. 29–31. Murray to Dundas, 10th May (private) 1793. There are some -significant omissions from his public letter of the same date as -published in the Gazette. _Auckland Correspondence_, iii. 58. - -[131] 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons. - -[132] Murray to Dundas, 15th and 17th May 1793. - -[133] Witzleben, ii. 194. - -[134] That is to say, guns not allotted to the infantry as -battalion-guns. - -[135] The brigade was reckoned at four battalions, the flank companies -being massed into a fourth battalion. - -[136] The Fourteenth and Fifty-third, with the flank companies of these -two regiments and of the Thirty-seventh, massed into a third battalion. -Witzleben (ii. 199) gives a larger number of British troops, calling -all squadrons and battalions in British pay by the name English. - -[137] Murray to Dundas, 24th May 1793. - -[138] Witzleben, ii. 210–211. This author states that the Duke of York -asked for the command of the siege, which I believe to be absolutely -incorrect, and indeed incredible. See Murray to Dundas, 26th and 29th -May; Dundas to Murray, 30th and 31st May 1793. - -[139] Blues, Royals, Greys, Inniskillings. - -[140] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 321, _sq._ - -[141] Dundas to Murray, 29th May, 14th June, 12th July; Murray to -Dundas, 18th June and 16th July 1793. - -[142] Murray to Dundas, 25th July. - -[143] Sybel, ii. 370–373. - -[144] Ditfurth, i. 69. Witzleben, ii. 263–64. Murray to Dundas -(private), 9th August 1793. - -[145] Witzleben, ii. 264, 370. Dundas to Murray, 1st August 1793. - -[146] Ditfurth, i. 73. 47½ battalions, 58 squadrons. British, 5200 -infantry, 1300 cavalry; Austrians, 10,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry; -Hanoverians, 9000 infantry, 1600 cavalry; Hessians, 5500 infantry, 1500 -cavalry. Total, 29,700 infantry, 5400 cavalry, 1900 artillery. - -[147] Hamilton, _History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 285. - -[148] The British engaged were the flank companies of the Guards and -Line, and Royal Artillery. Casualties, seventy-eight killed and wounded. - -[149] Murray to Dundas, 16th July; Dundas to Murray, 19th July 1793. - -[150] _Dropmore Papers_, ii. 444. Dundas to Grenville, 12th October -1793. - -[151] Dundas to Murray, 16th April 1793. - -[152] Calvert, vi. 118; Murray to Dundas, 3rd September. - -[153] _Vie de Carnot_, i. 394. - -[154] Murray to Dundas, 28th and 31st August 1793. - -[155] Murray to Dundas, 31st August 1793. - -[156] Sybel, ii. 417. - -[157] Murray to Dundas (private), 9th September 1793. - -[158] _Narrative of an Officer_, pp. 91–92; Ditfurth, i. 127–128. - -[159] _Ibid._ pp. 91–93, and see Ditfurth, i. 126. - -[160] Flank companies 9th, nine companies 4/60th, 50 artillery. - -[161] Cuyler to Dundas, 22nd March 1793. - -[162] Battalion companies of the 21st; flank companies (apparently) of -the 9th, 15th, 21st, 45th, 48th, 3/60th, 4/60th, 67th. Bruce speaks of -eighteen flank companies, perhaps including details of the 25th and -29th, which were serving on the fleet as marines. - -[163] Mr. Balfour to Dundas, 20th July 1793. - -[164] The official despatch reached the Government on 13th September, -but the fact was known to Pitt on the 7th. _Dropmore Papers_, i. 422. - -[165] Hood to Dundas, 25th August 1793. - -[166] Brenton’s _Naval History_, i. 101. - -[167] Mulgrave to Dundas, 1st September 1793. - -[168] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th. - -[169] Dundas to Murray, 11th, 14th September; to Hood, 14th September; -to Bruce, 18th September 1793; Pitt to Grenville, _Dropmore Papers_, -ii. 43 (the conjectural date of September attached to this last is -wrong, and should be changed to October). - -[170] _Narrative of an Officer_, i. 92. - -[171] 19th, 57th, three companies of the 42nd. - -[172] Poisson, ii. 525–526. - -[173] Dundas to Murray, 13th September 1793. - -[174] Dundas to Murray, 13th, 14th, and 28th September; 14th October. -Murray to Dundas, 14th and 15th October 1793. - -[175] Ditfurth, i. 147. - -[176] Murray to Dundas, 6th October. Dundas to Ainslie, 12th October; -to Abercromby, 13th October 1793. - -[177] 3rd, 28th, 54th, 59th. They had already made one voyage to Ostend -and back. - -[178] Murray to Dundas, 18th October; Ainslie to Dundas, 23rd October; -Dundas to Grey, 26th October; to Murray, 27th October 1793. - -[179] Two Austrian battalions, 3rd Guards, flank battalion of Guards, -one squadron 7th L.D., and one squadron 15th L.D. - -[180] Murray to Dundas, 30th October and 12th November; Dundas to -Murray, 8th November 1793. - -[181] _Chat huant._ - -[182] Poisson, iii. 139 _seq._ - -[183] _Ibid._ 239–248; Rousset, pp. 293, 299. - -[184] Rousset, 123–124, 236, 249; also generally, pp. 78–148. - -[185] Sybel, iii. 26–27; _Vie de Carnot_, i. 470; _Dropmore Papers_, -ii. 501. - -[186] _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 383. - -[187] “I think, if you see Dundas, it may not be amiss to urge the -danger of running after distant objects while the great object lies -still—of hunting the sheep till you have killed the dog. The most fatal -error will be, I apprehend, the seeking to preserve the popularity of -the war by feeding the avarice of the nation with conquests.”—Windham -to Mr. Elliot, December 1793. _Life of Lord Minto_, ii. 196. - -[188] Pitt to Grenville, 5th and 7th July 1794. _Dropmore Papers_, ii. -595, 597. - -[189] _Parliamentary History_, vol. xxxi.; Debates of 21st January, 3rd -February, 10th April 1794. - -[190] Adj.-gen. to the Duke of York, _C.C.L.B._ 31st October 1793. - -[191] These regiments are arranged according to the dates of their -letters of service. - -[192] Campbell’s was originally numbered 98th; Huntly’s 100th. - -[193] Adj.-gen. to Prince Edward, _C.C.L.B._ 17th March 1794. - -[194] _C.C.L.B._, Adj.-gen. to Lieut.-gen. Cunninghame, 8th October -1793. - -Here is an example of the scheme as used for raising a regiment of 10 -companies each of 60 men. - - Proceeds of sale of 1 Lieut.-colonelcy, 1 Majority, - 1 Company, 1 Lieutenancy, 1 Ensigncy, - amount to £9250 - Cost of 600 men at £15 9000 - ---- - Balance £250 - ==== - -Another scheme for augmenting battalions of infantry. As soon as 450 -approved recruits have been raised, there shall be added to it a -Lieutenant-colonel, and a Major. - - The Major will pay for his Lieut.-colonelcy £600 - The senior Captain will pay for his senior Majority 700 - Another Captain will pay for his junior Majority 550 - Two Companies thus vacated will sell for 2800 - Levy-money of £5 granted by Government for 450 men 2250 - ---- - Total £6900 - - Cost of 450 men at £15 (£10 bounty and £5 levy-money) - would be 6750 - ---- - Balance £150 - ==== - -Thus the country is saved all expense but £5 a man levy-money. -_S.C.L.B._ 15th April, 1st and 12th November 1793; 20th January 1794. - -[195] _S.C.L.B._ 9th July 1794. - -[196] _Star_, 13th April 1793. - -[197] One Lieutenant drew half-pay for 80 years after the drafting -of the 104th (Royal Manchester Volunteers), which was one of these -ephemeral corps. _Records and Badges of the British Army_, p. 833. - -[198] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 26th April 1794. - -[199] _Public Advertiser_, 2nd February 1793. - -[200] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 19th July 1794. - -[201] _Ibid._ 19th August 1794. - -[202] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 76–79; Bunbury, -_Great War with France_, Introd. p. xx.; _St. James’s Chronicle_, 27th -January 1795 (debate on Army Estimates of 21st January); _Journal of -Sir Henry Calvert_, pp. 360, 384–85. The letters of Lady Sarah Lennox -(the mother of the Napiers) throw a curious light on the scramble for -promotion through the enlistment of recruits at this period. “Think -of my bad luck about recruits. If I had seen an officer one fortnight -sooner who is here, he would have sold me 20 at 11 guineas per man. -Is not that unfortunate; but they are now gone. My Dublin stock too, -which was 40, has been reduced to 26,” ii. 109, _and see also_ ii. -101. “Is there any chance of recruiting men of five feet four inches -for 10 guineas, and as much under as possible, in your neighbourhood.” -Evidently the wives of poor officers plunged into speculation to help -their husbands with recruits. - -[203] _S.C.L.B._ 15th April 1793. _Daily Chronicle_, 16th April 1793. - -[204] York to Dundas, January 1794. - -[205] _Chronicle_, June 1793. - -[206] _St. James’s Chronicle_, 24th and 26th July 1793. - -[207] _S.C.L.B._ 26th March 1794. - -[208] _Ibid._ 29th April 1794. - -[209] York to Dundas, 2nd February 1794 (with enclosures). - -[210] Dr. Hayes to Lord Cathcart, 1st February 1794; Monthly returns, -1st February to 1st May; Ditfurth, ii. 32. - -[211] Witzleben, iii. 64 _seq._ - -[212] Sybel, iii. 49–65; York to Dundas, 22nd March, 3rd April 1794; -Witzleben, iii. 70–84. - -[213] Witzleben, iii. 91, 62, 29; Ditfurth, ii. 10 _sqq._, 28. - -[214] Ditfurth, ii. 30, 31. - -[215] Craig to Nepean, 7th, 22nd, 31st March, 11th April; to York, 7th, -15th, 16th March; York to Dundas, 9th, 22nd, 26th March, 1794. - -[216] Ditfurth (ii. 43) reckons the field force at from 120,000 to -130,000, but he includes British troops which were not on the spot, and -reckons the strength of those present at too high a rate. - -[217] Witzleben, iii. 94. - -[218] Calvert, p. 187. - -[219] Three squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Guards, two squadrons each of -the Blues, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th Dragoon Guards, 1st Royals, 2nd Greys, -6th Inniskilling Dragoons, 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons. The -8th and 14th Light Dragoons were embarked or embarking to join the -army. It has been a matter of much difficulty to discover how these -regiments were brigaded. - -_Harcourt’s Brigade._ (?) 1st, 5th, 6th D.G. = 7 squadrons. - -_Mansel’s Brigade._ (?) Blues, 3rd D.G., Royals = 6 squadrons. - -_Laurie’s Brigade._ (certainly), Bays, Greys, Inniskillings = 6 -squadrons. - -_Ralph Dundas’s Brigade._ 7th, 11th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons, 1st -squadron of the Carbineers = 9 squadrons. - -After the death of Mansel on the 26th of April, Dundas took over his -brigade, and Colonel Vyse took Dundas’s. But the regiments seem to have -been much shifted from one brigade to another. - -Calvert, pp. 197, 204. _Cannon’s Records_, Royal Horse Guards, p. 102. - -[220] Ditfurth, ii. 54. Craig to Nepean, 18th April 1794. - -[221] So say the records of the 15th Hussars. I suspect that there were -two squares with the guns between them, as at Avesnes-le-Sec on 12th -September 1793. Two squares side by side would give an appearance of -oblong shape to the formation. - -[222] The records of the 15th Hussars for some reason seek to excuse -the slaughter of the fugitives, by mentioning that the National -Convention had decreed that no quarter should be given to the English; -and this mistake has been copied by Sir Evelyn Wood in his excellent -account of the action in _Achievements of Cavalry_. As a matter of fact -the decree was not made until the 26th of May; and three hundred men -need no excuse for taking no prisoners when attacking five thousand. - -[223] In _Cannon’s Records_ of the 3rd Dragoon guards these casualties -are ascribed to the action of the 26th of April. Whether the mistake be -due to accident or to design, it is to be regretted. - -[224] Going over the ground, my companion and myself fixed upon a -hollow about half a mile to west of Inchy, and on the north side of the -road, as the spot where Otto concentrated his squadrons out of sight -of the French. The left flank of the French infantry, upon which the -attack was opened, we reckoned to have stood in a hollow about half a -mile south-east of Inchy. After very careful study of the ground, I put -forward these conjectures with some confidence. - -[225] The establishment of an Austrian Cuirassier Regiment was six -squadrons; the British regiments, as originally organised in 1793, -should have made thirteen squadrons; but I imagine that losses had -reduced one or other of them to a single squadron, for both Witzleben -(iii. 132) and Ditfurth (ii. 57) give the number as six Austrian and -twelve British squadrons. - -[226] Stewart to Dundas, 30th April; Craig to Nepean, 25th April; -Adjutant-general to Duke of York, 22nd April, 1794. These two -unfortunate battalions spent three weeks on the passage. - -[227] York to Dundas, 6th May 1794. - -[228] It is curious to note that Jomini’s account makes the French -force front to the south, whereas Craig conceived of it as facing to -the north; so that evidently it was prepared to face either way. - -[229] Witzleben, ii. 167. Memorandum of the 28th of April in _W.O. -Corres._ - -[230] Clerfaye (including the reinforcements from Ostend), nineteen -thousand; Walmoden at Warcoing, six thousand; Duke of York at Tournai, -eighteen thousand (Craig to Dundas, 6th May 1794). Witzleben, however, -reckons the united force at thirty thousand men only (iii. 143), and -Ditfurth gives but four thousand men to Walmoden. - -[231] _Life of Lord Combermere_, i. 38. - -[232] The regiments engaged were the Blues, Second, Third, Sixth -Dragoon Guards; First, Second, Sixth Dragoons; Seventh, Eleventh, -Fifteenth, Sixteenth Light Dragoons. Which were engaged throughout and -which came up as reinforcements, I have been unable to discover. The -account of the action is drawn chiefly from Calvert, _Journal_, pp. -203–205. _Narrative of an Officer_, ii. 41. Ditfurth, ii. 75. _Life of -Lord Combermere_, i. 38–39. The first is the most important. - -[233] Sybel, iii. 118–120. Witzleben, iii. 157–167. - -[234] Ditfurth, ii. 90. He says actually that there was nearly room for -the full width of a company, of course in triple rank. - -[235] Great part of the battle-field is now built over. Lille alone -covers a vast extent of it, and Roubaix and Lannoy are to all intent -part and parcel of Lille. But the general character of the ground, and -in particular its blindness, remains unchanged. - -[236] Witzleben (iii. 197–198) considers the slowness both of Clerfaye -and the Archduke Charles on this day to have been inexcusable. - -[237] Brigade of Guards (4 battalions); 14th, 37th, 53rd Foot, 2 -Hessian and 5 Austrian battalions; 7th, 15th, 16th Light Dragoons (6 -squadrons); 4 squadrons of Austrian Hussars. - -[238] Hamilton (_History of the Grenadier Guards_, ii. 304) says, -I know not on what authority, that the pretext for this order was -that Clerfaye required assistance. It is certain that the Austrian -Headquarters had heard nothing and knew nothing of Clerfaye’s situation -at this time, so that, if General Hamilton’s story be more than mere -gossip, the order was probably urged by Waldeck or some other of -Mack’s enemies, with the object of bringing his elaborate combinations -into contempt. The fact that the British would be the chief sufferers -in case of mishap, would rather have encouraged this faction in the -Austrian Staff to the measure. - -[239] The _Gazette_ prints this place as Bouderes; and the mistake -has been copied into many regimental histories. It is only one among -innumerable instances of the slovenliness of the clerks of the War -Office at that time. - -[240] Not to be confounded with the village of the same name further -north, on the road from Tournai to Lannoy. - -[241] The evidence upon this point is very conflicting. All the -English accounts state that, when the British reached Lannoy on their -retreat, the place was in possession of the French. Ditfurth, on the -other hand (ii. 133, 137 _seq._), is very positive that it was held by -the Hessians until 1 p.m., which, in his opinion, was long after the -British would have reached it; and the evidence which he adduces is -very strong. Against this, it is certain that the British would have -been only too thankful to rally at Lannoy if they could, and that they -were greatly disappointed to find themselves cut off from it. It is -also to be noted that Ditfurth rakes up everything that he can to the -discredit of the English, but was not at the pains to read a single -English account of the action, except the Duke of York’s letter as -published in the _Gazette_, and that his account of their movements is -consequently full of errors. I incline to the opinion that the Hessians -were still in Lannoy, but that the French around them were so numerous -as to cut the British off from it—in fact, that the French practically -held it invested, with a covering force powerful enough to keep the -British at a distance. The same was the case at Roubaix, which the -Sixteenth Light Dragoons contrived to hold till Abercromby retreated, -though the Austrians, the Duke of York, and Abercromby himself all -believed it to be in the hands of the French. It still remains to -be explained why the Hessians made no sign of their presence when -Abercromby’s column approached, for the British artillerymen actually -began to lay their guns upon it in the assurance that it was in the -enemy’s hands. - -[242] There are few actions which I have found so difficult to describe -as this of the 18th of May. I have drawn my account from Witzleben, -iii. 201–230; Ditfurth, ii. 130–157; Jomini; _Narrative of an Officer_, -ii. 47–51; Cannon’s _Records of the Seventh and Fifteenth Hussars and -Sixteenth Lancers_; Calvert’s _Journal_; and Craig’s letters to Nepean -of 19th May 1794 (Record Office). - -[243] Calvert, p. 269. - -[244] The French brigades at this period were of the strength of -divisions. - -[245] Jones, _Campaign of 1794_. The author was a captain in the -Fourteenth. - -[246] Witzleben, iii. 168–169. - -[247] Sybel, iii. 120–125. York to Dundas, 26th May 1794 (with -enclosures). - -[248] Captain William Parker to the Admiralty, 3rd June 1794. - -[249] Duke of York to Dundas, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Craig to -Nepean, 10th, 13th, 14th June 1794. Calvert, pp. 238–253. - -[250] Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 171–172. - -[251] Calvert, 277. _Life of Lord Lynedoch_, 91. - -[252] 3rd, 19th, 27th, 28th, 40th, 42nd, 54th, 57th, 59th, 63rd, 87th, -89th. - -[253] Moira to Dundas and to Nepean, 26th June 1794. - -[254] Duke of York to Dundas, 28th June, 2nd July; Craig to Nepean, -27th June; Moira to Dundas, 28th and 29th June, 1st July 1794. - -[255] York to Dundas, 2nd and 3rd July; Dundas to Diepenbrock, 3rd and -7th July; Diepenbrock to Dundas, 5th July 1794. - -[256] Coburg to York, 7th and 8th July; York to Coburg, 7th July; to -Dundas, 7th and 10th July; Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794. - -[257] Sybel, iii. 150–152, 171. Craig to Nepean, 4th July 1794. - -[258] York to Dundas, 15th, 19th, 20th, 23rd July 1794. - -[259] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 35. - -[260] Craig to Nepean, 11th July 1794. - -[261] Cornwallis to Dundas, 8th and 18th June 1794, and see _Cornwallis -Correspondence_, ii. 239–255; _Malmesbury Correspondence_; _Dropmore -Papers_, ii. 564–566, 577, 592, 594. - -[262] Sybel, iii. 240–243. - -[263] Poisson, iv. 262. - -[264] Ditfurth, iii. 217. - -[265] - - CAVALRY— - _David Dundas’s Brigade_—2nd, 6th D.G.; 2nd, 6th D. - _Ralph Dundas’s Brigade_—Blues; 3rd, 5th D.G.; 1st D. - _Laurie’s Brigade_—7th, 11th, 15th, 16th L.D. - _Vyse’s Brigade_—1st D.G.; 8th, 14th L.D. - _Foreign Troops_— - Uhlans Britanniques, Irving’s Hussars, Choiseul’s Hussars. - - INFANTRY— - _First Brigade_—3rd, 88th, 63rd. - _Second Brigade_—8th,[266] 44th,[266] 33rd.[266] - _Third Brigade_—12th,[266] 55th,[266] 38th. - _Fourth Brigade_—14th, 53rd, 37th. - _Fifth Brigade_—19th, 54th, 42nd. - _Sixth Brigade_—27th, 89th, 28th. - _Seventh Brigade_—40th,[266] 57th, 59th, 87th. - _Foreign Troops_— - Loyal Emigrants, York Rangers, Rohan’s Regiment. - -[266] The flank companies of these battalions were in the West Indies. - - Officers N.C.O.’s and men. - British Cavalry, 165 4,350 - Hanoverians } - and Hessians } 168 2,939 - --- ----- - Total Cavalry 333 7,289 - British Infantry, 583 21,170 - Hanoverians } - and Hessians } 322 8,722 - ---- ------ - Total 1,238 37,181 - ===== ====== - -Total of all arms, including artillery, etc., say, 1300 officers, -40,000 N.C.O.’s and men. - -[267] Craig to Nepean, 5th August 1794; Ditfurth, ii. 213 _seq._; -Memorandum of the Duke of York, 23rd December 1794; Calvert, pp. -385–386; see vol. ii. of this _History_, p. 88. - -[268] No officer could hope to master these mysteries without the help -of two fat little duodecimo volumes called _The Regimental Companion_, -and a third and slighter volume entitled _Military Finance_. - -[269] Craig to Nepean, 31st August; Craig’s Memorandum of 23rd December -1794. - -[270] _Sunday Reformer_, 29th December 1793. - -[271] Craig to Nepean, 12th and 31st August, 5th and 8th September -1794. The class of medical officer obtained by Government is described -in _Autobiography of Sir J. M’Grigor_, pp. 93, 94. - -[272] York to Dundas, 25th, 27th, 30th July, 1st and 6th August; Craig -to Nepean, 25th July 1794. - -[273] Its flank companies, and those of the 34th, were detained for the -West Indies. - -[274] Dundas to Mulgrave, 7th and 13th August; Mulgrave to Dundas, -17th, 19th, 26th, 30th August, 3rd September; Dundas to York, 22nd -August 1794. - -[275] On the 29th of August the Duke reorganised his force as follows: - - _First Brigade_—Maj.-gen. Stewart, 3rd, 40th, 55th, 59th, 89th. - _Second Brigade_— 8th, 27th, 28th, 57th. - _Third Brigade_— 12th, 33rd, 42nd, 44th. - _Fourth Brigade_—Maj.-gen. Fox, 14th, 37th, 38th, 63rd. - _Fifth Brigade_— 19th, 53rd, 54th, 88th. - - -[276] Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794. - -[277] The Bommeler Waert is the triangular tongue of land enclosed -between the Waal and the Meuse immediately to the east of Gorkum. It -is very nearly an island, the entrance to it from the east being very -narrow and defended by a fort, then, as now, called Fort St. Andries. - -[278] York to Dundas, 19th, 21st, 22nd September (enclosing -correspondence with Clerfaye); Craig to Dundas, 19th September 1794. - -[279] Craig to Nepean, 20th September 1794. Sybel, iii. 432 _note_. -From this it appears that all documentary evidence of the agreement -has been carefully destroyed, but that there is a hint of secret -negotiations actually proceeding on the 18th of September 1794. - -[280] York to Dundas, 25th and 29th September, 1st and 3rd October; -Craig to Nepean, 1st October; Grenville to York, 25th September 1794. - -[281] Dundas to York, 10th, 12th, 16th, 18th October; York to Dundas, -16th, 18th, 23rd October 1794. - -[282] Craig explained that this was owing chiefly to the inexperience -of a young Colonel. Thus the army-brokers had contrived to lift -children to the command even of regiments that had been eighteen months -on active service. - -[283] The troops engaged were the 15th Light Dragoons, 8th, 27th, 28th, -55th, 63rd, 78th. The last-named regiment, together with the 80th, had -arrived at Flushing at the end of September, when Dundas intended to -withdraw some of the older regiments for service in the West Indies. - -[284] York to Dundas, 7th and 11th November; Craig to Nepean, 10th -November 1794. - -[285] _Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 89–91; York to -Dundas, 27th November 1794; Harcourt to York, 15th December 1794. - -[286] Ditfurth, who never loses an opportunity of abusing the English, -of course puts a discreditable construction upon the Duke’s departure, -not knowing that he was sent for by Ministers (ii. 313). - -[287] York to Dundas, 27th and 29th November; Harcourt to York 11th and -15th December 1794. Ditfurth, ii. 310. - -[288] Dundas to Harcourt, 13th and 24th December; Harcourt to Dundas, -23rd December; to York, 25th and 29th December; Walmoden to York, 22nd, -25th, 29th December 1794, 1st January 1795. The regiments engaged in -the action were the 19th, 33rd, 42nd, 78th, 80th. - -[289] Jones, _Campaign of 1794_, pp. 171–175; Ditfurth, ii. 362 _sq._; -_Narrative of an Officer of the Guards_, ii. 100–104. - -[290] 15th Light Dragoons; 27th, 28th, 80th, and 84th Foot. - -[291] Walmoden to York, 3rd February; Harcourt to York (three letters), -11th February 1795. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN FLANDERS -1690-1794 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where - you are located before using this eBook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that: - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without -widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |